On a point of order. I see from your selection, Mr. Speaker, that you have not selected Amendment No. 14 to the Lords Amendments. It seems that this is an Amendment which is absolutely crucial to the consideration of the Clause in question. On this question of the point at which an offender might be informed things were said in the other place by the Minister which, as far as I can see, in no way appear in the Clause. This is a point which needs clarification. We are now at a stage of the Bill when the Minister cannot simply say "I will take that point and consider it"—

Order. The right hon. Gentleman cannot discuss on a point of order my selection of Amendments. The selection is always described as a provisional selection. I am very willing to have representations made about it but I have always said that I am against raising these matters on the Floor of the House as matters of order. If a case is represented to me for a change in my selection I will consider it. I much prefer it to be done that way.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

I think it may be for the convenience of the House if we discuss with this Amendment Lords Amendment No. 2 as well, in Clause 6, page 4, line 30, at end insert:

"or on the application of any person appearing to the court to be interested in the property concerned."

If that is the wish of the House.

These two Amendments deal with those Clauses of the Bill dealing with compensation and restitution. The object of these Lords Amendments is to make it clear that while under the Bill an application by the victim either for compensation or restitution is not required before the court can make an order for compensation or restitution the victim has locus to apply if he so wishes.

I should just like to say that the Government continue to rest on the view expressed by the Widgery Committee that it should be the court's decision to consider compensation as part of the sentencing process irrespective of any application. I hope very much that the courts will start to think compensation in future. Nevertheless, so as to make it quite clear that the victim would have the right to apply should he wish to use it we have thought it fit to propose these Amendments.

I welcome the Amendment and thank the Minister of State for the way in which he has introduced it.

The trouble with the Trade Descriptions Act in the past has always been that, although it enabled offenders in many cases to be brought to justice, it provided no recompense to the person who had suffered. This was a great failing, because the individual who had suffered generally could not afford to come to court to ask for help in connection with his suffering: the amount involved was too small; the legal costs were too great. It did not do him much good to have the satisfaction of seeing that the company or individual who had deceived him was brought to justice. He wanted compensation.

It is a great failing of our law as such that there is no small claims procedure and that, although a person who is badly off can get justice, and although often a person who is well off can get the same justice, the person earning the ordinary average living wage cannot get justice because he cannot afford to get the help of the law.

This has resulted in the Act being used indirectly to assist but not directly. Indirectly, we know that weights and measures inspectors were leaning on traders to honour their obligations, because they were hinting that, unless traders did so, they would be prosecuted. That is no way to have things done. We also know that the individual who knew where he stood would whisper to the trader concerned, "Either you pay me or I report you to the weights and measures inspector". That also is not a satisfactory way of dealing with it.

Now the victim will be able to get his rights. I welcome the Amendment, because it makes it plain that there are alternative ways of getting the rights. On the one hand, it should now be known that anyone who is cheated because of a false trade description, who is induced to buy goods or, in many cases, to acquire services because of false statements, should report the matter to the weights and measures authorities, not only because he can get a conviction in many cases because the person concerned can be stopped from doing it, but also because in that way he can get for himself cheap justice. If the offender is convicted, the victim can get compensation. He can get it in two ways, which is very important.

On the one hand, as the Minister of State has correctly said, it is vital that courts should think in terms of compensation, whether or not an application is made. It is equally vital that an eye be kept on the courts, because judges, alas, make mistakes. What is more, there are judges who are not victim-minded in their sentencing: they may forget or they may not feel that the compensation is worthwhile. A very important decision reported in The Times today makes it plain that compensation for a person who is deceived by a false statement made by a travel agent can extend to compensation for his disappointment and his unhappiness and not merely for financial loss.

I hope that the Minister of State will be prepared to indicate the basis on which he thinks that courts will be able under this Section to award compensation. It may be necessary in appropriate cases for representations to be made—I hope by the prosecution—to the trial judge on behalf of the victim; because it does not say that the application may be made by the victim; it says, "on application or otherwise". I presume that the prosecution would also see itself as representing the public and as representing the victim, and, therefore, able to present the matter to the court.

I hope that those who prosecute and who have the public responsibility—that is, the weights and measures authorities and others—will be instructed as part of their job to draw this to the attention of the court and to draw the court's attention to the fact that compensation is important and should be generous.

11.15 a.m.

This would be in accordance with the various rulings and decisions of courts in recent months. I am not asking for Lord Justice Roskill's view of the matter to be adopted by everyone. Lord Justice Roskill gave a very stern warning that, although fines under the Act were provided for and were generally imposed, the Act also provided for imprisonment. I am not asking that offenders be imprisoned. I am asking that justice be done to those who suffer as a result of false trade descriptions.

This can be done by the award of adequate compensation. Fines have been going up. Enormous fines have been imposed of late, particularly on travel firms. This may satisfy the public. It may warn the travel trade or other trades which are liable to make puffs which turn into representations.

On the other hand, what matters is not so much just to prevent the perpetuation of false trade descriptions. What matters is that the victims should be compensated. In the circumstances, I ask the Minister of State to give an assurance that the weights and measures authorities will be instructed to draw this provision to the attention of courts and will also seek to ensure that the compensation which is awarded by the courts is adequate in the circumstances.

I hope that in due course this compensation will be available, not only in the broad sense in which it is available at present to those who suffer through false trade description of goods, but also that those who provide services will find themselves, through an extension of Section 14 of the Trade Descriptions Act and a relation back to Section 1 of that Act, in a similar position. It will be now much easier for people to get compensation from those who deceive in the sale of goods than it will be to get compensation from those who deceive in the provision of services. Under Section 1 in connection with goods it is an absolute offence, but the same is not true of Section 14 in relation to services.

I hope that the two will be equated so that this very important provision of Section 1 of the Criminal Justice Bill as I hope it will be amended, will assist far more people than at present.

Meanwhile, I welcome the Amendment and repeat that I am obliged to the Minister for the way in which he has introduced it.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that it would be convenient if we discuss at the same time Lords Amendments Nos. 4, 5, 7—which is a new clause entitled "Recovery of assets for criminal bankrupt's estate"—and Nos. 31 to No. 34.

So be it, if that is the will of the House.

This looks a formidable Lords Amendment, but I hope that it will not take much longer to introduce it than it would take to read the Amendment as it stands on the Notice Paper.

The Amendment deals with provisions for unravelling transactions in relation to the new provisions of criminal bankruptcy by substituting provisions which were originally in paragraphs 9 to 11 of Schedule 1.

The Bill as originally drafted gave the trustee in a criminal bankruptcy a title to the criminal bankrupt's estate dating back to the beginning of the criminal proceedings, which would be the date of the issue of the writ, the summons or, I suppose, the arrest. It was hoped that this would be a means of avoiding the salting away of the assets by the person who was being charged. It was always appreciated, however, that it did not touch the period between the commission of the offence and the commencement of proceedings. At the same time it might well have adversely affected the rights of innocent third parties during the period from the commencement of proceedings until the date of conviction.

Therefore the intention of the Amendment is to leave the trustee's title on the basis that it exists in ordinary bankruptcy, namely on the date of the act of bankruptcy, namely, for these purposes, the date of the conviction by the criminal court. It will strengthen the powers available for unravelling previous transactions by giving the High Court power to set aside any disposition made by a criminal bankrupt at any time after the commission of the offence which is by gift or under-value afterwards of a type which is suspected of being made with the object of frustrating the effects of the criminal bankruptcy.

Ordinary bankruptcy law provides that the trustee's title to the bankrupt's estate shall be from the first date of bankruptcy. That will now apply to a criminal bankruptcy. I hope that the steps we have taken will make more effective and be a substantial improvement upon our original proposals to strengthen the power of unravelling any moves deliberately taken with an attempt to frustrate the effect of the bankruptcy order.

It is a complicated provision but I do not think I need say any more about it at this stage except perhaps that the court in future will have to specify what would be the operative date to which the trustee could go back. That, of course, will be the date of the commission of the offence or the date of the commission of the first of a series of offences, if it be a series of offences. I shall willingly try to answer any questions on the Amendments.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

It is what I might call, if it is possible so to call an Amendment, a continuing transitional Amendment. It deals with the powers of the courts to add a supervision order to a suspended sentence order. It was made clear in Committee in this House that the court would have power to add a supervision order to a suspended sentence order if a person appeared before the court in breach of that suspended sentence order.

I gave an undertaking at that time to look again at the Bill to see what the position would be of a person who was under a suspended sentence order when the Bill was enacted, namely, before there was power to add a supervision order, who then came back before the court in breach of that order. The effect of the Amendment is to provide that where a person comes back before the court in breach of such an order and where the court would deal with it by merely continuing the period of the suspended sentence, the court can add a supervision order.

It is continuing transitional to this effect. The House will remember that there is a power in the Clause to lower the period of any sentence in which a supervision order can be added. At the moment it can be only on a suspended sentence of over six months. But if at any stage that power were used, this transitional provision would come back into effect again in the case of a breach of a suspended sentence which, though originally incapable, because of its length, of having a supervision order attached to it, was nevertheless capable of supporting an order, by virtue of the power conferred by this Amendment at the time of its breach.

I wish only to supplement the remarks of the Minister of State by saying that we raised the point in Committee. The Minister was good enough to agree to look at it again and we are glad to see that he has come round to our view about how the power should work, and we are satisfied with the Amendment which he has put forward.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The Clause places restrictions on imprisonment of persons who have not been sentenced previously to imprisonment. A previous suspended sentence of imprisonment is to be disregarded unless the court has subsequently ordered that that sentence should take effect. What we had overlooked was the occasion where a suspended sentence had been passed in Northern Ireland and had then been brought into effect by an order of the court of Northern Ireland. The effect of the Amendment is to put right that omission.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, No. 1, in line 1, leave out 'On' and insert 'Before'.

We are also to take as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, No. 2, in line 10, at end add:

'and no consent to the making of such an order shall be valid unless such explanation has first been given'.

The Lords Amendment clarifies the procedure on the making of a community service order. We on this side have given full support to the concept of the community service order and we welcome it as a useful experiment in reform of the penal system. We are grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) in setting up, when he was Home Secretary, the advisory committee which led to the recommendation of the community service order. It was agreed when we discussed this before that if the provision is to be successful it must be explained properly to the defendant and that he must know of its because the emphasis is upon treatment rather than punishment. I believe it was for that reason that the Lords Amendment was passed in another place.

But in the wording of the Lords Amendment the duty to explain the community service order in its effect is an integral part of the making of the order rather than a condition precedent to the making of the order. If one takes the respectability of long-established precedent of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, one sees that Section 3(5), which applies similar provisions to the making of a probation order, says that before making an order the court has a duty to explain it to the defendant and to seek his consent. Our Amendment seeks to adopt the same procedure so that the explanation is preliminary to the making of the order if the defendant consents and is not an integral part of the making of the order.

I do not know whether it is usual at this stage of the Bill, but I am glad to say that I propose to accept Amendment No. 1 to the Lords Amendment if the hon. Member will be good enough not to press Amendment No. 2. The position here is, as he has rightly said, that the Amendment obliges the court making the community service order to explain to the offender in ordinary language its purpose and effect. Clearly that is right. The offender should be warned of the court's powers to fine or sentence him afresh if he fails to comply with the order's requirement and the powers in Clause 17 to review the order in the light of changed circumstances.

It was worded as it was because it was taken from the precedent of the similar wording of the requirement of the court under the Bill to explain fully the effect of a suspended sentence supervision order. But I agree that it is much more analogous to the requirement on the court to explain the individual provisions of a probation order using the word "before" making the order rather than "on" making the order, the reason being that both for a probation order and a community service order the person is required to consent and it is right that he should be warned of the effect of the order before being asked to consent. Therefore he should be asked to consent before the order is made rather than, as would be the case if the word "on" were allowed to stand after having given his consent.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

With this we are to take Lords Amendment No. 13, in page 21, line 2, leave out from "and" to end of line 7 and insert—

"(a) if he does not produce the licence as required he shall be guilty of an offence under section 101(4) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 (failure to produce licence for endorsement); and

(b) if he applies under section 95 of that Act for the disqualification to be removed and the court so orders, subsection (4) of that section shall not have effect so as to require particulars of the order to be endorsed on the licence, but the court shall send notice of the order to the Secretary of State and section 105(5) of that Act (procedure) shall apply to the notice."

and Lords Amendment No. 48, in page 44, line 27, at end insert—

"The Road Traffic Act 1972

In section 105(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 after the words 'for the purpose of endorsement' there shall be inserted the words '(or its production to comply with section 23(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 in the case of disqualification under that section)'."

Although these are not drafting Amendments, they are basically technical Amendments. What has happened is that the Road Traffic Act, 1972, has been brought into force since the Bill was introduced and the purpose of the Amendments is to take account of that and to make some necessary Amendments to deal with the situation in which an offender who has been disqualified applies for the removal of that disqualification.

This became necessary because, as those who served on the Standing Committee will remember, there were Amendments to deal with an individual's licence when he was disqualified under the provisions for disqualification for a criminal rather than a motoring offence. Unless a supervision order has also had to be made, it deals with what happens to his licence if that disqualification is later removed by order of the court.

I have selected Amendment No. 3 to the Lords Amendments. With it we may discuss Amendment No. 4, in line 10, leave out 'sixteen' and insert 'thirteen', and Amendment No. 10, in line 20, leave out 'twenty-one' and insert 'eighteen'.

On a point of order. Would it not be for the convenience of the House to discuss all the provisions about juries together? That would mean also taking Lords Amendments Nos. 15, 16, 35, 47 and 49, together with the Opposition Amendments to those Lords Amendments. That would widen the issue into one major debate.

I should not be happy with that suggestion. The group that you have selected, Mr. Speaker, raises an issue distinct from the others and I think that it would be better to debate that alone.

In that case, I call the hon. and learned Gentleman to move his Amendment.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 6, leave out 'twenty-one' and insert 'eighteen'.

The purpose of the group of Amendments is to enable young men and women to accept the responsibility of jury service at the age of 18 instead of the present minimum age of 21. They follow the pattern of recent years in the course of which the 18-year-old has accepted the responsibility of the vote and of full civil liability. The question that the House must ask itself is simple and clear. If at the age of 18 a man or woman is sufficiently mature to be entrusted with the responsibility of choosing his Member of Parliament, of electing his local councillor, of entering on his own account into binding agreements, is he none the less insufficiently mature to be entrusted with the responsibility of sharing in the judgment of the jury box? If he is old enough to share in the choice of a Government, to judge between the merits of one political party and another, is he none the less too young to judge between the guilt and innocence of his fellow citizens?

No debate on this important issue would be complete without reference to two major reports that have been presented to Parliament in the course of the last eight years. They are the Morris Report on Jury Service, which was presented in April, 1965, and the Latey Report on the Age of Majority, presented in July, 1967. Those two reports show a considerable degree of common wisdom when dealing with the issue of minimum age. Both avoid the paternalism that is so great a temptation when discussing the responsibility of the teenager. Although our proposal departs from the letter of the Morris Report, I am convinced that it accords with the spirit of both reports.

There are those who deprecate the jury system altogether and who would reduce our reliance upon it in courts of law. To them the answer invariably is that there is no better tribunal than one composed of the defendant's peers. But in the past that has been of only limited truth. The effect of the new provisions will be to bring it much nearer to the truth.

The criticism made of the typical jury as being middle-aged, middle-class and middle-minded will no longer be valid. What we are now considering is how far we should go towards the goal of trial by the defendant's peers. Do we go far enough if we perpetuate the present minimum age of 21?

The distinguished Committee which sat under the chairmanship of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest gave no consideration to any minimum age below 21. There was no reason for it to do so, because Latey was still over two years away. The Latey Committee had not even been appointed when Morris reported, and therefore no one could have expected the Morris Committee to recommend a minimum juror age below the age which was then the age of majority. Therefore, we find when we study the Morris Report that his Committee was more concerned with whether 21 was too low an age for the responsibility of jury service. But what the report said about the then age of majority being the right age for jury service applies with equal force to the new age of majority which followed the Latey Report and the judgment of both Houses of Parliament. The philosophy of Morris is contained in paragraph 71 of the Report, which says:

"A further argument which has been put forward is that an accused, particularly if middle-aged or elderly, might feel concern at being tried by a jury containing individuals much younger than himself. This argument is doubled-edged. An accused person can always remove individual jurors by use of the peremptory challenge … and a young accused person might reasonably welcome the presence on the jury of some people near his own age who would be more likely to understand his motivation and perhaps be better equipped to assess the truth of his defence. This consideration is the more forceful when it is remembered that the great bulk of offenders are relatively young, though of course only a small proportion of young persons come before the courts."

In the next paragraph the report gives us statistics relating to the year 1963, statistics which experience shows are just as valid today, if not more valid. They show clearly that by far the largest group of offenders convicted in the higher criminal courts was the age group 17–21. The number in 1963 was nearly one third more than the next largest age group, 21–25. It was far larger than any comparable age group in the table of statistics.

The principle of trial by one's peers was admirably summarised in the Morris Report in paragraph 74, which says:

"If trial by jury is to be trial by a representative cross-section of an accused's fellow citizens, good reason must be shown before removing from jury service that section of the adult population nearest in age to the great majority of offenders."

When Morris reported, that section of the population nearest in age to the great majority of offenders was not one that was considered to be adult, because the age of majority was then 21. The nearest section of the adult population which complied with Morris's criterion was then that section which began with the age of 21 years. But the nearest section which came within the Morris criterion regardless of the question of majority was quite clearly the section between 17 and 21.

11.45 a.m.

It was of the 21-year-olds that Morris was speaking when in the next paragraph, paragraph 75, he said:

"We take the view that there is a greater measure of maturity in people between the ages of 21 and 25 than some of our witnesses were prepared to concede, and that while such people may have less experience than their elders they may nevertheless possess experience which is relevant to the duties of a juror. The inclusion in a jury of one or two younger people could be valuable and should not, we think, be made impossible."

Elsewhere the report makes it quite clear that the statistical probability of having more than one or two within those ages on a jury of 12 is very low.

Today the adult age group nearest to the great majority of offenders is the age 18–21. Everything that Morris said in 1965 about the 21-year-old applies with equal force to the 18-year-old today. It is clear that that was the view that the Latey Committee held.

Our proposal is not a plea for juries full of teenagers, any more than Morris was a plea for juries full of 21-year-olds. I have already quoted his view of the statistical probabilities. Ours is a plea that there should be at any rate the possibility of having one or two jurymen of an age equivalent to that of the age group 17–21, which is the largest group likely to be tried and convicted in the courts.

The Latey Committee was appointed about three months after the Morris Report was published. The Latey Committee's concern was with civil law rather than with civic matters. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that in paragraph 25 of its report the Latey Committee makes the following observation:

"We have to confess that it would not actually keep us awake at night if people under 21 were to serve on a jury—if, that is, one eighteen-year old were liable to take his seat with eleven older people, since it is statistically unlikely to be more."

The report refers to an experiment in the United States in which young people were empanelled on unofficial juries, and says that the experiment was a considerable success.

In paragraph 125 the Latey Committee considers the advantages of taking the age of 18 as the overall age for reaching majority, although of course it was not dealing with civic matters. Since Latey they have been dealt with by this House, and Latey's views have been followed with regard to the age for voting. Putting forward the main arguments in favour of reducing the age to 18, Latey says:

"(1) There is undeniably a great increase in maturity towards that age.

(2) The vast majority of young people are in fact running their own lives, making their own decisions and behaving as responsible adults by the time they are 18.

(3) Those of our witnesses who seemed most closely in touch with the young favoured 18 as the age of which it was not only safe to give responsibility, but undesirable, if not indeed dangerous, to withhold it."

That was a very striking way of putting the matter. The report goes on to say:

"(4) This was the age at which on the whole the young themselves seemed to reckon themselves of age. Some of their arguments may not be sound. … Nevertheless this was a point which weighed with us. We felt that an important factor in coming of age is the conviction that you are now on your own, ready to stand on your own feet and take your weight off the aching corns of your parents', fully responsible for the consequences of your own actions. If, as we are convinced, the young on the whole react badly to the feeling that they are being 'protected' past the age at which they think they can look after themselves, then lowering the age to a point which still seemed to them too high would not have the desired effect of putting them on their mettle as adults. The resentments and irritations of feeling that responsi- bility was denied to them would remain. We think that, given responsibility at 18, they would rise to the occasion; but … the results of waiting too long might be as disastrous as acting too soon."

Those are formidable arguments advanced by the large majority of a Committee which spent some two years in considering what the age of majority should be. Its report has been adopted by the House and followed with regard to the responsibility of the vote. Since the report was written we can truly say that the young man or woman between 18 and 21 no longer has the paternalist protection which is accorded to the infant in law. The theme of Latey was that at 18 young people are ready for the responsibilities of the adult, and one of those responsibilities is the responsibility of jury service.

If we study Morris and Latey together, what do we find? We find that the 18-year old will bring into the jury box an understanding of the motivation of the young which Morris believed to be necessary to achieve a truly representative cross-section of the offender's fellow-citizens and which his report believed to be highly desirable. We further find that at the age of 18 our fellow-citizens are ready, so it is believed—so this House has accepted—for the full responsibilities of citizenship.

This House now has the opportunity to show that it has fully cast off the paternalism which so often goads the young into rebellion. It is, as has been pointed out in the reports, in any event only a small minority of the young who act in a way which hits the headlines and is shown on the media and causes the middle-aged, of whom I must count myself one, to declaim against the villanies of young people. The vast majority are responsible and mature, and by the age of 18 they are earning their livelihood and they are often married.

No.

They are often earning their livelihood and they are often married. There is no possibility of doubt on that and that is the view which Latey expressed on the evidence which was before his Committee. This is the opportunity which this House has to complete the process begun by Latey and continued by this House in a previous Parliament. It will be a sad day if the opportunity is missed and it will be an even sadder day if this House is whipped into missing it.

I had the honour of being a member of the Morris Committee and I want to take this opportunity of supporting as strongly as I can the arguments put forward by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin). When the Morris Committee deliberated, the age of majority was 21 and we did not think for a moment of going below that. We put forward all the arguments in favour of getting a really representative number of people on a jury and came to the conclusion that persons between the ages of 21 and 25 ought to be on a jury to represent that section of the community. Now the legislature has decided that 18 is the proper age for election purposes, for contract purposes and for many other things. It would be an extraordinary anomaly to allow the legislature, having done what it can to fix the age of 18 in these cases, to prevent a person between the ages of 18 and 21 from serving on a jury.

My hon. and learned Friend has read extracts from the Morris and Latey Committee reports. Clearly the philosophy behind the reports is that the younger element should be represented on a jury. Had we for a moment thought that the age of majority would be reduced, as it has been, to 18, I am certain that the Morris Committee would have recommended a lower minimum age of 18. My hon. and learned Friend has made a powerful case and the opportunity ought not to be lost today to rectify this matter and to ensure that persons of 18 are allowed to sit on a jury.

I would like to support this Amendment with all the vigour I can command. I am particularly desirous that it should be carried because I represent the University of Loughborough and I am on the council of another university and have some dealings with young people. I once taught medical students. My impression has been, talking to the students with whom I am at present associated, that there is considerable resentment that they are kept off juries. They feel that it is some indication that they are considered to be irresponsible. This resentment is a divisive force which cannot do the country any good.

I will not pursue the question of the Latey and Morris Reports dealt with by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) but the House ought to be greatly persuaded by the fact that we have heard from a member of the Morris Committee who has been able to give an authoritative view as to what it would have done if the age of majority had been 18.

There are certain economic arguments in favour of the Amendment. Jury service is, by and large, something of a nuisance to the majority of people. It does, to a small and limited extent, interfere with the economic life of the nation by preventing people from doing their business or pursuing their professions. This Amendment, by making another 3 million people liable for jury service, would spread the burden considerably more equitably. I put that forward as an economic argument not so far mentioned.

The important argument is that a man is entitled to be tried by his peers. I understand that in 1970, 30 per cent. of all persons convicted at assizes and quarter sessions were under the age of 21. Young offenders should have the opportunity to have someone on the jury who can understand their point of view, their motivation and their defence. There must inevitably be some injustice in trying young people with juries consisting wholly of people who are very different from them in their social strata and in their attitudes towards life.

Another important aspect is that jury service would be a valuable education for young people. It would get them into the habit of weighing evidence and avoiding emotional assessments, making assessments instead on the basis of known facts. I cannot help thinking that this would be useful educationally. It is a scientific fact that intelligence is at its maximum extent between the ages of 18 and 21. It may be disagreeable news to some hon. Members that one's intelligence steadily deteriorates thereafter.

I do not think that anyone is objecting to that, but intelligence is not in question. It is experience that is important.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising that point because there is a natural and real danger that lack of experience might make a young person unfit for jury service. My hon. Friend might feel that young people are rather impulsive and not accustomed to making judgments based on assessed facts. We have to accept that we put young people in a position in which they must use their judgment. We have talked about giving them the vote, but in many other spheres young people carry responsibilities, for instance in the armed forces. Young people between the ages of 18 and 21 carry out enormously responsible tasks, for instance operating the mechanism of submarines and maintaining aircraft. If we go to Northern Ireland we see young people with human beings in the sights of their rifles and it is their decision whether they pull the trigger, although they are given instructions.

Would my hon. Friend enlighten us as to his views about the eligibility of young people at the age of 18 to become members of this House?

Order. The hon. Member must resist that temptation.

I was about to say that, while I was grateful for the suggestion, I did not think it would be an appropriate occasion to take advantage of it. It is a very much wider subject. The most important point is that there is a wide psychological division between young people and their elders. The Government have rightly been criticised for having had a divisive effect on the country. I very much feel at present that the country is sharply divided between the rich and those not to well off, between trade unions and employers.

Another equally important divisive element between young people and their elders is that there is a general feeling among young people that their elders are rather cynical, devoid of ideals and rather less competent. On the other side there is some distrust of the attitudes and motives of young people. It is important that we overcome, as far as possible, this division between young people and people of mature years. The Government have an excellent chance in the Bill to reduce this divisiveness, which has been such a source of criticism in the past.

I am sorry to strike a slightly discordant note but I am not entirely convinced by the arguments put forward in favour of the Amendment. The main argument appears to be that because we have given the vote to people at the age of 18 then automatically 18 is the right age for everything else. This is rather a dubious proposition. One of the qualities required for jury service is experience, particularly of the world. I would be much happier with an 18-year-old on the jury who had left school at the age of 16 and done a couple of years' apprenticeship, than with an 18-year-old who had remained at school and was going on to university. The latter may have more intelligence but he has not got the experience.

The second argument appears to hinge upon the point about trial by one's peers. If that argument is extended to its logical conclusion there would be a case for appointing 15-year-old magistrates to the juvenile bench because most people coming before them are between the ages of 15 and 17. I do not accept this argument. There will still be a few people of 21 who have not had the experience I am talking about, but far fewer than at the age of 18. If I were before a jury charged with an offence, I would be far happier in the knowledge that the jurors were men and women with experience of the world and not people who had gone straight from school to university with absolutely no experience outside the academic world.

Is the situation not met by the point that a defendant always has a right of challenge in respect of jurors? If in certain circumstances a person feels it wrong that a young juror between 18 and 21 should play a part in his trial, he can challenge that juror. Is not that a safeguard?

It is a partial safeguard. I am not talking about individual cases but about the principle involved. I happen to feel that we have gone a little youth mad today. We are assuming that 18-year olds are in all respects as mature as older people. Many of them may be mature, but many others are not. Therefore I have grave doubts about this proposal. I hope it will not be argued that because we reduce the voting age to 18, we must reduce the age for everything else to 18.

This is the second time my hon. Friend has made that point. He has not followed the point I was seeking to make. I was not trying to say that because 18 has been fixed as the age for voting it should be the age for everything else. I was seeking to say that 18 is accepted as the right age of maturity and it is for that reason the vote has been given at 18.

I am saying that an important quality for a juror is experience of life and not merely experience within the narrow confines of an academic life. Many people at 18 do not have wide experience of the world.

This is not a matter on which conclusive arguments can be adduced. At one time I was of the view that we should have more information on this topic, but when we consider what kind of questions we should ask researchers we see how difficult it is to formulate them. Supposing we ask for more information about the attitude of a particular age group, what kind of attitudes would impel us to exclude or include them? In the end perhaps we can only back our own hunches.

There are three questions to which we should address ourselves. First, how far should we carry the principle that the jury is essentially representative of the public, a public which has deficiencies as well as virtues and which contains inexperience as well as expertise? Surely, only categories which there are specific reasons for excluding should be excluded from the whole cross-section of the public which is included in a jury.

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell) expressed fears about the effect of including inexperienced people on a jury, as if he envisaged a jury consisting entirely of people from 18 to 21. Statistically we are likely to have one person in that age group on a jury. Therefore, it would follow that the burden of giving reasons as to why this age group should be excluded is upon those who would seek to exclude it.

Secondly, if we did exclude them, would the under-21s feel dreprived and resentful? My hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) said that in his experience they probably would feel deprived. I would not pretend that there is any great crusade in the country for jury service at 18, but nor is there a great crusade for any age group to take on jury service. Unhappily, jury service is regarded as a burden, just as at one time service in this House was regarded as a burden, to be escaped if possible.

12.15 p.m.

But I have noticed that jurors, having served some time in that capacity, become interested in the legal system and become full of enthusiasm to know how it all works. If we want to encourage public participation in our system, then it may be a good thing if we can induce the public willingly to take part. The earlier the age at which a person participates on the side of justice, and not against it, the better.

Thirdly, it is true that, apart from considerations affecting the jurors, there is an individual on trial who is entitled to justice. If any one group of arguments is overriding, it must be that group. We should look to see whether there is any reason to think that 18 to 21-year olds would be less suitable than any other age group to contribute to the process of reaching a just verdict.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Joseph Harper) agreed, the intelligence of these young people is not in question. Such evidence as is available about this age group leads me to believe that it is probably more alert than those of us who are passing much more rapidly to advancing years. Are young people any less concerned about justice? My observation of them is to the contrary. Sometimes their concern for justice is less mellowed than that which comes to some of us in later years. But that this age group passionately wants to achieve justice would seem to me to emerge from any evidence we now have.

Then are they disqualified by lack of experience—though I am not even sure that that is the case today. Many people in this age group have had wider experience of some aspects of life than many of their elders of 60 years of age. This is true for obvious reasons—among them easier travel communications, and there is more money available for young people to spend on seeing the world. Therefore, I am not sure that that argument is made out on the facts. But in any event, if we were not to include one member of this age group in a jury of 12, this would deprive them of a method of gaining experience.

We often talk in the law about "the man on the Clapham bus". Is not a person between the ages of 18 and 21 very likely to be the man on a Clapham bus?

For the benefit of lay members, may I tell them that the man on the Clapham bus is a character invented by the lawyer in deciding what is a reasonable man. I agree entirely with my hon. and learned Friend that he may be young.

Is my hon. and learned Friend aware that I live at Clapham and travel by bus?

We all know that my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen is a reasonable man. He is entitled to his view, but even a reasonable man may on occasion be misguided.

The only remaining question appears to be whether this age group is liable to some particular prejudice which does not afflict the rest of the community. If prejudice were a disqualification, which of us would be entitled to be included in a jury? Perhaps it is desirable that a wider cross-section of prejudices should be included, since we cannot exclude all of them.

I recently discussed this proposal with a fellow member of the Bar. He was against it since he thought it would lead to a higher number of acquittals. But on inquiry, he thought that the proposal to remove the property qualification would itself lead to more acquittals. I see no reason to think that that will occur. The reason why, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich reminded us, we are traditionally entitled to trial by our peers, it is that they are likely to have an insight into people's motivation. It does not follow that that would lead to an increased number of acquittals. My hunch is that we should try this experiment. I believe that it will work, but any of us may turn out to be wrong.

It seems a little churlish to quibble about this Lords Amendment because the Government have gone a long way upon the path along which they were pressed in Committee. I very much welcome it. I think that tribute should be paid to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for South Fylde (Mr. Gardner) who originated the discussion and proposal on the Clause.

One reason why there has not been much pressure upon the 18 to 21-year-olds is that the campaign in Committee and eventually in the House of Lords was to get more women as jurors than young people. That was the campaign being run at that stage. Therefore, it is a title unrealistic to expect that there would be a mammoth campaign mounted for the 18 to 21-year-olds.

I still cannot understand why 21 should be the age for jury service and 18 the age for voting. It makes a great deal of sense to have a standard age for the rights of majority, unless some conclusive reason can be shown to the contrary. The only reason that can be advanced seems to be that put forward by the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell): that young people between the ages of 18 and 21 lack the experience and understanding necessary for a juror. I think that is an extraordinarily dubious argument. People in this age group can take responsibility.

I should like to go back to the point that was made about the troops in Ulster. I have just come back from Ulster. For a practical illustration of young people in the very age group about which we are taking responsibility in an extremely difficult situation, one has only to look to Ulster. It is not a question of when they press the trigger. It is a far more complex job of community relations and policing.

My point is that when people in this age group are given responsibility they respond to it. Therefore, if we are searching for a practical example of responsibility having been given, and given with extraordinary success, we need only to look at Ulster to see the fantastic maturity that the troops are displaying.

If I were to worry about this general question of lack of understanding of what goes on in the courts, I should be more concerned with another point made by the Morris Committee, namely, the basic lack of understanding of language. This is not a point that is made in the Bill or, indeed, in the Amendment. It is a difficult subject, but I should be far more concerned about a juror who was unable to understand the language and to have a perfect grasp of the arguments being advanced rather than the question of age.

If we are to aim at a basic representative cross-section of the public serving on juries—surely that must be our aim—young people must be part of it. In the Clause we recognise at long last not only the contribution that many more women can make to juries, but the part that young people between the ages of 18 and 21 can play. Reluctance to go the whole way on this matter seems to represent an all too general attitude in this country. We eventually make concessions to young people, but with apparent and obvious reluctance. We complain about the sins of the young, but we are reluctant to involve them fully in our society. Basically this is a bad policy on our part.

I believe that young people between the ages of 18 and 21 have a contribution to make. I cannot see that they lack the experience and understanding, which would be the only argument against them. I cannot see how they will swamp juries in any sense. We will be lucky to have one or two on a jury. It must be a basic presumption that people in this age group should have the right to serve on juries. I hope the Government will accept the proposal.

I support the views expressed by the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Fowler).

My hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell) seemed to evince grave suspicions and doubts about the ability of young people between 18 and 21 years of age to undertake jury service. In fact, I thought my hon. Friend went wider than that. In basing this argument upon experience he is being extraordinarily selective. After all, those of us who have been involved in assisting operation of criminal procedures have come across jurors who are totally unsuitable. For example, does an academic of perhaps 45 or 50 years of age, who has spent his life cloistered within the walls of a university acquire that necessary experience? Of course not. Obviously, some young people between 18 and 21 years of age do not have that experience, just as other sections of the community do not.

This point was made during the debate in another place by the noble Baroness Elles, who said:

"Many people of 18 to 21 remain blissfully innocent of many of the crimes committed by fellow citizens."

I think that is a somewhat doubtful proposition. I have a teenage daughter. My experience is that she is not all that blissfully innocent of the crimes committed by her fellow citizens. Young people are alive to what is happening today. They know what is going on in the world. If we want to apply an alert and intelligent attitude towards these matters, we can do no better than to include young people within our jury system.

The noble Lady went on:

"We therefore did not feel it was right, especially in the more rural areas of the country, that people from 18 to 21 should be asked to sit on juries and listen to the kind of criminal case that sometimes come to the courts."—[OFFCIAL REPORT, House of Lords, 27th July, 1972; Vol. 333. c. 1588.]

I find it a remarkable proposition that young people should be protected from hearing about countryside crimes or be denied the experience. Therefore, the burden which falls on those who are trying to resist the proposition has not been discharged either in this House or in another place.

In my capacity as a solicitor I have had occasion to defend many people who had the misfortune to come before Crown Courts. My experience—I am sure it is also the experience of barrister Members—is that often when young people are involved they have the utmost suspicion about being tried, allegedly by their peers, when they find that their peers are exclusively middle-aged. If this can be remedied so that we do not have the accused saying to his defending lawyers, "Can I get a fair trial before these people; why are not any young people able to be here so that they can understand what I am trying to say?", it can only be an advantage.

It has been rightly said that young people are sometimes in revolt against the established norms of society. Perhaps in the past they felt excluded. Some of the reasons for these doubts have been removed, but there still remains this one if the Government are to have their way today. There is no justification to exclude them from carrying out this essential rôle or burden, this essential responsibility in a democratic judicial process. I hope, whether jury service may be agreeable, disagreeable or burdensome, that they will be able to carry out that responsibility, bearing in mind at all times that there is the essential safeguard peremptory challenge.

I am surprised by the argument that we should not allow people between the age of 18 to 21 years to serve on juries because they lack experience. I have always been under the impression that juries are directed to remove all prejudices from their mind and to judge the case on the basis of the facts which are put before them. People between the ages of 18 and 21 years are able to assess the case as put, judge the facts and make a decision as well as anybody else whatever their age may be.

When we are talking about experience we are also talking about prejudices. Throughout life, various people build up prejudices which may have an effect on the judgment which they make on a particular case. Under those circumstances, people with fewer prejudices would be able to make a better judgment. In that respect, it is possible that the judgment of a person aged between 18 and 21 years would be better than the judgment made by a person over the age of 21 years, and particularly so as the age progresses.

When we talk about people who are able to serve on juries at present, are we suggesting that it is good that Alf Garnett should be able to be a member of a jury, with all his prejudices, but that the President of the Oxford Union perhaps should not be allowed to serve on a jury? Surely we are not suggesting that. However, on the basis of the argument against the proposal, that seems to be what the opponents are suggesting.

We have decided that people between the age of 18 and 21 years should be able to elect Members to this House and to vote for or against a Government. That exercise of judgment is more important than judgment which is exercised as a juror. Members who serve in this House are capable of making decisions on issues of peace and war, which are very important matters. The people who are elected to local government are elected to represent people and to take decisions on a wide range of issues. In so doing they will be spending millions of pounds of ratepayers' money. The exercise of judging who are best suited to do that job is much greater than the exercise of judgment which would have to be made by a person serving on a jury, who is basing his judgment on the facts which are put to him at that time.

indicated dissent.

It is no good the Minister of State shaking his head. The Minister should consider seriously these argument. The arguments are relevant and he will be doing a great damage it he does not accept the Amendment. We have a duty to see that young people are made aware of their responsibilities to society, and we should impose upon them the duties that they should accept throughout their lives.

I assure the hon. Member for Swindon (Mr. David Stoddart) that I have listened with interest to what has been said throughout the debate. Much of the debate has been very persuasive. When I shook my head at one stage, I did so on the basis that I was not impressed by the argument which the hon. Member was advancing at that time. One can put up a persuasive case based on the fact that the age of majority is now 18 years, and that when we are making the changes in the jury system which the Bill proposes, we can go the whole way and lower the age for jury service to 1 years. However, I am sure that those who have advanced that argument will fully appreciate and accept that it is not a question which the Government have not considered. Obviously the Government have considered the matter. Obviously there are arguments which could be advanced in favour of doing so. Equally, I suggest that there are stronger arguments for retaining the age of 21 years as the lower age for jury service.

If I wanted to sum up the arguments which have been adduced, I should do so in two ways. First, I agree with the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell) that because the age of 18 years is the right age for one matter it is not necessarily the right age for everything. Secondly, I agree with the intervention in the speech of the hon. Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) by his hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Harper)—we are not dealing with intelligence but with experience.

I take up the point which was made by the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen, that because 18 years is the right age for one set of circumstances it is not necessarily the right age for all circumstances. Listening to the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), I formed the impression that that was what he was saying, but I remind the House that within the law and the criminal courts we do not accept that argument in many other ways. Although we have lowered the age of majority, following the Latey Report, to 18 years, I have not heard it seriously argued from the Opposition that 18 years would be the right age at which to divide people from the point of view of punishment. It has been accepted that we are right to continue the present system regarding sentencing where the dividing age is 21 years.

The 18-to-21 year group is dealt with in the same adult court which deals with other people above the age of 21 years.

Of course they are, but equally the penalty imposed on their conviction is not the same. Not only are there the alternatives of the detention centre order and the Borstal order against imprisonment, but even those who go to prison within that age group are kept in different prisons. We are encouraged to do so by Members on both sides of the House. It is right that those under 21 years should be treated differently from those over 21 years. I confirm the point made by the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen, and I point out that in practice, when we look at the criminal law, we do not deal with people, because we have lowered the age of majority to 18, in the same way. We do not say that it must be 18 for everything.

I am sure that I would be the first to be attacked by the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich if I suggested that in future everyone over 18 should be regarded as having matured in every way and that they should be sent immediately to an adult prison on conviction and not dealt with in any different way. However, what is the argument for dealing with such a person in a different way? It is because it is expected that he cannot have the same degree of maturity and experience as a person over twenty-one.

Equally, in some of the arguments—particularly that advanced by the hon. Members for Loughborough and Dulwich—if one pursues the case of trial by one's peers, one gets to the extreme which the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen reached. But even going nowhere near that extreme, the fact remains that many people tried before the courts are 17 years old, and if it is argued that we should drop the age of jury service to 18 in order that those between 18 and 21 could help sit in judgment on their own age group, the argument could equally be applied to lowering the age to 17 or 16, which is the age at which people can marry and which was advanced as a justification for saying that they are mature and capable of taking decisions at that age.

As the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen says, one has to look at each particular aspect, whether it be that of marriage or of majority for the purpose of entering into contract, or whether it be suitability to vote or to stand for Parliament, which is a matter which the House has decided to refer for further consideration to Mr. Speaker's Conference. Surely it is no argument that because one fixes the age of 18 for one thing it must necessarily follow that the age of 18 is right for everything. One has to look at all these matters individually.

Would it not also be fair to point out that a sub-committee of the Penal Advisory Committee is examining the whole question of young offenders, so that it is unrealistic to say at this stage that the age for sitting in judgment on young offenders should be lowered? However, if the Committee comes forward with such a proposal, the Government will presumably not stand in the way.

The Committee is considering the whole range of penalties available for those under 21. It was not set up to consider the contents of the Latey Report.

I want to turn now to the Morris Committee Report. The hon. and learned Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) was a highly respected member of that Committee. It does not follow from the Morris Committee's Report that had the Latey Committee reported earlier it would have recommended an age of 18 rather than 21. It is true that the Committee did not or does not appear to have considered lowering the age of 21, presumably because that was the age of majority but it is abundantly clear that it gave serious consideration to the arguments whether the age should be higher than 21. In the end it came down with the view that it should remain at 21, but only after carefully considering the many arguments why the age should be higher.

I want to read two comments from the Morris Committee Report. I accept that the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich will say that they are selective, but they are no more selective than the passages he read out. The report said:

"The arguments for an age limit higher than 21 would have compelling force if there were any likelihood of particular juries being entirely, or largely, composed of persons not much over 21."

One of the effects of reducing the age from 21 to 18 would be, statistically, substantially to increase the number of people of either just over or not much under 21 serving on a jury as against the present situation. The report also said:

"There is nothing unusual or irrational in an inquiry to ascertain facts being undertaken by persons who are older than those whose actions are being considered."

12.45 p.m.

I assure the House that it is not a question of not accepting that the youth of today are as responsible as youth has ever been. It is in no way denigrating people between 18 and 21. It is a question of asking, as the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen, said, "Have they really the necessary experience to sit in judgment on others?". That is the point of distinction from what was said by the hon. Member for Swindon. It is one matter to cast one's vote, having made up one's mind as to whom one would like to see representing one; it is quite another to sit on a jury where one is deciding on the actions of another which can affect not one's own future but that person's future—whether he is to be at liberty or otherwise.

I know that it was not really meant in this way, but I was slightly appalled by the argument of the hon. Member for Loughborough that it would be a valuable education for young people between 18 and 21 to sit on juries. If I were being tried, I would not like to think that those trying me were treating it as a valuable educational exercise. I appreciate the point the hon. Gentleman was trying to make—that it would be valuable education in learning to assess facts—but I think he concedes the point that although the intelligence at 18, or 21, or any other age may be as high as in older age groups, the younger people will not have had the opportunity to gain a degree of experience by which they can assess facts and behaviour in the outside world in circumstances in which it is not their future which is at stake but the future of someone else.

I take the point that people between the age of 18 and 21 lack experience, but what the hon. and learned Gentleman is overlooking is that statistically it is very unlikely that any jury would contain more than about one person of that age. Thus, that person would be able to draw on the experience of his fellow jurors and at the same time contribute his knowledge and understanding of about one-third of the people tried before juries.

I accept that, statistically, lowering the age to 18 would provide about a similar proportion of people on the jury as the age group 21 to 25—namely, one or two per jury. But I think that in 15 cases a year the majority of the jurors would be likely to be under 25 if the age were lowered to 18.

The hon. and learned Gentleman will recall that the Home Secretary at the Conservative Party conference made the strong point that the obligations of citizenship should go alongside rights. One of the points which my hon. Friend the Member for Loughborough (Mr. Cronin) indicated strongly was that the obligation to jury service as one of the aspects of citizenship appeared to him and to many of us to go alongside the right to vote at 18. Would the hon. and learned Gentleman consider this aspect of the problem?

I accept that obligations go along with rights, but the fact that we as a House have agreed to lower the voting age to 18 does not mean that a person of 18 is also necessarily capable of undertaking the obligation to sit on a jury. The distinction I have pointed out is that the person sitting on the jury is being asked to use his experience, and so on, to assess and adjudicate on matters which affect the liberty of another person, which I think should require a reasonable entitlement for the individual concerned to be satisfied that those trying him are likely to have experience and knowledge of the world. As the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen pointed out, many people of 18 are probably still at school or are just leaving school or are in the process of entering university or college.

Several hon. Members have spoken of the maturity of our troops in Northern Ireland. I do not doubt that in any way, but is it not a maturity that the troops have gained by their dreadful experiences and the responsibilities they are undertaking? Is it maturity that they had at 18 on going to Northern Ireland? Or is it maturity that they have gained rapidly as a result of their experience in Northern Ireland? In any case, of course, if they were serving in Northern Ireland they would be entitled to exclusion anyway under the general principles of jury service. To say merely that a person of 18 fighting in Ireland is mature I do not think is the equivalent of saying that everyone of 18 is mature and therefore fully suitable to serve on a jury.

Surely a person of 18 casting a vote in an election is deciding on issues which may affect the future of other members of society, as he would be deciding, if he were a juror, the future of a prisoner in the dock?

He is, in a way, I concede, in that he is casting a vote in deciding what type of representation or government he wants, but he is doing it along with many millions of others, and I would suggest that that is not as direct an involvement as being in a group of 12 deciding on the future liberty or loss of liberty of another.

Let me draw my remarks to a conclusion by saying this: Morris looked at this, considered 25, and recommended 21. The rest of the provisions which we shall shortly be debating for implementing the Morris Committee's Report will itself have the effect of substantially lowering the age of jurors. It is the property qualification which causes the middle-class or middle-age aspects which the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich mentioned. If we pass certain Lords Amendments shortly, we shall be doing away with that qualification. By that alone we shall be substantially changing the image of the jury and lowering the age of jurors. The hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Peter Archer) says that we can only have a hunch on these things. I should have thought it unwise and dangerous, in the field of jury reform, to act merely on a hunch. I would suggest to the House that making this major alteration, as we are, lowering the age of potential jurors, as we shall in effect be doing by removing the property qualification, would be as much as it would be wise for us to do at this stage. It will always be open to review the age and whether it should be lowered. On the evidence put before Morris I do not believe, nor do I on the basis of what I have heard in this debate, that we would be right to lower it at this moment.

By leave of the House. I would add a few words. I certainly shall not keep the House for long because we have had an extremely good debate.

The views which have been expressed generally and clearly show that the predominant number of those who are taking part in it favour the idea of having a minimum age of 18 for jurors. I was particularly impressed by what the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Mr. Fowler) said about that when he put the point that in the circumstances it is not for those who are below the age of 18 to justify it but rather for those who say that 18 is too young an age to justify that.

That seems to me to be precisely what the Morris Report was saying, although dealing, for reasons which have been canvassed, with a higher age, when it said,

"If trial by jury is to be trial by a representative cross-section of an accused's fellow citizens, good reason must be shown before removing from jury ervice that section of the adult population nearest in age to the great majority of offenders."

What we have to consider now before we vote on this matter is whether good reason has been shown for removing from the jury that particular section which is the 18 to 21 year old section.

The only serious argument which has been put forward for removing them is the argument that they do not or may not possess the experience of their elders. Of course, in passing this Lords Amendment as a whole we are opening the way into the jury box of very many people who will not have the experience of the majority of those who at present act as juriors. We are widening the field very considerably, and doing so deliberately for the reasons which Morris has suggested.

We think that it is more important to have a representative cross-section of the accused's fellow citizens than to have the qualities of experience, knowledge and so on. If we were limiting ourselves to that criterion we would probably be going back to the idea of the special jury or some kind of test of education, which Morris specifically rejected. Experience is only one of the factors one needs to take into account, and the factor of having a true cross-section, of having true trial by the peers of the defendant, is most important, for so many reasons which have been advanced in the debate.

In considering experience we are entitled again to refer to Morris, where he deals with the whole question of experience:

"While such people"—

he is there talking of those between 20 and 25—

"may be less experienced than their elders they may nevertheless possess experience which is relevant to the duties of the juror."

I gather that that is the view of the House, because the House has not challenged the view that one should come down to 21. What Morris said about that, rightly, in my view, can properly be said about those between 18 and 21.

If we do not think so ourselves—and I certainly do—then the two-year study of the Latey Committee, which produced the proposals for a general reduction in the age of responsibility to 18, surely ought to have convinced us. Indeed, in a large field it has already convinced us. It is responsibility with which Latey is concerned, and it is responsibility which Latey feels, and which those who supported his report felt, is available at the age of 18. They felt it to be a view which should be recognised by society—in the way that Parliament itself recognised it by giving the vote at 18.

It is that responsibility which is in issue here. We are dealing with the age at which a person should be liable for jury service, and it is that responsibility which is just as applicable, in our view, to jury service as it is to casting one's vote whether nationally or locally, and in many other respects, for it is not just a matter of the vote but of other things which, as a result of the Latey Report, are now within the responsibility of those of our fellow citizens who have reached the new age of majority.

I am sorry, therefore, that the Government feel they must stand firm on this. I had hoped that the Minister of State could be persuaded. If that is not the case I shall certainly invite the House to support this Amendment in the Division Lobby.

The Amendment to the Lords Amendment expresses exactly what many of us have been arguing over the years as nothing more than common sense. I, like the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), am sorry that the Government see fit to take a stand on an age which first became the lower age for jury service as long ago as 1825.

Since then, much has happened. Today we recognise 18 as the age of majority. We recognise it as the age when people become responsible to fulfil their duty as citizens in perhaps one of the most important matters, namely, voting in a parliamentary election. There has been serious discussion by the Government about whether we should make 18 the age at which a person qualifies to stand as a parliamentary candidate.

My hon. and learned Friend knows far more about this than I do. Surely the basis on which the age was fixed at 21 in 1825 was that it was a property qualification and that the person concerned was a householder. Presumably, therefore, the ability to have that qualification arises only at 18. If the qualification were to be a property one, it would apply to anybody above that age.

On that logic it follows that if the property qualification had been 18 in 1825, then 18 would have been the lower limit. Today the age of majority is 18. It is logical and realistic that the lower age should now be 18. The majority

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, No. 5, in line 42, after 'physical', insert 'or mental'.

With it I understand we are to take the following Amendments to the Lords Amendment:

No. 6, in line 44, leave out:

'the person may be brought before the judge who' and insert 'the question shall be referred to the judge, who may, if he thinks fit, question such person in chambers and thereupon'.

No. 7, in line 46, after 'summons', insert:

'and may, if he thinks fit, declare him to be ineligible for jury service'.

No.17, in line 93, at end insert—

'Persons judicially declared ineligible

A person who has by virtue of the powers contained in subsection (4) of section ("Qualification for jury service") been declared by the judge to be ineligible for jury service'.

This is a series of Amendments directed to the question of what happens when a person arrives in court in answer to a jury summons and it then transpires that for some reason that person is unsuitable for jury service. It is not a matter which was specifically considered by the Morris Committee and it would have been wholly unreasonable to expect that Committee to go into such administrative details. But these are matters which may be of considerable importance for the individuals who are affected by them.

It sometimes arises now, but it is more likely to arise under the new Clause. Subsection (4) of the new Clause attempts to grapple with a solution of the problem. The present solution rests on the rather blunt instrument of challenge and most of us have at some stage in our legal careers found ourselves wondering on the spur of the moment whether, on a hunch, we should object, knowing that if we fail to do so it will be too late to do anything about it, but condemned to make that decisison on the basis of wholly inadequate information.

I hope that most of the weeding out process will take place before attendance and there was a discussion in another place as to how that could be done. As I understand the position, when the summons is served there will be included with it an information sheet setting out the categories of those who may be excused jury service and stating simply but in detail what action should be taken by those who wish to be excused. If I am wrong no doubt the Minister of State will correct me, but if I am right I should welcome his confirmation of the fact, because this is the matter about which the profession and the administrative officials would like some guidance.

1.15 p.m.

We hope that as much of the process as possible will take place before attendance for at least two reasons. First, if someone attends at court, he has missed a day's work and laid down his business affairs in order to attend. If he is then told that he is not required, it is not a light matter, and he will probably comment that it is a pity he could not have been told that he was not required at an earlier stage. Second, the discussion at the court of the circumstances which render a person unsuitable for jury service is likely to be an embarrassing experience for the person concerned and if it can be done quietly before he arrives at the court, so much the better.

But there will be some matters which will emerge only when the prospective juror attends court, and as I understand it the draftsmen of the new Clause have already envisaged examples like the juror who, when he arrives at court, transpires to be so hard of hearing that it is unlikely that he will be able to follow the proceedings. Amendment No. 5 to the Lords Amendment takes account of the juryman who through mental illness or some defect of the intellect, or through being included in the category which in a younger age group is labelled "educationally subnormal", is unlikely to be able to follow the proceedings or to be able to read essential documents. It is not easy to know where to draw the line, where lack of judgment ends and where a defective understanding begins. As was said more than once in the last debate, we are all agreed that the jury should represent the general public with its deficiencies along with its virtues.

But as the Minister of State emphasised in his concluding speech, we are dealing with the liberty of an individual, and it is essential that as far as possible he shall be tried by people who understand what is in issue. The Amendment proposes that on these grounds, in addititon to grounds of physical defects, it shall be possible for the judge to exclude a person from the jury. Clearly it is a jurisdiction which the judge will be required to exercise with some judgment and discretion but that, one hopes, is why a judge is there.

Amendment No. 6 to the Lords Amendment will be, we hope, a concession to compassion. We have arrived at the stage where the responsible official at the court has noticed that someone who is answering a jury summons has those characteristics which in the words of the proposed new Clause cast

"doubt on his capacity to act effectively as a juror".

Clearly, then, the issue whether he or she shall serve as juror must be decided by the judge. There is no one else to whom that jurisdiction can be entrusted at that stage. So, quite properly, the prospective juror will be brought before the judge. What is not clear from the text, but what seems implicit, is that he will be brought before a judge in open court, and that could lead to an embarrassing situation.

Turning to the example of the deaf person, it would be most unfortunate if there were to be an inquiry in open court as to the extent of his deafness and whether he was capable of following the proceedings.

If we are to invite the co-operation of the public in the administration of justice, we ought to turn every possible somersault to show a proper concern for people when they arrive at court. Witnesses are not likely to assist justice by coming forward if when they arrive at court they are stuck in some squalid room, and if when they arrive in the witness box, they are ridiculed or bullied. Most of us accept that without question and, happily, that kind of situation arises much less frequently than it once did. But in all our legislation we should be on the lookout for the kind of situation that discourages the public from coming anywhere near a law court, and if it is possible to avoid gratuitous embarrassment to a juror we ought to do so.

Amendment No. 7 is designed to reduce inconvenience and embarrassment. If it is clear that when a person has attended and has been brought before the judge his capacity to act effectively as a juror is affected by some characteristic, he should be excused jury service on that occasion; but if the characteristic is likely to be permanent, it seems pointless to send him away to take his chance of being called again on another summons, and to be dragged back again to have to go through the same embarrassing process a second time, and possibly a third time. Our proposal is that if it is clear that the characteristic is likely to be permanent, the judge should be entitled to declare him ineligible for further jury service, so that he will not be troubled again.

Amendment No. 17 is largely consequential upon that. If the House accepts that Amendment and a judge so declares, clearly that disqualification ought to be included in the list of disqualifications in the proposed Schedule.

It is not likely that a judge will exercise this power light-heartedly when circumstances may change, but in a proper case the judge should be entitled to exercise it as a matter of simple decency, and it is a matter of simple decency that this group of Amendments is largely about.

The hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Peter Archer) said that the purpose of the Amendments was to inquire as to the method whereby it was proposed that those suffering from physical or other defects making them unsuitable to serve on a jury was to operate in practice and whether it would be humane.

I should not like to mislead the hon. and learned Gentleman. That was not the purpose of the Amendments. I simply seized the opportunity to inquire.

The Amendments are concerned with the proposed scheme and it may be easier if I explain how the scheme will work, for I hope that that will satisfy the hon. and learned Gentleman that there is no need for the Amendments.

As he knows, subsection (3) of the new Clause that we shall shortly discuss provides for the ability of the person who receives the summons to make representations to the appropriate officer with a view to obtaining withdrawal of the summons if he wishes to be excused. It is the intention that a notice accompanying the summons will point out to people suffering from a physical disability, such as blindness or deafness, or to persons who do not understand English and who therefore would not be able to take their part in the deliberations of the jury, that they should consider whether they come within any of those classifications and whether they should apply for excusal on that ground. They will have an opportunity at that stage, in what might be described as complete privacy, to write to the appropriate officer asking to be eliminated, and it is hoped that most of them will be eliminated in that way.

However, should a person disregard that invitation to apply for excusal and if it becomes apparent on his arrival at court that he is physically or linguistically incapable, the provisions of subsection (4) will have effect. It provides that if it appears to the appropriate officer that

"on account of physical disability or insufficient understanding of English there is doubt as to his capacity to act effectively … the person may be brought before the judge, who shall determine whether or not he shall act as a juror."

I assure hon. Members at once that there is no intention of bringing him before the judge in open court. If necessary, he may be brought before the judge in chambers and it is proposed to ensure that by the rules of court. The second part of one of the Amendments is thus met without there being any need to write it into the Bill.

However, it is hoped that only seldom will matters reach the stage of bringing the person before the judge. It is hoped that when the appropriate officer of the court notices that a person is clearly physically or linguistically unsuitable for sitting on a jury, he will point out to him that he is entitled to be excused on that basis, and it is hoped that that will be enough and that the person concerned will accept that advice and probably be only too grateful to be excused. It is only a fall-back position that one should be able to take him before the judge; it is when, despite the view of the appro- priate officer, the person concerned is still adamantly of the view that he wishes to serve on the jury, the appropriate officer feeling that he is not suitable to do so.

A defect of the Amendment is that by converting "may" into "shall" it has the effect, no doubt unintentionally, that in every case when a person got as far as the court and the appropriate officer thought him inappropriate, the matter would have to be referred to the judge in chambers. Giving discretionary power, as we have, means that there will be no need to pursue the matter for most of the people concerned if the appropriate officer does not regard them as suitable to sit on the jury. But there is no suggestion that these matters should be dealt with in open court.

Equally, although I understand the motive, I do not see any advantage in giving the court power to declare a person to be ineligible. The majority of people in this category will have replied to the summons, or will have talked to the appropriate officer, and if they were unfortunate enough to receive another summons, they would presumably know the necessary routine to ensure that they were still exempt. Equally, the attention of the summoning officer will be drawn to the fact that these people have been thought by the court not to be suitable to sit on a jury.

However, one has to face the fact that there may be some whose incapacity will be only transient. It may happen that a person suffers from a physical disability which affects his ability to sit on a jury at one time, but which improves over the years until he is able to be a juror. Equally, a person who is linguistically incapable at one stage of following a trial adequately may have a command of English 10 years later making him thoroughly suitable. Rather than having the power to declare ineligible on the basis of what might be a transient incapacity, it is better to leave it to the summonsing officer and the appropriate officer of the court to make sure whether a person is capable.

At first sight subsections (3) and (4) read together do not appear to give an officer of the court power to excuse somebody once a written summons has been sent to him. It looks as though the intention is that when the person makes representations or attend in accordance with the summons, the officer may question him, the case then going to the judge, who decides. There may be a provision which I have overlooked giving a different effect, in which case I entirely assent to what the Minister said.

There is power under Section 34 of the Courts Act, 1971, and this is merely the method by which the application is made.

I see the purpose behind the hon. and learned Gentleman's first Amendment, to add the word "mental", but it could raise more difficulties than it cured. Those who are clearly mentally ill are already ineligible for service anyway if they come under the Mental Health Act. Therefore, a severely sub-normal person or someone of that nature is not eligible in any event. The difficulty is in drawing the line, in the powers to be given to an officer of the court to look at a person and say, "To be blunt, you appear pretty dim. I do not think you are very suitable". That is probably why Morris never tried to do anything of the kind, and rejected the idea of any form of educational test. It is very difficult for an appropriate officer to assess whether a person is mentally ill. He can tell whether a person is physically handicapped to such a degree as to make it difficult to follow the case, but it is much more difficult to say whether a person is mentally affected.

Since those who are mentally ill in the normal meaning of the words are already covered by the Schedule, I can only advise the House that the exercise of this power of selection is one which could cause abuse, and I think that it would be unwise to include it.

With the leave of the House, may I say that we are grateful for that explanation. There are matters here which could be debated at much greater length, and perhaps with the benefit of experience we shall feel that they should be debated again in the future. But for the moment we are grateful for the Minister's explanation, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 63 to leave out 'being' and insert

'knowing that he is'.

I believe that it would be convenient to consider with it the following Amendment: In line 74, at end insert

'; and it is hereby declared that the verdict of a jury in criminal proceedings (as in other proceedings) is not void by reason only that a member of the jury is for the time being ineligible or disqualified for jury service'.

My first Amendment is directed to the provision that a person who is ineligible for jury service but who nevertheless serves on a jury is liable to a penalty. That appears to create an absolute offence, but surely it is not the kind of situation in which we want to see a person who had no guilty intent declared guilty of an offence. It may be argued that all the grounds for disqualification are in the Schedule and are likely to be known to the persons concerned. So ignorance of the facts is unlikely.

But there are two situations which could operate harshly, even given that ignorance of the law is not necessarily a defence. It is unrealistic, and could work unjustly, to assume that everyone must know every detail of our modern, complicated body of law. It would be hard for someone to find that he had committed an offence simply because he was not familiar with the contents of the Schedule. It is not a regular topic of conversation in the public houses and clubs of the Midlands. And it would be unrealistic and hard to tell someone, "You have been employed in a forensic science laboratory in the past 10 years. You answered a summons for jury service and consequently served upon the jury. That makes you a criminal." Secondly, the person concerned may have forgotten the facts. We can imagine a man of 26 who at 16 had spent one month as a lab. boy in a forensic science laboratory, and who if he then serves on a jury becomes a criminal.

It may be said that the Court would probably take a lenient view and afford him a conditional discharge, but that is not sufficient. A person is entitled not to be deemed guilty of an offence in those circumstances and not to be in mercy. [Interruption.]

The amiable indication I have received from the Minister encourages me not to delay the House further on this Amendment.

I turn to my second Amendment, which deals simply with a situation which is puzzling to us. As my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Stoke Newington and Hackney, North (Mr. Weitzman) delightedly pointed out to me last night, the law as it is sought to be in consequence of the Amendment, is the law already. I understand that that is so by reason of Section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967. But it had not escaped the eagle eye of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) that in the Schedule of repeals, in Lords Amendment No. 49, it is proposed to repeal sections 14–16 of that Act. It would appear to follow that the law will be changed in that respect, and the Amendment is simply directed to ensuring that the law shall remain unaltered. If there is something that we have overlooked, we shall be happy to be corrected, and need not carry the matter further, but if the Minister intends to direct serious argument to the suggestion that the law should be altered, that may be very different.

I learnt in Committee to have great respect for the eagle eye of the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin), but on this occasion the eagle has slept, or whatever is the appropriate metaphor. Whereas the hon. and learned Member for Rowley Regis and Tipton (Mr. Peter Archer) is right to say that we have repealed certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, in Schedule 3, he will find that the point about which he is concerned, as to the verdict of the jury not being void on the basis of the ineligibility or disqualification from jury service of an individual member of the Jury, is covered by paragraph (d) of Lords Amendment No. 47. At present the provision that a jury's verdict shall not be put aside as void because of the ineligibility of someone serving on the jury is to be found in Section 40(2)(b) of the Courts Act, 1971. We are deleting the words at present in that Section of the Courts Act and saying,

"there shall be substituted the words 'qualified in accordance with section (Qualification for jury service) (1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972'."

I am assured that that has the effect of doing what the hon. and learned Gentle- man wants to make sure that we succeed in doing.

As to the hon. and learned Gentleman's first Amendment, it is unlikely that in practice anyone would ever be prosecuted for sitting on a jury if it later turned out that he was ineligible and was not aware of it. But that is not a complete answer. I readily accept that the House should not pass absolute offences unless there is good ground for doing so. Clearly, knowledge should be a necessary ingredient of the criminal offence of sitting on a jury when ineligible; the person concerned should know that he is ineligible. I am advised that the wording of the Amendment is perhaps not ideal, but at this stage in the Bill's passage I take the view that the Opposition's proposal is better than the Government's original proposal, which unintentionally made an absolute offence, and therefore I recommend that the House accept the Amendment, which I hope will be acceptable to their Lordships' House.

With the leave of the House, may I say that we are most grateful to the Minister for what he has just said. It shows that even at this late stage scrutiny of the Bill within the House is not without its profit.

As for the second Amendment, we are grateful for the Minister's explanation. But there is a little concern in our minds for those who may later have to operate these provisions, who will not have the benefit of being able to ask the hon. and learned Gentleman direct questions. The kind of situation we are in is likely to arise whenever draftsmen insist on legislating by reference. But we are grateful for the explanation, and clearly no Amendment is necessary. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the Amendment.

Order. That Amendment was selected for discussion only, so it need not be withdrawn.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment, as amended.

This is a major Amendment, only parts of which have been referred to. I wonder whether it might be possible to discuss with it Lords Amendments Nos. 15 and 16.

If that is the will of the House, but I must call the attention of the House to the fact that privilege is involved in Lords Amendment No. 16.

Lords Amendment No. 14 is of major importance because it makes a major change in the system of qualification for jury service, which has remained the same ever since 1825.

The Amendment incorporates the recommendations of the Committee on jury service under Lord Morris of Borthy-Gest, which reported as long age as 1965. The recommendations were accepted by the previous Government, but they never got round to implementing them, and they are now being implemented in the course of this Bill. I am glad that we have been able to implement all the Morris recommendations, even though we have had to do it during the Bill's passage through another place.

The important matter to realise is that the existing property qualification for jury service in England and Wales—that of being the householder of a house with a rateable value of £30 in London or £20 elsewhere—is abolished. Instead, subject to certain qualifications and age limits which have been changed yet again today, and which will now depend on the outcome of the Lords debate on the subject—they are certainly an upper limit of 65 and a lower limit of 21 or 18—the basic qualification is citizenship as evidenced by inclusion in the electoral roll as a parliamentary elector.

One of the major effects of this, and one which I welcome, is to bring far more women back on to the roll of those eligible for jury service who are now excluded by the property qualification. As one who was involved before the last General Election in a Committee looking into discrimination against women in the law, and one who made in the Committee's Report the recommendation that the Morris Committee proposals should be implemented, I am very glad to be the Minister responsible for carrying that into effect. It puts right what many women have felt was a completely unjustified discrimination against them. They have a great deal to offer to future juries and I believe that the widening of the roll from which jurors will be called accords with the wishes of the country. It was pointed out earlier that the present qualification has lasted since 1825.

The only other comment I need to make, although I will attempt to answer any questions, is that as well as implementing the major recommendation of the Morris Committee, the other effect is to implement those proposals which are aimed at the simplifying and modernising of the basis of excusal from jury service, either on the basis of ineligibility, disqualification or right of exclusion. It does not in any way limit the existing right under the Courts Act for the appropriate officer to use his discretion to excuse. There are now listed in a simpler, and I believe better, way those who by their occupation are ineligible, those who by their criminal record are disqualified, and those who by their occupation are entitled to excusal as of right.

In future the summoning of jurors now rests with the Lord Chancellor under Part V of the Courts Act. I hope that the House will agree to welcome this batch of Lords Amendments which carry out the undertaking given by the Government, having accepted in principle the proposals of the Morris recommendation, to implement them at the earliest stage. That we have done.

I join the Minister of State in expressing the thanks of this side of the House to the Morris Committee, despite the length of time which has elapsed since it made its admirable report. I also welcome the fact that the Government, following the pressure placed on them from both sides in Committee, have now included these matters in the Bill as it reaches us from another place. There are two points of a general nature, one flowing from another, I wish to raise.

I am not in any way criticising the Minister or the Government. An undertaking was given which the Minister has fulfilled but what has happened is that there is being presented to us by way of Lords Amendment a radical change in the law relating to juries, without the normal opportunity which this House would have of scrutinising such a change line by line in Committee. This is simply the procedure of the House and is no fault of any person. We have already found one or two respects in which the Clause could be improved. There may be others which more prolonged and careful scrutiny such as we are able to give these matters in Standing Committee would reveal. However, we do not have that opportunity.

I invite the Government Front Bench to consider whether there is some way, if we are presented with this sort of situation in future, of ensuring that this House has the opportunity of making the thorough scrutiny which such radical changes require. This may well arise in the course of next week with another Bill.

The second point to which I refer emerges from that and it is that the Minister may well feel that, now there have been changes in the law relating to juries, which will be partly in this Bill, partly in the Courts Act and partly in other legislation, it might be desirable, if the Law Commission were prepared to tackle the task, for the procedure of consolidation with Law Commission Amendments to be adopted. It is a valuable procedure in the course of which anything that this House has omitted to notice because of the way in which it has been dealt with could be cleared up. I hope that the Minister will give thought to that and perhaps discuss it with the Law Commission.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

The effect of this Amendment, by introducing a new Clause, is to increase the maximum penalties for contravening restrictions in the Shops Act, 1950, in three respects—first, Sunday trading; secondly the sale of butcher's meat on Sunday; and thirdly, the business of a barber or a hairdresser in Scotland on Sunday.

I do not think that this is the moment to go into the intricacies of Sunday trading laws but I ought to assure the House that we have taken the view that the penalty increases proposed are justifiable in isolation as an interim measure to assist enforcement of the existing law, whatever may be the future course of the amendment of the Sunday trading laws generally.

We want to probe the Government a little on this. The Minister will be aware that the Sunday trading laws are in a state of considerable chaos, with one local authority interpreting them severely, another less so, and with Sunday markets being moved from place to place according to the attitude of the local authority. We now have the absurd situation in which about the only thing that can legitimately be done on Sunday is to lie in bed with the newspapers, drinking intoxicating liquor and occasionally ordering some fresh flowers or fruit—and that can be done only until two o'clock, after which it is only the intoxicating liquor. It is not possible to sit and drink coffee or tea bought on a Sunday; it is impossible to eat other than Kosher meat bought on a Sunday. It is impossible to drink tinned fruit juice as an alternative to intoxicating liquor.

Anyone glancing at the Shops Act from 1950 onwards will find it surprising, in a society that has so much changed, that we should still rely on what has become a rag-bag of laws and regulations. Far more women now go out to work regularly, so that the problem of matching their hours with ordinary shopping hours has become more acute. While everyone on this side of the House would strongly support the argument that shop assistants must be protected over their hours of work, it becomes extremely doubtful whether this is any longer appropriate as a means of doing it as distinct from legislating in other ways to give adequate leisure time.

When are we likely to get some substantial consolidation and reform of the Sunday Trading Acts? I would also like to ask whether it seems sensible to prop up these laws as they become more highly anomalous by imposing yet stronger fines. Inevitably one finds—I speak as a non-lawyer—that the worst thing to do is to support a law which no longer commands broad public consent by the imposititon of more penal sentences and fines.

By leave of the House, I will reply. We shall keep very much in mind, in considering this difficult branch of the law, what the hon. Lady said. We are conscious of the unsatisfactory nature of this and the dubious public support for the present situation. The hon. Lady realises how controversial the subject is. I understand that the Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers is strongly opposed to any relaxation of the general stringency of the law. Various retail organisations, particularly those representing small shopkeepers in certain trades, do not favour any change. I do not say that these are compelling reasons for never changing but I am pointing out the difficulties we face. I cannot hold out hope in the near future.

We do not think the chances of real agreement are great and we do not therefore think that this is a matter of high legislative priority. We shall continue to study the problem in the light of changing public opinion.

On the hon. Lady's second point, there is a difficulty and on the whole we believe it right to go ahead with the increased penalties which the other place decided upon, even in the unsatisfactory state of the present law.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

Here again we are introducing another new Clause with something of the same effect as the previous Clause. This originated from a new Clause moved by Lord Stow Hill in Committee in another place. As a result of this and the further consideration we gave to it, this Clause was added in another place on Report. It increases from £20 to £100 the maximum penalty for using premises in breach of a closing order. It also increases from £5 to £20 the maximum daily penalty for continued use after conviction.

The House will have noticed towards the end of the Clause the words:

"in relation to any day after the coming into force of this section …".

That is simply to ensure, in accordance with the general principle of human rights, that a person is not made liable to the enhanced daily penalty in respect of non-compliance with the closing order before the Section came into force. A similar safeguard in relation to the main penalty increase, and the others in the Bill, is in Lords Amendment No. 28.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment:

In line 5, leave out

'and has not been previously sentenced to that punishment'.

I hope that with this Amendment we may also deal with the following Amendments as Amendments to the Lords Amendment:

In line 5, leave out 'been previously' and insert

'during the previous five years been'.

In line 5, leave out 'been previously' and insert

'during the previous ten years been'.

In line 20, after 'sentence', insert

'and "informed" means informed by the court'.

In line 24, leave out subsection (3) and insert:

'(3) In this section "detention centre" means in relation to Northern Ireland young offenders centre'.

Lords Amendment No. 20 is important since it is an improvement in the law which was introduced in consequence of the considerable pressure in this House and the other place for extension of the facilities for legal aid and knowledge of entitlement among those who may obtain it.

The general effect of the Clause is that a court is not to sentence a man to imprisonment or other custodial treat- ment unless he has applied for legal aid and the application is refused on the grounds of means or has been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and has not taken advantage of it. In addition to those qualifications a further qualification was introduced in the other place; namely, that the man has not been previously sentenced to that punishment.

We oppose the inclusion of the qualification on two grounds. First, we believe it to be inherently wrong. We hold that view because it is precisely those people who have been previously sentenced who are in the greatest danger of a heavy sentence of imprisonment or other custodial treatment. In our view, it is those people who are most in need of legal aid and who should not be sentenced to a form of penalty of that kind unless they have been made clearly aware of their right to obtain legal aid. The person with the previous custodial sentence is the man who is in much greater need of protection than the person in respect of whom this may be a first offence and in respect of whom a likelihood of a custodial sentence is much more remote.

We think it wrong in principle to include this provision. I do not understand on what logical basis one should exclude the need to inform a man of his rights to legal aid merely because he has previously been sentenced to a form of punishment. That is our objection in principle.

Our second objection is that the way in which this qualification has been framed appears to lead to absurd anomalies. The qualification is that the man has not been previously sentenced to that punishment. That punishment has three possibilities, imprisonment, borstal training or a sentence of detention in a detention centre. The court is required not to sentence him in that way without the man possessing knowledge of his rights to legal aid, unless he had previously been sentenced to the same punishment. In other words, the qualification will apply where somebody has been sentenced to a period in a detention centre and the court is minded to send him to such a centre again. The Minister appears to disagree with that interpretation, but that is how I read the matter.

I think the hon. and learned Gentleman has it the wrong way round. It relates to the representation of somebody who is being sent to prison and who has previously been in detention or in borstal.

The provision, as I understand it, provides that the magistrates' court or the Crown Court is not to sentence a person to imprisonment, borstal training or detention if that person is not legally represented and if he has not previously been sentenced to that punishment. In other words—and I hope that I have got it right—if he has been previously sentenced to that punishment, the Clause will not apply. As I understand the situation, if a person has previously been sentenced to serve a term in a detention centre the Clause will apply to his benefit if he is to be sentenced to imprisonment, but not if he is to be sentenced to another period in a detention centre. I hoped that that was what I said but, if I did not, I apologise for not making the matter clear.

That seems to me to produce an anomalous situation, the purpose of which is not clear to me. I do not see why there should be a distinction between three types of custodial sentence. If we accept the fact that a person has been previously sentenced to a custodial sentence, and if we take this as the key which enables escape to be made from the provisions of the Clause dealing with legal aid, I should have thought that it would not matter to what form of custodial sentences he was sentenced previously and what form of custodial sentence the court then has in mind. That there should be this difference in treatment, which arises purely from the fact that the custodial sentence now in mind is different, is an anomaly the explanation of which I do not understand. I hope that the Under-Secretary will be able to explain this anomaly.

Leaving aside the anomaly created by the wording of the new Clause, we attach great importance to the principle to which I have already referred. We think the right should not be diminished because a person has previously been sentenced to the particular punishment in question. We feel that these words should be removed from a new Clause which otherwise we fully support.

This is a very interesting Lords Amendment, and the Amendment moved by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) gives us an opportunity of probing why the Government have at last decided to handle the matter in this way.

The Lords Amendment has both positive and negative aspects. It is fair to start by considering what might be called the Widgery aspects of the Lords Amendment. I think we are confronted with something which will become famous, at any rate in the legal profession, as the Carlisle progression. We start this progression with the statement frequently made by the Minister of State that it is completely unnecessary to do anything about the Widgery criteria because the courts know what they are and are getting on with them very happily.

During the course of the Bill we reached the second stage in this progression when the Minister of State said that it was not appropriate to legislate on the Widgery criteria, but he would issue a circular to the courts drawing their attention to the criteria so that if any courts were not properly applying them they would have this further encouragement.

We have now reached the end of the progression. Apparently it is appropriate to legislate part of the Widgery criteria, but only in this very narrow area, contrary to my hon. and learned Friend's Amendment which was debated on Report and subsequently on two occasions in the other place. The Government are now saying that they will not accept my hon. and learned Friend's Amendment, but they will legislate in this very narrow area.

Why? According to what principle are the Government now operating? If legislation is appropriate for the Widgery criteria, why do not the Government do my hon. and learned Friend the honour of accepting his Amendment and writing it into the Bill? The Minister of State, as I expected, shakes his head. I suppose he cannot do it at this stage. However, he should tell us on what principle the Government are acting, why they have decided to legislate only for this small category, and why it is not being done more widely.

There are negative aspects to the Amendment, to some of which I will draw attention. The Amendment is contrary to the Widgery Report in several respects. It is contrary to what the Widgery Committee said in paragraph 163 were it came to the conclusion that this sort of division in the course of a case as to where legal aid was necessary and where it was not could not be made.

The Amendment is contrary, too, in that the Widgery Committee emphasised that it was important for a person in jeopardy to have the assistance of a lawyer at the stage when deciding how to plead, which is a most important moment, to ensure that he understands the charge and does not plead guilty under a misapprehension about the implications of the charge; and, indeed, throughout the trial.

2.15 p.m.

Why should the Government decide that only at the moment when the magistrates have decided that a man may be sentenced to imprisonment should legal aid be statutorily required?

Another negative aspect is that the Lords Amendment downgrades the circular which the Minister of State said he would send out. I take it that he will still send out the circular. The hon. and learned Gentleman promised me on an earlier occasion that, when he does, he will put it in the Library of the House so that we can read it. Already there is considerable doubt about the value of circulars, what happens to them when they arrive, and whether magistrates ever see them. In practice, it depends very much on the view of the clerk to the magistrates whether he shows it to them or regards it as important.

We shall have a situation where a circular will come out recommending certain things to the magistrates, but one small element in the Widgery criteria will be law and they will have to take account of it. I suggest the effect will be to reduce the impact that this circular would otherwise have.

What happens at the point at which the decision is made that imprisonment might be the sentence and it is discovered that the man is not legally represented? Will he be remanded in custody at that point, or will some lawyer be dredged up from the body of the court to consult with him for five minutes before making a plea in mitigation? That would be an extremely unsatisfactory position. How will it be handled? It could lead to an increased number of remands in custody. It is well known that when magistrates are thinking of sentencing anyone to imprisonment and for some reason wish to defer sentence, they usually remand in custody. I should be glad to hear the Minister of State comment on whether this could lead to an increased number of remands in custody.

Throughout the debates on the Bill one question which I repeatedly put to the Government concerned what they knew about the impact of their various proposals. Yesterday I had a Question down about the impact of the imprisonment proposals of this amendment. The hon. and learned Gentleman said that he did not have information available in the form I requested. It seemed to me to be a form which was very relevant to the wording of this Amendment. In a sense I was relieved. This enables me to maintain my 100 per cent. record as there has been no occasion when I have asked a Question of the Home Office about the impact of their proposals when it has known the answer.

It might be that the right hon. Gentleman has been able to maintain his record because he always asks Questions in such a form that it is impossible to answer them.

That immediately leads me to anticipate that there will be an answer from the hon. and learned Gentleman which will be in a form which the Home Office can give.

According to the 1969 figures, the last published figures, only 28 per cent. of persons sentenced to imprisonment had not previously been sent to prison. So, of those actually going to prison, this will cover about 28 per cent. on the 1969 figures. If that is wrong, no doubt the Minister of State will tell me. However, that is the estimate which I have made on the basis of the 1969 figures. If the hon. and learned Gentleman has better information, I should be grateful for it. That is one reason why I warmly support the Amendment of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich. At any rate, his Amendment would succeed in multiplying the coverage of the Lords Amendment by a figure of four, which would have a radical effect. I do not see why the hon. and learned Gentleman should worry about that when he has told the House so many times that it is the fact that all these people are legally represented anyhow. The hon. and learned Gentleman is saying that the Amendment will not have any effect, so let us make sure that what has already been achieved is written into the legislation. Those are the Widgery aspects and those are the reasons why I point out that the Lords Amendment, which is rightly welcomed, has certain negative aspects. I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will comment on that point.

Another aspect to the Amendment is that of suspended sentences. Although the New Statesman recently announced that I had been called to the Bar and immediately given silk, that is not true and I may be wrong on law. However, I take it that it is right that the Lords Amendment applies to the imposition of a suspended sentence.

indicated assent.

As that is the case, certain matters follow. Many of the people who will be protected by the Amendment would have been protected by the mandatory provision. The hon. and learned Gentleman will be pleased to know that that is the only reference I shall make to that provision. It is in this area that the Lords Amendment will bite, in the area of considering whether a person should be subjected to a suspended sentence. According to the now famous memorandum on suspended sentences which was published by the Home Office, 61 per cent. of those who are given suspended sentences will be covered by the Amendment, as they have had no previous custodial sentence. That is a very much higher percentage than the 28 per cent. which is applicable in the other area of immediate imprisonment. That is 61 per cent. of a comparable number of people.

It is here, to start with, that the Lords Amendment will bite. It also bites at the point which is relevant when one is considering the imposition of a suspended sentence. It may be valuable for a lawyer to be present and to say to the magistrates, "This is not a case for a suspended sentence in place of a fine or a probation order which he might have been given in this sort of case before suspended sentences were introduced." The real object and effect of the Lords Amendment is to discourage the use of suspended sentences instead of probation orders or fines.

Consequently, it could have an effect in reducing that area of imprisonment where people go to prison on a further offence when they are subject to a suspended sentence. That is an important and valuable effect. In the Bill we have the famous Clause 10(3), the enactment of O'Keefe. I was amused, when reading the debates in another place, to see how frequently the noble Lord, Viscount Colville of Culross, referred to the O'Keefe Amendment, saying how valuable it is, how it affords great protection, and how essential it is that it should be in the Bill. When I remember the fight which we had in Committee to get the hon. and learned Gentleman to commit himself to consider that proposal, I rejoice at how valuable the Home Office now regards the O'Keefe Amendment.

But what will be the effect of the Lords Amendment? The effect will be that the lawyer who is in court at the stage when the magistrates are considering whether a suspended sentence shall be given, will refer to Clause 10(3), remind them of O'Keefe and say, "You must not sentence this man to a suspended sentence unless you have satisfied yourselves in accordance with the relevant Clause of the 1972 Criminal Justice Act." So from this point of view I do not have any reservations about the Lords Amendment except that I should like to see the additional coverage which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich proposes.

I shall next refer to the meaning of "informed" which appears in Amendment 14. The hon. and learned Gentleman will appreciate that "informed" is of vital importance. The man has to be legally represented unless, having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and having had the opportunity to do so, he refuses or fails to apply. The meaning of "informed" is crucial. In the debates in another place it seemed that "informed" was interpreted as meaning that after conviction, and when the magistrates or the court were considering whether there should be a sentence of imprisonment, they would say to the offender if he was not legally represented, "Do you want to be legally represented?" At column 1552 of the proceedings in the House of Lords Viscount Colville of Culross says:

"All that we want to do is to make certain that before the magistrates sentence, if the man or the woman is not already represented he or she should be told. 'We have it in mind that you may have to go to prison for this offence. We are not allowed by law to sentence you to prison until we have had the assistance of listening to counsel or a solicitor on your behalf, if it is your wish to have one'".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 16th October, 1972: Vol. 335. c. 1552.]

At that stage they offer him legal aid. That may be the intention, but I do not see it in the Clause. I shall be pleased if the hon. and learned Gentleman can say that is what is meant, but the Clause says that he has been "informed". He might have been informed about the availability of legal aid by a leaflet or from the charge sheet. There are several places and ways in which he may have been informed. Can the hon. and learned Gentleman say that "informed" means what the noble lord Viscount Colville of Culross said it meant in the House of Lords? If he can, there is no further worry, but I should like him to clear up that point.

Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 are moderate Amendments which slightly extend the coverage of the Lords Amendment as it stands. In effect, they say, "You are excluding people who have previous custodial sentences from benefit under the Clause, but let us have a cut- off period." For example, if a man has been going steady for five years—I am generous enough to give the Government the choice, they can have five or 10 years—or a substantial period, and the offender has not committed an offence recently which has led to a custodial sentence, then let that man also have the benefit of the Clause. That is a mild and moderate proposal. I do not know how far it would extend the coverage but, whether or not it would extend it very much, it appears to me that a man who has not offended for 20 years, but who 20 years ago did offend and received a sentence, should benefit from the Clause. I am saying, "Let him benefit" and I am giving the Government the choice of five or 10 years. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will comment on these points and questions. In particular, I hope that he will tell us why the Government have changed their minds and according to what principle they now believe they are acting.

I hope that the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Dell) and the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin) will forgive me if I say that we have been over this ground on a great number of occasions since Second Reading. But I will try to explain the effect of the Lords Amendment. I will explain why we decided to implement it in the House of Lords and why I find the Opposition's proposed Amendment to it unacceptable.

The hon. and learned Member for Dulwich talked a lot about how necessary it is for a person to know and to be informed of his rights. The effect of the Lords Amendment is not to ensure that a person knows or is informed of his rights, but to say that he cannot be sent to prison if he has not been in prison before, that he cannot be sent to Borstal if he has not been in Borstal before, and that he cannot be sent to a detention centre if he has not been there before, unless he is legally represented, other than in two circumstances—first, that he was offered legal aid and refused or failed to accept it, and, second, that he is found by the court to be clearly of such substance as not financially to require legal aid. Otherwise, the person must be represented before the court before he can be sent to prison, or to Borstal, or to a detention centre, if he has not been there before.

The hon. and learned Gentleman may say, "Why specify the type of punishment?". He may ask why we should not specify a person who has never been to custodial sentence before. But that would assume that if a boy of 14, say, has been to a detention centre and appears before a higher court at a much later age—perhaps many years later—the higher court may say that it will send him to prison and that he is not bound to be represented because he has had a previous custodial sentence. The effect of limiting the provision to the type of punishment is to say that Borstal is graver than a detention centre, and that even if a person has been to a detention centre he should not be sent to Borstal unless he is represented and heard, and that, equally, if he has been to Borstal he should not be sent to prison for the first time until he has had the opportunity to be heard.

I am asked on what principle we distinguish between the person who has not been to prison before and the person who has been to prison before. The best advice I can get at the moment is that the figure of those going to prison for the first time is substantially higher than that which the hon. and learned Gentleman gave. It is likely to be between 40 and 45 per cent.

We make the distinction for the very simple reason that it is consistent with the principle, used in other parts of the Bill, that there should be a particular safeguard around the individual who has not been in prison before but who is likely to go to prison as a result of an offence—namely, that he cannot be sent to prison unless the court is satisfied that no other means is appropriate. Equally, when considering possibly sending to prison a person who has never been there before, it is particularly important for him to have the opportunity of expressing, and having expressed on his behalf, that which he wishes to express.

I have been asked on what basis of principle the Govearnment bring in this Lords Amendment. It is because it is consistent with other parts of the Bill, designed to highlight the situation of the man who has not been to prison before. The hon. and learned Gentleman, how- ever, asks why, having gone that far, we should not go the whole way and say that no one should ever be sent to prison unless he is represented before the court. The right hon. Gentleman wishes to have the argument both ways. He says that we should do that but also asks, since we have always said that it was not necessary to tell the courts other matters, why it is necessary to tell them about the case of the first offender.

I said at an earlier stage, and I repeat, that I believe that there is substantial evidence in the figures for my belief that the Widgery criteria are to a large extent being implemented today. Of those committed to quarter sessions, 95 per cent. were represented, while in the magistrates' courts legal aid was granted to 79,000 persons, although only 18,000 persons appearing in the magistrates' courts were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. I said that it was obvious from the growing use of legal aid that the Widgery criteria were being implemented and I was prepared to accept the argument and recommend to the courts that they should be used.

The right hon. Member was a distinguished member of the last Government, and I point out to him that both the Labour Home Secretaries—the right hon. Members for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) and for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan)—never at any stage went so far as to commend the Widgery criteria to the courts. But not only did we say that we commended the Widgery criteria to the courts. We also said that we would send out a circular to that effect. That is being done. It is only being held up for slight alteration to take account of the Lords Amendment.

Why, in view of the argument he has ventilated so proudly, does the hon. and learned Gentleman think it even necessary to send out the circular?

Because, perhaps unwisely, I listened to the hon. Gentleman's arguments and the arguments of others like him, who always say, "That may be your view but I do not accept it." I told him and others in the end that although my belief was that the Widgery criteria were very largely being operated, I accepted the weight of the argument that they were not. I said that the Government would therefore do what the last Government did not do—send out a circular recommending the Widgery criteria. The circular points out that a case where a person is liable to go to prison is clearly a strong prima facie ground for granting him legal aid.

Where a person's liberty is likely to be at stake, the courts will have drawn to their attention the view of the Widgery Committee that this is a strong prima facie for granting legal aid, together with the additional statutory requirement that if that individual has not been to prison before, and the court is thinking of sending him down the steps for the first time, he must be given the opportunity to be represented. That is right and it highlights the situation of the person who has not been to prison before. I accept that in the higher courts people were not sent to prison unless they were represented but we think that we should put it in statutory form.

I do not want to speak any longer, but I would just point out that, to distinguish between recommending Widgery and the proposals of the hon. and learned Gentleman, to say that in every single case, if anybody is sent to prison, he must be offered opportunity of legal aid, is to remove, as his party always seems to wish to remove, any form of discretion left to the courts at all. Let us just take the sort of example which he was giving. I give him two examples, of the concurrent sentence and the breach of probation. Let us take the case of a person who is put on probation by a higher court, perhaps after a considerable record of imprisonment. If he is warned fully and adequately, without being represented, that if he in any way breaks the probation or commits another offence he will go to prison for nine months, and then he breaks into a house and is brought back before the same court, is the hon. and learned Gentleman saying that the court should have no discretion whatsoever in deciding whether or not it would be appropriate that public funds should be provided to defend that man before the court gives him a sentence of nine months, after the court has warned him specifically the day before?

Would the hon. and learned Gentleman not agree that each case of sentencing has to be considered on the immediately relevant and determining factors which led to the commission of the later offence? Would he not also agree that those factors may be entirely new as between the sentence for the previous offence and the commission of the later one, and that it is, therefore, absolutely vital that these new and possibly highly relevant factors which led to the commission of the later offence should be fully considered by the sentencing judge and that they should be considered with the assistance and through the agency of counsel?

In the circumstances I gave, no, I would not agree.

The other example I would give is this. A man gets five years' imprisonment and is brought before the same or another court for some other offence, along with someone else, and the court gives him three months to be served concurrently. Is there anything to be said for granting him the presence of counsel—

Yes.

The hon. and learned Member says yes. I find it difficult to see why, in that type of case, the court should not, having the Widgery criteria, having the strong prima facie argument that they proposed to send to prison, should not be left discretion to say that there are certain cases where representation will achieve no object whatsoever. I have attempted to give two such.

I am almost driven to the conclusion, having listened to the hon. Gentlemen opposite a great deal on this Bill, that really they lack all willingness to give any discretion whatsoever to the courts in deciding in appropriate cases the type of sentence or the grant of legal aid or bail, and that they must have some very deep distrust of the conduct of the courts. For goodness sake, surely in an issue of this kind it is appropriate that the Government should remind the courts of the recommendations of the Lord Chief Justice of the circumstances in which legal aid should be given, and then to leave it to the courts to exercise their discretion to decide in any particular case whether it is given.

I believe that the Amendment to the Lords Amendment would lead to a situation where, whatever the facts, on every single occasion, where a court adjourned a case, and adjourned in custody—and as the hon. Gentleman said, more and more people are being remanded in custody—the accused would have to be represented before that court in the circumstances which I gave—not when a person has not been in prison before, but to widen it further is unnecessary—

On the question of remand in custody, with which the hon. and learned Gentleman dealt very superficially, I thought, is it his view that the Home Office will send out a circular dealing with the way in which persons should be represented? What does he have in mind in that respect? Does he think that in the circumstances adumbrated in the Lords Amendment as it stands persons will be remanded for seven days or 14 days within this category, or does he think that the provision of the Legal Aid and Advice Act will come into operation whereby a lawyer is appointed on the spot—which is also grotesquely inadequate in certain circumstances?

In some cases lawyers will be available and under the new Act will be asked to represent persons in such cases as the right hon. Gentleman has pointed out, in an argument I used against him on many occasions in Committee. The case will have to be adjourned before the person is sentenced to prison and the court might grant legal aid, so there would be no need for an additional adjournment. Sometimes there will be an adjournment.

Finally I would say to the right hon. Gentleman that I am indeed satisfied that the court will have to satisfy itself that the persons were informed. If he looks at the last words of the paragraph he will see that it is immaterial whether they are informed by the Crown Court or the magistrates' court. I think it is clear from that that it is the clear duty of the court to inform them and not give the information merely by leaflet.

By leave of the House. I listened with care to the Minister of State, as I always do, and the more he spoke the more, it seemed to me, he emphasised that the only results which we are going to have from passing into law this new Clause, if passed in its unamended form, is complication of matters, so far as the Widgery criteria are concerned, and creation of a situation in which the courts would have the Widgery criteria before them by way of circular warning them that it is undesirable for people who are unlikely to be sent to prison or some other form of custodial sentence to be granted legal aid.

At the same time they would have before them this new Clause which says to them in effect, "Never mind what Widgery says. That only arises if the person has not been sentenced to some form of custodial sentence before." The Minister shakes his head, but I really do not see how one can escape from that situation, if we make specific and limited provision in an Act of Parliament whilst at the same time sending out by way of advice from the Home Office a recommendation which does not bear that limitation. I think any court is likely in those circumstances to take the view that what Parliament intended is what is to be followed, rather than what appears by way of guidance.

I am coming very much to the view, having heard the Minister, and also the very pertinent points which my right hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Dell) made, that it would be better not to have this new Clause at all and to rely solely on Widgery, rather than have it unamended to create the possibility of confusion. When we put forward the Widgery proposals in statutory form we put them in that form; we did not select one, as the Government have, by way of a sop to opinion in this place or another place. Putting it forward in this way is only going to cause the courts to be ignorant as to the real intentions of the legislature, certainly unless the Amendment which I have proposed to the Lords Amendments is passed to delete the wording from the new Clause which produces a contradiction between it and the Widgery criteria.

In these circumstances I certainly would not wish to withdraw my Amendment to the Lords Amendment and I would invite the House to support it in the Division Lobby.

I beg to move, That this

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

I understand that with it we shall discuss Lords Amendment No. 56, in page 46, line 31, column 3, at beginning insert, "Section 7(1)".

The Amendment is necessary because of the decision in the recent case of the Crown v. Aylesbury Crown Court ex parte Simons and is to put right a situation in the Criminal Damage Act where they held that arson was a separate offence and as such, since it was not specifically shown in the schedule it could not be tried summarily even with the consent of the accused. It was always intended that this offence, although described as arson, should be able to be dealt with in appropriate cases summarily with the consent of the accused, and that is the effect of the Amendment.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

It provides for the approval, inspection and management of bail hostels and other similar premises. The Clause enables probation and after-care committees to provide day training centres, probation hostels and homes, bail hostels and other establishments for use in connection with the rehabilitation of offenders.

The purpose of the Amendment is to provide in relation to bail hostels powers similar to those already applicable to probation hostels and homes. It therefore provides for premises to be approved as bail hostels, for the Secretary of State to have power to make rules relating to the regulation management, and inspection of such premises and for the inspection of other premises not being approved bail hostels where persons may be required to reside as a condition of bail.

The purpose of providing rule-making powers is to secure common administrative arrangements for establishments which may be run either by probation and after-care committees or by voluntary bodies. More important, it is shown to the public and the courts that proper care is being taken about protecting and looking after people who will reside there as a condition of bail and that, should they be dissatisfied, they will not be free to leave without risk of forfeiting bail and being further remanded in custody.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

I understand that with it we are to take the following Lords Amendments No. 41, in page 41, leave out lines 14 to 19.

No. 51, in page 44, line 49, column 3, after "onwards" insert "paragraph 3(4)".

No. 55, in page 45, line 46, column 3, after "3" insert "paragraph 19(4) and".

The purpose of the Amendment is to enable a probation and after-care committee to delegate in certain circumstances and with the approval of the Secretary of State some of its functions to a sub-committee. The reason for the Amendment is related to the reorganisation of local government. The Government have decided to retain the broad pattern of local organisation in the probation service in committees of magistrates and they have also decided to establish a probation area for each new county created by the Local Government Bill.

It was represented to us that in the metropolitan areas the probation committee should be connected to the district rather than the county, but as the county is to be the paying authority, it is felt right that the metropolitan county should be the area of the probation and aftercare committee.

However, it is accepted that some of these areas would include large numbers and it may be appropriate and would meet the fears connected with having the county rather than the district as the probation committee area if there were the power to delegate the powers of the committee to sub-area committees. The proposal is that, where appropriate, the metropolitan counties could be divided into two or more sub-areas each of which would be under the supervision of a sub-area officer, whose office would be located in that sub-area, which would comprise one or more local government metropolitan districts. There would be, for each sub-area, a sub-area committee of magistrates to whom the senior probation officer in the sub-area would be responsible.

This proposal retains the wish of the Government to retain a connection between the counties and the probation areas as the counties are to be the paying authorities, while where necessary giving the opportunity to split the size of the probation service where the area is felt to be too great for there to be that contact between the officer and the committee that has always been a part of the probation service.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

With this we are to discuss Lords Amendment No. 37, in page 40, line 23, at end insert new Schedule C—

"Reference to Court of Criminal Appeal of point of law following acquittal on indictment."

The effect of the Amendment is to provide in the law of Northern Ireland for reference to the Court of Criminal Appeal in Northern Ireland on a point of law following the acquittal of a person tried on indictment. The general effect will be that the situation in Northern Ireland will be the same as that resulting from Clause 30.

I have a question on the general policy of including in United Kingdom Bills amendments to Northern Ireland Acts. Recently, we passed the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act, enabling this to be done by Statutory Instrument. Apparently, here the Government have chosen to do it by including amending provisions within a Bill which otherwise applies to the United Kingdom apart from Northern Ireland. Is it intended that in future we may expect Northern Ireland legislation to be amended through the medium of a Bill that otherwise has nothing to do with Northern Ireland?

I ask because Northern Ireland legislation is naturally of interest to Northern Ireland Members who, to judge by their absence today, have no idea that Northern Ireland law is being amended in this way. If this is to be future policy, they should know and should have the opportunity to scrutinise any legislation to find out whether there is some amendment of Northern Ireland law—until such time as the Temporary Provisions Act expires.

Whereas it is right that this change in the substantive law of Northern Ireland could have been made by Order in Council, it was felt that as the Bill extends to Northern Ireland for other purposes it was a matter of convenience to make the change by means of an Amendment to the Bill. It in no way means that matters will always be dealt with in this way.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 10, at end add:

'and no such rules shall take effect until the instrument in which they are contained has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament'.

The purpose of the Amendment is self-evident, that the rules of court to be made to restrict or prevent disclosure of the identity of a person whose acquittal is being appealed against on a point of law should be approved by both Houses of Parliament.

It is true that the House has a great deal of business, and that it is difficult to find time to approve Statutory Instruments. If that is a reason for not implementing Clause 30, that is all the more welcome, because that Clause in effect allows an appeal on a point of law against an acquittal; where a person is acquitted, the Attorney-General can refer the case to the Court of Appeal on a point of law. The Bill does not say that that is done as a matter of general guidance but talks about an opinion on a particular case. It is a question about which a great deal of concern and apprehension has been expressed both outside and by both Houses of Parliament.

That the appeal is against the decision in a particular case is quite clear from the way in which Clause 30 is drafted, because the defendant has the right to be represented in the Court of Appeal and to argue there. The conclusion is inescapable that it is an appeal against acquittal. We shall have a peculiar kind of verdict of "guilty but acquitted" if the decision is reversed on a point of law by the Court of Appeal, or "not guilty on a technicality".

A defendant acquitted by a jury but having the decision reversed by the Court of Appeal on a point of law is likely to suffer opprobrium. For that reason the Lords' Amendment was made to restrict or prevent disclosure of the defendant's identity. But the matter is not as easy as that. As was pointed out in another place, it may be a famous trial, and details of the offence complained of may have been published in every Sunday newspaper. Once a celebrated case goes to the Court of Appeal, whether or not the identity of the defendant is prevented or restricted, if the result is reported people are almost bound to identify the defendant. If he is, as it were, convicted by the Court of Appeal on a point of law, when he has already been acquitted by a jury, there is great danger of damage to his reputation.

What is the position of newspapers if they publish the facts or a brief description of the case which may identify the defendant? What happens when my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham, North (Mr. Arthur Lewis), who unfortunately cannot be here today, puts down Questions to the Attorney-General, asking, "Are you referring the case of the Crown v. Smith to the Court of Appeal on a point of law?"? Is he to be in contempt of court for putting such a Question to the Attorney-General? It can therefore be seen that the question raises matters which can affect the right of Parliament to question the decision of the Attorney-General. It raises most difficult questions for newspapers and the other public media. We do not know quite whether the rules will simply restrict the disclosure of identity or prevent it altogether. It is by no means clear from the way in which the Lords' Amendment is worded, The whole matter bristles with difficulties.

Therefore, we say that the rules of court to restrict or prevent disclosure of the identity of the defendant should be approved positively by Parliament, and not simply be left to the judges.

The simple answer to the hon. Gentleman's comments is that of course Parliament can have the opportunity to learn all the information about which he spoke and to debate it, since the provisions will have to be subject to the negative procedure, and it will be open to him to pray against the rules and to scrutinise them in that way.

But I should like to take the matter wider and try to allay some of the hon. Gentleman's more extreme fears about the provision. It shall not go into its merits, because that would be out of order. We are anxious to provide adequate safeguards for the person who has been acquitted. The Lord Chief Justice has been consulted and has advised that proceedings on a reference to the Court of Appeal can be conducted without the need for the name of the acquitted person to be mentioned.

The procedure that the Government intend should be adopted is that the Attorney-General should state a case for the opinion of the Court of Appeal, without any names, in much the same way as magistrates state a case. Proper names of persons and places would not be mentioned in the case or in any formal documents. In addition, there would be a requirement not to disclose these particu- lars in open court except with the consent of the acquitted person. Appropriate rules of court would be made to ensure that a procedure on these lines would be adopted.

The Lord Chief Justice envisages that when a case came before the Court of Appeal the Court would not refer to any of the facts of the original trial, except those stated by the Attorney-General in his submission of the case, and that when the Court gave its decision it would merely answer the questions posed for it as questions of law, and thus decide the point of law without indicating what effect this view might have had on the earlier case.

It is felt that it is right that the Crown Court Rule Committee should now be invited to make the rules to see that that provision can be carried out, with a view to preventing or restricting the exposure of the identity of the acquitted person.

Once those rules have been made it will be up to the Home Secretary to satisfy himself that they are adequate before making the order bringing this provision into effect. At that stage those rules will be subject to the negative procedure and can be debated in the House. It would be creating a dangerous precedent to say that rules made by the Crown Court Rules Committee should in one particular suddenly become subject to the positive rather than the negative procedure.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

I believe that it would be convenient if we also discussed Lords Amendment No. 38.

The purpose of these Amendments is to enable the chief superintendents of the Royal Ulster Constabulary to endorse warrants issued in Northern Ireland for execution in other parts of the British Isles, that is the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and vice versa. The need for the change has arisen simply from recent changes in police ranks in Northern Ireland.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 102, leave out 'ten' and insert 'five'.

I understand that it is the wish of the House that the following Amendment to Lords Amendment No. 35 be taken also:

Leave out lines 104 to 107 and insert:

been sentenced to imprisonment or detention for a term of three months or more or been ordered to be detained in a borstal institution and has served any part of such sentence or been so detained'.

The first of these Amendments is concerned with persons who are to be disqualified for jury service. The second part of Part II of the new Schedule refers to persons who at any time in the last ten years has in the appropriate place served any part of a sentence of imprisonment or detention, being a sentence for a term of three months or more, or has been detained in a Borstal institution.

The disqualification arises if someone has been sentenced to a term of three months as a minimum and has served any part of those three months at any time within the last 10 years. Sentences of three months' imprisonment are exacted in a wide variety of cases some of which are relatively trivial and certainly not to be compared with the sort of case comprehended by the first part of Part II, where they are a permanent disqualification. Nevertheless, we agree that there should be a disqualification in respect of these lesser sentences. Our doubts arise on whether it is necessary that in those cases the disqualification should last for as long as 10 years.

Paragraph 143 of the Morris Committee's Report indicates that the Committee shared our doubt because it recommended a period of five rather than 10 years. Our Amendment would give effect to the Morris Committee's recommendation. Perhaps the Minister can explain why it was thought that Morris was wrong and that double the period should be imposed in terms of disqualification in cases which may well have been of a relatively—I emphasise the word "relatively"—trivial character.

Amendment No. 19 is a drafting Amendment, because there seems to us to be some doubt about he meaning of the present form of paragraphs (a) and (b), in Part II. The reference in the first part of Part II is clearly to a person who has

"at any time been sentenced … to imprisonment for life or for a term of five years …".

But here we have a person who is disqualified if he has served any part of the sentence of imprisonment or detention.

What is the situation under this form of wording when a person serves part of the sentence of imprisonment, then takes the matter to appeal and the conviction is quashed or the sentence reduced to a period below the three months that is provided for? This matter is topical since I saw in my newspaper this morning that the Court of Appeal had reduced a sentence, the whole of which had been served, to a sentence of one day's imprisonment. If this applies to the service of the period of imprisonment, that person would presumably be disqualified. But if it applies only to the sentence he would not be disqualified because of the action of the court of appeal. Amendment No. 19, therefore, is a drafting provision intended to bring the form of wording in the second part into parallel with the wording of the first part and seeks to remove any uncertainty by making quite clear that what is intended is that this should apply when a person has been sentenced.

May I ask who are the Active Elder Brethren of the Corporation of Trinity House of Deptford Strond, mentioned in Group B, in Schedule A, as being persons ineligible to serve on a jury? Then, in Group C we see reference to

"a man in holy orders; a regular minister of any religious denomination".

These, too, are also persons said to be ineligible for jury service. I see a good reason why they should be in the same category as Members of Parliament, that is to say persons who may be excused jury service, but I should like to ask why they have to come under the heading of persons who are ineligible for jury service. Is there any historical reason for this ineligibility?

First, I will deal with the two Amendments discussed by the hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. S. C. Silkin).

The hon. and learned Gentleman may be concerned that the period of disqualification has been raised from five to 10 years. However, his concern is of recent origin. I was asked why Morris had been overruled and five years replaced by 10 years. The hon. and learned Gentleman must look to his own Front Bench for the answer to that rather than to the Government. In the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, the then Government implemented that part of Morris which prevented people with previous criminal convictions serving on a jury. The Labour Government specifically decided to overrule the Morris recommendations and make the period 10 years rather than five years. We have repeated what is in the Criminal Justice Act, 1967.

The hon. and learned Gentleman is wrong regarding his second point. If a sentence is set aside or varied by the Court of Appeal the original sentence of imprisonment does not stand. The only sentence that stands is the final sentence of the court. Therefore, although a person may have been in prison for four months and had his sentence reduced to three months, that four months is not served as part of the sentence of imprisonment, because the sentence of imprisonment is that finally given by the court. Equally, if it is quashed, although he has been deprived of his liberty, it is not by a valid sentence of the court.

The effect of the Amendment, unintentionally I think, would mean that the situation is not as it is at the moment, namely, that a person should not within the last 10 years have served any part of that sentence but that in the last 10 years should have received that sentence. If both Amendments were accepted, a man sentenced to five years' imprisonment could, less remission, come out in less than five years and be immediately eligible for jury service the next day. It must be right that the period of disqualification should follow from the end of the sentence rather than the date on which the sentence was imposed.

Before the Minister leaves that point. He has given an interpretation of paragraph (a)—far be it for me to suggest that is wrong—but what about paragraph (b)? There is no reference there to "sentence" at all. It simply says,

"been detained in a borstal institution."

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman take the view that that is covered in a similar way?

That seems rather a good point. Presumably "detained" means detained in accordance with an order. At first sight, there appears to be a distinction between serving part of a sentence of imprisonment and serving part of an order of detention in a borstal institution. I cannot at the moment explain that difference.

I turn now to the points raised by the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell). The Active Elder Brethren of the Corporation of Trinity House of Deptford Strond serve as nautical assessors in the Admiralty Court and therefore are ineligible as being people involved with the judiciary.

The Morris Committee specifically recommended that the clergy should go in the class of "Persons Ineligible" rather than in the class of "Persons Excusable as of Right", such as Members of Parliament, on the basis that the clergy might have private knowledge of a criminal through what had been said to them in a confessional.

I beg to move, as an Amendment to the Lords Amendment, in line 137, at end add—

'Women having charge of young children

Any woman who has the regular charge of one or more children under the age of five years'.

The purpose of the Amendment is to add to the list of those who are entitled to ask to be excused from jury duty, not by going through the summonsing officer but by being registered among those who may be exempt, the women who have charge of young children under the age of five years. The Morris Report made it clear that the present list of jurors includes only about 11 per cent. of women. Clearly, the Opposition welcome the changes which have been outlined by the Minister of State, which make it possible for far more women to serve on juries. I trust that we will not have an argument about maturity or immaturity of the sort which we had about the 18 to 21 years olds.

The Morris Report pointed out that only two or three women are normally found on a jury and that often a jury is composed entirely of men. It is also the case that a lot of trials nowadays, especially the more complicated trials, may last weeks and sometimes months. Therefore, the burden that falls on jurors is very heavy. We fully accept that that burden should fall on women as much as upon men, except where it is virtually impossible for a woman to fulfil her obligations if she serves as a juror. That puts her in the same position as a doctor, a Member of Parliament or a minister of religion.

We have drafted the Amendment narrowly to include women with children up to the age of five years because it is not unreasonable to suggest that women whose children are at school can normally make arrangements to cover their care during the time between the end of the court case each day and the children's return from school. However, we think that it is probably unreasonable to require a woman to serve on a jury when she has children of such a young age that they require her daily constant attendance. The Minister of State may point out that such a woman would be entitled to ask to be excused by the summonsing officer. However, I draw to the Minister's attention the view of the Morris Report, in paragraph 217, that the power is actually interpreted somewhat narrowly. That is given by the Committee as the reason for exempting people by entitlement.

When somebody is exempted by entitlement they are entitled, as we all know, not to take up that right. It is an absolute right to be excused but not one which anyone needs to exercise. A young woman with children under the age of five years, should she wish to serve on a jury and could easily make arrangements, would not need to seek to be excused. However, we are concerned that so much rests upon the discretion of the summonsing officer, especially when the Morris Report has found that the power of the summonsing officers is not used as imaginatively or as generously as it might be.

Finally, it is reasonable for society to accord a more equal status to women than that which they have had in the past, not least in the acceptance of their obligations as citizens and jurors to society. However, in many ways circumstances are unequal. Even though rights and obligations should, as far as possible be equal, it is important to have regard to inequality of circumstance. I do not need to remind the Minister of State of the tremendous amount of research which has been done to show how much harm can be done to young children if they are abandoned for long periods of time by the parent who mainly and normally looks after them.

I ask the House to consider the special problems which exist for women and to make a distinction or concession. As we do not intend to press the Amendment to a Division, I ask the Minister of State to consider seriously whether he cannot accept it because of the special problems that arise in these cases.

Normally a juror is allowed expenses or some recompense for loss of earnings while he is on jury service. Is a woman who has to employ somebody to look after her children or who has to put her child in a school during her jury service also allowed to claim compensation?

I am afraid that I cannot accede to the hon. Lady's request to accept the proposed Amendment to the Lords Amendment, but of course I am aware that women with young children may find themselves in a situation where it is difficult to act as a juror. But as she said there is already the right to the existing discretionary power in the Courts Act, enabling the appropriate officer to release anyone from jury service. Despite what the Morris Committee said, I would hope that the summonsing officers would use that power generously.

When the Morris Report said that the officers were restrictive in the way they used their power, it said so when the officers had a far narrower category of people qualifying the jury service. Now, all those between the age of 18 or 21 and 65 are eligible and I am sure that every summonsing officer will be able to exercise his discretion wisely and generously so that young mothers looking after children will be considered sympathetically for excusal from jury service, particularly on longer cases. In defence of my own profession, I would point out to the hon. Lady that it is the normal custom for judges specifically to ask individual members of a jury if they have any personal reason which makes it difficult for them to go on for a substantial period of time.

It would be difficult to transfer to those automatically entitled to exemption as of right this one group of mothers looking after children under five, although obviously such cases should qualify by merit for excusal if necessary. As the hon. Lady herself has said, many mothers arrange for someone to look after their children while they go out to work and I do not think that it would be very difficult to do the same in the case of jury service. The hon. Lady says that jury service is an obligation which women wish to undertake and I think that most mothers looking after children under five could make arrangements with friends or neighbours enabling them to serve on a jury. While I am not without sympathy with the hon. Lady's argument, I believe that it would be wrong to widen further the categories of those excused as of right, which the Morris Report thought should be kept limited the better to enable the summonsing officers to exercise their discretion reasonably and generously.

Will the hon. and learned Gentleman reply to the central point put by my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell), since sometimes arrangements can be made with neighbours if expenses are met but not otherwise. Would the hon. and learned Gentleman consider drawing the attention of the summonsing officers to this problem, since the Morris Committee did not have quite such a sanguine view of the imagination and generosity of these gentlemen as the hon. and learned Gentleman has?

I was not disputing the Morris Report. I was pointing out that the summonsing officers now have a wider range of choice than they had when the Morris Committee reported. I hope that they will be generous in the use of their power. Certainly we will consider giving them advice if that is helpful. I will write to the hon. Lady and to the hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. R. C. Mitchell) about the point he raised. I think I am right in saying that such a case would be covered by the rules of expenses, but I will look at it and write to the hon. Members.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

It would be convenient to take at the same time Lords Amendment No. 50: In page 44, line 45, column 3, at end insert—

"In Schedule 1, in paragraph (b) of the proviso to paragraph 3, the words "or to submit to treatment for his mental condition"."

Yes, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The effect of the Amendments is to repeal the 12-month limitation which now exists on a mental treatment requirement in a probation order.

As the House will know, a person can be put on probation for three years, but the limit on the period for which he can be required to undergo mental treatment is 12 months. There are cases in which one might want to make the period longer than 12 months. It was felt proper in another place, and the Government accepted it, that there should be wider power for the courts to do so if they thought it right.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is a short point, but it is one of substance. Its purpose is to make the provisions with regard to a community service order correspond with those existing for a probation order in that, if as a result of the community service order a person is sent to prison he cannot claim against that sentence, as one might say, any period he may have spent in custody before the community service order was originally imposed. That is the situation that occurs on breach of probation and it is right that this condition should be similar in both cases.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This Amendment extends in very minor respects the orders which an adult magistrates' court can make in respect of a juvenile without remitting him to a juvenile court to be dealt with. At the moment, an adult court can, without remitting, either discharge the juvenile absolutely or conditionally, bind him over or make an order on his guardian or parents to enter into a recognisance. The effect of the Amendment would be that they could also make any further order, which could be remitted, of conditional or absolute discharge.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said Amendment.

This is the last of the Lords Amendments, and it is necessary in order that the Title may accommodate the various Amendments regarding juries, and there have been a substantial number, which the Government introduced in another place.