On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I wish to question whether the Bill is properly for consideration today. As I was a member of the Standing Committee which considered the Bill, perhaps I may be allowed to explain the circumstances concerning it. When it went before the Committee it was in substantially the same form as when introduced on Second Reading on two previous occasions and, in particular, on Second Reading in this Parliament on 3rd May, by which time it had already passed all its stages in the other place.

The Bill went to a Standing Committee which considered it on 12th June. Government amendments were then put down to the Bill. They were complex, and amounted to a complete rewriting of the whole Bill, in that the original clauses were all deleted and fresh clauses were proposed in the Government amendments. Those amendments were put down only 48 hours before the Standing Committee on 10th June.

The Bill had previously received consideration by national organisations and experts in the subject with which it is concerned, and by those whose duty it would be to apply it if it became law, but 48 hours before it was to be considered by the Standing Committee the whole of the terms of the wording of the Bill were, in effect, changed. Incidentally, my amendments to the Bill could not be considered, nor could manuscript amendments be accepted by the Chairman of the Standing Committee because of the procedure adopted by the Government. The Standing Committee completed con sideration of the Bill at its Second Sitting on Wednesday 19th June. It did so without suffiicent consideration because there was insufficient study of the new terms by the experts and outside bodies to which I have referred.

The Bill as amended is now before the House but the Government have yet again tabled a whole series of amendments. The amendment list before us totals 36 amendments. They are amendments of substance and were tabled only yesterday—indeed, two of them became available to hon. Members only this morning.

We appreciate that the industrial dispute concerning the printers has affected publication of these matters, but it all amounts to the fact that back benchers have not had an opportunity of considering the wording of the Bill as it has progressed through this Parliament and we are now being asked to complete consideration without being able properly to consider the terms of the Bill.

If back benchers' rights are a matter for your protection, Mr. Speaker, I respectfully suggest that we should say that we are not a rubber stamp for the Home Office, and that we should ask that the Bill be withdrawn so that it can be properly considered after due study by the experts and outside bodies concerned. We in this House are not experts on any particular subject. We accept that there has to be assistance from outside bodies. We have not had that assistance, because the wording has been drastically revised by the Government in a short time without a proper consideration of the matters to be involved.

I ask you, Mr. Speaker, if it is not right that consideration of the Bill today should be withdrawn.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I may be able to assist the House in determining this question. I have great sympathy with the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook). The matter which he raises arises largely because the Government have been given the assistance of draftsmen and officials in redrafting the Bill in a confined period of time. We have all been working under considerable pressure.

I had hoped that we could restrict most of the major amendments to the Committee stage. The hon. Gentleman says that the amendments were put down late for Committee. In fact, they were considered in Committee each in turn and there was a full discussion of them in which the hon. Gentleman himself took part. He has tabled one amendment for Report stage, and that will be discussed today because it has been provisionally selected. Therefore, he has had the opportunity of raising amendments to the draft as it came out of Committee.

Nevertheless, it is true that we have found it necessary, because of some of the matters which were not capable of being dealt with in Committee, to table a number of technical amendments. I gave that warning in Committee and I shall explain the technicalities as we get to them.

In general, they do not seriously affect the principles of the Bill. There are only three matters on which issues of principle arise. Those matters are easily understood and capable of being discussed in the course of the discussion we shall have today. I shall draw attention to them as we reach the amendments. I do not think that the House will find itself in any way inconvenienced by the nature of the amendments I have tabled.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. It is surely an issue of principle that there should be adequate time for back benchers to consider amendments and to consult outside bodies which may be interested. Nobody is suggesting that the Minister is trying to pull a fast one, but it is important, I again stress, that there should be time for consultation. We all appreciate that there are technical difficulties and difficulties over printing. However, this has become virtually a Government Bill, and it differs completely from the original Bill which went into Standing Committee. If Private Members cannot be given adequate time to consider amendments, I suggest that further consideration of the Bill should be deferred for a few days.

This matter has been raised as a matter of order for the Chair. I have to do my best to protect the rights and interests of back benchers and, indeed, of the whole House. I know that certain difficulties have arisen because of the printing dispute, and I sympathise with hon. Members. I cannot rule that the House should not proceed with the Bill now.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I beg your indulgence—

I have ruled on the hon. Member's point of order.

On a new point of order, as a matter of procedure with regard to the Bill. Some of my hon. Friends and I have tabled Amendment No. 24 to Clause 5. Subsequently to our tabling it, Government Amendment No. 25 was tabled, which will have the effect of deleting Clause 5. In the circumstances, will you accept a manuscript amendment so that I can move my amendment to the new Clause 5?

If the hon. Gentleman will produce his manuscript amendment so that it can be considered, a ruling will be given on the matter.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The first group of amendments illustrates the difficulty that I was referring to, which caused the Government to give assistance with the Bill and try to help with the redrafting to meet all the difficulties that are attendant upon it.

The new clause deals with the position in relation to courts martial and courts martial sentences and convictions. Clearly it would not be right if we were to pass a Bill giving rehabilitation for convictions and sentences in the past if we did not try also to deal with the problem in relation to Service disciplinary proceedings. This is what the new clause does, together with the other amendments that are grouped with it.

Subsection (1) equates findings of guilt by Service authorities with convictions by civilian courts, and punishments awarded by such authorities with sentences passed by such courts, for the purposes of the Bill.

Subsection (2) provides that where, in Service disciplinary proceedings, a person is found guilty but insane, or not guilty by reason of insanity, the finding is to count as both a conviction and a sentence for the purposes of the Act. This brings it into line with the Bill as at present drafted in relation to civil criminal proceedings.

This means that a person is capable of becoming rehabilitated in respect of such a finding. The appropriate rehabilitation period is five years, or two years after release from custody, whichever is the longer, under subsection (7A) of the new Clause 3, which is to be inserted by a later Government amendment.

Subsection (3) defines "Service disciplinary proceedings" and is largely self-explanatory. The definition includes proceedings under Acts superseded by subsequent legislation so that persons found guilty in such proceedings may benefit from the provisions of the Bill. It also includes proceedings which take place outside Great Britain. Other Government amendments to the new Clause 3 set out the appropriate rehabilitation periods in respect of sentences imposed by service authorities.

11.15 a.m.

The other amendments are largely drafting. There are two to which I shall draw particular attention. Amendment No. 6 deals with

"a sentence of cashiering or of discharge with ignominy or dismissal with disgrace from Her Majesty's service".

Cashiering is now an obsolete sentence, and it is referred to only because there will be some people who still have a sentence of cashiering against them, and we have to deal with their position as well.

The way in which the matter has been approached is that these offences should count in relation to rehabilitation. In relation to a sentence of detention, the period will be seven years for rehabilitation. In relation to a sentence of dismissal from Her Majesty's service, it will be seven years.

In relation to dismissal with disgrace, it is not proposed that that sentence could be rehabilitated. I have considered this at some length, but I am advised by the Ministry of Defence that courts martial normally retain the sentence of dismissal with disgrace for very serious offences which might be equated in civilian courts with a sentence of imprisonment of more than two and a half years. In other words, it is rather like a Crown court sentence for an exceptionally serious offence. In those circumstances, the Ministry of Defence thinks it right, and I agree, that this sentence should not be capable of being rehabilitated. That would be the effect of the amendment.

Amendment No. 17 specifies the rehabilitation period applicable to a finding in Service disciplinary proceedings that the person is guilty but insane or not guilty by reason of insanity. The period is five years or two years after discharge, whichever is the longer.

The second new subsection provides that, where a conviction results in any kind of disqualification, the rehabilitation period applicable to the sentence shall be a period of disqualification beginning with the date of conviction. This goes wider than military service questions. It relates to the point taken in Committee about disqualification. The House will recollect that the Bill in its present state says that the period of rehabilitation shall be the period of disqualification or one year, whichever is the longer.

It was drawn to the attention of the Standing Committee that there will be occasions when a sentence by itself—not apparently including a period of disqualification—may attract, under the general law, a period of disqualification—for instance, disqualification from jury service. It would, therefore, appear possible that that period would be included. This amendment is designed to help with that provision and, equally, to deal with the position of disqualification from driving offences. It retains the effect of the new Clause 4(3) in respect of orders arising from a conviction—for example, under the Criminal Justice Act 1972, which disqualifies from jury service for 10 years anyone sentenced to more than three months' imprisonment. Under the new existing Clause 4(3), that would automatically apply a 10-year rehabilitation period to any such sentences, which would make nonsense of the shorter rehabilitation period set out in the Bill. By confining the effect of disqualification to orders arising from a specific conviction, that difficulty is overcome.

The next amendment with which I wish to deal is No. 20. This is merely a minor drafting amendment to take account of the inclusion in the clause of new subsection (7A) and (7B).

Amendment No. 30 is a drafting amendment, to deal with definitions. It provides that an official record for the purpose of the Bill includes the British armed service record at home and overseas.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is the Minister moving amendments or is he merely moving new Clause 1?

I was intending when the Minister had resumed his seat, to regularise the position, inasmuch as I was going not only to give the page and line numbers referred to on the typed copy of the Bill but also to mention, before proposing that the clause be read a Second time, the amendments which are to be taken with. I will do that now. With new Clause 1 are being taken Amendments Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 35, 17, 20 and 30. The page and line numbers in the Notice Paper refer to the typed copy of the Bill which was published yesterday and which hon. Members have in their hands. I hope that will help the hon. Gentleman.

I am sorry to be tiresome about this, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I have just been handed a copy of Mr. Speaker's provisional selection of amendments. I have been here since 10.30 asking for this list in the Lobby and in the Vote Office. These lists were not available at 11 o'clock. The hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman), who has just arrived, has a copy because presumably copies are in the Lobby now, but they were not in the Lobby at 11 o'clock. I was waiting for them. This really is an abuse of the proceedings of this House. It is taking away the rights of back-bench Members. The Home Office may have known how these matters were to be discussed, but back-bench Members do not.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The Home Office has no control over how Mr. Speaker selects amendments or groups them or deals with the way in which hon. Members are informed about the grouping. As I understand it from my hon. Friends, the table showing the grouping of amendments and the order in which they have been selected was available in the Vote Office this morning at a reasonably early hour.

Further to that point of order. They were in the Lobby at 11 o'clock. I picked up my copy then.

I understand that they were available before 11 o'clock; I could not give the exact time but somewhere around half-past Ten, I understand. That is my information.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this new Clause are to be taken Government Amendments Nos. 4 and 25, and Amendment No. 24, in page 7, line 67, at end, insert:

'(c) in any proceeding relating to the disciplinary jurisdiction of any judicial authority having the power referred to in subsection (4) of section 2 (effect of rehabilitation)'.

This clause is a much more substantial matter and is one of the few issues of principle which are raised in the amendments which we are discussing today. It arises out of the debate that we had on Clause 5 of the Bill as it emerged from Committee, which, as hon. Members will recollect, dealt with the effect of rehabilitation upon the courts and, in particular, upon magistrates' courts.

The way in which we approached the matter in Committee was as follows. The Bill as drafted in Committee followed the decision of the sponsors that, for the purposes of sentencing, the Crown courts and the higher courts should be able to look at spent convictions but the magistrates' courts should not. This was justified on the grounds that the mischief which they wished to prevent was the disclosure in minor criminal cases of previous convictions which may have been very much more serious a long time ago, which did damage out of all proportion to the kind of case which was being considered before the magistrates' court.

My view, which I expressed in Committee, was that if a spent conviction really is a spent conviction, a matter which ought not to be held against a man because he has lived it down, save in most exceptional circumstances, it ought to apply to all courts and not just to a magistrates' court. No one had put down an amendment in Committee to cover that situation. I indicated that I had allowed the Bill to go into Committee with the position relating to the magistrates' court as originally dictated by the sponsors, in order to listen to the debate and to make up my mind in the light of the debate.

The hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) sought to delete the provision relating to magistrates' courts, and there was also a sponsor's amendment which dealt with a compromise which had been reached; namely, that in indictable offences tried summarily in a magistrates' court the magistrates would be able to look at spent convictions but that in relation to summary offences or road traffic offences they would not.

I said in Committee that I did not find that to be a very happy compromise because there were cases involving summary offences of some gravity and there were indictable cases tried summarily which were not of great gravity, and it is a little difficult in practice to distinguish logically between the two. I therefore suggested in Committee that I would look at the possibility of allowing the spent conviction to be used for sentencing in all circumstances but that any reference to it should not be published in the Press afterwards.

It was borne in upon me by the sponsors that to do that might also have unforeseeable and difficult results. Therefore, I have discarded that possible alternative. The course that I have decided to take is dictated by a feeling that the watering down of the original provision in Committee has left very little of substance as a protection for people with spent convictions when it comes to sentencing in any court, and that I ought to try to deal with the matter by including all the courts. Therefore, what I am suggesting is that all criminal courts should be allowed to consider spent convictions in the sense that the matters can be laid before them, and that as a matter of practice they should not place any reliance on spent convictions save and except where it is in the interests of justice either for the prosecution or for the defence that they should do so.

11.30 a.m.

How to achieve that end was the problem which faced me. I did not wish to lay an even more complex amendment on top of all the other complex amendments which I had put before the Committee, and I was anxious that we should proceed as quickly as possible in order to allow the Bill a swift passage through Parliament. I have therefore asked my officials to contact the Lord Chief Justice to ascertain whether, in principle, he would be prepared to issue a practice direction which would dictate the practice to be followed in the Crown courts. We in our turn in the Home Office would propose, through instructions, to try to dictate the practice in the magistrates' courts.

It may be, if the Lord Chief Justice, on reflection, considers it right, that he will issue a statement about the practice in all courts, which would help to establish what we all want to see, namely, that spent convictions shall not be used in any court in relation to any sentence save in the most exceptional circumstances where they may be relevant.

We shall watch the position thereafter. The Lord Chief Justice has agreed to take that course. The terms of the announcement or practice direction have not yet been settled, but what we are trying to ensure—the exact terms will be a matter for discussion—is that the prosecution will not disclose spent convictions when putting antecedents before the court, so that evidence of spent convictions will normally be put in writing and not be given orally. A copy of the record of convictions, including spent convictions, will be given to the accused, and the court should refer to the spent convictions only if, in the very exceptional circumstances to which I have referred, it feels that they are relevant to the sentence which it proposes to pass in order that its decision may be understood.

If that practice is obtained in all our courts, it will, I believe, be a bigger advance than either the Bill as originally drafted or the amendment passed in Committee. Since the Lord Chief Justice is willing, in principle, to take the course to which I have referred, I have thought it more convenient that we delete from Clause 5 all reference to criminal courts. That is the object of new Clause 2 with the paving amendments relating to it. New Clause 2 will reinstate such parts of Clause 5 as are still maintained after that deletion, and it will, in effect, cut out the criminal courts.

I should refer to one other matter of substance, which was raised both in Committee and by the Solicitor-General. The Bill as it stood in Committee allowed a spent conviction to be put to the accused when, under the rules of evidence, it was relevant to do so for credit. It did not allow a spent conviction to be put to a witness where, under the existing rules of evidence, that also was relevant.

If the practice is coloured by the practice direction, as I expect it to be, one hopes that in courts in general spent convictions will just be disregarded. But it will be possible under the amendments which I am now laying before the House to put to a witness as well as to the accused a spent conviction if the existing rules of evidence allow that to be done.

I am not happy about that situation. All I can say is that there will be occasional cases—rare, I hope—in which a spent conviction will be relevant and right to be put both to the accused and to a witness, and it would be wrong to prejudice the accused if he could not use such a device against a witness to test credit.

Other parts of the new clause deal with certain matters raised in Committee, with the object to polishing up the drafting as it emerged from Committee. Basically, most of them are drafting matter, and I need not detain the House with them. No doubt, the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) will wish to deal with his Amendment No. 24.

I thank the Minister both for the changes which he proposes and for his detailed explanation. I was the Member who raised this matter in Committee. It seemed to me to be central to the Bill, and my main objection was to the proposal as it then stood. The steps which the Minister has taken meet my case completely, and I am grateful to him.

Will the Minister be good enough to refer to the last word of subsection (4) of the new clause? Is there a misprint? Should not the word "applies" be "applied", since the exemption must refer to the actual period, and the verb should be in the past tense?

I am not happy about the arrangement now made, which alters the original provision in the Bill that in magistrates' courts spent convictions should not be mentioned. Admittedly, my hon. Friend has arrived at some sort of compromise by arranging that there should be a practice note given by the Lord Chief Justice, but practice notes may be altered from time to time, and it seems an unsatisfactory way to legislate to declare that a proposed provision should now give way to a practice note given by the Lord Chief Justice.

The original idea in this part of the Bill was that, because magistrates' courts throughout the country were presided over by magistrates with differing ideas, spent convictions should not be referred to, whereas in the Crown courts, where a trained and experienced lawyer sat as judge, the matter was entirely different. In a Crown court, the learned judge has a discretion. In a magistrates' court, constituted in a different way and, as I say, presided over by magistrates who may have different ideas as between court and court, the position is entirely different, and I should much have preferred the original arrangement to remain.

The difficulty is that there has been such a short time to consider these matters. The Report stage has come very soon, and the amendments were not available until yesterday. One could not put down an amendment, therefore, save by way of manuscript. I am not tempted to do that—I recognise the difficulty—but I protest at the change which has been introduced. I regard it as a bad change which ought not to have been made.

I congratulate the Minister and his officials and the draftsmen on having produced the new clause in such a short space of time. I was not a member of the Committee, but I kept in touch with what went on, and I was concerned by the apparent anomaly which existed between the proposed procedure for the Crown courts and the magistrates' courts. I think that we may rely upon all courts, in spite of what the hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) said, to observe a practice direction given by the Lord Chief Justice, and I am more than happy to leave it in his hands to frame how that practice direction should be given.

Subject to the amendment which will be proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook), I welcome the clause.

It would be churlish not to thank the Minister for the clause and the way it amends the powers of magistrates' courts on sentencing. I rise only to rebut the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) that magistrates without legal training were not the best people to have access to all information concerning any individual defendant appearing before them. Lay magistrates deal with over 95 per cent. of all criminal cases, and they are chosen not because of their legal training but for their knowledge of the world, their experience and their common sense. Those are the qualities which primarily go to assessing a proper sentence for any individual, and it is right that full discretion should be awarded to them.

The magistrates are unpaid servants of society, the very best type of public servants. They are the people on whom we rely for the maintenance of law and order; they are the essence of a civilised society. We should trust them, and it is a good thing that the Government have accepted that principle in the clause by allowing them full access to information about previous convictions.

I beg to move, as a manuscript amendment to the proposed clause, in line 29 after "hearing" insert:

(f) in any proceedings relating to the disciplinary jurisdiction of any judicial authority having the power referred to in sub-section (4) of section 2 (Effect of Rehabilitation)

The new clause that we have just agreed to contains a number of alterations and extensions from the principle of the Bill, and modifications of the principle of exemption from that principle. In particular, subsection (2)(b) contains a reference to Service disciplinary proceedings or any proceedings on appeal from any Service disciplinary proceedings. I believe that it should apply also where disciplinary proceedings are being conducted by a profession. For that reason I believe that the Government, having accepted the principle, should accept my amendment.

I begin by declaring what may be an interest in that from time to time I sit as a member of a panel of legal assessors to the disciplinary committees of the General Medical Council and the General Dental Council. The Bill is concerned with criminal convictions, and I understand its purpose generally to be to prevent them from being dragged up unfairly out of the past for no useful purpose but to the prejudice and embarrassment of the offender, and as such I support it. However, the Bill already recognises that there are circumstances and contexts in which the effect of a conviction may, but not necessarily will, be relevant, however far back that conviction may have been recorded.

It may be relevant to the matter which a tribunal now has in hand. The question of sentencing for a subsequent conviction is an obvious example. The Bill already recognises that earlier convictions should not in certain circumstances be concealed from the tribunal, so that the protection of the Bill is withheld from criminal proceedings under the clause tabled by the Minister. It expressly preserves the normal admissibility of any evidence relating to a defendant's previous convictions and the reason must be the power of tribunals, criminal courts first and foremost, to impose really heavy penalties.

They should, therefore, before exercising that most serious and important power, know the full story. At least, they should be able to know the full record of the defendant before them. So often they must ask themselves whether the latest offence is out of character and whether it is likely to be repeated; can the public be adequately protected without imposing a heavy sentence? The purpose of the amendment, which I support, is not to extend that principle but to extend in a logical way the application of the principle to disciplinary proceedings by judicial authorities as they are defined in the Bill.

Parliament has created a large number of bodies separate from the criminal courts to exercise disciplinary powers over, generally, professional people subject to their jurisdiction. The disciplinary committees of the General Medical Council and the General Dental Council are obvi ous examples, and there are many more. The codes were laid down for them in a series of Acts passed between 1950 and 1960. All of them have the function of promoting high standards of professional conduct ultimately for the protection of the public. Most, if not all, have the power to erase a defendant's name from the professional register if that were thought appropriate on proof of conviction of a criminal offence.

That is a most severe penalty. It is capable of bringing to an end the professional life of the defendant, and it is not, therefore, one which should be exercised in all cases without the ability of tribunals to look at the complete record of persons before them. In the interests of justice and the public, these tribunals need to know, in exercising their powers, the defendant's complete record, or they may need to know it just as a criminal court may need to know. Take common offences such as the abuse of drugs or alcohol. The question for the committee in that sort of case is whether the defendant has done it before, albeit seven years previously, or whatever the rehabilitation period may be. If so, was it once or several times, and were the circumstances ancillary to those previous convictions? Did the defendant promise on those occasions to give up drink? Can he be allowed to continue safely to practise on the strength of his present assurance that he will stop drinking?

In the Bill as it stands any evidence of such convictions or series of convictions. or circumstances ancillary to them cannot be given to the tribunal. Registrars of disciplinary committees are liable to criminal proceedings if they divulge such information improperly. I know that the General Medical Council and the General Dental Council are most concerned about this issue, and I agree with them. The amendment would correct the situation.

The new clause we have just accepted includes Service disciplinary proceedings and lots of types of proceedings from which the protection afforded generally by the Bill is withheld. The amendment seeks to add to that list a further category. A judicial authority is defined in Clause 2(4) of the Bill in terms which obviously embrace disciplinary authorities. I do not believe that the amendment is too widely framed to serve the purpose to which I have referred. The situation that it seeks to correct has probably arisen by oversight. The circumstances are miles away from the mischief which is the true and proper target of the Bill. I commend the amendment.

I understand the motives behind the amendment, and I am sympathetic to its general tenor. There obviously are certain kinds of professional organisation with tribunals relating to high standards of probity in areas that touch upon the public which may find it necessary on occasions to see previous convictions, even including spent convictions.

The argument is not entirely self-evident. There are also many other areas of human intercourse where the fact that a man has a previous conviction may be thought to be relevant, at first sight, and where we are saying that because a man has lived down a past conviction it should not be held against him, particularly in relation to some kinds of jobs. It is not entirely easy to distinguish between a professional job which is governed by professional standards upheld by a disciplinary body and other kinds of jobs of high responsibility which are not professional but which nevertheless carry considerable importance.

If we are to exclude spent convictions in one sense, it is perhaps right to exclude them in another. What I should certainly want to see, even if I gave way on the amendment, or gave way to its spirit, is that any tribunal which thereby then had the power to consider a spent conviction would, on the whole, disregard it, except, as in the case of the criminal courts, in very exceptional circumstances.

Therefore, it would be a sine qua non that first it would have to be a judicial tribunal of high standing, capable of applying that kind of discretion, and it would also have to be borne in upon the tribunal that it was given the power specifically because it had that high standard and would apply that discretion.

The amendment is a little too wide. Clause 2(4) says that

"judicial authority'

includes any tribunal, body or person having power—

(a) by virtue of any enactment,"—

so far, so good, but it continues:

"law, custom or practice; … to determine any question affecting the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities of any person, or to receive evidence affecting the determination of any such question."

The House will see immediately that that is a good deal wider than the General Medical Council, the Law Society or any other of the professional bodies referred to this morning. It can include a number of bodies which may not have the same sense of discretion as we would expect from bodies such as the GMC.

I am in the hands of the House, and I will listen to the argument if the House feels differently, but I think that the best way for me to deal with this matter is to consider the representations of any body of that nature, about the right to look at spent convictions in relation to its disciplinary procedures, when we make the rules which will have to be made under new Clause 2(6). Under that provision:

"The Secretary of State may by order exclude the application of section 2 of this Act in relation to any proceedings specified in the order (other than proceedings to which section 6 of this Act applies) to such extent and for such purposes as may be so specified."

In those circumstances, I can by order include the GMC and not include other bodies which may be more suspect. If the House passes the amendment I shall not have that degree of selectivity, because it will have excluded all judical tribunals of the kind stated in the amendment. There is no power under the rules to put them back again.

Therefore, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment. I understand the spirit in which it is moved, and I promise that in the rules, which would have to be tabled in any case, and which are subject to the positive procedure, the House will have the opportunity to include anyone whom I fail to include.

I am grateful to the Minister for what he has said. The Bill has a dual purpose. Its philosophy is to help those whose minor convictions should be forgotten, but it is also that the public interest must always be remembered. The public interest is just as important in disciplinary tribunals as it is in dealing with such people in criminal courts.

However, I am prepared to accept the Minister's offer, which I think is sensible. It will give him and the tribunals concerned an opportunity to consider not only whether they should be included in the exceptions under subsection (6) but whether they might also wish to draw up their own practice direction similar to that which the Lord Chief Justice will draw up for criminal courts. It might be an advantage for the future if a practice direction were laid down for disciplinary tribunals, so that they knew the framework within which they had to operate.

I believe that the Minister's proposal is a satisfactory way of dealing with the matter.

In view of what the Minister has said, and the assurances he has given, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move, that the clause be read a Second time.

The effect of the clause is to apply the provisions and the benefits of the Bill to children who have committed offences in Scotland and whose cases have been disposed of by children's hearings. This application is achieved by equating to a "conviction" the acceptance of fact of commission of an offence, or the estab lishment of such commission by the sheriff; and also by equating to a "sentence" the disposal of a case normally by imposing a supervision requirement.

The clause makes it clear that these effects referred to are for the purposes of the application of the Bill and not for other purposes.

The system of children's panels in Scotland has got away from the concept of prosecution for offences, convictions and sentences. Children may be referred to informal hearings of three lay persons by an official called the reporter on a variety of grounds, though mainly offences. If the grounds for referral are accepted by the child or his parent, or subsequently established by the sheriff, the hearing considers whether to discharge the referrals or to make a residential or non-residential supervision requirement. In what is to some extent a treatment situation the hearing has to take its decision in the best interests of the child. The trouble is that this leaves the system outside the benefits of this Bill.

Although, for example, the supervision requirements following a referral for offences are not sentences they may still be regarded much in that light by some, and employers may well ask whether an individual has had any convictions or has been under a children's panel supervision requirement. It is wrong that a system designed to take children out of the elements of a criminal situation should leave them worse off in these rehabilitation terms.

12 noon.

I now turn to Amendments Nos. 9 and 10. The effect of the amendments is to make provision for a rehabilitation of six months where the referral of a child to a children's hearing in Scotland has been discharged by the hearing.

It is necessary to make provision for rehabilitation periods for decisions of children's hearings. They are not convictions in the sense in which they are normally described. The aim has been to create a system for children outside the court structure. But inquiries are not infrequently made as to whether young people have appeared before a children's hearing and what the result was because of offences that they have committed. It would be wrong to deny them the benefit of the Bill when, it they had committed serious offences and appeared before the courts, they would have had its protection.

Discharge by a children's hearing is therefore treated for the purposes of the Bill as technically a sentence. That is provided for in new Clause 3. It attracts the same rehabilitation period as discharge by a court.

Amendments Nos. 12 and 13 are drafting amendments. A supervision requirement is not an order and there-for the more general term of sentence is to be used. The effect of the amendments is, like the previous amendments about discharge by a hearing, to enable a rehabilitation period to be fixed for a supervision requirement by a children's hearing in Scotland under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. The reason is the same as that given for discharge—namely, the need to rehabilitate a person who has been the subject of a supervision requirement made by a children's hearing.

Residential supervision requirements and non-residential supervision requirements are broadly equivalent to care orders under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. The rehabilitation period is the same, namely, the period during which the order is enforced or one year from its being made, whichever ends the later. The formula in the Bill as it stands breaks down if conviction and sentence take place at different times. The new wording removes any doubt by tying the beginning of the period firmly to the date of conviction The amendments are within the principle of the Bill and I commend them to the House.

I beg to move Amendment No. 2, in page 2, line 59, leave out from first to ' to end of line 11 on page 3 and insert:

'his or any other person's past which cannot be answered without acknowledging or referring to a spent conviction or spent convictions or any circumstances ancillary thereto.

(1A) Subject to the following provisions of this section and to sections 5 and 6 below—

(a) any question seeking information with respect to a person's previous convictions, offences, conduct or circumstances, put to him or to any other person otherwise than in proceedings to which subsection (1)(b) above applies, shall, if it is capable of being answered on the basis that it does not relate to spent convictions or circumstances ancillary thereto, be deemed not so to relate, and the answer to any such question may be framed accordingly; and

(b) a person shall not be subjected to any liability or penalty, or otherwise, prejudiced in law, by reason of any answer given by him, otherwise than in any such proceedings, to any question referring expressly to a spent conviction or spent convictions as such, or to any circumstances ancillary to any conviction or convictions, being circumstances peculiar to spent convictions as such.

(2) The Secretary of State may by order make such provision as seems to him appropriate for excluding or modifying the application of either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1A) above in relation to questions put in such circumstances as may be specified in the order.

(3) For the purposes of'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Amendment No. 3, in Clause 2, page 2, line 59, leave out from first ' to ' to end of line 11 on page 3 and insert

'his or any other person's past which cannot be answered without acknowledging or referring to a spent conviction or spent convictions or any circumstances ancillary thereto.

(1A) Subject to the following provisions of this section and to sections 5 and 6 below—

(a) any question seeking information with respect to a person's previous convictions, offences, conduct or circumstances, put to him or to any other person, whether in proceedings to which subsection (1)(b) above applies or otherwise, shall be deemed not to relate to spent convictions or to any circumstances ancillary to spent convictions, and the answer to any such question may be framed accordingly; and

(b) a person shall not be subjected to any liability or penalty, or otherwise prejudiced in law, by reason of any answer given by him, to such a question as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of this subsection.

(2) The Secretary of State may by order make such provision as seems to him appropriate for excluding or modifying the application of either or both of paragraphs (a) and

(b) of subsection (1A) above in relation to questions put in such circumstances as may be specified in the order.

(3) For the purposes of'.

I find these two amendments the most difficult of all the amendments on the Order Paper. There is a difference of attitude about the way in which questions can be asked about previous convictions. There is a good deal of sophistication about the drafting of the amendments, which both seek to do the same thing, in rather different ways. The question really is to determine the alternative effects of both amendments. I am willing to listen to the supporters of Amendment No. 3 and to consider whether it is an improvement upon the drafting of Amendment No. 2 by the parliamentary draftsman.

As I understand it, the basis of Amendment No. 2 is to try to clarify the existing drafting for questions both in and out of court. The amendment proceeds on the basis that questions out of court must be treated in a more elaborate and detailed way than questions in court. If somebody is asked a question in court the question and the answer are controlled by the court and can be dictated by the judge or the magistrates. For court questions it is sufficient for the Bill to prohibit the asking of unwarranted questions and to permit a person to refrain from answering such questions.

The effect of the proposed paragraph (b) in Amendment No. 2 differs from the existing paragraph (b) only in that it speaks of questions that cannot be answered without acknowledging or referring to a spent conviction instead of questions which relate to a particular spent conviction. The proposed new phraseology is designed to cover such questions as, "Have you ever become a rehabilitated person?" or, "What spent convictions have you got?" Such questions do not in themselves relate to particular spent convictions in terms of the existing Clause 2.

If a prohibited question is asked in court—for example, "Have you any spent convictions?" and the answer is, "No" when, in fact, there has been one, the general provisions at the beginning of Clause 2(1) are considered to be a sufficient defence to a perjury charge and any detrimental consequence arising from procedures in court.

Out-of-court questions are dealt with in the proposed new paragraph (a). There is no way, as there is in court proceedings, to prevent a question being asked. All that can be done is to try to ensure that the effect of the question is suitably circumscribed so as to protect the person being questioned. Paragraph (a) in the amendment is directed to such questions as, "Have you any convictions?" or, "Have you any convictions for dishonesty?". It deems that such questions do not relate to spent convictions. The answer may be framed accordingly—for example, "I have not "or, "I was convicted of theft last week", despite a conviction 20 years ago. There cannot be a deeming provision of this kind in relation to a question referring expressly to a spent conviction because such a question could not be answered on the basis that it did not relate to a spent conviction.

I assert that with all the authority of those briefing me.

The answer to the distinction between Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 hangs upon a certain approach which is only a question of logical sensitivity, and I am not particularly sensitive to logic. If a man is asked, "Have you a spent conviction in 1967 for theft?", can it be said that there is a deeming provision which says that that question was never asked or that it does not relate to an actual spent conviction in 1967 for theft? Can the question be disregarded or should it be said, "Well, the question was asked, we shall simply allow the person to take whatever action he likes in relation to it without any consequences". Questions can be asked in court without any deeming provisions, as they will simply be stopped by the court. Under Amendment No. 3 the question is deemed not to have been asked even though it has been asked and refers specifically to a spent conviction which is known.

I should like to refer in particular to Amendment No. 3. I had great sympathy for the Minister when he said that he understood that the wording as prepared for him by the parliamentary draftsmen meant such-and-such. It might console the Minister to know that the sponsors of the Bill are in much the same situation. They, too, have their draftsmen, and when speaking in the House attempt to interpret in simple language what draftsmen of all sorts have put into various amendments.

I invite the Minister to consider two simple points which perhaps draw a distinction between his amendment and Amendment No. 3. First, in out-of-court proceedings, until a couple of days ago the Bill allowed a potential employee who was asked by his employer whether he had a spent conviction to answer, "No", even if he had one, but under Amendment No. 2 the employee will not be able to answer "No" to the specific question, "Have you a spent conviction?".

In in-court proceedings, the Minister is right in saying that the question about a spent conviction should not be asked in the first place because the judge or the magistrate should be wide awake and make sure that questions of that sort are not asked, but we all know, despite what some of my hon. Friends have said, that even magistrates are human and make mistakes, and a question such as "Were you convicted of stealing a bicycle 40 years ago?" is sometimes asked. Under the Government's amendment, a person who is asked that question and replies "No", although it is true that he has been so convicted, will be guilty of perjury.

It is in those two, I hope fairly simple, respects that Amendment No. 3 is an improvement on the Government amendment.

I listened carefully to what was said by both my hon. Friend and the hon. Member for Truro (Mr. Dixon). I cannot help but feel that both amendments seek to obtain the same result, and I must repeat the criticism that I have made before. The wording of Amendment No. 3 is much more satisfactory than that in the Government's amendment. It is simpler and more direct, and I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that amendment rather than ask the House to agree to Amendment No. 2.

One of the great ambitions of successive Parliaments is to simplify the laws that they pass and make them more readily understood. Following the extremely difficult consequences of making perjury not illegal in certain circumstances—which has always been regarded as a major difficulty—it seems that those who have spoken prefer Amendment No. 3, and I confess that I do, too.

Amendment No. 3 has a neatness and simplicity. It is more easily understood than the other amendment on first reading, and that is important, because there may be occasions on which people will have to be advised by their solicitors about the situation. That may be very near the time at which a conviction becomes spent. I can see occasions on which adjournments will be begged in criminal cases so that another week or month can pass in order that the conviction can be spent and questions cannot be asked about it.

I prefer Amendment No. 3 to Amendment No. 2. I do not feel strongly about this, but the former amendment is a little neater than the latter.

I am grateful to those who have supported the wording of Amendment No. 3. I do not want to engage in splitting logical hairs with the Minister who is more able than I am, but I should like to refer to two points that have been made.

I do not wish to be thought to be reflecting upon the attention with which judges pursue cases in court, but the judicial authority as defined in the Bill extends to a very much wider range of court and can be taken to be construed as covering arbitration proceedings by a mercantile body or by people who would not normally have borne in upon them the desirability of following the practice in the courts, and that is the reason for that Amendment No. 3.

The question of logic arises much more on the basis of the wording

"does not relate to spent convictions".

That would seem to exclude the effect that we are trying to achieve, and I cannot understand how the overriding power in subsection (1) would be deemed to govern that.

On questions as nicely balanced as this, who am I to resist the combined wisdom of the House? I yield, and I shall accept Amendment No. 3.

I am sure that the House is grateful to the Minister for what he has just said.

We are coming to one of the more objectionable parts of the Bill. The clause seeks to make all truth into lies, and lies into truth. It does not matter about the wording, because that remains a fact.

When witnesses go into court and swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth we think that we are getting something fine in our society. In fact, when there is a provision of the law which clouds the simplicity and clarity—

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I thought that I had accepted the amendment and that the discussion had therefore been closed. I do not quite know to what the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) is referring. It may be that he is starting a Second Reading speech.

You have not yet put the Question, Mr. Deputy Speaker, whatever the Home Office may think about it.

It is not a matter of putting the Question. As I understand it, the Minister is prepared to withdraw the Government amendment. The normal procedure would be, following that, for me to invite the hon. Member for Bromsgrove and Redditch (Mr. Miller) formally to move his Amendment No. 3. The difficulty is that if an hon. Member begins to speak after another hon. Member—a Minister to boot, if I may put it that way—has sought leave to withdraw an amendment, withdrawing the amendment becomes rather more complicated.

It may be made complicated, but it is not out of order. As I understand it, the amendment has not yet been withdrawn, by leave of the House, and leave of the House is necessary.

I take the point. The Minister has not formally sought leave to withdraw the amendment yet. The hon. Member may therefore carry on.

I am speaking for the rights of back benchers, because, as every hon. Members knows very well, an amendment may be withdrawn only by leave of the House, whatever the Minister may say.

I want to add a few words to the observation that I was trying to make. If Amendment No. 3 is accepted, these considerations will be in the minds of people who used to have a clear notion of what was truth and what was falsehood. The amendment will provide that—

"any question seeking information with respect to a person's previous convictions, offences, conduct or circumstances, put to him or to any other person, whether in proceedings to which subsection (1)(b) above applies or otherwise, shall be deemed not to relate to spent convictions or to any circumstances ancillary to spent convictions, and the answer to any such question may be framed accordingly."

That is nonsense. It is a typical example of wasting the time of the House on trying to make truth into falsehood and falsehood into truth.

I was about formally to ask leave to withdraw the amendment and to allow Amendment No. 3 to be put, but, in view of the criticism of the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) of words that are central to the Bill. I should like to add one comment.

The hon. Member is against the central principle of the Bill. I understand his opposition, but most of us are totally in favour of that principle. Once the principle is accepted, the question arises how, in proceedings in court or out of court, if a question is asked about a man's previous convictions, he is to be protected so that he does not have to divulge them.

The basic answer in the Bill is that if he is asked the question, he should not be obliged to answer it in a way that discloses his spent convictions. If he is obliged to answer, either because the law lays a burden upon him to answer or because of his own innate sense of honesty, if there is no defence to that situation, the Bill will be completely nugatory, having no practical effect in society at large.

Therefore, we have always said, and I say it again and the Press can go on repeating it, that in order to help a great many people who suffer because spent convictions are thrown up in their faces long after they have become spent, occasionally truth will be a lie and a lie will be truth. We allow that out of a greater sense of compassion for the man who has lived down his past and who should be allowed to live it down. There is no other effective way. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move Amendment No. 8, in page 4, leave out lines 21 and 22.

With this we are to take Amendment No. 18, in page 5, line 35, leave out 'passed by a court-martial' and insert:

'in a young offenders institution in Scotland'.

Clause 3 provides for a standard rehabilitation period of seven years for any sentence of detention in a young offenders' institution in Scotland. We think that that is unsatisfactory.

The parallel to be drawn with the treatment of offenders under sentence of detention in a young offenders' institution in Scotland is that of the treatment of a young person under sentence of imprisonment in England and Wales. The omission of lines 21 and 22 removes the detention in a young offenders' institution from Table B.

The words to be inserted in Amendment No. 18 do not replace those deleted in any real sense. Detention ordered by a court martial is now dealt with by Table A, under a different clause. The words inserted equate detention in a Scottish young offenders' institution with imprisonment for the purposes of the clause, and the rehabilitation period varies with the length of sentence accordingly.

I beg to move Amendment No. 11, in page 4, line 42, leave out from 'probation' to 'whichever' in line 53 and insert

'the rehabilitation period applicable to the sentence shall be one year from the date of conviction or a period beginning with that date and ending when the order for condi-

Amendment No. 11 is a drafting amendment which simplifies the existing provisions. If an offender is dealt with for the original offence, following a breach of a probation order or a conditional discharge, he will attract, by virtue of Clause 4(2), the rehabilitation period appropriate to the new sentence, so there is no need to make the shorter period provided by the subsection conditional on his not being so dealt with.

The same arguments do not apply to binding over, but it seems preferable to opt for clarity rather than try to make special provision for recognisance and bonds of caution.

Amendment No. 21 covers the situation where the offender commits a breach of a probation order or conditional discharge and is dealt with and sentenced for the original offence after the date on which the original rehabilitation period would otherwise have expired. This matter was raised in Committee by the hon. Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims) and we have tried to meet the point in the amendment.

If, on the second occasion, the offender receives a sentence carrying a longer rehabilitation period—revoked from the date of the original conviction—than the earlier sentence attracted, the conviction is deemed never to have become spent. This has the effect of extending the habilitation period to cover the time between

With this we are to take Amendment No. 21, in Clause 4, page 6, line 15, leave out subsection (3) and insert:

I beg to move Amendment No. 15, in page 5, line 22, leave out from ' discharger to end of line 26 and insert:

'(b) an order for detention during Her Majesty's pleasure under section 88 of the Lunacy (Scotland) Act 1857, section 2 of the Trial of Lunatics Act 1883 or section 3(3) of the Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act 1926; or

(c) an order for detention in or admission to hospital under section 3(3) of the said Act of 1926, section 63 of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960, section 5(1) of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 or section 6(1) or 14(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968'.

It will be convenient to take with this amendment Government Amendment No. 16.

This amendment represents an expansion of the Bill as drafted in respect of the orders relating to mentally disordered offenders which attract the rehabilitation period specified in this subsection. The new additions are mainly Scottish. Amendment No. 16 is a consequential amendment. If any hon. Member requires clarification on this point I shall be glad to assist.

I beg to move Amendment No. 19, in page 5, line 51, at end insert:

"(8A) References in this section to the period during which a probation order, or a care order or supervision order under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, or a supervision requirement under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, is or was in force include references to any period during which any order or requirement to which this subsection applies, being an order or requirement made or imposed directly or indirectly in substitution for the first-mentioned order or requirement, is or was in force.

This subsection applies—

(a) to any such order or requirement as is mentioned above in this subsection;

(b) to any order having effect under section 25(2) of the said Act of 1969 as if it were a training school order in Northern Ireland; and

(c) to any supervision order made under section 72(2) of the said Act of 1968 and having effect as a supervision order under the Children and Young Persons Act (Northern Ireland) 1950".

The effect of this amendment is to make sure that there is not premature rehabilitation of certain orders or requirements when persons are moving between Scotland and England, or vice versa, or when they are moving from Great Britain into Ireland. To illustrate the effect, take a supervision order in England on a child who moves into Scotland, and whose case is referred by the English court to the Scottish authorities—the reporter and the children's hearing. If they make a supervision requirement which means really a continuation of the English order, then, although the English order itself has lapsed and the rehabilitation period would therefore expire, this clause means that the rehabilitation period will continue until the derivation order—the Scottish supervision requirement—comes to an end.

The reason for this amendment is to prevent the wiping out of sentences without full rehabilitation periods simply because of cross-border moves. It may be argued that there is another "sentence" in the new country and that there is little practical loss; but, on the other hand, if there are a few moves and trace is lost individuals might rather too readily avoid rehabilitation periods.

The next amendment is No. 36.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am sorry that in my ignorance I remained seated for too long. I understood that the Minister was called on Amendment No 21 but that Amendments Nos. (a) and (b) were not called. I wanted to move them.

I thought that those matters should have been discussed with Amendment No. 11. I am sorry the hon. Member was misled. We are now on Amendment No. 36.

If I may assist the hon. Gentleman—

I think that assistance has already been given.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. If the hon. Gentleman wishes formally to move those amendments, they are matters of drafting and I should be prepared to accept them.

I am sorry, but the Chair has already put that amendment. Perhaps it can be put right somewhere else.

I beg to move Amendment No. 36, in page 6, line 39, leave out subsection (5) and insert—

(5) Where the rehabilitation period applicable to a conviction is the rehabilitation period applicable in accordance with section 3(7B) above to an order imposing on a person any disqualification, disability, prohibition or other penalty, the rehabilitation period applicable to another conviction shall not by virtue of subsection (4) above be extended by reference to that period; but if any other sentence is imposed in respect of the first-mentioned conviction for which a rehabilitation period is prescribed by any other provisions of section 3 above, the rehabilitation period applicable to another conviction shall, where appropriate, be extended under subsection (4) above by reference to the rehabilitation period applicable in accordance with that section to that sentence or, where more than one such sentence is imposed, by reference to the longer or longest of the periods so applicable to those sentences, as if the period in question were the rehabilitation period applicable to the first-mentioned conviction.

This amendment is a late amendment. It arose at the last minute because of a lacuna in the Bill. It has been tabled to deal with the situation.

The effect of the amendment is to confine the impeding action of a subsequent sentence on a previous one in the course of becoming spent to the sentence proper and not to any disqualification period which extends it.

Section 3(7B) provides that the rehabilitation period for a sentence with a disqualification ordered to be attached is the period of disqualification, if that is the longer. If a man is fined and disqualified from driving for 10 years, the rehabilitation period will be 10 years. But the delaying effect on any outstanding convictions will, assuming the offence is indictable, be the five-year period appropriate to the fine. If this amendment were not made, there would be the risk of a lifelong disqualification—for example, for motoring, preventing any previous conviction becoming spent. We had to take this somewhat heavy-handed way of dealing with a difficulty which will arise in a few cases but will be of considerable importance in those cases.

Was it not beyond the wit of the parliamentary draftsmen to put this clause in much simpler form'? It is almost incomprehensible.

We have had a discussion about these matters before and I have the greatest sympathy with my hon. and learned Friend. I am glad that he has reiterated the point, and I hope the parliamentary draftsman takes note of it. However, I am assured that it is impossible to deal with the matter in the simple kind of language to which my hon. and learned Friend and I are accustomed in our pleadings. The truth is that it depends on a different kind of tradition. I hope that this continual dripping on the stone will lead to a change in the situation. I am sure this should happen.

I beg to move Amendment No. 23, in page 6, line 43, leave out subsection (6) and insert:

'(6) Subject to subsection (7) below, for the purposes of subsection (4)(a) above there shall be disregarded—

(a) any conviction in England and Wales of an offence which is not triable on indictment;

(b) any conviction in Scotland of an offence which is not excluded from the jurisdiction of inferior courts of summary jurisdiction by virtue of section 4 of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act 1954 (certain crimes not to be tried in inferior courts of summary jurisdiction); and

(c) any conviction by or before a court outside Great Britain of an offence which, if the conduct constituting it had taken place in England and Wales, would not have constituted an offence, or would have constituted an offence not triable on indictment, or, if it had taken place in Scotland, would have constituted an offence not excluded as aforesaid from the jurisdiction of an inferior court of summary jurisdiction.

(7) Notwithstanding subsection (6) above, a conviction in service, disciplinary proceedings of an offence consisting in the commission of a civil offence shall not be disregarded for the purposes of subsection (4)(a) above if the civil offence in question is triable on indictment.'

We now come to Amendment No. 24

Mr. Deputy-Speaker, Amendment No. 24 was tabled by me and certain of my hon. Friends to amend the Bill as it emerged from Standing Committee. Subsequently, as a result of a Government amendment, the clause concerned has been deleted completely, so the effect of Amendment No. 24 is lost. If I need formally to ask for leave to withdraw the amendment, then I do so.

I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman.

I beg to move Amendment No. 26, in page 8, line 58, leave out 'either'.

These amendments rectify an omission in the defamation clause accepted in Committee. The omission relates to the defence of fair comment and, in particular, to the "rolled-up" plea. The matter was originally raised by the hon. Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook), and we have sought to meet his point as well as to maintain for the "rolled-up" plea the elements of justification where the justification can be proved to be in the public interest. The test whether publication is in the public interest is more stringent than the test whether the matter is of public interest, which is the essential requisite for fair comment. When the statement complained of relates to a spent conviction, and where a comment is added, as may often happen, the more stringent test involved in establishing the truth of the facts must be applied also in the defence of fair comment.

Hon. Members who are familiar with the defamation law will know that the "rolled-up" plea has nothing to do with corsets but concerns the question whether one can assert certain facts and then make comment on the facts. The facts must be justified as being true and the comment on the facts must be proved to be fair. The two are rolled together for the purpose of one defence, and both must be substantiated in the defence. While the fair comment provision was maintained in the Bill, the justification part of the facts might have been difficult to assert. Therefore, we preserved the justification provided also that it was in the public interest to assert the facts.

In relation to a spent conviction, the defence of fair comment will depend on whether the facts, first, are true, and, secondly, are published in the public interest and that the comment is fair.

Amendment No. 26 is purely drafting, for consistency with Amendment No. 27, as is Amendment No. 28, while Amendment No. 29 is consequential.

I am grateful to the Minister for the amendment which he has proposed to meet the criticism I made in Committee, but it does not remove my objection to the Bill or to the concept of public interest as a defence. An allegation of public interest as a defence will be a matter for consideration by the jury, and no one can say how the concept of public interest will be applied by a jury. When these cases come to court, they will no doubt involve consideration of what is meant by "public interest". It is a phrase of general scope, application and understanding by individuals, let alone lawyers, which may lead to a great deal of confusion.

12.45 p.m.

Juries may well take the view that the object of the Bill is a matter of public interest—in other words, that the Bill's social object transcends the importance of any other consideration, including the desirability for the public to have the fullest knowledge about a matter. It will, therefore, be a difficult procedure to understand and a difficult concept for juries and courts to apply, and it will lead to great confusion about the law generally.

For example, a reference given for a former employee will have to be in such vague and general terms that it will, in effect, perhaps be more damaging than would be telling the truth about him. One would not take the risk of having to show that it was public interest which justified the disclosure. This is another example in the Bill of the social object overriding the implications for the constitutional liberty of the individual. Therefore, we may well be causing a great deal of trouble for ourselves.

If the hon. Gentleman thinks that the average man in the street understands the niceties of the law of defamation, he is a more astute observer of the man in the street than I am. The question is of great complexity and is usually reserved to the esoteric lawyers who practise in this area of jurisprudence.

The hon. Gentleman is confused about the references between qualified privilege and the defence of fair comment. I make no criticism as I notice that in Committee I, too, fell into the same error. Under the Bill, the defence of qualified privilege is left intact, even in relation to spent convictions. Therefore, if a reference is called for and the defence of qualified privilege would cover the reference—which is the normal situation where information which may be defamatory is communicated under a moral or legal duty to some other person—the person concerned would have the defence of qualified privilege anyway. With regard to fair comment, this is a question of saying in public—not between two people who have an interest in communicating the matters between them—something about a man and then seeking to claim that it was fair to say it in the public interest. The question which then arises is: where is it right to allow fair comment for the purpose of the Bill?

We have said that the defence of fair comment shall be retained in certain restricted circumstances. If it is relevant to the "rolled-up" plea, one would have to show that the facts on which the comment was based were in the public interest. That will accord with the general provision in the Bill, but justification as such will no longer be a defence unless one can prove that it is in the public interest.

The concession made in Committee was generally welcomed as being a satisfactory compromise for all concerned. It is probably right that it should apply equally to the "rolled-up" plea and fair comment as to justification generally.

I beg to move Amendment No. 28, in page 9, line 13, after 'adduce', insert 'or require'.

Clause 6(7) speaks of a defendant not being at liberty to adduce evidence. It should be amended so that he is not at liberty to adduce or require evidence.

Clause 2(1) deals with admissibility of evidence in paragraph (a) and comparability in paragraph (b). Comparability should be reflected in Clause 6(7). The amendment makes Clause 6(7) consistent with Clause 1(2)(f) of the new Clause which is termed "Limitations on rehabilitation under this Act, etc".

That is a somewhat involved explanation of a simple amendment which is designed to improve the draftsmanship.

I beg to move Amendment No. 31, in page 10, line 31, after 'defendant', insert:

'(or, in Scotland, the accused person)'.

The amendment is required to take account of differences of expression between Scotland and England and Wales. The words "accused person" are substituted in Scotland for "defendant" in England and Wales.

This is a drafting amendment, and no point of substance is involved.

I beg to move Amendment No. 32, in page 10, line 59, leave out from 'and' to end of line 60 and insert:

'an order made under any provision of this Act except section 9 below may be varied or revoked by a subsequent order made under that provision'.

With this amendment we will take Government Amendments Nos. 33 and 34.

Amendments Nos. 32 and 33 are consequential amendments arising out of the later amendment to the commencement clause. The important amendment is No. 34, which seeks to meet a point urged upon me by the sponsors of the Bill, namely, that the commencement of the Bill should be on a fixed date.

I had some difficulty because, as the House knows, regulations are to be made under the Bill to indicate, for instance, which judicial tribunals will be covered by the Bill and which will not. There are certain classes of occupation where questions about spent convictions will be allowed or will not be allowed. Therefore, the regulations will take a little time to prepare as one has to try to survey the whole field to see where the regulations should catch.

In addition, one has to listen to observations by interested bodies before the regulations are tabled. I could not be sure how long that would take. I am determined that it shall take the shortest possible period, but it may still be longer than is normal for the coming into effect of an Act of Parliament.

I was loth initially to have a firm date for bringing the Bill into effect, but the sponsors urged upon me the desirability of having a firm date, and we we have compromised on Amendment No. 34. It gives the firm date of 1st July 1975, but it allows the Government to table an order to bring in the Bill if by any chance we are ready before then. I suspect that we shall be. To avoid any eventualities—and who knows what eventualities are before us in the next few months?—I have taken a rather longer date, but if we can table the orders before that time we will do so to bring the Bill into effect as soon as possible.

We sympathise with the Minister in these uncertain political times, and the sponsors are appreciative of the fact that he has come some way towards meeting our point. He has Oven himself flexibility, and I hope that he will arrange matters in his Department with the greatest expedition. He may manage to bring the Bill into effect on 1st January 1975. Possibly, if he and his officials put their skates on, we may have it in operation on 1st December 1974, or 1st November 1974, or 1st October 1974.

In view of the misunderstanding which occurred earlier, I invite the hon. Member for Bromsgrove and Redditch (Mr. Miller) to move, as verbal amendments to the Bill, the amendments which he wished to move to Amendment No. 21.

I beg to move, as an amendment to the words inserted in the Bill by Amendment No. 21, in line 9, leave out 'never' and insert 'not'.

I beg to move, as an amendment to the words inserted in the Bill by Amendment No. 21, in line 10, leave out 'never' and insert 'not'.

On a point of order. Mr. Deputy Speaker—

I am obliged to put the Question now. I will take the point of order afterwards.

Mr. Deputy Speaker, I wished to speak on the Third Reading.

Order. The Standing Orders required me to put the Question forthwith.

That is why I raised it as a point of order.

If the hon. Gentleman had been able to put his point of order, I should have told him that I must put the Question forthwith. The House has given instructions to the Chair, and occupants of the Chair try to obey the instructions of the House.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Before you put the Question, I should like to declare to the House, as I did to the Standing Committee, a possible interest as a director and member of a mineral working company.