I beg to move Amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 8, leave out 'subject to rules of court'.

With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments:

I wish to declare an interest, in that I am an Assistant Secretary of the Post Office Engineering Union and the union, through one of its other Assistant Secretaries—Mr. Brind—has asked me to take particular interest in this Bill.

The reason for this interest is that the union is often involved in litigation and has been very concerned about two aspects of the law. It has been concerned, first, about the problem of litigants in person not getting their costs and, secondly—I shall deal with this later in more detail—with the rate at which legal fees have increased—they have now become exorbitant—the way in which lawyers appear to be developing restrictive practices, and the way in which lawyers by way of attaining political office have themselves absolutely prohibited all reform in the law.

In Committee I congratulated my right hon. Friend the Member for Middles brough (Mr. Bottomley) on introducing the Bill. The measure is characteristic of my right hon. Friend, who has spent his life in the public service looking always to the interests of ordinary people and the protection of the underdog. It is typical of him that, following his fortune in the Ballot, he has brought forward this Bill, which sides with the case of the little man, the underdog, against one of the great bastions of privilege, namely, the legal profession.

My right hon. Friend's only fault is that he lacks guile. In a sense, it is that lack of guile and, indeed, his too trusting nature to which I wish to refer. He put forward the idea, which had already been argued by the hon. Member for Horsham and Crawley (Mr. Hordern), that litigants in person should be able to get costs in addition to those they were receiving at present. The hon. Member for Horsham and Crawley is not a lawyer, although he committed a sin in Committee since he apologised for not being a lawyer. In a sense, that apology contained a defect, and perhaps one should explore that matter in the present Bill.

I emphasise that my right hon. Friend has been too trusting. I think that the defect in the Bill is that the drafting or wording has been left to the lawyers. The drafting as undertaken by parliamentary draftsmen, and the advice received was that of lawyers. The Ministers involved in the processing of the Bill are Law Officers of the Crown. I have the utmost respect for the three Law Officers. I have worked with them and respect them as men of integrity and great ability. But they are lawyers.

Lawyers have monopolised legal offices in the House. Whereas entry is open to most of the great Offices of State in the United Kingdom, the Law Officers have become the prerogative or monopoly of lawyers.

The position is that two Members of Parliament, who want to improve conditions, set forth with the simple idea of ensuring that people who handle cases for themselves in court, rather than employ the services of lawyers, should receive costs. I shall attempt to show that litigants cannot rely on lawyers at every turn to bring their desires and purposes to fruition. I believe that Lord Halifax once said that if walls had ears they would complain of the lawyers. Before the Bill becomes law I wish to complain about lawyers.

The Bill is not written in a clear form. It is not clear to anybody who is likely to be a litigant in person. The phrase "litigant in person" is an anachronism. For instance, in Scotland such a person is called the party litigant.

The purpose of this amendment is to probe the phrase "rules of court" and the scope of the courts. Why does not the Bill deal specifically with this point? Why does not the Bill say that if any person does without the services of a lawyer in court he will receive his full expenses and costs? Why are these terms used in the Bill? The answer is that the lawyers grasped that simple idea and decided categorically that, although they were forced to accept the principle, they would ensure that by its administration no harm would in consequence be done to the legal profession.

11.15 a.m.

My right hon. Friend did not think of those words himself. Can anyone imagine him speaking in those terms in his constituency? I believe that my right hon. Friend, who always speaks in a courteous, direct, easy and understandable way, could not possibly have used these words.

Take the vague phrase "litigant in person". When I first read it I thought that it must be yet another of those sinecure appointments to which Government Whips are appointed. It means nothing to me. Only the lawyers would understand the terminology. These are lawyers' words. This is the oldest trap in the world—that set by lawyers for honest, law-abiding men.

Will my hon. Friend indicate, since he is dealing with this important matter, what are his views about the need for full explanatory notes?

I shall not be led away from my main theme, although I hope that one day legislation will be drafted in such a way that there will be no need for full explanatory notes. I hope that future Bills, whether or not amended in Standing Committee, will be readily understandable. The Bill is strange because some of the expressions used are unclear, yet it is intended to be understood by those who intend to do without the services of lawyers. That is a pointer to the way in which the lawyers in Parliament have always managed to protect their own professional interests.

I do not say that our laws do not hurt vested groups, because they do. The trade union movement has suffered on many occasions from repressive legislation, as have tenants. One group, however, never suffers from legislation which would adversely affect its occupational interests. One has only to experience the difficulty of getting through a moderate solicitor's (amendment) Bill to appreciate that fact. Of course, if it had been a barristers Bill there would have been no chance of reform.

In his usual eloquent and amusing way my hon. Friend is making a point, but I must remind him of one fact which I hope he will deal with in view of his general slur against the legal profession. The Monopolies Commission is at the moment investigating two references with respect to barristers, and the Senate of the Bar Council has made it abundantly clear that it is most anxious to co-operate with the commission in investigating any practices which might be considered contrary to public interest. Does my hon. Friend accept that perhaps his attack on the legal profession in general, while amply justified in respect of solicitors, has no foundation in respect of members of the Bar?

I simply recall the words of John Gay:

"I know how lawyers can with ease Twist words and meanings as they please"

I might be impressed with my hon. Friend's argument when I have seen how lawyers in this place respond to any recommendation of the Monopolies Commission. I shall want to know first about the background of the advisers to the commission. I would certainly not accept my hon. Friend's example as illustrating the reforming zeal of barristers without further examination. It would be stretching people's imagination to ask them to believe that legislators in this House who are members of the legal profession would want to see a reform.

It is revealing that the Law Officers of the Crown are monopolised by barris- ters. I can see no reason why the offices of Attorney-General and Solicitor General should be held only by those who are members of the legal closed shop. In this way the legal profession can ensure that legislation affecting it does not harm it in any way.

I declared an interest earlier. That is a marginal and minimal interest compared with the interest of my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to the Law Officers' Department. It is minimal compared with that of the Attorney General and the Solicitor-General, who in their official capacities are the leading members of the Bar.

Are they?

The brief I received from the Library certainly conveys that impression, but it could be wrong. I shall look at the point and verify the reference, but that is my advice.

The subject of the rules of court has become very important in this Bill. In Committee, which took only a morning, there was great confusion about precisely what would be the benefits of the Bill to the litigants in person. There were quite substantial differences of opinion among the legal members of the Committee about how those responsible would deal with claims. As I said in Committee, it is most important that we should know precisely what the situation is. We had to appeal to the Government very strongly in Committee to sort the situation out.

On that occasion my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Cunningham) said that to make certain what the actual costs to be met were there should be informal discussions before Report. He said:

"May I suggest that in order to remove any doubt about this"․

that is, concerning what rights the taxing master has and how he would behave․

"—because it is bad if Bills pass through Standing Committee leaving some doubt as to how they are to be interpreted if that doubt can he removed—it might be possible for the Parliamentary Secretary to consult the rule committee between now and Report, however brief that period may be, to ensure that they would interpret the provisions in the manner in which he understands it".

At that stage the draftsman and advisers at the back of the room were shaking their heads like sheep in the wind, and that prompted my hon. Friend to continue:

"I see that the various legal luminaries in the room are all shaking their heads at the impropriety, I presume, of doing this. It cannot be a shortage of time, because telephones were invented a considerable time ago. I cannot see that there would be any impropriety in saying to the people who have to interpret the statute 'This is how we think you would interpret it, and this is how the Committee wants you to interpret it. Is this, in fact, how you would interpret it?'

I have always understood that in English courts it is not proper for courts or other institutions to take account of what in diplomatic language are called the travaux préparatoires, namely, our discussions in deciding how words should be interpreted, that only the words themselves must be considered. But I do not see that that should stop the Minister consulting the rule committee between now and Report to make absolutely certain that this is the way that they would see themselves interpreting these provisions. If that is a change from previous practice, the House of Commons has on the whole improved things by changing and it is something that ought to be encouraged, not discouraged."

11.30 a.m.

What has my hon. Friend done about that suggestion? What precisely has happened? Has the Rule Committee been consulted?

Following my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury, I said:

"I am not happy to leave it to some later interpretation by the rule committee. If it is not clear—and that I am not sufficiently qualified to say—I want a clear indication put into the Bill itself."— [Official Report, Standing Committee C, 26th March 1975 cc. 17–18.)

I am pleased to see that the Parliamentary Secretary is consulting his officials. If he has not yet consulted the Rule Committee, and. perhaps having authority now from his officials to do so, I would excuse him were he to rush out and use the telephone, as my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury so judiciously advocated.

I should be quite happy to rush out, but I do not want to deprive myself of listening to my hon. Friend's speech. It would be impossible for me to do both. My preference at the moment is to stay and listen to my hon. Friend's remarks, which I find very interesting.

I hope that after I have concluded my remarks and a less non-learned Member speaks my hon. Friend will take that advantage. If he has not yet used the telephone, I hope he will use it to get on to the Rule committee to get an answer for my hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury, South and Islington, who was so disturbed about the matter in Committee. All was sweetness and light on that morning, because we thought that the Minister would leave the Committee Room at 16 minutes to twelve o'clock and use the telephone to institute the consultations which do not appear to have taken place.

I am being severe with my hon. Friend. My experience on several Bills on which I have worked with my hon. Friend is that he is hard-working and conscientious and deals with them well. Despite the fact that he is a lawyer, my experience has been that he could always be relied upon. But my suspicions were aroused when I read yet again the proceedings in Hansard on Second Reading of the Bill on 14th February 1975. Incidentally, on that day my hon. Friend, when introducing the Bill, thought it appropriate that it should be introduced on Valentine's Day—loving day. My hon. Friend should have realised that it was the Valentine's Day massacre—the massacre of the innocent man wanting to do good by the lawyers. But I will pass from that point.

This whole question of the stranglehold on expenses by the lawyers was passed over at the end of a long, detailed and excellent speech by the Parliamentary Secretary. He said:

"it is not possible for me to say that the Bill will allow the litigants in person to recover this, that, or any particular sum."

My hon. Friend could not tell us what benefits would accrue to people from the Bill.

Order. I have been very patient with the hon. Gentleman, but he is not entitled to make a Second Reading speech when moving an amendment on Report. If he would restrict himself to the amendment, we might get on.

You have been very patient, Mr. Speaker. This is on the point of the amendment. We want the principle of the Bill. We want people to be able to act in courts and to get their costs. It is an acceptance of the principle on our part. However, we do not like the lawyers controlling the way in which those costs are determined. I think that this is a Report stage point. The question is how the principle shall be applied, how it shall be controlled and who will decide what costs should be allowed. If I were discussing the principle of the Bill, I could see the force of the argument. But it was on a detailed Committee point that we gave notice to the Minister that we were not satisfied. We asked about the Rule Committee on a detailed amendment in Committee.

The Parliamentary Secretary said:

"The Bill introduces the principle that litigants in person may recover costs in respect of expenses incurred or work done in relation to proceedings.…The detailed working out of what the litigant in person will actually receive and the sums he will receive are left to be decided by rules of court, and I think that the House will agree that that is right."—[Official Report, 14th February 1975; Vol. 886, c. 817.]

In Committee we said that it was not right. We pressed my hon. Friend on this matter. Is it right that the rules of court will decide? This could be a point of contention between us. We accept the principle of the Bill and support it very strongly, but we challenge the right of lawyers to have this stranglehold on the expenses of going to court. Lawyers have put a stranglehold on this House. It is intolerable that one profession, with its 108 Members of Parliament, its three Law Officers, and its Lord Chancellor in the Cabinet, can stop us from getting an improvement in the law. If we were dealing with restrictive practices—if there were any—among Post Office engineers the whole force of the House would be brought to bear against them and it would be left to my hon. Friend the Member for Westhoughton (Mr. Stott) and myself to stand up to the solid weight, as we have to do now, of 108 lawyer Members of Parliament with all their influence, the Law Officers and others. We think it is intolerable that the taxing master, or whoever he is—and I shall come to him in a moment—should determine what costs our members will get, because the decision will not be based on equity.

The Parliamentary Secretary went on to say:

"In England and Wales it will have to be decided by the Supreme Court Rule Committee and the County Court Rule Committee. In Scotland and Northern Ireland the rulemaking authorities will also have to consider this question, and I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate for relieving me of possibly having to explain the Scottish position, which I should be totally incapable of doing in any case."

The next paragraph shows the arrogance of the profession when dealing with non-learned members and members of the public. It shows the way in which members of the legal profession have on all occasions tended to get us to accept the payment of higher legal fees than should be paid. My hon. Friend said:

"The question of costs is, of course, highly technical."

If someone does not want to blow the gaff, if he does not want members of the public to understand anything, if he does not want the mysteries to be brought into the light of day, if he wants to continue to line his own pocket, what does he do? If he presents a client with a bill and is asked "Can you tell me how this bill is made out?" the thing to do is to reply "This is too complicated", or "You would not understand it. It would take too long to explain, what with VAT and all that".

What does the Parliamentary Secretary, speaking in his capacity as an able assistant to those two leading members of the Bar, the Attorney-General and the Solicitor-General, say when we ask him what our members will get? His reply is:

"The question of costs is, of course, highly technical. I am sure that hon. Members will realise that in these rule-making authorities one has the necessary expertise and experience to decide these matters."

Expertise? It is all about lolly, about pounds and pence, about who gets what, when and how. It is not a matter of expertise to determine whether a bloke will be paid if he has helped to prepare his case in leisure time. That is lolly. It is not a matter of expertise to work out the cost of travelling by bus from Newcastle-under-Lyme town centre to the Crown court at Hanley. That is not a technical matter. It may be a technical matter for the Minister, but if it were up to me I should ask a bus conductor.

I cannot see that the question of costs is technical. It is an argument of white wash. It is the witch-doctor technique, of keeping the mysteries of the craft. It is the masonry of the professional world. When dealing with these technical subjects, does the taxing master, wearing a long wig, sit before an IBM computer?

He does not wear a wig.

I am glad to hear that, and perhaps this is one subject on which I can be enlightened later.

The Minister went on to say:

"It is not possible, therefore, for me to say anything in respect of my right hon. Friend's comments on the work done in leisure time, other than that if the Bill becomes law this is a matter that the rule-making authorities will no doubt consider and that I am sure we shalldebate, probably at length—"—

Now comes the most touching sentence of all—

"I have no doubt that if there are lawyers on the Committee,"—

If there are lawyers on the Committee! For the first time in the recorded history of this House every lawyer Member was in attendance at that Committee by half-past ten. It was a world record of attendance by lawyers at a Committee of this House, but there it was. My hon. Friend said:

"I have no doubt that if there are lawyers on the Committee,"—

and then he gave the game away—

"as there will be"—

Surprise, surprise, they got the Whip—

"it will be at length—in Committee."—[Official Report, 14th February 1975; Vol. 886, cc. 817–88.]

In fact, we did not have that debate at length, because the Government were not able to answer the questions that we put. We shall put the questions again this morning when we get to the point. It is of paramount importance to us, though it may not be to lawyers, to know what the Bill means in terms of costs for our members, what they are entitled to under it, and what they are not entitled to.

What we find intolerable is that we should pass a Bill which says that our members, our contituents, our electors and the public may have costs but these will be determined by a group of, I think—I do not know—lawyers, and there are, of course, others involved in the legal profession elsewhere. It is that aspect of the Bill which we resent and to which we are opposed.

Why is it that we are opposed to this provision? There was some confusion about this on our side of the Committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) thought that the consequence of leaving this to the Rule Committee would be that litigants in person would be more adequately recompensed than perhaps they would otherwise be. His argument was that the Rule Committee—if it is the Rule Committee that does this—would try to establish that the litigant in person was well paid and, indeed. to make certain that there was no cutting of the rate for the professional barrister.

My hon. Friend cited the analogy of the high television fees paid to some of my colleagues when they appear on television. The fees are high not because of the value of their performances, which are often questionable, but because others in the television world have decided that if they were to allow these talkative Members of Parliament to appear on the screen at five bob a time they would lose their employment prospects.

The argument put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover․I an sorry that he is not here to put it himself․is that high fees would be that outcome if we allowed an internal committee of lawyers and those involved in the law to settle the costs. If that were so, it would be unfair to the person fighting the litigant in person. We must look at both sides of this question. Not only must we be fair to the litigant in person but we musst make certain that he does not get more than he is entitled to becausewhatever he gets will be paid by the person on the other side.

My view, however, has been contrary to that of my hon. Friend the Member for Bolsover. The view which I put in Committee was that if we left it to the Rule Committee, the members of the committee being lawyers, would act at once if they saw any growth in litigation by ordinary individuals. Let us talk in plain language. If people found that they could get better results in court by putting their own case properly instead of having it badly put by young lawyers, and they were encouraged by the knowledge that they stood to lose very little by it, or even stood to gain, the lawyers would soon act. They would say "Let us fix the rules so that it will not pay people to do that. Let us kill the principle of the Bill. The Bill says that people shall have their costs, but it is left to us to fix the details and technicalities. We are dishing out the lolly, and we can fix it". They are devious men, and they would at once start to reduce the level of expenses so that the word got round that litigation in person was not worth doing after all.

One thing has been quite certain right from the sixteenth century. I shall not give all the examples, but the evidence for the rapacity of lawyers is well known. From the sixteenth century, the legal profession has been seen as the paramount profession for greed in relation to its customers. Here is just one quotation from Barton Holyday, whom not everyone reads nowadays:

"A man may as well open an oyster without a knife as a lawyer's mouth without a fee".

That is not a particularly apposite quotation nowadays, of course, because the only people who can afford oysters are lawyers.

There is ample evidence showing how lawyers, by their various practices, have ruled themselves out of court as people qualified to determine costs to be awarded in the courts themselves.

Before my hon. Friend comes to the second part of his speech—I do not want to put him off his planned approach to this matter—I must ask one question to have the matter clear. Perhaps I should say that I heard the beginning of his speech, and then I popped out to the Library to look up what "litigant" meant. I can tell my hon. Friend what it means later on, since he seemed a bit confused.

Was my hon. Friend arguing the trade union principle of the rate for the job? Does he say that it should be the rate for the job for the litigant conducting his own case and that he should have exactly the same fee as the lawyers have?

I am in difficulty on this argument. In my view, the litigant should be given a fair sum in relation to his case. It is difficult to determine what the rate for the job is in legal terms. In the first place, there is in the legal profession no straightforward rate for the job as those of us in the trade union movement know it. Whereas it is impossible for us, for example, to agree to do a job, not do it, and then get paid for it, lawyers have this buttoned up. They have one restrictive practice after another.

I asked the Library to give me a brief letter on the iniquities of lawyers, and I received a parcel by way of response. For instance, there was an article—I shall not read it because that would be improper—in the Sunday Times of 27th October 1968. It was headed "The Lawyers' Pound of Flesh". I see my hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Lead bitter) nipping out of the Chamber, and I assume that he is rushing off to get it. It dealt with some of the problems, and these are the headings of the various sections․

"The fee for work not done.

The fee for work not bargained for.

The unqualified master of the fees".․

who is the barrister's clerk.

"The counsel the client does not want.

Work a barrister may not touch".

The article deals with the iniquitious way in which legal people have carved out for themselves lucrative incomes not on the basis of the rate for the job but on the basis of how the customer can be exploited and how much can be extracted from him. That is the lawyers' principle.

I see that my hon. Friend the Deputy Chief Whip has come to harass me, but I must tell him that we have yet to draw attention to other reasons why the Rule Committee should not determine the costs, and why I shall wish to press my amendment to have those words deleted.

I draw the attention of my hon. Friend the Minister to an argument which took place on a Bill in relation to which he was very influential on the Standing Committee—the Fair Trading Bill. On 12th April 1973 my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, West (Mr. Williams) made one of the finest speeches ever made in a Committee of the House, and I think that my hon. Friend the Minister was in attendance that day.

My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea, West drew the attention of the Committee to an article by Robert Millar in the Daily Express of 29th January, and he quoted from it because, he said, it epitomised to some extent public feeling on this matter. This is the quotation:

"I do not go all the way with Shakespeare when he said: 'The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers'."

I agree that there must be no slaughter, no resort to physical violence. Robert Millar went on to say:

"But I must admit I am often sorely tempted. Over the past few years, I have read thousands of heartbreaking letters from ordinary people caught up in the clutches of our legal system. They convince me that in no other sphere of British life can the individual be treated with such timeless callous indifference…the legal profession is a giant monopoly determined at all times to take ruthless action against anyone trying to muscle in on its preserves."․[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 12th April 1973; e. 1321.]

There can be no doubt about that.

12 noon

My hon. Friend drew the attention of the Committee to a book called "Conduct and Etiquette at the Bar". Under the heading "The General Principles Governing Practice" it says:

"It is the spirit and tradition of the Bar that counsel is separately instructed and separately remunerated by fees for each piece of work done, it is not permissible for counsel to undertake to represent any person, authority or corporation in all their Court work for a fixed annual salary."

My hon. Friend, backed by the present Minister, said that if that was not a restrictive practice he had never come across one. The paragraph says that as a general rule:

"In so far as contentious business is concerned, neither before nor after litigation should a barrister act or advise without the intervention of a solicitor"

If a boiler maker, with his chalk—

Order. I have certain responsibilities under Standing Order No. 22 with regard to tedious repetition. The hon. Member has taken so far about 55 minutes. If that is not clear, let me remind him of what he once said when I commended him for making a short speech.

For the benefit of the House, I would explain that because the House may be curious. On that occasion I said that I was always capable of making a short speech if I knew what I was talking about. There is no exception in this case. However, it has been my experience that there is no Standing Order—thank God—that demands that a Member knows what he is talking about before he speaks; otherwise we should have a much shorter working day.

Order. May I help the hon. Member? It is not a question of the hon. Member knowing what he is talking about; it is just a question of tedious repetition.

Can you advise me, Mr. Speaker, because I do not want to leave anything out of my speech, whether we are taking Amendments No. 4 and No. 7 with this group of amendments?

No.

I shall, therefore, have the chance to deal with some of those topics later, because, obviously, Mr. Speaker, you want me to he as brief as possible.

Am I right or wrong in assuming that the Rule Committee consists of lawyers? You may have gathered, Mr. Speaker, that I have a certain prejudice against lawyers. It would certainly reassure me to be told that the Rule Committee does not consist of people with a financial interest in this matter.

I should like to know all the members of the Rule Committee, their experience, their professional standing and qualifications and the social class to which they and their fathers belong. How many of them are there? What particular area do they cover? In what way are technicalities involved? What are the difficulties of calculation?

Order. We have had all this several times and I shall soon direct the hon. Member to conclude in moving his amendment.

What alternative arrangements could be made for the determination of costs? Could the Minister say what expenses witnesses will be allowed and whether expenses are likely to be increased at any time? Who is the taxing master and to whom is he responsible? Is there no hope of getting a change in this title, because it will deceive the ordinary layman, for whom the Bill is intended?

The amendment refers to the

"taxation or other determination of those costs".

This is a technical use of the word "taxation". Ordinary people understand the word "taxation" to mean the amount that the Chancellor of the Exchequer takes from them.

While you, Mr. Speaker, have been consulting the Chief Whip, I have turned from the amendment relating to rules of court to that relating to "taxation or other determination".

Order. I am quite capable of talking to the Chief Whip and also hearing what the hon. Member says. I was listening to him.

I am just trying to be helpful, Mr. Speaker.

It is archaic and, in the eyes of ordinary people, misleading to use the word "taxation" in a technical sense in this context. They will not know that "taxation" is being used in the sense of "assessment". They will think—and here I am in danger of tedious repetition —that it relates to the sums taken from them by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Who appoints the taxing master? To whom is he responsible, and who pays his salary? How much does he receive, how is he paid, what are the terms of his office and how can he be removed? If he takes a decision that I do not like in relation to one of my constituents, what can I do about it? Can I report him to the Parliamentary Commissioner? I doubt it. If the answer is in the negative, perhaps the Minister will tell me why, as a Member of Parliament, I should approve a Bill giving the taxing master this power? Why should I endorse his power?

I did not intend to speak for so long, but I got carried away by the importance of the subject. I sit down hoping that the Minister has sound answers to my questions, and I hope that the House receives satisfaction.

At the commencement of his speech my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding) made some generous references to myself, for which I thank him. However, he implied that because of my kindness and gentility I might lack guile. I suggest that the Bill perhaps shows that that is not so. I managed to get five lawyers to append their signatures to the Bill. At first sight it would appear as though they were doing something against the interests of their profession, but I was able to convince them that my Bill was designed to remove an injustice.

The injustice was that a lawyer could go to court on behalf of a client and, as a result of fighting his case, get expenses. If for some good reason a person decided that he did not want legal advice and went to court on his own to fight his case, he would not be able to claim expenses. The lawyers are co-operating, because my Bill will give laymen the same privileges that lawyers enjoy.

If the amendment were accepted, the layman would be put in a privileged position and would get terms superior to those which a solicitor or a barrister can get. For this reason, I have to resist the amendment.

My hon. Friend also said that the Bill clearly was not drafted by myself. I readily acknowledge that. Indeed, I am grateful to the Consumers' Association in particular, and its lawyer, David Tench, who gave me much assistance, and to the Lord Chancellor's Department for its assistance.

I want that kind of assistance and expertise. When I first became a junior Minister, I said, like my hon. Friend I do not want all this legal jargon. Why is not the Bill drafted in a form which a layman can understand? I will show you how to draft a Bill" I drafted a Bill on my own. When I took it along to the parliamentary draftsman, the lawyers and others who had to examine it were able to show me that there were so many pitfalls in it that people would never have accepted as just what it sought to do.

I therefore hope that my hon. Friend will bear with me and support the Bill as it is and not press the amendment.

I strongly support the idea behind the Bill. I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) on introducing it.

I shall deal shortly with some of the matters which were dealt with so charmingly and amusingly in the very able speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding). He was right in saying that the language of lawyers is esoteric and not easily understood by laymen. I should welcome any move to remove much of the traditional waffle and mystique that surrounds some of the most absurd practices in the legal profession—and there are many.

On the other side of the coin, I must point out that the legal profession, particularly under the encouragement of previous Labour Governments, has already made enormous progress in this direction. It was Mr. Attlee's Labour Government between 1945 and 1951 that introduced the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 and the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949. It was Lord Gardiner, when he was Lord Chancellor in the Labour Government of 1964, who introduced a whole host of measures in various departments of the law—the setting up of the Law Commission itself and the establishment of a large number of committees to make recommendations in many aspects of the law. That brought about the first huge comprehensive review of various legal subjects with the object of making the law more intelligible to ordinary people.

I want to deal with the vexed question

"subject to rules of court".

My hon. Friend asked the Law Officers who are the members of the committee which produces the rules of court. I can tell him that they are all very distinguished lawyers themselves. He asked whether they have the traditional legal training. The answer is that they have. He then asked whether that meant that they had a built-in bias against those for whom they are, in effect, laying down rules.

I take the point. My answer to my hon. Friend is that experience has shown that rules of court are very complicated; they are the subject matter of much litigation, and it is quite impossible to expect Parliament to prescribe in advance precisely all the situations which might arise on a taxation.

The comments my hon. Friend made about the legal profession contained many half-truths. I can match any of his quotations. Dr. Johnson once said that he

"did not care to speak ill of any man behind his back but he believed the gentleman was an attorney."

There are many other such quotations.

One of the reasons why the legal profession is often in such odium is, I regret to say, the unsavoury practices of many members of the solicitors' branch of the profession with whom the ordinary members of the public first come into contact. There is a strong case for having a comprehensive inquiry into the solicitors' profession. I understand that there is legislation in the pipeline attacking, for example, the solicitors' monopoly in conveyancing matters, and that there are other ideas in the pipeline for reviewing the rights of audience by solicitors and members of the Bar before various courts.

12.15 p.m.

The legal profession is conscious of these criticisms and has already done a good deal to put its own house in order. At a time of high inflation and continuing rises in wages in all walks of life, the Bar is the only profession which has voluntarily reduced its fees in the last few years by the abolition of the two-thirds rule and by the effective abolition of the circuit system, which means, in effect, that the necessity to have a junior from the circuit and the customary kite fee has gone out of the window.

Those were clearly restrictive practices, which could not be justified in the public interest. It is to the credit of the organisers of the Bar that they have recognised this and have voluntarily, with out any form of legislative interference, abolished those practices.

I recognise that there is a great deal more to be done. I should be interested to hear the Minister spell out the Government's ideas. Speaking as a new Member and as a back-bencher who before coming here spent many years at the Bar, my impression is that whenever we have a Labour administration there are abundant ideas and many excellent reforms in the doctrines of law, whether in personal injury law, criminal law, or anything else, but little—if any—reform takes place in the organisation of the legal profession, the judiciary, and the legal system in general, many aspects of which require substantial reform in the public interest.

I hope that this Lord Chancellor, like the one in the last Labour administration—Lord Gardiner—will make it a fundamental hallmark of his administration to encourage substantial law reform, particularly with regard to the organisation of the system and the profession.

Various scurrilous attacks were made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme on the integrity of taxing masters and other court officials. Those attacks were thoroughly unfair, and without justification. He asked various rhetorical questions—for instance: who are the taxing masters? The answer is that they are, without exception, highly experienced practitioners, appointed by the Lord Chancellor, on a fairly modest salary. My hon. Friend asked what is the power to remove them, and I suppose the answer would be that the Lord Chancellor can remove them if there is any question of misconduct or negligence.

Another question was: what remedy has a constituent against the decision of a taxing master? I suppose the answer is that there is a straight-forward right of appeal to another tribunal. Here my hon. Friend has made a good point, at last, because it seems to me that the question of costs is, in effect, unappealable effectively. Although the remedy exists, in practice experience has shown that it is well-nigh impossible for a dissatisfied litigant to appeal successfully on the question of costs, because he is always met in the Court of Appeal or the appeal tribunal by the argument "the matter of costs is one of discretion for the taxing master or the judge at first instance. We are not going to interfere with the judicial exercise of discretion, provided that it has not been unreasonably exercised."

I want to say a word about one of the comments of my hon. Friend on the question of the yardstick that is to be used in the assessment of costs in this or any other kind of litigation. He asks quite fairly and understandably on what principle, if any, is the time spent by a litigant in person to be assessed by a taxing master when it is decided what amount of money the litigant in person shall recover by way of costs. In my judgment, the question of yardstick here is very difficult. Practitioners are only too familiar with the individual idiosyncrasies and quirks of certain taxing masters. If one goes to one taxing master one receives a certain sum of money by way of costs. If one goes to another taxing master, who has done exactly the same amount of work, a different sum is awarded.

At long last my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme stumbled, almost by accident, on a good point and a valid criticism of the taxing system. I suggest that the Government should consider some form of prescribing uniformity of costs in those cases. By all means give the taxing master discretion, but that discretion should be based on some sort of scale. For example, in another field of law—road traffic offences—the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice have recently approved a table of suggested penalties to be imposed by magistrates. It still allows them a discretion to fix penalties according to the facts of the case and the antecedents of the defendant, but it is some yardstick. I suggest that in this sort of situation it might be useful to make available a yardstick of that kind.

We on the Government side of the House, and, I am sure, all fair-minded people, would welcome any legislation to make the law fairer and to put the litigant in person in a comparable position to that of the person who is represented by a lawyer. I apprehend that over the years the number of litigants in person will increase and not decrease. Why is that? Why are there more litigants in person now than there were? I do not know whether there are any reliable statistics, but, looking around the courts from time to time, one cannot help noticing that there are many litigants in person, and it is absolutely fundamental that they should have the same rights before the law as do litigants represented by lawyers.

I believe that one of the reasons why there are more litigants in person is dissatisfaction with the legal profession. I think we have to recognise this fact. There is profound dissatisfaction with the legal profession, particularly with solicitors. In the last two or three years many actions for negligence against solicitors have been heard in the courts. Most of those cases reveal only the tip of the iceberg. No solicitor welcomes that sort of situation and, through his insurance company, will do his best to settle such a case long before it comes to the court.

One has the impression that there is a good deal of this type of litigation about, and from letters that one receives from constituents one knows that many people have had the most unfortunate experiences with solicitors. They may have been unlucky. The case that they have taken to the solicitor may have presented unusually difficult problems. But I get the impression—I have talked to other Members who have had the same impression—that there is considerable disillusionment among ordinary men and women at the ability and diligence of many firms of solicitors. I think this is a deplorable state of affairs, and I welcome the move by the Lord Chancellor and the present Government to introduce and expand the Neighbourhood Law Service, which has done—

Order. I do not think we can deal with the Neighbourhood Law Service on this amendment.

I am grateful, Mr. Speaker. I was giving that as an illustration of the healthy tendency, these days, to fill up the gap in the performances by solicitors.

I return to the amendment. The point is also made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme that the word "taxation" is confusing. He says—the point is easily demonstrated—that "taxation" has the sort of conventional meaning whereby a person thinks that he is going to have money taken away from him by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. I have considerable sympathy with my hon. Friend on that point. As I said before, I am in favour of cutting out the mumbo-jumbo and waffle that one finds in legal documents.

On the other hand, I want to protect as precisely as possible the rights and safeguards related to litigants in person. As the system stands at the moment, it is essential to retain those words in this provision, because without the words complained of by my hon. Friend the provision becomes meaningless. The remedy which we seek to give to liti- gants in person will not exist if we remove these words.

Has my hon. Friend noticed that the Parliamentary Secretary to the Law Officers' Department has taken my advice that when the speeches were less effective he should make his telephone call?

I have noticed the Parliamentary Secretary's absence from the Chamber. However, that is not consistent only with him making a telephone call. It may be due to other circumstances. I remind my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme that the suggestion made in Committee, which he welcomed, about consultation between members of the Rule Committee and the Law Officers, was endorsed by myself during the Committee stage of this Bill, when I said:

"There is nothing to be lost, and possibly something to be gained by informal discussions with the rule committee, just as the Law Officers and the Lord Chancellor's Department frequently discuss proposals with senior judges before they are brought forward in legislation in order to gain the general views and reactions of the judiciary without in any way committing it.—[OFFICIAL REPORT, Standing Committee C. 26th March 1975; c 20.]

I endorse his suggestion. I am all in favour of Law Officers using telephones, and I am all in favour of their speaking to the members of the Rule Committee generally.

My hon. Friend made a number of comments about the Law Officers. Years ago, if the biographies are right, distinguished lawyers sometimes became Members of Parliament at considerable financial sacrifice, and they were able to lend their legal experience to the House. The position today is often very different.

Is it in order, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for the hon. Gentleman to continue like this? Is his speech within the terms of the amendment? Many hon. Members are waiting for the next Bill to come before the House.

As the hon. Member will know, I have just taken the Chair. I gather that the hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman) was replying to a point raised by an hon. Gentleman who had already taken part in the debate. I shall have to wait and see what happens.

I was answering points made at inordinate length by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme who took over an hour to make them. I have been on my feet for about 15 minutes. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me if, in the space of 15 minutes, I have not yet had an opportunity to deal with points which took over an hour to make—points which to many Labour Members are extremely important to the public, even if they are not important to the hon. Gentleman. Nothing is more important than the fair administration of the law—the fair administration of justice—especially where unrepresented ordinary people are concerned.

The hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) said in Committee:

"I am sorry that I appear not to have understood, by virtue of my youth, innocence and inexperience, that perhaps the best way of achieving my aim.…"—[0fficial Report, Standing Committee C, 26th March 1975 c. 4.]

Does my hon. Friend agree that if we want to revise legislation we must intervene at the appropriate time, and that the failure of other hon. Members not to intervene at the appropriate time cannot be attributed to us?

I agree with that broad proposition. This is a matter of fundamental importance which affects all ordinary men and women. We all come into contact with the law, whether we like it or not, at every stage in our lives. Lord Birkett, who, as Sir Norman Birkett, was one of the most distinguished members of the Bar and a Liberal Member of the House for a relatively short time, said that every ordinary man and woman came into contact with the law the moment he or she turned on a bathroom tap. Whether it is legislation to do with housing, health, rents or road traffic, we come into contact with the law long before we come into the realms of criminal or matrimonial law, or administrative law, or planning law. Therefore, ordinary working-class men and women will be vitally affected by the provisions of the Bill, and it is important to consider it in great detail.

Before the intervention of the hon. Member for Ripon, I was speaking about the Law Officers, about whom my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, spoke at length. My hon. Friend made a most serious allegation, saying that there was a built-in prejudice and bias in the legal profession, which sought, through its membership of the House, to preserve a closed shop and a vested interest in the enactment of new laws. That was a totally irresponsible and unfair slur upon the legal profession generally.

I take the point that there are individual black sheep in every profession, and that there are individual examples of culpable behaviour in the solicitors' profession and at the Bar, just as there are in the Church, the Services and other professions. However, to make such a general slur and to reinforce it by obscure articles from obscure newspapers such as the Sunday Times and the Daily Express is going too far. This is a serious subject. We have been treated to an entertaining but thoroughly frivolous and mischievous speech by my hon. Friend.

I wish to revert to the serious point raised in the Bill, because fundamental rights of ordinary people are involved. It is nonsense to make cheap forensic points about lawyers when such important issues are at stake.

If the amendment succeeds, the whole subsection becomes absolute nonsense. The purpose of the subsection is to ensure that a litigant in person will enjoy the same rights, financially, as a person who is not legally represented. It was once said that justice was open to all, like the Ritz Hotel—that there was one law for the rich and one law for the poor. Unfortunately, in many circumstances that dreadful anomaly has not been cured, although great credit is due to successive Labour Governments for introducing legal aid and advice legislation which has enabled legal aid to be given to ordinary working-class men and women who had not enjoyed it hitherto.

However, there is a great deal more to be done. The Bill is another step in a great tradition of law reform. I wholeheartedly support it, and oppose the amendments.

Interest in this subject has been building up for a considerable time. Because of my concern with the matter when I was a member of the Consumer Council I am anxious to join in the debate, partly to express my support for the intention behind the Bill, and partly to support the amendment.

I find myself in a difficult position in relation to my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding), because I am suspended somewhere between the hon. Members and the hon. and learned Members of the House. In relation to the administration of justice. as a justice of the peace, I might be said to be sitting on the fence, with one leg either side of it—a singularly uncomfortable position.

I understood that magistrates sat on benches, not fences.

I was speaking only of my gymnastic performance in relation to the points made in my hon. Friend's speech.

I am particularly concerned about the point which the amendment seeks to make about the way in which costs are determined when a litigant represents himself in the county court. As long ago as 1968 the Consumer Council carried out an important survey in seven county courts, as a result of which it published an interesting report entitled "Justice out of Reach". It presented a case for the small claims court.

Since then a great deal has happened. Legislation has moved on. The county courts have been reformed to a great extent, to make it easier for small claims to come before them and for people to represent themselves. In the view of those who carried out the survey on behalf of the Consumer Council, the greatest problem in pursuing these matters in the courts was expense. Difficulties arose because solicitors were unwilling to take up the small claim, as they could not see a successful financial outcome. Therefore, the opportunity arose for litigants to represent themselves in court.

However, it is plain to most lay people that the expenses which can be incurred are not always easily definable—perhaps not even as easily definable as those of members of the legal profession. A great deal of time can be expended by an individual in trying to find suitable backing

for a case which he wishes to make in court and in doing research on his own account in order to put his case before legal luminaries. I remind hon. Members of the fear of most people about going into a court and speaking in support of their case and of the trouble to which they need go to ensure that they are able to present it effectively. Often they go to court to try to avoid a wrong being done to them financially or to claim financial redress for a wrong which has been done to them. For the lawyers to be able to make a decision about the value of their costs adds to their disadvantage.

There is great opportunity for a litigant to appear in court and present his case. I invoke my experience as a justice of the peace in saying that I had a great deal of sympathy with some of the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme about the quality of representation in the courts which is sometimes available to a person. Often a junior law representative in the courts would make a better case. However, if a litigant wishes to speak on his own behalf, it is essential not only that he should have the protection of the law but that he should not be subject to such financial loss in making his case that even if he wins he is still seriously disadvantaged.

My purpose in speaking is to plead that serious consideration be given to the way in which costs are determined. I do not perhaps go as far as my hon. Friend for Newcastle-under-Lyme in suggesting that the vested interests of members of the legal profession are such that they will gang up on litigants and try to drive them out of bringing their actions. However, if it became widely known that people who had prepared their own cases and incurred considerable expense in the process found, even though they were successful, that they were still at a disadvantage and that it had cost them more to defend themselves than it would have done if they had employed lawyers, the whole system would be thrown into disarray.

The survey of seven county courts showed how few solicitors were prepared to take on small cases. This is a compelling argument which should commend itself to the Minister.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding) took over an hour in making all sorts of allegations against the legal profession apparently because, as he suggested, the words which his amendment sought to omit had been inserted in the Bill because the legal profession desired to protect its interests—an absolutely ridiculous suggestion.

My hon. Friend's speech was very amusing. Some of us could hardly contain ourselves with laughter. There were tears in the eyes of the Government Chief Whip. However, my hon. Friend's allegations against the legal profession were —and I use the word quite specifically—disgraceful. Members of the legal profession have been Members of Parliament for many years and they have contributed in no uncertain way to the services of the House. They have given those services loyally. They have contributed their expertise. My hon. Friend's disgraceful attack was utterly and completely wrong and it calls for a complete answer and denial.

I do not know why my hon. Friend made his allegations. Whether it was jealously of the legal profession—

It may be that the hon. Member's allegations were false and should be refuted, but is it in order to refute them within the context of the amendment?

As the allegations have been made, the hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) should be allowed to refute them if he so wishes.

They have been refuted by the hon. Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman).

I should imagine that the hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington is probably better qualified to do it.

One of the reasons for the amendment put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme was that he thought the legal profession wanted the words which he proposed to omit to be in the Bill for its own interests. That must be a point of the greatest importance and I want to refute it as strongly as I can.

I declare an interest. I am a member of the much maligned legal profession and I have been a Member of the House for many years. I do not desire my hon. Friend to attack me for the services I may have rendered to the House. I repeat that his was a most disgraceful allegation against hon. and learned Members and I hope that at some time he will withdraw it.

I wish to deal with the amendment to which so little attention was paid by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme in moving it. He has entirely misconceived the effect of the words in the Bill. If, as he proposes, they were omitted, the question of costs would be left at large; there would be no way of determining them. They have not been inserted by lawyers to serve their interests; they are vital for protecting the interests of the litigants.

Does not my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme appreciate that, in order to determine costs, one must know what sort of costs will be allowed? The Rule Committee—an important body of judges and legal people—has set out criteria for judging the question of costs. As for taxation, we have taxing masters to whom a litigant may appeal and who deal with costs questions.

The points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mrs. Miller) are relevant, but they are not assisted by the amendments. The arguments she put forward are the subject matter of the Bill. My right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesborough (Mr. Bottomley) by the Bill is attempting to ensure that the litigant who acts in person shall he able to get the costs he has properly incurred, the expenses and, by a subsequent amendment, the loss he has suffered. My right hon. Friend is doing exactly what my hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North wishes in this matter.

The amendments are entirely misconceived, and I hope that they will be rejected.

I want to address myself specifically to the amendment before us, apart from making a few comments in an attempt to take the heat out of the dialogue. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding). in an admittedly long speech, expressed some reservations about the legal profession. It would be remiss of the House to interpret that purely as an expression of acrimony without acknowledging that the legal profession has an important role and that the lawyers in the House perform a useful and important function.

On 21st November 1968, in New Society, an interesting article appeared, one paragraph of which reads as follows:

"Barristers and solicitors have often, as has been shown, successfully opposed or diverted measures which have threatened their professional positions, and even the Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 was made by lawyers for lawyers. There are still no laymen on the legal aid committees to administer legal aid in civil proceedings."

That article shows that there is criticism, but that it is constructive criticism. The House has a function to examine the work of lawyers, but without detriment to their individual standing and integrity.

The amendment merely calls for an appraisal of the problem before us. There can be no argument about the House being anxious that the law shall be comprehensible. The law is often obscure and, in spite of the great care with which the House exercises its legislative powers, often confuses litigants, especially litigants in person. It is unarguable that the layman should be saved the hazards of unnecessary and oppressive legal operations I am sure that that proposition is acceptable to both sides of the House. It is also unarguable that no layman should have to go through the labyrinth of modern legal proceedings without professional advice, and that, if he cannot afford it, he should be assisted in obtaining that professional advice.

That is exactly what the Bill seeks to achieve. My right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) has once again made a valuable contribution by introducing the Bill which is aimed at securing that litigants in person shall be assisted. There is some doubt in our minds as to whether the Bill will do what it intends when it becomes an Act of Parliament.

Before my hon. Friend develops his speech and moves on to his next argument, may I ask him to address his mind to one matter? He rightly spoke of the extension of legal aid. Does he appreciate that there are several types of action in civil courts for which a person is not eligible for legal aid? There fore, a person who cannot afford privately to employ expensive solicitors and barristers is still at a disadvantage and comes within the Bill as a litigant in person. It is more important than ever that people who cannot get legal aid for prosecuting an action for defamation, false imprisonment or malicious prosecution should come within the category of a litigant in person.

Yes, I agree. My hon. Friend has explained exactly what the Bill does and there is no division of opinion. My right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough is seeking, in his Bill, to crystallise the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman), which I support.

I ask the Minister to give us some assistance on the difficulty of assessing what is meant by "work done". Perhaps a brief definition of that phrase could be given. Perhaps we can deal with the question of loss when we come to Amendment No. 3.

My hon. Friend the Member for New castle-under-Lyme spoke about the taxing master. The taxing master is appointed by the Lord Chancellor and, that being so, we are entitled, for the sake of clarity and not in a spirit of criticism, to ask how that appointment is made. Who makes the recommendation for the appointment and to what extent is that appointee subject to the practices which have caused genuine fears to arise in the mind of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme?

I remind the House that the Lord Chancellor in practice but not as a matter of obligation is a lawyer and as a lawyer appoints the taxing master. We should like to know by what process that is done, if only to remove any fears we may have. I reiterate that I am in no way questioning the integrity either of the Lord Chancellor or of the taxing master. In dealing with an important subject like this hon. Members are entitled to know exactly what is involved so that any doubts we may have can be resolved.

I had not intended to intervene in this debate, partly because this is not a specialty of mine and partly because I had to be elsewhere earlier and could not attend the initial stages of the discussion.

I did not hear the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under Lyme (Mr. Golding) and I am not aware of the course of the debate so far. However, I was sorry that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman), who has given such long and respected service to the House over many years, got so upset about what had been said. If there were any unfair attacks in the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, I would regret them. However, I want to make a few comments about the legal profession, much as I respect the role of lawyers, such as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington, in the House and in the general working of the parliamentary institution. However, I do not want my hon. and learned Friend to feel that this appreciative view of lawyers is widely held by people in the community, particularly among the poorer sections for whom Labour Members speak.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ilford, North (Mrs. Miller) spoke about the legal aid service. Whatever may have been in the minds of those who set up that service many years ago, it must be said that at present it is a disgraceful shambles that does no credit to our democracy. We in this House are often complacent about the state to which the service has degenerated, and something should be done urgently to put the service right. So long as the service is left as it is, the people whom we are setting out to assist will not be helped.

I hope my hon. Friend will appreciate that over 50 years ago I attended regularly at sessions aimed at giving poor men's advice on law. Many of my colleagues have continued to carry out that process from that day to this. The legal profession has been persistent in its efforts in trying to help poor people and others and has given that legal advice voluntarily up to the present time.

I yield to nobody in my respect for my hon. and learned Friend, and, indeed, I know a good deal about his activities on this score. I also know of the record of a number of other lawyers on both sides of the House who have given sterling service in these matters, but one cannot lump together the whole of that large and distinguished profession. There are some bad apples in the legal barrel. That is the section of the legal profession on which I wish to concentrate. My hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman) said that in all professions there were black sheep. One of the deficiencies in the legal aid service lies in the fact that often a third-class service is given to people who are most deserving of our help. If anybody doubts this, I invite him to come to my constituency. If I had my way, I would put a quarter of the solicitors in that constituency behind bars. I can think of at least two, and even three, people who have been incarcerated as a result of the neglect of their legal aid advisers. I can think of frequent cases where there has been dilatoriness or inefficiency in respect of people, often poor people, who have been defended. I do not want to delay this discussion, but I am simply making the point that this is not good enough.

I share my hon. Friend's strong point about deficiencies in administration of the legal aid scheme. I also share his proper concern about the performance of individual solicitors who often neglect their duties. However, will my hon. Friend bear in mind that if ever he comes across any case such as he has outlined he has a simple remedy? The remedy is to report the individual solicitor immediately to the Law Society with a recommendation that the society's disciplinary committee should investigate the case and take action. I know that the Law Society welcomes such intervention and is anxious to deal strictly and quickly with solicitors who neglect their duties.

I accept my hon. Friend's advice in the spirit in which it was offered. I have followed that course on several occasions. My hon. Friend will be aware that it is a time-consuming business, bearing in mind one's duties as a busy Member of Parliament. Nevertheless, I shall bear his advice in mind in any future cases which come to my attention.

I wish to counsel the legal profession against any complacency in this matter. There is a widespread fear among ordinary people, particularly the poor, that they are the victims of a very unfair system at the moment. It is up to all of us on both sides of the House to act as spokesmen for the people I am describing. This should be treated as a matter of urgency and not as a matter for commissions of inquiry or for learned research. The matter should be cleaned up before many more months pass us by.

I, too, did not intend to take part in this debate. I have heard that opening gambit on many occasions, and I must confess that it does not impress me all that much. I am sorry that I denied myself the pleasure of hearing the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding). By all accounts his speech was lengthy, and it certainly aroused the ire of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman). I do not know why my hon. and learned Friend got so excited. He has been a Member of this House for a long time. That remark also applies to myself. I do not take exception to criticisms of the legal profession for I know that more often than not those criticisms are fully justified.

Does my hon. Friend appreciate that my ire was aroused by the fact that my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding) said that the inclusion of certain words in the Bill were in the interests of the legal profession?

I must leave it to my hon. and learned Friend to fight out this battle on a later occasion, either inside or outside the House. I do not intend to become involved in a dispute between two hon. Friends.

It is true to say that lawyers have been the subject of criticism throughout the ages. They were certainly criticised in the Middle Ages and I cannot understand why my hon. and learned Friend should get so excited at criticisms of lawyers. He should devote his future activities in the House to more useful purposes than setting out to defend the whole of the legal profession against attacks.

I have only one criticism to make of the Bill. Certain people are litigious by temperament. When people feel that they have a jolly good case, they are often aggrieved and offended when told by the legal profession that their case is not strong. This Bill will encourage litigants to go to the courts and fight their case in the fond hope that they will get their costs. It may encourage certain people to go to law who would not otherwise do so. That is a risk that we must take. We must direct the litigants to decide whether they have a good case and whether, by conducting it in person, they will be able to win it. However, many litigants who appear in person may be lawyers.

The hon. Member's speech would be more applicable to the Third Reading. We are now discussing a limited amendment. I hope that the hon. Member will address himself to that amendment and postpone his speech until the Third Reading.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. May I ask for your guidance? Would the speech be of more profit to the next set of amendments, dealing with costs and losses, when this point could probably be made?

From what I heard, the hon. Member seems to be giving a general welcome to the Bill, which would be more appropriately expressed on Third Reading. However, if when we come to the next set of amendments his speech is in order, he may make his contribution.

Being a law-abiding person․

That seems to follow from being a lawyer, I hope.

I accept your ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, without further demur. If I am in the House I hope that I shall have the opportunity of catching your eye at a later stage in the debate.

First, I congratulate the hon. Member for East bourne (Mr. Gow). He has not yet spoken but, being a lawyer, he will doubtless make an effort to do so on what is, I believe, his first appearance on the Front Bench. However, I do not think that his presence will gratify my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding).

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme on moving the amendment, by his terms, briefly. Those who have heard his contributions in the past know that they are always amusing. This was by no means one of his lengthier speeches; it was one of his middle-grade speeches. It was very amusing and interesting. However, I received the impression that he was not over-fond of the legal profession. The allegations which he made were answered by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman). Therefore, I do not think that it will be necessary for me to launch into another defence.

I am in an impossible position. If I replied in detail to all the allegations and points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, he would accuse me as a lawyer of being garrulous and of speaking overlong and of endeavouring to confuse him. However, if I speak briefly he will say that I am showing the usual arrogance and contempt that lawyers have for the ordinary layman. However, I shall deal with his points and I am sure that he will listen carefully. I am certain that he will exercise his right of reply.

1.15 p.m.

My hon. Friend the Member for Blyth, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington and my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) have all said these amendments were not acceptable. My right hon. Friend the Member for Middles brough said that, if passed, these amendments would destroy the whole concept of the Bill.

The Bill provides specifically for the extension of the rule-making power. My hon. Friend the Member for NewcastleUnder-Lyme must believe me when I say that "costs" is a word which in this context has a technical meaning. The Bill seeks to put the costs of the litigant in person on the same footing as the costs of a solicitor. A solicitor cannot charge anything he wishes, because both the type of work for which he can charge and the amount of that charge are regulated by rule. They are regulated by the Rule Committee, which my hon. Friend spent some time in decrying.

Will my hon. Friend deal with one aspect of this problem? Surely it is not right to say that a solicitor cannot charge what he likes, because it is subject to taxation, and there are strict rules about what can be claimed. Surely that proposition has been accurately stated by the Minister. Before we get to that stage a solicitor can present a bill to a client, unless the client insists on taxation. If the client is fool enough to pay the solicitors bill, he has no remedy afterwards. That is the distinction between the situation where a litigant insists on taxation and the situation where an applicant is faced with an enormous solicitor's bill which he might pay if he does not appreciate that he has freedom from taxation.

I have no intention of defending high charges by solicitors or anyone else. The position which my hon. Friend has set out is accurate. I am dealing with the position in which the costs of the solicitor are being taxed. That is the position faced by the litigant in person when he presents his case to the courts.

This is one of the most interesting parts for consideration. My hon. Friend said that the intention of the Bill was to have the costs of the litigant in person determined in the same way as the solicitor arrived at his costs. How can the litigant in person see that he can achieve those costs? What machinery is available to help him to achieve those costs?

I shall deal with that point, together with the other point he raised in his interesting contribution.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough said, and has said consistently, it is not the intention of the Bill to put the litigant in person in a better position than that of the solicitor in respect of remuneration for work done. The alternative to leaving a regulation of the amounts to the rule-making authorities would be for the Bill itself to prescribe in detail the amounts and the headings under which the litigant in person can recover. This is plainly impractical and would bring about ambiguities and the very sort of bad, vague legislation that I am sure my hon. Friend would want to avoid. That seemed to be the theme running through his speech.

It is self-evident that there are two sides in litigation—the paying side and the receiving side, the losing side and the winning side. They must both be considered. All the costs which the litigant in person will receive if this Bill becomes law, as I am sure the House hopes it will, will in most cases fall to be paid by his opponent who loses the case. If the type of work for which a litigant in person is to be remunerated and the amount are not to be prescribed in the Bill—I hope that I take my hon. Friend along with me in saying that that would be impractical—the person who loses may have to pay more to an unrepresented litigant than he would to one who had a solicitor or counsel appearing for him.

I am sure that it is not my hon. Friend's wish—it certainly is not the Government's view—that anyone should make a profit from litigation. I am sure that his wish is that the litigant should receive a sum to compensate him for the loss incurred in conducting the litigation. That is the purpose of the Bill. It is to be hoped—and this advice is always given—that no one embarks lightly upon litigation and that no one undertakes litigation except as a last resort. If, however, a person is forced into it and chooses to represent himself he should not be out of pocket if he is successful.

As I understand it, if a layman takes a case he cannot make a profit, and if this amendment is not made that will remain the situation. Is it not also the case that when a solicitor takes his own case he can get costs? Could he therefore not also make a profit? If that is so, what possible justification is there for it?

One of the anomalies that the Bill specifically sets out to remove is that of the solicitor who represents himself being able to get costs. As I understand it, it was certainly never the case that the solicitor who appeared for himself could actually make a profit out of doing so. He would be allowed by the Rule Committee the necessary expenses that he would have got had he been representing someone else. I have no intention of embarking upon a defence of any practices in the legal profession which are against the public interest or not in the interests of the litigant. I am sure that my hon. Friend agrees that there must inevitably be some control over the amount that a litigant in person recovers, just as there is—my hon. Friend must take my word for this—over the amount that a solicitor recovers. It is only right and fair, and equitable, that the paying party is protected. In 99 cases out of 100, the paying party is a member of the public and is, like my hon. Friend, a layman.

If the sums that a litigant in person has to recover are to be costs they will and must be subject to the present rules of court. The sums must be costs, for technical reasons. It is possible that a litigant in person will have as his opponent someone who is legally aided. Section 13 of the Legal Aid Act 1974, with which my hon. Friend will be intimately familiar, permits costs to be paid out of the Legal Aid Fund in certain circumstances. Indeed, in Committee the Bill was amended by the Government to provide that the litigant in person should benefit from this provision. The only costs—I put this in as useful background for my hon. Friend—which at present can be recovered from the opposing party are those necessarily incurred in proving or defending a claim. In England and Wales the Rules of the Supreme Court at Order 62, rule 28(2), which I am sure my hon. Friend has read, provide that where costs are taxed on a party and party basis

"there shall be allowed all such costs as were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being taxed."

This party and party basis of taxation is one to which every solicitor's bill must be subject to protect the paying party, and a litigant in person's bill must be subject to it as well.

If one accepts, as I am sure my hon. Friend will, that the losing side must be protected, there must be rules about the type of work or expenses for which the litigant in person can claim. Of course, this will be to the assistance of the litigant in person as well, who may have no idea of the sort of claims it would be proper for him to make. That is why the expertise and experience of the rulemaking authorities are so important, and why the costs and expenses of the litigant in person have been specifically left to the Rule Committee in the Bill. At this stage, when the rule-making authorities have not met, it is difficult to indicate the form the rules will take, but it is reasonable to suppose that they will provide reasonable guidelines within which there will be an element of discretion for taxing officers.

My hon. Friend asks who the rule-making authorities are. In England and Wales they are the Supreme Court Rule Committee, the County Court Rule Committee and the Matrimonial Causes Rule Committee. In Scotland the position is different. The composition of the Supreme Court Rule Committee is fixed by Section 99 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1925. It consists of the Lord Chancellor. the Lord Chief Justice, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division, four other judges of the Supreme Court, two practising barristers, who must be members of the General Council of the Bar. and two practising solicitors, one of whom must be a member of the Council of the Law Society and the other a member of the Law Society and also of a provincial law society. I do not suppose that that list will give my hon. Friend very much satisfaction. However, they are all distinguished lawyers of the highest integrity and greatest possible experience.

My hon. Friend is going a long way to try to be helpful. Before he leaves the provisions of Section 99 and the composition of the Supreme Court Rule Committee, will he confirm that such a committee does not work in separation when dealing with the advices which are brought to it? Is it the position that there must be some machinery through which those advices are brought to its notice?

My noble Friend the Lord Chancellor is the head of that committee. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme suggested that I should ring the Rule Committee. My telephone call today was not to the Rule Committee.

I turn now to the composition of the County Court Rule Committee.

Before my hon. Friend leaves that tonic, will he deal specifically with the following point? I understand that in Committee an undertaking was given that consultations would take place between the Government and the Rule Committee to ascertain in advance the Rule Committee's reaction to these proposals. Have those consultations now taken place? If so, with what result? If not, why not?

I am not aware that any such undertaking was given. Clearly, the Rule Committee, headed by the Lord Chancellor, will read very carefully what was said on Second Reading, what was said in Committee, and what is said here today. The views of the House will be transmitted to the Lord Chancellor and, through him, his advisers and officials, to those who comprise the Rule Committee. I should point out that the Rule Committee cannot possibly start to draw up the rules until it knows the final form of the legislation.

My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme also asked for the composition of the County Court Rule Committee. That consists of five circuit judges, two county court registrars, two practising members of the Bar and two practising solicitors. The Matrimonial Causes Rule Committee consists of my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor, the President of the Family Division, one High Court judge, two circuit judges, one principal registry registrar and one county court registrar—

Will the Minister speak a little more slowly, because it is very difficult to take down these facts at the rapid rate at which he is delivering them?

I shall read out the list again very slowly, because I know that my hon. Friend is most anxious to take it down. The County Court Rule Committee consists of five circuit judges, two county court registrars, two practising members of the Bar and two practising solicitors. The composition of the Matrimonial Causes Rule Committee consists of the Lord Chancellor, the President of the Family Division, one High Court judge, two circuit judges, one principal registry registrar and one county court registrar, two barristers and two solicitors.

I am advised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate—who cannot be here today because he has a ministerial engagement in Scotland, but who was here on Second Reading and throughout the Committee stage—that the Rule Committee in Scotland does not consist entirely of lawyers, but members are usually connected with the legal system and the courts, as practising lawyers, members of the judiciary, or members of the permanent staff of the courts. I understand that members of the latter category are not usually legally qualified.

I turn now to the second leg of the amendments, because they are in two specific groups. The effect of leaving out the words,

"on the taxation or other determination of those costs",

would be to remove the right of the court to consider the reasonableness of the bill of costs put in by the litigant in person. Clearly my hon. Friend's intention is that it should be linked to the previous amendment. However, the Bill states that there "may be allowed", and unless it contains some provision stating who is to make the allowance, both in general terms, for the guidance of all, and, within those guidelines, in a specific case, its interpretation will be far from clear. My hon. Friend wants the intention of the Bill to be as clearly stated as possible.

There will still be no compulsion in allowing a litigant in person his costs for expenses incurred or work done, and within the framework of the Bill it will be necessary to devise some way of determining what is to be allowed. It is better that the Bill should be clear and that the task of determining the proper amount that the paying party should have to pay to a litigant in person's costs should be left to the methods presently used by the court and to the experience of the court in determining the proper amounts.

It is possible that my hon. Friend has not appreciated the importance of the words "or other determination". Although, when a case is fought out, the usual way of determining costs is for them to be taxed, they can be dealt with in other ways. That can be important when the judgment is obtained without a dispute, after only a formal hearing, or where the steps which have been taken in an action are simple and straightforward.

In England and Wales the rules provide for costs to be a fixed sum on some occasions and, on others, for them to be assessed within prescribed minima and maxima. In the High Court, under Order 14, which provides for summary judgment when a defendant has no arguable defence, a prescribed sum is allowed for the work involved in issuing the writ, serving it, taking out the summons and attending the court when judgment is obtained.

Similarly, in the county court, when a summons is issued claiming a sum of money, there is added to the amount that the defendant has to pay not only the court fee but a sum of costs. If the defendant pays on receipt of the summons, that fixed sum is the total amount of the costs.

At present, we are dealing with solicitors' costs, but the Bill, as drafted, would permit the rule-making authorities to consider similar fixed sums for litigants in person. As well as fixed costs, there are occasions on which the court will allow a lump sum. In a simple case in the county court the judge may, instead of ordering taxation, award a lump sum. This could also be valuable to the litigant in person, because drawing up a bill and having it taxed, though necessary in some cases, is unnecessary in simple cases where the amount of work involved is slight.

One example would be a case brought by a consumer in which the amount involved was about £150. If the dispute were simple and took only a short time in court, and there was little preparation, it would be in the interests of the successful litigant in person to claim assessed costs and save himself the trouble of a detailed bill and further time.

There are, however, cases in which taxation is inevitable. As I have said, one reason is that the paying party—the losing side—must also be protected. In a big case, where a substantial amount of work has been done, there is no alternative to the successful party submitting an account. In fixed and assessed costs the paying party is amply protected by the rules. On taxation it is the taxing officer who must determine the reasonableness, in relation to the work done, of the charge made.

The rule-making authorities will no doubt have it in mind that the litigant in person must not be required to produce anything too complex. It will be necessary for him to submit a statement only of what he has done and the losses and expenses that he has incurred. He will have the rules to help him, and if the Bill becomes law my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor will consider giving further help to a litigant in person in submitting his bill.

It may be that the most appropriate way of helping the layman to understand the position, would be to issue a booklet on the lines of the highly successful booklet "Small claims in the county court", but this needs further study and thought, and the Lord Chancellor is considering in what way the rights of a litigant in person to costs can be explained to him in the simplest language, and in language that will not give rise to confusion.

My hon. Friend asked who the taxing master was. The answer is that he is a solicitor of at least 10 years' standing, appointed by the Lord Chancellor. He is appointed Master of the Supreme Court Taxing Office, and he taxes under the High Court rules. In the county court, taxation is carried out by the registrar. I am told that in Scotland—I hope that my hon. Friend will not press me too far on this because I am not qualified to answer any detailed question about the position in Scotland, and I know that he has had conversations with the Lord Advocate—

My hon. Friend may like to know that in a letter that he has written to me the Lord Advocate has apologised for his absence. He would have liked to be here, but he has an important engagement in Scotland, which he must attend.

I am told by those advising me and the Lord Advocate's Department that in Scotland there is no taxing master, as such. The question of expenses is essentially a matter for the court—that is, the judge—but to assist the judge there is an auditor of court who performs the day-to-day duties of processing claims for litigants' expenses. Questions of difficulty are referred to him to the court. He is not necessarily a lawyer, but, on the best information that I have, he is usually qualified in accountancy.

Oh!

I do not know whether that profession is any more popular with my hon. Friend.

My hon. Friend asked why costs are a technical matter. What we are dealing with—my hon. Friend must realise this—is the position in which costs have to be awarded after the determination of a legal dispute which itself has to be conducted according to certain rules. Some one has to determine whether what was done was necessary in the circumstances.

1.45 p.m.

The Rule Committee will lay down the type of work for which remuneration can be allowed; for instance, the preparation of particulars of claim or defence. For relatively mechanical work it may prescribe fixed sums, but for more responsible work it may prescribe a maximum or a minimum, or it may leave the amount to be allowed wholly to the discretion of the taxing officer.

A good deal of expert knowledge is necessary to perform this task effectively, as I am sure my hon. Friend will agree. The general complaint against the Rule Committee and taxing officers—this may come as some comfort and joy to my hon. Friend—is that they are too mean to the legal profession. That is the complaint made by members of the profession.

I think that my hon. Friend made some reference to witnesses' expenses.

I asked a question about them.

I stand corrected. My hon. Friend asked specifically about witnesses' expenses. These are within the discretion of the taxing master in the High Court. In the county court, scales of witnesses' allowances are laid down, and these have recently been increased by the Rule Committee.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hartlepool (Mr. Leadbitter) referred specifically to legal aid and the fact that the committees were composed exclusively of members of the legal profession.

That is not strictly correct. Local legal aid committees are composed of members of the legal profession. They deal exclusively with points of law, with the question whether somebody applying for legal aid has a prima facie case. I am sure my hon. Friend will agree that lawyers are necessary to decide what is and what is not a point in law. But advisory committees have laymen on them, and their numbers have recently been increased.

I do not think that you, Mr. Speaker. would allow me to develop the matter of legal aid generally, but this issue was raised. The Lord Chancellor is aware of the imperfections of the system and is trying to improve the position. He has recently appointed an expert in his Department to look at the deficiencies and to see in what way legal aid can be strengthened. I am sure that the Lord Chancellor will take to heart the criticisms that have been made of the legal system. I know that he wants to do everything in his power to ensure that the maximum number of people have the advantage of legal aid.

I do not think that any other specific points were raised on the amendment. I understand why my hon. Friend wished to delete these words, but I must tell him that if the amendment were carried the result would be contrary to the interests of the litigant in person. I therefore ask the House to resist the amendment.

As this will probably be the last time that I shall speak for about six months, I must say that this has been a brief but interesting debate.

I do not know how it is that, having been described by Mr. Andrew Roth as mild, donnish and moderate, I should be so set upon and savaged by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) and my hon. Friend the Mem- ber for Myth (Mr. Ryman). Perhaps that illustrates the importance of my remarks.

What I said was supported by two articles. One was published in New Society on 21st November 1968 and headed

"A Layman Over the Lawyers"

and the other was an interesting article in the Sunday Times of 10th November 1974 under the heading

"The Huge Cost of Going to Law".

Both articles included a summary of general indictments of the legal profession, and I should not want to alter the general tenor of my remarks.

I must, however, put it on record that during my time in the House I have received substantial assistance from each of the present Law Officers. When working on Committees they have been most assidious in their attendance. I have received a lot of help and encouragement from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington, and certainly he would never consciously be a party to what I have described. None the less, I still think that there is an unconscious element of self-defence in what is said in defence of the profession by those who practise it.

Since my hon. Friend relies so much on the authority of the two newspaper articles to which he referred, one in the Sunday Times and the other in a more obscure publication, will he tell us who were the authors of those two articles, if we are to pay any attention to the propositions set out in them?

I do not wish to be led astray. The time has come for a conclusion on this matter. I shall pass the articles to my hon. Friend later on. One of them was written by Bruce Page and Phillip Knightley—

Who are they?

I will not be led astray by my hon. Friend. He is inexperienced in the ways of the House, and seems in capable of appreciating a victory when it has been won. I think it better to draw this debate to a close as swiftly as possible.

What the Minister said about the determination of costs justified virtually everything I said. It is a closed shop at least in England and Wales; lawyers dominate the determination of costs, and that is quite unsatisfactory. However, I realise that there are defects in my amendment, and I should not wish to put upon my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) the responsibility of seeing that those defects were removed in another place.

I had intended to say at the outset of my opening speech that this was a probing amendment. I am not altogether satisfied with the replies I have received. but I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move Amendment No. 3, in page 1, line 10, after expenses ', insert ' and losses '.

I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we consider at the same time Amendment No. 6, in page 1, line 20 after ' outlays ', insert ' and losses '.

These two amendments arise from the debate in Committee about the intended scope of the Bill. At the end of that debate I suggested that I should consult the Parliamentary Secretary to see whether it might be appropriate to change the wording on Report to meet some of the points made in Committee. I have had consultations with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, and the outcome of them is seen in these two amendments. he amendments fall to be considered together because each makes, in effect, the same change.

Amendment No. 3 adds the word "losses" immediately after the words "any expenses" in that part of Clause 1 which deals with England, Wales and Northern Ireland. and Amendment No. 6 deals with the position in Scotland in similar terms. In both instances the intention is that the litigant in person who is successful in civil proceedings should be enabled to received as part of an award of costs payment in respect of losses which he may incur in the pursuit of justice. This is to be in addition to what he may be enabled to receive in respect of work done or other expenses incurred, which are covered by the existing working of the clause.

Hon. Members may ask why it is necessary to cover losses if work done and expenses incurred are already catered for. The reason is that it is agreed on all sides that one of the main items which the Bill is designed to allow to a successful litigant in person is a payment to compensate him for any loss of earnings which he may incur as a result of having to take time off from work to deal with his case. He may have to attend a hearing at court on a preliminary matter, such as a pre-trial review in the county court, or a summons for directions at the High Court, or he may have to take time off from work to go and see a potential witness. There are all sorts of things which he may have to do but which, in the nature of things, he can do only by taking time off from work.

The hours that a man puts in may well be such that he suffers a loss of earnings in so doing. Under the present law, that loss cannot be recovered from his opponent even if he wins the case. One of the main purposes of the Bill is to change that. The Bill already allows compensation for work done, so that if a litigant in person has to do some work —for instance, issue a summons, see a witness or attend a hearing—he will be able to get something for that. On the other hand, if in order to do the work he has to take time off from his job, what could be more natural than that the amount which he should be allowed under the rules for work done should be the earnings lost from his normal job?

I thought—and I believe that the Government and those advising them thought —that the Bill was drawn widely enough in the use of the expression "work done" to allow what was envisaged. However, I wanted to remove any doubt, and for that purpose I have put down these amendments.

The hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), who is not present today, argued in Committee, with all his skill and persuasiveness, that "work done" did not cover loss of earnings, and asked why we should keep the words "work done" when we are adding "losses" to cover that point. I feel that I must part company with the hon. Gentleman, believing that the matter should be fully covered beyond doubt, since the prime purpose of the Bill is to allow a litigant in person to receive compensation from his unsuccessful opponent for the work which he does to prepare and fight his case.

I urge, therefore, that the rules about costs should allow for these aspects loss of earnings through having to take time off from work, and payment of compensation for work done in preparing and fighting the case. It is my wish that the Bill should leave the House worded in such a fashion as to permit both sorts of payment to be recovered under an award of costs to a litigant in person.

I accept that it will be up to the various rule-making authorities dealing with our various civil court procedures in the different jurisdictions covered by the Bill to determine just what shall be allowed, to whom, and in what circumstances. It may well be that they will have more hesitation in allowing a successful litigant in person who has an award of costs something on this other aspect, but that will be up to them.

This is largely an enabling measure. The Rule Committee is not compelled to do anything. The Bill provides that costs may be allowed.

Secondly, I hope the Rule Committee will find it possible to look favourably on allowing payments for work done. I would ask for the support of other hon. Members so that this view can be reinforced.

There may be some problems about what a litigant in person should be allowed when he devotes his own time to preparing his case. If he is a wealthy person, should his time be rewarded at a higher rate than if he is a poor man? I think not, but I am content to leave the Rule Committee to work it out. Just because this is a difficult question to answer does not mean that it should not be answered. The courts and the Rule Committee are for ever wrestling with difficult questions, and I do not apologise for adding to them. I am sure that they will work something out, and I have confidence in their ability to make any necessary adjustments. At this stage we should give a wider rather than a narrow discretion to the Rule Committee, and we should not restrict its power to determine what may be covered by an award of costs to a successful litigant in person, any more than under the present law we restrict its power to determine what costs may be allowed to a represented litigant.

2.0 p.m.

The hon. Member for Burton made the valid argument in Committee that a litigant who had a solicitor had to spend a good deal of time and effort dealing with matters connected with the case; for example, going to see his solicitor, sifting through documents and perhaps even talking to witnesses. He receives no allowance for costs of that kind. The hon. Member suggested that the Bill might have the unintended effect of putting the successful litigant in person in a better position than his counterpart who has a solicitor. If this is so, I would agree with him. However, I think he is wrong. Therefore, I hope that the hon. Member, who is absent, will acknowledge that these points have been considered, and I am glad that there will be no further presentation of that view.

The main object of these two amendments is to widen the power to decide what may be covered by an award of costs to a successful litigant in person and to remove doubt about how those powers will be operated under the present wording of the Bill.

The subject of losses and expenses was discussed at some length in Standing Committee. I appreciate what was said there, but I still have some doubts about the extent to which there will be equity of treatment for a litigant in person and an assisted litigant.

My hon. and learned Friend has done exceptionally well to meet the problem, but my doubts still persist. It has already been said that the successful litigant in person may be in a more fortunate position than the litigant who is assisted. That anomaly should not be continued, but the Bill leaves discretion to the Rule Committee, and it is important to get some clarification.

If this problem is to be dealt with by the Rule Committee and not spelt out in detail in the Bill, the corollary is that variations in practice will exist. That must follow if we do not include in the Bill great detail. Expenses may be easily definable but that is not true of losses. If the intentions of the House are not conveyed to the courts, variation in practice may cause anomalies that will subsequently result in dissatisfaction.

There is anxiety about how losses are to be defined. Loss of earnings is clearly definable, but leisure losses and travelling losses and others are not. There is a lack of clarity about losses that does not apply to expenses. My hon. and learned Friend may say that because of that discretion will have to be exercised, and so be it, but that should be made clear now before the exercise of discretion without explanation produces a feeling of injustice.

I shall refer briefly to one difficulty in this amendment. I support wholeheartedly the general principle of providing equality between litigants in person and represented litigants. However, I do not see the necessity for inserting the words "and losses", because any item of special damage or loss which a plaintiff proves to have been incurred as a result of the litigation would automatically be recovered in the judgment of the court before the subject of losses was considered.

Let us take the example of a simple case of personal injuries or breach of contract. The losses that the plaintiff has incurred as a result of that personal injury, accident, or breach of contract constitute part of his general damages, or special damages added to the general damages by the learned judge who delivers the judgment. I cannot see any point in adding the words "and losses".

Before the taxing master deals with the question of costs the judge will have dealt with the question of losses. I should be grateful to the Minister if he could explain the purpose of these additional words if they have already been covered by the judgment in the substantive action. How do these words clarify matters? What do they add? We have all been at pains to point out that we wish this legislation to be as simple as possible. The amendment would complicate it.

In Committee the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) produced one red herring after another and showed an abysmal lack of knowledge of elementary principles of procedures before taxing masters and of civil litigation generally. I do not understand how these additional words would help a taxing master in the award of costs. I believe that they would unnecessarily complicate the matter.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Middles- brough (Mr. Bottomley) said, the amendment arises from a discussion in Committee on whether a litigant in person would, as the Bill is presently drafted. recover in respect of his loss of earnings if he is obliged, as part of the preparation of his case, to take time off work.

The view I expressed then on behalf of the Government—the Government's view is still the same—was that the Bill did, by including the term "work done", enable the rules to provide for payment in respect of loss of earnings. However, there was a view expressed in Committee, notably by the hon. Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), that the term "work done" could not include work not done and that there was, therefore, some doubt about whether loss of earnings would be included.

As my right hon. Friend said, he undertook to the Committee to discuss with the Government whether any change in the Bill was necessary. The Government's view remains the same as that put to the Committee, that no additional words are necessary because "work done" would allow the rules to prescribe that a litigant in person can recover where he has lost earnings.

The misunderstanding seems to have arisen because a litigant in person will recover a sum for work done. He will not be paid his loss of earnings as such, but his loss of earnings will be an item which on taxation will be considered as a guide to the amount he should be allowed under the term "work done".

I well understand why my right hon. Friend has moved the amendment, and the Government intend to accent it. To add the words "and losses" makes it abundantly clear on the face of the Bill that loss of earnings, subject to rules of court, can be allowed.

I appreciate that there is a slight danger in including, out of an abundance of caution, words which may not be necessary in a statute. However, in this case if the words are included, and I think that the slight risk is worth taking to remove any possible doubts, it will ensure that the intentions of the Bill are carried out.

I strike a note of caution by saying that I do not think that it would be the intention of either my right hon. Friend or the House as a whole to ensure that all losses of earnings were automatically recovered. I do not think that anybody would agree that, for instance, a managing director of a very large company would of necessity get all his loss of earnings if he took time off work. That is why the Rule Committee is specifically provided for in the Bill and why, in the discretion and according to the experience of that committee, such a person recovers a just and equitable sum.

May I first thank the Parliamentary Secretary for the kind welcome he extended to me when he first addressed the House today?

I declare an interest. I am a solicitor but, as a member of the junior rank of the profession, I am in one sense in the same category as the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding), because neither he nor I is eligible as the law stands for appointment either as Attorney-General or as Solicitor-General, and at least he and I have that in common.

The Second Reading debate on the Bill lasted for one hour and 40 minutes. The Report stage has already lasted for three hours and 10 minutes, but I do not intend to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme in making a long speech. On the contrary, I intend to follow precisely that advice which he gave to himself but which he did not follow when he said "I can always make a short speech if I know what I am talking about".

The Opposition welcome the Bill. We congratulate the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) on the skill and pertinacity which he has shown in piloting the Bill through to its Third Reading. The Bill will right a wrong which the litigant in person has suffered for too long. We commend the Bill to the House. We hope that it will soon reach the statute book.

The Bill is almost completely through the House on its way to the statute book. I want warmly to thank those who have contributed to making that possible.

I join in the congratulations which have been extended to the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) and thank him for what he has said today.

The initiative for bringing the Bill before the House and the advice that I had in doing so lay with the Consumers' Association. Many people forget that the Consumers' Association publishes the magazine Which?.

I have been interested in the way in which the Bill has been considered not only in this country but in other parts of the world. British Columbia has a law reform commission which has been examining the subject covered by the Bill. Since Second Reading I have heard from the chairman of that body in Vancouver. The commission has investigated the matter.

I have before me a copy of the British Columbia law reform commission's working paper entitled "Costs of Successful Litigants in Person". The law of British Columbia is to all intents and purposes the same in this respect as the law in this country. Indeed, the working paper cites the decision of the Court of Appeal in this country in the case of Buckland and Watts in 1969 as being authority, under the law of British Columbia, for the proposition that a successful litigant in person is not entitled to any costs beyond his out-of-pocket expenses.

The report of the working paper of the British Columbia law reform commission concludes its deliberations with this conclusion:

"… we consider the law concerning the costs recoverable by a successful lay litigant to be in an unsatisfactory and unacceptable state, and have concluded that it should be changed."

That is exactly what we are doing in the House.

Speaking as a former Commonwealth Secretary, I must say that it gives me great satisfaction to learn that a province of one of the founder members of the Commonwealth has had the good sense and initiative to set in train an inquiry that in due course will enable it to pass a Bill. I sincerely hope that the legislature of the province of British Columbia will in due course be able to do that, and I imagine that it will derive some value from reading what has been said in this debate.

Let no one be encouraged to embark on litigation on the strength of the enactment of this reform. Litigation will always, or should always, be a last resort. No kind of human conflict is desirable, and litigation is a form of conflict that is seldom a pleasure, often a pain, and always an expense. For those unfortunate few who become embroiled in litigation, it behoves Parliament to provide the fairest means possible of resolving their disputes, and this fairness must extend to every aspect of court rules and procedure. That includes the question of costs.

We trust that the Rule Committees whose job it will be to prepare the rules about costs will speedily apply themselves to preparing the rules of the various courts affected by this Bill, so that with the minimum of delay a litigant in person will start to be entitled to a fair deal when it comes to the costs of the case. We do not, I must finally emphasise, seek to place the litigant in person in a better position, but in a corresponding position, as near as may be, with the litigant who has a solicitor to act for him.

I add my congratulations, on behalf of the Government, to my right hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) on successfully piloting this Bill through the House.

I should like to add a personal note. As I said on Second Reading, it gives me a personal pleasure because I was one of the original sponsors of the Bill when it was in the hands of the hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), and. secondly, because, as other hon. Members will have experienced, my right hon. Friend was among those who assisted me very much when I first came into the House. It is fitting that he should have introduced a Bill which will be of such considerable help to other people who have legitimate claims to pursue and who are at present penalised by an anomaly in the law.

I do not think there is anything more that I can say, except that I am sure the House gives a general welcome to this useful legislation.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

I am grateful for the opportunity to bring this Bill before the House. I add my congratulations to those which have already been accorded to the right hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bottomley) on the passage of his Bill through the House. Indeed, it was with some dismay that I listened to the speech of the hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding), which lasted for 62 minutes. It was curiosity which led me to the Vote Office to find out what marathon discussions had taken place in the Committee stage of that Bill and for how many days that Bill was in Committee. To my astonishment, I found that the Committee stage did not last for one morning. It lasted for one hour and 14 minutes in Committee, and the hon. Gentleman spoke for three or four minutes.

I would not wish to suggest that there was any intention to reduce the time that we can devote to my Bill on education. It is with some regret that I say that those outside this House may, indeed, draw such a conclusion. I am sure that it would be erroneous, because I welcome the statement made on 17th December last by the Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science, whom I am glad to see here. He said:

"We are most anxious to involve parents in schools…"—[official Report, 17th December 1974; Vol. 883, c. 1340.]

If that is the case, it is indeed a pity that we shall not have more time to discuss the Bill today.

I should like to say a few words about the background to the points raised in the

Bill, and then refer to some of the provisions in the Bill and the reason why they have been phrased as they are. We must accept that there is an increasing cause for concern about the standards in many of our schools today, especially schools in deprived urban areas. I refer to standards of literacy, of truancy, of discipline and, I am afraid, sometimes, of violence.

On literacy, many of us were reassured by the findings of the Bullock Committee, which showed that, contrary to what some people believed, there does not seem to have been a decline in the standards of literacy in the past few years. This, of course, we all welcome. Nevertheless, it did not leave any cause for complacency in our minds. The Bullock Report showed clearly that literacy is not as good as it might be, and there has been other research the results of which have not been quite so reassuring.

Some research was undertaken by the Department of Education in the form of a survey in Liverpool, Birmingham, Deptford and the West Riding. The report of that survey said:

"Thousands of children leave Inner city primaries at 11 unable to read even a simple sentence."

In Teacher Magazine of 17th May last year reference is made to the Inner London Education Authority and to the fact that in over half the sample of 16year-olds of day release pupils, the reading level was below the average of 10-year-old pupils. This is obviously of concern to all in this House and in the education establishments. Bullock may have assured us that the situation is not as bad as we feared, but I am sure that it is not as good as we would wish.

On truancy, various figures are bandied about. I am the governor of a good comprehensive school in South London. The other day the headmaster told me that in that school at the moment there is an absentee rate of about 18 per cent. I asked "What percentage of that is truancy?" He said "It is awfully difficult to know, because so often the parents will not co-operate and tell you whether the child is absent for a reason, or whether it is truancy. If I had to guess, I would think that about half those absent children are truants." That would mean that 250 children are away every day, of which number perhaps over 100 are truants. This can leave no cause for complacency.

On discipline and violence, I refer to the reports made by the National Association of Schoolmasters. As the introduction of one of those reports said, there is no crisis. Thank heavens there is no crisis, but neither is there cause for complacency. It may well be that the politicians—we in this House—have paid too much attention to this complicated business of reorganisation and not enough attention to trying to improve what is going on in the maintained sector and the comprehensive sector of education, where, after all, the majority of the children receive their education. There is a heavy responsibility on us and on teachers to see that things are better in all our schools.

Part of this manifestation of concern, I think, is shared by parents. I must tell the House that I have been intimately connected with education only since 1966–67, but I have no doubt that parents are showing an increasing concern about the way in which their children are educated. The night before last there was a lobby at the House of Commons, when 1,000 parents came here demonstrating for the retention of direct grant schools and grammar schools. I do not intend to talk about direct grant schools and grammar schools today, because the Bill has little or nothing to do with them. I think that those demonstrating parents all agreed when I said that they would not he demonstrating if they believed that all the schools in the system were as good as they thought the schools attended by their children to be. Their demonstration for a certain type of school was the obverse of the coin of their concern about other types of school. If we could have all schools of a single, magnificent, uniform level, parents would feel much less concern.

What can we do? In these days, one immediately adds a rider by asking "What can one do about this which will not cost much money?" In the country's present economic situation it is not sensible to make suggestions and recommendations which will cost a great deal.

It has been reported in the newspapers that the purpose of the Bill is parent power. That is nonsense. It is nothing to do with parent power. It is merely to tilt the balance slightly towards parental rights, and perhaps slightly away from the local education authorities. I believe that the greater part of it complies strictly with the intentions of the 1944 Education Act which were not realised.

The involvement of parents in education can only be welcomed. An interesting experiment took place in the United States, called the "Head Start Programme ", in which money was spent on nursery education for children aged three years to five years in one part of a State, whilst in another part the same amount was spent on teaching the mothers how to talk to their children, get them interested and so on. After five years the results were apparently conclusive that the money was better spent on educating the parents and getting them involved with the children's growth and learning.

That is academic, because many mothers go out to work and there is no alternative to providing nursery education. But I draw the conclusion that it is very important that the interest of a father and mother in the education of their children can have an important effect on the children's education. It should be a partnership between the parents, the school and the child to do the best for the child.

I sent a draft copy of the Bill to more than a dozen organisations connected with teachers, to teachers' unions of all sorts—in fact, to everyone that I could think of. I have had a considerable response. About 10 replied in great detail, with many helpful suggestions which were incorporated into the final draft now before the House. I think that not one of those organisations expressed any antagonism towards the general purpose of the Bill. Their doubts concerned matters of substance in the drafting, and in most cases I have taken them into account.

Was a copy sent to the greatest teachers' union, the National Union of Teachers?

A copy was sent to Sir Edward Britton just before 1st April. when he gave way to the new General Secretary, Mr. Jarvis. It is perhaps for that reason that I received no reply from the NUT, which I regret. I can only suppose that it was because of the changeover.

I am very grateful to all those who spend a great deal of time going through the Bill. Some letters ran to five or six pages—longer than the Bill.

I have said that the general objective is to tilt the balance slightly towards parental rights. I am sure that all hon. Members are aware of the famous Section 76 of the 1944 Act, which lays an injunction on local authorities to "have regard to the general principle that pupils should be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents

"so far as is compatible with the provision of efficient instruction and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure".

I do not believe that those who drafted that section were merely expressing a pious hope that children should be educated according to the wishes of their parents.

As far as I can ascertain, in the 30 years that the Act has been on the statute book no parent in England has yet managed to win a court case when he has disagreed with the way in which his children were being educated and has sought to apply the section. I understand that in every case the two provisos have vitiated the injunction, though I believe that someone managed to win a case in Scotland. If the Under-Secretary can tell me that I am wrong, I shall be delighted, but it must have happened rarely, because I have been unable to discover any instance.

I was told by the secretary of a distinguished teachers' union of a case in which he was involved some years ago, when a father pleaded Section 76 so that he could send his two boys to a public boarding school. The father said that he was prepared to pay the boarding cost element, and showed that the result would be cheaper than sending the boys to the school to which the local education authority wish to send them. The father lost the case.

I was interviewed by a journalist about the Bill yesterday, and she said—

Whether or not parents have been successful in winning cases, does not the hon. Gentleman admit that since 1944 the intention of the Act has been very much implemented, in that by and large schools consult parents about their children's education in a way that never happened previously? Before 1944, what one got at school was what one was given. The number of parents' meetings and other forms of consultation with parents today constitutes an enormous revolution compared with the situation before the war.

That is true. The situation is improving all the time. But no hon. Member can be happy with the present situation when we see the growth of parental discontent at the way in which their children are being educated. We are all well aware of the number of parents who come to us, especially in the early autumn, at the time of school transfer, feeling despair and anxiety about the school to which the local education authority proposes to send their child.

The journalist who interviewed me was fairly young. I do not think she had been out of school long. She asked whether the Bill would have helped her when she was at school. She said that she had been in the A-stream and in consequence had had to take physics and chemistry, when what she was longing to take was biology. Biology was taught only to the B-stream. It would have cost no more for her to take biology, and I believe that she and her parents should have been allowed to insist that she should take it.

If any hon. Member wishes to say that if the school had not been streamed she would have been able to take biology. I reply that that is not relevant to my argument. In certain cases parents cannot insist on certain things being done for their children because of the drafting of the 1944 Act. That is why I propose an amendment to the effect that the local education authority should educate children according to the wishes of their parents unless it can show that it would be unreasonable so to do on the ground of disproportionate cost.

That is a difficult provision to draft. I have consulted widely about it, and we may wish to consider the matter in Committee. Lord Alexander, the Secretary of the Association of Education Committees, wrote a letter to me in his personal capacity because at that time he had not consulted the AEC. The draft which I had sent him merely contained the words "unreasonable so to do" and did not include the proviso about cost. He said:

"I fear your draft would open the door to a very great many appeals. Let me give you a few examples: the parent who wanted a child to receive boarding education"—

that is covered by the cost element in the final draft—

"the parent who insisted on choosing a school which involved the authority in substantial travel expenditure"—

that, too, is covered by the cost element—

"the parent of a child where there was a sufficient handicap—physical or mental—to justify special education who insisted that the child should be educated in an ordinary school".

I agree that those are matters which we may well wish to discuss in Committee.

Nevertheless, local education authorities would not be stripped of protection. The comparative cost proviso would cover the vast majority of cases. A mother may say "I wish Johnnie to be taught Chinese." The school may say "We should have to employ a teacher in Chinese at a cost of £3,000 a year. Therefore, instead of costing £300 to educate, he would cost £3,300. We cannot provide an instructor in Chinese." That case would be covered by the Bill.

There are other provisions in the 1944 Act which protect local education authorities. I refer to the imposition on local education authorities to give efficient instruction. This is a cover for them to provide education according to a child's age, aptitude and ability—the famous three As. I do not believe that local education authorities would be stripped of protection, but a parent who had a legitimate reason for wanting a certain change made would stand a better chance under my suggested amendment than he would under the 1944 Act. It is interesting that the Education (Scotland) Act, which was passed 20 years or so later, is worded slightly differently. Perhaps between the passing of the 1944 Act and the passing of the Scottish Act it was realised that changes needed to be made.

The suggested amendment of the 1944 Act incorporated in Clause 1 of the Bill should be read in conjunction with Clause 2, in which I suggest that a form of appeals tribunal should be set up to which parents could go should they feel aggrieved by an education authority's decision. Clauses 1 and 2 are part and parcel of the whole. At the moment parents have little or no means of appeal against an education authority. Section 68 of the 1944 Act gives the Secretary of State the right to issue a writ of mandamus if he believes that a local education authority is acting, or is about to act, unreasonably. It is interesting that the word "unreasonably" is used.

However, in the 30 years or so since the 1944 Act was passed no writ of mandamus has been issued, although I am told that Durham was threatened with one. Therefore, parents have not been overwhelmingly successful in convincing successive Secretaries of State that their local education authority has been acting unreasonably in education their children.

It is true that we have a Local Government Ombudsman, Baroness Serota. However, in the provisions by which the ombudsman was set up education policy is specifically excluded. I understand that all that a local education authority which is called before the ombudsman has to say is that it is its policy to do a certain thing, and, by some magic formula, the matter because ultra vires and the ombudsman cannot comment on it, although an authority probably would not get away with that on such matters as school meals and transport. A parent cannot appeal to the ombudsman on the ground of policy.

I suppose we could consider ourselves to be a form of court of appeal because many parents come to us in the autumn saying that there is no school for their children to go to, that the school the children are supposed to go to is the wrong school or that Johnnie has a younger sister and, therefore, they want him to go to a co-educational school and the local education authority says that he must go to a single-sex school.

We should therefore make provision for the setting up of appeal tribunals in local authority areas. There are less than half the number of local authority areas that there were until quite recently and, therefore, such tribunals would not be very expensive. I accept that if a parent says to an appeal tribunal "I wish my child to go to such-and-such a school" and the local authority says "The school is full. It would be a disproportionate cost to add a wing to the school for your child", the parent would lose the appeal. But at least he or she would have had the satisfaction of having had the matter discussed by an independent body, of having presented the evidence and of having had a judgment made.

Without casting any reflection on the education services, may I say that too often a feeling of bureaucracy is given to a worried parent who goes to the division office and asks to see the divisional officer, who is genuinely much too busy to see her, and usually ends up talking to a clerk. Parents become frustrated and are made unhappy by such occurrences. We must have an independent system for appeals. Education is very important for a child and the decision made by a local education authority can mould his whole life.

My third objective is to try to get parents more involved in the running of the school. The Confederation for the Advancement of State Education made a survey at the beginning of 1973 just before the reorganization of local government. That survey found that only 30 out of the 164 local authorities which existed then were bringing parents and teachers on to school governing bodies․that is, about 20 per cent.

Living in London, as I do, where the ILEA for some years has had parents and teachers on governing bodies, I am inclined to accept that practice is universal. It is not. At least three parents and two teachers should be on governing bodies, and the headmaster should have the right to be on the governing body should he so wish. In the first draft I included the headmaster on the governing body, but the opinion of many of the groups which I consulted was that certain headmasters, genuinely and properly, felt that they could do their job better if they were not on the governing body to be made up of parents, but the Bill provides for the inclusion of at least three parents.

I intend no reflection on our colleagues who serve on local councils, but too often governors are local councilors who have been put on the governing body because they have won a local government election. If they are interested in education, that is excellent, but if their interest lies in housing or roads, would it not be better, instead of a councillor, to have a parent?

I accept that there are problems in legislating for three parents to be on governing bodies. There may be problems with aided schools because the balance of representation between the local authority and the trustees of the church—if it is a church-aided school—might be affected. That matter will have to be considered in Committee.

I am well aware of and welcome the Government's proposal to set up a committee to inquire into the government and management of schools. My proposals in Clause 3 are in no way in contradiction to the Government's proposals. I cannot believe that any committee would recommend that there should be no parents and no teachers on governing bodies. Indeed, if a committee were to recommend that, I should oppose it, as would most educationists and most hon. Members. There is no reason why the proposal contained in Clause 3 should wait upon the recommendations or report of the committee which has, quite properly, been set up by the Government.

Consultation has increased enormously in the last generation, and we all welcome that. Nevertheless, it is not uniform throughout the country. There are schools with excellent systems of consultation. On the other hand, we all know of schools which have, metaphorically, a large notice over the front door saying "Parents keep out". Decisions are still taken to put children into uniform or to take them out of uniform and to change the length of the school day, decisions which vitally affect parents, without consultation with the parents.

Clause 4 requires a system of consultation. I had intended that it should require the setting up of parent-teacher associations or parents' unions, but I have been advised that there are satisfactory forms of consultation other than through parent-teacher associations. What I am looking for is satisfactory consultation.

I have suggested that matters concerning the curriculum should be excluded from that consultation—again on advice which I accept. I have a question in my mind about sex education and religious instruction. Those are probably matters on which there should be consultation with the parents. If parents served on the governing body, no doubt they would represent parents' interests sufficiently, but the recent case of the inclusion of Marxism in religious instruction raises profound queries in my mind. Whether there is a way of providing legislatively for consultation on matters of that sort concerned with the curriculum, I do not know. No such provision is included in the final draft of the Bill.

In many parts of the country parents have a choice of school, principally in urban areas. They have the choice of a single-sex school, a co-educational school, a school that is near at hand or one that is further away, and they may also be influenced by the ambitions which the headmaster has for his school. No parent can make a proper choice without information. Without information it is not a choice but a lottery. Parents may visit possible schools or talk to their friends. The ILEA produces an excellent booklet called "Secondary Schools in Islington". Each page deals with one school. That is better than nothing. In Hertfordshire I am told that the education authority produces merely a sheet listing the schools in the neighbourhood and giving the size and the structure. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, but I was told about it by a member of a teachers' organisation.

On the other hand, there are excellent prospectuses such as the two I have in my hand, one produced by the Lad-broke school and the other by the Henry Compton school, both within the ILEA. Every school should be able to make available to parents a prospectus of that sort. The cost would not be great. It might run into a few hundreds of pounds a year, but it would be of great value to the parents. There is no true choice without knowledge.

I do not claim that the Bill, should it ever see the light of legislative day, will wave a magic wand and cure all our education problems. But I believe that at practically no cost it will involve marginally another 10 per cent. of parents in the education of their children. If the Bill achieves that, our time will have been well spent because it is so important that parents should be involved in the progress of their children.

There are some schools and a number of local education authorities on which the Bill would have no effect because they are already doing what I wish to see carried out. However, there are other schools on which the Bill may have a profoundly beneficial effect. Therefore, I ask the House to give the Bill a Second Reading.

The hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Shelton) said that if the Bill were given a Second Reading it would not provide a magic wand to solve all our education problems. I have a feeling that the Bill may enlarge some of those problems rather than solve them.

Nevertheless, I welcome this opportunity to discuss some aspects of the education service, because we have lacked opportunities for such a debate in the present Parliament. I hope that we shall use this occasion to discuss matters which are so fundamental to our children's education.

I wish first to deal briefly with those provisions of the Bill which concern themselves with parental wishes. I feel that the parents whom the hon. Gentleman has in mind and who, perhaps, at times feel a sense of dissatisfaction, are parents who were in a relatively privileged position when their children had the opportunity to attend a selective school. The development of the education system has greatly contributed to the widening of educational choice.

Manchester has a very famous grammar school, in which I have served as a governor. Until the city recently decided to reorganise the system of secondary education, there were 90 selective places each year in the Manchester Grammar School—and those places were very selective indeed. I do not know how the Bill would assist parents in the Manchester area if those places were still available and parents were able to say "Yes, we should like our boy to go to the grammar school". Under the previous system there was no opportunity for many parents to envisage their children passing the selective examination.

I conducted correspondence with the Manchester Grammar School suggesting that instead of a selective examination there should be a wider choice for parents in the city. I suggested that the school should allow two pupils from each primary school in the inner city area to go to the grammar school without selective examination. I felt that if the grammar school had to cope with problems of pupils who came from unfortunate homes—the sort of problems with which ordinary schools have to cope every day—the school would face a difficult task, but would learn many important lessons. After all, the rest of the school system has to cope with those boys and girls.

I wish to stress the widening of opportunity given to parents following the development of non-selective education. Again, I give an example from my own city. Before the development of the comprehensive system in Manchester, we had a reputation in terms of equality of opportunity in the maintained grammar schools and technical high schools in the city—but for many parents it was still a limited opportunity Some 20 per cent. or more—those whose children passed the 11-plus examination—had the opportunity to make a choice. A limited group of parents, whose boys or girls obtained places in a technical high school, had a further opportunity. However, the great majority of parents had no choice. They had to take the places that remained in the secondary modern schools.

The hon. Gentleman seems to believe that this is a debate about comprehensive and grammar schools. It is not. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that neither he nor the Labour Party is keen to involve parents, or to give them more choice within the comprehensive framework?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising that point. I shall develop it later. I shall try to develop the theme of widening the opportunity for parents to choose, which the hon. Gentleman wants. I hope that I shall be able to satisfy him that some local education authorities have been able to do that.

Formerly, many parents had a limited opportunity to choose, depending on whether their children had been successful in the 11-plus examination. In Manchester, under the selective system, if the parents, of a boy or girl had the opportunity of a place in one of the city grammar or technical high schools they were invited to say which school they would like their child to attend. They had a first, second and third choice. The city endeavoured to meet that choice in terms of the places that were available. When the selective system was abandoned, the city of Manchester decided that it would continue the same system for comprehensive schools. It was decided that as pupils transferred from primary to secondary schools the parents would be given a choice of which school they would like their children to attend.

As a result, in 1969—the first year of comprehensive schooling–78 per cent. of Manchester parents obtained their first choice, while 16 per cent. obtained their second choice. In the following year 82 per cent. of parents obtained their first choice. Never since the introduction of comprehensive schooling in the city of Manchester has the figure of parents' first choice been less than 76 per cent. If the Opposition believe that choice can exist only in a selective system, they are greatly mistaken.

We do not say that. The hon. Gentleman should listen.

Manchester is not a small city. Each year an average of 5,500 pupils are transferred from the primary to the secondary system. Appeals machinery exists in the city of Manchester. Parents can appeal to the local education authority if they feel that the choice is not a satisfactory one.

Is the appeal from the decision of the local education authority to another committee of that authority, or to an independent body?

In the first instance parental wishes are dealt with. Later, if parents are not satisfied, they have the opportunity to have their case considered by the full committee, which endeavours to meet parental wishes. About 5,500 pupils are transferred each year, but only hundreds of appeals are made. In many cases, as the figures I have given indicate, a substantial proportion of the appeals are successful.

On the question of parental wishes, the hon. Member is seeking to take us backwards, not forwards. The opportunities will increase greatly as the development of non-selective secondary education continues within the education system.

I turn now to the part of the Bill which gives parents rights to be represented on school boards and governing and managing bodies of schools. It is certainly the experience in my city that, generally, the great majority of members who have served on boards of this kind have been parents. Many members of local authorities send their children to the maintained schools and take a continual interest in them. This matter does not need an amendment of the Education Act if it is to be developed. We see it every day, in terms of meetings of governors and managers of schools throughout the country. Parents are interested, and take part in the proceedings of these bodies.

We should not be considering how we can devise some new kind of system to satisfy some parents who, in their hearts, want to retain a system of selection in the secondary schools. I want local education authorities to develop their secondary schools in such a way that the opportunities for the boys and girls who attend them are continually expanded and widened.

As roughly eight hon. Members are anxious to take part in the debate I shall appeal for five-minute speeches, because the winding-up speeches will begin at about 3.30 p.m.

It is extraordinary that every time we debate education the Labour Party shows its obsession with the structural reorganisation of the system. Labour Members cannot get away from comprehensive schools and selection. The Pavlovian dogs did not have a better system of reflexes than they have. One hon. Member said that there had been a revolution in the way that parents had been involved, but the opportunities of parents in this country to have a say in what goes on in schools are minor compared to those in many other countries. Our system has many merits, but we place on the headmasters and staff of the schools almost full autonomy, and things do go on that parents are not even informed about, let alone consulted on.

We are therefore saying that we should try to devise some way of increasing parental involvement in our maintained schools. We are not concerned with the independent sector, and this is not an attack on comprehensive schools or anything else. This is a modest measure, incorporating some of the best practices of LEA's throughout the country. Some schools operate some of the practices, but others do not, so why should we not place obligations on them all, not involving cost, to bring about some improvement?

Today there is an anxious generation of parents in this country who are deeply concerned about some of the schools in their areas, and they are very concerned about where their children will end up. It is important to involve those parents. We have a major convert on our side in the Editor of The Times Educational Supplement, in the piece he has written this week. He points out the importance of the diversification, of a plurality of educational institutions, and of the need to have some sort of variety of system to match the variety of needs and potentials of children. He has given some examples of what goes on in America, where, parents having been given a say in the choice of schools within the State system, there has not been a cataclysmic collapse. Some make use of the system and others do not.

Why should it not be possible, within the comprehensive pattern, for a parent to say "My child is gifted in music or languages. The neighbourhood school is not very good in these subjects, but there is another school in the area which is very good. Cannot my child be transferred across the boundary into that school?"? I understand that it does happen sometimes. But not always. Some local bureaucrats dig in.

I fought a battle with the former West Riding education authority. It proved difficult to get a transfer in that instance. The new North Yorkshire authority has now agreed with me on this matter. Recently I visited the Mexborough grammar school—it is not a grammar school in the old sense—which has children attending from many different authorities. Students of 15, 16 and 17 are allowed to go there because they or their parents want that kind of school.

Why cannot we put an obligation on education authorities to take seriously the wishes of parents? Many authorities use the way that the Act is presently formulated automatically to shove aside parents' wishes. The bureaucrats in the local eduction offices often do not want to know. They do not want to be troubled by parents. It is too easy at the moment to say that it is too expensive. We are attempting to switch the onus through the medium of the Bill.

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that parents want the best for their children, that the problem facing us in this situation is that inevitably certain schools are identified with particular localities, and that to promise the vast majority of parents that they can have the choice of the best schools, when it is only a pint pot for a quart, is a phoney prospectus?

I want people to have the right to have a say in their children's education. These are the children of parents, not of the State or of the teachers in the schools. Let us listen to the parents. Let the local authorities listen. Let us see what happens. All too often in so many matters which come before the House we concentrate on the difficulties of hypothetical situations. Let us show the will and get down to testing this matter and see what happens. I believe that we shall get a sane and sensible response from parents. Since the old form of selection is dying out—and I welcome it; I have never supported selection at 11-plus—it is important that there should be an independent appeals procedure because there are so many different methods for putting children into different schools. It is important that parents should have the right to say that a certain school is not suitable for their children. We have taken the practice of some areas and seek to apply it to all. Let us, when talking of education and of doing something about the structure, be flexible and get away from rigidity in all its forms.

The Bill can be amended in various parts—for example, the composition and procedure of the appeal tribunal. It might be better to have a percentage of parents on governing bodies rather than a certain number, as in the Bill.

We welcome the inquiry set up by the Government under pressure from this side of the House. Over the years hon. Gentlemen opposite have ignored the matter. Now they have come round to it. The Secretary of State had to come to the House and say something about standards in a debate which we initiated. Having pooh-poohed the whole idea time after time, eventually he had to have something to get the headlines.

I am glad that we have had a debate on this matter today. Earlier, it looked suspiciously as though there would be an attempt to push us right out of the schedule of the House today. The hon. Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Mr. Golding) went on at considerable length, even to Mr. Speaker's concern.

Order. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not waste any more time on what went before.

Anyway, I am delighted that the Minister sees the debate as being important. That is demonstrated by the large team of people who have been assembled in the Official Box today. I am delighted at that and I hope that he will respond to our proposals as his right hon. Friend did to the inquiry about governing boards. Why cannot we have parents on governing boards? Inquiries take a long time. Look at the inquiry into the cost of bussing and the number of times the Minister has to say that he is still consulting. It could take ages for an inquiry to report on the management and governing of schools. A lot of local authorities are dragging their feet in the matter of having parents on governing boards. Let us give them a kick and get them moving by passing this Bill.

What we are testing today is whether the Government are prepared to see common sense, to have a flexible educational system and to accept measures which come within the spirit of the 1944 Act, or whether they will demonstrate to the country that they are ideological to the nth degree and are not concerned with parents who are concerned about their children, but will pursue narrow dogmatic ends regardless. The Government are set on an educational pattern which is rigid and from which they will not move. That is what it is all about, otherwise they would accept the Bill today and amend it in Committee. If it was passed it would help enormously to ease some of the anxieties of this generation of anxious parents.

I do not think that anybody in this House will argue or disagree with the underlying motive of the measure, which is to involve parents in the education of their children. The question that arises is how far the Bill goes towards achieving that. In my opinion, it goes a very little way in that direction.

The hon. Member for Ripon (Dr. Hampson) said that every time we debate education in this House Government Members bridle and bring in questions of comprehensive schools, and so on, but this is an important point in the whole debate, for the simple reason that the question of choice depends upon the education set-up in any borough.

I ask the House to consider the situation in my borough. It has all the choice in the world. We have grammar, comprehensive and secondary modern schools. Eventually, we shall get rid of the secondary modern schools, and if the Government do not do something about it we shall keep two selective, divisive grammar schools.

Where is the choice? The choice will depend entirely upon two factors. The first is whether a boy passes an examination at the age of 11 which will take him to a grammar school or to a comprehensive school. The second will be whether he happens to live in the neighbourhood of a particular comprehensive school when the complete reorganisation has taken place.

That is the situation in my borough, and I am sure that it applies to many others. It makes nonsense of the whole idea of parental choice at this time. I know that choice is not left merely to schools. There is the question of the choice of subject and the fact that a parent finds that his child is not able to take, say, Chinese because the teaching of this subject is reserved to those in the C-stream, and something should be done about this.

The Bill attempts to deal with the grievances of parents by setting up tribunals. I cannot for the life of me see how a tribunal could do very much more than the local education authority can in any specific instance. The tribunal will consist of teachers, parents, and so on, but nothing is said in the Bill about the terms of reference. It is all extremely vague.

There is also the question of finance, which is skated over rather lightly. For the life of me I cannot see how a tribunal can take the place of the right of parents to appeal to the local authority when they have a grievance. I have often had parents come to see me in August or September because they have not been given the school of their choice. If the place is not there because the school is already fully subscribed, I cannot see how a tribunal can do anything about that.

In the first draft which I sent to the various bodies, I suggested that the appeal tribunal should be a committee of the local education authority, but the great majority of the teachers' bodies which replied said that they did not feel that it was suitable to appeal from one part of an authority to another part of the same authority. That is why I drafted my proposal in its present form.

That does not get away from the point that whatever body is set up cannot be very effective in these cases.

The Bill has certain superficial attractions, if I may so put it. For example, Clause 3 would make it mandatory to have teacher and parent representatives on school boards. I agree with that now, and I have always agreed with it. Parents and teachers should be represented on the boards. I wish that this message had got through to my own authority, a Tory authority.

Then pass the Bill.

Give it a kick.

I understand that this is Tory policy. It was expressed in the Tory manifesto. But although in the borough of Redbridge there is representation of parents, in an attenuated form, if I may say so, this does not apply to teachers, the idea being that teachers work in the schools and may, therefore, have an interest.

It is essential that more and more parents should be involved in the working of our schools. Unfortunately—I am sure that this is the experience of most teachers—it is difficult to bring in the very parents one wishes to become involved. There is always the articulate parent who is keen about the progress of his child, who comes to the school to speak to the teachers and the head teacher, but this is seldom true of the parent of the child who is not doing so well. This attitude may well have started at the time the child was a "failure" at the 11 plus—considered a failure not merely by the child itself but by the parents as well, who then gave up.

The answer to this problem is not to be found in the Bill. We must involve all kinds of parents, not merely the articulate, not merely those who make the biggest fuss at parent-teacher association meetings. The old saying is still true—one can take a horse to water but cannot make it drink. Indeed, it would be impossible to create a parent-teacher association in certain areas, and there must be other means of consultation. This purpose is not yet met, and I shall be interested to hear what other forms of consultation are available apart from those taking place today.

Somewhere along the line we must involve the parents of more difficult children. There has been reference already to truancy, vandalism, and the other ills of our time. We must involve the parents of these children, and I am quite sure that it will not be done through parent-teacher associations.

I see that you are anxious that we get on, Mr. Deputy Speaker, so I conclude in this way. The Bill has a certain attraction which is, shall I say—

Specious.

No. not exactly specious. It has a certain attraction on the surface. Frankly, it adds nothing, or only very little to the objective that it sets itself.

I rise briefly to support my hon. Friend's Bill. I do so not only as a Member of Parliament and a school governor but, more particularly, as one of those involved in the Bill—as a parent with three children at local authority schools>lb/> I draw attention to Clause 5. At about this time of year many parents with children of 11-plus age receive a list of schools to which their children may be sent—whether it is a selective or a nonselective system is immaterial. What do those parents know of the schools?

Some schools may hold meetings at which parents have the opportunity to find out what is going on. Apart from that, they learn from hearsay, from friends and neighbours. Some people in my constituency think that one school in the area is the best and they fight to send their children to it. Others would not allow their children there in any circumstances. That sort of situation is bound to arise.

As much information as possible should be given to parents so that they have information on which to make their choice. There is a strong case for Clause 5, which requires local authorities to publish prospectuses for schools within their area.

In addition, I support Clause 2. After allocation, which is bound to be arbitrary, there are all sorts of difficulties and problems with parents who do not have their first choice. My son was allocated to a school which was not among the first three of my choice. What follows? There are attempts—often abortive—by parents to get hold of someone at the education office. If they are successful, embarrassing and distressing scenes may follow. There may follow letters by worried parents to councillors and Members of Parliament, and interviews at our surgeries, in an effort by the parents to get their way.

All this could be avoided if there were an appeals procedure to an independent body. We cannot satisfy everyone, but if parents were able to put their view to an independent body, they would feel that they had had a fair hearing. I hope the House will give the Bill a Second Reading.

I should like to join in the con- gratulations to my hon. Friend the Member for Streatham (Mr. Shelton) on giving the House the opportunity, however briefly, to discuss this most important subject. I regret that we have had such a short debate. I hope that the Government's supporters will resist any thoughts they might have of talking the Bill out and that they will give it an opportunity to go to Committee, where full and detailed discussion can take place.

The Bill is wholly in accord with Conservative basic principles, and, for all I know, it may also be in accord with basic Socialist principles, because the basic principle that is involved is that the right to educate children belongs to the parent and not to the State. I hope that the Under-Secretary will agree with that, although he is looking puzzled. That is not a principle of Socialism, but it may well be a principle that the Labour Party could support, because to be a Socialist and to be a member of the Labour Party is not always the same thing.

Parents want a say in the education of their children. They want some influence and some choice. They want their voice to be heard. This right is fundamental to human nature. It is essential to people's self respect.

It is one of the paradoxes of the twentieth century that as society grows more affluent it grows more impersonal and loses its sense of community. Parents are no longer content to be treated as cyphers, as some kind of painful prerequisite for children, and as nothing else. They want to be listened to, and they want to exercise the most creative function that most human beings have, which is to bring up another generation and influence them for good in the future. Although many local education authorities take this into account, some officials do not. I have had experience of parents being brushed aside as though they were irrelevant pests.

The Bill could have a profound effect on basic attitudes. After all, the law is a creative instrument as well as a reflective one. It reflects consensus sometimes in a community, but in other cases it can create new attitudes. The Race Relations Act is an Act of that nature which created new attitudes in society.

My hon. Friend spoke with characteristic modesty of his Bill as a minor Bill. He underestimates the importance of the proposals he puts forward, because this could be the beginning of a Copernican term in the education system so that there was a revolution in attitudes, a shift in the balance of power back to the parent again. The shorthand "parent power" has been used. I think that parent power is a very good thing. The Bill seeks in practice to give that idea some reality.

Clause 1, which sets out to amend Section 76 of the Education Act 1974 so that children can be effectively educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents, is a very constructive and reasonably drafted clause. Section 76 lays down a general principle that children are to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents. Apparently law is a science, unlike philosophy, where there can be a universal without a particular. This general principle has been treated by the courts as a pious aspiration and nothing else.

The amendment proposed by my hon. Friend is intended to make that general principle an effective principle of action by shifting the burden of proof away from the parents, who have to prove something positively about their wishes, to saying that that is no longer necessary and that the norm now is that children should be educated in accordance with the wishes of the parents unless it can be shown positively that it is unreasonable to do so on the ground of the cost involved. That is an important change.

I say to the hon. Members for Ilford, South (Mr. Shaw) and for Manchester, Moss Side (Mr. Hatton) that parental wishes is a much wider concept than merely a choice between a grammar and a comprehensive school. I echo what my hon. Friend the Member for Rippon (Dr. Hampson) said. Hon. Members opposite must get away from the obsession with the choice between grammar and comprehensive schools. It is an important choice but it is not the only choice. It is part of a wider range of choices.

After all, parents want a choice between different types of comprehensive schools, for example. They want a choice between a school that streams and a school that does not stream. They may want a choice between a single-sex school and a mixed school, and they are entitled to that. They may want a choice between a religious school and a non-religious school. They may want a choice between a large school and a small school. They may want a choice between a school which has a good reputation and another in the same locality which has a bad one. They may want their child to be educated at the same school as his brother or sister. They may know that one school teaches a subject particularly well because it has teachers who specialise in that subject, and they may want that school for their children.

As for range of choice, is it not the case that parents achieve a high degree of satisfaction on all the points mentioned by the hon. Gentleman but that the crucial choice—namely, that the majority will go for the best school—is not realisable within the framework of the Education Act nor within the terms of the amendment proposed by the Bill?

I am glad to have the hon. Gentleman's support. I agree with him that we shall not get complete freedom of choice through this. In fact, we shall never get complete freedom of choice: it is an impossibility. It is a question of degree. We can move towards it. The Bill is an important move towards achieving it.

The Bill would set up an appeals tribunal. This again is of great importance, because parents want to have their voice heard and they want to be satisfied that their case has been heard impartially, that they have had a fair deal. That is why my hon. Friend's proposals are so important, so that this tribunal should be independent and should be seen to be independent. Of course, I imagine that my hon. Friend is not wedded to the proposals in detail. They could be amended in Committee, and we look forward to having the whole expertise of the Under-Secretary's Department at our disposal.

Clause 3, dealing with parent governors and teacher governors, is most interesting. It would provide all over the country for the election of parents and teachers to governing bodies, not in the attenuated form which apparently prevails in the borough of Redbridge, according to the hon. Member for Ilford, South. Incidentally, I do not know what a parent in an attenuated form is! This would extend what is the good practice in certain authorities and make it a general rule.

If we look at the independent sector we find that one of the reasons why so many schools are good in that sector is that they have effective governing bodies which take an active interest in their schools. This is so. The Under-Secretary looks dubious and worried at the same time, but it is, in fact, the reason why there are a number of good schools. Why not look at what is good in the independent sector and see how the same results can be achieved within the maintained sector, which must be our principal concern? Through this proposal we would create a sense of community and of identification between parents and the local schools.

The hon. Member for Ilford, South said "You can lead a horse to the water but you cannot make him drink." I imagine that he claims no originality for that phrase. We can meet that objection in the Bill because we say that the governors should be elected by parents who have children at the school. That is a most important part of my hon. Friend's Bill, because that would involve all the parents.

We should also look at the role of governors and their powers with regard to the curriculum and the appointment of teachers. We want them more involved, not less involved. There are provisions relating to consultation between the schools and parent-teacher associations. A method of consultation only is proposed, of which the parent-teacher association could be one form. A most important provision relates to school prospectuses, so that the information is available to enable one to make an informed and intelligent choice.

The principles on which my hon. Friend has based his Bill are absolutely right, and I congratulate him on the workmanlike job that he has made of it, on the extensive consultation which has taken place with the various associa- tions and the trouble that he has taken in drafting the Bill. Of course, it is not perfect; nobody says it is, but it is on a reasonable basis to take to the Committee and improve it there.

I know what the Under-Secretary is going to say when he replies, not because I am peering at his notes over the Dispatch Box—his writing is practically illegible—but, having been a Minister, I know that his civil servants will have given him a marvellous brief saying how wonderful the idea is in principle but how impossible it all is in practice. I have lived with those attitudes and I know what they arc, and it is remarkable how they can be changed. What is needed is an assertion of will on the part of the Under-Secretary and the Secretary of State. If that will is asserted, we shall see that the impossible immediately become very possible. The impracticable is changed into practicality in an evening. I have seen that happen.

I hope that the Under-Secretary will encourage the initiative so rightly taken by my hon. Friend. That is what private Members are for—to take an initiative, to push forward the debate and to push forward measures when the whole ponderous machine of the Government is caught in a sort of paralysis.

The Under-Secretary is not without imagination—on his better days. I hope that he will exercise that imaginative sympathy and empathy today, and give the Bill a fair wind. If he does, he will earn the gratitude of millions of parents throughout the country, and we shall be glad to share the credit with him.

I am always at my best at about 4 p.m. on a Friday, because it is nearing the time when I can go to Kings Cross and escape to the North. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Chelmsford (Mr. St. John-Stevas) for his comments.

We have been discussing an important feature of our education service. I congratulate the hon. Member for Streatham (Mr. Shelton) on the work he has done.

I do not have time to deliver the speech that was prepared for me, but I want to deal with one or two important issues in a serious way. I know that the hon. Member for Chelmsford has done the job that I am doing now, but I believe that he is far too pessimistic about parental involvement in schools. There is more direct parental involvement in Britain's schools today than at any time in the history of our education service. I can remember when there were notices telling parents that they must not pass through particular gates, and so on. Now we have involvement but not as much as I would want.

I believe that in the next decade we shall have much more parental involvement, teacher participation and community involvement in the schools. I am all for it, but the House understands very well that the Government of the day have a duty to provide full-time education for all our children, rich and poor, those in inner cities, and those in remote rural areas. We want to give parents as much say as possible in the kind of education their children are offered.

Everybody knows that, whatever we do, at least 75 per cent. of the children will go to the school that is allocated to them. That is a fact of life. The essence of the Bill, which comes from the Tory manifesto—I welcome an effort to honour their pledge—is choice of school. Choice of school is a difficult operation. I do not run away from the difficulties. I do not believe that the Bill deals with them effectively. I do not think that it will advance the cause of parents.

Clause 1 would amend Section 76 of the 1944 Education Act. Parents are becoming more and more dissatisfied with the education service. I do not complain about that; I welcome it. I want parents to be dissatisfied and to pressurise our people, because the way to get rid of the dissatisfaction caused by children's being allocated to schools with which parents are not happy is not to have competition between schools. It is not to have a pecking order in a particular local education authority area and then to allow certain articulate and interested parents to have an advantage. The only way to deal with this fundamental problem is to practise positive discrimination in favour of those schools that in the past have had less than their fair share of the resources—to give them extra teachers, extra equipment. better buildings, and so on.

A great deal has been said about Section 76 and other sections relating to choice of school. As Sections 76, 37 and 68, which relate to the question of choice of school, have been administered by successive Secretaries of State, the wish of parents must always prevail unless the authority can show that the wish is unreasonable. The burden of proof is on the authority. I have been associated with many cases in the Department which bear that out.

A great deal has been said about Section 76. It is a difficult provision. My authority is no less than Lord Butler, who was associated with the 1944 Act. Speaking in another place, last year, he said:

"I drafted that section myself…it was very carefully drafted, because in my opinion it must be said, if one speaks honestly on this matter, that you cannot absolutely assure to every parent in the country exactly the education he wants for his child owing very often to circumstances of where the parents live, which authority they may be in, to what school they may have proximity, and so forth. Therefore the words were brought out that we had to have regard to the parent's wishes. That is as far as any legislation can possibly go".—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10th July 1974; Vol. 353, c. 590.]

That is an apposite comment on this Bill.

There is no doubt that the main contention in today's debate has been the question of choice of school. I understand the excitement of Opposition Members about the question of different types of school and the argument and controversy going on in the education service and in the community. It is not possible to have parallel systems of education, although the Opposition continually allege that it is. We can have either a genuine comprehensive system or a selective system. The argument is that a selective system narrows choice. Once we defend a direct grant grammar school or any kind of selective school we in effect select and reject.

Let us suppose that a parent says, "I want my child to go to a school with a good academic curriculum where he can follow O level and A level courses". That would be a very reasonable request. Many such requests have been referred to us. In the past five years we have never had fewer than 1,000 choice-of-school cases in the Department. The number is increasing every year. Most of them are settled amicably between the authority and the parent, with my Department intervening, and no order is necessary. In the past year we have issued directions in respect of eight authorities, involving 25 children.

There is therefore no question of rubber-stamping what the authority wants. All the merits and demerits are considered in cases relating to Section 76. I assure the House that every care is taken.

Suppose a parent says "My child is going to the grammar school because that is the only school that offers the kind of course I want my child to follow". However many tribunals and however many appeals procedures there are, in the end that parent is not satisfied because unless the child manages the 11-plus procedure successfully, he will be sent to a school which is not considered suitable for children taking the O level and A level courses.

When the hon. Member for Chelmsford argued this case in the debate last July he spent most of his time talking about the independent sector.

That is not so.

I am talking about the debate we had last July.

I am sure the hon. Gentleman does not wish to mislead the House. That simply is not true. Although there was a passage in my speech which dealt with independent schools, if the hon. Gentleman takes out a slide rule he will be able to calculate that that was a minor part of my speech and that the major part of it dealt with other matters. This is all irrelevant anyway; let us not waste time on it.

The hon. Gentleman chose to raise it. In that debate I said:

That is not evidence of what I said; it is evidence of what the Under-Secretary of State said. The fact that he was mistaken then is evidence that he is mistaken again today.

I invite hon. Members to read Hansard. On that occasion the hon. Gentleman said that the reason why the Conservative Party valued independent schools was that they gave an extra choice to parents. To how many parents? To which parents?

The main clauses of the Bill deal with the choice of school. The only way to give real choice to parents—parents should have a choice in the education they want for their children—is to make sure that children go to a school that offers a full range of choice and are not labelled and categorised before they even enter a school. A genuine comprehensave school offers far more choice to far more parents than is offered by any selective system.

I turn now to the question of tribunals. The present structure is that when a child is allocated to a secondary school the parent, naturally, has access to the school. If the parent is not satisfied, he has access to the democratically elected councillors who are members of the local education authority. Those councillors are accountable to parents and to the electorate. If parents are not satisfied they write to their Member of Parliament, as I know very well. Half the correspondence I receive comes from Members of Parliament on behalf of their constituents whose children have been allocated to schools which the parents do not wish them to attend.

The matter then comes to the Secretary of State. Discussions are held with local authorties. It has been said that never at any time in the last 30 years has a court come down against the local authority in favour of the parent, but that is a tribute to local authorities and to the work of my Department. We make sure that wherever possible parents' wishes are fulfilled. In the nature of things, local authorities have difficulties in satisfying everyone.

It is interesting that the Opposition always say that central Government—

rose in his place and claimed to move, That the Question be now put; but Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER withheld his assent and declined then to put that Question.

It is interesting that the Bill should come from the Opposition, who are always preaching throughout the country that local authorities should be given more powers and more autonomy and that less power should be concentrated in central Government. The only way that one can get proper parental involvement is by the willing cooperation of parents. One cannot impose democracy—

Object

Object.

Object.

Mr. Deputy Speaker—

The hon. Gentleman cannot discuss the Bill now.

What day? No day named.

Object.

What day?

Friday 9th May.

Has the hon. Gentleman written authority of the sponsor of the Bill?

Yes, Sir, I have written authority.

What day? No day named.

Object.

What day?

Friday next

Does the hon. Gentleman have the authority of the sponsor of the Bill?

Yes, Sir.

What day? No day named.

Object.

This Adjournment debate arises out of a Question which I tabled to the Secretary of State for Defence on 11th February. I then asked whether he was satisfied with the existing arrangements for members of the Armed Forces and spouses to vote in General Elections and referenda by post and by proxy. The right hon. Gentleman said in his reply:

"Not entirely, but we take steps to ensure that Service families know and can take advantage of the existing facilities for Service registration."—[Official Report, 11th February 1975; Vol. 886, c. 188.]

In an answer to a supplementary question on the same occasion, at col. 189, the Minister of State told the House that only between 25 per cent. and 30 per cent. of those eligible to register as Service voters did so. He went on to say that although the recommendations made to the last Speaker's Conference jointly by the Ministry of Defence and by the Home Office had been largely accepted, those recommendations had not yet been implemented.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) then described the present situation in regard to Service voting as little less than a scandal as can be seen from column 189. It is against that background that this debate takes place.

It is common ground that members of the Armed Forces, who have chosen to serve their country in a special way—often overseas, usually away from home. and almost always in conditions of discomfort and sometimes of danger—should, in fact, be able to vote in exactly the same way as any other citizen.

In an important statement on Tuesday the Minister of State for Defence explained that the total number of Service men and women entitled to a Service vote was 340,000 and that the estimated number of spouses was in the region of 55,000, making a total approximate number of those entitled to a Service vote in the region of 400,000.

The Minister of State confirmed—he used the lower figure which he mentioned on 11th February—that out of those 400,000 entitled to be on the register approximately 100,000, or 25 per cent., were on the register. In view of the fact that the Government accepted that most unsatisfactory situation which the Minister of State revealed, they tabled an important amendment to the Referendum Bill, which was given a Third Reading yesterday.

On Tuesday the Minister of State said that it was the intention of the Government to introduce legislation at the earliest possible moment to implement the recommendation of Mr. Speaker's Conference. It would be out of order for me to discuss that legislation, and I shall not do so. In view of that, I should like to ask the Under-Secretary what administrative arrangements the Government will make in the meantime, pending this legislation, to secure what we both want to achieve, which is a substantial increase in the number of Service men and their wives on the Service register. It is within the competence and power of the Secretary of State for Defence to secure that increase.

I should like to quote briefly from the final report of Mr. Speaker's Conference in 1965, which was quoted in a memorandum submitted to the 1973 Speaker's Conference on Electoral Law.

The document says:

"The present arrangement for continuous registration of members of the forces and their wives should cease.

The Service authorities should in future be required to obtain information for the purpose of registration from any member of the forces who appears to be qualified to be registered whenever similar information is required to be given by a civilian householder, and it should be the duty of the commanding officer of each unit to see that this is carried out in time for entries to be made in each ordinary register.

The obligation on the Service authorities to obtain such information at such times should extend to wives of servicemen in the United Kingdom who are residing in premises maintained by the Service authorities or by the Ministry of Public Building and Works as well as to wives who are residing outside the United Kingdom to be with their husbands."

That recommendation, made in 1965, was implemented in part only by Section 2 of the Representation of the People Act 1969. The Act did not place a direct responsibility on commanding officers to ensure that members serving in the units and the wives of those serving in the units should be on the register. Compulsory registration for Service men would, of course, require legislation, but there is, in a sense, compulsory registration already for everybody else who is not a Service man. By law, in October of each year each one of us is required to fill up a registration form saying who, on that date in October, is resident in his house. At present, there is no such obligation on commanding officers. I suggest to the Under-Secretary that we could achieve a substantial improvement in the number of Service voters by his taking administrative action through the Minister of Defence.

I wish to refer to the Memorandum for the Guidance of Electoral Registration Officers in England and Wales in order to examine in a little detail the administrative steps that the Ministry of Defence could take. Will the Under-Secretary please say exactly what obligations there now are on commanding officers to advise those serving in their units and the spouses of those serving in their units of their right to a Service vote—their right to be put on the Service register?

I have been a soldier, and on the Reserve, which meant going back to a Regular unit until December of last year. I know how easy it is for commanding officers to comply with the letter of any instruction which comes from the Ministry of Defence about posting a notice on a board. I know, too, how frequently that notice board is in some draughty and windy corridor, how the notice is imperfectly duplicated, and, if forms have to be applied for—which they do—how the forms are in the adjutant's office or the office of the chief clerk, where an ordinary soldier goes with great temerity and fear. Sometimes soldiers are told to apply for a form at an inconvenient hour. I am sure that there are administrative ways in which it could be made much simpler for Service men to register, and in which their right and facility to register could be brought home to them much more clearly, simply as a result of administrative instructions issued to commanding officers.

Of course, we know the difficulties. We know the difficulties of those serving at sea, in submarines or the fleet. We know the difficulties of those who are flying, and who are based at stations in Cyprus and are—or, at any rate, will be until the Government succeed in cutting our defences—still serving in Singapore and Hong Kong. We know the rigorous training programme of our forces stationed in West Germany. We know the special difficulties which face our soldiers in Ulster. In spite of all these difficulties, I believe that it would be right for the Ministry of Defence to issue instructions to commanding officers saying that individual notification should be sent to every soldier serving in the unit under their command and that a similar communication should be sent to the spouse.

It is a matter of great regret—I know that the Minister of State, who addressed the Committee on Tuesday, shares this view—that only 100,000 of the 400,000 eligible to be on the Service register are actually on it. I believe the Under-Secretary shares that view.

This debate has been an attempt to try to take a giant stride towards a common objective. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will give sympathetic consideration to the suggestions that I have made.

As the hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Gow) said in quoting the Question that he put to the House and to the Minister of State recently, he has, both by that Question and by his speeches in recent months, demonstrated his interest in the subject being debated this afternoon.

Perhaps I might advance the hon. Gentleman's knowledge of the statistics just a little for the sake of interest, because they will not only deal with the question that I want to raise later but give some idea of the problem.

We are, as the hon. Gentleman said, talking about Service voters. The wives of Service men abroad and Service men at home and abroad altogether number 400,000 people. Of those, approximately about 400,000 people. Of those, approximately 105,000 are Service men serving abroad. In addition there are about 142,000 wives of Service men serving in this country who at the moment have to register in the same way as the civil population.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for raising this subject, even at an hour which is normally regarded by most as the bosom of the family hour on a Friday, for two main reasons.

The first reason is to explain in more detail the present position and. secondly, to expound why we feel it to be unsatisfactory.

Prior to 1969, registration was on a once-for-all basis. The Service man registered once and was kept on the register until he left the Service. That led to many anomalies. At that time about 60 per cent. of all eligible Service men were registered for the vote.

In 1969 Mr. Speaker's Conference recommended assimilation with the civil practice—that is, annual registration. When that was recommended the decline in the registered voting population in the Services was not foreseen. As the hon. Gentleman made clear, in the six years which have succeeded that conference, the figure has fallen alarmingly to approximately 25 per cent. of those eligible to be registered at the moment.

It might be supposed by the casual observer of the scene—I know the hon. Gentleman does not suppose it—that this is the result of inadvertence on the part of those members of the Forces who are eligible to vote, and, therefore, they deserve what they get.

There are good reasons why registration is lower than in civilian life and why the Services should be regarded for this purpose as a special case. The first reason is the mobility of Service life—the fact that there are relatively frequent moves both in and out of the United Kingdom, some of which are at fairly short notice. The second reason is that arduous conditions and the remoteness of some of the places in which Service men find themselves inhibit registration.

Thirdly—we must be clear about this—the fact that proxy voting is prescribed is unpopular with many people. It is also difficult in the sense that, as the years go by and as the Service man's connection with a particular district gets more tenuous—perhaps his parents die—it gets more difficult to appoint proxies.

The fourth reason, which is not inconsiderable, is the length and complexity of the form that the Service man has to fill in, nominating not only a first but a second choice proxy, and the fact that it has to be attested by a Service officer. That, too, as much as the adjutant's office syndrome, makes it unpopular with the Service man.

Another point, which should not be made too much of, is that the lack of active involvement in party politics tends to weaken the sense of belonging. It is also true that in some units at some levels there may be a breakdown of the machinery necessary to distribute the forms and to encourage the personnel, but I do not overstate that. As far as we can, we encourage everyone who can take advantage of this to do so, but at times there may be that minor blemish.

Finally, there is a point of principle in that some officers and men whom I have met take the point of conscience that they are, as servants of the Crown, not willing to exercise their vote, but those are relatively few in number.

The proportion of the civil population which is registered is about 96 per cent. of all those eligible. Prior to 1969 about 60 per cent. of the Services were registered. For the many complex reasons which I have adduced and which make the Forces' task much more difficult, I do not believe that we shall ever get the proportion of the Forces who register up to the same proportion as that for the civil population, but I believe that we should aim immediately at reverting to the proportion which registered prior to 1969 and at passing it as soon as possible. It is necessary to make the machinery of registration as easy as possible to encourage that rise.

It was in that sense that my Department and the Home Office put forward their evidence to Mr. Speaker's Conference in 1973 which led to the report which is currently under discussion. Mr. Speaker's Conference recommended a number of changes. The first recommendation was the cessation of annual registration, which is the current position. It recommended a once-for-all registration with an annual declaration of changes.

The second recommendation—I think that this in large measure meets what the hon. Gentleman said—was that an obligation should be placed upon commanding officers to distribute the forms individually to each Service man and to do various other things, which I would categorise in an omnibus way as encouraging Service men to exercise their rights, and to collect the forms and dispatch them once collected. I believe that this would give greater encouragement than Service men have at present. It must be recognised that this recommendation goes beyond even the pre–1969 position.

The third recommendation was that details of a Service man's registration should be entered on his records and should then accompany him to his unit and that the records should be amended when he changes his registration.

The fourth recommendation, which again would go beyond the pre–1969 position, is that the wives of Service men should be registered as Service voters. At present, as I have said, only spouses who accompany their husbands or wives abroad on service—I believe it to be only wives accompanying their husbands—are eligible for the Service vote. The wives of Service men in this country must register in the same way as other electors. Although they are not under the same disadvantage as Service men, they nevertheless suffer the same problems of mobility. This is what I believe led Mr. Speaker's Conference to make the recommendation that in future all wives should be registered as Service voters.

Is it not the case that, as the law stands, in the comparatively small number of cases where there are accompanied tours in Ulster, for there are some families in Ulster although most of the soldiers there are not accompanied, even though the wives are on the other side of the Irish Channel they are not entitled to a Service vote? That highlights the point the hon. Gentleman was making about the need for the change.

Certainly. Ulster is recognised as part of the United Kingdom. The arrangements for Service voters do not apply in the United Kingdom.

That is the background which we have to consider in this debate. About one in every four is registered, and in 1973 the Speaker's Conference made the recommendations to which I have referred. For reasons of extreme electoral preoccupation in 1974 as much as anything else, it has not yet been possible to enshrine them in legislation, but, as my hon. Friend the Minister of State said in the debate on 22nd April, it is the Government's intention to introduce legislation at the earliest possible time to remedy that state of affairs.

I have to tell the hon. Gentleman that the exact form of the legislation has necessarily still to be worked out, and I cannot give details of what will be included or excluded. However, without trespassing upon the normal bounds of an Adjournment debate, I think that I can say that the legislation will be designed along the lines of the recommendations of the Speaker's Conference.

The hon. Gentleman raised with me the question of the administrative arrangements which can be taken in the meantime in an effort to secure a larger registration, and he asked also about the obligations placed upon a commanding officer. The commanding officer is responsible to ensure that all Service men are given a form, and he is responsible to encourage Service men to register, this responsibility extending overseas to Service men and their spouses.

There has been a publicity campaign drawing attention to the need to register. Forms have been exhibited. Perhaps the latter is of little account, but, more pertinently, on the British Forces broadcasting service attention has been drawn to these matters. We try in whatever way we can to draw attention to them because we are neither satisfied with nor complacent about the present position.

I remind the hon. Gentleman that one of the recommendations of the Speaker's Conference in 1973 was that, while an obligation should be placed upon a commanding officer—this has been one of the problems in the past—no military offence should be created as a result of the recommendations, since in such a moving and changing Service to make failure to carry out the recommendations a Service offence would be extremely onerous and, I think, a rather pointless exercise.

I shall go beyond what I have told the hon. Gentleman so far—always assuming that anyone reads the annals of Parliament nowadays—by taking this opportunity to fulfil certain of the recommendations of the Speaker's Conference regarding greater publicity A man joining the Armed Forces has to make many sacrifices on behalf of his country, as we all know, but he does not lose his rights as a citizen, and the most fundamental right of all is the right to cast his vote in an election.

I issue an appeal, therefore, to members of our Armed Forces to heed that fact and to ensure that they register their right to vote. The legislation which the Government will introduce will make it as easy as possible for this registra- tion to be effected. Beyond that, however, it must always in large measure depend upon the willingness and keenness of members of the Forces to effect that registration. Although it will be made easier, there will still be an obligation on the individual. I hope that they will match the willingness which the Government have shown to try to extend the franchise by their efforts in taking advantage of the benefits conferred.

In the meantime, the present arrangements stand, and here again I wish to give as much publicity to this fact as possible. Although legislation is coming, I hope that by all possible means those who are eligible to vote will take advantage of the existing system of registration in order that they may do so. They will be in no way discouraged by any of the members of the Armed Forces who have custody of the forms. I hope that they will be encouraged in every way, and it is the Government's hope that the legal framework which we provide, supplemented by the increased willingness of members of the Armed Forces to take advantage of their rights, will put an end to the present sorry chapter and will restore the Armed Services franchise to something far better than its present ludicrous position.

I thank the hon. Gentleman. It has been a valuable debate, and I hope that he will accept our assurances in that light.