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Commons Chamber

Volume 898: debated on Tuesday 28 October 1975

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House Of Commons

Tuesday 28th October 1975

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Private Business

Mallaig Harbour Order Confirmation Bill

Considered: to be read the Third time tomorrow.

Oral Answers To Questions

Employment

Unemployed Persons

1.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many persons are now registered as unemployed.

On 9th October 1,114,211 people were unemployed in Great Britain.

Will the Secretary of State tell us what he expects the figure to be by the end of 1976? Will he deny that he believes that by then it will reach at least 1½ million? If he does not accept that figure, will he say what figure he does accept?

No, I shall not make such a prediction. It would not be sensible. Indeed, I do not think that any Government have made predictions of the character suggested by the hon. Gentleman.

One of the measures introduced by my right hon. Friend is the temporary employment subsidy scheme. Will he indicate how that scheme is going? Did he see reports that there have been only 7,000 applications and only 4,000 approvals? Is that in fact the case?

There is a later Question about the details of the scheme, which my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State will be answering. We never claimed that the numbers involved would be large. We believe that the scheme has made a good start. We think that it can save the jobs of quite a large number of people. We do not believe that the conditions which have been laid down are preventing applications going through. We are prepared to examine the working of the scheme as it goes along. My hon. Friend will recall that we took steps a few weeks ago to extend the scheme to the whole country.

Does not the present record level of unemployment provide powerful evidence, in terms of human misery, of the misplaced faith of the right hon. Gentleman in the social contract? Does he now realise that his refusal to acknowledge the failure of the social contract has resulted in higher unemployment and worse rates of inflation?

I do not accept what the hon. Gentleman said. No words of mine will express any complacency about the present unemployment figures, which are appalling. Since the same level, proportionately, prevails in many other countries such as Germany and France—and there is a much bigger figure in the United States—and throughout the rest of the Western world, it would be much more sensible and logical for people to attribute it to common factors in all countries rather than to one policy in this country

6.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what additional measures are being taken to reduce the level of unemployment.

12.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what further steps are being taken by his Department to combat unemployment generally and to assist school leavers in particular; and if he will make a statement.

One essential measure in order to reduce the appallingly high level of unemployment is to reduce the rate of inflation, and I am confident that that goal will be achieved. The measures announced on 24th September can help to mitigate the situation, and their effect is being closely studied, particularly the assistance they provide to school leavers. Of course, we would all like to see much more far-reaching measures adopted, but their timing must depend partly on the success of the anti-inflation drive.

What is my right hon. Friend doing about the statement that was presented before the Labour Party conference, to which he replied, about unemployment levels? He said specifically that further action should be taken to bring down unemployment. It is all right for those who have never been in a dole queue to use all the rhetoric about facing the economic typhoon, but that is small comfort to those who join the ever-lengthening dole queues and cannot afford to buy even a sail to help them face this whirlwind. Is it not time that my right hon. Friend got down to the job of seeing that the present massive rate of unemployment is brought down to a reasonable level?

I want to see the appalling rate of unemployment brought down as speedily as possible, by every means available to us. Some of the measures were announced a few weeks ago, and I think that further measures will be announced very soon, dealing with the construction industry, for example. One of the main measures—not the only one—to deal with the problem is to bring down the rate of inflation itself. I think that my hon. Friend must face the fact that inflation helps to cause unemployment.

Is the right hon. Gentleman unaware, or does he not wish to disclose, that it is the fall in the rate of inflation that necessarily causes transitional unemployment, and that therefore, since the rate of inflation has to fall, this transition must be experienced?

We have debated this matter with the right hon. Gentleman on many occasions. He takes a purist, classical laissez-faire view of the situation. Most of us object to that. The right hon. Gentleman has not converted his own ex-party, and he need not think that he will convert us.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the report last week by the independent Price Commission makes the most heartening reading for years, apropos the inflation situation? At last there are signs of inflation being countered, which will mean a reduction in the level of unemployment. Nevertheless, will my right hon. Friend be prepared to consider the situation of young men and women entering apprenticeship schemes, and ensure that their prospects are not damaged during this difficult period, because their services will be needed later, when we and this Government have overcome inflation?

I agree with my hon. Friend that the report of the Price Commission was a good sign in the right direction, but it has to go much further before we can see unemployment falling at anything like the rate that we would like to see. I hope that that will follow.

I agree entirely with what my hon. Friend said about apprenticeships. Although we face many difficulties, it is right that we should take some satisfaction from the fact that, despite all the difficulties, the number of apprenticeships is increasing. Many people feared that the recession would bring about what it has done on previous occasions, namely, a collapse in the number of apprenticeships, but the engineering industry, for example, has taken substantially more apprentices than it did in the early years of this decade. The construction industry, with the help of additional places made available by the Training Services Agency, is also operating above normal. I think that the work done by the Agency in this respect has been extremely valuable.

Has the Minister read the report produced by the Training Services Agency entitled "Vocational Preparation for Young People"? Does he accept its conclusions, particularly about gateway courses? If so, what action does he propose to take?

There are many valuable suggestions in that report. Some of them have already been put into operation. The Agency cannot have any criticism of this Government about the support which we have given to training in different forms. Certainly we regard it as a valuable report, on which we can build.

10.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what estimate he has made of the likely trend and numbers of unemployed over the next 12 months; and if he will make a statement.

18.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what forecast he makes of unemployment trends in the United Kingdom and Scotland, respectively, over the next 12 months; and if he will make a statement.

If present trends persist the calculation is that unemployment will be something under 1·2 million, seasonally adjusted, at the end of the year, and that it will then begin to level off. I doubt whether predictions beyond that can have much value, nor can I make a worthwhile separate estimate for Scotland. Of course, the total I have mentioned is not a tolerable one, and a main objective of Government policy is to get it down as soon as possible, by every intelligent means available to us.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. We cannot hear what the Minister is saying. We can hear the questions but not the answers. Can something be done about the transmission?

There are some difficulties today, but we are trying to remedy them. It would help if Ministers would speak a little more loudly.

Why does the right hon. Gentleman persist with the cruel deception that a fall in the rate of inflation will cause a drop in the numbers employed? Is he aware that I am prepared to make a level bet with him that the year in prospect will see a fall in the rate of inflation and a rise in the rate of unemployment? Does he dissent from that forecast?

I am not keen to engage in bets with the hon. Member, for a number of reasons. The last one that I had with him I won so resoundingly that it would be almost sadistic to have an-another. In any case, I am not prepared to assent to what he said. I know that he accepts the view of the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) on this subject, but we do not. We believe that it is possible to bring down inflation and to take measures also to guard against a rise in unemployment and eventually to bring it down, and that it can be done by planning measures rather than leaving these matters to be decided by the market.

Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that I am most certainly grateful for the steps that have been taken by the Government to minimise the problems in Scotland? Is he aware that I believe that we should cease to be grudging in our appreciation of the steps taken by the Government? My hon. Friends and I are aware of the need to save the pound—although members of the SNP do not seem to be aware of this. May we have an assurance that this will not be accomplished at the expense of an inordinate number of persons unemployed in Scotland or throughout the United Kingdom?

My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary answered a question a minute or two ago giving percentages showing the situation in Scotland and in the rest of the United Kingdom. He illustrated the fact that the Scottish figure had not risen, proportionately, as much as it had done on previous occasions. Admittedly that is not a great satisfaction, because the total figure throughout the country has gone up sharply. The figure in Scotland has risen sharply but there are other parts of the country where unemployment has risen even more steeply. We need a combination of general measures as well as individual measures applied to the various parts of the country which have always been most heavily hit by unemployment. That applies to large parts of Scotland, whatever may have happened in some other parts of that country, such as Aberdeen.

Is the figure of 1·2 million unemployed, which the right hon. Gentleman gave earlier, inclusive of school leavers? If it is not, what is the figure, including school leavers?

That figure includes school leavers. Whether it makes an appreciable difference depends upon the stage at which the school leaver figure is taken. In the middle of this year there were 500,000 unemployed. For two or three months the figures were serious indeed. I do not seek to minimise them. The figure of 500,000 came down more slowly than it has done in previous years. It is now coming down much more rapidly, and about 9 out of 10 of those school leavers have secured jobs in the last few weeks. We believe that our recruitment subsidy has assisted. It depends when the figure is taken whether the number of school leavers adds greatly to the general total.

Could my right hon. Friend spare a few moments from examining the 5·1 per cent. unemployment figures in Scotland to consider the West Midlands, and Coventry in particular where the level of unemployment is now 7·1 per cent. and has doubled in the past 12 months?

There are many other parts of the country more hard hit than Scotland as a whole. The West Midlands is one such area that has been hit harder in this recession than in any previous recession since the end of the war. Merseyside is harder hit now. No one can disguise the serious nature of the figures. There are many other parts of the country where male unemployment is 10 per cent. or more. I have said on every occasion that I have stood at this Dispatch Box that we regard the total as absolutely intolerable. We have to take a whole series of measures to try to deal with it. One of these measures, no matter what the right hon. Member for Down, South may say, is to beat inflation. If we are to reduce unemployment, we have to beat inflation.

The right hon. Gentleman has twice referred to using every possible measure to combat unemployment. Will he not therefore condemn the actions of those who, in support of the closed shop at Ferrybridge, British Railways and British Leyland, add to unemployment by forcing some of their fellow workers to get the sack? Will he intervene to find a solution to this problem and reduce unemployment?

If the hon. Gentleman will table a Question dealing with this situation, I shall be prepared to reply. What we have been seeking to do, and what our legislation has assisted in doing, is to bring down the number of days lost through industrial strikes. That is what we are having success in doing. The number of days lost owing to industrial action in the past year is lower now than at any time since a Labour Government was last in office.

Wales

2.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many man- months of additional employment for the coming winter will be created in Wales as a result of the Government's recent announcements on this matter.

I regret that it is not possible to make the estimate desired by the hon. Member. The answer must depend on whether those individuals, firms or other organisations eligible to benefit under, or make use of, the various schemes, choose to do so.

Is the Secretary of State aware that deep regret will be felt that there is not enough appreciation of the progress of these schemes to estimate the effect in Wales? Does he accept that if Wales obtained 10 per cent. of the jobs created by the Manpower Services Commission, it would amount to 1,500 jobs, which would give work to only one out of every 50 unemployed persons in Wales? Is he not deeply concerned that other Government policies may be creating unemployment at a faster rate than jobs are being provided by the various schemes now going on?

I do not accept the latter part of the hon. Gentleman's supplementary question. All the policies of the Government are directed towards bringing down unemployment; that includes the attack on inflation, which we believe to be an essential part of our policies. The measures to which the hon. Gentleman referred may not have a major effect on the level of unemployment, but the hon. Gentleman should not be so pessimistic as to say that they do not have any effect. The Gwynedd County Council is in contact with the Manpower Services Commission about participating in a job creation project. I am glad that the main contract for the dynamic hydro-electric scheme in the hon. Member's constituency is going forward. I am sure that he will welcome that development.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that one problem facing Wales, as well as other parts of the United Kingdom, is the lack of investment in manufacturing industry? Will he discuss with his colleagues as soon as possible the setting up of the National Enterprise Board and the Welsh Development Agency?

I agree that that is one factor which, over the years, has contributed to the difficulties of the present situation in Wales, as elsewhere. The sooner we can get the National Enterprise Board, planning agreements, and the Welsh Development Agency in full operation, the better.

On the subject of youth employment, will the right hon. Gentleman use his influence with the Secretary of State for Education and Science to provide additional places and courses at technical colleges to cope with the extraordinary demand for technical college places—a demand which is not being met by the places which are available at the moment?

Yes. I shall continue to have discussions with my right hon. Friend. Again, I am not complacent about the situation. However, the appallingly high figure of unemployment among school leavers has been considerably reduced during the last few months. Indeed, in the last few weeks the figure has come down faster still, due partly to measures introduced by the Government.

Worker Participation

3.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he has discussed his proposed legislation on worker participation in industry with the Transport and General Workers Union.

Both the Minister of State and I have had informal discussions on industrial democracy with many unions and employers, and I hope that all interested parties will put their views to the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy in due course.

When the Secretary of State meets the Transport and General Workers Union—if he has not already done so—will he raise the case of Larry O'Donnell? He was a convener at Felixstowe Docks, He was asked by the Felixstowe Dock Company to join the board, and was sacked by the shop stewards. This clearly presents a great problem. What advice would the right hon. Gentleman give to employers? Should they put workers on the board at the risk of having them sacked by shop stewards, or should they not?

If the hon. Gentleman wishes to have a detailed answer on the question of the Felixstowe Dock Company Board he should put down a Question on that subject. In the meantime, I should like to say that his facts as presented today are about 90 per cent. wrong, and possibly 100 per cent. wrong.

Why is there such a lack of urgency about this matter? A committee of inquiry was announced by the Secretary of State for Trade before the Summer Recess, but we still do not know the names of its chairman or members. Will the right hon. Gentleman, who has an interest in the matter, put some zip behind this issue?

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's impatience to ensure that the Government's measures are put into operation as speedily as possible. I share his indignation. I want to see this committee established as speedily as possible because we, as a Government, are committed to introducing legislation on industrial democracy not in this coming Session but in the Session after that. We want to fulfil our pledges, but developments in industrial democracy need not await the report of the inquiry. We hope that in the meantime we shall make progress in the public sector in improving the situation.

Pay Settlements

5.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many pay settlements of less than £6 per week have been notified to his Department; and what proportion of pay settlements made since 1st August this represents.

On the basis of information available to my Department about major settlements made since 1st August, I estimate that about 5 per cent. of the employees covered have received increases significantly less than £6. I regret that this cannot be meaningfully expressed in terms of numbers of settlements, of which there are very large numbers, mostly covering small groups.

In view of the precarious situation in which many firms find themselves, and the increase in unemployment, does the hon. Gentleman feel that the next phase of the incomes policy will have to include pay settlements for less than £6 a week if we are to preserve existing jobs?

No, Sir. I do not think that it is appropriate at this juncture to make forecasts about the next stage of the incomes policy. What we are principally concerned about is that the initial success of the policy and its general observance by negotiators and all involved in it should be maintained. We should use the time that is purchased for us to consider what form of development the policy should take beyond this stage, but it would militate against any such proper consideration if a Minister were to suggest that the increase under some future policy would have to be more or less than £6.

Will my hon. Friend give an interpretation of the way in which the £6 increase operates in cases where, for example, there is a trainee who, from the age of, say, 18 or 19, would normally get a £10 increase—a concrete example of this is in Dunlop's—but is now getting only £6? The firm says that this is because of Government policy, and it means that the individual is having to work for £4 less than is received by other workers who are doing the same job. This is an absurdity, and a ludicrous situation. Will my hon. Friend interpret the Government's view on this?

I cannot comment on that specific case, but the view taken by those who originally framed this policy was that incremental scales should be regarded as the rate for the job and that where such scales applied they should continue to operate, subject to their not producing, together with the annual pay increase, an average increase of more than £6. Where they did that it would count against any future increases during the period of the policy. In all cases, incremental scales are subject to an upper limit of £8,500.

Ladbroke's Scotland (Industrial Dispute)

7.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he has offered the services of ACAS to resolve the industrial dispute between Ladbroke's and its West of Scotland workforce.

The Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service is an indepen- dent organisation. I understand that the ACAS offered to assist the parties to this dispute when it began in June, and has remained in touch with both sides.

Does the Minister accept that many of us find the employers' stubborn refusal to negotiate with the unions to be irresponsible and their refusal to reinstate the workers nothing short of punitive? Will he confirm that when the rights of recognition in the Employment Protection Bill are law the services of ACAS will be available to put an end to this dispute, which is now almost six months old?

The refusal to negotiate with the TGWU on behalf of its members in particular betting shops in Scotland, and to take back those members into employment when they end the dispute, makes it particularly difficult to achieve proper conciliation in this case. When the Employment Protection Bill is law, trade unionists in this position will be able to apply for recognition through the machinery of that legislation. I trust that it will avert disputes like this in future and will provide a solution to recognition disputes when the provisions of the Bill come into effect.

School Leavers

8.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will introduce a period of youth community service for school leavers unable to secure employment.

The job creation programme is providing temporary work for unemployed people through community projects. It is intended particularly for young people, including school leavers.

Is the Minister aware, however, that there is a serious lack of co-ordination among local authorities, community organisations and Government Departments? Will he not consider a one-year period of youth community service in environmental and social service work? Will he, also, consider a lowering of the retirement age to allow jobs to be opened up, particularly in the nationalised industries, for young people starting work?

First, I do not accept what the hon. Gentleman said about lack of co-ordination. There has been cooperation recently between local authorities and Government services. The lowering of the retirement age could be very expensive. The steps that we are taking, such as the recruitment subsidy and the job creation programme, probably represent the right way to go about it.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the job creation programme is only scratching the surface of the problem, and that by insisting on operating a scheme of this kind, applying wages of the normal kind rather than a more imaginative scheme on a voluntary basis, he is depriving the country of the opportunity to see much more massive job creation than at present?

I do not accept that the provision of £30 million for 15,000 jobs is scratching the surface, along with all the other measures which have been taken. Nothing in that programme prevents organisations from forming voluntary programmes. After we have urgently taken this kind of step, the hon. Member's reaction is somewhat churlish.

Scotland

9.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment if he will make a statement on the current unemployment situation in Scotland.

The current unemployment rate for Scotland is 5·8 per cent., which is still significantly above the level for Great Britain as a whole. Although, over the last two years, there has been a considerable improvement in the unemployment position in Scotland relative to that of Great Britain, the present situation in Scotland continues to give cause for serious concern.

Is the Minister aware that the rate which he has mentioned is almost six times the rate in Norway—a country of comparable size and resources to Scotland? Since the Secretary of State for Scotland once gave a pledge that he would resign if the figure exceeded 100,000 in Scotland but is now not prepared to do so, will the Secretary of State for Employment resign in his place?

If the hon. Member wants to make a comparison, the right one is with other regions of the United Kingdom. Such a comparison shows that, from October 1974 to October 1975, unemployment rose in Scotland by 49·8 per cent., and in the South-East of England by 108·4 per cent. Although the vacancies have declined in Scotland by 38 per cent., that is much lower than the decline in the whole of Great Britain, of 58 per cent. Action which has been taken has benefited Scotland, proportionately, compared with other parts of the United Kingdom.

Will my hon. Friend examine the investment policies of the Post Office? Is he aware that the Post Office has considerable investment potential, particularly in the development areas—not only Scotland but Merseyside and other areas? If he will consult the Post Office to ensure that its investment programmes are geared to helping to find a solution to unemployment in Fife and elsewhere, that will be very welcome.

My Department is not responsible for the Post Office, but I appreciate my hon. Friend's point about ordering policy and investment policy. I am sure that that point will be considered urgently by the Government as a whole.

When the Minister replies in future to idiotically misleading questions by members of the SNP, will he remind them that it is just as misleading to talk about Scotland as a whole, because in that part of Scotland represented by the hon. Member for Aberdeenshire, East (Mr. Henderson) we have a shortage of labour, not unemployment, and that, tragic as are the unemployment figures in Scotland, there are four other parts of the United Kingdom where unemployment is clearly worse?

The hon. Member is right of course. In Aberdeen, the rate of unemployment is 2·1 per cent.

11.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what was the ratio of unemployed persons to notified job vacancies in Scotland at the most recent date for which figures are available; and what were the comparable ratios one and two years previously, respectively.

My Department no longer calculates these ratios as a matter of course, because total vacancies are not known and the two figures collected for notified vacancies, respectively, for employment and careers offices, overlap and so cannot be added together. However, comparing the figure of unemployed registered at employment offices with vacancies notified to employment offices, the ratio for this October is 7·4 to 1, compared with 3·5 to 1 for October last year and 3·9 to 1 for October 1973.

Are not those figures most depressing, showing, as they do, that unemployment in Scotland is increasing at the rate of more than 1,000 a week? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of concern about unemployment in the motor industry? Will he give an assurance that the promise given by Chrysler Motors about its continued production in Britain also relates to production facilities in Scotland?

I said earlier that the unemployment situation in Scotland gave rise to serious concern. It is not much comfort to stress some evidence that Scotland has fared rather better than some other regions of the United Kingdom. The hon. Gentleman will understand that I am not in a position to give the assurance for which he has asked concerning Chrysler. I shall make sure that his remarks are directed to the proper quarters.

Will my hon. Friend take this opportunity of reminding all Scottish local authorities that they can receive Government assistance for work creation schemes, particularly schemes involving young people? Does he realise that the unemployment situation in Scotland is leading to an emergency? Perhaps we need emergency action to deal with it. Will my hon. Friend ask the House for emergency powers to instruct local authorities to produce plans for such work creation schemes to ensure that young people, in particular, have the right to work?

I understand that, overall, there has been a good response to the job creation programme. I shall certainly be glad to hear about any local authority that is not responding. It is a little early to assess the response. I shall keep my hon. Friend in touch with the situation.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the people of Scotland are fed up with having their economy and their unemployment compared with that of bankrupt England? Is he aware that the comparison should be with Norway and other prosperous countries of Western Europe?

The hon. Member's allegation does not become any more true as a result of repetition. In the United Kingdom we have a system of development areas. These are given special help and incentives. Many of these have been to the benefit of Scotland. I believe that the people of Scotland are aware of this.

Young Persons

14.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what further steps he is taking to help unemployed young people to find jobs.

My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced additional measures on 24th September, including a programme, of job creation and a recruitment subsidy. It is too early to say how exactly these measures are working or how they might be extended.

Will the Secretary of State keep in mind the exceptionally high level of unemployment among young people in some inner city areas? Cannot his Department do more to get employers involved in the task of bringing new hope and jobs to these areas and bringing real drive and urgency to the Government's urban policy?

One of the main purposes of the job creation scheme was to assist in urban areas. That was stated at the time the Government introduced the scheme. It is along these lines that we have given every encouragement we can—and quite a lot of money—to the Manpower Services Commission, which carries out the job. Many responses are coming forward in connection with the job creation scheme. We hope that these will have a direct effect in assisting young people. Our recruitment subsidy is also having some effect in that respect. The figures are improving. I am not in any way complacent about the matter, but I believe that our measures have helped significantly.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that youth unemployment is inextricably bound up with the general unemployment situation, and that no solution will be found to the former without resolving the latter? Will he, therefore, in considering positive steps to take, also consider activating the construction industry, which has tremendously high levels of unemployment, especially since there is an urgent need for housing?

I entirely agree with the first part of my hon. Friend's remarks about the connection between youth unemployment and the general employment situation. One of the ways in which a solution might be found could be in fresh assistance to the construction industry. The Chancellor announced on 24th September that he would be making further proposals on that subject, and that these would be announced soon.

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that the best way to help unemployment would be to increase exports? Does he realise that we have failed to win exports because of our bad performance in connection with delivery dates? Will he use his great power of speech and persuasion to encourage the belief that if men strike they are acting as export saboteurs?

I agree that an increase in exports could assist greatly with the unemployment problem. I agree also that the better the delivery dates the better our exports. It is, however, wrong to attribute failures in delivery dates to industrial disputes. Industrial disputes may have contributed in certain instances, but the hon. Member is wrong in his broad inference that they are the sole problem. We have had considerable success in overcoming a number of industrial disputes with the establishment, for example, of the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, which is already assisting the country. I had hoped that we would have a welcome from the Opposition for the service, which will help the country to overcome these disputes by trying to discover their true causes.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that a large unemployed force in this country is itself a contribution to inflation, since it represents a large body of consumers who do not produce goods? Would it not therefore be better for the Government to abandon their deflationary measures, which create unemployment, and, instead, to release money for investment, especially for public works, to create jobs and so strengthen our industrial structure, so that it will be able to face the revival of trade and avoid the imbalance which has arisen in the past?

I agree that the Government should, by every means available to them, whether through the operation of an old instrument or through the new instruments which are being created—the NEB and the others—do everything in their power to try to create jobs. I do not believe, however, that the Government would succeed in that purpose if the inflation rate continued at the rate of some months ago. If that had happened, far from creating jobs it would have done away with jobs, which is why action was needed to deal with it.

Job Creation Programme

15.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment how many jobs have been offered to young people, and in what regions of the country, since the announcement of the Government on 24th September of its £30 million work creation programme designed to create jobs for 15,000 people.

16.

asked the Secretary of State for Employment what has been the response to the Government's special measures to assist local authorities and other organisations to combat rising unemployment.

Since the Manpower Services Commission announced details of its job creation programme on 9th October, it has received 103 applications, requesting a total of about £2·5 million. Projects so far approved provide 65 jobs in Ellesmere Port, 25 in Huddersfield and 27 in Sunderland.

Is the Minister aware that the action committees in the regions are under the impression that they should pay the maximum weekly rate of £50 to the young people who have had jobs created? Will he please advise them that they do not need to do this? Will he tell them that if they do, first, the money will run out quickly, and secondly, that when the young people get a job on the open market it will be at a much lower salary.

I should like to scotch that total misconception. The rate of pay for those getting jobs under the job creation programme is the rate for the job. That information is in all the literature distributed by the Manpower Services Commission. That should clear up any misunderstanding.

Is my hon. Friend aware that the job creation programme is only scratching at the surface? Does he accept that the real solution to unemployment is a planned economy? Does he further accept that a planned economy includes also the planning of imports, and that selective control of imports is of absolute importance in order to preserve existing capacity and to avoid it being eroded, as it already has been in the motor cycle industry and part of the textile industry?

My hon. Friend talks about scratching the surface. Let me remind him that we have provided a job creation programme, an unprecedented increase in the number of training places, the recruitment subsidy, and the temporary employment subsidy. I hope that he will recognise that this is an unpredecented package of measures to deal with an extremely difficult situation.

Order. May I tell the Prime Minister that the amplifying arrangements are not working very well, and will be therefore kindly speak up?

Economic Policy (Minister's Speech)

Q1.

asked the Prime Minister if the public speech given by the Secretary of State for Employment at Blackpool on Wednesday 1st October, on economic policy, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

My right hon. Friend did not speak from a prepared script, but in the light of the Press reports and television recordings of extracts from his speech which I have seen, the answer is clearly "Yes, Sir".

Is the Prime Minister aware that I had the advantage over him of being present at the Tribune rally on that occasion? I greatly enjoyed the speech in question, but I found it remarkable. The Secretary of State's message was that the Labour movement should rally behind the present Government until they have an adequate parliamentary majority to introduce public ownership on a vast and unimagined scale. If that is the Government's policy, how does he think it will affect their current appeals to private industry to invest? Is it not like saying to a man "We are going to shoot you, but will you please lay in good food supplies for the future?"

I accept that the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel) had the advantage over me. I think that all parties welcomed his presence in Blackpool with the BBC on that occasion. All the reports I have seen justify the answer I have given. The Government are carrying out the manifestos on which we fought the last two elections. Anything beyond that is a question for the manifesto for the next election, which we shall win as well.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the major deficiency in our economic policy has nothing to do with the Secretary of State for Employment, but with the failure of the Opposition to come clean and tell us what they are going to do by way of the public expenditure cuts they keep telling us about?

Since the Opposition are concentrating mainly on public expenditure, I am still awaiting a message from the Leader of the Opposition to say what they would cut.

Is the Prime Minister aware that under his Government we have had record inflation, record unemployment, record borrowing and record taxation? Why, then, does he display record complacency and record incompetence?

It must have taken most of the morning to draft that—[Interruption.] I can answer these important questions only if I can be heard, in view of the mechanical defects which exist today. The right hon. Lady will know from the record of her Government, from which she dissociates herself on almost every question, that the decline in industrial production began under that Government—and she never complained about it then—and that her own newspapers were saying that they should go to the country in January last year because of an expectation of 18 per cent. inflation that year.

Scottish Assembly

Q2.

asked the Prime Minister whether he will make an official visit to the proposed site of the Scottish Assembly.

I have at present no plans to do so, Sir. My right hon. Friends the Lord President of the Council and the Secretary of State for the Environment visited the site last month.

Is the Prime Minister aware that there is deep concern in Scotland over the progress of the Government's devolution policy? Will he now give a categorical assurance, in the name of the whole Cabinet, that the Government will move to introduce the necessary legislation to establish the Assembly early in the next parliamentary Session? Will he give a further assurance that unless there is evidence of deliberate and continuing filibustering, there will be no suggestion of any guillotine being applied, bearing in mind that this is the most major constitutional legislation since the Act of Union of 1707?

I give the assurance for which the hon. Gentleman asks. I want to make it quite clear that the Government are resolved on proceeding in this matter and that the White Paper is at an advanced stage of preparation and will be introduced into the House in the next few weeks. While we shall, of course, be more than ready to listen to any public debate upon it and to have consultations upon it, we are already starting, and, indeed, have started, on the drafting of legislation.

On the question of a guillotine, that matter does not arise, because the right hon. Lady the Leader of the Opposition and the Conservative Party are in support of the White Paper that we have published. [Interruption.] The White Paper we are drafting is intended—[Interruption.] The White Paper, on which we fought and won the election last year, has been supported, I understand, in general terms by the Conservative Party. The White Paper on which we are working clothes that White Paper with a great deal of detailed proposals, on which we shall be glad to have the views of the House.

I hope that there would not be any question of even having to consider a guillotine—though there is a very powerful precedent which I would not want to follow, namely, the application by the right hon. Lady's Government of a guillotine on the EEC legislation.

If we have Edinburgh Government, how, in conscience or logic, do we deny Northern Ireland at least an extra 10 Members?

My hon. Friend's views on this matter are well known and deeply respected, but they do not represent the view of the Labour Party, as stated in the manifesto on which we fought the election. I do not agree with him. The situation in Northern Ireland, which the whole House has deep regret in recognising, is entirely different from the situation on this side of the water. All of us hope that with good statesmanship in Northern Ireland we shall find a solution.

Is the Prime Minister aware that the Royal High School referred to would be a picturesque ruin before any decision-making came back to Scotland if he listened to some of the reactionaries on his own benches and on the Conservative benches? Is he also aware that, contrary to what has been said, the Chairman of the Scottish Conservative Party has given a guarantee that if the Government meet with any trouble from their own backwoodsmen, the Scottish Conservative Party will support them on a guillotine motion?

I do not know what the Chairman of the Scottish Conservative Party—for whom, I hasten to add, there is no ministerial responsibility—has said. I was not sure whether the hon. Member meant that the Government or the Opposition would introduce the guillotine motion. I do not accept the opening part of what the hon. Gentleman said. We are proceeding with all reasonable speed in this matter. We shall at all times, from now on, from the publication of the White Paper, be ready to listen to what is said in consultations. The White Paper represents the views of the Government. Subject to consultations or any comments made in public debate, we would propose to proceed on that basis.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Is there not to be an opportunity for an English Member to raise his voice?

Prime Minister (Visits)

Q3.

asked the Prime Minister when he next intends to visit the west of Scotland.

As the House knows, I shall be in Scotland next Monday to attend the ceremony to mark the inauguration of BP's Forties Field, but I have at present no plans to visit the west of Scotland again this year.

Is the Prime Minister aware that the people of the west of Scotland would deplore the break-up of the United Kingdom, which, apart from other evils, would destroy thousands of jobs in the Glasgow area in Government offices such as the Post Office Savings Bank? In particular, will the right hon. Gentleman explain the very worrying slippage in the agreed timetable for the transfer of 1,000 Foreign Office jobs and 7,000 defence jobs to Glasgow? Will he give an assurance that the go-slow is not because of fears of Ministers and others that the devolution plans, if badly constructed, might precipitate the break-up of Great Britain?

On the hon. Gentleman's point, he will realise that there is no question in our proposals of any break-up of the United Kingdom. Indeed, the measures we are proposing—this has become clear from many debates in the House in the present Parliament—are for a devolution of areas of control over the national life and economy of Scotland, but not separatism. We are convinced that the people of Scotland do not want separatism. I hope that that is clear, and that the hon. Gentleman will support it.

On the second part of the question, about Civil Service redeployment, I shall be glad to look into the matters that the hon. Gentleman has raised and either to write to him about them or have the information conveyed to him.

In view of the assurances on the second part of that answer, and leaving aside the matter of jobs, may I revert to the question of the timetable for devolution? Will my right hon. Friend confirm—in view of the reports in the Press in the past five days and the suggestion that it would take us 28 days on the Floor of the House to pass the Bill and, therefore, that it might run into the sands of time rather than be passed through the House—that the Bill will be introduced in January and not in March?

There is no ministerial responsibility for the various comments that I have been reading, which bear no relation to the facts. We shall introduce the legislation at the earliest possible moment. It is complicated. [Interruption.] We shall introduce it at the earliest possible moment—or the day before. I cannot be more specific than that. The House will want to consider the White Paper. This will come within the next few weeks. The legislation, as I have said, is already in course of preparation. It will be introduced at the earliest possible moment. There will be no avoidable delay, and certainly none of the kind that I have seen foreshadowed in the Press in recent days, for whatever reason.

European Regional Development Fund

Q4.

asked the Prime Minister if he is satisfied that there is adequate co-ordination between the Foreign Office and the Welsh Office in respect of the European Regional Development Fund.

In view of the relative failure of a succession of regional development policies over 40 years—it is relative failure if one considers the demographic trend—and in order to obtain a truly European regional development, does my right hon. Friend agree that it is essential to mobilise and develop the political will which exists in the region and, therefore, that it is important not only to establish an elected Assembly—important though that is—but to ensure that existing institutions, such as local authorities, for example, have direct access to the European fund's administrators?

I agree with my hon. Friend about the need to mobilise all the resources of Wales—material, human and labour resources. He will be aware that several of my right hon. Friends and I had an important meeting with the Welsh TUC, in which were raised many of the questions which I know are in his mind. We have now sent the Welsh TUC further information, and discussions will be continued by my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State. I agree with my hon. Friend—as in Scotland, so in Wales. An important contribution to what he and all of us have in mind is not only pushing on with the White Paper but turning it into reality.

In the context of Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom, do the Government regard money from the European Regional Development Fund as being in addition to the amount of money that the Government would have spent, or in substitution for it? Is the Prime Minister aware that a previous answer we have had on this matter is not clear?

When European funds are used for projects which would otherwise have been supported by the Exchequer, funds are freed to enable us to support regional development in other ways; for example, through the advance factory programme recently announced by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State. Had it not been for the European contribution it would have been much more difficult for us to devote money to a project such as that.

Will the Prime Minister either confirm or deny a report in the Economist that, whereas Italy, Ireland and France were quick off the mark in applying to the Regional Development Fund, we were rather late in applying and, as a result. Italy received £36·2 million whereas the United Kingdom received only £8·8 million?

I have no ministerial responsibility for reports in the Economist, but I would wish to comment on this. It is certainly not true that we were slow off the mark. I recall that during the referendum campaign many accusations were made, which have since been falsified, that there was a speeding up of regional aid from the Community until, it was suggested, 4th June. Those accusations have since been disproved by the substantial increases in regional disbursement, certainly to Wales—of which I gave figures to the Welsh TUC—and to other parts of the United Kingdom in need of regional development.

Order. I hope that the hon. Lady will not pursue her point of order. I intend to call her for a supplementary question after the hon. Member for Penistone (Mr. Mendelson).

By doing so the hon. Lady may lose her chance to ask a supplementary question. I deprecate points of order at Question Time. As I said, I shall call her for a supplementary question after the hon. Member for Penistone.

With reference to the availability of funds for regional development, has the Prime Minister noticed a recent unfortunate development, in that certain members of the EEC have refused to make available additional sums on the ground, well-argued during the referendum campaign, that the excesses of the common agricultural policy demand larger and larger sums for useless policies, with the result that regional policies suffer? Will my right hon. Friend join forces with those Governments in putting a stop to the wasteful policies being pursued under the heading of the common agricultural policy?

That does not arise out of a Question about Wales. I agree with my hon. Friend that it is an important matter, but it raises wider issues, on which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has answered Questions. I go along with any proposal, from wherever it comes, to eliminate waste in the expenditure of EEC funds, as, I am sure, does the House. My hon. Friend will have seen the initiative I took and the proposals I made in the European Assembly on the introduction of a system approaching our own Public Accounts Committee in the financial mechanism of the EEC.

Is the Prime Minister aware that local authorities in England are concerned about the lack of information on the criteria used by the Government when submitting schemes to Europe for assistance from the Regional Development Fund? Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in Lancaster, which has an unemployment rate of 7·3 per cent. and an employment job vacancy ratio of 41·4 per cent., much help is required? Is he further aware that the answer he has just given to the House is inaccurate, in that the United Kingdom was behind Italy, Ireland and France in its application? That information was given to us in Europe last week, and we were told that we could use it.

I am aware of the hon. Lady's concern, not only for European questions but for the area which she represents. The Question relates to Welsh matters. If the matters raised by the hon. Lady are raised at Question Time with my right hon. Friend the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, I am sure that she will be satisfied with the answer.

I am sorry about the acoustics. I seem to be able to hear everyone except the person who is speaking from the Treasury Bench. Whether or not that is an advantage, I do not know; it is not for me to say. I shall try to have the matter put right.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. If whoever is addressing the House from the Dispatch Box would move three yards to the left, everyone would hear. I am sure that the Prime Minister is sufficiently flexible to be able to address the House from that position.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Some of us learnt to speak in public in the days before microphones. I know how anxious are Opposition Members always to hear what I have to say. That is why they barrack so much. If this mechanical defect occurs again, I hope that I shall be in order in standing on this Bench and addressing the House.

Questions To Ministers

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. During the exchange of questions and answers on devolution, an Opposition Member made a plea that English Members should also be heard. May I draw your attention to the fact that devolution is not just a Scottish and Welsh issue? It is an issue about which we are all deeply concerned. If there are to be Assemblies in Scotland and Wales, many hon. Members would wish to see nothing less than that in the English regions. On that basis, I appeal to you to allow English voices to be heard in future when the issue of devolution is raised.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Would it not be correct to say that it is the hon. Members who put down Questions who are normally called?

I am in sympathy with the point of view that English Members should be allowed to enter into devolution debates, but in calling hon. Members to ask supplementary questions I must have regard to the hon. Member who puts down the Question. If English Members put down Questions on devolution which are reached, they will be called first for supplementary questions. Today we have had difficulty in getting four Questions answered by the Prime Minister. I should have liked to call a great many other hon. Members, but I could not do so.

Guildford And Woolwich Bombings (Press Allegations)

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. If my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General would move to the microphone two away from him, he would perhaps find that he could be heard. He cannot be heard through the microphone beneath which he is standing—and this is a very important statement.

I am prepared to do anything for the convenience of the House, and if I can do it by moving to the left, I will do so.

With permission, I would like to make a statement on behalf of my right hon. and learned Friend, the Attorney-General, about allegations made in the Daily Express on 23rd October, to the effect that a politically-motivated veto was imposed on the intention of the Surrey police to charge a number of people with conspiracy, arising out of the Guildford and Woolwich bomb incidents, and that this veto resulted in the release of a number of suspects against whom there was a good case. Hon. Members will recall that this statement was promised by my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary on Thursday.

I should begin by saying with the utmost emphasis that my right hon. and learned Friend is most disappointed at being unable to make this statement himself, but he is ill in bed.

The allegations appeared in an article on the front page of the Daily Express under the banner headline "Bomb Police Muzzled", and the words
"How Government veto let suspects go free".
The article alleged that, as a result of political pressure, my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary, on behalf of the Government, decided that there should be no more conspiracy trials, and gave orders to that effect, that the Director of Public Prosecutions and my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General accepted those orders, and that the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions had issued written instructions to the Surrey police, who were compelled to drop what they regarded as a good case if conspiracy to murder could have been charged.

It would, of course, be wholly improper for the Government to interfere with the prosecution process, and in particular to impose a veto of this nature on the activities of the prosecuting authorities. It is also a very serious reflection on the prosecuting authorities themselves to suggest that either my right hon. and learned Friend, or the Director of Public Prosecutions, or the police, or by inference, counsel for the prosecution would accept such a veto. In these circumstances, the House may feel it right that I should state the history of this matter in a little detail.

Bombs exploded in Guildford and Woolwich on 5th October and 7th November last year. On 10th December, the Surrey police formally notified the Director of Public Prosecutions that they had arrested and charged six men and a woman with murder, four men with unlawful possession of explosives, another man with conspiracy to cause explosions—not conspiracy to murder—and another woman, with both murder and unlawful possession of explosives.

There was no intention on the part of the Surrey police to charge a number of people, or indeed anyone, with conspiracy to murder. Subsequently, on the advice of counsel, a charge of conspiracy to murder was introduced at the trial in respect of one accused, by reason of the particular facts relating to him, and proceeded with.

Investigations continued, and the police report and statement were received by the Director of Public Prosecutions on 17th January. He immediately sent them to counsel to advise in the matter. The team of counsel was led by the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon (Sir M. Havers).

After very careful consideration of all the papers, the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon and his team came to the conclusion that the evidence against some of those arrested and charged was insufficient. This advice was accepted by the Surrey police and the Director of Public Prosecutions as the only possible decision in the circumstances.

Junior counsel appeared on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions before the Guildford justices on 3rd February and offered no evidence against three of the men charged with murder, and against the one who had been charged with conspiracy to cause explosions. They were accordingly discharged. Up to this time, there had been no consultations of any kind with my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, nor with the Law Officers' Department, except that, in accordance with normal practice, the Attorney-General had nominated counsel for the prosecution.

On 14th February, my right hon. and learned Friend received a request for his consent to proceedings under the Explosive Substances Act 1882 against the remaining accused, since for proceedings under this statute his consent is necessary. Having considered the papers and discussed the case with counsel and representatives of the Director of Public Prosecutions, he granted his consent to prosecutions for offences under the Act which could include conspiracies to cause explosions, and the charges were pursued. This was the first occasion that my right hon. and learned Friend had seen the papers, and this of course was after the decision to offer no evidence in respect of four of the accused had been taken and implemented.

Neither the Director of Public Prosecutions nor my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General has issued any ruling that there shall be no more conspiracy trials, and no written or oral instructions were sent to the Surrey police relating to conspiracy charges in this case. The allegations made by the Daily Express in this regard are therefore totally without foundation and thoroughly mischievous.

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary rightly described the article by the Daily Express as one of the most false, irresponsible and malevolent Press reports he had ever seen, and the hon. and learned Members for Wimbledon, who, as I have said, led the team of counsel throughout the case, described the article as "totally false and irresponsible".

My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary called upon the Daily Express to withdraw the grave and unfounded alle- gations which it had made. So far, however, from publishing any withdrawal, the Daily Express on the following day published a leading article the purpose of which could only be to divert attention from the very serious allegations of political interference, and which made no attempt to withdraw them.

Instead, the article put forward a new charge, that is to say that the policy followed by the Law Officers and the Director of Public Prosecutions had been to refrain from charging persons with conspiracy alone, that is to say, not to charge them unless they were also charged with some substantive offence. This allegation is equally untrue. Conspiracy is charged where there is evidence to support such a charge, and where it is an appropriate charge to bring. It has in fact been charged on occasions, without at the same time charging a substantive offence.

The leading article ended by asking for
"confirmation of the authorities' determination to use every constitutional means to smash terrorism".
I can assure the House that all constitutional steps have been and will continue to be taken to bring to a halt what the Daily Express describes, rightly, as
"that terrorism which is everyone's foe".
It was hoped that the Daily Express might feel called upon to withdraw these allegations. It has chosen not to do so.

This failure of the Daily Express to make an immediate and specific withdrawal of patently false statements is keenly resented by those referred to in it, the Government, my right hon. and learned Friend, the Director of Public Prosecutions, counsel and the police. It also occasions grave and unnecessary anxiety to the public.

In the light of this statement, I am sure that the whole House will agree with me that the Daily Express should now totally withdraw the very serious allegations which it made, and do so without reservation.

The House will be grateful to the Solicitor-General for what he has said.

I can confirm the accuracy of the account from my own knowledge so far as it concerns the recent Guildford and Woolwich bombing trial, and I emphasis is such emphasis is still necessary, that no pressure of any kind was put upon myself and those responsible with me for deciding whom to charge and with what offences.

False allegations of this kind not only fail to recognise the independence of the Bar, which exists when engaged in prosecutions just as much as in other fields of the law, but also tend to cause a public loss of confidence in our prosecuting system, which I deplore.

In my view, no counsel would continue to act for the prosecution if he believed that he was being subjected to pressure by the executive for political reasons. I have never known this to happen during my 27 years' experience in prosecuting for Government Departments as well as the Director of Public Prosecutions and the police, and I believe that this should be known and accepted by the public, and certainly by the Daily Express. I hope that we shall not hear this kind of allegation made again.

I echo the words of the hon. and learned Member for Wimbledon (Sir M. Havers). In my 25 years' experience at the Bar, I have never known political pressure to be brought upon counsel. Had it been brought, I am sure that in this case the hon. and learned Gentleman would have returned his brief immediately and simply disclosed the fact. Is it not right that the procedure followed in this case was exactly the same as that followed in any other serious case and that there was no suggestion of impropriety at any time? The hon. and learned Gentleman having made his statement today, if the Daily Express does not withdraw these serious allegations, what steps do the Government intend to take?

I thank the hon. and learned Gentlemen for what they have said. I do not believe that there is any division in the House on this. It is true that the normal process was followed in this case.

Concerning the last question, perhaps we should wait and see what the Daily Express now does in the light of the statement.

In view of the great amount of talk about the threat to our democratic way of life in this country, would not my hon. and learned Friend agree that the greatest threat is the publication in our newspapers of lies which frighten people to a considerable extent? When it is pointed out to the newspaper concerned and its editor that lies have been published and are likely to cause very considerable damage and public misgiving, and the newspaper refuses to publish the statement and persists in its attitude, is not that the greatest threat to our democracy in this country—greater than any other?

I am sure that responsible sections of the Press will agree with what my right hon. Friend has said.

Has my hon. and learned Friend taken any steps to try to find out the source of these totally baseless and misleading accusations, and has he any reason to believe that these may have come from within the police force?

Would not my hon. and learned Friend agree that he has raised a very interesting point in saying that it was prosecuting counsel who determined the charges to be laid? Does not that conflict with the position and the answers given in the Shrewsbury picketing case, where it was claimed that the police authorities themselves decided upon the charges of conspiracy? Is it not a fact that we are being told that in this matter the prosecuting solicitors decided against the use of conspiracy charges, thereby producing a situation which was quite contradictory to that in the Shrewsbury picketing case?

What happened in the Shrewsbury case is not the responsibility of this Government. Perhaps the questions raised by my right hon. Friend should be directed elsewhere.

Scottish Licensing Law (Report)

With permission, I should like to make a statement to the House. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State, at the end of the debate in the Scottish Grand Committee on 15th and 17th April this year, said that we would make a statement as soon as our consultations on the Clayson Report were completed. The Government have decided to prepare legislation to amend the licensing law in Scotland. However, my proposals differ in some important respects from the recommendations of the report.

First, on the major social recommendations on permitted hours, I have decided that the evening closing hour should be extended to 11 p.m. and that this should apply also to off sales from hotels and public houses. It should not, however, apply to off sales shops, which should close at 8 p.m.

I have decided that there should continue to be a statutory afternoon break.

I propose that the one-hour extension to 11 p.m. should also apply to hotels and restaurants on Sundays but I do not accept the recommendation that public houses should be permitted to open on Sundays.

The Clayson Report proposed the introduction of a "refreshment house" licence which would provide an opportunity to encourage the establishment of premises accessible to adults and children in which parents could have alcoholic drink and their children have soft drinks with or without food. I accept this recommendation. I have rejected, however, as inappropriate in Scotland at present the children's certificate proposal which would have allowed children under 14 to enter the part of a public house specified in the certificate.

I propose to implement the report's proposal for a new form of licence for cinemas and other premises providing entertainments which can be tailored more closely to the needs of the premises.

I agree that the legislation on temperance polls should be repealed. I propose, however, to introduce transitional arrangements which would continue for a period of five years the restrictions in areas at present "dry" or subject to limitation.

I accept the Clayson recommendation that police should have a right of entry to registered clubs as they do to licensed premises.

I have also accepted the recommendation that the present licensing courts should be replaced by licensing boards of islands and district councillors appointed by these councils and that the present courts of appeal should be replaced by a right of appeal to the sheriff. These licensing boards, with the support of the local authorities which appoint them, will be in a position to maintain and accelerate the trend to an improved standard of facilities in licensed premises.

I propose to make various other changes, mainly procedural, in the light of the report. No change will be made in the age limit on the purchase of excisable liquor and its consumption in a bar or in the system of registration of clubs with the sheriff.

Urgent consultations on the proposals which I have outlined will be initiated with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities and other bodies involved in their implementation. A Bill will be introduced when a suitable legislative opportunity is available.

I welcome sincerely the statement by the right hon. Gentleman, which will be particularly welcome throughout Scotland. While recognising that this is a problem in which there is never any hope of pleasing everyone, I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman, despite his vacillations during the debate during the summer, on what I think is a certain amount of courage in tackling this problem and to a large extent implementing the proposals from what was generally recognised to be a very good report by the Clayson Committee.

I particularly welcome two points. First, despite the restriction in relation to the age of children, I express the hope that the introduction of the refreshment licence may be a very useful step in trying to stabilise attitudes towards drinking in Scotland.

I think that the right of appeal to the sheriff will be widely welcomed in Scotland and will perhaps reduce the concern which has existed about undue influence having been used in the past.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman a question? Does he realise that his statement will raise expectations very widely throughout Scotland, and can he therefore be somewhat more forthcoming about when legislation will be brought in? If this is not done within the forthcoming Session of Parliament, I believe that all the expectations he has raised today will simply be dashed.

I am glad to have the commendation from the hon. Gentleman about the general approach. It was not a matter of vacillation. But we thought it wise, when we were having the debate, having sought consultation and advice elsewhere, that the House of Commons should also be allowed to express its opinion. The Government would then be able to make up their mind.

I note what the hon. Gentleman said about the recommendations of the Committee. As to his other point about legislation, I ask him to wait until the Queen's Speech.

I, too, welcome this announcement of Government action on the Clayson Report. At first sight, the Secretary of State appears to have made some very wise selections from the report's recommendations for action. The right hon. Gentleman referred to proposed legislation. Is he aware that many of us feel that we do not make adequate use of the machinery of the Scottish Grand Committee sufficiently early in a new Session of Parliament and that perhaps this legislation might be tackled by the Scottish Grand Committee within a matter of weeks?

As for the point about entry of the police into registered clubs, is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there will be some anxiety? It is a matter of some principle. What is to be the future distinction between a pub and a club, unless some other concession is to be offered to clubs?

There is, of course, a considerable difference between pubs and clubs, and not just in terms of licensing A club licence is a matter for the sheriff and is not controlled by the licensing laws. The hon. Gentleman will recall the very useful debate on this subject that we had in 1962. I hope that he will bear in mind the considerable extension to clubs since 1962 and that he will recognise the importance of this recommendation.

As regards the Clayson recommendation about the licensing of cafes, does my right hon. Friend accept that some of us are concerned about any prospect of cheap wine, which has a high profit margin, being made available to teenagers, even down to the age of 12 or 13? We gather that the licensing of cafés would permit this. May we be assured that that would not be acceptable to the Government?

The purchase of alcoholic wine by children is a completely different matter. There is a considerable element of doubt about cafe licences. But we think that this is an experiment which should be made. Of course, the police will watch carefully during its early years.

My hon. Friends and I welcome the right hon. Gentleman's statement. It is a reasonable package, though not everyone will agree with it or with the original Clayson recommendations. Nevertheless the broad selection is useful.

May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to deal with one or two specific questions? Will he explain the reason why the Sunday opening of public houses has been disregarded by the Government since in many cases hotels are the equivalent of public houses on Sundays?

Secondly, have the Government in mind as part of the overall package the making available of additional funds for the treatment of alcoholism in Scotland, and have they any proposals for the restriction of liquor advertising on television during hours when children watching television might be attracted by the advertisements?

That last point is important but it hardly comes within the Clayson recommendations. It is a general point, though I agree with the hon. Gentleman about it. But I cannot see it being dealt with in the Bill in relation to licensing. I note what the hon. Gentleman said about our not being able to please everyone. I recall reminding the Scottish Grand Committee, in the course of the debate to which I referred just now, of what Lloyd George said in 1915: that every Government who have ever touched alcohol have burned their fingers in its lurid flame. However, I think that a certain cautious change is desirable.

I know that it will be controversial in terms of the non-opening of public houses on Sundays. But here we face two problems. Although there has been a decline in church attendance on Sundays, Sunday is still very much a family day in Scotland and, bearing in mind the nature of public house drinking as against other kinds of drinking—it must be remembered that it is very much a male-only form of drinking—we thought it desirable to retain this traditional aspect.

I neglected to deal with the matter raised by the hon. Member for Pox-burgh, Selkirk and Peables (Mr. Steel) about the early introduction of the necessary legislation. Bearing in mind that we have to consult people, I do not want to give the impression that the legislation is ready to be introduced right away. If it were, I should bear the hon. Gentleman's point in mind. It is right that we should get it started as quickly as possible.

My right hon. Friend referred to the board which will grant licences and to a right of appeal to the sheriff. Will that work both ways? In other words, will that right of appeal be available not only to those who have an application for a licence turned down but in cases where objectors to it have been turned down? Secondly, will such a board consider issuing guidelines? I have in mind such matters as recommendations regarding the provision of food as a criterion for the granting of new licences.

That latter point is worth looking at. However, we are discussing not one board but boards in the various districts. There may be some desire to give general guidance along the lines that my hon. Friend suggests. As for his point about the right of appeal, it will work both ways—to objectors and to those who have applied for a licence and had it turned down.

In view of Scotland's appalling problem of alcoholism, will the right hon. Gentleman assure the House that the liberalisation of our licensing laws will be accompanied by a major educational drive in schools to warn children of the dangers of excessive drinking?

As the representative of the only "dry" constituency in Scotland, may I ask the Secretary of State what is meant by the "transitional arrangements" for temperance polls? Does this mean that an area which is dry can stay dry for five years, or does it mean something else?

It means exactly that. We have to freeze the present position for five years. Following that—not just straight away—we have to move into freedom for the licensing boards. I have given some thought, and I shall consider it further, to whether it should be preceded by a motion in the district council so that there might be local participation in it.

The hon. Gentleman raised the matter of education. This is one of the big debatable points—the suggestion by people that we make wholesale reforms which will change attitudes. I do not believe that that is the case. We have to appreciate, as the Clayson Report says, that there is no doubt that Scotland suffers from a serious problem of alcohol misuse, both absolutely and in comparison with England and Wales. We have to continue and to step up our education in schools and elsewhere in relation to this need.

Although I believe that the Scottish people will welcome the liberalisation announced by my right hon. Friend, and although this liberalisation policy has been dictated by the general situation not only in Scotland but in the United Kingdom as a whole, will the Secretary of State nevertheless take the point made my the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Taylor) that the greater availability of alcohol will not reduce the incidence of alcoholism? Is my right hon. Friend aware that there is a relationship between the availability of alcohol and the number of alcoholics? Therefore, will he make sure that facilities are available to take account of this possibility in the future?

Will the right hon. Gentleman say whether the proposed legislation will include provisions to tighten up the restrictions on those who are the means by which alcohol gets into the hands of minors, whether they be publicans or others giving alcohol to school pupils? Will he also consider the idea of imposing a direct levy on the manufacturers of alcoholic drinks to finance research into the causes and cures of Scotland's appalling problem?

The hon. Gentleman raised this matter in April, and he raised it again in a letter to me this week. Having given it full consideration, I shall be replying to him on this point.

As for what can be done to stop alcohol getting into the hands of young people, it is difficult to stop it if it is bought legitimately by an adult and handed over. In a number of cases, social disciplines are such that it may be available in the home. It is not a matter which can be dealt with entirely by the licensing system. It is a matter of attitudes and the acceptance of responsibility by the community.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that although his statement will be welcomed, it does not go far enough for some of us? Does he realise there will be great disappointment that pubs will not be permitted to open on Sundays? Does he know that in order to get a drink on a Sunday many people in Scotland have to squeeze into hotels and often have to fight their way to the bar in overcrowded and barbaric conditions which are degrading for customers, who include many people who religiously observe Sunday as a day of rest?

Religiously observing Sunday and fighting their way to the bar? I think my hon. Friend should choose his words a little more carefully. I am quite aware that the statement will not please everybody, but when one bears in mind what happened in 1962, with the more generous provision of licences for hotels and the move away from the bona fide system, I think there is now far more opportunity for civilised drinking on Sundays than ever before, I considered the matter very carefully but did not think that we should make a further extension for public houses.

Statutory Instruments

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That the draft European Communities (Definition of Treaties (No. 2) Order 1975 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments.—[Mr. Edward Short.]

Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A ( Statutory Instruments).

Not less than twenty Members having risen in their places and signfied their objection thereto, Mr. SPEAKER declared that the Noes had it, pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A ( Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments)

Legal Aid And Advice

4.12 p.m.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the system of administering legal aid and advice.
The purpose of my Bill is to make significant changes in the legal aid scheme. The scheme is 25 years old this month and has assisted 2 million people, recovering about £160 million in damages. This is a proud accomplishment by any standards, but I am less concerned today with the achievement of the scheme than with its shortcomings. I want to put forward some constructive proposals.

I believe that an independent public corporation, called the "Legal Services Commission", should be set up to administer the legal aid scheme in the interests of the community. It is quite wrong that the Law Society, whose prime function is the protection of the interests of the legal profession, should be administering the present legal aid system. This is not criticism of the Society, which is doing an honourable job, but it is not ideally qualified to administer a system for people in need. We need an independent commission which can administer legal aid without ambiguity and which can avoid the present conflicts between the Law Society, the legal community and local authority workers. It would be independent in every sense of the term and would not be protecting the interests of solicitors, barristers or anyone else in the legal profession.

Now it is generally agreed that, for a variety of reasons, many people are not receiving the legal assistance that they require. One of the most important reasons is that representation, under legal aid, is not allowed to people appearing before tribunals. This is a scandalous omission. It means that the powerful are protected by skilled legal representation while the weak are exposed because they cannot afford that representation and are not permitted it under the legal aid system.

This is no small problem. In 1973, the last year for which figures are available, 1,287,336 people appeared before tribunals. They were concerned with assessments of their rents, rates and taxes, among other things and, perhaps more important, many were concerned about their entitlements. They included the old, the disabled, widows, war pensioners the unemployed and immigrants. Many were poor, baffled and bewildered by the legal complexities of their cases and were quite unable to match the skills of the legal advocates who were opposed to them. The question is—what do we do to correct this glaring injustice? The answer is that we exclude them from all legal representation under the legal aid scheme. We shackle the Davids and strengthen the Goliaths.

It is sometimes claimed that these harassed individuals do not need representation because their problems are technical, but if that is the case, why do Government Departments, landlords and employers use skilled legal representation? What is sauce for the golden goose is nectar for the impoverished gander. Welfare law is just as much law as any other part of the law, even though many lawyers are unenthusiastic about performing in this field. One can only guess at the reasons for this lack of enthusiasm, but this is a very complicated and important part of the law which needs as much skill and care as do the other branches. It is inconceivable that only one side would ever receive legal representation in a criminal action, and such a situation would rightly be condemned as unjust. It is unwarrantable that we should allow this kind of blatant injustice in welfare law which affects innocent and under-privileged people.

My Bill provides that all tribunals under the auspices of the Council on Tribunals should be automatically included in the legal aid scheme. There are other tribunals which do not come under the auspices of the Council, for example, the tribunal which administers the criminal injuries compensation scheme. I believe that this tribunal, among others, should be considered for inclusion in the system for legal representation. I know that it is not a statutory body, but its operations are similar to those of other tribunals and its findings are just as important.

My Bill will not become law in this Session, but I am staking a claim for progress in this negelected field and saying that the Lord Chancellor's judgment was wrong when he said that he did not regard an extension of legal aid representation before tribunals as a priority. It is a priority. Without it, injustice is not only done but is seen to be done, and that is something that cannot be tolerated in our society.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Jack Ashley, Mr. William Hamilton, Mrs. Millie Miller, Mr. Norman Atkinson, Mr. R. C. Mitchell and Mr. Frank White.

Legal Aid And Advice

Mr. Jack Ashley accordingly presented a Bill to amend the system of administering legal aid and advice; and the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow and to be printed. [Bill 243.]

Orders Of The Day

Children Bill Lords

As amended ( in the Standing Committee), considered.

New Clause 1

Transfer Of Parental Rights And Duties To Voluntary Organisations

'.—(1) Where it appears to a local authority as respects a child in the care of a voluntary organisation which is an incorporated body—

  • (a) that the child is not in the care of any local authority; and
  • (b) that a condition specified in section 2(1) of the Children Act 1948 is satisfied: and
  • (c) that it is necessary in the interests of the welfare of the child for the parental rights and duties to be vested in the organisation,
  • the authority may, subject to subsections (5) and (6), resolve that there shall vest in the organisation the parental rights and duties with respect to that child.

    (2) While a resolution under this section is in force the parental rights and duties shall vest in the organisation in whose care the child is when the resolution is passed.

    (3) If, immediately before the resolution is passed, the parental rights and duties are vested in the parent in relation to whom the resolution is passed jointly with any other person, then on the passing of the resolution the parental rights and duties shall vest jointly in that other person and the organisation in whose care the child is.

    (4) In determining, for the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, whether the condition specified in section 2(1)( b)(i) of the Children Act 1948 is satisfied, if the whereabouts of any parent of the child have remained unknown for twelve months, that parent shall be deemed to have abandoned the child.

    (5) A resolution under subsection (1) may not be passed by a local authority in respect of any child unless—

  • (a) the child is living in the area of the authority either in a voluntary home or with foster parents with whom he has been boarded by the organisation in whose care he is; and
  • (b) that organisation has requested the authority to pass the resolution.
  • (6) The parental rights and duties which may vest in an organisation by virtue of this section do not include the right to consent or refuse to consent to the making of an application under section 14 and the right to agree or refuse to agree to the making of an adoption order or an order under section 25; and regulations made under section 33(1) of the Children Act 1948 shall apply to the emigration of a child notwithstanding that the parental rights and duties relating to the child are vested in the voluntary organisation.

    (7) Subsection (8) of section 2 of the Children Act 1948 shall apply in relation to a resolution under subsection (1) as if it were a resolution under the said section 2.'—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    4.21 p.m.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    With the new clause we are to take Government new Clauses 2, 3, 11 and 15 and Government Amendments Nos. 131, 132, 186 to 204, 209 and 210.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am disturbed to see that there are 240 amendments on the Notice Paper. We have very complicated matters to deal with in one day. We are grateful to the Minister for his help, but it is an enormous number of amendments to get through in a day.

    I was very courteous to the hon. Lady, because she knew in the first ten seconds that I appreciated that that was not a point of order. The hon. Lady's quarrels with the Government are not quarrels with the Chair.

    New clauses 1, 2, 3 and 11—and new Clause 15 makes similar provision under Scottish law—give effect to an undertaking that I gave in Committee on 29th July to introduce a new clause which would enable a voluntary organisation to obtain parental rights and duties in respect of a child in its care by means of a resolution passed by a local authority instead of by a decision of a juvenile court, as proposed in the new Clause 7 discussed in Committee.

    The proposals in the new clauses differ in a number of respects from the proposals outlined in Committee. These changes have the approval of the National Council of Voluntary Child Care Organisations, and the initial reaction of the directors of social services is also favourable.

    We on this side of the House very much appreciated not only the many undertakings which the Minister gave in Committee but the way in which he has fulfilled them. We have had a steady stream of papers from him setting out more clearly the various steps that he would take. We welcome the new clauses.

    However, I should like to ask the hon. Gentleman for clarification of new Clause 1. As I understand it, it makes no provision for the child who is in the care of a voluntary body which is not incorporated or for the very rare cases where the local authority does not consider a voluntary body to be a suitable recipient of parental rights. May we assume that in such cases the authority will still have powers under the 1948 Act to assume parental rights itself directly? May we have assurances on this matter?

    I can give the hon. Gentleman assurances on both those matters. In both instances the manner in which the children are cared for is subject to oversight by the local authority under Section 54 (3) of the Children Act 1948, which places a duty on local authorities to cause children living in voluntary homes to be visited from time to time, or under the Boarding Out of Children Regulations 1955.

    Restricting the voluntary organisations which may apply to a local authority for parental rights and duties to those which are incorporated bodies is done because we are advised that in law only an incorporated body could be vested with these powers as a body. In fact, many voluntary organisations already are incorporated bodies, and for others it is very simple to become incorporated.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 2

    Duty Of Local Authority To Assume Parental Rights And Duties

    '.—(1) If it appears to a local authority, having regard to the interests of the welfare of a child living within their area, the parental rights and duties with respect to whom are by virtue of a resolution under section ( Transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations) vested in a voluntary organisation, that it is necessary that the parental rights and duties should no longer be vested in the organisation, the local authority shall resolve

    that there shall vest in them the parental rights and duties relating to the child.

    (2) The local authority shall within seven days of passing a resolution under subsection (1) by notice in writing inform the organisation and each parent, guardian or custodian of the child whose whereabouts are known to them that the resolution has been passed.'—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 3

    Effect Of Resolutions Under Sections (Transfer Of Parental Rights And Duties To Voluntary Organisations) And (Duty Of Local Authority To Assume Parental Rights And Duties)

    '.—(1) A resolution under subsection (1) of section ( Transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations) shall cease to have effect on the passing of a resolution under subsection (1) of section ( Duty of local authority to assume parental rights and duties).

    (2) Section 6 of the Children Act 1948 shall have effect in relation to a resolution under subsection (1) of section ( Transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations) as it has effect in relation to a resolution under section 2 of that Act.

    (3) A resolution under subsection (1) of section ( Duty of local authority to assume parental rights and duties) shall be deemed to be a resolution under section 2 of the Children Act 1948 except that sections 2(2) to (7) and 4(3) of that Act shall not apply.'—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 4

    Reports By Local Authorities And Probation Officers

    '.—(1) A court dealing with an application made under this Part, or an, application which is treated as if made under section 32, may request—

  • (a) a local authority to arrange for an officer of the authority, or
  • (b) a probation officer,
  • to make to the court a report, orally or in writing, with respect to any specified matter which appears to the court to be relevant to the application, and it shall be the duty of the local authority or probation officer to comply with the request.

    (2) Subsections (2) to (6) of section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1973 shall apply in relation to reports which are requested by magistrates' courts under this section as they apply to reports under subsection (1) of that section.'—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this new clause we are to consider Government Amendments Nos. 35, 36 and 63 to 69.

    Subsection (1) of the new clause restates in plain language, instead of by reference to other legislation, the effect of Clause 37, which is taken out of the Bill by Amendment No. 35. Its effect is to give any court dealing with an application under Part II power to call for a report from a local authority officer or a probation officer.

    Subsection (2) applies to such reports when they are asked for by a magistrates' court, the provisions of Section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1973, as amended by Clause 73, relating to the way in which a report may be admitted in evidence.

    I hope that that will clarify an issue which was discussed in Committee.

    Are we dealing with something that is purely a matter of clarification? Amendments Nos. 63 to 69 refer to "a magistrates' court". Does not this complicate the situation in Scotland, or are there other amendments to sort out the situation?

    I believe that there is clarification of the situation in Scotland elsewhere. I do not believe that this causes any problems in Scotland, but I shall check.

    If there is any effect on Scotland, it would be as well if a Scottish Minister said something about it. Only one Scottish hon. Member served on the Committee considering the Bill, and he was not from the Labour benches. In Committee there were two Ministers dealing with the Bill, and now we have a third. The Bill is being rushed through the House without adequate consideration being given to its effect on Scotland.

    With due respect to my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, that is not good enough. My hon. Friend should give me an assurance that nothing is being done that will offend my sensitivity about the possible effect on Scotland.

    I am glad to respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson). I can assure him that we have gone into the Bill thoroughly. Former Ministers and I spent many hours on it during the Committee stage. There is nothing in the new clause that is detrimental to Scotland. If my hon. Friend is prepared to sit through what I hope will be a reasonably short sitting he will learn that we have paid a great deal of attention to Scotland.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 5

    Amendment Of Interpretation Act 1889

    '.—(1) In the Interpretation Act 1889 after section 19 there is inserted the following section—

    19A.—In any Act passed after the Children Act 1975, unless the contrary intention appears—

  • (a) the expression "the parental rights and duties",
  • (b) the expression "legal custody" (as respects a child), and
  • (c) references to the person with whom a child has his home,
  • shall be construed in accordance with Part IV of the Children Act 1975.

    (2) This section does not extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland."'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With the new clause we are to consider Government Amendments Nos. 60, 61 and 62.

    The effect of the clause is to insert into the Interpretation Act 1889 an indication that the definition of the three expressions referred to is to be found in Part IV.

    The clause is a result of an undertaking given in Committee to the hon. Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker) and the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) to look again at these provisions. It has the support of the Law Society and the Association of British Adoption Agencies. Its purpose is to make readily accessible the definitions of certain commonly used legal concepts which are now embodied within the Bill, whilst avoiding the need for their repetition whenever the terms are used in future legislation.

    Amendments Nos. 60, 61 and 62 delete the references to future enactments in the relevant interpretation clauses.

    4.30 p.m.

    We very much welcome the Minister's action. It has for long been a matter of grave concern to many of us that such legislation has to be so cross-referenced. I am sure that, with the new clause and the removal of the references to future enactments, matters will be much easier for many of those concerned.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 6

    Care Etc Of Child On Revocation Of Custodianship Order

    '(1) Before revoking a custodianship order the court shall ascertain who would have legal custody of the child, if, on the revocation of the custodianship order, no further order were made under this section.

    (2) If the child would not be in the legal custody of any person, the court shall, if it revokes the custodianship order, commit the care of the child to a specified local authority.

    (3) If there is a person who would have legal custody of the child on the revocation of the custodianship order, the court shall consider whether it is desirable in the interests of the welfare of the child for the child to be in the legal custody of that person and—

  • (a) if the court is of the opinion that it would not be so desirable, it shall on revoking the custodianship order commit the care of the child to a specified local authority;
  • (b) if it is of the opinion that while it is desirable for the child to be in the legal custody of that person, it is also desirable in the interests of the welfare of the child for him to be under the supervision of an independent person, the court shall on revoking the custodianship order, order that the child shall be under the supervision of a specified local authority or of a probation officer.
  • (4) Before exercising its functions under this section the court shall, unless it has sufficient information before it for the purpose, request—

  • (a) a local authority to arrange for an officer of the authority, or
  • (b) a probation officer,
  • to make to the court a report, orally or in writing, on the desirability of the child return-

    ing to the legal custody of any individual, and it shall be the duty of the local authority or probation officer to comply with the request.

    (5) Where the court makes an order under subsection (3)( a), the order may require the payment by either parent to the local authority, while it has the care of the child, of such weekly or other periodical sum towards the maintenance of the child as the court thinks reasonable.

    (6) Sections 3 and 4 of the Guardianship Act 1973 (which contain supplementary provisions relating to children who are subject to supervision, or in the care of local authority, by virtue of orders made under section 2 of that Act) apply in relation to an order under this section as they apply in relation to an order under section 2 of that Act.

    (7) Subsections (2) to (6) of section 6 of the Guardianship Act 1973 shall apply in relation to reports which are requested by magistrates' courts under this section as they apply to reports under subsection (1) of that section'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    In Committee on 24th July I accepted that the Bill as drafted did not accord sufficient protection to children who were the subject of applications for the revocation of custodianship orders. I undertook to bring forward an amendment on Report to ensure that the court dealing with a revocation application had adequate information and appropriate powers to make whatever orders it saw fit.

    The general purpose of the clause is to provide that, when determining whether to revoke a custodianship order, the court shall consider what result revocation of the order would produce for the child, having regard to the provisions of Clause 42(1) on the revival of rights to legal custody on revocation, and that, if the court has insufficient information for this purpose, it shall be empowered to call for a report. Where the court considers that the operation of Clause 42(1) would produce results that would not accord with the welfare of the child, or that supervision would be desirable, the court is empowered to commit the care of the child to a local authority or to make a supervision order.

    We agree with the Minister that the clause is a considerable improvement on the previous wording. It shows that our lengthy discussions in Committee on this subject have turned out to be worth while.

    In Committee we were concerned that the court would not be sufficiently informed about the circumstances of the child. The Minister will remember that we spent much time discussing the extent to which the court should investigate these circumstances. The Minister said that it would be sufficient to give the court authority to require a written report or an oral one. Both new Clause 6 and new Clause 4 incorporate that requirement. We welcome the situation as put forward in new Clause 6.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 11

    Appeals By Parents, Etc

    '(1) Subsections (2) to (5) and (7) of section 2 of the Children Act 1948 shall apply to a resolution under section ( Transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations) as they apply to a resolution under the said section 2, with the substitution for the reference in subsection (2) to the vesting of parental rights and duties in the local authority of a reference to the vesting of parental rights and duties in the voluntary organisation.

    (2) An appeal may be made—

  • (a) where the complaint relates to a resolution under section (Transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations), by a person deprived of parental rights and duties by the resolution, or
  • (b) where the complaint relates to a resolution under section (Duty of local authority to assume parental rights and duties), by a person who but for that resolution and an earlier resolution under section (Transfer of parental rights and duties to voluntary organisations) would have parental rights and duties,
  • to a juvenile court having jurisdiction in the area of the authority which passed the resolution, on the ground that—

  • (i) there was no ground for the making of the resolution, or
  • (ii) that the resolution should in the interests of the child be determined.
  • (3) An appeal shall lie to the High Court against the decision of a juvenile court under this section.

    (4) Section 4B of the Children Act 1948 shall apply in relation to proceedings under this section.'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 12

    Recovery Of Children In Care Of Local Authorities

    '(1) This section applies to a child—

  • (a) who is in the care of a local authority under section 1 of the Children Act 1948; and
  • (b) with respect to whom there is in force a resolution under section 2 of that Act; and
  • (c) who—
  • (i) has run away from accommodation provided for him by the local authority under Part II of the said Act; or
  • (ii) has been taken away from such accommodation contrary to section 3(8) of the said Act; or
  • (iii) has not been returned to the local authority as required by a notice served under section 49 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1963 on a person under whose charge and control the child was, in accordance with section 13(2) of the said Act of 1948, allowed to be.
  • (2) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person specified in the information can produce the child to whom this section applies, he may issue a summons directed to the person so specified and requiring him to attend and produce the child before a magistrates' court acting for the same petty sessions area as the justice.

    (3) Without prejudice to the powers under subsection (2) above, if a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a child to whom this section applies is in premises specified in the information, he may issue a search warrant authorising a person named in the warrant, being an officer of the local authority in whose care the child is, to search the premises for the child; and if the child is found, he shall be placed in such accommodation as the local authority may provide for him under Part II of the Children Act 1948.

    (4) A person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with a summons under subsection (2) shall, without prejudice to any liability apart from this subsection, be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £100.'—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With that new clause we may take Government new Clause 13.

    We may also take new Clause 21—Recovery of child—and new Clause 22—Powers of local authority following assumption of parental rights. We may also take the following amendments:

    No. 227, in Clause 90, page 65, line 17, after '83', insert 'section (Recovery of child)'.

    No. 228, in page 65, line 17, after '83', insert:
    'section (Powers of local authorities following assumption of parental rights)'.
    Government Amendments Nos. 157, 158 and 178, and Amendment No. 229, in Schedule 4, page 93, line 11, column 3, leave out 'section 54' and insert 'sections 49 and 54'.

    The clause introduces two new powers which a local authority will be able to use to effect the recovery of children in the voluntary care of a local authority under Section 1 of the Children Act 1948 who are subject to a parental rights and duties resolution; and who have either run away, been taken away from premises in which they are required by the local authority to live, or have not been returned to the care of the local authority after having been allowed by the authority to be in the charge and control of a parent, relative, guardian or friend in exercise of the authority's powers under Section 13(2) of the Children Act 1948.

    The clause gives effect to an undertaking I gave in Committee, when we considered new Clauses 21 and 22, about ways of strengthening the hand of local authorities to secure the return of children who are subject to parental rights and duties.

    The clause meets points raised by the Association of Directors of Social Services in their comments on the Children Bill. I commend it to the House.

    We discussed the problems of the recovery of the child a great deal in Committee. A number of outside bodies, in particular the Association of Directors of Social Services, told us quite strongly of a situation where someone may be concealing a child, where there had been insufficient rights of entry and where the person could be taken to court and perhaps fined but where the authorities would still have difficulties over obtaining the child in person. Although one might have strong grounds for believing that a child was being concealed in someone's home, there was no provision for getting that child out of the home.

    That is why we tabled new Clause 21 and new Clause 22. New Clause 11 meets our anxieties on this matter. It should prove satisfactory and remove the anomaly. Therefore, we shall not seek to press new Clauses 21 and 22.

    This is a hybrid Bill and I am not sure of the extent of the application of the new clauses to Scotland. Do they extend to Scotland? If so, is the terminology correct? Will it be applicable?

    This Bill is two Bills in one. It is not always clear in relation to new clauses what is applicable to England and Wales, what is applicable to Scotland and what is applicable to the whole of the United Kingdom. Important issues can be raised in this way.

    I reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson) that we have paid special attention to the needs of Scotland. I have been concerned with the Bill only on Report and Third Reading, but my officials have paid attention to points raised in the clauses which affect Scotland. These clauses do not affect the Scottish position. If my hon. Friend remains for the whole of these proceedings, he will appreciate that most of the points about which he is concerned will be covered before we reach Third Reading.

    First, may I thank the Minister for the conscientious and effective way in which he has dealt with all the points which arose in Committee? Although I have been a Member of Parliament for only a limited time, on all the Committees on which I have served where we have been assured by a Minister that he will look into the matter, in no case have they been dealt with more completely and fully than by him. I speak for all members of the Standing Committee when I say that we did a useful job and that due to the work which the Minister did in following up the points raised, the Bill is infinitely better than it was originally. New Clause 12 is an example of this. I support it.

    There is a massive amount of work before us. It is a pity that there is not more time to go into it. The Government's legislative programme is in a most appalling state. I am not blaming the Minister of State for that, because he has his own crosses to bear. I am sure that Conservative Members will wish the business to be dealt with with the maximum speed, although there will be a number of occasions when we shall refrain from speaking although we should have liked to speak. It is a pity that we could not have had two days for Report and Third Reading.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 13

    Extension Of Powers Under S 32 Of The Children And Young Persons Act 1969

    '(1) Section 32 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (detention of absentees) shall have effect subject to the following provisions of this section.

    (2) In subsection (1) of the said section 32, paragraph ( b) shall cease to have effect.

    (3) After subsection (1) of the said section 32, there is inserted the following sub section:—

    "(1A) If a child or young person is absent from a place of safety to which he has been taken in pursuance of section 2(5), 16(3) or 28 of this Act without the consent of—
  • (a) the person who made the arrangements for his detention in the place of safety in pursuance of the said section 2(5) or 16(3), or
  • (b) the person on whose application an authorisation relating to the child or young person has been issued under the said section 28,
  • he may be arrested by a constable anywhere in the United Kingdom or the Channel Islands without a warrant, and shall, if so arrested, be conducted to the place of safety at the expense of the person referred to in paragraph (a) or (b) (as the case be) of this subsection.".

    (4) In subsection (2) of the said section 32, after the words "subsection (1)" there are inserted the words "or (1A)", and for the words "twenty pounds" there is substituted the word "£100".

    (5) After the said subsection (2), the following subsections are inserte—

    "(2A) Without prejudice to its powers under subsection (2) of this section, a magistrates' court (within the meaning of that subsection) may, if it is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person who is absent as mentioned in subsection (1) or (1A) of this section is in premises specified in the information, issue a search warrant authorising a constable to search the premises for that person.
    (2B) A court shall not issue a summons or search warrant under subsection (2) or (2A) of this section in any case where the person who is absent is a person to whom subsection (1A) of this section applies, unless the information referred to in the said subsection (2) or (2A) is given by the person referred to in subsection (1A)(a) or (b) (as the case may be) of this section.".

    (6) In subsection (3) of the said section 32, for the words "one hundred pounds" there is substituted the word "£400".

    (7) In subsection (4) of the said section 32, for the words "subsection (1)" there are substituted the words "subsections (1), (1A) and (2A)", and for the words "that subsection" there are substituted the words "subsection (1)."'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 17

    Certificates Of Unruly Character

    'The Court shall not certify under section 22(5) or section 23(2) or (3) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 (committals to remand centres or prison) that a child is of so unruly a character that he cannot safely be committed to the care of a local authority unless the conditions prescribed by order made by the Secretary of State are satisfied in relation to that child.

    In this section, "court" includes a justice'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this we shall take Government new Clause 31 and Government Amendment No. 256.

    I should like to draw the attention of the House to a printing error in new Clause 31 on page 2925 of the Amendment Paper. At line 7 the words "made by statutory instrument" should be inserted after the word "order".

    As the new Clause represents something which was not raised in Committee and which has been inserted on Report, it merits a little explanation. The House knows that the number of remands to Prison Department establishments of juveniles charged with a criminal offence and certified to be of so unruly a character that they cannot safely be committed to the care of the local authority, has risen steeply in recent years. The number of receptions to prisons of boys aged 14 to 16 rose from under 2,000 in 1971 to more than 3,500 in 1974. The number of certificates issued in respect of girls rose from under 100 in 1971 to nearly 250 in 1974.

    The sending of these young people to Prison Department establishments and in particular in the case of girls and some boys to establishments in which adult prisoners are held has rightly attracted growing and widespread criticism. It is a difficult problem. The continuance of such treatment, particularly for the older, more difficult and more violent juveniles, will clearly need to continue, I regret, for a little time at least.

    We have given considerable attention to this matter and I am now looking with my Home Office colleagues at the recommendations of the Social Service and Employment Sub-Committee of the Expenditure Committee in its recent Report on the Children and Young Persons Act. We had to consider whether we should use the opportunity that was presented in the Bill to take this power.

    The purpose of the clause is to empower the Secretary of State to prescribe by order the conditions which must be satisfied before courts issue unruly certificates authorising the commitment of juveniles who are remanded to Prison Department establishments.

    I think that the House will agree that it was right in this specific instance to take advantage of the legislative opportunity provided by the Bill, even at this late stage of its passage, and to take an enabling power to regulate the issue of unruly certificates.

    The Government would, of course, have liked to consult the various interests concerned—some interim informal consultations have taken place—including the courts and the social services, before deciding on the clause, but time has not permitted this.

    I should like now to repeat the categoric assurance already given to the various representative bodies that the Government will consult those bodies fully on the form, content and timing of the bringing into operation of the regulations. I do not myself regard them as having resource implications. Rather, they are concerned with ensuring that the courts and social services can together make the best use of what remand facilities are available within the community home system and to confine remands of juveniles to Prison Department establishments to the minimum necessary at this stage of development of the facilities in the community home system. The question of the need for more secure accommodation and the interpretation of the Children and Young Persons Act is not covered and has deliberately been left outside.

    I do not intend to move Amendment No. 256 which would have brought into operation new Clause 31, which covers Scotland—this is a matter with which my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson) is concerned—on the passing of the Act. We would now prefer to leave the matter to be dealt with by commencement order, as will be the case in the case of new Clause 17. This puts the two clauses on equal footing. The principle is exactly the same.

    As the Minister of State says, this is an important clause which has not up to now been debated. The hon. Gentleman was kind enough to consult us We agreed that it should be introduced at this stage.

    The Opposition are greatly in favour of the intention behind the clause. The aim is to keep children out of prison. That is an aim on which we can all agree. A year ago I went to Wormwood Scrubs prison, which some hon. Members may remember is a special security prison with extra security precautions.

    However, another wing of Wormwood Scrubs housed the borstal allocation unit for the southern part of England. The boys who were sent there stayed three or four weeks whilst it was decided what borstal they should be sent to. Many of them went not to a closed borstal but to an open borstal. Although the boys were obviously kept separate from the adult prisoners, it could have hardly have failed to get around that they were being kept in prison. Twenty-five per cent. of them slept three to a cell.

    It is a scandal that children should be kept in prison. It is even worse if they are kept in prison when they are awaiting trial or sentence, because we are dealing with children whose guilt has not been determined or whose eventual sentence will not necessarily be a custodian one.

    This is a problem to which both sides of the House should turn its attention. The problem has gone on for far too long and we should certainly seek to solve it with the minimum of delay. Anything that can be done to minimise the problem is good and the Opposition will support it wholeheartedly.

    4.45 p.m.

    It should be remembered, however, that children are not in prison simply because magistrates are anxious to commit people to prison. That is not the case as the Select Committee, of which my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Dr. Vaughan) was a member, made clear in its Report.

    We took steps to consult the Magistrates' Association this morning. The association has made it clear that it would welcome any steps that would obviate the need to send children to prison.

    The problem which must be faced, however, is the shortage of secure places for difficult juveniles. Therefore, as the leader in The Guardian said this morning, we should not approve this clause without having some information about how it will work and how it is to be applied in practice. There are at least two questions. I am sure that the Minister of State, whose interest in this question is well known, will have the answers.

    First, what new arrangements has the Minister of State in mind for making new secure accommodation available? We all agree that children should not go to prison. We all agree that prison should not be used in this way. How are we to avoid that situation arising? As the hon. Gentleman will probably have seen, tonight's Evening Standard carries the report of a councillor in one London borough talking about the crisis of child care in London and saying that there is no way of controlling the increasing violence in our community homes without a massive increase of staff. That is the problem we face. What alternative arrangements does the hon. Gentleman intend to make?

    Secondly, will the hon. Gentleman say something about the regulations and the policy? For example, do the Govern- ment intend to accept the Select Committee's recommendation that the practice of remanding young persons to adult prisons should cease forthwith?

    Like the hon. Member for Sutton Cold-field (Mr. Fowler), I warmly welcome the clause, which seems to be designed to tighten up the conditions in which an unruly certificate is issued. About 4,000 children are admitted to prison establishments every year—not just to remand centres, but many of them to local prisons. On any one day about a dozen girls will be in Holloway prison. As the hon. Member said, that is a scandal to which too little attention has been paid by hon. Members of the House and by the public at large. It is a blight on society that we should send children to prison and that there should be so little in the way of alternatives to offer.

    My hon. Friend the Minister of State has gone some way, but unfortunately not yet far enough, to alleviate the situation. As the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield reminded us in his very fair and welcome comments, many of the children who are in prisons or prison establishments are awaiting trial; they have not yet been convicted of any offence. It is merely alleged that they have committed offences. A substantial proportion of the children committed to prisons as a result of the granting of unruly certificates are subsequently found not guilty of the offence with which they are charged or are given custodial sentences. Yet in effect they have already served a prison sentence. They have not just lost their liberty. They have been exposed to what anyone with any sense of compassion would regard as intolerable and uncivilised conditions.

    No one suggests that all of these children are innocent or are angels. Some are very unruly. Some are violent. Some are difficult. They are aged from 14 to 16.

    What precisely are the alternatives that my hon. Friend is offering? All that he is doing by means of the clause is to say that we shall tighten up the way in which unruly certificates are granted, that we shall make the conditions more stringent. Perhaps he will illustrate the exact nature of the conditions that will be prescribed by order. In future, under what conditions will magistrates be able to grant unruly certificates? How does the clause compare with the commitment made to me by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department that he was considering the phasing out altogether of unruly certificates?

    There seems to be some confusion between the two Departments. It would seem that the Home Office and the 111 Members who signed the all-party motion condemning the imprisonment of children agree with me that we should phase out unruly certificates. At one stage that was felt necessary for girls, but Lord Harris has made it clear in a letter that that should apply to all children. However, the Minister is saying that we are talking not about phasing out but about tightening up the conditions under which the certificates shall be advanced.

    We are not stopping the imprisonment of children by means of the clause. My hon. Friend is saying that we may prevent a few of them going to prisons because we shall have more stringent conditions than in the past. In his opening remarks my hon. Friend said something about the "minimum necessary". Surely he did not mean that. Surely he did not mean that it is necessary to imprison children, that it is necessary for some children to be in penal establishments. However, that is what he said. I believe that he said that, apart from the minimum necessary, it is to be hoped that the majority will now be dealt with by other means.

    That raises the question of the exact nature of the other means. This is an issue of resources. As the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield said, we cannot deal with 4,000 so-called unruly juveniles a year unless we are prepared to commit the necessary resources to the building of secure units. I do not believe that all of the 4,000 children that pass through our penal establishments each year should lose their liberty. Many of them could be properly cared for in the community by means of supervision orders, by the local authorities or by the probation service. Perhaps there is an important and continuing rôle for the probation service in offering that sort of care. The fact that so many are proved innocent or given non-custodial sentences only serves to emphasise my point.

    Clearly there are some children who require secure accommodation. My hon. Friend has been rather unforthcoming as to exactly how the local authorities are to provide such accommodation, unless the Government are prepared and willing to advance far more resources than in the past. I know that there is an amendment to provide an extra £2 million to be tied to local authority provision of secure accommodation, but what are the special conditions that will be prescribed in future for the granting of certificates? What alternatives does my hon. Friend now propose for those children who will not go into prison establishments? What resources does he propose to give to local authorities? Will he consider the suggestion in The Guardian that has been mention by the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield—namely, that when children are sent to prison the local authorities should pay the full costs of their incarceration?

    I end with an urgent and heartfelt plea—I feel that it will be echoed on both sides of the House—for my hon. Friend to act speedily in conjunction with the Home Office to ensure that we remove this scandalous blight from our society, that we move from the Dickensian situation of having children in prison. I urge my hon. Friend to move quickly.

    Although a final judgment on the clause must await the conditions which the Secretary of State prescribes, I join in welcoming the principle in the clause and what the Minister of State is seeking to do. At present a magistrate is faced with a difficult decision when there is an application for an unruly certificate, when he is told that unless a certificate is advanced the social worker cannot ensure that the child will reappear at court when next required. Anything which will in some way regularise the position has a great deal to commend it.

    Perhaps this debate also gives the opportunity to emphasise that magistrates do not of their own volition issue certificates of unruliness. They can only issue a certificate if the social worker applies to the court for a certificate. Social workers make application only if they consider that the circumstances warrant such action. They make application if they do not have the accommodation to cope with the child. If the clause can go some way to alleviating the present position it has my support.

    It is clear that new Clauses 17 and 31 can hardly have very much in common. The procedures for dealing with children in Scotland initially preclude a court proceeding. The question of sentence does not arise initially if the matter is being dealt with by the children's panel. New Clause 31 deals with the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 and not with the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. Two different concepts are raised. I think that my hon. Friend might have dwelt a little longer on the different procedures that apply.

    When we consider these provisions in relation to Scotland we must bear in mind the number of children who are in the notorious prison of Barlinnie. We must bear in mind the number of children who have appeared before children's hearings and who have been told that nothing can be done for them as there is no residential accommodation to send them to for corrective treatment. The backlog is so great that the whole system of children's hearings is in danger of collapse unless there are considerable added resources. Unless those resources are applied to the whole procedure I am afraid that it will become a laughingstock and will be brought into disrepute. That will be a pity.

    Theoretically, unless a child has been found guilty of some criminal behaviour it does not appear before the courts for sentence. However, the practice is rather different. We are bringing in new proposals that have unclear intentions. At present we cannot operate the provisions of current legislation. The Government might have been better employed had they considered how to deal with the existing problems.

    For example, they should have considered how to make the children's hearings more effective, bearing in mind the many children coming before them. At present there are no ideas about how those children should be dealt with and kept out of further mischief because of the lack of accommodation and the lack of resources. The result is that many children are without any real guidance or help from the social work departments. It gets to the point of being downright cynical to table clauses of this nature. Unless something is done to the present system there is a danger of collapse.

    I shall be interested to hear what my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State has to say on this matter. When he was a back bencher he had some scathing things to say about the social work provision in Scotland, particularly as regards children's panels and children's hearings. I shall be interested to hear whether he still holds those opinions after the short time that he has been in his new position wearing his new hat. Will he try to defend the indefensible, or is he pie pared to let this matter go by without saying anything?

    5.0 p.m.

    I am concerned about the provision of the resources with which to back up this measure. The Minister said that he did not think additional resources were necessary. Will he give us more details of how he thinks these provisions will be carried out? We are concerned that there will be insufficient resources with which to implement many parts of the Bill. It is not only a question of buildings. It is more a question of staff.

    It is not only the prison and remand home aspects which cause concern. Resulting from our anxiety about young people in prisons or prison-type surroundings there has been increasing pressure on the psychiatric services. Those services are being stretched to take unruly children. I do not refer to children who need psychiatric treatment. I mean the children whom the community find difficult to look after. The alternative to prison is the general adult psychiatric hospitals. In those hospitals, which are sometimes large, children are exposed to the sight of the most serious forms of mental illness. That cannot be right. Sometimes they are placed in children's units containing children being treated for minor disturbances, such as learning disorders and bed-wetting problems. Therefore both the disturbed and difficult children are mixed. That is bad for both types of child. In psychiatric units disturbed and restless children need a staffing ratio of at least one member of staff to two children, or one member of staff to one child.

    My hon. Friend will reply to the points concerning Scotland which were raised in this short debate.

    The Expenditure Committee expressed concern, reflecting the evidence it received from several witnesses, that unruly certificates were being issued too freely on less than adequate grounds in a substantial proportion of cases of juveniles who do not in the end receive any custodial sentence from the courts. The Government make this pledge. There is no difference of opinion between the two Departments involved. This is a joint exercise between my Department and the Home Office. We are carefully examining the report of the Select Committee. We intend to answer that report and to give a full, detailed reply to Parliament. In the examination we are looking at a commitment, which has already been given by the Home Secretary, on the phasing out of remands on unruly certificates.

    We have emphasised, especially in respect of 14–year-old girls, the constraints set by the facilities at present available within the community home system. Even if the money is available, it takes time to build a community home and to staff it. There are problems of staffing and money. We must persuade people to undertake this type of difficult work. It is easy for the Press and the rest of us to put up our hands in horror at the thought of juveniles in prison establishments. In many senses these young persons are adults. They are physically well developed. They are violent. Often they have a record of aggression which is frightening in such young people. They require a high ratio of staff, often of considerable physical strength.

    Although I do not wish to exaggerate the problem, there are many young people who should not be in prison establishments. However, there are some who will always present a problem to society. We need more community homes.

    Although the Bill makes provision for direct grants I do not wish to deal in great detail with the provision of resources for this aspect of the social services, which is being given a high priority by the Government and the local authorities. When local authorities are allowed to choose their own priorities and capital building programmes it is noticeable what a high priority they give to secure accommodation. We shall look in detail at the target for the provision of more secure accommodation places.

    We hope for consistency and uniformity in the criteria under which unruly certificates are issued. They could be prescribed by regulation. We hope that this will lead to a reduction in the number of such demands and to the more careful vetting and selection of cases.

    Following the evidence to the Expenditure Committee, the intention is that the local or temporary difficulty in finding a suitable place in the community home system should not be allowed to lead to wholesale remands to prison establishments in cases where thorough and determined efforts to find suitable places should have succeeded. A check will be made on the situation. I do not claim that that will solve the problem. However, it is a modest step forward in reducing the number of juveniles in prison. We shall hold consultations about the regulations. It will be open to the House to debate the regulations.

    It may take a little time to telephone the social services department to discover whether provision is available. It may mean more of a search in social services departments to find secure accommodation. We shall encourage those concerned to search outside their area or region to find secure accommodation within the community home system.

    Will the Minister be more precise about the criteria for unruly certificates? Will the conditions be prescribed by order? What are the criteria? When will the order be laid? What will be the date of commencement?

    We do not know yet what the specific provisions will be. We must first consult the bodies concerned. This is an enabling power. I should have liked to have had fuller consultations before now. When we looked at the matter in the light of the report of the Expenditure Committee we discovered that we did not have the power to deal with the problem. We are taking the power. I hope that consultations will take place and that we may soon be in a position to announce to the House the results of our review in the light of the report of the Expenditure Committee. I should not like to commit myself to the date when we shall lay an order.

    Has the Minister made an estimate of the total number of children who are likely to be involved?

    We have not made an estimate of the number of children in prison or the number of people who need secure accommodation. This evidence was given to the Select Committee, but it would be very difficult to make an estimate of the number of children who would be involved as a result of a tightening up of the regulations.

    I do not wish to sound critical of the procedure in granting unruly certificates. However, the magistrates are responding to pressure. Much depends on the regulations and on the collaboration between the magistrates and the social services departments. The position has improved substantially in the past year. As a result there will be a substantial drop in the number of such people in prison establishments. That will make a bigger impact than the editorial in The Guardian gave credit for. It will not solve the problem. I warn the House that a complete solution of this problem in terms of an absolute ban is some time away. It will be difficult to achieve. However, there will be a dramatic drop in the number of persons in prison establishments if these suggestions are soundly and sensibly applied. I do not think that we utilise to the full our existing secure accommodation facilities.

    I wish to respond to my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson) regarding List D schools and the effect of Clause 31. Perhaps my hon. Friend's memory may be a little faulty about my protestations from the back benches regarding List D schools. I have made many protestations from the back benches in regard to social work, but not in regard to children's panels and List D schools. That perhaps was a fault on my part.

    I agree that the question of resources is extremely serious. Nobody would claim that we are entirely satisfied with the provision for Scotland. I also take the general points made about this matter, which have been covered in the remarks of my hon. Friend the Minister of State at the Department of Health and Social Security. As the House knows, I have been in my present office for only a few weeks, but I assure my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley that I shall be writing to him on the subject.

    Projects due to be completed later this year on the existing List D schools programme will provide an additional 20 secure places, almost doubling the existing accommodation. We are also discussing with the Lothian Regional Social Work Department the possibility of its providing a youth treatment centre for 40 very disturbed children. These are welcome provisions.

    I agree with my hon. Friend when he says, "Not enough". Seventeen new children's homes have been provided by the new local authorities since the beginning of 1972, and 13 are at present under construction. The total number of places involved in the project is around 500. A further 17 projects are included in the building programme in 1975–76, including the provision of another 315 additional places. I agree that the provision is not sufficient, and I give an assurance that I shall take that matter on board in the next few weeks and I shall write to my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley on the subject.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 8

    Return Of Child Taken Away In Breach Of Section 49

    'A court in which an application for custody of a child is pending may—

  • (a) on the application of a person from whose custody the child has been removed in breach of section 49, order the person who has so removed the child to return the child to the applicant;
  • (b) on the application of a person who has reasonable grounds for believing that another person is intending to remove the child from the applicant's custody in breach of section 49, by order direct that other person not to remove the child from the applicant's custody in breach of that section.'—[Mr. McElhone.]
  • Brought up, and read the First time.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    The clause makes provision for the court in Scotland to order the return of a child taken away from the possession of a person who has applied for custody in terms of Clause 49. It refers to a person who has had the care and possession of a child for at least three years before making the application. The clause is equivalent to Clause 40—a provision which was introduced in Committee—relating to applications for custodianship in England and Wales.

    The clause provides that on due application having been made by the person from whose custody the child has been removed—or is believed to be in danger of removal—the court can either order the return of the child to the applicant, or, where the applicant has reasonable grounds for believing that someone intends to remove the child, can order that the child shall not be removed.

    The purpose for which the provisions are to be included in Part II of the Bill in relation to Scotland concerns the powers of redress of a person from whom a child is removed in breach of Clause 49. Removal of a child in these circumstances is made a criminal offence and it is clearly desirable that the offence should be capable of rectification without the need to await the outcome of a criminal prosecution.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 9

    Amendment Of Section 20 Of Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    'The following subsection is substituted for subsection (1) of section 20 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968—

    "(1) Where a child is in the care of a local authority under any enactment, the local authority shall, in reaching any decision relating to the child, give first consideration to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood; and shall so far as practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision and give due consideration to them, having regard to his age and understanding."'.—[Mr. McElhone.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    5.15 p.m.

    With the new clause we may also take Government Amendment No. 59.

    The purpose of the new Clause and Amendment No. 59 is to remedy an anomaly in the Scottish care provisions in the Bill as drafted at present.

    The existing Clause 62 amends Section 15 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 by incorporating in it a general duty on local authorities in respect of children in care. The new duty requires the local authority, in reaching any decision relating to a child in its care, to give first consideration to the need to promote the welfare of the child, and for this purpose to ascertain his wishes and feelings so far as may be practicable. This new provision overlaps to some extent with Section 20 of the 1968 Act which, as it exists at present, imposes a general duty on a local authority having a child in its care to promote the interests of the child. This provision should have been repealed when Clause 62 was incorporated in the Bill.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 14

    Power Of Reporters To Conduct Proceedings Under The Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    "The following section is inserted after section 36 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968—

    '36A. The Secretary of State and the Lord Advocate may, by regulations—
  • (a) empower officers or any officer or class of officers appointed under section 36 of this Act, whether or not they are advocates or solicitors, to conduct before a sheriff—
  • (i) any proceedings which, under this Act, are heard by the sheriff in chambers;
  • (ii) any application under section 37 or 40 of this Act in relation to a warrant;
  • (b) prescribe such requirements as they think fit as to qualifications, training or experience necessary for any officer to be so empowered. '".—[Mr. McElhone.]
  • Brought up, and read the First time.

    With the new clause, we may also take the new Clause 10—Amendment of section 36 of Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968—and new Clause 27—Additional provision in section 36 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.

    We may also take Government Amendments Nos. 252 and 171.

    I apologise to the House in advance for the length of the explanation on the new clause. I take this course because a number of hon. Members from all sides of the House have taken an interest in this matter which deals with the question of reporters in court. I should like to emphasise the great interest shown in this matter by my hon. Friend the Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan) and other hon. Members. I have carefully noted new Clause 10 tabled by my hon. Friend and supported by my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan) and the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel). I have also noted new Clause 27 tabled by the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) and others.

    Although I acknowledge that these clauses have some general purposes, I wish for a number of reasons to commend the alternative provisions contained in new Clause 14 which, as I shall try to demonstrate, is designed to achieve the same objectives as new Clauses 10 and 27.

    The purpose of the new clause is to provide the Secretary of State, jointly with the Lord Advocate, with the power to deal with a difficulty that has arisen in connection with children's hearings. The clause would allow the making of regulations to enable reporters to children's hearings, although they are not advocates or solicitors, to conduct before the sheriff courts proceedings arising from children's hearings. It also gives power to prescribe qualifications, training or experience, as may be thought necessary, for reporters who are so empowered.

    The system in Scotland at children's hearings is that reporters to children's panels have to decide whether children who have committed offences or who are in need of care should be brought before a children's hearing, or whether they can be dealt with in some other way, such as by voluntary measures as agreed by the social work department. If a reporter decides to refer the case to a hearing, that hearing can proceed to determine the merits of the case—for example, what form of disposal is appropriate to the child's situation as it affects the grounds for referral likely to be accepted by the child and his parents. If not, application is made to a sheriff in chambers and the case must be considered and, if the facts are established, decided. If they are so established, the child goes back to the hearing for consideration and disposal of his case.

    Similarly, at a later stage there is provision for an appeal to the sheriff against the disposal of the hearing, although each year there is only a handful of appeals. We have also provided in the present Bill, in Clauses 67 and 68, amendments to Sections 37 and 40 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. It empowers reporters to seek from the sheriff extensions to certain warrants made at a hearing to retain children in a place of safety where cases are being considered.

    Since the children's hearing system began in 1971 many courts have allowed non-legally qualified reporters to appear before them in applications and appeals. In July this year, however, the Court of Session, on an appeal from a decision of the Sheriff in Glasgow, decided that, as no clear right of audience on the part of reporters had been confirmed by the Social Work (Scotland) Act, the normal rules of audience must apply, namely, that only solicitors or advocates may appear before the Sheriff. This has meant that reporters have had to take steps to instruct outside solicitors or solicitors from other local authority departments to proceed with these applications.

    A number of representations have been received from the Reporters' Association, the advisory council on social work, the chairmen of regional children's panels and hon. Members from both sides of the House, suggesting that an early opportunity should be taken to give reporters the necessary power to do what, in many cases, they have been doing in practice for the past four years, namely, to appear before the sheriff in chambers.

    Since July we have been considering carefully what action should be taken. It would have been tempting simply to give reporters the necessary powers, and to restore the situation which prevails in practice if not in the strict sense of the law. However, the issue goes wider than that. On the one hand, it is important that reporters who have knowledge of individual cases are able to deal with them all the way through, especially when they are complex cases in the realm of child protection.

    On the other hand, of course, it must be stated that it is usual for qualified solicitors or advocates to conduct proceedings in court for the good reason that it is in the interests of the courts and justice generally that cases should be presented as competently as possible. In this connection it is true to say that there have been instances in which the handling of some cases by reporters without legal qualifications has been criticised by some sheriffs. In its recommendations the Reporters' Association suggested that the granting to reporters of the necessary powers to appear should be accompanied by the Secretary of State having the power to prescribe any necessary qualifications.

    Although we recognise the validity of various arguments for and against the appearance of non-legally qualified reporters, we consider that some action should be taken relatively quickly to allow reporters to appear before the courts. The Secretary of State and the Lord Advocate therefore propose to make early regulations allowing reporters with a year's experience to conduct the relevant proceedings before the Sheriff. This will prevent too long a continuation of the ad hoc alternative arrangement to which I have referred which tends to be relatively expensive, time consuming and, at the end of the day, not very satisfactory.

    In terms of the proposed new clause, officers who may be empowered by regulations to appear, are officers appointed under Section 36 of the Act. That section provides not only for appointment of the reporter himself but also for appointment of
    "such other officers as deputies of the reporter as may be required."
    The term "deputies" is not however used in the Act in the technical sense which may apply to the term depute reporter for administrative or grading purposes within local authorities, but is used to mean any officer appointed to assist or to act for the reporter in the performance of his duties. It is therefore proposed that the regulations will empower to appear before the sheriff persons who may be categorised as assistant reporters but who, nevertheless, act on behalf of the reporter.

    Concurrently with the making of the regulations, we propose to enter into discussions with all the interested legal and social work bodies on a whole range of matters concerning the training, qualifications or experience of reporters. Our discussions will cover such matters as the special training or qualifications which reporters should have to enable them to operate effectively in all areas, but especially in the complex situation of appearing before the sheriff. We also hope to consider whether it is practicable and desirable not merely to make training available but to prescribe it in further regulations as a necessary preliminary to the exercise of these powers of appearance. It is our hope that what will emerge will be proposals for the future which will be acceptable to all shades of opinion.

    If such proposals required regulations specifying training or qualifications, we should not hesitate to provide such regulations as soon as possible.

    Whatever might happen to the new clause and about the regulations which we may make under it, it must be recognised that work involving the courts is necessary in only about 10 per cent. of the reporters' cases and is only a small part of the work on such cases. The rôle of the reporter is essentially that of decision-maker, together with the ability to establish relationships with all the bodies which supply information for the hearings. Those are his key functions. We should not like the present situation to lead local authorities to believe that the post of regional reporter or the higher subordinate posts within regional authorities must be filled by members of the legal profession.

    Local authorities have currently shown a readiness to regard both social work and legal qualifications as having substantial relevance for such posts, and in some cases other disciplines also. The new clause should make it possible for the service to continue developing along the existing lines, but with greater regard being paid to the necessary training for this new and vitally important appointment of dealing with children in trouble.

    I draw the attention of the House to Amendments Nos. 171 and 252 which relate to the new clauses. Amendment No. 171 is a minor consequential amendment to Section 49(3) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act, to make it clear that, notwithstanding that the reporter may be presenting a case before the sheriff, he may still be formally examined by the sheriff, as is the position at present under section 49(3).

    Amendment No. 252 concerns the commencement provisions of the Bill and secures that the new clause and the consequential amendment to Section 49(3) come into operation immediately on the passing of the Act.

    The new clause and associated amendments are to be welcomed. It is apparent that on this issue there is agreement which straddles the Floor of the House. However, I should like to make it clear that I place great stress upon what the Minister said towards the end of his speech about the need for experience. From my own practical knowledge, as a solicitor before being translated to this place, at times difficulty was experienced when dealing with reporters who did not know the niceties of the law of evidence.

    I point out to those people who have not appeared before the sheriff and defended children with a reporter present that a qualified solicitor does, or could, have an advantage which stems from his knowledge of criminal law and the regulations concerning evidence. Had the Minister restricted his advocacy on this clause purely to one year's experience, I should have been a bit chary about accepting the Government's clause. Undoubtedly, along with the practical experience which comes from appearing in court, and having to deal with legal situations, there is also the need for training in the law of evidence and sometimes in the procedures of argument in court.

    Let us take as an example the rather complicated provisions of the Social Work (Scotland) Act, which will be complicated even further by this Bill. There is no doubt that a fundamental knowledge of how to present a case in terms of advocacy is required.

    I was glad to hear from the Minister that it is intended to deal not only with the question of experience, which presumably means an assistant reporter sitting alongside a qualified reporter who has been duly authorised to appear before the sheriff, learning the practical ways of how to deal with lawyers, sheriffs and legal thinking, but also with the need to attend courses to learn the law of evidence. Many reporters, knowing the difficulties which they sometimes have to face in court, have voluntarily gone ahead and attended these courses and gained some of the necessary experience which is required. There is no doubt that the clause is required.

    5.30 p.m.

    I should like to mention that the stated case which I read relating to this matter, which came from the Glasgow sheriff's court, contains a definition of the law as it was passed in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. On the interpretation of the sheriff and on the confirmation of that interpretation by the Court of Session, that definition ruled out the opportunity of reporters appearing before the sheriff's court for legal purposes.

    In many courts throughout Scotland it was the practice of sheriffs, no doubt with some irritation, to hear reporters present the cases with which they had been dealing. At the outset of the social work provisions and reforms there was an acceptance by the then Government that reporters would be allowed to appear before sheriffs.

    I should like to quote from a circular which was submitted by the Social Work Services Group on 6th February 1970 to county clerks and town clerks of large burghs, as they then were. Under, "Functions and responsibilities", it states:
    "Where the grounds are not accepted by the child or his parents, the reporter will present the case to the sheriff, including the leading of evidence. He will also represent the children's hearing at appeals to the sheriff from their decisions."
    There is no doubt that when the Government, through the officers of the Social Work Services Group, were considering this question, that power had been given to reporters to appear before the courts, and sheriffs in many cases accepted that situation. I am not sure about the background, but, perhaps because certain unqualified reporters had appeared before sheriffs and made a mess of things, general irritation began to grow.

    Will the hon. Gentleman explain to lay Members what constitutes an unqualified reporter?

    This is one of the conundrums. The reporter represents a new discipline. The specification by the Government at the outset for the recruitment of reporters was that due or equal consideration should be given to both legal and social work qualifications. It may be that in time, as the new system gets under way, academic disciplines will emerge from the universities which manage to combine both legal and social work qualifications. Perhaps, for the purpose of the argument, in relation to the stated case emerging from Glasgow, I could define an unqualified reporter as an inexperienced reporter. A reporter is appointed by the local authority. It is the local authority's responsibility so far to decide who is the best person to appear.

    There is no doubt that in areas such as Tayside, part of which I represent, considerable difficulty has been caused by reporters who had been accustomed to appearing before the courts, suddenly being refused the right of appearance. It is only proper that the situation should be put right. Indeed, additional expense is incurred by local authorities if a duly qualified lawyer—I do not intend to define him—has to present the case on behalf of the children's hearing. He is instructed and given all the papers. In many cases he is also given the arguments by a reporter or depute reporter who will be sitting alongside him. Therefore, one gets duplication of functions.

    There is the practical point that in many areas there are no legally qualified reporters. For example, Fife has no qualified solicitors, but it has five reporters who are not qualified solicitors. Tayside has no qualified solicitors on the reporters' staff, but it has seven reporters who are not qualified solicitors. Orkney has no qualified solicitor, but it has one reporter who is not a qualified solicitor. In Shetland the position is the same. Strathclyde—this huge area which repre- sents half of Scotland—has two qualified solicitors and 46 reporters who are not qualified solicitors. I am not sure whether this is correct, but I am informed that one of the two qualified solicitors is resigning and that the other prefers not to go into court to present cases. Be that as it may, in Strathclyde and in other areas there is a great problem. It is necessary that this gap should be closed.

    The new clause is acceptable to me in exchange for my own which specifies some training courses. However, I hope that the regulations, which will give meat to the skeleton which has been presented to us, will ensure that the irritations from which sheriffs suffer regarding inexperienced reporters are removed. It is not good for a child to see the reporter who represents the system under which children are to get treatment, twisted round the fingers of, say, an extremely well qualified solicitor.

    I am informed that the Tayside area, through both restrictive and non-restrictive advertisements, advertised for applicants for the regional post and that it did not get a single application from a qualified solicitor. That suggests that there is no tremendous enthusiasm on the part of solicitors to become involved in the new post of reporter which takes in a mixture of disciplines.

    I tabled new Clause 10 which in some respects, is similar to the Government's new Clause 14. The reason for tabling the new clause was a recent decision by the Court of Session in the case of Kennedy v. O'Donnell, to which reference has already been made by my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State. The decision by the Court of Session virtually deprives reporters to children's panels and their deputes and assistants of the right to appear in court in cases involving, for example, disputed grounds of referral to children's hearings unless they possess practising certificates from the Law Society of Scotland. It is important to remember that in giving that decision Lord Wheatley was expressing the law as it stands. He was not expressing an opinion on the desirability or otherwise of reporters, their deputes or assistants, making representations in court.

    Under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 a children's hearing may decide to make application to the sheriff for several reasons, first, where there are disputed grounds of referral and, secondly, when there is incapacity on the part of the child to understand the grounds of referral—for example, in the case of a battered baby. There is also the case where a child or his parents decide to appeal against the decision of the hearing. I am reliably informed by Mr. Alan Finlayson, the Midlothian children's reporter, that in his region the frequency of such cases works out at about five per week, mostly in the first two categories—disputed grounds of referral and incapacity to understand the grounds for referral.

    There are precedents for people who are not practising solicitors making representations in court. For example, Customs and Excise officers can conduct prosecutions in court in cases where people have avoided or attempted to avoid Customs. Factory inspectors can also prosecute in court for breaches of safety regulations, and so on. In view of these precedents, there seems to be no reason why, given other good reasons, a reporter should not be allowed to make the appropriate representations in court.

    The main responsibility of a reporter is to decide whether, and if so how, to intervene in the life of a child once a report has been submitted, and it is questionable whether a legal qualification is all that relevant and necessary to a reporter's job. The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) referred to the fact that a social work background could be as relevant—if not more so—as a legal background.

    There is the possibility of recruitment to the post of reporter being inhibited unless the new clause is accepted. Without it, lawyers would be the only people qualified to apply for posts as reporters, and even assistant and deputy reporters. Unless the new clause is accepted there will be a kind of two-tier system of reporters: those who are in the top tier, namely, those who are legally qualified, and those in the second tier who are not legally qualified. It would be unfair to many applicants with excellent social work backgrounds, and so on, if they were deprived of the opportunity of reaching the top tier of their chosen profession.

    It also appears that not many lawyers are all that interested in becoming children's panel reporters. Not many applications for vacancies come from people with a legal background, and I am told that in the Strathclyde Region only one out of the 49 reporters or assistant reporters is a practising solicitor and therefore would be qualified, under the present law, to appear in court.

    There is even the possibility of a complete breakdown in the service unless an external solicitor is instructed. The hon. Member for Dundee, East referred to the extra expense which a local authority would incur as a result of having to pay additional fees to an external solicitor. There is also the danger that if an external solicitor or a solicitor from another local government department took on a case before the court he would not have experience of the child's background, and this lack of continuity would be against the best interests of the child.

    Much of our debate today has been about the rights, and the lack of rights, of reporters, but we must remember that we are discussing a children's Bill which is concerned primarily with the rights and welfare of children, and it appears to me that unless the new clause is accepted there could be a break in continuity in dealing with a child and this could be detrimental to his welfare and interests.

    My new Clause No. 10 would give all reporters, deputies and assistants some ex officio right to make the appropriate representations in court. The Government's new clause contains a better form of wording than I have proposed because it stipulates qualifications, training and experience to be decided by the Secretary of State and the Lord Advocate and also because it mentions making applications for warrants.

    Having listened to my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Queen's Park (Mr. McElhone) I get the impression that the regulations governing qualifications and experience will not be too restrictive but, at the same time, they will ensure adequate standards of competence. I shall, therefore, not call for a Division on my new clause. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Queen's Park for listening to my suggestion. This is the first time that I have had one of my suggestions adopted in legislation by the Government. Recently, in reply to a Parliamentary Question that I tabled some months ago I was told that the Government were tabling a new clause similar to the one that I had put forward. I am, therefore, willing not to press my proposal as the Government have shown themselves more than willing to listen to what I have had to say. It is a pity that there are not more Government Ministers who are as receptive as my hon. Friend the Member for Queen's Park has been.

    5.45 p.m.

    The hon. Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan) said that this was the first time he had had one of his suggestions accepted. He will have noted that the new clause had my name to it as well, and that might have made a substantial difference.

    I welcome the Government's new clause. I used to have to declare an interest in that my wife was reporter for the children's panel in Selkirkshire, but since the reorganisation of local government she has left that post and therefore I give notice that I no longer have to declare a financial interest in these matters. But I still have a close interest in the development of the children's panel hearing system, and it is a pity that we are debating the matter on such a narrow point because, apart from one debate some time ago in the Scottish Grand Committee, we have never had a chance to review the working of the system as a whole and pay the tribute which ought to be paid and which is long overdue not only to the professional reporters but also to members of the children's panels and the social work departments for the way in which the system has operated. The system comes under much unjustified criticism, mainly from those who are resistant to the philosophy behind the Social Work (Scotland) Act and the criticism usually ought to be directed at the lack of basic facilities provided by the local authorities to enable the panels properly to carry out their work.

    As the hon. Member for West Stirlingshire said, this is a children's Bill, and it is children about whom we are concerned. The Government's decision, although it is a late one, is very welcome, as is the fact that the practice in the past of sheriffs varying in their attitude towards reporters, whether or not they had legal qualifications, will end, and the decision in the Kennedy case will be reversed.

    The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) referred to the irritation felt by some sheriffs and some lawyers in court at facing inexperienced reporters, but that irritation is two-way. I suspect that there has been a lot of irritation amongst reporters at the obscurantism of the legal profession, often up to the Bench, on the philosophy behind the new Act. That measure was designed for the benefit of the family, for the benefit of the children, and it is right that in this Bill we should take steps to make a minor amendment to the law to put right something that we did not foresee at the time of the original Minister.

    I hope that the Minister will bring the regulations forward at an early date, because this is an important matter and he has not given much indication of timing. Secondly, I hope that he will so frame the regulations that the job of reporter will continue to attract a mixture of people from different disciplines, including the legal profession, because I am concerned at the stories from different hon. Members about the relatively small proportion of people from the legal profession going into this new job. I hope that in the new regulations the door will be left open for the direct recruitment of people with legal qualifications as well as those with other qualifications to come in and do this worthwhile job.

    I am sorry that my hon. Friend the Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan) has decided not to press his new clause to a Division. The position, so we thought, was that reporters had the right to appear before sheriffs. The House of Commons passed a measure giving, as we thought, reporters that right, but, lo and behold, much to our astonishment we discovered that that was not so. What guarantee is there that even with the words now proposed some other judge, at some other time, in relation to some other case will not find that Parliament has not the right to make this decision?

    We occasionally get into this kind of situation, and if it were confined to an exceptional case, or to one aspect of a reporter's work it would not be so bad, but in recent days another decision has been taken in relation to another field of work. In that case, judges and courts have decided that people who are not solicitors do not have the right to appear in the pleading. This is a good clause if it does what the Government believe it will do, if only because it breaks the monopoly—

    Will my hon. Friend make clear one point that I am trying to grasp? Is it not the case that a reporter will still not be entitled to appear in court unless he has a minimum of a year's experience?

    Even that is not clear. Even under this new clause it is not clear which reporters can attend in which circumstances to deal with which cases.

    Two things were done by the decision of the Court of Session. One was the re-establishment of the monopoly of the legal profession in the courts which the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 was thought to breach. Even with these words, there is no guarantee that their intention will be carried out. It is clear that the Government have retreated from the position they took in the 1968 Act, if only in subsection (b).

    We have to decide what the relevant skills of a reporter are. Is he to be a social worker with a law degree or a solicitor with a social work degree? When we passed the 1968 Act we agreed that the person we wanted primarily was a social worker with an understanding of the laws relating to the care and problems of children and the whole social work climate. What we did not want—the Government assured us that this would be so—were the formalities and procedures normally associated with the law brought into children's hearings. Although there was nothing to prevent a lawyer who took some courses in social work from becoming a reporter, it was never intended that a solicitor should, just because he was a solicitor, be qualified to be a reporter. He had to be rather more than a solicitor.

    When I hear about the irritation of sheriffs and judges, I sometimes wonder whether they understand the irritation of the rest of us—particularly that of Members of Parliament—about their pronouncements and judgments and the way in which they deal with our proposals.

    I am not sure that the publishing of regulations is a good thing. The Government could have met the situation had they restated their intentions in the 1968 Act and given the reporter in all circumstances when a case had been referred from a children's hearing the right to represent in the sheriff court the point of view of the panel and of the child. If a sheriff is an expert in law and is to make sociological judgments, must we demand that he has a degree in sociology? Perhaps that would be a good idea. Who says that they are always well qualified to make judgments?

    We have said time and again that the child is the most important factor in these matters. The law must take second place. We must restate that firmly and clearly. I hope that the new clause will achieve that. I doubt it, but if the judges, on their Olympian heights, can hear an echo, I hope that they will hear this warning, "You have heard our intentions: interpret the words accordingly."

    In view of the general agreement that new Clause 14 is desirable I shall not detain the House long, but I want to place on record my appreciation of the Minister's responding so quickly to the case made by the reporters, the children's panels and hon. Members, including me, who have raised with him the points arising out of the case of Kennedy v. O'Donnell.

    The clause does not quite restore what was understood to be the position under the 1968 Act. However, it is probably the neatest way of amending that Act. I want to be sure of one thing: that the regulations which the Minister will then be empowered to make will appear steadily. He said that, concurrently with the regulations being prepared, there would be consultation with the legal profession, the reporters, the children's panels and so on. There is an old saying,
    "Procrastination is the thief of time."
    My experience of doing my hon. Friend's job is that consultation is the thief of time. We seem to go on far too long in consultations when often the intention of Government and Parliament is perfectly clear.

    The difficulty arose in this case because the 1968 Act was silent on this point. What was assumed to be the case has now proved not to be so because of the challenge in the sheriff court and subsequently in the Court of Session. It is agreed that that position should be restored and reporters enabled to carry on their previous practice. I hope that my hon. Friend will tell us that, as soon as the Bill is activated, we shall have the regulations to restore what was thought to be the position.

    I welcome the new clause. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Glasgow, Craigton (Mr. Millan), who is here, must be taking a particular interest in this matter as the Minister who was responsible for steering the Social Work (Scotland) Act through the House. We are glad to see some of the intentions of that Act being made more clear.

    It is right that the power, which we believed to be intended, should be restored. As many hon. Members have said, we are thinking particularly of the interests of the child. When a reporter has a particular knowledge of a child it is important that that knowledge is carried through all the stages at which the child is dealt with.

    The Minister said that this problem arose in only a small proportion of cases—about 10 per cent. Apart from the one case which has given rise to this problem in legal terms, over the last four years has the representation of children by reporters caused any practical problems? I question whether it has. Has there been any concern in legal circles or among sheriffs about the appearance before them of reporters who were not legally qualified?

    6.0 p.m.

    The Minister dealt with this question of a reporter having one year's experience. He went on to say that there would be consultations about qualifications and so on. I was unclear as to whether it would be one year's experience alone or whether there would be other things involved. Can the hon. Gentleman be more specific on this point? Paragraph (a) speaks of empowering:
    "officers or any officer or class of officers".
    Can the Minister explain in a little more detail what is meant by that? At one end of the scale it could mean a class of officer such as a reporter with one year's experience, while at the other end it could mean any officer. A regulation could be used to empower an individual by name. Will the hon. Gentleman explain what is meant here, because the words appear to cover an extraordinarily wide range?

    There is also this question of consultation on training or experience. How wide will the consultations be? Will the Government consider publishing draft regulations so that we may know rather more exactly what is involved? There is some unease in some quarters.

    While I support this new clause in principle I agree with the hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson) that it is a good thing that reporters should be able to appear before the sheriff, in the spirit of the Social Work (Scotland) Act. I gently remind the hon. Gentleman that ultimately the final custodian of the liberty of the individual is the law. The law is made here, certainly, but it has to be administered in the courts. I am not a lawyer and am not always given to defending them, but there are occasions when the interests of a child cannot be served because someone is not legally qualified.

    Several of my legal friends pointed out during the passage of the Social Work (Scotland) Act the importance of bearing in mind that ultimately it is in the child's interests to make certain that the best legal advice is available from someone who is properly qualified. The purpose of the law is to serve the ordinary citizen. I say that with a certain amount of feeling because it is so important to remember this when talking about the necessary training or experience. We must ensure that the kind of qualifications a reporter needs before he can appear in a court enable him to give a child the full protection of the law.

    I welcome the new clause and would be grateful if the Minister would respond to the questions I have put.

    By leave of the House to speak again, I would say the hon. Member for North Angus and Mearns (Mr. Buchanan-Smith) has, along with other hon. Members, raised several important points. It is proposed that the first set of regulations to be made as soon as possible after the Bill becomes law should give a right of audience to those reporters and staff who have a minimum of one year's experience working as a reporter. These initial regulations would not require any training or qualifications. Consultations will, however, be set in hand to discover whether suitable training or qualifications can be devised. If this is possible, amending regulations will be introduced in due course.

    It should be noted that the qualifications for reporters which the Secretary of State may prescribe under Section 36(2) of the Act as amended were intended to relate to general qualifications for the reporters' work rather than the presentation of cases before the sheriff to which this clause relates. It is doubtful how wide the powers will go in terms of a reporter's staff. They would not cover training or experience.

    The hon. Member for North Angus and Mearns asked whether there had been many cases other than that which occurred in Glasgow. As far as I am aware the Act has worked well generally in all parts of Scotland since the social work provision for children's panels came in. There is a requirement of one year's experience for reporters or deputy reporters or, as it says in the clause "officers". The hon. Member asked why we used the term "officers"—

    Can my hon. Friend clarify this quesion of a minimum of one year's experience? Is it not also subject to subsequent qualifications which the Secretary of State will lay down? Since there could be an able reporter who would not qualify under the conditions laid down by the Secretary of State does it not mean that there could be reporters with several years' experience who would not be eligible to appear before the sheriff?

    It is a question of striking a balance. This is a judgment upon the time a reporter could be within a social work department or a regional authority. We came down in favour of one year as being the most suitable period. This covers the whole of Scotland and allows reporters to go into the courts. It does not cause an interruption of the many cases coming before the courts on referral from children's panels.

    I return to the point about the use of the term "officers". The word means a deputy in the sense of the term as it is understood for administrative or grading purposes within local authorities. It is simply used to mean any officer appointed to assist or to act for the reporter in the performance of his duties. It is proposed that the regulations will empower people to appear before the sheriff—persons who may be categorised as assistant reporters but who, nevertheless, are acting on behalf of the reporter.

    I am grateful for the kind words spoken by my hon. Friend the Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan) and for the general welcome given to the new clause by the hon. Member for Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles (Mr. Steel). I appreciate, too, the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes). As for the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson), knowing him as well as I do, I feel sure that the judges will be listening to him and will take due note of his comments.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 15

    Duty Of Local Authority In Scotland To Assume Parental Rights And Powers Vested In A Voluntary Organisation

    'The following section is inserted after section 16 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968—

    16A.—(1) If it appears to a local authority, having regard to the interests of the welfare of a child living within their area, the parental rights and powers in respect of whom are by virtue of a resolution under section 16(1)(b) of this Act (hereafter in this section referred to as "the earlier resolution") vested in a voluntary organisation, that it is necessary that the said parental rights and powers should no longer be vested in the organisation, the local authority shall resolve that the said parental rights and powers shall vest in them; and the said parental rights and powers shall vest from the date of the resolution under this subsection.
    (2) The local authority shall, within seven days of passing a resolution under subsection (1) of this section, by notice in writing inform—
  • (a) the organisation who but for that resolution; and
  • (b) any person, in so far as that person's whereabouts are known to them, who, but for that resolution and the earlier resolution,
  • would have the parental rights and powers in respect of the child, of the passing thereof.
    (3) On a summary application being made for the determining of a resolution under subsection (1) of this section by a person who but for that resolution and the earlier resolution would have the parental rights and powers in respect of the child, the sheriff having jurisdiction where the applicant resides may order that—
  • (a) the resolution under subsection (1) of this section shall continue to have effect; or
  • (b) the resolution under subsection (1) of this section shall cease to have effect and that the earlier resolution shall again take effect; or
  • (c) the resolution under subsection (1) of this section shall cease to have effect and that the parental rights and powers in respect of the child shall again vest in the applicant; or
  • (d) the resolution under subsection (1) of this section shall continue to have effect, but that either for a fixed period or until the sheriff, or if the order so provides, the local authority, otherwise directs, the local authority shall allow the care of the child to be taken over by, and the child to be under the control of, the applicant.
  • (4) In hearing an application under subsection (3) of this section the sheriff may consider whether there was any ground for the making of the earlier resolution, and if he is satisfied that there was no ground for the making of that earlier resolution he shall make an order under subsection (3)(c) of this section.
    (5) In this section "the parental rights and powers" means all the rights and powers in relation to the child which in accordance with the earlier resolution were vested in the voluntary organisation.
    (6) While a resolution under subsection (1) of this section is in force with respect to a child, the child shall be deemed to have been received into and to be in the care of the local authority by virtue of section 15 of this Act, and subsections (2) to (5) of that section shall apply accordingly; except that where the earlier resolution was passed by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (ii), (iii) or (iv) of subsection (I) of section 16 of this Act, that part of subsection (3) of section 15 of this Act from the words "and nothing in this section shall authorise" onwards shall not apply in relation to the person who but for the earlier resolution and the resolution under subsection (1) of this section, would have the parental rights and powers in relation to the child.
    (7) Subsection (9)(a), (b) and (c) of section 16, subsections (3) and (4) to (9) of section 17 and subsections (1), (2), (4) and (4A) of section 18 of this Act shall apply to a resolution under this section as they apply to a resolution under section 16(1)(a) of this Act.
    (8) A notice served by a local authority under subsection (2) of this section shall not be duly served by post unless it is sent by registered post or recorded delivery service.".'—[Mr. McElhone.]

    Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 16

    Return Of Children Taken Away In Breach Of Section 17(8) Or (9) Of The Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    '. In section 17 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 (effect of assumption of parental rights) the following subsection is inserted after subsection (9)—

    "(10) Where an offence under subsection (8) or (9) of this section has been or is believed to have been committed, a constable, or any person authorised by any court or by any justice of the peace, may take and return the child to the local authority or voluntary organisation in whom are vested the parental rights and powers relating to the child.".'—[Mr. McElhone.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    It inserts provisions in Section 17 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 relating to the procedure for the recovery and return of children whose parental rights have been vested in a local authority or voluntary organisation. Equivalent provisions in regard to England and Wales have been introduced under new Clause 12.

    Section 17(8) and (9) of the 1968 Act as at present drafted together allow that it shall be an offence, punishable by a fine or imprisonment, for a person either to remove or prevent the return of children whose parental rights have been vested in a local authority, or to fail to return such a child when legally in the person's possession after being required by the local authority to return the person. Under a separate amendment, the same provisions will also apply in cases where parental rights have been vested in a voluntary organisation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 26

    Counselling In Scotland For Adopted Person Seeking Information About His Birth

    'In section 22 of the 1958 Act—

    ( a) the following words are added at the end of subsection (4)—

    "or a local authority or an approved adoption society which is providing counselling, under subsection (4A) of this section, for that adopted person.";

    ( b) the following subsections are inserted after subsection (4)—

    "(4A) Where the Registrar General for Scotland furnishes an adopted person with information under subsection (4) of this section, he shall advise that person that counselling services are available—
  • (a) from the local authority for the area where the adopted person lives: or
  • (b) if the adopted person's adoption was arranged by an adoption society which is approved under section 4 of the Children Act 1975, from that society,
  • and it shall be the duty of such local authority and approved adoption society to provide counselling for adopted persons who have been furnished with information under subsection (4) and who apply to them for counselling in respect of that information.

    (4B) Where an adopted person has arranged to receive counselling under subsection (4A), the Registrar General for Scotland shall, on receipt of a request from the local authority or adoption society which is providing that counselling, and on payment of the appropriate fee, send to the authority or society an extract of the entry relating to the adopted person in the Register of Births."'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this we may take Government Amendments 150, 151 and 152, and we may also take Amendment No. 21, in Clause 26, page 18, line 4, after 'years', insert

    ', and who was adopted on or after 1st January 1976'.

    6.15 p.m.

    The clause refers to Scotland, and perhaps it is important at this stage that we should talk about Scotland first, because Scotland has led the law. In this case, English practice is to some extent catching up with common Scottish practice.

    The Scottish clause differs, however, from the corresponding provisions for England and Wales by virtue of the fact that counselling of adopted persons who seek access to their birth records is placed entirely on an optional basis, as in the case of persons in England and Wales for persons adopted after the Bill becomes law. This is entirely appropriate in view of the fact that the law in Scotland since 1930 has allowed that adopted persons should be permitted access to their original birth records on attaining the age of 17. There is, accordingly, no question of a change under the present Bill in the circumstances in which persons given for adoption in Scotland can subsequently trace their natural parents.

    While the Scottish provisions do not provide for counselling as a necessary preliminary to the receipt of information by an adopted person, they lay down a clear avenue to such a person obtaining counselling in Scotland if he wishes to receive it. The Government amendments all relate to access to birth records for adopted persons. Amendment No. 150 is a paving amendment and combines the existing provisions of Clause 26 with those proposed in Amendment No. 151 to form a new Section, 20A, for the 1958 Act.

    Amendment No. 151 provides for the counselling schemes which will be obligatory for persons adopted before the passing of the Bill—subsection (6)—but will merely be offered to those adopted after the Bill. Subsection (3) places a duty on the Registrar General, local authorities and approved adoption societies to provide counselling for adopted persons who apply to the General Register Office for information to enable them to trace their birth record.

    Subsection (4) reques the Registrar General to inform every applicant of the counselling services available to him. These include the General Register Office, for those who prefer the anonymity of a central unit; the local authority in whose area the applicant lives, for those who wish to receive counselling locally; the local authority for the area where the court which made the adoption order sat. That authority may have supervised the placement while the application was pending, or provided the guardian ad litem to report on the application and might therefore have some detailed information. Finally, there is the adoption society which arranged the adoption, if known and if approved under Clause 4. This choice could not be offered until after Clause 4 was put into effect; that depends on high standards in relevant agencies.

    After our debate in Committee I took the Bill away and came to the conclusion—and it was my personal view—that unless we could have a system of counselling, this provision would not be acceptable to the House. It seemed to me the will of that Committee that all counselling should be obligatory for people who were adopted before the passing of the Bill. We have therefore tried to make a distinction in the legislation on that score. We undertook extensive consultation, but I do not claim that we have met every point. I think that these compromise proposals genuinely meet the consensus, and I get the impression that most people feel that the balance we have struck between centralised counselling and a local authority arrangement, in giving a choice, is probably the best way out of a difficult situation.

    Will the Minister say something about the consultations? What was the balance of advice to the Department? We all recognise that this is a difficult question, but it would help if he could tell us.

    The directors initially wanted counselling to be handled by the local authorities and were not so keen on the idea of a centralised unit. I think that they changed their view when they realised that a high priority was being given to the local authorities for those who wished to receive counselling locally. That was the slight difference. Otherwise, I think that broadly the ABAA and most other organisations have favoured a combination of a centralised unit and a local authority option. Some, of course, have not been altogether happy about the idea of obligatory counselling. I think that it should be put on record that some of the social service workers feel that this is not necessary, and they point to experience in Scotland.

    However, I think that the feeling of the House is quite different. It is a feeling that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) holds strongly, and I understand her point of view. Some felt that although under the present rules people could obtain access to their adoption records, this fact was not so widely known, and many people had been adopted in the belief that the arrangement had been a private one.

    The House was therefore obliged to recognise this fact by making a distinction in the procedure. Once the counselling procedure is carried out, however, there is no way of stopping a person from having access to his or her records. I think the House is taking broad precautions to prevent distressing situations. They cannot, however, be prevented completely and may well arise. On balance, I believe that we have adopted the right approach to a very difficult problem, and I commend it to the House

    I am deeply troubled about Clause 26 and the new Clause which we are now discussing. In Committee I withdrew my amendment so that I might raise the general idea again now. Hon. Members do not generally understand exactly what Clause 26 seeks to do. This is a Children Bill, not an adults' Bill, and I accept that. I am determined at all times to help children, even unborn children, because I recognise that they have very strong rights.

    I am, however, still troubled by the clause. In giving a child the right of access to its birth records and in doing so from the date when the Bill becomes law, we are creating a situation that will cause many women sleepless nights. Many women have had children, perhaps when they were very young, and they allowed the children to be adopted. They then closed the door on that episode of their lives.

    My concern springs mainly from my experience of a constituency case where an excellent marriage was totally ruined. The wife at the age of 17 had had an illegitimate child, and the child had gone for adoption. The woman subsequently married and had a very happy marriage with three children who were brought up lovingly in a very happy home. When her illegitimate child was 21 he discovered his mother's whereabouts and went to see her. That visit totally destroyed the marriage. The husband, who had not been informed of the wife's first child, found his trust in her totally ruined. He felt that if she had not told him about her illegitimate child, he did not know what else she might be keeping from him. The case had such a sad ending that it led me to form the views I hold about this clause.

    We have permitted women to close the door on any indiscretions in their past. Goodness knows, the men do it very successfully, indeed. Until now, it has been accepted that this is a woman's right. Having allowed her child to go for adoption, if she does not wish to see that child again, or to have that child in her life, it is very difficult to decide whether the child ought to have a right to know her when she would prefer not to know the child.

    One wants to give children the right of access to their records. I do not object to the theory for the future. That seems perfectly reasonable. We are passing a Children Bill and saying to the country "From now on, any child who is adopted may know that he has access to the records of his birth". But I do not think that we are being fair to the women involved if we make this provision retrospective. They understood when they allowed a child to go for adoption that henceforward that would be the end of that. Parliament is now dragging before them the spectre of something that they thought was finished.

    I beg hon. Members to appreciate that this is a genuine human dilemma. It is very difficult to have to weigh in the balance that sort of situation with the right of the child to have access to his birth records. It is not a light matter. It is not true that the whole problem can be got over by the adopted child being able to get access to counselling. There is not one word in all the clauses about counselling for a distraught and distracted woman who might find her family life threatened by what we are doing by the clause.

    I question very much whether obligatory counselling is a good thing—any more than obligatory schooling is good for certain children who would much rather leave school. What sort of use will it be to grab someone by the scruff of the neck, sit him down and say "You are to have some obligatory counselling whether you like it or not"? With the best will in the world, the Bill insists on obligatory counselling. I should not feel so badly if we were told that the counsel- ling service was available and if people were left to choose themselves whether they wished to take advantage of it.

    Over and above that, however, I am very worried about the whole pious hope that counsellors will be available. Where are they to come from? We have not enough counsellors in any part of our social service network. I know of no area where all of the social workers both sides of the House would wish to have available are actually available.

    I am greatly worried by the effect of Clause 26. I have recognised, as has the Minister, that it is a difficult matter. I do not seek in any way to be awkward or argumentative, but I believe that in this clause we are being grossly unfair to a number of women who will be astonished that the House of Commons should so lightly and easily take away their rights.

    I find it very difficult to follow the argument of the hon. Lady for Birmingham Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) about Clause 26 as opposed to new Clause 26—and we must be careful of the distinction that we have here. The hon. Lady mentioned a specific case of a specific marriage being ruined by a specific event. I do not dispute for one moment that the case to which she refers is genuine or that the marriage was ruined because an illegitimate child found its way into the home and destroyed the husband's trust in the woman concerned. But the fear that some day her husband would find out about her previous indiscretion must have been with her for a very long time. I appreciate and am concerned about the fact that all of the women who have committed what we in this House call an indiscretion—women who have had an illegitimate child and had the child adopted—and who have subsequently married and said nothing to the husband must today, irrespective of the passing of this Bill or of Clause 26 on access to birth records, have at the back of their minds the nagging fear "What happens if my husband finds out?" There is no way in which anyone can be certain that a husband will not find out, or what the effect of that will be.

    During our lengthy discussions in Committee—I do not want to go into all of them again—I said that one of the problems of legislation of this kind, where there was an element of retrospection or where there was no element of retrospection, was that we must legislate for the uncommon, while maintaining a sense of proportion in legislating in the common sense. If because of one or two or, perhaps, dozens of cases similar to that mentioned by the hon. Lady we were to deny children the right to see their original birth certificates, perhaps to deny that right to many thousands of people, that would not be sensible law. This is an issue in which no amount of argument or persuasion, no question of obligatory counselling or voluntary counselling, will make one bit of difference to those who are opposed to the retrospection. On this matter sooner or later we shall have to divide, and each must stand where he will on the issue.

    I turn to new Clause 26, which deals with the Scottish position. As I have said, I do not want to rehearse the arguments about the Scottish position, but the House ought to be aware that since 1930 and the Adoption of Children (Scotland) Act people in Scotland have had the right of access to their birth certificates. There is nothing to suggest that this has caused any untoward difficulty over the past 45 years.

    That is an experience that should be weighed carefully by those hon. Members who represent English or Welsh constituencies and who are looking for some way of resolving their personal dilemma about access to birth certificates. If they have not done so, I suggest that they read the Hansard for the Committee proceedings for 17th July, from column 354 onwards, where the results of the Triseliotis survey are very well detailed.

    I come to the subject of counselling. Having looked into it very carefully, I am of the opinion that counselling was unnecessary, in Scotland at least. There is nothing to show that we needed it. Nevertheless, I would not object to counselling being brought in. It is done at present, admittedly in a rather rudimentary and informal manner, by the Registrar General. I have no objection to the general idea of counselling being spread out to the local authorities and adoption agencies. I have no disagreement in principle.

    However, we must recognise—it would be foolish not to do so—that the social workers and the local authorities are at present under a very heavy strain. Most of them have case loads far beyond what any reasonable person would expect them to carry. Simply adding to this another duty, that of counselling, does not make a lot of sense in the present climate of public expenditure. Although I would be prepared to accept the new clause as regards counselling, I hope that counselling will not reach the point where it becomes an absolute priority with local authorities.

    I want to ask one or two questions about the new clause. I am concerned that there should be no interference whatsoever with the right of access which has hitherto applied in Scotland. It is worth while. I do not see why we should change it. That is not to say that because it has worked as a general overall principle, what has been good in Scotland for 45 years is automatically good, or that we cannot learn from English experience. That is not the point at all. Our experience is that the right of access has had no great effect.

    6.30 p.m.

    I hope that we can take it that counselling in Scotland will be purely voluntary, and that if an applicant who is advised of the counselling that is available from the local authority or adoption agency says that he is not interested in counselling, but wants the information now, that information will be made available to him, as it would have been before the passing of the Bill. There will thus be no need for a person to refer to the counselling service before the information is made available.

    I am curious about the possible effect of subsection (4B), which is as follows:
    "Where an adopted person has arranged to receive counselling under subsection (4A), the Registrar General for Scotland shall, on receipt of a request from the local authority or adoption society which is providing that counselling, and on payment of the appropriate fee, send to the authority or society an extract of the entry relating to the adopted person in the Register of Births."
    We are often told that the law is not what we think it is but what it says it is. In an earlier debate the appearance of reporters in the sheriff court was referred to. It was thought that the law allowed reporters to appear but, the law being silent on that point, that right is not conferred on them. It would be curious if, by voluntarily accepting a counselling service, the rights of the individual to access to his birth certificate were delegated by his voluntarily handing over to the adoption society or local authority his right of veto.

    I am sure that that is not the intention of the subsection, but it says nothing about the individual's right once he goes for counselling. I hope that the Under-Secretary of State will make clear that this device is simply to assist the applicant and will not result in the applicant's rights being removed. It would be extraordinary if a diminution of an individual's rights or civil liberties resulted from a clause designed to be helpful and not restrictive.

    I am not opposed to counselling, but I hope that people will understand that resources are restricted. The Scottish system, which has served us well for so many years, should not be interfered with. The experience we have gained will be of great service to England and Wales. I hope that it will help to resolve the personal dilemmas of hon. Members and that they will support the Government on the clause and the subsequent amendments.

    I warmly congratulate the Under-Secretary of State on his recent appointment. Will he confirm that he agrees with what the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) said and that counselling in Scotland will be purely voluntary, bearing in mind that the Scottish system has worked extremely well for the past 20 years?

    I, too, am apprehensive about the wording of the clause, particularly subsection (4B). Its intentions are obscure. There is no need to alter the law, because anyone who wishes to receive assistance can easily obtain it. We would perhaps do better to look at the Money Resolution to see whether extra resources are to be made available to local authorities for counselling services. The Strathclyde Region is 1,400 social workers below establishment. What possibility is there of establishing a counselling service in Strathclyde? It is a pious hope, the fulfilment of which would add an extra burden on local authorities.

    The Scots are wiser. We never inquire too deeply into our antecedents. We might find a sheep stealer among them and prefer to keep it quiet. That is a policy which the English could well follow. It is sometimes better to leave well alone. This information for many years has been available to anyone who wanted it, and I have never heard of any person becoming distressed on receiving the information.

    My hon. Friend is not doing us a service by insisting on the inclusion of the clause. It gives us nothing. If he were saying that there would be a voluntary service for which extra resources would be provided that would be fair enough, but he is putting on local authorities a duty to provide such a service at any time they are called upon to do so without providing an extra penny piece to pay for it. That is just another bit of cynicism which experience tells us is unnecessary.

    I should like to be reassured about the meaning of subsection (4B). It seems to me to be superfluous. Will my hon. Friend tell us its purpose?

    I do not wish to say much about Amendment No. 151. I dare say the position in England and Wales is the same as it is in Scotland. Our social workers are hard pressed and local authority resources are being cut, not added to. To put extra duties on local authorities merely means a cut in some other service. To insist on compulsory counselling can only damage the service. In my view the clause and Amendment No. 151 are unnecessary and the Government would be well advised withdraw them.

    I agree almost entirely with what has been said by the hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson). There is no advantage in adding a requirement for counselling. Voluntary counselling can only be helpful, but to add an obligagation to receive counselling will be time wasting and may cut across the purpose which lies behind the Scots law in its present form of which I approve.

    Being a matrimonial lawyer of many years standing I have considered this matter a great deal. The law is based on inherent respect for all the parties involved and the complex relationships which occur when a child is adopted. It is based on a great respect for all, including the natural parent or parents who may have to make a painful decision, the child who may have a curiosity about his parents and be left with the feeling that there is something disgraceful in a decision being made to give him away to someone else, and the adoptive parents.

    To take, first, the child's attitude if the child is happy, although he has the right in Scotland to inquire about his parents, he generally will not inquire. Some do, but there are always exceptions. An unhappy child often does inquire. He may want to check on his roots and, perhaps, to find someone somewhere. He may feel an obligation towards his natural parents. He may not be able to rest if he thinks that perhaps somewhere his mother is existing below the poverty line. Nothing should be done to discourage such a genuine attitude.

    I come next to the mother's attitude. I was interested in the example given by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight), but should not the lady to whom she referred have disclosed the facts to her husband? If she did not, should not she take the consequences? Why, because she chose to make that decision, should her child be deprived of his rights?

    Many of the decisions made by mothers who give their children away are made, and with finality, in an agony of self-sacrifice against, until now in our society, a background of extreme economic difficulty. Perhaps society will improve, and enable a woman always to be in a position in which she can make such a decision without regard to economic worries, but that day has not yet come, and for those women who made their decision in the past it was not there. Many of these women in my experience made the decision feeling genuinely full of self-sacrifice, wanting their children to have the best possible life and worried about the sort of life that they themselves could give them, bearing in mind the difficulties that society was enforcing on them.

    I think the hon. Lady is unnecessarily censorious of the women concerned. Will she recognise that it is often a desperately difficult decision to make but that it is at least made easier by the knowledge that it will not drag on, that there is an end to it, that the child is adopted and that is that? I think that it is a great shame to be censorious of the women concerned.

    I am not being in any sense censorious. This is a moral decision for the woman herself, but, in my view, in making her decision, there is another party—the child. I do not think that, whatever her attitude or decision, she has any right to take a right from another human being. This has worked well in Scotland. It has not been abused; nor has it given rise to many cases such as that we have heard about. I certainly do not mean to be censorious. I have the utmost sympathy with any woman in this position. I am not concerned about moral grounds but with the point that I have made.

    On the question of finality, I ask whether anyone should have the right to close a door when she has actually brought a child into the world. That is another question, but I would say that the woman does not have such a right, that there must always be the possibility that the child will feel an obligation to a parent; for example, living a good life the child may feel it necessary to satisfy an obligation should it arise.

    Quite a number of children who take up the right to find out only want to satisfy themselves that the reason was a reasonable one for putting them into care of other people so that they could live happily. That in itself makes them happier in the family of their adoptive parents. Very often, a child, having found out these things, does not follow up. Very often, those who inquire find that the mothers are not in need and leave the matter there.

    In my experience, adoptive parents are quite happy to take this position in Scotland. They know that there will come a day when the child can find out. I have never had an adoptive parent complaining to me about it. They all have taken the view that if they bring up a happy child they have nothing to fear in that child seeking out the maximum information about his background.

    I join those who urge that counselling be purely voluntary and that we should not have any additional impediment to the present system, which does work well and has worked well in Scotland, and which I commend to England and Wales.

    Following four Scottish Members it is, perhaps, appropriate for an English intervention to inject a note of compromise into the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson). I was one of those who in Committee advocated the old Clause 25, later to become Clause 26, without, perhaps, seeing quite the force of the argument from many quarters saying that we should have a counselling procedure. It is incumbent on us to realise not only how far the Government have moved in these discussions but not to offer again on Report a kind of paperback version of the speeches in Committee.

    A good deal has happened since Committee. Although I can accept the force of Scottish Members' feelings in what they have said about the possibly otiose nature of these proceedings as applied to Scotland, and one's researches indicate that there has not been the kind of difficulty to which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) referred. I would feel now that nevertheless, Scotland must bear that burden. Those who wish to see this right of access, available as it is by counselling, made available to the children should meet the Government half way about the procedure proposed. I am prepared to do so.

    6.45 p.m.

    The hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston has again raised the question of what will happen to the mother who has given her child for adoption and then might live in fear of what might happen if the child were to return at some later date. But this is the Children Bill. It is not the "Protection from the Return of Stigma Bill", or the "Concealment of One's Past Bill". It is designed to give children, as far as we can, that right to access which we know that they have exercised under the more sensible Scottish law of 1930 perfectly adequately.

    I do not believe that even in the present situation we have the total protection for the natural mother which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston supposes to exist under the law as it stands. Many adoptive children find their natural parents. They do so without benefit of counselling. I found my mother without any recourse to social workers or representatives of local authorities or any representative of an adoption agency. Had I been a homicidal lunatic, my mother might have been at risk as a result. Perhaps the hon. Lady thinks that I am, and that my mother was at risk. However, I do not wish to pursue that.

    The hon. Gentleman must not trail his coat tails to that extent, because it is too tempting. But I beg even him to recognise that while in the past it was possible to find the mother—I described such a case of an adopted child—I am saying that any woman knew with almost complete certainty that she would not be found, often being told by the adoption agency how she could avoid being found. She followed that guidance and was henceforth not found. The difference in Scotland was that she always knew that she could be found. In England, whereas formerly she was protected, now she will not be. I beg the hon. Gentleman not to think this funny, because it is not.

    As I said in Committee to the hon. Lady, by having recourse to counselling we make it much more likely that the person who may be at risk, or who may put that contact with the original biological mother into a dangerous situation of some kind, will be discovered and given proper advice. I think that the counselling procedure is eminently sensible on that point.

    The hon. Lady said that the mothers giving their children for adoption in Scotland always knew that there was the possibility of discovery of this kind, and that is correct. They did—in so far as they thought about it. My guess is that very few mothers in such circumstances make that a prime consideration. My guess is that they are thinking of quite different matters when they put their child forward for adoption.

    The hon. Lady was reminded in Committee by my hon. Friend the Member for Welwyn and Hatfield (Mrs. Hayman) that every time one changes the law relating to personal relations one is saying that some people whose relations were governed by the law as it was may find themselves in a new situation. My hon. Friend gave the example of the divorce law. We did not say then that only those people who married after the reform of the divorce law could have easier divorces. That is the situation when one changes the law as it touches on personal relations.

    After all the discussions which have gone on about this controversial matter I and many other people believe that the proposals of Amendment No. 21 are quite unacceptable. The Association of British Adoption Agencies, in its submission, has again said that to restrict access to birth certificates to those adopting in future would be to undercut the whole point of the clause. That, indeed, is the case. We are dealing with what I regard as a basic civil right for the children. There must be protection of the other parties concerned. This is what the counselling procedure does.

    I hope that in the suggested form of counselling which my hon. Friend circulated to those who were members of the Standing Committee it will be made clear to those nationally and locally who will be looking at this scheme that there is no legal barrier, as is said in paragraph 5, to the handing over of information after counselling. Later in the consultation paper, in paragraph 7, the wording is not suggested to mean that only if an adopted person further pressed for the details of his birth certificate after counselling should he be told how to get it and how much it will cost, but that where any adopted person has recourse to counselling locally or nationally, and is seeking that information, his right to have it, subject to counselling, should be explained and safeguarded throughout.

    This is becoming much more widely understood and accepted. During the Committee proceedings I had letters from women who many years ago gave their own children for adoption, and they have praised the merits of this scheme and acknowledged what the counselling will do. Even the gentleman whose case I raised in Committee has now heard from the foundling hospital that it is prepared to trace his mother, though it will not give him any details about her, unless she is dead, since that would break the conditions of the Thomas Coram Foundation.

    This is not only a basic right for the adopted child but will actually strengthen the bonds of the adopted child with his adoptive parents, making it possible for a real source of loss and anguish to be relieved in the minds of many women who years ago, when the stigma of bastardy was much greater than it is today, gave up their children for adoption.

    We support what the Minister is proposing, and people working in the field share our view that this is a reasonable compromise. It is a very difficult question, and I think that a good balance has been struck.

    There are two aspects. One is the ethical and moral aspect, in relation to which great emotional feelings are generated. Much of our time was spent on that. There are people—we all have them in our constituencies—who are deeply involved and who greatly wish to know their origins, to know more about their parents, and to meet them if possible. We share the anxieties of my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) about the retrospective considerations. This is a very difficult problem. I find it interesting that both my hon. Friend the Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker) and myself have, for example, swung right round during the course of the discussions and are now completely behind what the Minister is doing.

    The second aspect concerns the procedure. Here we should have liked to know a little more about how the Minister sees the counselling actually working. As I understand it, he is proposing both a central or a general register service, with presumably at least one or two social workers at the centre, and working through the local authorities. Is that correct?

    Therefore there would be, as stated in his circular, the scheme C, with a local service and a central service. This is put quite fairly in the circular.

    The disadvantage of the local service, as he saw it, was that it would be a very elaborate procedure, and he queried its likely expense. He also said, very fairly, that it could be a formidable bureaucratic procedure and that it could throw considerable work on to the local authorities.

    He further made the point that, because of the spread right across the country, there might be difficulties about ensuring sufficient skilled people for the counselling in each local area. There is the worry, to which hon. Members have already pointed, that it might not be possible to find sufficient counsellors to do this work. I should like to have the Minister's reassurance on these aspects.

    There has been the question of the quality of the counsellors who would be prepared to work centrally. The Minister in his paper said that he thought the central cost would work out at about £70,000 a year. He said that he thought that the central procedure might have distinct disadvantages. There would be fewer safeguards for the natural parents. Can the Minister tell us where he thinks this counselling will come from, what kind of counselling he has in mind, the total cost likely to be involved, and to what extent his anxieties about a heavy bureaucratic procedure are likely to be founded in practice?

    We have had a very interesting debate, and I know that there are strongly held views on this issue. I am grateful for the way in which the hon. Gentleman has endorsed the compromise that we have eventually reached. No one has come to this decision lightly or easily, and none of us is absolutely certain what the available funds will be.

    In listening to the debate, and particularly to the Scottish Members, who have experience of the system in Scotland, I felt that many of us in England had been helped in making up our minds about the situation by the knowledge that others had lived with the Scottish law for many years.

    Counselling will not be mandatory in Scotland at all. It is purely and simply intended to put it on a voluntary basis, and to make it available to Scottish people. It is a matter of tidying up the existing legislation. It is not envisaged as being a very large burden on local authorities. I recognise that their resources are already stretched.

    As for the system in England, we hope, first, that the GRO in London will be able perhaps to use retired, and experienced social workers of considerable skill, in that way draining less from the pool of skills. It is the sort of job that is ideally suited to such people. In the first few years I envisage that the load might be rather heavier.

    There is within the GRO's office already a system for dealing with applications for information about births. The staffing will have to be increased. It is not exactly certain how many clerical staff will be required. It is difficult for any of us to make an accurate estimation of the increase. In the first year the cost may vary between £20,000 and £50,000. It may be lower; it may be higher. It is likely to be somewhere in the middle. It is very interesting that the directors of local authority social services have all taken the view that it is already to a great extent part of normal social work practice. The extent to which it will put a burden on them is difficult for them to tell.

    When I had my discussions with the local authorities—we shall later be discussing the whole rate of implementation—most of them thought that this was a burden, although a small one. At the moment they are resistant to taking almost any burdens, but they felt that it could probably be absorbed in the forthcoming year.

    Spread across the country in each local authority it should not be a considerable burden. We have tried to cut the bureacracy to the absolute minimum by giving people the option to decide where to go. I think that this, too, will cut costs.

    Much of it can be done on paper. However, the appointment, naturally, has to be a face-to-face meeting with the counsellor. But once directed to the GRO or the local authority, it will be a question of a meeting. Facilities can be arranged easily for interviewing rooms in London in the GRO. There is no problem about that. In the local authorities, it would form a natural part of social work practice and no special buildings would be needed.

    The total cost could be £75,000 in a year. I have to admit that it is very difficult to estimate. I tend to think that in the first year there will be considerable interest in England and that we shall find a large number of people making applications. I expect that to die down fairly quickly after the initial period of interest. I accept that in the first year the cost might be higher. As for skilled personnel, I am satisfied that they can be found, and the directors feel that this is not too great a burden.

    I hope that the House will feel able to accept the Government's recommendation.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 30

    Review Of Case Of Child In Care In Scotland

    'In the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 the following section is inserted after section 20—

    " Review of case of child in care

    20A.—(1) Without prejudice to their general duty under section 20(1) of this Act, it shall be the duty of a local authority who have at any time had a child in their care throughout the preceding six months and have not during that period held a review of his case, to review his case as soon as is practicable after the expiration of that period and, if a supervision requirement is in force with respect to him, the local authority shall consider in the course of the review whether to refer his case to their reporter for review of that requirement by a children's hearing.

    (2) The Secretary of State may by regulations—

  • (a) amend subsection (1) of this section by—
  • (i) substituting a different period for the period of six months mentioned in that subsection (or for any period which, by previous regulations under this subsection was substituted for that period);
  • (ii) specifying different periods in respect of the first review under that subsection occurring after a child has been taken into care, and in respect of subsequent such reviews;
  • (b) make provision as to the manner in which cases are to be reviewed under this section;
  • (c) make provision as to the considerations to which the local authority are to have regard in reviewing cases under this section.".'.—[Dr. Owen.]
  • Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this we may consider Government Amendments Nos. 224 and 242.

    7.0 p.m.

    This amendment introduces a new provision in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 requiring local authorities to review the case of any child in their care not less than six months after the child has come into care or after the previous review. It also empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding the manner in which cases should be reviewed and to vary the minimum interval for reviews by prescribing a different period under regulations.

    Local authorities in England and Wales are already under a requirement to carry out six-monthly reviews of children in care by virtue of provisions in the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. In the past, there has been no substantial demand for a similar provision in Scotland, but the matter has been further reviewed in the light of certain discussions at the Commons Committee stage of the Bill, which focussed attention on a number of aspects of child care legislation lying outside the matters dealt with in the Report of the Departmental Committee on Adoption. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, the Association of Directors of Social Work and the Scottish Branch of the British Association of Social Workers are equally in agreement that such a provision should be introduced into the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.

    As for England, the amendment would extend the scope of Section 27 of the Children and Young Persons Act, which places a statutory duty on local authorities to carry out six-monthly reviews. The amendments are tabled to enable regulations to be made to meet undertakings given in Committee, some of which relate to points raised by my hon. Friends when we discussed the child's psychological parent, the question of what parents should be informed of six-monthly reviews, and, where appropriate, that they should be consulted.

    The present amendment also takes account of the Committee's views, arising from the discussion of Amendment No. 358, which was opposed by the Government but which was nevertheless accepted by the Committee and added as a new ground for the assumption of parental rights and duties, that the child's emotional needs and development warrant it and that the child's development will be impaired or stunted if he is returned to his parents. We shall have an opportunity to discuss this later. But it is the intention that the need to consider a child's emotional and other needs should be embodied in the regulations to be made under this amendment as one of the aspects of a child's welfare which should be looked at in the course of a six-monthly review of children in care.

    The amendment would give effect to a number of proposals included in a consultation paper circulated to local authority associations and all the various other interested bodies. The proposal to use the six-monthly review as a means of embodying the spirit of amendments discussed in Committee has received unanimous approval. The only reservation expressed by the directors of social services was in relation to the proposed power to vary the frequency of reviews. However, the directors were reassured when we explained to them that it was the intention to use this power only to advance the date of the first review to three months after reception in care and not to increase their frequency thereafter.

    In the light of that explanation, I hope that the clauses will be accepted by the House.

    It so happens that I am a foster parent of about 18 months' standing, and my experience leads me to believe that although a statutory requirement for the review of a case by the social work committee of the local authority may be made, it may be that, because of the lack of resources, such a review will not be carried out, or it will be done in such a perfunctory manner as to be useless.

    In my experience, despite a statutory visit from the social work department to inspect the conditions in which the children were living with me, it took the department 18 months to send someone to see the children concerned, and only then after a little prompting. I must admit that it was a relief not to be bothered with social workers on our doorstep day after day. However, there was a requirement. But if there are insufficient social workers, or if, as happened in Scotland, local government reorganisation should occur, however much we may have legislated for it, a proper review may not be carried out. I should like to know what proposals the Minister has to make this provision workable.

    I appreciate the concern of the hon. Member for Dundee. East (Mr. Wilson) and the experience from which he speaks. We are making provision for these visits. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, the Association of Directors of Social Work and the Scottish branch of the British Association of Social Workers were in agreement with this clause.

    I take the hon. Gentleman's point about the shortage of social workers. But we are concerned in Scotland, as in other parts of the country, that these visits are made. So far as my responsibilities go in Scotland, I can assure the hon. Gentleman that these visits and reviews will be carried out.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 31

    Children Of Unruly Character In Scotland

    'The following provisions of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975 (which relate to children of unruly character) shall be amended in the manner specified in paragraphs ( a) to ( c) below—

  • (a) in sections 23(1)(b), 24(1), 297(1) and 329(1)(b) of the said Act of 1975 the following words are added at the end—
    • "; but the court shall not so certify a child unless such conditions as the Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument prescribe are satisfied in relation to the child.";
  • (b) in sections 23(3) and 329(3) of the said Act of 1975 the following words are added at the end—
    • "; but a commitment shall not be so revoked unless such conditions as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe are satisfied in relation to the said person.";
  • (c) in sections 24(2) and 297(2) of the said Act of 1975 the following words are added at the end—
    • ";but a commitment shall not be so revoked unless such conditions as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe are satisfied in relation to the child.".'—[Dr. Owen.]
  • Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 19

    Appeals Against Refusal Of Approval Of Or Withdrawal Of Approval From Adoption Societies

    'Any decision of the Secretary of State relating to the refusal of approval of or withdrawal of approval from an adoption societly under sections 4 to 6 of this Act shall be subject to a right of appeal to an Independent Adoption Society Appeal Tribunal appointed in pursuance of Schedule (Independent Adoption Society Appeal Tribunals) to this Act'.—[ Mr. Norman Fowler.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this we may take Amendment No. 226, the proposed new schedule—Independent Adoption Society Appeal Tribunals.

    This is a matter that we touched on in Committee. The starting point is that the voluntary adoption agencies have, as we all know, made an enormous contribution. If it were not for them, there would not be the adoption service that we have at present. Therefore, as well as recognising their worth in words, we feel it right to safeguard their interests to the maximum extent possible.

    The Bill gives the Secretary of State a great power and discretion. It lays down criteria that an adoption society shall meet, but those criteria are necessarily drawn very widely. The Secretary of State is required to take account of the numbers of staff, of financial resources, of organisation and control, and of operations, but none of these criteria is exact and the Minister has the last word on whether the society shall continue.

    Naturally, we accept the Minister's good faith and good intentions, We have co-operated with the Government on this legislation, as I am sure the Minister will agree. We would not have done that had it not been the declared intention of the Government to promote a partnership between the local authorities and the voluntary organisations. However, we have to recognise that we are making laws and seeking to guard against unwelcome future developments.

    If the Secretary of State were to decide to pursue a policy of making a substantial reduction in the number of voluntary agencies, he has all the powers in the Bill that he would need. He could set the criteria as high as he wished and he could easily reduce to a handful the number of voluntary agencies. It is true that the Secretary of State must set out in writing the reasons for withdrawing his approval. Although that safeguard is useful, it is not sufficient. The fact remains that any Secretary of State is judge and jury in this case.

    If we were dealing with a case in the purely civil rights sphere, there would undoubtedly be calls from both sides of the House for an adequate appeals machinery. I pointed out in Committee that other legislation provides for the right of appeal. The Children Act 1948 provides for the registration of voluntary children's homes, but there is also an appeal tribunal to determine appeals against ministerial requirements to close down such homes. Then there is the tribunal for independent schools which determines appeals against ministerial requirements to close down a school or to remedy a defect in an independent school. We have taken this provision into our clause, in that the appeal tribunal that we propose closely follows the already existing legislative form.

    In Committee the hon. Gentleman rejected the idea of there being an appeal to the courts. We have sought to meet him on this point, as he has sought to meet us on a number of other points, notably the point dealt with in the last debate He also sought to argue that a tribunal was not the best way of dealing with this question. He said this to the Committee:
    "I am not persuaded that ultimate wisdom always lies outside the House of Commons in some strange tribunal that may be established."—[Official Report, Standing Committee A; 8th July 1975, c. 112.]
    I do not suggest that either this proposed appeal tribunal or any such system would produce ultimate wisdom. I suggest that it might provide a safeguard on the exercise of power, which is something about which the House should be concerned. I urge the House to support the motion.

    I urge the Minister of State to accept the clause. Adoption societies are concerned about the long-term future. We must not lose sight of the fact that there is a great wealth of experience within such societies. They have performed years of dedicated work. Many people work for these societies in professional or in voluntary capacities and they have given a lifetime of work and seen their work bear great fruit.

    It would be very frustrating if such people were to feel that at some time in the future their societies could be gravely endangered and that they did not have open to them the common justice of going to an independent appeal tribunal which could judge the situation at that time. I ask the Minister to accept this point so as to ensure that in future societies, even in changing conditions, have the right to go to an independent appeal tribunal.

    On 8th July I advised the Standing Committee to reject an amendment seeking to introduce a right of appeal to the High Court against the Secretary of State's refusal or withdrawal of approval of an adoption society. I also said that the case had not been made out for having what I called an appeal tribunal.

    I recognise that the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Fowler) has taken up the criticism and tried to seek another method which I think is preferable. I undertook in Committee to have another look at the matter
    "if, as a result of this debate there were substantial recommendations from the voluntary agencies saying that this was not a satisfactory situation".—[Official Report, Standing Committee A; 8th July 1975, c. 114.]
    I do not think that the voluntary agencies are the only people who have the right to express an opinion. Hon. Members have that right. Hon. Members, of course, attach great weight to what the voluntary agencies think because, after all, they are most likely to be affected by this. However, I do not think that the voluntary agencies share the anxieties of hon. Members about the Secretary of State's power.

    7.15 p.m.

    The ABAA, which represents most of the large voluntary adoption agencies as well as local authorities, wrote to me, following my appeal for views, saying that the matter had been considered by its council where there had been
    "full agreement from the voluntary society representatives that appeal to a court would be not only unnecessary but unsuitable since standards of adoption practice are not appropriately judged by legal criteria."
    The only dissenting view that I received was from the National Adoption Society and that appeared to be at least partly based on a misunderstanding of how applications would be dealt with. The society suggested that an appeals panel could give guidance to a society on how to attain the standard required for approval. In fact, we envisaged that such advice would be given, when needed, by the Department's social work service at as early a stage as practicable in consideration of a society's application and that a society could then be allowed a reasonable period in which to improve its standard before a final decision on its application was taken. If approval is refused, therefore, it will not be, as the National Adoption Society suggests, for lack of advice or guidance. It will be because, in spite of such guidance, the Secretary of State's professional advisers and the local authorities concerned cannot recommend that the society be allowed to carry the full range of responsibilities that an approved adoption society will be enabled to assume under the provisions of the Bill.

    I do not think that this one letter can be considered to amount to
    "substantial representations from the voluntary agencies".—[Official Report, Standing Committee A; 8th July 1975, c. 113.]
    and, in the light of the very strong recommendations from the ABAA, which is a professional organisation which speaks authoritatively of the view of the voluntary organisations, I have found no reason to change my view.

    I should like to be able to meet the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield on this point because I know that he attaches great importance to it. It occasionally arises on the Bill that there will be a difference of judgment. The decision in the case of an individual society will involve a qualitative judgment based on reports from the Secretary of State's advisers and from the local authorities with which the society will be working. I believe that the Secretary of State's answerability in the House is in this case a sufficient safeguard in allowing the full exercise of this power. However, I recognise that my judgment may not be shared by hon. Members opposite.

    As the Minister of State said, his judgment is not shared by Opposition Members. He has at least agreed that our proposed scheme is preferable to that we proposed in Committee. He spoke about representations made by the ABAA. As I understand it, the ABAA said that it was not in favour of an appeal to the courts. That is not exactly what is proposed. We changed our original proposal in view of what was said in Committee.

    It is the duty of hon. Members to see the defects in legislation. We should seek to be experts upon how legislation is framed and to spot its defects. The adoption agencies are the experts on adoption.

    Division No. 368.]

    AYES

    [7.20 p.m.

    Adley, RobertHavers, Sir MichaelPattie, Geoffrey
    Aitken, JonathanHawkins, PaulPercival, Ian
    Arnold, TomHayhoe, BarneyPink, R. Bonner
    Atkins, Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)Hordern, PeterRawlinson, Rt Hon Sir Peter
    Banks, RobertHowell, Ralph (North Norfolk)Renton, Rt Hon Sir D. (Hunts)
    Bell, RonaldHunt, JohnRenton, Tim (Mid-Sussex)
    Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)Hutchison, Michael ClarkRhys Williams, Sir Brandon
    Bottomley, PeterIrvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
    Bowden, A. (Brighton, Kemptown)Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)Rodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
    Boyson, Dr Rhodes (Brent)James, DavidRoss, William (Londonderry)
    Bradford, Rev RobertJohnson Smith, G. (E Grinstead)Royle, Sir Anthony
    Brittan, LeonJones, Arthur (Daventry)Sainsbury, Tim
    Brotherton, MichaelJopling, MichaelShaw, Giles (Pudsey)
    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)Kellett-Bowman, Mrs ElaineShaw, Michael (Scarborough)
    Buchanan-Smith, AlickKilfedder, JamesShelton, William (Streatham)
    Budgen, NickKing, Evelyn (South Dorset)Shepherd, Colin
    Bulmer, EsmondKing, Tom (Bridgwater)Sims, Roger
    Chalker, Mrs LyndaKnight, Mrs JillSkeet, T. H. H.
    Churchill, W. S.Knox, DavidSpicer, Jim (W Dorset)
    Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)Latham, Michael (Melton)Spicer, Michael (S Worcester)
    Cockcroft, JohnLe Marchant, SpencerSproat, Iain
    Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)Macfarlane, NeilStanbrook, Ivor
    Costain, A. P.Madel, DavidSteen, Anthony (Wavertree)
    Dodsworth, GeoffreyMates, MichaelStewart, Ian (Hitchin)
    Douglas-Hamilton, Lord JamesMather, CarolStradling Thomas, J.
    Dunlop, JohnMawby, RayTaylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
    Durant, TonyMaxwell-Hyslop, RobinTebbit, Norman
    Dykes, HughMeyer, Sir AnthonyThomas, Rt. Hon P. (Hendon S)
    Eden, Rt Hon Sir JohnMills, PeterTrotter, Neville
    Fairgrieve, RussellMitchell, David (Basingstoke)van Straubenzee, W. R.
    Fletcher-Cooke, CharlesMoate, RogerVaughan, Dr Gerard
    Fookes, Miss JanetMontgomery, FergusViggers, Peter
    Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)Moore, John (Croydon C)Wakeham, John
    Goodhart, PhilipMorgan, GeraintWalder, David (Clitheroe)
    Gorst, JohnMorrison, Hon Peter (Chester)Weatherill, Bernard
    Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)Mudd, DavidWinterton, Nicholas
    Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)Neubert, MichaelWood, Rt Hon Richard
    Gray, HamishNewton, TonyYoung, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)
    Grieve, PercyNott, JohnYounger, Hon George
    Grylls, MichaelOnslow, Cranley
    Hall-Davis, A. G. F.Osborn, JohnTELLERS FOR THE AYES
    Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)Page, John (Harrow West)Mr. Adam Butler and
    Harrison, Col Sir Harwood (Eye)Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)Mr. Richard Luce.
    Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon MissParkinson, Cecil

    NOES

    Allaun, FrankBagier, Gordon A. T.Beith, A. J.
    Anderson, DonaldBain, Mrs MargaretBennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
    Armstrong, ErnestBarnett, Guy (Greenwich)Blenkinsop, Arthur
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)Bates, AlfBoardman, H.
    Atkinson, NormanBean, R. E.Booth, Albert

    The hon. Gentleman's reply was short and disappointing, although I accept that he gave a rather longer reply than he gave in Committee. He relied upon the Secretary of State's discretion and his answerability to the House. If we were always to rely upon that, there would be no departmental appeal mechanism. However, there are appeal mechanisms, not only in the hon. Gentleman's Department, but in other Departments.

    We shall press the clause to a Division. The Government have not met the spirit of our argument.

    Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

    The House divided: Ayes 127, Noes 188.

    Bottomley, Rt Hon ArthurHarper, JosephRoberts, Albert (Normanton)
    Bray, Dr JeremyHarrison, Walter (Wakefield)Robertson, John (Paisley)
    Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)Hatton, FrankRoderick, Caerwyn
    Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)Hayman, Mrs HeleneRodgers, George (Chorley)
    Buchan, NormanHeffer, Eric S.Rooker, J. W.
    Buchanan, RichardHenderson, DouglasRoper, John
    Callaghan, Jim (Middleton & P)Hooley, FrankRose, Paul B.
    Campbell, IanHooson, EmlynRoss, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
    Canavan, DennisHowells, Geraint (Cardigan)Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
    Cant, R. B.Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)Rowlands, Ted
    Carter-Jones, LewisHuckfield, LesSandelson, Neville
    Castle, Rt Hon BarbaraHughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)Sedgemore, Brian
    Clemitson, IvorHughes, Mark (Durham)Shaw, Arnold (Ilford South)
    Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
    Cohen, StanleyHughes, Roy (Newport)Skinner, Dennis
    Colquhoun, Mrs MaureenHunter, AdamSmall, William
    Concannon, J. D.Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford)Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
    Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)Jackson, Colin (Brighouse)Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
    Corbett, RobinJanner, GrevilleSpearing, Nigel
    Cox, Thomas (Tooting)Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)Spriggs, Leslie
    Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)John, BrynmorStallard, A. W.
    Crawford, DouglasJohnson, Walter (Derby S)Steel, David (Roxburgh)
    Cryer, BobJones, Alec (Rhondda)Stewart, Donald (Western Isles)
    Dalyell, TamJones, Barry (East Flint)Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)
    Deakins, EricJones, Dan (Burnley)Stoddart, David
    Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)Kaufman, GeraldSwain, Thomas
    de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir GeoffreyLamond, JamesThomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
    Dell, Rt Hon EdmundLitterick, TomThomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
    Dempsey, JamesLoyden, EddieThompson, George
    Doig, PeterMabon, Dr J. DicksonThorne, Stan (Preston South)
    D-ormand, J. D.McCartney, HughTierney, Sydney
    Duffy, A. E. P.MacCormick, IainTinn, James
    Dunnett, JackMcElhone, FrankTomlinson, John
    Dunwoody, Mrs GwynethMacFarquhar, RoderickTomney, Frank
    Eadie, AlexMcGuire, Michael (Ince)Urwin, T. W.
    Edge, GeoffMackenzie, GregorWainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)
    Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)McMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)
    Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)McNamara, KevinWalker, Terry (Kingswood)
    Evans, John (Newton)Marks, KennethWard, Michael
    Ewing, Harry (Stirling)Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)Watkinson, John
    Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)Watt, Hamish
    Faulds, AndrewMillan, BruceWeitzman, David
    Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.Miller, Mrs Millie (Ilford N)Welsh, Andrew
    Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)White, Frank R. (Bury)
    Flannery, MartinMorris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)White, James (Pollok)
    Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)Whitehead, Phillip
    Ford, BenMurray, Rt Hon Ronald KingWhitlock, William
    Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)Noble, MikeWilley, Rt Hon Frederick
    George, BruceOakes, GordonWilliams, W. T. (Warrington)
    Gilbert, Dr JohnO'Halloran, MichaelWilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
    Ginsburg, DavidOrme, Rt Hon StanleyWilson, Gordon (Dundee E)
    Gould, BryanOvenden, JohnWoodall, Alec
    Gourlay, HarryOwen, Dr DavidWoof, Robert
    Graham, TedPalmer, ArthurWrigglesworth, Ian
    Grant, George (Morpeth)Park, GeorgeYoung, David (Bolton E)
    Grant, John (Islington C)Pendry, Tom
    Grocott, BrucePenhaligon, DavidTELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    Hamilton, James (Bothwell)Prescott, JohnMr. Donald Coleman and
    Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)Reid, GeorgeMiss Margaret Jackson.

    Question accordingly negatived.

    New Clause 20

    Procedure For Periodic Review Of Operation Of Act

    'The Secretary of State shall, within three years of the first of the dates appointed by order by the Secretary of State under section 90(2) and, thereafter, every five years lay before Parliament a report on the operation of those sections of the Act which are in force at that time; and the Secretary of State shall institute such research as is necessary to provide the information for these reports'.—[ Mr. Norman Fowler.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    7.30 p.m.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    The clause is perhaps the most fundamental proposal we shall be discussing today. Too often we have passed laws and simply left the matter there. We have not sought to monitor the effect of those laws in operation. Therefore, the House has been deprived of up-to-date and continuous information about how legislation is working in practice. When legislation breaks down, there is a public outcry and probably demands for debates in this House and calls for action. We have seen that process take place in many instances, not least concerning the legislation dealing with children and young persons.

    I should also like to make a general point relating to our recent debate on the Finer Report on One-Parent Families. I believe that there is a basic lack of information on social problems and how to cope with them. As a nation we must devise better ways to identify social problems and to monitor the effect of our policies in tackling the problems. This point was made by the Central Policy Review Staff set up by the Conservative Government. In a report published earlier this year that organisation made the point that the best conceived policies sometimes fall short at the point of delivery to their clients. One example lies in the social services and the low rate of take-up benefits or services designed for the public.

    Many programmes also lack adequate operational yardsticks. Without such yardsticks and information, it can be hard to make proper comparisons between programmes and objectives or to take informed decisions about priorities and phasing. The United States Commission on Crime observed that there was no other area in which so much money was spent with such an imperfect idea as to aims and achievements. The same is true of social policy generally. We spend far too little on identifying social problems and on research into how we should tackle those problems. We also spend too little on monitoring our declared policies.

    The clause seeks to do two major things. It places on the Secretary of State responsibility to lay before Parliament a report within three years of the coming into operation of the legislation, and thereafter at five-yearly intervals. In addition, it lays upon the Secretary of State a responsibility to institute such research as is necessary to provide information on those reports. Even on present standards that will not place any great strain on public expenditure, but it will break new ground and set a precedent for social legislation passed in this House. It will provide built-in research for legislation, as I believe is the wish of the House, and I am sure that it will have the support of both sides of the political spectrum.

    We attach great importance to this clause for we believe that it will be an excellent development in the legislative process. We urge the Government to meet us on this point.

    I am glad to say that the Government are happy to accept the new clause. I agree with many of the remarks made by the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Fowler). There is a tendency to lay down legislation that is static, and there is no more important area than that represented by the living law than in the area of children's legislation.

    The law can change, and on a number of issues I have taken discretionary power or power by regulation to amend legislation, particularly on the question of time limits and other aspects. I have also made abundantly clear to the House—and I emphasise this strongly—that if people want a manifestation of the seriousness of our financial difficulties over the next three to four years, they need to look no further than the way in which this legislation is being introduced. I am sure that nobody doubts my commitment to this legislation, but I am determined that it shall not be introduced on the basis that we should will the ends but fail to provide the means. Nothing could do more harm to the best interests of children.

    I believe that it would be beneficial for the House to have an opportunity to look at the implementation of this legislation. I have made it clear that the Bill cannot be implemented as fully as I—and I suspect hon. Members on both sides of the House—would wish to see. Therefore, we hope that the House will take the opportunity to review progress at fairly regular intervals.

    Some of the powers that we have sought to take as affecting the lives of children have been criticised. It is essential that those powers are wielded only by local authorities and adoption agencies which we are satisfied adopt the highest standards of social work practice. That is the spirit in which we accept the clause.

    The reference in the clause to research must depend a little on available resources, but there is access to the Secretary of State through regional social work services that will provide a source of information and seek to monitor the effects of legislation. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that the results should be put before the House. I recommend that the clause should be accepted.

    I am delighted that the Minister has been able to accept the clause. Had I been called to speak before the Minister, I intended to say that he was obviously straining at the leash to accept these provisions. Therefore, I am more than pleased that he has been able to do so.

    I believe that the passage of the present Bill has seen the House of Commons at its best. There has been an acceptance on both sides, and certainly from the Minister, that we must decide these matters with judgment and balance. We cannot be certain that we have achieved that aim and have reached the right decisions on each and every provision in the Bill. However, we can certainly take the view that the clause will enable the House to review the operation of the Bill and, as and when necessary, to change the legislation after it has been in operation for some time.

    The Bill as it stands inevitably must have a number of flaws, mistakes and loopholes. Reviews over the years will enable us to close those loopholes and to correct mistakes. The research and information that we hope will become available will enable us to do this as effectively as possible. This will be a good investment for the future. We shall be able to prevent other mistakes, and perhaps tragedies such as the Maria Colwell case. Every penny spent on research and the collation of information will enable Parliament to legislate more effectively in the years to come. By pushing through the new clause we shall not have to wait another 15 or 20 years, if that is necesary, to amend the present Bill. The Minister and the Government are to be warmly congratulated on having accepted the new clause so promptly.

    On behalf of the Opposition, I should like to state that we are grateful to the Minister of State. This is the second time in two days that we have had the opportunity of helping the Government in their policy. Obviously we are now making progress. In all seriousness, I state that we are most grateful. I hope that when the economic climate permits, new research will continue and that it will not be simply a question of an administrative collection of figures. I hope that there will be original research. After all, research is probably one of the most cost effective means of seeing how the legislation is implemented.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

    New Clause 23

    Amendment Of Section 1(2) Of The Children And Young Persons Act 1969

    'In section 1(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, the following paragraph is inserted after paragraph ( b):—

    "(bb) he is or is likely to become a member of the same household as a person who has been convicted of any of the offences mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 in respect of him, or in respect of another child or young person; or"'—[Dr. Vaughan.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this it will be convenient to discuss new Clause 24—Amendment of section 2 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969—and Government Amendment No. 253.

    New Clauses 23 and 24 are both technical clauses amending the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. For convenience we have separated the two new clauses, but they have the same general objective. They seek to improve the conditions for taking children into care. As the Minister said in Committee, it is a question of technique. In Committee the Minister gave an undertaking to discuss this matter with the various organisations concerned.

    New Clause 23 aims to protect against adults who have been convicted under Schedule 1 offences. We have added a corporate clause to include protection not only where a child has been taken into care but where there may have been action against any other child or young person. We have looked carefully at Government Amendment No. 253. In my view there is a fine legal distinction between our new Clause 23 and Government Amendment No. 253. The intention is clearly the same, but our wording is rather better. I ask the Minister to consider accepting new Clause 23.

    New Clause 24 seeks to cover situations where, although no actual injury or damage may yet have occurred to the child, there are strong grounds for thinking that such an injury or damage might occur in the near future. For example, this would include children who are left for long periods or completely on their own so that they are clearly at risk. It can be argued that that type of situation is already covered by an earlier section of the Children and Young Persons Act. I put it to the Minister that he should seriously consider accepting new Clause 23 and perhaps also new Clause 24, but I should like to have his comments on that matter.

    7.45 p.m.

    I do not believe that there is anything of substance between us on this matter. The Government amendment would add as a further primary ground for the making of an order under Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 the fact that a person who had been convicted of one of the offences listed in Schedule 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 is or may become a member of the same household as the child in respect of whom the proceedings were brought.

    New Clause 23 and the amendment have been tabled to meet a point raised by the Association of Directors of Social Services in its "comments on the Children Bill" that paragraph (bb) should be added to Section 1(2) of the 1969 Act as a new primary ground for taking care proceedings.

    We prefer the Government amendment, but not just because it is tabled by the Government. We knew that the hon. Gentleman's proposal was on the Order Paper. He may remember that I have modified that proposal even further towards meeting the point about "likely". We use the words "or may become". The reason we prefer the Government amendment to new Clause 23 is that the latter does not require the court to consider, before making an order, the proba- bility that the child in respect of whom proceedings have been brought will be ill-treated, neglected, and so on, within the terms of the existing Section 1(2)(a) of the 1969 Act which reads:
    "(a) his proper development is being avoidably prevented or neglected or his health is being avoidably impaired or neglected or he is being ill-treated; or".
    We regard this consideration as essential before the court should be able to make an order. Unless there were a probability that any of the conditions in Section 1(2)(a) would be satisfied there would be no justification for making an order.

    The words "or may become" would enable a court to make an order before the person who had been convicted of a relevant offence actually became a member of the same household as the child in respect of whom the proceedings were brought. That is, of course, one of the points that is made in new Clause 23.

    I did not believe that our previous amendment covered the matter sufficiently cleary. That is why we have redrafted it. I prefer the way we have dealt with the amendment as opposed to the rather technical method used by the hon. Gentleman. I am advised that ours is a clearer method of dealing with the matter for the reasons I have tried to illustrate.

    I am grateful to the Minister. If proceedings have taken place against another child—not a child in the household to which these particulars relate—does Government Amendment No. 253 cover that eventuality as does our new Clause 23? I do not believe that it does.

    If the person involved has committed an offence against another child, I believe that that is covered by our amendment. A particular case has been the subject of a recent inquiry. The report of that inquiry is with the Government and will soon be published. It is for that reason that I have paid particular attention to this aspect of the legislation. In this case we are able to make legislative changes prior to the presentation of a report. In that case and in a number of other cases which I have been considering recently, I am satisfied that that eventuality is covered by the amendment.

    New Clause 24 would add a declaratory subsection to Section 2 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 for the purpose of simplifying the interpretation which courts would be expected to place on Section 1(2)(a) of the 1969 Act. The objections to it are that the wording is defective and that it adds nothing to the meaning of the words already in Section 1(2)(a). The wording of the clause is defective because the words in lines 2 and 3,
    "if it is proved that the care and protection exercised over the relevant child by his parent or guardian is such that he is placd at risk".
    impart the opposite meaning to that which is intended. It would seem that these words are intended to mean that it is the absence or lack of care and protection which is placing the child at risk. I am sure that that is what the hon. Gentleman is after. This is an important distinction because the word "care" in the context of the child denotes concern or interest in his welfare and is thus a positive measure for the good of the child which is hardly likely to place him at risk unless misconceived.

    I urge the hon. Gentleman not to press new Clause 24. There is no difference between us on new Clause 23 and Amendment No. 253. I have tried to redraft Amendment No. 253 to meet the main substance of new Clause 23. I recommend the House to accept Amendment No. 253.

    We accept what the Minister said. As I said in opening, this is a technical matter. We accept that new Clause 23 is covered by the Government's Amendment No. 253, but naturally we would have preferred our own wording. In the circumstances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

    Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

    New Clause 25

    Conviction Of Person Involved In Care Of A Child

    '(1)A chief officer of police shall supply such information as to the conviction of certain persons involved in the care of children as may be prescribed by regulations to be made by the Secretary of State.

    (2) The regulations to be made under this section shall specify—

  • (a) the categories of persons authorised to seek and receive information as to convictions,
  • (b) the categories of persons about whom such information can be supplied,
  • (c) the form in which the information shall be given, and
  • (d) such other matters as may be requisite to the supply of such information'.—[Mr. Norman Fowler.]
  • Brought up, and read the First time.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    We debated this clause in Committee and voted upon it, but we felt that it was sufficiently important that the House should have the opportunity to express its view upon it.

    The clause concerns a matter to which several hon. Members, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Mr. Bowden), attach importance—namely, the conviction of a person involved in the care of a child.

    The case was put to us by the Association of Directors of Social Services, and it is correct to place on record the outstanding contribution that the directors have made to our debates through the information which they have supplied.

    I understand that it is common practice for the police to search their records at the request of local authorities seeking information about possible criminal convictions recorded against prospective adoptive or foster parents. Such arrangements have the backing of the Home Office, but there appears to be no statutory framework for such action. It is normally only in connection with prospective or foster parents that the police will co-operate in this way.

    The Association of Directors of Social Services makes the point that there are other circumstances where the right to knowledge of criminal convictions would be valuable. The directors give as an example consideration whether to permit a child to return to his home under supervision. Clearly it would be helpful to know in such a case whether there were any convictions recorded against, for example, the stepfather to whom the child is returning. Certain types of convictions could—not necessarily would—indicate that it would be unwise to return a child to such a household. In that way, the system would operate as a safeguard. After all, we are seeking to provide as many safeguards as we can. In principle, the Government have a strong case to answer.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown referred to the case of Maria Colwell. I am sure that he will doubtless wish to refer to that case again if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

    I should like to refer to the case of Roger Gleave, which shows that it is possible in our society for a man with convictions for offences concerning children to have further responsibility for children and then to commit further offences. Gleave ran a series of hostels in London. The only defect in the arrangement was that in 1959 he had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment for an offence concerning an Army cadet and in 1971 was given a two-years' suspended sentence for an offence involving a 14-year-old boy. That man was not only operating a hostel for children and young persons but was receiving official help for doing so. The story was completed this year when three men working for Gleave were sent to prison for life for the murder of Billy McPhee, a former resident in one of Gleave's hostels. The Minister knows that we are pressing for an independent inquiry into that case and that we shall want to return to it later.

    The only reason that I mention Gleave's case is to make the general point that it is possible for someone involved with children to have mat kind of record.

    The position is that, in order to obtain information about previous convictions, the local authority depends largely upon the co-operation of the local police. Yet the information could be absolutely vital to a child's future.

    We submit that there should be a specific requirement in the legislation regarding the obtaining of such information rather than have it left to a voluntary informal arrangement. The detail would be spelled out by regulations to be made later. The Department would be free to carry out wide consultations into the form that those regulations should take. I am sure that this proposal will have the support of hon. Members on both sides of the House. I urge the Government to accept it.

    This clause covers the case to which the hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Fowler) referred, which was the subject of the television programme "Johnny Go Home". That programme led me to communicate with the Minister regarding the stress which is laid elsewhere in the Bill on the suitability of homes for children. The man concerned was running not a children's home but an institution for homeless adults, and children or young persons became involved. The Minister's reply, that institutions of this kind, which are primarily for the use of the homeless, will be covered by the need for the absolute protection of young people, did not entirely satisfy me. I appeal to the Minister to bear in mind that it is not sufficient merely to protect children through institutions which are run by voluntary organisations for children. He must go further, because there are institutions for adults which, as a sideline, take in young people who may become the victims of this type of person preying on them.

    I am sure that the Minister will concede that this is an important clause, and I hope that he will feel able to accept it.

    I make no apology for reminding the House that Maria Colwell, who died in my constituency, was viciously battered to death by her stepfather, a man who by the age of 21 had two convictions for violence. It is no exaggeration to say that, if that information had been in the hands of the Social Services Department at an earlier stage when the question of Maria's care and protection was before the court, she would probably—I put it no higher than "probably"—be alive today.

    I know that the Minister has studied the document produced by the East Sussex County Council, "Children at Risk". Indeed, he has made some kind comments about it, and I should like to repeat my tribute to it. Paragraph 90, on page 41, states:
    "We also asked the police about their attitude to providing information about people and this is relevant to the points raised in the Report about references that could have been obtained about Maria's stepfather. The police operate at present under the Home Office Circular 140/73 'Police Reports of Convictions and Related Information' which strictly only enables the police to release information to the Social Services Department about prospective adoptive and foster parents. This excludes information, for example, about a child's prospective stepfather. The Sussex police are willing to co-operate, but need the formal agreement of the Home Office to the disclosure of such information. We feel that this matter is of particular importance, and the need for the information to enable informed decisions to be made about children outweighs the other disadvantages about individual privacy, and so on. We think that this is a particular area where present practices should be altered on a countrywide basis."
    I stress that that is a report from the local authority in whose area Maria Colwell died.

    8.0 p.m.

    I hope that the Minister will take the recommendations of that report to heart and accept new Clause 25. No doubt he is aware that consultations are going on between the East Sussex County Council and the Home Office, and if he is able to tell the House that it will be possible to get over this problem without the new clause we shall take a different approach to it, but if he is not able to give that assurance, I hope that he will accept the clause.

    I mention the tragic case of Richard Clark, a Scottish case, to reinforce what has been said about the need for the new clause.

    I said in Committee that Richard Clark was introduced to hospital in May 1974 suffering from a massive cerebral haemorrhage as a result of severe ill-treatment and battering from the household in which he had been staying. His mother was charged with attempted murder on one day and on the same day senior social workers transferred Richard to a household where the two persons, the man and the woman, had already been convicted under Section 12 of the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act of having neglected their children by failing to provide adequate food, clothing, lodgings and medical attention and keeping the children in a verminous condition. If information were made freely available in an emergency situation, it would be much less likely for a child to be transferred to a household where he might be battered within an inch of his life, as happened in this case.

    I understand the civil liberties argument, and I have some sympathy for it. It seems that there might be something in the argument about the police making available background information which does not refer to a conviction. But I suggest to the Minister that what matters is the interest of the child, and I should hate to think that in an emergency situation in which a child might be vulnerable and his life might be in danger the House would not consider it necessary that the information should be made freely available to senior social workers.

    The full history of the Colwell and Clark cases does not point to the fact that it was only because of a lack of information from the police that the incidents occurred. The worrying thing in both cases was that there was no lack of social workers going into these homes.

    The major failing was the lack of liaison between social workers operating from different agencies. Between the time of the crisis and the eventual incidents there was ample time for social workers to have identified the problem and taken action to remove the children from their homes. I hope that the impression will not be given, as I am sure it is not intended to be, that it was primarily because of a lack of police co-operation that these children suffered in that way.

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if a senior social worker knew that a man and woman had been convicted of a serious crime against children he would be unlikely, in an emergency situation, to transfer children to their care?

    On looking ahead to the business before us I notice that the Minister, in Amendment No. 248 to a later clause, refers to information about a household to which one might return a child. He refers there not to the person to whom the custody of the child can be given but to other persons in that household.

    The Minister knows how concerned I have been on this score, and if he has seen fit to put forward that amendment to Clause 38 it seems that he should also see fit to accept the new clause, because there will be times when, without the provisions of the clause, the information will not be available to allow the social worker to judge whether a child should be returned to a home or whether a child should be in a particular home.

    It seems to me that we shall make the work of our local authority social services departments that much more difficult if we deny them this kind of information which will be given, I am sure, in the greatest of confidence, and only in those cases where it should be given. We are not seeking the disclosure of every bit of information which any chief police officer may collect. We are seeking to protect the interests of the child. That is the reason for the new clause and, because of his later amendment, I cannot see how the Minister can refuse it.

    This debate is familiar. There was a similar amendment in Committee and the arguments both against and for it were similar to those that we have heard today. We are united in our belief that there is a need for better communications. It is the lack of communication that has often been the reason for an incident to children when it might have been avoided. Almost every inquiry, whether formal or informal, into where child care has gone wrong has shown a lack of communication.

    In all these arguments the case has been put forward for the statutory provision of information. In many cases the argument has been that this is not the right way, and one has tried instead to arrange an informal process, or sometimes a formal process such as the area review committees, for the exchange of information.

    The House should be under no illusion that what we are debating here, as we did in Committee, is a major change in our legislative practice. Such a provision as this would be the first instance in English law of a specific statutory obligation on the police to provide information of this kind. I do not believe that such a major change ought to be made, or can be made, in just this legislation.

    I hold strongly to the view that the best interests of the child should come first, but I do not think that this can be confined to cases involving children. Mention has been made of the Gleave case. The hon. Gentleman knows that my right hon. Friend has a letter outstanding in reply to what he wrote on this matter. There is a question of the form of inquiry, but nobody has denied the need for an inquiry into this case, and in the light of that inquiry it would be wrong for anyone to prejudge any consequences that may come out of it.

    The hon. Gentleman asked whether the Home Office had reached a conclusion on the request of East Sussex County Council. I am not in a position to answer that, but I imagine that it has not. I think that its conclusion is that it is within the county council's discretionary powers to reach a voluntary agreement at a local level between the police force and the social services department, and I am not convinced that the way to deal with the problem is to impose a statutory obligation on the police force.

    I hope that the Minister has not missed the point that I am anxious to stress. As things stand, there can be no voluntary agreement between the Sussex police and the East Sussex social services department because of the existing regulations. The police in Sussex are anxious to supply the information, but at the moment they cannot do so.

    I agree, because I understand that it does not require legislation. It is within the power of the Home Office, either by guidance or in particular circumstances, to agree that it should be done. This is primarily a Home Office matter, not one for my departmental responsibility. I understand that it would require formal agreement from the Home Office but that it does not require legislation for it to give that agreement.

    What I was trying to say to the hon. Gentleman is that this case, where the request has come from a local police force in combination with the social services department, will be in a way a test case for what he wants and what the House would wish to establish—a close working relationship between the police force locally and the social services department. The question posed by the amendment is whether we should make this statutory.

    I am not convinced that by making a statutory provision one ensures better communication. Indeed, in many cases where there was statutory provision—one hon. Member mentioned the provision for visits—it had not been complied with. We delude ourselves if we think that statutory provision ensures better communication.

    There are major civil liberties issues involved here. I remain of the conviction that this is the wrong place in which to make such a major change. The change may come, through voluntary arrangements, as I would prefer, or through a statutory obligation if it is felt by the Home Office, the Police Federation and the police constables that that is what is necessary, but I do not think that a statutory provision here which would make a precedent is the right way to proceed.

    I hope that the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland will explain where Scotland stands in this respect, since this discussion has related to the powers of the Home Office. If the Home Office has power to make decisions of this kind, has he consulted it? If so, what is its attitude? I should also like to know the attitude of the Scottish Office.

    I am speaking for the Government, but since this is mainly the departmental responsibility of the Home Office, it can be taken for granted that the Home Office feeling is that the House should be urged to resist the new clause and that a statutory provision is not the way to deal with this need. No one denies the need for better communication or wishes to restrict access to information. This raises the whole question of which the House is very jealous in other respects—how much police information, dossiers and the rest, should be made available to other Departments.

    I know that the hon. Member holds a different view, but he is asking us to establish for the first time in English law a specific statutory obligation on the police to provide such information. He cannot get away from the fact that this would be a major change involving major issues of civil liberties, issues which the House would be well advised to take very cautiously. It is for the Home Office to agree to this policy, which has been put to it. If I am wrong, specific legislation would be needed and that would have to be produced in its widest context. I believe that this is an aspect which will be looked at in the inquiry, but I must ask the House to resist the new clause.

    8.15 p.m.

    If I may deal with the Scottish situation, Scottish local authority social work departments already have access to records of conviction in relation to prospective foster and adoptive parents. The arrangements are given effect in the administrative circular, a version of which is about to be issued to police forces which will strengthen this situation. The circular says:

    "A director of social work inquiring about applicants to act as foster or adoptive parents may be given details of their convictions."
    It adds:
    "A director of social work inquiring about prospective employees in residential establishments for children may be given details of their convictions."

    Both Ministers have made the point. They claim that civil liberties are at stake, but what we want is already being done in some areas and we wish to ensure that it can happen everywhere. It cannot be argued that new and fundamental civil liberties questions are involved—

    There is all the difference in the world between a police officer making available information for a local social service department under a voluntary agreement and a statutory provision that he shall supply information.

    But the Minister contends that new and fundamental issues are involved. That is not so. This already happens in some areas.

    To reinforce my hon. Friend's point, the police willingly provide information about prospective adoptive or foster parents. Surely it is only a narrow line that we are asking that it should be available in the case of stepparents.

    I agree entirely. We are all seeking to safeguard the interests of the children. This debate has concentrated on circumstances in which men with convictions have got through the net, so the system is not working that well. Statutory provision will not necessarily be the ideal solution or solve all problems for ever, but it is more likely to lead us to an ideal solution than the informal and inadequate arrangement we have. I must advise my hon. Friends to vote against the Government.

    Division No. 369.]

    AYES

    [8.17 p.m.

    Adley, RobertHayhoe, BarneyRawlinson, Rt Hon Sir Peter
    Aitken, JonathanHenderson, DouglasReid, George
    Arnold, TomHooson, EmlynRenton, Rt Hon Sir D. (Hunts)
    Atkins, Ht Hon H. (Spelthorne)Hordern, PeterRenton, Tim (Mid-Sussex)
    Bain, Mrs MargaretHowell, Ralph (North Norfolk)Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
    Banks, RobertHowells, Geraint (Cardigan)Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
    Beith, A. J.Hunt, JohnRodgers, Sir John (Sevenoaks)
    Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)Hutchison, Michael ClarkRoss, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
    Bottomley, PeterIrvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)Royle, Sir Anthony
    Bowden, A. (Brighton, Kemptown)Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)Sainsbury, Tim
    Boyson, Dr Rhodes (Brent)James, DavidShaw, Giles (Pudsey)
    Brittan, LeonJones, Arthur (Daventry)Shaw, Michael (Scarborough)
    Brotherton, MichaelJopling, MichaelShelton, William (Streatham)
    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)Kellett-Bowman, Mrs ElaineShepherd, Colin
    Buchanan-Smith, AlickKershaw, AnthonySims, Roger
    Budgen, NickKilfedder, JamesSkeet, T. H. H.
    Bulmer, EsmondKing, Evelyn (South Dorset)Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
    Chalker, Mrs LyndaKing, Tom (Bridgwater)Spicer, Jim (W Dorset)
    Churchill, W. S.Knight, Mrs JillSpicer, Michael (S Worcester)
    Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)Knox, DavidSproat, Iain
    Cockcroft, JohnLatham, Michael (Melton)Stanbrook, Ivor
    Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)Le Marchant, SpencerSteel, David (Roxburgh)
    Costain, A. P.MacCormick, IainSteen, Anthony (Wavertree)
    Crawford, DouglasMacfarlane, NeilStewart, Donald (Western Isles)
    Crowder, F. P.Madel, DavidStewart, Ian (Hitchin)
    Dodsworth, GeoffreyMates, MichaelStradling Thomas, J.
    Douglas-Hamilton, Lord JamesMather, CarolTaylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
    Durant, TonyMawby, RayTebbit, Norman
    Dykes, HughMaxwell-Hyslop, RobinThomas, Rt. Hon P. (Hendon S)
    Eden, Rt Hon Sir JohnMeyer, Sir AnthonyThompson, George
    Ewing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)Mills, PeterTrotter, Neville
    Fairgrieve, RussellMitchell, David (Basingstoke)van Straubenzee, W. R.
    Fisher, Sir NigelMoate, RogerVaughan, Dr Gerard
    Fletcher-Cooke, CharlesMontgomery, FergusViggers, Peter
    Fookes, Miss JanetMoore, John (Croydon C)Wainwright, Richard (Colne V)
    Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)Morgan, GeraintWakeham, John
    Freud, ClementMorrison, Hon Peter (Chester)Walder, David (Clitheroe)
    Goodhart, PhilipMudd, DavidWatt, Hamish
    Gorst, JohnNeubert, MichaelWeatherill, Bernard
    Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)Newton, TonyWelsh, Andrew
    Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)Nott, JohnWiggin, Jerry
    Gray, HamishOnslow, CranleyWilson, Gordon (Dundee E)
    Grieve, PercyOsborn, JohnWinterton, Nicholas
    Grylls, MichaelPage, John (Harrow West)Wood, Rt Hon Richard
    Hall-Davis, A. G. F.Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)Young, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)
    Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)Parkinson, CecilYounger, Hon George
    Harrison, Col Sir Harwood (Eye)Pattie, Geoffrey
    Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon MissPenhaligon, DavidTELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Hastings, StephenPercival, IanMr. Adam Butler and
    Havers, Sir MichaelPink, R. BonnerMr. Richard Luce.
    Hawkins, Paul

    NOES

    Allaun, FrankCastle, Rt Hon BarbaraDunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth
    Anderson, DonaldClemitson, IvorEadie, Alex
    Armstrong, ErnestCocks, Michael (Bristol S)Edge, Geoff
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)Cohen, StanleyEvans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)
    Atkinson, NormanColeman, DonaldEvans, Ioan (Aberdare)
    Bagier, Gordon A. T.Concannon, J. D.Evans, John (Newton)
    Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)Ewing, Harry (Stirling)
    Bates, AlfCorbett, RobinFaulds, Andrew
    Bean, R. E.Cox, Thomas (Tooting)Fernyhough, Rt Hon E.
    Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)Fitt, Gerard (Belfast W)
    Blenkinsop, ArthurCryer, BobFlannery, Martin
    Boardman, H.Dalyell, TamFletcher, Ted (Darlington)
    Booth, AlbertDeakins, EricFord, Ben
    Bradford, Rev RobertDean, Paul (N Somerset)Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)
    Bray, Dr Jeremyde Freitas, Rt Hon Sir GeoffreyGeorge, Bruce
    Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)Dell, Rt Hon EdmundGilbert, Dr John
    Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)Dempsey, JamesGinsburg, David
    Buchan, NormanDoig, PeterGould, Bryan
    Buchanan, RichardDormand, J. D.Gourlay, Harry
    Callaghan, Jim (Middleton & P)Duffy, A. E. P.Graham, Ted
    Campbell, IanDunlop, JohnGrant, George (Morpeth)
    Carter-Jones, LewisDunnett, JackGrant, John (Islington C)

    Question put, That the new clause be read a Second time:—

    The House divided: Ayes 147, Noes 163.

    Grocott, BruceMcMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)Smith, John (N Lanarkshire)
    Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)McNamara, KevinSpearing, Nigel
    Harper, JosephMarks, KennethSpriggs, Leslie
    Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)Stallard, A. W.
    Hatton, FrankMarshall, Jim (Leicester S)Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)
    Hayman. Mrs HeleneMillan, BruceSwain, Thomas
    Heffer, Eric S.Miller, Mrs Millie (Ilford N)Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
    Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)
    Huckfield, LesMorris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)Thorne, Stan (Preston South)
    Hughes, Rt Hon C. (Anglesey)Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)Tierney, Sydney
    Hughes, Mark (Durham)Murray, Rt Hon Ronald KingTinn, James
    Hughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)Newens, StanleyTomlinson, John
    Hughes, Roy (Newport)Noble, MikeTomney, Frank
    Hunter, AdamOakes, GordonUrwin, T. W.
    Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford)O'Halloran, MichaelWainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)
    Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)Ovenden, JohnWalker, Terry (Kingswood)
    Janner, GrevilleOwen, Dr DavidWard, Michael
    Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)Palmer, ArthurWatkins, David
    John, BrynmorPark, GeorgeWatkinson, John
    Johnson, Walter (Derby S)Pendry, TomWeitzman, David
    Jones, Alec (Rhondda)Prescott, JohnWhite, Frank R. (Bury)
    Jones, Barry (East Flint)Roberts, Albert (Normanton)White, James (Pollok)
    Jones, Dan (Burnley)Robertson, John (Paisley)Whitehead, Phillip
    Kaufman, GeraldRoderick, CaerwynWhitlock, William
    Lamont), JamesRodgers, George (Chorley)Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
    Litterick, TomRooker, J. W.Woodall, Alec
    Loyden, EddieRoper, JohnWoof, Robert
    Mabon, Dr J. DicksonRose, Paul B.Wrigglesworth, Ian
    McCartney, HughRoss, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)Young, David (Bolton E)
    McElhone, FrankSedgemore, Brian
    MacFarquhar, RoderickShaw, Arnold (Ilford South)TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    McGuire, Michael (Ince)Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)Mr. James Hamilton and
    Mackenzie, GregorSkinner, DennisMr. David Stoddart.
    Mackintosh, John P.Small, William

    Question accordingly negatived.

    New Clause 28

    Amendment Of Section 44 Of The Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    'In subsection 44(1) of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 the following paragraphs are inserted after subsection (1)( a)—

    "(b) to pay a penalty or damages whether with or without any other requirement by virtue of making an order that the penalty or damages be paid by the parent or guardian of the child instead of by the child, unless the children's hearing is satisfied that the parent or guardian cannot be found or that he has not contributed to the grounds under which the referral has been brought by neglecting to exercise due care of the child, or
    (c) to pay security for his good behaviour by virtue of making an order that the security be paid by the parent or guardian of the child, or
    (d) to carry out such unpaid community service as the hearing may consider appropriate to the treatment of the child given the grounds for referral and the age, mental condition and physique of the child."

    and the following subsection is inserted after subsection (2)—

    "(2A) In making an order under paragraphs (b) and (c) of subsection (1) hereof, the hearing shall give the parent or guardian time to pay such penalty, damages or security but should payment not be made within the stipulated period or any extension thereof which may subsequently be granted by the hearing, then the hearing shall be entitled to vary the supervision requirement provided that nothing in this subsection shall be construed as limiting the powers of variation contained in Section 47 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 or any other section of that Act."'.—[Mr. Cordon Wilson.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

    This clause is for Scotland one of the most important that we are discussing this evening, because it gives the House the first opportunity since the 1968 Social Work (Scotland) Act was passed to consider the powers of the panels and the children's hearings which were set up for dealing with children in difficulty and trouble where the emphasis was placed on the need for treatment.

    8.30 p.m.

    During the five years or so that have elapsed since the new system was introduced there has been, particularly recently, a rising volume of complaint as to whether resources are adequate to implement the concept under which this enlightened system was introduced. One of the complaints concerns the main method of dealing with children. Under Section 44 of the Social Services (Scotland) Act, after the grounds of referral have been accepted or proved, the course of action taken to deal with the child has been by way of a supervision requirement. That requirement covers almost nothing and everything. Under it there could be what used to be the old probation order whereby children were subject to supervision, so that in a sense they were on good behaviour.

    The alternative would be to adopt a requirement for residence in a specified establishment, usually a List D school, or a school which used to be an approved school. Under the first course a child is expected to be of good behaviour under the supervision of the social work department, with right of review by the hearing, with or without action being taken by the supervisory officer.

    The problem is that the good intentions of this system—and I am one of the many who are enthusiastic about it—have in a sense been undermined by the lack of resources available to social work departments and the children's hearings. Sometimes this lack of resources covers an inability to find a place in a List D school. The Government have been trying to find resources, but there has been difficulty about getting children into such a school immediately the hearing has decided on that course of action. That is the worst of all possible worlds, because if the treatment is desirable, the last thing the child should be told is to go away and come back, perhaps in six weeks' time, when he might get in. Sometimes, depending on the vacancies available, the child can go immediately to the establishment of the hearing's choosing.

    The fundamental concept in the 1968 Act was not any criminal sanction against the child, and I agree with that. It is premature to bring in criminal sanctions during formative childhood years. Criminal sanctions tend to scar a child's life. There has been frustration among members of panels about the absence of resources. Frustration is also caused by a shortage of experienced social workers or by social workers changing departments or areas.

    A lack of continuity may have robbed the system of the guidance envisaged when the legislation was first enacted. In many instances such guidance was given, and it would be wrong to say that the intentions of the Act have always been thwarted. Probably in the majority of cases the opposite is the case.

    In certain areas where there is a shortfall in social workers supervision has not been of the desired standard. The whole object of these provisions for dealing with children was to see that guidance could be given on the spot by the social worker and would override the bad influence of parents when they were not taking sufficient care of the child or were misleading the child in its development. Because of these two factors, the social work system and the children's hearings have in some ways come under attack by the public.

    I instance a child who has been repeatedly before a hearing. Perhaps because of parental background or trends of behaviour, that child became eligible for a List D school but was unable to get into that school. Two things might follow. The first is a hiatus—the time during which there is no execution of the decision of the hearing, which makes the hearing itself look ridiculous. It reduces the authority of the members of the panel who are discussing the question with the parents if they cannot deliver the goods, if they think that it is better for the child to be dealt with in that fashion.

    The second way in which the system has fallen down is if the panel, seeing that there will not be any prospect of finding a home or educational establishment suitable for the child and recommended by the social work department, perhaps even on occasion with the agreement of the parents, has to decide on some other alternative. That other alternative might very well be supervision without the adequate back-up which the whole system would require. In those two situations—and they have occurred and there is sufficient evidence to show that they have—this new scheme, which has been in operation for five years, although the enactment was seven years ago, could fall into disrepute and that might lead to its abolition.

    What I am suggesting in the new clause is that, accepting that it is unlikely in the current United Kingdom situation that there will be any major increase in social work allocation, or any major programme to provide either the List D schools or other residential establishments required—approved schools or List D schools are not the only things and one must look at other training schools or establishments which might be of advantage to the child, because it is the treatment of the child which is looked upon as the important thing—the panels are faced with choosing between supervision and detention. What else are they to do?

    The whole concept of a children's hearing was a discussion among the reporter and the members of the hearing and parents. It was intended to be, and probably is, one of the main strengths of the whole new arrangement. But if other children find that their peers are getting off lightly for what used to be called offences but are now, in the language of the Social Work Act, described as social indiscipline, or something of that sort, that is an encouragement for others to follow suit. What is suggested in the new clause is an intermediate method of providing ways by which the hearings can adopt alternative solutions which are not primarily dependent upon the provision of new accommodation, which may not be available because of lack of Government funds, ways to help to push up the authority of the panel members and give them more authority in trying to encourage parents to co-operate within the system.

    I should like to go over the proposals and explain them in relation to the problem I have outlined. The first thing I should like to make clear is that these proposals are not intended to reintroduce the criminal or quasi-criminal system which used to operate, either under Section 50 of the old Juvenile Courts Act or the Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1957, or the sheriff juvenile courts, which in many other parts of the country took the place of the special JP courts. What it does is to introduce a supervision requirement, which is the basic formula produced in the Social Work (Scotland) Act. That is the provision that in given circumstances, if the hearing finds it useful and desirable and, above all, in the best interests of the child—that must be the crucial criterion—to make an order incorporated in the supervision requirement, a penalty or damages be paid either by the child or by the parent. The option is given, and the formula that is adopted has worked for many years.

    A penalty is not a fine and has no criminal sanction behind it. It will not necessarily scar the future development of the child. Such a penalty could bring home to a range of children who come from good family backgrounds the need for more care and individual responsibility. Although arrangements are made for the penalty to be paid by the parent or guardian, it could, by agreement between the parent or guardian and the panel, be deducted from the pocket money of the child appearing before the panel.

    In my earlier days, as a solicitor, I had some experience as a JP and procurator fiscal in an old Section 50 juvenile court. I have seen parents who really wanted to encourage their children to come back. There was no problem in requiring constant supervision or introduction into a List D school. It is helpful to the child for the money to be deducted from his pocket money, because it brings home to him the importance of individual responsibility for his acts.

    The second ground—damages—could relate to a child who had committed a minor form of vandalism. The provision means that by agreement there could be some form of restitution, which is one of the best ways of dealing with vandalism. It brings home to the child before the panel for the first time that there is individual responsibility for damaging public or private property. It makes the child realise that no one lives in limbo and that someone else in society is automatically affected by any action he takes.

    I attach a great deal of weight to the second provision, which is for paying security for good behaviour. When a supervision requirement is made the hearing may consider that in addition a little more encouragement should be given to the child and perhaps to the parent. The hearing may say that if a certain sum of money is paid—not necessarily in a lump sum but by instalments—that payment will be lodged for security of good behaviour of the child, in addition to the supervision order. That gives more chance for the parent to co-operate with the supervising officer in giving guidance to the child. That co-operation is essential. The power is an intermediate one that the hearings do not have at present.

    The third power contained in the clause is that there should be a requirement—again, built into the main order—that the child should:
    "carry out such unpaid community service as the hearing may consider appropriate to the treatment of the child given the grounds for referral and the age, mental condition and physique of the child."
    I am not suggesting a form of forced labour, merely that there is room for action by the child who has been before the hearing to help him gain an understanding of communal responsibility.

    I am thinking, for instance, of an order for the removal of graffiti which may have been put on walls, either by that child or by someone else—it does not necessarily have to be related directly to the grounds on which the child has been brought before the hearing. Perhaps it could be the picking up of litter, or clearing up the back lots of tenements, to encourage responsibility. Perhaps it could be dishwashing in an old people's home. It could be an additional useful power to have the child do gardening work at the homes of old folk. All these things would be of use to the whole community and they would bring in some form of community service.

    8.45 p.m.

    How does one enforce this community work? What sanctions are provided?

    The main concept of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 is treatment of the child and co-operation with the parents and an attempt to talk matters out with them and gain their co-operation. It is only in those terms that corrective action can be taken. It can be taken in institutions, but all too often it proves a failure there, with supervision officers, for example able to give only a limited time to a case. The concept is set against the background of co-operation.

    In drafting my proposed subsection (2A), I had to make a decision about what sort of power there should be to implement the decision of the hearing. My first decision was in relation to some monetary penalty in that there should be a transfer of the arrangement to, say, the sheriff court, which has the machinery by which, in adult cases, fines can be col- lected. But I thought that that would go against the whole concept of the Act under which these hearings were introduced.

    Needless to say, it was a strong temptation to say that panels must have the opportunity to enforce the conditions, and my proposal is that this should be done if possible by way of agreement for a certain range of jobs and that if agreement were not reached, the hearing could make an order. If the parents did not comply with that order, it would be necessary, under the terms of the clause, to bring the case back before the hearing for alternative action.

    I am not suggesting that that is the strongest way of enforcement. If the system did not work out—and we have committed ourselves to a rolling review of the legislation—there is no reason why, if it was considered necessary, we should not build in more compulsory methods of enforcement. But, meanwhile, let us try this system of keeping the basic provisions of the Social Work Act while trying to give them more power and trying to work in co-operation with the children.

    In any event, certain of the powers proposed are those in which many parents worried about their children—those I am considering would not be the habitual attenders before children's panels but those there for the first time, having kicked over the traces—would be willing to participate. My main argument is that, after some five years of experience, certain gaps in the present system have emerged.

    The resources are not adequate at present. Above all, something has to be done, and it has to be done quickly. Committees are looking at this matter, but we cannot always wait for committees, knowing the burden of legislation with which the House is dealing. Therefore, I ask the House to adopt the clause. It would do a great deal to help to build up social responsibility in Scotland, and it would be of help to the children's hearings in carrying out the functions entrusted to them under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.

    It is rather strange that the incipient punitive tendencies of the SNP should emerge in a matter like this. The hon. Member might well have gone the whole hog and suggested the abolition of the children's panels. Whatever fancy words the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) may use, however he may dress up his proposed clause, what it means is the introduction of juvenile court measures, which have not worked.

    Had the hon. Member come from one of the fancy areas on the West side of Glasgow, I should not have been surprised, but I understand that he had a practice in Paisley, and he must have heard of Ferguslie Park. Some community work is done there with graffiti. Usually the cleaning up is of Ferguslie Park and not the graffiti.

    He cannot be serious in what he is suggesting. This is not the problem that the children's panels face. The resources have never been available for the Social Work (Scotland) Act to operate, and yet the hon. Member seems to be suggesting that we should scrap the Act. When we ask the obvious questions, the whole of the fairy tale breaks down and the argument becomes a nonsense.

    What he meant came out later. He said that if this did not work, consideration could be given to more compulsory measures being used to enforce the fine or punishment or whatever is determined by the panel. The one naturally leads to the other. I should not have objected too much if he had said quite clearly that he did not believe that the methods of remedial and corrective treatment used by the children's panels were right, and that we should punish the children or the parents. Had he said that, I should have thought much more of him, or at least known where he stood. He is simply trying, as I see it, to get the best of both worlds.

    The system is not working in Scotland. Certainly it is not working in Paisley. But, having said that, let us say why it is not working. There are no places in these schools. There is no other accommodation where children can be given corrective treatment. This is not to condemn the concept, but it is to say that we must have these facilities and resources. There are not enough social workers—and there are many reasons for that. In the Strathclyde area the pressures on the social work department are enormous, especially as a result of the reorganisation of local government, and we shall not succeed unless the Government are determined to see that the resources are made available. If that proves to be the case, we are talking now in a vacuum and there is no meaning behind our words.

    I operated in juvenile courts as a magistrate knowing that what I did would not have much effect on the basic problem. The basic problem has to be solved by social workers, and in that description I include a whole range of other people in the community. It will not be solved by punishment. It will not be solved by putting people in gaol. We need a new approach, and the basis of that new approach is to be found in the Social Work (Scotland) Act. Any derogation from that destroys the whole concept.

    Let us not despair. Let us put pressure on the Government for the resources that are required so that the policy may become meaningful.

    The hon. Gentleman is being a little harsh in his strictures. If, after all the protestation, the Government provide little or no additional money for the necessary background facilities, what does the hon. Gentleman suggest should be done?

    We must continue to apply the pressure. I do not know of any other remedy. That is the only way in which we have been able to get anything done in the past. But that is the remedy. The remedy is not to revert to what was there previously because it did not work.

    To be fair, the hon. Member for Dundee, East has not suggested flogging, the whip or the hangman's rope, although it may be that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Taylor) will. But even those did not work. They did not reduce the incidence of delinquency. They did not reduce vandalism.

    The Social Work (Scotland) Act was a serious attempt to come to grips with the problem. Unfortunately, the Act having been introduced by a Labour Government in 1968, we then had a Conservative Government who did not believe in it and who starved the service of the necessary resources. But I ask this Government to give it a chance as it was conceived and to give it the resources.

    I was extremely interested to hear the speech of the hon. Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson), and he echoes the opinion of all of us in wishing that resources could be made available. It was a request made constantly during the Second Reading debate, and the Minister made it clear that, if a Children Bill were to be passed, other resources and back-up facilities would have to be provided.

    The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) has moved what in my view is a valuable clause. His is not a heavy-handed approach. In some areas, and certainly in my own constituency, vandalism is a very serious problem. When the stage is reached where old ladies write to their Member of Parliament saying that they have had windows blown out by airguns and asking what is to be done, it becomes clear that some firm action must be taken.

    This proposal appears to provide a subtle and simple approach. It allows a children's panel powers which may restrain a child from violence. If a panel can impose an order requiring a parent or guardian to pay damages for a child's act of vandalism, the parent or guardian will put pressure on that child not to commit illegal acts. What is more, if a parent or guardian has to put up security for the child's good behaviour, that parent or guardian has a vested interest in seeing that the child does not break the law. This might well produce quick results.

    9.0 p.m.

    Thirdly, if the panel can order unpaid community service, persons engaged in vandalism may well make restitution for their acts of vandalism. In a skyscraper in my constituency which houses 250 families there is graffiti scrawled on the walls from top to bottom. Residents dislike the graffiti intensely. Those responsible for the graffiti might perform a useful service to the community if they were told that they were required to remove the graffiti instead of going to a detention centre.

    Rather than being too harsh on the hon. Member for Dundee, East, we should ask the Government to consider the clause favourably. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dundee, East on his ingenuity in introducing it, because a proposal such as this might well act as a deterrent and restrain youths from committing acts of vandalism.

    Strangely, perhaps, on this occasion I do not share the strictures of the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) which have been expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley (Mr. Robertson). Nor do I share my hon. Friend's strictures about expenditure on social work. After allowing for inflation, expenditure on social work has grown at the rate of about 8 per cent. per annum. The Conservative Government of 1970 to 1974, who were responsible in large part for the implementation of the 1968 Act after the Labour Government left office in 1970, should not be decried for their efforts as regards social work.

    The hon. Member for Dundee, East paid tribute to the original concept of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 and the establishment of children's hearings. The decision to abolish juvenile courts in Scotland was bold and imaginative. It was decided that in the case of juveniles the concept of crime and punishment was no longer to apply, that there was to be a recognition that what was necessary was not fines or probation as such but a tailoring of the treatment of the case to the needs of the individual within the family and home circumstances.

    It is understandable that some people are impatient because there is no positive proof that the new system is operating effectively. Such people want to be able to say that since 1971, when the system of children's hearings began, there has been a reduction in vandalism and that fewer people are now referred to children's hearings than were referred to the juvenile courts.

    The people who take that view do not realise, perhaps, that many children come before the children's hearings not because they have committed an offence or because they have been involved in antisocial behaviour but because they are in need of care and treatment which so far the community has been unable to provide.

    I wish that someone would come forward with an easy, clear answer to the problem of recidivism and to anti-social behaviour such as vandalism, but there is no easy answer. All of us are worried about vandalism and about the fact that it is an offence which seems to be committed many times over by one youth.

    However, paradoxically, there was much in what my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley said, namely, that the only way to ensure that someone will not commit an offence is to hang him. But there are few people who would argue that that penalty should be exacted even for the offence of murder.

    In our society there is great compassion for children who live in difficult circumstances. Because of old slum conditions or arising from the new slums—multi-storey blocks, and so on—some children now find it difficult to come to terms with society. It is all too facile to say that the present system is all wrong and generally to rail against vandalism as though that can easily be cured.

    Complaints about the operation of the children's hearings system centre on the shortage of approved schools. It is unfortunate that Parliament looks to local authorities to provide the whole answer. The responsibility for the provision of List D school places under the 1968 legislation is placed on local authorities. In spite of the growth of local authority expenditure, I shall act like Oliver Twist in asking for more funds.

    Unfortunately, the local authorities have not responded by providing enough List D places. There is a shortage of such places. Behind the complaints about these schools there is a misconception in the mind of the public about the purpose of List D schools. A List D school is not a juvenile prison. Many people think that it is. We hear cries to the effect that we should take young persons out of society and lock them away for a period. People forget that the child must return to the community. We must seek a method by which children can be cared for and treated within the community. We must help them to overcome the handicaps of their background and the difficult circumstances in which they live.

    The children's hearings occurred in an experimental situation, in which there were no guidelines to steer them along the way. Nowhere in the world is a system operated in this way. In the beginning reliance was placed on List D schools. People tended to regard the children's backgrounds as being so bad that the only solution was to be found in List D schools. I have listened in a private capacity to one or two children's hearings. Knowing the circumstances, I said to myself "Thank goodness I do not have to make a judgment in this case". It is very difficult to make judgments in such cases. It is easy to blame the tribunals. Although they rely too much on List D schools, I do not condemn them for that.

    We must now look to intermediate treatment, in the sense of individual experimental schemes, to deal with the problem, without necessarily taking the children out of the community. Anyone interested in the problem should inspect Panmure House in Edinburgh. It is a kind of youth club. Important work is being carried out there to inspire confidence in the children. Many of these children, who are in trouble time and again, have no friends in society. Very often they have no friends in the home.

    It is said that parents should be responsible for restitution for acts of vandalism and that they should put up a bond or make a payment. I shall not use the word "fines". The problem is that the parents of 99 out of 100 children in trouble do not give a damn. That is part of the reason why the children land in trouble. Perhaps payment by the parents would work in a minority of cases, but the system would not work in the majority of cases. I am not convinced that the principle of monetary payments or restitution by parents has yet been proved. The problem is being examined now by at least one committee. I am prepared to await the studies now being made before going further.

    Will the hon. Gentleman say to which studies he refers?

    I refer to the working party set up under the auspices of the Scottish Office. The Minister will be able to give its title.

    I have some sympathy with paragraph (d) of the new clause. Perhaps we should look at the question of social responsibility and social restitution, although I doubt whether those matters in themselves will change the troubles we appear to be facing. However, it may be helpful if we encourage such an approach.

    My impression is that the clause may have some relevance in relation to Section 44 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 under which a child in need of compulsory measures of care may be required to submit to supervision in accordance with such conditions as a children's hearing may impose. Then subsection (8) provides that:
    "A supervision requirement shall be in such form as the Secretary of State may prescribe."
    Perhaps something could be done administratively to encourage that aspect.

    I hope that the clause will not be pressed to a Division. I believe that a period of four years is too short a time in which to come to conclusions about the success or failure of a process. Bold experiments are taking place in Scotland which may give a lead to many other parts of the United Kingdom, and indeed to Europe as a whole. It is a mistake to condemn the whole system because in certain cases there may have been failures. We need a longer period in which to examine the situation.

    The hon. Members for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) and Paisley (Mr. Robertson) appear to have worked on the simplest assumption—an assumption which I hope they will examine and reconsider—that penalties do not deter. Indeed, the hon. Member for Paisley referred to my views on capital punishment when dealing with the relevance or otherwise of deterrent penalties.

    I hope that both hon. Gentlemen will examine an Answer that was given to me only last week by the Secretary of State for Scotland relating to convictions for murder before and after abolition. They will discover that in Scotland in not a single year in the 20-year period between 1945 and 1965 did convictions for murder amount to double figures. But they will also find that in not a single year since 1965 has the total been fewer than 20. We must remember that the 20-year period after the Second World War was a time of social breakdown, and yet I repeat that in that period the murder figure did not rise above 10.

    Is not one of the reasons for the figures given by the hon. Gentleman that before abolition such charges did not involve murder but culpable homicide? Has he compared the total number of criminal deaths year by year rather than simply those connected with charges of murder? Indeed, will he tell the House the last time that there was a hanging for murder in Scotland, irrespective of the state of the law? I can tell him the name of that case if he wishes to know it. Does not that affect the hon. Gentleman's views on murder?

    The situation is becoming difficult for the Chair. We are discussing not murder but the Children Bill. I hope that hon. Gentlemen will keep to that subject.

    I was trying to deal with the argument advanced by Labour Members that penalties do not deter. I was seeking to point out that there was ample evidence that they did deter. I was asking hon. Members to examine the Written Answer showing that the figures for culpable homicide moved in exactly the same way. I shall not dwell on that point. I ask the hon. Member for Paisley to examine the figures, to establish whether he is right in saying that there is no evidence that penalties deter. I believe that there is ample evidence.

    9.15 p.m.

    The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) has brought forward a moderate and sensible new clause that should command the support of all reasonable hon. Members. The hon. Member for Paisley astonished me when he said that the Social Work (Scotland) Act was not working. He said that we must wait until the resources were available. I was astonished by his compassion for youngsters in trouble, but I wonder whether he feels the same compassion for the victims suffering the consequences of vandalism. He has said that until resources are available, we shall not be able to do anything practical. However, there is no evidence that resources will be available. What is more important is that there is no evidence that even if resources were available the situation would improve.

    First, let me deal with resources. There is a shortage of List D school places. It is interesting to note that since the introduction of the Act the shortage has become more acute. We have no idea of what is the real shortage of List D places, because, apart from the fact that there is a waiting list, it must be borne in mind that many panels have decided not to send children to List D schools because of the long waiting list. That will be within the knowledge of the hon. Member for Paisley and the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North.

    Secondly, we must consider whether the provision of more cash would relieve the shortage of social workers. There is no evidence that the provision of cash would make good the deficiency in the number of social workers. The hon. Member for Aberdeen, North was kind enough to refer to the good old days when the Conservatives were in power and when there was plenty of money. I can remember some happy and indeed some unhappy times when I was a Minister at the Scottish Office. I used to come here and constantly say to Labour Members that there was no shortage of cash for social work, that nothing was being held back because of a shortage of money. I know that there are conflicting views within the Conservative Party about whether we created the money in the right way, but there certainly was plenty of it. It was even suggested that perhaps the money was just printed. At any rate, I know that there was plenty of it at that time.

    The jam in the provision of social workers appears to be the difficulty in finding field worker placements. A doctor has to do his practical work in a hospital. A social worker has to undertake a field work placement before becoming qualified. Because of the shortage of field workers, it is not possible to find sufficient field work placements. Even if hon. Gentlemen were successful in persuading their miserable Government colleagues to adopt the financial principles that the Conservatives adopted to ensure that there was plenty of cash, it would not solve the problem. It will be a long time before any progress can be made in this direction.

    The hon. Member for Dundee, East asked what we should do in the interim if money was tight or if the availability of cash would not resolve the shortage of social workers. We cannot allow the upsurge of vandalism to continue because even if the hon. Member for Paisley will not accept it, I am sure that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Central (Mr. McMillan) will accept that there are many people in his constituency, and mine, who are living a life of hell because of vandalism by youngsters and because of other anti-social behaviour by young people. First, we have a duty to deter youngsters from getting involved in antisocial acts. This is where the deterrent comes in. It is important to have a deterrent to warn young people against becoming involved in this kind of unhealthy anti-social activity.

    Secondly, we need to reassure our police forces. Anyone who has had discussions with police officers in our cities, if not in other areas of Scotland, will accept that many of them are fed up to the teeth with the attitude of youngsters when apprehended if those youngsters are at the age which involves their going before a panel. I think that you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, in your constituency, and other hon. Members in their constituencies will know that the police are fed up to the teeth because they believe that it is a waste of time to apprehend youngsters who are guilty of offences of vandalism if they are of the age that means going before a panel. The panel does not strike fear into the hearts of youngsters who engage in anti-social activities. We need something that will strike a measure of fear into the hearts of those contemplating anti-social behaviour.

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that one deterrent would be a policeman on every street corner, or possibly a policeman on the beat? The hon. Gentleman said that the police were fed up. Will he give us a few examples? The hon. Gentleman once had a very close interest in acting for the police. Is he talking about police in motor cars or on the beat?

    I am talking about police in general. The hon. Lady is quite right. I had the pleasure of very close contact with the police when I was adviser to the Scottish Police Federation before the Conservatives got into power and things had to change. I keep in close touch with the police, as does the hon. Lady. It probably would be helpful to have a policeman on every street corner, but there is no point if youngsters who throw bricks through windows respond to police inquiries by saying "You can only send me to a panel". The hon. Lady will be aware that that is the attitude of many young people. I accept that it would be helpful to have more policemen on the beat, but, with the shortage of manpower, that is not possible. However, the police can and do perform a useful service.

    Something must be done. I do not think that new Clause 28 provides the kind of answer I would prefer. The hon. Member for Dundee, East will be aware that I would go a lot further and that it would be successful. However, I accept that this would be a useful interim measure. It has the merit of probably commanding the support of a large number of hon. Members and people outside. Basically, the proposal is that a youngster coming before a panel would be given the option of doing some community service or of being sent to a List D school. That would be a useful step forward. It is a suggestion that should be tried.

    One thing stands out a mile: it would be wrong and shameful to allow the present situation to continue for another five years. The indications are that the problem is getting worse. The public are losing confidence in the panels in their present form. Some action must be taken. This proposal is a useful step forward. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dundee, East and, if he takes his proposal to a Division, I shall certainly give it my support.

    The problem that we are discussing is not new. If anything is wrong, it is the same phenomenon as has been wrong in the past—namely, that Acts of Parliament are passed without the necessary financial support to back them up. That is what is wrong now.

    We have all had experience of dealing with young offenders, and several courses of action can be taken to deal with them. First, they can be allocated to List D schools. Secondly, they can be allocated to assessment centres. Thirdly, they can be sent home to be supervised by social workers.

    Frankly, none of these three categories of action is possible. There is no room at List D schools for the next six months; there is no room at the assessment centre in Lanarkshire; and the social work director advises us that he has not sufficient social workers to supervise young offenders at home. Therefore, we are left with the old standby of sending young offenders to the police for a warning. Of course, some of these youngsters go to the police so often that they put their fingers to their noses at the uniform and do what they like.

    This is the stage that we have reached, and I should like to draw attention to one aspect of the whole problem. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes) that List D schools are not the answer. I say that because I have come across boys who have been expelled from List D schools, and they run around the streets carrying out acts of violence. I have taken this matter up and asked whether, after a panel, acting under the law has allocated a person to a List D school for treatment, the head of that school has authority to expel the individual who has been sent there for treatment, and I have been advised by the Secretary of State that the head of the establishment is within his rights to take that action. I know one offender who has been expelled from two List D schools. There is no use sending him to an institution of that type. He is already roaming the streets committing one foul act after another.

    One of these individuals smashed up three houses in one day. I should like to hear my hon. Friend's views if he arrived home and found his wife in tears, his house broken into and smashed twice in one week. I am sure that he would be demanding stern action against the culprits who committed such an outrage against decent well-behaved members of the community.

    What type of offences have we in mind when we talk about the new clause? I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson). He put forward a good case for his new clause, but the one fact that he overlooked is that many of the depredations are committed by young people under 10 years of age. One cannot give them useful community work to do at that age, and the problem is what to do with them.

    A new primary school was virtually burned to the ground, resulting in a loss of £100,000, by three youths, the youngest of whom was nine. It is difficult to find an effective way of dealing with these individuals at that early age. Only recently a serious tragedy occurred when a young boy was carrying some glue. Another youth went by and set light to the glue, which spread over the hands of the boy who was carrying it and caused him considerable damage. What does one do to a person who commits a series of offences such as that? There is no List D accommodation. There is no assessment centre accommodation. There are no social workers to help. Is he to be sent back home? Is that the attitude that we are to adopt? What is wrong with our society today? The answer is that it is sick, and one reason for this is the lack of discipline. It is as well to face this problem, because we cannot allow the present situation to continue indefinitely.

    I remember being called from an engagement one night to attend a panel hearing which had been suspended so that I could get there. We had before us a boy who had stolen 27 cars and at the age of 14 had been driving along the main thoroughfares of some of our towns. His relatives appealed to the panel "For God's sake take him away and put him in a place of safety somewhere". There was "no room at the inn", and that boy was sent back to the very relatives who were pleading for the panel to take him away.

    9.30 p.m.

    We cannot stand by in such a situation. That is only one of the many cases with which I could weary the House. We tried to have that boy placed in the only security institution in Scotland, at Montrose, but were told there was a six-month waiting list. Why should we introduce any legislation if we do not back it up financially?

    My hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen, North told me when he was a Minister about the intermediate experiments. We have been conducting them in Coatbridge and Airdrie for a long time, but they are not the answer to the problem. We still have to send these children home. When they are convicted of serious offences, we take them to the local hills and show them Wallace's monument, or take them canoeing on Loch Lomond. They have committed outrages like cutting old people's telephone wires or putting smoke bombs through their letter boxes and setting their houses on fire.

    This is no joke. It is a serious problem and we must decide how, when and where to introduce a deterrent. Altering the present law will mean legislation and take some time, but we could do much more. Could the new clause give any additional help or introduce new deterrents? Could it deal with these individuals more effectively? I am talking about people who habitually destroy property and attack others. It is dreadful to hear of an old person having been clubbed to the ground by hoodlums too young for the present law to deal with. It is a tragedy to let this state of affairs continue.

    If we are to use the present Act, let us make it effective. I do not see how the new clause can operate without financial support. The present Act might work—although I have my doubts—with financial support. When one has to tell relatives who are pleading for a boy to be taken away that he must go home, when he then goes in the front door and out the back and commits another crime, there is something lacking in our society.

    The authorities are doing all they can. In Coatbridge, we provide area policemen—that is, beat policemen—in the difficult areas. I wish they had police dogs with them as well. One sees at football matches what a deterrent to hoodlums a trained police dog is. It is tragic when business people virtually in tears report £1,000 worth of damage to their plate glass windows, yet when the police catch the culprits by excellent detection and take them to the children's hearing, nothing can be done with them. This is a serious problem which we ought to consider when examining this clause and the existing law.

    I hope that we have said enough to make the Minister roll up his sleeves, go to the Chancellor and say, "Finance must be made available." We know that there is an inflation problem and that we are all out to save the pound. We also know that at the same time we are duty bound to make sure that the law should be given the opportunity to work. It never has been given the opportunity because it has not had the financial backing. I hope that as a result of this debate the finance will be forthcoming.

    The hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) has raised a wide point of principle with his new clause. It goes very much wider than matters dealing with children and concerns reparation of a type almost appropriate to a Criminal Justice Bill. The Government have rather laid themselves open to this type of proposal. The clause contains an important principle, which applies just as much to children as to other classes of offenders. It is important because it may help to bring about a greater degree of parental responsibility. The lack of such responsibility, at school and when children grow older, is one of the problems in our society. This reparation type of proposal helps to some extent because as a form of punishment—and we kid ourselves if we think that punishment is not important in this context—it could lead to a greater degree of understanding on the part of the child of the seriousness of the offence committed than do other types of punishment we sometimes think of.

    I listened with interest to the hon. Member for Aberdeen, North (Mr. Hughes). There is a need for some form of intermediate treatment between the pat on the head and sending a child to a List D school. The type of project he mentioned, Panmure House in Edinburgh, is a good example. It may be a mistake to put List D schools under local authorities for finance purposes. Such schools have a difficult job. I have one in my constituency, Rossie School, which does a first-class job in very trying circumstances. I take this opportunity of commending the amount of good work which the staff does in difficult conditions.

    There is a place for some form of intermediate treatment. I support the idea in principle. I was a leader of a youth club for over 10 years and in that capacity worked closely with the police. I know the kind of work that can be done when the police bring someone along who is in trouble. There is a problem of supervision. I am worried about legislating for this type of treatment in advance of making sure that there is proper supervision.

    However, I fully support the principle of the proposal and I await with interest what the Minister will say. While the idea may be more appropriate to a Criminal Justice Bill, the Criminal Justice Act for England and Wales gave powers to the courts for reparation on an experimental basis, and I think that the experiment has worked out fairly well

    If the Minister will not accept the spirit of the amendment, or say that it is a principle he is prepared to apply in Scotland, my hon. Friends and I would feel inclined to support the hon. Member for Dundee, East.

    I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) and his hon. Friends for giving us the opportunity of an interesting and well-informed debate. If accepted, the clause would give the children's hearings three new powers. These would be the power to require restitution from parents or guardians; power to require parents to pay security for good behaviour, or caution, as it is known in Scots law; and power to require community service. Subsection (2A) requires the hearing to give the parent or guardian time to pay, but, if payment is not made, makes it clear that the hearing can vary the supervision requirement.

    There are three parts to the clause—three new powers suggested for the hearings. They are not new thoughts, and they had had their obvious attractions in the past. But for one general and several particular reasons the clause cannot be accepted.

    The main point is that these new powers are too important and their presentation is too final in form for them to be accepted, snap, at this last-gasp stage in the Bill. The disposals by children's hearings have not been under detailed consideration in the course of the Bill and they cannot be given proper consideration in the time left. The Secretary of State has already indicated that he proposes to consult about possible changes in the powers and procedures of children's hearings and of the courts in relation to procedures against children. A consultative memorandum may be issued very shortly. Any points that the memorandum does not endorse could readily be raised by others in the context of the consultative process and be given proper consideration there.

    On the specific proposals, the Secretary of State's current view, as contained in a reply to a Parliamentary Question in July 1974, is that he would not seek to give children's hearings the power of restitution. Nor did the Kilbrandon Committee favour compulsory restitution, which it thought would not be likely to benefit the child or encourage the cooperation of the parents.

    The clause seeks to empower the hearings to require restitution from parents or guardians. The general question of reparation by the offender to the victim in Scotland is under consideration by the Dunpark Committee. The committee, although primarily concerned with issues in the criminal courts, has received evidence from children's panels and others. It would be inappropriate to legislate in what is a difficult field without looking carefully at the considered views of the committee. The committee is expected to report in the course of 1976.

    To a great extent the community service proposal in paragraph (d) links with what has just been said. Reparation can be not only financial payment of damages but practical restitution. Direct practical restitution is often a very effective disposal and is quite often, we understand, achieved under the present system, sometimes by tacit or explicit agreement of all the parties, sometimes by the attachment of conditions to a supervision requirement. Conditions could also be used for community service; but the situation is rather different from that of a short adult sentence of community service as a non-custodial disposal. If the social worker is to work with the child, he must have the possibility of working out an appropriate treatment programme after consideration. Questions of this kind and of who would organise and supervise the community service are the kind of things best considered once the Dunpark Committee has reported.

    9.45 p.m.

    Before concluding I should touch on the point raised by the hon. Member for Dundee, East regarding security for good behaviour. Security for good behaviour is a rather different point. It is certainly a point that we would expect to be raised

    Division No. 370.]

    AYES

    [9.50 p.m.

    Adley, RobertBanks, RobertBowden, A. (Brighton, Kemptown)
    Aitken, JonathanBeith, A. J.Boyson, Or Rhodes (Brent)
    Arnold, TomBennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)Bradford, Rev Robert
    Atkins. Rt Hon H. (Spelthorne)Boscawen, Hon RobertBrittan, Leon
    Bain, Mrs MargaretBottomley, PeterBrotherton, Michael

    in the consultations we shall be having on possible changes in powers and procedures of the hearings; and that, in our view, is the right place to consider what would in theory at least be a substantial new power for the hearings involving financial powers and expanding their powers for the first time to include parents as well as children.

    But whatever the outcome of the considerations we must not expect miracles from this kind of power. The courts have this power of caution and in relation to those children who came before the courts in 1973 it was used in only three cases out of 3,000.

    In conclusion, this amendment is very relevant, but action should await the Dunpark Committee and detailed consideration of possible changes in the powers and procedures of children's hearings, about which we shall be consulting soon.

    Therefore, I must resist the new clause.

    I shall endeavour to be brief. What we have heard from the debate, which I shall not rehearse, is that there is worry and doubt about what is happening in relation to dealing with children's offences. There is a crisis. It has been admitted by many people who may not necessarily support the proposals that I have brought forward. The answer is resources, but when will they come? We may wait until Kingdom Come for them. Certainly there is no real prospect of resources being made available to deal with this problem in the foreseeable future. If cash restrictions are imposed upon local authorities—there are suggestions that they may be imposed—social work might be one of the first casualties.

    With those views I ask the House to accept the new clause, because something must be done now. What we need is action now, rather than prevarication.

    Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

    The House divided: Ayes 147, Noes 160.

    Brown, Sir Edward (Bath)Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
    Buchanan-Smith, AlickIrving, Charles (Cheltenham)Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
    Budgen, NickJames, DavidRoss, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
    Bulmer, EsmondJones, Arthur (Daventry)Royle, Sir Anthony
    Butler, Adam (Bosworth)Jopling, MichaelSainsbury, Tim
    Chalker, Mrs LyndaKellett-Bowman, Mrs ElaineShaw, Giles (Pudsey)
    Churchill, W. S.Kershaw, AnthonyShaw, Michael (Scarborough)
    Clark, Alan (Plymouth, Sutton)Kilfedder, JamesShelton, William (Streatham)
    Cockcroft, JohnKing, Evelyn (South Dorset)Shepherd, Colin
    Cooke, Robert (Bristol W)King, Tom (Bridgwater)Sims, Roger
    Costain, A. P.Knight, Mrs JillSkeet, T. H. H.
    Crawford, DouglasKnox, DavidSmith, Cyril (Rochdale)
    Crowder, F. P.Latham, Michael (Melton)Spicer, Jim (W Dorset)
    Dodsworth, GeoffreyLe Marchant, SpencerSpicer, Michael (S Worcester)
    Douglas-Hamilton, Lord JamesLuce, RichardSproat, Iain
    Dunlop, JohnMacCormick, IainStanbrook, Ivor
    Durant, TonyMacfarlane, NeilSteel, David (Roxburgh)
    Eden, Rt Hon Sir JohnMadel, DavidSteen, Anthony (Wavertree)
    Evans, Gwynfor (Carmarthen)Mates, MichaelStewart, Donald (Western Isles)
    Fairgrieve, RussellMather, CarolStewart, Ian (Hitchin)
    Fisher, Sir NigelMawby, RayStradling Thomas, J.
    Fletcher-Cooke, CharlesMaxwell-Hyslop, RobinTaylor, Teddy (Cathcart)
    Fookes, Miss JanetMeyer, Sir AnthonyTebbit, Norman
    Fowler, Norman (Sutton C'f'd)Mills, PeterThomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)
    Goodhart, PhilipMitchell, David (Basingstoke)Thomas, Rt. Hon P. (Hendon S)
    Gorst, JohnMoate, RogerThompson, George
    Gow, Ian (Eastbourne)Montgomery, FergusTrotter, Neville
    Gower, Sir Raymond (Barry)Moore, John (Croydon C)van Straubenzee, W. R.
    Gray, HamishMorgan, GeraintVaughan, Dr Gerard
    Grieve, PercyMorrison, Hon Peter (Chester)Wakeham, John
    Grylls, MichaelMudd, DavidWalder, David (Clitheroe)
    Hall-Davis, A. G. F.Neubert, MichaelWatt, Hamish
    Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)Newton, TonyWeatherill, Bernard
    Hampson, Dr KeithNott, JohnWelsh, Andrew
    Harrison, Col Sir Harwood (Eye)Onslow, CranleyWiggin, Jerry
    Harvie Anderson, Rt Hon MissOsborn, JohnWilson, Gordon (Dundee E)
    Hastings, StephenPage, John (Harrow West)Winterton, Nicholas
    Havers, Sir MichaelPage, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)Wood, Rt Hon Richard
    Hawkins, PaulPattie, GeoffreyYoung, Sir G. (Ealing, Acton)
    Hayhoe, BarneyPenhaligon, DavidYounger, Hon George
    Hooson, EmlynPercival, Ian
    Hordern, PeterPink, R. Bonner
    Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)Rawlinson, Rt Hon Sir PeterTELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Howells. Geraint (Cardigan)Reid, GeorgeMrs. Winifred Ewing and
    Hunt, JohnRenton. Rt Hon Sir D. (Hunts)Mr. Douglas Henderson.
    Hutchison, Michael ClarkRenton, Tim (Mid-Sussex)

    NOES

    Allaun, FrankDell, Rt Hon EdmundHughes, Mark (Durham)
    Anderson, DonaldDempsey, JamesHughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)
    Armstrong, ErnestDoig, PeterHughes, Roy (Newport)
    Atkins, Ronald (Preston N)Dormand, J. D.Hunter, Adam
    Atkinson, NormanDuffy, A. E. P.Irving, Rt Hon S. (Dartford)
    Bagier, Gordon A. T.Dunnett, JackJackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)
    Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)Dunwoody, Mrs GwynethJanner, Greville
    Bates, AlfEadie, AlexJenkins, Hugh (Putney)
    Bean, R. E.Edge, GeoffJohn, Brynmor
    Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)Johnson, Walter (Derby S)
    Blenkinsop, ArthurEvans, John (Newton)Jones, Alec (Rhondda)
    Boardman, H.Ewing, Harry (Stirling)Jones, Barry (East Flint)
    Booth, AlbertFaulds, AndrewJones, Dan (Burnley)
    Bray, Dr JeremyFernyhough, Rt Hon E.Kaufman, Gerald
    Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)Flannery, MartinLamond, James
    Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)Leadbitter, Ted
    Buchan, NormanFord, BenLitterick, Tom
    Buchanan, RichardFowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)Loyden, Eddie
    Callaghan, Jim (Middleton & P)George, BruceMabon, Dr J. Dickson
    Campbell, IanGilbert, Dr JohnMcCartney, Hugh
    Carter-Jones, LewisGinsburg, DavidMcElhone, Frank
    Castle, Rt Hon BarbaraGould, BryanMacFarquhar, Roderick
    Clemitson, IvorGourlay, HarryMcGuire, Michael (Ince)
    Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)Grant, George (Morpeth)Mackenzie, Gregor
    Cohen, StanleyGrant, John (Islington C)Mackintosh, John P.
    Colquhoun, Mrs MaureenGrocott, BruceMcMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)
    Concannon, J. D.Hamilton, James (Bothwell)McNair-Wilson, P. (New Forest)
    Conlan, BernardHamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)Marks, Kenneth
    Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)Harper, JosephMarshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
    Corbett, RobinHarrison, Walter (Wakefield)Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)
    Cox, Thomas (Tooting)Hatton, FrankMillan, Bruce
    Cryer, BobHayman, Mrs HeleneMiller, Mrs Millie (Ilford N)
    Dalyell, TamHeffer, Eric S.Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)
    Deakins, EricHooley, FrankMorris, Alfred (Wythenshawe)
    Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)Hoyle, Doug (Nelson)Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)
    de Freitas, Rt Hon Sir GeoffreyHuckfield, LesMurray, Rt Hon Ronald King

    Newens, StanleySedgemore, BrianWalker, Terry (Kingswood)
    Noble, MikeShaw, Arnold (Ilford South)Ward, Michael
    Oakes, GordonSilkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)Watkins, David
    O'Halloran, MichaelSillars, JamesWatkinson, John
    Ovenden, JohnSkinner, DennisWeitzman, David
    Owen, Dr DavidSmall, WilliamWhite, Frank R. (Bury)
    Palmer, ArthurSmith, John (N Lanarkshire)White, James (Pollok)
    Park, GeorgeSpearing, NigelWhitehead, Phillip
    Pendry, TomSpriggs, LeslieWhitlock, William
    Prescott, JohnStallard, A. W.Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
    Roberts, Albert (Normanton)Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)Woodall, Alec
    Robertson, John (Paisley)Swain, ThomasWoof, Robert
    Roderick, CaerwynThomas, Ron (Bristol NW)Wrigglesworth, Ian
    Rodgers, George (Chorley)Thorne, Stan (Preston South)Young, David (Bolton E)
    Rooker, J. W.Tierney, Sydney
    Roper, JohnTinn, JamesTELLERS FOR THE NOES:
    Rose, Paul B.Tomlinson, JohnMr. Donald Coleman and
    Ross, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)Urwin, T. W.Mr. David Stoddart.
    Rowlands, TedWainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)

    Question accordingly negatived.

    New Clause 29

    Duty To Promote Welfare Of Child

    'Before making an adoption order or refusing to make an adoption order otherwise than on grounds of incompetency or on grounds falling within section 12, the Court shall be satisfied that to make or refuse the order as the case may be will safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood and the Court shall, so far as practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the making or refusing of the order and give due consideration to them having regard to his age and understanding'.—[ Mr. Gordon Wilson.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    With this we shall take the following amendments:

    No. 237, in page 2, line 38, leave out Clause 3.

    No. 260, in Clause 3, page 2, line 38, at beginning insert:
    'Subject to subsection 2 of this section'.
    No. 261, in page 2, line 40, after 'first', insert 'and paramount'.

    No. 262, in page 3, line 3, at end insert:
    '(2) In reaching any decision relating to—
  • (a) dispensing with the consent of a parent or guardian of a child in accordance with section 12(2) or section 14(3), or
  • (b) the application of a former parent under section 16,
  • the court shall have regard to all the circumstances, first consideration being given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood; and shall so far as practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision and give due consideration to them having regard to his age and understanding'.

    I shall be brief because this matter was rehearsed at considerable length in Committee, where there was discussion about the meaning of the phrase "first consideration" and also on an amendment relating to the word "paramount".

    All these are concerned with the interests of the child—

    It being Ten o'clock, further consideration of the Bill, as amended, stood adjourned.

    Ordered,

    That the Children Bill [Lords] may be proceeded with at this day's Sitting, though opposed, until any hour.—[Miss Margaret Jackson.]

    Bill, as amended ( in the Standing Committee), further considered.

    I have been advised by a professor of law that on the existing wording there could be a chance of its being misconstrued by the courts. There was a discussion earlier this evening about the effect of a decision taken by the court of session on a stated case relating to the right of reporters to appear in the sheriff courts. There is, according to the advice and guidance that I have been given, a danger that this could very well happen in the present instance. I have made it clear that this question has been gone into, and I have produced a form of words which I hope will help to clear up some of the weaknesses and poverty of draftsmanship in the present version.

    I ask the Minister to consider the amendment and to see whether it might not be an improvement on the present text.

    It was on an amendment moved by me, together with an amendment moved by the hon. Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker), that the debate on this subject took place in Committee. To my mind, as I stated in Committee, Clause 3 is the heart and kernel of the Bill. Whereas the economic constraints prevent the ideal solutions from being implemented, many of the clauses in this Bill are based on hope rather than on expectation in many respects. The one thing this House can do is to lay down guiding principles for the courts, without interpreting such questions as those relating to the adoption of children.

    In this country for centuries the blood tie was all-important. Until about 20 or 30 years ago it was regarded as so important that it overrode every other single consideration with regard to children, welfare, inheritance or anything else. We have moved a considerable way—so far, in fact, that the Houghton Committee recommended that the first consideration in adoption be given to the welfare of the child.

    When the Government first introduced the Bill they dropped that form of wording, and it was replaced in the Lords as a result of an amendment moved by my noble Friend Lord Wigoder. As I said in Committee, I ran the risk of upsetting the apple cart and having the original wording introduced in place of the more liberal wording introduced in the House of Lords.

    Nevertheless, I feel that it is very important that we in the House of Commons should insist that in this Bill we have the words that the "first and paramount" consideration in adoption is the welfare of the child. I say "first and paramount" because these words occur in the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. Therefore, this phrase "first and paramount" has been interpreted by the courts and everybody knows what it means. It does not mean that the child's welfare is the overriding consideration or that it is numerically the first consideration either. It means that the scales are weighted in favour of the welfare of the child.

    I speak as an adoptive parent. I have two adopted children and I know the anguish of going through the process of adoption from the adoptive parents' point of view.

    There is, of course, the great problem of the natural mother surrendering the child. However, anyone who has studied this subject will agree that what matters in the long run is the long-term interests of the child.

    In my view, the right wording to ensure that the courts follow this principle is that which spells out that the first and paramount consideration should be given to the welfare of the child, save in two specific instances which I set out in the amendment—where one is dispensing with consent, which is very important, and where there is revocation of consent within a given period by a natural parent who may have agreed initially. In those two instances the word "first" is sufficient to safeguard the welfare of the child.

    We went into this matter at length in Committee, and for that reason I shall not detain the House now. But if this amendment is rejected, the House will fail to take this opportunity to put what we feel beyond peradventure—that it is the interests of the child which should be first and paramount. I say that because every lawyer to whom I have spoken, including members of the judiciary, has felt that there is ambiguity about the term "first consideration". It can be interpreted as meaning that it is the paramount consideration. It can be interpreted as meaning that it is the first to be considered numerically in deciding any issue arising in the adoptive process.

    The mistake in the Bill is to take one touchstone for all circumstances. It is that the term "first consideration" covers all considerations arising under an adoption, whereas I believe that "first and paramount" should apply in all except the two considerations included in my amendment.

    As the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) said, this clause has been argued about more than any other part of the Bill. I do not claim that it will satisfy everyone. However, I believe that in its present form it reaches about as great a consensus as possible, and that was the conclusion in Committee where we discussed the matter in detail.

    I respect the hon. and learned Gentleman's views. He has been consistent and he has argued the same case all the way through. But, in view of what he said about the opinion of judges, it is worth recording that among the judiciary, after considerable discussion and some changes of view, the Lord Chancellor, the present President of the Family Division, Sir George Baker, and a past President, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, believe that this wording represents the best way round a very difficult problem.

    I recommend strongly that we do not change the wording. It has received broad acceptance from people who will practise it as well as from the members of the legal profession who will have to deal with it. That is my judgment, and that was the judgment of the Committee. I recommend strongly that we stick to it.

    On the specific matter raised by the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson), Clause 3 refers to any decision relating to the adoption of a child. I think that he has in mind that certain decisions of the court could fall to be taken on matters of pure law—for example, whether the court has jurisdiction, the domicile of the parent, and so on. Such decisions may leave the court with no discretion to weigh the merits in terms of the child's welfare, and the hon. Gentleman's clause emphasises this point by referring to the making of an order.

    I have consulted people about this, and there are precedents. In Scotland, Section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 has wording which is broadly similar. It mentions reaching any decision regarding the custody, education and upbringing of the child, and so on. The courts have applied similar provisions sensibly in the past. I have no reason to believe that they will not use the same sensible way of interpreting these words.

    This is a provision affecting the whole of Great Britain, and I have looked at it from both sides with the assistance of Scottish legal advice and of English legal advice. I am satisfied that the point raised by the professor of law in Scotland, with which I was familiar, will not arise and that the courts are not unfamiliar with a situation such as this.

    I am grateful to the hon. Member for Dundee, East for drawing attention to the matter. It is on the face of it an important point, but I do not think that the hon. Gentleman's fears are as justified as may have at first appeared. I hope that he will agree to withdraw the motion and I hope that the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery even granted the strength of his views, will accept that the House would be well advised to stick to the present wording.

    It is no secret that many of us are very unhappy about the use of the words "first consideration". I have had a great deal of experience professionally in the divorce courts with discussions about custody. I know that "paramount" has a well-known connotation and has been regarded as a useful word.

    We have become obsessed with finding one or two words to describe what is wanted—"paramount" or "first consideration". I agree with the Minister that "paramount" probably would have been a mistake. As the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) said, the phrase "first consideration" is open to confusion in that it could mean "first priority" or it could mean "first in time".

    Clause 89 contains a list of definitions. It is a weakness of the Bill and a criticism of the Government that Clause 89 contains no definition of "first consideration". The inclusion of a defintion would have strengthened the Bill greatly and would have taken us off this hook. This is bound to cause us trouble. By "first consideration" do the Government mean "greatest weight" with a list of other factors to be taken into account?

    I do not accept the Minister of State's arguments. On the merits of the case, my proposed wording would impose a duty upon the court to be satisfied that in making or refusing an order the effect will be to

    "safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood".
    That would have been a more convenient form of words.

    I hope that the Minister is right. I do not propose to divide the House at this late hour, particularly as the matter has been ventilated at length. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

    Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 1

    Establishment Of Adoption Services

    I beg to move Amendment No. 245, in page 1, line 9, leave out 'within their area'.

    With that amendment we are to take Amendment No. 246, in page 1, line 9, after 'needs' insert 'within their area'.

    These are small drafting amendments which are nevertheless important within a narrow sphere. Clause 1 reads:

    "It is the duty of every local authority to establish and maintain within their area a service designed to meet the needs in relation to adoption…".
    The amendments propose to move the words "within their area" so that they qualify not the words "establish and maintain" but the word "needs".

    As the wording stands, it is the duty of an authority to meet the needs within its area. On a strict interpretation of the present wording, an authority must establish and maintain a service within its area—that is, the service must be provided within the area.

    There are certain areas—mine is one—which are sparsely populated and where it would be more economical if the authority were able to share the service with adjoining authorities. The present wording would preclude an authority from sharing a service with adjoining counties.

    Great complaints are made about the enormous enlargement of local government services and the building up of small empires where they are not necessary. The present wording of the clause invites that process.

    This is a small amendment. It would cost the Government nothing to adopt it. It makes it clear that the service to be established and maintained need not necessarily be located in the local authority's own area.

    10.15 p.m.

    There is no difference of intention between the hon. and learned Gentleman and the Government. I made it clear on a number of occasions that it is possible for local authorities to provide services for adoption by, for instance, collaborating with voluntary adoption agencies, although going outside their boundaries. However, there must be a responsibility on them to co-ordinate the facilities of the full service. I believe that they should have the responsibility to ensure that people in their area benefit from this service. The restriction which the hon. and learned Gentleman feels is placed on local authorities does not exist. Local authorities are able to go wider than their own areas. That is important, but I do not want there to be any misapprehension. No local authority can get out of its responsibility to provide an adoption service.

    The existing wording carries out the hon. and learned Gentleman's intention. I do not think that there is any need to make the amendment which he suggests. His wording might act in a slightly more restrictive way on the local authority. I advise the House not to carry this amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 230, in page 2, line 15, at end insert—

    '(5) The service maintained by each local authority under subsection (1) of this section shall be subject to approval by the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of State shall not give his approval unless he is satisfied that that service is of equal standard to those provided by adoption societies approved under section 4 below.
    (6) When determining whether or not to approve a local authority adoption service the Secretary of State shall have regard to the same criteria as are set out in section 4(3) below'.
    We support an adoption service covering the whole country and partnership between local authorities and voluntary organisations. The amendment seeks to ensure that the service should be of an equal standard and subject to an equal check.

    The Secretary of State is responsible for approving voluntary adoption societies and for seeing that they are efficient and have adequate staff. We propose that he should oversee all adoption agencies and that the same standards should apply to the service throughout the nation.

    We do not seek to criticise local authorities or their staff. We seek to ensure that there is no double standard in the Bill. I should like to give one example. In Committee the Minister spoke of the danger of the Department speaking with two voices, of imposing a tough, inspectorial standard and at the same time not giving the resources to the local authorities to enable those standards to be met. However, the same general consideration applies to the voluntary societies. The Government face a crisis of resources. So do the voluntary agencies. Voluntary organisations now face one of the most acute crises in their history. It is nevertheless still proposed by the Government that inspection should continue and that standards should be enforced. Therefore I urge the Government urgently to examine this question and to see whether it would not be better for the Department to oversee operations throughout the nation and to apply the same basis to voluntary societies and local authorities. The suggestion is put forward in a constructive spirit and with the aim of ensuring that similar standards are applied to local authorities and the voluntary agencies.

    This matter was discussed in Committee. There is no difference between the two sides about high standards required of local authorities as of voluntary organisations. The issue in this respect arises periodically in many other areas of local government activity. All local authority functions are carried out under the general guidance of the Secretary of State but local authorities, in the light of competing priorities, must judge how best to use resources. They are directly accountable to the public for the service they provide. That is the difference between local authorities and voluntary organisations. We expect the same high standards in local authorities as we do from voluntary organisations. I do not think there should be any double standards.

    We already have social work service offices located in the regions and they keep the Department and the Secretary of State informed of progress. I believe that the overseeing rôle which the hon. Gentleman seeks already exists. Indeed, the service that already exists is a proven and effective method of raising standards in local authorities. In most cases we shall have to ensure that the same high standards apply. Because I believe the social services already undertake an overseeing rôle, I ask the House to resist the amendment.

    We wish to make progress. We shall see how the system works. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 7

    Inactive Or Defunct Adoption Societies

    I beg to move Amendment No. 149, in page 5, line 17, after 'society', insert

    'or by the society jointly with the authority'.
    The effect of this amendment is to enable a local authority directed by the Secretary of State under Clause 7 to take over activities of an inactive or defunct adoption society, or a society from which approval has been withdrawn, to apply to a court for an order transferring parental rights and duties which had been vested in the society following a Clause 14 order.

    The amendment should put beyond dispute a local authority's power to make such an application on its own. I hope that the amendment will commend itself to the House.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 1, in page 5, line 20, at end insert—

    '(2) Before giving a direction under subsection (1) the Secretary of State shall, if practicable, consult both the society and the authority'.
    The amendment provides that under Clause 7 the Secretary of State, before directing a local authority to take over the responsibilities of an inactive or defunct adoption society, shall, if practicable, consult the society and the authority. The words "if practicable" allow for emergency situations where, for example, there might be difficulty in getting a response from a society and the welfare of the children in the society's care was at risk. This fulfils an undertaking given to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) on 8th July.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 8

    Adoption Orders

    I beg to move Amendment No. 2, in page 6, line 1, leave out paragraph (b).

    The amendment deletes the provision that would have prevented any duty to pay maintenance arising from an agreement made by a person at a time when he was not liable to maintain a child from being extinguished when the child is adopted.

    The Committee was concerned that the Bill, as drafted, did not provide for such a duty to be extinguished, and thought it unfair to insist that a maintenance agreement made voluntarily by a relative or friend should continue when the child was adopted. I agreed to examine the matter, and I hope that the House feels that I have met the point.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 182, in page 6, line 6, at end insert:

    '(5A) An adoption order shall not be made in Scotland in relation to a child who is a minor unless with the consent of the minor; except that where the court is satisfied that the minor is incapable of giving his consent to the making of the order, it may dispense with that consent.'.
    The purpose of this amendment is to secure the retention in the law on adopttion, as it is to apply in Scotland under the Children Bill, of provisions at present contained in Section 4 of the Adoption Act 1958 regarding the right of children who are minors under Scots law to give or refuse consent to their being adopted. These provisions were omitted from the Bill as originally drafted for reasons I shall explain.

    The amendments also reintroduce the provisions at present contained in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1966 relating to the position of a minor who is incapable of giving consent. It is necessary to retain the existing powers of the court to dispense with a minor's consent where the infant who is the subject of an adoption application is incapable of giving consent.

    Section 4(1) of the 1958 Act provides that an adoption order shall not be made in Scotland in respect of an infant who is a minor except with the consent of the infant. Scots law differentiates, in a way which the law in England does not, between the status of "pupil"—that is, girls under 12 years of age and boys under 14—and "minor", namely, girls of 12 years or over, boys of 14 or over, up to 18. The provisions regarding the consent of minors to their adoption have existed since 1930, when the first legislation concerning adoption in Scotland was enacted.

    In associating Scotland with the provisions in Part I of the Bill relating to adoption, it has clearly been necessary to do everything possible to highlight the duty of the court in Scottish adoption proceedings, no less than proceedings elsewhere, to promote the welfare of the child in regard to any decisions relating to his adoption. Thus the provisions of Clause 3 in relation to the court's welfare duty extend fully to Scotland and the court will be required to
    "ascertain the wishes and feelings"
    of the child having regard to his age and understanding, and to
    "give due consideration to them".
    It has been the wish of Scottish Ministers to avoid, if possible, detracting from these most important provisions, by requiring the court to follow different steps in dealing with a proposal to adopt an older child. A particular concern has been the need to avoid overlaying the procedure for assessing the child's wishes, which may change, with a formal system of consents. Another worry has been the fact that psychological and chronological ages will not always coincide, so that a dividing line based on 12th and 14th birthdays may turn out to be arbitrary in practice.

    It has become apparent, however, that the initial decision not to continue the right of minor children to refuse consent to their adoption under the Bill has been seen as involving a loss of an existing right on the part of minor children in Scotland. This may be more a question of principle than of practice, since it is hard to envisage a court insisting on an older child's adoption against his or her wishes, bearing in mind the duty imposed by Clause 3 of the Bill. Nevertheless the Secretary of State has decided to restore the provisions to the Bill on receiving assurances from the Scottish Law Commission that the matter will receive further consideration in connection with its current study of the legal capacity of pupils and minors.

    In conclusion I should like to express my thanks to the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton) for raising the matter with me. I assure him that I am most reluctant at any time to see rights removed where continuance is in keeping with the progress of the law more generally. I think that we have reached a sensible conclusion in this matter. I hope that the Law Commission's studies will point to a satisfactory solution in due course.

    It is I who should be thanking the Minister for recognising this right under Scottish law. I assure the Minister that his decision in this matter will be greatly welcomed by many persons north of the border.

    I am a Scottish lawyer and I should like to congratulate the Minister on safeguarding this particular tenet of Scottish law. Although in terms of the differential of age it does not seem to meet the provisions of the Sex Discrimination Bill, both sexes of those ages will be very pleased with the result.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 9

    Child To Live With Adopters Before Order Made

    I beg to move Amendment No. 3, in page 6, line 27, at end insert—

    '(3) An adoption order shall not be made unless the court is satisfied that sufficient opportunities to see the child with the applicant or, in the case of an application by a married couple, both applicants together in the home environment have been afforded—
  • (a) where the child was placed with the applicant by an adoption agency, to that agency, or
  • (b) in any other case, to the local authority within whose area the home is'.
  • With that amendment we may discuss Government Amendments Nos. 5 and 9.

    The amendment fulfils an undertaking given to the hon. Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker) on 8th July to clarify one aspect of Clause 9. The Committee was concerned that Clause 9 appeared to allow a court to make an adoption order even though the child might have had his home with only one of the couple applying to adopt him. The amendments make it clear that, while the child has to have his home for a fixed period with only one applicant, the court, before making an adoption order, must be satisfied that the local authority or adoption agency reporting on the application has had sufficient opportunities to see the child with both applicants together in the home environment. I hope that the hon. Lady feels that I have met the point.

    We are most grateful to the Minister for coming back with better amendments than those that I proposed in Committee. It is recognised on all fronts that unless a child has had the chance to settle down with both persons who might be in that environment—as we are trying to enshrine in other clauses—there may be consequent problems when new adults come into the home. I hope that this clause and other clauses that follow it will be welcomed by all hon. Members.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 10

    Adoption By Married Couple

    I beg to move Amendment No. 215, in page 6, line 28, at beginning insert—

    'Subject to sections 35(1) and 50(1),'.

    With this amendment we may discuss Government Amendments No. 216, 31 to 34, 212 and 213.

    I undertook in Committee on 10th July to introduce an amendment on Report to meet two points made in debate. The first of these was to include in the provisions of Part I of the Bill—the provisions in Clauses 10 and 11—specifying what a court should consider when dealing with an adoption application, a forward reference to the power of the court when considering an adoption application, to make a custodianship order instead, that is, the provisions of what is now new Clause 35. The first objective is met by Amendments Nos. 215 and 216.

    The second point was that the wording of what is now new Clause 35—Clause 50 for Scotland—should be altered to bring it more closely into conformity with Recommendation 20 of the Houghton Committee. I hope that the House will think we have met those points.

    Amendments No. 212 and 213 to Clause 50 make equivalent provisions in Scotland to Clause 35(1) for England and Wales, requiring that the court shall not make an adoption order in the case of an application by a relative or step-parent unless it is positively satisfied that the adoption is the better course in the particular case. I believe that that faithfully records the undertaking I gave in Committee.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendment made: No. 5, in page 6, line 39, leave out subsection (3).—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 11

    Adoption By One Person

    Amendment made: No. 216, in page 7, line 12, at beginning insert—

    'Subject of sections 35(1) and 50(1),'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 7, in page 7, line 13, leave out from 'person' to first 'is' in line 15 and insert

    'where he has attained the age of 21 and—
  • (a) is not married or
  • (b)'.
  • ' or

    This is a drafting amendment.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 8, in page 7, line 18, at end insert

    (iii) his spouse is by reason of ill health, whether physical or mental, incapable of making an application for an adoption order.'.
    The effect of this amendment would be to enable one of a married couple to apply to adopt alone where a husband or wife is incapable of joining in the application because of physical or mental ill-health. This meets the undertaking that I gave to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight).

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendment made: No. 9, in page 7, line 25, leave out subsection (3).—[ Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 10, in page 8, line 2, leave out from 'child' to second 'the' in line 4.

    This amendment removes a superfluous reference to Clause 32(5) from Clause 11(5) and brings its wording in line with that of Clause 10(4). This is mainly a drafting amendment.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 12

    Parental Agreement

    10.30 p.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 11, in page 8, line 28, at end insert—

    '(g) three months has elapsed since the original consent to adoption was made'.
    It is many years since the House has considered legislation relating to adoption and it may be many years before it has a similar opportunity. It is a pity that that opportunity has not been taken by means of the law concerning the irrevocability of consent to adoption. The House should give some consideration to this matter, and that is why I have moved the amendment.

    The House will be aware of the present procedure whereby, if a mother decides that she wishes her child to be adopted, she signs a written consent to that effect. The child is then in due course placed by a proper agency for adoption. When the child has remained with the adoptive parents for at least three months and possibly longer, there is a court hearing for an adoption order to be made. At that time, the mother is again asked whether she still gives her consent. This may be several months after she first gave her consent and she then has the power to withdraw it. If the court feels that she is unreasonably withholding that consent, it may overrule her and go ahead with the adoption order. The mother may then appeal. As a result it may be some time before the matter is finally resolved.

    I will not burden the House again with the details of the case I mentioned in Committee, when 13 months elapsed between the time when the child was first placed with the adoptive parents and the time that the adoption order was finally made. I accept that that may have been exceptional, but I suspect that many hon. Members will be familiar with cases in which a number of months have elapsed.

    The procedure that I have just described is the present procedure and there is nothing in the Bill to alter it. It is true that the Bill introduces the new option of freeing the child for adoption, but the present procedure remains should the natural mother prefer to follow that course. In my view this procedure imposes uncertainty and unnecessary strain on all the parties involved. It is unfair on the natural parent, the prospective adoptive parents and on the child, bearing in mind that the child involved in any sort of change that may arise from these procedures will possibly be at the vulnerable age of 12 months.

    It seems that three months is an adequate period in which the mother could reconsider her decision. It is a period which caters for all the sorts of problems raised by post-natal depression. If three months have elapsed since the mother originally gave her consent to adoption, at that point that consent should become irrevocable.

    I notice that the Association of British Adoption Agencies in its commentary on some of the amendments being discussed suggests that my amendment could be punitive to natural parents. I suggest that the present system is punitive to natural parents with its "Do you or don't you?" approach. Since I raised this matter in Committee I have consulted other bodies and individuals concerned. Needless to say there is not unanimity on this. I have been surprised at the wide range of people who share my views—people who are much involved in this work. I quote from a letter from my local director of social services who says that his views are supported by his senior officer, who has been working with adoption matters continually for 10 years. He says:
    "It will be acknowledged that adoption is an irrevocable step and crucial to this is the giving of consent on the part of the natural parents. With the improved service now being given to more adequately informed parents they are tending to agree that, having given their consent, this should, in fact, be regarded as final. From experience it is on the whole the caring parent who gives up her child for adoption. Her need to finalise the process of adoption is as great as the prospective adopters. They are both anxious that the adoption procedure shall be completed within a reasonable space of time."
    I, too, am equally anxious. That is why I have tabled this amendment.

    I support my hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst (Mr. Sims). I have been impressed by the number of people who are very close to this problem and who are strongly in favour of the principle of irrevocability being inserted into the Bill. I could mention many bodies but I single out of those to whom I could pay tribute the justices clerks, who have had a tremendous amount of experience in this area. They feel that the principle of irrevocability is immensely important.

    For the parents there is the long-drawn-out peculiar sort of torture which ought not to be encouraged by legislation. There is nothing in this clause which would cover irrevocability. Subsection 2(a) talks about the parent or guardian not being able to be found or being incapable of giving agreement. Perhaps the parents would be quite capable of giving agreement. How does one decide whether agreement is being withheld unreasonably? Three months seems to be a reasonable period of time. If it were written into the Bill it would be a great deal easier for parents and for those who have to make the decision whether the agreement is being unreasonably withheld or whether a person is incapable of giving agreement. It would be easy to decide whether a child has been neglected abandoned or persistently or seriously ill treated. There is, however, nothing to help a person who simply is incapable of making up his mind. The trouble for such people can drag on for so long.

    I therefore ask the Minister to listen, if not to our words then to those outside the House who regard this whole principle as important and helpful to adoption matters.

    There is little I should like to add to the lucid arguments advanced by my hon. Friends. This is an excellent Bill and I congratulate the Minister on his personal authorship. The motivation behind the Bill is the well-being of the child and the advancement and protection of its interests. Of all the contributions which can be made to that well-being in this initial stage, surely the element of stability is the most important. By fixing a finite period, as we suggest in the amendment, we are making possibly the most important contribution of all to that stability.

    We all know of instances when the possibility of a reversal hangs over the new family, and this can cause stress and strain at a particularly critical stage. I believe that paragraph (g), which we should like to insert, is every bit as important as those categories already incorporated in paragraphs (a) to (f). The House should seriously consider whether this is not the most important contribution we can make.

    The amendment embodies a major issue of principle which we discussed at length in Committee. There are people who believe that the Bill offers the opportunity to put an irrevocable agreement into law. I accepted in Committee that in future years such a proposal might prove much more acceptable. There are at present, however, a number of reasons for resisting it.

    I do not find a major body of support for such a principle at this stage. It was specifically looked at and rejected by the Houghton Committee. The Committee has produced a new procedure of freeing which might or might not change the climate of opinion to make it easier to introduce in later years what the supporters of the amendment argue for now. It would not be right to make such a provision now.

    We are here making decisions on a balance of judgment, a balance between parental rights and duties and what is good for the child. We are all agreed that in the Bill we wish to shift towards giving a far greater priority to the best interests of the child than hitherto. However, we must be careful not to swing that balance too far. I should prefer to see the new procedure for freeing operated for some years before moving on to irrevocable consent.

    I know how strongly hon. Members feel about this issue, but I urge them to leave the Bill unamended at this stage so that we may all have open minds in future years about the introduction of such a proposal.

    Amendment negatived.

    Clause 14

    Freeing Child For Adoption

    I beg to move Amendment No. 219, in page 9, line 1, leave out subsections (1) to (6) and insert:

    '14.—(1) Where, on an application by an adoption agency, an authorised court is satisfied in the case of each parent or guardian of the child that—
  • (a) he freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, agreed generally and unconditionally to the making of an adoption order, or
  • (b) his agreement to the making of an adoption order should be dispensed with on a ground specified in section 12(2),
  • the court shall, subject to subsection (5), make an order declaring the child free for adoption.
    (2) No application shall be made under sub section (1) unless—
  • (a) it is made with the consent of a parent or guardian of the child, or
  • (b) the adoption agency is applying for dispensation under subsection (1)(b) of the agreement of each parent or guardian of the child, and the child is in the care of the adoption agency.
  • (3) No agreement required under subsection (1)(a) shall be dispensed with under subsection (1)(b) unless the child is already placed for adoption or the court is satisfied that it is likely that the child will be placed for adoption.
    (4) An agreement by the mother of the child is ineffective for the purposes of this section if given less than six weeks after the child's birth.
    (5) An order under this section shall not be made in Scotland in relation to a child who is a minor unless with the consent of the child; except that where the court is satisfied that the minor is incapable of giving his consent to the making of the order, it may dispense with that consent'.

    With it we may also discuss Government Amendments Nos. 26 and 79.

    In Committee on 15th July I undertook to look again at the overlapping aspects of subsections (1) and (3) of the clause—it was about the only time that we got heated in our discussions—to consider whether the different situations covered by the subsections might be dealt with differently. We have found a way of doing so.

    The amendment has two effects. It changes the basic structure of Clause 14 and removes the overlapping aspects of subsections (1) and (3). It also removes subsection (6).

    Amendment No. 26 operates the freeze in relation to the clause in a more selective way than was possible before the clause was redrafted, and Amendment No. 79 is purely consequential.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 16

    Revocation Of Section 14 Order

    10.45 p.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 220, in page 11, line 30, after 'authority', insert 'or voluntary organisation'.

    These three amendments to Clause 16 deal with the revocation of freeing orders and the re-vesting of parental rights. They are fairly self-explanatory. Amendments Nos. 220 and 221 depend on the acceptance of new Clause 1, which would allow a voluntary body to hold parental rights over a child in its care.

    Amendment No. 222 emphasises that parental rights shall not revert in a body or authority. It stems from a question raised in Committee by the hon. Member for Reading South (Dr. Vaughan)—why does the Bill sometimes use "person" and sometimes "individual"? I hope that this clarifies the matter.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 222, in page 11, line 32, leave out 'person or persons' and insert—

    'individual or, as the case may be, the individuals'.

    No. 221, in page 11, line 33, leave out "that order was made' and insert—

    'they were vested in the authority or organisation'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 162, in page 11, line 38, leave out subsection (4) and insert—

    '(4) If the application is dismissed on the ground that to allow it would contravene the principle embodied in section 3 the former parent shall be entitled to make a further application only with the leave of the court.'

    With this we may take Amendment No. 231, in page 11, line 43, after 'child', insert—

    'unless there has been a material change in his circumstances and with the leave of a Court, and'.

    I move my amendment merely formally. I understand that the Minister has a proposal to meet the point in question.

    With the permission of the House, I shall seek to move, as a manuscript amendment to the Bill, in page 11, line 38, at beginning insert 'Subject to subsection (5)'.

    As a further manuscript amendment, I shall seek to move, in page 11, line 45, at end add—
    '(5) Subsection (4)(a) shall not apply where the court which dismissed the application gives leave to the former parent to make a further application under subsection (1), but such leave shall not be given unless it appears to the court that because of the change in circumstances or for any other reason it is proper to allow the application to be made.'
    It will be clear to the House that this incorporates the substance of Amendment No. 231, and it is intended to meet that point. It also meets the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Stock-port, North (Mr. Bennett). I hope that it commends itself to the House. I am sorry about seeking to move these amendments at such a late stage.

    The Opposition welcome the Minister's manuscript amendments. As he says, they fulfil the function of Amendment No. 231.

    We were concerned about the situation where a child may be freed for adoption and then a year later, if the child has not been adopted, the parents may apply to the court for a revocation of the order. If then the court refuses the revocation and afterwards the circumstances and the child's natural home improve, the parents have no right then to apply to the court again for a further revocation. This seemed to us both unjust and not at all in the interests of the child.

    As far as I can see, the point is met entirely by the manuscript amendments. In those circumstances, I shall not move Amendment No. 231.

    The position is that the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) should now withdraw his amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Manuscript amendments made:

    In page 11, line 38, at beginning insert "Subject to subsection (5)".

    In page 11, line 45, at end add—

    '(5) Subsection (4)(a) shall not apply where the court which dismissed the application gives leave to the former parent to make a further application under subsection (1), but such leave shall not be given unless it appears to the court that because of the change in circumstances or for any other reason it is proper to allow the application to be made.'—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 20

    Guardian Ad Litem And Adoption Officer

    I beg to move Amendment No. 14, in page 13, line 25, leave out from "and" to end of line 26 and insert

    'performing such other duties as the rules may prescribe.'
    This amendment provides that rules of court may prescribe the duties of reporting officers appointed under Clause 20(1) (b) of the Bill.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 15, in page 13, line 31, leave out paragraph (b).

    This amendment, by deleting Clause 20(2)(b), removes the prohibition on the guardian ad litem or the reporting officer being an employee of the local authority involved in a non-agency application.

    Amendments made to Clause 20 in Committee provide that guardians ad litem and reporting officers must be independent not only of the adoption agency, that is, a local authority or approved adoption society, which placed the child or made the application for a freeing order or held parental rights over a child who was the subject of an application for the revocation of a freeing order, but also of the local authority which has been notified by the prospective adopters of their intention to apply for an adoption order if the child has not been placed by an agency.

    The Association of Directors of Social Services, BASW and ABAA have all pointed out that this is unnecessary and could be a waste of social work resources. I am sure that the House will welcome the amendment.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 16, in page 13, line 34, after '14', insert 'by'.

    No. 17, in page 13, line 36, after '16 insert 'by'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 22

    Making Of Order

    I beg to move Amendment No. 18, in page 14, line 24, leave out 'will' and insert 'may'.

    The amendment substitutes "may" for "will" in Clause 22(1), as it more correctly expresses the intention of the subsection.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 19, in page 15, leave out lines 9 to 11.

    This is a technical amendment which remedies a minor omission not detected in Committee.

    Clause 22(6) provides for the application of the earlier provisions in Clause 22 to Scotland. Paragraph (a) of Clause 22(6) refers to wording in subsection (2) which is no longer extant, following a Government amendment in Committee which substituted a completely new and unrelated subsection (2) for that subsection. A specific reference in subsection (6) to subsection (2) is, therefore, irrelevant in the context of the revised clause.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 25

    Adoption Of Children Abroad

    I beg to move Amendment No. 20, in page 17, line 13, leave out 'and (8)' and insert '(8) and (9)'.

    The amendment provides for an adjustment of provisions in Clause 25(2) dealing with the status of a child who is made the subject of an order providing for his adoption overseas.

    As at present drafted, the Bill provides that Schedule 2, dealing with the status of an adopted child in Scotland, shall apply to a child in Scotland. It is clearly not appropriate, however, that a child who is the subject of an order facilitating his being taken for adoption abroad should be given the legal status of an adopted child in Great Britain by virtue of the court order. The need for differentiation is all the greater given the enhancement of the status of such children under the Bill.

    The amendment disapplies Schedule 2 to such children and brings the Scottish position into line with the position in England and Wales.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 233, in page 17, line 13, after '11(2)' insert '14 to 16'.

    Three of those four amendments are technical. The heart of the matter is Amendment No. 236 which proposes the deletion of subsection (5). The reason for it is that as the Bill stands it prejudices a small but vulnerable group of children; that is to say, minority groups. For example, it has been found possible to make successful placements of black children with black American Service men over here, and they are often willing to take older children.

    If the subsection remains and the Bill becomes law as drafted, the work of the adoption societies will be inhibited. The amendments have the support of the Association of British Adoption Societies.

    We welcome the amendment. In Committee I raised several times the problem of children of mixed parentage and the difficulty of adoption by parents not domiciled in this country. We hope that the amendment will bring to an end the difficulty which arises in the placement of many children who come into our adoption societies because one of their parents is no longer in this country. This has been a problem not only with our own Service men but with an increasing number of troops who move round the world. The deletion of sub- section (5) will do a great deal to help those prospective adoptive parents.

    The Government have helped with the drafting of the amendments and I congratulate the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson) on them, for they are important. We ask the House to accept them. As a Member representing a Service constituency, I am particularly glad that we are able to accept the amendments.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 234, in page 17, line 13, after '22(1)' insert '23'.

    No. 235, in page 17, line 13, leave out from '24' to the end of line 14.

    No. 236, in page 17, line 37, leave out subsection (5).—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 26

    Obtaining Of Birth Certificate By Adopted Person

    Amendments made: No. 150, in page 17, line 40, leave out from '(5)' to 'The' in line 1 on page 18 and insert

    'after the word "except" there are inserted the words "in accordance with section 20A of this Act or".
    (2) The following section is inserted in the 1958 Act after section 20:—

    'Disclosure of birth records of adopted persons.20A.—(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (6) of this section,'.

    No. 22, in page 18, line 10, after and insert 'who'.

    No. 151, in page 18, line 17, at end insert—

    '(3) It shall be the duty of the Registrar General and each local authority and approved adoption society to provide counselling for adopted persons who apply for information under subsection (1) of this section.
    (4) Before supplying any information to an applicant under subsection (1) of this section, the Registrar General shall inform the applicant that counselling services are available to him—
  • (a) at the General Register Office; or
  • (b) from the local authority for the area where the applicant is at the time the application is made; or
  • (c) the local authority for the area where the court sat which made the adoption order relating to the applicant; or
  • (d) if the applicant's adoption was arranged by an adoption society which is approved under section 4 of the Children Act 1975, from that society.
  • (5) If the applicant chooses to receive counselling from a local authority or an adoption society under subsection (4) the Registrar General shall send to the authority or society of the applicant's choice the information to which the applicant is entitled under subsection (1).
    (6) The Registrar General shall not supply a person who was adopted before the date on which the Children Act was passed with any information under subsection (1) of this section unless that person has attended an interview with a counsellor either at the General Register Office or in pursuance of arrangements made by the local authority or adoption society from whom the applicant is entitled to receive counselling in accordance with subsection (4)."'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 27

    Restriction On Arranging Adoption And Placing Of Children

    Amendments made: No. 23, in page 18, line 21, leave out 'subsections are' and insert 'subsection is'.

    No. 24, in page 18, line 29, at end insert—

    '(aa) the following subsections are inserted after subsection (1)'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 25, in page 19, line 4, after 'months', insert

    'and for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400".'.

    With this we are to take the following Government amendments: Nos. 27, 28, 37, 48, 102, 103, 104, 107, 111, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 140 and 141.

    In Committee I undertook to look at the whole question of the fines in the Bill. Hon. Members felt that the fines proposed were not commensurate with the gravity of the cases. I hope that the House feels that I am now raising them to a more appropriate level.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 28

    Restrictions On Removal Of Child Pending Adoption

    Amendments made: No. 26, in page 19, line 21, leave out from 'application' to 'is' in line 23 and insert

    'is pending for an order under section 14 of the Children Act 1975 and—
  • (a) the child is in the care of the adoption agency making the application, and
  • (b) the application was not made with the consent of each parent or guardian of the child,
  • no parent or guardian of the child who did not consent to the application'.

    No. 27, in page 19, line 31, leave out '£100' and insert '£400'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 161, in page 19, line 31, at end insert—

    '(4) Any application by a parent or guardian under subsection (2) of this section to remove the child must be heard within 28 days of the application being made. '
    In Committee, considerable concern was expressed about the problem of frivolous or misguided applications for adoption. The Minister agreed to re-examine the matter and this amendment is designed to see whether there can be some safeguard for the parents. My particular concern is that the courts are the last resort. While one accepts that the courts should be able to make the final decision, if we are to have good case work done it is far more important that cases are kept out of the courts as far as possible. But if they go into the courts, it is essential that they should be decided quickly so that anxiety and uncertainty are not prolonged.

    I hope that my hon. Friend will either meet the point now or will at least agree to monitor the legislation in practice with a view to legislating again at an early date, if necessary.

    I am certainly prepared to monitor the working of the Bill and, if necessary, make changes. I believe that at the moment there are good reasons for resisting the amendment. However, I have consulted the Home Office and the Lord Chancellor's Office, and it is considered that a time limit for application to remove a child is unnecessary. In the county court, an application is heard at not less than one clear day's notice to all the parties, and in the magistrates' court not even one day's notice is required in any event. Matters affecting children can be given high priority in the courts and when parties are quick to inform the court that an application is urgent, it can be disposed of speedily.

    On frivolous or misguided applications, subject to consultations the Adoption Agency Regulations, which apply to local authorities and approved societies, will specify that applications under Clause 14(2) should be made at not less than assistant director level for local authority applications and a similar level for approved adoption societies. The directors' association welcomes this provision and will be giving guidance to its members. I think that this reply will meet the point put by my hon. Friend.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    11.0 p.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 163, in page 20, line 17, leave out from 'is' to end of line 21 and insert

    'may, if appropriate, remove the child from the actual custody of the applicant or of the prospective adopter in pursuance of its general duty to promote the welfare of the child under section 12 of the Children Act 1948, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) of this section. '
    This causes me far more concern than Amendment No. 161. We are considering a matter in which this legislation upsets existing practice. It has been accepted over the years that one should take the advice of the social worker who was supervising a particular case.

    If this legislation goes through in its present form, without amendment, it will be possible for the foster parent to take a unilateral decision which may not be in the best interests of the child. This may eventually be decided in the courts, but it is important that we retain the authority of the social worker. The amendment is designed to do that and to ensure that if a course is in the best interests of the child the social worker can pursue it, and that the scheme cannot be upset by the unilateral action of the foster parent.

    The problem arises where one has a child placed in a very satisfactory foster home for nearly five years and it is clear that the intention of the local authority, the social worker and the natural parents is that the child will be returned at some time to the natural parents. Just before the five-year point arrives, if a social worker feels that a foster parent is particularly possessive and may want to take advantage of the five-year period, the social worker has to face a difficult choice of taking the child back to the natural parents at that point, which may not be the appropriate point, or to move the child to a different foster home. A great deal was made of this in Committee and many felt that the provision in the Bill was unsatisfactory. We want to be careful not to erode the authority of the social worker and give too much authority to the foster parent, who may not be the best person to exercise it.

    This point was discussed in Committee. These amendments are designed to give local authorities the power of veto over adoption or custodianship applications by foster parents regarding children in care.

    The British Association of Social Workers proposed these amendments because of its objections
    "to allowing foster parents unilateral rights over a child in care, especially when those powers are triggered by a child remaining in a foster home for a particular period of time".
    The Committee discussed this, and since then I have consulted the Home Office and the Scottish Office and I am satisfied that the provisions in Clauses 28 and 39 do not prevent a local authority from removing a child who is at risk, by means of emergency procedure for obtaining a warrant or authorisation allowing the child to be removed to a place of safety.

    The advantages and disadvantages of allowing foster parents to apply for adoption or custodianship without the consent of the local authority in whose care the child is were fully discussed and the Committee accepted the Government's arguments in favour of the time limits and decided not to accept an amendment moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Andrew F. Bennett).

    Safeguards built into the legislation protecting local authorities' perfectly legitimate interests are real and sufficient. We have to take a balance of view in this matter, and I say to my hon. Friend, who has made his views clear throughout, that we should see how the legislation goes. I hope that his fears will not be fulfilled.

    Amendment negatived.

    Amendment made: No. 28, in page 20, line 39, leave out '£100' and insert '£400'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 29, in page 21, line 4, at end insert—

    '(8) In relation to Scotland, subsection (3) of this section does not apply where the removal of the child is authorised, in terms of Part III of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, by a justice of the peace or a children's hearing'.
    The purpose of this amendment is to provide a Scottish application for provisions which were included for Great Britain in Clause 28 by the Standing Committee. The provisions, which appear now as Clause 28(3), limit the circumstances in which a child can be removed by a local authority from the possession of a person with whom the child has had his home for over five years, and who has applied, or given notice of an application, to adopt the child. Clause 28(3) already provides that a local authority shall not be able to remove a child who is in the care of that authority except with the leave of a court.

    It is necessary in Scottish terms for any provision governing the removal of a child to have regard to the provisions of Part III of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 governing place of safety orders made on the authority of a court, justice of the peace or children's hearing. This is done by Amendment No. 29, which provides that the restriction on removal imposed by Clause 28(3) shall not apply where removal of the child is authorised either by a justice of the peace, in the case of the emergency procedure provided under Section 37(2) of the Act, as now amended by Clause 67, or by a children's hearing, under Section 37(4) or Section 40(7) of the Act after the child has been brought before a hearing.

    The power of the sheriff under Section 37(2) is preserved by the reference in Clause 28(3) to removal
    "with the leave of a court".

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 29

    Return Of Child Taken Away In Breach Of Section 34 Or 34A Of 1958 Act

    I beg to move Amendment No. 153, in page 21, line 14, at end insert—

    '(3) If, in the case of an order made by the High Court under subsection (1), the High Court or, in the case of an order made by a county court under subsection (1), a county court is satisfied that the child has not been returned to the applicant, the court may make an order authorising an officer of the court to search such premises as may be specified in the order for the child and, if the officer finds the child, to return the child to the applicant.
    (4) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a child to whom an order under subsection (1) relates is in premises specified in the information, he may issue a search warrant authorising a constable to search the premises for the child; and if a constable acting in pursuance of a warrant under this section finds the child, he shall return the child to the person on whose application the order under subsection (1) was made.
    (5) An order under subsection (3) may be enforced in like manner as a warrant for committal.
    (6) Subsections (3), (4) and (5) do not apply to Scotland'.

    With this we may take Government Amendment No. 156.

    I undertook, during the discussions in Committee on 5th August on new Clauses 21 and 24, to give further thought to the question of the enforcement of orders under Clauses 29 and 40, and to consult leading authorities on the matter.

    The effect of these amendments is to provide courts with fresh powers to order premises to be searched for a child who has been taken away unlawfully and has not been returned in accordance with an order made under subsection (1) of both Clauses 29 and 40.

    I think that this fulfils the wish of the House, and I am glad that we have been able to meet those wishes.

    We debated over and over again in the Committee this problem of recovering the actual person of the child, and I am glad that the Minister has been persuaded by our arguments that there was a loophole which needed filling. We welcome these amendments.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 31

    Payment Of Allowances To Adopters

    I beg to move Amendment No. 232, in page 21, line 24, leave out Clause 31.

    With this we are to take Government Amendments Nos. 154 and 155.

    The amendment is moved in the firm belief that the whole principle of payment for adoption and continued payments for adoption is quite a wrong principle. After all, parents have their ordinary family allowances, which are very welcome. But if we adopt this principle that some adopters will be paid for the children they have adopted, how on earth are we to say to the foster mothers of others, "You are not eligible for payment"—in other words, that some people are and some people are not eligible.

    If would-be adopters needed to have payment—and certainly there are many people not well endowed with cash who would be happy to give a child a home if only they had the money to do so—we should have to find the money for them, acting as a fairy godmother. I completely agree with that principle, but surely any parent in that position could be a foster parent. There is full and easy machinery for the payment of foster parents.

    I do not think foster parents are paid enough. I should like to see them getting more. If we could, by making it financially viable, encourage more people to have children in their homes, it would be a very wise and sound move.

    Clause 31 permits some adopters to be paid simply for having adopted children, and I think that is a very difficult principle to carry out unless it is done for all adoptive parents. Since it is fully established that foster parents come into this category and get paid, why are we in this clause suddenly saying that there may be a totally new category of adoptive parents, somehow different and somehow more deserving, and somehow singled out for special State help, apart from all the other adoptive parents? Are we not putting ourselves into a very difficult position indeed when the decision comes to be made as to which is in the magic category of the receivers and which is in the less fortunate category of not receiving money at all? Are not we making a rod for our own backs in this regard? Will not the Minister please look carefully again at this principle?

    I recognise that this is an issue on which the Committee was fundamentally divided. Indeed, it was the casting vote of the Chairman which resulted in the retention of the clause in the Bill.

    I have always respected the major issue of principle behind the Opposition's amendment. However, in Committee, concern was expressed on two points. The first was the breach of the principle that adopted children should be in the same position as children born to the adopters. The second was that there was nothing in Clause 31 to indicate the experimental nature of relaxation in the law. It was the second which created the stronger current in the Committee's proceedings, and I undertook to consider whether this objection could be met.

    Subsection (7) of Amendment No. 155 provides that the Secretary of State's power to approve schemes shall expire seven years after Clause 31 comes into force, unless the Secretary of State under subsection (8), by an order made by statutory instrument at any time before the seven years is up, repeals subsection (7)—in which case the power continues.

    Subsection (9) provides that the Secretary of State shall not make an order under subsection (8) unless a report has been published under subsection (6) and a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House, so that the House would make a decision on the basis of information on the working of it.

    Subsection (10) provides that payments made under an approved scheme may continue even if that scheme is subsequently revoked by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of State's power to approve such schemes expires. Without such a provision, persons who adopted a child on the understanding that they would receive payment so long as they had need of it would be at risk of breaking the law if the scheme were revoked and the Secretary of State's power to approve such a scheme came to an end. In other words, once started, it needs to go through on a continuum.

    The effect of Amendment No. 154 is to amend subsection (6) in Clause 31 to provide that the Secretary of State shall, within seven years of the date on which Clause 31 comes into force, and every five years afterwards, publish a report on the operation of the schemes of payments. As the Clause stands, the first report is to be made seven years after the first scheme is approved.

    Subsection (9) of Amendment No. 155 requires a report to be made under subsection (6) before Parliament is asked to consider whether the power to approve schemes should continue. If by any chance the first scheme were not approved within seven years of Clause 31 being implemented, the report could not be made. The amendment avoids this remote possibility by tying the requirement to report to the date of implementation of the clause.

    If Parliament resolves that schemes should continue, the Secretary of State will still be obliged to report on the operation of the scheme every five years.

    This is a serious attempt to meet some of the very fair objections which were raised in Committee. The original intention and, indeed, the recommendation of the Houghton Committee was that it should be experimental. But it was not sufficiently spelt out in legislative form that it was experimental.

    My view remains the same, that it is right to make this limited experiment. The Adoption Resource Exchange, which is particularly concerned with children who are hard to place, has written to all hon. Members who served on the Committee supporting Clause 31. Islington borough has inquired when Clause 31 is likely to be implemented as its councillors are anxious to submit a scheme. They have a number of suitable foster parents who are prevented from adopting only because they cannot afford to forgo the boarding-out allowance.

    With this important modification to the principle of legislation, I hope therefore that the House will agree that the Government's amendments are preferable to that moved by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight).

    Before the Minister sits down, will he say up to what age he envisages these payments being made?

    I have to admit that that question has caught me out slightly. I assume that it would be until the child becomes an adult, or possibly 16 might be the age. I am not certain about this. I shall have to look into it. But I think that we would tend to take account of when the child was of earning age. However, in the case of a mentally or physically handicapped child, I should not want to see any specific age level introduced into legislation.

    This is a decision that I have not consciously made. Each case must be considered on its merits. Some of these children will be severely mentally and physically handicapped and will be very unlikely ever to be able to earn their living. In that situation the family would get no financial relief as the children grew older if the burden were relieved from them.

    11.15 p.m.

    May I, as one who spoke strongly against the clause in Committee, say that I now think that the Minister has met my main objection to it, namely, that it was drawn too widely? I have been greatly persuaded by the letter written by the Adoption Resource Exchange. I see the great difficulty of placing some children without some form of financial subsidy. It would be difficult to arrange the adoption of a family of two or three coloured children who had been abandoned, but who it was desirable should be kept together, unless there were some form of financial subsidy.

    I can also see that difficulties might arise about arranging the adoption of two spina bifida children unless there were a subsidy.

    The objection of the hon. Lady the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) is wrong in principle. It does not follow that, because a subsidy is given in hard cases, there will be a general demand for a subsidy. I therefore think that as amended the clause should be supported.

    I urge the Minister of State to take on board my point that the way out of this difficulty is by keeping to the foster parent principle, which is an excellent one. Money is paid to foster parents. It is difficult to see how fish can be made of one and fowl of another by saying that one adoptive parent will be eligible for money but another will not. If the foster parent scheme were not already established and recognised as an excellent way of making homes available for children, I should not be arguing in this way. It is now proposed that there should be two different sorts of adopters. This is what worries me.

    Nothing that the Minister of State said convinced me that there is an easy way out of the dilemma of how to decide which adoptive parents shall have financial assistance. It is easy with foster parents. It will be very difficult with adoptive parents, particularly when adoptive parents get to hear that by some magical means money is available to adoptive parents in the same street, for instance.

    Amendment negatived.

    Amendments made: No. 154, in page 21, line 40, leave out:

    'the first scheme is approved under this section'

    and insert

    'section 31 of the Children Act 1975 comes into force'.

    No. 155, in page 21, line 43, at end insert—

    '(7) Subject to the following subsection, subsection (4) of this section shall expire on the seventh anniversary of the date on which it comes into force.
    (8) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument at any time before the said anniversary, repeal subsection (7) of this section.
    (9) An order under subsection (8) of this section shall not be made unless—
  • (a) a report has been published under subsection (6) of this section, and
  • (b) a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House.
  • (10) Notwithstanding the expiry of subsection (4) of this section or the revocation of a scheme approved under this section, subsection (1) of this section shall not apply in relation to any payment made, whether before or after the expiry of subsection (4) or the revocation of the scheme, in accordance with a scheme which was approved under this section to a person to whom such payments were made, where the scheme was not revoked, before the expiry of subsection (4) or, if the scheme was revoked, before the date of its revocation.'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 32

    Custodianship Orders

    I beg to move Amendment No. 164, in page 22, line 29, after 'child', insert:

    'who is not in the care of a local authority'.

    With that amendment we may take the following amendments:

    No. 165, in page 22, line 32, at end insert—
    '(d) Any person with whom the child in the care of a local authority has had his home for a period or periods before the making of the application which amount to at least three years and include the three months preceding the making of the application and who has previously obtained the permission of the local authority in whose care the child is. '
    No. 166, in Clause 39, page 27, line I, leave out sub-section (2).

    No. 167, in page 27, line 5, leave out from 'is' to end of line 7 and insert:
    'may, if appropriate, remove the child from the applicant's custody in pursuance of its general duty to promote the welfare of the child under section 12 Children Act 1948, notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of this section. '

    On an earlier amendment I referred to the problems which I believed existed in regard to the right at any rate to apply for adoption after five years. We come now to the same problem as regards custody, except that now the period is three years.

    The major concern of people working in this area is to ensure that action should be taken only with the consent of the local authority. The aim of Amendments Nos. 164 and 165 is to ensure that applicants for custody orders must seek the consent of the local authority where a child is in the care of that authority. Alternatively, Amendments Nos. 166 and 167 provide a safeguard. If the local authority feels that the applicant for a custody order is unsuitable it can prevent the application from succeeding.

    The major issues were thoroughly discussed in Committee. Most people are still unhappy about the time limits. They feel that this should not be a matter for the courts but should rather be one of consent. As a result of the existence of time limits the natural parents may act hurriedly, or the foster parents may suddenly make an application when, in the absence of time limits, good social work could be carried out and the desired objective achieved without upsetting anyone.

    I press the Government to accept Amendments Nos. 164 and 165. If they are unable to do so they may find the second set of amendments acceptable.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) is nothing if not persistent. I respect his views.

    The effect of these two amendments taken together would be to prevent a person who has looked after a child for over three years from applying for a custodianship order in respect of the child if he is in the care of a local authority, unless the local authority has first given its permission. The amendments were discussed in Committee and there was a vote.

    I understand the general intention underlying the argument. However, I ask the House to resist Amendment No. 166. The effect of this amendment is to remove from the Bill the provision restricting the power of a local authority, pending a court decision, to remove a child from the home of an applicant for a custodianship order who has looked after the child for three years, where the child was in care before he began to live with the applicant and is still in care. Removal by the local authority in such circumstances requires the consent of the applicant or the leave of the court.

    Here we are trying to find a balance between the rights of the person who is looking after the child and the local authority. My hon. Friend has always drawn a major distinction in respect of children who are in the care of a local authority. He is right in saying that that relationship is different from any other. But the logic of his argument is to give the local authority an overriding veto in these cases. Many people feel that that does not pay sufficient attention to the interests of the child. It is a balance of judgment. Such a conflict will rarely exist. Good child care practice would usually ensure that no such conflict arose between the local authority and the foster parents. It would be wrong for us to predict that conflict would arise frequently, although I can imagine circumstances in which a conflict would arise. In the event of a conflict the decision should be made by the court.

    I ask the House to reject the amendments. I understand the motives behind them. The British Association of Social Workers feels strongly about this matter, but a large number of social workers believe that the original provision should stay within the legislation.

    Amendment negatived.

    Clause 33

    Access And Maintenance

    I beg to move Amendment No. 241, in page 24, line 1, leave out subsection (2).

    This amendment seeks to make the deletion because some of us feel that the provision would enable custodians to obtain contribution orders against stepparents and former foster parents in respect of whom custodianship orders have been obtained.

    I seek an assurance from the Minister on subsection (2) because it seems that almost anybody who has taken care of a child for a period of time may find coming out of the blue a demand for payment. In Committee we discussed the situation of a man who married a lady with three children by her previous marriage. The marriage was not a happy one and lasted only a few months, but the man in question found that henceforward he was responsible for his former wife's children. Such a man could discover that a custodianship order was being made against him and under the subsection could suddenly find himself liable for payment.

    Surely under the subsection a person by taking on a step-child or privately fostered child will make himself liable for maintenance contribution in the event of possible custodianship for somebody else and also may even risk having his will upset in favour of a former child of the family. I am not happy with the subsection as it stands.

    The Government's view is that the clause does not change the law. Is that the true situation? Surely such orders may be made independently of matrimonial proceedings so that the machinery of the court will not be brought into play. It appears that the provision changes the law to a drastic extent. Foster parents who for some reason cease to foster a child will now be vulnerable. Applications may come at them out of the blue by future custodians. The same thing could happen to stepparents in cases where the real parents have died or neglected the child, or even badly treated it.

    A relative may have taken a child in care for a short period of time totally oblivious of the fact that the law may later take the view, "You had little Johnny after the child was taken from its parents because he was badly treated for three months. You are now liable for payment." Where grandparents were looking after a child no matrimonial proceedings might be necessary under these provisions. It seems to us that liability may well be assessed in direct proportion to the step- or foster parents' past generosity.

    If the Minister tells me that this is a totally wrong reading of the subsection, I shall be pleased to withdraw the amendment, but at present it appears that, unless the amendment is made, many people who take charge of children may find themselves in difficulty.

    The purpose of this amendment is to prevent a court which has made a custodianship order from making a further order requiring a person other than the child's natural mother or father to contribute towards the child's maintenance. The amendment would also—though this is probably not intended—have the effect of preventing a court which has made a custodianship order from granting access to a person who, though not the child's natural mother or father, has nevertheless treated the child as a child of his family.

    I am sure that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Mrs. Knight) would not wish to deprive anybody of access. I pointed out in Committee that, contrary to what the hon. Lady suggested, the relevant provision in Part II of the Children Bill did not introduce a new principle into the law, since there was ample precedent for it in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which consolidated earlier legislation.

    I accepted that much ill-feeling could be caused by the courts requiring persons to contribute towards children not their own, but I suggested that while the precedent existed, the right course was for the Bill to follow it.

    Subsection (2) of Clause 33 provides that references in subsection (1) to the child's mother or father include any per- son in relation to whom the child was treated as a "child of the family", as defined in section 52(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. But the court in deciding whether to order a person other than the child's mother or father to pay maintenance for the child is to have regard to whether that person assumed responsibility for the child's maintenance and, if he did, to the extent to which and the basis on which he did, and the length of time during which he discharged that responsibility. The court is also to have regard to the liability of any other person to maintain the child. "Child of the the family" is defined in the 1973 Act as meaning, in relation to the parties to a marriage, a child of both of those parties; and any other child, not being a child who has been boarded out with those parties by a local authority or voluntary organisation, who has been treated by both of those parties as a child of their family. The effect of the provision is to enable a person who has treated the child as his own during the currency of his marriage, for example, a step-parent, to be treated as a parent of the child for the purposes of subsection (1).

    11.30 p.m.

    It is difficult to give total reassurance to the hon. Lady. Each case would be considered individually on its merits, weighing a large number of factors. I should not like to give a categorical assurance in some of the instances that she mentioned. Much would depend on the circumstances of each case.

    But this is not a new problem. It is a difficult decision for the court to make and in one or two instances decisions of the courts have been a little surprising. The only way around this difficulty is to have a provision, perhaps cast a little more widely than one might want, that relies much on the sense of the court applying it. For those reasons I believe that this provision is a necessary safeguard and that it will be helpful, in most cases, although I do not totally escape the charge that it could be misapplied in some instances.

    I should be most grateful if the Minister would say what principle the Bill follows in saying that a person who has voluntarily opened his home to a child for a short time should be vulnerable to a demand for payment although under subsection (3) the child's father is not to be liable for payment. It seems odd that the father of an illegitimate child will not be vulnerable although a good-hearted relative who acts out of kindness may be vulnerable.

    The hon. Lady raises the whole subject of matrimonial causes legislation. All I can say is that if there are many examples of the present law being misapplied, we shall have to look at that, but I am not yet convinced that that is so.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 30, in page 24, line 20, after '1973', insert

    'and sections 3 and 4 of that Act (supplementary provisions)'.
    This is a drafting amendment to avoid an ambiguity on the face of the Bill and to facilitate later consolidation of legislation relating to children.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 35

    Custodianship Order On Application For Adoption Or Guardianship

    Amendments made:

    No. 31, in page 25, line 19, leave out from beginning to 'are' in line 21 and insert—

    '(1) Where on an application for an adoption order by a relative of the child or by the husband or wife of the mother or father of the child, whether alone or jointly with his or her spouse, the requirements of section 12 or, where the application is for a Convention adoption order, section 24(6) are satisfied, but the court is satisfied—
  • (a) that the child's welfare would not be better safeguarded and promoted by the making of adoption order in favour of the applicant, than it would be by the making of a custodianship order in his favour, and
  • (b) that it would be appropriate to make a custodianship order in the applicant's favour,
  • the court shall direct the application to be treated as if it had been made by the applicant under section 32, but if the application was made jointly by the father or mother of the child and his or her spouse, the court shall direct the application to be treated as if made by the father's wife or the mother's husband alone.
    (1A) Where on an application for an adoption order made—
  • (a) by a person who is neither a relative of the child nor the husband or wife of the mother or father of the child; or
  • (b) by a married couple neither of whom falls within paragraph (a).
  • the said requirements'.

    No. 32, in page 25, line 25, leave out from '32' to end of line 27.

    No. 33, in page 25, line 33, leave out from '32' to end of line 36 and insert—

    '(2A) Where a direction is given under this section the applicant shall be treated (if such is not the case) as if he were qualified to apply for a custodianship order and this Part, except section 38, shall have effect accordingly.'.

    No. 34, in page 25, line 41, at end insert—

    '(4) Subsections (1) and (1A) do not apply to an application for an adoption order made by the child's mother or father alone.'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 37

    Reports By Local Authorities, Etc

    Amendment made: No. 35, in page 26, line 4, leave out Clause 37.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 38

    Notice Of Application To Be Given To Local Authority

    I beg to move Amendment No. 247, in page 26, line 19, leave out from 'investigate' to end of line 22 and insert

    'make a report to the court (so far as is practicable) on the matters prescribed under subsection (3) and on any other matter which he considers to be relevant to the application.
    (3) The Secretary of State shall by regulations prescribe matters which are to be included in a report under subsection (2) and, in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, the prescribed matters shall include—'.

    With this we may take Government Amendment No. 248.

    We may also take Amendment No. 146, in page 26, line 29, at end insert—
    '(c) the suitability of any person living either temporarily or permanently in the household of the applicant; and'

    These Government amendments are designed to ensure that the local authority, in carrying out its duty under Clause 38(2) to report to the court on an application for a custodianship order, shall include relevant information, of a kind to be specified in regulations, relating to members of the applicant's household.

    The amendments are intended to fulfil my undertaking, given in the tenth sitting of the Standing Committee, to consider the possibility of meeting on Report the point underlying Amendment No. 168, suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett), who withdrew it, which would have required the local authority to investigate the "suitability" of other persons living in the applicant's household. I explained that there were difficulties about using the term "suitability" in this context in the Bill. Those objections apply also to Amendment No. 146 now tabled by the hon. Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker). However, I think that we have met the substance of her argument in Committee.

    We welcome the Government amendments on this matter. It came to my knowledge only this week that there is a tragedy in my own area where a child of mixed parentage in a secure foster home has been taken back into the home of natural parents. Custodianship would have been applied for had the Bill been passed. Without these amendments there would have been no reason for the social workers to investigate the part-time cohabitant in this particular family who, regrettably, happened to be racially prejudiced.

    We are now beginning to get to the bottom of the case, which but for the concern of the social worker and her interest in the legislation might not have been possible.

    We welcome the two amendments to the Bill. We are sure that they will improve the Bill and the practice of social work.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 248, in page 26, line 29, leave out 'and' and insert:

    '(bb) information of a kind specified in the regulations relating to members of the applicant's household;'.

    No. 36, in page 26, line 33, leave out from 'report' to end of line 36 and insert:

    'under this section which is submitted to a magistrates' court.'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 39

    Restriction On Removal Of Child Where Applicant Has Provided Home For Three Years

    Amendment made: No. 37, in page 27, line 11, leave out '£100' and insert '£400'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 40

    Return Of Child Taken Away In Breach Of Section 39

    Amendment made: No. 156, in page 27, line 26, at end insert:

    '(3) If, in the case of an order made by the High Court under subsection (1), the High Court or, in the case of an order made by a county court under subsection (1), a county court is satisfied that the child has not been returned to the applicant, the court may make an order authorising an officer of the court to search such premises as may be specified in the order for the child and, if the officer finds the child, to return the child to the applicant.
    (4) If a justice of the peace is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a child to whom an order under subsection (1) relates is in premises specified in the information, he may issue a search warrant authorising a constable to search the premises for the child; and if a constable acting in pursuance of a warrant under this section finds the child, he shall return the child to the person on whose application the order under subsection (1) was made.
    (5) An order under subsection (3) may be enforced in like manner as a warrant for committal.'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 41

    Enforcement Of Custodianship Etc Order

    I beg to move Amendment No. 38, in page 27, line 28 after "child" insert

    'by virtue of a custodianship order made by a magistrates' court'.

    With this we may discuss Government amendments Nos. 39, 40 and 128.

    The purpose of this group of amendments is to assist future consolidation of Clause 41 and section 13 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971. It is a simple matter.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 39, in page 27, line 37 after "made" insert "by a magistrates' court".

    No. 40, in page 28, line 1 after "money", insert

    made by a magistrates' court'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 45

    Granting Of Custody

    I beg to move Amendment No. 183, in page 29, line 16 at end insert

    'enactment or rule of law conferring a—'.

    Both these amendments are designed to emphasise the relationship between the new statutory provisions in Clause 45(1) under which the relative, step-parent or foster parent of a child is entitled to apply for custody of the child in Scotland, and the existing law relating to custody applications.

    The first amendment makes it clear that the new provisions are without prejudice to the existing rights of application for custody, and powers of the court to grant custody, under any enactment or rule of law. The insertion of these words makes it clear that the existing law which the new provisions build upon is part statute law—for example the Guardianship of Infants Acts 1886–1973—and part common law.

    The insertion of the reference to Section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 in Clause 45(2)(d) is designed to emphasise the relationship of the provisions of Clause 45(2)(d) with the general principle, applying to all cases involving the custody education or upbringing of a child, embodied in the 1925 Act. This is the same principle as is mentioned in the context of custodianship applications in England and Wales in Clause 32(9) of the Bill. Mention of the Scottish provisions is now felt to be desirable in view of the doubts that have been expressed since the Bill was originally published—by among others the hon. Member for Edinburgh West (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton)—as to the application of Section 1 of the 1925 Act to custody proceedings in Scotland to which the new statutory provisions in the Bill will relate.

    These doubts have been related to paragraph (d) of Clause 45(2) dealing with cases where a person is applying for custody without having the locus of a parent or guardian, or who does not fall within any one of paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) of Clause 45(2). The second of the two present amendments should put those doubts to rest by making it absolutely clear that the case to be made by an applicant under paragraph (d) must be related expressly to the court's duty to treat the child's welfare as the first and paramount consideration in dealing with any application relating to custody, education and upbringing.

    By this amendment, the Minister has protected the rights of non-parents to apply for custody in the Scots courts. I am sure that this decision will be warmly welcomed by Scotsmen.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendment made: No. 41, in page 29, line 42, after 'cause', insert,

    ', having regard to section 1 of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 (the principle on which questions relating to custody, upbringing etc. of children are to be decided)'.—[Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 46

    Miscellaneous Provisions Relative To Custody

    I beg to move Amendment No. 42, in page 30, line 23, leave out 'applying for' and insert

    'making an application relating to the'.

    With this amendment we are to discuss Government Amendments Nos. 43, 44 and 45.

    The purpose of these amendments is to extend the provisions of Clause 46 in such a way as to provide that certain ancillary provisions already applicable to the making or determination of applications for custody of a child in Scotland shall also apply in relation to any proceedings subsequent to the making of a custody order by the court. The points now covered have arisen from further consideration of the Scottish custody provisions. They deal with matters relating to court procedure and ancillary powers of the court in custody proceedings in Scotland; the proposed changes extend not only to the new categories of persons qualified to apply for custody under the Bill but more generally to any person applying for the custody of a child in Scotland.

    No changes are being made to the substantive provisions of clause 46 which have already been agreed in Committee. These amendments simply apply the provisions of Clause 46 more extensively to the whole range of custody proceedings including applications for variation or discharge of the order and for access or maintenance.

    Amendment agreed to.

    In calling the next amendment, may I appeal for brevity? It is getting rather late now.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 238, in page 30, line 26, leave out from 'child' to end of line 27.

    I am surprised that you should ask for brevity now, Sir. I had intended to be brief, but I do not see why I should be singled out.

    My first reaction was lack of sympathy for those fathers who beget illegitimate children, but after further consideration one realises that some fathers have been in a permanent relationship with someone for three, four, five, ten or 15 years. They have produced children and when the relationship finishes, they are interested in the future of the child. I presume that that is at the root of the clause.

    There is a technical difficulty which I am not sure is dealt with by the amendment, which may go too far. It relates to the term "known" in the clause. How does one know who is the father of a child? In a permanent liaison there is no difficulty, but if a child has appeared as the result of a hit-and-run association, it is sometimes difficult to decide. The clause refers to an Act of Sederunt which could be passed by the Court of Session outlining the criteria by which the putative parent could be found. Even so, there could be difficulties without adequate guidance from the statute.

    An example is a mother telling an applicant for custody that someone is the father. Does that mean that the applicant must give notice to that person? If an entirely innocent person were dragged in, the applicant could be in hot water. So the Government should try to define what a "known" father is. He could be defined—this could possibly be done in another place—as one who is liable under a decree of the court or a written agreement to contribute to the aliment of the child or who has for a period of some months preceding had possession of the child, or, if one wanted a much looser definition, someone who has contributed to the payment of aliment for a child. In those circumstances, the admission would have been made by the father that he is responsible for the child and has paid for it.

    There can be few better admissions than the payment of money. In any event, I would like to think that the known parent is someone who has had some fairly close association with the child over a period of time and not someone who is just plucked from the blue because he happens to be the father of an illegitimate child.

    11.45 p.m.

    This amendment proposes the removal from Clause 46 of wording which requires notice of a custody application to be given not only to the parents of a legitimate child, or the mother of an illegitimate child, but also to the putative father of an illegitimate child.

    The effect of the amendment would be that when application for custody of a child was being made by any person, whether a parent, or one of the persons now qualified to apply by virtue of the new statutory right contained in Clause 45(1), or a person applying under common law, the putative father might not be aware of the proceedings at all. The problem does not arise as a significant issue in the case of existing custody proceedings in Scotland since, where the custody of an illegitimate child is in question in proceedings taken under the Custody of Illegitimate Children (Scotland) Act 1930, both parents, including the putative father, where known, will normally be involved as parties.

    Such an effect would be unfair to the putative father and undesirable in terms of policy regarding the Scottish custody provisions in the Bill. The departmental committee was at pains in its report to stress that the position of the putative father should be fully examined before an order was made freeing the child for adoption and Clause 14(9) of the Bill expressly requires that the court considering the making of a freeing order should satisfy itself as to the possibility—in the Scottish context—of a prospective application under the 1930 Act. If the court should be required to consider the position of the putative father before making a 'freeing' order, it is also appropriate that the putative father's position should come under review when the making of a custody order is under consideration.

    The most effective means of securing this result, while avoiding any delay which might arise, is to require the applicant for custody to serve notice on the putative father along with the mother of the child, where practicable. There is, admittedly, no requirement as to the giving of notice to the putative father in the case of an application for adoption under court rules as at present framed. Clearly, however, this should be looked at again in the preparation of new adoption rules after the Bill becomes law having regard to the comments made by the departmental committee on the position of the putative father at pages 56–57 of its report.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Amendments made: No. 43, in page 30, line 29, leave out 'may be revoked' and insert 'discharged'.

    No. 44, in line 34, leave out 'any application other than one' and insert

    'an application relating to the custody of a child, other than an application'.

    No. 45, in line 36, leave out 'for custody of a child'.—[ Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 49

    Restriction On Removal Of Child Where Applicant Has Provided Home For Three Years

    I beg to move Amendment No. 46, in page 31, line 37, at end insert:

    '(1A) In any case where subsection (1) applies, and
  • (a) the child was in the care of a local authority before he began to have his home with the applicant, and
  • (b) the child remains in the care of a local authority,
  • the authority in whose care the child is shall not remove the child from the applicant's custody except—
  • (i) with the applicant's consent;
  • (ii) with the leave of a court; or
  • (iii) with the authority, in terms of Part III of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, of a justice of the peace or a children's hearing'.
  • Amendment No. 46 inserts a provision corresponding to one inserted in Committee in Clause 39(2) in relation to England and Wales. Its purpose is similar to the provision in Clause 28 which inserts a new section 34A(3) in the Adoption Act 1958 in relation to England and Wales and Scotland. The purpose of Clause 49 is to restrict the removal by local authorities of children who are the subject of custody applications by persons who have had the child concerned in their possession for a period of over three years.

    Amendment No. 47 is a drafting amendment consequential to Amendment No. 46.

    The inclusion of Amendment No. 46 derives from the fact that the custodianship provisions in Part II of the Bill were expanded by the Committee so as to inhibit the removal of a child by a local authority from the possession of an applicant for custody in circumstances where the applicant had had custody of the child for over three years and removal could be seen as an attempt to frustrate the wish of the applicant to obtain legal custody of the child.

    The provision now made is the equivalent in Scottish terms to that contained in Clause 39(2) while allowing for the provisions relating to the temporary accommodation of the child in a place of safety contained in Part III of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968. Amendment No. 46 makes equivalent provision in this regard to that in Amendment No. 29 which dealt with the removal of a child from an applicant for adoption.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 47, in page 31, line 38, leave out 'this section' and insert 'subsection (1)'.

    No. 48, in page 31, line 41, leave out '£100' and insert '£400'.—[ Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 50

    Custody Order On Application For Adoption In Scotland

    Amendments made: No. 212, in page 32, line 9, leave out from beginning to 'direct' in line 12 and insert:

    'applicant is a person qualified to apply for custody of the child, and the court is of opinion—
  • (a) in the case of an applicant who is a relative of the child or a husband or wife of the mother or father of the child (whether applying alone or jointly with his or her spouse)—
  • (i) that the child's welfare would not be better safeguarded and promoted by the making of an adoption order in favour of the applicant than it would be by the making of a custody order in his favour; and
  • (ii) that it would be appropriate to make a custody order in favour of the applicant; or
  • (b) in any other case, that the making of a custody order in favour of the applicant would be more appropriate than the making of an adoption order in his favour,
  • the court shall'.

    No. 213, in page 32, line 13, leave out 'in such a case' and insert:

    'where such a direction is made'.—[Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 53

    Restriction On Removal Of Child From Care

    I beg to move Amendment No. 49, in page 33, line 16, leave out from 'authority' to end of line 23 and insert: 'not less than 28 days' notice of his intention to do it'.

    With it we may take Government Amendments Nos. 50, 51, 184 and 185.

    We may also take Amendment No. 168, in page 33, leave out lines 18 to 21.

    The amendment would remove from the clause the requirement, added in Committee, for the parent of a child in the care of a local authority under Section 1 of the Children Act 1948, or in the care of a voluntary organisation, to give variable periods of notice of intention to remove the child from care depending upon the length of time the child had been in care. The amendment would substitute for the variable periods of notice a single requirement to give up to 28 days' notice after the child has been in care for six months.

    The Government's proposal, to substitute a single requirement to give up to 28 days' notice after six months in care for the requirement now in the Bill to give variable periods of notice which would begin to apply immediately the child was received into care, was included in a consultation paper which was circulated among professional bodies in September.

    The response to this paper indicated that opinion on the need for notice of removal during the first six months was polarised between those of the Association of Directors of Social Services, which would have preferred that there should be a requirement to give up to 28 days' notice effective immediately the child came into care, and the British Association of Social Workers, which preferred that there should not be any requirement to give notice however long the child had been in care.

    Between these extremes there were the views of the voluntary organisations concerned with child care which expressed a preference for the Government's proposal to the variable provisions now in the Bill.

    Perhaps I may quote from some of these. The National Council for One-Parent Families said,
    "We are very worried about Clause 53 because the majority of children in care from 0–6 months are in care because of the illness of the parent and the one thing they long for is to be able to go home. Even a delay of two days will seem extremely long, especially to a very young child.
    We think that 14 days is ample time for the Local Authority to apply for an order preventing a child in their care from being returned to his parents should that be thought necessary, and to prepare the child for the return".
    The National Council of Voluntary Child Care Organisations said it had consulted all its major societies and that they felt that it was important to have only one qualifying period as it would be impossible to give valid reasons for variable periods in care requiring different periods of notice.
    "I think they would have preferred the period to be twelve months rather than six, as the Houghton Committee recommended, but they appreciated the point that the requirement for notice could be waived by the authority or organisation."
    The Association of British Adoption Agencies said,
    "The flexibility of the Committee Amendment with its variable periods of notice is very attractive but we fear that it would prove complicated in practice and very easily misunderstood. Rather regretfully therefore, we support the government compromise of a single recruitment of up to 28 days' notice after 6 months. We wonder, however, whether six months will soon prove to be too long a period and would like to see the Secretary of State given power to change the time either up or down. Differentiation between short-term and long-term does seem valid but only experience can show where the dividing line should be drawn."
    It seems clear that we cannot meet the wishes of all who have expressed a view on this contentious issue and therefore in a spirit of compromise I have tabled this amendment which goes part of the way towards meeting the differing views expressed. The original proposals in the Bill have been changed from 12 to six months.

    The amendment would, of course, enable the Secretary of State, by order subject to approval by each House, to vary the periods of 28 days and six months should these prove, in practice, not to be the most suitable.

    I know that my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) has very strong feelings about this issue. I respect those feelings. He has already successfully moved an amendment which has substantially changed the periods. We have met him half way, although he may say that it is not quite as far as half way. My only consolation to him is to say this: first, it may well prove that his suggestion eventually is the one that is fixed on. My own sympathy for the fact that that may well be so is well known. I have always wanted shorter periods, but I am bound to take account of what the professional organisations feel. There is very strong feeling against going for the variable period as a first step.

    The compromise, which does not meet all the objections of everyone, is in the best interest of children. It will give us a six-month period—down from 12 months. It will give us experience of this shorter period and time scale. If as the result of experience we want to go even further down, it gives the Secretary of State full power.

    I have often stressed that this legislation must not be static legislation. We must be able, in the light of experience, to make adaptations. But equally, we would be extremely foolish if we were to ignore the collective experience of those who are working in the child-care field.

    I take account particularly of the National Council for One-Parent Families. It is our duty to respect one-parent families, who face very formidable problems. We can easily tilt the balance in this legislation too strongly against single-parent families. Although I have a great deal of sympathy with the need to put the interests of the child first and foremost, we must always remember that there are other balances to be held when we are considering this legislation. Therefore, I urge the House to accept this compromise.

    Very reluctantly, I have to say that I am not exactly satisfied with the new amendment proposed by the Minister. I say that regretfully, because I have admired the way in which the Minister has handled the Committee stage of the Bill and the period since then. I have admired his courteous replies and his treatment of members of the Committee. It has been a model as regards treatment of Committee members. I was proud and privileged to serve on such a Committee. The level of debate has been as high as, if not higher than, that of many Committees. Much of this has been due to my hon. Friend the Minister. I unequivocally give credit to him in that regard.

    However, I have one sorrow. I have no personal axe to grind in this matter, but I have come to know over many years' involvement in public health and local government a great number of people and many problems in my constituency. One of these problems has been the midnight snatch, the sudden snatching away of children from Section 1 care under the 1948 Act. In my constituency this has happened at all hours, sometimes in the middle of the night. Children have been literally snatched from a bath when a parent has turned up.

    I am not saying that the parent does not have a right to take the child back. That is not the argument. We are saying that there ought to be a reasonable period before the child is moved from one situation to another, no matter how long it has been in care. This kind of situation can occur, even in the first six months. I should have said that 28 days' notice after six months is too long. The scale ought to be graded down, even going right to the bottom. I am worried about the reaction which might be set up among some parents at the end of, say, five months and 20 days because of the 28 days' notice which would come into force at the end of six months. There will be a reaction. They will want to get back the child quickly because the 28–day period is too long.

    12 midnight.

    I do not have as many contacts with the professional organisations as does my hon. Friend, but I have many contacts with foster parents who live in fear that a child may be snatched away. There has been an increase either in the number of such incidents or in the reporting of them. People may be more concerned because of our discussions on the Bill. They may have reacted because of their fear of what might happen because of the Bill, or there may be a general increase in these incidents because people are worried. There is just as much need for protection in the first six months as in any period thereafter.

    There is no adequate protection now. That is no reflection on the authorities. They may be reluctant to operate the existing legislation, or there may be a delay in operating the legislation which allows the parent to carry out a snatch. If we are to prevent the occurrence of incidents similar to those which are so frequently reported in newspapers and on the radio, the time scale must start from the beginning. I am unable to accept the absence of any protection in the early days.

    I am puzzled by the Association of Directors of Social Services. In Committee my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) referred to a letter from that association which welcomed the principle of the clause but wished to see the principle applied to all children in care. The association did not suggest that it should apply only after six months or 12 months. It referred to an abrupt change of surroundings being very distressing for a young child, especially for one who had been away from home for much less than a year.

    I do not want there to be any misunderstanding. That is the view of the Association of Directors of Social Services but it is polarised by the BASW view which is that there should be no requirement.

    That is the kind of healthy debate we had in Committee. Many foster parents who do a tremendous job, often with difficult children, fear the possibility of a snatch. I want that fear to be removed. We must, therefore, return to the time scale accepted by the Committee after much discussion. Several compromises were suggested, many amendments were tabled and, after long discussion and a consensus of expert opinion, we arrived at the words which appear in the Bill. I do not think that we could have arrived at a better set of words, and I hope that the House will accept the clause as it stands and reject the amendment.

    I rise to support the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard). With great respect to the Minister, I remind him that we had an excellent debate in Committee where, by 12 votes to nine, the wording in the Bill was accepted by the Committee. It is regrettable that the Minister should ask us to overturn that decision.

    I have on many occasions expressed my great respect for the way in which the Minister has handled the Bill. He has done a remarkable job. Yet, on this amendment, he has put the weakest case and weakest argument of any discussion on the Bill.

    As the hon. Gentleman has said, the Minister had before him a whole range of possibilities of compromise, but he has come up with the worst possible answer, a limit which is too long—six months—and if the child is only one day within the six-month limit it can be taken away by the parent without warning.

    In Committee, I outlined a number of horrifying circumstances in which it would have been possible, under the original proposal, for a parent to remove a child from care without warning. Much as I respect the director of Gingerbread, I do not think it reasonable to say that even two days' delay could cause stress and strain because the child might be in care because the mother was ill. As the Bill stands, that two days' notice could be and would be waived easily in the vast majority of cases, but where it was undesirable to waive it, where the local authority wished to make further inquiry, it would be able to do so. I urge the Minister to think again about this. He should let the provision stand as the Committee decided by the substantial majority of 12 votes to nine.

    I hope that the House will support the Minister of State's amendment because in a very difficult situation it is a reasonable compromise. The decision to make the change at six months makes a clear distinction between short-term and long-term fostering. We should be trying to make short-term fostering as informal and as easy as possible. Only in the long-term fostering situation do we need the sort of safeguards suggested.

    In most instances quoted, a snatch-back, even if in a long-term fostering case, would be covered by the amendment. In the one case I have had quoted to me of a snatch-back in a short-term fostering case, the local authority should have used powers it already had to have the child in care under Section 2 instead of Section 1 of the 1948 Act.

    We should consider carefully what we mean by short-term fostering. Many hon. Members have had family crises in which they have been unable to look after the children and have turned to grandparents, uncles, aunts or friends, with the children moved at short notice because of family illness, for example. When the crisis is over, the children are brought back quickly. I can think of circumstances in which I fetched my children back from grandparents at very short notice with complete agreement.

    But there are many families which have no supportive web of friends or relatives to turn to in a crisis, so the local authorities have to provide short-term fostering. They should be working in the same supportive way as relatives and friends support the vast majority of families, and it is important that they should not have to give this sort of formal notice.

    There are many instances where someone has made plans for a confinement, for instance; the husband has a job which takes him away from home but makes arrangements to be on holiday on the due date to look after the other children. Then the birth starts early, he is away and the other children have to be looked after. The only course may be to place them in a foster home. The father returns and naturally goes to the house to collect the child. He sees the child but is told "You have not given two days' notice" or the foster parent may not think that he is the ideal person to take the child away, but the child runs to him.

    It is important to keep short-term fostering as informal as possible. If there are any grounds for the natural parent not to be in possession, the local authority should use not Section 1, but the existing powers—

    There are bound to be circumstances of what is technically short-term fostering which cannot be seen as the legal equivalent of a family situation where powers have been taken, but if a child is in care in a fostering situation, we need safeguards to prevent a snatch-back.

    The statutory powers should be those within the 1948 Act which provided that parents should not take a child back at will. The sad thing is that many local authorities have been reluctant to use this power, which they already have. They could use that power to stop those situations. We have to concern ourselves that we do not extend the power to a completely different group and cause a lot of upset.

    We should look at the situation of a single parent facing sudden illness who possibly knows someone who might be persuaded to look after the child in an informal situation or may have an elderly relative who could look after the child. Does she do that or use the first-class local authority foster home? So long as there are these time limits, they may push her to use the poorer services when she feels that she is not losing her child. It is about cases of that kind that the British Association of Social Workers and certainly the social workers to whom I have spoken in Stockport are worried.

    What do we do about enforcement? If a parent does not give notice but turns up, especially if it is only after three or four weeks, the child will recognise the natural parent and it will be difficult for the foster parents to ring up the police. They would have to say, "You have not given notice and the child stays here". What do we do then? We have to tell the natural parents that they are losing some rights.

    There is also a difficult situation where possibly someone is taken into care because the parent has a breakdown in mental health. How does one tell people in such a case?

    My last point is about timing. There are many problems with this if one faces it. I would plead with the House to recognise the short-term fostering situation. There should be informal arrangements for 99 per cent. of cases and in the cases where there are problems the local authorities should be using their existing powers under the 1948 Act.

    May I refer the hon. Member to what he said in Standing Committee in the light of what he has just said about where he stands? He then said,

    "The simple answer is for parents to tell the local authority, perhaps giving 24 hours' notice, so that the representative of the local authority can be present when the child is transferred.—[Official Report, Standing Committee A, 29th July 1975; col. 550.]

    Yes. I am sure that that would be the simple answer, but the problems are for the short period. I accept the suggestion that six months is perhaps too long and that perhaps one could come down for small children in a short-term fostering of two or three days, but we should look at it in the family situation. If we look at the figure for children in care in 1973, we find that it was 93,000. Some 54,000 of them had come in during that year. Therefore the vast majority come in and go out over a very short period of time.

    The compromise put forward by the Minister is, I think, the best, retaining the very valuable short-term service. If we introduce any time limits we shall discourage some parents from letting their children come in and cause a great deal of unrest among social workers.

    12.15 a.m.

    :I remind the House that, as the Bill stands, in the case of a child in care from nought to six months—that is a period, not the age of the child—the notice is two days, for a child in care from six to 12 months the notice is seven days, and for a child in care over 12 months the notice is 28 days.

    We were starting just now to lose sight of the fact that we are concerned with children in care over a period of time. We are not concerned with the child who goes into care while a mother is in hospital for a relatively short period. We are concerned with up to six months in the first instance. While accepting what the hon. Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) says about the use of Section 2 of the 1948 Act, that is not the argument behind this particular matter.

    The Minister has reported to the House a wide range of views, and has come down very much more on one side than I would have expected from what he reported to us. We have had from the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) and from my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Mr. Bowden) a clear exposition of the problem. Had we not had that, I think that the words of the National Foster Care Association regarding the notice of removal would be extremely relevant. The Association maintains that any reasonable parent will see the necessity for a foster parent to have at least 24 hours' notice to prepare a child for his return home, to get his clothes and toys together and prepare her own family for the child's departure. In cases where circumstances are not really suitable for a child's immediate return home, many tragedies could be averted by the obligation to give notice—even two days' notice for a child in care under six months.

    In one case a toddler of 19 months was brought out of his cot one Sunday evening at eight o'clock and given to his father, who had been discharged from jail that day and had never before seen the child. That child was to be taken, the foster mother was told, to an address which was that of a neighbour. That child has never been traced by the foster parent from that day forward. It was somewhere in North Wales. The addresses were completely false. Yet there was absolutely nothing the foster parent could do, or the local authority social worker, to prevent that parent snatching that child—a child that he had never seen.

    The effect on two other foster children in the same home was such that it took weeks to settle them. They said, "We are terrified that someone will snatch us away as Jenny was snatched away last night." This is a case from my own constituency.

    In all we have heard it seems to me that we need to give the foster parents the chance to ensure that the facts they are being given are true. For the shortest period of care now written into the Bill, nought to six months, the two days' notice is a very short period, particularly when a child's mind needs to be prepared for that transition.

    I hope very much that the House will support the hon. Member for St. Pancras, North and reject the Government's proposals on this point.

    Although it is not clear that this provision or the Government amendment would apply to Scotland, it is a possibility that we have to consider in the light of later amendments. But, whatever be the case, I support the Bill as it stands, because I believe that the case made by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) is unshaken. My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) was careful to avoid mentioning the reason why notice was required. It must be within his experience of cases in his own constituency that some form of notice would have been beneficial to all concerned. In any event, it is only common decency that a child should not be snatched away in the middle of the night, which is always a distinct possibility.

    There is a problem. The period now in the Bill and proposed originally by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North in Committee may not be perfect, but it is better than the Minister's proposal. I cannot see why, in the case of a period of six months less one day, no notice should be required, but that a period of six months plus one day should require 28 days' notice. In both cases, sufficient notice is needed so that the foster parent can verify the facts and the local authority can take some action if necessary so that the situation can be kept under control.

    I support the provision now in the Bill.

    The argument has been well demonstrated in the conflicting views advanced by my hon. Friends the Members for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) and Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett).

    The Houghton Committee studied this proposal and recommended a period of notice—and this is the first time that it has been incorporated in our legislation—after 12 months. The Committee discussed it and decided in favour of the provision now in the Bill. I have come forward with a proposal to introduce a pause up to six months.

    The Secretary of State would have power to come to my hon. Friend's proposal if it seemed better in the light of experience, but in my view it would be unwise to take this step quite so quickly. It may be a step to which we shall come eventually.

    I hope that I have demonstrated that, on balance, the compromise which I propose commands the greatest respect among those whom we have consulted. But I accept that there are differing views, and I respect those views.

    We have to be careful in striking a balance. We have to bear in mind the possibility, as the Bill stands, that poorer families will be deterred from putting their children in care when things go wrong in the absolute certainty of being able to reclaim their children immediately. The open access of short-term fostering and care facilities is a very important factor. As matters stand, we should have to explain to anyone putting their children into short-term care that there would have to be a two-day period of waiting. We have to be careful that we do not deter people from using the care facilities in times of economic difficulty.

    It is with that possibility in mind that the National Council for One-Parent Families has not felt able to support my hon. Friend. I might say, incidentally, that far from being an elitist organisation, the National Council has championed the cause of people who have no access to elite organisations, as have the fostering organisations—

    Can my hon. Friend make a distinction between voluntary care on a short-term basis as opposed to the situation when a local authority takes a child into care? Is there a distinction?

    The important thing is when the child goes into care. It applies whether the person concerned is taking care of the child under an order—in which case, if that person has been shown to be

    Division No. 371.]

    AYES

    12.25 a.m.

    Allaun, FrankFernyhough, Rt Hon E.Noble, Mike
    Armstrong, ErnestFlannery, MartinOakes, Gordon
    Atkinson, NormanFord, BenOwen, Dr David
    Bagier, Gordon A. T.Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)Palmer, Arthur
    Bates, AlfGeorge, BrucePenhaligon, David
    Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)Grant, George (Morpeth)Prescott, John
    Blenkinsop, ArthurGrant, John (Islington C)Roper, John
    Boardman, H.Grocott, BruceRoss, Rt Hon W. (Kilmarnock)
    Bray, Dr JeremyHamilton, James (Bothwell)Rowlands, Ted
    Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)Harper, JosephSedgemore, Brian
    Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)Harrison, Walter (Wakefield)Small, William
    Buchan, NormanHoyle, Doug (Nelson)Smith, Cyril (Rochdale)
    Buchanan, RichardHunter, AdamSmith, John (N Lanarkshire)
    Callaghan, Jim (Middleton & P)Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)Spearing, Nigel
    Campbell, IanJohnson, Walter (Derby S)Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)
    Cocks, Michael (Bristol S)Jones, Alec (Rhondda)Stoddart, David
    Cohen, StanleyJones, Barry (East Flint)Swain, Thomas
    Coleman, DonaldKaufman, GeraldTierney, Sydney
    Concannon, J. D.Lamond, JamesTinn, James
    Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)Leadbitter, TedUrwin, T. W.
    Corbett, RobinMabon, Dr J. DicksonWainwright, Edwin (Dearne V)
    Craigen, J. M. (Maryhill)McCartney, HughWalker, Terry (Kingswood)
    Dalyell, TamMcElhone, FrankWatkinson, John
    Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)MacFarquhar, RoderickWhite, James (Pollok)
    Dell, Rt Hon EdmundMackenzie, GregorWhitlock, William
    Dempsey, JamesMcMillan, Tom (Glasgow C)Wilson, Alexander (Hamilton)
    Dormand, J. D.McNamara, KevinWoodall, Alec
    Duffy, A. E. P.Marks, KennethYoung, David (Bolton E)
    Dunwoody, Mrs GwynethMarshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
    Eadie, AlexMarshall, Jim (Leicester S)TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
    Evans, John (Newton)Millan, BruceMr. Thomas Cox and
    Ewing, Harry (Stirling)Morris, Charles R. (Openshaw)Mr. Tom Pendry.
    Faulds, AndrewMurray, Rt Hon Ronald King

    NOES

    Bain, Mrs MargaretEwing, Mrs Winifred (Moray)Knight, Mrs Jill
    Bowden, A. (Brighton, Kemptown)Henderson, DouglasLoyden, Eddie
    Cryer, BobHooson, EmlynMontgomery, Fergus
    Douglas-Hamilton, Lord JamesHughes, Robert (Aberdeen N)Newens, Stanley

    unable to look after the child, there are other powers open to the local authority—or whether it is a case of a parent who has done no harm to the child at all but where there is a long period of illness, financial difficulty, a housing crisis, or violence in the marriage. It might be a temporary situation. Initially the parents may have thought that they were putting their child into care for a very short period and it may have developed into a very long period.

    I return to the point that the House must decide whether it wishes to take a much wider step than was recommended by Houghton or a more cautious step, with the possibility of going to the scale recommended by my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras North. I hope that the House will agree with myself and my hon. Friend the Member for Stock-port, North and decide to support Amendment No. 49.

    Question put, That the amendment be made:—

    The House divided: Ayes 94, Noes 24.

    Robertson, John (Paisley)Thomas, Ron (Bristol NW)Wool, Robert
    Sillars, JamesWelsh, Andrew
    Sims, RogerWhite, Frank R. (Bury)TELLERS FOR THE NOES
    Skinner, DennisWilson, Gordon (Dundee E)Mr. Phillip Whitehead and
    Stallard, A. W.Winterton, NicholasMr. R. C. Mitchell.
    Steen, Anthony (Wavertree)

    Question accordingly agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 50, in page 33, line 29, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.

    No. 51, in page 33, line 37, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 54

    Substitution Of S 2 Of Children Act 1948

    I beg to move Amendment No. 169, in page 35, line 6, leave out paragraph (d).

    With this we may take Government Amendments Nos. 172 to 176.

    A little earlier we considered the problems of children in care under Section 1 of the 1948 Act. I believe that many children who are now in care under the provisions of Section 1 of that Act should come within the provisions of Section 2. There has been a growing feeling in the last 10 years that local authorities have not made sufficient use of existing legislation. However, within the last six months or so many local authorities have again started to use their powers in the existing legislation. Unfortunately, the Bill includes paragraph (d), a provision that seems to be inappropriate. Whereas all the other provisions repeat or strengthen the powers in the 1948 Act, that paragraph seeks to bring in new criteria. The grounds involve a positive act of failure by the parent. The Bill is now seeking to look merely to the passage of time.

    I am most disturbed by the thought that many local authorities may again fail to carry out their duties. During a period of three years many problems may arise. Therefore, surely it would be better to use other provisions in existing legislation rather than wait for the passage of time.

    I hope that the Minister will consider removing the paragraph from the Bill and will make clear that local authorities will be expected to use their existing powers in Section 2 of the 1948 Act and will not be able to invoke as an excuse the mere passage of time.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Stockport, North (Mr. Bennett) has on many occasions sought to emphasise that many problems could be circumvented if local authorities were to use the existing powers. My hon. Friend is right to say that. There is no doubt that if local authorities took that line it would greatly alleviate the situation. To that extent I strongly endorse his closing remarks. However, in the opening part of his comments he virtually argued that we should go back on the major Houghton recommendations. I would regard that as totally wrong. I believe that we should endorse, as did the Standing Committee, the Houghton recommendations. Therefore I believe that there are strong grounds for resisting Amendment No. 169.

    Government Amendments Nos. 172 to 176 bring about a change in Section 2(1) (d) of the Children Act 1948 introduced by Clause 54 and also the body of subsection (1) so as to make clearer the meaning of the subsection as it applies to a child who has been partly in the care of a local authority and partly in the care of a voluntary organisation. I do not think that these are contentions provisions. They merely help to clarify the situation.

    Amendment negatived.

    Amendments made: No. 172, in page 35, line 9, after 'or', insert:

    'partly in the care of a local authority and partly'.

    No. 173, in page 35, line 10, leave out 'or partly the one and partly the other'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 52, in page 35, line 11, leave out from 'other' to end of line 15.

    The following amendment may also be discussed: No. 148, in page 35, line 12, leave out from 'child's 'to' if 'in line 15 and insert:

    'proper emotional needs and development have been avoidably prevented or neglected or his health has been avoidably impaired or neglected and is likely to continue to be so'.

    This amendment will remove from Section 2 of the Children Act 1948, subsection (1)(e), which provides as a ground for the passing of a resolution assuming parental rights and duties,

    "that the child's emotional needs and development warrant it, and that the child's development would be impaired or stunted if returned to his parents".
    This paragraph was added to Clause 54 as a result of Amendment No. 358, which was opposed by the Government, but was carried on a Division. My hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) will no doubt wish to argue with the proposal.

    There were a number of hon. Members who were not present in Committee. I should like to remind the House that the proposal was passed in Committe by 15 votes to five—only the Government Ministers and one other hon. Member voting that way.

    I am not trying to escape from the voting figures. However, if legislation is passed in Committee, as with other procedures, I have to put the matter forward for consultation and ask what should be done in this particular situation and how it would affect the child-care practice.

    The comments received from the professional bodies to which the Government's consultation paper was sent indicated a remarkable number of people who supported the removal of the words. The ACC, the AMA and BASW supported the removal. The NCVCCO said:
    "there is unanimous disapproval of the new subsection (1)(e)…as a dangerous weapon in the hands of a manipulative social worker perhaps conniving with a possessive foster parent."
    The ADSS said:
    "It looks as though the Association will wish to support your proposal"
    to remove the subsection.

    The NFCA was very concerned at proposals to delete subsection (1)(e), which it strongly opposed.

    The ABBA said that there was some division of opinion within the Association on Clause 54 2(1)(e). While it strongly supports the intention of protecting the child's emotional health and development, it is also aware that this subsection introduces new and vaguely defined reasons for depriving natural parents of their rights.

    Words like "emotional needs", "impaired" or "stunted" could give rise to real difficulties concerning legal interpretation. I recognise that there is a wish to try to introduce this concept, and I have undertaken that I will be prepared to try to write this into the regulations, but I do not think that we should write it into the body of the Bill. Therefore, I ask the House to agree to withdraw these terms, which I think will shift the balance. There has been some considerable unease about this wording. I do not think it is easy to interpret in terms of legislation, and I hope that the House will agree to withdraw it.

    I make no apology for keeping the House for another few minutes. I shall be as brief as possible because most of us were here until the early hours of this morning—and rightly so—discussing the Hare Coursing Bill and cruelty to animals. We are now discussing, but not nearly so late, what some of us may think is as important as, or more important than, hare coursing; namely, children.

    I was a little disappointed with the last vote, as no doubt hon. Members will have guessed. I therefore make no apology for keeping the House to discuss what is a very important subject.

    Our parliamentary democracy and system can sometimes be extremely frustrating for a back bencher. There is nothing more frustrating than when one succeeds in having an amendment accepted in Standing Committee, by a reasonable majority and after a good discussion, only to find on Report that it is turned out by the full weight of the Government Front Bench and the Government machine. It is frustrating when it happens once, but when it happens twice, we backbench Members may be forgiven for feeling a little inadequate and for developing some kind of complex. This amendment was carried in Committee by an even larger majority than was the last amendment. The only people against it were Government spokesmen and one backbench Member.

    12.45 a.m.

    I divorce myself from any criticism of the organisations that the Minister has mentioned—the National Council for One-Parent Families, the Child Poverty Action Group and others. I have supported them for many years, and I shall continue to do so, even though from time to time we have to agree to differ about certain aspects of their policy. I shall, for instance, fight whole-heartedly for the implementation of the Finer recommendations. This debate will make no difference to my arguments in that respect.

    It must be remembered that this is not a parents Bill; it is a Children Bill. Ministers have been at great pains to say that first consideration should be given to the child's needs, development, welfare and so on for all its childhood. That is what the amendment is about. We say that to put the child's needs first automatically means that the needs of someone else must come second, and that might even mean the parents. If the concept of the Bill is accepted, that must be a result.

    There is often a fine balance, and who am I, any more than any other man, to say that I am right? Perhaps we shall not know who is right for some time. But I am convinced that in this respect we are more right in our approach than are those who oppose us. We are talking not about all children in normal circumstances but about special children and special parents in special circumstances. Fortunately, they are a very small minority.

    The amendment deals with an exception to the grounds on which a local authority may assume parental rights. We want the exception because, as it was so aptly put to me, most of the grounds concern the fittedness—if there is such a word—or the unfittedness of the parents. In other words, there is a direct criticism of the parent in those circumstances.

    Our amendment is an attempt to create some kind of escape clause, some ground that would not necessarily condemn the parents. It would allow the parents, the social worker and everyone else involved to say that there were grounds connected with the child's emotional development and so on. Who is to say that that approach is wrong in a Children Bill? I should have thought that that was what the Bill was all about.

    The amendment will mean controversy and criticism. Since it was passed in Committee, we have been the subject of a number of criticisms. The first, mentioned by the Minister, naturally came from the National Council for One-Parent Families and the Child Poverty Action Group. They said that the amendment introduced a new criterion—poverty and inadequate housing conditions—and that that criterion could be used by a local authority against the parents. Having discussed the matter with them and reread the amendment, I believe that the criticism of the words was justified. That is why I changed the words and amended the amendment. The words "stunted" and "impaired", which the Minister mentioned, have now been removed.

    The other legal criticism was that there was no precedent. I have in the main used the words in the 1969 Act, so that criticism cannot be maintained.

    Perhaps, the words which remain, "emotional needs" are capable of some interpretation. If the Minister had said that he would support the amendment without them, that would have been reasonable, but he did not say that: he said "Scrub the lot."

    With respect, I did not say that. What I said—the House has accepted Amendment No. 224—was that in the regulations about the six-monthly re view for the child I am prepared to write in "emotional needs" and similar wording to that in my hon. Friend's revised amendment. It is much better to do that by regulation than by legislation. Since my hon. Friend has now accepted that "stunted" should go out, the difference between us is not great.

    I do not profess to have the expertise or the advice to enable me to know whether regulations are better than legislation in this case. I am a little suspicious. If we accept the spirit of this proposal, perhaps it is better to have it in the Bill as well. Many people will read the Bill but not the regulations. That is not to say that I do not have complete trust in the Minister and the Government, although I am not so sure about some future Government—God forbid!

    My new amendment is a genuine attempt to take care of genuine criticism. The Minister has said that the fundamental right of parents is the custody of their children. No one disagrees with that, but the amendment deals with children in care. Of course parents have rights, and they are often vocal in demanding them. But under the Bill children have rights, and they often have no one to speak on behalf of their rights.

    I hope that the amendment will enable us to protect children's rights. It is difficult to get parents to give up some of their parental rights because of the present law, which demands that the local authority should demonstrate that someone has shown a parental failure. We say that the amendment would help in that difficulty.

    Since the Committee stage I have been inundated with letters giving examples of cases that might be helped if this amendment were included in the Bill. I am moved by that kind of response. I never expected it. Having amended my original amendment, I would have thought that the House could accept the new form of the amendment, thus strengthening the Bill and helping these parents and all involved.

    We all know at this late hour what the situation is—the Committee proposes, the House disposes. The House in this situation frequently consists of many hon. Members who wish to get home. They support the Government loyally in the Lobby and do not necessarily follow every line of the proceedings in Committee.

    In Committee the vote was 15 to 5 in favour of the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard). He has been conscious of some of the criticisms of the phraseology that have been levelled at the original amendment. There was the question of the use of the word "stunted" and so on. The whole of the offensive phraseology has been removed. My hon. Friend and I now propose a form of words similar to that in the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. I accept that those who have criticised this and who apparently have had their way with the Minister—although he was also of that persuasion in Committee—have at heart the best interests of those they represent.

    Mr. Holland, from the British Association of Social Workers, and Margaret Bramall, of the one-parent family organisation, have written to me about this. They are good friends of mine, and I expect to be working with them on many issues in future. I think they are wrong on this one. Mr. Holland has written to say that nowadays the
    "unwillingness to act which may have characterised some local authorities a few years ago has changed dramatically since the Maria Colwell inquiry".
    In other words, he says there is now no need for us to be seeking legal safeguards.

    Mrs. Bramall takes a different line and suggests that the Children Act 1948 and the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 are the way to seek these safeguards and that it should be done through the courts rather than by giving powers to local authorities. We say that in this narrow area the local authority should have in some circumstances—which were gone into in Committee—these powers and should be able to exercise them.

    We have gone to great lengths to find a form of words which has a precedent in Section 1 of the 1969 Act so as to meet objections about the phrasing that we had in Committee. I hope that those who have listened to this short debate will support the majority in Committee—a three to one majority. In doing so they will be supporting not only the principle of the amendment, which may be imperfectly understood from this debate, but the whole principle that Committees of this House sit and deliberate on legislation in a meaningful way and cannot simply be steam-rollered by the Government late at night.

    I echo the words of the hon. Members for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard) and Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead). We spent a long time in Committee considering most carefully what the outcome of this difficult situation would be. I know how difficult it must be for hon. Members who come in to a debate late at night and may not be sure of what the argument is. It has happened to me. There are many hon. Members who have listened to the debate tonight.

    We are concerned that we now have a thoroughly acceptable amendment in the shape of Amendment No. 148. It is a great improvement on the amendment we passed by 15 votes to 5 in Committee. Four of those five votes belonged to Labour Members.

    1.0 a.m.

    Very often local authorities cannot find sufficient grounds for implementing Section 2 rights. We feel that Amendment No. 148 is needed by the local authorities to strengthen their hand.

    Perhaps I can give one small example. A baby of 14 months was suffering from severe malnutrition. Until he was 2 years old the mother never bothered to visit him. Between the ages of 2 and 3 years she took him out about once a month, but not every month. From the age of 3 she ignored him again. At this stage the local authority had still not implemented its Section 2 rights, in spite of frequent requests that it should do so. The child was past the age of 5 before that happened. The emotional development of that child has been such that at the age of 7 years he will not accept invitations to visit other children with whom he goes to school because he does not want to go to a strange house, even with people he sees on a daily basis in school.

    One could go on criticising and amending every amendment. There were times this week when it was suggested that we might amend Amendment No. 148. I decided against that course because I felt it was adequate for what the local authorities required.

    We have heard from the Minister and from a number of bodies, but I am concerned now with the people who care for the child in this difficult situation. Therefore, I put most weight on the views of the foster parents. They are unequivocal in their view of the importance of a child's emotional development. The Government must drop their amendment and accept Amendment No. 148.

    The hon. Member for Wallasey (Mrs. Chalker) has made much of what the local authorities require. She must, therefore, address herself to the fact that the ACC and the AMA, which represent the authorities which will be most deeply involved in social services, support withdrawal of the provision. That is also the case with the directors of social services and the British Association of Social Workers. These are the people who will have to operate this Act and use the legislation. Although I respect the views of the foster parents, they are in a minority on this issue.

    The Committee made many changes to the Bill. Many of the Committee suggestions have been accepted throughout the proceedings this evening, but we are also bound to take account of the views of other people on Committee amendments, and in rejecting Amendment No. 148 I ask the House to recognise that I have undertaken to put the wording about emotional needs as far as possible into the regulations. To that extent I am taking a sizeable step towards meeting the objection of my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard).

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 174, in page 35, line 17, leave out from 'them' to 'and' in line 19 and insert:

    'the parental rights and duties with respect to that child'.

    No. 175, in page 35, line 20, leave out 'that parent' and insert:

    'the parent on whose account the resolution was passed'.

    No. 176, in page 37, line 20, at end insert:

    'or an order under section 25 of that Act'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. When will the House have the opportunity to vote on Amendment No. 148?

    The House will not vote on Amendment No. 148. It fell when the House agreed to Amendment No. 52. That is the way of life.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 53, in page 37, line 20, at end insert:

    '(12) Before passing a resolution under the provisions of subsection (1) of this Clause, the local authority must—
  • (a) have regard to and consult the individual who has had the closest personal relationship with the child over the previous three years, as far as this can be established, and
  • (b) ensure where at all possible that the relationship continues thereafter, having regard to Section 3 of this Act.
  • In this subsection "closest personal relationship" shall be interpreted as that person who on a continuing daily basis has fulfilled the emotional and physical need of the child in place of a stable parental relationship'.
    The purpose of the amendment, which is supported by the hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Steen), is to return to the concept which we brought into the Committee stage with what was then Amendment No. 400. That amendment was much criticised when I moved it in Committee on the ground that we incorporated the phrase "psychological parent" for that person who had the closest emotional and personal relationship with the child at the time when the child might become subject to a care order. I drew there upon the wording of Dr. Anne Hayman, to whom again I pay tribute, who was very keen on the particular phrase "psychological parent."

    I can see that the phrase leads to certain difficulties, but I have been amused to find it cropping up not once but four times in a letter written on 24th October to my hon. Friend the Member for St. Pancras, North (Mr. Stallard), in which my hon. Friend the Minister said that in his redrafting—which is Amendment No. 224, I think, which we discussed earlier—he would see something roughly equivalent to the concept of psychological parenthood written in, if not into the statute at least into the advice which will be sent out under the terms of Amendment No. 224.

    What the hon. Member for Wavertree and I have sought to do is to provide a precise definition of those close personal relationships which ought to survive and should be acknowledged when any local authority is making a care order. We have now said that the local authority must, when making any resolution under subsection (1) of the clause
    "have regard to and consult the individual who has had the closest personal relationship with the child over the previous three years, as far as this can be established, and"—
    and perhaps this is more important—
    "ensure where at all possible that the relationship continues thereafter, having regard to Section 3 of this Act."
    That is the clause which asserts that the rights of the child have primacy within this legislation.

    I do not wish to detain the House unduly. The hon. Member for Wavertree hopes to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. However. I say to the Minister, who has been most patient throughout these proceedings, that I should like him to say whether he can take something of the spirit of this amendment as implicit in whatever instructions may be issued or whatever consultations may take place under the auspices of his Department along the lines of Amendment No. 224, which the House has already accepted.

    It would be useful for the House to appreciate the seriousness of the amendment, because what the clause does is to extend the powers which local authorities were given under Section 2 of the Children Act. The clause gives to local authorities the powers to pass resolutions which deprive the natural parents of the rights to their own child. The House should not shrink from realising the severity of the clause. It is saying that the local authority, with all its bureaucratic machinery and all its weakness, should have the right to deprive the parents of any rights towards their child. Local authorities are in a weak position in view of the turnover of social workers, many of whom do not stay for long, and good social practice is not as widespread as we should like. In those circumstances the clause has serious implications.

    Sacred to the Bill is the concept that the family unit should be maintained at all costs and that it should be nourished and boosted. Every support should be given to that concept by the local authority. We must encourage the unstable family. We must promote the concept of neighbourhood and community.

    Families face special stress in the worst urban areas, and in those areas the social service workers are also facing stress and deprivation. It is significant that social workers are often as deprived as are the clients they serve. The clause is likely to be used in the most deprived urban areas and it wields an axe with a potential cutting edge sharp enough to sever the whole family unit and to permeate the extended family.

    The clause refers to children who are in care. Where a local authority, on the recommendation of social workers—often young and untrained—takes the view that a parent is:
    "of such habits or mode of life as to be unfit to have the care of the child, or
    (v) has so consistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a parent as to be unfit to have the care of the child;"
    it can pass a resolution which will divest the parent of that natural relationship. That is a serious matter, and the hon. Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead) and I feel that the clause needs modification.

    The Minister may say that the parent can serve a counter-notice on the local authority, as provided in the clause, within one month after the passing of the resolution, but he must know that deprived parents are often depressed and downtrodden and do not have the life force or will to appeal against the bureaucracy which has taken away the child. They feel that the full weight of bureaucracy is bearing down and crushing them.

    The clause will have the most pernicious effect upon the most deprived families. Perhaps too many mistakes are made by unskilled social workers. The amendment does not interfere with the powers contained in the clause. It merely allows local authorities to have a further source of information before passing a resolution to divest parents of their natural rights. It provides that, before passing the resolution, the local authority should examine as closely as possible the relationship which the child may have had over the previous three years—it may be with an aunt, an uncle, friends or grandparents—and consult the individual who has had the closest personal relationship. In that way, the members passing the resolution would have two sides before them—the social worker's recommendation and hearing a member of the family or a close friend who has known the child and can advise them.

    1.15 a.m.

    In Liverpool, I attended a large case conference about a child and I was amazed that it was put under a Section 2 care order without either the mother being there or any member of the family or friend being approached. Clause 54 goes further than Section 2, and that is why the amendment is so crucial. It would not reduce the powers of local authorities. It would simply direct the local authority towards a fresh source of information to help and guide it in a very difficult decision.

    In this way, it would provide some continuity in the child's life. Without it, the child could pass from the natural parent into the bureaucracy of a local authority with social workers changing year in and year out. The amendment would at least offer some continuity with the child from a person who has had close dealings with it for three years. This is a relatively modest amendment but it could make a lot of difference to the lives of the children in the years to come.

    I do not think I disagree with anything my hon. Friend the Member for Derby, North (Mr. Whitehead) and the hon. Member for Liverpool, Wavertree (Mr. Steen) have said. There is no doubt that to use these powers without proper regard to the personal relationships would be wrong. That is not confined to the regulations on parental rights and duties. It applies to practically the whole Bill.

    It was to meet these general points that I put down Amendment No. 224 relating to Section 27(4) of the Children and Young Persons Act so that we would be able to make regulations prescribing six-monthly reviews and the manner in which they should be carried out. I assure the House that in those reviews those aspects of the child's welfare which are important, particularly the personal relationships and emotional needs, will be covered, as they should be.

    I think that we can find a form of wording in the regulations which will be freer and easier and not so hidebound as it would be in legislation. It will certainly have regard to the concept of personal relations, which are very important. Amendment No. 224 will give us an important new power in a wide range of regulations for which the local authorities are the key people. I think that in this way we shall meet the purpose of Amendment No. 53 and some of the others which we are discussing.

    Why will the hon. Gentleman not consider putting the provision in the Bill as well as in the regulations? It is our fear that committees and local authorities will look not at the regulations but at the Bill. To put this requirement in the regulations might mean that it will fall on eyes that do not read.

    Amendment No. 53, as drafted, is open to the objection that the parent may be the individual referred to in paragraph (a) and it may not be practicable or desirable to consult him.

    A further point about the amendment is that Clause 54, to which it relates, is concerned only with children who have been placed voluntarily in the care of local authorities under Section 1 of the Children Act 1948. Amendment No. 53 would not apply this concept of considering a child's personal relationships to other children who have been committed to the care of a local authority under other legislation such as the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, guardianship and wardship, or matrimonial legislation, where it might also be relevant.

    There are a number of technical points. It is often tedious for a Minister to plead that it is better to do things in another way, but I believe that in this case we shall get a more flexible and wider coverage of the points made by hon. Members by dealing with them in regulations.

    Amendment negatived.

    Clause 57

    Addition Of New Sections To Children And Young Persons Act 1969

    Amendments made: No. 54, in page 38, line 25, leave out from 'a' to end of line 26 and insert:

    'relevant supervision order or a supervision order made under section 21(2) of this Act on the discharge of a relevant care order; or'.

    No. 55, in line 28, leave out from 'a' to end of line 29 and insert:

    'relevant care order or a care order made under section 15(1) of this Act on the discharge of a relevant supervision order; or'.

    No. 56, in line 35, leave out from 'a' to end of line 36 and insert:

    'relevant supervision order or against a care order made under section 15(1) on the discharge of—
  • (i) a relevant supervision order; or
  • (ii) a supervision order made under section 21(2) on the discharge of a relevant care order; or',
  • No. 57, in page 38, leave out line 40 and insert:

    'relevant care order or against a supervision order made under section 21(2) on the discharge of—
  • (i) a relevant care order; or
  • (ii) a care order made under section 15(1) on the discharge of a relevant supervision order,'.
  • No. 58, in page 39, line 27, at end insert:

    '(5) In this section—
    "relevant care order" means a care order made under section 1 of this Act;
    "relevant supervision order" means a supervision order made under section 1 of this Act.'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 62

    Amendment Of Section 15 Of Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    Amendments made: No. 59, in page 42, line 34, leave out paragraph ( a).

    No. 184, in page 43, line 9, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.

    No. 185, in page 43, line 24, leave out 'twelve' and insert 'six'.—[ Mr. McElhone].

    Clause 63

    Substitution Of S 16 Of Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    Amendments made: No. 186, in page 43, line 30, leave out from beginning to end of line 24 on page 44 and insert:

    '16.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, a local authority may resolve—
  • (a) that there shall vest in them the relevant parental rights and powers with respect to any child who is in their care under section 15 of this Act; or
  • (b) that there shall vest in a voluntary organisation which is an incorporated body, or a trust within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921, the relevant parental rights and powers with respect to any child who is in the care of that organisation,
  • if it appears to the local authority—
  • (i) that the parents of the child are dead and that he has no guardian; or
  • (ii) that there exists in respect of a parent or guardian of the child (the said parent or guardian being hereafter in this Part of this Act referred to as the person on whose account the resolution was passed) and of the circumstances specified in subsection (1A) of this section; or
  • (iii) that a resolution under this subsection is in force in terms of sub-paragraph (ii) above in relation to one parent of the child and that parent is, or is likely to become a member of the household comprising the child and his other parent; or
  • (iv) that throughout the three years preceding the passing of the resolution the child has been in the care of a local authority under section 15 of this Act, or in the care of a voluntary organisation or partly the one and partly the other.
  • (1A) The circumstances referred to in sub-paragraph (ii) of subsection (1) of this section are that the person on whose account the resolution was passed—
  • (a)has abandoned the child; or
  • (b) suffers from some permanent disability rendering him incapable of caring for the child; or
  • (c) while not falling within paragraph (b) of this subsection, suffers from a mental disorder (within the meaning of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960) which renders him unfit to have the care of the child; or
  • (d) is of such habits or mode of life as to be unfit to have the care of the child; or
  • (e) has so persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge the obligations of a parent or guardian as to be unfit to have the care of the child.'
  • No. 187, in page 44, line 29, after '14, insert' or 25'.

    No. 188, in line 32, leave out 'under paragraph ( a)' and insert

    'by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (i)'.

    No. 189, in line 36, leave out 'under paragraph ( b)' and insert

    'by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (ii)'

    No. 190, in line 40, leave out 'under paragraph ( c)' and insert

    'by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (iii)'.

    No. 191, in line 44, leave out 'under paragraph ( d)' and insert

    'by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (iv)'.

    No. 192, in line 46, at end insert—

    '(2A) A local authority shall not pass a resolution under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section unless—
  • (a) it is satisfied that the child is not in the care of any local authority under any enactment; and
  • (b) it is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the welfare of the child for the parental rights and powers to be vested in the voluntary organisation; and
  • (c) the child is living in the area of the local authority either in a residential establishment or with foster parents with whom he has been boarded out by the voluntary organisation in whose care he is; and
  • (d) that organisation has requested the local authority to pass the resolution.'.
  • No. 193, in page 45, line 1, leave out 'paragraph ( b), ( c) or ( d) of'.

    No. 194, in line 2, at end insert

    by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (ii), (iii) or (iv) thereof'

    No. 195, in line 5, after 'authority', insert

    or in the voluntary organisation, as the case may be,'.

    No. 196, in line 45, leave out ' ( b), ( c) or ( d)'.

    No. 197, in line 46, after 'section', insert

    'by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (ii), (iii), or (iv) thereof'.

    No. 198, in page 46, line 16, at end insert 'or'.

    No. 199, in line 22, leave out 'or the child' and insert

    'or the child; or
    (d) it is a resolution under paragraph (b) of subsection (1) of this section and a resolution is passed under subsection (1) of section 16A of this Act in respect of the child.'.

    No. 200, in page 46 leave out lines 23 to 29 and insert—

    '(10) If the whereabouts of any parent or guardian of a child have remained unknown for twelve months, and throughout that period the child has been in the care of a local authority under section 15 of this Act, or in the care of a voluntary organisation, or partly the one and partly the other, then for the purposes of this section that parent or guardian shall be deemed to have abandoned the child'.

    No. 201, in line 32, leave out 'paragraph ( d)' and insert 'sub-paragraph (iv)'.

    No. 202, in line 34, leave out 'paragraph' and insert 'sub-paragraph'.—[ Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 64

    Making Of Adoption Orders Where Local Authority Have Parental Rights

    Amendment made: No. 203, in page 47, line 5, after 'authority', insert or a voluntary organisation'.—[ Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 65

    Safeguarding Of Interests Of Children In Proceedings In Scotland Relating To The Assumption Of Parental Rights

    Amendment made: No. 204, in page 47, line 9, at end insert ', 16A(3)'.—[ Mr. McElhone.]

    Clause 67

    Amendment To Section 37 Of Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968

    I beg to move Amendment No. 254, in page 48, line 25, at end insert—

    '(bb) who is, or is likely to become, a member of the same household as a person who has committed or is believed to have committed such an offence; or'.

    With this we may take Amendment No. 239, in Schedule 3, page 85, line 36, at end insert—

    '48A. In section 32(2)(b), at the beginning, leave out "through lack of parental care". ' and Government Amendment No. 251.

    Amendment Nos. 254 and 251 are intended to extend provisions of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 relating to the system of children's hearings and dealing in particular with the provision of compulsory care for children who are in a situation of risk, whether physical or otherwise.

    The origin of the proposals lies in part in the consideration given by the Standing Committee to proposals for amending the Bill by providing additional grounds for the making of a care or supervision order by a juvenile court in England or Wales in care proceedings. Two of the proposals advanced at that time were in identical terms to existing grounds for referral of a child to a children's hearing in Scotland under Section 32(2). The third related to children who are members of a household where there is present a person who has committed, or is believed to have committed, offences against children. This is covered in the present amendments which are parallel to Amendment No. 127 in relation to England and Wales. Amendment No. 251 has a wider purpose, however, which is connected with Amendment No. 239 tabled in the name of the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Gordon Wilson) and other hon. Members. I hope that the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members associated with him in this amendment will note that we have met their point.

    I wish to thank the Minister for incorporating within his amendments the tranche of our amendments. It meets a need which has been made clear by those active within the children's panel system in Scotland. We are grateful that he has incorporated this group.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 69

    Parental Rights And Duties

    Amendment made: No. 60, in page 50, line 33, leave out 'and any future enactment'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 177, in page 51, line 14, at end insert—

    '(5A) Subsections (4) and (5) apply in relation to the dissolution of a body corporate as they apply in relation to the death of an individual.'.
    This amendment extends to voluntary organisations which are incorporated bodies for the purpose of new Clause 1 the provisions of subsections (4) and (5) of Clause 69, which deals with the devolution of parental rights and duties on the death of a person holding those rights and duties. It is uncontroversial.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 70

    Legal Custody

    Amendment made: No. 61, in page 51, line 18, leave out 'and any future enactment'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 71

    Actual Custody

    Amendment made: No. 62, in page 51, line 33, leave out 'and any future enactment'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 73

    Procedure In Guardianship Proceedings

    Amendments made: No. 63, in page 52, line 5, after 'above', insert 'to a magistrates' court'.

    No. 64, in line 7, leave out 'copies' and insert 'a copy'.

    No. 65, in line 15, leave out 'The' and insert 'A magistrates''.

    No. 66, in line 24, leave out 'the' and insert 'A magistrates''.

    No. 67, in line 32, leave out from 'evidence' to

    'notwithstanding' in line 34 and insert 'is, in the opinion of the court, relevant to the application,'.

    No. 68, in line 35, at end insert:

    '(2) The following subsection is added after subsection (5) of the said section 6—
    "(6) A single justice may request a report under subsection (1) of this section before the hearing of the application, but in such a case the report shall be made to the court which hears the application, and the foregoing provisions of this section shall apply accordingly."'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 74

    Procedure In Matrimonial Proceedings

    Amendment made: No. 69, in page 52, line 43, leave out 'copies' and insert 'a copy'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 78

    Visiting Of Foster Children

    I beg to move Amendment No. 206 in page 56, line 34, at end insert:

    '(1A) In section 1A of the Children Act 1958 (visiting of foster children in Scotland) the words "where the local authority consider such a course to be necessary or expedient for the purposes of this section," shall cease to have effect, and for the words" from time to time "there are substituted the words" in accordance with regulations made under section 2A of this Act."'.

    These amendments together provide for the application, in Scottish terms, of the provisions contained in Clause 78 of the Bill dealing with the oversight of private fostering arrangements. The reason for their inclusion is related to changes made at the Committee stage in the provisions of Clause 78 as they apply to England and Wales.

    The second of the two amendments is purely technical. It seeks to allow for the fact that the provisions in Section 3 of the Children Act 1958, referred to in Clause 78(3), are provisions which do not extend to Scotland.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendment made: No. 207, in page 57, line 13, after 'Act', insert:

    'as it applies to England and Wales'.—[Mr McElhone.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 70, in page 57, line 14, after 'authority)' insert—

    "(a) in subsection (5A), for the words "one or more foster children" there are substituted the words "a foster child", and for the words "foster children" and "any foster children" there are substituted the words "that foster child";
    (b) in subsection (5B) for the words "foster children" there are substituted the words" a foster child", and for the words "any of them as a" there is substituted the word "that"; and
    (c)'.

    These amendments are to make good the defects of Clause 78(3) as printed in the Bill. They make it clear that when regulations are made under subsection (2) of Clause 78 foster parents will have a duty to notify the local authority whenever they cease to maintain a child, as well as when they receive a child, unless the child leaves their care for a temporary period not exceeding 27 days—for example, to go on a holiday with its parents.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No 71 in page 57 line 16, leave out 'Subsections (2A) and (5B)' and insert 'Subsection (2A)'.

    No. 72, in page 57, line 19, leave out subsection (4)—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 79

    Notification By Parents

    Amendment made: No. 73, in page 57, line 38, at end insert—

    '(2) In section 14 of the said Act (offences), in subsection (1)(a), after the words "this Part of this Act" there are inserted the words "or under regulations made under section 3A of this Act".'—[Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 80

    Advertisements Relating To Foster Children

    I beg to move Amendment No. 74, in page 57, line 42, leave out 'made by statutory instrument'.

    Amendments Nos. 74 and 75 are drafting amendments.

    Amendment No. 76 is intended to make the meaning clearer, which is to provide that regulations may be made under paragraph (a) to say who shall be prohibited from advertising to seek foster children, or under paragraph (b) to say who shall be allowed to advertise. This will give flexibility to allow advertising which is considered acceptable, such as advertising holidayse for children.

    In Amendment No. 77 the intention is to remove any doubt that regulations may distinguish who may and who may not advertise, and, in relation to (1A), to allow advertisements seeking foster parents to be made on behalf of parents by approved bodies. I would add that (1A) prohibits a person from "causing" an advertisement to be published.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made:

    No. 75, in page 58, line 4, leave out 'made by statutory instrument'.

    No. 76 in line 5, leave out from" prohibit "to end of line 15 and insert—

    '(a) a member of a class of person specified in the regulations, or
    (b) a person other than a person, or other than a member of a class of persons, specified in the regulations,
    from publishing or causing to be published any advertisement indicating that he is willing to undertake, or to arrange for, the care and maintenance of a child.'

    No. 77, in line 16, leave out

    'A statutory instrument made under subsection (1A) shall be'

    and insert

    'Regulations made under this section—
  • (a) may make different provision for different cases or classes of cases, and
  • (b) may exclude certain cases or classes of cases, and shall be made by statutory instrument'.—[Dr. Owen.]
  • Clause 83

    Courts

    I beg to move Amendment No. 78, in page 60, leave out line 21 and insert—

    '(b) the sheriff court of the sheriffdom within which the child is'.

    It is a purely drafting amendment. It adjusts the definition of "authorised court" contained in Clause 83(3)(b) of the Bill which establishes court jurisdiction in proceedings in relation to the adoption of a child in Scotland. The present definition provides that in the case of the sheriff court, the court authorised to hear and determine an application shall be that within whose jurisdiction the child is. The revised definition refers instead to the sheriff court of the sheriffdom within which the child is.

    The present wording, "within whose jurisdiction", is clearly unsatisfactory, because the court's jurisdiction should not be defined in terms which use the word "jurisdiction" itself. The alternative wording chosen avoids this pitfall by relating jurisdiction to the physical presence of the child in the care of the sheriffdom.

    Amendment No. 80 disapplies the definition of "authorised court" in Clause 83(3) for the purpose of applications to a court under Clause 29 and provides a separate definition for this purpose. The applications in question relate to the return of a child illegally removed from the possession of a person after application has been made, or notice given of intention to apply for an adoption of a "freeing for adoption" order under Part I of the Bill.

    The terms of the new definition refer to the court where the application is pending or the sheriffdom where the applicant resides rather than where the child is. It is clearly desirable that the court with continuing jurisdiction in relation to the application for the child's adoption should be that where the child was at the time he was illegally removed. In the case where an application for adoption or freeing for adoption has been made, this is the court in which that application is pending. In the case where an application for adoption has not yet been made, it must relate to the area in which the applicant resides—the term "applicant" referring in this context not to an application for adoption, but to one under Clause 29 for return of the child.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 79, in page 61, line 11, leave out '14(2) or (3)' and insert '14'.

    No. 80, in page 61, line 16, at end insert:

    '(9) Subsections (3) and (8) do not apply in the case of an application under section 29 in Scotland but for the purposes of such an application the following are authorised courts—
  • (a) if there is pending in respect of the child an application for—
  • (i) an adoption order; or
  • (ii) an order under section 14,
  • the court in which that application is pending;
  • (b) in any other case—
  • (i) the Court of Session;
  • (ii) the sheriff court of the sheriffdom within which the applicant resides'.—[Mr. McElhone.]
  • Clause 89

    Interpretation

    1.30 a.m.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 81, in page 63, line 9, at end insert—

    '"area", in relation to a magistrates' court, means the commission area (within the meaning of section 1 of the Administration of Justice Act 1973) for which the court is appointed;'.
    The purpose of the amendment is to remove ambiguity as to the meaning of the term "area" in relation to a magistrates' court.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Clause 90

    Amendments, Repeals, Commencement And Transitory Provisions

    Amendments made: No. 252, in page 65, line 12, leave out 'and section 91' and insert:

    ', section 91, section (Power of reporters to conduct proceedings under Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968) and paragraph 50A of Schedule 3'.

    No. 82, in page 65, line 16, leave out '69' and insert '67'.—[ Mr. McElhone.]

    No. 83, in page 65, line 16, leave out '72' and insert '74'.

    No. 255, in page 65, line 18, leave out 62'.

    No. 256, in page 65, line 17, leave out and to 89 ' and insert

    ', 86 to 89 and section (Children of unruly character in Scotland)'.

    No. 257, in page 65, line 19, leave out from 'paragraphs' to end of line 21 and insert:

    'A1, A2, 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11(6), 13, 15, 16, 16A, 16B, 17(1), (2) and (4), 18 to 22, 24( b), 26, 30, 31( b), 32, 34( b), 36, 37( c), ( d) and ( e), 38, 40, 45, 46, 47( a), 47A( f)(ii), and ( g)(ii), 49, 50, 50B, 50C, 51, 52, 53, 55 to 59, 62(2), 64, 65, 68 and 70'.

    No. 91, in page 65, line 22, after 'I', insert 'IA'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Clause 91

    Short Title And Extent

    Amendments made: No. 157, in page 66, line 5, after 'except', insert: insert:

    'section (Extension of powers under s. 32 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969)'.

    No. 158, in page 66, line 9, at end insert:

    '(3) Subsection (1) of section (Extension of powers under s. 32 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969) extends to the Channel Islands'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Schedule 1

    Status Conferred By Adoption Or Legitimation In England And Wales

    Amendments made: No. 92, in page 69, line 18, leave out sub-paragraph (3) and insert:

    '(3) For the purposes of this paragraph, and of paragraph 6, provisions of the law of intestate succession applicable to the estate of a deceased person shall be treated as if contained in an instrument executed by him (while of full capacity) immediately before his death'.

    No. 93, in page 69, line 25, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

    No. 94, in page 69, line 42, at end insert:

    '2A. As an example 1 or 2, but referring to grandchildren of A, instead of children of A'.

    No. 95, in page 71, line 21, leave out paragraph 12.

    No. 96, in page 72, line 15, at end insert—

    '(9) Part 1A of Schedule A, which repeals enactments superseded by this paragraph, has effect as respects any instrument, other than an existing instrument'.

    No. 97, in page 72, line 34, at end insert—

    '(or, if deceased, is treated as legitimated)'.

    No. 98, in page 72, line 38, after 'legitimated', insert

    '(or, if deceased, is treated as legitimated)'.

    No. 99, in page 73, line 26, leave out from beginning to 'affect' and insert

    'This Schedule shall not'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Schedule 2

    Status Conferred In Scotland By Adoption

    Amendments made: No. 100, in page 74, line 32, leave out 'provision of the'.

    No. 101, page 74, in line 47, at end insert:

    Pensions

    1A. The provision in paragraph 1(1) whereby a child who is the subject of an adoption order is to be treated in law as if he were not the child of any person other than the adopters or adopter shall not affect entitlement to a pension which is payable to, or for the benefit of, the child and is in payment at the time of his adoption.

    Insurance

    1B. Where a child is adopted whose natural parent has effected an insurance with a friendly society or a collecting society or an industrial insurance company for the payment on the death of the child of money for funeral expenses, the rights and liabilities under the policy shall by virtue of the adoption be transferred to the adoptive parents who shall for the purposes of the enactments relating to such societies and companies be treated as the person who took out the policy.

    Social Security

    1C.—(1) Paragraph 1 shall not prevent a person being treated as a near relative of a deceased person for the purposes of section 32 of the Social Security Act 1975 (payment of death grant), if apart from paragraph 1 he would be so treated.

    (2) Paragraph 1 does not apply for the purposes of section 70(3)( b) or section 73(2) of the Social Security Act 1975 (payment of industrial death benefit to or in respect of an illegitimate child of the deceased and the child's mother).

    (3) Subject to regulations made under section 72 of the Social Security Act 1975 (entitlement of certain relative of deceased to industrial death benefit), paragraph 1 shall not affect the entitlement to an industrial death benefit of a person who would, apart from paragraph 1, be treated as a relative of a deceased person for the purposes of the said section 72.'.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Schedule 3

    Minor And Consequential Amendments

    Amendments made: No. 102, in page 77, line 2, at end insert:

    'Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (23 and 24 Geo. 5 c. 12)

    Al.—In section 1(1)( b), for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400".'.

    No. 103, in page 77, line 2, at end insert:

    ' Children and Young Persons ( Scotland) Act 1937 ( c. 37)

    A2.—In section 12(1)( b) for the words "twenty-five pounds" there is substituted "£400".'

    No. 104, in page 77, line 11, leave out '£100' and insert'£400'.

    No. 105, in page 79, leave out lines 12 to 14.

    No. 159, in page 79, line 15, at end insert:

    '14A. In section 2, as it applies in England and Wales,—
  • (a) in subsection (1), after the word "guardian" there is inserted the word "custodian";
  • (b) in subsection (4A),—
  • (i) for the words "registered adoption society as is referred to in Part II of the Adoption Act 1958" there are substituted the words "adoption society approved under Part I of the Children Act 1975", and
  • (ii) for the words "that Act" there are substituted the words "the Adoption Act 1958".'.
  • No. 107, in page 79, line 25, at end insert:

    '16A. In section 14(2), for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400".
    16B. In section 37(2), for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400".'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    These are technical amendments, the first of which is consequential on the repeal effected by the second.

    Amendment agreed to.

    I beg to move Amendment No. 109, in page 80, line 19, leave out paragraph (a) and insert:

    '(a) the following subsections are substituted for subsection (1)—
    "(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations prohibit unincorporated bodies from applying for approval under section 4 of the Children Act 1975 (Approval of adoption societies); and he shall not approve any unincorporated body whose application is contrary to regulations made under this subsection.
    (1A) The Secretary of State may make regulations for any purpose relating to the exercise of its functions by an approved adoption society.";'.

    These amendments provide that the Secretary of State may by regulations provide that voluntary adoption societies must be incorporated bodies if they are to be considered for approval under Clause 4.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 110, in page 80, line 22, after '(2)', insert:

    'for "(1)" there is substituted "(2)" and'.

    No. 111, in page 80, line 24, leave out '£100' and insert '£400'.

    No. 112, in page 80, line 24, at end insert:

    '(c) the following subsection is added after subsection (3)—
    "(4) Regulations under this section may make different provisions in relation to different cases or classes of cases and may exclude certain cases or classes of cases. "'.

    No. 113, in page 80, line 36, at end insert:

    'and for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400".'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 114, in page 81, line 5, leave out' subsection is 'and insert' subsections are'.

    Amendment No. 115 imports certain changes in the provisions of Section 37 of the Adoption Act 1958 relating to the circumstances in which a child placed for adoption ceases to be a protected child. The changes are necessary to ensure that the provisions of Section 37, in their application to Scotland, properly reflect Scottish differences in the relevant statutory provisions.

    This is the Scottish equivalent of an amendment relating to England and Wales incorporated in Committee into paragraph 28 of the schedule.

    Amendment No. 114 is a paving amendment to the amendment I have just described.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 115, in page 81, line 21, at end insert:

    '(4A) In relation to Scotland—
  • (a) subsection (4) does not apply; and
  • (b) a protected child ceases to be a protected child when—
  • (i) the application for an adoption order lapses or is withdrawn;
  • (ii) the application for an adoption order is granted or otherwise determined;
  • (iii) an order is made awarding custody of the child;
  • (iv) an order is made appointing a guardian of the child; or
  • (v) the child attains the age of 18'.
  • No. 116, in page 81, line 26, at end insert:

    'and for the words "one hundred pounds' there are substituted the words "£400".'.

    No. 117, in page 81, line 31, at end insert:

    'and for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400";'.

    No. 118, in page 81, line 35, leave out '£100'and insert '£400'.

    No. 119, in page 81, line 36, leave out paragraph 33.

    No. 120, in page 81, line 38, after '52', insert '(1)—

    (a)'.

    No. 121, in page 81, line 39, at end insert: '

    'and—
    (b) for the word "six" there is substituted the word "three" and for the words "one hundred pounds" there are substituted the words "£400".'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 122, in page 82, line 48, leave out '; and "legal custody" means custody'.

    This is a purely technical amendment removing the definition of "legal custody" in Scottish terms which paragraph 38 of Schedule 3 inserts in Section 57(1) of the Adoption Act 1958.

    The need for the amendment arises because the Bill as amended in Committee no longer proposes the insertion of the term "legal custody" in the 1958 Act as it did previously. There is, therefore, no need now to include a meaning of "legal custody" for the purposes of the Bill.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 178, in page 83, line 5, at end insert—

    'Children and Young Persons Act 1963 (c.37)
    39A. In section 49(1), for the words "twenty pounds" there are substituted the words "£100".'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    No. 123, in page 83, line 16, at end insert:

    'and paragraph 1B of Schedule 2'.—[Mr. McElhone.]

    No. 179, in page 83, line 27, leave out '"Provisional"' and insert '"the word 'Provisionally'"'.

    No. 180, in page 83, line 28, after 'words', insert '"the words'.

    No. 181, in page 83, line 30, at end insert:

    'followed by the name, in brackets, of the country in which the order was made."'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 208, in page 85, line 16, at end insert:

    ". In section 6(1)(b), after sub-paragraph (ii) there is inserted the following sub-paragraph—
    "(iii) a child who has been placed for adoption by an adoption agency (within the meaning of section 1 of the Children Act 1975); "'.

    With that amendment we may take Government Amendments Nos. 249 and 242.

    The amendment applies purely to Scotland and adjusts the terms of Section 6 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, which confers powers of supervision and inspection in regard to residential establishments and other premises on officers of the Secretary of State authorised for the purpose. The adjustment is necessary purely to reflect certain changes in the law relating to children placed for adoption who are protected under Section 37(1) of the Adoption Act 1958. It is precisely equivalent to Amendment No. 127 in relation to England and Wales.

    The amendment extends Section 6(2) of the 1968 Act and makes it possible for authorised officers to supervise places where children have been placed for adoption by adoption agencies in terms of Clause 1—that is, either a local authority or an approved adoption agency. Section 6(2) at present covers foster children and protected children in terms of Part IV of the Adoption Act 1950. The amendment will not in fact extend the total range of situations open to inspection at present, but will ensure that the powers of supervision continue to be available in the case of all adopted children.

    The purpose of amendments to Sections 69 and 70 of the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, respectively, is, first, to provide a power on the part of the court in Scotland to issue a search warrant in cases where it is shown to it that there are reasonable grounds for believing that a person is harbouring a child who has either absconded, or has been unlawfully removed, in terms of the provisions of Part V of the Act. The second purpose is to extend the provisions of the section to deal with cases of a child who absconds not only while in one of the situations covered by Part V at present, but also while awaiting transfer to such a situation.

    Amendment agreed to.

    Amendments made: No. 209, in page 85, line 31, at end insert:

    '47A. In section 17—
  • (a) in subsection (3), for "section 16" there is substituted "section 16(1)(a)" and after "local authority" there is inserted", in whom are vested in accordance with the resolution the parental rights and powers in respect of a child,";
  • (b) the following subsection is inserted after subsection (3)—
  • "(3A)A resolution under section 16(1)(b) of this Act shall not prevent the voluntary organisation, in whom are vested in accordance with the resolution the parental rights and powers in respect of a child, from allowing, either for a fixed period or until the voluntary organisation otherwise determine, the care of the child to be taken over by, and the child to be under the control of, a parent, guardian, relative or friend in any case where it appears to the voluntary organisation to be for the benefit of the child";
  • (c) in subsection (4), for "section 16" there is substituted "section 16(1)(a)";
  • (d) in subsection (6), for the words "the said section 16" there is substituted "section 16 of this Act";
  • (e) in subsection (7), after the words "local authority" there are inserted the words "or a voluntary organisation";
  • (f) in subsection (8)—
  • (i) for the words "to whom this section applies" there is substituted ", in respect of whom a resolution under section 16 of this Act is in effect,"; and
  • (ii) for the words "fifty pounds" there is substituted "£400";
  • (g) in subsection (9)—
  • (i) for the words "where a local authority have, in accordance with subsection (3) of this section, allowed" there is substituted—
  • "Where—
  • (a) a local authority have, in accordance with subsection (3) of this section; or
  • (b) a voluntary organisation have, in accordance with subsection (3A) of this section,
  • allowed";
  • (ii) for the words "fifty pounds" there is substituted "£400".
  • 47B. In section 18—
  • (a) in subsection (2), for "section 16" there is substituted "section 16(1)(a)";
  • (b) in subsection (3)—
  • (i) in paragraph (a), for "paragraph (a)" there is substituted "sub-paragraph (i)";
  • (ii) for paragraph (b) there is substituted "(b) in the case of a resolution passed by virtue of circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (ii), (iii), or (iv) of sub-section (1) of the said section 16, by the person who, but for the resolution, would have the parental rights and powers in relation to the child,";
  • (iii) after the words "otherwise direct, the local authority" there are inserted the words ", and any voluntary organisation having parental rights and powers with respect to the child,";
  • (c) in subsection (4), after the words "local authority" there are inserted the words "or voluntary organisation"'.
  • No. 210, in page 85, line 32, leave out paragraph 48.

    No. 251, in page 85, line 37, leave out paragraph 49 and insert:

    "49. In sections 32(2)—
  • (a) for paragraphs (b) and (c) there is substituted—
  • "(b) he is falling into bad associations or is exposed to moral danger; or
  • (c) lack of parental care is likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or seriously to impair his health or development; or";
  • (b) in paragraph (d), for the words "Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937" there is substituted "Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975";
  • (c) after paragraph (d) there is inserted—
    • (dd) the child is, or is likely to become, a member of the same household as a person who has committed any of the offences mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975; or".'.
  • No. 171, in page 85, line 41, at end insert:

    '50A. In section 49(3) for the words "The sheriff may examine the reporter and" there is substituted—
    • "The reporter, whether or not he is conducting the proceedings before the sheriff, may be examined by the sheriff; and the sheriff may examine".'.

    No. 249, in page 85, line 41, at end insert:

    '50B. In section 69—
  • (a) in subsection (1), at the end there are added the following words—
    • "; and a court, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the child is within any premises, may grant a search warrant authorising a constable to search those premises for the child."
  • (b) for subsection (5) there is substituted—
  • "(5) In this and the next following section any reference—
  • (a) to a child absconding includes a reference to his being unlawfully taken away;
  • (b) to a child absconding from a place or from the control of a person includes a reference to his absconding while being taken to, or awaiting being taken to, that place or that person as the case may be."
  • In section 70, at the end there are added the following words—
    • "; and a court, if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the child is within any premises, may grant a search warrant authorising a constable to search those premises for the child.".'

    No. 125, in page 85, line 41, at end insert—

    '50C. In section 71 for the words "one hundred pounds" there is substituted "£400".'.

    No. 242, in page 85, line 41, at end insert—

    '. In section 44(5) after "20", there is inserted "20A.".'.—[Mr. McElhone.]

    I beg to move Amendment No. 240, in page 85, line 41, at end insert—

    'In section 94, at the end of the definition of the word "parent" there shall be inserted—
    • "(c) in relation to a registered pupil attending a school belonging to or operated by a local education authority and for the purposes of section 32(2)(a) only means the headmaster or depute headmaster of the said school, provided that the facts upon which the ground is based arise during normal school hours."'.
    This is neither a technical nor a drafting amendment. In fact, it is a very important amendment. It is intended to deal with a serious deficiency in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968.

    Previous amendments alter the grounds of referral on which children can be sent to children's hearings for acceptance of the facts and for subsequent treatment. There is one difficulty. If the disruptive behaviour occurs at school, there is doubt whether the children's hearing has power to deal with what used to be described as a criminal offence. If there is an assault, or an act of that kind, which, under the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, forms a ground of referral, the trouble emanating in the school can be dealt with by means of the children's panel and the children's hearings procedure.

    Where a headmaster acts for a local authority in loco parentis, and is responsible for a child while in school, and the child's behaviour can be termed disruptive behaviour, which affects the running of the school, causes wear and tear on the nerves of a teacher, or affects the running of the classroom and the education of other children, there is doubt whether the children's panel can deal with the situation.

    A briefing that I received from one panel states categorically:
    "At the present time there are no grounds for the referral of children whose behaviour in school is severely disruptive. Parents cannot easily be held liable for the behaviour of their child in the classroom or playground. The exclusion of pupils is not an effective or desirable method of dealing with the problem."
    The Educational Institute of Scotland maintains that there possibly is power to deal with the situation, but it admits that many of its headmasters and deputy headmasters doubt whether they have power to initiate complaints as a result of which the child will go to the children's panel for treatment, or for a decision which might help to cure the problems causing difficulty in the school. The easy solution, of barring the child from that school, is not acceptable. That is far too crude a method of dealing with it. Headmasters feel that their powers in that direction should be improved.

    This amendment was referred to the Educational Institute of Scotland. It was discussed with one of the depute secretaries of that organisation. The institute approves of the amendment. As that body is the largest teaching institute in Scotland, the Government are well advised to accept the amendment.

    At present the parent of the child at school is defined as the headmaster or deputy headmaster of a school which belongs to or is operated by a local education authority where the pupil is a registered pupil of that school. That is an unacceptable way of accomplishing our aim. There is a glaring gap in the present arrangements which should be plugged as quickly as possible. If the Government do not accept the amendment, I shall not force a Division, although I should have done so had the matter been discussed earlier.

    The effect of the amendment would be to provide that a new ground for the referral of a child to a children's hearing would be that he was beyond the control of his headmaster or deputy headmaster within the school situation. The amendment may one day become law, but this issue presently requires—and is receiving a good real more preliminary consideration.

    At present the children's hearings deal with children who have truanted. Internal discipline within schools is another matter. It is, of course, a matter for concern, which is why the Pack Committee on Truancy and Indiscipline was set up in 1974. That committee is considering in a substantial way the issues that arise on indiscipline within schools. The proposition contained in the amendment will be considered by that body.

    1.45 a.m.

    There are many implications in the situation which it will have to consider before making recommendations, which in turn will have to be considered by all the bodies concerned. Examples are, alternative solutions, internal discipline and how far that is a question for the schools themselves, and the degree of education machinery required to ensure that such referrals could be controlled and carried out consistently. These matters will have implications for social work departments. But to discuss those matters now would be entering into an education debate and going far beyond the scope of the Bill.

    We recognise the concern over this matter, but we feel that the amendment is premature and too simplistic in approach to be acceptable in a complex situation.

    Amendment negatived.

    Amendments made: No. 253, in page 87, line 1, at end insert:

    '56A. In section 1(2) the following paragraph is inserted after paragraph (b):—
    • "(bb) it is probable that the condition set out in paragraph (a) of this subsection will be satisfied in his case, having regard to the fact that a person who has been convicted of an offence mentioned in Schedule 1 to the Act of 1933 is, or may become, a member of the same household as the child;",'.

    No. 127, in page 87, line 29, at end insert:

    '59A. In section 58(1), the following paragraph is inserted after paragraph (b)—
    • "(bb) premises in which a child is living with a person other than his parent, guardian, relative or custodian, with whom he has been placed by an adoption agency (within the meaning of section 1 of the Children Act 1975);'".

    No. 224, in page 87, line 29, at end insert:

    '59A. In section 27—
  • (a) in subsection (3), for the words "their general duty aforesaid" there are substituted the words "their general duty under section 12(1) of the Children Act 1948";
  • (b) the following subsections are substituted for subsection (4)—
    • "(4) Without prejudice to their general duty under the said section 12, it shall be the duty of a local authority to review the case of each child in their care in accordance with regulations made under the following subsection.
    • (5) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision as to—
    • (a) the manner in which cases are to be reviewed under this section;
    • (b)the considerations to which the local authority are to have regard in reviewing cases under this section; and
    • (c)the time when a child's case is first to be reviewed and the frequncy of subsequent reviews under this section.".'.
  • No. 152, in page 88, line 2, after '1', insert:

    '(a) at the end of the entry relating to the Adoption Act 1958 there are added the following words "Counselling services for adopted persons";
    (b)'.

    No. 128, in page 88, line 28, at end insert:

    '(1A) In section 13(2), after the words "order for the payment of money" there are inserted the words "made by a magistrates' court".'.

    No. 129, in page 88, line 39, leave out 'made with respect to a minor of whom care' and insert:

    'an order requiring payments to be made to an authority to whom care of a minor'.

    No. 130, in page 89, leave out lines 14 to 19 and insert:

    '67—(1) In section 4(3) for the words from "the following provisions" to the end there are substituted the following words "sections 12(2) and 13 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 shall apply as if the order made under section 2 of this Act were an order under section 9 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971.
    (2) After section 4(3) there is inserted the following subsection—'.

    No. 131, in page 89, line 37, leave out 'paragraph is' and insert 'paragraphs are'.

    No. 132, in page 89, line 39 at end insert:

    '(g) proceedings under section (Appeals by parents etc.) (2) of the Children Act 1975".'.—[Dr. Owen.]

    Schedule 4

    Further Repeals

    Amendments made: No. 133, in page 90, leave out lines 5 to 12.

    No. 134, in page 91, line 3, in column 3, at end insert 'Section 7(3).'.

    No. 135, in page 91, line 6, at end insert 'Section 18(1).'

    No. 136, in page 92, leave out lines 4 and 5.

    No. 137, in page 92, line 28, at end insert:

    '1975 c. 61.Child Benefit Act 1975.Section 24(3)(c).

    No. 138, in page 92, line 29, leave out 'These repeals' and insert:

    'The repeals of sections 16 and 17 of the 1958 Act, and of provisions containing references to those sections, have effect subject to

    'PART 1A
    LEGITIMATION

    Chapter

    Short Title

    Extent of Repeal

    16 & 17 Geo. 5 c. 60.Legitimacy Act 1926Section 1(3).
    5Sections 3 to 5.
    In section 8(2), the words from "and to the taking" to "of a legitimated person".
    10In section 11, the definitions of "disposition", "intestate" and "entailed interest".
    1969 c. 46.Family Law Reform Act 1969.Section 14(8).
    Section 15(4) and (6).
    These repeals have effect subject to paragraph 13(9) of Schedule 1'.
    No. 140, in page 93, line 3, at end insert:
    '23 and 25 Geo. 5 c. 12.Children and Young Persons Act 1933.In section 1, in subsection (1) (a), the words "not exceeding one hundred Pounds" and in subsection (5), the words from "the maximum" to "pounds, and".'
    No. 141, in page 93, line 3, at end insert:
    '1937 c. 37Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937.In section 12, in subsection (1) (a), the words "not exceeding one hundred pounds" and in subsection (5) (a) the words from "the maximum" to "pounds, and".
    No. 142, in page 93, line 6, column 3, at end insert:
    'Section 21(3).'.
    No. 225, in page 93, line 6, in column3, at end insert:
    'In section 20(4), the words from "pursuant to" to "in force".".
    No. 143, in line 39, at end insert:
    '1973 c. 29.Guardianship Act 1973.'Section 3(5).'
    No. 144, in page 94, line 12, leave out 'and (3)'.
    No. 258, in page 94, line 12, at end insert:
    '1966 c. 19Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1966.Section 4'.

    No. 259, in page 96, leave out lines 17 to 19.

    No. 145, in page 97, leave out lines 34 and 35.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That the Bill be now read the Third time.—[ Dr. Owen.]

    1.48 a.m.

    paragraph 5(2) of Schedule I, and the other repeals in this Part'.

    No. 139, in page 92, line 30, at end insert:

    Reading. It is not too much to say that progress on the Bill has shown Parliament at its best. Our debates have been constructive, we have not divided on party lines, and our discussions have been aimed at protecting essentially, and above all, the interests of children. That has been the cause advanced by all who have taken part.

    I wish to congratulate the Minister of State. The measure undoubtedly will become known as the Owen Bill', just as recent pensions legislation became known as the "O'Malley Bill". There must be somebody missing somewhere in the team. I also wish to thank the members of the Standing Committee on my side for their contributions, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Reading, South (Dr. Vaughan).

    On Second Reading I said:

    "We are now accustomed to talking about the choice of priorities in social services, and with an ever-deepening economic crisis it is likely to become more and more a feature of our debates."—[Official Report, 20th June 1975; Vol. 893, c. 1840.]

    That economic crisis is now evident to everyone. It might not have been evident in June when the Bill had its Second Reading, but its effects have been devastating in social policy terms.

    Already there are yawning gaps in our social services. Already there are people in desperate and urgent need who are unable to get help. It is unlikely—I fear that we must accept this truth—that we shall be able to help these people and many more like them over the next few months or perhaps years.

    Inflation hits those who can least look after their own interests. Inflation hits the weakest in our society. That is our greatest social problem. As we pass this legislation, let us recognise and face that problem.

    In many ways we are passing legislation in the hope that resources will become available. I join in that hope. Certainly it could be argued that the Government should give first and foremost priority to the children. Upon such an aim and effort both sides of the House can agree. If we fail or omit to give help in childhood, the omission may never be repaired. That is why children should be given priority, especially in the resources that we make available.

    I congratulate the Minister and the Government on their efforts, but let us not think that the battle is over: the battle has just begun.

    I became involved in these proceedings late in the day, because I was concerned with the Petroleum and Submarine Pipe-Lines Bill when the Children Bill was in Committee. Nevertheless, my hon. Friends and I have had a strong interest in the subject of the Bill, and we are glad to see that it has reached a happy landing.

    I should like to make a strong criticism. Perhaps it could have been made on Second Reading, and certainly in Committee. There should have been two Bills—one for England and Wales and another for Scotland.

    This Bill adds to the hotchpotch of legislation with which Scottish lawyers find it extremely difficult to deal. It is bad enough if one is an English lawyer to deal with legislation that keeps chopping and changing, but if one is a Scottish lawyer and has to keep translating terms from one jurisdiction to another, it is murderously difficult. Such a situation also applies to social workers, reporters, the judiciary and all those who have to interpret various pieces of legislation.

    The reforms or changes in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968 are belated. We know that a review is taking place involving a number of committees, but this too gives room for criticism about the way in which Scottish legislation is tackled in this House. Apart from the large number of Scottish Ministers who passed through the pipeline in Committee—three Under-Secretaries and the Lord Advocate—there was only one other Scottish Member of Parliament on the Standing Committee dealing with the Bill. That was unsatisfactory. However, we should express our thanks to the hon. Member for Edinburgh, West (Lord James Douglas-Hamilton) and the Ministers who have been concerned with this subject. I hope that at the end of the day we have made some improvements in Scottish law on the treatment of children, although there is much more that we have to carry forward.

    In passing I should like to pay tribute to the new Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, who has taken over at a very late stage, as I have. Tonight he has accepted a number of amendments that had been rejected in Committee, amendments that will prevent the assimilation of Scots law to the law prevailing in England.

    If one thing has emerged from these debates it is that there is a tremendous gulf between the way in which Scotland and England tackle the problems of custody, adoption, the treatment of children before children's panels, juvenile courts, and so on. That does not necessarily mean that our methods in Scotland are the best, and plenty of criticism has been expressed this evening about some of our legislation. But it means that the English and Scottish methods are completely different, and one of the strongest arguments for a Scottish Assembly is that we could have a rolling review of Scottish legislation to make sure that it was up to date and in line with current developments on the Scottish scene.

    1.57 a.m.

    The passing of the Bill is a very important landmark of the way in which the community at large treats children. We have come a long way from the days of Charles Dickens, and this is another step on the way.

    I should like to add my congratulations to those already offered to the Minister of State. I know that he will take great pleasure in seeing the Bill become law, for the simple reason that when he was successful in the Ballot as a Private Member he chose this as the subject for his Bill. I had the privilege of working with him on the drafting of that Bill, and I know that he was an expert before he became a Minister.

    In my experience in Parliament—although it is not as long as yours, Mr. Deputy Speaker, it is not short—I do not remember a Member presenting a Private Member's Bill and being at the receiving end of much discouragement, being told that it was so complex that it was impossible to contemplate a Private Member's Bill covering the subject, and then having the opportunity of putting his ideas into effect with the whole strength of the Department behind him.

    A good deal has been said tonight and in Committee about the economic constraints of our time, and of course they limit the speed at which some of the provisions of the Bill can be put into operation. Nevertheless, it is important that the Bill should be enacted, for it takes the law a considerable step forward. Although it is a time of economic constraint, this is the right time to pass good social legislation. It need not be rushed, although the Bill certainly has been more rushed on Report than it should have been.

    I congratulate everybody concerned and say that this is the best handled Bill that I have seen. The Minister and his Department have been prepared throughout to look at suggestions in Committee. I have never known any team on a Bill as cooperative as the Government team have been on this occasion.

    Normally, legislation ends in acrimony as it begins in acrimony. It is a great pleasure to be involved in a Bill that did not begin in acrimony and certainly does not end so.

    1.59 a.m.

    I should like to be associated with the tribute paid to the Minister by my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Fowler). The Minster has emerged at the end of the Bill with increased stature and respect both inside the House and outside. I know that he would be the first to pay tribute to the tremendous help he has received, from the very start, from his officials.

    The Bill is rightly called the Children Bill. It is a new charter of children's rights. I am proud to have been associated with it and to have played a small part in its passage. It is the care section which has been my greatest interest, of course, because it was in my constituency that the tragedy of Maria Colwell took place. The name of Maria Colwell is indelibly printed on my memory and that of everyone in Brighton. I think. As the Bill has progressed, the people of Brighton have realised that it will go a long way to reducing the chances of such cases happening in future. The care section is indeed a worthy memorial to that tragic little girl.

    We respect the Minister's determination to make the Bill work. He has said that he is prepared to do everything possible to reallocate resources within his own Department to ensure that it gets under way as quickly as possible.

    There is greater public awareness of the needs of children, but there must be continual vigilance. No law by itself can produce all the answers. Public commitment is essential. The family is still the basic unit in our society and I hope that it always will be. Ultimately, the protection and welfare of children is the responsibility of every individual citizen.

    2.2 a.m.

    I should like to pay tribute to all the Ministers involved with the Bill for the gracious way in which they dealt with amendments. Many representations were sent to me from many bodies in Scotland. Each of the four Scottish Ministers involved took immense trouble to take up these complaints and to deal with them satisfactorily. There were only two outstanding complaints, and I am glad that the Scottish Minister who has just taken over dealt with them in Government amendments tonight.

    Anyone who participates in Scotland's legal system—the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Mr. Wilson) and I are both qualified lawyers on different sides of the profession—will know that an enormous effort has been made. If we took up a disproportionate amount of time, I apologise to English Members, but the Scottish requirement has been well defined. Scottish Office Ministers took particular trouble to help in this connection.

    At a time of severe financial stringency, we all hope that, however many cuts there may be in public expenditure, they will never be at the expense of children. I hope that sufficient funds and facilities will be made available to make the Bill work well in future. I wish the Minister every success with it.

    2.4 a.m.

    :I want to pay tribute to someone who has been mentioned many times during our debates on the Bill—the late Sir William Houghton—and his committee. The Houghton Report was an absolute model. Despite all the enthusiasm of the Minister of State, we should have found it more difficult to carry the Bill through without the recommendations of that committee.

    I should also like to congratulate the Minister of State on the immense care, good humour and patience he has shown. I do not suppose there has been any Committee stage in which more undertakings have been given which have actually been carried out. We have appreciated this very much. I believe that the Bill will be much more effective as a result of what we have done. Clearly, there will be a need for a consolidation Bill for children's legislation. The scene has now become very confused. People working in this area will need some kind of guidance by bringing the legislation together.

    I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr. Fowler) for the way he has led the debates for the Opposition. It will be no surprise to the Minister if I say how concerned we are about the resources that will be needed to back up this measure. We all know what happened to the Children and Young Persons Act and the difficulties that arose in implementing it. That was one of the reasons why we emphasised the need for some kind of monitoring and research. We were pleased that the Minister accepted that need.

    We are concerned about staffing. Although we appreciate the sincerity of what the Minister says—that this measure will not be implemented until there are the resources to back it up—there are fears that, particularly in the present economic climate, it will not be possible to implement it. We are now getting reports, for example, that Wakefield is cutting its social services budget by £273,000. This involves, among other things, the abandonment of the appointment of 31 social workers and nine trainees. This is a major depletion of the ranks and is bound to have an effect on legislation of this kind. In East Sussex the bill is being cut by £750,000. This, too, will affect, among other things, the establishment of social workers and, in this case, stand-by emergency duties of social workers, which is most serious. At Coventry, major cuts are being made which will affect the establishment of social workers.

    I do not want to end on a gloomy note. I mention these things to support the anxiety that we have shown about the implementation of the Bill. We accept the Minister's sincerity when he says that he will introduce the Bill in stages as resources are available. We have appreciated the harmony and good will that has been shown throughout proceedings on the Bill.

    2.8 a.m.

    I thank hon. Members on both sides of the House for their kind references to me. It is worth putting on record from the start that this legislation could never have been brought to this stage had it not been for the work of the Houghton Committee and my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), who as Home Secretary set up that Committee. There is now only one member of that Committee left in the House, my hon. Friend the Member for Pontypool (Mr. Abse) who is at present out of the country. I know that he wanted to take part in the Committee proceedings. He was a tremendous friend of this measure when it was a Private Member's Bill, as was the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Hooson).

    I have many people to thank, not least those in voluntary bodies outside the House. They have contributed tremendously to the informed debate on both sides of the House. They have had a major and genuine influence. I like to think that they have been consulted in depth at all stages.

    I do not think that I could let this occasion pass without mentioning the Association of British Adoption Agencies, which certainly helped me greatly when the Bill was introduced as a Private Member's Bill. It made an outstanding contribution. Many other voluntary organisations have also helped. Nor can I forget the work of the volunteer draftsmen who worked on the Private Member's Bill. They worked against massive obstacles to draft the Bill in its early stages before it became Government legislation. That push given to the Bill then was crucial. There were young lawyers who gave up a lot of their time, and we are grateful to them.

    No one could possibly deny the contribution made by the Department. Many hon. Members have been the recipients of letters from it. It has been hard work. I am grateful to members of my Department and members of other Departments. The Scottish Office, the Home Office and the Lord Chancellor's Office have also been involved—to name the major Departments. We are certainly very grateful to them all.

    I must mention my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Miss Jackson) without whose ability to keep together the requisite number of hon. Members for voting purposes the Bill might have had a more difficult time.

    We start the Bill at a very difficult financial time, and it would be quite wrong if the message were to go out from the House tonight and when, eventually, as I hope, the Bill receives the Royal Assent, that somehow and automatically many of its desirable provisions will be automatically implemented. They will not be. That must be clearly understood. Most of us here recognise that the Bill will have to be implemented in phases and at a speed which many of us will regret. Those, however, are the facts of life, and I believe that we shall serve the best interests of children by being realistic about resources.

    Too often in the past the House has willed an end and then failed to provide the means. This time we must move at a pace at which we can match the means to our aspirations, and I hope that we shall be able to achieve that.

    I have been discussing implementation of the Bill with the local authorities. The first group of clauses, which I hope will start to operate on 1st January 1976, includes the welfare clause, the clause concerning the additional reason for dispensing with consent, requirements as to religious upbringing, power to order inquiries, supplementary powers and other aspects involving no extra costs.

    The second group will require a period of six to nine months for rules and regulations to be made dealing with relatively minor changes and re-enactments of adoption law. I think that we shall be able to introduce in 1976–77 the provision to enable people to have access to their birth record. The acceptance of the new concept of custodianship orders cannot be jeopardised by premature introduction, but I hope that the prospects for introducing it in 1977–78 are reasonable.

    The core of the Bill is the comprehensive adoption service, and this is the area where the big money is involved. An extra £5 million will probably be needed in addition to resources spent on adoption. It will not be possible to implement that immediately. I do not believe that we shall know before the rate support grant discussions next summer and autumn whether we shall have sufficient resources to give enough money for local authorities to have at least a year's warning of the introduction of statutory provisions, and a longer period than that may be needed before we can be sure of the necessary high standards.

    Separate representation, a new aspect of the legislation, again involves high cost. I am discussing with the local authorities the possibility of making a start in the year 1976–77, with particular attention to cases like that of Maria Colwell involving applications for the variation or discharge of care or supervision orders. That would be a modest low-cost start, and it is important that this provision is started as soon as possible.

    Against that sort of background we shall not know the true pace of implementation until we know what resources are available. We shall have to match the demand on these parts of children services with all the other pressures on the services, such as the rise in juvenile delinquency and increasing numbers of children in care. All these factors make demands on scarce skills. It is not always just a question of shortage of money. One of our scarcest resources is skilled people, although that often comes down in the end to a question of money.

    Reference was made to the need for consolidation. That is a high priority requirement, and I hope that the adoption provisions will be the first part of the Bill to be consolidated.

    This has been United Kingdom legislation. We have gained from Scottish experience, and in certain aspects there is no doubt that Scottish law has been in advance of English law. However, there are advantages when discussing an issue so central to the whole stability of the United Kingdom—the family and children—in being able to bring together legislation from across the United Kingdom. I think that this has been helpful for all of us.

    Tonight marks the end of the Bill's stages in this House. It has taken a long time to bring it this far. It is a very much better Bill than the Bill which went into Committee, and a better Bill than the Bill which left Committee. Tonight's proceedings, though they have had to go on rather long, have improved the Bill substantially. Many people have contributed to this. I think that it has shown perhaps a view of the House of Commons that is not often appreciated enough outside—the detailed work that can go across party lines to improve legislation without political rancour and show the House of Commons in one of its most attractive aspects. Would that we received more opportunity to publicise that working of our parliamentary democracy to the country as a whole. I am grateful to the Opposition for the way in which they have enabled that spirit to manifest itelf throughout the legislation.

    With those sombre warnings about the future and of a phased implementation which will not be as rapid as any of us would wish, I hope that in the last analysis what the Bill will do more than anything else is to change people's attitudes to child care. It will be a success if as a result of this legislation we see increasingly and in all decisions that are made about children the best interests of the child becoming the priority consideration. It is that interpretation of the legislation that I should like to see operated by the courts.

    We for our part, in the difficult financial choices that will face us, must face up to the fact that if we do not invest in the children of the country, we are serving future generations ill. They are the seed corn of our future, and they need and demand an investment of money and resources but perhaps above all a fundamental change of attitudes in many aspects of our decision-making as it affects children.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Bill read the Third time and passed, with amendments.

    Adjournment

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. Coleman.]

    Spain (Miss Nicola Baughan)

    2.17 a.m.

    I wish to raise the case of the tragic death of Nicola Baughan, aged 15, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Baughan, of Alvaston, Derby, my constituents.

    The family went on holiday to Calella, Spain, on 20th July. After 10 days in Spain, on 1st August, Nicola, the daughter, was knocked down by a car when crossing the main road in Calella, and she was taken to a small hospital in the town. She was then transferred from that hospital to a larger hospital in Barcelona. After about one hour it was decided that no one there could treat the particular problem of Nicola and the injuries she sustained in the accident, and she was on the move again. This time she was taken to the Residencia Francisco Franco, outside Barcelona. The family were not allowed to leave until they had been presented with a bill and had given the home address in England and all the relevant detail to make sure that they could meet the expenses necessary.

    They were told at this hospital that it would be necessary to perform a small operation on Nicola, and the mother realised, of course, that this was to be a hole drilled in the skull to relieve the pressure on the brain. Nicola was taken to the operating theatre some time after 5 p.m. After about two hours the operation was finished and Nicola was taken into the intensive care unit. The family were allowed to look at her for only a very short time through a window, and then the intensive care unit was shut up for the night.

    Following this, various visits were paid, naturally, by the family to see the daughter. Eventually they saw the doctor, on Sunday 3rd August, and he explained that Nicola was very seriously injured and that the brain damage was extensive, but that her condition was not hopeless.

    On Monday morning 4th August they visited the hospital again and spent two hours in the finance department sorting out who would be responsible for the bill. They saw Nicola for a few minutes, after which they were told to leave.

    Mr. Baughan then had to return home because the holiday was over, and Mrs. Baughan was left alone. She went to the British consulate in Barcelona and saw a Mr. Bradley, who said that he would keep in touch. Mrs. Baughan received a telephone call from Mr. Bradley to the effect that the consulate would arrange for her to move from her holiday hotel to a hotel nearer the hospital, but, as an illustration of how everything went wrong, when Mrs. Baughan in her anxious and emotional state arrived at the hotel, no room was ready for her and the hotel provided no food.

    Mrs. Baughan went back to the hospital, saw her daughter for about an hour and spoke to the doctor, who told her that Nicola's chances of survival were about three in 10. Mrs. Baughan returned to the hotel and arranged to move, so that she could be sure at least of getting food after returning from the hospital. On the next day she visited Nicola again and saw her daughter through the window, as usual.

    There was no change in Nicola's general condition until Friday 8th August, when, on visiting the hospital once more, she found that Nicola was on a respirator. Naturally, she was very upset about this, so the nurse telephoned the doctor, who explained that Nicola's condition was not desperate. However, when Mrs. Baughan saw her daughter at the hospital on Saturday she saw that her condition was not good. The doctor said that he would take Nicola off the machine to see whether she was breathing spontaneously. After a short time he came back to Mrs. Baughan and told her that Nicola was dead. Mrs. Baughan asked to see her daughter, but permisson was refused.

    The consulate was informed that Nicola had died, and Mr. Bradley telephoned to say that a post-mortem examination had been performed. When Mrs. Baughan said that her permission for a post mortem had not been requested, he replied that in Spain permission was not needed and post-mortem examinations were performed as a matter of course before burial authority was granted. He asked Mrs. Baughan what the family had decided to do with Nicola and, naturally, was told that they wanted to take her home. He said that that would take a very long time and cost a great deal of money. He asked the family to think about it and gave a telephone number where he could be reached. He explained that nothing could be done then, because the consulate was closing for the weekend—this during the busy time of the year in Spain.

    On the next day, Mr. Baughan arrived back in Spain and he went ahead with the funeral arrangements. On Sunday 10th August several attempts were made to contact Mr. Bradley on the telephone number he had given, but there was never an answer. Not until Monday were the family able to get hold of Mr. Bradley. He was still involved in other duties at the consulate.

    At 9 a.m. Mr. and Mrs. Baughan went to the mortuary, accompanied by Mrs. Farrell—an English resident who spoke Spanish and with whom the family had become acquainted during the holiday. They again telephoned the consulate, and Mr. Bradley said that he was just leaving to come to the mortuary. The general idea he conveyed was that he would be free to help to make the arrangements for the funeral. Several telephone calls were made to the consulate, and it was said that Mr. Bradley had left in good time to help with the funeral arrangements.

    Eventually, just after noon, a Mr. Ortega arrived at the consulate. He went through the arrangements, and said that he understood everything and would arrange for a Protestant clergyman to conduct the funeral service on the following day.

    On the following day, 12th August, the family arrived at the mortuary for the funeral. Mrs. Farrell and her sister were there and so were two members from the agency that had arranged the tour. But there was no one from the British consulate at all; nor was a Protestant clergyman present. They thought there had perhaps been some mistake and therefore they went on to the cemetery. They thought that perhaps the clergyman and people from the consulate would be there in attendance.

    They arrived at the cemetery only to find that there was no one there, and several telephone calls were made, but without any success. After quite a long wait, they were told that the coffin must be interred because of the terrific heat, and they drove up to the tombs, as they are described. The coffin was unloaded on to the floor. Shortly, some workmen arrived with a small truck and winched the coffin up to its resting place. There still was no sign of the clergyman or anyone from the consulate.

    So Nicola was sealed in her tomb without a proper funeral service. Mrs. Farrell and her sister said the Lord's Prayer, and that was all. The family went back to the hotel and later in the evening received a telephone call from a Mr. Copestake, the clergyman who should have been at the funeral. He explained that Nicola had been buried in the Catholic cemetery and he had been waiting at the Protestant cemetery.

    The family went to the British consulate next day and saw Mr. Ortega, who was very nervous and did not seem to know what to say. Eventually, they went to see the consul, a Miss Winifred Durbin. She was apologetic and accepted the criticism. Apparently, everything was left to assumption. Mr. Ortega assumed that Mr. Copestake knew where Nicola was being buried and Mr. Copestake assumed that she was being buried in the Protestant cemetery.

    One can imagine the effect this series of events had upon the family. Quite clearly, they were very dissatisfied, to put it mildly, with the service and treatment they received from the consulate throughout the whole of this time. Having seen the family and discussed the matter in detail, I wrote to my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. I received a reply from the Minister of State and I asked the family to meet me again so that we could discuss his reply.

    We came to the conclusion that the Minister of State's reply was a whitewashing exercise and that he had fallen over backwards to find excuses for the indolent way in which the consulate had carried out its duties. Mrs. Baughan made it clear that she had no complaint against the travel agency, and yet the Minister said time and again throughout his reply that the blame lay with the travel agency for not making the proper arrangements and that that was the cause of the chaos. I conclude by asking my hon. Friend some questions, and I hope that he will answer them.

    First, will the Foreign Office now, as a result of what I can only describe as a disgraceful episode, carry out a full investigation into the slipshod, indolent, incompetent attitude of the consulate staff in Barcelona? Secondly, the Minister of State excused the staff there by referring to a large number of incidents over the weekend, yet Mr. Bradley, presumably one of the senior members of the consulate, said that the consulate was closed for the weekend. Surely at this very busy time of year, the last two weeks of July, there should be some staff on duty over the weekend.

    I am also advised that the consul-general was on leave. The slack period between November and March is surely the time when the consul-general should be on leave, not during this busy period. Why did Mr. Bradley of the consulate staff put so many obstacles in the way of Nicola's being flown home for burial? When the consulate staff knew that Mrs. Baughan was alone, why did they not assign a member of the staff to deal with the problems of hotel, cost of hospital treatment, and funeral arrangements? Finally, will the Foreign Office now try to make amends by flying home Nicola's body for burial in Derby? That would at least ease the pain and anguish still being suffered by Mrs. Baughan and family.

    The Spanish authorities also come badly out of this. I have related how Nicola was moved from one hospital to another immediately after she had sustained serious injuries in this accident. When she finished up at the hospital where she was operated on, the authorities spent most of the time trying to find out how much money the family had and whether the bill would be paid. Spain gets many British holidaymakers and, bearing in mind the vast amount that must go into the coffers of that country as a result of British holidaymakers going there, they are entitled to more sympathetic understanding than they get. I ask the Minister to see whether we can do something to assist in cases like this, not only on questions about how a consulate would deal with the matter, but by having discussions with the Spanish authorities.

    This has been a difficult time for the family and I trust that the Foreign Office will at least make amends by flying home this coffin so that Nicola can have a decent burial in this country.

    2.32 a.m.

    The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
    (Mr. Edward Rowlands)

    Before dealing in detail with the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Derby, South (Mr. Johnson), let me say how deeply sorry I feel about Nicola's tragic and untimely death. I am a family man and no one can help sharing in the agony and grief of the family. I hope that my hon. Friend will pass on my sympathy to Mrs. Baughan.

    My hon. Friend has outlined some of the facts of this tragic case. From the moment they knew of the accident to the date of Nicola's death on 9th August—that moment was on 4th August—the consulate-general responded to various inquiries and requests from Mr. and Mrs. Baughan. For example, it arranged for privileged hospital visiting facilities for Mr. and Mrs. Baughan to see their daughter, as well as for hotel accommodation. Following Nicola's death on 9th August, the consulate-general at Barcelona contacted Mr. Baughan, who had returned to Britain. Mr. Baughan decided that Nicola should be given a local burial. The consulate-general did not pressurise the decision, It was made by the family. The consulate-general explained the circumstances and the costs involved. It did not make the decision, nor "persuade" Mr. Baughan, as one Press comment said. The decision was taken by Mr. Baughan.

    On Monday 11th August Mrs. Baughan sought the help of the consulate-general in two ways—to arrange for a Protestant clergyman to officiate at the funeral and to assist in making the funeral arrangements with the local undertaker. The consulate-general began to look for a clergyman. However, it had not planned to be with Mrs. Baughan that morning since she was to be accompanied at the undertaker's by a friend who lived locally and spoke Spanish and by the local travel agent of the tour organisers. It was the peak of the holiday season and the staff at the office were dealing with a number of other serious accidents on the morning itself. Unfortunately, before the vice-consul was able to join Mr. Baughan, the undertaker arranged the funeral at an entirely Catholic cemetery.

    Meanwhile, the staff of the consulate-general had found a Protestant lay preacher, who, unfortunately, was not informed of the arrangement to hold the funeral at the Catholic cemetery. The next day the lay preacher went to the wrong cemetery. Before he or the consular official could get to the right one, the interment had taken place.

    I want to tell my hon. Friend that we make no attempt at all to whitewash the circumstances arising from the funeral arrangements. In his letter, my hon. Friend the Minister of State expressed his deepest regret and apologies that this tragic misunderstanding had occurred and that the arrangements were not dealt with more effectively.

    We accept that there should have been more care to avoid the confusion and misunderstanding that arose. I wish publicly to express my own sincere regret and to associate myself with the apologies that the consul made to Mr. and Mrs. Baughan on the day after. Concerning that tragic aspect, and particularly the misunderstanding and confusion over the funeral arrangements, I repeat that we have not attempted to whitewash but have accepted the element of responsibility for that misunderstanding.

    My hon. Friend has raised a number of specific points. He has asked for a full inquiry. That has taken place. We have already held a detailed investigation, and that has led to this statement, as well as the reply from the Minister of State to my hon. Friend. As for the fact that the consulate was closed at the weekend, there is always a duty officer at weekends, contactable through the consulate. As my hon. Friend said, the family were therefore given telephone numbers to ring. I am sorry if they did not actually make contact.

    As for the "obstacles" put in the way of flying Nicola's body home at the time, I do not think there were obstacles. The consulate explained the problems and the difficulties which could arise. They were not meant as obstacles but as a factual explanation of the situation that faced the Baughan family. My hon. Friend has asked about the assigning of staff, and I shall refer to that shortly.

    His main question concerned the possibility now of flying the body home. I quite understand and sympathise with the request made for the repatriation of Nicola's body. I think we ought to explain to Mr. and Mrs. Baughan that, Mr. Baughan having decided on a local burial, to bring the body home now would present very difficult problems. The chief one is that if the Baughans wish to bring the body home, they have to bear in mind that Spanish regulations, like those of some other countries, are such that exhumation can be considered only after two years. That is not a regulation confined to Spain. It is in force in other countries. Mr. and Mrs. Baughan and my hon. Friend will no doubt wish to consider the matter in the light of these facts.

    The Department as such has no funds available with which to finance the repatriation of the body, but in any case we are faced by the fact of the Spanish regulations concerning exhumation.

    The Minister is now aware, as were the consular staff, that no proper burial service took place. He can imagine that even now the family suffer very considerably from the anguish of knowing that their daughter was just put into a tomb and interred without any religious ceremony at all. I still say that the Government have a responsibility to make amends here to the family, and I ask the Minister to think again and to talk to the Spanish authorities with a view to bringing the body home.

    I have made the point that these are the Spanish regulations. As a Christian myself. I appreciate the point about there having been no proper Christian burial. I was simply pointing out that these were the Spanish regulations. I shall take note of the further representations that my hon. Friend has made to me tonight.

    Finally, I wish to make one general point. My hon. Friend has quite rightly drawn attention to the difficulties over staff in meeting the needs and requirements of Mr. and Mrs. Baughan in these tragic circumstances. If I put the whole matter in the context of the work of the consulate, I hasten to say that it is in no way meant to detract from the deepest regret that I feel and the apologies that I have just made to my hon. Friend and, through him, to Mr. and Mrs. Baughan. However, I feel that we should be aware of the circumstances and pressures under which the staff of the consulate-general were working at the time, bearing in mind my hon. Friend's reference to the need to assign staff to deal with circumstances of the kind in which Mr. and Mrs. Baughan found themselves.

    When I looked at the pressures under which this office was working in August, I was frankly both astonished and shocked. For example, at the time when Mrs. Baughan called at the office, the staff were also dealing with four road accidents involving two dead and five seriously injured Britons, together with one death by illness and a medical repatriation by air. They were also trying to help 500 British campers who were reported stranded further up the coast. This was on top of other more routine but equally time-consuming work on passports, visas, thefts from visitors, missing persons and tourists in trouble with the police.

    In the month of August, the office in Barcelona alone dealt with problems arising from 15 deaths—in all, more than 500 queries and calls were made in the month. So far this year there have been 77 deaths of United Kingdom nationals reported to the consulate-general in Barcelona, of which 37 required significant action such as informing next of kin, contacts with insurance companies, assisting with funeral arrangements and transfer of funds.

    At the British consulate-general in Barcelona we have one career consul, one locally-engaged vice-consul, two locally-engaged assistants, and three counter clerks. With clerical workers, the sum total of the Barcelona consular office is nine people.

    I am sure that many citizens, and many holiday-makers, will not have been remotely conscious of the tremendous variety and number of problems that our consulates in major holiday resorts face each year. What I have described certainly presents a different image from the popular one fostered sometimes in the media—of our missions and posts abroad enjoying an easy life, constituting somehow a luxury that we cannot afford. They try to provide a service, to assist British citizens abroad, to help when trouble arises. It is the duty of our posts to do so. But we face a period of financial retrenchment. We are being forced to close one consulate in Spain this year, and the service will be severely pressed to maintain its present capability in the future.

    I am certainly very conscious and aware of the very sad circumstances of the case my honourable Friend has rightly brought to our attention tonight. No one hearing about it can fail to be moved and shocked, and, as I said to my hon. Friend, we apologise sincerely for the misunderstandings and the confusion over the funeral arrangements. But I am sure that he will appreciate that people working abroad in consulates under the pressures that exist are human beings who may make mistakes. I hope that we shall be able to avoid such an instance in the future.

    I shall take note of my hon. Friend's further representations, though it would be cruel to offer any hope that we can get round either the regulations about exhumation of the body or the problem of the costs involved. The Department has no funds with which to finance the repatriation of Nicola's body.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at sixteen minutes to Three o'clock a.m.