Commons Chamber

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House Of Commons

Friday 15th July 1977

The House met at Eleven o'clock

Prayers

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Counter-Inflation Policy

11.4 a.m.

With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement about the further measures which the Government propose to take in the fight against inflation and unemployment in the light of discussions they have held with representatives of the TUC and of the revised prospects for the economy. The Government continue to regard the mastery of inflation as the pre-condition for success in returning to full employment.

In the last two years the nation has derived immense advantages from the guidelines on pay which the TUC has formulated in agreement with the Government. These guidelines have been fully observed by the whole of the trade union movement and have given invaluable help in the fight against inflation.

The Government and TUC have recognised that the period after July 1977 must bring an orderly return to normal collective bargaining and that there must be no free-for-all or pay explosion.

On 22nd June, the TUC General Council made a major contribution towards these objectives by publishing guidance on the strict maintenance of settlements made under the current policy. The General Council said that negotiators should not reopen settlements made under the current policy after 31st July in breach of the 12-months rule, and should not defer settlements due before 31st July in the hope of securing an advantage by doing so. The only exceptions to the 12-months rule relate to occupational pensions and self-financing productivity schemes.

The Government attach the greatest importance to this guidance by the TUC.

Provided it is observed by all those concerned with pay determination in both the private and public sectors, it will go far to prevent a wage explosion from developing after July 1977. It is the keystone for an orderly return to collective bargaining because it means that the phase 2 policy will continue to affect the level of the nation's earnings until the last settlement made under it expires at the end of July 1978.

The effect is to facilitate a phased return to normal collective bargaining. For most people the next settlement will not come until the first half of 1978. By that time there is a good chance that, thanks to the strict adherence to the TUC pay policy in the past year, the rate of inflation will be approaching, or will have reached, that of our major competitors. That will provide a better climate for settlements, which can be reinforced by any assistance which the Government are able to give.

The TUC does not think it practicable for it to give general guidance on the level of pay settlements in the next round when the 12 months has expired for the bargaining group concerned. But since the Government have a responsibility both for the economy as a whole and for the management of the public sector, they have a duty to the British people to state their position on this matter.

The country now faces a choice which will determine whether, by getting a sustained fall in the rate of inflation, we can profit fully from the new opportunities opened for us by the success of our other policies and the flow of North Sea oil. Many factors may affect the rate of inflation. Some of these are now turning in our favour. On the best forecasts now available of all the factors which may contribute to inflation, the prospect for prices in 1978 and after will depend critically on the rate of increase in the nation's wage bill. To take three examples by way of illustration: first, if the rate of increase in earnings is not more than 10 per cent., inflation should fall below 10 per cent. well before this time next year and stay there throughout the year: secondly, if the rate of increase in earnings is as high as 15 per cent., we should not get inflation down to 10 per cent. at all, and it would be rising steadily through the second half of next year and into 1979; thirdly, if the rate of increase in earnings were as high as 20 per cent., prices would soar and we should be back in the situation that we faced just over two years ago.

Any given rate of earnings increase implies a significantly lower rate of increase in settlements. The rate of increase in earnings takes account of overtime, job changes and other factors which contribute to what is called wage drift. The House will recall that the £ 6 policy, which represented an average increase in wage settlements of nearly 11 per cent., produced an increase in earnings for the year of about 14 per cent.

Faced with a choice of the kind illustrated by the examples I have described, the Government have a clear duty to urge all concerned to base their approach to pay negotiations on getting inflation into single figures. The Government must therefore urge that the general level of pay settlements should be moderate enough to secure that the national earnings increase is no more than 10 per cent.

In a period which must mark an orderly return to normal collective bargaining, the Government agree with the TUC that it is not possible to stipulate a specific figure at which individual negotiators should invariably settle but we must seek to ensure that the national target is achieved. This means that the general level of settlements must be well within single figures. I shall later describe the measures the Government propose to ensure that living standards will not fall in consequence.

The Government recommend those concerned with pay determination in both the public and private sectors to be guided by these considerations and to make new settlements on the basis that they will last for 12 months. The Government will do everything possible to secure that full account is taken of this guidance throughout the public sector; but the guidance applies equally to the private sector, and the Government expect similar action there.

In settling pay in important areas of the public sector, the Government have long had valuable assistance from the three pay review bodies. The Government value their help and will ask them to continue their task within the guidance for pay that I have described.

It will not be possible in the next 12 months to deal with the whole range of pay anomalies and other problems that have inevitably arisen during a period of strict pay guidelines. Only the most serious difficulties can be tackled in the coming year, if necessary on a phased basis and taking full account of the need to keep the total settlement within single figures.

Dividend Control And The Remuneration, Charges And Grants Act 1975

The Government propose to extend dividend controls for a further year with the same limit of 10 per cent as at present. The Government have already announced their intention to extend for one year the present control over the profit margins of manufacturers, service firms and distributors. In addition, it is necessary to continue the provisions in relation to employers in the Remuneration, Charges and Grants Act 1975 to the extent needed to support and enforce the TUC guidance on the 12-month rule. An order will be required under that Act to achieve all these purposes. Further orders will be needed in clue course for the details of the margin control.

Where a firm has reached a settlement which is quite clearly inconsistent with the policies set out in this statement, the Government will take this into account in public purchasing policy and the placing of contracts, and also in the consideration of industrial assistance.

The Government will, of course, continue discussions with the TUC over the whole field of the social contract. Meanwhile, the Government are responding to the TUC's request for action to create a climate favourable to an orderly return to normal collective bargaining. In particular, we are proposing measures which give working people confidence that their living standards can be generally maintained by moderate settlements at 12-month intervals. These measures are designed to give special help to the low-paid and to families with children.

The improvement in the economic prospects since the Budget—in particular the improvement in the balance of payments —makes it possible for me to make the following proposals in the field of tax relief, price reduction and employment.

Tax Relief

The House is now agreed that the reduction already agreed in petrol duty should take effect from 6 p.m. on 8th August. I do not intend to look for offsetting tax increases elsewhere.

The Government also accept the principle expressed in certain amendments made at Committe stage of the Finance Bill that the income tax personal allowances should be increased further. However, the Government wish to concentrate relief this year particularly on families. By contrast, the Committee stage amendments would tilt the balance in favour of the single personal allowance. I shall therefore be proposing at Report stage of the Finance Bill to substitute an amendment which will increase the allowances but to restore the balance of my original proposal in favour of families. It will increase the single personal allowance by £40 and the married person's allowance by £70 as compared with the increase in these allowances which I originally proposed in my Budget speech, at a cost of some £490 million; and there will be corresponding increases in other allowances.

At the same time, I shall propose a reduction in the basic rate of income tax by lp from 35p to 34p, at a cost of some £470 million.

The total full year costs of the income tax reliefs in this year's Finance Bill will thus come to some £2 billion—closely in line with my original intention in the Budget.

The Government have also decided to increase family support in 1978–79 by a substantial improvement in the rates of child benefit as part of the further phasing in of the child benefit scheme. From April 1978 child benefit rates will be increased from the present £1 for the first child and £1.50 for subsequent children to £2.30 for all children, together with a doubling of the present premium for the first child of one-parent families to £1, at a net Exchequer cost in 1978–79 which will be over £300 million. The new rates will result in part from a further step in the phasing out of child tax allowances, the basic level of which will be reduced to £100. A fuller statement about the level of child tax allowances in 1978–79 will be made in due course. Regulations for the new child benefit rates will be laid very shortly.

The Government have decided to prevent certain increases in the cost of living which would otherwise take effect before the end of this year and which are particularly burdensome for people on low incomes or with family commitments. Milk is an important item in family budgets, especially when there are several children. The Government have therefore decided to increase the milk subsidy so as to prevent an immediate further price rise of l½p a pint and to keep the price of milk unchanged until the end of the year. The cost of this will be about £110 million, falling in the financial year 1977–78.

The Government have also decided to raise the income limits for eligibility for free school meals. This will provide over half-a-million more children with free school meals and increase the number benefiting to about one-quarter of all those children who take school meals. School meals will now be free for a family with two children having earnings up to over £60 a week, and for a family with four children up to over £75 a week. The cost will be £18 million in 1977–78 and £28 million in a full year, and local authorities will be consulted about how this should be reimbursed.

The electricity discount scheme will be operated again this winter, in order to relieve households receiving family income supplement or supplementary benefit of 25 per cent. of one quarter's bill.

Additional Jobs And The Industrial Strategy

The Government announced last month a programme of training and work experience courses for young people, at a cost building up to £160 million a year, and a special temporary employment programme providing jobs for adults, at a cost of £68 million a year.

The Government have now also decided to approve up to a further £100 million for construction in the current financial year, so as to assist employment in the construction industry, which is now going through a particularly difficult time. This, of course, is in addition to the £100 million for inner cities which I announced in the Budget. The Government are considering in the course of the normal annual review of public expenditure what further help can be given to the construction industry in the next financial year.

The Government have also reviewed the requirements for additional expenditure in support of the industrial strategy. As a result, a further cash sum of £70 million will be provided, to be drawn down over the next few years, for schemes in the ferrous foundry and machine tools industries and for a new product and process development scheme.

The total cost of all the measures that I have just announced is £1 ¼billion in the current financial year, rising to £1½ billion in the next year. The resulting stimulus to demand in the economy will in itself generate substantial additional employment.

Public Expenditure

The Government will maintain their strict control over public expenditure. The cost of the public expenditure measures in the current year will be found from within the contingency reserve so that no change will be required in this year's planned total for public expenditure.

The individual expenditure programmes for 1978–79 will also be affected by the decisions now announced concerning child benefit, school meals and the industry schemes. However, for total public expenditure the White Paper published last January℄Cmnd 6721℄remains the basis for planning. The programmes will be reviewed in detail in the annual survey.

Cash Limits

For 1977–78 the cash limits have already been fixed and published in Cmnd 6767. No general changes are planned in the limits. For 1978–79 the assumptions used for cash limits will reflect the Government's policy on pay. Spending authorities will not be able to rely on supplementary provision beyond the cash limits.

Public Sector Borrowing Requirement And Monetary Policy

Taken by themselves, the tax reliefs which I have announced this morning imply a net addition of £100 million to the Budget estimate for the public sector borrowing requirement for the current year. On the other hand, developments in the economy since the spring point to a reduction in the original forecast. As I have explained, the additions to public expenditure this year will be found from within the contingency reserve, and imply no additional change in the PSBR. I am satisfied that the measures I have announced will not increase the PSBR above the level of £8.5 billion I forecast in the Budget—that is, a figure within the limit of £8.7 billion which I announced last December at the time of the IMF agreement.

Equally, I am satisfied that the measures which I have announced this morning are consistent with the limit which I have announced for domestic credit expansion and the forecast range for sterling M3. The Government are determined to maintain their DCE limit and the related control of M3.

Conclusion

In deciding, Mr. Speaker, on the measures which I have announced this morning, the Government have taken account of the progress achieved on the balance of payments since the Budget, of the guidance given by the TUC for a phased and orderly return to normal collective bargaining and of the revised prospects for the PSBR in 1977–78.

They will give substantial additional protection to living standards, for working people generally, and especially for families with children and those with earnings well below that average. Indeed, for the great majority of workers they will themselves be enough, or more than enough, fully to offset the price increase which the Government expect between now and the end of this year.

As I have said, this orderly return to normal collective bargaining is essential to our objective of getting inflation down to single figures and keeping it there. We recognise that we are now attempting something which earlier Governments of both parties failed to achieve. But the policy I have described is one within which living standards will be maintained.

It is a policy which must be applied by all concerned with good sense and realism. The Government will play their full part with the TUC and CBI in seeking to achieve this.

The Chancellor has made a long and important statement and I hope that I shall be allowed a little latitude in asking questions about it, on the basis that I received a copy of it only minutes before the Chancellor rose.

Does the Chancellor agree that the Government's failure to reach a satisfactory agreement on pay with the trade unions, let alone to publish a White Paper embodying it, means that the economic strategy, right or wrong, which was at the heart of his letter to the IMF and at the heart of his last Budget Statement has now entirely collapsed?

Does the Chancellor understand that we were more than a little surprised to hear his continuing reference to the field of the social contract? Does he not recognise that in the eyes of almost everybody outside the House and of hon. Members on both sides of the House the continued pursuit of social contract policies, involving extension of trade union power, high taxation and the destruction of differentials, has done very great damage to the economy of the country? Is he further aware that we shed no tears whatever over the death of the social contract?

On the other hand, I make it clear that we warmly and whole-heartedly support his determination to stick to strict targets for the control of the money supply, of the public sector borrowing requirement, of public expenditure and of cash limits. Does the Chancellor understand that if he and his colleagues stick as firmly as he has said to their duty of exercising their authority and influence—

Like Tony Barber?

—to secure pay settlements in the public sector, if they are in line with the target that the Chancellor has outlined, he will receive our full support?

However, does he realise that we have little confidence in the Government's capacity to pursue policies of that kind, founded, as they are and must be, on essential monetary principles? We have little confidence in them when the Chancellor was unable yesterday to secure the agreement of his colleagues in Cabinet to his own White Paper.

Does the Chancellor appreciate that we certainly welcome his acceptance, at least in part, of the additional tax reliefs im- posed upon the Government in Standing Committee, but that we regret that the Government have failed to cut public spending further, have failed to face the need for higher indirect taxes if necessary, and so will not give skilled workers and managers the full benefit of tax cuts originally promised which are so essential to the restoration of incentive in our economy?

Finally, does the Chancellor recollect the unqualified insistence, as I understand it, of the Leader of the Liberal Party—who, sadly, is not here today—that a further satisfactory agreement on pay was an essential condition of the continuance of the Liberal-Labour pact? Will the Chancellor explain to the House how, even to the most liberal of imaginations, that condition can now be regarded as having been fulfilled?

I do not like hitting a man when he is down; therefore, I shall try to give a moderate reply to the specific points that the right hon. and learned Gentleman made.

I welcome very much the right hon. and learned Gentleman's kind words about the Government's successes in controlling public expenditure and the money supply. It is particularly welcome, coming from a representative of the previous Government who were so signally unsuccessful in both these regards.

As to a White Paper, I think the House will agree that the statement I have made was precise and comprehensive. I believe that it will serve to meet all the requirements for which the House could possibly ask the Government in defining their position on pay policy and on measures to support pay policy.

As to whether the heart of my policy has collapsed, I assure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that my heart is beating very strongly and is not suffering the sort of palpitation that was evident in his muddled and sour remarks.

What is it that will prevent a wage explosion after normal free collective bargaining has in due course been restored?

If I may refer to at least four factors which give good hope— as I heard the Vice-Chairman of the British Institute of Management saying on the radio this morning—the Government, first of all, are not printing money to accommodate excessive expenditure in the way that the previous Government were doing. I noted that the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr Powell) was nodding his head when I said that.

Secondly, the Government have the support and good will of the trade union movement. Thirdly—and this is a piece of good fortune attributable largely to the sacrifices made by the trade union movement in the last two years of pay policy —the return to free collective bargaining will take place at a time when the rate of increase in prices is falling, not rising, as it was in the last year of the last Government's policies.

The fourth reason is that the course of world prices now looks a good deal more moderate than was the case when the last Government's pay policy expired in such catastrophic conditions.

The Chancellor referred to an objective of single-figure settlements. Will he agree that this formula is dangerously vague compared with the figure of 5 per cent. which was widely canvassed by Ministers over a number of months? Was 5 per cent., or some other precise figure, in the original Treasury draft of the White Paper? If so, why was it removed? Is this another indication that the Government are running scared of the Trades Union Congress and the Tribune Group?

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his inquiries and will seek to answer them. There was no figure in any draft submitted by the Treasury to the Cabinet or any Cabinet committee. The pay policy which I have just announced is the pay policy that we have been talking about for very many months.

I say to the right hon. Gentleman—[HON. MEMBERS: "Friend."] No, the right hon. Gentle man. The right hon. Gentleman was a trade unionist of some experience in his earlier career. He has also been a Minister in the field of employment. I think that he will know that a return to normal collective bargaining is inevitable after two periods of strict pay policy. The important thing is that that return should be an orderly one. The trade union movement wishes that, the Government wish it, and I hope that I have indicated this morning how it can be achieved.

I am sure that the whole House will wish to confine its general reaction to next week and to confine itself today to questions. May I first ask the Chancellor about the commitment by the TUC General Council on 22nd June on the 12-months rule? Has he had any indication from representatives of the trade union movement in the last two or three days that that commitment still stands?

Secondly, will the Chancellor say a little more about how he intends to enforce the provisions in the public sector on the private sector, in particular spelling out his link with prices and price control? What will he do when the first major private sector firm breaks the 12-months rule or wildly exceeds the 10 per cent. limit?

Finally, if at the end of the first three months or thereabouts of the new policy earnings have risen by more than can possibly be contained within an annual estimate of 10 per cent., what fiscal measures will he take?

On the last point, I cannot anticipate my next Budget, but I have given the TUC representatives an assurance that if prices appear to be rising to an extent which will not maintain living standards, and if pay increases have been held within the general guidance that I have stated, I shall consider with them what fiscal action is most appropriate in order to correct the position.

As to the 12-months rule, I have been assured by representatives of the TUC, including the leaders of the more important trade unions, that they intend to maintain and to recommend to Congress the guidance they gave about the 12-months rule on 22nd June—guidance which was passed, let me say, by 19 votes to 4 in the General Council. The hon. Member will know that the TUC has always shown that when an important decision is taken by Congress as a whole, even trade unions which disagree with it seek to abide by it.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that I think that most of us—or all of us on the Government side—will not think that it is the end of the world to have a return to collective bargaining. Is he also aware that we feel that over the last two years trade unionists have shown remarkable patriotism and restraint which has not been accepted by all sectors of society?

Will my right hon. Friend also accept that we shall obviously have to look at the taxation proposals very closely indeed but that we certainly welcome any effort made to carry out the other part of the social contract, namely, to develop full employment and particularly to get the construction workers back to work? I hope that the £100 million is but a first step towards getting the 300,000 workers in the construction and allied industries back to work at the earliest possible moment.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his remarks. It is not, of course, the end of the world that two years of an extremely stiff pay policy, which has caused distortions and rigidities in many parts of the economy, is now coming to an end and that there is a return to normal collective bargaining, which must be orderly and must avoid, as the TUC has laid down, both a free-for-all and a wage explosion. I think that that is widely understood throughout the country.

I gratefully accept the tribute that my hon. Friend has paid to the patriotism and restraint of the trade union movement over the last two years, and I wish that it had been more evident on the Conservative Benches. Opposition Members do not do themselves credit by sneering and giggling every time any reference is made to the contribution that people in far less comfortable circumstances than themselves have made to help the nation in the past two years.

I understand that many of my hon. Friends will want to question and argue aspects of tax policy. As always, I look forward to that type of argument. As for the construction industry, I think that my hon. Friend will realise that this is a second step. The first step was taken in the Budget. I do not pretend that a stride has been taken. The problems of the construction industry remain severe. In the course of the current expenditure review the Government will be considering what further steps they can take in the coming financial year.

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that although there will he a welcome for additional funds for the construction industry, it must be taken into account that the money involved seems rather small compared with the other measures that have been announced? is he able to give a judgment today on the effect that the additional funds will have on the rate of unemployment by the end of this year?

The measures for the construction industry are likely to increase employment in the construction and supply industries by about 12,000. I know that that is not large compared with total unemployment in the industry, but I think the House will agree that it is substantially better than nothing, especially for the 12,000 human beings concerned. Compared with the present situation, the measures as a whole represent a total stimulus to the economy of £1½ billion in the current year, rising to £1½ billion when the new child benefits come in next April. That should generate additional employment of about 60,000.

Is my right hon Friend aware that many optimistic forecasts have been given about prospects for prices under the social contract? The trouble is that people have simply stopped believing them. Does he agree that he cannot give guarantees on maintaining the standard of living without risking infringing IMF conditions? Finally, is he aware that in the present circumstances a Government of either party are bound to go to the IMF to renegotiate a more sensible set of conditions?

I am afraid that I cannot agree with my hon. Friend. In the first year of the social contract the reduction in the level of inflation was precisely what I forecast it to be—namely, half from about 26 per cent. to about 13 per cent. In the second year of the pay policy there has been an increase in the rate of inflation attributable to the excessive depreciation of the pound —much of which has now been recovered since the December measures—the increase in food prices due to the drought, the increase in world commodity prices and other factors. It is true that no Government can guarantee what inflation will be because many factors affect inflation besides wages. That is one of the lessons of the past year. if there were events outside this country that led to a large increase in the price of oil, that would have its effect again as it did in 1975. As I said in my statement, on the best forecast that we can make of all the factors affecting inflation—exchange rates, interest rates and world prices, for example —the outlook is as I have described it.

The Chancellor referred to some additional sanctions on the private sectorߞnamely, the use of public purchasing power and financial assistance. Will he give some assurance about nationalised industries? Notably, will he assure the House that he will not artificially hold down the prices of nationalised industries irrespective of cost increases, not allow their deficits to add to the taxpayers' burden? Will he make it plain that if those prices are increased, in view of the sanctions that lie has put upon the: private sector, those overpowerful unions that might cause excessive wage settlements will be causing unemployment: to their fellow trade unionists in other sectors?

I have heard of Satan rebuking sin, but I think that the right hon. Gentleman is merely an imp in that regard. Let us recall that the right hon. Gentleman was a Minister in the Treasury at a time when the Conservative Government wrecked financial discipline and morale in the nationalised industries by forcing them to hold down prices and imposing an extra burden of £1,500 million on the taxpayer, which the Labour Government, at some cost to their popularity, have now removed. He will have noticed that there is no action proposed in my statement on nationalised industry prices. The number of Daniels coming to judgment outnumber the lions in any den that the Conservative Party may wish to inhabit.

Does; my right hon. Friend accept that the proposed increase in child benefits will be widely welcomed? Does he also accept that we are pleased to hear his statement that tax relief should be directed mostly to the low-paid, even if his conversion has been a little belated? In fact, it is more the welcome for that. May we look forward to an extension of that policy so that in my right hon. Friend's next Budget we may reach a situation in which tax is not paid by those with incomes below the poverty line? That will be the next logical step from what my right hon. Friend stated this morning.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for what she has said. As she knows, she shot my fox. I hope that she will not object too much if I have stuck on the tail in a slightly different part of the anatomy. I recognise what she says, and she will recall that I said in my last Budget Statement that I regarded the lifting of the level at which tax is paid above supplementary benefit level as a priority target. She will know that many members of the trade union movement and members of the public regard a reduced rate band of tax as having more priority than further action on thresholds. I shall have to make up my mind on that issue before the next Budget comes along.

Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that cash limits in the public sector for this year allow an increase in earnings of only 5 per cent.? If his pay policy in the public sector has any credibility, that means that the public sector wage increase next year will be confined to 7 per cent. Will he confirm that that is correct? How can he justify a further period of dividend control when there is now no firm policy on pay control?

All Governments of which I am aware have imposed dividend control whenever they have wished to maintain any sort of pay policy. I think that this Government are right to retain such control. Cash limits will be maintained in the current year, but the hon. Gentleman should know that they cover the period from April of this year to April next year. Settlements in the next pay round in the public sector will not begin until August. The majority of them come late in the year. They are not very much influenced by cash limits. There is a good deal of play in respect of cash limits because of the overlap between the cash limit period and the other points that the hon. Member for Worthing (Mr. Higgins) pointed out in a recent article, the moderation and good sense of which many of his right hon. and hon. Friends should copy.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the emphasis that he put on support for families in his statement is especially welcome on the Government Benches, although I noticed that the right hon. and learned Member for Surrey, East (Sir G. Howe) did not seem enthusiastic about it? Is he aware that the retention of the increased child benefit supplement for one-parent families is a welcome benefit for the one-and-a-quarter million children who are being brought up by those parents?

Yes. I am grateful to my hon. Friend. However, I think that she is a little unfair to the right hon. and learned Member for Surrey East (Sir G. Howe). He has not been greatly given to enthusiasm recently.

Will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that he said in his statement that occupational pension schemes were to be exempt from the 12-month rule? Does that mean that the present restrictions on the improvement of occupational pension schemes are now removed? Can the right hon. Gentleman give the House an assurance that firms in the private sector which wish, in order to help the unemployment situation, to introduce voluntary early retirement schemes on the same lines as those proposed for the miners and teachers will be free to do so?

On the hon. Gentleman's general question, I can confirm that there will be freedom to improve occupational pension schemes after 31st July without the limitations which apply in the current year. Frankly, I do not know the answer to the hon. Gentleman's question about voluntary retirement schemes. If he will put down a Question, I shall see that it is answered.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that I warmly welcome almost the whole of his statement, especially the first steps towards reflating the economy, which would have been better taken a few months ago, as doubtless they would have been but for the gross miscalculation by the Treasury of the public sector borrowing requirement? However, does my right hon. Friend realise that the analysis which he made in the early part of his statement weakens the authority of his policy and its acceptability to millions of trade unionists in that it may appear to them to suggest that wages are the only factor affecting inflation—[Interruption.] I hope that those of my hon. Friends who dissent from that will read carefully the first 300 or 400 words of my right hon. Friend's statement. What I am asking is based fairly on those words. Will not my right hon. Friend confirm that many elements in inflation are due directly to policy decisions of the Government about levels of interest, levels of rent, expenditure, the exchange rate of sterling and taxation, including the highly inflationary VAT, to say nothing of the common agricultural policy?

I do not know how far I can welcome all that my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) says, although I am grateful to him for welcoming the substance of my statement. But he was unfair to it. I said specifically in my statement that very many factors influenced inflation, and I repeated that later in answering a supplementary question. This, of course, is the case. If wages were the only factor to influence inflation, we would have had a big fall in inflation this year.

With respect to my hon. Friend, the Government are not responsible for the depreciation of the pound sterling or for the rise in interest rates last year. They resulted not from decisions of the Government but from the play of market forces. Hon. Members must accept—those Opposition Members who served in the Treasury and who know anything about financial matters will know—that there are very narrow limits within which any Government can influence the effect of the markets in those two areas.

But my hon. Friend would have done more credit to himself if he had recognised that interest rates have fallen from a MLR of 15 per cent. last October to 8 per cent. today, that the dollar exchange rate has risen by 16 cents above what it stood at last October, and that the only factor which now shakes world confidence in sterling is the occasional rumour that the right hon. Member for Finchley (Mrs. Thatcher) might by some accident be put in charge of our economy.

I am sorry that I cannot return the right hon. Gentleman's complimentary remarks. It is fairly apparent that he did not anticipate all that would be in this Budget Statement. If he believes that money supply and DCE will remain approximately the same, why does he anticipate an increase in aggregate demand which will significantly increase employment? Does he agree that even an increase in earnings of 10 per cent. against the framework that he has set will lead overall to an increase in unemployment?

I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman's first question though I do not blame him for seeking to protect himself against my compliments. I assure him and the House that DCE and sterling M3 are well on target—we published figures during the current week—and that they will remain so through the financial year.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend on his admirable and realistic proposals. But can he give an undertaking that, if wage rates increase to a prejudicial degree, he will not lose control of the money supply? In that context, is it not an act of remarkable effrontery on the part of the right hon. and learned Member for Surrey, East (Sir G. Howe) to be lecturing the Government on the money supply when he was a member of the Cabinet which brought about the most insane expansion of the money supply ever to have occurred in this country?

I can give my hon. Friend the assurance for which he asked in his first question. As for his second question, I must confess that I rather agree with him. The Opposition Front Bench remind me of nothing more than a home for rather aged fallen women who are now commending all those virtues which they never practised when they were themselves on the streets.

The right hon. Gentleman spoke a great deal about the effect of his proposals on living standards. Is he aware that living standards will be determined not by anything that he has said today but by how much workers and managers can produce and sell in the markets of the world? As for pay, to get the stage 3 pay agreement which he sought originally mean that inflation over the coming year will be any higher than it would have been otherwise?

I can give the hon. Gentleman the confirmation for which he asked in his first question. It is good Socialist doctrine which we have always preached to people who regard purely financial and monetary factors as determining all aspects of the economy. I am glad to see that the hon. Member for Blaby (Mr. Lawson) is moving, though slowly, in our direction. This view is taken unanimously by those in industry and banking and the TUC who support the Government in their industrial strategy. They expressed this view very strongly in the recent meeting chaired by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

rose—

I have allowed 35 minutes of questions. I propose to take only two more questions from each side of the House. The matter can be pursued on another occasion.

Has my right hon. Friend noticed the universal welcome on this side of the House for his additional measures of family support? On the wages front, what reassurance can he give trade unionists, especially those in the public sector, who may be prepared to moderate their wage claims, that they will not lose out?

I welcome what my hon. Friend said about family support. Dealing with his second question, it is essential that employers in the private sector follow the lead which the Government propose to set in the public sector. We have the right to use the weapons which have been used over the past two years in the withholding of Government assistance and support to companies which breach the guidance that I have mentioned, and the Price Code will also play a role.

Is it not clear that the right hon. Gentleman's reversion to the policy of controlling prices and dividends without any adequate restraint on wages marks a return precisely to the policies that he pursued in the first 16 months of his Chancellorship, which have proved so disastrous for the nation ever since?

No. Sir.

Does my right hon. Friend accept that the reception he has been given owes at least something to the complete failure of the Opposition this morning? Nevertheless, there are real problems, and there will be those who will seek to pass on unjustifiable price increases. Will my right hon. Friend give all his support to his right hon. and hon. Friends in the Department of Prices and Consumer Protection to ensure that they take immediate action, if necessary, to bring down prices, not merely to contain them?

I agree with my hon. Friend. I am afraid that even an artificial fern looks rather better if it is in a bed of rather dirty pebbles. On my hon. Friend's second point, I shall put that to my right hon. Friend, who I noticed was listening with great attention when I made my statement.

If this is another phase of pay policy, will the Chancellor say what help he proposes to give to a company in the private sector faced with a ruinous choice between strikes which will throw it out of business or breaking the Government's pay norm?

I am afraid that the Government can give no help to such a company. I believe that the employers' organisation plans to consider what help it can give, but Opposition Members must not sneer at incomes policy and then point out the difficulties of running a system that depends on moderation in trade unions.

Orders Of The Day

Control Of Food Premises (Scotland) Bill

Lords amendments considered.

Clause 1

CLOSURE OF FOOD PREMISES, STALLS OR VEHICLES DANGEROUS TO HEALTH

Lords amendment: No. 1, in page 1, line 13, leave out "or vehicle" and insert", vehicle or place"

12.3 p.m.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this we may also consider Lords Amendment No. 2 and Lords Amendments Nos. 4 to 15 inclusive.

Will it be possible, Mr. Speaker, to have separate votes on certain amendments? Some of my hon. Friends and I object to some of the amendments.

They will, of course, be taken separately for a vote.

These amendments, which are all very closely related, have two simple purposes. The first is to clarify that the activities of food businesses carried on at places other than on actual premises, vehicles or stores—such as, for example, pavement cafes—are also covered by the major provisions of Clauses 1 and 2. The second purpose is to put beyond all doubt that the Bill extends to the transportation of food as part of a food business.

I have no wish to delay the passage of the Bill, but I am sure that the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) will agree that it is as well to put on record that the Bill has reached this stage with virtually no discussion on it in this House. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not think it amiss if we seek explanations for various parts of the Bill.

This series of amendments was proposed in the other place. I must put on record that the Committee stage in this House went through in two minutes flat. I am sure that the hon. Member for Ayr recognises that this is a fairly considerable Bill containing eight clauses. I think that many hon. Members refuse to believe that any Bill is as perfect and as non-controversial as a two-minute Committee stage would seem to suggest.

The House of Lords took a much more conscientious view of its responsibilities than the House of Commons, and the Second Reading there took eight minutes, which seems like a filibuster in comparison with what took place in Standing Committee. Consideration of amendments that were suggested in Committee took a whole hour, and another 40 minutes was taken by later stages. The result is the string of amendments that the hon. Member for Ayr has invited the House to accept.

The purpose of the amendments is clearly not to weaken the Bill in any way but to strengthen it by remedying some defects. I want to ask—possibly at a later stage—certain questions about other aspects of the Bill concerning which questions were asked in another place, to which no satisfactory answer has been given. It is important that this House should get the Bill right, because this is the last opportunity for doing so.

The hon. Member for Ayr has referred to clauses that apply to vehicles. In the other place the Minister said that reference to a food business included the transportation of foods, and he also suggested that questions of insanitary and dirty vehicles transporting food were covered by Regulation 30(1) as amended by the 1966 amending regulations. Will the hon. Member for Ayr assure us that that is the case?

Whether we like it or not, there is a general impression that in mobile vehicles —which by definition are mobile —the serving of insanitary food is proportionately more dangerous than in static canteens, or whatever. There may not be any justification for that fear but the fear is genuinely felt. Moreover, it is more difficult to control insanitary conditions if a vehicle is travelling from one place to another. This makes it extremely difficult for the authorities or the courts to exercise the same control over it as if the vehicle was static.

While discussing the difference in the comparative risks of static and mobile places, will the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) address his mind to whether it is possible to have premises of which, in the terms of this Bill,

"the condition, situation or construction …is such that food is exposed to the risk of contamination"?

I have never been able to see any premises that are not exposed to the risk of contamination.

The hon. and learned Gentleman makes a fair point, and I hope that the sponsor of the Bill will meet it. It is no obligation of mine to answer cross-examining questions by a legal luminary. That is the duty of the sponsor, who is well-qualified and obviously well-briefed on these abtruse matters. I am sure that he will give a very satisfactory answer to the hon. and learned Gentleman, who, I hope, will follow up that question with more such questions in due course.

The hon. Member for Ayr is performing an extremely useful service to the House and Scotland, because the eating of hygienic food, wherever it is done, is extremely civilised and satisfying. I hope that the Bill will make some contribution to that.

It is right that we should probe the amendments rather more fully than some of us had at first thought necessary. My first objection is to the insertion of the word "place", because we are at risk of putting sloppy draftsmanship on the statute book.

There was a time when "place" never entered a statute. The reasons are obvious. The Oxford Dictionary contains page after page of definitions of "place". Anyone who has sought to earn his livelihood in the courts defending or prosecuting those thought to be guilty of the kind of offence dealt with in the Bill—I have done both, as no doubt my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Mr. Fairbairn) has—knows what a feast of work sloppy legislation can provide. It means not only that lawyers can spend two or three hours in a magistrates' court and then the quarter sessions, or whatever is the equivalent in Scotland, arguing about what a "place" is, but that before any prosecution is brought those who run businesses are anxious whether they are within the four corners of the law.

Perhaps more important, the use of the word puts a great burden on those responsible for public health, on those officials in local authorities who may not be legally qualified but who have the difficult task of trying to intercept the law. Therefore, it is essential that Bills such as this contain words that are precise, that admit of only one or two meanings, with the result that those responsible for interpreting, administering and enforcing the law have fewer difficulties than the Bill is likely to provide.

The hon. Gentleman has said that in the Oxford Dictionary "place" has many definitions, and I accept that. Does it contain any definition of "place" as a vehicle?

I regret to have to inform the hon. Gentleman that a vehicle can be a place, according to certain statutes.

My first submission is that with the inclusion of the word the Bill will be a sloppy piece of legislation. I do not want to be critical of the original draftsman. On the contrary, the Bill was perfectly all right when it began, when it passed through this House and when it reached the Committee stage in the other place. I do not know what happened to their Lordships on Report. They got their teeth into the Bill and went berserk, deciding at that late stage to insert "place" where it should not be.

The noble Lord who moved the amendment had to think of some kind of place that might be brought within the scope of the Bill, and he spoke of a pavement cafe. That was the only example he could think of. But a pavement cafe is either public or private property. If it is public property, the local authority has all the powers needed to effect a closure order and prevent its operating, if any official suggests that the tables, chairs or whatever may be on the pavement are dirty and unhygienic. If it be private property, it is essentially part of the premises.

I think that the argument used in the other place was that inserting "place" would sweep in all the other activities that could not be included under "premises, stall or vehicle". The other place should think again about whether one can eat or prepare any food, or do anything with food, other than in "premises, stall or vehicle".

The Bill should be four-square with the regulations. The purpose is to give teeth to the existing regulations, to prevent dirty food from being sold in shops, restaurants and elsewhere in Scotland. The whole purpose is to make sure that the consumer is protected, but only in accordance with the existing regulations, which are set out very clearly and do not use the word "place". They do not have to. They use the words "premises", "vehicles" and "stalls

Before it blithely allows this sloppy draftsmanship to go through, the House should ask those responsible for agreeing to the proposal from the other place to say exactly why it is necessary. No doubt the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland has instructions on the matter and has given it careful thought. It is imperative that we hear clearly from him and those who advise him why it is necessary for "place" to be included and to jiggle around with the regulations, which are perfectly clear.

12.15 p.m.

Regulation 30(1), which is of particular importance in this context, says:

"Every stall or vehicle which is used in the course of or for the purpose of a food business shall be kept clean and be of such construction and in such order, repair and condition as will enable it to be effectively cleaned, and the lay-out of any such stall or vehicle shall be such as will enable operations conducted therein for the purposes of food premises to be conducted hygienically."

I shall be most grateful if the hon. Gentleman can give me a bit of information, because I am not a lawyer and I am a bit out of my depth in these matters. I like to look at legislation through the eyes of one who asks "What does it mean to an ordinary chap?" The hon. Gentleman quoted a regulation. Does that include any definition of "stall", or does the statute under which the regulation is made include such a definition? Is there a legal definition of "stall" in any statute?

It will be my argument that the existing definitions are adequate and that we do not need to add "place", which one does not normally find in the statute book. We, are guilty of sloppy work if we slot this word into the legislation, and for that reason it is objectionable.

The regulation is perfectly clear. This Bill will be quite a severe measure, and it will mean that a closure order may be made, quite properly, on premises that are unhygienic. The Bill gives the sheriff greater power and we should all be a little apprehensive about that. While it may be perfectly correct for magistrates or sheriffs in Scotland to close premises that have been condemned as unhygienic, what this Bill does also is to permit an interim order to be made to enable the premises to be closed before the shopkeeper or restaurateur has been convicted of an offence.

The shopkeeper may be innocent of having unhygienic premises or a dirty stall. Therefore, the Bill gives the sheriff very considerable power—the power to bring to an end what may be a very small or modest business, to put a man out of action and prevent him from earning his livelihood until his case is heard. When it is heard he may be proved not guilty, but his premises will have been closed down.

The hon. Member is being very moderate in concentrating on the sloppy use of this word "place". He is suggesting that someone may be put out of business by this interim procedure. If he looks at Lords Amendment No. 3 he will see that it alters the Bill to read:

"The state or situation of the premises, stall or vehicle".

What on earth is the point in putting in the situation of the vehicle? Does this mean that if a vehicle is on a particular spot at a particular time a man can be put out of business for three months, even though his vehicle may not remain in that place?

Yes, the hon. Member is absolutely correct. This is another example of sloppiness. "Situation" is not a word that normally appears in our Bills, yet the other place has thought it wise to put it in on this occasion.

When my hon. Friend refers to Lords Amend- ment No. 3 and the word situation "does he not realise that this is not grouped for debate with these amendments? We shall be coming to that at a later stage.

I am much obliged to the hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate), and I hope that the hon. Member for Holland and Boston (Mr. Body) will bear that point in mind.

I shall not trespass into that area and I must not be led astray. If the Under-Secretary agrees to this amendment, he must be forthcoming with an explanation of why we should accept it—

If my hon. Friend looks at Clause 2(4) he will see that, although the procurator fiscal can apply to the court for an order if a complaint has been served in respect of a criminal offence, under subsection (4) if that order is given by the sheriff, who is a judge, it can be lifted for some extraordinary reason by a local authority, which has no judicial function of any kind. Therefore, if under Clause 2(4) a person who wishes to carry on makes an application about premises on which a sheriff has put a closing order, the local authority can say "Yah boo to you, sheriff." That seems a very odd procedure.

Yes, it is indeed. We must probe this point later on. It is an absolute nonsense and my hon. and learned Friend is right to draw attention to it. I suppose the excuse forthcoming will be that, as local authorities would be responsible for the prosecution, it is unlikely than an interim closure order would be made unless the local authority itself had instituted the proceedings.

What this clause comes to is that once the local authority has brought the case before the sheriff, the sheriff has made an interim order to close and the local authority then changes its mind, it could disregard what the sheriff has done and of its own accord could end the interim order. That seems most undesirable. The right thing would be to return to the sheriff and ask him to bring the order to an end.

That is yet another example of the unsatisfactory state of this Bill and another reason why we should be more detailed in our examination of it than has been suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) when he moved these amendments with rather alarming speed. No doubt he will seek to catch your eye again, Mr. Speaker, and reply to these points. I hope that he will tell us why he finds it necessary to support these amendments, which were introduced somewhat belatedly in another place and which many of us believe to be quite unnecessary.

The phrase "premises" is quite enough. If we add "vehicles" and "stalls", that is all that is necessary and it is all that the regulations stipulate. If this is to be a good piece of legislation it should be four-square with the regulations and should not try to go beyond them in a way that means more work and trouble to my colleagues at the Bar.

It means more money for them.

I do not think the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) need worry about that. Plenty of work is provided by this House and the more we churn out this kind of ambiguous stuff, the more work there is for my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire.

While my hon. Friend is having a discussion with the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) about my income, which I am perfectly willing to declare as an interest if hon. Members really want to know just how little it is, will he raise the important question of whether the Bill is going beyond the original statute? It is not on all fours with the original statute because it stipulates "stalls" and not "premises".

I think my hon. Friend is looking at only one of the regulations. If he looks at the regulations as a whole he will find that "stalls", "vehicles" and "premises" are all included. The essential attack has been on premises rather than on vehicles or stalls when food and hygiene legislation has been introduced and enforced.

While my hon. Friend might be right in saying that the regulations include certain words that we are now discussing, is it right—and he seems to be implying that it is—to base a new piece of primary legislation on definitions of words contained in secondary legislation, namely, the regulations issued under the Act?

That is a formidable argument and I cannot see how anyone can refute it. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr is now contemplating an answer as best he can. Perhaps he will need time and he may even have to take instructions. That again underlines how unwise it is to introduce legislation of this kind, which goes far beyond the regulations which have been in force and which have worked pretty well. Those who have to deal with such cases in the courts know what they are about when they argue about "stalls ', "vehicles" and "premises". They are three legal terms that have been defined over and over again. Therefore, one need not go into a magistrates' court armed with a whole host of volumes and waste a day arguing about what a stall is, because it is defined. "Stalls", "vehicles" and "premises" are defined.

12.30 p.m.

Before my hon. Friend collects all his volumes and goes into the magistrates' court with them, will he bear in mind that this matter cannot be raised in the magistrates' court, because there is no such court in Scotland? My hon. Friend would have to go into the sheriff court to obtain the same jurisdiction.

I was speaking of my experience. Unfortunately, Scotland is to have the same kind of law in this respect. The procedures will be much the same. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire will have to learn how we do things in this country and act accordingly, if perchance he ever stoops so low as to do this tiresome work, which no doubt he would have left behind him long ago.

I should like now to refer to some of the definitions of "premises". I submit that the word "premises", which is in the Bill, is sufficient and need not be improved upon by adding the word "places".

The first item of legislation to which I refer the House is the Radioactive Substances Act 1960. I do not know whether radioactive substances creeping into cafes might be a breach of these regulations. However, Section 19(1) of that legislation provides:

"'premises' includes any land, whether covered by building; or not, including any place underground and any land covered by water".

The definition of "premises", according to that Act, is anywhere where one could possibly consume, manufacture, package, sell or do anything else with food.

Has my hon. Friend the sufficient experience to tell us whether the consumption or sale of food under water is a. regular practice in Scotland?

I have been to Scotland on only a few occasions and I have been startled at some of the things that the Scots contrive to do. I will believe anything of the ingenuity of my hon. and learned Friend. No doubt in due course we shall listen to some of his ingenuity.

This is not a jocular matter. The hon. Gentleman knows that there are oil rigs in Scotland and that submersibles go down to examine the foundations. If the occupant of one of those submarines suffers food poisoning, would he be covered by this legislation?

Yes, because I submit that a submarine would be defined as premises. The hon. Gentleman may be right. After all, if we find the Loch Ness monster, we may go under the loch to some submarine platform from which we shall be able to watch him and take our refreshment. We must guard against these possible eventualities. This definition of "premises" certainly is sufficient to show that water is material as premises can be under or above water.

Another piece of legislation in which the word "premises" is defined is the Private Places of Entertainment (Licensing) Act 1967. That Act is material to this legislation, and it is recent.

This point is tremendously apposite to that being made by the hon. Gentleman. Many licensed premises have two or three tables and a few chairs outside, so they are pavement licensed premises. If they are covered by "premises" and do not need "places", one may reasonably ask why that does not apply in this Bill as well.

Indeed. I am grateful to the hon. Member for putting that point. I am on a bull's-eye with this one. The definition of "premises" in this piece of legislation completely knocks on the head any necessity for including the word "places". According to Section 7, "premises' includes any place". There it is. It could not be stronger.

I turn now to another more recent piece of legislation that is fairly relevant to the Bill. I have not sought to find any definition of "premises" that is irrelevant to the Bill. If I had, I should be here all day. It is not my wish to address the House all day on this subject. I want to be fairly short.

Section 39(1) of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 provides:

"'premises' includes any place and any stall, vehicle, ship or aircraft".

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr is taking account of these definitions. He wants to insert the word "places". I underline that all places are premises and all premises arc places.

One noble Lord in the other place was very puzzled. He wanted to know whether the provisions covered aircraft, trains and oil rigs. He was left in a state of great uncertainty.

I do not think, with respect to noble Peers in the other place, that they did very much homework on this legislation. It is evident from the original Committee stage that they waffled on and took a lot of time over it, but they were not very decisive. It was not until they reached the dreadful Report stage that they realised that they had made a muck of it and started making one amendment after another. It is obvious from reading the Official Report that they did not know whether they were coming or going. At one stage, there being so many amendments, the Deputy Chairman in the other place started putting the wrong amendments. That may be why we are struggling to put the Bill right. There was a tremendous amount of chaos on Report in the other place.

I should now like to dip into antiquity, but only into the last century, to discover what is meant by the word "premises". One cannot have better authority, if one is to consider how the word "premises" has been interpreted in the courts, than Lord Chief Justice Wilde. In the case of Hemmings v. Willetts in 1849, he said:

"The word 'premises' is commonly used as comprising land and houses and other matters."

Any lawyer knows that that embraces everything. It must do. That obiter dictum of Lord Chief Justice Wilde may not be binding on Scottish courts, but the Under-Secretary knows that it has a persuasive effect.

I submit that is would persuade any court in Scotland that "premises" are so defined. Indeed, if one were to seek other persuasive authorities, as lawyers use the term, one can canter round all the countries—

Order. I am following with great interest the argument being put forward by the hon. Gentleman. I understand that the word "place" is the word to which he should be addressing his argument. The word "premises" is already in the Bill.

I am trying to explain that it is unnecessary to insert the word "place" because the word "premises" governs the word "place".

I shall make one more quotation, which I hope will be the last, to try to convince my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr that it is unnecessary to include this change. I need not stress that Commonwealth authorities have a persuasive effect on the courts of this land.

Before my hon. Friend quotes that case does he appreciate that Volume 4 of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, fourth edition, published by Sweet and Maxwell in London in 1974, defines the word "place"? The definition is 42 pages long and I shall refer to it in more detail a little later:

"The word 'place' is generally found in conjunction with other words, such as 'the other place', which give it a colour, and is usually controlled by its context."

My hon. Friend might like to consider how this is controlled by its context and what colour it is in the terms of the legislation.

My hon. and learned Friend from Scotland has given me a lesson in succinctness. That is one of the most important arguments I have heard on this matter, and I hope, that he will enlarge on it if that becomes necessary. One can only hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr will be persuaded long before that. If that does not happen, it may be necessary to go through all those weighty definitions and authorities. So far I have quoted only a few and I have not made very much progress. However, I detect a little doubt on the faces of the Minister and others.

I turn to the New Zealand authority, which refers to the word "place" in the context of "premises". It is the case of Alloway in 1916 when Mr. Justice Edwards said:

"The words 'the premises of a man engaged in business' signify the place in which he carries on his business."

I hope that that quotation is persuasive authority, because it carries great weight.

I do not want to repeat myself, but I insist that the word "place" in the Bill is unnecessary, will spoil the Bill, and perhaps will be an encouragement to others who propose to introduce legislation to slip this kind of language into their Bills. That would be an undesirable course.

If those who introduced this Bill are concerned about the word "premises" and feel that it is vague enough and that the kind of authorities that I have quoted are not good enough, the proper course is to have a definition clause in the Bill to define "premises". Perhaps that is the proper way of going about the matter, instead of slipping in this proposal as an afterthought in the other place by sweeping up the "ifs" and "buts", as one Peer put it.

Does my hon. Friend appreciate that if the word "place" means anything different from "premises" or "vehicle", the word "place" would cover the sale of home-made lemon curd at a Salvation Army charity jumble sale? I do not know whether the Bill is intended to cover such sales, but, if it does, it has serious implications.

12.45 p.m.

I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr had that example in mind when he was considering the Bill. I am surprised that he did not refer to Salvation Army charity jumble sales. Surely the Salvation Army cannot operate except on premises. The word "premises" has been defined over and again, not only in legislation dealing with this kind of matter involving common law but in criminal law. "Premises" is a phrase used frequently in the criminal courts in cases involving house-breaking and the committing of crimes on the premises of other people.

I have in mind the case of the Queen v. Lushaba in 1956 when the defendant was found guilty of entering premises with intent to commit a crime when all he had done was to enter a yard, a public place between houses, and throw a brick through the window to break into a house Having broken the window, he panicked and ran away, but when apprehended he was still found to be on the premises of that house, although it was not enclosed in any way. It was simply a yard which any member of the public could enter.

I hope that my hon. Friend will think carefully before slipping into accepting any word or phrase that will cause difficulty. I have no doubt he will get this Bill, but he must consider his responsibilities in putting on the statute book a Bill that will contain—such a defect. Certainly the Bill will be all the better without the inclusion of the word "place".

As a distinguished member of the English Bar, my hon. Friend will be aware of the case entitled Powell v. Kempton Park Company, reported in 1889 Appeal Cases, at page 194, where the esteemed judgment of Lord James related to a matter that would interest the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo). The question related to whether the definition of the word "place'' in regard to betting could cover a situation in which the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow and myself met on Salisbury Plain to exchange our illegal contract. Lord James said that in general terms the word "place" mentioned in legislation must be to some extent ejusdem generis with the words that qualified it. However, he did not think that it possessed characteristics sufficient to enable it to have a separate meaning from the words that qualified it.

Clearly, in this case "premises" or "vehicle" is the qualifying word. I should not have thought that a vehicle or premises formed a category that was idem genus. If it does not form such a category, it means nothing—and if it does, it means the same.

I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr will be persuaded by that important observation. Perhaps he will give careful consideration to that important point.

Before my hon. Friend persuades the proposer of the Bill to accept the amendment he should consider the situation in a constitutional sense. It would be a serious business to disagree with the Lords in its amendment, so it is not a wholly straightforward matter.

I agree that we do not want to create a major constitutional issue, but we are moving rapidly in that direction. If we can persuade my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr to think again about this matter, we shall not upset the Lords.

He is half way to the Lords, anyway.

If my hon. Friend can give, by a nod or a wink, the impression that he will think again about the word "place", I am sure that we shall make progress. Of course, we still have other amendments to discuss. He took us by surprise by grouping Amendment No. 1 with Nos. 2 and 4 to 15. I do not propose to speak on them all, but only on their relationship to the word "place". No doubt I shall seek to intervene when we deal with some of the other amendments. I have grave misgivings about some of the other amendments, particularly the references to exempting the Crown and the powers given to the Secretary of State under Clause 8.

Order. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman would reserve his observations on that important matter until it arises.

I shall indeed do so. I realise that other hon. Members are seeking to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and it would be discourteous to them if I were to seek to pursue these points further. I know that other hon. Members are anxious to do their utmost to persuade the House that the Lords amendments should not be allowed.

I join with my hon. Friend the Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) in thanking the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) for introducing the measure and for the work that he has put into it. The cause of raising standards of sanitation and hygiene generally, particularly involving the preparation, handling, serving and transport of food, is one from which no hon. Member would dream of dissenting for a moment. I am quite sure that after we have completed our examination of a few words in the measure the voices that will give assent to the Bill on Third Reading will be loud, enthusiastic and will include mine.

As I suggested earlier, I like to have a look at the language of statutes from a non-legal point of view. Of course, I realise that what I think about these things does not carry the authority of the opinions of hon. and learned Members. However, the chap who may lose his livelihood or have it interrupted for a period of time—perhaps quite properly —will probably not be a lawyer, either.

If a chap is told that if he does not do a particular thing he will be proceeded against under this measure, the first thing that he will do will be to nip along to the Stationery Office to get a copy of the legislation. That places an obligation upon us to avoid ambiguity as far as possible.

There is a particular reason for avoiding ambiguity in this measure that I am sure the hon. Gentleman will appreciate. Unlike most statutes, under this one the opinion of a totally unqualified official of the local authority on oath to the sheriff that the measure should be interpreted in a particular way will justify an order that would deprive a man of his livelihood. It will be the man on top of the Clapham omnibus who will he the expert in the interpretation of the law.

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman. When I read the part of the measure that refers to an officer of the local authority virtually having the power to shut a place down I was extremely worried, because I do not like officials having such powers. However, we can deal with that in more detail later. There would be a special case if, for example, a particular stall would otherwise go on selling poisoned meat pies and creating illness among many people. There is a case for emergency action by methods that we should not want to apply normally.

I return to the chap who was going to the Stationery Office. This creates an obligation upon us all, lawyers and laymen, as far as possible within the limits of avoiding ambiguity, the need for clarity and the desirability of not providing extra and unnecessary work of interpretation for the courts, to write our statutes in a way that is reasonably comprehensible to the ordinary man.

I hope that when the hon. Member for Ayr replies to the debate he will not use the argument that I have heard used on so many occasions since coming into the House a little more than 30 years ago. It has been used when similar points have been raised about Private and Public Bills—big'uns as well as little'uns. The argument is that it may be that a word is redundant and that the other words cover all the contingencies, but it does not do any harm to leave the word in anyway, so it might as well be left. That is what an hon. Member referred to earlier when he quoted the phrase "sweeping it up", which was used in another place. That has absolutely no justification at all.

This is an important argument, particularly when one considers the extent of the meaning of the word "premises". The definition of that word is found in 43 pages of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, fourth volume. This point is also covered by the judgment in the case of Gardner against Sevenoaks Rural District Council 1952 which can be found in the All-England Law Reports, page 84. That case would be considered as an authority in Scotland because it has the authority of a decision in the House of Lords.

In that case the word "premises" was considered even in relation to its consequences with regard to deeds, writs or other pieces of paper. The word "premises" could cover the Morning Star if a food business sold fish and chips in an edition of that paper. If a copy of that paper or even the Tribune was used for such a common purpose, and if the word "premises" covers such a generality of good journals, surely it is not necessary to add the word "place ', which would not cover the Morning Star or the Tribune.

I. am grateful, as always, to the hon. and learned Gentleman, who never makes an intervention without adding to our knowledge. On this occasion the hon and learned Gentleman was talking about something of which I have practical experience, because in the course of my life I have on numerous occasions eaten fish and chips out of various publications. I must say that I had a small twinge of regret when that was made illegal. The hon. and learned Gentleman will know that it is no longer legal to sell fish and chips bang on to the paper, so that now one cannot read last Thursday week's cricket matches in between the smears of vinegar. Since that was rendered illegal and now that by law some intermediate covering must be put between the chips and the newspaper, the chips do not taste nearly as good. Any regular devotee of this classic British dish will confirm what I am saying without hesitation.

I remember the occasion during the war when the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) and I repaired to a fish and chip shop and had fish and chips wrapped in the Daily Express. I recall that the hon. Gentleman said that that was the best purpose to which one could put the Daily Express.

1.0 p.m.

I had better not pursue that point or I shall incur your displeasure, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I never wish to do that.

When I saw the amendment, I wondered what could be meant by "place" other than "premises", "vehicle" or "stall". I was aware of the example of a pavement café that was quoted in another place. There is such a café across the road on the Victoria Embankment and it is a very pleasant place. It is on a piece of pavement that presumably belongs to the premises and is therefore part of the premises.

The hon. Members who have given a number of legal references have demonstrated that the fact that the café has no roof does not stop it being part of the premises. If someone used part of a pavement that he was not entitled to use because it was not part of his premises but was part of the public footpath, we should not need this or any other legislation to deal with the problem. The local authority could sweep him up whether his food was hygienic or not.

I considered how food could be served other than from a stall, premises or a vehicle. 1 asked earlier whether there was a statutory definition of "stall". To me it is something providing a horizontal surface on which goods arc placed for the purpose of selling them. It could be a trestle table—as it often is in open-air markets—a barrow with a flat piece of wood on the top, an ordinary table, a collapsible card table, a tea chest, a crate, or a platform.

If "place" means anything other than "premises", "vehicle" or "stall", it must relate to a person selling food off the pavement. If someone is selling food off the pavement, the problem arises how one puts a closure order on a piece of pavement. Such an order would have to refer to that section of the pavement of Oxford Street on the north side of the street spreading 1·5 metres from the building line and beginning at a point 122 metres and ending at a point 126·3 metres from the west side of Duke Street.

It is even more ludicrous. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that prosecutions under the Act are to be brought by the local authority. But the local authority will own the pavement. Consequently, we shall have an astonishing procedure in the peculiar courts that we have heard described. The two parties will be the left and right hand of a local authority. The public health officer will be wagging his finger at the man from the highways department and threatening him because he had permitted Joe Bloggs to open a pavement café that was unhygienic. Bloggs would then start wagging his finger at the public health officer and saying that the landlord was to blame. The whole thing would be a nonsense.

The hon. Gentleman concurs with my view that whatever else place "can mean, it cannot mean selling goods off the pavement or the road. Once they are taken off the pavement or the road, they will be on a stall, unless they are taken on to something mobile, which will be a vehicle, or on to a public place, which will be premises. All the possibilities are covered.

We must consider this matter very carefully or we shall be letting loose some very stupid legislation. Under the Public Health Act 1875, the definition of "premises" includes messuages, buildings, land, easements and hereditaments of any tenure. If Joe Bloggs, who owns a cafe, acquires an easement on the pavement over a period, that easement is still essentially part of his premises. I hope that the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) is noting these points. The word "premises" is perhaps stronger than "place".

I had noted that fact. There are statutory definitions of "premises" that are in such a form that it is clear that they cover anything that might be covered by the word "place". Therefore "place" is a redundancy, tautology, or, maybe, even worse, a pleonasm.

I hesitate to correct the hon. Gentleman but he said that if someone took food off the pavement, he had to put it on a stall. There is another possibility. He could sell it from a horizontal platform that was not a stall because it was suspended round his neck. He could be conducting a food business from a place and that place could be a whole town if the man were an itinerant salesman of, for example, chewing gum, which is defined as a food in the Food and Drugs Act.

It could be that, by accident or design, another place is proposing to extend the Act to cover the businesses of a whole range of people who are not aware that they may face prosecution.

In the 1859 case to which I referred the Lord Chief Justice swept my hon. Friend's point in by speaking of premises including any other matters. That would cover the astonishing operation that my hon. Friend has tried to describe.

I must confess to not being familiar with the obiter dicta of Lord Chief Justices of more than a century ago, but the the hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) conjures up a fascinating picture of a man with a chain round his neck selling three fried cods and four portions of chips from a little platform resting on his belly. On what would one serve a closure order? How does one define the place for the purpose of making the closure order?

On my way to the House this morning I went into Church Street Market. It is not very far from where I live. My wife and I often go shopping there—at least, she does the shopping and I am the beast of burden. It is a very large and busy market, and a very good one. It has some excellent shopkeepers, stallholders and market traders. This morning I walked from one end of that market to the other.

The ingenious chaps who sell goods in this market have all sorts of bright ideas and good ways of selling their stuff. I looked at every transaction that was taking place. It took me quite some time. I asked myself what there was there that was not a vehicle, not premises and not a stall. From the Edgware Road end of Church Street to the Lisson Grove end, going down one side and up the other, I could not find any transactions going on that could be described as taking place other than in premises, from a vehicle, or off a stall. Therefore, I am inclined to share the desire of the hon. Member for Holland with Boston (Mr. Body) that we should not put provisions in Bills for the sake of putting them in. We should not put in phrases that are sloppy.

As has been said by every contributor to the debate, we all applaud the Bill and approve of it warmly. That is why we all want the Bill to be as good as it can possibly be. On those grounds I hope that the hon. Member for Ayr, to whom I again express my gratitude for the work that he has put into this cause, will be good enough to have second thoughts.

I agree with all those who have paid tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) for introducing what must be in principle a very desirable measure. I share the view of the hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) that there could hardly be any hon. Member who would not give all support in principle to my hon. Friend in endeavouring to give greater strength to the autorities to enable them to prevent the sale of contaminated food that might be endangering the wellbeing of the people of the United Kingdom, and in this case the people of Scotland. Therefore, my hon. Friend certainly has my support on the general principle. Any comments that I make on the amendment are made only in accordance with the desire to see that the Bill leaves this place in as good a form as possible and is totally effective.

I find myself initialy in some confusion. Originally I shared the views of the hon. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton), who thought that it was a little undesirable that all the earlier stages of the Bill—I am relating this comment specifically to the amendment —should have proceeded without a single word being uttered by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr. I thought that there was some cause for congratulations to my hon. Friend on the fact that the Bill had gone through Second Reading, Committee and Report stages and Third Reading without his uttering a word.

The hon. Member for Fife, Central, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the amendment, thought it right this afternoon that we should be giving further consideration to the Bill and should not leave it entirely to their Lordships.

On the other hand, my hon. Friend the Member for Holland with Boston (Mr. Body) then put a different angle on the subject. He said that without a single word having been uttered in this place, the Bill left this place in perfect form, and that it was only when their Lordships started to make amendments that the Bill began to deteriorate. Therefore, we see ourselves now in the position of the revising chamber, trying to correct some of the errors created in another place.

Their Lordships were not too bad when they had their Committee stage. It was when they had their Report stage that they went funny and started to introduce all sorts of amendments.

Observations about proceedings in the other place are not in order.

I was wishing to concentrate on the merits of the amendments that the other place has produced. Pre- sumably, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that is not only in order but is the object of our deliberations today.

I am in something of a dilemma. However, my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr deserves congratulations not only on having got so far with his Bill but on having done so with hardly a spoken word. I think that he has been trying to emulate some of his ancestors. I believe that there was Scottish Parliament that sat in Glasgow in about 1662.

We cannot let that comment pass unnoticed.

I was hoping that the hon. Gentleman would let it pass, because it has nothing to do with the amendment.

Perhaps I may make the point very briefly and come straight to the amendment.

Perhaps the hon. Member would be good enough to proceed with the amendment. There appear to be many important matters to be discussed in relation to the Bill.

1.15 p.m.

I shall deal with the question of the Drunken Parliament at Glasgow in 1662 on a separate occasion. I can satisfy my hon. Friend about the accuracy of the point that I have made.

However, despite what I have said in praise of my hon. Friend, I think that he might have been a little more fulsome today in presenting these amendments to us. We have already had a fairly detailed analysis of the meaning of the word "place" and its relevance to this proposed statute. This amendment is only one of four very significant amendments. Mr. Speaker has grouped for discussion, for the convenience of the House, four amendments. The first group of amendments relates to the question of extending the definition of "premises" to include "place". A further amendment adds the phrase "vehicle or place". Another amendment changes the definition of the activities that can be carried out and brings in the term "a food business". A further amendment, which is of great significance, extends the definition to include the transportation of food.

This is a matter of very considerable importance. The House is quite right to consider each of these amendments in some detail. They have considerable legal significance. I do not think that we would want a Bill to leave this place or would want amendments from their Lordships House to be passed if it resulted in sloppy or loose legislation. There is ample evidence to show that the amendments are defective in some ways and perhaps undesirable—although obviously we await to hear what my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr has to say when he answers the debate. I know that he is an outstanding authority on these matters and will be able to give us the benefit of his very considerable knowledge on the question of food and drugs legislation applying in Scotland and, indeed, in England.

One of the strong arguments advanced in favour of the Bill was that, broadly, a comparable statute had already been enacted in England.

Order. The hon. Gentleman is dealing with an amendment to the Bill, not the Bill.

Perhaps you will bear with me, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I was coming to the question of comparability in relation to this amendment and the question of the insertion of the word "place". I think that my hon. Friend would accept the argument that, broadly, he is endeavouring to introduce legislation for Scotland that is comparable to that which has been introduced in England.

What is fairly obvious to me and, indeed, it is one of the arguments that supporters of the Bill have adduced, is that the legislation is working well in England. Therefore, we are entitled to see whether the English legislation has been extended in this way. If it has not, perhaps that is an argument against the inclusion of the word "place" in this Bill. As far as I can see, the English legislation does not include the word "place".

Why is it necessary to extend the Scottish Bill with the words "premises or place", whereas the legislation seems to work perfectly satisfactorily in England on the basis of the word "premises''? In view of the arguments that have been produced, I think that we are entitled to have an answer to that point.

Furthermore, we have argued about the question of the word "place", but there has been no definition of the word " vehicle". Again, we are entitled to have a much clearer explanation on many of these matters.

My hon. Friend for Holland with Boston quoted someone who had described the object of the amendment as being to sweep in any activities of the food business which are carried on other than at premises, vehicles or stalls. The only example that has been given at any time of the need for the word "place" has been that of a pavement cafe. I have not been convinced by any of the arguments that I have heard in favour of the need to import the word "place" to cover a pavement cafe. It seems to me—I need not elaborate this point at great length, as it has been argued already—that a pavement cafe is using an area of land which is under the control of the local authority. If the local authority wishes to prevent some undesirable food activities, it does not have to use the stop notice power provided for in this legislation. Nor does it even need an enforcement notice to be issued under the previous legislation.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned that the front of the premises would be under the control of the local authority. Does he realise that in London particularly, and probably in Glasgow, there are what are known as forecourts, which do not come under the purview of the local authority but remain under the purview of the owner of the premises?

The hon. Member is right. I was saying that to the extent that the area of land is pavement, and we are talking about a pavement café, it must be under the control of the local authority, the total control of the local authority. I do not know what arrangements are normally made to secure the right to place tables and chairs and canopies on a pavement, but the local authority retains total control over preventing undesirable food business activities from being carried on on that part.

In case the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Perry) is slipping into the way of agreeing to these Lords amendments, will my hon. Friend underline and make clear to the hon. Gentleman that if it be a forecourt attached to the building it must be part of the premises? It is part of the premises of that shop, café or restaurant for rating purposes, for the purposes of the Public Health Act and under all the legislation passed by Parliament.

That is exactly the point I was coming to. I am even more fortified in the belief that I am right by the point put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Holland with Boston. Is the hon. Member for Battersea, South aware that in cases where it is not pavement but the forecourt clearly under the ownership of the café proprietor or whoever else is carrying on the food business, it must be within the curtilage of the premises. There is ample legal definition of what that means. I do not think that in the case of a pavement café the argument in favour of the inclusion of the word "place" can have any weight. Yet, significantly, it is the only example that has been put forward.

If we wish to have further evidence, let us look at the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956, to which I shall refer as the parent statute, although that is obviously the wrong use of the term. We can safely say that this Bill is the offspring of that Act. The definition of "premises" is stated in that Act quite clearly to

"a building or any part thereof and any forecourts, yards and places of storage"—

not place, but places of storage—

"used in connection therewith."

We shall be commenting later on the fact that certain definitions on which this Bill depends are not to be found in the Act, but the definition of "premises" is helpfully there and it emphasises that there is no need for this amendment. One wonders why their Lordships indulged themselves in this way. I hope that my hon. Friend, when he answers, will be able to give us an explanation.

If the word "premises" is unnecessary and we rely on the 1956 Act, why do we need additional definitions to be inserted in this Bill?

I am not sure that the intention is to import a further definition. I do not think that I have grasped the hon. Member's point, but if the meaning of the word is to be changed, definition clauses are needed in this Bill, and definition clauses are not there. I have been striving hard to think of other examples and the only one I can think of is a picnic place. I cannot even think of businesses that are conducted at picnic places that are not conducted from premises or stalls or by that other category of person that I call the itinerant salesman.

How can a salesman be itinerant without a vehicle?

Surely my hon. Friend will cast his mind back to the days when he was consuming fish and chips from the Daily Express and when he was a regular buyer of ice creams and the like. In this country I presume that the majority of itinerant salesmen, perhaps walking along the sea front, would be selling ice creams. I can remember seeing itinerant salesmen in Italy walking along the beach—those were the days when one could afford holidays in Italy—selling doughnuts. I do not know whether doughnuts are sold in Scotland or what the Scottish equivalent of them is.

Haggis.

Haggisnuts, perhaps. But by including the words

"carrying on a food business"

from a place it seems that the Bill is being extended far beyond what is in the English statute and beyond what was originally intended. This requires analysis.

The food and drugs legislation presumably, rightly in my view, must be designed to prevent the sale of bad food or food which could endanger public health and welfare from any source, whether it be from cafés, restaurants, retail shops or itinerant salesmen walking along the sea front selling ice cream or candy floss. How one puts a closure order on the man walking along the sea front, I do not know. It is equally difficult to define what his place of business is, because he could be walking around the whole town. In practice. I would not oppose in principle the exercise of this power. but I think that we are entitled to a much fuller explanation from my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr. It may be that if that is the intention, the Bill becomes defective in other ways.

Let us have one thing quite clear in our minds before we make an absolute bog of this Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) quoted earlier the possibility of the itinerant salesman selling ice cream from a tray. But we are concerned about the making of a closure order. Does he think that it will be a suitable weapon in the interests of public hygiene to have a closure order on a tray?

I do not want to disagree with my hon. Friend, but if somebody is walking around the streets of London, Glasgow or Edinburgh selling unhygienic food that could be damaging to the public, I suspect that it must be right—it might already be lawful—to issue an enforcement notice on that individual preventing him from selling those bad wares. The Bill is designed to toughen the enforcement procedure.

One cannot close the man. One can only close the tray.

It must be desirable, if an enforcement notice is advisable in the first place, to toughen that procedure and to have stop notices with the rights of closure on an interim basis to prevent the man from carrying on this undesirable activity. That begs the question how one actually does it, whether the Bill seeks to do it and if it does, whether it does so properly. No doubt we shall be told by my hon. Friend exactly the detailed arguments. I am sure that he will advise use. It is difficult to apply a closure order to an individual who is walking around the streets and who might be in one town on one day or in another town on another day.

I want to turn to a rather different point about the other amendment that introduces the words

"vehicle or place or transported on that vehicle".

This strikes me as being an amendment of very considerable significance. It is possible to put a stop notice on a café quite easily. It is harder to place a stop notice on an itinerant salesman. It is even harder to place a stop notice on a vehicle that might not only be moving around within Scotland but could be in Scotland on one day and in England on the next—or, indeed, in France.

1.30 p.m.

If the vehicle were properly taxed according to its code and properly insured, how could it be prevented from operating on the highway?

I do not think that I know the answer to that question. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr will know it. It is a pity that one has not the time and vast research staff that would be necessary to investigate the many regulations in this country, as well as the EEC regulations, which will have some considerable bearing on the carriage of goods. In other words, even if a vehicle is properly taxed, insured and licensed, there are still food regulations which determine the standards under which goods are carried.

Concerning the intervention of the hon. Member for Battersea, South (Mr. Perry), surely the point is that the vehicle could still be used as if it were taxed and otherwise lawfully in use. The closure order would only be in respect of its use for conveying food, and as a place from which food is sold. Am I not right?

It has obviously been accepted that to introduce the word "transport" is in order, but I suggest that the use of the words

"or transported on that vehicle"

in Amendment No. 2 extends the whole scope of the Bill. The Long Title refers to

"An Act to prohibit as respects Scotland the sale etc."

I do not know what "etc." means in that respect. I have no doubt that there is ample precedent for its use. But I presume that its use in the Long Title is not totally flexible and that it could not, for example, include direct elections. I presume that it is bound by the context in which it appears, which is one of sale. We are concerned here with a Bill dealing with the sale of foodstuffs generally from retail premises, and no doubt manufacture also comes into it, but once we talk about transport we are extending the scope of the Bill.

From Clause 1(1) it appears to be intended that transport should be as an adjunct to a food business. It might be food transported in an ice cream vehicle, and so on, but the clause says that

"if the sheriff is satisfied"—

I am unable to find under which amendment this important matter would arise.

I understand, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that we are discussing Amendments Nos. 1, 2, 4, 6 and a number of others. The key point, however, is that Amendment No. 2 reads:

"Page 1, line 19, leave out 'or vehicle' and insert ',vehicle or place or transported on that vehicle'."

I submit that the inclusion of the word "transported" introduces a totally new dimension into the Bill. I hope that observation meets with your approval, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and I shall endeavour to stick very closely to the question of the transport of foodstuffs.

My point is whether the inclusion of these words is to be seen as simply an adjunct to retail sales or to a food business, or whether it includes food transport in the broadest sense of the term. I think it does, because Clause 1(1) reads:

"if the sheriff is satisfied that—

(i) food continues or is likely to continue to be prepared, stored, sold or offered or exposed for sale at those premises or on, at or from that stall or vehicle".

It seems to me that the words in Amendment No. 2

"or transported on that vehicle"

are a clear alternative to the words

"prepared, stored, sold or offered or exposed for sale",

and that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, by supporting the amendment, is saying, in effect, that all food transport in connection with any food business is now covered by the Bill. He might say that that is desirable, but it is certainly not clear from the original Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956 that that was intended, nor is it present in the English Act to which reference has so often been made by those who have been supporting the Bill in another place.

If it extends now to the transportation of foodstuffs in the broadest sense, this opens up a whole host of other considerations. What is a food business? Quite clearly, it relates also to farmers. The term "food business" is not defined in the Bill, and I do not wish to trespass on the time of the House by dealing with a matter which is the subject of another amendment in regard to the definitions. But clearly it seems to me that farming is a food business.

Amendment No. 2, to which my hon. Friend has referred, proposes to insert the words

"vehicle or place or transported on that vehicle".

This refers back to the "vehicle in line 13 which is being used for

"the carrying on of a food business".

I should have thought, therefore, that on this narrow point it was improper to discuss the road haulage of foodstuffs in general, because it seems to me, on this very narrow point, to apply only to vehicles which are used for the carrying on of a food business as defined in the Bill and not to vehicles which are solely concerned with carting foodstuffs from one part of the country to another. Perhaps I am wrong.

I think that my hon. Friend's point raises alternative possibilities.

The wording is unclear.

I certainly agree that it is unclear. That is an argument against the amendment. My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr would, I think, wish to ensure that the Bill leaves this House in a clear and comprehensive form. I do not think it is in that form at the moment. It could be that the transport of foodstuffs referred to in the Bill is only relevant inasmuch as it relates to the sale of foodstuffs on arrival, in conjuction with the sale of goods from the vehicle or the delivery of foodstuffs to the premises at which they are to be disposed of. If that is the case, it is still very important it discuss the condition under which food is carried.

I submit that on the other point my interpretation is right, and that it would include

"or transported in that vehicle"

in a proper sense, and cover food transport, whether or not it is in conjunction with the storage, selling or offering for sale of those foodstuffs. To that extent, therefore, it would include farming.

I am sure that my hon. Friend is not trying to introduce new controls on farmers in a Bill of this kind. That does not seem to me to be his intention, but if that would be the result, it must be due to sloppy drafting. I do not think that that could be his desire. Perhaps my hon. Friend will tell us whether he accepts that argument. Will he submit to their Lordships, or support a proposal that disagrees with the proposition?

If the Bill is to cover all forms of food transport and all forms of vehicles, how is transportation to be controlled? Surely it would be wrong to have a separate Scottish Bill dealing with these matters. This must be a United Kingdom matter. If we wish to control the conditions in which food is transported from one part of Scotland to another or from one part of England to another, cannot see how we can have separate English or Scottish legislation. I said earlier that a vehicle could be in England one day and in Scotland the next—indeed, a vehicle could come from France and be in Scotland the next day.

That brings me to EEC regulations. There are EEC regulations on the transportation of food.

There are regulations on everything.

Indeed there are. It has been said, for example, that we can no longer eat our fish and chips straight from the newspapers as there has to be an intervening piece of paper. I thought that that was probably the result of an EEC regulation, but I might be doing someone an injustice.

Undoubtedly there are EEC rules. Perhaps that is being slightly inaccurate, because I think that at this stage they are draft proposals on the transportation of foodstuffs. It is desirable for those of us who believe in the rule of law, even if we dislike the Community, to accept such regulations and ensure that at least our own law is compatible with them. Indeed, it is often subservient to them. Compatibility is surely a desire that the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) would share.

Although the hon. Gentleman and I agree on the position of Britain and the Common Market, namely, that we want to see Britain out of it as quickly as possible, I believe it necessary at all given times, even in respect of the amendment, if it is accepted, and the transportation of foodstuffs from the Continent to Scotland, that we do not accept all that is laid down in draft directives. When we get the opportunity to debate such matters in the House—I am told that we shall have a two-and-a-half-hour debate on Monday on a bundle of directives on energy and other matters—we usually find that the documents that are placed before us are out of date.

The hon. Gentleman talks about making our law compatible with EEC regulations, but do I know whether the proposal or directive to which he refers is in order? Will it last? Has it been superseded? Has it been debated in the House? Has it been accepted by the House? Has it passed through the myriad of different structures? We should not automatically assume that we should adopt a posture of agreement and of upholding the law when we are not sure whether that law has been made, whether it is about to be made, or whether it is in the process of being changed.

If the transportation of food from the Continent is to be covered, I think that the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) must look afresh at these matters and come up with some pretty fine answers to convince those of us who have had the opportunity of listening to the hon. Members for Faversham (Mr. Moate) and Holland with Boston (Mr. Body). It seems that those in another place have made a mess of the Bill, or have shown it to be deficient. It is my guess that they have placed some deep holes in it and caused some trouble for the hon. Gentleman. Perhaps he has different views about the other place arising from the mess that it has made of his Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for his brief intervention. I prefer to stick to the common ground between us rather than to emphasise the differences. As for membership of the Community, I should prefer us not to be in it, but, subject always to the continuing assent of Parliament, we must accept the result of the referendum for the time being.

It is generally desirable to seek common policies as a voluntary objective. No doubt the hon. Member for Bolsover is a supporter of internationalism. I agree that the greater freedom of trade we can have, the better. We should always strive to achieve common policies if they are acceptable to our country. However, that is rather academic. Whether we like it or not, draft proposals are likely to be imposed upon us. Perhaps that makes voluntary agreement academic.

1.45 p.m.

The fact remains that at some stage the House will be considering a proposal for a Council decision concerning an agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and the special equipment to be used for such carriage. The Bill makes no provision in that respect. It cannot dc so because at present the EEC document is a draft proposal. Nevertheless, I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, who is a keen supporter of the Community, and the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, the hon. Member for Glasgow, Provan (Mr. Brown), who accepts the Community, would not wish to put anything on the statute book that in any way conflicted with regulations that we are likely to accept. Of course, we cannot know precisely whether they will be in conflict. Some of my hon. Friends who are experts on these matters will know, but most of us will not know without a careful scrutiny of food and drug legislation.

Consideration must be given to an enforcement procedure. For example, to issue a stop notice on a vehicle from France transporting food into Scotland could in some way conflict with international obligations. As that form of enforcement is likely to be adopted under the Council's proposal, it is not a minor matter.

The hon. Member for Bolsover expressed concern that many of these proposals become rapidly out of date. The explanatory memorandum of EEC document R/2029/76 refers to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe publishing an agreement on 1st September 1970 on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and the special equipment to be used for such carriage. It refers to an agreement that was signed in 1971. Therefore, we are talking about matters that are five or six years out of date. They still have not come before the House. No doubt when they are presented to us we shall have little scope for amendment, even though they may be totally out of date.

There is no doubt that the EEC proposals have a considerable bearing on the proposition being put forward by my hon. Friend and their Lordships in another place that we should include the transportation of foodstuffs in the Bill. I do not intend to read the regulations paragraph by paragraph—

The hon. Gentleman should tell us what they contain.

They are rather long and we are anxious to move on to other matters.

It is important that we should ascertain whether the draft directive will make the Bill unnecessary. As my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) knows only too well, Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome provides that the document to which he is referring will become immediately in force if it is passed by the Council, overriding any legislation that this House may pass. We may be wasting our time. We have been discussing the Bill for nearly two hours in trying to lick it into shape, with respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger), and to make it slightly better, or at least to put it back to its original state before it was mucked about by those in another place. However, it may be that all our efforts will be of little avail.

I was about to come to that, because, although it is not my intention to read the whole of this docubecause there is not time and I want to ment paragraph by paragraph, simply touch on more important matters in this memorandum, the point must be made that this is not merely a draft proposal. I hope that I have not misled the House. When I look at the explanatory memorandum prepared by the Department of Transport, I see that it says that this draft Council decision would require member States that have not already done so to ratify the UN agreement by 21st November 1976. It may be, therefore, that this is already in force. Later, under the heading Timetable", it says that for States which have ratified it the agreement enters into force on 21st November 1976 and that the Council should therefore take a decision on the Commission's proposal by the end of October 1976.

I think that we are entitled to ask for a Minister from the Department of Transport to be here to advise us whether this document has been accepted. I presume that the Minister who is present will be responsible for its Scottish aspects. We are nevertheless talking about a United Kingdom obligation, and it will be hard to proceed with this Bill unless we have some guidance from a Minister from the Department of Transport about whether we are bound as yet by this new EEC regulation on the international carriage of perishable food stuffs.

I do not believe that we should dismiss this matter as being one of minor importance.

I do not think that the hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) should assume that, because he does not know, someone in one of our Ministries will know. I tend to the view that on Common Market matters we cannot take it for granted that someone in one of our Ministries will be able to put his finger on the nub of the problem and say "Yes" or "No". These regulations and directives are flowing in from the Common Market in great numbers and all the time they are being superseded by others.

I think that the hon. Member for Faversham should turn his mind to the possibility that we shall soon be in the dangerous position of having a little clause at the end of each Bill saying:

"All the foregoing is subject to whatever happens in the Common Market, on whatever date it may happen."

We have to turn our attention to the possibility of someone in Brussels doing that and, as a result, pressing us in this House into having this kind of addendum stuck on the bottom of every Bill to the effect that it is subject to all Common Market regulations in the future. I can well see that happening, and what the hon. Member for Faversham has been explaining is that it is possible that this may occur.

We now see a loophole. Along comes the hon. Member for Faversham saying that a certain regulation or directive has some relevance to this Bill, as obviously it has in respect of the transportation part of it which the House of Lords has, foolishly or not foolishly, according to one's point of view, introduced. The hon. Gentleman has been able to show us that the Common Market is interfering once again, and my guess is that, if we are not careful, we may arrive at a position in the future where all British Bills have this little proviso inserted—possibly on each clause or perhaps as an additional schedule—indicating that the Common Market is supreme.

That is why I said earlier that, if we are to assist the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) in getting through this Bill, we have to turn our attention also to this superstructure in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg—the people concerned there are transported as well; it depends which is the sunniest place at any time of the year —and we have to ensure that the Common Market is not in a position to take over, to destroy, or to emasculate any Bill by its directives. If the Common Market is able to introduce orders that we cannot eat British ice cream and that, if we do, we cannot call it ice cream, it will introduce directives of all kinds, some of which we may never discover.

It is clear that the House of Lords had in mind the transportation of food from country to country inside the United Kingdom and from the Common Market. It is a pretty wide area, and it is one which at the end of the day is fundamental to all United Kingdom or Scottish Bills.

I seldom wish to exceed any statement by the hon. Member for Bolsover. However, on this occasion he has understated the position. It is worse than he says. It is not necessary to add to a Bill of this kind that it is subject to whatever may be done in Brussels. That is already, in many respects, the effect of the law today.

In every respect.

In certain respects, I qualify it to the extent of the difference between directives and regulations.

I am trying to point out that the House of Lords decided to introduce this small amendment and that it has turned out to be one of mammoth proportions. I agree with the hon. Member for Faversham that to a certain degree the Common Market has taken control of British legislation and that its effects are widespread. But it may be, arising out of our attention being drawn to this matter, that for simplicity's sake —not necessarily for us, but in order to be able to streamline matters more and get them through more quickly—the Establishment here may insert the proviso to which I referred in order to circumvent the possibility of our raising these matters.

Not under this amendment.

What is relevant to this amendment is this EEC document, and I have studied it closely enough to know what form it would take when it became the law of the land. It might be done by regulation. I suspect that it would be. In that case, it would be directly applicable in the United Kingdom without the need for any further enactment by this House.

If we passed legislataion which was in any way in conflict with these regulations, the regulations would take precedence over our enactments. I have no doubt that in the European Court regulations from Brussels would take precedence over any enactment of ours. To that extent the hon. Member for Bolsover was understating the position somewhat.

If it was a directive, we would have to enact it ourselves in our own form. To that extent, in theory, there is greater control by this House over the form that it takes, although net over its contents. I say "in theory" because even that is very hard to pin down on many occasions.

This proposal is very far reaching and affects the carriage of foodstuffs in Scotland. To demonstrate that let me quote one or two extracts from it. The agreement lays down

"that the carriage of chilled or deep frozen foodstuffs and milk products, meat, fish and game between signatory States by rail and road or a combination of the two, must, depending on the case, be carried out using insulated and refrigerated equipment which meets specific standards and conditions."

On the fact of it, that is an eminently sensible proposition, although obviously we should like to know the specific standards and conditions. Unless we know those, we cannot know how they relate to the Bill. We cannot know whether the stop notice procedure, which my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr advocates, could be used in accordance with those specific standards and conditions, or whether it could be used in circumstances where more stringent conditions were imposed. We must have some conformity between my hon. Friend's Bill and the international changes which it appears that we are about to accept or have already accepted.

I shall emphasise the point again by quoting from paragraph 3 of the explanatory memorandum:

"Within the Community the public health conditions under which certain perishable foodstuffs are transported between member States are subjected to the following Community regulations:

Council Directive 64/433/ECC of 26 June 1964 on health problems affecting intraCommunity trade in fresh meat".

Have we adopted that one and to what extent does it refer to the transportation of food as in the Lords amendments?

"Council Directive 71/118/EEC of 15th February 1971 on health problems affecting trade in fresh poultry meat…

Council Directive 72/462/EEC of 12th December 1972 on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of bovine animals and swine and fresh meat from third countries".

I do not know whether the importation of bovine animals or fresh meat from third countries comes within the definition of food businesses, but I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr knows, because he is smiling confidently with the expert knowledge that he has. I am sure that he will tell us precisely how the Bill relates to this matter.

2.0 p.m.

This leads me to the next amendment dealing with the definition of a food business. I believe that we are also discussing Amendment No. 6—in page 2, line 6, leave out from "the" to "and" in line 8 and insert

"carrying on of a food business at those premises or on, at or from that stall, vehicle or place".

It is rather odd that we do not include the word "transportation" there. Apparently, it applies in the first instance but when we reach this page of the Bill the word "transportation" is left out, which I think is slightly strange.

These words seek to replace the much more precise and helpful phrase

"prohibit the preparation, storage, sale or offer or exposure for sale".

As the Bill is drafted, the present definition seems much more in accordance with the Long Title and much more helpful. The Bill is dealing primarily with the sale of food stuffs and protecting the public from the sale of bad foodstuffs.

Does my hon. Friend accept that the term "food business" is defined for the purposes of the Bill and that the definition is to be found in Regulation 3 of the Food Hygiene (Scotland) Regulations 1959, which states:

"In these regulations, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression 'food business' means any trade or business consisting of or so much of any trade as consists of the selling, exposure, service, preparation, transport, storage, packaging, wrapping or delivery of food."

I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for providing a most useful definition In the time available to me I tried to obtain a copy of those regulations. He has obviously been more successful. At a later stage we shall consider whether it is right that we have to look to regulations under an Act to find a definition on which the primary legislation depends. The definition of food business is not in the original Act. It is only in these regulations. I think that that is totally unsatisfactory. Even my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr may be hard put to it to justify that.

That emphasises how right my hon. Friend is to refer to the EEC directive and how we are in danger of having a clash between the directive and what has already been decided by this Parliament and what my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr envisages in this Bill.

It was for that very reason that I expressed my gratitude to my hon. Friend for having quoted that definition to the House. It is now clear that a food business is currently defined to include the transport of food, although control over that definition is somewhat reduced by the fact that the definition is contained only in a regulation. Even without Amendment No. 2, apparently, which includes the words "or transported on that vehicle", I believe that the definition clearly includes farmers, and I am sure that we could think of many other examples.

Why is it necessary to insert the words "food business" which is a much broader definition? It would be arguably better for my hon Friend not to move his amendment. By disagreeing with the Lords amendment we should be restricting the Bill to its original purpose, of which the main object is to deal with the sale of foodstuffs. Perhaps my hon. Friend is not giving us the full story. Unless it is the avowed intention of the Bill to deal with the transport of food—it is not clear from the Title and it has not been clear from any of the debates in another place—my hon Friend should enlighten the House on this point I should have thought it was much better to leave the words as they stand:

"the preparation, storage, sale or offer or exposure for sale".

The words "food business" are too wide. They include everything connected with the production and preparation of food in all shapes and forms, and I think that that is going far beyond the intention of this very modest, desirable Bill.

I have tried to put the arguments as succinctly as possible. There are many other matters which we could explore. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr will be able to answer all the points of considerable substance that have been raised on this group of amendments.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) on what he has said. He has been highlighting some of the difficulties that the amendments from the other place are causing to the Bill. He has dealt in particular with the possible consequences of our membership of the EEC, which is not referred to at all in the Bill. It would be foolhardy to proceed without realising that there is a European context and a European application and that the time spent on the Bill so far and the time we are spending today could all come to naught in the light of some European documentation.

I wish to refer particularly to the insertion of the word "place" in a number of amendments. I agree with some of the comments that have been made by hon. Members on both sides, but without some form of definition of the word "place" the most utterly ridiculous situations could arise. The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) made an amusing speech on this subject when he told us that there was a possibility that a pavement could be construed as a place. As the amendments are phrased ai: the moment it would be far better if the words "or place" were not added in the way proposed. It would have been far better to carry out that intention in another way.

Why not simply say "place" and leave out "stall or vehicle"? They are both places, although one is mobile and the other is removable. Better still, it would have been possible to amend the Bill by saying "a place which is mobile, collapsible or static". That would have had the same effect.

Does my hon. Friend accept that the words "premises", "stall and" vehicle "are defined and that the courts have had little difficulty in interpreting them over the years? "Place" can mean almost anything. The Oxford Dictionary has page after page of meanings of that word. It is objectionable to have in any statute a word that can have so many meanings.

I agree. It would have been much better if these amendments had not been made in another place, because they have introduced to a Bill which was fairly straight forward, and T think generally acceptable, a measure of unacceptability, confusion and misunderstanding. Some of the ridiculous situations that can arise as a result of the amendments have already been highlighted.

The hon. Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) spoke of the possibility of using a pavement for the sale of food in Oxford Street. He was not quite right, because this is a Scottish Bill. He should possibly have referred to Princes Street in Edinburgh.

If the amendments are agreed to, "place" could just as well be a field or a zoo. My hon. Friend the Member for Holland with Boston (Mr. Body) referred to picnic places, which are found in many national parks in Scotland and the rest of Britain. There will be no limit to the meaning of "place" unless it is defined in the Bill.

There was a reference to a pavement cafe as a "place". I think of the cafe on the embankment near Westminster Bridge. It was suggested that at a pavement cafe with chairs and tables on the pavement those chairs and tables are part of the premises of the cafe. I accept that, but what is the position when, as often happens now in some parts of the United Kingdom—I am not sure about Scotland —cafes install tables and chairs on squares and roads which are part of newly-formed pedestrian precincts?

What is the position where, as also happens in parts of the United Kingdom, squares are made pedestrian precincts only for certain hours of the day, generally in the evening, so that people may sit out in the street to take refreshment? The square or road is opened up again for normal through-traffic in the morning and the portable trees in tubs are put to one side. The chairs and tables there cannot be construed as part of the premises under subsection (1)(a), and they arc certainly not stalls or vehicles, referred to in subsection (1)(b). Therefore, they would presumably come into the category of "place" if the amendments were agreed to.

2.15 p.m.

My hon. Friend referred to the pavement café near the House. Is it not significant that the English measure, which would naturally cover those premises, makes no reference to "place"? That means either that in England it is considered right that the word "premises" includes "place" or that it is considered unnecessary to protect the public against what happens in places such as pavement cafés. I cannot believe that it is right to accept that the English should be exposed to such risks and the Scottish not. Therefore, is not that an argument that "premises" is satisfactory in both cases and that "place" is unnecessary?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. That is probably the conclusion that most hon. Members are coming to after this discussion.

My hon. Friend gave way to me during his speech on the question how farming would be affected by the amendments. If we add "or place" to "stall or vehicle" in subsection (1)(b), we shall increase the scope of the Bill to an unacceptable degree. That would undoubtedly affect farmers, producers and horticulturists who sell their produce by the roadside, but not from stalls or vehicles and certainly not at their premises. As I saw only the other day, they often stack up a number of cases or crates containing strawberries, cherries or whatever for display to people passing in vehicles. Presumably they would be doing so at a place which would call for the supervision of the Bill. If we agree to the amendments, the consequences could be severe for many people who grow fruit.

In Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom there is a great seasonal trade in fruit and vegetables. For example, there is now a good trade in strawberries, and later in the year there will be a good trade in cherries in Kent and potatoes in Lincolnshire.

We have far better strawberries and every kind of fruit and vegetable, not just potatoes.

I accept that my hon. Friend's constituency produces excellent strawberries and bulbs. My point is that there is a big roadside trade in such commodities—in Kent cherries, in certain counties strawberries, and in other counties vegetables —beside the road. If we agree to the amendments, places which are not stalls, vehicles or premises but simply a collection of cases, boxes or baskets of fruit or sacks of vegetables will be subject to control under the Bill.

Producers of all sorts of food—horticulturists in particular—will be in a ridiculous position. For example, hundreds of acres of strawberries now growing in the fields are displayed for sale to the general public. In addition, there are cherry orchards, apple orchards and other places, such as mushroom sheds, where customers can pick their own produce. If we add "and place", all those places where fruit is grown will be subject to control under the Bill. This will make the whole arrangement completely nonsensical.

With his considerable knowledge of agriculture and the many regulations bearing on farmers, can my hon. Friend tell us whether there are any other measures whereby enforcement action can be demanded against horticulturists on hygiene grounds in relation to the production of foodstuffs in a field, rather than the subsequent handling and processing of them? This Bill extends the definition of "place" to the field in which the food is produced. This might open a whole new area of legislation and statutory control.

If these amendments are made and if the word "place" is considered to be a place where food is grown and where customers can help themselves, the ramifications are enormous. My hon. Friend asks what regulations exist now. There are many regulations that are observed by agriculturalists relating to the spraying of growing crops. For example, if crops are consumed with spray on them it can be very damaging, and also damaging to bees. There are many regulations relating to the treatment of animals. One cannot inject animals with certain medicines so many days before slaughter.

At present the range of control is sensible, but if a Bill like this is enacted, a producer, who is displaying for sale food at the point of growth in a field in such a way that it was considered that the food might risk contamination, might be subject to prosecution. This makes a nonsense of the whole measure.

I hope that the amendments will not be accepted. They show little or no thought, and unless the word "place" is defined to our satisfaction, I hope that my hon. Friends will join me in voting against them.

I regret very much that I was not able to be here to listen to all the learned arguments from the Conservative Benches. I am very intrigued by them and I think that they carry great weight.

I am convinced that these amendments should not be accepted. They throw very considerable doubts upon the construction of Clause I. I hope that the promoter of the Bill will take this matter seriously and accept that it is not just a case of opposition for opposition's sake.

I understand that objection has been made to the use of the words "vehicle", "situation" and place "and to a combination of all three. I have looked very carefully through the Bill to see whether there was any definition of any of these words. The promoter may say that these are ordinary words used in the ordinary way and that they mean the ordinary meaning that they would normally attract. I do not know whether he has had any experience of the courts in this country—I have riot had experience of the courts in Scotland—but is a judge expected to turn around and say to a litigant" What is a vehicle—is it a barrow?" That is an example of the way in which difficulties may arise in definition.

I believe that the word "place" in this Bill is entirely misconceived. What does it mean? A number of examples have been given of the way in which there may be doubts as to what constitutes a place. If the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) accepts these amendments and wants the word "place" inserted, he should put in a definition clause showing what he means by "place", "vehicle" and "situation".

I am rather disturbed about the definition of the word "situation". The proposal in Lords Amendment No. 3 is that we should insert the word "situation". This would mean that the clause would read:

"the state or situation of the premises, stall or vehicle continues or is likely to continue to be such as gave rise to the said offence".

I call upon the promoter to answer these points. They are not niggling points and they must be explained if we are to accept these amendments. I hope that he will deal with them satisfactorily.

I am deeply touched by the tremendous interest that has been shown by hon. Members on both sides in my Bill. The thought of all those hon. Members cancelling their constituency engagements in order to be here to contribute to my Bill makes me feel very humble. I am grateful for their interest and for the excellent points they have raised.

I have a great advantage in that I am not a lawyer. Therefore, in answering all the points that I have the advantage of being able to look at the words in the Bill without any preconceived ideas of interpretation. I look at them as an ordinary person would.

I shall give a brief background that will make most of the question fall into place. This Bill is not creating new regulations or widening the scope of the present regulations. It simply ensures that the existing regulations are adequately, efficiently and quickly enforced. With the sole exception of Clause 7, which deals with ships, the Bill does not extend the regulations.

This Bill only becomes effective and bears upon the previous enactment—the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act of 1956 —in Section 13 where the regulations are laid down. Everything that happens in the Bill—and I hope the House will approve it—happens as a result of that Act and those regulations. Most of the questions that have been raised about interpretation of terms are clearly covered in the regulations.

Everyone who has spoken today has expressed support for the principles in the Bill. None of us wants to see food sold on unhygienic premises or in an unhygienic manner. We are all searching for the same aim, and we are all concerned to see that food is not sold in any form that is unhygienic anywhere.

2.30 p.m.

Whatever the regulations may say, surely the hon. Gentleman agrees that there must be clarity in the legislation so as to avoid litigation. Our objection is that no such clarity exists here or in any regulations that the hon. Gentleman may have followed.

I entirely agree that we want clarity. I hope to show that we have got clarity in the Bill and that these amendments add to that clarity in a small but worthwhile maner.

The admendments are concerned solely with vehicles and the introduction of the term "place". I shall deal with them one by one.

Vehicles are already covered in a detailed manner in regulations that have been in force for years. I can answer the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate). There is no extension in the treatment of vehicles. Vehicles have been covered by such legislation—since 1956 anyway—and there is a long section in the regulations and the amendments that covers vehicles in a detailed manner.

I suggest that we should agree to the amendments and have "vehicles" specifically mentioned, because in another place the question was raised whether it would be clear in all cases that vehicles were to be included, because they were not specifically mentioned.

No one has suggested that there is any doubt about the importance of ensuring that food treated, sold or transported as part of a business on a vehicle should be kept in hygienic or satisfactory conditions. We are making it clear that any vehicle, while being used for the transport of food as part of a business, has to conform to the regulations under this legislation. I think that covers the point rightly made as a matter of concern regarding what would happen to the vehicle in question. The question was posed: if a vehicle were under suspicion under the legislation, would it have to stop operating, would it be withdrawn from service on the road, would it affect its road licence and so on? I assure the House that is not affected. The inclusion of the word "vehicle" means that any vehicle carrying or engaged in the selling of food as part of the process of running a food business has to conform to the regulations regarding hygiene, and those regulations specifically lay down in what way vehicles shall be covered in those circumstances.

When this point was first mooted in Committee in the other place, I think I am right in saying that it was stated, on behalf of the Government, that it would be unnecessary to include the word "vehicles". If it were to be included, we might as well go on to include storage and packaging. Does my hon. Friend agree that that argument has any strength? Does he feel that "storage" and "packaging" should be added as well as "vehicle"?

I do not disagree with that view. I think that the Bill would achieve almost all its purposes if the word "vehicle" were not written in. That is clear from what was said in another place. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gray, who was particularly keen that this amendment should be put in, that in future—no one can foresee these things—new kinds of vehicles might be used and that we should make it clear that vehicles as such are included not as a by-product of other provisions.

Does any Act of Parliament or regulation define the word "vehicle"? For example, does it include a barrow? I do not understand why, when the Bill was drafted, paragraph (a) did not stipulate the carrying on of a food business at any insanitary or any premises and why the definition of the word "premises" did not include stall, vehicle or other place. Why was that not done? That would have been a simple way of doing it.

There are definitions of "vehicle"—a word frequently used—in many enactments, as the hon. and learned Gentleman knows. I do not see any necessity to redefine "vehicle" in this legislation as it is a well-known term used in other legislation. I am satisfied that in the Bill the word "vehicle" means what we think it means. It is perfectly appropriate.

First. I apologise for having left the Chamber when my hon. Friend began his response. I am sure that he is right that many Acts contain definitions of "vehicle". They are usually different definitions relevant to the specific purposes of those Acts. If my hon. Friend wishes to have an umbrella definition of "vehicle in this Bill, it should be defined.

It is not for me to make definitions or to interpret Acts. That is for the learned judges or, in this instance, the sheriff or the sheriff principal. It is their job to interpret the legislation. I am concerned to see that vehicles are included. There may be numerous court cases in future where the question "What is a vehicle?" is argued. That is not my task. I am concerned to see that the word "vehicle" is included. It is then for the courts to interpret it.

:The hon. Gentleman said just now—the House should not misunderstand him—that the definition is for the judges. It is not. The definition clause ought to be in the legislation. Judges interpret the law according to the definition in the legislation.

Of course, but we do not need a definition clause for every term in every Act. There are numerous terms that are common to much legislation. However, they are not redefined in every Act. I appreciate the point that the hon. and learned Gentleman is trying to make. Naturally, I bow to his much superior knowledge of matters of law. However, perhaps he will accept that, as a layman, I have a slightly more simple view of these matters than he. I think that both of us have a place in these matters.

The question "What is a food business?" is well defined in the regulations that have been in force for many years. Regulation 3(1) defines a food business. My hon. Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) may be interested to know that Regulation 3(2)(iii) specifically excludes any agricultural activities. Therefore, we do not need to have any concern that farming or agricultural activities will be interfered with in this way.

Is horticulture also exempt? There is a big difference.

There is a big difference between agriculture and horticulture. I have been advised in the past—I am talking not about this legislation, but about previous occasions on which I have met this problem—that normally horticulture would be taken to be included in agriculture although it is often separately mentioned.

Finally, I turn to the use of "place" as well as "premises". My hon. Friend the Member for Holland with Boston (Mr. Body) made quite a bit of the fact that "place" is not used in the English Act. With respect, "place" is in the English Act. For example, in Section 6(1)(b) "place" is used in a perfectly understandable way. In the English Act and, indeed, in the original Scottish Act, I do not think that the use of the word "place" has been clearly enough defined. Therefore, it is valuable to have it in this legislation.

As for "premises" there are various definitions in different Acts, but what matters is the definition of "premises" in the regulations. I refer to Lords Amendment No. 17, which replaces Clause 6 in the Bill as printed. That amendment redrafts Clause 6 and refers all the expressions in the legislation to the expressions used in the regulations.

There are many definitions of "premises" and "food premises". The regulations describe "premises" as meaning

"a building or any part thereof and any yards, places of storage used in connection therewith".

That brings us to the interesting question of what is a premises and what is not. The question of a pavement cafe; has been dealt with and it has been suggested that the word "place" is needed to describe such concerns. The word "place" has been said to be too wide. But we are talking not about any place but about "a place" where a food business is carried on. Nothing is relevant to this legislation until we have a place where a food business is being carried on. For the Bill to apply at all, it must be a place that is caught by the 1956 Act. Before any issue arises, it must envisage a food hygiene inspector going to the place or premises and deciding whether it comes within the ambit of the Act and whether there is some question of food being sold in a manner that is unhygienic.

Is my hon. Friend not trying to have it both ways? He referred to the 1956 Act, but that Act contains a definition of "premises" and does not define "a place". The English Act tends to rely for its main purpose on the word "premises". Why is he not content to accept the English example, which is said to work satisfactorily?

My hon. Friend is very persuasive, but the word "place" is already used in the Scottish Act. The word "place" is used in the regulations related to the 1956 Act. The regulations state

"No food, business shall be carried on in any business, vehicle, stall or place the situation of which would expose food to contamination".

Therefore, the word "place" is not new. All that is being suggested by the noble Lords is that it should be specifically written into the Bill.

The majority of the purposes that I want to see achieved by the Bill could be achieved without the use of the word "place", but their Lordships had a point when they tried to make provision for the small number of cases where the food may be sold in unhygienic conditions where it is not a vehicle, premises or stall. That is the situation we all want to cover because none of us wants to see food sold anywhere that is not hygienic.

We have discussed pavement cafes, and I appreciate that in most cases tables could rest on pavements owned by local authorities. In other cases it may be common ground or a mixture of the two. If this is not specifically stated, it may be possible to argue that this is not part of premises and in that event it may not be covered by the Act and in that way unhygienic food may be sold.

Another example may involve the sale of food at open-air events such as race meetings, point-to-points or fairs. Furthermore, we must have in mind the man who sells ice cream from a tray suspended from his neck. He would not be a stall, or premises or a vehicle. But because he is in a place, he might well be covered. I do not think there is any doubt that "a place" adds a small amount to the Bill and would cover a small number of particular cases which otherwise might be allowed to lead to unhygienic circumstances. Since none of us wants to see that situation, I suggest that we should add this small but worthwhile provision to the Bill.

2.45 p.m.

Finally, I wish to say something about closure orders. How does one close a vehicle? Furthermore, how does one close a person selling ice cream from a tray round his neck? The answer is that the definition of "closure" in the regulations relates to the carrying on of a business. If the person concerned, in what ever circumstances, has an order served upon him under the Act, he would be committing an offence if he continued to sell the food after the notice had been served on him. That is the simple answer.

I am grateful to my hon. Friends for raising these matters and I hope that they will agree to these amendments so as to make assurance doubly sure. If this legislation goes through, it will not be possible in any place for food that is liable to be contaminated or unhygienic to be sold to the public. That is a desirable aim which we would all support, and I hope that we can agree to the Lords amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords Amendment No. 2 agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 3, in page 1, line 20, after "state" insert "or situation".

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment refers to the state of premises. It is intended to cover the condition, situation or construction of premises, but the amendment was proposed because it is arguable that, although the state of premises might be held to cover condition and construction, it does not necessarily cover the situation.

The amendment seeks to cover the state of affairs that would exist if premises that were satisfactory in all senses were situated in an appalling environment or situation in which they would be liable to cause danger to public health. I hope that the House will agree to the amendment.

My hon. Friend has presented a succinct and persuasive case. Indeed, one wonders why this expression was not included in the first place. There is logic in stating precisely that the situation of premises is one of the criteria for issuing an enforcement notice and a stop notice. We see in line 9 of the Bill reference to

"premises or… any premises the condition, situation or construction of which is such that food is exposed to the risk of contamination".

Later, in line 20, there is reference to

"the state of the premises, stall or vehicle."

It could be argued that the state of the premises includes the situation of the premises. I do not think that is satisfactory. The state of premises refers to condition, whereas the situation of such premises is primarily taken to mean the circumstances in the immediate neighbourhood.

I should have thought that in that case the word "situation" would clarify the position. Simply for the sake of reinforcing the argument of my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger), in case others should seek to disagree, I must point out that the corresponding part of the English Act states:

"by reason of the construction, situation or insanitary condition of the premises or stall".

It is on those criteria that a stop notice can be issued. It therefore makes sense to include the word "situation" in the Bill so that a local authority can obtain a stop notice on undesirable activities.

This raises a more interesting and fundamental point because to a certain extent the situation of the premises is not necessarily in the control of the man running the business. We are envisaging the circumstances, presumably, where the neighbouring premises fall into a bad state of repair. There might be a café adjoining a derelict building or a building that has become derelict and infested with rodents through no fault of the café owner. Obviously, the café owner would wish action to be taken to have that objectionable activity removed, but it is not always within his power to ensure that it happens.

I am concerned that a stop notice could be issued on such an individual because of a situation which would seem to be beyond his control. There ought to be some way round this. This is not just an academic point. An individual could be penalised through the action of the local authority behaving properly within the terms of the statute, and he could suffer a grievous loss through the fault of someone else. It seems logical that he should have some defence and recourse, but I have heard nothing from my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr and read nothing in the Bill to indicate that there would be anything that such an individual could do about it.

By including the word "situation" as one of the criteria for the imposition of a stop notice my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr and their Lordships are specifically allowing the closure of premises as a result of the action of a third party. The Bill was previously unclear about this because it referred simply to the state of the premises and that implied that the individual would have a defence against closure because the conditions leading to the issue of the notice were not of his own making. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr could tell us more about this matter.

We are also entitled to know more about the word "situation". Is there a time factor? If an individual sets up a café in a slum area he is, to a certain extent, partly responsible for the general conditions. If an area is in a poor state of repair and deteriorating, it may be that the local authority must take action against all property in that area because of the general conditions. That might be right, but if an area has been deteriorating it is hard that an individual should be penalised in this way.

Sub-paragraph (ii) says:

"the state of the premises, stall or vehicle continues or is likely to continue".

Why is the word "continue" included there? Why is it not "or could be likely to"? That affects the argument of the hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate).

There is a problem here with the time factor. I cannot answer the hon. and learned Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington (Mr. Weitzman) now, but perhaps when he contributes to our debate he will bring his considerable legal knowledge and abilities to bear on the matter. One is widening—probably rightly —the scope for a stop notice, and an individual is entitled to know that there is some method open to him whereby he can apply through whatever procedure is provided to say that it is not his fault.

It could be argued that such a person would have some redress in the courts and that a stop notice must be issued because it is undesirable that the public should be able to buy food from a clean café that happens to be next door to an infested derelict house. It can be argued that while one is sorry that an individual will suffer, it is in the public interest that a stop notice should be issued, and that if the individual wished, he could then sue the owner of the neighbouring property. However, presumably if such an individual could take steps against the neighbour the council could have done so to ensure that that person was complying with health and hygiene regulations. Such a position is likely to arise in the precise circumstances where a café owner cannot reach the owner of the neighbouring premises. That is in the nature of the circumstances that we are discussing.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr can tell us what defence exists for the individual proprietor of a food business against being penalised in such circumstances as I have described. That is a major point of some consequence. I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to satisfy us that it is necessary to extend the word "state" to cover "situation" and, if it is necessary, whether he is satisfied that there is no way of a stop notice being used oppressively.

I use the word "oppressively" with no intent to disparage local authorities. It is often used in that context when referring to stop notices. How can we be sure that a stop notice will not be used oppressively against an individual who, through no fault of his own, may find himself in circumstances that require a stop notice to be issued in the public interest?

I am pleased to reply to that important point. I must come back to the matter of food being sold in premises that may be considered insanitary. We must all agree that we cannot let that happen and that the Bill is designed to prevent it. We are talking about possibly satisfactory premises being put outwith the law by their situation, by the effect of something that a neighbouring proprietor may do or by the sheer surroundings. We cannot do anything that would enable food to continue to be sold in such unsatisfactory conditions. We are talking about the effect of the measure on the proprietor of the premises selling food. Naturally, I agree that hardship could result in some cases and that it might be extremely unfair on a proprietor who, through no fault of his own, was found to be in breach of the law.

As for criminal proceedings, if the owner of the food premises were prosecuted for committing a breach of the regulations and he could show that it was not due to his fault, there would be a defence open to him.

Clause 4(2) provides that Section 45(2) of the 1956 Act shall apply in relation to proceedings under the Bill as it applies to the 1956 Act. Section 45 of the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956 provides for the acquittal of a person who, charged with contravention, is able to satisfy the court that he has used all due diligence to ensure compliance with the requirements and that contravention was attributable to someone else's fault. A defence is available to the operator of food premises who is charged with the contravention of the regulations under criminal law when he can show that he used his best endeavours to comply with the standards in the Bill and that the actions of a third party was responsible for the breach.

3.0 p.m.

If a stop notice is issued because the circumstances are undesirable, can the person continue to contravene the closure order and be liable to pay a fine of up to £400 on summary conviction or will it be an adequate defence to say that it is not his fault? Does this not make a nonsense of putting in "situation" in the first place?

No. We are concerned with whether an individual is going to suffer a penalty. It would be a defence to the charge to say that it was not his fault and to demonstrate that it was the fault of a third party. However, that does not prevent the stop notice from being served to prevent the food from being sold.

On the point about the adverse effect on someone's situation because of the premises of a third party producing emissions and so on, there would be recourse in law. The person affected could take action against a neighbouring property that was emitting fumes, polluting the water supply or making such an intolerable noise that the food premises were liable to prosecution. This happens in many cases and affects not only food premises. Many of use have instances in our constituencies of a person moving into premises and starting a noisy or unpleasant new process. We immediately get protests from the neighbours and there is a remedy if a nuisance is being committed.

I recollect from my experience of the law that one of the most difficult actions in civil law is one of nuisance or annoyance against an adjoining occupier. It is lengthy and expensive. Is it the case that a humble stall holder, without many resources, could have the state of his stall made foul by an enormous, rich, adjoining factory emitting fumes and noise and that the procurator-fiscal, with all his powers, could descend upon the small man and issue a stop notice? Would that man's sole redress be a lengthy and expensive civil action against the mammoth factory? If so, I find that disturbing.

My hon. Friend is right, alas. This happens all over the country all the time. Alt too often, it is an expensive and lengthy business to get remedies at law. My hon. Friend is a lawyer and does not need me to tell him that. But this is the case in respect of all instances of recourse to law. If we could find a way of ensuring that people suffering nuisances from those next door could get the matter settled without lengthy proceedings, I hope that someone will tell me about it because many people in my constituency would be glad to know. The situation outlined by my hon. Friend is no different from that in many other legal matters. We have provided the safeguard which will work perfectly satisfactorily.

We have heard what my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) has said about the amendment. I think that many of us on both sides of the House are a little worried about the situation in which a small café proprietor, for instance, will find himself if the amendment is made. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, Central (Mr. Grant) has Indicated the absolute helplessness of a small café proprietor who might be the owner or operator of a premises near a very large industrial factory that emits unpleasant smoke or an unacceptable amount of soot, smut or fumes, or dangerous gases.

It is no argument at all to answer that recourse may be had by such a small person to the courts. Litigation is expensive, and, what is far more important in this case, litigation is time consuming. In the weeks or months during which the case waits in the queues to be heard, a man's business can be put in jeopardy while his premises are closed down because of the direction made to him.

Again, we have the same difficulty with this amendment that we had in relation to the first group of amendments. There is no interpretation of the meaning of the word "situation". My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr explained what is meant in this context under the Bill, and he pointed out that it meant the actual physical situation of the premises in question. However, I should have thought that it would be far better if a definition of the word "situation" had been included in the interpretation clause, Clause 6.

It is a pity that Clause 6 does not include such an interpretation, because, in addition to what is generally recognised as the physical or geographical situation of a building, the word "situation" can also apply to its general condition. One can quite readily describe a building as in a run-down situation or in a run-down condition, so there is a certain amount of uncertainty about the meaning of the word in that respect.

What my hon. Friend has not referred to and what he ought not to ignore entirely, perhaps, is that, thanks to the House accepting the first group of amendments, we are now considering not merely the state or situation of a premises, stall or vehicle but the state or situation of the premises, stall, vehicle or place. This again gives the whole meaning of this part of the clause much greater scope and much greater obscurity and lack of certainty. Again, I am not happy about the position here.

The situation.

It could be very unfair on a person who has a small business, for instance, a small café, which is near to some industry which has caused a form of pollution that is unacceptable and over which he has no control. He may be near the River Thames, over which he has no control. In Scotland, he may be near the River Clyde, which may have overflowed its banks, and his premises may be flooded. A small café owner has no control over that sort of event. There are so many ways in which matters and events may be beyond the control of a small trader.

My hon. Friend's remarks and the remarks that I made earlier are not necessarily to the effect that it is desirable for those small activities to continue. It might be right for the food business to cease because of the circumstances that my hon. Friend has described. However, is it not regrettable that the individual has no way of seeking compensation or redress, even perhaps from those who have imposed the stop notice?

I am grateful for that intervention. It is a pity that where a local authority has made such a decision, a requirement is not laid down in the Bill for the local authority, perhaps, to help the person who is so adversely affected, perhaps by providing alternative nearby premises or facilitating his continuance of his business in some other way. In other words, it is a pity that more thought has not been given to the small café owner or proprietor who can be put in a very serious situation in which he has no control over the events which have brought it about.

I have only one short point to put to the proposer of the Bill. I was waiting for him to speak, because I thought he might give a satisfactory answer. The Bill says

"the state of the premises".

The word "state" must include "situation". Why on earth does he want to add the words proposed by the other place? They do not make for clarity. If one adds words to an Act of Parliament, it only makes for confusion. In the phrase

"the state of the premises",

surely the word "state" includes "situation".

As my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) will appreciate, there is a report which is of immense value and great importance called the Renton Report, which deals with the proper principles of legislation. A specific part of that report deals with the proper way of dealing with Scottish legislation.

One of the benefits of Scots law is that it is terse. Statute law is becoming unnecessarily and increasingly verbose. The more verbose it becomes, the more uncertain it becomes, and that is to be deplored. Therefore, if this statute is to mean anything, and if Clause 1 is to mean anything, it should be properly drafted.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr must agree that if the clause is left as it is, if the sheriff is satisfied that

"(i) food continues or is likely to continue to be prepared, stored, sold or offered or exposed for sale at those premises or on, at or from that stall or vehicle; and
(ii) the state"

—and I stop there and put in the amendment

"or situation of the premises…is likely to continue to be such as gave rise to the said offence".

I do not know what is meant by the word "situation", although I shall deal with the definition of it so far as the law of England has been able to deal with it. So far the law of Scotland has not found it necessary to define the word "situation".

Having listened to the argument that the hon. Member put in defence of the amendment concerning the word "place", I take the view that he regarded the word "premises" as a place which had a permanent situation. Therefore, to make an amendment in which one requires the sheriff to decide whether heritable property is likely to move from where it is to somewhere else is absurd. Heritable property moves, so far as I know, from one place to another only if sentimental Americans think it reasonable to spend a great deal of money taking down London Bridge and rebuilding it in a desert, or taking down some house which they value and shipping it across the Atlantic. I believe that there are proposals to move Temple Bar, which presumably is a heritable property, from its present situation. I must therefore take care in advancing my argument because at one time the Temple Bar was a premises from which a food business was conducted. I believe it was that peculiar seafood known as whelks. I believe that there used to be whelk stalls around the Temple Bar.

3.15 p.m.

The sheriff has to decide under the Bill, presumably, whether St. Giles Cathedral, around which there used to be luckenbooths, will move, on the principle, no doubt, of the statue of Il Commendotore in "Don Giovanni". It is odd that we should conceive of the sheriff having to consider, before he grants an order, the possibility that heritable premises are likely to change or move from where they are to somewhere else. If they move from where they are to somewhere else, as was pointed out in the last debate, they may be, under the definition of "premises", under water, if they move at all. It seems to me to be very bad drafting, therefore, to use the word "situation" to cover "premises". Obviously, a stall may move its situation, if one definies the word "situation" purely in terms of where it is sited, but the word "situation" does not alone mean that.

I find it even more difficult, when one moves to "stall or vehicle", to judge how the sheriff is to be able to pass an order which will remove the livelihood of a person—an order which, I think, requires the say-so of two local authority officials, on the application of the procurator fiscal, no less, and against a person who is quite improperly referred to in the clause as the "accused". He is not accused of anything. He is not charged with committing a criminal offence. The position is that someone wishes a stop order to be put on an activity. There is no accusation and, therefore, the use of the word "accused" is incorrect.

I see that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr is shaking his head. With great respect, in Clause 1 there is not an accusation. It is only in Clause 2 that the process can start, once a person has been accused of an offence under the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956. There is, therefore, in Clause 1 a grossly improper use of the word "accused".

It would appear that a sheriff, on the say-so of two officials, is to be asked to pass an order, based upon his view of the situation. At the moment I am using the word " situation" as meaning the placement, the site, and when the sheriff is to be asked whether a stall or a vehicle is likely to remain on that site, the position becomes absurd. If a person is selling whelks from a wheelbarrow he has to move it only an inch. If he is selling rotten fish from a caravan to the hon.. Member for Fife, Central (Mr. Hamilton) he has to move the caravan only an inch and the locus and purpose of the sheriff is immediately removed, because there has to be a fresh application in law. The last order would be incompetent, because the "situation" of the wheelbarrow or the caravan—or in- deed, of the statue of I1 Commendotore in "Don Giovanni"—would have changed.

I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr is not a lawyer, and it is a great loss, if I may say so to the Bar in Scotland that he is not one of our members. It is one of our great benefits that his brother is one of our members. It has been of great benefit to me that he has frequently been my junior, although not in the prosecution of anything so trivial or duplistic as the hon. Gentleman's proposed offence. Indeed, it is not an offence; it is a procedure under Clause 1.

I find it extremely difficult to understand why "situation" is regarded as necessary. I am sure that hon. Members on both sides of the House will have read the debate that took place in another place on the amendment and reason for the inclusion of "situation". It is not clear to me why it was thought necessary, but being a devious Jacobite episcopalian and a Scot, and therefore a sceptic, I read the earlier part of the clause to see whether I could find some justification for a cuckoo normally dwelling in cloudland thinking that the word was necessary.

Having listened to the hon. and learned Gentleman talking about Temple Bar in situ above the whelk stalls, will he clarify a point of history for me? In the 1715 rebellion were there any Scottish heads above the whelk stalls, or were they all heads such as Derwentwater and English gentlemen from the North? Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman, who is a Jacobite and an episcopalian, will tell me that?

I can enlighten the hon. Gentleman. None other than the important head of the Duke of Argyll was displayed on that monument. The Black Argyll was displayed upon it. In modem times the head of a Duchess of Argyll might be more likely to be impaled upon such a monument, but I must not make these distinctions for fear of perhaps running into trouble with the Sex Discrimination Act. I want to keep my remarks on a cross-party basis.

It appears that those who are convicted of rape are thought suitable for a condign punishment and that those who break the law in other ways are not. Therefore, it is important to look back at the previous part of the clause to see whether "situation" is justified. The clause states:

"Where a person is convicted of an offence…the carrying on of a food business on, at or from"

—I do not know how one carries it "on, at or from" but as a whole prepositions are short so they may be included—

"…or which is so situated or constructed, or is in such a condition, that the food is exposed to the risk of contamination, then, if the sheriff is satisfied that …".

If it is considered that the state of the premises should also include the situation of the premises, why should not the construction and condition of the premises be included? The only justification of "situation" being added to the second condition on which the sheriff has to be satisfied—

The position is stronger than that. The English Bill uses "situation", but also inserted is the word "construction". What is puzzling to some of us is that the other place, having inserted "situation" to align the Bill with English legislation, did not go further and add "construction".

I am obliged to my hon. Friend. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, if he has learned nothing else today, will have learned something about the construction of statutes.

In answer to the argument advanced by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr in defence of the word "place" in the last set of amendments, he should understand that, as the Bill stood, the state of the premises was intended to cover where the premises were situated, how they were constructed, whether they were insanitary, the condition they were in and whether food was exposed to a risk of contamination. If that is what "state" means, what does "situation" mean? If "state" covers all these matters, it can mean anything, whereas, as I understand it, the word "situation" means essentially and primarily where a place is sited.

I now refer to Volume 5 of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, although I did not manage to exhaust Volume 4. I have the benefit, thanks to the English, of Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, the Fourth Edition. Since we are a small nation, we in Scotland do not have the benefit of judicial dictionaries. They are extremely useful. I am glad that those who publish Stroud's Judicial Dictionary are not so narrow minded as to include only English judicial definitions in a work which is essentially about the law of England. Sometimes they take the view that it might be helpful to look at what happens in the law of Scotland in the interpretation of words.

In what I am about to say, I do not seek in any way to set up an authority. The only lawyers in Scotland who have any authority must first be dead. Since I am alive, nothing that I ever say will have any authority until my demise, at which time it will take on a validity which I regret hon. Members of this House do not always give it during my passing phase on this earth.

"Situation" is first defined as being "A sufficient description", and then the reader is referred to the case of R. v. Penkridge. The extraordinary feature is that, although the dictionary is produced by Sweet and Maxwell, it does not give any date. For that reason, I do not know whether it is Regina or Rex v. Penkridge. The sovereign is not disclosed. It appears that, unfortunately, the case was heard in a local court and, for some reason, no date is given. I see a reference to "LJMC 132". It must be "Local Justices Magistrates Court", I imagine, but I am subject to the correction of any member of the English Bar.

I think it means "Law Journal, New Series, Probate, Matrimonial and Admiralty".

I had not appreciated that the word "Admiralty" began with the letter "c".

Perhaps it is "Law Journal New Series, Magistrates Courts".

Perhaps the initials to which the hon. and learned Gentleman referred would give him some clue to the date if he read them in terms of Roman numerals.

That is very helpful. That would make it about the year 550. It does not say whether it is AD or BC.

If my hon. and learned Friend looks at the table of abbreviations at the beginning, he may find the date. Then he will know whether it is Rex or Regina.

3.30 p.m.

Unfortunately, I do not think that a table of abbreviations occurs in other than the first volume.

In the case of Penkridge the word "situation" was given as a sufficient description of premises for a licence under the Wine and Beer house Act 1869. It must have been a Victorian case. The identification of premises was adjudged to vary according to

"the circumstances of the locality in which the house or shop was"

for the purposes of the Wine and Beer-house Act, so that

"if the locality was a little village it would be sufficient to state that it was situated in that village, or, if a small town, enough would generally be done…if the street of that town was given".

It is therefore clear from the case of Regina v. Penkridge that, generally speaking "situation" is defined as meaning the place in which a property is situated.

However, I regret that that was contradicted in another important case, that of Soper v. Basingstoke 2CPD 440. I regret to say that once again I am at a loss on the date of the case unless it took place in the year 200 AD or BC. That was a case under the Municipal Elections Act 1875 in which the question arose as to what was the situation of a property. Again, it was held that the word "situation" meant only the place where it stood at the time of the enrolment of the candidate.

You will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, as an ardent reader of the Evening News, which has now been saved, and the Evening Standard, which I believe is also still in current production, that there is a column in those newspapers headed "Situations Vacant". Contrary to popular belief, that is not a list of sites that may be developed by those who wish to build houses. As I understand it, it is an attempt to advertise the fact that there are still opportunities, few though they may be, for the 1½ million or so people who are unfortunate enough not to have a job. Therefore we have to consider with greater care the concept of the meaning of "situation" in this Bill.

If "situation" means "job" and we use that definition, we must say that the sheriff has to decide that the job of premises or a stall or vehicle continues or is likely to continue to be such as to give rise to the offence. If the vehicle is a motor car, I think it reasonable to say that the job of a motor car is to start when asked to, to stop when asked to, to move when asked to and to stay where it is, unstolen, when it is asked to. I think that that would satisfactorily outline a contract of employment that a reasonable man would put as the first four categories in a job description, having regard to the Contracts of Employment Act and the Employment Protection Act.

Bring on Morecambe.

I am not sure whether I am wise enough to understand the implications of that remark.

I think that what I have said would be regarded as the job of a motor car, although there are other jobs that a motor car can do. It may be used for the storing of bombs that may go off on time or prematurely, or may be used for birds to nest in.

How can a sheriff be satisfied that food is prepared in a situation in which the job of the motor car—whether moving or not, starting or not, going, accelerating or stopping—is likely to give rise to the offence? We have some excellent sheriffs in Scotland, and some not so excellent, but it would tax the wisdom of them all to decide that the job of a motor car made it more likely that food would be contaminated.

There was a great Englishman who would be almost unknown were it not for an even greater Scotsman. I refer of course to Dr. Johnson and Mr. Boswell of Auchinlech, which I think is in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr. Boswell, too, was a member of the Scots Bar. When Dr. Johnson inquired of the wife of a Scottish judge whether the family ate oats, he was told that they did. But the wife added "We also feed it to our horses", to which he replied "I am glad you treat your people as well as you treat your horses".

If the job of a motor car is to convey people from one place to another, I do not think that it is reasonable that "situation", in that it also means "job" should be included in the clause. It does not seem to me to be a proper use of the word and it is not one that I would approve of.

The third definition of "situation" in statute is in a vague and metaphoric sense, meaning the state of events. The question "What is the current situation?" is not a question about one's job, as in "Situations Vacant", or one's position, as in "Where is it situated?" It means "What is the current state of events?"

It is unfortunate that the English language is now so misused that a word meaning so many disparate things should be thought by those in another place to be appropriate, in all its manifest meanings, to add to things as disparate as "premises", "stall" and "vehicle". I say that with a feeling of alarm that it is assumed that food can be sold only from premises, stalls or vehicles, because if "stall" and "vehicle" have any special meaning, it is a very restricted meaning. "Premises" has a general meaning and "stall" has a minor meaning, part of which I understand relates to a place where a donkey stands—for example, in the manger at Bethlehem. It will be remembered that the ox and the ass were in a stall. This may be relevant to a later matter when we deal with the Farriers (Registration) (Amendment) Bill. If I may say so without stalling, "stall" covers the sale of food from what I would call a stable, a place where horses or oxen are kept.

On the other hand, "situation", far from being a word of close definition, is one of wide definition. In the well-known case of Carshalton Urban Council v. Burrage which is reported in Chapter 500 of the Law Journal, the word "situation" is defined in this way:

"If in any situation fronting, adjoining or abutting on any street or public footpath," there was any excavation or bank dangerous to passengers, the same might be ordered to be made safe, the excavation or bank did not need to be absolutely contiguous to the street or footpath if it was sufficiently near thereto to cause danger".

So there is another definition of the word "situation".

Will the hon. Member agree that the word "situation" can be used in conversation as meaning position? People often say "If you were in my situation". Will the hon. Member agree that this introduces a new area in which confusion can arise?

I am obliged to the hon. Member. That is the fourth definition of the word "situation". It is also an indication of the sloppy way in which we use language. Legislation is supposed to be absolute and the courts are supposed to define absolutely the meaning of legislation as it reads and not as we think it should be.

What does the phrase "in his situation" mean? Does it mean at his time of life, in his marital status, having his political views, or sharing his satisfaction with his lunch? "Situation" means anything, and, with great respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr, words that mean anything mean nothing.

I see no point in adding nothing to the Bill and therefore it would be inappropriate to pass the amendment. I was taught that something plus nothing is unaffected. I was always in difficulty with my mathematics master because I could never grasp that two times nothing equals nothing. What happens to the poor old two? It was there to begin with, but the indication is that there was nothing there to begin with. Why should the poor old two be altered because it is multiplied by nothing? I could never see the logic in this and was cruelly beaten for it.

I am getting a little confused following the hon. and learned Member. Would he tell me his situation now?

I can indeed, Mr. Speaker. It is nothing.

I do not often speak on Scottish legislation but I should like to return to the point that I raised briefly in an intervention somewhat earlier in our lengthy debates on this Bill.

I note with regret that the Scottish National Party is not represented here today. Were its Members present, they would note the care with which we examine Scottish legislation in an attempt to make sure that its details are precise and can be applied by the courts.

The penalty specified in this Bill is not appropriate to the effects if the word "situation" is added. If we pass this amendment we shall be agreeing that where an offence has been committed or seems likely to be committed in that the vehicle continues to be in a situation or is likely to continue to be in that situation, the sheriff may apply for a closure order on the vehicle. The proper action in this situation would be to make sure that the vehicle was moved.

3.45 p.m.

It would seem to be Draconian to say that in a situation—I cannot avoid using the word; I apologise—where, after an offence has been committed, a vehicle continues to be in a particular place, a closure order shall be applied. The only redress for the owner of the vehicle is to apply to the local authority. If he moves the vehicle and applies to the local authority, the authority may make an order removing the closure order within 14 days. Merely because the vehicle, in the judgment of the sheriff—who is to check the judgment of the sheriff?—is likely to continue to be in that place or in that situation—we are not told for how long—the trader may find himself put out of business for at least 14 days, even if he moves very rapidly in applying to the local authority.

It would seem appropriate if the hon. Member for Ayr wishes to add the word "situation" to devise another procedure whereby the police, or the sheriff for that matter, prohibit the vehicle from trading in that particular situation. But it would not seem appropriate in those conditions —I am talking not about the state of the vehicle, which may be in a fine state, constructed properly, sanitary and suitable for the sale of food, but about the fact that it is in the wrong situation—to determine that that business must close down.

I hope that the hon. Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) will take heed of the arguments that have been put forward, albeit at some length, and agree that the amendment should be withdrawn.

Question put and agreed to.

Unless hon. Members wish to divide on or to challenge any of Lords Amendments Nos. 4 to 15, I shall put them formally, because they have been discussed.

Lords Amendments Nos. 4 to 15 agreed to.

Clause 3

Right Of Appeal

Lords amendment: No. 16, in page 3, line 39, at end insert

", and any appeal under this subsection shall be by way of summary application".

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This is a small amendment to rectify a technical weakness in the Bill about the method by which the hearing shall take place before the sheriff.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 6

Interpretation

Lords amendment: No. 17, in page 4, line 31, leave out Clause 6 and insert new Clause—

Interpretation

"6. Expressions used in this Act and in the regulations mentioned in section 1(1) of this Act shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the same meaning in this Act as in those regulations."

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This amendment clarifies the intention of the clause to link the interpretation of terms used in the Bill with definitions assigned in the food hygiene regulations that have been used for many years.

I shall be brief. I do not wish to delay the progress of this legislation. I think that we are all grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Younger) for his courtesy and patience in answering questions on previous amendments. I shall put this point briefly in the hope that he will be able to satisfy me about it.

The amendment seeks to ensure that definitions in the regulations will be applicable to this legislation. In earlier debates I expressed the view that that was unsatisfactory. I think that there is a precedent. It seems to me from a quick glance that this situation applies in the English Act. I do not believe that it can be right for a new piece of primary legislation to be dependent for its definitions upon regulations that in turn are dependent upon another statue.

This could mean that the definition of such things as a food business could be changed simply by the annulment procedure. That is an unsatisfactory way of producing legislation, and I hope that my hon. Friend will be able to give some assurance on that point.

I am sure that he has examined the matter, because the point was raised in another place, but we should not allow this point to pass without comment. I doubt whether there is much we can do in this instance, but it is an undesirable procedure and I hope that we shall never see it happen again in legislation.

I appreciate what my hon. Friend said and in normal circumstances I would warmly agree with him. However, there is a difference in this case since the whole of this Bill depends on the 1956 Act. In this case it is not all that unusual that we should depend for definitions on that Act. I hope that I have given by hon. Friend the assurance for which he asked, although I appreciate that it does not go the whole way.

Question put and agreed to.

New Clause A

Effect Of Order In Council Under Section 52 Of The Food And Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956

Lords amendment: No. 18, in page 5, line 17, at end insert new Clause A—

"A. For the avoidance of doubt, the making of an Order in Council under section 52 of the Food and Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956, applying regulations made under section 13 of that Act to the Crown shall not have the effect of applying the provisions of this Act to the Crown."

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This is a technical amendment to clarify the provisions of the Bill so that they shall not apply to Crown properties.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 8

Short Title, Commencement And Extent

Lords amendment: No. 19, in page 5, line 20, leave out from "force" to end of line 21 and insert

"on such day as the Secretary of State may by Order made by statutory instrument appoint."

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

This is a technical adjustment in respect of the date on which the Bill shall come into force. It is necessary because the speed of progress of the Bill in this House has been so satisfactory that the new regulations or up-dating of them may take a little longer to put into effect. It is very much hoped that the Bill may be brought into effect this year.

With that assurance, I hope that the House will agree to the Lords amendment.

May I ask for your guidance, Mr. Speaker? If this amendment were to be put to a Division and were lost, would the clause remain in its present unamended form? I want the hon. Gentleman to have his Bill, but I am anxious to know what will happen in the event of a Division being lost. Would the Bill stand in its present form, or would there be some untoward consequence that I would not wish to see?

If the House disagrees with the Lords amendment, we shall have to send it back to another place with an explanation, and I fear that that will be the end of this measure, because this is the last of the Private Members' days.

I am grateful for that explanation. In that case I shall not continue my opposition to the amendment. I merely wish to say that I do not like Bills the operation of which is left to the discretion of Ministers. Theoretically, the Bill may never come into operation if the Secretary of State of the day dislikes it, or is put under pressure not to implement its provisions. He would not have to oppose the Bill but would merely not make any orders under it.

If the circumstances were different from those you have outlined, Mr. Speaker, I would carry my opposition to a vote, but in present circumstances I shall not do so.

I have a special interest in this matter. I am a Co-operative Member of Parliament and naturally matters concerning food sold from mobile shops are of interest to me.

I should like to differ, briefly, from my hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Mr. Mikardo) about the point that he raised. I wish to support the amendment for the simple reason that there is a good deal to be said for flexibility when one is introducing such a measure as this, covering a wide range of provisions including health and sanitary provisions. I accept the point that my hon. Friend made about the amount of power that is left with Ministers as to when the measure should be made operative, but there is an advantage in having a certain amount of flexibility in making sure that when the provisions become operative, they do so correctly.

There is something in what the hon. Member for Brent, South (Mr. Pavitt) has said and it is more normal to leave the matter open than to have a fixed date in the original Bill. I understand why it is better to have flexibility and that the Bill has made more rapid progress than was expected which is not normal in this House.

It is undesirable that with all such commencement orders we do not have a parliamentary procedure whereby an order must be laid. The Bill will come into effect when the Minister issues an order. There has to be no affirmative or negative order and there will be no opportunity for further consideration.

That would be all right if we were always assured that such an order dealt only with the commencement date, but other transitional provisions are often slipped in. I am sure that that will not happen in this case, but it is worth making the point, even at this late stage. I do not, broadly speaking, disagree with the Lords amendments.

Question put and agreed to.

Unfair Contract Terms Bill

Lords amendments considered.

Clause 1

Scope Of Part I

Before I call the first Lords amendment to the Bill I must inform the House that I have selected the two starred amendments to Lords Amendment No. 12.

Lords amendment: No. 1 in page 2, line 1, leave out from beginning to

"subject" in line 2 and insert—

"(2) This Part of this Act is subject to Part III; and in relation to contracts, the operation of sections 2 to 4 and 7 is"

3.57 p.m.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

I understand that with this we are to consider Lords Amendment No. 55.

In the few minutes available to me before the House must consider a procedural motion I should like to put in a word that I may not have the opportunity of expressing during the remaining stages of the Bill in appreciation of the work that has been done by the Lords in extending and amending the Bill. The Bill started its course with just 15 clauses and it has now 34 clauses and four schedules. The Lords did an excellent job and it is not likely this afternoon that we shall be able to explore the work that was done there.

In speaking to Lords Amendments Nos. 1 and 55 I must point out that the Bill as now presented has provisions exempting certain types of contract from the controls in Parts I and II. These amendments ensure that the amendments in Part I are subject to the amendments to Part III. In the few moments left to me I hope that it will be possible for me to move formally all the remaining amendments.

Order. I can put only one amendment at a time unless the hon. Gentleman is given leave of the House to move all the amendments; that is to say, if the House agrees, he may move them, but otherwise I cannot allow him to do so.

In that case, I request the House to agree to all the amendments.

Object.

In that case I cannot allow all the amendments to be moved together. The Question on the first Lords amendment must be put separately.

This amendment was worth a longer speech from the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward). However, I admire his ingenious efforts to secure such a rapid passage for 57 Lords amendments, but it would be doing less than justice to their Lordships if we passed 57 amendments on the nod. The hon. Member would be doing an injustice to his own Bill if we allowed such a procedure.

Division No. 200]	AYES	[.400p.m.
Anderson, Donald	Grocott, Bruce	Perry, Ernest
Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)	Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)	Rhodes James, R.
Benyon, W.	Harrison, Rt Hon Walter	Richardson, Miss Jo
Berry, Hon Anthony	Hayman, Mrs Helena	Rodgers, George (Chorley)
Biggs-Davlson, John	Jackson, Miss Margaret (Lincoln)	Roper, John
Bottomley, Peter	Jenkins, Hugh (Putney)	Rossi, Hugh (Hornsey)
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)	Kaufman, Gerald	Smith, Dudley (Warwick)
Buchan, Norman	Kerr, Russell	Snape, Peter
Buck, Antony	Lawson, Nigel	Spearing, Nigel
Canavan, Dennis	Litterick, Tom	Slallard, A. W.
Clark, William (Croydon S)	McCartney, Hugh	Stewart, Rt Hon M. (Fulham)
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael	McCrindle, Robert	Summersklil, Hon Dr Shirley
Cook, Robin F. (Edin C)	McDonald, Dr Oonagh	Thorpe, Rt Hon Jeremy (N Devon)
Crowther, Stan (Rotherham)	MacFarquhar, Roderick	Tierney, Sydney
Davles, Denzll (Llanelll)	Marks, Kenneth	Townsend, Cyril D.
Davis, Clinton (Hackney C)	Mates, Michael	Ward, Michael
Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth	Maynard, Miss Joan	Weatherill, Bernard
Dykes, Hugh	Mikardo, Ian	Wise, Mrs Audrey
English, Michael	Miller, Dr M. S. (E Kilbrlde)	Younger, Hon George
Evans, Fred (Caerphilly)	Mlscampbell, Norman
Flannery, Martin	Moore, John (Croydon C)	TELLERS FOR THE AYES:
Foot, Rt Hon Michael	Neubert, Michael	Mr. Ted Graham and
Fowler, Gerald (The Wrekin)	Page, John (Harrow West)	Mr. Bruce Douglas-Mann.
Fraser, John (Lambeth, N'w'd)	Pavltt, Laurle

NOES
Farr, John	Scott, Nicholas	TELLERS FOR THE NOES:
Klmball, Marcus	Taylor, R. (Croydon NW)	Mr. Nicholas Fairbairn and
		Mr. Roger Moate.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Unfair Contract Terms Bill

Question again proposed, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

I was endeavouring to elicit from the hon. Member for Peterborough a more thorough and helpful explanation of the amendment, he having unsuccessfully endeavoured to move all

I should like to say a few words on this amendment even though the hon. Gentleman did not feel it worthy of introduction. I ask the hon. Gentleman why there is a need for the amendment. I understand that Part I seeks to amend the law to provide that—

It being Four o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Business Of The House

Motion made, and Question put,

That the consideration of Private Members' Bills may be proceeded with at this day's sitting, though opposed, until Five o'clock.—[ Mr. Stallard.]

The House divided: Ayes 67, Noes 4.

57 amendments. I wonder whether I was being a bit uncharitable to him and that he had not understood Mr. Speaker's selection. The first selection is Lords Amendments Nos. 1 and 55. Perhaps the hon. Member thought it said "Lords Amendments 1 to 55" and that he would be able to obtain approval for that batch.

But since the hon. Member was unusually restrained in presenting his case because of the time factor, it may be that he will be able to give a more helpful explanation when he replies to the debate. I do not know whether, under the rules of order, the hon. Member can now advance his argument.

The hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward) will reply to the debate since he is the Member in charge of the Bill. He can then answer the questions that have been put to him.

My hon. Friend raised an important issue towards the end of our debate on the Control of Food Premises (Scotland) Bill concerning the principle of drafting. It is extremely unfortunate that a Bill conceived with the intention of altering the law of contract in England and Wales and Northern Ireland is inadvertently allowed just to slip over into Scotland in certain provisions because it happens to be convenient to fiddle around with the law of Scotland as an addendum to the law of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland.

Will the hon. and learned Member give way?

I cannot give way. I am interrupting my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate). It is my way, and he is giving it. [An HON. MEMBER: "Sing it."] I am a better poet than I am a singer and I would rather put my question in rhyme than in song. Though the hon. Member for West Stirlingshire (Mr. Canavan) thinks that 1 am a lousy painter, I bet him that I can sell my paintings for more than he can sell any of his capabilities.

It seems to me to be improper—I hope that my hon. Friend will not mind my making this point—that it should ever be conceived that amendments affecting two totally different legal systems should be grouped together as if they did not have different effects.

I presume that my hon. and learned Friend is referring to the Unfair Contract Terms Bill, although he confused me by referring to the previous debate on the Control of Food Premises (Scotland) Bill. If he is saying that it is wrong in principle to include a Scottish clause in this Bill—

That is one point.

—I disagree with him. I appreciate that we have different legal systems. To me that is a matter of regret, though that is a rather challenging state- ment to make to my hon. and learned Friend.

4.15 p.m.

Hon. Members may recall that the whole consideration of exemption clauses by the Law Commission was carried out separately for Scotland and for England and Wales. There are two separate Law Commissions, probably on account of the sorts of differences in law to which reference has just been made. When the Bill originally came to the House, it was for England and Wales only. It was possible to incorporate a provision for Scotland in this way, only because of the speciality of language. Most people think that it is better to do it in this way.

We have seen earlier today the folly of having separate Bills for England and Scotland, with different provisions for each, when there is no obvious reasons why the residents of Scotland should be treated differently from the residents of England in, for example, the matter of pavement cafes, which was one of the vital issues that we were discussing earlier. It is a rather dubious approach to introduce legislation for Scotland at a late stage in a separate part of a Bill. The Bill has undergone some very significant changes, particularly in regard to change of name and the insertion of Scotland. I was really seeking information from the hon. Member for Peterborough. I want to pursue further the question which arises under Amendment No. 1. As the hon. Gentleman was not able to move it fully, I thought I might try to analyse the position as I see it. The amendment proposes the insertion of the words

"(2) This Part of this Act"—

namely, Part I—

"is subject to Part III; and in relation to cow tracts, the operation of sections 2 to 4 and 7 is".

Part I of the Bill seeks to amend the law to provide that negligence shall include not only breach of common law but breach of certain contractual liabilities. That is a major change in the law of this country. Part II relates to Scotland. Part III introduces a number of miscellaneous provisions and in particular contains a number of important exemptions. I hope that I have it right so far, but it is not easy to follow a Bill through the very lengthy debates which have taken place in this House in Committee and in another place.

The key exemptions are those concerning the contracts for the carriage of passengers by sea and by air and in particular the matters to be dealt with by the Athens Convention. Then there is other relevant legislation for which there is also some exemption.

It would seem that the object of the amendment is simply to ensure that Part III applies to Part I with regard to those exemptions. It is a simple intention. My object is to ask why it is necessary at all. I should have thought that nothing could be clearer in the Bill as it stands at present than that Part III applies to the whole of the United Kingdom. It says so at the top of page 13:

"Provisions applying to whole of United Kingdom."

Why on earth do we need a specific amendment saying that Part III applies to Part I, which is the part of the Bill relevant to England and Wales and Northern Ireland? It would seem to be a totally unnecessary amendment, and as such I should have thought that it does not deserve consideration by this House. I hope that, unless we can have a better explanation, the House will say that this is unnecessary and that we disagree with the Lords in the amendment.

The origin of the separation of Scotland into Part II is to try to bring the work of the two Law Commissions into one measure. That seemed to meet with general approval. It met with the approval of Scottish Members who took part in the discussions, and certainly it found favour with their Lordships in another place.

If it had not been done, it would not have been possible to deal with the law of Scotland at this stage. That could have resulted in real difficulties for those engaged in the making of contracts. That might have been beneficial, for example, to certain people seeking to avoid the effect of the law in England. They might have gone to Scotland to make all their contracts for various purposes. Perhaps that would have created work for lawyers and others in Scotland, but it would have added to the difficulties for consumers generally.

I know nothing about Scottish law and we may be hearing more about it from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Mr. Fairbairn), but is the hon. Gentleman saying that the law of contract in Scotland is so vastly different from that of the law relating to ordinary commercial transactions in England that there would be a temptation to pop across the border? I never thought that the laws on contract were so different.

I refer the hon. Gentleman to the reports of the two Law Commissions. If he studies the report of the Scottish Law Commission and compares it with the report of the English Law Commission he will see that there are clear differences, especially in language. From the points of view of convenience and assistance to consumers and those engaged in contractual litigation in Scotland, it is better that they should have provisions set out in their legal language. That is why we have decided to have a separate section for Scotland.

The hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) said that he did not consider the amendment to be strictly necessary. In fact it was put forward as a result of a request for clarification. Although it may not have the significance that it would have had if it had been in the Bill before we sent it to another place, we have taken account of the desire of those in another place to have greater clarity. It is our belief that this small amendment to Clause 1 achieves that. I hope that that explanation will be acceptable to the hon. Gentleman.

I find this a thoroughly bad Bill for innumerable reasons. If my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) takes time—it may require considerable time—to read the Renton Report, he will see that it recommends that in whatever branch of law we are dealing with there is no excuse, unless it is the statute law of the United Kingdom, which is universal, such as road traffic legislation, for attempting to frame a Bill for England and Wales and to add into it bits of law for Scotland on what may be the same subject but not involving the same principles.

The whole history of content in the law on contract in Scotland is entirely different in its origin, application, language and effect, especially in its effect on penalties on tort and breach of contract in respect of this measure. As I understand the Bill, it is intended that many of the situations of the conditions of contract should not operate. Therefore, it is totally contrary to the principle of the Renton Report, which was accepted unanimously on both sides of the House, that there should not be separate Acts for Scotland and England. When this sort of legislation is being conducted it involves something that may loosely be termed contracts, but in many sensitive areas there are differences in history, extent, and attitude.

It is for that reason that I find it extraordinary that this first amendment should say that his part of the legislation, which presumably is the English part, if I may so refer to it—after all, Part I refers to the law of England, Wales and Northern Ireland—shall be subject to Part III. As I understand it, Part III is headed

"Provisions applying to the whole of United Kingdom."

I know that devolution is a crazy dream in the minds of some and that independence is an even great fantasy in the minds of others. It is nice to be able to welcome, as usual, SNP Members when we are discussing a Bill which alters the law of contract in Scotland!

Where are they?

It is extraordinary that provisions applying to the whole of the United Kingdom are applied under this amendment to England, Wales and Northern Ireland and that apparently Scotland is not part of the United Kingdom, so that it does not apply to Part II, which is the law relating to Scotland. There may be many good reasons for that. The Government may imagine that they have already passed the devolution Bill and that Scotland is a separate and independent State. It may be that the statutes of England, all of which will have to be altered on the occasion of the creation of that happy little oil-fired tartan Ruritanian tax haven which the nationalists propose to set up, will contain such a provision. But I find it difficult to understand why Part III, the provisions applying to the whole of the United Kingdom, should require an amendment specifically applying them to the law of England, Wales and Northern Ireland and, by inference, excluding them from the provisions which apply to Scotland.

If it is done for greater clarity, as the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward) said, so that we can all be certain that we have underlined everything twice and crossed all our t's, it gives rise to an immense contradiction. If, on the other hand, there is a reason why Part III should not apply to Scotland, I should be happy to hear it.

I refer the hon. and learned Gentleman to Clause 15—it may appear on the copy of the Bill which he has as Clause 16, because we are handling several versions of the Bill—where he will see that similar words are used to apply Part III to Scotland specifically. However, it is worded slightly differently from the early reference which he is discussing.

I am obliged for that explanation which, I regret to say, I had overlooked. But that gives rise to another question, which is why it should be treated differently. If the words "sections 15 to 17" apply to any contract, I simply do not understand it. As a lawyer I am not very good at understanding statutes, but it does not seem to me that the words say the same thing at all.

If the hon. and learned Gentleman will study the wording he will see that the Scottish reference applies only to contracts whereas the English reference has to apply to other matters which are taken into account in the first part of the Bill.

4.30 p.m.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. If ever there was a justification for the principle which the Renton Committee laid down, that would seem to be it. It is very unsatisfactory when we are dealing with entirely different systems of law. They are entirely different, because the law of Scotland derives from the civilian system which was learned in Leyden and Paris by Scots lawyers who were excluded from England by the general hostility between the two countries.

So the law of England, which was developed in England alone because the English were excluded from the Continent, was a very good reason why the English were hostile to the Continent. The law of England was a fantasy which grew up in the minds of Englishmen, whereas the law of Scotland is based on the civilian system. With the laws of the Netherlands and France, and to some extent Germany, which was then called something else, it grew and developed from the law of Rome, on which the law of England is not founded. They are profoundly different systems. It is very bad to have a statute eroding the common civil law of Scotland on the basis of piecemeal legislation, and I deprecate the system.

I had come to the Chamber to raise matters of more fundamental objection later and I had assumed that this amendment was a formal one which could be allowed to go through speedily. But after I heard the questions of my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) a question mark emerged in my mind about why we needed this reference. I then heard the explanation given by the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward), who appeared to be saying that everything was explained in the debate in another place. I then wanted to question this reference to Part III. Then I heard my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire (Mr. Fair-bairn) and became even more confused. The mystery seems to be becoming deeper.

I looked up what was said on Report in another place when the noble Lord who moved the amendments said—and I paraphrase his words—that the amendment was simply to make clear that the provisions of Part I were subject to the provisions of Part III. But he did not say why it needed to be made clear.

A similar provision for Part II was introduced by Lord McCluskey and was accepted in Committee. I therefore tried to find out what Lord McCluskey said. I was groping for an explanation for this strange mystery. The speech of Lord McCluskey occupied no more than about a dozen lines in Hansard. He said that his amendment was required because Part III contained various provisions exempting contracts from the controls in Parts I and II. For that reason the provisions of Part II required to be qualified by a general reference to Part III. That does not explain the fundamental answers to the questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Faversham.

If Part III is all-embracing and the provision defines the whole of the United Kingdom, why does it need to be mentioned at all in this amendment? I hope that the hon. Member for Peterborough will give answers to this strange mystery.

I hope that my hon. Friend appreciates that Lord McCluskey was a Solicitor-General of Scotland and is a very distinguished member of the Bar. I am sure that if there was an explanation, he would have given it.

I am sure that my hon. and learned Friend is right. However, Lord McCluskey's short speech did not make apparent the reasons behind the amendment. I shall conclude my remarks now—or perhaps I should keep going until the Minister has finished being briefed by his Department.

I am sure that the Committee wants to make progress. The Bill was considered by the House of Lords and particularly by its judges. The Master of the Rolls called it the most important change in the law of contract that we have known in this century. I believe that the House should agree with the Lords, that very distinguished body of judicial figures, in this amendment. As a result of the deliberations in another place the Bill is now in a clearer form than it was when it left this House.

I accept that the House of Lords is bristling with legal talent. The whole weight of learning resides in the other place.

If the hon. Member for Peterborough says that this should be done, I am prepared to accept that, but if there is another explanation, I shall accept that.

It is very unwise to take from Ministers in particular the concept that the genius of judges should be accepted, regardless of the justification of their judgment. If I may mention Scotland again, we are all suffering from the genius of Lord Wheatley, a member of the other place and the Lord Justice-Clerk of Scotland, whose genius told us that we must reorganise local government in a manner which has turned out to be unpopular, inefficient and very expensive.

I do not think that I could even tiptoe gingerly into the delicate matter of the rival merits of Scottish Law Lords and Law Officers. I leave that to my hon. and learned Friend. I am prepared to accept what the Minister says. I have been a Minister myself, and I know that Ministers act responsibly.

I think that the Minister said that the Bill had been described as the most important change in the law of contract this century. Does not my hon. Friend think it strange that a proposal of this magnitude should be put before a half-empty House at this time on a Friday night, or at any time on a Friday, and in the form of a Private Member's Bill? Such a matter requires consideration in depth.

I am inclined to agree. I have sympathy with the principle behind the Bill, but I recall that its older brother, half-brother or cousin—the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973—which I strongly supported and in the passage of which I played a part, was a Government Bill. This Bill should also be a Government Bill as it is so complex and profoundly important.

Therefore, I say with the greatest respect to the hon. Member for Peterborough, who has valiantly fought the Bill through to this stage, that I should have preferred the] Bill to come before us at the proper time with the whole panoply of the Government behind it so that we might be given explanations.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 2, in page 2, line 3, leave out from "1" to end of line 5.

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this amendment we may take Lords Amendment No. 51.

A number of technical defects came to light in Clause 26 as it was. Lords Amendment No. 51, which is a complete redraft, puts the matter right.

Despite the new structure of the clause as recommended by their Lordships, the policy is the same. The clause makes provision for contracts for the carriage of passengers by sea until the provisions of the Athens Convention have the force of law. It is hoped that there will be a Merchant Shipping Act to carry those provisions into effect before very long.

Once again the speech of the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward) has been remarkable for its brevity in introducing a substantial new clause. I wish to reiterate my anxiety that we should not be presented with significant new law at a time arid in a manner that deny the right of proper scrutiny.

I am no lawyer and I cannot say offhand whether the new Clause 26 is absolutely precise and correct. it is the job of the House to ensure that it is. We may place great reliance upon another place and have immense faith in their Lordships' legal expertise, but it is still the duty of the House to examine this matter. I am not aware that there is always universal acceptance on the Government Benches of the total wisdom of their Lordships, but on this occasion Labour Members seem to be accepting it. We have on this occasion a very substantial new clause.

This is not an entirely new clause. The Athens Convention, which has not yet been incorporated into our law by ratifying statute, has been embodied in the Bill. This was available for discussion at Report stage and it went in that form to the other place. The other place found that there were considerable defects in the drafting of that particular clause so it was withdrawn. It is wrong to suggest that there is a new principle in this provision. It has simply been redrafted to take account of the Athens Convention.

I accept that, but technically it is a new clause and it is substantially larger than the one it replaces —almost twice as long. One does not measure the merits of a clause by its length, but if it is longer that gives more scope for analysis and for ensuring that it is legally precise and correct.

I understand that the new clause provides interim arrangements for the period between the signing and the implementation of the Athens Convention. It makes sense that there should be an interim measure to protect the consumer in the manner envisaged.

One of the matters most often raised is the question of conditions in travel by sea ferries. This provision would have a particular effect on people using cross-Channel ferries. Faced with this signicant amendment, the House could have been given examples in real, human terms of the effect of legislation of this kind.

It is all very well to be presented with a legally complex clause, but we are discussing human understanding. If we are to educate the public in their rights and tell them that in future the conditions of contract are not precisely what they mean and that they need not take them as gospel, the first stage is to explain to the House the down-to-earth implications of the amendment.

I expect that the hon. Member is anxious to get his Bill through by 5 o'clock. But I understand that time may be provided for Lords amendments—the Leader of the House said that yesterday —and the hon. Member would be doing more justice to his Bill if he explained clearly, concisely and meaningfully to the House and the public the meaning of his amendment.

How will the Athens Convention be translated into United Kingdom law? The hon. Member said that this provision would be embodied in the Merchant Shipping Act, but that is not quite what it says. I believe that we are to have regulations issued under this provision—I assume under Clause 26—which will embody the terms of the Athens Convention when it is implemented. It would be helpful to know whether we are to have a Merchant Shipping Bill for dealing with this proposition, or a Statutory Instrument, which is not quite as satisfactory.

4.45 p.m.

In the last lines of the new clause there is the statement:

"a statutory instrument containing the regulations shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."

I think that the House allows negative procedure Statutory Instruments to go through too easily. This is a matter of importance. The conditions of carriage by sea, particularly on ferries, which have often been quoted as requiring further consumer protection, emphasise that. I think that this is a matter for the affirma- tive procedure, but this is a provision for the negative procedure. I question whether it is appropriate. I agree that if we objected to all the negative procedures, we should never cease debating the point. Nevertheless, it is right to make a protest when one has the opportunity.

Can the hon. Member for Peterborough or the Minister tell me whether, as an interim implementation of the unimplemented Athens Convention, the clause is on all fours with its provisions? That would be a helpful statement. Practical examples of how the clause will help the consumer would be helpful. I think that is the right way to present matters of this kind.

Perhaps I may reply to the hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate). If the clause did not appear in the Bill, the carriers of passengers by sea would be liable without limit for death or personal injuries caused to passengers. They would not be able to contract out of their liability for death or personal injury.

The Athens Convention is not yet law. Therefore, were the clause not to be included, a shipper would not be able to contract out of his liability. He would be liable for death or personal injury of a passenger aboard a ship.

Shipping interests properly represented to us that they would be put at a disadvantage with their foreign competitors if such a clause were not included in the Bill. We thought that the best way to deal with the matter was to anticipate the Athens Convention. We suggested an exemption clause dealing with death or personal injury that was on all fours with the Athens Convention—it has not yet become law in this country—and that provided limits of compensation for death or personal injury. That is the first part of the new clause.

The second part gives powers by regulation to impose an alternative limited liability. We are breaking new ground and dealing with international matters. Shippers say "The Athens Convention may present difficulties if you anticipate it. There are other kinds of limits of liability that we should like to have in the meantime instead of the Athens Convention. Will you approve of them?".

We think it right to say that we can approve of alternative limits of liability for death or personal injury provided that they are approved not by ministerial fiat but by regulations that would have to be laid before the House and be subject to annulment under the negative procedure. Pending the ratification of the Athens Convention, the clause gives some protection to shipping companies and does not impose a n extra liability upon them. We think it right to do that, because we do not want to disturb their competitive relationships with foreign owned companies.

Question put and agreed to.

Lords amendment: No. 3, in page 2, line 14, at end insert "of the occupier

I beg to move, That this House doth agree with the Lords in the said amendment.

With this amendment we may also take Lords Amendments Nos. 26 and 32.

This amendment will ensure that the Bill shall not apply when occupiers of premises use them solely for private purposes. If I may quote a human example in my constituency, Lord Fitzwilliam occasionally holds a fete in his grounds, and it will be necessary for the responsibility for all matters relating to that fete to rest on those who run the fete and not on Lord Fitzwilliam. Therefore, this is a simple protection for which their Lordships asked in respect of people who might wish to use their private houses for such unusual business purposes. I commend it to the House.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for quoting a human example. When I saw the Lords amendment, I put in my notes that it was a "travelling circus amendment", since its object was to protect the person with a rather large garden who wished to allow it to be used for a travelling circus. The hon. Gentleman gave an example involving a noble Lord in his constituency who allows his land to be used for a fete.

I understand that the purpose of the amendment is to give special preferential treatment to people with large gardens. I cannot see the point of the amendment. The object is to see that restrictions that normally apply will not apply to such people. I am delighted that the hon. Gentleman is so concerned about noble Lords with large gardens.

Their Lordships raised the matter.

Presumably, the hon. Gentleman is supporting the Lords amendment. The matter puzzles me because I am not convinced that there is a case for the amendment.

If a man who uses his land for a business then enters into a contract with an individual for him to use that land for the purposes of a fair or a circus, there is no difference between that man using that land for commercial purposes and the man who is a private occupier of land and who lends it for the purpose of a fair or circus. That would still be private land, and I cannot see the difference. I am not sure why the hon. Gentleman is so anxious to confer this special privilege on large landowners.

Perhaps my hon. Friend will bring his arguments to a proper conclusion and tell the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward) what the law is. He gave an example of Lord Fitz-somebody-or-other holding a fete in his garden and suggested that that would involve a business purpose. In fact a fete would not be a business purpose. The definition of "business premises" for business purposes is very extensive. However, I repeat that using one's garden for a fete is not a business purpose. Therefore, the matter the hon. Gentleman wants to cover is not covered by the amendment.

Nor is it clear in those circumstances in terms of a fete that there will be any form of contract or normal contractual relationship between the promoter of a fete and landowner. In the case of a circus, there would have to be a more formalised contract, albeit not necessarily couched in the most precise terms. I am not convinced of the necessity for the amendment, and I should be surprised if Labour Members thought that this related to a worthy cause—namely, that certain members of the public should be subject to special terms and specific exemptions. I am also concerned about the phraseology and drafting of the amendment because, unless I have it wrong—and if so no doubt the hon. Member for Peterborough will tell me—it will read

"from the occupation of premises used for the business purposes of the occupier''.

If the exclusion applies to business purposes of the occupier that would imply that business premises would be exempt. The hon. Gentleman cannot mean that, but that is how the clause is couched.

We have been told repeatedly of the legal expertise of their Lordships and that we should automatically accept what they tell us as right, but this strikes me as an extremely bad piece of drafting that will cause endless confusion. should have thought that it would allow a considerable number of references to the courts for decisions on whether certain contract terms applied in the circumstances of the occupation of premises used for the business purposes of the occupier.

The amendment does not even achieve what the hon. Member said it would when he introduced it. It is a dubious proposition and badly worded. It is open to the hon. Member to tell us more about it, and, if he does not, I shall be inclined to vote against it.

I should have thought that the wording of paragraph (b) was perfectly clear. The clause relates to the occupation of premises for business and for the business purposes of the person who occupies them.

The hon. Member for Faversham (Mr. Moate) raised a problem about those people who rent their land out occasionally—for example, a person who makes available a field for use as a car park. That is possibly a good example. Part of the purpose of the Bill is to protect people and to allow them to obtain damages for death or injury if injured in such a place. If someone makes a field available to National Car Parks, NCP could not contract out of its liability for death or personal injury to those using it, because NCP would be the occupier using the land for business premises. If one wants to impose a liability upon occupiers generally, that would require separate legislation and would not be appropriate to this Bill.

The amendment goes much further than the Minister and the hon. Member for Peterborough (Mr. Ward) realise. By making the Bill refer exclusively to the occupier, one is negativing its principal effect. If the intention, referring to contract and tort in Clauses 2 and 7, applies only to business liability —so, presumably, excluding domestic liability and I imagine that that is the general purpose—one then excludes the occupation of premises used for business purposes from the provisions. That is all right. We understand what is meant by the occupation of premises used for business purposes, but if one adds the words "of the occupier", one excludes a large category of persons who would be covered otherwise.

This is a far-reaching amendment. With great respect to the hon. Member for Peterborough, it has nothing to do with somebody letting out his garden or land for a fête. It has to do with the occupation of premises used for business purposes and it does not matter who occupies them. If the Bill is restricted to the occupier, whether temporary or permanent, that excludes all other employees, owners and everybody else. As I understand it, that was not the intention of the Bill at all.

If the hon. Member for Peterborough can reassure me on that point, I shall be delighted. If one adds the words "of the occupier", one totally changes the meaning of the clause to cover a generality of business liability which it was not the original intention of this part of the Bill to cover. I am not saying that I approve, but it was not intended to cover the whole generality of business liability. Far from relating merely to people strolling on one's lawns and selling home-made lemon curd for an afternoon, the amendment would exclude a large number of people, including ICI.

I urge the hon. Member for Peterborough to think again and to withdraw the amendment, because it has the reverse effect to his original intention—

It being Five o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

Further consideration what day? No day named.

Private Members' Bills

Before the Clerk reads the remaining Orders of the Day, I should inform the House that in the case of the remaining Lords amendments to Bills, it is permissible for me to put the Question in the case of each Bill, That this House doth agree with the Lords in their amendments—taken as a whole. If this Question were not objected to, it could be put and agreed to. However, if there is a single objection, consideration of the Lords amendments would have to be deferred.

Town And Country Planning (Amendment) Bill

Order for consideration of Lords amendments read.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I appreciate that this Bill is third on the list. What has happened to the Unfair Contract Terms Bill?

It has been talked out.

Lords amendments agreed to.

Insurance Brokers (Registration) Bill

Order for consideration of Lords amendments read.

Hon. Members: Object.

To be considered upon Monday next.

Rentcharges Bill

Lords amendments agreed to.

Firearms Bill (Changed From Firearms Act 1968 (Amendment) (No 2) Bill)

Order for consideration (as amended in the Standing Committee) read.

Hon. Members: Object.

To be considered upon Monday next.

Farriers (Registration) (Amendment) Bill Lords

Not amended (in the Standing Committee), considered; read the Third time and passed, without amendment.

Shops (Amendment) Bill

Order for consideration (not amended in the Standing Committee) read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Consideration what day? No day named.

Abortion (Amendment) Bill

Order for consideration (as amended in the Standing Committee) read.

Hon. Members: Object.

To be considered upon Monday next.

Building Societies (Reorganisation And Nationalisation) Bill

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Second Reading [4th March].

Hon. Members: Object.

Debate to be resumed what day? No day named.

Penal Reform Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Private Security (Registration) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Corporal Punishment Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading deferred till Friday next.

Local Government Finance Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading deferred till Friday next.

General Elections (Limitation Of Expenses) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Council House Tenants (Security Of Tenure) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Housing (Shorthold Tenancies) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Companies (Audit Committees) Bill

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Second Reading [13th May].

Hon. Members: Object.

Debate to be resumed what day? No day named.

Ticket Touts Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Price Control Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Limitation Of Legislation Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Dunfermline College Of Physical Education For Women (Change Of Name) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Objection taken. Second Reading what day?

Monday next.

This must be done by the promoter of the Bill, unless he has given authorisation.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The promoter has given authorisation, and notification to the Table, as I understand it.

Second Reading what day?

Monday.

Second Reading deferred till Monday next.

Appointment Of Ambassadors And Other Public Servants Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Employment Protection (Holidays) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

National Land Fund (No 2) Bill>

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Magistrates (Democratic Selection) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Construction Of Roads (Time Limit) Bill Lords

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Heritage Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Public Health Act 1936 (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Import Of Live Fish (Scotland) Bill Lords

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill Lords

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Deer Bill Lords

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Guardianship (Amendment) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading deferred till Monday next.

A I D Children (Legal Status) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Diplomatic Cars Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Hon. Members: Object.

Second Reading what day? No day named.

Statutory Instruments, &C

Motion made, and Question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.).

Hovercraft

That the draft Hovercraft (Application of Enactments) (Amendment) Order 1977, which was laid before this House on 17th June, be approved.—[ Mr. Stallard.]

Question agreed to.

Motion made, and Question put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No. 73A (Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c).

Overseas Aid

That the draft International Fund for Agricultural Development (Initial Contribution) Order 1977, which was laid before this House on 23rd June, be approved.—[ Mr. Stallard.]

Question agreed to.

Government Expenditure

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[ Mr. Stallard.]

5.8 p.m.

I accept and understand that after the excitements of the day, the few of us left feel somewhat like the dregs in a bottle of old wine. However, I start by expressing my appreciation for the presence of the Treasury Bench in response to this brief Adjournment debate.

In examining the development and creation of the Government Press Centre, I am seeking to look at the control or lack of control through Parliament of public expenditure. I am seeking to use the Government Press Centre's creation as an illustration of this. At this stage I want to put on record my very serious thanks to the Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Marks), who I had thought might be responding to the debate. He has had to bear responsibility for answering many, many Questions that I have put down on this matter for some while.

You might well ask, Mr. Deputy Speaker, why I wish to discuss so small an item as the Government Press Centre as an illustration of the lack of control by Parliament of public expenditure. I think that the reason would be well appreciated by the Minister of State, Treasury, as he and I spent some time together on the Public Accounts Committee. I think that he would agree with me—and much of what I have to say is very much of a non-political, non-partisan nature—that one of the difficulties one has in discussing public expenditure in the Public Accounts Committee, or, frankly, at any other time in this House, is the sheer vast size of the sums involved. It is extremely difficult to get one's teeth into amounts running into billions. I felt that the Government Press Centre was a place that was of a human manageable size and, given its size, that the money involved should have been debated in this House. I stress that I am not discussing whether there should or should not be a Government Press Centre, and I apologise to those people in the Department of the Environment from the Property Services Agency who have been forced to answer so many of my questions. I simply use the Press Centre as an illustration, though one might ask in the tightened circumstances of our budgetary controls whether we can afford something so grandiose.

In drawing attention to the Government Press Centre, I wish to illustrate two factors. I want to examine the decision-making process of Government specifically in regard to the allocation of scarce resources which we must control through public expenditure provisions. We are not talking about a negligible sum. About £3 million is involved. The second factor I want to examine is parliamentary control, or lack of it, over such expenditure.

On the first point, there was no parliamentary debate at any time on this subject. I am sure that when other hon. Members read this debate in Hansard they will be surprised to know that there is such a thing as a Government Press Centre. The decision about it was taken by the governmental Civil Service decision-making machine, and no information was provided through Parliament.

I am indebted to the Under-Secretary of State for the Environment for an excellent background paper that he provided for me. He attached this paper to a letter dated 20th June. It says:

"After a great deal of consideration an inter-Departmental Working Party recommended in August 1975 that Lancaster House and 8 Cleveland Row should be used, with the intention that the former Bath Club should be hired to provide a convenient Press Centre nearby".

That expresses the essence of the decision. I accept that the working party saw that a need existed. My concern, from a public expenditure point of view, is that although the need was recognised, the problem of allocating scarce resources was not considered adequately at that time. If that sounds harsh, I believe that that facts will make the point even more harshly

Two kinds of cost are involved in this project—capital costs and running costs. I will not go into great detail on the question of the £1 million-plus that has been spent on capital building works at the Bath Club to make the Press Centre. However, a seven-year lease was signed with six years' usage only. At the end of the lease there will be no contractual relationship relating to those premises. That suggests to ms that the £1 million-plus is to be written off at the end of the period.

I turn now to running costs, and here I rely upon ministerial Answers to Questions. I can say with authority therefore that there was no knowledge within Government at the time the decision was made of the potential running costs of such an institution. Let me quote an Answer that was given to me, which said:

"Detailed estimates for running costs were not available at that time because precise requirements had not been established."— [Official Report, 15th February 1977; Vol. 926, c. 133.]

My conclusion concerning the decision-making process is that, although I accept that the discussion was all about the need for the centre, the resource use and the commitment of the —3 million, which I shall detail later, had very low priority.

I turn now to an area which I regard as far worse, in order to illustrate what I call the charade of parliamentary control of expenditure. This was a new venture, but no attempt was made to seek specific parliamentary approval. If one were very critical, one could say that there was almost an attempt to conceal.

The Library has been extremely helpful to me in my attempts to unravel the background to the allocation of parliamentary moneys. With the Library's help, I have been through all the Supply and Supplementary Estimates going back some years. The only reference which has any specific relationship to the creation of a new Government Press Centre comes in 1976–77, Class XIV, 1, Appendix 1. Under "General" there is a reference to

"Conference and Press Facilities, 1977" of £1,300,000.

That figure covers "Conference and Press facilities" for 1977. But the figures did not appear at any time in the 1975–76 Supplementary Estimates, and did not appear again with any variation of any kind in 1977–78. That was the only specific reference I could locate, with the Library's help, to the moneys that we are discussing.

A much more serious point arises I make what I might call my ex post factor examination of my attempt to get at the facts. This is really quite frightening I remind the House of what we have been told following the whole series of Questions that I have put down over the past six months. The whole appearance of the scheme gives the illusion that we are talking of something very insignificant, very small and very uninteresting in terms of public expenditure.

I refer again to a parliamentary Answer given to me about the official capital and running costs associated with this venture. I asked what was the "annual expected cost", and in a Written Answer on 8th February 1977 I was told that it was £30,000 per annum. In a Written Answer of 15th February 1977 I was told that under Class XIV Vote 1, the original estimate of expenditure, prepared in October 1975, was £725,000. But by this time it was indicated that £830,000 had been spent. That was a modest increase, not excessive. It would seem, therefore, looking at the two figures that I uncovered in the course of my parliamentary Questions, that we were not talking of anything very massive—£725,000 in capital costs and a modest £30,000 per annum in running costs.

Then I looked at the reality as opposed to the appearance. The reality was deeply worrying in terms of parliamentary control of public expenditure. I shall go through the process and show how the current figure is reached. The original estimate for capital costs at October 1975 was £725,000, although this was never specified in Estimates but authorised under Class XIV, Vote 1. The expected cost that I was given, although the contract was not completed, was £830,000. That was a modest increase.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, in a letter to me of 30th June 1977, said that the cost had increased. He pointed out that there were extra engineering works needed to the tune of £200,000. The capital cost, therefore, was now up to £1,026,000—an increase of 41·5 per cent.

Having uncovered this, one would have liked to see some kind of recognition of an error, or an apology, but nothing of the sort was forthcoming. I quote again from the Under-Secretary's letter, which points out that

"As a result of savings elsewhere it is unlikely that overall works costs on the Press Centre will exceed our initial estimate of March 1976 by more than about £120,000."

If you are getting lost, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I must say that I was totally lost at that stage. I was unable to reconcile these irreconcilable figures. What were the figures? It seemed that £725,000 had been committed and £830,000 spent. The £1·3 million in the Supplementary Estimates might have had some relationship to those sums.

I turned to the memorandum that the Under-Secretary of State had kindly sent me. I began to see a different figure emerge. The memorandum states:

"Financial approval was confirmed in March 1976."

The hon. Gentleman refers to money spent on the centre at Lancaster House and 8, Cleveland Row. It is stated:

"£905,000 would be spent on works at the Press Centre".

At what stage should we have had a Supplementary Estimate or a specific reference to allow Parliament to discuss changes that were clearly radical and different?

I have been referring to capital costs but what about running costs? I was told in a Written Answer that it would cost about £30,000 a year. I was uncomfortable with that figure. I have some experience in business and it seemed unusual that an operation of such a size could be run in London on such small running costs. After much digging I thought that I had found much greater running costs and more detail, but the detailed report from the Under-Secretary of State shows that even at that stage I had not uncovered all the figures.

The report states that running costs for the seven-year period total £856,000. I had been told in a Written Answer that the running costs would be £30,000 per annum. An entirely new figure appeared. It appeared that there would be custody services of £15,000 per annum for seven years, telephone and Telex rental costs of £13,000 per annum for seven years, and rates, which most of us realise we have to pay. They had not been assessed but were thought to be £75,000 per annum for six years.

We may also assume that rent will have to be paid. Most of us who run organisations have to pay rent. Let us assume that the rent is not £12 or £10 per sq. ft., or whatever it may be in that area, but £6 because of the work that has had to be done on the premises. On that assumption we have rent of £984,900 for the six years' usable time on top of running costs of £856,000. Therefore, we have a total cost for the six years' usable time of £1,840,900, or £ 306,816 per year, as opposed to the £30,000 that I was told in a parliamentary answer.

The parliamentary exasperation and frustration are further illustrated by two tiny points. However, they may be illustrative of the way in which parliamentary control is regarded. In the column of figures in respect of costs the total is shown as £1.8 million. The figures are not difficult to add by use of arithmetic and they can be checked by a calculator. In fact, the total is £1,910,000. Another £100,000 appears because of poor arithmetic.

The second small point arises under FCO costs. There is £16,000 set against typewriters. I assume that the typewriters are disappearing from the centre as they are not covered in running costs. As the Minister will know, Members of Parliament have to buy their own typewriters. I remember buying one for my secretary. I negotiated as good a deal as possible and was able to obtain a reconditioned machine for £120. A cost of £300 or £400 a machine, which it must be if the total is £16,000, is illustrative of the different way in which we concern ourselves with our own money as opposed to public money.

It seems that there is no parliamentary control. There is a slipshod disdain for parliamentary examination of the details. One wonders where else this may apply.

As I said at the beginning, I thought initially that this was an insignificant matter in terms of the total money involved. But, taking capital and running costs together, divided over the six years' usage of the Governments' Press Centre the expenditure involved means that we are paying £482,483 per annum for the use of it. I should have thought that, if we had had a debate in Parliament on that amount of expenditure, there might have been a degree of criticism about whether that was the right use of resources of that size and scale.

I conclude my remarks with three conclusions which I have reached after this study. First, resource allocation is often determined by officials who thereby diminish our political ability to determine expenditure priorities. Secondly, in the expenditure of public resources, insufficient diligence and discipline are exercised by civil servants. Thirdly, Parliament is not currently exercising control of expenditure and is therefore, for whatever reason, remiss in its prime elective responsibility. I think that the issue becomes clear from this small human illustration of the degree to which we are remiss in those duties.

5.26 p.m.

I have no doubt that the hon. Member for Croydon, Central (Mr. Moore) has raised an important issue. Unfortunately, he has raised it under the heading

"The inability of Parliament to control Government expenditure",

and, although I have heard about the National Press Centre, he will understand this is not really a matter for the Treasury in terms of the detail of the operation. It is a matter for the Department of the Environment, and the hon. Gentleman has acknowledged the assistance which he has received from my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary in giving him the information which has enabled him to compile his arguments.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, therefore, if I do not go into the details of the expenditure of £16,000 on typewriters. The Treasury has enough problems on its plate without putting its civil servants into every Department to ensure that not too many typewriters or quill pens are bought.

I turn, therefore, to the basic subject of the debate, which concerns Parliament's inability to control Government expenditure. There, again, this is a matter for Parliament. In saying that, I am not abrogating any responsibility. As a Member of Parliament, I have a very close interest in this difficult topic, as do all other hon. Members. But the responsibility of the Treasury is to ensure the control of public expenditure within the various limits, and over the past few years the Treasury has attempted to tighten its control over expenditure. It has tried to do so through cash limits, which have enabled it to keep a closer control of public expenditure. It has tried to do so through a tighter use of the Contingency Reserve. Again, that is helpful.

But the hon. Gentleman will recognise that, at the end of the clay, items of general global sums of public expenditure are determined not by civil servants but by Government Ministers in Cabinet in the normal PESC exercise which takes place every year. Departments fight for their priorities, and each of them ends up with its allocation depending on how the Cabinet determines priorities. It is then for the Treasury to attempt to ensure, through cash limits and the other controls that it has, to keep them within their budgets.

Our difficulty is that at the end of the day only a very little piece of the pie is available to spend through Parliament on the viable projects that we need, because so much has been taken by this administrative action.

I accept that. I was developing my argument. I contend that Parliament has practically complete control over what the Government spend in terms of the total. Parliament votes money for the Government. If it wishes and if it has the necessary majorities, Parliament can deny the Government funds, and then the Government are unable to govern. So the control is there in the ultimate. But I accept that, when we come down to the smaller and detailed sums, perhaps the parliamentary mechanism is not sufficiently precise and stringent.

This is not a matter for me, and I would not wish to tell the House how it should control expenditure. Having sat with me on the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Gentleman knows that that Committee does a heroic job in at least trying to analyse what has happened. It may be that the case he mentioned will one day come before the Committee. That is a matter not for me but for the Comptroller and Auditor General and for the Committee's Chairman. Although it may be a case of closing the door after the horse has bolted, it could be fruitfully considered in the Committee and lessons learned for the future.

This would not deal with the past problem, but there may be a case for extending the Committee's remit. It is interesting to see how other countries deal with such matters. In the United States the General Accounting Office has, at least in theory, a very strong power, and it is equipped with high-powered staff. I say "in theory" because I do not know how it works in practice, which is often different from theory. The Cour de Comptes in France has considerable powers. I do not know whether it works better than our system in practice. There may be a case for an examination by the House of the powers of the Public Accounts Committee to see whether they can be extended into these areas. The Select Committee on Procedure may be looking into the matter.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the House cannot determine expenditure of £16,000 on the purchase of typewriters. It has enough to do. But perhaps we could develop our Committees differently, and it may be that the Public Accounts Committee would be one means of doing so.

The matter is under continual debate. In our system change often comes slowly. Perhaps this is an area where it should come a little more quickly than in the past.

I cannot take the matter any further. The hon. Gentleman has raised a case that illustrates the difficulty in any modern complex society of any democratic body exercising detailed control over a bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is not necessarily a bad thing, but there is difficulty in controlling detailed Government expenditure. However, I must repeat that at the end of the day Parliament has the authority and the power to control Government expenditure. It can deny the Government money, and if that happens to any Government they must hand over to somebody else.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at twenty-six minutes to Six o'clock.

Volume 935: debated on Friday 15 July 1977

House Of Commons

Prayers

Counter-Inflation Policy

Dividend Control And The Remuneration, Charges And Grants Act 1975

Tax Relief

Additional Jobs And The Industrial Strategy

Public Expenditure

Cash Limits

Public Sector Borrowing Requirement And Monetary Policy

Conclusion

Orders Of The Day

Control Of Food Premises (Scotland) Bill

Clause 3

Right Of Appeal

Clause 6

Interpretation

New Clause A

Effect Of Order In Council Under Section 52 Of The Food And Drugs (Scotland) Act 1956

Clause 8

Short Title, Commencement And Extent

Unfair Contract Terms Bill

Clause 1

Scope Of Part I

Unfair Contract Terms Bill

Business Of The House

Private Members' Bills

Town And Country Planning (Amendment) Bill

Insurance Brokers (Registration) Bill

Rentcharges Bill

Firearms Bill (Changed From Firearms Act 1968 (Amendment) (No 2) Bill)

Farriers (Registration) (Amendment) Bill Lords

Shops (Amendment) Bill

Abortion (Amendment) Bill

Building Societies (Reorganisation And Nationalisation) Bill

Penal Reform Bill

Private Security (Registration) Bill

Corporal Punishment Bill

Local Government Finance Bill

General Elections (Limitation Of Expenses) Bill

Council House Tenants (Security Of Tenure) Bill

Housing (Shorthold Tenancies) Bill

Companies (Audit Committees) Bill

Ticket Touts Bill

Price Control Bill

Limitation Of Legislation Bill

Dunfermline College Of Physical Education For Women (Change Of Name) Bill

Appointment Of Ambassadors And Other Public Servants Bill

Employment Protection (Holidays) Bill

National Land Fund (No 2) Bill>

Magistrates (Democratic Selection) Bill

Construction Of Roads (Time Limit) Bill Lords

Heritage Bill

Public Health Act 1936 (Amendment) Bill

Import Of Live Fish (Scotland) Bill Lords

Sexual Offences (Scotland) Bill Lords

Deer Bill Lords

Guardianship (Amendment) Bill

A I D Children (Legal Status) Bill

Diplomatic Cars Bill

Statutory Instruments, &C

Hovercraft

Overseas Aid

Government Expenditure