I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 2, leave out line 7.

With this, it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 2, in page 2, line 8, leave out from beginning to 'and'.

No. 6, in clause 3, page 3, line 29, at end insert—

'(5B) Where an officer has seized any vehicle or equipment under subsection (5A) above, the owner or charterer of the boat or the owner of the vehicle or equipment, as the case may be, if he is not the person on board the boat or in charge of or in or on the vehicle or equipment, shall be notified of the seizure as soon as practicable and informed of how the matter will be proceeded with.'.

The intention of the amendment is to enable the House to consider whether an owner of a vehicle or piece of equipment should automatically be guilty of an offence even though he or she may have no knowledge that such an offence has been committed. I believe that rather different issues apply to the owners of fishing vessels, as I shall seek to explain later, but the automatic extension of that offence to deal with the particular problems with which the Bill is concerned needs to be considered carefully.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way at this early point in his speech, but he made some remarks publicly on the radio yesterday about his amendments, and referred to the importance, which we all appreciate, of the natural environment, and in particular the activities and advice of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. Will he tell us whether any of the amendments that he is about to move, or any others, had the support of that society? Will he tell us why he thinks membership of that society is incompatible with public office? I declare an interest as a member of that society.

I do not for a minute believe that membership is incompatible with public office. Sadly, the pressures on one's time in the House mean that one must make choices about what one does with one's time. I found that there just was not time to read Birds magazine. That is a great sadness for me. I concentrate—I make no secret 'of it—in my spare time on my interest in railways rather than birds. But that does not mean that I have lost my interest in birds. The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. In fact, I was about to set my amendments in precisely the context that he sought to do in his intervention.

Before my hon. Friend moves on, I should like him to clarify something. During the Committee proceedings on the Bill, is it or is it not correct that it was the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. McFall) who raised the issue with which my hon. Friend's amendments deal, and that, in trying to tackle this difficult issue, my hon. Friend is protecting not only the interests of the environment, but the interests of Hertz and Avis car rental companies, on behalf of whom the hon. Gentleman spoke?

My hon. Friend anticipates some remarks that I wish to make later when I talk about amendment No. 2, to which the remarks in Committee of the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. McFall) are relevant.

The Bill was drawn to my attention as a direct result of the publicity surrounding the campaign of the RSPB and its concerns for the protection of marine life generally. I believe that the Bill and the amendments that we are discussing provide a very rare opportunity to debate the protection of marine life and, specifically, bird life. My study of the Bill, as a result of that publicity, revealed other concerns, to which the amendments—and those that were not selected for debate—are relevant. That study revealed that, although the primary reason for the Bill was an environmental concern, it also affected the livelihood of farmers and contained some rather worrying aspects of enforcement provisions.

I wish to clarify one point that applies to amendments Nos. 1 and 2. According to the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984—perhaps matters have been updated since—quite significant sentences are available for breaches of the provisions: fines of up £5,000 on summary conviction, and without limit on conviction and indictment; and in some cases confiscation of equipment, boats and the like. Does not that underline my hon. Friend's point that one must be very careful about people unwittingly breaching the proposed law?

Again, my hon. Friend anticipates remarks that I intend to make later. I have concerns, and will express them to my hon. Friend the Minister on Third Reading, about the levels of fines. They might not be high enough for some of the greater breaches of the regulations. They are certainly too high for those who are caught by accident under the provisions of the Bill and the Act to which it refers. My hon. Friend is right to make those comments and I hope that he will make them at greater length later.

The main purpose of the Bill, and it is important to understand this to understand the amendment, was adequately summarised in the Scottish Wildlife and Countryside Link magazine in April 1993. It said:

"Attempts to regulate the Solway cockle fishery highlight another drawback of the existing system. Using tractors to harvest molluscan shellfish at low water also takes place in the Solway Firth. It has an impact on shellfish stocks and can also disturb resident bird populations. The regulation of these fishing activities does not, at present, come under the control of the Inshore Fisheries (Scotland) Act. For effective regulation of the Solway fishery to occur, Local Authority by-laws to control tractor-dredging must be introduced to complement the Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department controls on dredging from boats. However, these controls can only be introduced to control nuisance rather than to protect the ecosystem or fishery, although the Secretary of State has indicated that they will change the Act in the near future."

It is my understanding that the Bill, which is a private Member's Bill, but which was, I believe, drafted with the assistance of the Government, seeks to meet precisely that commitment from the Secretary of State.

I must emphasise that neither these amendments, nor any others that were not selected for debate, form part of any attempt to wreck the progress on this Bill or any other Bill on today's Order Paper. I have to say in all honesty that, if that had been my aim, I could have tabled many more amendments to the Bill. I have some concerns, about which I have not tabled amendments, that I shall raise with my hon. Friend on Third Reading to seek assurances on a number of important points.

It is not the number of amendments that matter, but the length of time spent debating other matters on the Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) Bill that is the cause of concern for many disabled people.

I can understand that, but, as I said, this is a very rare opportunity for the House to discuss these issues, and it is one which we should not pass up lightly. The RSPB is taking a very close interest in our proceedings and welcomes the interest that the House is taking in this important measure. It is certainty not a Mickey Mouse measure in any sense.

Many rural jobs and much income are tied up with the activity. If the hon. Member for Kingswood (Mr. Berry) dismisses the subject because he has an interest in another Bill, that is unfair.

My hon. Friend's intervention speaks for itself and I agree with it entirely.

Will my hon. Friend comment on the fact that the hon. Member for Kingswood (Mr. Berry) has just said that the number of amendments did not matter and that what mattered was the length of speeches. I have tabled a few amendments on the Sale and Supply of Goods Bill about which I feel strongly and which I hope we shall reach. Will my hon. Friend comment on the complete contradiction between the words of the hon. Member for Kingswood and those of the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Sheerman), who referred to an onslaught of amendments that had been tabled.

I think that you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, would rightly take me to task if I speculated on amendments to other Bills. It may help the House and the hon. Member for Kingswood to know that it is not my intention to remain beyond the completion of proceedings on the first Bill, which is the only one that concerns me today. I take note of what my hon. Friend said and I think that the House will find much in what he says with which to agree.

The amendments seek to eliminate unfairnesses in the Bill and to improve it. The Bill is small but vital and must complete its passage today. If I am advised by my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Kynoch) or my hon. Friend the Minister that the effect of the amendments will be to destroy any of the Bill's purposes, I will not to proceed with them, but I hope that that will not prove to be the case. I do not intend, during the debate on the amendments, to steal the thunder of my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Kynoch)—I know that he wishes to explain to the House in greater detail the importance of the measure.

It is important that amendments Nos. 1, 2 and 6—and the Bill on Third Reading—should be properly scrutinised. The Bill has had precious little scrutiny in either House. Unfortunately, it received a brief Second Reading in another place and an equally brief Committee stage.

Did the hon. Gentleman amend the Bill in Committee? Did he apply to be a member of the Standing Committee? I know that he has diverse interests. When I look at the Register of Members' Interests, I see that he is associated with Tim Bell, Visa and Avis—[Interruption.] Well, let me say that the hon. Gentleman has a large number of interests. I should have thought that if those interests were so high a priority with him he would have applied to be a member of the Committee and would have amended the Bill in Committee, which he knows that he can do even if he is not a member of the Committee.

The hon. Gentleman cannot have been listening to what I said earlier. The Bill received only a formal Second Reading in the House before it was referred to a Standing Committee—a Scottish one to be precise. I was unaware of the Bill's passage through the House and became aware of it only—as the hon. Gentleman would have known had he been listening—when the campaign of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds on marine life—

Order. It would be for the convenience of the House if the hon. Gentleman dealt with the amendments.

I am grateful for your help, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I do not think that the remarks of the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Sheerman) were entirely relevant to the amendments. In view of the vindictive campaign being waged by some Opposition Members against individual hon. Members, I shall answer one question posed by the hon. Member for Huddersfield that is relevant to the amendments and shows why I am interested in the Bill.

The hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) mentioned my membership of the RSPB. I have spent time in the Solway firth, watched the bird life there and derived great pleasure from doing so. He will know that I regularly speak on marine issues in the House. He may not know —this is relevant to the enforcement proceedings that we are about to discuss—that my family is now, and has been, involved in fisheries protection, and my brother-in-law served on a fishing vessel that was taken up from trade used in the Falklands war. Therefore, fishing issues are of great interest to me. I have absolutely no commercial interest in the Bill. My motives are entirely concerned with the Bill's enforcement provisions and the protection of marine life.

Today's debate on the amendments is timely. The amendments relate to the use of tractor dredgers on the foreshore to take cockles—an activity not covered by the 1984 Act. We need to regulate shore fishing to conserve the stocks. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Mr. Atkinson) said, cockles provide a source of income for the fishing industry, food for shops and restaurants and essential food for birds. It is important that the regulations exist and are effectively enforced.

The new-style tractor dredgers—the equipment referred to in clause 2—can collect an average of 1.5 tonnes of cockles per hour. It is significant equipment. In the process, the ecology of the foreshore is destroyed. It is important that the Bill and the clause should ensure that the provisions are enforced. The consequences for bird life are serious as the ecology of the foreshore is wrecked—the marine organisms dry out and there is not enough time for them to be rewatered by the incoming tide.

The Bill's draftsmen have not recognised the fact that the clause not only deals with problems caused by cockle fishing, but goes wider. The Bill catches in its net—if I may use a fishing metaphor—all fishing activities because it refers to boats at sea as well as activities on the foreshore. It is important to take this opportunity to consider the wider significance of the amendment and the clause.

Amendment No. 1—

The amendment deals with vehicles or equipment subject to hire and the hirer, not the Bill in general.

Amendment No. 1 extends the guilt of an owner in relation to fishing boats in section 4 (1) of the 1984 Act to vehicles and equipment owners. It is more likely that the owner of a fishing vessel will be party to illegal fishing. It is difficult to see how such an owner could let a boat go to sea without knowing what it was going to do. There are strong logical reasons for the provision to cover sea fishing. It is much more likely that vehicles and equipment—to use the phrase in the Bill—could be involved without the owners' knowledge and consent. That is precisely my worry.

We all know that farmers share tractors. If the clause is unamended, we could encounter problems in relation to tractors in shared ownership. An owner could lend a tractor believing it to be for one purpose and find that the person borrowing the tractor intends to engage in an activity that, as a result of the Bill, is illegal. The owner of a tractor could use the claim that he thought that the tractor was being used for another purpose as a defence against prosecution, which would make the law unworkable.

The same is true of other equipment, but probably not the dredging equipment, which is highly specialised. The absence of any definition of equipment is a problem in the Bill. Section 9 of the Act could have usefully been amended to include a definition of equipment. The fact that there is no such definition makes it more difficult to discuss the clause meaningfully. If my intention were to destroy the Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) Bill, I could have done so. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister or my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside will give a specific assurance on the subject of definition.

I am seeking to remove—

The hon. Gentleman should sit down.

The hon. Gentleman makes comments from a sedentary position that I have already answered in response to interventions from hon. Members on both sides of the House. I do not want to repeat those responses as that would incur the wrath of the Chair and the House. I am seeking to be courteous and not to waste the time of the House and it would he helpful if the hon. Gentleman desisted from making sedentary observations.

Clause 2 is well intentioned but goes too far. It makes someone guilty of an offence that he or she could not have known was to be committed. Amendment No. 2 relates to similar issues. It would effectively delete line 8 on page 2 of the Bill relating to the vehicle or equipment subject to hire and the hirer. Concern was expressed in the Standing Committee that new section 4(1A)(c) of the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984, inserted by clause 2 of the Bill, may make a person guilty of an offence if she or he hires a vehicle and it is used without his or her knowledge to commit an offence. The purpose of the amendment, which deletes the reference to such hirings, is to enable an exploration of the issue.

As has already been mentioned, on 9 March the hon. Member for Dumbarton referred to the problems of companies such as Hertz and Avis. He asked:

"Would the offence relate solely to the person renting the car or could it relate to Hertz or Avis? Despite legal opinion, I was asked to raised the matter in our debate on the clause. My understanding is that the provision relates only to the person who rents the car and that the hirer would not be affected. Will the hon. Gentleman comment on that for the sake of those who may be affected?"

In response, my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside said:

"I shall certainly get back to the hon. Gentleman … but I understand that the provision would not cover a car parked alongside the dredger; it would cover the equipment that is doing the damage."

My hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Gallie) then said:

"Following the comments made by the hon. Member for Dumbarton, it may be more appropriate to refer to a tractor than to a car. A tractor and a dredging unit could be hired from separate sources. The hirer of the tractor may have no connection with the hirer of the dredger."—[Official Report, Second Scottish Standing Committee, 9 March 1994; c. 6.]

My hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside provided limited reassurances in response to that matter, but the essential point is that he promised to get back to the hon. Member for Dumbarton. He will know that, since the Pepper v. Hart judgment, what is said during our proceedings can be taken into account by a court of law, but, to the best of my knowledge, this aspect of the Bill has not been put on record in the House. We would appreciate it if my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside could give further reassurances on this point. That would be a great comfort.

10 am

Amendment No. 6 is the most substantial in terms of text and it is also of great importance in the context of cockle fishing, the specific issue covered by the Bill. Although my principal concern relates to the owners of vehicles or equipment, I am also concerned about the owners of boats who are currently covered by the Bill. Amendment No. 1 would remove owners from automatic prosecution and amendment No. 6 would give them some rights over their property especially if—for whatever reason—they were not aware that their boat, vehicle or piece of equipment was being used to commit an offence. It would impose a simple duty on fishery officers to let an owner know what was likely to happen to his property as a result of their action.

It is essential that the House protects the property rights of innocent parties. There is a risk of the abuse of such rights under the 1984 Act unless amendment No. 6 is accepted, although there is less risk of boats being used without their owners' permission. I fully accept the importance of fishery officers being able to seize fishing vessels or equipment. If the Bill is to protect marine life effectively, the officers must have such power.

If a skipper is apprehended by fishery officers, he can anticipate a heavy fine, as my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson) said. He can also anticipate confiscation of his catch and, more important, the confiscation of his gear which means that he has to return to his home port to replace it. That is a major inconvenience, especially for foreign vessels. Confiscation of equipment is an extremely effective deterrent against sea fishing abuse, but, unless amendment No. 6 is accepted, the Bill will widen the definition of what can be confiscated. It is therefore important that we consider the amendment carefully.

The most obvious vehicle that could be detained under the Bill would be a tractor; but to whom might a tractor belong? What if it has been stolen or borrowed without authorisation? What if it has been taken without the owner's knowledge due to a simple misunderstanding by the person who has committed an offence? It is essential that we protect the property rights of innocent parties to an offence. I accept that confiscation is a powerful deterrent and I am seeking not to remove that power but to temper it by letting the owner know what is happening. He can at least then plan for his needs even if he cannot get his equipment back.

Amendment No. 6 is reasonable. I ask only that fishery officers notify an owner of the seizure of his vehicle or equipment as soon as is practicable. I am not seeking to place an onerous duty on their shoulders. The amendment underlines my other concern, to which I shall return on Third Reading, which is to ensure that all powers provided under the Act are used properly and fairly.

When my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Kynoch) or the Minister responds to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Luff), I hope that they will consider the use of, for example, minibuses by cockle fishermen. Those who have seen the cockle harvest in Wales will know that it sometimes resembles the Klondike. Hundreds of people appear on the foreshore having travelled to the scene by minibus.

As I understand it, under the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 the Scottish inshore waters over which the fishery officers have jurisdiction stretch only from six miles out to the mean high water mark. A gang of people who come to the foreshore in a hired minibus often park, not unreasonably, on the road which is, of course, above the mean high water mark. In England and Scotland, if one is caught poaching with the use of a vehicle, the magistrates or sheriffs can confiscate it, but, in this case, the fishery officer would have no power to confiscate the vehicle because it would not be within his jurisdiction—it would be in the jurisdiction of the police or the byelaw enforcement officer.

It appears that there could be a lacuna in the law and I should be grateful if my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside could explain clearly what would happen in such circumstance.

I shall not detain the House very long, but I am concerned about the very points to which the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Luff) relate. He rightly mentioned the need to protect the innocent owner, but the technical issue of who the owner of a vehicle is also needs to dealt with.

In today's world, it is highly likely that the owner may be a financial institution that has retained the property rights of the tractor or whatever vehicle may be used. We must recognise that the ownership and use of various types of equipment and vehicles can be quite separate. Many years ago, I was prosecuted for owning a vehicle with defective tyres although I had had nothing to do with the use of that vehicle. Fewer people now own outright the equipment that they use and that fact must be reflected in the law. That is why I was pleased that my hon. Friend tabled the amendments.

Like my hon. Friend, I fully support the motives of the Bill. I am a firm and active supporter of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and welcome its initiatives to encourage the Government's proposals introduced in the Bill. I in no way want to delay or detract from the Bill, but I am anxious to ensure that innocent parties who unwittingly find that equipment in which they have a proprietorial interest has been used to commit an offence should not suffer and incur the penalties to which my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson) has already drawn our attention. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Kynoch) or the Minister will be able to deal with that issue.

I disagree with some of the points made by my colleagues. My interest in the Bill arises from the time that I have spent on the Solway firth, not least one or two liquid new years at Drummore. The attraction of that part of the country is its traditional environment. It is an example of a delicately balanced ecosystem. If the Bill is to be effective it must firmly regulate the dredging in such parts of the country, but I believe that the amendments would weaken the proposed enforcement.

In another place, Lord Campbell set out clearly the background to the Bill. For years, traditional cockle picking has been part of the local way of life and has been carried out in balance with nature. The mudflats support large numbers of birds, and I spoke to representatives of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds this morning. Increased prices will inevitably mean more dredging by tractors—that is a simple fact. The Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 is not sufficient in scope to stop it, but can we introduce sufficiently restrictive measures?

The reservations expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Luff) are entirely understandable. To put the matter in context, we must realise what sort of community we are talking about. Unless we give the police specific powers to stop and search and to confiscate, it is difficult in a small community for a local policeman, who knows everyone in the area, to say, "I have a reasonable suspicion that you are doing this." It is much easier for the police if they have a more clearly defined power in law. Amendments Nos. 5 and 3, although attractive in terms of introducing the idea of reasonableness, might make it more difficult to enforce the legislation on the ground.

There is a more general point about the amendments. If we introduce environmentally protective legislation, it must be meaningful. If we water it down, as proposed in the amendments, we are in danger of making the legislation relatively meaningless. If we are to protect ecosystems, we must make the powers rigorous. To introduce, as the amendments do, the idea of doing things that are reasonably necessary to facilitate a search simply waters down—

Order. The hon. Gentleman is straying on to non-selected amendments. Amendments Nos. 5 and 3 have not been selected.

I apologise, Mr. Deputy Speaker, if I have the numbers of the amendments wrong. I return to the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Would not it help progress if, when the Whips organised a filibuster like this, they briefed their hon. Friends a little better than they have done?

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The Bill is of considerable concern to people in Scotland and to people who are interested in the environment. That is true of people in my constituency, which is situated near the Solway firth. During the progress of the Bill, we have been subjected to endless heckling from sedentary positions about filibusters. Some of us are concerned about the provisions of the Bill.

It is now time that the House got on with its business.

I was referring to amendment No. 6. It might seem reasonable that we should make clear who owned what equipment at what time. However, in small rural communities, it will be extremely difficult to enforce the legislation. We would not want people outside the House to feel that, in trying to be reasonable in the amendments, we were giving less environmental protection than was initially intended.

The surveys carried out by the marine laboratory of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland have shown a massive diminution in the biomass of cockles in the Solway firth. We must give as much protection as we can. Although the amendments are well intentioned, they would not achieve that because they would make the enforcement of a rigorous Bill more difficult. I hope, therefore, that my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester will address that point when he replies and that my hon. Friend the Minister will take those points on board.

Like other hon. Members who have commented on the Bill, I believe that it is a small but important measure. It deserves the whole-hearted support of the House. It is important for the people of Scotland and for people who live near the border. I represent a seaside constituency where these issues are important. I understand that the powers that we are discussing are already within the bailiwick of the fisheries committees in England and Wales. The Bill proposes to put right a position that was never envisaged in 1984 when the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act, which the Bill would amend, was passed.

I support the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Luff) and the thrust behind them. Speaking as a lawyer, I have to say that it is important that when the House considers criminal penalties—we must be in no doubt that we are talking about criminal penalties—it must be sure that they will be applied fairly and against people who are aware, or who have the possibility of being aware, that they are committing the offence covered by the Bill. The amendments, especially amendment No. 6, open up the discussion about the rights of owners who may not be aware that their boat, vehicle or other equipment is being used to commit an offence.

The amendments are sensible and fair. We are all anxious to make progress this morning, so, like other hon. Members, I shall try to be brief.

One only has to glance at the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 to see that there are significant penalties. That is the thrust behind the amendments. My hon. Friend the Minister may be able to correct what I am about to say; I have not had a chance to discover whether in the intervening years a regulation or another Act has amended and, no doubt, increased the possible penalties.

10.15 am

Under section 4 of the 1984 Act, a person guilty of an offence can, on summary conviction in a magistrates court, be liable to a fine of up to £5,000. As I have said, for all I know, that penalty may have already have been increased by the House through secondary legislation. On indictment, a person can be liable to a fine with no limit. That is bad enough. My hon. Friend the Member for Worcester has already touched on the other, rather more draconian, penalties that are contained in the 1984 Act. They include the rights of officers to enter dwelling houses and other premises, to search premises, to seize documents and to issue warrants for the impounding and sale of boats, gear and other equipment. People have to forfeit such equipment. Those are, rightly, very serious penalties to attach to very serious matters.

We all know the importance of such a conservation measure. We have debated at great length in the House—it is also an issue in my constituency—the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1992. We know that feelings run high, but we also know that if legislation is passed and enforced, the stocks can be built up again in a relatively short time. That is especially true of cockles. There can be a great surge of regeneration which produces abundant stocks again.

It is important that the penalties are serious and that they are taken seriously by those who consider breaking the regulations. However, I urge my hon. Friend the Minister and my other hon. Friends to consider seriously the force behind the amendments. They are designed to ensure that unwitting people cannot stray into breaking the regulations and into criminal convictions, with severe penalties attached to them and with draconian powers of search, detention and confiscation, without being aware that they have done so. That is why hirers and owners who may have no connection with the current use of the piece of equipment concerned should be protected as much as possible. I believe, and I urge the House to accept, that the amendments are absolutely accurate and spot on about the issue. I commend them to the House.

This has been an interesting debate on important amendments. I draw attention to the fact that there are no Scots spokesmen present on the Opposition Front Bench. I know that the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. McFall), who is a firm advocate of the Bill, would have liked to be here today. With the greatest of sympathy from Conservative Members, we are well aware that he is attending the funeral of John Smith. I know that all Scottish Conservative Members have great sympathy for John Smith's family at this time and our feelings are with them today.

I shall deal first with amendments Nos. 1 and 2 and then with amendment No. 6, which is slightly different. Amendments Nos. 1 and 2 raise the question whether the owner of a vehicle or equipment should be criminally liable, without proof of complicity on his part, if the vehicle or equipment is used in breach of an order under the Bill. Amendment No. 2 raises the question whether such an owner should be criminally liable if he has hired out his vehicle to another person. Rightly, those are issues of concern to my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Luff) and I am grateful to him for providing the opportunity to explain the intention of the measure. The House will know that the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 already contains, in section 4(1), a similar measure in relation to fishing boats. Where a fishing boat is used in the commission of an offence under that Act, the master, the owner and, if there is one, the charterer are all guilty of an offence.

The purpose of clause 2, which the amendments seek to alter, and, indeed, the purpose of the Bill as a whole is simply to mirror the existing provisions of that 1984 Act. The purpose of the proposed new subsection 4(1A) is therefore to ensure that owners and hirers of vehicles and equipment are in no different position from the owners and hirers of fishing boats. The principle on which both measures is based is that while, in either case, those persons may not directly be conspiring to bring about the commission of an offence, they may directly or indirectly make profit from its commission. I am anxious that the Government have as complete an arsenal of weapons as possible to assist them in policing those measures. To deprive them of recourse against owners and hirers would leave open a major loophole of enforcement. We may find that the minnows are caught, but the big fish swim undisturbed.

It is also part of my consideration that persons should not be able to avoid liability under the law by the subterfuge of entering into contracts of hire with the operators of their vehicles or equipment, leaving those operators to face prosecution even though the bigger fish may still, through indirect routes, be the ultimate beneficiaries of fishing activity. In fact, I have heard many stories of the shore at Southerness on the Solway firth, where numerous vehicles have been seen ploughing up the beach suction dredging, and I have been told that a person arrives in a car with a wad of bank notes and pays those people for the services. That person, who, presumably, owns the equipment, should be responsible if there is a breach of the Act.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester will accept that careful consideration has already been given to the issues that he has raised today. I fully appreciate that his concern may rest with entirely innocent owners or the hirers of vehicles or equipment, but he must bear in mind the fact that that may be the position of owners or charterers of fishing boats as well. He should also bear it in mind that, on the whole, we will be dealing with specialised vehicles and equipment which may have to be adapted for that purpose. It would also be fair to say that, in exceptional cases of complete disconnection between an owner and the commissioner of an offence, the investigating authorities, the prosecuting authorities and, of course, the courts will have some discretion in the matter of responsibility. Of course, the Crown will have regard to public interest and the courts to culpability in reaching their respective conclusions. Therefore, it is my intention to close any loophole by ensuring that owners of vehicles and equipment and persons who take them on hire continue to be liable under the measure.

I hope that my hon. Friend will accept my arguments and recognise that the circumstances which cause him concern will be rare—if, indeed, they arise at all. The benefits of the proposed measure clearly outweigh any disadvantage which he envisages. He referred to the point raised by the hon. Member for Dumbarton in Committee, with particular reference to Avis, Hertz and cars. I said in Committee that the equipment had to be an integral part of the equipment carrying out the dredging operation and, therefore, that an innocent car parked on the foreshore, which clearly was not part of the dredging operation, would not be affected.

rose—

If my hon. Friend would bear with me and, also, to save time, I should like to put on the record a letter from my hon. Friend the Minister to the hon. Member for Dumbarton on 15 March. I shall refer only to the section that applies to the matter and not include the introduction. It states:

"The proposed powers under clause 1 of the Bill could only be used where a vehicle played an active part in fishing activity, such as pulling and dredging equipment along the foreshore. Any other use would not come within the purview of the Bill.

The Bill proposes that hirers should also be liable where fishing has taken place from their vehicles partly to mirror the powers already available against charterers of vessels and partly to prevent parties from avoiding the consequences of liability by contracting out equipment. The Bill was carefully drafted to meet that concern without drawing in vehicles which were innocently using the foreshore. I hope this clarifies the issue for you."

I appreciate my hon. Friend's point, but I am still concerned about what happens to a car that is being used to transport people to the beach to take part in illegal activity, unwittingly, for example. Would that be caught in the provisions of the Bill? It may be a technical point. I do not think that he has answered my point about a tractor that is being unwittingly used. I still feel very nervous about those points.

I thank my hon. Friend for expanding on that. A vehicle transporting people to the beach would not be covered. The purpose of the Bill is to cover the equipment concerned. That means the equipment involved in the dredging. To consider a tractor is a fair point, which was raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr (Mr. Gallie) in Committee. However, if a tractor were connected to the dredging equipment, it would be part of the equipment and therefore should be part of the process of seizure. Therefore, the owner of that tractor should already also come under the auspices of the Bill, being similar to the charterer of a vehicle.

The point that my hon. Friend has just raised was precisely what I was trying to get at in my short intervention. Today, the vast majority of farmers and others do not buy tractors outright, but use a range of different financing methods and leasing is increasingly popular. As I understand the law, for vehicles or equipment bought on lease, the title does not transfer to the operator, but remains with the financial institution. My hon. Friend's proposals are made for worthy reasons and I understand everything that he has said so far, but it means that the big finance houses would find themselves liable, as owners of title, for tractors that were used.

My hon. Friend raises a valid point, but I would argue that a similar situation exists in relation to boats. Very few boats are bought outright and the purchase of them involves finance companies as well. I agree that an innocent farmer may well unwittingly rent out his tractor to someone else, but I argue that, if he knows that there are restrictions on cockle fishing in an area, it is his responsibility to find out the purpose for which his tractor is being rented.

I shall move on to amendment No. 6, in relation to clause 3. That would impose a requirement on an officer who has seized a vehicle or equipment to inform its owner, if the owner has not been present at the seizure, of that fact and how matters proceed. The Bill intends to give power to British sea fishery officers to seize vehicles or equipment which, in their opinion, have been used to commit an offence under the Bill. The purpose of that power is not permanently to deprive the owner of the vehicle or equipment, but to ensure in cases in which it is appropriate to do so that the vehicle or equipment is available as evidence to be put before the courts to make out a case. It often happens that the only proper evidence that the law will accept is the offending article itself.

May I clarify one point, which I covered in my short speech? Under section 8 of the 1984 Act, there is also a power for what is called poinding—rather than being a typographical error, I assume that that is a Scottish legal expression—and sale of the boat and its gear and catch. Is my hon. Friend saying that it is not envisaged in the Act, as amended by this provision, that there can be permanent deprival of equipment? It may not be a question that my hon. Friend can answer on his feet, but in the 1984 Act, which is our starting point for the debate, poinding, whatever that is, and sale are envisaged.

I would not dare to embark on the difference in the detailed legal terminology between Scotland and England, but I can confirm that what my hon. Friend says is absolutely correct. There is no intention of permanent seizure.

To return to the point about tractors and leasing companies, as I said earlier, the procurator fiscal has some latitude in whether he pursues the owner. Obviously, he would not cause an innocent owner to be pursued. However, the provisions for the owner to be included have to be in the Bill.

I was about to explain that the evidence of the equipment is usually known as the best evidence rule. Seizure should therefore be seen as an evidential matter rather than as a form of summary justice. Powers to detain fishing boats and to seize fishing gear are already available under the provisions of the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 and other provisions of sea fishing legislation. I believe that such powers are used sparingly and only where circumstances demand, particularly in the case of the tying up of a fishing boat. I envisage that the proposed powers would be similarly sparingly and intelligently used by those who exercise them.

At present, there is no equivalent provision to that proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester in any of the sea fishing legislation of which I am aware. That omission does not appear to have given rise to a problem. Owners of boats or gear have always seemed to find out about their detention or seizure—believe it or not, in no time at all. Obviously, word travels very quickly if something is seized and there has been a contravention of the law.

10.30 am

I recognise the concern of my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester, but I wonder whether the provision would do all that he expects of it, or whether it is entirely necessary to be included in the Bill. My hon. Friend may believe that the provision encompasses boats. That is not the case because it refers only to equipment.

The ownership of a vehicle may be difficult to determine. The vehicle may be the subject of a hire contract and the appropriate person to notify may be the person who has taken it on hire, as opposed to the leasing company or hirer. By the time that the appropriate person to notify has been found, the purposes of the provision may have been rendered unnecessary. Although the appropriate person may be known, that person may not be able to be traced in good time.

For those reasons and more, which I am sure may occur to my hon. Friends, I am reluctant to see the measure included in the Bill. However, I am aware that in many respects the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency, which will primarily be concerned with the enforcement of the Bill, currently carries out its various duties in such a way as to least upset lawful fishing activities, so far as that is practicable. Indeed, in line with the Government's citizens charter commitments, it has produced a code of enforcement practice which, among other things, specifically commits itself to carrying out its duties in that way.

In the spirit of that policy, I understand that the agency might see the merit of some form of notification being made by the agency in the case of seizure of vehicles or equipment where circumstances merited it—for example, where it was clear that those responsible for the equipment or vehicle on the spot were unable to do so.

When the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, my hon. Friend the Member for Eastwood (Mr. Stewart) responds to the debate, I wonder whether he will be able to offer a commitment in relation to notification in those circumstances. If that is the case, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester will be prepared to withdraw his amendment, which I fully understand and appreciate, but which I believe to be unnecessary.

My hon. Friend the Member for Worcester (Mr. Luff) raised several important points which, as he said, were referred to by the hon. Member for Dumbarton (Mr. McFall) in Committee. To underline the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Kynoch), we entirely understand why the hon. Member for Dumbarton and his colleagues and colleagues in the minority parties from Scotland are in Scotland today and not here for this debate. However, it would be appropriate to say that they are fully supportive of the Bill in principle.

Hon. Members may also wonder why I am responding to the debate rather than my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries (Sir H. Monro), who has been very closely involved with the Bill both as the fisheries Minister and as a constituency Member. Hon. Members will be aware that Lady Monro has been in hospital for a few days. I have to tell the House that she died late last night. I am sure that the whole House will wish to extend its sympathies to my hon. Friend the Member for Dumfries.

My hon. Friend the Member for Worcester raised genuine issues. However, at the end of my remarks, I hope that he will follow the advice of my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside and withdraw the amendment. As my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside said, the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Act 1984 contains a similar measure in relation to fishing boats. Where a fishing boat is used in the commission of an offence under that Act, the master, owner and—if there is one—the charterer are all guilty of an offence.

The purpose of clause 2, which the amendments seek to alter, and indeed the essential purpose of the Bill as a whole, is to mirror the existing provisions of the 1984 Act. The purpose of proposed new subsection 4(1A) is therefore to ensure that owners and hirers of vehicles and equipment are in no different position from owners and hirers of fishing boats. I emphasise that that was very much the view of the fishermen themselves.

I understand my hon. Friend's argument and the fact that he wants consistency between the ownership of fishing vessels and the ownership of tractors, and so on. However, does he accept that the financial provisions that are available now are different from those that were available in 1984? In particular, leasing then was not such a widespread means of operating a vessel or a tractor as it is today. As a consequence, the law should reflect that.

I accept that my hon. Friend has a point. However, we are talking about very specialised equipment. We are not talking about someone hiring a car or a van, or even a tractor, and going out for a picnic. It is fairly obvious what the hirer's purpose would be.

I want to clarify the point, as my hon. Friend the Minister seems to misunderstand slightly. There is a definite distinction between hiring and leasing. The point that I raised, and the point to which I believe my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Staffordshire (Mr. Fabricant) is referring, is leasing—using the money of a finance house to lease a vehicle or a piece of equipment for several years, just as I lease my computer equipment here in the House of Commons instead of having to pay for it upfront. It is a form of purchase, but the title remains with the finance house.

I accept that my hon. Friend has a genuine point, to which I shall return. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside that the enforcement authorities will have no interest in prosecuting an innocent person who has perhaps leased a vehicle in complete innocence of its purpose. However, on balance, he was right to say that the Government should have as complete an arsenal of weapons—to use his phrase —as possible to assist them in policing these measures. To deprive the Government of recourse against owners and hirers would leave open a fairly major loophole in enforcement.

I do not want to mix metaphors, but the minnows might be caught while the big fish would swim undisturbed if that were the case. It is clearly possible that there could be subterfuge in respect of those entering into contracts of hire with the operators of the vehicles or equipment leaving the operators to face prosecution even though the people behind the activity might be the ultimate beneficiaries of the activity.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester will accept that we have considered the matter carefully. However, there are two arguments. The first relates to the owners or charterers of fishing boats. We are bringing the provisions of the Bill into line with that. Secondly, in exceptional cases—which is the point raised by my hon. Friend on leasing—where there is a complete disconnection between the owner and the commissioner of an offence, the investigating authorities, the prosecuting authorities and, ultimately, the courts—

Does my hon. Friend accept the point that I made earlier—at present, boats are frequently leased and the operation does not seem to cause any problems in the existing Act?

My hon. Friend is correct to refer to the 1984 Act. The provisions of that Act do not seem to create any problems; there is no evidence that there is a problem with the Act. Where there is a complete disconnection between an owner and the commissioner of an offence—which is, essentially, my hon. Friend's point—the investigating authorities, the prosecuting authorities and the courts have discretion with regard to their responsibilities. The Crown will have regard to the public interest and the courts will have regard to culpability in reaching their respective conclusions.

May I be clear on what my hon. Friend is saying? Is he saying that, notwithstanding the fact that clause 2 says

"Where an offence is committed by way of contravention of any order … each of the following persons shall … be guilty of an offence",

the courts will have discretion? If so, that would be a real comfort to me in considering what I should do with my amendments. It seems to be clear that there is no discretion. However, if my hon. Friend is saying that there is discretion, that is extremely welcome.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend—obviously, it is an important point. Perhaps I can confirm exactly what I am saying: the courts will have some discretion in the matter for their own responsibilities. The Crown will have regard to the public interest and the courts will have regard to culpability in reaching their respective conclusions. I hope that that reassures my hon. Friend.

In conclusion, I understand entirely the points made by my hon. Friends with regard to amendments Nos. 1 and 2. However, I hope that they will agree that the benefits of the proposed measure—because of the assurances that I have been able to give with regard to the powers of the courts—outweigh the disadvantages, which they envisage.

I shall refer briefly to some of the other points made by my hon. Friends with regard to amendment No. 6. I can confirm that vehicles on the foreshore would not be covered unless they were actively involved in fishing activities. If someone hires my motor car, or that of my hon. Friend, and goes to the beach for a picnic, that would not be subject to the provisions of the Bill. Vehicles innocently using the beach would not be affected; nor would vehicles being used only to transport fish from the beach to processing plants or fish markets. Under the Bill, the vehicles must be specialised. The equipment is extremely specialised. I assure my hon. Friend that car hire companies would be unlikely to be affected by the provisions of the Bill.

My hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside rightly pointed to the best evidence rule with regard to seizure. It is right to underline his point that seizure should be seen as an evidential matter. It is not a matter of summary justice; it is simply an evidential matter. What we are doing is creating a level playing field between fishing boats and fishing gear on the one hand and land-based fishing activities on the other.

I hope that I have been able to reassure my hon. Friend the Member for Worcester on those matters. He has raised legitimate points, as were raised in Committee.

I will be reassured if my hon. Friend is able to give an assurance that fishery protection officers will exercise their powers carefully and responsibly, and consider taking steps to notify owners, even if the owners are not party to an offence. If my hon. Friend can give me that assurance, I will be greatly reassured.

My hon. Friend makes a valid point, which was also raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Kincardine and Deeside. We have been in touch with the Scottish Fisheries Protection Agency on that matter. I understand that it has given that assurance on the way in which it will handle such matters, so I can give that assurance to my hon. Friend. In the light of the assurances that I have been able to give, I hope that my hon. Friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment and not push it to a vote.

I am extremely grateful to both my hon. Friends the Member for Kincardine and Deeside (Mr. Kynoch) and the Minister for their remarks. I think that I am largely reassured. Ideally, I should have liked more time to test these amendments in Committee than I have had the opportunity to do today. However, I am anxious not to delay the House any further.

As to amendments Nos. 1 and 2, the assurance that I have been given that there is some discretion to the courts with regard to public interest is important. I am glad that that is on the record, and I am glad that it will be borne in mind in the future. As to amendment No. 6, what my hon. Friend the Minister said at the end of his remarks gives me precisely the reassurance that I was looking for. Therefore, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

No.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I wonder if you could give the House guidance on what now happens.

Every political party in Scotland has supported this Bill—

Order. I can give that advice. We go on to the next Bill.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The Bill has been killed by the Government and their tactics because they were unable to control the filibuster—

Order. The House must settle down. It is getting into a mess.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I do not want to raise the temperature in the House today of all days, but would you not rule that the Bill has been universally accepted by political—

Order. With great respect to the Minister, I have already ruled. We must go on to the next business.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Is this a point of order on the same subject? If it is, I have already ruled on the matter.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

There is no further point of order on the subject. We have moved on.

I beg to move amendment No. 15, in page 1, line 8, leave out

'in the course of a business'.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 16, in page 1, line 10, at end insert

'whenever the seller sells goods in the course of a business and otherwise when in all the circumstances it is reasonable to imply the same.'.

No. 10, in page 1, line 14, after first 'relevant' insert,

'any representations or other statements made by or on behalf of the seller expressly or by implication which it is reasonable for the buyer to rely upon'.

No. 11, in page 1, line 15, at end insert

'including the commercial reputation of the seller, as the seller himself by himself or by any associated company or brand name may have induced in respect of the particular class of goods or otherwise by advertising, marketing or otherwise promoting the same.'.

No. 7, in page 2, line 9, at end insert—

'(2) In section 14 of that Act, for subsection (3) there is substituted—

"(3) Where the seller sells goods in the course of a business there is an implied condition that the goods supplied are reasonably fit for the purpose usually intended or to the knowledge of the seller or an agent of the seller (including any credit-broker) actually or reasonably foreseeable intended by the buyer for such goods, and in determining reasonableness regard shall be had to all the circumstances including the commercial reputation of the seller, as the seller himself by himself or by any associated or brand name may have induced in respect of the particular class of goods or otherwise by advertising, marketing or otherwise promoting the same.".".

I must declare an interest as an adviser to the Dixons group of companies, which are obviously involved in the sale and supply of goods.

The House will be aware that during the past few weeks—culminating in a vote in the House last week—I have single-mindedly pursued the issue of horse racing on Sundays. I am grateful to the House for its support on that issue, which I pursued with similar single-mindedness to that of the hon. Member for Kingswood (Mr. Berry) in relation to the Civil Rights (Disabled Persons) Bill. For that reason, I have only recently been able to turn my attention to other issues. As the interest that I have just declared makes abundantly clear, I am concerned about the sale and supply of goods.

Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 are linked and refer to the implication that a seller is operating a business for the supply or sale of goods even though he or she is not.

Many hon. Members will be familiar with the fact that car boot sales, Sunday markets and other opportunities for people to dispose of goods are burgeoning. Car boot sales have come a long way since their origins as somewhere where people could sell unwanted household commodities from the boots of their cars. Many different people now operate at them, sometimes as genuine businesses, but sometimes on the very fringes of respectability, selling a range of commodities, both new and second hand. I dare say that some of the commodities are purported to be new but are not.

Another development is shop squatting, which has caused great distress to the retail industry. As premises become vacant, for whatever reason—sadly, during the past two or three years it is often because the previous tenant had to close the business down—people move into them, often at Christmas time, to sell a range of commodities. In such cases, the goods are almost entirely new, but they are of fairly dubious quality.

The common feature of car boot sales, Sunday markets and shop squatting arrangements is that the sellers appear to be operating as businesses. The Bill clearly sets out to protect consumers and I do not want to detract from that aim. I am trying to enhance consumer protection in that respect. We must therefore ensure that members of the public are not excluded from the protection offered by the Bill because someone is masquerading as a business, but is not one in reality.

It is impossible for a consumer to know for certain whether someone is legitimately operating a business or whether they have managed to procure a pile of out-of-date groceries, tinned foods, Christmas decorations or any one of the countless variety of products that are on sale on such occasions. A potential purchaser does not know the business background. Perhaps someone has been left the goods, found them in their attic or obtained them by dubious means, which is a matter for the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Bill, which is next on the Order Paper. Or they may simply have gone out and purchased them.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the law should state that only the purely private seller is excluded? His amendments would give the courts discretion to achieve that, which has been impossible under existing legislation.

I always bow to the judgment of colleagues who are experts in the legal profession, as I am not. I am therefore even more grateful that my hon. Friend appears to endorse my argument.

In my constituency, many people who go to, or purchase goods from, the various sales that I mentioned are greatly concerned and I am sure that other hon. Members also find that that is the case. Car boot sales are especially common and purchasers have no idea of the origin of the products on sale. It is impossible to know whether the goods are being sold genuinely and whether they are genuinely new. Goods often seem to be in the original packaging, but sometimes there are grounds for doubting that they are new.

The Bill as drafted, and after the Standing Committee, does not protect the consumer if sellers of goods can demonstrate that they are not selling them as a business.

I appreciate that my hon. Friend's proposal will not apply to charities, but existing law applies to second-hand goods. What effect would his amendments have on the following situation, which is not unheard of in my constituency? Someone—perhaps a farmer—takes a sort of rental for the number of people coming to a big car boot sale. People might not come regularly to set up a stall as they might have full-time jobs during the week. Perhaps they come along from time to time to sell stuff that is theirs or that they have acquired in the way that he described, which might include second-hand goods.

The second-hand goods aspect is extremely important and I am pleased that the Bill as drafted proposes that protection be extended to cover second-hand goods. I want that protection also to be extended to similar goods sold in situations where purchasers believe that they are buying from a business when they are not.

Once one moves to the second-hand goods arena, one must clearly begin to question the origins of the goods. There is no way that purchasers can know who has title to the goods. One has to assume that it is the seller. One must also assume that the seller is telling the truth if he says that he bought the product new only a year ago and that it has hardly been used, or that it was his grandmother's and has never been turned on because she died shortly after buying it. A range of salesman's glib talk can be used to persuade the gullible to purchase goods that they believe to be in good condition, but when they get them home they find that they are not.

If it can be proved that the person from whom the item was bought was not operating as a business, the buyer has no right of redress, which the Bill seeks to provide. I am anxious, therefore, that the provisions regarding a business should extend not only to new products but to second-hand goods, as I understand that they would if the amendments that I have drafted were made.

That would not be a precedent. Already, every classified advertisement must declare at the end if it is a trade sale. That is most commonly seen in vehicle advertisements. I am sure that all of us are old enough to remember reading classified advertisements for second-hand cars in the days when an ancient car was all that we could afford, and telephoning about a car only to find that one was telephoning a garage when one had thought that it was a private number because it was in the classified advertisements. If a garage advertises in those columns now, it must make it clear that it operates as a trade business. The extension of that principle to the sale and supply of goods would give much greater protection to the consumer.

I conclude by making a positive statement to the House. The subject has arisen many times, and I hope to pre-empt accusations that may be made later. In tabling my amendments, I have not had any advice, assistance, participation or, to the best of my knowledge, any knowledge from Ministers, civil servants or parliamentary counsel. They were drafted by myself in conjunction with other Back-Bench colleagues who are lawyers and better able to put them into legal language.

I accept entirely what the hon. Gentleman has said about the drafting of his amendments. I think that the proof of what he has said is the fact that most of his amendments were ruled out of order by the Speaker. However, as the hon. Gentleman has been a Member of the House for a considerable time and was here in 1989, the last time that the measure was debated, will he explain why, with his great interest in the subject, he did not table those amendments then?

Life moves on in this place and Members' interests tend to vary. The hon. Gentleman will find that during the period to which he refers I was actively involved in other aspects of the legislation of the House. I am a firm believer in the fact that one cannot concentrate on too many things at once, and that people who try to do so end up in difficulties. I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's acceptance of the statement about the authenticity of the amendments, although his comment about the proof of it was perhaps unnecessary.

I have proposed my amendments Nos. 15 and 16 specifically because I wish to protect the consumer, who may be misled into believing that he or she is buying from a genuine business, only to find, when seeking redress, that it was not a genuine business. That is the sole purpose of the amendments. I commend them to the House.

The Bill is a welcome measure of consumer protection as far as it goes, and the amendments in the group all deal with specific matters designed to improve consumer protection. I welcome what my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice) has said and I shall develop his argument a little further as it introduces the other amendments, Nos. 10 and 11, which stand in my name.

Part of the problem is that branded goods acquire a commercial reputation. If one buys from a private citizen a nearly new second-hand something-or-other—perhaps a rather expensive motor car—which turns out to be what the Americans call a lemon, what happens? Under the existing law, and under the Bill as drafted unless it is amended in the way that we are discussing, a sensible private seller would say nothing more than that it is a nearly-new something-or-other. The fact that it may have been very unsatisfactory in the six months for which one owned it is neither here nor there. The law imposes no obligation on the seller to say anything about the item. If the seller does say something about it, the law imposes a liability on the seller only if the seller makes a misrepresentation of existing fact—a narrowly defined category—or if the seller makes a contractual promise, which most sellers are not foolish enough to do.

11.15 am

Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 catch that situation, where someone buys a nearly-new something-or-other which is sold by a private citizen but the private citizen receives a higher price as a result of the commercial reputation of that class of goods. I suggest that that is the classic situation in which it would be reasonable for the court to treat the item as being sold in the course of a business.

That leads to amendments Nos. 10 and 11, which tackle the problems caused by the fact that the vast expenditure on advertising, marketing and promotion induces in members of the public—very reasonably, since that is why the money is spent—expectations of quality, which are not always met. The public, as consumers, should have wider protection in those circumstances. As the Bill is currently drafted—I welcome it although I am nostalgic for that useful ancient term, "merchantable", although I can understand that it is no longer up to date—clause 1(2A) provides:

"For the purposes of this Act, goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking account of any description of the goods".

I pause there because that deals with amendment No. 10—description—which is a very narrow legal category.

What I suggest should be considered specifically as part of all the circumstances are representations—that is perhaps not so controversial or novel—and all other statements made on behalf of the seller, expressly or by implication, on which it is reasonable for the buyer to rely. If the seller puffs up the goods, it seems to me that it ought to be specifically drawn to the court's attention as something to which it is reasonable to have regard. That is fair and just because it is the seller's expenditure on advertising, promotion and marketing that has raised expectations in the public of satisfactory quality, and that should be specifically brought into account.

In one of my amendments, which was not selected, I tried to tackle the problem, which my hon. Friend approaches in a different way, of a seller making a statement, for example, to the effect that the vehicle has a defective vacuum pump, but not explaining the full relevance of that—the full relevance being that the braking system would fail if the vehicle went on the road. In such circumstances, would the quality and nature of that statement be fully taken into account in deciding whether the quality was satisfactory?

I am grateful for that intervention because my hon. Friend makes an extremely important argument. I imagine that most of us, as consumers, would regard that situation as crying out for a just remedy.

The intention of the wording introduced in amendment No. 10, "other statements", is that if those statements are incomplete in the way described in my hon. Friend's example, or if a part-truth is told, which may be true as far as it goes but nevertheless does not go any further—

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Can he gave the House a broad estimate of how long he intends to speak on this group of amendments?

I should not have thought that that was relevant to what I am saying. I shall not speak at great length. From the clock, I believe that I have been speaking for about three minutes.

How long are you going to speak?

I shall not continue very much longer, if the right hon. Gentleman will just listen. These are important technical matters. I have spent more than 20 years at the Bar arguing about cases arising from the existing legislation and I have been struck by the degree of injustice whereby consumers do not obtain what they reasonably expect and anticipate. The amendments are intended to catch the wily Arthur Daley type of salesman, who ought to be sued successfully. It should not be enough to say, "I have said just enough and it is accurate as far as it goes," in the way my hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, North (Mr. Heald) described. That is what I want to catch.

I will move on quickly to amendment No. 11, which refers to a good point that I should have thought that Opposition Members would find attractive. I want to add a specific provision as to "all the circumstances",

"the commercial reputation of the seller, as the seller himself by himself or by any associated company or brand name may have induced in respect of the particular class of goods or otherwise by advertising, marketing or otherwise promoting the same.'".

It would seem to me unjust for large commercial organisations to arouse expectations of quality which, in a particular case, they manage to get out of because under the existing law nothing has been said that is specific. Clause 1, which is highly satisfactory and desirable, could be strengthened in that way to deal with that problem. I commend the amendment to the House.

I do not intend to go on for much longer, which should console the right hon. Member for Manchester, Wythenshawe (Mr. Morris), who seems to be still here. My final point is that I am deeply troubled by what the Bill does to section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In the 20 years since I passed my Bar exams, the law has been altered twice, and in drafting terms it is a dog's dinner. I have a specific question which I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will answer specifically. Why is section 14(6) left in when it should not be? I appreciate that those who drafted amendment No. 7 may not have thought of the importance of section 14(3), but if we are to have a new and effective definition of satisfactory quality, the definition of

"reasonable fitness for the purpose intended"

contained in that subsection should be brought up to date as well.

The House must bear in mind the fact that when I sat the Bar finals it was the other way round: reasonable fitness came first as the primary remedy, then merchantable quality. Parliament subsequently inverted that and we are now playing around to improve merchantable quality and, rightly and properly, substituting "satisfactory quality". It is necessary to broaden the test of reasonable fitness, which was traditionally far too narrow and again favours businesses and does not protect the consumer. The way in which it works at present is that where the buyer makes known a particular purpose to the seller, the goods have to be reasonably fit for that purpose. That is all very well as far as it goes, but it is extremely limiting.

If I were to say to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker—and if you were in trade, which you are not—that I wanted a something-or-other to do something-or-other, it would be fair game, if you were going to sell it to me, that it should be reasonably fit for that purpose. Most of us go into large retail warehouses to buy goods and we should have the same kind of protection. There is bound to be, and there always has been, an overlap between merchantable quality and reasonable fitness. Because the term "satisfactory quality" is so much better drafted, there will be even wider overlap.

Amendment No. 7 would ensure that the goods should be reasonably fit for usual purposes, and that should be spelt out. It would also ensure that the actual purposes of the buyer, which the seller knows, are made clear. It goes further, however, and refers to the purposes of the buyer which are "reasonably foreseeable" by the seller. In other words, if the commercial reputation of the seller and the goods in question is such, all the matters which have been aroused in the way of expectations on the part of members of the public should have a remedy. That is the purpose of the amendment.

It is my submission to the House that this combination of amendments strengthens this welcome Bill. When my hon. Friend the Minister speaks in due time, I hope that he will consider each of those aspects and see how far he can follow the spirit of the arguments that have been put. I commend what I have said to the House.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice), who has tabled amendments Nos. 15 and 16, which address problems that I have encountered in the courts as a barrister in the past 20 years. Those problems arise from the definition in section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 that the implied term as to "merchantability", or now "satisfactory condition" arises

" where the seller sells goods in the course of a business".

Those words cause two problems. First, the words "in the course of" have considerable uncertainty to them at law and do not provide adequate consumer protection. We should remember that the Bill, dealing as it does with the supply and sale of goods, affects all our constituents. It is not to be lightly trifled with and if there are mistakes and errors in the law, which there are, they should be remedied.

The second problem is that the word "business" is not a legal term of art, but it is an etymological chameleon, which means different things, depending on its context. There is a need for additional flexibility to protect the consumer.

To appreciate the nature of those problems it is necessary to consider the background. The words were first inserted in the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 and are similar to words used in the Trades Description Act 1968 that the false description must be applied

"in the course of a trade or business".

The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 uses similar words,

"makes the contract in the course of a business"

The policy of the words has never been clear at law. If I make a brief reference to "Benjamin On Sale of Goods", which is the leading text on this, the problem can be appreciated. About those words, it states:

" It seems plain that they cover not only a seller making a regular sale of goods in which he deals, but also a seller who by way of business manufactures or obtains or sells a commodity for the first time: this is supported by authority on the former wording … It seems also to be generally agreed, though such authority as there is derives from decisions in other contexts, that there is no need for the seller to be in the business of selling items such as that sold, or indeed to be in the business of selling at all; a one-off adventure will suffice."

On that basis, it was generally thought up to 1984 that the purpose of the wording was to include all sales except those by purely private sellers. In an earlier intervention I made that point to my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East. Most of us thought that that was the law and it is my submission today that it should be and that the amendments would achieve that.

I successfully argued in cases that the principle should be that only private sellers were excluded. In the earlier edition of "Benjamin on Sale of Goods", the following passage appeared, which seemed to support that:

"A farmer who sells off a surplus tractor, or a medical practitioner or solicitor or local government department disposing of surplus equipment which sells a used typewriter acts in the course of a business and so attracts the operation of the statutory term."

You may feel, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that if you were purchasing an item of property—a computer or a typewriter from a local authority—you would expect it to meet a certain standard and you would be somewhat surprised and feel that you should have a remedy at law if it was in a poor condition, unsatisfactory or, to use the old word, "unmerchantable".

The law was thrown into confusion in 1984 by the House of Lords decision in Davis v. Sumner, which is reported in the weekly Law Reports. That was a case under the Trades Description Act upon the wording,

"in the course of a trade or business".

The House of Lords decided in that case that a "sporadic" sale of an item was not covered and that there must be some degree of regularity to the provision of those goods in a business.

In that case a self-employed courier sold a car that he had used for his business during the preceding two years. The sale was held not to be

"in the course of a trade or business".

He had done 118,000 miles on his car, but the odometer showed 18,000 miles. He sold it and signed to say that 18,000 was genuine. The House may find it rather extraordinary to discover that it was held that he was not liable when the goods were not of merchantable quality—in this particular instance they did not meet their trades description.

There is a distinction to be drawn between the Trades Description Act and the Act with which we are concerned, the Sale of Goods Act. Under the Trades Description Act one is talking about the criminal standard and one is trying to restrain criminal activity. It is therefore right that the definition in that Act should be restrictive. I shall develop the argument that the same considerations can be applied under the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The House of Lords decision in Davies v. Sumner was followed in a 1988 case, R and B Customs Brokers Co. Ltd. v. United Dominions Trust. As it was not reported until early 1989, that explains why my hon. Friend did not bring it to the attention of the House on a previous occasion. That case was brought under the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, where it was held that the buying of goods must form at least an integral part of the buyer's business or be a necessary incidental thereto.

Because that decision failed to make the distinction between the two purposes of the two Acts, the effect is to reduce protection for buyers.

11.30 am

It is right that there should be a restrictive definition in a criminal statute, but a more liberal one is required where the consumer and his protection is at stake in a civil context, as here. It appears that a sporadic sale by someone who is not in the business of selling would not be covered by the protection. That is wrong, and amendment is needed. The words "in the course of" are inadequate for the purpose of consumer protection. The amendment is needed for that reason. The same is true in respect of the meaning of "business". Trading corporations or partnerships are businesses, but there are numerous borderline cases—non-trading corporations, partnerships, private individuals, and non-profit making organisations such as universities, colleges, schools and nursing homes.

Is a hospital restaurant, university book shop or even school tuck shop a business within the meaning of the statute? That may seem an arcane point, but it arises regularly in the provision by charities of low-cost furniture and the sale of secondhand clothes at jumble sales. One assumes that the charity itself would not be covered, but a problem arises where a charity or any of those other institutions moves into the commercial field.

In the leading text, that problem is outlined as follows:

"There are also organisations of a non-profit making nature such as universities, colleges, schools, nursing homes and so forth which make sales: although the whole activity may perhaps not be appropriately designated as a business, certain portions of it (e.g. a university bookshop or hospital restaurant) may be. Such cases must be solved with the aim of the legislation in mind; this seems to be the protection of consumers against those who sell with some degree of professionalism and regularity. The answer will turn on the circumstances of each case, and it is doubtful whether any specific principles can be laid down. At present such authority as there is … arises in other contexts".

The amendment would delete the words

"in the course of a business"

and add to the concept of a sale in the course of a business the flexibility that the implied term may be implied when, in all the circumstances, it is reasonable to do so.

In a proper case, that would enable the court to allow in the implied term, to deal with two particular problems. They are the case of a sporadic sale by a business man whose business was not that of selling—the problem that I outlined in respect of a farmer selling a tractor—and situations such as car boot sales, which are the subject of considerable public concern.

At present, the Government are amending the law on markets in three ways. One is a provision in the Deregulation and Contracting Out Bill. There is currently a prohibition on setting up a market within six and a half miles of an existing market.

Six and two third miles.

Within six and two third miles of an existing market. That prohibition is going. The provision as to market overt may go if the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Bill [Lords] is dealt with today. Car boot sales and their implications as markets are also being considered.

The law as it stands is not capable of dealing with the problems that arise for the consumer in knowing whether the place where he is purchasing goods is reputable. At car boot sales there will be individuals who are not selling in the course of a business as existing law would have it, but who none the less frequently attend car boot sales with items for sale. The flexibility provided by the amendment would address that situation.

My only concern is that the flexibility is too widely drawn. When my hon. Friend the Minister considers amendments Nos. 15 and 16, I should be grateful if he would address their specific wording and say whether their breadth and flexibility is too wide and might catch private individuals who sell goods, perhaps through a newspaper—whom we all agree should be excluded from the ambit of the legislation. I look forward to hearing my hon. Friend's response.

It may help to progress matters if I answer the points that have been raised. I am sure that they cover the amendments, so other hon. Members may not need to repeat them and prolong debate.

Amendment No. 15 would amend section 14(2) of the 1979 Act. At present, it provides that it is an implied term of a contract of sale that goods are of satisfactory quality. That introduces one of the basic requirements of the 1979 Act, but it is limited to cases where the seller sells goods in the course of a business. It does not extend to sales where the seller is not acting in the course of a business. Amendment No. 15 would remove that limitation, so that all sellers of goods would be required to supply goods of satisfactory quality.

That would place a significant burden on individuals wishing to sell goods. If a dealer sells a secondhand car, it is reasonable to expect him to have the skills and equipment to check that the vehicle is of satisfactory quality. A private seller is not in that position. His description of a vehicle may become an implied term of the contract, but that is all that should be expected. I cannot, therefore, support that amendment.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way on that point?

If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I want to make progress.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

No.

The hon. Gentleman is making a great mistake.

Amendment No. 16 would also amend section 4(2) of the 1979 Act. The requirement that goods should be of satisfactory quality would apply in contracts of sale—

Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to intervene?

I will give way to the Minister.

I am most grateful. The Government and I whole-heartedly support the Bill, but in the light of recent suggestions, will the hon. Gentleman confirm—as I believe that he did in Committee—that he received from the Department of Trade and Industry help with his Bill and with meeting points raised in amendments tabled by my hon. Friends?

I do not understand the point that the Minister is trying to make. Both sides of the House want the Bill to pass, which is why some of us cannot understand the prevarication of Conservative Members and their attempts to delay progress. We know of course that their behaviour relates not to this Bill but to one that is to be considered later today—if we ever reach it. It is my intention to get the Bill through quickly because everyone wants it.

The effect of amendment No. 16 would be that the requirement that goods should be of satisfactory quality would apply to contracts of sale not only where the seller sells goods in the course of a business, but where, in all the circumstances, it is reasonable to imply—I assume that the hon. Gentleman means infer—that he sells in the course of a business.

I cannot agree to that amendment. Its second part is unclear and imprecise, and would introduce great uncertainty into transactions. What circumstances would be relevant in deciding whether it may be inferred that someone is selling by way of a business? Is it reasonable for a buyer who responds to an advertisement and visits the seller's house to purchase goods to assume that the seller is in the course of a business because he has 20 items for sale? The risk of being assumed to be acting by way of a business would deter many individuals from selling goods.

What does the hon. Gentleman say to the point that I was making: that if the law stays as it is, as proposed in his amendment, the effect would be that if someone, perhaps a farmer, sells a tractor after two years, where his business is not naturally the sale of tractors, he would not be covered by the legislation? Surely he should be. The person buying from the farmer should be able to rely on the satisfactory condition of the item.

The farmer might very well sell his car rather than his tractor; it is still a motor vehicle. He is not an expert in car sales. He is merely selling a second-hand car, as many individuals do.

rose—

I shall not give way again. I have answered that point. Any individual can sell an item without being an expert in the nature of the item and cannot be held to be running a business as a result.

I do not see the need for amendment No. 10, as the additional factor is already covered by the present wording of section 14(2)(a). Any representations or other statements made are likely to amount to a description of the goods, which is already a factor referred to in that section. If they are not a description, they are, I suggest, "other relevant circumstances" and are therefore covered by the third factor in that section.

The Bill is drafted in general terms to cover a wide variety of situations and types of goods. Its terms are therefore often of a general nature. We should avoid introducing amendments that move away from that. In addition, introducing further factors into section 14(2)(a) could result in a court feeling constrained to consider only those factors, to the exclusion of all others. Furthermore, the introduction of that factor would be somewhat at odds with the provision of proposed section 14(2)(c). I can imagine that retailers may become most reluctant to offer any statement in respect of goods. That could deprive buyers of the advice that they require.

Amendment No. 10 refers to representations or statements on which it is reasonable for the buyer to rely. That would create a degree of uncertainty in commercial transactions. What criteria will be used in deciding whether it is reasonable for a buyer to rely on the representations made to him? Ultimately, the matter will have to be decided by a court, but it is likely that, in many cases, where the purchaser is an individual, he will not pursue the matter if the seller asserts that it was not reasonable for him to rely on any representations, as to do so could involve considerable legal costs.

Amendment No. 11, like amendment No. 10, would add additional wording to the proposed section 14(2)(a) suggesting that an additional factor be introduced, which, in essence, would be the commercial reputation of the seller. Again, I cannot support the amendment. Section 14(2)(a) already refers to the consideration of

"all the other relevant circumstances."

To the extent that the commercial reputation of the seller is relevant, it is already covered by that provision. I cannot, however, accept that the seller's commercial reputation is a relevant factor. Section 14(2)(a) explains what makes goods of a satisfactory quality, and the reputation of the seller cannot have any impact on that. It is totally inappropriate when assessing the quality of goods to assess the commercial standing of the supplier.

I am most concerned that the effect of amendment No. 11 would be to suggest that buyers should have different rights depending on from whom they purchased goods. That should not be the case. The requirements of the legislation should apply with equal force to all sellers who act in the course of a business.

I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman is not concerned about the effect of advertising and the vast amount of money that is spent on building up brand names and reputations. When somebody buys a nearly new something-or-other, why should not the fact that it is a something-or-other, with all that goes with it, which has been puffed up in expensive advertising, be specifically drawn to the court's attention as something that could be taken into account? I should have thought that that was elementary social justice and a considerable protection.

I do not imagine that there is anything to prevent that from being brought to the court's attention. We are saying that we do not think it needs to be written into legislation.

I now deal with amendment No. 7. Section 14(3) of the 1979 Act deals with a situation where a purchaser of goods expressly, or by implication, makes known to the seller or, in certain circumstances, a credit broker any particular purpose for which the goods are being bought. In such circumstances, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied are reasonably fit for that purpose. That is the case whether or not the buyer's purpose is a purpose for which the goods are commonly supplied, except where those circumstances show that the buyer does not rely, or that it is unreasonable for him to rely, on the skill or judgment of the seller or credit broker. A number of aspects of that section should be noted.

The purchaser, if he wishes to rely on the implied conditions, must make it known to the seller or credit broker, either expressly or implicitly, the purpose for which the goods are required. There is an obligation on the purchaser in some way to make known the purpose; there must be some action by him. Another aspect to note is that the implied condition covers whatever use the buyer has in mind as long as that use is made known to the seller or credit broker. That includes a wholly unlikely use. A third aspect is that the buyer cannot rely on the implied term where circumstances show that he does not rely on the seller or credit broker's skill or judgment, or it would be wholly unreasonable for him to rely.

That can be illustrated by examples. A buyer who wishes to rely on a seller's skills must make it clear what he intends. A purchaser who makes it clear that he wants to fill a bottle with boiling oil should not be supplied with a plastic one that melts on impact with the hot liquid. An expert builder should not seek to rely on the skill and judgment of an untrained assistant in a DIY superstore when purchasing building materials.

That demonstrates that that provision of the Act should remain as it stands. There is reference in the amendment to an implied term that the goods are

"reasonably fit for the purpose usually intended."

But proposed new section 14(2)(b)(a) states that one of the aspects of satisfactory quality is

"fitness for all the purposes for which goods of the kind in question are commonly supplied".

That part of the amendment appears to amount to no more than a repetition of what is already an implied term. To include it would cast doubt on what is already included in the Bill and could result in considerable confusion.

The amendment goes on to refer to what is

"reasonably foreseeable intended by the buyer".

There is a danger that a court could interpret that as placing a higher burden on the seller than the present provision does. The existing provisions require the buyer to make some indication of his intention, but the formulation of the proposal is such that the seller may be deemed to have been in a position where it should have been reasonably foreseeable to him what the buyer intended, regardless of any activity, or inactivity, on the part of the buyer.

The amendment goes on to refer to the "commercial reputation" of the seller. I do not think that that can have any relevance in the matter. The purchaser of goods is entitled to the same level of protection whether he purchases from a household name or from a small trader. The law should not in any way suggest that there is any difference between the requirements applicable to small traders and those applicable to retail chains. The purchaser should always be entitled to the same rights.

I hope that I have answered the points raised by hon. Members. Hon. Members on both sides of the House want the Bill to go through. It has been discussed in this place before, in 1989. It has been discussed on Second Reading and in Committee. We have gone to considerable lengths to discuss it again this afternoon. I see no reason to delay the Bill any further. I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn.

I support the principles and thinking behind the amendments. It was unfortunate and, if I may say so, contradictory that the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland), the sponsor of the Bill, indicated at the beginning of his speech that he thought that it would be helpful to hon. Members, and perhaps make it unnecessary for them to contribute, if he spoke at that point in the debate. He then proceeded, on at least two occasions, to refuse to accept interventions from me. I assume that his intention was genuine, but if he had accepted my intervention my remarks now might not have been necessary. Perhaps he and the House would like to reflect on that as the debate develops.

The Bill is important. I was not in the House in 1989 and so did not have the benefit of debating the matter then. It is important, not least to my constituents and those of other hon. Members. We have lost one important piece of business today thanks to the manoeuvres of Opposition Members, and I hope that that will not be the case with this Bill. It matters to ordinary members of the public who buy goods in the way of business or otherwise. It is important that we understand what "in the course of business" means. Some Opposition Members have tunnel vision during such debates. We are discussing an important measure. Other important measures appear later on the Order Paper and an important measure was lost earlier. I deprecate the sneering attitude that some hon. Members have adopted to an important and technical piece of legislation. I hope that we shall hear no more of that language in speeches or sedentary interventions.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. This is not acceptable. We all know that the hon. Gentleman is filibustering just after a Division when, breaking all conventions, we had a payroll vote. How dare the hon. Gentleman cast aspersions on hon. Members who support a Bill that we are to come to later? It is not right.

Let us get on with it.

I withdraw no aspersions. The remarks of the hon. Member for Huddersfield (Mr. Sheerman) were wholly inappropriate and I withdraw not a word of what I said.

The hon. Gentleman would not; he is an unctuous slob—[Interruption.]

Order. I apologise—I did not hear what the hon. Gentleman said. If he said anything that fell outside parliamentary language, he must withdraw it.

I do not think that "unctuous slob" is unparliamentary.

The Chair happens to think that it is unparliamentary, and I should be grateful if the hon. Gentleman would withdraw it.

I reluctantly withdraw the phrase.

I reluctantly accept that reluctant withdrawal. I hope that we can now make progress. I am several minutes into my speech and have not got to the meat of it. The reason for that lies entirely with Opposition Members. Let us now make progress, as we should all like to do.

The concerns underlying the amendments are important and deserve to be considered. If I can be reassured by remarks made by the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge or the Minister, that will be splendid. We are in a different era from when legislation on the subject was originally introduced. When the sale of goods legislation was introduced, we considered a simpler position whereby there was little option between buying goods in a shop, which is clearly in the course of business, and buying goods privately, perhaps from a neighbour, or through classified advertisements in the local newspaper. But now, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice) has said, the distinction is blurred.

My hon. Friend related stories of people who respond to classified advertisements and discover that they are dealing with a commercial business such as a car showroom. We heard about the practice of shop squatting, which occurs in my constituency. Local authorities have occasionally been reduced to putting skips full of earth outside premises to stop shop squatters gaining access.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Will you rule on whether the hon. Gentleman is talking about anything to do with the Bill? Shop squatting and skips outside shops have nothing to do with the Bill.

The hon. Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson) is in order; if he were not, I would have ruled him out of order.

If the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge had held his peace for a millisecond longer, I should have come to the subject of car boot sales, on which I hoped to intervene during his speech when he rattled through his Department of Trade and Industry brief.

Car boot sales are a problem in all sorts of ways. There are few Members of Parliament who have not had to deal with the range of problems associated with car boot sales such as planning and traffic matters. Many of us—I am no exception—regularly receive letters from people who have acquired items that are new or second hand at such sales. They are a substantial business—at least in my part of the country, in Sussex, and I dare say in other parts of the country as well. That is why the definition of

"in the course of a business"

is so important.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hertfordshire, North (Mr. Heald) spoke of where the definition draws the line—whether the business is defined by the place where the property is acquired or the activity of the seller. My hon. Friend wondered whether someone who sporadically sold items would fall within the definition. That is precisely what I want to know from the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge. If someone occasionally, not necessarily every week or every weekend, goes to car boot sales, rents a pitch and sells items that are new or second hand—it is common ground that the sales of goods legislation applies every bit as much to second-hand goods as to new ones—and a member of the public buys an item, is that transaction caught within the wording of the Bill? I do not know whether the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge wants to deal with that issue—apparently he does not.

One way to approach the subject is to look at the ordinary life style and business of the seller. Perhaps my hon. Friend the Minister will comment on that subject. Perhaps the tax law can assist us. Will the person who is selling on a part-time basis be caught by the tax provisions, and is what he or she is doing a business? If tax is paid, will it be capital gains tax or income tax?

I have one reservation about amendments Nos. 15 and 16: I wonder whether they are drawn a little too wide. Any law student will say that there is already an enormous body of case law on the sale of goods. I hope to speak later on the word "merchantable", which has acquired a massive body of case law—I regret its proposed demise. The same will apply to the amendments, which are loosely worded. My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire South-East said that he did not have the expert assistance from which the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge benefited. With due respect to my hon. Friend, perhaps the Government draftsmen can do a better job. My only reservation is whether the amendments, if accepted, will produce a substantial volume of new case law, which is the last thing we need on the subject of sale of goods.

It seems that when one speaks on the subjects of Bills one has to provide one's provenance to prove that one has a genuine interest in the subject. I spoke on the subject in 1989. I think—I do not know—that I am the only Member present today who spoke on the Consumer Guarantees Bill in 1990. For those who are interested in great speeches, my remarks can be found in columns 1221, 1222 and 1223 of the Official Report of 26 January 1990. I opposed the Bill then because I thought that it was far too widely drawn. I do not know whether it was as a result of opposing the Consumer Guarantees Bill that shortly after that I was made a Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs. I have taken an interest in such matters for some time.

Although a number of us opposed the Consumer Guarantees Bill on 26 January 1990 because we felt that it was drawn too widely, it was in many ways a forerunner of the Bill that we are discussing today. When I was a Minister with responsibility for consumer affairs, I took an interest in such matters, not least because, as a lawyer, I had been involved in them for a number of years. I had hoped that we would manage to produce a wider consumer Act. Replacing "merchantable quality" with the words "satisfactory quality" has been a controversial issue for a long time. The law commissioners dealt with that at some length and the Bill of the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland) is useful. There is no doubt that, whatever one's romantic feelings about an old-fashioned term such as "of merchantable quality", the Bill is long overdue.

I regret that the Government, for very good reasons, have been unable to introduce a Bill in Government time —we understand the pressures on the legislative timetable—but this is a useful Bill which we should all welcome. It is precisely because it is useful that I oppose the amendments moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice).

My hon. Friend is not a lawyer, and it is perhaps because he is not a lawyer that he spoke so clearly on a complex subject. I shall deal in a moment with the concerns of my hon. Friends the Members for Monmouth (Mr. Evans) and for Hertfordshire, North (Mr. Heald). I understand the concerns expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East that led him to table the amendments. I hope that I shall not sound too much like a negative lawyer, but I believe that the amendments would be unworkable. If, by some mischance, they were to be accepted, they would drive a coach and horses through the Bill and provide new opportunities for litigation. They would be a lawyers' paradise. I do not know What my hon. Friend the Minister is going to say, but I suspect that it will be very similar to what I am saying.

12 noon

I understand why my hon. Friend the Cambridgeshire, South-East tabled the amendments. He is worried about Sunday markets and I, too, constantly receive complaints about car boot sales. I suspect that he was speaking as a frustrated layman and on behalf of his constituents when he said that the public should be protected. The people who set up at car boot sales are effectively masquerading as business men. The public should therefore be protected as they would be if they were dealing with a business. I agree that a member of the public cannot possibly know the nature of the business involved in a car boot sale or a shop squat. My hon. Friend said that the Bill should be restrictive and that only the wholly private seller should be excluded from its provisions. He felt that the amendment would make that clear.

I receive many complaints from my constituents, especially about Hemswell market near Gainsborough where people have bought what they subsequently considered to be shoddy goods but had no redress. I confess that I receive fewer complaints about goods from people who have bought them at car boot sales than from reputable businesses in Gainsborough which believe that such goods have fallen off the back of a lorry. It is not so much a question of the goods being shoddy and the public not receiving a perfectly satisfactory buy; the people who are suffering are not those who attend Sunday markets such as that at Hemswell but the reputable traders of Gainsborough who are losing business and the ordinary people of Gainsborough whose videos and other goods have perhaps been stolen.

Unlike my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridgeshire, South-East and for Monmouth, I do not believe that the main problem with car boot sales is the nature of the goods sold there. I suspect that members of the public who attend car boot sales know that they are taking a slight risk because they are not going to a reputable shop. They know that such sales take place on an ad hoc basis. They wander around enjoying themselves and hope to get a bargain.

Does my hon. Friend accept that people buying goods such as tape recorders at car boot sales are often assured that the goods will work but find that they do not when they get them home? In the present circumstances, they have no redress.

My hon. Friend is quite right. It is precisely for that reason that I would not buy a video or a tape recorder at a car boot sale. I would have the common sense—I suspect that many of my constituents have, too—to know that, if one goes to a car boot sale and picks up a lemon, one has no redress. That is the nature of the deal—that is life. It is the give and take of commercial life.

Let us consider what would happen if the amendments were passed. Anyone selling items at a car boot sale or any kind of informal gathering would have placed on him an obligation as onerous as that placed on an ordinary shopkeeper. A potential purchaser could attend the sale determined to buy something dirt cheap—it could have fallen off the back of a lorry—but do so in the knowledge that the item he bought was covered by the implied term "satisfactory quality". He would therefore win in every way.

The amendment would therefore promote the very shop squats and car boot sales about which the House is worried, whereas we want to protect reputable shopkeepers who are paying rates and rents. I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East will accept that the amendment would not only mean a massive increase in litigation but would achieve precisely the opposite of what he wants and harm reputable shopkeepers.

My hon. Friend is right to say that anyone attending a car boot sale should not expect the same quality of goods that one buys in a shop and that we should not seek to place the same onerous responsibilities on a car boot salesman. However, if one finds a bargain and asks the person selling it whether both rings on the cooker work or whether the tape recorder works, one asks a specific question to which one receives a specific answer. In that case, it is surely wrong for the car boot salesman to lie. Should not there be redress in such circumstances?

That is a different situation. If there is misrepresentation, various forms of traditional legal redress are available under common law, if not statute law. My hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth has more experience of this than I. We are debating an implied term. Is my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Staffordshire (Mr. Fabricant) arguing that the new implied term "satisfactory quality" should apply to goods bought at informal gatherings?

I am not in the business of protecting people who misrepresent goods. If I, as a private person, wish to sell my car and go out of my way to misrepresent it, there would be a right of redress against me, or at least the possibility of damages. The consumer could come back to me. I hope that no one is suggesting that if I sell my car as a private person, I should be bound by the same implied terms that would cover a commercial car salesman. I am open to persuasion, but I hope that, whatever his concerns, my hon. Friend will withdraw the amendments.

My hon. Friend mentioned classified advertisements, but he did not make a very powerful case. Under modern law, one is entitled to know whether a classified advertisement has been put in a newspaper by a commercial salesman or a private individual. The situation is quite different at a car boot sale where one is face to face during a transaction. One can ask someone questions face to face. It is difficult to ask a classified advertisement about what is being sold, but one can ask someone who is trying to sell something at a car boot sale where the goods come from and what the nature of the person's business is.

Similar arguments apply to the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth. He is trying to take matters so wide that virtually anything that one says can be taken as a description. I appreciate that my hon. Friend is a lawyer; for all I know, he may still be in practice. However, I am sure that when he thinks these matters through he will realise that, once again, this is simply an opportunity for opening up vast areas of litigation.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth, I am nostalgic for the old term "merchantable quality", but I am sure that my hon. Friend would accept that the ordinary member of the public has no idea what that term means. I hope that, although my hon. Friend is, as I am, a conservative, he will realise that the term "satisfactory quality" is a far more modern term which the man on the Clapham omnibus can understand.

When I was doing my law finals, I did not understand what "merchantable quality" meant, but I was too shy to ask my law teachers. I am still not entirely sure what it means. We have in the Bill satisfactory wording that a reasonable person, if he is buying from someone who is engaged in sales in a commercial sense, can understand. He will know that there is an implied assurance of satisfactory quality. If we were to take matters further, we would not improve the legislation.

I know that what I am saying is, in the words of my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth, that there will be all sorts of Arthur Daley-type salesmen who will get away scot free. That has always happened in real life. We can rely on the good sense of people who go to Sunday markets to know what is going on and to take particular care. I hope that, on mature consideration, we shall leave the Bill unamended.

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to this short debate. I do not propose to detain the House long as there is important business after this which I know that a number of hon. Members present wish to address.

I very much endorse the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle (Mr. Leigh). I believe that the Bill should be left alone. However, I believe that my hon. Friends the Members for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice) and for Monmouth (Mr. Evans) made some powerful and telling comments. I shall pick up one or two of their points and refer to two or three of the amendments.

If you will allow me, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I feel that it is necessary to make one important point. I was not present for the debate on the Inshore Fishing (Scotland) Bill, although I have sought to speak on this Bill. In view of some of the rather unpleasant exchanges during the previous Division, I feel that it is necessary to say that I propose to speak with considerable brevity. It is well known that within my constituency I have been a campaigner for disabled people, both before and during my time as a Member of Parliament. I am also a registered disabled person myself, so I hope that it will not be necessary to listen to any nonsense by way of sedentary interventions by Opposition Members.

With regard to amendments Nos. 7 and 11, I am especially concerned about the suggestion that members of the public should have adequate protection if they buy goods from a particular seller. What concerns me more than anything else is the suggestion that it should be possible to provide consumer protection for those who buy goods from a particular source. I am especially concerned about whether we should allow for protection in respect of goods that are bought from someone who appears to the buyer to be a reputable seller, but who turns out not to be a reputable seller of the goods.

12.15 pm

Amendment No. 7 goes to the heart of the problem, but it will be rather unworkable. My hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth should think carefully about withdrawing it. I accept that the amendment would make it a requirement that the goods would need to be fit for the purpose reasonably intended by the buyer. However, I subscribe to the view put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle that the amendments would lead to a lawyers' paradise and that they are unworkable. The Bill should be left intact.

Amendment No. 15, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson) referred, would require that goods would need to be of satisfactory quality even if not sold in the course of business. This goes to the heart of my concern about how much one can legislate for. I want to see adequate consumer protection.

The hon. Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland) did not give way when I tried to intervene on this point. Bearing in mind what our hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East (Mr. Paice) said when he introduced the amendments, it is unrealistic to look at amendment No. 15 without looking at amendment No. 16, as they are part and parcel of the same proposal. It is not being suggested that all private sales should be covered. What is being proposed is that

"whenever the seller sells goods in the course of a business and otherwise when in all the circumstances it is reasonable to imply the same",

such sales should be caught.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for clarifying his position; that is especially helpful. I assume from what my hon. Friend has said that he does not seek to over-legislate.

indicated assent.

My hon. Friend indicates that he does not seek to over-legislate and I am grateful to him for that. Under the law as it stands, the only implied terms when the seller is not acting by way of business are that the seller has good title and that the goods are as described. However, I am not convinced that the amendments should be accepted. It will be for my hon. Friend to decide on the appropriate course of action later.

The hon. Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland) referred to the question of buyers having different rights depending on when or where they bought their goods. My contention is that it will be especially difficult to legislate for all the occasions when a member of the public buys an item from one source or another.

I hope that the Bill will move smoothly through the House today. I want it to be workable and enforceable, and I want it to provide adequate protection for the public. I did not have the opportunity to speak in the House in 1989, but I have taken a particular interest in consumer protection both before and during my time in the House and I am grateful to be able to speak in the House, albeit briefly, on this important Bill and the amendments.

In view of the time and the brevity of other contributions, I shall restrict my comments to amendment No. 11. My hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Evans) is normally a straight-down-the-line, deregulating, free-market Conservative, but there are always one or two occasions when job creation gets the better of hon. Members, especially lawyers, who regard this legislation as especially beneficial in terms of job creation for them. The clause is the classical intrusion of the nanny state into what reasonable members of the public can decide for themselves when they buy goods. My hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle (Mr. Leigh) made that point clearly.

The idea that we must include commercial reputation, brand name, advertising and marketing is simply nonsensical, because whether or not an individual buys a product is not built purely on what influences are brought to bear by advertising, or by brand name and so on, but on the experience that they have in the products that they have previously brought. For example, if somebody buys Sainsbury's cola because it happens to look like a can of Coke and finds that it tastes terrible, they would go back and buy Coke the next time, irrespective of the advertising pressure on them. That is just common sense, which members of the public have.

How are we to interpret the amendment? For instance, if I say that I am selling my car and that it is a Rover, one owner, does that somehow mean a great deal more in law, irrespective of whether I have been a dreadful driver or a very good driver and have looked after my car well, because Rover may be a good brand name?

We must persuade my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Evans) to withdraw his amendment, because it is nonsense on stilts. We have all bought second-hand cars. As I understand it, my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth is saying that just because there had been advertisement which advertised a Rover or a Volvo as a safe or a beautiful car or whatever, somehow the person selling one three or four years down the line would be bound by that advertisement. That is absolute nonsense. My hon. Friend cannot have thought the matter through.

My hon. Friend makes the point for me. How far can we take it? For example, am I to take my jeans back to the store because in the advertisement it was possible to roll down a hill in them quite happily, but when I fell over in the street they ripped? Am I somehow being sold goods that are unsatisfactory? If my teeth do not turn out perfectly white in the morning like those in the Pearl Drops advertisement, am I somehow being sold unsatisfactory goods? If I climb up a mountain in a jungle and am sweaty at the end of it, despite having used a particular deodorant, does that make that product null and void?

The amendment is nonsensical and the worst kind of intrusion into the freedom that individuals ought to have to use their own judgment in buying goods. I hope that we shall not allow such a terrible, nannying intrusion into a Bill which is otherwise quite acceptable. Clause 1 is fine. We do not need the amendment. It is the worst sort of intrusion, saying that the public cannot make up their own minds, that we have to decide everything for them and put it into to detailed legislation, giving lots of jobs to the lawyers on the way. I hope that my hon. Friend will seek leave to withdraw the amendment.

We have had the benefit of the explanation of my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough and Horncastle (Mr. Leigh), who welcomed the Bill and, indeed, his substantial recognition of the direction that it is taking. In the light of various allegations that have been made over the past few days, it is worth pointing out that the Government have helped the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland) both in bringing forward the Bill and in giving him help and advice on the amendments drafted by hon. Members. A lot of nonsense has been talked about something that has been a long-standing practice when private Members' Bills are brought before the House.

May we get the record straight? There are no allegations about when the Government quite properly help someone like my hon. Friend the Member for Tyne Bridge (Mr. Clelland) with a Bill of which they approve, which has support on both sides of the House, provided that it is open and above board. The only controversy that arises is when things are done behind the scenes in an underhand way and a Minister misleads the House about what is going on. That has nothing to do with my hon. Friend the Member for Tyne Bridge and the conduct of business in respect of his Bill.

As I said, I did not want to resurrect that particular argument. I was merely putting on record the fact that help has been given to the hon. Member for Tyne Bridge by the Department of Trade and Industry because we welcome the Bill.

With regard to the amendments and the speeches that have been made, my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth (Mr. Evans) has had a bit of a drubbing from his own side, which he is not used to, for not being the kind of deregulator that we expect him to be. However, he asked me a specific question about section 14(6). I accept that the Bill is complicated and I said that I would give some clarification in the presence of the Consumers Association. This is not the right place to give that clarification, so I shall provide it later. In answer to my hon. Friend's point, section 14(6) has been repealed and has been replaced by different words. I refer him to schedule 2, page 17, line 25, which he now has readily to hand. I hope that that covers some of his concerns.

My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge South-East (Mr. Paice) in introducing the group of amendments, which includes amendments that he and my hon. Friend the Member for Monmouth tabled, gave a warm general welcome to the Bill. I am grateful for that because I think that the Bill will go a long way to enact what has been suggested to us by the Law Commission as a sensible set of proposals. History has shown that the measure has had an unfortunate record, falling almost at the final stage. My hon. Friends the Members for Gainsborough and Horncastle and for Woodspring (Dr. Fox) and others have said why they believe that the amendments are not suitable to form part of the Bill. The Bill goes a considerable way towards enhancing consumer protection, straightening out the consumer protection law, especially applying to some of the concerns which came out of the Bernstein case, and is broadly welcomed by all.

My hon. Friends the Members for Mid-Staffordshire (Mr. Fabricant) and for Eastbourne (Mr. Waterson) referred in passing to the problems of car boot sales. They rightly reflected a concern, but it is not the purpose of the Bill to deal directly with car boot sales. There are bits of consumer legislation which deal with the description of car boot sales and are already covered in the Bill.

I hope that hon. Members will forgive me if I deal specifically with the amendments before the House. The Government oppose amendment No. 15. It would be wrong to impose on a seller, who is not acting by way of business, the full obligations of a seller who is acting by way of business. In appropriate circumstances, an individual may be acting by way of a business and the implied terms of quality would, therefore, apply to him. Most sales by private individuals, however, are not like commercial sales.

The requirements that goods should be described can already be quite a stringent requirement. For example, if I were to sell my car and describe it as having no rust, as doing 40 miles per gallon and as being capable of 0 to 60 mph in 15 seconds, it would have to meet that description. I must say that, if my car could do that, I would not be selling it. However if I were to put it on the market, it would have to meet that description. However, I would be setting out a description of the car and I would therefore have a responsibility to ensure that that description was met. I hope that that goes some way towards meeting the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East.

With regard to amendment No. 16, I assume that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridgeshire, South-East intended the word "imply" to read "infer". If that is so, the effect would be to create an area of doubt as to whether the implied term as to satisfactory quality applied in certain contracts. It would be clear that it did where the seller was acting by way of business and clear that it did not if the seller was not acting by way of the business. Those circumstances can be tested objectively, but in between there would be a grey area as to who was doing the inferring. If it were the buyer, that would be a very subjective assessment and it would create great uncertainty. If the intention were to use "imply", the only person able to imply that he was acting by way of a business would be the seller. Any seller who implies that he is acting by way of business most probably is. The wording in amendment No. 16 is not quite right and I hope that my hon. Friend will not press it.

Simply from reading the words, the party doing the implying is surely the court. That is what the wording must mean.

I take the point that there is always substance in respect of the court implying. My hon. Friend has cleared the point up and I am grateful to him for that.

The aim of amendment No. 10 is already sufficiently covered by other items taken into account in assessing whether goods are of satisfactory quality. In particular, the description of goods must be taken into account. Moreover, the list of items is not a closed list. It includes additional and other relevant circumstances.

With regard to amendment No. 11, it is inappropriate to consider the reputation of the seller when assessing the quality of goods. That would lead to a particularly peculiar situation in that identical goods could be deemed to be satisfactory if sold by one seller, but not satisfactory if sold by another.If the seller applies a description to the goods, such a distinction may be appropriate, but that is already covered elsewhere in the subsection.