On a point of order, Madam Speaker. We are debating three protocols relating to the North Atlantic treaty. The protocols have been tabled. They are Command Papers and are available to the House, but the explanatory memoranda are not available in the Vote Office. May I suggest that, in our quest for ways in which to modernise this place, we might think again about the Ponsonby rule, under which treaties, conventions and protocols are ratified in the House? We are lucky to get a debate on the enlargement of NATO. As the House is considering how it administers its proceedings, the Ponsonby rule might fruitfully be reviewed.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point of order. It seems to me that the Modernisation Committee could look at that. I shall see that the relevant section of the Official Report is given to the Modernisation Committee.

For almost half of this century, Europe has been divided between east and west. That division would have been incomprehensible to previous generations. For the preceding two centuries, Berlin, Warsaw, Prague and Budapest were part of a common European heritage expressed in shared culture, music and architecture. Their separation from the rest of Europe after the war was brutal, and was enforced with frequent brutality.

The restoration of those capitals and their countries to our common European heritage has been the most exciting change in political geography of our generation. It began a decade ago in Berlin with the destruction of the wall that symbolised the iron curtain. It will continue for another decade, as we continue the process of enlargement of the European Union to embrace the new democracies of central and eastern Europe. Countries that have emerged from former communist rule to share our democracy and our freedom of speech must also be given every opportunity to share in our prosperity. We cannot allow the iron curtain between east and west to be replaced by a velvet curtain, dividing the haves from the have-nots.

Today's debate is another step in rolling back the division that has scarred Europe for too long. Just as enlargement of the European Union will enable the people of central Europe to share in our prosperity, so the enlargement of NATO will enable them to share in our security. It is a mark of the momentous change in our continent that three countries that, only a decade ago, were among our potential enemies will, from now on, be among our firm allies.

That step is in the interests of the new member states, but it is also in the interests of the existing states. We, too, have everything to gain from increased security in central Europe. The division of Europe has lasted since a war that began with the invasion of the Czech lands and of Poland. Today, we put such conflict between us firmly into the history books by bringing those countries into a common military alliance based on the principle of mutual defence.

NATO has been the foundation stone of Britain's security for 50 years. As the iron curtain parted, there were those who claimed that NATO would become redundant. Some still say that, with the Soviet Union dead and buried, NATO has done its job and should be given an honourable discharge, but, 10 years after the cold war, NATO has a new role. We have learnt that there is a continuing need for a military organisation of NATO's competence and strength. We have learnt that NATO is still essential to maintaining peace and stability. NATO's role now is not solely one of the territorial defence of its members against any external military threat. The mission most often undertaken by NATO forces is to act as the instrument of regional security by building peace rather than deterring war.

In Bosnia, we saw war wreak its misery once again in our continent. NATO played the key part in bringing that war to an end, and is playing an equally key part in building the peace. Without NATO's resolve, the brutal repression in Kosovo in early June would have remained unchecked. It is NATO which is providing comfort and solidarity to the neighbouring countries of Albania and Macedonia by high-profile military visits and exercises. Therefore, there is a clear, continuing role for NATO, facing up to new threats to security and stability.

On NATO's role in southern Europe, will my right hon. Friend reflect on whether there is a case for expanding the work of the United Nations, giving it the capability it needs to ensure that ceasefires are observed and peace is upheld, rather than handing matters to a military alliance which is not answerable to the UN?

The United Nations remains at the centre of the Government's policy in creating a strong, healthy and peaceful international community. Indeed, over the past year, we have ensured that key decisions on peacekeeping and conflict prevention are taken to the UN. Also, we have made proposals in the strategic defence review for ensuring that Britain is ready to respond to calls by the UN on our forces in order to meet challenges to peace around the world. Senior UN figures are of course adamant—as we are—that the UN must be the body which provides the mandate and the international community's response to threats, but, by its culture and nature, it is not a military organisation, and is not well placed to provide command and control of military operations. That is why the UN's recent history in peacekeeping operations has been to use military regional organisations to respond to its mandate and requirements. NATO must be able to respond to such UN calls when they are made.

This Government can speak with some authority on NATO because, of course, a Labour Government negotiated the North Atlantic treaty. Britain has remained one of NATO's major allies and contributors ever since. NATO has served our country well; it has given us security against external threat, confidence in our relations with European partners and the means by which to police the security of our region. NATO is also the most powerful pillar of the partnership between Europe and the United States.

We who owe so much to the alliance must now be generous in admitting as members the central European countries on our borders. As the hon. Member for Romsey (Mr. Colvin) mentioned on a point of order, that is achieved by three protocols—one for each of the three countries. Incidentally, I have made inquiries; the explanatory memoranda will be in the Vote Office as soon as they can be copied this morning.

There are three fundamental components to NATO's effectiveness: collective defence, armed forces that can work together and a commitment to common values. We believe that each will be strengthened by admitting Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as new members.

The new york times reports that a majority opinion in Czechoslovakia is against joining NATO. Having said all that about NATO's advantages, what is my right hon. Friend's assessment of the effect of NATO expansion on nationalist forces in the Soviet Union, which do not love democracy and which might exploit for their own purposes such expansion to their borders—especially the Baltic states?

It is not for the House to decide the state of Czech opinion. That is a matter for those who are elected to represent Czech opinion; they are unanimous in their wish to accede to membership of NATO. The one occasion on which public opinion in any of the three lands was tested was in Hungary, where a referendum organised by the Hungarian Government produced a thumping majority in favour of membership. We NATO members must recognise and accept the advice of those who represent the three countries that it is the settled view that they wish to share the security that NATO membership confers.

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

I have not yet finished answering the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), but I shall happily take another one on board.

I apologise to the Foreign Secretary; I thought that he had finished the point. Will he reflect on the public opinion that used to be registered in Spain and the way in which the Spanish view has changed considerably?

Spain is now so comfortable and at home with the alliance that the alliance's Secretary-General is a former distinguished Spanish Minister.

It may be appropriate to respond to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow, who anticipated part of my speech, by making the following points. We have always maintained that Russian concerns were misplaced. NATO is a defensive alliance; its primary duty remains the defence of its member states against aggression from any quarter. Its most urgent work at present is securing stability in parts of Europe where there is instability, such as the western Balkans. It is in Russia's interest that NATO should be able to restore stability in such regions of common interest. Indeed, Russia has worked with NATO to secure that objective in Bosnia. I accept my hon. Friend's point that Russia's concerns about NATO remain, although we have established valuable dialogue with Russia on wider issues.

On the eve of the Madrid summit on enlargement of NATO, all members of the alliance signed the NATO-Russia founding Act, which has established a new relationship based on co-operation not confrontation. The founding Act provides for a permanent joint council between us. I have attended ministerial meetings of that council, which have been extremely productive and conducted in a friendly spirit. The permanent joint council has a wide agenda, covering a variety of common interests from assistance with economic and employment consequences of defence reduction to greater transparency of force levels and capability. A year on from the summit, I find it welcome that we can talk constructively with Russia about issues of common interest without the matter of enlargement getting in the way of the dialogue.

I return to the issue of the three countries that are seeking to join us. I said that the principle of collective defence still lies at the heart of NATO. Article 5 of the Washington treaty makes an attack on one NATO member an attack on all. It is the strongest possible guarantee of our security, and sends the clearest possible message to anyone with designs on the territory or freedom of action of a NATO member. The three new members of NATO will enjoy that guarantee; they will accept, too, the responsibility that it imposes on them. We will help to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; they will help to defend us. The principle of collective defence will not be weakened by the expansion of NATO's numbers. On the contrary, the capability to deliver on that principle will be strengthened by the increase in numbers and the greater security of our present borders.

The Foreign Secretary has said that it is in all our interests to secure stability in the western Balkans. Might we not be able to enhance our security in that area by admitting Slovenia to NATO? The United States made clear its opposition to that at the Madrid summit. Does it remain United Kingdom policy that Slovenia should be admitted at an early opportunity? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that that would enhance the stability of the western Balkans?

The case for Slovenia becoming a member of NATO stands on its own ground and does not require to be approached tangentially by reference to the western Balkans. It is well known that, in the lead-up to the Madrid conference, Britain supported the case for admitting Slovenia.

Two main schools of thought emerged in discussions before and during Madrid. One was that there should be an enlargement by the admission of three countries, and that is the proposition that we are debating. It is manageable, and I shall later deal with why it is important not to have an unmanageable enlargement.

The second proposition was that there should be an enlargement by five countries to embrace both Slovenia and Romania. There was no support in the alliance for an enlargement of four. However, this will not be the last enlargement, and other countries, including Slovenia, have made applications which will continue to be considered on their merits

I have said that, in debating enlargement, we must reflect on three considerations. The first is the maintenance of our collective defence; in our judgment, the enlargement will strengthen, not weaken, that. The second consideration must be the military effectiveness of the alliance.

The former communist countries have had to face a series of daunting tasks. They have had to re-create democratic institutions, restore individual freedoms and restructure and modernise their economies. They have also had to address the need to reform their armies as modern military forces that are accountable to civilian rule. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have all approached that challenge with determination and energy.

Through NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme, we have provided training, advice and joint exercises. Britain has provided extensive programmes of education in the English language, which is a key part of integration into NATO in which English is the common language of command. Britain has also sponsored seminars in the new member states on subjects such as air traffic control, the role of the junior ranks and military law. We have first-hand knowledge of the competent and disciplined character of their armed forces from working alongside them in Bosnia. Armies that once exercised in readiness for war against each other now work together to impose a common peace.

Working alongside our forces in Bosnia is a mechanised infantry battalion from the Czech Republic, another such battalion from Poland and an engineer battalion from Hungary. The contribution of those countries to the NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia demonstrates their commitment to fulfilling their obligations as allies

I am listening to my right hon. Friend with great interest. He places great credibility on the military input of the three new countries to NATO. I ask him to back-pedal a little on that proposition, because the contribution of those nations to the campaign in Bosnia is currently the total contribution that they will be able to make to NATO's future defence.

Will my right hon. Friend re-emphasise his earlier comment that we are not debating a military decision? It may have military significance in a decade, but the important aspect at present is the political decision to expand. Those three countries have given a commitment to increase defence expenditure. When that happens, they will be able to make a real military contribution, but that will be in perhaps five or 10 years' time, rather than at present.

My hon. Friend makes an interesting contribution. I do not go along with him in the limited character that he ascribes to the military forces of those three countries. They would be the first to recognise that they have further to travel. As one of the existing members of NATO, we are willing to help them to travel that road and to continue to work with them. We shall be able to do more with them as allies in the alliance than we can do while they are not. Of course, my hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the powerful political character of the decision. His contribution leads me naturally to the third consideration in debating enlargement and whether those countries are ready to join NATO.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

I shall give way, but, at some stage, I must be allowed to make my speech.

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that another key factor in those countries' eligibility for membership of NATO is the democratisation of their armed forces so that they are under civilian, political control rather than military control?

The hon. Gentleman takes me to my third consideration, which is about how we assess those countries.

NATO's fundamental strength is not its military capability: it is the common values of the alliance countries. The strength of the alliance derives from our respect for democracy and human rights, individual liberty and the rule of law. The Washington treaty reaffirms the faith of NATO members in the United Nations charter and their wish to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

Ernest Bevin, the first Labour Foreign Secretary after the war, laid that treaty before the House. He said that it was

"an endeavour to express on paper the underlying determination to preserve our way of life—freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and the rights and liberty of the individual."

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have shown that they share those values. Perhaps they treasure them even more than we do, because they had to struggle for their freedom and democracy and they know their worth. Perhaps that helps to explain the great enthusiasm within those countries for membership of NATO.

NATO is effective because all its members share common principles. That is why 16 countries can still be effective, even though every decision is by consensus. The same will be true of a NATO of 19 allies with shared principles. The enlargement by three countries that was agreed at Madrid still leaves on the table applications for membership by other countries. In an intervention, the hon. Member for Chichester (Mr. Tyrie) drew attention to one such country.

Those countries are also seeking to address the modernisation of their armed forces, and we are playing an active part in assisting them through "Partnership for Peace". We are also in close political dialogue with them on security through the Euro-Atlantic partnership council.

It was no easy decision to choose which among so many applicant countries should be successful. The consensus that emerged from long discussion in Madrid was that they should be the three countries that we are debating. Critical to that judgment was the broad view that NATO enlargement should proceed at a pace that is consistent with NATO absorbing its expanded membership. We would do no service to the other countries that aspire to join NATO if we expanded so rapidly that NATO lost its effectiveness as the military guarantor of peace on our continent. As I have said, this will not be the last NATO enlargement. No one should be under any illusion about the magnitude of the current enlargement.

I hope that, when the Foreign Secretary amplifies his remarks, he will address the issue of Russia. Early in his speech, he said that the expansion of NATO was an export of security to central and eastern Europe. In view of the NATO-Russia founding Act, will the culmination of that process be Russian membership of NATO, or is that not the Government's view?

As was famously observed by a Prime Minister, "never" is one of the longest words in the English language. Nobody rules out any option for the future of NATO. At present, Russia has not applied to join NATO, and we are a long way from the time when that will be a credible proposition. However, we work hard for the success of the permanent joint council, and that is the basis of our current dialogue with Russia. In the same way, we are working with Ukraine through the charter that we have formed between it and NATO.

At present, NATO has not only a good relationship with applicant countries, but a strong relationship with many countries such as Russia and Ukraine which have not submitted an application to join, but who work with us through "Partnership for Peace". Many of those countries are participants in the Euro-Atlantic partnership council, which has met four times, and proved successful when it has done so. We particularly welcome the relations with Ukraine.

Although Ukraine and Russia may not be part of the enlargement, it is still a substantial enlargement. The admission of the three countries will increase the territory within NATO by a sixth, and will increase the borders of NATO by a third. The immediate priority must be to make a success of such a large expansion of the alliance by ensuring the integration of the new members into the command structure and the interoperability of their forces. The costs of doing so are modest, and well worth the price.

The UK may have to pay an estimated additional £110 million to NATO's common budgets; that will be spread over a decade. The costs to the new members might be higher, but they will not be excessive. It is a cost which, in large part, they would have had to undertake if they were to modernise their forces, whether or not they were members of NATO.

The figure of £110 million over 10 years is called into question in the Select Committee report. Has the Ministry of Defence examined the £110 million projection? If so, are the Government prepared to stand by it?

I assure the hon. Gentleman that any figure given by a Cabinet Minister to the House is one which the Government are prepared to stand by. There is a memorandum in the Library—hon. Members are welcome to consult it—which compares our estimates of the cost with those made by others.

Two years ago, The new york times reported that the congressional budget office had estimated that the price tag might be as high as $125 billion over 15 years. The American estimates seem very different from the one that my right hon. Friend has given the House. Is he saying that the American estimates are baloney?

The agreed NATO costs, which embrace the Americans' support, is a total of $1.5 billion, of which the UK share is the £110 million to which I have referred. I invite my hon. Friend to consult the papers in the Library, which go into some detail about why we believe in the figures and why we believe that other estimates are exaggerated.

I have explained the costs to the House, and I welcome the interest of hon. Members in making sure that it is convinced of the figures. However, it is broadly agreed that the cost of enlargement will not be great, to either existing or new members. I hope that the House will agree, without the necessity to consult the Library, that the rewards of a successful enlargement will be great for both existing and new members.

The reward is a NATO that unites, rather than divides, our continent. Enlargement of NATO is a logical response to the end of the cold war and the collapse of the iron curtain. I therefore hope that the whole House will join today in offering a warm welcome to our new partners in the Atlantic alliance.

I agree with much of what the Foreign Secretary said, but I am slightly more cautious than he is. He made a diplomat's speech, but there are military considerations in the further expansion of NATO which I wish to touch on in rather more detail than he did.

Before I go on, I apologise to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, and to the House, as I cannot stay to the end of the debate. I have already apologised to the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence. I also wish to say to the Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), that, in preparing for the debate, I found the Committee's report extraordinarily valuable and comprehensive. We all owe him a debt of gratitude.

Like the Foreign Secretary, I wish to spend a moment on the background. NATO was formed as a defensive alliance nearly 50 years ago, in response to a clear military threat from the Soviet Union and its allies. It is worth reminding ourselves that it is and was a collective defence organisation with a commitment to mutual military defence. The Foreign Secretary referred to article 5. That is a serious commitment for one state to make—that it will consider the invasion of another state or a threat to its territory as a threat to itself.

As a result of that commitment, we developed in NATO a highly integrated military command structure, and we committed troops and equipment in Germany to resist any attack. That was a commitment to the forward defence of the whole NATO area, and it has been an incredibly successful venture. By any standards, the result of the cold war has been victory for the west.

That victory poses problems and challenges about the identity and purpose of NATO, which we must address. The Madrid summit last year contained many items in its further programme of activity, but I wish to mentioned four: the admission of the three new states, on which the Foreign Secretary spent time and which we wholly support; NATO's commitment to an open-door policy; the enhancement of the programme for peace and the creation of the European-Atlantic partnership council; and the instruction that NATO staff should examine the strategic concept of NATO and come back to the conference next year to carry the discussion forward.

The purpose of NATO after the end of the cold war is the big question that ought to be addressed before we consider how far NATO's expansion might go. The old objective was substantial and involved the possibility of total war, including the use of nuclear weapons. Those threats have largely disappeared, and all member states of NATO have significantly reduced defence spending as a result.

The future role of NATO must be to defend the vital interests of NATO members. That extends from resisting external attack on NATO territory—improbable though that currently seems—to intervention in non-NATO regional disputes and to defending NATO interests outside the NATO area.

The immediate threat of a Russian attack has considerably diminished, but territorial threats remain, at least potentially—the poverty and Islamic fundamentalism of the Maghreb countries in north Africa; rogue states, such as Libya and Algeria, with biological and chemical weapons capability and, in some cases, the possibility of nuclear weapons; and potential instability in Russia, Ukraine and other countries in the region.

The hon. Gentleman has mentioned nuclear weapons twice in the last few moments, and he emphasised earlier the importance of the security guarantee to be extended under article 5 to all members, including new members. That security guarantee includes, if necessary, the use of nuclear weapons, which tends to underline the solemnity of the guarantee and the extent to which we should appreciate what we are to extend.

The hon. and learned Gentleman makes his point very well, and I agree. We are extending our military umbrella, which includes the availability of nuclear weapons from the United States, France and ourselves, to the defence of those other countries. That throws into stark relief the extent of the commitment we are making.

How does the hon. Gentleman reply to the view of Dr. Arbatov that the Russians have admitted that the parlous condition of their conventional forces makes them more reliant on their nuclear weapons? Does not that have serious consequences for East-West tensions?

I wanted to look later at the problem from the Russians' point of view. It may be the fault of the lawyer in me that I like to look at things from the other side, but it is probably a virtue in a diplomat as well—to try to see things from a different point of view.

I thought the hon. Gentleman was a politician.

I am a lapsed lawyer, I am afraid.

It is worth reminding ourselves that there are many heavily armed states with modern weapons outside NATO—40 have modern aircraft, 20 have ballistic missiles, 12 have chemical and biological capability and some, as we know, are developing nuclear capability as well. Threats to our interests remain—for example, the instability and war in the former Yugoslavia, the possibility of a spillover into south-eastern Europe from middle east disputes, and the need to protect commercial interests, as we saw in the Gulf recently.

Such threats—which are unforeseen precisely because no one can predict what they will be—will arise. The possibility of a resurgent Russia may be remote, but we should take it seriously. When we consider the conflicts in which we have been involved over the past 16 or 17 years, we should remember that the Foreign Office did not predict the Falklands conflict or the Gulf war, so the chances that the next conflict will be predicted are remote.

An advantageous feature of NATO is that it has made war between its member states unthinkable. Without its military structure and the integrated military command, that may change, which would be a dangerous departure.

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the whole thrust of NATO expansion—right up to the borders of Russia and down through south-east Europe—may encourage increased militarism in the countries that it borders? The military in those countries will be encouraged to demand increased resources at the expense of an often very deprived population. Should we not demilitarise Europe rather than increase militarisation on its borders?

I shall deal later with how expansion appears, and what the consequences may be, in Russia and some of the other countries of the former Soviet Union. I do not agree that our response should be to demilitarise NATO; I have enumerated some of the threats that we may have to meet with military force.

We must decide what kind of NATO we want—do we want a hard NATO or a soft NATO? We clearly need it to have a crisis management, peacekeeping function, as has been shown over the past few years. As the Foreign Secretary said, we need to foster understanding and good relations with the countries of the former Warsaw pact and the former Soviet Union.

The three successful applicant countries—and, indeed, the other applicant countries—want to join NATO because of the territorial security guarantee. They do no want to join it because they regard it as a nice western political club; they want the security guarantee that article 5 of the NATO treaty will give them.

It would be foolish to disband NATO's integrated military command structure, which gives it the capability to handle such military threats; if we did, we might have to put it together again at rather short notice. We should remember that, in the Gulf war, the NATO command structure enabled the British and the Americans to work closely together. Indeed, the French found it difficult to work with their allies; as a result, they played a somewhat peripheral role.

NATO keeps the United States committed to European defence and involved in any military operations, which I regard as vital. We should ask whether the United States would be involved in Bosnia if NATO did not have a hard military element and whether, without the United States, we would be involved in Bosnia. Europe has been reluctant to become involved in such disputes without the support of the United States—most of NATO's hard dimension depends on the United Kingdom and the United States.

NATO is not a political club; it is a military alliance. Membership is not a reward for good behaviour; it is about mutual military defence and the efficiency and rapidity of response. We are all aware of the letter that was sent to the Prime Minister in May by 23, I think, distinguished military and diplomatic figures, who referred to the

"vital need to preserve NATO's ability, in the new Europe where, by common consent, potential threats to the peace are diffuse and unpredictable, to make rapid decisions and take quick and effective decisions on what action, if any, to take."

We must ensure that NATO retains those characteristics.

Any new members must be defendable without huge extra expense or risks to the existing members, and they must make a real military contribution. We must ask some difficult questions. Are we prepared to go to war to defend their territory under article 5 of the NATO treaty? How practical would it be for NATO to defend the Baltic states? NATO obligations could lead to a general war in Europe. Are we prepared to allow that to happen for the sake of the defence of some of the applicant countries? We must consider the military commitments very carefully.

I wholly agree with my hon. Friend's point that, as NATO is only as good as its weakest link, we must be cautious about too rapid an expansion. The most recent expansion was in 1990, when east Germany became part of west Germany, so to speak; the Bundeswehr had fundamentally to restructure east German forces to integrate them into the west German army. Does he agree that we should be cautious about the time and money that will be required to restructure the armed forces of some of the new countries, so that they can play an active and useful part in NATO?

My hon. Friend is right. The United States Department of Defence estimates that the restructuring and development of the armed forces of the three successful applicant countries will take about 10 years.

The current round of enlargement increases the length of NATO's borders by 31 per cent. Hungary, one of the three new countries, does not have a border with any other member state; it sits alone with other non-NATO countries between it and its allies, although that would, of course, change if Slovakia became a member.

Slovenia.

I am talking about the geographical gap, and Slovenia would provide only a narrow corridor between Italy and Hungary.

The fact that new members will have to restructure and upgrade their forces will, in the short term, reduce NATO's overall military effectiveness; as my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (Mr. Gray) pointed out, that is likely to take some time.

What should the criteria be for new membership? The military and strategic considerations that I have mentioned should remain paramount, but we must remember that, as the Foreign Secretary said, many of the applicant countries regard themselves as European; they believe that, over the past 50 or 60 years, they were temporarily detached from Europe by Russian imperialism. If we denied them membership, we should be sending a clear and unwelcome message, and perhaps drive them back into the Russian orbit.

Difficult decisions must be taken. Although we must encourage progress towards greater democracy and freedom, we must be careful that that does not lead states into thinking that they will be entitled to membership if they meet certain conditions. No state should be ruled out from membership, but there can be no timetable or fixed commitments. The essential conditions for membership must be that an applicant country is internally stable and at peace with its neighbours and that it has stable and responsible Government and political institutions. Moreover, it must be able to make a real military contribution to its own defence without imposing heavy military or strategic commitments on others.

The intermediate status of membership in the "Partnership for Peace", the European Atlantic partnership council, the European Union or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe should reinforce the confidence of former Warsaw pact countries that are not members of NATO. All those organisations have great value in their own right, not only as stepping stones to something else. We do not regard membership of the European Union as a stepping stone to NATO membership; it is, and should continue to be, possible to be a member of NATO without being a member of the European Union, and vice versa

Before my hon. Friend leaves that point, will he say whether he agrees that some countries that want to become members of NATO—and the European Union, for that matter—have equally important bilateral relations with their neighbours? The Baltic states collectively have a bilateral agreement with the United States of America, which has important security implications for them as they wait and hope to join NATO.

My hon. Friend is right to say that we should not regard NATO membership as the only solution to many of these problems. Membership of the organisations that I have mentioned may offer something, and he suggests other possibilities.

As I said, I want to look at the matter from Russia's point of view. We must remember that Russia was one of the world's two super-powers. It had a large empire, and was the second biggest military power in the world. Now, it is much diminished—it is much smaller, its economy is in a parlous state and its military capability is a pale shadow of what it was. Although we cannot allow Russia to have a veto on NATO's future, NATO must recognise Russia's legitimate interests and how it sees things. Rightly or wrongly, Russia regards NATO's expansion with suspicion.

We must acknowledge that it is a legitimate aim of Russian foreign policy to seek security and secure borders. Russia no doubt feels that there is a need for there to be other states between NATO's eastern borders and its own western borders. I am not pretending that the issue is not difficult, but we cannot ignore it or pretend that it does not exist.

I wholly agree with the Foreign Secretary that it is vital that Russia, Ukraine and the other countries of the former Soviet Union are brought back fully into the international community. The west has devoted substantial resources and efforts to that end, and we all hope for success.

Does my hon. Friend agree that it would not be to the benefit of European security if we were to let the Russian Government believe that they could ever exercise a veto on the decision of any free, independent, democratic country, on its borders or elsewhere, to come into a collective security arrangement in its own interests and the interests of its neighbours?

I agree entirely, but it would be foolish and short-sighted not to take into account the Russian point of view. In 10 years' time, Russia's view may be completely different, but we should never consider the question solely from a western, or even American, point of view.

Russia seems to have accepted the three new members, and there are one or two others to which it would probably have no objection, but would it take the same attitude to, for instance, Romania and Bulgaria or the Baltic states, which involve specific problems, such as the substantial Russian minorities living there, and access to Kaliningrad? The United States has recently been supportive of the Baltic states' desire to join, but Russia has made it clear that it would view that as a serious threat.

According to the BBC's summary of world broadcasts, a Russian Minister said in June that he viewed NATO's planned expansion eastward, and especially the possible admission of former Soviet republics to the alliance, as a "serious threat to Russia". In May, the Russian President himself warned in The Guardian that NATO would cross a perilous red line if it invited the Baltic states or Ukraine to join. We have to take those views seriously, even though they may change over the next five or 10 years—I hope that they will.

There is a danger of NATO expansion helping the cause of the ultra-nationalists in Russia by undermining the position of the western-oriented democrats, who may not be able to persuade other Russian politicians that it is a benign development. That would be a tragedy, because it could help to create a new threat. There is obviously suspicion in Russia, because the START 2 treaty is stalled in the Duma, and doubts are being expressed about the conventional forces agreement.

I agree entirely with the American Secretary of State and the Foreign Secretary that Russia cannot have a veto, but we would be foolish to ignore its concerns.

Russia may have fears, but if those fears are misplaced, our duty is to allay them. The expansion to include the new east European countries offers Russia far more security, because they will come under the umbrella of NATO military doctrine and discipline, with civilian control of the military, which will make them far more stable neighbours than they might otherwise have been.

The hon. Gentleman makes two points, one of which I agree with and the other of which I am not so sure about. I agree that we must try to allay the fears. There are a variety of programmes to try to do that, and to develop constructive and peaceful relationships with the countries of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw pact.

I have tried to say why I do not agree with the second point. Russia has some suspicions. I entirely agree with the Foreign Secretary that those are unfounded and that we are not a threat to Russia, but that is not how Russia sees it.

rose—

rose—

I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson).

The fundamental point that needs to be put on the record is that the Baltic states were free and democratic before they were incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940, by force of arms and against their will, so no one should take away their legitimate democratic inheritance by bullying or cajoling.

Of course that is true, and I completely agree with my hon. Friend. My point was simply that this is a two-way street: the Baltic states may want to join NATO, but we have a say in whether we accept them, and, when we come to make that decision, I hope that we will consider seriously the military commitment that we are making to them. One does not have to be a great historian or geographer to realise that that will be a difficult commitment to fulfil.

There are significant Russian minorities living in the Baltic states, and there is a piece of Russian territory, at Kaliningrad, which can be accessed only through those states. In any case, their accession is probably a long way off, so the issue remains somewhat theoretical. I simply want to put more emphasis than the Foreign Secretary did on the military aspects of our commitments.

There are widely differing estimates of the cost of having the new members. That is incredibly important, because it relates directly to the military and strategic factors involved in defending the territory of a new member state. The mainstream estimates vary from $1.5 billion up to about $10 billion, although, as the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) said, the congressional budget office at one point had an estimate about 10 times higher than that.

The Select Committee said that it thought that the likely cost was in the middle of that range, and the Government say that they are confident of their estimate. I only hope that they are right; otherwise, we will all pay a very high price for NATO expansion, despite being told that there is no military threat. I am concerned that the low estimate is effectively based on the assumption that NATO has no enemies, which implies that, if a threat emerges in future, there will be extra spending to be met. I hope that we can be more confident of such estimates in future, and that there will not be quite such a wide range.

It is a significant task to integrate Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into the alliance.

The hon. Gentleman said that he would not be here at the end of the debate, and that he would not want to divide the House on the issue, but he has made a very long speech setting out all the reasons against taking the three countries into NATO. Will he say outright whether he and his party are in favour of NATO enlarging to incorporate those countries?

The right hon. Gentleman anticipates me, because I was going to say that we fully support those countries' membership. I have taken an awful lot of interventions. Apart from those, I have spoken for only about 15 minutes, which is half the time that the Foreign Secretary took. I am sure that his contribution was worth more than mine, but I nevertheless think that the Defence Secretary's stricture was not fully justified.

We fully support the accession of the three new members, but it will be a significant task to integrate them into NATO's military structure, and that must be substantially completed before there is any further expansion. We should be cautious about having more new members until it is clear how the situation in central and eastern Europe is developing. Almost all the countries that want to join fail at least one of the tests that I set out earlier.

NATO has an enormous current agenda without further enlargement: the integration of the three new members; developing a new strategic concept; and building relationships with Russia and its former allies. Those are all significant tasks, which will take much effort and time. Let us ensure that they are concluded satisfactorily before proceeding any further.

I am relieved that, at long last, the House is discussing NATO enlargement. When the Defence Select Committee visited NATO very early in the new year, we met the Secretary-General, Mr. Solana, who ever so politely expressed his hope that Britain would be the first, or at least almost the first, country to endorse enlargement. Now we are into July, and four member states—Canada, Denmark, Norway and Germany—have completed all their ratification procedures and formally ratified the enlargement protocols. They have deposited the protocols with the depository state, the United States of America.

The Parliaments of Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Iceland, France, Spain and the USA have all approved the enlargement protocols, but their Governments have not yet deposited the instruments of ratification. The Belgian Senate has approved the protocols, and its lower house will do so shortly. That leaves the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Portugal and Turkey as the member states whose Parliaments have yet to approve the protocols, or in our case even to debate them in full.

Frankly, I am not entirely happy with that arrangement. As has been said, we were the instigator of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in 1949, and it has been embarrassing, bordering on humiliating, going to the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to talk to diplomats and politicians who have been asking, "When will your Parliament ratify our membership of NATO?" The business managers and the Government have had an enormously hectic programme, but it is with some relief that we are now finally to approve ratification.

Does my hon. Friend share my concern that neither of the principal Opposition spokesmen will be here for the reply? Last week, the shadow Defence Secretary was not present for the important land mines debate. Frankly, that shows a lackadaisical, if not frivolous, approach by the Opposition Front-Bench team to such important defence and foreign policy matters. The sooner that they are replaced by people who would do the job, the better for Parliament.

The last thing that I want to do is contribute to a descent into partisanship in what is basically a non-partisan environment, although I would have preferred the debate to take place on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday.

My second parliamentary point is not directed at my right hon. Friends the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and for Defence, and I am not patronising them when I say that I admire what they have done and what they are doing. They are both exceedingly competent. My criticism is that of hon. Members for many decades and is about the process of ratification. The deputy Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, the hon. Member for Romsey (Mr. Colvin), raised that matter when he jumped up to retaliate early in the debate.

Our Parliament is about the only one—bar Canada—that has no real role in the ratification process. I dignified our proceedings today deliberately, although erroneously, by saying that we were ratifying, but we are doing nothing of the sort; we are debating. Clearly, the Modernisation Committee must realize—the Defence Select Committee report spelled this out in great detail—what is wrong with our alleged ratification system.

The hon. Member for Romsey referred to the Ponsonby rules and said how important they were. We should go beyond those, because few Ponsonby treaties have been debated here unless we have been compelled to debate and formally ratify them. This Parliament has no formal input in treaty-making, which is the prerogative of the Executive acting on behalf of the Crown, as we all know. That system is profoundly unsatisfactory, and this Parliament is in a minority in being totally marginalized in the process. In virtually every other democratic country, it is not simply the prerogative of the Government or the Crown to ratify a treaty. Why is that not the case here? It should be up to us.

The Foreign Affairs and Defence Select Committees, or the relevant Select Committee, should consider the matter and make representations to the House, and there should be a formal vote as part of the treaty-making process, not simply a polite add-on to ratification. That is a general principle, and I hope that, in due course, the House will unite to demand, not ask, that we function as a legislature is supposed to and not be seen as simply an appendage to the Executive in decision making.

Having got that off my considerable chest, I can move on to the subject of debate. Perversely, I shall start with the conclusion of the excellent Defence Select Committee report. Paragraph 117 answers some of the criticisms of the Opposition. We produced earlier reports on NATO enlargement in the 1994–95 and 1995–96 Sessions. We shall also be producing a report before the 50th anniversary of NATO in the middle of next year.

As we said in our latest report,

"We should embark upon this new era … with our eyes open."

We concluded:

"A long period of debate has culminated in the current proposals which the NATO governments have put before us."

We recommended

"that the House endorse the admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the North Atlantic Alliance."

We are unequivocal about our recommendation, but we are cautious, because we must consider the legitimate anxieties of Russia and listen carefully to the anxieties of the countries in eastern and central Europe that were hijacked into the Soviet orbit just before or just after the second world war and that are desperate to return to our political and democratic culture. Not all of them subscribed in the 1930s to that culture—the Governments of eastern Europe then were not all perfect democracies by any stretch of the imagination.

However, can one imagine what the message would have been from NATO Parliaments or Governments if we had said, after such a lengthy period of debate as to who should join, "Sorry lads, you're out—Russians in, Hungary out"? It would be Russians in, in the sense that we would be accepting their veto, and we would just have to tell those other countries to wait. The consequences would have been politically disastrous. Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic deserve to be reincorporated into Europe—into its security, political and economic environment.

In due course, although again one has to be cautious, Slovenia, Romania and perhaps in a few years Slovakia and Bulgaria—but not yet—will be added to the list. We must develop NATO's absorbative capacity. When the three new countries have been formally admitted, NATO should consider further enlargement, but it should be selective.

We must be concerned about the effect on Russia. To a large extent, we have accommodated that country's views. We have done so in a variety of ways. Russian officers are now in NATO and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE—no longer do the Russians have to employ Soviet military intelligence, as the information is largely there for them and is handed to them. There are the "Partnership for Peace", the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and the NATO-Russia permanent joint council. There are treaties with Russia and the Ukraine. The G7 has admitted Russia. Russians are working alongside troops from NATO countries in Bosnia. There are enormous financial injections from western countries into development and democratisation in Russia.

Does my hon. Friend accept that NATO's expansion to the borders of Russia provides the Russian generals and military-industrial complex with strong arguments for expanding expenditure at the expense of the poorest people in Russia? NATO will also cause large increases in defence costs for the new applicant members.

I disagree with my hon. Friend, as he might expect. The Defence Committee hoped that the accession of the three countries would not be seen by American, British, German or French defence manufacturers as a chance to step into countries that can barely afford existing security expenditures. We do not want to destroy developing economies by lumbering them with enormously costly aircraft. Clearly, those countries must spend sufficient money to join NATO, but many countries are drifting down towards the level of expenditure of those three countries. As our spending is projected to be 2.3 per cent. of gross domestic product, we are going perilously close to the spending of countries that cannot afford to be in NATO.

There is anxiety among generals, and among both Russophobes and Russophiles, about the weakness of the former Soviet Union. In talking to generals and politicians in Russia, I often hear the same attitudes that were expressed by the State Department in the United States just after the Falklands war. The State Department official then responsible for relations with Latin America, now deceased, was visited by a large delegation of Latin American Foreign Ministers and ambassadors, and they admonished him and the United States Government for supporting the United Kingdom in the conflict. They gave him hell, but as they left, one after another of them walked past him out of the view of their fellow ambassadors and Foreign Ministers, and winked at him as if to say, "I had to say that, didn't I?" One feels that many people raise ritualistic objections.

One of the contributors to my seminal Jane's NATO Handbook, which was purchased only by the hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell)—at £125 a copy, I can understand why—was Rainer Rupp, who is well known to some hon. Members. Rupp is now doing 12 years in the slammer in Germany for transmitting 29,000 pages of classified NATO documentation to East German intelligence. That must have been the greatest exercise in confidence building in world history. Comrade Rupp's transmission of information surely led the Soviet Union to realise that we were weak, and that we were not aggressive. I hope that the Russians will realise that they do not confront NATO in an eyeball-to-eyeball cold war environment. We are partners, and we are working together. It is as much in our interests as theirs that they should democratise and modernise their economy and their political culture.

Khrushchev said more than 30 years ago that NATO would one day include the Soviet Union as a member, and everyone laughed. Who knows what will happen five, 10 or 15 years from now, but anyone who argues that NATO is superfluous, or that Russia should be incorporated now, is being premature, to put it politely.

My hon. Friend may not be aggressive, but the Russians are faced by the 10 conditions set out by Senator Jesse Helms. The third of those conditions is the explicit rejection of a nuclear-free central Europe. Did my hon. Friend's Defence Committee reflect on the Helms conditions?

It would be unfair of me to criticise the chairman of another country's Foreign Relations Committee, but Jesse Helms does not, thankfully, sit alongside Bill Clinton in decision making. Senator Helms's Committee has a great deal of power, but, even as a proponent of more power for our Committees, I realise when I see the powers exercised in the United States that there must be some exceptions.

I do not regularly read the Morning Star but, when my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesterfield (Mr. Benn) contributes, I do. Earlier this week, the paper reflected the paranoia in some circles in both the west and the former Soviet Union. There are fears that war is about to burst out, or that we are all aggressive. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence would have smiled to read:

"Our own defence review in Britain, for instance, provides for greater expenditure".

Perhaps I have been asleep for the past week. If that statement were true, I would be frankly delighted, and I am sure that my right hon. Friend would be delighted, too. However, it is not.

Such collective paranoia suggests that the end of the cold war has left us all spending more on defence. However, our spending has gone from 5.2 per cent. Of GDP under the previous Government to about 2.5 per cent. now, and we are drifting a little lower. I see no evidence of a build-up of military equipment and threats. We have only one mechanism—Trident—for delivering nuclear weapons, and the numbers of warheads and missiles are dropping way below the numbers in France, which some hon. Members consider, although I do not, a greater threat than Russia. I say that in jest, so no one should think that I am totally paranoid.

A practical example of the unfounded paranoia to which the hon. Gentleman refers is the fact that Russian troops took part in NATO's intervention force in Bosnia. He and I saw at Tuzla that they were under direct command of the United States general who was in overall command, and they were able to operate reasonably, sensibly and constructively.

I agree.

We are used in the House to dealing with the paranoid, but the situation in Russia can be terrifying. Several of us attended, in Copenhagen, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the Russian delegation included Zhirinovsky. With the security of parliamentary privilege, I can say that he is, at least in his public pronouncements, certifiable. I suspect that he is much saner and more rational than the public image that he creates would suggest.

About three months ago, I went to a meeting of the Duma, which was headed by people who had recently been converted to the idea of parliamentary control of the Executive. The meeting was held in a Communist party caucus room where there was an enormous bust of Lenin. We should remember that the words emanating from the Duma are those of true unreconstructed cold warriors. While we must listen, we must not get obsessed by what we hear.

In support of what the hon. Gentleman says, does he agree that there is a parallel between the argument that we must not take certain steps for fear of upsetting or strengthening the warmongers in Russia and that of unilateralists between 1981 and 1987 that, if NATO pressed on with nuclear deterrence, it would make war more, not less, likely? The reverse was the case, and he was one of a relatively small minority of Labour Members who stood up for that view.

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's support. He knows a little about penetrating left-wing organisations from his early political career. I am sure that much of the work of the Stasi and KGB was based on his successful penetration of the Labour party in early 1980s. We have to be balanced, and we are.

I have examined costs, on which much nonsense has been written. There are reports by the congressional budget office, Rand, the United States Department of Defence, NATO and the Polish Euro-Atlantic Association. My hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen) published a report under the auspices of the North Atlantic Assembly. Much of the confusion arises because some studies are based on there being four new entrants and a longer time scale. They were made rather early on. We concluded that the cost of NATO enlargement is a bargain for the UK. The Secretary of State for Defence had said that it represented each year the cost of a quarter of a Eurofighter. Even if it doubled to a half, the UK would have gained enormously from its contribution to NATO enlargement.

We strongly argue that the cost may eventually fall between the alarmist costs suggested by the congressional budget office and Rand reports and that suggested by the NATO study. The Committee states:

"We conclude, therefore, that it would be as well, in choosing to endorse the process of enlargement, to be prepared for the costs shared among the 19 members of NATO to drift up at least towards the mid-range between NATO's $1.5 billion over ten years and the US DoD's $5–6 billion over thirteen years."

That might seem expensive, but the decision to endorse enlargement will be made not on economic but on political grounds. I firmly believe that the costs are manageable, and not high.

There are some hon. Members—there were more before 1 May last year—who are as enthusiastic about joining NATO as about joining the masons. They believe that we should have kept out. I have no sense of guilt about supporting NATO, even in the heyday of the cold war; quite the reverse. Like any sane person, I knew that it was necessary in 1949 to establish a defensive military and political alliance.

People seem to forget, because they do not want to remember, that NATO has always been as much a political as a military alliance. It incorporated new members and it will incorporate more. It has reformed incredibly. People who are prepared to look can only admire how NATO has adapted to the new world environment. NATO is still necessary. It would be lunatic beyond words to subscribe to the old mid-1980s philosophy of peace groups that the alliance should wither away or collapse precipitately and be replaced by a collective security organisation that I would have regarded as akin to the League of Nations.

The hon. Gentleman is describing the Foreign Secretary's views in the mid-1980s as lunatic beyond words.

The Foreign Secretary is exceedingly competent. Like the Labour party, he has adapted over the years, but, even when he was anti-nuclear weapons, he was unequivocally pro-NATO. Many people on the same side of the Labour party as me in the early 1980s thought that money spent on Trident could be better spent on enhancing our conventional capability.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

No, I shall not give way.

The policy is right now. It is not that we have been converted to being pro-defence. Conservative Members should invest in my other study, "The British Labour Party and Defence".

How much?

It is much cheaper. If Conservative Members invested in it, they would see that all that we are doing is returning to our roots of being very pro-defence. If I were in a provocative mood, I would invite them to read our parliamentary debates in 1940 to find which parties favoured a strong effort against Nazi Germany. It was the Liberals and the Labour party. I shall not make that point.

I do not feel guilty about the NATO of the past or of the future. I believe that, in enhancing our security, it will enhance not only the security of the three countries that will join it formally next year but that of people in the countries that have not yet had their requests for membership agreed. It is certainly enhancing the security of people living in the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and, even more certainly, Bosnia. This is an alliance for the future. The day may come when it can wither away, but I suspect that it will not be in the lifetime of any hon. Member in the Chamber at the moment.

Having spoken at excessive length, for which I apologise, I urge all hon. Members to endorse the recommendations of the Government, of all NATO Governments and of the countries that are desperate to join, backed, in most cases, by their public opinion. Above all, I urge hon. Members to accept the recommendations of the Defence Committee by saying a resounding yes to enlarging the alliance to include the three additional members.

Several hon. Members rose—

Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Some of us have waited for more than a year for this debate. It is intolerable not only that it should be held on a Friday when most Members have gone to their constituencies but that it should be interrupted by a Government statement that will interfere with an important debate. We protest in the strongest terms.

It is not a matter for the Chair how the business of the House is arranged. In view of the tightness of time, making such points only detracts from the time available. Sir Geoffrey Johnson Smith.

I did not realise that I deserved this honour, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I thought that you had recognised me for another reason. I shall take advantage of the minute or two left before the statement that the Government feel it necessary to make today. It could have waited.

The North Atlantic treaty would not have been signed had it not been for the Soviet threat but NATO has never been regarded by those of us who have studied it as a purely military alliance. One has only to examine the treaty preamble, which clearly articulates support for

"democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law".

I make that point because it explains why, with the end of the cold war and with no imminent Soviet threat, NATO was not disbanded.

My view is that, had NATO not responded to the challenge of building a new security architecture for Europe following the end of the cold war, the people of western Europe would have said, "What is the purpose of this military alliance? The cold war has ended. Russian communism is dead and buried and the Soviet threat has disappeared." The answer to the question "Why not disband it?" that was posed in people's minds was based on the statement made in 1967, when the Harmel doctrine, as it was called, was adopted. It made it clear that NATO strategy was to be based on a twin-tracked policy of maintaining adequate defence while seeking a relaxation of tensions between east and west Europe.

In short, NATO was not just a military alliance; it was and continues to be a political alliance—

With permission, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I should like to make a statement.

The Government are modernising the welfare state to meet the changing needs of the 21st century. We inherited a system that was failing on all counts. It was failing to tackle poverty, despite spending more. It was failing to help people work, and was writing them off to benefit dependency.

Reform is necessary—work for those who can work and security for those who cannot. We have already set about the task. We have established the new deals—with the biggest ever investment in opportunities. We are not only helping the young and long-term unemployed, but for the first time helping those whose aspirations had not previously been recognised, whose benefit dependency had simply not been addressed—lone parents and people with disabilities and health problems. We are overhauling the child support system, setting up a comprehensive counter-fraud strategy and raising child benefit with extra help for the poorest families.

We are committed to fundamental reform of incapacity benefit for new claimants. We aim to spend less on incapacity benefit, and to provide more help for severely disabled people with the greatest needs and more help for disabled people to return to work. We will improve gateways into disability benefits, and we have already begun discussions with disability organisations about that.

Helping people into work helps them to be better off than they can be on benefits, but it will also help them to provide more for themselves in their retirement. Later this year, we will publish a Green Paper setting out our long-term strategic proposals for pensions. Now we are starting pensions reform for today's pensioners.

This House rightly places great emphasis on the concerns of older people—people who have worked hard all their lives either out at work or bringing up a family; the generation who fought in the war. They are entitled to security in their retirement. They deserve dignity in their retirement.

There has been much focus on the basic state pension, and that is right. It must remain the foundation of income in retirement. We will uprate it at least in line with prices, but we know that pensioners feel that their concerns were not central to the previous Government, and they want action now.

Yesterday, my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health announced to, the House the abolition of charges for eye tests for all pensioners. On Monday, my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister will announce new concessionary travel for all pensioners. Today I can announce to the House, as part of the comprehensive spending review, extra help with winter fuel payments for all pensioners.

We have already made a winter fuel payment of £20 to all pensioner households and announced our intention to do so again this winter. As a result of cutting VAT on fuel, our winter fuel payments and other changes, average pensioner fuel bills are as much as £100 lower this year. As part of the comprehensive spending review, we have allocated a further £0.5 billion to make those winter fuel payments a permanent feature of all pensioners' income. All pensioners will know that, in addition to the help with their fuel bills from our cut in value added tax to 5 per cent., they will get a winter fuel payment of £20.

There are elderly people for whom even the extra help of the basic state pension increase and the winter fuel payment is simply not enough. These are the pensioners whose income has fallen furthest behind. Typically, they have no occupational pension, no private pension, no savings, no state earnings-related pension scheme, sometimes not even the full entitlement to the basic state pension. They fall back on income support. They have fallen further and further behind. In a divided Britain, the gap between the poorest and the richest pensioners has been widening. It has been widening for 30 years, and without decisive Government action is set to widen further.

This Government are committed to tackling poverty and social exclusion and we are not prepared to let that happen. We are taking action. We will establish a guaranteed minimum income for pensioners. So, for the poorest pensioners, we are increasing their income by three times the increase in income support that they would have received had we awarded only the usual price uprating. For 1.5 million of the poorest pensioners, this is the biggest single increase they have ever had.

For the first time, all pensioners will have a guaranteed minimum income of not less than £75 a week. For the first time, pensioner couples are guaranteed a minimum income of £116.60. The oldest pensioners will get even more.

There are some pensioners who are even poorer than those on income support. They are some of the very poorest people in Britain. They are the pensioners who are entitled to income support, but are not getting it; those who are slipping through the safety net altogether—the forgotten pensioners. This is not a marginal issue involving just a few slipping through the net. We estimate there are as many as 1 million of these forgotten pensioners. They are mostly very elderly, and nearly all women. Now we are taking action to bring the guaranteed minimum income to them, too.

Starting from next April, we will be introducing, for the first time, a new national programme of personal advisers for pensioners. We have already set up, and are running, nine pilot projects to help us shape this new service. Through new technology, we will for the first time use the information that pensioners have already given us throughout their lives. We will match the data that we already hold on their personal records in the Contributions Agency, the Benefits Agency and the local authority records to identify those who are likely to be over pension age, entitled to income support and not receiving it.

The pensioner will then be contacted by the personal adviser, who, over the telephone or through a visit, will assess their entitlement, and then fill in the forms for them. All that pensioners will have do is sign, and their extra money will come through the following week.

Yesterday, I visited one of the pilot projects in Torfaen in Wales and met some of the pensioners who had already been helped. The pensioners were all absolutely clear about two things. First, the extra money, even where it was only a small amount, meant a great deal to them. It is desperately needed. Secondly, without the personal contact, there would have been absolutely no chance of their getting the money. It is right that we are taking this service nationwide. It will begin to tackle the hidden problem of pensioner poverty.

Today, my announcement marks a major modernisation of the pensions system. We have been able to deliver real help for pensioners within a social security budget that is set to grow more slowly in this Parliament than it did in the last, to take a lower share of gross domestic product, and to take a lower share of public spending as a whole. It is part of our pensions reform and marks a new approach to tackling the problem of pensioner poverty and inequality.

We promised to reform the welfare state around work for those who can work. We have made progress on that. We promised security for whose who cannot work. Today we make progress on that too. This marks a major step forward in our determination to deliver security and dignity in retirement for all.

I thank the Secretary of State for giving me advance sight of her statement, although I did not receive the last two minutes, so some of the details will have to be studied later.

Today's statement is as fascinating for the detail, which I shall address later, as for the omissions. The way in which we account for how we pay for the changes and how pensioners receive the increases depends to a large extent on how well the economy does, which clearly depends dramatically on how the social security budget is either kept in check or reduced. What has happened over the past few days is a deliberate attempt by the Government to talk themselves out of a pledge that they gave at the time of the last election.

The quotes are straightforward and simple. The Prime Minister said at the time of the last election:

"we have said as we get the welfare bills down, these appallingly high bills for social and economic failure under the Conservatives, then we can release more money into education and health and the services…we really want".

Therefore, my first question for the Secretary of State is this: why are she and the Prime Minister now trying to pretend that the Labour party did not pledge to reduce the costs of social security?

The 1996 Labour document, "Getting Welfare to Work—A New Vision for Social Security" states clearly that they had "three fundamental goals", the second of which was,

"to save money for the taxpayer, as the benefit bill reduces."

That is the key: the Government are acting like a bunch of con men, trying to persuade the public that they never made such a pledge. It is not an easy pledge to meet, but the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State must answer the question—why are they trying to avoid it?

In her statement, the Secretary of State spoke of reducing dependency and of the pledges in that respect, but it is clear that, like a number of the Government's measures, the working families tax credit—I know that the Secretary of State does not want that to be in the social security budget, but the fact is that it replaces benefit payment, so it is in that budget—raises dependency quite dramatically, as more than 400,000 extra people will enter dependency as a result. That is another broken pledge.

The key to today's statement is the question of how the pensions are to be afforded. We need to determine how much of the money will be long-term and sustainable, so let us look at the reality of the welfare budget—how much the Government have managed to secure through reductions, and what that means overall. The document about which the Chancellor made a statement on Tuesday is significant for the absence of most of the money within the social security budget of which it is necessary to take proper consideration.

For example, we saw that the Government had taken out administration costs—roughly £3.5 billion a year. They have also taken out the working families tax credit, with most of it hidden in accounting adjustments, but with 20 per cent.hidden elsewhere. Those figures should have been included, because they represent money that was family credit and part of overall benefit payments.

When we look at the figures, despite the absence of calculations on housing benefit, council tax benefit and other benefits, we begin to get a much truer picture of what the state of the budget is and, more important, is likely to be over the next few years. The figures tell us that, before Labour's arrival in government, the welfare budget was falling each year, year on year; and that, as a direct result of the previous Government's actions, it went into negative growth in the first year of the new Labour Government—it actually fell to less than 12 per cent. of GDP. That figure was clearly the result of the activities of the previous Government—so to say that the Conservatives did not reduce the overall burden of welfare or reduce the costs of welfare as a proportion of GDP is utterly absurd. The figure fell below 12 per cent. and was likely to fall further.

When we then examine the Government's figures with all the relevant figures having been added back in, as the Library has done for us—

When is the hon. Gentleman going to talk about pensions?

I shall get on to pensions, all right.

The point about affording pensions lies absolutely in whether or not the costs of welfare are being reduced or increased. In reality—even according to the Government's own predictions—once working families tax credit has been added back in, the budget is set to rise to 12.3 per cent. of GDP by 2001. From what independent analysts have calculated in the past few days, we can begin to see that, even if there is only slight variation in growth, that budget forecast is likely to rise to more than 12.5 per cent. of GDP; and if growth becomes worse, it will rise to nearly 13 per cent. of GDP by the end of this Parliament.

All that bears directly on the Government's ability to afford what they say they want to pay to pensioners and others, so why did the Secretary of State allow such misleading figures to be published? Does she accept that the figures in the book that was published on Tuesday are not correct; and that, when the money relevant to the social security budget is added back in, the proposal breaks the Government's pledge about reducing the overall burden of welfare as a proportion of GDP?

Several questions remain to be answered, even after today's statement. The statements on health and education dealt with the entirety of the changes and the implications for the budget, but today the Secretary of State has chosen not to talk about the entirety of the changes, so a huge number of questions arise. The comprehensive spending review says that the new education maintenance allowance will be "linked to parental income". Will the Secretary of State clarify whether child benefit—

When is the hon. Gentleman going to talk about pensions?

The hon. Gentleman probably does not realise that child benefit is part of the social security budget.

Will child benefit be taxed or means-tested as a result of that declaration? Will the Secretary of State also tell the House how much money the Government expect to raise from the announced switch to education maintenance allowance, or will spending on child benefit and EMA remain the same as the total spending on child benefit, but simply be reallocated?

Why were no decisions on the future of disability benefits explained in the statement? Why was there nothing on housing benefit and council tax benefit? Why was there no mention of the change programme? Part of the proposal to hold costs in check relies wholly on what happens in respect of restraining administrative costs, which remain fairly flat in the Government's forecast. What are the Government likely to receive in terms of such cuts?

In his statement on Tuesday, the Chancellor announced a target of 40,000 lone parents going back into work as a result of the new deal programme, which bears directly on the social security budget, which has a bearing on pensions, to which subject I shall turn in a second. In a debate on Monday, the Secretary of State said that she would announce no targets until she had received the full understanding of what was entailed in the programme currently in place. Did she receive that understanding overnight? How is it that the Chancellor was able to announce on Tuesday a target of 40,000 lone parents going back into work as a result of the Government's programmes?

Conservatives have always upheld, and will continue to uphold, the principle that the most vulnerable, especially pensioners, should be assisted in claiming their full benefit entitlements; and that those entitlements should reach the level required for people to have a sustainable income in retirement. Yet the question remains whether the increases announced today are real and sustainable and will not be clawed back in due course as a direct result of the Government losing control of the economy, as has happened so often under Labour Governments. The Government have already clawed money from pensioners through their hit on advance corporation tax dividend tax credit, which has taken £5 billion a year from pensioners who bother to save.

The new higher so-called guaranteed income is a massive increase in means testing. It represents a complete U-turn from the more sensible policies advocated by the Labour party when in opposition, and, more particularly, some of the more sensible utterances of the Minister for Welfare Reform, who said that extending means testing would be a retrograde step. Not only will it have a devastating effect on the incentive to save of people on modest incomes, who have been encouraged and who want to save, but it will deprive them of the enhanced means-tested benefit.

The Government now have a policy that will simultaneously greatly increase both dependency and Government expenditure. How do the Government propose to persuade more people to claim their means-tested benefits? How much more money will be lost in bureaucracy?

The Secretary of State talked about advisers, but I want to know how many she expects there to be. There are 10 million pensioners in this country, of whom only 1.7 million claim income support, so, if the Government's intentions are to be taken seriously, that must mean that more than 8 million pensioners will have to be screened or visited. If one civil servant can screen roughly 1,000 pensioners a year, that means more than 8,000 new civil servants, at a cost of £250 million every year, spent just on bureaucracy. How much of the money for pensioners will have to be allocated to the bureaucratic mechanisms that will be necessary?

Does not that also mean that the Secretary of State's proposals will begin the erosion of the contributory principle which so many hon. Members on both sides of the House think should be enhanced rather than clawed away? In the present proposals, the Government have sounded the absolute cry that they no longer consider the contributory principle to be the mainstay, and bit by bit, they will extend the means-testing process across the whole state income.

As the Secretary of State knows, one of the reasons why many pensioners do not claim income support is that they do not like the idea of taking what they view as charity, but they believe in taking their basic state pension because they view that not as charity but as a provision to which they have contributed. How is the Secretary of State building on that? Surely she is asking all those people, to whom income support may not be at all relevant, to declare their incomes when they did not do so before.

In conclusion, the issue is sustainability and whether the Government, like so many Labour Governments, have for short-term reasons declared that they will somehow raise incomes only to claw them back as the economy fails and they fail on their pledge to cut social security and welfare dependency. In a few years, pensioners up and down the country will find their incomes falling, not rising, as a result of the Government's actions and failures.

The hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith) has failed to address pensioner poverty and to say whether he thinks that we are right to tackle that problem by investing in help for pensioners and giving the greatest help to the poorest, who have been left behind. If, in addition to the help that we are giving all pensioners, we gave them the £2 billion that we have set aside for the poorest pensioners, the poorest would get just pence—they need pounds. We cannot limit the help that is needed by the poorest to that which we could prudently give to all. The problem is that the pensioners who have fallen behind—the very poorest—need extra money.

I shall tell the hon. Gentleman about one of the pensioners I met yesterday. She is an elderly widow who had been identified through our pilot project and given extra help. She told me that, instead of being able to buy only two apples at a time, she could now afford to buy a pound of apples. We are talking about people who are living on the margins, while the hon. Gentleman is pursuing high-blown theory. The proposal aims to tackle pensioner poverty and give pensioners the help that they need.

The hon. Gentleman said that the proposal will lead to means testing and bureaucracy. He has not listened. Personal advisers will not have to visit all 10 million pensioners. Of course that is not our proposal. We are doing what his Government did not; we are using the data that we already hold on our computer systems to identify those who are likely to be vulnerable. The personal advisers will visit only those people, who are screened by new technology, so the question is not simply one of bureaucracy.

The hon. Gentleman said that there will be a massive increase in means testing. Presumably he opposes the measure, but he has no proposals to stop the poorest pensioners falling behind, and none to tackle the problem of the 1 million pensioners who, under his Government, fell through the net altogether.

The measure has nothing to do with the devastating effects on the incentives to save, which were caused by the rip-off of private pensions, in which £1 in every £4 was eaten up in costs and administrative charges. The devastating effect on personal pensions was caused by the scandal of pension mis-selling. This is a practical, sensible and socially just proposal for giving immediate help to those who are most in need, and we are right to make it.

The hon. Gentleman talked about overall spending figures. He made two points. He accused us of being misleading about the figures, and he took issue with the overall spending plans. He said that we had hidden social security administration figures. We have not; they are not hidden. They are on page 16 in table 1 of the comprehensive spending review, clear for all to see. Those figures cover three years.

The hon. Gentleman said also that the working families tax credit was an accounting fiddle and a broken promise. It is not; it is a promise being kept, to give more help to low-income working families and to make sure that work pays as part of our welfare-to-work programme.

The Government have fiddled the figures.

We have not fiddled the figures. There are times when figures move, as they did under Conservative Governments, from the social security budget to the health budget, from health to social security and in and out of the tax system.

I shall give examples. Did not the hon. Gentleman's Government remove spending on residential care in nursing homes? That was switched from the Department of Social Security to the Department of Health under community care. We did not argue that it should be put back into the DSS figures. It moved from the social security budget and the same amount was dealt with under community care. The Conservatives removed the cost of statutory sick pay from the social security budget. We did not argue that it should put back, because it was being paid differently.

We are restructuring the help that we give to low-income families in work. We are rightly paying that money through the tax system as part of a major reform of tax and benefit. All the figures are there to see, and we have accounted for them properly and publicly.

The hon. Gentleman talked also about the level of social security spending. Under the Conservatives—we have their record on which to judge them—the social security budget rose from 9.7 per cent. of gross domestic product to 12 per cent. Under this Government, it is set to fall from 12 per cent. to 11 per cent. While the social security budget was increasing in cash and percentage terms, poverty was also increasing. There was less help for those who needed it, but extra help was being given overall because more people depended on benefits who could and should have been in work. That is why we have said that we shall cut the cost of social and economic failure.

We shall invest, through the new deal, in opportunity and help those who can to work. All the lone parents who have gone to work under the new deal are, on average, better off by £39 a week than they were on benefit. That is tackling poverty. However, their benefit dependency has also decreased by £42 a week on average. That is our approach. We are investing in opportunity and cutting the cost of social and economic failure. At the general election, we set out what we would do to tackle poverty and social exclusion and to broaden opportunity. We said that social security would be part of reforming the welfare state. We have done that.

Despite the icy-hearted response from the Conservative Front Bench, a great number of British people will applaud the measure to support citizens, many of whom are in their 80s and 90s, who are not only some of the most decent people in this country who have served us so well over the years, but some of the poorest.

However, I have a suggestion. As personal advisers will be calling on that group, could we ask them also to find out whether they are missing out on other parts of the welfare state, such as insulation grants—some elderly people make a choice in winter between eating and heating—and to advise them about the new free eye tests? Those are just two examples. The personal adviser system will be relatively expensive, and rightly so, but could we use it more generally as a human access point for the wider welfare state for people who ask so little but deserve so much from the rest of us?

My hon. Friend makes a very important point. The pensioner personal advisers—I pay tribute to the work that they are doing—are changing the face of social security and bringing help to people who have fallen through the net. They also advise on free eye tests and insulation grants.

Yesterday, I spoke to one pensioner and her personal adviser in Wales. She had a problem with another bill altogether—she was told that she owed more than she did—and her personal adviser helped her to sort it out. It is an overall service that helps vulnerable people with their problems and gets them help in their own homes when they need it. It is less expensive than spreading help thinly to all pensioners, although we are concerned about all pensioners: that is why we are providing free eye tests, concessionary travel and winter fuel payments and will retain the basic state pension as a foundation of income in retirement. However, we must get extra help to the very poorest.

Unlike the hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), I congratulate the Secretary of State, first on not keeping the Prime Minister's pre-election promise to cut welfare spending, and secondly on focusing help on poorer pensioners, about whom I have made representations on many occasions.

I welcome her statement this morning, but does she accept that, when history comes to judge the first two years of the new Labour Government, it will view them as a wasted opportunity because of the unnecessary adherence to Tory spending plans? Does she accept that, for many very elderly pensioners who are in the last years of their lives, two years is too long to wait? Would it not have been better as an immediate measure to increase the basic state pension for all older pensioners so that people got the money straight away?

Does the Secretary of State propose to link the proposed pension guarantee to earnings or prices? We very much welcome the above-inflation increase next April, but beyond that what will happen? If it is not linked to earnings, first, the Government will break their manifesto pledge that pensioners would share in general prosperity, and, secondly, the growth in pensioner income inequality that the Secretary of State professes to oppose will continue. So I hope that she will reassure us that it will be linked to earnings.

Finally, does the Secretary of State believe that she is subject to the Trade Descriptions Act? Can the minimum income guarantee to which she referred justify the word "guarantee"? For want of a better word, is it guaranteed, or is it the case that, even when the so-called guarantee is in place, tens of thousands and probably hundreds of thousands of pensioners—particularly those who are not claiming benefit—will still miss out, so that it is not a true guarantee?

Before the election, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister promised to cut the cost of economic and social failure—the cost of people who depended on welfare and benefits but who could and wanted to work—and that is what he has delivered. I am happy to acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman and many of his hon. Friends have urged that we should give extra help to the poorest pensioners and criticised an approach that simply gave help to all and allowed the poorest to fall further behind. I acknowledge the part that his arguments have played in the change.

Reform of the welfare state has been under way since we took office. Last July I set up the new deal for lone parents. That is welfare reform, extending opportunities to those who did not have them before in order to increase their incomes and cut the cost of economic and social failure.

We started pensions reform very shortly after taking office, by investing millions of pounds in establishing pilot projects. We would not be in a position to target help nationally to the poorest pensioners had we not conducted piloted projects. The previous Government made no attempt to help the poorest pensioners. As soon as we were elected, we set about establishing pilot projects in order to be confident that we could take the policy forward. We are not announcing the start of activity, but going national on activity that we have been piloting, and I hope that the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether the minimum income would be guaranteed. That is an important question, as it goes to the heart of the issue—those who are falling through the net altogether. We have not simply announced an increase and said that it is there for those who can get it; we shall make sure that we get it to those who need it through our system of data matching and personal advisers. We are investing in a new delivery system. It would have been the utmost cynicism to announce in the House a guaranteed minimum income for pensioners who were already identified and claiming income support. It is right that at the same time we are introducing a new delivery system to reach something like 1 million forgotten pensioners.

rose—

Order. I have to protect the main debate of the day, so I must appeal for short, single questions and short replies.

Is it not a blot on the country that so many pensioners are forced to live in acute poverty? Many of them are ex-service men who sometimes wonder—and ask me at my surgeries—who actually won the war. Is it not absolutely essential that they are assisted, having been betrayed by the Tory Government? In respect of the concessionary travel to be announced on Monday, I hope that my right hon. Friend will try her very best to see to it that there can be a reduction in the cost of TV licences, as that, too, would be helpful to many retired people.

My hon. Friend has been a long-standing advocate for pensioners in his constituency and throughout the country, and I warmly welcome his comments. I am sure that they will be borne in mind by my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister.

Surely what is important is not whether it is called a minimum income guarantee or income support, but how much extra money will be in the pockets of pensioners. What does it mean for the contributory principle? Is not the statement, with its narrow focus, rather like the dog who did not bark in the night? Why is there not more talk about how cuts in total welfare spending—as promised at the election—will finance increases in public spending on health and education? Is it not time to admit that welfare spending has risen remorselessly in all western countries in the past 40 years; that the bulk of welfare spending falls quite rightly on pensions, the disabled and child benefit; and that it is impossible for the Government to deliver their promise to cut the total welfare bill?

We promised to cut the cost of social and economic failure. The reduction in benefit dependency allows us to prioritise our resources on our manifesto commitments in health and education. As we are not spending money on those who could be working, we are able to direct the resources to those who are not working because they are in retirement.

Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that receipt of the new guaranteed minimum income will not affect entitlement to income support? It would clearly be wrong to give increased pensions with one hand and take away entitlement to housing benefit and council tax rebate with the other. Does my right hon. Friend recognise that today's pensioners are demanding the restoration of the link with earnings and that, until that happens, her generation will not have redeemed their debt to them?

My hon. Friend makes a very important point. Many pensioners in Scotland are struggling to make ends meet. In fact, 156,000 pensioners do not have enough second pension or savings and depend on income support. However, we estimate that a further 100,000 pensioners in Scotland are entitled to income support but are not receiving it. My hon. Friend has been a long-standing advocate of our determination to tackle poverty and inequality. I am sure that he will agree that we should get help not only to the 156,000 who need a better standard of living, but to the 100,000 who are falling way behind. The guaranteed minimum income will ensure that all those pensioners will be much better off than they could ever have been with the previous rates of income support.

Although I very much welcome her statement, I have noticed that on two occasions now the Secretary of State has refused to make a commitment to restore the link between pensions and earnings. Given that, obviously, it is now the Government's position that the link will not be restored, will she recognise that, as hon. Members on both sides of the House have pointed out, the issue of concessionary payments will become even more important? Can she confirm, therefore, that the announcement that will be made on Monday on concessionary travel will mean that it will be available to all pensioners at the same level, wherever they live, and will she make it clear that the Government will reconsider the issue of concessionary TV licences?

I am afraid that the hon. Gentleman will have to wait until Monday for confirmation of the details of the Deputy Prime Minister's statement. May I say, however, what an urgent issue the poverty of the poorest pensioners in Wales is? We estimate that probably more pensioners in Wales are entitled to income support and are not getting it than are entitled to income support and are getting it. As a result, of all those pensioners in Wales who fall below income support level, only about half receive income support. That is why I believe that the measures that we have announced today—a guaranteed minimum income for pensioners and an increase for all the poorest pensioners—will be especially important for pensioners in Wales.

I thank the Secretary of State for her statement, which will be welcomed by the pensioners of Putney and, equally important, by my 87-year-old mother and her friends. However, no mention has been made of the scandal of excess winter deaths of pensioners. Will the Secretary of State outline her action plan to deal with that scandal?

My hon. Friend has raised an important issue—that of excess winter deaths. More people die in the winter than throughout the rest of the year. There are about 48,000 excess winter deaths among pensioners every year. If one compares that situation with that in countries where there is a much wider fluctuation of temperature, I am afraid that one can draw only one conclusion: pensioner poverty is contributing to the toll of deaths in the winter.

We were not prepared to stand by and allow that problem to continue growing when the prosperity of the country has increased in each of the past five years. The measures that we take today, which specifically focus extra help on the poorest pensioners, are urgently needed.

The Secretary of State has made several references to a pledge to cut the costs of social and economic failure. With the number of unemployed people and those claiming benefit rising, we are actually witnessing an increase in the costs of the Government's economic failure. Will the Secretary of State answer the very simple question that was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith)? How many personal pension advisers will be employed, what will be the cost of employing them, and what will be the cost of the data-matching exercise, which presumably will be on-going, in order to obtain the names of those pensioners who should be approached by their personal pension adviser?

The hon. Lady made two points—first, on the issue of the cost of social and economic failure, and secondly, on the issue of personal advisers and costs. The number of lone parents on income support was increasing under the Conservative Government. There was no programme to help them to return to work. Married women were returning to work, and it was obvious that it should have been possible for lone parents to do so too, especially once their youngest child had started school.

We have introduced the new deal for lone parents. The number of lone parents on income support has fallen below 1 million for the first time, as the Prime Minister told the House on Wednesday, and it is forecast to fall by a further 40,000 next year. That is not a target; it is a forecast. We hope to move things even further forward with the new deal for lone parents. We are cutting the cost of economic and social failure. The bill to keep lone parents on income support at a low standard of living, with their children being brought up in a workless household, was rising. Under the present Government, backed by our programme of action, which will be augmented by the child care and the working families tax credit, that bill, which is a cost of economic and social failure, will fall.

The hon. Lady also asked about the number of personal advisers. As I have said, we are piloting their introduction. Details of the numbers of personal advisers and the costs of the new technology will be available when we have finished and evaluated the pilot project.

When?

When I announced our plans, I said that that would be early next year. We have no doubts that it is better to do things this way. We cannot help the poorest pensioners with pence; we must help them with pounds. The previous Government did nothing to tackle that problem.

Will the Secretary of State tell us how pensioners are to cope with the twin problems that they currently face—a state pension that has been increased only in line with prices, not earnings, and is therefore £25 a week or more less than it should have been had that link been maintained; and the poverty trap in which many pensioners find themselves because they have a small secondary pension which takes them just above income support level and thus lose out on council tax and housing benefit entitlements? How will her proposals today affect those entitlements? Is she still considering a longer-term increase of the pension in line with earnings—the link that was so callously broken by the previous Tory Government?

The Green Paper, which we shall publish in the autumn, will look at the level and future of the basic state pension. As a result of the announcements that we are making this week as part of the comprehensive spending review, all pensioners—not just those on income support—will be better off. They will not have to pay the cost of their eye tests; they will receive permanent help with winter fuel bills; and they will get concessionary travel.

The Secretary of State will be aware that many British pensioners live overseas, some of them in countries where their pensions have been frozen at the rate that they were receiving when they emigrated. Why has not her review addressed that injustice? Does she recall that the Minister of State, when Chairman of the all-party Select Committee on Social Security, recognised that injustice and recommended that there should be a debate in the House in Government time with a free vote? I believe that that would be a good idea now, so that the 144 people who have signed the early-day motion calling for the unfreezing of those pensions may air their concerns.

We are aware of the representations that many hon. Members have made. I believe that, bearing in mind the scandal of the very poorest pensioners in this country, about which we have been talking today, the overseas pensioners are unlikely to be a priority.

rose—

Order. I am afraid that we must now move on. We have an important debate, in which many hon. Members seek to participate.

rose—

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman as he is about to speak, but earlier Madam Speaker said that she would refer to the Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons the issue of debates such as this. Will you also ensure that the Speaker considers the whole issue of what happens when so much of a debate like this, for which we have waited a year, is taken up with a very important statement? Should not statements be better timetabled?

That is a matter to take up directly with the Modernisation Committee.

I agree with what the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) has said. I believe that what we have experienced today represents a gross discourtesy to the House. It certainly interrupted the flow of the debate. Anyway, we shall make the protest at another time.

Before I was interrupted, I was saying that, ever since I can remember, the NATO alliance has been not just a military, but a political, alliance. That probably accounts for the fact that the alliance did not end when the cold war ended. We recognised that there were good reasons—including political reasons—for extending the scope of NATO to fulfil one of its original aims in its preamble: that it should be there to protect democracy in Europe. We also recognised that there were good reasons for extending that remit, after the end of the cold war, into eastern Europe by opening the alliance to European states that wished to join and meet the requirements of membership.

From the beginning, the enlargement process has produced differences of opinion. Some of those opinions have already been expressed during the debate. The differences have emerged in debates of the NATO parliamentary assembly that I have attended. The American Government's influence on the other Governments and in debates in the assembly has persuaded most people to look favourably on the principle of enlargement. There is nothing new about enlargement. NATO has been enlarged before, when Germany, Spain, Portugal and Turkey joined the founder members. The development came as no surprise and was affirmed in July last year by the NATO Governments, who said:

"A new NATO is developing; a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe."

Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary emerged from the pack as the principal contenders for entry to NATO. All three suffered dreadfully at the hands of the Nazi and communist dictatorships. Before and after the war, the west did nothing to help them in their moments of distress. I have taken a positive view about the inclusion of those countries, because refusing their request for membership would have been a dreadful act of insensitivity.

Mr. Brzezinski, a distinguished former adviser to a President of the United States, once said:

"The expansion of NATO is an important milestone in European history. It is an important step forward in that unique relationship that binds America and Europe together. It expands the role of the alliance from an alliance that has defended freedom and deterred war to an alliance that promotes the scope of freedom and enhances peace."

That is a fine sentiment, but it should not stop us from questioning the wisdom of ever more expansion. NATO should be used as a political force to help build a political consensus in Europe, as well as to back up our diplomatic initiatives and political goals with military options.

The prospect of NATO enlargement has already given central Europe greater stability. It has helped to strengthen democratic procedures and settle border and other disputes. The NATO-Ukraine pact is one example. There has been no opposition to enlargement from Ukraine. Poland has already created a joint peacekeeping battalion with its neighbour Ukraine and with Lithuania.

However, it is reasonable to ask whether expansion can go on without undermining the cohesion of the alliance and playing into the hands of Russian nationalists. On the other hand, can we or should we risk disappointing those countries that contend that they should not be excluded if the Visegrad countries can join? It is difficult to give a precise answer to such questions from countries known to be keen on joining NATO.

Since NATO accepted the idea of enlargement, certain events have moved the argument further than was originally envisaged. Those events should cause us to pause and reflect. The development of "Partnership for Peace" has fundamentally changed our attitude towards co-operation between the nations of western, central and eastern Europe. When "Partnership for Peace" was first raised, it was described as a "policy for procrastination". It was regarded as a tool or a sop to defer enlargement. Its recent progress has been substantial. It has had impressive success and achieved a momentum in military exercises in which the UK and other western NATO countries have participated. It has also given non-NATO countries opportunities to work with NATO in military exercises, helping to strengthen democratic control over their armed forces. We had feared that, when the cold war ended, democratic practices, particularly democratic control of the armed forces, might not be introduced.

The establishment of the new co-operative arrangements, such as the Euro-Atlantic partnership, will also provide new possibilities for closer dialogue on a broad range of political and security-related issues in Europe. Then there is the NATO-Russian Founding Act, signed on 27 May this year in Paris, which provides a unique framework for improving relations between NATO and Russia on a new basis of partnership and co-operation.

The hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) said in his excellent speech that Russian officers can be seen swanning around NATO headquarters. They are obviously enjoying themselves, not feeling shut out from anything. They can get hold of all the relevant information that anyone needs to know about NATO. We have taken that on trust, but we have agreement from the Secretary-General of NATO to go into the HQ. We want to assure our Russian friends that, as democrats, we do not just take for granted what the Executive tells us; we go and see for ourselves. When we have reported back to the NATO parliamentary assembly, we shall go to Moscow and say what we have seen.

The Russians are not privy to discussions about article 5 issues.

That is a fair point. There is some concern about how far article 5 protection should be extended to those states that seek membership. That is an important issue. If they join NATO, they will expect that we would respond to any attack on them. One has to question the wisdom of that protection, particularly to countries close to the Russian border or to other areas of tension. Many initiatives have been drawn up since expansion was first considered, which should encourage the stability and co-operation we seek with the nations of eastern Europe.

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that candidates for membership should not be admitted to the alliance unless they are willing and able to engage fully on article 5 issues in relation to other nations?

The hon. Gentleman has made a valuable point. I have a high regard for the "Partnership for Peace". I am indebted to a report that the hon. Gentleman submitted to the NATO parliamentary assembly, which went into the issue in detail. He showed how convincing a system it is for ensuring that those nations feel more protected, not more vulnerable, and enjoy the benefits of closer co-operation with NATO. Asking them to take article 5 on board is a serious step, which we cannot impose in the immediate future.

That is why I ask for a pause in the examination of which nations we should allow to join NATO and which we should encourage. Nothing is more devastating to people than to be told, "Don't worry; spend a little more money, hold a conference for us and we will ensure that you have a good opportunity—perhaps not next year or the year after, but in five years' time—of joining NATO." To encourage people in such a way provokes dissension in their countries and mistrust of our way of dealing with them; it is not fair to them.

The initiatives that I have mentioned have permitted central and eastern Europe to participate in a wider range of NATO activities. In so doing, membership of NATO has become less urgent—indeed, for some countries, unnecessary. It would therefore be wise not to encourage those involved in "Partnership for Peace" to believe that it provides a passport to NATO. It should not necessarily do so. For that reason and others, further expansion of NATO should be treated with caution.

It is always a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith)—not that I follow his politics. I follow him more in friendship. We have shared quite a few exchanges in defence debates over the years. I have been a Member of the House for more than 15 years and have taken part in quite a number of defence debates. Some might say that my contributions have been mediocre, but I hope that today's might be more helpful to the House.

As a delegate to the North Atlantic Assembly—NATO's parliament—I am vice-chairman of its defence and security committee, and its special rapporteur on reform of Russian forces, for which I must consult and work with a Russian general and two senior members of the Duma. As the right hon. Member for Wealden said, I am the author of the assembly's report on "Partnership for Peace". Therefore, I hope that my comments will be helpful in filling out some of the structures laid before us.

If I had been consulted on NATO 25 years ago, it would have been apparent that I was an ardent opponent of it. Indeed, I was a passionate advocate of the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the organisation. Today, of course, I am a firm supporter. As I have said more than once in the House, if it did not exist we would have to invent it.

What have I learnt that has made me change my mind? I suppose that I must start by saying that NATO has always been a thoroughly defensive alliance. It was formed as a defensive organisation in response to fears of a threat from the east. The offensiveness of its character—it was offensive in part—was purely economic. Its existence and activity compelled the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact satellite states to commit very scarce resources to arms production rather than industrial development and infrastructural schemes.

However, NATO proved its unthreatening posture when, as the cold war began to thaw, western analysts began to postulate and propagate the principles of inoffensive defence. They began to promote the ideas of exchanging details of force structures and deployment so that the opposite side would understand, if not agree, that the configuration and deployment of such forces were thoroughly defensive rather than threatening. That was a major change in climate.

Such a change proved to be welcome in the Soviet Union, as it began to admit more openly what it had acknowledged privately for several years: it could not sensibly afford the continuing madness of a Gadarene arms race. Indeed, the United States of America came to the same conclusion at about the same time. The House will recall that President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev admitted as much jointly at their meetings in Reykjavik.

However, easement of the bipolar conflict following Mikhail Gorbachev's declaration that his secret weapon was that he could deprive the west of its enemy has been only partial. It is true that the wall has come down, trade links are being developed and there are even joint ventures in arms production—although small. A burgeoning democratic pluralism is evident in central and eastern Europe and in the Russian Federation, and civilian control of the military is improving steadily.

Will my hon. Friend reflect on the fact that, on the break-up of the Soviet Union, NATO member states might have done better to heed Mr. Gorbachev's words about wanting a better European home? Does he agree that they could have looked to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe as a base for future European co-operation and security rather than to the expansion of NATO up to the Russian borders, which puts pressure on the Russian military and encourages it?

My hon. Friend's intervention pre-empts some of my comments. I remind him that the European home has not been forgotten. The OSCE consists of 55 nations. It is top heavy and does not have many resources, apart from its archival filing cabinets and the intellectual initiatives of its diplomats and observers. It does not have the resources of NATO, which has been proved over a couple of generations and is structured to provide the architecture for common, collective European security.

I have said that there have been some improvements since the thaw in the cold war. However, there is a long way to go. There are still blocks of strong doubt and great mistrust. There is great mistrust between the Russian Federation and the west, and even more mistrust between the Russian Federation and its previous satellite allies. Ironically, NATO is proving to be the most effective single instrument in removing the doubts and building the missing confidence.

My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), the Chairman of the Select Committee on Defence, gave some examples of how NATO is building confidence. It is slowly and surely changing its declared aims and processes, engaging in a liberal application of its globally acknowledged planning resource, and making use of its integrated military command structure. It is also employing its exchange training programme and its "Partnership for Peace" programme.

One of the disadvantages of the exchange training programme is that, at least until recently, Russian officers who returned to the former Soviet Union after attending military academies in the west were consigned to command posts towards Siberia. It is thought that some of the senior Russian military suspect some contamination of those who have been trained in western establishments. That is sad, but the problem is easing.

Article 5 of the treaty commits member states to enter armed conflict in defence of other full member nations. At the moment, 16 nations are so committed, but, after ratification of the protocols, there may be a further three. In Hamburg in 1998, I was proud to move a resolution in the political committee of the North Atlantic Assembly that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic be admitted to the assembly as observer nations. That was not to every nation's liking. The French referred to me as an imbecile. They may have been right and that may still be true, but the motion won the day and, within 12 months of its acceptance by the political committee, at the assembly in Rome, Vladimir Lobov was on one side of the defence and security committee and, I think, Bernard Rogers was on the other. The meeting was chaired by the right hon. Member for Wealden. All that happened in 12 months—it was very sudden.

Article 4 of the treaty commits members to a form of operational crisis management and peacekeeping, not involving outright armed conflict. NATO's "Partnership for Peace" programme offers nations an opportunity to improve and enhance their capacity to co-operate effectively with NATO members in those international peacekeeping operations. Each partner for peace can pick its own profile and work towards it at its own pace as it qualifies for that co-operation.

The effectiveness of that programme can be seen in Bosnia, where every informed military analyst would assert that there could not have been a successful operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina had it not been for the previous work done through the programme. We have heard about the co-operation between the Russians and the Americans under American direct control, and several hon. Members have seen that in visits to Tuzla.

The "Partnership for Peace" programme has 27 signatory nations. The present candidates for membership—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—are signatory nations, and could be called "gonna-bes". A number of other countries, such as Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia, would like to join the alliance, but are in limbo. Nevertheless, they are active within the partnership programme. They could be called "wanna-bes".

There are other signatory nations within the partnership programme, including Finland and Sweden, who are fiercely protective of their declared neutrality. They want to take an active role in the creation of a collective European security architecture, but they do not want to do it on a declared basis. We are lucky to have nations of that calibre and expertise.

Finland and Sweden have a particular history. Each stood out against the former Soviet Union when it was at its most threatening. Both nations won—one more than once. Their relationship with the Russian Federation is based on respect. The Russian Federation respects them, and they respect the Russian Federation.

Finland and Sweden have a measure of confidence in their relationship with the west. There is also a large measure of confidence—because of their historical example—between them and the previous satellite states. They serve a useful purpose in working on the block of mistrust between the Russian Federation and the west, and the even larger block between the former satellite states and the Russian Federation. We must cultivate and encourage the continuation of that relationship.

We have heard about the prospect of the Russian Federation adopting its old outlook. The Russians are not unaware of that, and understand it just as much as people on the centre and centre-left in Germany worry about the far right in that country. The Russians are afraid also of a return to totalitarianism. One has only to consider the news from Russia. The good news is that Lenin's mother is alive; the bad news is that she is pregnant. The Russians make a jest of their past, but they are fully aware of it. They joke seriously.

My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) rightly spoke of the danger that Russia may become antagonised and alienated. I promise him that we are fully alert to that. I believe that we should embrace the Russian Federation, as it has a unique experience and talent. It may have led the Warsaw pact unsuccessfully, but the threat was big enough to worry us for many years.

We have an opportunity to allow article 5 nations to focus around the United States of America, as we do now for article 5 actions, and to allow the "Partnership for Peace" nations, which are not full members of the alliance, to concentrate on article 4 operations—the crisis management and peacekeeping—using Russia as a focal point. The two bodies could act as drayhorses in a common harness, pulling European security in the same direction. Ironically, Russia cannot afford to adopt that leading role, because the arms race left its economic structures in such a terrible mess. None the less, I believe that we should give Russia a more active role in the partnership programme.

Another obstruction to Russian confidence is our failure to make progress on the review of the conventional forces in Europe treaty. Most alliance member states have reduced their force structures and deployment to levels that are way below those set out in the treaty.

The hon. Gentleman suggests that the arms race destroyed the Soviet economy, but, because of the failure of state planning, the whole economic system would have collapsed regardless of whether it was designed to make weapons—that is what led to the current malaise in the Russian economy.

The hon. Gentleman is looking at the same thing from a different angle. Because Russia was compelled to take part in an arms race—which was just as deleterious for the United States, except that the Americans had greater resources—and consigned so much of its effort into arms production, it was not able to develop sufficiently rapidly to take care of its social structures. He and I are saying the same thing, and I do not understand his intervention. Perhaps I did not make my point sufficiently plainly, but I hope that it is plain now.

As I said, alliance member states have reduced their forces to the levels determined in the conventional forces in Europe treaty or below. However, those levels were set when Russia had its Warsaw pact allies. The Warsaw pact has collapsed, so there is a huge imbalance. That is a cause of great concern to the Russian Federation, which feels itself—we have been talking about perception—to be outgunned. NATO is in danger of hugely increasing that imbalance by admitting two and half former Warsaw pact nations—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The perception of imbalance in Russia is in danger of getting ever greater, and we must address it urgently if we are to avoid further alarming the Russian Federation.

We will not make any decisions today. My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North has expressed dissatisfaction about that, but democracy is not only about decisions: it is about expressing disagreement, disapproval or whatever one feels. We will decide today only whether to adjourn, but we have a valuable opportunity to express our opinions.

Democracy involves the capacity to accommodate disapproval, disagreement and differences of opinion, although that was not evident in the previous Government, and some take the view that it is not over-common in the present Government.

We have an opportunity to comment on the three protocols. If we seek a stronger, broader-based, more effective collective European security architecture, NATO is the only means to achieve it. If we seek a vehicle by which the United Nations can effectively offer appropriate means of giving protective cover to people and nations under threat, NATO is the most experienced and capable organisation, with the necessary resources and commitment.

When enlargement was first discussed, I and one or two of my colleagues were opposed to it in principle—why change a winning team, I thought—but changes in circumstances and in the character of NATO have altered my views. Exchanges with representatives from central and eastern Europe have accelerated that change.

I support paragraph (r) of the summary of conclusions and recommendations in the Select Committee report. To those who say that we cannot afford enlargement, I say that we cannot afford not to have it. The broadening and strengthening of a collective European security architecture are essential precursors to developing the state of play that will doubtless be achieved some time after we have departed this life: global governance. The approval of the three protocols will be a small but positive step in that direction.

This important debate should have happened some time ago. I absolutely concur with the view expressed by the hon. Members for Walsall, South (Mr. George) and for Romsey (Mr. Colvin), as well as by many other hon. Members, that our mechanism for dealing with overseas treaties is simply not satisfactory. I made that point to the Leader of the House in an attempt to secure earlier progress on the Ottawa convention and land mines legislation.

The procedures are not only unsatisfactory but non-existent. Under the royal prerogative, the Government can sign treaties and make war or peace with any country they choose, and Parliament has no say in it whatever. Before we lecture the world about democracy and the mother of Parliaments, we should at the very least bring treaties within the orbit of Parliament.

The hon. Gentleman makes the point extremely well, and perhaps I was understating the case. I am not given to hyperbole.

Nor am I.

That is something we share.

The mechanism does not work effectively, even when a treaty requires changes in domestic legislation, because of the inevitable delays. I, like other hon. Members, have had the embarrassment of talking to friends from Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic who simply cannot understand why Britain appears to have taken a lead on the matter but cannot get the procedures right and give the appropriate support.

Lest I fall into the trap into which Ministers accused the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples) of falling, let me make the Liberal Democrat position absolutely plain from the outset. We have supported NATO and we support the new concept of NATO and enlargement to encompass the present three applicants. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) has made it plain on a number of occasions that we see no difficulty in being both Atlanticists and Europeans. The two are not mutually exclusive, and our only concern is that some of the structures within Europe do not sufficiently take account of that fact or enable us to construct the arrangements by which Europe could speak with a strong enough voice in the negotiations.

If this debate had taken place a little while ago, one major question would have been whether NATO should continue. With the changing situation throughout Europe, there were doubts about its role in the security of the European continent. To a large extent, that is a dead argument, because NATO has made the adjustment and has sought a new role. It still makes an important contribution to the concept of the defensible entity that provides enhanced security within Europe and provides stability to areas that have historically been unstable points of tension between powers—not merely the Warsaw pact and modern western Europe but, going further back in time, those areas that have always been areas of difficulty for the continent. Providing stability in such areas is an important role.

NATO is also developing its peacekeeping role, and I agree with the hon. Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) that that should be an enhanced role for the United Nations, too. NATO should offer a service, often mediated through the UN. We would go further, and make designated forces regularly available to the UN—not a standing army, but forces that would be available for peacekeeping, but that is a different debate.

The military structures of NATO need to change to allow rapid deployment. That is a downgrading of the normal state of readiness.

Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind, when he talks about rapid reaction deployments, that the shortfall is due not to the military, but to the fact that we do not have rapid reaction politicians?

We need both, I am grateful for that intervention, as that is an important point. One of the many difficulties that bedevil any negotiations on a European front is the inability to seek early consensus.

On the questions whether enlargement is possible and desirable, and whether there is a rationale behind it, let me say that this would not be the first enlargement of NATO. Other major enlargements have been mentioned. It has enlarged in the past 10 years with the incorporation of the eastern lander of Germany—part of Germany was on the other side and is now on our side, and its armed forces have had to be incorporated, although we have perhaps not had the same agonies over that decision.

Enlargement has some important ground rules. I would be greatly concerned if it were seen as some sort of second prize for countries that aspire to be members of the European Union, but are not economically ready for the task. That would be a distortion of the intention behind NATO and would not be an appropriate way to deal with the aspirations of the countries of central and eastern Europe. Vice versa, it would be wrong if the EU were considered the short cut to NATO, without having to go through the business of providing support for it, and we must be aware of that. There must be genuine mutual security benefits to both NATO and the applicant countries.

We cannot divorce accession from economic considerations, not only as they relate to control of the armed forces but as they affect the applicant countries which will incur expenditure and will hope to nestle in a security blanket that provides an environment in which economic investment can take place. That is crucial to countries whose fragile economies are trying to grow in a democratic context.

Acceding countries must form part of a defensible area. It makes no sense to incorporate countries that cannot be defended in any real sense. That may preclude some countries that might wish to develop an interest in NATO at some stage.

The Visegrad three—the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary—pass all the tests. They would pass with even greater aplomb if Austria would finally take the tortured decision to end neutrality and join NATO. In Vienna last week, I spoke to senior Austrian politicians and found that great differences of opinion have yet to be resolved, but there are strong advocates of accession to NATO. That would correct the geographical problem that has been referred to. Routes around Slovakia take us around one side, but Austria provides a more direct route of connection for Hungary to the rest of NATO.

All that is important in terms of the points made by the Foreign Secretary. We are discussing mitteleuropa, the core of Europe. At the heart of the European continent, countries share with us many cultural and political aspirations that were submerged for so long by the Russian empire. It is symbolically important that mitteleuropa should rejoin the European family of nations.

Other countries may apply. I have no problem with Slovenia's application, although it is slightly offensive that it appears to have been subject to American veto before reaching the negotiating table. I accept that Slovenia will not make a massive contribution, but it passes all the tests, and I see no reason why it should not eventually join NATO.

Romania has strong advocates among French politicians, who can instantly list all the reasons why it should be a member. That may be based on a slightly odd view that Romania remains Francophone: when one talks to the Romanians one finds that they are not, despite the perception in Paris that Romania forms part of the French sphere of influence. Romania would be a valuable ally. Its democracy is still tentative, but is developing quickly.

The Baltic states are more difficult, because they are inextricably linked with Russia. Other hon. Members have mentioned that we cannot entirely eliminate the Russian view. There can be no Russian veto, and Russia cannot arbitrarily decide with whom we shall do business on defence, in economic terms or in any other sense. No veto, no surprises, must be the right way to deal with Russia.

We should recognise the difficulties that inclusion of the Baltic states would present to Russia. It would mean the encirclement of Kaliningrad, which, as a highly militarily engaged enclave, would be a node of instability. It would worry me if Russia felt that part of its sovereign territory was so encircled in an area where there is high level of military activity. There is a problem. To incorporate the Baltic states while the other Scandinavian countries lie outside NATO might seem an unnecessary provocation. It is not necessarily a good enough reason for not doing it, but it should be considered in examining the benefits.

I do not accept that Russia has some area of influence that we have to respect under all circumstances, and into which we can never intrude, but we must be sensitive to what Russians feel about what is happening near their borders. We should base our decisions on what creates stability and security in Europe rather than on that which does the opposite. That is a proper consideration.

We have another problem with Estonia, which may soon be in the European Union. There are few obstacles to its accession other than those common to all applicant countries. As an EU member, it has virtually automatic membership of the Western European Union. It is a conundrum that will cause us difficulty.

The hon. Gentleman mentioned the possible entry of the Baltic states into the European Union. He said that they would automatically enter the WEU. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence will correct that impression. It does not work that way around. It has become a precondition of entry into the WEU that a member state of the European Union must also be a member of NATO. He may argue, as I intend briefly to argue, that we should change that configuration, particularly in the cases of the Baltic states so that their entry into the EU—

Order. This is a very long intervention. 1 know that the hon. Gentleman hopes to catch my eye later. Perhaps he could make those points when he does.

I apologise. I hope that it will be sooner rather than later. Perhaps we could alter the rules so that entry into the EU would mean automatic entry into the WEU.

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has raised that point, and he will no doubt expand on it later.

There is the further difficulty with the extension of NATO to Russian borders. It is not a matter of principle that the Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus should not be incorporated, although in the case of Belarus it seems unlikely. It is a matter of identifying the objectives of NATO, how they work in the geopolitical climate of Europe and whether it is anyone's interest to create what might be perceived as a new cold war front along the Russian border. We must consider whether that would create instability where it does not exist.

I want to discuss what is commonly called the architecture of NATO, which is not always a helpful term. A proliferation of pillars bedevil the European Union, and they are beginning to bedevil NATO. I do not like the analogy of two pillars. If architecture is based on two pillars and one becomes weaker, we get a lopsided structure. I prefer to use the term "a twin foundation". We clearly have that with the United States, which is a very important player, and with the states of Europe, which would form a much stronger player than they currently do, were they able to come to a common position.

I believe that we have to have concerns about the position of the United States. One has only to listen to the debates in the Senate and Congress to realise that there are proper concerns that we as Europeans must face about the attitude of United States politicians and their potential attitude in the future. I thought that the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) was exceedingly polite about Jesse Helms, his American colleague, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Such American attitudes are the sort of thing that we in Europe could frankly do without.

It is essential to develop the positive contribution that the European dimension within NATO can provide. We have the European security and defence identity, and combined joint task forces. All those are moves in the right direction, but we are not there yet. I should like to see much more consolidation within Europe—for instance of the defence industries—as that is essential if we are to maintain competitiveness with the Americans. I should like to see the review undertaken by the Secretary of State for Defence encompass the European dimension much more overtly. He knows that we have applauded a great deal of what has emerged from the strategic defence review, but what was missing was the view of how that fitted into a wider European context. We should also see an extension of common procurement.

None of the development that has taken place ought to preclude further strengthening of the consultative machinery to which several hon. Members have referred—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is an underdeveloped area of activity. All our Governments should pay a little more attention to CSCE and provide better resources if it is to do its job effectively. We have in it a process for de-escalation of potential tension. That must be the name of the game. We must seek to avoid conflict, rather than having to resolve it once it has arisen. That is an essential component.

The one area that has not been discussed, yet I believe will be essential to European and world politics in the 21st century, is the development of sub-regional organisations. In this sense, "sub-regional" means anything up to half a continent, but it means that people can talk about security, economic and environmental issues that transcend boundaries in the context of a smaller unit that takes people outside the fixed certainties of the blocs and enables them to make quicker progress. We have seen that developing in the Baltic council, the Barents sea, to an extent in the Caspian sea and rather unsuccessfully in the Mediterranean. Those are the areas on which we need to concentrate.

I have not referred yet to the costs of enlargement. As other hon. Members have said, they are terribly difficult to get a grip on in any accurate sense. They are unlikely to be as high as the highest expectations in America or elsewhere. I believe that those expected figures are wrong. We can be sure that the costs will certainly not be as high as the costs of failure in defence in Europe. If we fail to incorporate other countries into NATO and give them reason to develop their armed forces and security machinery outside the envelope of NATO, the costs will inevitably be much higher.

It is important that we do not saddle the applicant countries with inappropriate costs. There is a clear necessity to improve their command structures and their training, but I do not believe that there is an enormous need to improve the military material that they have at their disposal. Enlargement should not be a licence to Lockheed to go hawking its wares around central and eastern Europe. Instead, we should concentrate on the contribution that the applicant countries can make best.

I have taken enough of the House's time, so let me say finally that the Czechs, the Hungarians and the Poles have been waiting for a clear message from the House, as from other Parliaments across Europe. We have a significance as one of the countries that has often taken a lead in these matters and it is a shame that we were not able to do so earlier, but I hope that the message that will go forward from this morning's debate is a clear one.

We accept the protocols that have been laid before us but, more than that, we embrace the countries in central and eastern Europe and we want them to be part of the European family. We believe that they have contributions to make; the contributions will be not entirely one way, as some hon. Members have suggested, but reciprocal. Those countries have a contribution to make to NATO and we look forward to ratification at the earliest opportunity. It has the Liberal Democrats' full support.

rose—

Order. Before I call the next speaker, I should like to point out that many hon. Members want to contribute to the debate. We have already lost quite a lot of time because of the statement, so, unless hon. Members' speeches are brief, many will be disappointed.

Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for not allowing my perhaps over-long intervention on the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) to prejudice your judgment as to who should follow him. I am grateful.

I share the concern expressed by hon. Members on both sides of the House about the nature of the ratification process for the protocols and treaties. I hope that the Modernisation Committee, as part of its work on improving the working methods in this place and within Government machinery as a whole, will find some more sensible method of allowing Parliament not only to discuss such matters but to be involved in the decision-making and ratification processes.

You, Mr. Deputy Speaker, have drawn attention to the fact that the debate is a short one, but that is not our fault. I shall try to heed your request, but we were presented with a maximum of four and a half hours for this debate, and three-quarters of an hour disappeared because of a statement. I welcome that statement, but it means that the House will have only three and three quarter hours at most to discuss a crucial issue. That is a message that the Government and their business managers should take to heart.

I do not want to introduce a note of political acrimony into the debate, because there appears to be cross-party support for the measure in hand, but I am slightly disturbed by the attitude of the official Opposition. The Government fielded my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to introduce the debate, and it will be wound up by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence. But who do we have on the Opposition Front Bench? There is no shadow Foreign Secretary—in fact, the shadow Front-Bench team is a real shadow today. I do not know what urgent business is keeping the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) away from the House, but—

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The time for the debate is limited, and you have previously spoken to the hon. Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall) about a lengthy intervention. What the hon. Gentleman is talking about is not germane to the debate, and I wondered whether we could get on.

That is not a point of order for me.

You are quite right, Mr. Deputy Speaker; nor do the hon. Gentleman's remarks have any relevance to the point that I am making.

My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) is sorry to be unable to be here today, but he is travelling abroad. From time to time, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State for Defence have been unavoidably absent from the House for the same reason, and we quite understand when that happens.

I am grateful for that information. I realise that shadow Ministers, as well as real Ministers, have appointments that they have to keep; however, I pointed out the absence of shadow Ministers today because it shows the degree of importance that the Opposition attach to the subject of our debate. Many of us have important things to be doing elsewhere in the United Kingdom today. I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) would prefer to be in his constituency, and I would prefer to be in Leicester. I only wish that the shadow Foreign Secretary were here to speak on behalf of the official Opposition.

Bearing in mind the point made by the hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt), I shall move on to my constructive contribution to the debate. Like many of my hon. Friends, I have often, throughout my adult life, had equivocal feelings towards NATO. I have never been anti-NATO, but I have been more sceptical and critical of it at some times than at others. I have been a member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament for most of my adult life.

If the hon. Gentleman has been a member of CND for most of his adult life, either he does not realise the implication of that or he is not being fully open with the House. CND's constitution requires the one-sided abandonment by Britain not only of nuclear weapons and nuclear bases but of nuclear alliances. If he has been supporting CND for most of his adult life, he has, like the Foreign Secretary, been supporting withdrawal from NATO and a policy of neutralism, unless NATO gave up all its nuclear weapons, which of course it never had any intention of doing.

As I was saying, I have been a member of CND most of my adult life. One of my criticisms of NATO was its undue emphasis on the possible use of nuclear weapons. I still hold that view, and I do not intend to apologise for that to the House or to the hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis).

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that NATO has been one of the most successful military and political alliances of all times. Fifty years ago, it brought together nation states, many of which were traditional enemies, under the hegemony of the United States. A decade ago, it defeated its enemy without having to resort to physical warfare.

With the end of the cold war and the emergence of pluralistic democracies in central and eastern Europe which are committed to market forces, to respect for human rights and to peacefully settling disputes with neighbours, it was inevitable that NATO's future would be debated in the context of future security arrangements in Europe. In that regard, there are three possible scenarios. The first, which is favoured by some of my hon. Friends, is to disband NATO; the second is to remain an alliance of 16; and the third is to expand, particularly in central and eastern Europe.

The first scenario—the disbandment of NATO—would lead to the withdrawal of the United States of America from Europe, and to Europeans making the decisions and taking any necessary action to protect European security interests. Events in Bosnia, later in Albania and currently in Kosovo have shown clearly the inability of European states to act in concert to deal with their own problems without the political involvement and leadership of the United States. Events on the ground in Bosnia, through the actions of NATO, have shown the value of NATO planning and the integrated command structure.

That leads me to two inevitable conclusions. First, there is a need to maintain the involvement of the United States in European security through the proven structure of NATO. Secondly, it demonstrates the efficacy of NATO as a military machine.

The second scenario—to remain an alliance of 16—has received publicity in recent weeks, which is a bit late in the day to contribute to the debate. One of its supporters is my noble Friend Lord Healey. Advocates of this position argue that there should be no expansion because the alliance would become too unwieldy and would therefore be unable to deal with the delicate political problems that are likely to occur on the military map in the next century. Their basic argument is that consensus among 16 is difficult enough, and that that situation would be an order of magnitude worse if there were 19-plus members of NATO. They also argue that it would adversely affect relations with Russia.

I believe that NATO remaining an alliance of 16 would ignore political reality in Europe. There is no doubt that the end of the cold war created in central and eastern Europe a vacuum waiting to be filled either by a volatile Russia or by the western democracies. In that regard, it is interesting to note that the three countries invited to join NATO—Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic—and other applicant countries want to join NATO and the European Union because those organisations are seen to have contributed to the peace and prosperity of their member states over the past 15 years. It would be a grave strategic error to bar them from admittance to NATO because of possible future difficulties resulting from increasing the size of NATO.

For Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, NATO membership could well have a positive outcome. In respect of relations with Russia, there is a real prospect that NATO's expansion will prompt a genuine reconciliation between the Russians and their central European neighbours. Once in NATO, the central Europeans will no longer fear that their closeness to Russia can lead to a mortal embrace—a fear that is undoubtedly deeply rooted in painful historical experience.

On that basis, I welcome the admission of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to NATO. As I said in an earlier intervention—not one to which you were privy, Mr. Deputy Speaker—it is right that the current round of enlargement is based more on political considerations than on purely defence-related calculation, as I believe political considerations are paramount.

Despite what we may hear from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence, it is generally accepted that the three candidate countries will not be able to make a proportionate contribution to NATO for at least another decade. However, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome said, we should not forget that those three countries are prepared to pay the price of membership of NATO and of European Union membership, for which they have also applied, in terms of accepting the acquis of the European Union. We could not have a surer indication of the value of those institutions to those three countries and to others than the economic price that they are prepared to pay in defence expenditure and in public expenditure to bring their social and environmental infrastructure up to scratch to join the European Union.

Finally, we must have regard to countries that are unsuccessful in their applications, and make it clear to them that enlargement of NATO is an open exercise and will not be closed. We have to make it clear, particularly to central and eastern European countries, that they will be part of the next enlargement within the next decade to 15 years if they can meet the minimum requirements for NATO membership. It would be foolish to close the door to those countries permanently; that way lies future instability. We must ensure that there is a continuum allowing them to move toward membership of NATO in the foreseeable, rather than the distant, future.

As I said when I intervened on the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, I share the concern about the Baltic states. There are grave dangers in encouraging them to believe that membership of NATO is on the immediate horizon. It would be unfair to allow them to believe that. It would create instability in that part of northern Europe around the Baltic.

I favour the solution proposed by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome—that the best way for those countries to get into the European security architecture is via membership of the European Union. Despite what we say about the European Union and defence, the European Union has an indirect security context. No one could persuade me that, if a member state of the European Union was attacked by any foreign country, we would not go to that member state's assistance. There is therefore an implicit security guarantee in membership, which I believe we should encourage the Baltic states to accept.

As I said in response to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, I believe that we must alter the configuration between the European Union, the Western European Union and NATO, so that member states of the European Union that are not members of NATO have the right to join the WEU. That would not only solve the problem of the Baltic states, but cover the case of Slovenia, which is likely to be accepted into the European Union at the next enlargement, and which is keen to join NATO.

In our relationship with Russia, we must ensure continuing close co-operation and consultation through the Permanent Joint Council of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, but obviously there must be no veto. Finally, I believe that we must try to make it evidently and credibly clear to the Russians that the expansion of NATO and the expansion of the European Union are open-ended historical processes, without fixed geographical or time limits, and that, eventually, a more formal association with both is on Russia's political horizon.

This has been a consensual debate. No contributor to it has opposed the entry to NATO of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, and I confirm that I support that. The debate has been consensual as between Labour and Conservative Members. The admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland is consensual, accepted by the United States and Russia. However, that consensual attitude—that harmony—has not always existed.

When I trained as a pilot, 40 years ago, the wing commander in charge of flying called in the newly training pilots and told us, "At this moment, in the Soviet union, a young pilot will be starting his training today, and one day you may meet him above the skies of central Europe. If he is better trained than you, he will kill you." That was the atmosphere in which my generation grew up. We believed that there might be a war, and we were prepared to fight in it.

The 1960s, 1970s and 1980s were a difficult period, and not a consensual one. Many of us fought the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Labour party conference after Labour party conference passed resolutions demanding the abolition of nuclear weapons. I was chairman of an organisation called the Campaign for Defence and Multilateral Disarmament. We tried to tie CND's shoe-laces together, with some success. We fought things such as the Lambeth nuclear-free zone. We watched Michael Foot march to Aldermaston. There were organisations such as socialists against the bomb and scientists against the bomb, and various fellow travellers. I once received a missive from an organisation calling itself Streatham lesbian dentists against the bomb—I am still not sure whether that was meant to be serious. It was a period when there was absolutely no consensual attitude.

The security and safety of this country owes nothing to the Labour party at that time. It took Margaret Thatcher's support for President Reagan in the deployment of cruise missiles at Greenham Common to face down the expansion of the Russian and Warsaw pact missile programme. Fortunately, history will not say what would have happened had we had a Labour Government at that time. No Labour Government would have given President Reagan the support that the Americans needed to face down the Warsaw pact. That was a period of triumph for us, and I am proud that we were there. I have mentioned the Labour party, but the Liberals were even worse. Woolly of clothing and of mind, they were even more firmly in favour of CND, if that is possible, than was the Labour party.

I am questioning not the patriotism of the Labour party or the Liberals, but their judgment. Their judgment was wrong: thank God we had a Conservative Government to support NATO.

The hon. Gentleman has given a list of dirty tricks that the Conservatives used to undermine CND—an organisation that reflected the will of the majority of the population, who were worried about nuclear war after the Cuban missile crisis. The Conservatives seem to have no policies and are useless at reflecting what people need. Are they going to employ such dirty tricks to try to undermine the Labour Government?

That is unfair of the hon. Gentleman, who should know me well enough to realise that I would not engage in dirty tricks. I went round the United Kingdom, going to universities, colleges and open meetings. I debated several times with Monsignor Bruce Kent and put forward the argument for nuclear weapons, which was unpopular in many circles, although most of the population believed in their retention. CND had to be fought. That was a difficult period, when we were seriously concerned that CND would undermine the defence of the country. I am proud that we fought that battle and won it on intellectual grounds.

rose—

I am sorry, but I cannot give way because there are too many people waiting to speak.

NATO was created to counter-balance the Warsaw pact. It was a military and political alliance—both aspects were important. NATO brings United States and Canadian military force and political support to Europe. NATO has always had some weak points. Some years ago, I travelled around NATO countries. In Greece we were given a presentation on "the threat". We were surprised that a map of Turkey was put up when the threat was mentioned. Some members of NATO have always been stronger and more allied than others. Some of our allies have armed forces far weaker than ours.

There has been some discussion about whether NATO was required and whether the Western European Union could make NATO less relevant. That argument is in the past. The thrust is for mutually reinforcing institutions. We have the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and "Partnership for Peace", which has 27 members and has been exceptionally successful in promoting understanding and the use of military facilities between different countries, not all of which are or, wish to be, members of NATO. It is vital that NATO should retain its core value and its ability to fight a high-intensity war.

The concept of NATO expansion is not new: Greece and Turkey joined in 1952; the Federal Republic of Germany joined in 1955; Spain joined in 1982; and, more recently, eastern Germany has joined. Why expand now? The motor for expansion is the United States of America. It is worth remembering that only 7 per cent. of Americans have travelled abroad and that 40 per cent. of Congressmen do not even possess a passport.

All those people had to come from somewhere. As we have seen, the Irish in America tend to become more Irish the longer they are there. There is a strong feeling among the American people that the nations from which their ancestors came should not be deprived of the benefit of NATO membership. There has also been a rapturous response in central and eastern Europe, where membership of NATO is seen as a western credential and a way of joining prosperous western nations as well as enjoying NATO's support in defence.

I have been agnostic about the expansion of NATO. I am not at all sure that we should expand too fast. My doubts are focused on three main areas. First, several central and eastern European countries have very insecure foundations as democracies. I was recently briefed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington. It is not for nothing that the FBI has a special division which deals with countries which are, effectively, controlled by organised crime. Several of them, including those whose names have been mentioned in this debate as candidates for NATO, have extremely insecure foundations as democracies. In some of their elections, their Members of Parliament have been accepted as having strong links with organised crime. We must be careful that countries that are admitted to NATO are true and secure democracies.

My second argument for being cautious about NATO expansion concerns the costs of defence of countries that are admitted. That is a respectable doubt for a person to have; Lord Healey has been mentioned as one such person. An article last year in Defense News referred to 46 people who came together to write a letter to the President of the United States on the matter. They included former Senator Sam Nunn, two former ambassadors to Moscow, a former ambassador to Poland, a former Under-Secretary and a former NATO Assistant Secretary-General, all of whom argued:

"Instead of expanding … NATO should boost its Partnership for Peace program, which aids nonmembers in military training and helps Eastern and Central Europeans join the European Union."

Much of the expenditure on defence could be better spent on improving economics. Having said that, I reiterate that I do not oppose Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic joining NATO. I just feel that we should be cautious about expanding still further.

My third main reason for being cautious about NATO expansion is the attitude in Russia. I am saying this not because I am afraid of Russia but because I think that we have stronger links, through the Founding Act of 1997, at presidential and governmental level with Russia than we have at parliamentary and people level. No one who has seen—as I have—a Duma packed with people who are seriously concerned that the expansion of NATO will cause instability in Russia can doubt that that needs to be taken seriously. We need to build on and expand the Founding Act, which states that one of its purposes is to improve public awareness of relationships between countries.

Most changes in the former Soviet Union have been greatly for the better, but in Russia in particular there has been seismic shock. Communism is—was—a way of life; it is virtually a religion. The people have lost not only the illusion of military might but their faith. The nearest parallel I can think of is this: it is as if the Vatican had been told that God did not exist and that the Roman Catholic Church was a myth, corrupt and incapable.

The people of Russia are baffled, disillusioned and angry that their faith has been taken from them. More than half the members of the state Duma have signed a resolution stating that expansion of NATO will create new dividing lines and barriers in Europe. The question that has always been asked in Russia is against whom NATO is expanding. Instability in Russia is not surprising, bearing in mind the arrears of pay and appalling housing conditions in the armed forces. We hear that even officers and their families are living in tents.

Russia and the Warsaw pact countries had military-industrial combines and much employment depended on military and industrial expenditure in military areas. A month ago, the Pentagon told me that, in 90 cities in the former Soviet Union, more than 75 per cent. of the population work in the defence industry. Think of that industry being undermined and people realising that they are losing their former markets—the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary—because those three countries and others will re-equip with NATO-compatible equipment.

The NATO-Russian framework is sound at Government level, but it needs to be broadened and strengthened. One way to do that is to have Russian delegates at our North Atlantic Assembly meetings. It is surprising to me that I am on conversational terms with Mr. Zhirinovsky. I have had several conversations with him and have chaired meetings at which he spoke. We have experienced the calming and reassuring influence of personal contact with people from the former Soviet Union countries and from Russia.

There should be more military contacts between NATO and Russia, and I welcome the fact that there are now Russians in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. The "Partnership for Peace" programme has been an outstanding success in promoting a sense of common purpose in defence-related activity of all kinds, including even air traffic control. Russia is losing markets in former Soviet Union countries, and we must seriously face the loss of business and currency to Russia. If currency does not enter Russia, reform may not happen.

How can we co-operate? I shall put to the House a thought that may seem eccentric. It is that the former Soviet Union, and in particular Ukraine, has the Antonov aircraft factory, which is without orders. It manufactures aircraft that are similar to those that are contained in plans for the future large aircraft. I welcome the fact that the Germans are seeking to co-operate with the Antonov factory, and regret that no other NATO country seems to want to co-operate with Antonov, which has a world leader in the field. Similarly, the Mig 29 Fulcrum and the Sukhoi 35 have airframes which, as far as I can see, are far superior to any in the west. I regret that we have not found ways to co-operate with Russia or to pass orders to it to demonstrate that the confidence that we express in the expansion of NATO does not mean that we are seeking to do it down.

As the Foreign Secretary said, the expansion of NATO involvesa geographical expansion of one sixth of territory and a borders expansion of one third. That is a large expansion. I would resist further expansion in the foreseeable future, and I would avoid a timetable for further expansion. Meanwhile, we must retain the core role of NATO and its ability, if necessary, to engage in high-intensity warfare.

I am vehemently opposed to the expansion of NATO. When occupants of both Front Benches are united, they are sometimes united in error. In view of what the hon. Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers) said, I should like to place on record the names of those who share the view that expansion is a folly of historic proportions. They are Ken Aldred, the director of the Council for Arms Control; Sir Michael Atiyah, the President of the Royal Society; Sir Hugh Beach; Sir Michael Beetham; Frank Blackaby; Field Marshal The Lord Bramall and Field Marshal The Lord Carver; Sir Frank Cooper, the former permanent under-secretary at the Ministry of Defence; Sir John Curtiss; Sir James Eberle, who ran Chatham House; John Edmonds, the former ambassador to the comprehensive test ban treaty; Sir Stephen Egerton and Sir John Graham, former ambassadors; Dr. Helga Graham, who put the letter together; Hugh Hanning; Lord Healey; Sir Michael Howard; Sir Arthur Hockaday; Lord Kennet; Sir John Killick; Sir Ian McGeoch; Sir Harry Tuza and Mrs. Elizabeth Young. They are not exactly CND marchers. They say:

"Our misgivings are manifold, but what lies at their heart is the vital need to preserve NATO's ability, in the new Europe where, by common consent, potential threats to the peace are diffuse and unpredictable, to make rapid assessments and take quick and effective decisions on what action, if any, to take. This is difficult enough with 16 members, as the Bosnian experience as shown; with more it risks becoming impossibly slow and ineffective."

There are other disturbing implications:

"Actual and potential arms control and arms reduction agreements, both nuclear and conventional, will be more complicated and difficult; their ratification and implementation may be jeopardised … The security threat to those states not admitted in the first wave is liable to be increased; yet it is they, the Baltic states for example, who are already the most vulnerable. On the other hand, we fail to identify any countervailing advantages for the Alliance in enlargement. It will therefore continue to antagonise Russia for no good reason."

I hope that the Defence Secretary will give a serious answer to those distinguished people. I hope he will answer another question. I do not think that I do the Foreign Secretary an injustice in saying that he implied that, somehow or other, what we are doing was okay by the Russians. That is not their view.

Dr. Alexei Arbatov—whom some of us have met at Labour party groups and, doubtless, Conservative groups—of the Russian state Duma has said:

"First the enforced reconcentration on strategic nuclear forces is ruinous to our [economic] development. Second, our need to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the Western military regions of the country and in the Northern fleet damages our prospects significantly. Thirdly, there is the need to expand anti-missile defences at great expense in European Russia. And fourth, the increased vulnerability of Russian strategic nuclear bases and conventional forces means increased defence commitments and expenditure."

Dr. Arbatov concluded by complaining that one third of the west's military power in Europe is close to Russia's land frontiers, and that historical hostility to Russia is part of the policy and attitudes of some of the new countries.

We are assured that the NATO-Russian Founding Act establishes the framework for co-operation between NATO and Russia and creates the foundation for a lasting friendship, yet arguably, the 10 conditions imposed recently on US ratification of NATO enlargement by the ultra-conservative Republican Senator Jesse Helms, according to the Russians,

"guts this incipient co-operation of any realistic content and revives the spirit of the Cold War."

What are the facts of the matter? What are the Russians saying to us? In particular what are they saying about the Helms conditions? As I understand it, the Helms conditions have created considerable worry in the Russian Duma. The conditions are:

"1. Outline a clear, complete strategic rationale for NATO expansion.

2. Agree that no limitations will be placed on the numbers of NATO troops or types of weapons to be deployed on the territory of new member states, including nuclear weapons.

3. Explicitly reject Russian efforts to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in central Europe.

4. Explicitly reject all efforts to tie NATO decisions to UN Security Council Approval.

5. Establish a clear delineation of NATO deliberations that arc off-limits to Russia, including, but not limited to arms control, further Alliance expansion, procurement and strategic doctrine.

6. Provide an immediate seat at the NATO table for countries invited to join the Alliance.

7. Reject Russian efforts to require NATO aid for Russian arms sales to former Warsaw Pact militaries joining the Alliance …

8. Reject any further Russian efforts to link consensus in arms-control negotiations including the … ABM treaty and the CFE treaty.

9. Develop a plan for a NATO ballistic missile defence system to defend Europe.

10. Get a clear advance agreement on an equitable distribution of the cost of expansion, to make certain American taxpayers don't get stuck with the lion's share of the bill."

What is the attitude to those conditions? Any foreseeable Russian Government must surely deeply resent them.

The worries are not only British, but American. I shall spare the House the list of the American signatories to a letter to President Clinton, but the fact that it includes people such as Nitze shows that there is at least a queasy attitude to what we are doing. I believe that we are unnecessarily alienating and isolating Russia. Such vindictive handling will encourage revanchism; a genuine comparison can be made to Weimar Germany in what we are doing to the fragile and flawed democracy of current Russian politics.

Enlargement along the lines that are proposed will be counter-productive. It will undermine the efforts of the reformers in Russia and support the rise to power of reactionaries, whether of the communist left or the authoritarian right. Even in the short term, the alienation of Russia may remove its incentive to co-operate with the west in other areas of international affairs, such as the non-proliferation and nuclear arms control treaties.

The START 2 agreement on nuclear arms reduction, which was signed in 1993, has not come into force because of the Duma's refusal to approve it.

What is the assessment of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State of the likely effect of enlargement on START 2? Until the situation is resolved, there will be no movement on further START negotiations. Indeed, Russia has revealed that, until funds are found to modernise its armed forces, it will place a greater onus on its nuclear arsenal in its defence strategy. In February 1998, the Duma passed a motion calling NATO enlargement the biggest threat to Russia since the end of the second world war.

Elsewhere, Russia has followed policies that are not consonant with those of the US and Britain, notably on the treatment of Serbia, and particularly on Kosovo. If we want Russia to co-operate on such delicate matters, is it really wise to provoke it?

We must also consider the interests of the applicant states. As envisaged, NATO will never be able to achieve the consolidation of a peaceful and undivided Europe unless Russia—a European country—is made a full member of the alliance, which is most unlikely. Dangerous military or psychological imbalances could occur between those countries that are in and those that are out. New members, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, will have access to military communications and nuclear intelligence that regional neighbours such as Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria will be denied.

That is a difficult situation. Senator Moynihan pointed out that, if the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which are panting for membership, were brought in, the United States and other signatories would have a solemn obligation to defend territory further east than the westernmost border of Russia. Is that wise?

Sam Nunn, who has been mentioned, said:

"Russian co-operation in avoiding proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is our most important national security objective".

He pointed out that NATO expansion makes the Russians

"more suspicious and less co-operative".

When Mr. Gorbachev was directly approached by Sir Hugh Beach, Dr. Graham and Sir John Killick, he said:

"In 1990 I was assured by, among others, Chancellor Kohl and the then US Secretary of State James Baker that there were no plans for the expansion of NATO Eastwards and that there would not be any. Of this we have documentary evidence. James Baker, in particular said to me on 9 February 1990: 'We understand that, not only for the Soviet Union but for other European countries, it is important to have guarantees that, if the US, in the framework of NATO, maintains its presence in Germany, that will not lead to the extension of the jurisdiction or the military presence of NATO by one inch Eastwards.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Forgive me. I am rushing through my speech, because so many hon. Members want to speak.

The expansion of NATO means Russia relying more and more on nuclear weapons. It is NATO's hope that co-operation under the Founding Act, and especially joint operational experience of peacekeeping, will help to dispel Russian mistrust of NATO and its enlargement, but the existing member states should not be deluded about the extent of the psychological trauma suffered by the Russian political elite as a result of the collapse of the Soviet empire. We really had better be careful about what we are doing.

What is the likely cost of equipping central European countries for NATO membership? What proportion are they supposed to pay, and what would be the effect on, for example, the Polish economy? What will it cost to make central European weapons systems compatible with those of NATO?

The Pentagon recently came up with a new estimate of the cost, at $1.5 billion over 10 years, but the new york times said that the figure was laughable, and clearly cooked up to reassure the Senate as it approached a vote. Only a few months ago, the Pentagon calculated that the cost could run as high as $35 billion over 13 years. One is entitled to ask what costs are involved.

The entry of the Baltics would create huge problems in Moscow. NATO expansion may damage paramount security interests for decades to come. The American President and the British Government may mistake Yeltsin's seeming acquiescence for permanent Russian acceptance. Other Governments will come along in Russia, and they may not acquiesce.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Mr. Corbyn) said, the whole American plan seems to be at the expense of the United Nations. Why cannot the UN be involved? It is not clever to give grave offence to a weakened Russian state. We are encouraging the slow candle of Russian nationalism. I beg those on both Front Benches to be careful.

I am tempted to follow some of the thoughts of the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), but I will resist. I am amazed that so many intelligent, well-informed and experienced people could put their names to the documents that he told us about. Much of what he and other hon. Members have said today rests on how Russia will respond to NATO enlargement, which I welcome, but with caution, as expressed in the Select Committee's third report.

The House may have overlooked Russia's capability to mount a military reaction to enlargement. There is concern about Russia's economy and internal politics. There is a danger of that enormous country, with all its human and natural resources, imploding. A reactionary leader might then be tempted to go on an external adventure.

Following what my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers) said, one has to ask oneself how quickly Russia could tool up for war. At present, its armed forces are totally demoralized—most of them are unpaid and there is massive desertion—and if it made any attempt to tool up for a military adventure, the west would get so much warning that we would be able to respond and, I think, deter any aggression. That is what deterrence is all about. Also, before Russia went on any external adventure via its front door, it would have to bear in mind the 3,500 miles of its back door, which is the People's Republic of China all the way along.

There has been much discussion of enlargement of the European Union as well as of NATO, and the two have a certain synergy. If I were from a central or eastern European country, in terms of security I would far rather go for membership of the EU than of NATO, because achieving comparability with the other NATO member countries and interoperability with their weapons would impose considerable costs. Implicit within membership of the European Union is a mutual security obligation. It is inconceivable that, if any member state were attacked, it would not expect other EU members to come to its assistance.

Much has been said about membership of the Western European Union. However, the Brussels and Washington treaties both contain a fifth article—the mutual security article—so it is inconceivable that any country joining the EU that qualified to join the WEU would not also qualify to join NATO. The Select Committee on Defence has always pointed out that a European country cannot belong to one without belonging to the other.

Another important point is that the EU will enhance trade. In 1975, when we were debating Britain's continued membership of what was then the European Economic Community, a history master in Andover told me that to him the matter was simple. He said, "Where you trade, you have peace, and when trade breaks down, you often have war." My advice to the countries of central and eastern Europe that are concerned and disappointed about the lack of a quicker way to join NATO is to concentrate on achieving EU membership and on maintaining and enhancing the trading links that they had with Russia when they were part of the Soviet Union.

It is time that NATO redefined its mission. For example, at the moment it is geographically restrained—its southern flank is the north coastline of north Africa. We must understand that the world security situation is now completely different. Gone is the stability of the cold war, and the loss of cohesion means that everyone is much freer. All sorts of new problems now face us.

For instance, a crescent of crisis stretches from the Caspian sea right across the southern flank of NATO, following the fault line between Christian and Muslim communities. In the north African states, there is much fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. By undermining the economies of those countries, the terrorists are sowing the seeds of the sort of problems that could well harm the soft underbelly of the EU and NATO. Therefore, NATO must rethink its strategic concept, which was first drawn up in 1991. It is high time for a new concept, and that should be top of the agenda at the NATO Washington summit next year.

I suggest that the concept might contain, first, the clear mission statement that I asked for; secondly, guidance to the military and defence planners; thirdly, reassurance to world audiences that NATO is still a vital part of the free world's security system and that it is flexible enough to react to anything, anywhere in the world. Finally, it must accommodate the European security and defence identity and the common foreign and security policy without undermining the North Atlantic alliance.

I shall refer briefly to Spain's membership of the integrated military structure, and to Gibraltar. Earlier this week, at the annual general meeting of the British Gibraltar parliamentary group, an event which does not usually generate much parliamentary excitement, concern was expressed about agreement at Madrid that Spain should join the IMS. We were assured by the Foreign Secretary at the time of that agreement that it would not mean a sell-out of Gibraltar. However, many of us felt that, as Spain was so keen to join, the British Government should take the view that, unless Spain stopped harassing the civil population of Gibraltar, it should not enter the IMS of NATO.

The Foreign Office has assured me that a deal has been done with Spain. I should like to know a little more about that. COMGIBMED, the NATO headquarters in Gibraltar, is to close, which will have an impact on the economy of Gibraltar, and there is much concern on the rock, as hon. Members who have visited recently have confirmed. If Spain is to enter the IMS, we must have firm assurances that harassment of military ships and aircraft and of movements connected with NATO exercises will stop. Harassment of the civil population must stop, too.

The Defence Committee has repeatedly said that NATO remains the cornerstone of our security and defence policy. I welcome Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, but I sound a note of caution about further enlargement.

My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) was kind enough to mention my reports to the economic committee of the North Atlantic Assembly on the costs of NATO expansion. Those reports helped to clear obfuscation about the costs of expansion, to which NATO unnecessarily added by its secrecy about the costs.

On 2 December 1997, NATO's meeting of Defence Ministers adopted the conclusion of NATO's senior resources board's study that the costs of new infrastructure would be $1.5 billion over 10 years, as the Foreign Secretary said. That might be an underestimate, but the figure is certainly significantly lower than the Pentagon's estimate, and a fraction of estimates in reports from other bodies such as the congressional budget office.

Earlier reports made three assumptions. They believed that five countries would join, but there will in fact be three. They believed that there would be forward deployment of forces from current member states into the territory of new members, something that is not necessary. They believed that infrastructure for new member states would have to be compatible with that of existing members, a belief that is not supported by the threat environment or by facilities in the new member states. Those reports therefore came up with such high costs on a flawed basis.

The estimate of $1.5 billion is for common funding of NATO infrastructure. It covers only one category of costs that analysts have linked to enlargement. Other costs will fall to national Governments, not to NATO, and they include restructuring and modernising, particularly for states' own armed forces. The three new countries have agreed to increase defence spending by between 10 and 30 per cent.

Has my hon. Friend taken account of the tendency of those in the United States who plump for the higher estimates to use the argument to support their consistent demand for more burden sharing and to justify a higher European contribution?

That is a factor. Some would like European nations to put in much more money, but that is not justified, in my view.

The main emphasis should be on interoperability—which will not happen overnight—better communications between the new members' forces and their allies, training and joint training. The new countries should not be harassed to upgrade their weapons quickly. As long as there is a benign security environment, there is no case for that, or for the excessive cost estimates.

We must resist pressure from militarists and United States right wingers to insist on high defence spending across Europe and especially in the new countries. We must resist United States and other defence contractors who want to use hard sell and make up false threats to try to get those countries to buy weaponry.

Much has been said about Russia. Whatever happens with NATO, one of the most important issues will be how the treaty is seen by non-members, especially Russia. The effects of capitalism are much more likely to lead to trouble in and from Russia than any alliance configuration. Democracy, anti-corruption and economic stability should be the priorities. We have partnership agreements with Russia, which even has a full-time delegation at NATO headquarters. It could be said that Russia is at least a little on board with the new security arrangements whereas, during the cold war, it was not on board at all.

I am not in favour of any return to cold war blocs or cold war thinking. Territorial expansion after military victories invariably breeds resentment and the potential for future wars. The end of the cold war has that potential. It is essential that its end should be seen in terms not of victory and defeat but as an opportunity for a more inclusive new world order incorporating security arrangements for all, including Russia. It is essential to improve NATO's inclusive arrangements for Russia.

Such arrangements must include a conventional forces in Europe agreement, tightened by all NATO countries, as well as Russia, holding fewer arms. NATO countries should take the lead in having fewer conventional forces in Europe. The arrangements should lead to nuclear weapons reductions. They are still the greatest danger to the world, and we should take this opportunity to get significant reductions everywhere, not just in Europe. We should play a role in that.

There should be no duplication of militarism. I oppose the expansion of a military role based on the European Union. I do not think that the European Union should have a military wing in addition to what exists in NATO. That would be duplication.

NATO must change. That it changes is more important than expansion. The shadow Defence Secretary's comments about NATO being hard or soft were most unhelpful. The combined military force of NATO countries is massive. It could more than ably deal with any conventional threat. The weak link is political liaison and the potential for mistrust and misunderstanding. So, with the cold war over, there has to be far more of a political role for NATO. That is why I welcome the defence diplomacy aspects described my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Defence in the strategic defence review last week. That has to be extended to NATO.

We must have observation, verification and joint exercises with the non-member countries such as Russia, in order to increase mutual trust. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe should have an expanded role as well.

The three new states are joining NATO because they want to. I believe that they have unduly high expectations of what they will get out of membership. Some may view it as a panacea, and I certainly do not think that it is that, but they want to join, and those views should be respected. However, that does not make any automatic case for their joining. Existing NATO members can also say no or not yet if they choose. I believe that they should say that in respect of any significant future expansion. Integration should be tilted towards the European Union instead in the first instance. That is where the emphasis should be over the next decade.

Defence is an insurance policy, but it can be costly. Money for social purposes such as schools and hospitals is lost as a result of defence spending, so it should be kept to the minimum deemed essential. Alliances and co-operation between states can lead to improved security for all and to less cost than defence which is born out of mistrust. I favour greater communication, co-operation and partnership between states. I favour far greater inclusivity rather than isolation, within which threats are imagined and exaggerated to dangerous proportions.

A security system is better than none at all. However, it should not be at exorbitant cost or be unnecessarily heavily armed. It must be an institution for peace, not a threat to world peace in itself. It must be inclusive, not exclusive. That is why NATO must change politically. NATO's peacekeeping role in Bosnia, including the non-NATO states, points to one of the ways forward to that change.

The way in which NATO is run also needs to change. It is a different animal now than it was in the cold war. The United States' tendency to insist on, or dominate, decision making, or to threaten not to engage if it does not get its way, should give way to a more open, equal, consensual decision-making process involving all the NATO members. NATO expansion is going ahead, but it is its political role, with an emphasis on inclusivity and co-operation, that needs to be expanded.

Grand strategy and high diplomacy do not merit long speeches. I want to refer to the issue that is central to our whole debate. What does NATO exist for? It exists for the preservation of liberty and the safeguarding of democracy—values that are now shared across our continent, thank God. It is an alliance to which all ought to be able to aspire. It is an alliance which all ought to be eligible to join.

The Foreign Secretary, quite rightly, said that he wanted the process of enlargement to include Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland and not to produce any further divisions in our continent, of which we have seen enough in our lifetime. For me, the coming down of the Berlin wall was the most exciting event of my time in politics. The interment in a fitting manner of the Tsar, the Tsarina and their family in St. Petersburg today has a symbolic aspect that we should not forget: it is a beacon of hope for restitution and reconciliation within Russia, on which a new relationship within our continent can be built.

Vulnerability should not exclude a country from membership. Had it done so, would we have allowed Norway to be in NATO? During the cold war, there was only one Norwegian battalion in position in Finnmark, and in the whole of the northern part of Norway, there was only one Norwegian brigade. There were no NATO troops, nor any nuclear weapons stationed in Norway; there were exercises, it is true, but never were they stationed there. Norway, a country contiguous to the Soviet Union at a point of particular strategic vulnerability to the Soviet Union—northern Norway is adjacent to the Kola peninsula, which had the greatest concentration of offensive Soviet military power—was able to maintain a satisfactory relationship with its totalitarian neighbour and preserve its own integrity as a country as a full member of the north Atlantic alliance. That is a model which we should follow.

We should remember that never in its history has NATO acted in an offensive manner. That is in complete contradistinction to what the Hungarians suffered at the hands of their Warsaw pact allies in 1956 and the Czechoslovaks suffered in 1968. Similarly, the Poles have little to be thankful for, what with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Yalta agreement, the way in which the workers' uprising was put down in 1956 and the struggles of Solidarity against what ultimately became military rule.

All three countries—Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic—are now to be warmly embraced in our collective security apparatus in NATO, but we should not exclude others—for example, the Baltic states. How can they be a threat in any sense to their neighbours? They do not possess the armed forces to be a threat; they are democratic; and they have the rule of law. Estonia and Latvia are trying to come to a satisfactory accommodation with their Russian minorities, offering them citizenship and full participation in the democratic processes of their respective nations. I have had the privilege of leading parliamentary delegations to both those countries in the past three years.

People may point out that there is a border dispute between Estonia and Russia, but it is not of Estonia's desire. Estonia hoped that the Tartu treaty would be recognised by the new Russian Federation, but it has not been. Estonia has put forward new proposals to accommodate Russian concerns but, so far, those have lain on the desk of the Russian Government, unsigned. As for the Latvians, they are doing everything that they can to extend citizenship to the Russians living within their border.

If we are to say that a nation should be excluded because it is small and can make very little military contribution, how is it that Luxembourg, which has only one battalion, is a member of NATO? How is it that Iceland, which has no troops at all, is a member of NATO? We should not be too critical of NATO nations' internal affairs, because all countries go through difficult periods. We accepted Portugal under Salazar. We allowed Greece under the Greek colonels to remain in the alliance. We even allowed Turkey to remain in NATO after it invaded northern Cyprus.

We should bear it in mind that freedom is indivisible. We were prepared to launch the Berlin airlift 50 years ago to ensure that freedom was retained in the western part of the city. Had we not done so, Berlin could have fallen, which would have been a dire precedent. As a consequence of our action, the Brussels treaty was signed later that year and the Washington treaty the year after. It is because of the collective security arrangements that were put in place at that time that western Europe has enjoyed liberty. I do not see why central and eastern Europe should not also, under NATO, ultimately enjoy that liberty.

If any hon. Member had stood up in the House 10 years ago and said that NATO would enlarge its membership into central and eastern Europe in the next decade, he or she would have been regarded as unhinged.

We have heard much today about how the enlargement of NATO is an historic development—which it is—on a scale that is still hard to grasp. My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) made an important point about today's events in St. Petersburg. There has been a remarkable transformation of the landscape in Europe, which is an historic development indeed.

It is also an historic vindication of those who bought the western alliance to its present position. There would have been no possibility of enlargement if Baroness Thatcher's Government in the 1980s had not, in the recent words of the Leader of the Opposition,

"rejected the simple-minded arguments for unilateral disarmament, and stood up for NATO and the western alliance in the years when that support counted the most".—[0fficial Report, 9 July 1997; Vol. 297, c. 939.]

The hon. Gentleman's quote referred to "unilateral disarmament". I believe that he and his right hon. Friend meant unilateral nuclear disarmament. There is a difference.

I happily confirm that that is what my right hon. Friend and I meant.

The road along which Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have travelled towards NATO ran through Greenham Common, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Gosport (Mr. Viggers) reminded us, that road ran within the perimeter fence of Greenham Common, not outside it.

It gives all Opposition Members enormous satisfaction to hear the Foreign Secretary concede, if not in so many words, that he is now one of Thatcher's children. He referred to

"We who owe so much to the alliance".

That transformation of his view is a matter for congratulation. Never mind about seeing the light on the road to you know where. He pronounced only 10 years ago:

"It is nonsense on stilts"

for Britain to

"pretend to be a nuclear power."

On 20 September 1985, on page 6 of Tribune, he put his name to the view that Britain should not be aligned to any major power, such as NATO. Thank heavens he is now one of us. We welcome the Foreign Secretary in his role as a full-hearted supporter of NATO and its nuclear deterrent. It can be said that, on this issue at least, the Foreign Secretary is sound.

Continuity in policy—[Interruption.] This is an important point. Continuity in policy towards the extension of the NATO alliance to the east is welcome. The Madrid summit, where Britain was represented two months after Labour's general election victory by the Prime Minister, brought to a successful conclusion the work begun at Brussels in 1994. The Opposition today whole-heartedly support the three former Warsaw pact nations seeking membership of NATO.

Two weeks ago, I was in Poland at a conference that included politicians from all three Visegrad countries. We were discussing their approach to the enlargement of the European Union. They were disappointed at how little progress had been made on that in the past six months, but they were immensely enthusiastic about their coming membership of NATO. In Poland, that is a cross-party matter. From their point of view—and from ours, as Opposition Members—the Madrid summit was more successful than the Amsterdam summit.

So much for the past—the old certainties that existed when NATO kept watch on the iron curtain have gone, or at least changed beyond recognition. A new question has arisen and will continue to be the central concern for the foreseeable future: what is NATO for?

We have heard many interesting views on the subject today and there has been general agreement on many, if not most, points. My right hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Sir G. Johnson Smith) spoke with huge authority, based in part on his distinguished role in the NATO parliamentary assembly. Much the same is true of the hon. Member for Stockton, North (Mr. Cook), who made an excellent point about current economic realities in Russia.

Our debate has been most lively in respect of the Russian question. While not agreeing with the hon. Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell), he put the case against expansion with great passion. The view of almost all others who spoke, starting with my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples), was that, while Russia's perception of its own interest is vital, we must not allow it to have a veto over the alliance.

It would also be right to include the important contribution to the debate by the Defence Select Committee, whose Chairman, the hon. Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George), made an important speech. The Select Committee sought to find answers to some difficult questions, including the particularly astute question put to it by Mr. Ronald D. Asmus, who said:

"If Russia is no longer the question to which NATO is the answer, what is the question? And how does enlargement help answer the question?"

The Committee's conclusions are important, and I should like to pick out one or two. The vital issue in terms of enlargement is not whether there will be an extension of NATO, but its pace and manner. That was the view reached by the predecessor Committee in 1994 and endorsed by today's Select Committee. It is the right view.

Particular concerns have been expressed about the effect of enlargement on NATO's military effectiveness, especially in the light of the need for new entrants to improve their military capabilities. The Select Committee rightly concluded that the benefits in terms of increased ability in central and eastern Europe should outweigh the short-term costs.

Others have questioned the effect of an increase in NATO's size on its flexibility and the speed of its decision-making processes. There is, however, no reason to believe that the new NATO partners will wish to step out of line with the existing 16 or that they will be anything other than model members.

In the context of relations with Russia, we welcome the signing of the Founding Act in May 1997, which provides mechanisms for co-operation between NATO and Russia, including the establishment of the permanent joint council. However, we urge the Government to take serious notice of the views of the United States Senate's Foreign Relations Committee and our own Select Committee that the Founding Act should not become a means by which Russia could gain a veto over alliance decisions.

We also welcome the formation of the Euro-Atlantic partnership council in May 1997, building on the existing "Partnership for Peace" initiative and offering central and eastern European countries enhanced co-operation with NATO. The operation of the NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia, drawing NATO and non-NATO countries together has helped to ease fears over NATO's expansion. Perhaps the Government will clarify their position on the boundaries of NATO operations for the future. Will NATO's capacity to act out of area be increased?

There are other important questions on which we should like to hear the Government's views today. Indeed, I should like to bring the focus of the debate back to the Government. Greater clarity is needed on the financial costs of enlargement, both to new entrants and to existing NATO members.

The Prime Minister told the House last year that there was

"no reason why Britain's financial contribution … should rise significantly in real terms."—[Official Report, 9 July 1997; Vol. 297, c. 937.]

Is that still the Government's view?

Have the Government had any reason to revise their opinion since then? The Defence Select Committee's third report of 1997–98, on NATO enlargement, noted that the figure of $1.5 billion as the estimated cost of enlargement was a minimum figure, and said in paragraph 77 that the actual cost

"may well be greater." The Committee concluded, in paragraph 86: "we cannot share the Secretary of State's confidence that $1.5 billion represents the probable limit on the true costs of enlargement."

Will the Secretary of State clarify the position? Might the United Kingdom pay more than the current estimate of 1 1 million per annum for enlargement during the next decade?

Conservative Members were not bowled over by the recently announced strategic defence review. We shall watch very closely indeed how the Secretary of State manages with his greatly reduced budget. Britain must always be in a position to honour in full its NATO responsibilities. May we have a specific assurance on that point today?

Perhaps the Secretary of State will help us by setting out the Government's position on the future enlargement of NATO. I return to the subject of the Russians. The widely predicted Russian backlash against the existing extension of NATO never materialised. Should we now allow supposed Russian intransigence to be used as a reason to block further NATO expansion into, for example, Slovenia or Romania—about which my hon. Friends spoke well? In 1997, the Prime Minister said that those countries were

"strong candidates for any future enlargement".—[Official Report, 9 July 1997; Vol. 297, c. 937.]

Perhaps the Secretary of State will expand on that view today. Is future enlargement a clear priority for NATO, and is it a clear priority for the UK Government?

It must be acknowledged that Russia will vigorously oppose the Baltic states' entry to NATO. What is the UK Government's reaction to that? It is a commonly held view that Russia should not have a veto on NATO expansion, yet Russia's attitude is central to the debate on the possible entry into NATO of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. If those countries are judged to have made the necessary progress in, for example, their treatment of the Russian-speaking populations, will the bar to NATO membership remain? Washington recently reassured the Baltic states of its continued support for their right to seek NATO membership. Is that also the position of the British Government?

The Secretary of State heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford-on-Avon and my right hon. Friend the Member for Wealden that we believe that the greatest caution should be exercised in that area. This debate illustrates the importance of NATO as the basis for European defence and the main guarantor of European security. However, some would favour another solution to the question of European security, through the integration of the Western European Union into the European Union, as foreshadowed by the Amsterdam treaty. We believe that that move was driven by political considerations and a desire in some quarters to advance the cause of European federalism.

We welcome the fact that European countries are doing more to defend themselves, and we support initiatives such as the combined joint task forces, which enable the WEU to support NATO more fully. However, the WEU should not be used to undermine the Atlantic alliance, or to question the role of NATO and the vital United States contribution as the cornerstone of our defence. I hope that the Government share those sentiments.

My hon. Friend the Member for Romsey (Mr. Colvin) and the hon. Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall) made interesting points on the relationship between NATO, the WEU and the European Union. No doubt we shall debate the subject in greater detail in future.

Comparisons between NATO and EU enlargement are instructive. The two are complementary but not symmetrical. Of the two, NATO enlargement is proceeding more rapidly, despite the obvious obstacles in the way of extending a military rather than a political alliance. That shows what can be achieved when there is real political momentum behind the reforms.

NATO enlargement will achieve two aims. First, it will provide security guarantees for the individual states involved. Secondly, it will enhance the prospect of peace and stability for Europe as a whole.

However, in considering enlargement, we must recognise that, although prospects of NATO membership act as a spur to democratic and constitutional reform in central and eastern Europe, NATO, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stratford on Avon said at the start of the debate, is a military guarantee, not a political club. In that I must disagree with the hon. Members for Leicester, South and for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen). Expansion has to be manageable and credible. New entrants need to be able to contribute to the collective security that NATO membership entails. Military considerations should be at the heart of discussions about NATO expansion.

In the 1980s, the Conservative Government got right the question to which NATO was the answer. It is a matter of some regret that the Labour party did not. Now that the Labour party is in government, let us hope that it helps to frame the right questions for the future. The right answer will remain the Atlantic alliance.

Let me begin with a simple, but, I hope, clear statement about the importance of the North Atlantic alliance to the Government and to this country. Unlike the Conservatives, I give Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic an unambiguous and warm welcome to the NATO family.

Since its foundation in 1949, when another Labour Government were in power, the transatlantic alliance has been the cornerstone of European security. It established a community of nations committed to promoting shared values and defending common interests, and it still forms a concrete link between the influence and interests of European democracies and those of the United States and Canada. By doing so, it enhances the political and military capability of every member of that community.

Every British Government and official Opposition since 1949 have been firmly committed to the alliance. The House should have no doubts about the Government's continuing commitment. As the strategic defence review amply demonstrated, we are determined to ensure that strong British defence is maintained and that the alliance remains the key instrument in ensuring peace and security for our citizens.

The strategic defence review which we published last week reaffirmed that a strong and relevant NATO is central to the security of Europe and to Britain's defence and security policy. The outcome of the review, with its emphasis on the need for forces that are deployable, mobile, flexible and sustainable, means that we shall maintain a highly effective commitment to the full range of alliance missions, including peace support and collective defence. We shall continue to play a leading role in the vital work of transforming the alliance, including the admission of the three invited countries.

I will not have been alone in finding the speech of the Opposition's chief defence spokesman grudging, confused and mean-spirited, and a remarkable transformation from previous Conservative positions on the rights of newly freed nations to make their own decisions about their security. For more than half a century, we have yearned and worked for the day when the great countries of central Europe returned to democracy, pluralism and enterprise economies, and the unwanted chains of the Warsaw pact were cut from their armies.

It is sad that it took my intervention to prompt the hon. Member for Stratford-on-Avon (Mr. Maples) to get round to saying outright that he was in favour of our old but temporarily enslaved allies rejoining us in a free alliance of nations. I assure him that the people of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will notice with some concern the change in tone and content from the Conservatives.

The right hon. Gentleman is reading too much into what was said earlier. A little humility would be in order from the representative of a party three quarters of whose Members of Parliament wanted this country to give up its nuclear deterrent and wanted NATO to refuse the vital cruise and Pershing missiles that saw the end of the Soviet Union. The people of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia—as it then was—remember which party stood up to the Soviet Union and which party wanted to lie down in front of it.

The hon. Gentleman, of all people, should not be castigating others for changing their minds. Let him be reminded that, from 1949, when a Labour Government took us into the North Atlantic alliance and a Labour Foreign Secretary was the architect of the treaty, the Labour party has never wavered for a moment in its support for NATO and continued membership of it.

I turn briefly to a political party that is not represented in the House today. No member of the Scottish National party has contributed to or been present for this important—indeed, historic—debate. That is hardly surprising, given that the SNP does not believe in NATO. Despite the fact that the alliance has helped to maintain peace and security in Europe for the past 50 years, and despite its magnificent efforts in Bosnia, the Scottish nationalists would turn their backs on NATO.

While other small nations in Europe are desperately trying to get into NATO, the SNP is scrambling to get out. What more obvious example could one give of the narrow nationalism and isolationism of that party? What more potent symbol does one need of the nationalist empty-chair policy in the councils of Europe? As part of the United Kingdom, Scotland is able not only to enjoy the security that comes from being part of NATO but to offer leadership to the world. The SNP wants to throw all that away and turn Scotland from a world leader to a spectator on the sidelines.

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

No, I want to address some of the many points that have been made in the debate. I may be generous to the hon. Gentleman later, as he has sat through the entire debate.

Enlarging the alliance is, of course, no small step. As many hon Members have said, it requires careful thought. I therefore welcome all the thoughtful speeches in the debate, as well as the admirable report of the Select Committee on Defence, which was published in April. I also welcome the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South (Mr. George) in amplification of that report. I welcomed the report when it came out, and I gladly and sincerely welcome it now. It was a considered analysis of the issues. I was heartened by its broad support for the policy that the Government have pursued on this important issue.

The Committee commented on the need for a parliamentary and public debate on NATO enlargement. Although some hon. Members have expressed dissatisfaction with the delay and interruption in the debate, I should point out that we are debating this important issue before the Government ratify the treaty—under the Ponsonby rules, we are not obliged to do so—and following the publication of the strategic defence review, which has helped.

The Defence Committee, chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, South, produced another report yesterday, which dealt with a further letter that I had sent to it. The report asks that the confidential study on costs published by NATO and made available to the Committee in confidence be put in the public domain. We shall ensure that NATO is informed of the Committee's request. The matter is one for collective decision based on consensus among allies. The report is not the property of the Government, but we will certainly tell NATO of the Committee's views.

The broad political considerations that underpin the alliance's decision to add to its membership have been set out amply by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary. As Defence Secretary, I shall stress the practical and military implications of enlargement of the alliance. I shall remind the House of the commitments involved. When we undertook to defend Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, they undertook to defend each other and all other NATO members. In the memorable words of the Washington treaty,

"an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an armed attack against them all".

Those historic and momentous words in 1949 are still as important and significant today. I have no doubt that the three invited countries will meet the obligations involved in such a commitment with honour, dedication and military professionalism.

My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, South (Mr. Marshall), who apologised for having to leave before the end of the debate, was wrong when he suggested that the contributions of Poland and the Czech Republic to SFOR in Bosnia represented the limit of their military capabilities. That is simply not true. The new members have substantial armed forces and have plans to modernise them and make them interoperable with NATO forces as a whole. The three new countries understand that they must develop such capable forces and must commit them to NATO.

It will take time to integrate the armed forces of the three countries into NATO. We seek a contribution to common defence, not rapid rearmament or crippling defence expenditure. For their own security, the three countries would have had to invest anyway for their own defence, and it is easier and more effective to do that collectively inside NATO.

We have heard much about the importance of Russia and of Russian views. My hon. Friend the Member for Linlithgow (Mr. Dalyell) has changed his views a number of times on these issues, but we always listen to him with interest for a view that may be different from those that are expressed throughout the House. However, he was wrong to say that the two Front-Bench teams were united. If he reads the speech by the Opposition spokesman, he will see a clear difference between it and the warm welcome for NATO enlargement from my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary.

My hon. Friend read out the names of the distinguished signatories to the letter to The Times that objected to further NATO enlargement. I disagreed with it when I saw it, and I disagree with it now. My hon. Friend asked for a response to that letter. There was one from my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister to the signatories, and I will ensure that a copy is placed in the Library so that my hon. Friend can see it.

My hon. Friend asked about assurances that might have been given to the Soviet Union about NATO enlargement. No British Minister has ever given any formal undertaking that NATO would not expand eastwards; nor should any have done so. The Government believe that it is a decision for the three countries and for NATO, and for nobody else. He asked about the impact of NATO enlargement on the START 2 process. We all hope that the Duma will soon ratify START 2. The Russian Government are confident that it will do that. I hope that, when Mr. Primakov reads the copy of the strategic defence review that I sent him yesterday, he will see what this country is doing about reducing strategic warheads. Perhaps the Duma will follow our example.

The opponents of NATO enlargement cite Russian resistance to it, but Russia has nothing to fear from that enlargement. The stability that it will bring to central Europe will be in Russia's best interests. We have said that to the Russians. Their opposition to the new NATO is misplaced, because NATO is not designed to threaten Russia, or its legitimate interests or those of any other country. NATO simply provides its members with a guarantee of collective defence.

Of course, we must consider the impact of these decisions on Russia and on other countries, and we should be open and honest about our intentions and those of the alliance as a whole. As many hon. Members have said, Russia cannot exercise a veto on the decision to join or to be admitted to NATO. NATO members made the intentions clear and gave specific assurances to Russia and to others.

I ask the Russians, whether the Government, the Opposition or the various parties in the Duma: can we really believe that Russia is less secure as a result of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland being governed by democratic and moderate Governments and able to participate fully in the system of collective defence that has done so much to defend peace in Europe? The answer to that question is self-evident.

I cannot say which country will be next invited to join the alliance or when, but we will not close the door on the legitimate aspirations of countries that wish to join the alliance, whatever their location in Europe. Our guiding principle will be the effectiveness—

Will the Secretary of State give way?

At 28 minutes past 3, even my generosity would be stretched to the limit. I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for not giving way.

Our guiding principle is, and will continue to be, the military effectiveness of the alliance. It will be important to assess the process of absorbing the three new countries and the practical military implications of the current enlargement before making decisions on further invitees.

Much has been made of the cost of enlargement, but the new figures presented by NATO have been accepted by all major countries, including the Americans, as well as by the invitees. The figures form a solid, sensible basis for moving forward into enlargement.

I should like to close the debate with a statement which I think expresses the feelings of the House and this country. This decision is a landmark in our relationship with the three fellow European countries which have suffered so much from the turbulence of this century. Their commitment to NATO represents—

I am grateful for the opportunity to introduce a debate on the subject of limiting the environmental impact of airport developments.

In the next week, the Government will publish a White Paper setting out their proposals for an integrated transport policy. The House and large sections of our community await with considerable interest the Government's statement. Most of the publicity heralding the White Paper has focused on how my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister and his team will tackle the damage to our environment caused by the unfettered use of the car, and the largely unplanned expansion of the road transport system over the past century.

It is now well over 20 years since society began to take seriously the need to limit the environmental impact of the car, yet it is only in the last few years that there has been a growing realisation that the massive expansion in air traffic, and the associated development of airports, cannot be left to a combination of free market forces and the isolated planning inquiry decisions which have often permitted incremental environmental devastation.

My hope is that the White Paper will start in earnest the debate on how we can plan the future of air transport in this country in line with the Government's manifesto commitment:

"The guiding principles of our aviation strategy will be fair competition, safety and environmental standards."

Central to the debate will be the question of how we can limit the environmental impact of airport developments. There is a growing body of opinion which says that we need a new approach to the development of airports. Before the last general election, the Deputy Prime Minister argued that it was time to think afresh about airport policy.

Until now, airport growth has been almost totally reactive to air traffic demand, and extremely little account has been taken of the long-term environmental impact of any development. The corollary of that approach is that the aviation industry has generally dominated policy making over airport expansion, while the wishes of communities and environmentalists have largely gone unheeded. If the preservation and improvement of our environment is to be among the core guiding principles of our integrated transport strategy, we can no longer simply react to the demands of the BAA, or any other section of the industry.

Instead, we must be proactive and set environmental standards and limits in advance of any proposed airport development or expansion. In that way, we should establish set criteria against which any development proposals would be judged and clarify an environmental cap placed on any particular airfield.

If anyone doubts the need for a new and proactive approach, I would simply draw to their attention the historical development of Heathrow, located in my constituency. Heathrow is a classic case study of the reactive incremental expansion of an environmental nightmare.

The history of Heathrow has been drawn together in a fascinating book by Phillip Sherwood, a local historian. He describes the small, picturesque villages and hamlets that existed in the south of my constituency before the second world war, including Heathrow, Longford, Harmondsworth, Sipson and Harlington. The fields near what was then Heathrow village became the location for a small civil airfield, which was brought into military use during the war. It is now clear that, at the end of the war, the Government decided that the Heathrow airfield should expand into a major airport for London.

For the following 30 years, the creeping development of the airport obliterated Heathrow village and began to erode the quality of the environment of the remaining villages and beyond. In the late 1970s, a proposal was submitted for a fourth terminal at Heathrow; it was eventually agreed to after an inquiry. However, lain Glidewell, the inspector at the inquiry, made a firm recommendation to the then Secretary of State:

"all possible steps should be taken to satisfy those living around Heathrow that this is the last major expansion at the airport."

Initially, that was accepted by the Government. The then Under-Secretary of State for Trade, now Lord Tebbit, assured the House that the Government would not permit a fifth terminal at Heathrow. I regret the fact that, within six years, that commitment had been discarded and the inspectors' conditions ignored. As hon. Members will know, applications to construct a fifth terminal were submitted; they have been the subject of a public inquiry that has now entered its fourth year of deliberations.

The environmental impact of Heathrow is best illustrated by the representations being made to the terminal 5 inquiry by local community organisations and environmentalists. I pay tribute to the local residents who have led their David and Goliath struggle. I pay tribute to all those in the various residents' associations who have campaigned against the airport industry to protect our local—and, indeed, Londonwide—environment.

Leaders such as Dennis Gould and Rita Pearce from Longford, Mr. and Mrs. Sobey, who have campaigned for the Harmondsworth and Sipson association, and our former local councillor Keith Dobson have all had to fight hard merely to put their arguments at successive inquiries. Moreover, HACAN—the Heathrow Association for the Control of Aircraft Noise—has estimated that more than 1 million people are seriously affected by aircraft noise from Heathrow.

Does my hon. Friend agree that a ban on night flights is needed? I am sure that his constituents, like mine, have to put up with flights as early as 4 am every morning, which keeps them awake and makes life intolerable.

That is a pertinent point. At the terminal 5 inquiry, HACAN has made it clear that the noise generated by the four-terminal Heathrow is causing widespread suffering. Thousands of families are persistently deprived of sleep, as my hon. Friend said, by the noise of jumbo jets flying over London; the noise starts at 4 am and continues throughout the day. Even on BAA's evidence, 50 per cent. more people will be affected by aircraft noise in 2016 if terminal 5 is given the go-ahead.

From my constituency, residents' associations, the community health council and local doctors have combined to research and expose the impact on the health of local residents of air pollution from the airport and its associated road traffic. A key finding of surveys undertaken by the community health council and residents was the high level of respiratory illness among people living on the estates round the airport. One local doctor has reported an incidence of asthma among local children of twice the national average and a similarly high comparative incidence of asthma and respiratory disease among other patient age groups.

The residents' associations have also expressed strong concerns about the risk to public safety posed by the location of one of world's largest airports in an area of such high population density. We should never underestimate the risk to life and limb of an aircraft coming out of the sky over such a densely populated area. Hanging over the heads of all the residents is a sense of inevitability that, if terminal 5 is given the go-ahead, the increase in the number of passengers passing through Heathrow from 15 million a year to 19 million a year will result in the next development—a new application for a third runway.

A third runway could result in the demolition of up to 4,000 homes in my constituency, wiping off the face of the earth the remaining villages to the north of the airport and displacing a whole community. That prospect creates uncertainty, which blights a whole area and a whole community.

The experience of my community with Heathrow should never be repeated, there or anywhere else. It could be avoided by the process advocated by numerous community and environmental organisations: the setting of environmental limits for existing and new airports. Those limits are nothing more than a set of permanently fixed environmental criteria that must be adhered to at each airport or planned airport.

The limits would be enshrined in the area's local development plan, and would involve an extensive range of environmental impact assessments. They would protect the local environment from continual expansion of airports and relieve the uncertainties and blight that expansion pressures create in any community.

My hon. Friend makes a powerful point about Heathrow's impact on his constituency. He will also be aware of the possible sale of RAF Northolt to the private sector, or the increase in the number of commercial flights that has been touted by people from various sources. Does he agree that, if either scenario were to materialise, local communities in both his constituency and mine would suffer blight, and there would be considerable environmental consequences?

That is a valid point. The consequences would be devastating for the whole region. My constituents would be sandwiched between two major airports, with all the pollution that that involves, and my hon. Friend's constituency would suffer not only increased noise and pollution but road transport gridlock, which would affect the whole of north-west London.

Environmental limits would relieve pressure and give certainty, as well as demonstrating to the aviation industry exactly what the operational limits of a particular airport are and what standards would be expected in any planned new airport. Stability would be provided both for the communities and for the industry, and the need for lengthy planning inquiries would be obviated, or at least reduced.

Environmental limits could be established either by agreement between the local planning authority and the airport operator, or by the Government. Their effectiveness would depend on their virtual irreversibility once agreed or set. The range of impact assessments or criteria that would comprise the agreement for a particular airport would naturally reflect the local environment.

There could readily be local flexibility, but several core limits are obvious: the airport's geographical boundary and its proximity to residential properties; the appropriate noise contours; the types of aircraft to be operated and the maximum number of air traffic movements per annum; the runway configuration and approved tracks for aircraft; the times of operation; the need or otherwise for the use of reverse thrust, night running of engines, ground power units, and other high-noise sources; the location of public safety zones and built-up areas overflown by aircraft on landing and take-off; the development of infrastructure to support the airport; and the protection of the green belt.

In its evidence to the Transport Sub-Committee, the Aviation Environmental Federation provided a checklist of environmental concerns relating to the use of airports, including an exhaustive list of issues to be addressed, under the broad headings of noise and vibration; emissions and effluents; land take; and infrastructure.

Serplan, the south-east regional planning conference, recently published a consultation document on a sustainable development strategy for the south-east and recommended that local authorities identify environmental limits at existing airports and set capacities in relation to surface access, noise and associated developments.

The advantages of setting such limits are obvious. They would establish how much air and road traffic would be generated by an airport development; how many air movements would take place, and between what times; the noise levels permitted; and, combined with local development plans, the area beyond which the airport cannot expand.

For the aviation industry and local businesses, it would be clear what developments were applicable. It has been proposed that the monitoring and enforcement of environmental limits would be the responsibility of the local authority, which would have strict enforcement powers. However, with the advent of a strategic authority for London, that may well be one of the environmental powers that we could attribute to the mayor and the assembly.

The use of environmental assessments is not new, especially under European legislation. In the past year, the Government have been consulting on a European Union directive on the extension of impact assessments to the environmental effects of public and private projects. That directive provides for greater public access to the environmental information on major development projects, such as airport developments, which enhances accountability and democratic control and ensures that decision making is more open and transparent. That would be a first for the aviation industry. Environmental limits would give purpose and teeth to the assessment.

Clearly, the country has recently woken up to the need for a thorough debate on the future of airports and the aviation industry. Like other forms of transport, air transport has brought considerable benefits, but the massive growth in air traffic and the substantial growth of airports has also imposed significant environmental costs. In my constituency, we know of the effect on each generation—each generation of asthma sufferers, of people with respiratory problems and of people who cannot sleep at night and whose pleasure in their own gardens is undermined because of noise pollution.

If we are to tackle the environmental implications of that growth in airports, we must go beyond the protection of local environments from overblown airport development. We will need to combine the environmental limiting of airports with measures to promote the "polluter pays" principle within the aviation industry. That is a principle to which the Government have adhered since their election—they are now developing not only green policies but even green Budgets.

That could mean reviewing the existing tax exemptions on aviation fuel, for example, and negotiating via the European Union an environmental levy on airline fuel purchases. As in the car industry, that would increase the incentives for airlines to put pressure on manufacturers to improve fuel efficiency. In addition, Britain could follow other European countries by basing charges to airlines on the noise and weight of an aircraft, and fining individual companies for off-track flying.

I look forward to all those issues being tackled in the integrated transport strategy, which is to be published next week. I hope that, despite the proximity of that publication, the Minister will be able to throw some light on the Government's thinking on the impact of airports on the environment. That issue affects not merely my constituency and those of other hon. Members represented here today, but the whole of London. We have endured that problem for decades. It requires urgent attention, and I believe that this Government will give it such attention.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (Mr. McDonnell) on his success in obtaining this debate and raising a matter that is of considerable importance not merely to residents in his constituency but those living throughout London, as he rightly said in his conclusion.

I shall do my best to respond to the issues that he raised, but I hope that he will appreciate that my responsibilities are primarily in the planning field and that wider matters of aviation policy are more strictly the responsibility of my hon. Friend the Minister for Transport in London. I know that my hon. Friend has contacted her about these matters and will continue to do so.

Our aim, like that of successive Governments since aircraft noise became a cause for concern, is to strike a balance between the economic benefits that airports bring and the numerous other effects on the surrounding communities, some of which are far less beneficial. Noise is usually the paramount concern of local residents, but we are also concerned about aircraft emissions, as they can affect both local and global air quality, and the surface access implications of airport developments, which are always carefully scrutinised.

Every airport has to tackle a range of waste and energy management issues, as well as development pressures, which are often concentrated in the areas surrounding an airport. Those pressures must be managed both by the airports and through the planning system to ensure that environmental consequences are acceptable.

Not surprisingly, much current interest in the subject surrounds BAA's current application for a fifth terminal at Heathrow airport. The House will appreciate that I may not address that issue in any great detail. The applications were accompanied by an environmental assessment, and the environmental impact has been the subject of much written and oral evidence to the inquiry. All information will be fully considered by the inspector, who is responsible for the conduct of the inquiry and for the consideration of evidence.

The Secretary of State's quasi-judicial position in the planning process precludes me from discussing the merits of the case, except to say that my Department's position on the application remains one of neutrality. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington has appeared twice at the inquiry, and he will understand the constraints that I am under. Our factual evidence is already on the public record, and I do not propose to recite swathes of it here.

Ministers are, however, committed to speeding up the planning process, and the way in which proposals for major infrastructure projects of national importance are dealt with—a stance that we reiterated in a policy statement in January. We are examining various options, ranging from modifications to inquiry procedures to alternative processes such as special development orders, hybrid Bills and Transport and Works Act 1992 procedures. We intend to consult widely on proposals to improve planning appeal procedures generally, with a view to reaching quicker decisions and minimising uncertainty while safeguarding the ability of all interested parties to participate fully and effectively in the appeal process.

One matter that does not appear to have arisen during the consultation process is the power of compulsory purchase, which the BAA inherited from the nationalised industry. The BAA uses that power ruthlessly to pursue its objective of developing the airport beyond what the local community believes to be legitimate environmental parameters.

As I understand it, the proposals being considered at the inquiry concern land within the existing curtilage of Heathrow airport, so no compulsory purchase powers are required. As for the time scale for inquiries, the long-running inquiry into terminal 5 at Heathrow is very much the exception rather than the rule.

My hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, West (Mr. Thomas) mentioned Northolt. I reiterate what my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces said in a recent Adjournment debate, when he made it clear that early proposals on the future of RAF Northolt were highly unlikely. In any case, the concerns of the local community, which my hon. Friend rightly aired today, will be an important consideration, as will matters raised by the White Paper on integrated transport when my right hon. Friend the Deputy Prime Minister publishes it in the near future.

Noise is of great concern to my hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington and for Putney (Mr. Colman), whose constituents are much affected by the noise of aircraft flying over them. Planning policy guidance 24 on planning and noise advises local authorities in England on the use of planning powers to minimise the impact of noise, at aerodromes and elsewhere. It sets out criteria for permitting both noise-sensitive and noise-generating developments, and it advises on the use of conditions to minimise the impact of noise. I am well aware, from my mailbag and from the views expressed by my own constituents who are affected by aircraft noise, of wide concern about noise in the vicinity of aerodromes. We will review PPG 24 and will take action, if necessary, to ensure that its principles are followed by local authorities and developers.

Regional planning guidance will apply national policies for airports at the regional level, taking full account of the Government's objectives for sustainable development, integration with surface transport and regeneration.

My hon. Friend will join me in welcoming the Heathrow express, which has just opened as extra access to the airport, access to which by public transport is difficult. Does he support the Sweltrac—South and West London Transport Conference—concept of a dedicated line from Waterloo through Putney and Wimbledon to allow direct access to the airport from the south-west?

I am happy to agree with my hon. Friend about the merits of the Heathrow express, but I cannot be drawn into commenting on a matter that is not strictly my responsibility. I am sure that he has been assiduous in pressing the case for the Sweltrac proposal on my hon. Friend the Minister for Transport in London.

The Government recognise that it is essential that the potential impacts of development options, including airport development, are rigorously appraised as an integral part of the RPG preparation process. To that end, we have proposed that RPG should be subject to a sustainability and environmental appraisal from the outset. We have let a research project which will produce good practice guidance on the application of this technique, which is in its infancy, to RPG.

The Government are directly responsible for certain noise control requirements at Gatwick and Stansted, as well as at Heathrow, under section 78 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. Under this power, we set night restrictions, noise limits and routes for departing aircraft, and regulations relating to arriving aircraft. Noise insulation has been provided.

The Government are engaged in a two-stage consultation on night flying restrictions, which were raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Putney, at the three airports. A preliminary consultation paper was issued at the end of February which sought views on all aspects of the current arrangements. All responses to it will be considered before specific detailed proposals for night flying arrangements are drawn up. These will be consulted on in the second stage paper, which we intend to issue at the end of September. Hon. Members will appreciate that I cannot comment in detail on this matter while the consultation process continues.

Proposals to reduce the departure noise limits, by 3 dB(A) for daytime and 2 dB(A) at night, were made by the previous Administration. Following representations by the International Air Transport Association, the Department has undertaken to issue a supplementary consultation paper on these proposals. When this paper is issued, eight weeks will be allowed for consultation.

Noise preferential routes for departing aircraft are of long standing and have been designed to minimize—subject always to the need of safety—overflight of the more densely populated areas. In a city such as London, it is impossible to avoid overflight completely; even in the vicinity of Gatwick and Stansted, it is inevitable that substantial numbers are directly overflown. Efforts are being made to improve compliance with the routes.

The Department, through its aircraft noise monitoring advisory committee, is also examining noise from arriving aircraft and the feasibility of operational limits, and the scope for improvements in operational practice by airlines and air traffic controllers. That issue has assumed increasing importance, not least as the noise climate attributable to departing aircraft has improved over the years at Heathrow, Gatwick and some other airports.

Ground noise is subject to separate arrangements, managed by the airports. It comprises a range of activities, including taxing, ground engine running and movement of airport vehicles, which can cause significant nuisance to people living in close proximity to the airport, including constituents in Hayes and Harlington. The Department's technical advisers, the department of operational research and analysis at National Air Traffic Services, have recently undertaken a study of ground noise at night at Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted, and intend to publish the results soon. BAA, partly in the light of this work, has taken steps to improve practice—for instance, by the increased use of fixed electrical ground power supplies instead of noisy auxiliary power units.

Returning for a moment to Heathrow, we have given a commitment to do everything practicable to ensure that the noise climate there continues to improve, even though, after the phase-out of chapter 2 aircraft, this will be more challenging to achieve than hitherto. Because of uncertainty about the future aircraft fleet mix at Heathrow and retirement dates for Concorde, we cannot be sure of achieving such improvements year on year, every year. However, we have offered a further assurance to local people around Heathrow that the Government will take all practicable steps to prevent any deterioration in the noise climate after the chapter 2 phase-out is complete.

The regulations made in the UK implementing agreements made through the International Civil Aviation Organisation for the limitation of noise and emissions from aircraft also bear closely on the environment around airports, both large and small. The Government participate actively in the international forums responsible for developing environmental standards for new aircraft, and we are pleased that the older, noisier chapter 2 jet aircraft will be withdrawn from service by March 2002. We are pressing for a new standard, quieter than the preset ICAO chapter 3 requirements, to lock in advances in technology, and work on that will start shortly.

The only other issue that I wish to discuss is that of environmental limits, the case for which was eloquently espoused by my hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington. He made some interesting suggestions, not least on the role of the mayor and assembly. We will consider those points. I hope that I have assured him that the Government are actively considering the issue of noise and the environmental impact of airports and doing our best to improve matters.