I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 2—Availability of domestic football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons—

'(1) An application for an order under section 6 of this Act may be made by a relevant authority if it appears to the authority, in relation to any person, that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with prescribed football matches.

(2) In this section "relevant authority" means any chief officer of police.'.

Amendment No. 33, in clause 1, page 1, line 11, after `offence', insert

`or to which an application has been made under section (Availability of international football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 34, in page 1, line 18, after `accused', insert

`or to the person who is the subject of an application under section (Availability of international football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 35, in page 1, line 23, after `accused', insert

`or to the person who is the subject of an application under section (Availability of international football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 36, in page 2, line 5, after `conditionally', insert '; or

(c) following an application under section (Availability of international football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 37, in clause 4, page 6, line 12, at end insert—

'(1C) Subject to subsection (3) and section 17 below, an international football banning order has effect in relation to a person who is the subject of an application made under section (Availability of international football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons) for a period determined by the court making the order—

(a) which begins with the date of the making of the order;

(b) which is not longer than 3 years; and

(c) which is not shorter than six months.'.

Amendment No. 38, in clause 6, page 7, line 24, after `applies', insert

`or to which an application has been made under section (Availability of domestic football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 39, in page 7, line 34, after `accused', insert

`or to the person who is the subject of an application under section (Availability of domestic football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 40, in page 7, line 39, after `accused', insert

`or to the person who is the subject of an application under section (Availability of domestic football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 41, in page 8, line 2, after `conditionally', insert & or

(c) following an application under section (Availability of domestic football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons).'.

Amendment No. 42, in clause 8, page 9, line 12, after `years', insert

`, except in respect of persons who are the subject of an application under section (Availability of domestic football banning order in respect of unconvicted persons), in which case the period shall be not less than six months nor more than two years.'.

This is an important group of new clauses and amendments. New clauses 1 and 2 seek to bring into legislative effect the suggestions made by my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) on Second Reading. The Bill has not been amended much in Committee. However, it relates entirely to those who have been convicted of offences. The clause concerning international football banning orders relates to those who have been convicted, as does the clause on domestic banning orders.

As was said extensively on Second Reading, there might be a great many people whom football intelligence officers, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and chief police officers know to be dedicated troublemakers who can be violent, but who have not been convicted of an offence.

I intend to explain why it is important to explore the possibility of including that group, and I am keen to hear the reaction of the Government. I do not intend to force the new clause to a vote, but it is worth exploring, as the Bill—which does some good things—could leave some serious gaps. With the Euro 2000 championships coming up, it is important that we do not have gaps in legislation.

I am conscious that making the changes that I am suggesting may unsettle or destabilise the Bill. I am conscious also that the new clause probably has not been thoroughly drafted, but it is not a bad attempt. However, certain technical amendments might be necessary if the new clause were to be accepted.

The Bill deals with convicted people. Bolting on a new clause—even one which is in order—concerning unconvicted people may destabilise the thrust of the Bill. It may be better in due course for the Government to propose separate legislation—or, if they wish, to propose a series of new clauses in the other place to frame in legislation the intended purpose of the new clause.

The amendments grouped with the new clauses are consequential. Both new clauses propose to do the same thing, essentially. New clause 1 relates to international banning orders, and refers to

"any chief officer of police".

I am happy to accept under that description chief constables, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police—who is not technically a chief police officer, but a civilian appointment—and the director-general of NCIS, who is a chief officer of police rank. It is important that the director-general of NCIS be included, as NCIS ran the football intelligence unit and is spearheading the effort against violence perpetrated by hooligans in this country and overseas. The new clause would include also the Commissioner of the City of London police.

I want to give those officers the power to apply the measure in relation to "any person". I must use that phraseology, because I mean "any person"—including those who have not necessarily been convicted of a relevant offence. That would include all those whom the officers suspected, because of evidence or intelligence, of being involved in football hooliganism or violence, or indecent chanting or racist abuse at matches—the troublemakers whom they are currently monitoring—as well as those who had been taken to court but not convicted. I will say more later about the civil liberties implications, which may worry some people of a more sensitive disposition.

The power would appear to be draconian, but an order would not be imposed merely on the say-so of a chief officer; he would have to apply to the court. The new clause does not specify what level of evidence would be necessary to satisfy the court. It may be difficult to determine what level of evidence would be appropriate to secure an order without jeopardising police operations.

A similar proposal was in the Government's consultation paper on football-related legislation. The Minister said in Committee that she was interested in the concept, but that the Bill might not offer the right opportunity and the Government might want to explore the idea further at a later stage. The proposal was dropped after consultation because it aroused considerable controversy.

Some of the respondents were concerned about what would constitute sufficient evidence and others were concerned that courts might be presented with hearsay evidence. I do not rate that point very highly because that danger exists at present and the court would always rule such evidence out of order. It is up to the court whether it believes a police officer who says that he saw someone doing something. In the case of an unconvicted person, the evidence presented might not be enough to gain a conviction but it might satisfy the court that the person had committed some acts that merited the imposition of a domestic or international banning order.

I am more concerned about the risk of intelligence information being compromised, although I am sure that we can get round that. We will not go into the details of how NCIS operates. I would not go further than its press release on its football intelligence unit and the operation of its local football intelligence officers in each force. All one can say is that it is highly effective.

It was my experience during Euro 96 that the intelligence-run policing operation conducted by all police forces and co-ordinated by the Met was absolutely superb. Many people—some of them, sadly, from my own patch, north of Penrith, in Carlisle—got tooled up, got into their minibus, set off to have a good ruckus and were very much surprised when they were intercepted along the route by the police and the pickaxe handles, knives, chains and bottles were taken off them and they were locked up.

The same expression of surprise was seen on the faces of miscellaneous foreign supporters who boarded planes, got to Heathrow, passed through customs and immigration and then were intercepted by the police because of the football intelligence work of overseas police officers attached to the co-ordination unit at the Met and NCIS. Intelligence-led policing works. We were able to deport those foreign hooligans immediately as well as prevent our domestic ones from getting to matches. The fact that they were detained in cells overnight and could not get to matches was highly effective.

9.45 am

Such intelligence-led policing depends on the knowledge of NCIS and local police officers of who the troublemakers are. The new clause is designed to build on that operation and allow us, rather than merely detaining the hooligans in a cell overnight or questioning them for a few hours so that they miss the match, to go one step further and present information to a court, perhaps with video evidence.

I am conscious that presenting video evidence to a court could compromise intelligence, so it must be left to the police and NCIS to decide how much evidence to give, taking into account the risk that if they do not give the court sufficient information—if all they have are rumours, gut reaction or a bobby's instinct—they will not get the banning order. We do not need to prescribe too much detail in legislation.

I do not see too great a risk of intelligence being compromised. I would leave it to the good sense of the police to keep their intelligence sources intact, as there are much more valuable gains to be had in the long run with convictions of some of the nastiest hooligans, which must be a more pressing concern than gaining a banning order against one individual.

The new clause has aroused some concerns about the scope for civil actions against the police on the grounds of their presenting uncorroborated information to the court. Certainly, that is a risk. It is possible that people may claim to have been defamed by the police. If the police have laid information before the court about an innocent member of the public–innocent in the sense both of the person being unconvicted and of the information being wrong–there would of course be scope for action, but it would not be any greater than the present scope for action against the police on a whole range of, in my opinion, bogus issues. The number of law suits against the police is rocketing. It has become the newest and juiciest racket for getting money from the state. A group of lawyers has no doubt moved on from medical negligence cases to action against the police.

Probably the greatest concern is about civil liberties, and some of my more sensitive colleagues may want to speak about that. I have not had unanimous, wholehearted supported from them for the new clause, although I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford will want to support me this morning.

Some of my hon. Friends may say that the new clause is a sledgehammer to crack a nut. They may think that it is disproportionate to the mischief being created, and that we would be passing draconian measures in providing that some people who have not been convicted of an offence may be banned from travelling overseas, or may be subject to a whole host of sanctions imposed by the courts.

Subsection (3) would allow those sanctions. It states:

"Where an order is made under this section, the court may, if it thinks fit, impose such conditions in the order as may be imposed where an order is made in respect of a person who has been convicted of a relevant offence."

My new clause would give the courts the right to impose the same range of penalties and restrictions—including passport removal—on those who have not been convicted as they may already impose on those who have been convicted.

I appreciate the civil liberties concerns about such a provision, but we should remember that—thank goodness—we are not dealing with hundreds of thousands of people. Although I am not arguing that it is acceptable to remove the civil liberties of even one person, the fact is that we are dealing with a few hundred or—at the very most—a few thousand dangerous hooligans, whose civil liberties will not be removed on the whim of a police officer or a chief police officer. Their civil liberties would simply be restricted on the basis of evidence presented to the court that they would be a danger and might cause violence if they were to go to a football match. The courts would be able to decide whether to grant an order, and what conditions to impose. I do not think that such restrictions are extremely draconian.

Restricting someone's freedom of movement and travel is, of course, a potentially severe measure. I should therefore be very keen to hear the Minister's views on whether my proposals—or an amended version of them—would satisfy the requirements of the European convention on human rights. I realise that—as the Government have not seriously contemplated including my new clause in the Bill today—the Minister may not have taken legal advice on its compliance with the ECHR. However, if she has a view on whether we may be on dangerous ground in relation to the ECHR, the House would be interested to hear it. Nevertheless, I think that it should be possible for a court to restrict someone's freedom of movement and travel within the European Union without falling foul of the ECHR.

My proposals are not totally new or off the wall, as there are some precedents for imposing an order in cases in which an offence has not been committed. Anti-social behaviour orders, for example—which were introduced in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998—allow a court to impose any prohibitions considered necessary to protect persons in the local area.

Incidentally, during that Act's passage, the official Opposition tabled an amendment to introduce football behaviour orders in cases in which a person had acted in such a way as reasonably to give cause to believe that an order was necessary to prevent him from disturbing good order at any designated football match outside the United Kingdom, or during the period before or after any designated football match. The amendment was not pressed to a Division—as some of my colleagues were merely testing the water—and was withdrawn.

I am, therefore, not on entirely new ground in suggesting that it is appropriate to go to a court to obtain an order restricting the freedom of movement of an individual who has not been convicted of an offence in cases in which there is evidence suggesting that the person is a troublemaker or likely to commit violence.

As other hon. Members wish to speak, I shall not go on for too much longer. I merely wish to draw attention to some of the NCIS statistics on football violence and disorder, some of which were quoted on Second Reading. The NCIS view on the matter is very important. In its December 1998 press release, NCIS said:

"The National Criminal Intelligence Service today warned that they were becoming increasingly concerned about the number of incidents of football hooliganism being reported by their football section and by the network of FIOs"—

football intelligence officers.

Bryan Drew went on to say:

"Although it is too early to say that the overall downward trend for football-related arrest figures over the past five years is being reversed, the signs are not encouraging."

He was referring to the fact that, although the overall figures for football-related offences and convictions had been dropping, he had noticed that there were more arrests for the more violent football-related offences of affray, violent disorder and missile throwing. He said that those had

"shown a marked increase over the previous season."

Bryan Drew continued:

"This season, the ugly face of football hooliganism has continued to make its unwelcome presence felt. The numbers of people involved remain comparatively small, but it is hard core, well organised and hellbent on causing mayhem. It is using football matches as a cover for its criminal activities."

Mr. Drew went on to talk about the fact that, although incidents of violence were declining inside the grounds, they were increasing outside or away from them.

On Second Reading, when I stated that statistics showed about 1,000 arrests for football-related violence, Labour Members made the point that that number could be only the tip of the iceberg. I accept that, usually, the majority of those committing a crime are not arrested and convicted. So it is quite possible that many hardcore football hooligans have not been arrested by police, or that, if they have been, the evidence was not sufficient to obtain a conviction or—under clauses 1 or 6 of the Bill—a banning order.

My new clause would permit police, in limited circumstances, to take action against those other well-known offenders—whom every Opposition Member talks about; they know who they are—who regularly follow football matches and foment violence, but manage to be on the back line when police move in to make arrests. The police have information and video evidence on those people. In many cases, police may have sufficient evidence to convince a court—in the terms of my new clause, although they may not have enough evidence to obtain a conviction—that the liberty of those people should be restricted.

New clause 1 is worthy of an airing, and I should be interested to hear what my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford has to say about it. I was very interested in his comments, some time ago, on the potential for such a new clause. I should also be interested to hear why he has resiled from the tough stance that he proposed taking on such a provision. I am sure that he wants as many of these hooligans locked up—or at least prevented from causing trouble overseas, ruining the good name of Chelmsford and other parts of the United Kingdom—as I do.

As my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford says:

"For far too long, a small minority of mindless, moronic football hooligans have besmirched the reputation of football in this country and dragged the game into the gutter by their anti-social behaviour."

My hon. Friend knows the rest of his press release. He was suggesting taking tough action to deal with those people.

I hope that, today, my hon. Friend will tell me that tough action will indeed be taken. If he cannot accept my new clause, I hope that he will he go away and—as he has been working very closely with the Minister, as his press release states—perhaps by the time the Bill goes to another place, propose similar new clauses. As he is keen on Government legislation, perhaps next year he could even promote an entirely new Bill to implement similar measures. Nevertheless, I am keen to hear why he has decided that it is no longer appropriate to include such a provision in his Bill.

I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) on his new clauses and the way in which he spoke to them. I have much sympathy with many of his comments. He mentioned some earlier comments of mine and I make no bones about the fact that when I announced that I would introduce the Bill, in late December, I had hoped to be able to include provisions to give powers to the courts, in certain circumstances and under certain controls, to place international and domestic banning orders on people unconvicted in a British court but who the police and courts have reasonable grounds to believe would commit an offence if they travelled to a football match.

10 am

Clearly, such a power could not be used willy-nilly to settle scores, to undertake round-ups or to bring hundreds of people before the courts. It would have to be used with great responsibility, because—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border said—it raises civil liberties issues. However, the police and NCIS know of a number of people who are determined to cause misery and suffering to pursue their own agendas and to benefit from crime under cover of the crowds associated with football matches. In many ways, the organisers of such activities have escaped action in the courts and it is the thugs on the ground who have been charged with offences—the same problem arises with drug-related offences.

In those circumstances, I thought it might be right to include a provision in the Bill to give the police an opportunity to make a case to the courts for them to determine whether there were reasonable grounds, in exceptional circumstances, to restrict the attendance of unconvicted individuals at football matches. The provision would have included opportunities for the individuals to attend the court and make the case for their innocence. If the courts were not convinced and believed that the authorities had presented a compelling case, the individuals would have a right of appeal. In that way, safeguards would have been in place.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border said, precedents exist in English law for such provisions, and he cited the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. I mentioned on Second Reading the powers relating to individuals on bail and, in exceptional circumstances, to those involved in difficult child custody cases. The courts already have, and use, similar powers.

In the past two years, the Conservative party has become a listening party, and I believe that that is commendable. It is time politicians were prepared to listen, because we do not always have all the answers to all the issues. I listened carefully on Second Reading to several speeches from hon. Members on both sides of the House. They were supportive of the Bill, but they expressed strong concerns about the powers we have been discussing. I have also met several outside organisations and listened to their concerns about those powers.

Am I right in thinking that the Football Association has said that the powers would be helpful?

My right hon. Friend is right, and I did not wish to give the impression that every organisation associated with or interested in football is against the powers. Indeed, I would like to see those powers on the statute book in some shape or form so that the police and the courts have another weapon in their armoury to combat the problem of football hooliganism. However, I am also a realist, and as I thought more about this highly contentious issue, I came to the conclusion that it would be more sensible not to pursue it via a private Member's Bill.

In effect, the new clauses would give the courts the power to impose a penalty on unconvicted individuals if their background leads the courts to believe that they might commit acts of violence or other forms of hooliganism. Denying the right of freedom of movement to an individual is so serious that I believe that it should be done by Government legislation rather than through a private Member's Bill. It gives me no pleasure to say that, because I would like the authorities to have those powers alongside the other powers in the Bill.

The Minister made it clear in Committee that she and her hon. Friends support the principle behind the powers in the new clauses and I hope that the Government will seek to include them in criminal justice legislation as soon as possible. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border said, last year the Opposition sought to introduce a similar proposal on Report to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, although we did not push the matter to a Division.

I am afraid that I cannot support the new clauses today for the reasons that I have given, but I hope that the Government will introduce their own similar legislation when parliamentary time permits. I also hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border, in the light of my comments, will feel able to withdraw his new clause.

I shall be brief. I welcome the acceptance by the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) that the matter is complicated and that the proof of the Bill would be in its implementation, not in what is said about it here. I agree that the courts may find it difficult to decide whether an offence had been committed and, if so, whether it was football related. Such matters, and others, were discussed in Committee.

However, I wish to challenge the assumption, made by the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean), that there is an upsurge in hooliganism in the domestic game. He used the phrase "tip of the iceberg", and talked about the serious offences of affray, violence and missile throwing. The increase in arrests for those offences has nothing to do with a resurgence of football violence and hooliganism, but stems from our greater ability to deal with such problems.

For example, the introduction of closed circuit television has been probably the most important step forward in combating hooliganism. The offences of affray, violence and missile throwing are readily detected on CCTV, which means that courts and authorities are able to take action.

In the pursuit of brevity, it is possible that I did not make myself clear. I accept that the number of arrests has fallen over the past five years and that there is not a great upsurge in violence. However, I was quoting a Labour Member who said on Second Reading that the people who are arrested are always the tip of the iceberg and that many others commit violence but are not arrested. That was the only point that I wanted to make. Bryan Drew of NCIS has said also that although the number of those arrested is declining, the proportion of more violent offences is rising.

I accept that explanation, but I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will accept that the Bill is not about violence in the domestic game. It is a tidying-up measure, dealing with issues such as racism and the behaviour of English fans abroad. Legislation to tackle such problems is needed.

I accept the view of the hon. Member for West Chelmsford that a private Member's Bill may not be the way forward. However, I hope that we can continue this debate in the spirit of trying to iron out the difficulties, so that when the Government propose measures, perhaps in a Criminal Justice Bill, there will be total support in the House for dealing with the few remaining hooligans who are responsible for the lingering disrespect for Britain in Europe. Those hooligans arouse nothing but disgust among true football fans.

It is perhaps surprising that this debate has attracted so little attention among hon. Members. More than many others, it goes to the heart of the difficult balance that Parliament has to strike, in what we regard as a free society, between the powers given to the authorities and the historic freedoms for individuals that we guard so jealously.

I regret that I part company with my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) over the new clause. I do that rarely, but am obliged to do so on this occasion. New clause 1 would alter the balance that I have described in a completely unacceptable way. I cannot understand why so few hon. Members are in the Chamber this morning, given that it will be left to this thinly attended House to determine that balance, as it would be affected by the new clause and the associated amendments.

One of the most fundamental rights of our citizenry over many centuries is that a person who has not been convicted of an offence is regarded as innocent until proven guilty by due process of law. That right is the subject of the new clause. It was implied in the comments made so far that the law and society are in a weak position with regard to wicked people seeking to act in a way that we find distressing or unacceptable.

However, we already have legislation on the statute book such as the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol Etc.) Act 1985, the Public Order Act 1986, the Football Spectators (No. 2) Act 1989, the Football (Offences) Act 1991 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, as well as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, to which my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) and my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border have referred. Given that list, and the other provisions in this Bill, one would have thought that the cumulative effect would be that the authorities had sufficient powers to deal with people whose behaviour is deemed to be unacceptable. Yet my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border is not content. He wants to alter, in a very significant way, the balance between the power given to the authorities and the rights of individuals. The new clause and the associated amendments go much further than I should have thought conscionable for anyone.

With his typical openness and frankness, my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford has told us that, even though some similar provision remained part of his thinking, he had accepted on Second Reading and in subsequent conversations and consultations that the proposal did not have the necessary support. I agree. I rather regret that my hon. Friend has urged the Government to introduce similar measures and I hope that the Government, too, will perform a listening exercise among their Back Benchers.

10.15 am

My hon. Friend stated in a press release that he was considering the approach embodied in the new clause and that he intended to raise the matter in Committee. On Second Reading, however, Government Back-Bench Members broadly in favour of the Bill and with a long-standing interest in such matters expressed their reservations and indicated that they would not be able to support this measure. Given that background, I was surprised when my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border brought the new clause back for consideration today.

My hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) was in listening mode when he took account of those Labour Members who said that he should not include measures such as those embodied in the new clause. Similarly, on Second Reading I was persuaded by him that there was some merit in the proposal, which is why I decided to table the new clause for consideration today.

I accept, of course, my right hon. Friend's explanation, which renders irrelevant my earlier suspicion that, having served with such distinction in the Home Office for so long, he had approached the matter with what I can only describe as a Home Office mentality. In other words, I was concerned that his instinct was that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the authorities rather than to the individual, rather than the other way around. That would not normally be typical of my right hon. Friend, but I assumed that his long and distinguished Home Office experience must have contributed to his tabling of the new clause, although that is a matter for him and not for me.

However, the new clause is before us. I contend that it would affect one of our most fundamental and cherished rights for individuals, which we have guarded through the centuries. It is an irony that Britain, through organisations such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe, has hectored, lectured, guided and inspired other countries to adopt our approach to individual liberties and civil rights, which we have said have great importance for us. Those of us who travel to other legislatures, in the Commonwealth and elsewhere, know that legislators and members of the judiciary in those countries consider individual rights and civil liberties to be of key importance at the end of the 20th century. We can take much of the credit for that, although our American friends might say they had something to do with it, and I would not argue with that. It must surely be inappropriate to challenge our liberties as the new clause does.

In his excellent exposition, my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford said that when he first decided, at the Committee stage, to add the new clause to the Bill, he wished to reassure us that the power would be used not willy-nilly, but responsibly. Such siren words are often used. We are told, "Don't worry, folks—these huge, draconian powers will be used responsibly. Trust the authorities and all will be well."

We have heard that sort of thing time and again down the centuries and across the globe from people who wish to encroach on individual liberties, and my hon. Friend is at it again. Do not worry, he tells us: were there any such prospect of that—I was glad to hear that he accepts that there might be, even if he is urging the Government to consider the new clause—the authorities would use the power responsibly, and we could all sleep in our beds at night without being bothered.

I do not find that reassuring. That is not the likely outcome of my hon. Friend's exercise. Surely the onus must be on those who seek to alter the balance to reassure individual members of society that they will be protected. That is the whole point of our judiciary procedures, and I thought that it was also the point of the European convention on human rights. I do not support that convention, and I mention it only because I have to accept that it exists and that we have gone a long way towards incorporating it in our law. I regret that.

Given, however, that the nation and the House of Commons are committed to the convention, I doubt whether the Bill would survive scrutiny by those who believe in the convention. My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border skipped over that point, and I can understand why. I should not use the convention as a principled argument against the Bill because I did not advocate its incorporation into our law, but incorporation has happened and the convention is therefore relevant.

I was not going to mention the convention, although I may return to it later. My right hon. Friend has cast doubt on some of the intelligence gathered by NCIS. May I persuade him in its favour by using the powerful words of Pierre Picone, the divisional commissioner in the Parisian football intelligence centre? Commenting on the world cup in 1998, he described British police intelligence as accurate, thorough and diligent. Georges Querry, the French security co-ordinator, said that the intelligence had been exceptional. I am sure that my right hon. Friend will find their words powerful and persuasive.

My right hon. Friend should know me better than to quote foreigners at me. I rarely find them persuasive. I shall certainly take no lessons on civil liberties and individual rights from anyone from France. Anyone who has seen the CRS in operation will know that French respect for individual liberties is, to say the least, scant. I am not impressed by my right hon. Friend when he tells me that some Frenchman in authority is trying to reassure me, him or anyone that things will be all right. If anything, my right hon. Friend reinforces my doubts. Yet again, we are hearing someone in uniform telling us not to worry because these enormous powers will be used with great discretion. It matters not whether that is said in French, English or any other language. I simply cannot accept it.

I see the drift of where Bills such as this are taking us. I feel no happier about the new clause than, to be frank, I did about some of the things that my own Government did over the years. It is quite wrong for legislators to argue that it is increasingly justifiable to use the powers of the Executive to reassure the mass of people that individuals will be restricted. That easy and seductive argument has been used to justify many things, but our attitude historically has been that the individual should be given the benefit of the doubt until due process has demonstrated that he should not.

That principle seems to be slipping away. Increasingly, we are told that the benefit of the doubt should be given to the authorities and to society rather than to individuals, and the reassurances that we have heard this morning are used to justify that drift. My hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford originally argued—and has only half back-tracked from that argument today—that we should not worry because the Bill would be dealt with by the courts. We are supposed to be hugely reassured by that, but recent events in the judiciary lead me to doubt it.

My hon. Friend also said that there would be a right of appeal, but I do not know whether he was right. I see no reference to a right of appeal in the new clause. Does he assume that there will be such a right, or is it to be provided in some other way? Even if it exists, a right of appeal will merely worsen the peculiar position in which someone who has not been convicted of any offence can be dragged before the courts and put through a distressing process. That person is supposed to be reassured because he or she will have a right of appeal, but I do not find that reassuring. I shall not go into all the ramifications of the availability of legal aid or proper defence representation.

I believe that my right hon. Friend supported the legislation on protection from harassment which I introduced. That twin-track legislation created a new criminal offence and provided new civil powers, under which someone alleged to be harassing anyone in any way could be dragged before the courts so that an injunction or banning order could be made. My right hon. Friend was an avid supporter of that legislation, and I was very grateful to him.

My right hon. Friend is untypically wrong. He will recall that, as a member of the Government in which he and I served, I was bound by collective responsibility. I was faced with the classic dilemma of those who serve in the foothills of Government, as I did for many years. In considering a Bill such as that introduced by my right hon. Friend, I had to decide whether to be bound by collective responsibility and to support it or to resign from the Government. No doubt I struggled with my conscience, but it would appear that I decided, on reflection, to remain in the Government, to lend reluctant support to my right hon. Friend's Bill and to continue to play my modest role. That is my recollection of what happened. My right hon. Friend's characterisation of my avid support of his measure is not how I remember it.

Having listened to my right hon. Friend for all these years, I cannot believe that he would have put the prospect of advancement before the freedom of the individual.

As it happens, I did not get much advancement. I would characterise my prospects as those of survival rather than advancement. Perhaps my right hon. Friend and I can meet later to reminisce over our period in the foothills of Government and the constraints that came with it.

I am not persuaded by the argument that individuals are protected because the matter will be dealt with by the courts, although that does provide the reassurance of due process and judicial protection. Nor was I reassured when my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford said that there would be a right of appeal. Individuals are to be pulled in by the authorities and put through a harrowing judicial process—I shall challenge the process later—with a rather undefined right of appeal, to which the Bill does not refer.

10.30 am

Fortuitously, that brings us to one of the main thrusts of my right hon. Friend's argument. He went on and on about something called NCIS, in which he seems to have enormous faith. I do not know much about that body. The more I hear of it, the more it sounds like a shadowy, sinister body of people. I do not know whether they are in uniform, what constraints are on them, or within which statutory framework they operate; but the more I hear of them the more worried I become.

I hear more and more about covert surveillance and people being picked up in car parks and whistled off here and there. My right hon. Friend seems to think that that is all good stuff. His period in the Home Office seems to have assured him that if such a body is prying into what is going on in citizens' lives and picking those individuals up and whisking them off into custody, we should all be reassured. I am not sure that I am. I would be even less reassured if I thought that if the new clause were accepted, that sinister group, which no doubt has the enormous resources that such groups always have these days, could pick up people who have not been convicted of any offence but are simply suspected or accused of doing something or being minded to do it. That is what my right hon. Friend seems to be saying.

That brings us to another crucial part of what is being suggested. From what my right hon. Friend has said, it appears that people will not necessarily have had to do something. This sinister body, NCIS, has simply to believe or have reason to believe that people are minded to, or are going to, commit an offence. That would be sufficient to whistle them off, deprive them of their liberty and put them through some harrowing court procedure.

I am a little concerned about my right hon. Friend's use of the word "sinister". The work that NCIS does to advance the cause of law and order is tremendous. Will he be reassured by the fact that it was the Government in which he, my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) and I all served that set the body up, presumably through primary legislation which he supported at the time?

The more I hear, the more I worry about what went on in the Home Office over the past 18 years or so. It is funny that I should say this, but if I had been a Back Bencher between 1988 and 1997, I might well not have supported a lot of this nonsense that I now learn that Government were enacting. I was constrained by collective responsibility and therefore obliged to support the legislation.

I am not at all certain whether I would have supported the creation of that body. In a gesture of friendship to my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford, I will not use the epithet "sinister"—I will think of a more appropriate one in the next few minutes. However, it is a fact that I am unaware of what it does, as are most people, and yet there it is, working away quietly and secretly, allegedly on our behalf. Nevertheless, it appears to have wide powers.

My point, which is surely key to the new clause, is that my right hon. Friend seems to suggest that, having carried out its surveillance, gone to these car parks and done what it does there, all that NCIS needs to do is to satisfy itself that an individual member of society may be minded to commit some act related to football. That will be sufficient for that person to be deprived of his or her liberty and whisked off to a judicial process in a court. I will refer to the other authorities mentioned in the new clause in a moment, as I accept that they have a role to play as well—this is a multi-stage process.

How quickly or even whether the individual would have access to a court is another matter, as is the question of whether they would be held in custody for an undefined period before they had access to the judicial process. I wonder whether my right hon. Friend has given that matter sufficient thought and whether he can provide any assurances that the individual, having been deprived of his or her liberties on more or less flimsy grounds, would at least have the reassurance of having the case considered promptly rather than having to wait, or what is worse, being incarcerated for any period of time. My right hon. Friend did not mention that and I do not know whether it is in his power, or even that of the Minister, to reassure me. At the least, there is an area of doubt about which we should be extremely concerned.

My right hon. Friend said that we should not be too worried and he listed some extremely important people who would be involved and whom he obviously thought we could trust implicitly. He mentioned chief constables and the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis as coming within the definition of relevant authorities in the new clause. It states:

"any chief officer of police".

However, he spoiled the whole thing because he swept into his definition someone called the director-general of NCIS. The difficulty is that it is one thing for us to give a proper role—a discretionary role or role of judgment—to chief constables and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police, as we traditionally do and have done for many years in statute, but it is quite another to go a stage further and to give such a role to this shadowy figure, the director-general of NCIS, of whom I had not heard until now, although obviously I should have done.

I do not know where that person comes from, what his or her statutory authority is, or anything of the kind; nor do I know what constraints are on the director-general of the type that we are increasingly placing on chief constables—the new Greater London Assembly will have an important role in the part played by the police in Greater London, as the Minister well knows. Perhaps my right hon. Friend can reassure me.

I am sure that my right hon. Friend, with his new computer facility, will soon be surfing on hyperspace. Then, he will find all the NCIS press releases and information about Mr. Bryan Drew, the director-general of NCIS. Nevertheless, the important point is that NCIS now has the same statutory basis as an ordinary police authority under the Police Act 1997—another wonderfully libertarian piece of legislation that I had the pleasure to put through the House. That Act created a service authority too. Therefore, the director-general is in the same position as a chief constable, with an elected service authority to give the democratic accountability element.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who has set my mind at ease, but only within the limited terms in which I asked the question. Perhaps he has slightly restored my confidence in the Home Office during the term of office of the Government in whom I served and in some of the legislation in which he played a distinguished part. He has given me some confidence.

We have established, and it has usefully been placed on the record, which demonstrates the value of this little debate, that the director-general of NCIS—we now even know his name—is, slightly reassuringly, subject to the same accountabilities and constraints as are placed on the other authorities. However, the director-general is not mentioned in my right hon. Friend's new clause. Therefore, if we mistakenly agree to it, which I hope we will not, I am not sure that merely because my right hon. Friend has said so the director-general would be included in subsection (2), which states:

"In this section, 'relevant authority' means any chief officer of police".

I suspect not. That may be one of the defects to which my right hon. Friend, with his typical candour, referred during his opening remarks on his new clause.

Were the House to accept new clause 1, that point may have to be reconsidered in another place. I do not want to quibble on technicalities—we try to avoid that and debate, as I am doing, the substance of issues—but we have already found a flaw. We have flushed out what may be a serious lacuna in the drafting which would have to be corrected were we, mistakenly, to proceed with it.

The court access that may or may not be available in this encroachment on individual liberties must be considered. What if the relevant authority was not immediately available to make a judgment? The covert operations, following surveillance operations by NCIS, have swept people from the car park and whisked them off in a black van to some dank cell—but it is all right because a relevant authority will quickly consider the matter and decide whether to pass it to the courts. What if the relevant authority is not available?

rose—

I want my right hon. Friend to listen. I think that he is going to reassure me again, but I want to put this on record. What if the chief constable or director-general of NCIS were at an important conference on civil liberties? What if they were abroad boasting about how Britain had a sacred regard for civil liberties? If they were, I hope that they would admit to what NCIS was getting up to. I suspect that my right hon. Friend is going to bail me out again.

It will be a source of deep regret to my right hon. Friend, but we no longer have any dank cells. They are too warm and cosy for his liking. The term "chief officers" should encompass deputy and assistant chief constables, all of whom are of Association of Chief Police Officers rank.

Order. It is time for me to assist the House. The debate is going far too wide in dealing with the issues raised in new clause 1 on international banning orders. New clause 1 is about whether such orders should be extended to unconvicted persons.

I was merely querying a term in the new clause, but I shall not trespass further on your good will, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Apparently not unreasonably, subsection (3) states:

"the court may, if it thinks fit, impose such conditions in the order as may be imposed where an order is made in respect of a person who has been convicted of a relevant offence".

This is the crux of the matter. I do not blame my right hon. Friend for this because it was how he had cleverly to construct new clause 1, but it is not obvious from the wording that unconvicted persons can have their freedoms and liberties restricted. We must consider carefully not only new clause 1, but new clause 2 and the consequential amendments Nos. 33 to 42 to get a full sense of what subsection (3) really means: someone who has not been convicted of any offence in our judicial process can nevertheless be made subject to an order restricting his liberties. Never mind all the objections that I have briefly outlined, this is where I part company from my right hon. Friend. I stand firmly by the view that unless someone has been properly convicted through our judicial process, we should not be able to take such measures.

10.45 am

Later, we will discuss other important provisions concerning the removal of passports, which I find equally threatening, but here we are discussing a simple principle. I cannot agree with my right hon. Friend's approach. I am unhappy with his mechanisms for dealing with the matter. I am unhappy about the role of NCIS and of the chief officers, whom we now learn can be almost anyone in the bizarre world of the Home Office. I am unhappy about the lack of reassurance in respect of court proceedings and the alleged right of appeal, which appears nowhere in the new clause.

I am even more unhappy about my core objection. I was half relieved when my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford said that he does not support new clause 1, but I was appalled when he went on to urge the Government to introduce a Bill of their own to do it, but we will leave the fight for another day. I hope that the Minister will be more reassuring and remember what her Back Benchers said on Second Reading. I hope that she will not be persuaded by my hon. Friend; we will find out soon. I vigorously oppose new clause 1, as I hope the Minister will.

I hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border will reconsider, cast to one side his distinguished service in the Home Office, and reflect on the matter in a fresh light as an even more distinguished Opposition Back Bencher. I hope that he is aware of the importance of individual liberties as against those authorities in whose company he moves so effortlessly. I hope that he will think again and that we do not have to divide the House on the matter.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway), who has previously dealt with this matter for the Opposition, unfortunately cannot be here, so I stand in his place.

This debate is important because we are not merely debating the addition of a short new clause to a short Bill: we are considering a vital principle of the operation of the civil law. My right hon. and hon. Friends and the hon. Member for Northampton, South (Mr. Clarke) have highlighted the difficulty of achieving the right balance between the freedom of the individual and the necessity of protecting innocent bystanders. That is what the criminal law is all about.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) on his carefully balanced presentation. I am delighted that he has been listening. I agree that the Bill is better as it is, without new clause 1.

We had an excellent consideration of the principles in the debate between my right hon. Friends the Members for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) and for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth)—a debate that was unusual as my right hon. Friends normally agree with each other. In taking the argument carefully to pieces and reconstructing it, they have quite properly—as is the duty of the House—given us the chance to consider the principle before us, as did the hon. Member for Northampton, South, who also spoke well.

The Opposition do not disagree in principle about what we are all trying to achieve in the Bill. We are all trying to achieve a better regulation of football supporters' behaviour and to give the right amount of power to the police and other authorities so that they can deal with hooliganism in football grounds and in connection with football games. We all want to achieve the same thing for the great sport of football at which our countries—I stress the plural—are so good on the world and the European stage. It is such a shame that, often, the achievements on the pitch are diminished and besmirched by what happens off the pitch. The Opposition therefore have no disagreement with the measure in principle.

There has been some confusion about the similarity between the provisions of this Bill and those in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 relating to ASBOs—for the uninitiated, ASBOs are antisocial behaviour orders and are a vital part of the 1998 Act. ASBOs restrict freedom without a criminal conviction, but they cannot be imposed without resort to the civil court. An ASBO can be imposed only after a legal hearing, whereas the provisions of the new clause would result in a much more summary administration of justice. It is not correct to argue that the effect of the new clause would be similar to the imposition of ASBOs. I shall be interested to know whether the Minister agrees with that point. ASBOs do not go quite so far in administering summary justice as the new clause would.

I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford that the Opposition would welcome further discussion of that matter, if the Government want to pursue it in a future Bill, as they have indicated that they might. I conclude by pointing out again that what we are trying to achieve is the important balance between the liberty of the individual and the protection of the public. That is a fine balance, but I strongly believe that it is the duty of the House always to protect first the freedom of the individual. The Opposition support the Bill as it stands.

This has been a most interesting and enjoyable hour and a half. I thank the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) for tabling the new clause. We spent much time on Second Reading discussing the issues that it raises, even though they were not specifically included in the Bill. Those issues were also discussed in Committee, although not in relation to a particular clause. We have now considered a specific clause and the right hon. Gentleman is to be congratulated on having given us that opportunity to discuss the important question of how we deal with football hooliganism committed by people against whom it is not possible to use the normal court proceedings. On Second Reading and in Committee, we were aware that there were several serious concerns about such measures; they were also expressed in response to the football consultation document, "Review of Football Related Legislation", to which the right hon. Gentleman has referred.

The document considered the introduction of tougher ways to deal with unconvicted hooligans. The response to the public consultation exercise was mixed and demonstrated serious concern about introducing bans without prior conviction. We have discussed the matter with the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) and have taken into account the views of hon. Members on both sides of the House and of respondents to the public consultation exercise. As the hon. Member for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) pointed out, in all legislation we must strike a balance between the civil liberties of the individual and those of the general public.

We must also take into account the practical and operational concerns about how the measures proposed in the new clause would work. The obtaining of such an order would rely exclusively on the quality of intelligence and information put before the court by the police and the prosecutor. In presenting that information, as the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border pointed out, the police may be required to compromise their intelligence-gathering mechanisms, including information on informants. We may not like informants, but in reality, they can sometimes play an important role in combating crime—especially organised crime.

I am surprised that the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) seems to know so little about the National Criminal Intelligence Service. It is an important organisation, which carries out a wide range of work combating criminal activity—especially organised crime. Its headquarters are in my constituency—a few minutes' walk from the House—and I am sure that, if John Abbott, the director-general, is fortunate enough to read the account of this debate, he will want to invite the right hon. Gentleman to visit NCIS. As the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border said, anyone who sees what NCIS is doing will not fail to be impressed. The service operates in a statutory framework; it is accountable and is required to report to a service authority. It may further reassure the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst to know that the chairman of that service authority is a former Member of the House, Sir John Wheeler. I hope I have reassured the right hon. Gentleman that NCIS is not a sinister organisation, but a most important one.

Clearly, it would be an operational decision for chief officers whether to acquire the evidence required to stop an unconvicted hooligan travelling abroad. We are also concerned that some overseas jurisdictions may look to this proposed new power as a means by which they can deport suspected offenders from their country without prosecution, on the basis that when such people returned to this country they would be liable to action in the courts here. The right hon. Gentleman will remember how annoying it was to see people behaving appallingly in European countries and being instantly sent back here. We wanted those countries to take people to court and we are co-operating with other European countries so that that can be done. We want to continue to encourage the jurisdictions in which the offence has been committed to use the due process of law in that country to seek convictions. It was most disturbing to see footage of people behaving violently, and to know that the next day they would be sent back to this country—probably free—and that we could do nothing about it.

We should also consider the position of information gathered in a foreign jurisdiction and the ability to make use of it in a court in this country. At present, the taking of video material is subject to privacy laws in some countries and those laws place restrictions on the use of such material. There are difficult, practical problems as to how we obtain the evidence in order to convict hooligans through the judicial system.

The Bill, as it is constituted at present, would introduce a range of measures to strengthen and improve the existing banning process and its effective enforcement. If those measures are introduced, they will have a significant effect. They will make a difference, by increasing the number of banning orders while sending out a strong preventive message. We clearly have to monitor the effectiveness of the Bill—if it is passed—in terms of offences committed and the number of orders. We need to be in possession of that information before we can further consider the significant new powers proposed in the new clause.

The right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst may well be right to say that we shall have to revisit this debate in future, and it is possible that we will need those extra powers. However, given that the Bill's existing provisions command the support of so many people, we must wait and see how they work in practice.

Does the Minister share my reservations about the speed of access to the court procedure that might be available, were the approach she has set out to be taken? She acknowledges that that question might have to be re-examined, so I am putting down a marker as much as anything else. However efficient NCIS may or may not be, and however accessible the chief constable and all the other people mentioned by my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) may or may not be, unless access to the court process is quickly available, we run the risk of seriously encroaching on people's liberties without their ever having been convicted of anything.

The right hon. Gentleman is right. If the Bill had been proposed as a Government measure, such assurances, checks and balances would have to be carefully considered and speed of access ensured. However, the Bill is not a Government Bill, although we are supporting it wholeheartedly, and the hon. Member for West Chelmsford has made his views known on the subject.

We need time to monitor how the additional powers to deal with convicted hooligans that the Bill will give when enacted work in practice. There is cross-party concern that we should do all that we can to prevent known hooligans from going about their activities freely. There is support both within the House and outside for ensuring that such people cannot travel abroad, which is why we inserted provisions dealing with the removal of passports. We do not want our country's name to be besmirched by the disgraceful incidents that have been witnessed over the past few years.

I acknowledge the sentiment behind the amendments and have some sympathy with them. We shall discuss with the Opposition and all interested parties what further action can be taken in the light of monitoring the effectiveness of the Bill. However, the amendments do not command the universal support that the Bill's other provisions command, and to insert contentious provisions into a private Member's Bill presents greater difficulties. Although that is not in itself a reason not to proceed—sometimes it is necessary to do things that substantial numbers of people dislike—the success of football legislation relies on a vast range of factors, including policing, intelligence, effective stewarding, closed circuit television, safer and more comfortable grounds and effective ticketing policies. Most importantly, it also relies on the support of those who are affected—the football supporters.

The provisions of the Bill as it stands have achieved widespread support. Including the amendments at this time, without the detailed consideration that I have mentioned, would be likely, at best, to reduce confidence in the legislation and, at worst, to alienate the very people whose support we need in order to combat hooliganism. For those reasons, and in the light of the assurance that we shall keep the legislation under review, I hope that the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border will withdraw his new clause.

This has been an important debate and it has been quite contentious at times. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) is right: it is a pity that on such an occasion, when we are making important amendments to the criminal law, the House is not packed with some of our great parliamentarians from both sides indulging in a debate on the freedom of the individual and civil liberties.

I have listened carefully to the speeches made. There are a few key points on which I wish to reassure my right hon. Friend and a few comments I wish to make on the Minister's speech before I decide whether to withdraw the new clause. For the sake of brevity, and so that I did not stray too far out of order, I did not explain fully what NCIS was and what it did. I apologise for my arrogance: having worked with NCIS when I was a Minister at the Home Office, I assumed that everybody knew what the acronym stood for. It stands for National Criminal Intelligence Service—

Order. The right hon. Gentleman does not need to explain that to the House—it has all been done before.

I shall give my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst a briefing on NCIS later, or he can tune in to its website and read the information there. As for an invitation to visit, if NCIS is as sinister as he believes it to be, I do not think that he will need to ask for an invitation, for the second he steps outside the door of the House, he will be swept off the street, taken to a dark cell and briefed by John Abbott himself. But NCIS is not a sinister organisation.

I did not specifically mention NCIS in the new clause, because I did not think that I had to. I took the view that the phrase "chief officer of police" includes the Commissioner of the Metropolitan police and the head of NCIS, who has to be of chief officer rank before taking that post.

Can my right hon. Friend and the Minister guarantee that, were I to go anywhere near NCIS, I would have immunity?

My right hon. Friend has not committed any offence under the terms of this legislation and he is not suspected of being a violent hooligan or of causing disorder, nor do I believe him to be suspected of committing any of the other crimes with which NCIS concerns itself—drug dealing, terrorism and paedophilia. Therefore, I believe that he is safe.

It might be worth clarifying the question of the term "chief officer of police". That category includes chief constables, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and the City Commissioner, but it does not include the director-general of NCIS, even though he is of similar status. In practice, NCIS passes intelligence to chief officers of police. It does not initiate prosecutions itself, so the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) is quite safe.

That was an extremely helpful clarification of that part of my clause. Even though the term "chief officer of police" in my new clause does not include the director-general of NCIS, there would be no glaring lacuna in the law, because NCIS would pass on the information and act as an intelligence-gathering body for the whole British police service, and local chief officers would then use the powers designated in my new clause to go to the court. Unless my right hon. Friend has any other specific concerns about NCIS, I do not propose to make further reference to it.

My right hon. Friend was concerned about balance. It is a serious matter to extend the criminal law to curtail the freedom of movement of individuals who have not been convicted of an offence, but similar powers already exist in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. That Act allows people—men or women—to go to court to obtain an injunction to prevent someone from hanging around outside their flat, even though that person is doing nothing but hanging around, when they feel threatened or harassed by that person in those circumstances. The principle before us is similar.

If we can build into our legislation the principle that someone can be prevented from phoning another person, sending that person flowers, or hanging around outside that person's flat, surely it is no greater step to provide that, when the police apprehend that there may be violence and disorder and the courts conclude that that is so, a person may be prevented from travelling to a venue to commit that violence or disorder.

I am beginning to suspect my right hon. Friend of being a closet Marxist. He appears to be talking about irreversibility and inevitability, saying that, because we have done something before, we can do it again now. Has he not considered the possibility that what we did before can be proved to have been wrong, or that we got the balance wrong on that occasion? Surely my right hon. Friend does not believe that it is adequate to argue that, because we have done something before, it must be all right to do it now?

I am not making that point. I am not following the Marxist supremacy of law point that I learned and forgot about 30 years ago. My point is simply that there is a precedent: the proposal does not break new ground. In fact, the measure is in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 which refers to disorderly and disruptive children. I am not saying that we should extend the measure to this legislation because we have done so before.

There is potential for extending the measure to deal with problems of violence and disorder. The figures are decreasing: the arrest rate has fallen to 13.4 per 100,000 spectators in the past year, compared with 15.7 in the previous season. In 1997–98, arrests totalled 3,307, compared with 3,577 in 1996–97. Although the total has decreased—there were 1,000 drink-related arrests, 500 arrests for disorderly behaviour and about 300 for threatening behaviour—the numbers of violent disorder and affray offences, at 65 and 52, is double those of the previous season. Although the number of offences overall continues to decrease—many of the offences are minor, including drink-related offences and breaches of exclusion orders—the nasty offences, such as violent disorder or racial or indecent chanting, have increased. The police have pointed out that the figures show that football hooliganism at home is continuing to decline. Criminal intelligence—

Order. The House extends to the proposer of a new clause the privilege to speak a second time in order to allow him to reply to the debate. The right hon. Gentleman should not make his arguments all over again.

My apologies, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I was attempting to respond to the points raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth)—I had better not try to respond to all of them. I clearly may not be able to persuade him to my point of view. I am not saying that, because few people will be affected, it does not matter if we deprive them of their civil liberties.

1 do not wish to get the right hon. Gentleman in trouble with you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I refer him to his comments about the increasing number of arrests for racial and verbal abuse. Will the right hon. Gentleman congratulate the vast number of football supporters in this country who are responsible for bringing about those arrests? People are less tolerant of racism and fascism at our football grounds, and supporters are making stewards aware of unacceptable behaviour. That has led to an increase in the number of arrests.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct. Because the number of arrests has decreased and football grounds have become safer, people no longer expect to attend matches and have cans thrown at them. They expect to attend football matches with their families, as rugby spectators have been able to do for 100 years. Football supporters are now less tolerant of that sort of behaviour.

Nevertheless, there was a small increase, from 10 to 33, in the number of people arrested for racial or indecent chanting. The police have said vociferously in their press releases that, while they are concerned about that increase in hard core offences, the number of offences has declined in relation to the number of people attending football matches. That figure has increased dramatically, yet the overall arrest rate has fallen. That means that more decent, honest people and fewer hooligans are attending football matches.

My new clause seeks to deal with the small number of hard core supporters to whom the police continually refer. As with any criminal activity—terrorism and so on—the hard core offenders hide behind those in the front line and foment violence and disorder, but they are not convicted.

Order. The right hon. Gentleman is now repeating himself. He is using almost exactly the same language as he used in his opening speech, and I am not prepared to accept that.

I am sorry, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I was led slightly astray by the intervention of the hon. Member for Northampton, South (Mr. Clarke).

A further point relates to the European convention on human rights, of which my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst suggested the new clause could fall foul. I do not think that it will. As I suspect the Minister is not seriously contemplating enacting the measure, she will not yet have checked with the ECHR provisions. However, if something has judicial approval and is to go before a court, I think we may be satisfied on ECHR grounds.

I mentioned this matter on Second Reading. We are satisfied at present that the measures outlined in the review document in respect of unconvicted persons would not, in principle, be in breach of the ECHR or the EC treaty, provided that sufficient safeguards were in place. However, if we were to pursue the measures, we would have to ensure that they complied fully with all our international obligations.

I am grateful to the Minister. That is the best possible answer that my right hon. Friend could receive. I do not need to elaborate on it one iota as it responds fully to my right hon. Friend's concerns—

Except that, if this measure were to be compatible with the ECHR, it would confirm my view that the ECHR is pretty useless.

I may agree with that point of view on many occasions—indeed, I may agree with it now. However, my right hon. Friend objected to my new clause on the basis that it could fall foul of the ECHR. The Minister says that it will not, and it is not adequate for my right hon. Friend to respond by saying, "Well, the ECHR is rubbish".

The Minister touched on a crucial point concerning evidence. The police may not wish to go to the court and seek a banning order if they do not have sufficient evidence, or if their evidence is based on information from informants or on the release of other information. However, that point does not work against my new clause because the police might be in that position at present. Because they can secure a conviction only by revealing a valuable source of information or intelligence, the police may decide in a variety of cases—including football-related cases—to ask the Crown Prosecution Service to drop the case. That happens on rare occasions—we may not know about them—and it will be no different in future. If the only way of persuading the court to grant a banning order—either domestically or internationally—is by revealing certain information to the court, and therefore to the accused, the police may decide that, because such evidence could not be provided in camera or in private, it is not worth the candle and they will not proceed. I do not think it destroys my new clause to acknowledge that the police will not pursue a conviction in some cases. That is a judgment for them.

My right hon. Friend—who is not officially learned yet—referred to the speed of access to the court process. The police will be seeking banning orders. They will not sweep people off the streets, as my right hon. Friend suggested, and keep them in cells for days before taking them to court. Even if there were no other provisions in the criminal law, it would be in the interests of the chief officer of police to sweep a hooligan off the street, to take him to court as soon as possible and secure a banning order. The offender could then be released back into the public domain, but he would not be able to travel to a particular football match.

Does the chief officer—whoever that may be—have control over the speed of the court process? I believe there are two separate issues. It is one thing for the chief officer to enforce the provisions of the new clause and quite another to give the individual who is subject to this measure any reassurances about the extent to which the judicial process will be readily available to him.

Of course the chief officer cannot dictate when people will get to court. Nevertheless, those people are not kept in police detention for the whole time.

Where are they?

They are at liberty.

Are they in the car park?

If people are arrested in the car park and they have weapons of violence, they could be committing an offence, so they could be arrested and charged appropriately. The point about my new clause is that it seeks a banning order to stop people travelling overseas to a football match. It is not necessary for the police to keep them in permanent custody to achieve that, but it is in their interests to get the banning order and release the people into the public domain. They must then report into a police station, hand over their passport or comply with any conditions imposed by the court. My right hon. Friend need not be worried that access to justice would be too slow and that it would therefore deny individuals their liberty.

I have tried, with the new clause, to extend criminal law. I appreciate that I have suggested moving into an area that causes deep concern to some of my hon. Friends. The Minister is also concerned that there are loose ends, and she wants the current legislation to bed down before taking the step of introducing banning orders for people who have not yet been convicted of a criminal offence. Clearly, if I were to pursue the new clause to a vote, I would not have the unanimous approval of the House and, in any case, I would lose my customary partner teller.

Bearing it in mind that my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) has been persuaded by the Government to do a U-turn and that the Minister advises me not to pursue my new clause now—I greatly respect her opinion on a range of issues—I shall not do so, although it has been worth while airing the arguments. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 10, in page 1, line 17, leave out 'the duty of' and insert 'available to'.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 11, in page 1, line 23, leave out 'shall' and insert 'may'.

No. 1, in page 1, line 26, at end insert—

'(2B) Where a court makes an international football banning order, it shall state in open court that it is satisfied that there are such reasonable grounds as are mentioned in subsection (2) above and give reasons why it is so satisfied.'.

No. 22, in clause 5, page 6, line 31, leave out

shall be under a duty to'

and insert 'may'.

No. 6, in page 6, line 40, at end insert—

`(5B) Where a court makes an international football banning order, it shall state in open court that it is satisfied that there are such reasonable grounds as are mentioned in subsection (5) above and give reasons why it is so satisfied.'.

No. 23, in clause 6, page 7, line 32, leave out 'the duty of and insert 'available to'.

No. 7, in page 7, line 42, at end insert—

'(3A) Where a court makes a domestic football banning order, it shall state in open court that it is satisfied that there are such reasonable grounds as are mentioned in subsection (2) and give reasons why it is so satisfied.'.

The amendments take us into new but not entirely unrelated territory because the wording that I seek to amend is another attempt to curtail the traditional freedoms of the courts and the judicial process. The Bill says:

"Subject to subsection (3) below, it shall be the duty of the court to make an international football banning order in relation to the accused if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at or in connection with designated football matches."

In other words, the Bill gives a statutory instruction to a court to do something. That strikes me as a step too far.

I have always understood that traditionally, in this country, we prefer the court to be given the maximum discretion to make its judgment in the light of the full circumstances known to it at the time. It is not even for this House to seek to pre-empt what might happen in a court. The whole point of our judicial process and court proceedings is that the court will listen carefully to the arguments of both sides. It must then make several decisions, the first of which is whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. The next is concerned with sentencing. In doing that, the court will have to take into account all the circumstances made known in the proceedings and, most obviously, decide whether there are any mitigating circumstances.

The provision in the Bill therefore strikes me as peculiar, to say the least. I have always been uneasy about the Bill, but this sort of provision has made me even more uneasy. I cannot understand why my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) cannot be content with normal judicial proceedings. Instead, most uncharacteristically, he resorts to wording such as that in clause 1 and seeks to use his Bill as a vehicle to prescribe to the court what it will do. My hon. Friend cannot know what will happen in court.

I do not want to destroy the right hon. Gentleman's argument so early in the debate, but does not he accept that all we are suggesting is that the court should have a duty—rather than a discretion, as at present—to consider imposing an international banning order? One of the problems in the game today is that many of our hooligans turn up at international fixtures abroad, irrespective of the fact that they have committed an offence and been charged and sentenced, but an international banning order was not imposed on them because the court failed to consider the possibility. All we are doing is requiring the court to consider those orders, rather than leaving that to its discretion.

I can see the sense in what the hon. Gentleman is saying and I am interested in his argument. It might be worth reviewing the entire statute book to find out whether we can insert into every statute an obligation that the court should consider this, that or the other as an appropriate penalty. I am tempted by that prospect, although it is not a process that we would usually undertake.

I hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) catches your eye in this debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, because his experience is most apposite. He might be able to set this debate in the context of the efforts that I seem to recall the previous Government made to bring in minimum sentencing provisions. At that time, as a fellow member of the Government, I thought that the process was very dubious. Although I think that in many cases the actions of the courts are pretty weedy and wishy-washy, and I should be very tempted to bring back mandatory capital punishment for almost anything, I was constrained by another view, which prevailed on that occasion. I believe that, whether I like it or not, I have to respect the ability of the courts to use their proper discretion and judgment in the full knowledge of the circumstances at the time.

Like me, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you must often meet constituents who have read a story in a newspaper and ask, "Why on earth did the court let the defendant off with such a ridiculously light sentence?" You may well reply, as I do, "I do not know because I was not in the court at the time. I did not sit through the proceedings. I did not hear the evidence and I was unable to look at the accused and assess his or her demeanour. I was unable to take account of the full range of circumstances and regrettably, therefore, I cannot come to a judgment." I am always tempted to err on the side of harsh penalties, but I always resist that temptation. Clause 1 and amendment No. 10 take us into the same territory. We have to respect the court's judgment, given the knowledge that it has at the time.

My next part of the argument is similar, and relates to our old friends "may" and "shall". Clause 1(2A) says:

"Where the court has power to make an international football banning order in relation to the accused but does not do so, it shall state in open court that it is not satisfied that there are such reasonable grounds as are mentioned in subsection (2) above and give reasons why it is not satisfied."

Again, a requirement in the Bill seeks to encroach on the discretion of the court. Surely such decisions must be left to the court's discretion, even if it is stated in open court that it is not satisfied. I can imagine circumstances in which the court might judge that it is not entirely appropriate, proper, fair or reasonable to state openly why it has reached one judgment or another.

I should have thought that we should generally err on the side of openness. My hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford—typically, because he is an open sort of guy—has sought to include that openness in his Bill. All I am suggesting, however, is that my hon. Friend, in all his reasonableness, might accept that every now and then there might be circumstances in which such openness might not be appropriate. However, the Bill would not allow the courts to have that degree of discretion. That is why I am arguing that "shall" should be "may". I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford will see the sense in that, will return to his normal, reasonable demeanour in these matters and will allow the courts to have a degree of discretion.

11.30 am

The argument behind amendment No. 1 appears to go in the opposite direction. Interestingly, I might be about to argue against myself. The amendment reads:

"Where a court makes an international football banning order, it shall state in open court that it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds as are mentioned in subsection (2) above and give reasons why it is so satisfied."

I am beginning to have second thoughts. I am wondering whether I am breaching the principle that I have outlined. I do not want to spend excessive time on this matter, notwithstanding its importance, because there are many other important matters that we want to discuss. However, should we be introducing distinctions and saying that it would be justified to allow the courts discretion in one case but not in another? Against that background, I am inclined not to press amendment No. 1.

My right hon. Friend will recall that when we were drafting amendment No. 1 we took the view that we should copy the order set out in clause 1(2A). The clause contains "shall" and we used "shall" in the amendment. If my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) were willing to accept an amendment to clause 1(2A), to insert "may" in place of "shall", it would be appropriate to have "may" in amendment No. 1. We were merely copying what was already in the Bill.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for reminding me of why I did what I did. I am merely saying that we should be careful in this instance to ensure that we are as consistent as we can be. I am arguing, I hope consistently, that we should wherever possible give the courts—the judicial process—as much discretion and flexibility as possible. After all, the courts are fully aware of the circumstances at the time. The argument will have been advanced in the courts one way or the other.

As I have said, we may not always agree with the courts, but we respect their judgment. I accept that, perhaps with some reluctance. However, I think that we should always respect the discretion of the courts and allow them to do what they think is appropriate. That is why I am puzzled—I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford will be able to help us and so set my mind at rest—that the wording of the Bill is extremely prescriptive.

I am anticipating what my hon. Friend might say, but we return to an earlier argument. It seems that the argument runs that we are dealing with such outrageous and heinous crimes and activities that we must take every possible action and make available every power to the courts, the authorities, chief officers of police and all those who are involved in the process, to reassure society that these matters will be dealt with properly. I understand that motivation.

Anyone outside this place and any of our colleagues who are sadly not in their places today will read the title of the Bill, the Football (Offences and Disorder) Bill, and think, "That is probably all right. It seems that it is a fairly minor measure." However, we have discovered that it is not a minor measure. In my hon. Friend's enthusiasm to deal with these matters in his apparently innocent and relatively restricted Bill, he has allowed to creep into it the sort of measures to which I have referred.

I wonder whether my hon. Friend has consulted the representatives of the magistrates and those of the judiciary. Perhaps the Minister has taken the trouble to ask those to whom we give the responsibility to exercise their discretion in the judicial process whether they would welcome constraints being placed upon them, either now or in future.

The hon. Member for Northampton, South (Mr. Clarke) made an interesting point to which we might return in future. He made the intriguing suggestion that perhaps whenever in future we are legislating in this way, we should outline in Bills the thoughts that we have collectively in this place on the sort of penalties that might be properly considered by the courts, or even provide them with a menu from which they could make selections. That would be breaking new ground but it might go part way to answering the problem to which I referred when constituents come to us to ask, "Why did not the courts do this, that or whatever?" We would be giving the courts a range of options. However, we are not in that business.

I hope that I shall be given some explanations and reassurances, and some background that explains why my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford came up with the form of words that appears in the Bill, what he thought he would achieve, and whether he shares my worry that we are doing something that we might live to regret, setting a precedent of which my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border seems suddenly to be so fond. I hope that we shall not hear, "We have done it before so it is all right." I would rather hear it said, if I may draft a speech for my right hon. Friend, that if we believe that the things done in the past were not correct or have had an adverse effect, we should have the openmindedness and flexibility to say, "That was not the proper way to do it. We have the balance wrong. We are encroaching too much on individual liberties and court discretion"—and on all the other areas of our tradition that I thought were sacrosanct and hallowed. It appears that they are no longer considered in that way.

Some extremely important principles arise from this modest Bill, which contains some quite serious threats to the great traditions of our polity, our judicial process, our history and things in which we have taken such pride. I hope that I am not overstating the position, but I think that the amendment will give an opportunity to my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford, and perhaps the Minister, to tease out some of the arguments and to reassure me. I hope that I shall be reassured, and that is one of the objects of the amendment. If I am not, we may have to take a very serious look at these matters.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) said in ably speaking to this group of amendments, they fall broadly into two groups. If the House will allow me, I shall keep to those two groups. I shall deal first with amendments Nos. 10, 11 and 23 and then deal with the points that arise from amendments Nos. 1, 6 and 7.

In many ways, I am saddened to have to tell my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst that I am not attracted to the amendments. They go to the heart of the Bill and if they were to be accepted they would, to my mind, seriously undermine and undo what I consider is the good work of legislation in giving the authorities—the police and the courts—greater and enhanced powers to deal with those whom I have described before as a small, mindless group of moronic hooligans who cause such a problem.

The effect of my right hon. Friend's first group of amendments within the group as a whole would be, as he rightly said, to remove the duty on courts to make an international and domestic banning order where a football-related offence has been committed, and the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the order would help to prevent violence and disorder at or in connection with future football matches.

In effect, the amendments would give the courts a discretionary power to make such orders if the relevant conditions were fulfilled. I fear from the evidence that is available so far that the courts have been using their discretion in a wide way, in effect to dilute the laws that are currently in place, because of a reluctance to use a power that will have dramatic effects in preventing hooligans from attending matches and causing the problems from which this country and others have suffered far too much.

For the benefit of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst, the latest figures that I have—I assume that they are still more or less correct because they go to 16 April—show that on 16 April, there were 113 international banning orders and about 400 domestic banning orders. If the amendments are used to reintroduce the discretionary power, that will seriously undermine the Bill's aim—which is to deal with the problem more effectively.

In my experience, if one tries to tie a court's hands in one area it will free them up in another. Even though clause 1(2) says that

"it shall be the duty of the court to make an international football banning order",

if the court does not like being tied to that, is there not a danger that it will conclude, "We were not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds"—thus giving itself an out in that sense?

My right hon. Friend raises a valid point. It is difficult to give him a completely accurate and straightforward answer, because the matter is subjective. He may be correct in some circumstances, but I am not convinced that the courts would behave in that way.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst should not forget that although the courts have the freedom not to impose a banning order, if they do not use that power, they must give reasons why they have not done so. I believe that it is perfectly reasonable for a court to explain why it has decided not to exercise a power that it has under the law to impose a banning order.

On amendments Nos. 1, 6 and 7, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said that he might be arguing against himself. He was being slightly harsh on himself in that respect. However, it does seem contradictory—and unnecessary, over-regulatory and a burden on the courts—to impose on courts an obligation to state in open court why they are imposing a banning order. More often than not, when a person is sentenced, having been convicted of an offence, the judge or magistrate is more than ready to explain why they are imposing the sentence and why they consider it justified.

My right hon. Friend hinted that he might not press these amendments, which suggests that I may be pushing at an open door. I believe that, on reflection, he of all people, given his excellent record of seeking to break down the over-burdensome regulation within the state, would feel that it would be unnecessary and unfair to burden courts, judges and magistrates with such an obligation.

My hon. Friend is stretching it a bit too far. His Bill says that the court shall state in open court why it is not imposing an order. He then suggests that it is an over-burdensome new regulatory power to insert a similar power saying that the court shall state in open court why it is imposing an order. I do not think that that is as heavy a regulatory burden as he suggests. Judges are capable of giving their reasons very simply.

In a way, my right hon. Friend is making my point, because I mentioned earlier that judges and magistrates, when imposing a punishment or sentencing someone who has been convicted, state their reasons for doing so. I consider that it would be burdensome and nanny-statish to regularise into law something that is already common practice on, to all intents and purposes, a voluntary basis.

I was seeking to explain to my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst that, given his reputation and his crusade to prevent individuals from being overburdened at the hands of the state, he may decide to follow his gut instinct not to press that set of amendments. I hope that, when he has had an opportunity to listen to the full debate, he will feel that, whereas it has been extremely useful and important to discuss the issue, it might be sensible not to press the amendments. I leave it in the capable hands of my right hon. Friend to take that decision at the appropriate time.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) may have been persuaded by the eloquence of my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns), but I have not been yet. This is a small but important group of amendments. As my right hon. Friend said, we are trying to restore the traditional discretion of the courts.

I have a few years' experience of producing legislation in the Home Office, and any legislation that appeared to limit the discretion of the judiciary was always fought hard by it. I suspect that, unless we are willing to contemplate the amendments, when the Bill goes to another place later this afternoon, it may not be so satisfied with legislation that imposes a duty on a court to do something, and uses words such as

"it shall state in open court"

when it prefers discretion. I have not had a chance to consult the Magistrates Association yet, but usually, as a principle, it likes to ensure that any legislation imposing obligations on the court does not tie its hands, but gives it flexibility to impose whatever penalty it wishes beneath a maximum level. Usually, the association does not like minimum penalties. Magistrates like to have that freedom. It is a traditional freedom, and we have got into trouble when trying to limit that discretion.

Clause 1(2) says:

"Subject to subsection (3) below, it shall be the duty of the court to make an international football banning order in relation to the accused if"

the court

"is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence"

and so on. The danger is that when my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford has tied the court's hands in the first line,

"it shall be the duty of the court"

to make a banning order, in borderline cases where judges would have liked to have a discretion they will say, "We do not really want to make the order". Instead, they will rule that the evidence was not good enough and that they were not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for making an order. That is not a corruption of justice; it is an inevitable part of our human nature.

May I put another scenario to my right hon. Friend? The courts may decide that the offence that the individual has committed is not serious enough to warrant a banning order, so, using their discretion, they do not impose one. They then give their reasons and make the precise point that they do not consider that the offence was serious enough to warrant the issue of a banning order. Is not that the way around the problem that is exercising my right hon. Friend so much?

I do not think that it is. I take the subsection as it is presented in the Bill, and as my hon. Friend has proposed it. He needs to come up with a different form of words to ensure that, in all cases where the evidence is clear cut and any person in their right mind would impose a banning order, the courts would do so. He is trying to tie the courts' hands in a way that they will try to escape; they will use the second part of the clause to get out of imposing a banning order in those borderline cases. They will merely state that they were not satisfied that there were reasonable grounds for imposing one.

The proposal is that it should be the duty of the court to make an order if it is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making the order would help to prevent violence or disorder at designated football matches. If the court regards the offence of which the person has been convicted as relatively minor within that ambit, it may feel that the individual will not cause violence or disorder at a future match, and will not issue the order. The court will then give the reasons. That is perfectly reasonable.

It may be pedantic but my concern is that, by using the words "shall be the duty", my hon. Friend will increase the likelihood that the courts will use the excuse that the potential is negligible or that there are not reasonable grounds. Courts and magistrates do not like being tied strictly to an obligation to impose a particular sentence, because there will be borderline cases where they think that the sentence is not appropriate. The clause allows the court to deal with borderline cases, which cannot use a discretionary power, only by exaggerating the last part of the clause—by saying that it does not believe that the order will help to prevent violence or disorder, or that the grounds are not substantial.

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that we are simply trying to bring clarity to the decision-making process of the court? Does he further accept that the judiciary sometimes gets it wrong? Until December 1998, only three international banning orders had been made. That was in a year when we witnessed terrible scenes of trouble in France during the world cup, perpetrated by so-called England fans. Does not that prove that, so far, the judicial process has failed? The hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) is seeking to bring clarity by determining which offences would and would not warrant an international banning order.

I am always keen to have clarity in the law, and this House has, over the years, tried to bring clarity to the law. However, the proposal will not necessarily cause an increase in international banning orders, as the hon. Gentleman suggests. If one wants to get a lot of people banned, there is no point in giving the court the power to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that making the order will prevent violence or disorder.

If a court decides that it is not entirely satisfied, it can say that although the individual concerned may have convictions for affray, hooliganism or violence, on this occasion it does not think that an order will help to prevent violence abroad. The court will not make the order because the person has not satisfied the reasonable grounds provision. Not all courts will behave like that in all circumstances, and the tightening of the law will mean that we can expect more banning orders.

I am merely suggesting to my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford that if one attempts to tie the hands of judges by putting in the words "shall be the duty", the judges—in an attempt to get the liberty not to impose orders—will extend the last half of the proposal and conclude that there are no reasonable grounds.

Time and time again, I have heard the argument that if a sentence appears too severe, the court will not convict. We have heard the argument that if capital punishment were brought back, juries would not convict an obviously guilty person because they did not like the consequences. That applies to a whole range of sentences. If courts, juries and judges do not like the inevitable consequences of a guilty verdict because they do not like the compulsory sentence that they must impose, in borderline cases they will conclude that the person is not guilty after all.

Also, we should not make it compulsory that reasons "shall be" given in open court. I would prefer to use the word "may", which would give the courts the traditional discretion for which they have fought for years—and for which they used to fight me when I, as a Minister, tried to take it away. In another place, more attention will be paid to that.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst made most of the arguments for the amendments powerfully, and I need not bore the House by repeating them. My hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford was in danger of misleading himself when he said that he did not like amendment No. 1 because it says that where a court makes an international football banning order, it "shall state" the reasons for that decision in open court. The amendment was drafted in that way because we wanted it to be consistent with the preceding subsection as we were working on the assumption that my hon. Friend or the Government might not accept our amendment to change "shall" to "may".

Amendment No. 1 would be a sensible addition to the Bill. I profoundly disagree with my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford, who suggested that it might be an awful burden to impose on the judiciary or the magistrates. In the past, we were dealing with three cases, and now we may be dealing with, at most, 100 cases per annum coming before the 30,000 or so magistrates in this country.

There is already an obligation in the Bill that the court "shall state" in open court where it is not satisfied. I hardly think that it is a great burden if the court has to make a simple statement when it has imposed an international banning order. Courts must do that in a range of cases, particularly in terms of all offences concerning children and young people, in which they must state their reasons in much greater detail.

I strongly urge amendment No. 1 on the House, but if my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford and the Minister continue to resist it, I would not wish to waste the time of the House by dividing on it. However, I hope that it will be considered seriously in another place.

It is comforting that the House is now back to normal and my right hon. Friends the Members for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) and for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) are in harmonious agreement. I am not, however, in agreement with them. The Opposition support the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns).

We have before us a very important point of principle on the criminal law. It is important to give sufficient discretion to the courts and to the judiciary. There must be some discretion in the way in which judges or magistrates deal with the law in making a judgment after considering the particular circumstances of a case, but it is up to the House to make the laws for them to interpret. That important distinction is often overlooked when we are considering the extent to which the courts should be bound by the letter of the law.

It is important to get the balance of discretion right in any Act of Parliament, and I feel strongly that the Bill as it stands allows sufficient discretion. The Opposition do not support the amendment.

The Government feel that the amendment would weaken the Bill. It would be wrong to remove the duty placed on courts to make banning orders when a football-related offence has been committed and they are satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an order would help to prevent violence. It is very important to remember what happened when the courts had discretion: in December 1997, there were only nine restriction orders in force and it was clear that the courts were not using the discretion available to them. They did not even seem to realise that they could impose the orders.

The Home Secretary had to write to the Magistrates Association and point out that such orders were available, and by the end of June 1998 the number in force went up to about 60; it is now about 150. Those may still be relatively low numbers, but it is important that we say that, when the evidence is there and the courts are satisfied that the person has been convicted of a football-related offence, an order should be imposed.

The courts will still have discretion and I do not think that they will be so terrified of issuing banning orders that they will refuse to convict, as the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) seems to imply. Our magistrates are not like that and we would not expect them to act in that way.

I hope that the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) will withdraw the amendment. If there is such strong feeling in the other place, presumably the matter will be discussed there, but I do not think that the amendment is necessary. It would water down the Bill, and the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) has clearly put the case why the provision should remain as it stands.

The argument is about how far we in the legislature are prepared to trust the judiciary. The Minister has made it clear that she believes that the judiciary can often fail properly to interpret Parliament's views. Interestingly, she said that, if given a bit of a nudge by the Home Secretary of the day, the courts may buck up their ideas and start to realise that penalties are available of which they were previously unaware. That provides a counter-argument, as it suggests that the wording in the Bill may not be necessary.

For the sake of making progress—but reluctantly, I must admit—I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I want to put down a marker and say that we should all think about this matter very seriously.

Does my right hon. Friend agree, as a point of principle, that it is up to Parliament to make laws and that if too much discretion is given to the courts we will end up with judges making laws, which must be wrong?

I am not sure about that. I understand exactly the point that my hon. Friend is making, but the principle may lead in directions which, to some people, seem very threatening. Some people may, for example, want to bring back mandatory hanging for sheep stealing—perhaps that is a good example of the point that she was making—although I suspect that, currently, the majority view is that that would be unwise, and that it is always better to leave the discretion at the point at which the knowledge exists: the court, which has had its proceedings and taken full account of the circumstances, mitigating or otherwise. I therefore remain to be convinced that it is proper for this place, and Parliament generally, to constrain the courts by stating in too much detail what they will or will not do. Hon. Members do not sit in the courts, on the jury or on the magistrates' bench. Now that I think of it, some of my hon. and learned Friends are on the bench, but most of us are not.

I do not wish to delay the House, and I am sure that we shall return to the argument on another occasion. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 12, in page 2, line 4, leave out 'absolutely or'.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 24, in clause 6, page 8, line 1, leave out 'absolutely or'.

The House will be relieved to know that amendment No. 12 deals with only a narrow—but important—point and need not detain us for too long. I really am quite worried about the wording in this part of clause 1(3). My amendment is therefore a probing one, so that I may clarify and ensure that I—and, therefore, the House—fully understand what my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) and the Government understand to be thrust of the provision.

Clause 1(3) states:

"An international football banning order may only be made—

(a) in addition to a sentence imposed in respect of the offence of which the accused is (or was) convicted".

In other words, a banning order may be in addition to a conviction. The clause goes on, however, to provide that an order may be made

"(b) in addition to an order discharging him absolutely or conditionally."

That is what worries me.

I can certainly appreciate the point of imposing a banning order subsequent to a conviction. I can also fully appreciate—although I am less happy about it—imposing a banning order in addition to an order conditionally discharging someone. Although I am no legal expert, I assume that a conditional discharge entails an element of guilt, and that a banning order would therefore be related to an act containing at least an element of guilt.

I part company with the Bill—this is the point of amendment No. 12—where it provides that a banning order may be made when someone has been discharged absolutely, as I really wonder whether that is the proper way to proceed. It seems to me—as a non-legal expert—that, if someone has been absolutely discharged, they have not been convicted and are not guilty of the offence.

In those circumstances, I cannot for the life of me see how one can justify imposing an international banning order—unless we are back to where we started in the debate and are saying, "We haven't been able to convict you in this case, or even to impose a conditional discharge—we are discharging you absolutely. But we don't much like the look of you, or your friends. These NCIS people are telling us that there's something pretty flaky about you, and that your behaviour is peculiar. We therefore have some reason to restrict your freedom. So, under the powers given to us by the Bill, we shall impose an international banning order, although you have been absolutely discharged." That really would be too much.

The provision would—as we have found time and again in the Bill, in provisions curtailing the court's discretion or dealing with people with or without convictions—tilt the balance too much. One of the traditions of our law is the presumption of innocence until proven otherwise, but here we have a provision that would mean that even if a person had been absolutely discharged, the courts would still have the power to restrict his freedom. I hope that I have misunderstood the position, because I find it unacceptable.

I confess to the House that although I support my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) on a range of his amendments, my name should not appear in the list of supporters of this amendment. I did not study this amendment carefully when my right hon. Friend showed it to me and I told the Clerks in the Table Office that I would happily sign all his amendments. I must part company from my right hon. Friend on this amendment.

An absolute discharge is still a conviction. I have never considered absolute discharges a sensible sentence in English law. If someone is convicted, they should face some penalty, however slight. Nevertheless, while the concept of an absolute discharge remains, it is still a conviction. It is not a finding of not guilty or of innocence: it is a finding of guilt where the court, in its infinite stupidity, declines to impose a sentence. The only penalty is that the person still has the stigma of having been convicted by the court. The hope is that someone who has been absolutely discharged will not repeat the offence because he will know that he will face a much heavier sentence next time.

An absolute discharge is a conviction without a sentence, so it would be inconsistent to remove it from the Bill. If we were to do so, people who were convicted and given a £10 fine or a few hours' community service would be caught by the legislation, but someone given an absolute discharge for the same offence would not be caught. At the lower end, some of the penalties for the football-related offences are very slight. A few hours' community service or a £10 fine do not rank much higher than an absolute discharge.

I am following my right hon. Friend's argument closely, as ever. Is he saying that if someone has been found technically guilty, but the court recognises that the offence is so minor that it does not require any penalties, such a severe restriction of freedom as an international banning order is still justified?

If there is a fault in the system, it is the existence of the absolute discharge. If my right hon. Friend is successful in the private Members' ballot next year and introduces a measure to abolish the absolute discharge, I shall be happy to support it. However, the absolute discharge currently exists and courts can and will impose it.

By the way, this is not a matter of technical guilt: one is either innocent or guilty. Someone may be blatantly guilty but, for some good reason—personal circumstances or the feeling of the court that the person is highly unlikely to offend again, which is often the case when absolute discharges apply—the court may decide not to impose a financial or any other penalty. If the court wants the conviction to stand, it imposes an absolute discharge.

If the court has been persuaded that an individual is highly unlikely to repeat an offence, how on earth can one justify an international banning order? The point of such an order is to ban someone who is likely to do something unpleasant, but my right hon. Friend has just said that absolute discharges are given to people who the court reckon will not do something unpleasant. We cannot have it both ways.

Different courts and time scales are involved. When a court gives a person an absolute discharge, it does so for one of many reasons. A court examines an offence, convicts the person who it is convinced committed it, and then disposes of that person in one of many ways—by means of a term of imprisonment, a fine, community sentence or custody. Alternatively, it may grant an absolute discharge. One of the dozens of possible reasons for that decision may be that, in the opinion of the court, that person is unlikely to commit another offence.

Weeks, months or years later, that person may come before a different court because there is a possibility that he will be involved in football violence. That new court will have to consider whether the terms of clauses 1 or 6 are satisfied, and whether an international or domestic banning order is appropriate. In such circumstances, the new court may conclude that, as the earlier absolute discharge is still a conviction, a banning order may be appropriate because the person has not behaved himself in the interim.

I am conscious of the point that my right hon. Friend makes, which is that an absolute discharge feels like no penalty at all. The only penalty faced by a person given an absolute discharge is the fact that the discharge is still a conviction: that person has been convicted of an offence for which a financial penalty or a period in custody has not been imposed. Nevertheless, an absolute discharge remains a conviction and so has to be included if this part of the Bill is to be logical and consistent.

My right hon. Friend may say that absolute discharges are a load of nonsense and should be reformed. I agree, but we cannot do that in this Bill. While the absolute discharge remains available to courts as a sentence and a penalty, we must include it in this Bill. I sincerely apologise to my right hon. Friend that I did not study the amendment carefully enough when I signed up to it. I studied it in more detail overnight, and I have to oppose it.

I do not want to disappoint my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), but I share the views of my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean).

This is a narrow point, but my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst rightly said, when moving the amendment, that this part of the Bill applies to international and domestic banning orders with regard to people who have been given absolute discharges. However, my right hon. Friend supported the Public Order Act 1986, which provided that exclusion orders—the old domestic banning orders—covered people who had received absolute discharges. This part of the Bill merely provides that people on whom international banning orders are imposed will be treated in the same way that the 1986 Act treats people in relation to domestic banning orders.

I hope that that goes some way towards reassuring my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst about the consistency of the proposal.

I am grateful for that, but I am a bit worried about the approach adopted by my hon. Friend and by my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean). The implication is that I must always and absolutely support measures that I have previously supported in the brief time since I entered the House in 1983. Nothing could be further from the truth. My hon. Friend has been in the House for a considerable period, and he will know that we can all look back and regret what we have done. All of us change our hearts or minds sometimes. Even as eminent a person as the Prime Minister has been known to change his mind on the odd occasion. If we look back at what the right hon. Gentleman thought in, for example, 1983, we can detect a few differences because he has since taken a more mature judgment. My hon. Friend may know that I thought something was a good idea in my impetuous youth, but now that I am a statesman, I may not necessarily agree with it any more.

I fully accept that point. Let me try to reassure my right hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border made a cogent case, but I shall try to clarify matters further. If a court considers an absolute discharge to be the appropriate disposal, it may be satisfied that the person involved is unlikely to be involved in future disorder. The court would not necessarily issue a banning order in such a case, although, as a result of the amendments that we discussed earlier, the court would have to give a reason for not issuing an order.

For that reason, the amendment moved by my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst is not necessary, and it would not enhance the Bill. I urge him to withdraw it in the light of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border has said.

Once again, we are in the uncomfortable position of hearing my right hon. Friends the Members for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) and for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) disagree. Once again, we must consider how the amendment would work. It may be appropriate that no penalty should be imposed in some cases, even where a person is found guilty. However, the purpose of a banning order is to prevent future offences. It may therefore be appropriate, if an unconditional discharge is imposed, for the court to have the power to impose a banning order to prevent future offences. I agree, therefore, with my hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford, West (Mr. Burns), and I hope that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst will withdraw his amendment.

The amendment offers a clear example of why a non-lawyer intervenes in these matters at his peril. I confess that I am not a lawyer and that I have no legal training or experience—in the lack of which I am in distinguished company. My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border is virtually a lawyer by dint of his long and distinguished service at the Home Office, and he knows much more about these matters than I can ever hope to. I wholeheartedly accept what he has said. He placed his trust in my wording of this modest amendment, but I had betrayed his trust because my assumptions were mistaken. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford for correcting me so courteously, and even more grateful to the Minister for not rubbing salt into the wound. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 2, in page 2, line 13, at end insert—

'(6) Any person placed under a duty to report to a police station as specified in an order under subsection (5) above shall have the right of appeal to the court within fourteen days of the imposition of the order.'.

I have pleasure in moving the amendment, which stands in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) and myself. On this occasion, I can perhaps make amends for not managing to talk to my right hon. Friend properly in the past few days to advise him on the latent faults in the previous amendment. I have great pleasure in supporting him on this occasion because this amendment is on exactly the right track. It is consistent with the spirit of civil liberties that he has espoused this morning and, at last, it deals with a right of appeal, about which he is very keen.

The amendment would provide for a right of appeal within 14 days against the imposition of a requirement to report to a police station under a banning order. The House will be aware that the Bill as drafted places a duty on a person who is subject to a reporting requirement under such an order to report to a specified police station in England or Wales. At present, the person concerned can report to any police station without prior agreement or notice, which does not hinder travel.

This little amendment is important. Its aim is to ensure that, should a police station be specified to which it is in practice unreasonable or difficult for the person to report, an appeal would be possible. In the vast generality of cases, there should be no problem. It is highly likely that the police station specified will be near the individual's home or work, or in many cases both as those will not be too far apart.

One of the worrying aspects of football hooliganism is that some of the people convicted have, unfortunately, hailed from Carlisle. They were involved in some ghastly football violence. I said "unfortunately" because Carlisle is next door to my constituency and one likes to think that we do not do that sort of thing up there. However, there was a nasty pocket of football hooligans in Carlisle.

One such hooligan, who was targeted at Euro 96 or the world cup, had a business. In fact, a few of the hooligans were business men. They travelled and had company cars. I cannot remember what business they were in, so I will not say whether it was insurance, banking or whatever, but it was a highly respectable business and they were apparently highly respectable and successful business men, which just goes to show that hooligans are not all the mindless morons about whom my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) talks. They are mindless morons when they get involved in violence, but some of them are not merely lager-swilling louts who sit in a pub all day doing nothing; they are successful business men and hooliganism is a dark and sinister side to their characters.

I have no truck with such people. If they commit an offence, I am happy for them to be locked up for as long as the court thinks appropriate. However, if a reporting restriction is to be imposed, the last thing that I want is for those people to lose their jobs or find it impossible to continue in their work and to become a new burden on the state. If they are travellers or computer salesmen, or if their job is to travel throughout the country, I want to ensure that they can appeal to change the police station to which they report or to bring some flexibility into the system.

Might not the fear of losing one's job act as an extra deterrent? In a sense, the amendment would make it easier for such people to offend without fear of losing their jobs.

I entirely disagree. That concept is not built into the amendment. Losing one's job is not a penalty in the Bill. If we want to build that into the legislation we should do so, but we should not make loss of employment an accidental facet of a requirement to report to a police station. That requirement is in the Bill so that the police can keep tabs on hooligans. The police know that they are reporting to the station and not going overseas or somewhere else to commit violence. That measure is not built into the Bill as a threat to their employment, which is a different concept. If fear of losing one's job is to be the deterrent, I am happy with that. If we are going to make it part of the sanction that hooligans face a danger of losing their jobs, we should have the guts to build it into the legislation. If they go to prison or custody, they may lose them anyway. Depending on their business, people may be dismissed for certain offences. Companies will not want to employ people with convictions for violence.

12.30 pm

The provision is a simple, sensible, reporting requirement, and I am merely saying that while that is all right for most working people, many are now taken away by their work, such as salesmen or contract workers. It is not only building site workers but computer contract workers and electrical engineers. If their job means that they can be suddenly taken away, they should be able to get the police station to which they have to report changed to make it more convenient and avoid putting their employment at risk.

I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford will not say that my amendment will weaken the Bill, because it will not dilute it. It is not a wrecking amendment. If he rejects it, I will not press it to a vote and risk damaging the Bill, but it is sensible to give people whose work means that the police station may have to be changed a right of appeal. If he has a better way to build in such flexibility, I would be happy to accept it.

I reassure my right hon. Friend that I am not going to say that his amendment seriously weakens the Bill. I hesitate to say this, because as Ministers we all too often said it; and now in opposition, I find that Ministers say it to me so often that it drives me to drink but, sadly, the amendment is defective. There is a right of appeal in respect of the issue of an order. I appreciate that that was not his point but I hope that he is reassured on that.

On my right hon. Friend's narrow point about a right of appeal in respect of the police stations to which people are designated to report, unfortunately his amendment is defective, because the duty to report is within five days of making the order where as his amendment refers to 14 days. That is no big deal, because if we accepted the principle and its urgency we could adjust it.

I wish to reassure my right hon. Friend about the nub of his argument. When an order is being imposed and the arrangements are being made about the police station to which a person has to report, there is an opportunity for that person to discuss them with the courts and the police to ensure that they are convenient and do not impose undue hardship. In making orders, the courts will not be giving additional punishment by imposing the most complicated arrangements to cause problems for people but ensuring that they turn up at the right time and place to surrender their passports so that the law is implemented and effective.

Does my hon. Friend accept that the police and the person involved can discuss it until they are blue in the face and pick the best police station, but that that will not help if he is sent by his work to the north of Scotland for two weeks or told that his job will take him around the country? The work force are more mobile than ever before. How does the Bill tackle that?

I appreciate that. The individual can ask for further consideration to be given to genuinely changing circumstances. However, my right hon. Friend will also have come across individuals who seek to avoid their responsibilities. The Child Support Agency is an example of some people having become highly skilled at abusing the law and the requirements imposed on them to the nth degree. If one is not careful, under this measure, individuals would abuse that position and would try to bring the law into disrepute and make it less effective than Parliament wants it to be. On those grounds, I ask my right hon. Friend to reconsider the matter and to withdraw the amendment.

I am now rather confused. Normally, our little debates help to clarify matters—as did the previous debate—but I am somewhat confused by the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns). To say—as has been said—that we should not worry too much about the measure, as it is not intended to be penal, and that we do not intend to make it difficult or inconvenient for the individual, but rather to make it as easy as possible, strikes me as slightly bizarre in the context of our debate.

All morning, we have been told about individuals who have committed the most ghastly and heinous acts and are a threat to society. Now, we are told that we are trying to find the most convenient outcome for such people. That strikes me as somewhat odd. Perhaps it is typical of the court leniency that has been mentioned during the debate. However, that matter is for another day. The more I consider it, the more I am tempted by the suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean): that were I—God forbid—ever to come high enough in the ballot for private Members' Bills, that subject might merit my attention.

Be that as it may, I am not clear about the object of the exercise. I guess that it is to prevent certain persons from going to football grounds—that is the most obvious' object—but I am distressed to hear that there is no intention to subject them to any penal element. I am even more confused by my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford saying, in effect, "Don't worry, because the individual will be able to discuss the matter and make representations about it during the court proceedings". Of course, he will—or, at least, I hope so—because that is what judicial proceedings are all about. If the matter were so simple, we should never need the right of appeal in any case.

According to what my hon. Friend said, we need only tell the accused individual that, during the court proceedings, he and his legal representative would be able to make all the points they wanted; they could ask the court to take this or that into consideration and should trust the court because it would all turn out all right.

I obviously made my point inadequately and it caused confusion. What is important is that a police station is designated to which an individual has to report. That individual will be able to ask the court to take certain factors into consideration in determining a police station at which attendance would not cause an undue penalty. On the other side of the coin, if a court convicts and sentences someone to a prison sentence, I am sure that my right hon. Friend would not expect the court to start discussing with the prisoner at which prison it would be convenient for him to serve his sentence.

I thought that was not part of the penalty. We cannot have it both ways. If it is to be part of the penalty, I should build a large police station in Stornoway and insist that everyone reported there. That would have the required effect. However, that, apparently, is not what we are saying. We are saying, "Don't worry. You will be asked to report to a police station, but it will be very convenient and probably warm; you might even get a cup of tea when you go there." The way things are going, I should not even be surprised by that. It must be one thing or the other—either it is part of the penalty or it is not. If it is not part of the penalty, that is a different matter.

If the idea is simply to make sure that individuals are where we want them to be at a particular time, to prevent them from going anywhere near a football match—although why anyone would want to go near a football match is quite beyond my comprehension, but apparently there are those who do—we are in different territory altogether.

I hesitate to intervene as I do not want to delay the debate and talk out my Bill. However, I hope that my right hon. Friend realises that the measure refers to international football banning orders. If a court imposed such an order, an individual would have to turn up at a police station not less than five days before a match to hand in his passport, to prevent him from travelling overseas where he could cause problems at the football match or in the surrounding area. The provision merely states that the courts have to sort out a police station for the person to go to at a certain time. Of course the courts will try to find a police station that is convenient to the individual, so that it gives no further encouragement to the individual not to comply with the banning order.

It is getting worse and worse—we have not got to the cup of tea yet, but I sense that it is imminent.

However, we need not fall out over this matter. I was persuaded by the arguments of my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border, whose knowledge of police stations is far greater than mine as a result of his having been in far more of them than I have, and I defer to him in this case. The more I hear from my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford the more worried I become, however, because it all seems very soft and easy going; but I shall not prolong my comments on amendment No. 2 because I am anxious to reach the amendment dealing with the surrender of passports, which will be another debate altogether. I shall be guided on this occasion, as on so many others, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border, but I am not entirely convinced.

I, too, am not convinced by the arguments of my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns). I am not convinced, although I am willing to be corrected by the Minister or anyone else, that handing in the passport is the sole purpose of specifying a police station. The court can impose any conditions it thinks fit, and I was under the impression that specifying the police station to which the person must report might involve more than a single visit to hand in a passport: for example, there could be a requirement that the person should report there regularly.

However, I see from head movements in the Chamber that I am wrong and my hon. Friend is right, but even if he is right and the purpose of specifying the police station is solely to do with the handing in of the passport, it makes sense to introduce a degree of flexibility to deal with a small number of cases. For example, say it is decided for a person who lives and works in Penrith that Penrith will be the reporting station where he must hand in his passport five days before a football match. Say that person then discovers that he is being sent to work on a contract in the Devon and Cornwall police area. Surely it should be fairly simple to specify a police station in Devon or Cornwall.

Such cases may constitute only a tiny minority, but I am not entirely convinced that there are powerful arguments against their being provided for. I am not in the business of diluting the Bill or making life inconvenient for the police; nor am I in the business of allowing people a right of appeal to change the police station where they must hand in their passport every other day and around every single police station in the country. I accept that there would be clever fly-boys who would try to make a mockery of the law by taking advantage of such flexibility.

However, as I said, we would be dealing with only a small number of people, all of whom would be on the NCIS computer and that of their local police force. With the police national network up and running and all the digital communications that were installed under the previous Government, on which the current Government are no doubt building, it should be quite possible for the police services of the UK, which are all now in touch with each other, simply to effect a change—for example, that the reporting station for an individual has been moved from Penrith to Penzance.

Nevertheless, today is not the day when I shall try to persuade my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford to deal with that point. I suspect that, when the Bill goes to the other place, their lordships in their infinite wisdom will conclude that the matter deserves their attention. At that time, my hon. Friend may have to table an amendment—one that is more correctly drafted than my own—to deal with this small but important point. It is the small but important improvements that give us the best criminal justice legislation in the world, which is why we should never be afraid to deal with the small issues as well as the mega-issues. However, since I do not intend to pursue the matter today, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 3, leave out lines 20 to 25.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 4, in page 3, leave out lines 27 to 29.

These amendments have two quite different aspects that are important in their own right. One of them refers, coincidentally, to a comment made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean), who reminded the House that the more difficult it is to define an offence, the more difficult it is to obtain a conviction. We are well into that territory here.

In his enthusiasm to make this Bill as all-embracing as possible and to ensure that individuals can be caught in several different ways, my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) has excelled himself. This clause contains a definition of offences, which includes

"any attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit that offence"

and references to

"aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of that offence."

I have scant knowledge of the law, but I believe that it is well known that it is difficult to obtain a conviction for the offence of conspiracy—and rightly so. That is because one is involved in all sorts of areas that are rarely subject to the normal availability of evidence and so on. Cases are based much more on hearsay evidence, subjective judgment and the like.

The Bill contains an even less easy definition, which is

"any attempt, conspiracy or incitement"

on the one hand, and

"aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of that offence"

on the other. I am worried that, if that definition remains in the Bill, it may encourage the misuse of resources by the shady NCIS organisation, which has untrammelled surveillance and other powers about which I am becoming increasingly alarmed. I am sure that, if I were summoned to attend upon NCIS, I might never emerge from the building.

I am concerned that if those words remain in the Bill, that will encourage the authorities—I am not keen on that word, but at least it is more neutral and less pejorative—to spend an enormous amount of time and energy pursuing those offences that are so poorly defined. One can imagine setting out to prove in a court of law that someone had attempted to conspire or incited to commit one of the related offences or, worse, aided and abetted, counselled or procured the commission of an offence.

What does "counselling" the commission of an offence mean? I do not know whether it is a term of art in the law or whether it is a new provision dreamed up by someone. I think I understand "conspiracy" and "incitement"—if pushed, I might even understand "aiding and abetting", but I am not sure whether I will ever understand the legal definition or implication of "counselling" the commission of an offence in the context of the individuals about whom we are talking.

All morning, we have heard references to the kinds of odious individuals who are involved in football offences, including disorder. They are mean-minded and violent individuals, and it is a complete mystery to me how counselling the commission of an offence will apply to them.

I might not usually be too worried about that, but we are legislating. If the House is to allow itself to be put in the position of endorsing such wording, the Bill's sponsor and the Minister must be prepared to set out—to satisfy me, if no one else—how they envisage a conviction could be obtained in a court of law for counselling the commission of an offence.

As I have said, I have doubts about "aiding and abetting" and "procuring", to say nothing of "conspiracy" or "incitement". My worry is not only that the provision might encourage the authorities to occupy much of their time and effort in pursuing prosecutions of those offences, but, on the other side of the coin, that the wording could, at worst, draw into the net many individuals who are barely, if at all, involved in the commission of those offences.

It is obvious that most of the right hon. and hon. Members who have participated in these debates have a clear idea of the people with whom they want the Bill to deal: those who commit, or allegedly commit, offences or cause disorder at football matches. When one start to talk about conspiracy, incitement and counselling, we potentially draw in a much wider group of people who have a much more tenuous connection with the offences, and subject them to all the processes that we have been discussing.

I shall give an example. My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border is very fond of car parks, and he has been telling us with pride how the shady people of NCIS, with all their intrusive surveillance mechanisms, hang around in car parks and listen to people's conversations. They then finger their collars, whisk them off to a luxurious cell, give them a cup of tea and tell them that they have been nicked.

That would be bad enough, but what worries me about the wording that my amendment seeks to remove is that somebody who may be having an innocent conversation with one of the aforesaid people might readily be drawn into that process. The NCIS man will be waving a copy of this legislation, if it ever becomes an Act, and will say, "Oi mate. I'm having you for counselling the commission of an offence. I saw you in the act of counselling. You were standing in the car park talking to an odious individual, and our high-powered, sensitive devices that intrude on individuals' privacy told me that the conversation that you thought you were conducting privately involved counselling the commission of an offence."

I am slightly overstating the matter to emphasise my point, but I hope that I shall be reassured that what I have described will not happen. That, however, is my reading of the Bill. I suspect that in their enthusiasm for the Bill, its promoter and the Minister have allowed it to be drawn so widely that it has the potential to draw into the process a large number of people. That increases the risk of miscarriages of justice and of court proceedings going wrong. It further strengthens the arguments about rights of appeal that have, rightly, been put forward during the proceedings. I hope that we shall take the issue very seriously and examine it closely.

The Bill's promoter may want to argue that the provision is absolutely essential to the Bill's viability. The Minister may tell me that the provision about conspiracy, incitement, aiding and abetting and, in particular, counselling, is absolutely essential if the Bill is to have the intended effect. I remain sceptical. I should have thought that the panoply of existing law and the huge, shadowy organisation that moves mysteriously in society, trying to identify people of whom it disapproves and to drag them to court, would be quite sufficient, but it seems that we are going even further.

We ought to know much more about that provision. Let me make it clear that I want to delete it. The burden of proof is on those who want to leave those words in the Bill, and it is not unreasonable for me to expect them, particularly my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford, to explain clearly how they believe those words add to the Bill. That is my first concern.

Amendment No. 4 deals with something equally worrying. Clause 2(2)(a) reads:

"For the purposes of paragraphs…above—

(a) a person may be regarded as having been on a journey to or from a designated football match whether or not he attended or intended to attend the match".

I think that I understand the purpose of that provision but it gives rise to misgivings on my part. It strikes me that certainties will exist if somebody is in attendance at a football match—presumably with CCTVs everywhere in our lives, he will be spotted. The Minister proudly said earlier that actions captured on video would be beyond doubt. It may be that if an individual attends a match and misbehaves in the way that is defined in the Bill, he can be dealt with legitimately. However, the Bill goes beyond that, obviously deliberately.

I am asking my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford and the Minister whether they are absolutely satisfied that the provisions of this part of the Bill are as they should be and that there is no possibility of serious miscarriages of justice. The subsection is drawn extremely widely:

"a person may be regarded as having been on a journey to or from a designated football match whether or not he attended or intended to attend the match".

That is throwing the net very wide.

This part of the Bill worries me the more I think about it. We are no longer focusing on the people with tattoos who behave outrageously, carrying and using offensive weapons and so on; we are talking about another group. Earlier, we were talking about those who counsel others to do something. It is a bizarre thought that the sort of people who commit the offences with which we are concerned will be subject to counselling. As I have said, I want to hear more about that.

We have moved on to talk about a different and much larger group of people who have not been on the journey to the match and who may or may not have attended it. There is scope within the Bill, if lines 27 to 29 remain in it, to draw into the process people who are entirely innocent, or who are involved only peripherally, or who are drawn in inadvertently. For example, they may have been travelling with the alleged offenders and, therefore, may be drawn in. There is the potential greatly to complicate the processes that would follow the identification of the alleged offenders.

I need many reassurances about this part of the Bill, which takes the matter much further than it need do or should do. The wording is dangerous and rather loose. I hope that having reflected on it, my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford and, perhaps, the Minister will say, "This is not necessary to the core purposes of the Bill. There are worries here and there are possibilities of things going badly wrong. Therefore, we are prepared to go along with the amendment and take out these parts of the Bill."

Once again, my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth), with his customary rhetoric and lucidity, has clearly set out our concerns, as reflected in the amendment. That being so, I can be relatively brief.

I could not hope to match my right hon. Friend's eloquence but I share his concerns, which are reflected in amendment No. 3. Clause 2(2) contains the words:

"Any reference to an offence in paragraphs (a) to (q) above includes…a reference to any attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit that offence".

It is a long time since I studied law, but as I have said to the House on numerous occasions, I got out before I was totally corrupted. I am not a qualified lawyer, although I took a law degree in Scotland about 30 years ago. I cannot remember whether a reference to an

"attempt, conspiracy or incitement to commit that offence"

means that the person has been convicted for an attempted offence, an attempted conspiracy or whatever.

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The point that I am inadequately trying to make is, does the reference to "attempt" or "conspiracy" mean that it is enough for the police to be of the opinion that, whereas others have been charged with an offence of affray or violence or disorder, an individual has been involved in it, attempted to commit it, was conspiring to commit it or incited others to do it but has not been convicted of attempt or conspiracy or incitement? I presume that the references are to people convicted of attempt or conspiracy or incitement.

indicated assent.

Nevertheless, I am concerned that the wording brings a very indistinct category of individuals within the scope of the Bill. The category is not as clear cut as that of those who have been convicted of an offence, and I am not certain that it would be possible or feasible to prosecute an individual on such grounds. Specifically, such a prosecution might be over-dependent on police intelligence, which would be compromised as a result.

Therefore, although the provision may seem to my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) to be a good little catch-all—without it, one may get all those convicted of an offence, but miss someone who has been convicted of an attempt to commit the offence or of conspiracy; and, naturally, my hon. Friend wants to catch those people—he may, by inserting that catch-all, produce an unenforceable piece of legislation.

I do not feel too strongly about amendment No. 3, but the subject is worth exploring. I shall listen if my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford or the Minister say that the safeguard is essential and that many nasty hooligans have been convicted of attempt or conspiracy. I share the law's view that conspiracy and attempted violence are as important as actual violence. In fact, those behind the scenes who are conspiring to commit violence, or aiding and abetting or fomenting it, are often the most evil, and my new clauses 1 and 2 were designed to get at them. I am happy for them to be caught, if that is sensible; I simply want clarification that the provision does not go a stage too far, inserting an unenforceable passage or weakening a sensible and tough provision.

Amendment No. 4 relates to those who are regarded as being on a journey to or from a football match even if they did not attend the match or did not intend to attend the match. It is the second part of that which worries me. Those who did not intend to attend a football match can be deemed to be on the journey to it even when they were not. That could catch innocent people.

The law is obviously trying to catch those who buy tickets to a football match, intending to go to it and to have a punch-up, and those who intend to go into the vicinity of a match—although not attend it—and to have a punch-up nearby. Those people are fair game. I am happy for those football hooligans who have no intention of attending a football match, but intend to be outside the ground or in the pub nearby committing their violence, to be caught. However, I am worried that—as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst eloquently said—the provision could sweep in people who are not football hooligans, but are travelling to the same place at the same time on the same day, or who are in the company of some of those nasty people, but have been swept up in the violence.

My hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford may say that if people travel in a minibus alongside violent hooligans, to get a free ride to the town where the football match is taking place, it serves the blighters right if they get swept up. I do not take that view. Sometimes, trains are hired for special outings or events, and the wives or families of those attending the event take advantage of the availability of the hired coach, bus or train to shop or do other activities while others attend the football match. There may be examples of people who are seen to be travelling with football hooligans and nasty scum being innocently swept into the provisions. I hope that my hon. Friend or the Minister can reassure me that that will not be the case.

The amendments are probing, as there are doubts in my mind. I would be happy if my hon. Friend said that had I understood the Bill and the other legislation correctly, I would not have these doubts. However, I would seek an assurance before I am satisfied. I have no intention of weakening the Bill, but I do not wish it to be diminished or discredited by catching a few genuinely innocent people.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst mentioned counselling. I believe that we are referring to the old-fashioned counselling in the criminal law sense, meaning advising someone to commit an offence. It is not the new-fangled, touchy-feely, "I feel your pain" or "Give me a cuddle" counselling with which the country is now awash. If legislation were proposed to deal with the million new counsellors who give everyone a cuddle every time it rains, I would support it if it meant that they were banned for life and sent to prison. That is the sort of counselling we need to outlaw.

I accept what my right hon. Friend says, but does he seriously imagine that the kind of people whom we are told repeatedly commit these offences will be the subject of what he has defined as counselling? I have a mental picture of someone with a shaven head, tattoos and other accoutrements who is about to commit ghastly crimes in the name of being a football supporter. Who will counsel—by whatever definition—that person to do something illegal?

My right hon. Friend has not seen some of the new members of the probation service. That will get me a few letters. My right hon. Friend has misled himself—he has counselled himself unwisely. We are talking not about sitting down and giving these scumbags a cuddle, but about the technical, legal sense of counselling, where someone aids, abets or advises someone to commit an offence. If the other form of counselling were one of the penalties appropriate to these people, I would be worried that the Government had gone really soft on crime.

This part of the Bill does not create new offences—we must make that clear. Whether they have been confused with the new form of "counselling" or not, these criminal offences exist. The Bill merely proposes to enable the court to make a banning order if someone is convicted of one those offences.

The amendments would significantly reduce the ability for action to be taken against those who use football as an excuse for their behaviour. Adding to the list of football-related offences the offences of conspiracy and incitement would provide the courts with the ability to take banning order action against those convicted of such offences.

Everyone who knows anything about conspiracy will accept that it is difficult to obtain convictions for offences of that nature. The people most likely to be involved in committing those offences at football matches are those who plan and organise the activities of others. They tend to avoid being the subject of banning orders, for the simple reason that they themselves do not commit the acts of violence or disorder. That is why we can discuss "unconvicted football hooligans". These people will not be caught committing violence or disorder, but they are the motivators, instigators and planners who escape the powers at present available to the courts under existing legislation. The Bill is intended to bring those people within the ambit of the law.

Our original document went out to wide consultation and we were especially interested in the response on this matter. Many respondents who understood what went on behind football violence supported our proposals. The Football Supporters Association, which, along with the National Federation of Football Supporters Clubs, tried to show people that a minority were responsible for the violence, felt that it was important to add conspiracy. We have listened and we think that the provision is necessary.

The Bill is designed to tackle the problem of those who use the environment around football matches to cause trouble and stir up violence. I appreciate that the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) does not go to football matches, but if he did he would know that many people go without tickets, with no intention of going into the ground; they simply take the build-up of people and the organisation that goes into it as an opportunity to hide behind the vast majority of law-abiding supporters.

Having no intention to attend the match does not, sadly, mean having no intention to cause or be involved in acts of hooliganism around the ground, or on the way to or from the match. By showing that the person's journey was principally in connection with a football match, the provisions will extend the banning order process to those who commit offences outside the ground without any intention of entering it.

I understand why the right hon. Gentleman felt that he should explore the amendments, and in particular amendment No. 4, but I believe that they would weaken the Bill. The genuine, decent supporters prefer the Bill as it stands, so I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. She said that the offences are not necessarily new, and that, allied with the very helpful explanation from my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean), gives me some reassurance that we are on fairly familiar and secure territory in terms of the definition of offences. I can now see, as a non-attender of football matches, that there may be a category of people who are not readily identifiable, but bear a large part of the responsibility for the offences.

I am still not entirely satisfied that there is no danger that a wider group of innocent people might be drawn into the process by the very wide wording in the Bill, but on this occasion I am prepared to give my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) and the Minister the benefit of the doubt. They appear to be sure that the provisions are essential and would not give rise to the risks that my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border and I outlined.

I still have my doubts, but I am sufficiently reassured not to press the point. I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

I beg to move amendment No. 16, in page 4, leave out lines 19 to 25.

This is the amendment that I have been waiting for, although I will try not to make a meal of it. I well remember an impassioned speech on Second Reading by my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield (Mr. Fabricant), who expressed grave reservations about this aspect of the Bill. I am only sorry that he is not with us today. I would have liked to hear the speech again, it was so good. I will try to make up for his absence by my own modest contribution.

I share my hon. Friend's reservations about the surrendering of passports. I know that we can get very misty-eyed about passports. There are those who believe that the British passport—in its excellent old form, as opposed to the dreadful little maroon thing that we are all now stuck with—goes back a long way into our history, but I do not think that it does. The Minister may correct me, but I think that the British passport in its magnificent previous form dated back only to about the 1920s. Be that as it may, the passport was and remains a powerful symbol of a number of different things.

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A passport is not merely something that we possess and are able to show—many authorities, of course, require it to be shown for various purposes—but is an expression of our sense of national pride and identity, which are very important to us. In the context of the Bill and the amendment, however, a passport is the symbol and statement of one's inalienable—at least I thought that it was inalienable—right to travel freely and untrammelled.

Part of our consideration of the Bill should include the extent to which it is necessary to hold and produce a British passport to travel across the European Union. I should like to hear the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) and of the Minister on whether the compulsory surrender of one's passport would prevent one from travelling across the European Union. Although, in a sense, the point deals with an argument that is the reverse of the one that I want to make, it is relevant to our consideration.

I have heard it argued that one can and should be able to—I have done it myself on one or two occasions—travel throughout the European Union without having to show a passport, and that any other method of identity should be adequate. Are my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford and Ministers sure that, if someone's passport were to be confiscated, that person would be prevented from travelling? It is one important aspect of the argument, although, strictly, not germane to the amendment.

I am much more worried—this is why I tabled amendment No. 16—that the authorities will be able to march in and compulsorily take away one's passport. As I said, I am no great fan of the European convention on human rights, but I know that there are those—not least Liberty—who argue that temporary removal of one's passport may well be a contravention of article 1 of the convention's first protocol. Allowing the authorities to take someone's passport may well be a worry for those who are fans of the convention.

As interestingly, Liberty is also arguing that to require surrender of a passport might conflict directly with our international obligations to guarantee freedom of movement under article 12 of the international covenant on civil and political rights. I never thought that I would hear myself arguing that, as I am not a great fan of the covenant. I always regard that type of thing as international verbiage. I could use a much ruder word, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but you probably would not allow me, and the House will get the sense of what I mean. Nevertheless, hon. Members will need reassurances that, in so far as we think that those guarantees are important, the Bill will not contravene them.

I am really interested in a much more fundamental and British point. How content are we that our authorities should be in the business of taking away our passport and saying that what we always thought was one of our fundamental rights—the freedom of travel—is to be removed? Around the world, people take the view that their right to leave their country is one of their most important freedoms.

I am sure that, internationally, over many decades, if not centuries, we have rather pompously taken that view, and said to people, "We are very proud that our citizens are free to escape from the authorities if they think that they are being unreasonable." Almost the entire United States is populated by the successors of those who sought freedom and escaped not only from countries on the continent—many of whom came to the United Kingdom for their freedom—but from the United Kingdom. Therefore, let us not underestimate the importance of the issue.

I am surprised that my right hon. Friend has not alluded to the remarkable statistic that only 12 per cent. of Americans carry passports—which demonstrates that, having got there, they have no desire to return.

Indeed. As someone who has recently returned from the United States—voluntarily, I should add—I appreciate exactly what my right hon. Friend is saying. Nevertheless, the fact remains—it is part of the case that I am trying to make—that, for a very long time, we have argued that the ability to leave the country freely and untrammelled is a very important element of individual and political freedoms and of civil liberties. The proposal in this case is that, as part of a penalty and as a guarantee that people will not travel abroad possibly to do things of which we disapprove, we will make them surrender their passports. That is a serious step to take.

The point was made on Second Reading that there is a precedent for such a move. My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) also made the argument, saying, "Don't worry, we've done it before, so it's all right now." I am not sure that it is all right now. The fact that, in a moment of weakness, the Government of whom I was apparently a member allowed the removal of passports does not mean that I can rest easy that we are to do it again. The fact that we have mistakenly done something before does not mean that we should compound the mistake by doing it again.

I am not convinced that as serious a measure is the right step in the context of this Bill. It may be justifiable for offences such as treason or murder, although I would like to hear the arguments and I would not accept them readily. I do not know whether the offences we are contemplating, however awful they appear, justify the power to remove passports. We should not forget that the Bill is called the Football (Offences and Disorder) Bill, and yet we are talking about taking people's passports away. What is the world coming to? Have we lost all reason? Are we out of our minds? Are we suggesting that offences related to football should be dealt with through the compulsory removal of people's passports, which will mean the removal of one of our most sacred rights?

I sense that the Minister will tell me that I should not worry because we can already remove people's passports for many other reasons. I am not convinced by that argument. It seems to me that people are not aware that their passports could be removed. It is time that they were. Perhaps this debate will assist in the process and I can expect the streets to be filled tomorrow with angry people saying, "We didn't realise that this country had come to this." Perhaps this is the point at which we should start to reverse the process and say, "This is something up with which we will not put." We should say that we do not believe that the authorities are justified in taking passports away that easily and readily and denying people their freedom to travel and to leave the country, especially if we believe that the authorities are acting unreasonably.

I have been surprised, just in our little debate this morning, by the extent to which the Bill has pushed out the frontiers of the powers of the authorities to encroach yet further on the freedom of individuals. I know that my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border will tell me that we have already done it, so we can do it again. That argument is wearing increasingly thin with me and, I suspect, with others.

Order. I have listened carefully to the right hon. Gentleman and, on occasions, he repeats his case. He makes his points effectively, but it is against the rules of the House to make the case twice in the same go.

I am grateful, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The argument has obviously lost its effectiveness, so I had better not pursue it any further. I want to hear a positive and comprehensive case made for these provisions, because if it is not, we should remove them.

As my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) said, this is a serious matter. His amendment would mean that the courts would not have the power to impose passport surrender as a condition of an international banning order. That goes to the heart of the purpose of this part of the Bill.

I urge my right hon. Friend to think again. The amendment would destroy the Bill's purpose of tightening up international banning orders. My right hon. Friend is right to say that taking away people's right to travel abroad is a serious step, but we must see it in context. The people involved will have been convicted of serious crimes. On the authority of a court, banning orders are imposed to prevent people from travelling abroad, during limited periods, when there is reason to believe that they might repeat the trouble overseas that brought about their conviction in the first place.

Current practice shows that there is no point in imposing a banning order if there is no effective way to enforce it. The only effective enforcement of international banning orders is the withdrawal of passports, albeit for a brief period. Although such orders may be imposed for a number of years, people are not prevented from going abroad on holiday or in pursuit of their personal business. The effect is simply that they are not allowed to have their passports for five days before a match is played abroad.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the requirement to report to a police station is equally effective in preventing someone from travelling? In any case, may not a person want to travel abroad legitimately, for urgent family or even business reasons that are quite separate from football?

On the first point, in theory my right hon. Friend may have a case. However, current practice does not work, as people do not turn up at police stations when football matches take place. That is why we must tighten the law.

On my right hon. Friend's second point—that genuine family or business reasons may exist that require travel abroad—my response is to say, "Tough." The decision to issue a person with an international banning order preventing him from going to a football match is not taken lightly, but follows a conviction in a court.

It is odd that my right hon. Friend should argue, in effect, that the system should fit in with an individual's personal arrangements. Taking away a passport is a punishment as well as a way of preventing a repetition abroad of acts of violence. We should not roll over like little dogs wanting their tummies tickled to fit in with the arrangements of a person who has committed an offence but who then wants the state to bend over backwards to make it easier for him to travel abroad, even if the purpose is not to attend a football match.

My right hon. Friend is, like me, a member of the party of law and order. I know that he has a genuine desire to protect the vast majority of people who are innocent. He has talked skilfully and reasonably about civil liberties, but I have heard nothing about the civil liberties of the vast majority of innocent people who go to football matches for an afternoon or evening of entertainment but who inadvertently get caught up in the behaviour of the mindless minority that causes so much misery.

We must stiffen our resolve and take the actions that all responsible people, in football and the law, are urging us to take. They want us to give the authorities more powers to prevent the activities of the violent minority.

Finally, I want to reassure my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst about the legality of the proposals within European human rights legislation—a matter that came up on Second Reading. Like the Minister, I have sought advice from the Home Office, and can assure my right hon. Friend that the Bill is entirely compatible with European obligations and human rights considerations. I hope that he will be able to withdraw his amendment.

I have one question to put to the Minister, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) omitted to ask. I share my right hon. Friend's pride in holding a British passport. My first passport said that Ernest Bevin, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, "requests and requires" in the name of His Majesty, et cetera, and I was able to go bravely abroad holding that passport. I am out of date on the statistics relating to the issuing of passports but one felt greater pride having acquired one's passport from Peterborough, from which it took 40 days to arrive, than one did if it had come from Belfast, where the process took only four days.

My question to the Minister is important. I do not wish to intrude on the Minister's private grief, but inner London Members have been communicating over the past six months with the Home Office about the passports of constituents that the Home Office has lost. Some 80 per cent. of the passports of Thais—

Order. The right hon. Gentleman is perhaps discussing business that might be more appropriately raised on another occasion. The loss of passports and difficulties with the Passport Agency are not entirely relevant to the amendment.

I hesitate to allow even a scintilla of controversy to enter into my relationship with you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as you have always been extremely kind to me. However, the amendment seeks to remove the provision that the passport

"should be returned … as soon as reasonably practicable after the match has taken place."

My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst did not ask the Minister for a guarantee that the Home Office—whether through the police or in its own right—will in fact be able to find a passport when its holder comes to ask for its return, and that is the assurance that I seek.

I shall respond first to the point made by the right hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. Brooke). Clearly we will not be dealing with huge numbers of passports. The right hon. Gentleman may know that there have been only 150 international banning orders over the past two years. A small number of people will have to leave their passports at a police station, and I am confident that the police will not get themselves into the recent difficulties experienced by the Passport Agency.

I strongly oppose the amendment, as must anyone who has sat through the Second Reading and the Committee debates. It relates to the most crucial part of the Bill. The constituents of the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) would be the first to tell him that if a court has ordered that someone should be prevented from travelling abroad, that person should be stopped from going. We have not been able to prevent people from travelling, and some of the disgraceful incidents that have occurred in Europe involved people who had been served with international restriction orders.

Prevention has not been possible because of the way in which the orders have operated. The Bill will toughen up the law so that people will have to attend a named police station and hand in their passport five days before a match. If they do not do so, the police will know that they will travel, and something can be done to prevent it. That is the point of the Bill.

Can the Minister advise me whether it is possible for someone to travel to other European Union countries without a passport? I am fairly certain that it is possible to move freely in and out of the United Kingdom and among the other countries that are parties to the Schengen agreement without a passport, but with some other satisfactory means of identification. If that were so, it would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the measure that the Minister described.

The right hon. Gentleman should be absolutely clear that such people would not be able to get back into the country without a passport. Therefore, they would be choosing to spend the rest of their lives in another country. I understand what he implies, but if we want the law to be upheld, it is important that we find ways to prevent people, as far as is possible, from getting around the law. If this measure is not enacted as drafted, they will be able to do so.

The aim of the measure is not to prevent the individual going about his or her lawful business. That is why the passport must be returned as quickly as possible. Sometimes, it may be returned when the person turns up at the police station to meet the reporting requirement. The location and timing of the match may mean that the person could get the passport back quickly and not have to wait even until the end of the match. We do not envisage that the passport will be retained for any longer than is necessary. That guidance will obviously be issued to police forces.

On the civil liberties aspect, article 12 of the international covenant on civil and political rights protects freedom of movement and the right to leave one's country, as the right hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst said. However, that article also allows Governments to restrict the right in the interests of public order and a wide range of other things. Clearly, this Bill and measure relate to that provision. The Government are satisfied that the provisions of the Bill comply with all our obligations under the covenant. I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.

I am grateful, as ever, to the Minister. Her last point simply reinforces the view that most international agreements are not worth the paper they are written on. If we can comply with some high-sounding, high-falutin', verbose international piece of nonsense and still remove people's passports, it does not say much for the protocol, covenant, convention—call it what you will.

I am not sure that it is that impossible to get back into this country without a passport. I am pretty sure that I have done it myself. I think that if one pitches up at immigration control and can satisfy the officers that one is a bona fide Brit, they will tend to let one in—and so they damn well should, as opposed to some of the other people who are allowed into the country. I do not think that what the Minister said was true, but she may want to take advice on it. It is a matter for another occasion.

This is not either the occasion or the opportunity to take this matter as far as it should be taken. It is prime territory for the other place while it is still fully functioning, fit and feisty. I hope that when Members of the other place consider this Bill, and I am sure that it will shortly proceed there, they will study the provision carefully and satisfy themselves that they would want it to remain in that form in the Bill. I can see some of the strength of what the Minister has said, but I am not totally convinced.

This is not a matter on which I should properly divide the House at this stage. It is sufficient to express my reservations, to allow the provision to remain in the Bill for the time being, but to flag up the fact that it is disproportionate to the aims of the Bill and, therefore, should be seriously considered. On the basis of this short debate, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 17, in page 6, line 6, leave out 'ten' and insert 'fifteen'.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 18, in page 6, line 7, leave out 'five' and insert 'seven'.

No. 19, in page 6, line 11, leave out `six' and insert

No. 20, in page 6, line 12, leave out `three' and insert `five'.

No. 21, in page 6, line 16, leave out `two–thirds' and insert 'one–third'.

No. 25, in clause 8, page 9, line 11, leave out 'one year' and insert 'six months'.

No. 26, in page 9, line 11, leave out `three' and insert `five'.

No. 27, in page 9, line 12, at end insert—

`(1A) In section 33 of the 1986 Act (application to terminate order) for subsection (1) substitute—

"(1) A person in relation to whom a domestic football banning order has had effect for at least one–third of the period determined under section 32(1) above may apply to the court which made the order to terminate it.".'.

No. 28, in page 9, line 17, leave out 'six months' and insert 'three months'.

No. 29, in page 9, line 18, leave out 'level 5' and insert `level 4'.

I shall be brief as we shall reach Third Reading shortly. I want to test the water with these amendments, which seek to increase the minimum and maximum periods for which banning orders can be imposed while allowing appeals for termination of orders to be made earlier. I am giving my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) a chance to toughen the Bill drastically while increasing the court's discretion in using the penalties.

The amendments affect clauses 4 and 8. The Bill provides a maximum period of 10 years for a banning order for someone who has been imprisoned. The amendment suggests 15. In cases not involving imprisonment, the Bill suggests five years and the amendment seven. The minimum periods in the Bill are six years and three years; the amendment suggests nine and five. Clause 8 deals with the period of effect of orders under section 32 of the Public Order Act 1986. It is currently no less than one year and no more than three, whereas I suggest not less than six months and no more than five years. We are lowering one end of the scale while increasing the other.

The other important change allows application for termination of orders to be made earlier, although that is coupled with the possibility of longer maximum sentences. That could be a better way of ensuring that the courts have the powers to impose stiff bans where necessary, but they can choose much longer or shorter periods. If the ban is longer, people will have the right to appeal against it after one third of the period rather than two thirds. The provision increases flexibility while allowing the courts to thump those whom they wish to penalise.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his remarks. I hope that he does not feel that I am a wimp. I am tempted, but I do not want to go down that route, however attractive it may be. We must take a balanced and acceptable approach to penalties so that they are not so harsh that people lose sympathy with the general aims of the mechanism. The Bill has the balance right. The penalties both fit the crime and will be seen as reasonable because they allow individuals to go back to the courts to ask, in respect of international banning orders, for the last third of the sentence to be rescinded on the ground of good behaviour. I think that that applies after a year of the sentence has been served in respect of a domestic banning order. I hope that my right hon. Friend will not press the amendment.

This is slightly bizarre. My hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) was almost frothing at the mouth a moment ago about the need for the severest possible penalties. He came close to accusing me of being a wimp on law and order, to which I am unaccustomed. Now he says that we must not go too far or be too harsh and that the penalties are all right.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) said that we have to satisfy ourselves about proportionality and appropriateness. We are prepared to take the drastic step of removing someone's passport; we have just been told that that is essential to make the Bill work. However, we must also consider what will be left of the discretion of the courts. What will be available to them to ensure that appropriate penalties are applied? If nothing else, the maxima will give some guidance to the courts about what we had in mind in legislating.

As I argued earlier, we should not tie the hands of the courts too much. If we were to set severe maximum penalties, that would show the courts that some of the offences that might be committed under the provisions of the Bill were so serious as to merit severe penalties. However, for some reason, the promoter of the Bill does not seem to think so. He seems to think that it is one thing casually to take away someone's passport, but another thing to send a person to prison for a long time. That does not show much consistency. However, I shall again defer to the superior experience of my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border and be guided by him, although I remain somewhat uneasy.

I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) made those points in his customary lucid style. I too was uneasy about the response of my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford to the amendments. It seems inconsistent to go to the extreme step of taking away a person's passport, but not to allow the courts the freedom to increase the period of the banning order from 10 to 15 years. I was not even proposing a compulsory maximum; I merely wanted to give the courts that extra flexibility in the cases of those vile hooligans to whom my hon. Friend is strongly opposed. In those cases, the court could determine that a 15-year ban might be appropriate.

I suspect that the House will have to deal with this matter again when the Bill returns from another place. In the interests of making progress, I shall not force the matter today, but I suspect that the noble Lords at the other end of the Corridor may take a different view. My hon. Friend has not persuaded me. He said that he was almost tempted to accept the amendment. I hope that, if he is presented with amendments to the Bill when it returns from the other place, he will be prepared to accept some of them—in order to give the courts greater flexibility and freedom to impose tougher sentences, if they want to do so.

As I shall clearly not make further progress today and the House wants to move on to other matters, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Order for Third Reading read.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

I am delighted to have had the opportunity to pilot this important measure through the House. I am proud to have been associated with it. After the obscene behaviour in France last year and because of the far too many occasions in this country when a small band of mindless hooligans have caused so much damage, not only to the reputation of football but to the enjoyment of other people—the vast majority of law-abiding football supporters—we need to take action to block loopholes in the law in respect of racist and indecent chanting. We also need to give the police, the courts and the authorities greater powers to bring to book and to punish those who indulge in that sort of unacceptable and illegal behaviour.

I shall not detain the House for long, but I want to pay tribute to my right hon. Friends the Members for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) and for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) for the way in which they have raised a series of important issues during Report. They gave the House the opportunity to debate matters of concern to them and to some other hon. Members.

I am grateful that a large majority of hon. Members on both sides of the House agree with the Bill—as do interested parties outside the House, ranging from the Football Association, the Football Supporters Association and others to the law enforcement agencies and the National Criminal Intelligence Service. The Bill does not cause party political divisions, so I also pay tribute to, and thank, the Under–Secretary of State for the Home Department for the helpful way in which she has assisted me—as have her civil servants, led by Mr. Alan Brown. He has done tremendous work in helping to inform me on several highly technical and difficult issues. That has ensured the smooth running of the measure through its stages in the House, and its improvement in Committee. Shortly, my Bill will leave the House and go to another place. I trust that their lordships will give it swift passage, so that a badly needed measure that commands great support is on the statute book by the end of July, comes into force by September and is in place for most of the next football season, when it can do something positive to minimise the sort of behaviour that has become all too familiar, both in this country and, especially, overseas.

I want to say only a few words and concur with the remarks of the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns). I congratulate him on the way in which he piloted his Bill through Second Reading and in Committee. As a football fan, I am pleased that the Bill is now making speedy progress, as I hoped it would when I spoke on Second Reading. I shall focus my remarks on two clauses, 9 and 10, which deal with racist chanting and ticket touting, against both of which I have been campaigning for some time.

I am pleased that, today, we as a House have an opportunity to say once and for all that we oppose the racist chanting that has bedevilled football for many years. We should be aware of its intrusion into cricket and other sports, which might be an issue that my hon. Friend the Minister will wish to discuss with colleagues, including our hon. Friend the Minister for Sport.

On Second Reading, I said that ticket touting was not entrepreneurship, but robbery. I have no doubt that stronger regulations to stop ticket touting are welcome in this country. I hope that we shall be able to use that framework as the basis for discussions with our European partners about how to strengthen the framework for overseas football.

I congratulate the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) on introducing his Bill, which highlights and tackles the loopholes that have enabled football hooligans to continue to flourish.

To a certain extent, the media have misrepresented the debate in such a way as to make us believe that we still have a problem in our domestic game. That is not true. In the main, football has cleaned up its own act, largely through the efforts of supporters working hard within their clubs. Now, we are addressing loopholes that enable hooligans to cause trouble abroad and to chant racist slogans at matches, and we are acting to rid ourselves of ticket touts.

In the other place and when the Bill returns to this House, I hope that two fundamental points that still cause me concern are addressed. The first relates to football-related offences and my hope that we will find a way to give some protection to third parties who get caught up in violent events. People go to bars for many reasons—for a stag night, for a night out with friends or as regulars—but if they get caught up in violence that is construed as being football related, they might fall foul of the restriction orders that we impose.

The second point relates to racist chanting. The Minister may be aware of concerns that I voiced in Committee, that although we have corrected one anomaly—that of a chorus being defined as at least two people before action could be taken; that has now been reduced to one person—we have not corrected the anomaly relating to repeated utterance. Although action might be possible under a breach of the peace, unless the offending comment is repeated, it might be difficult to obtain a conviction.

If ever a reason was needed for legislation of this nature being on the statute book, it was provided this week in Four Four Two, in an article about a self-confessed hooligan and Chelsea fan by the name of Martin King. The article states:

"On one occasion, King, whose passport was recognised by a copper when he was off to watch Chelsea in the Cup Winners' Cup, told an officer he no longer followed football and was going wine-tasting in France—by sheer coincidence on the same day the Blues were playing in Europe. 'Sorry to bother you lads,' replied the policeman, who handed King back his passport."

For that reason, we must not let this matter drop. I wish the legislation every success, in its present form or as a Government measure.

I wish briefly to commend my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) for introducing this excellent Bill, which, as has been shown this morning, enjoys wide support throughout the House. It will have far-reaching consequences, so it is right that we have considered the arguments in depth today. I also commend my right hon. Friends the Members for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) and for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) for their assiduous examination of the Bill. However, as I appreciate that brevity is necessary to ensure that the Bill does not run out of time, I am happy simply to commend it to the House and to leave the rest to the Minister.

It always makes me nervous when I hear hon. Members say, "This Bill has wide support on all sides of the House." My memory goes back to the Child Support Agency, which similarly enjoyed the support of both sides of the House, and which subsequent Conservative and Labour Governments attempted to put right many years later. My right hon. and hon. Friends will recall many measures that were introduced in a rush of enthusiasm and received widespread support throughout the House, and which almost invariably turned out to be some of the worst pieces of legislation ever inflicted on the voters and taxpayers. I hope that this will not be one of them.

I have expressed my reservations about the Bill. I understand why my hon. Friend the Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) has introduced it and I accept that there is support for the measure. However, I add in parenthesis that the amount of support—visual, vocal and physical—has not been exactly overwhelming today. The House has its own peculiar reasons for working in this way and moving mysteriously its wonders to perform, so I shall leave that to one side.

I remain somewhat uneasy about the extent to which in this Bill, as in others, we are shifting the balance—slowly but inexorably—away from the traditional rights enjoyed by individuals in this country to benefit "the authorities", whoever they are, and who take many forms in this country, as in others. They have ever greater powers and resources, and technology is widely available to them. I am sure that, in most cases, that is a force for good and reassures the majority of law-abiding people. However, we must acknowledge that, every now and then, there is a distinct danger that those huge mechanisms and enormous powers will go wrong and be abused—usually inadvertently, but sometimes deliberately. Above all, our prime responsibility in the House of Commons is to seek to protect the individual.

I hope that we have discharged that responsibility in this case and I hope that the Bill's wider powers will not go wrong in any way. I hope that I am proved wrong, but I must express that reservation. I accept that my hon. Friend's Bill will proceed, having received due process and proper debate in the House and in Committee. It received a good debate on Report—which is the only way I believe legislation should be able to proceed. My hon. Friend came high in the ballot and he has handled the Bill impeccably. I congratulate him on carrying the House with him. It now remains to be seen to what extent the other place will examine the matter. I support Third Reading.

I congratulate the hon. Member for West Chelmsford (Mr. Burns) on successfully getting his Bill through all its parliamentary stages. I am grateful for his co-operation during the Bill's drafting and its progress through the House, and for the skilful way in which he has approached that. I am grateful to other hon. Members for their informed, considered contributions to debates on these important measures, which aim to maintain and enhance the high quality of our national sport and the prominence that it enjoys. We must maintain that by looking after the interests of the decent, law-abiding supporter. The supporters' interests remain paramount, and I was pleased with the constructive contributions to the consultation process made by many of those who represent them.

As we all know, the introduction of the Bill will add to our sophisticated legislative process for dealing with football-related offences. We all recognise, however, that legislation is only part of the solution to that problem. As the hon. Member for West Chelmsford has said throughout the debate, the most important people who can help us, and whom the Bill is really about, are the decent supporters. They will benefit from the measures.

I do not want to go into recent international results on the pitch which have, sadly, not gone too well for the home countries, but we continue to hope that we shall have representation at the Euro 2000 championship in Belgium and Holland. We have already entered into discussions with our colleagues to work out the details of policing and security for that competition.

We want to ensure that all supporters travelling from this country are able to enjoy football in a safe, secure environment, as the vast, well-behaved majority do. They are just as sickened by the shameful antics of the tiny minority who, regrettably, tarnish the image of decent supporters as well as that of our country. That is why we shall continue to seek to introduce measures that prevent those who commit football-related offences from travelling abroad.

The Bill will help to promote the positive aspects of good behaviour. It sends out a strong message that there are firm measures to deal with those who view football as a battleground, not a playing field. We do not want those people associated with our game, and we should all work together to get rid of them. The Bill takes a good step towards that.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

I beg to move amendment No. 9, in page 8, leave out lines 17 to 22.

With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 10, in page 8, line 20, leave out from 'knowledge' to end of line 22.

The amendments are small but potentially important. Clause 14 is in the miscellaneous and supplemental part of the Bill and will insert into section 56 of the Adoption Act 1976 restrictions on people bringing children into the United Kingdom for adoption, contrary to any regulation that may be prescribed by the Secretary of State. The amendments do not deal with those regulations. Leaving aside whatever requirements the Secretary of State may prescribe in those regulations, it is important to have penalties for anyone who breaches the restrictions in clause 14.

My concern is with subsection (4), which says:

"Proceedings for an offence under this section may be brought within a period of six months from the date on which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to warrant the proceedings came to his knowledge; but no such proceedings shall be brought by virtue of this subsection more than three years after the commission of the offence."

The amendments in my name and that of my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) would have one of two effects. Amendment No. 9 would delete the whole of subsection (4), and as an alternative, amendment No. 10 would delete the last part, which is the bar on prosecution more than three years after the commission of the offence.

It is worth while probing these matters to ascertain the views of the Minister and of the promoter, the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), on the reasons for the provision of three years. I appreciate that there cannot be an indefinite period. Clearly that would be an injustice. However, when the Minister was last in his place on a Friday we were debating putting people on the so-called black list in the context of the Protection of Children Bill. I cannot remember the time limits for backdating offences in that Bill or for saying that people could be put on the register even if their paedophiliac activity or their abuse of children happened many years ago. I think that the time scale in that Bill was much longer than three years.

Nevertheless, we are talking not about child abusers but those who have adopted a child, or who wish to do so, who have committed an offence by bringing somebody into the United Kingdom for adoption. They have done that not because they wish to abuse the child but possibly as a result of a misguided sense of loyalty or a misguided decision that they can help the child, or possibly for wrong and selfish reasons. They may not wish to comply with the law or may not comply with it, but they wish to breach the law to adopt a child illegally.

In those circumstances, we should be sending out a slightly stronger signal. A bar after three years perhaps sends too weak a signal. If an offence has gone undetected for three years, those concerned will know that they will get away with it. If we conclude that it is wrong in any event for people to commit such an act, we should not put a three-year bar on their being prosecuted for the offence.

I cannot remember what the usual bar on criminal prosecutions is. Is there a limit of seven years? The period is different for many different offences. However, three years seems to be a highly restrictive period within which to bring a prosecution once there is evidence that a crime has been committed.

Amendment No. 9 would remove the obligation on a prosecutor, on discovering that a crime has been committed, to act within six months of his feeling that there is sufficient evidence. That is slightly too restrictive. Do we need to have a time limit? I think that there is an obligation on the Crown Prosecution Service in any case to move as speedily as it can, and there may be good reasons for it taking slightly longer than six months to commence proceedings.

Inevitably, in circumstances involving the illegal adoption of children or of bringing children into this country to adopt them improperly, people will have behaved deviously. The facts will possibly be difficult to ascertain. The prosecutor might need more time to put together a case that will stick in court. I cannot see that there will be a fundamental injustice to the accused person, or the person who may be accused, if proceedings are not commenced within six months.

I agree, of course, that there should not be a ghastly sword of Damocles hanging over someone's head, where they are told that proceedings may be brought against them and it takes years and years before any prosecution is or is not brought. That is not appropriate. However, we either need a period that is longer than six months or we do not need a period to be prescribed; the matter can then be left to be dealt with under the normal rules and subject to the obligation that already applies to the CPS to bring prosecutions as speedily as it can provided that it has sufficient evidence.

We must examine carefully the bar after three years. In many cases evidence may come to light only when the child has started school. In some cases it may come to light only when the child has come of age, has applied for a national insurance number, or has a health problem and is taken to a doctor when aged five, seven, nine or whatever. In those circumstances the doctor or the health centre may discover that the child was adopted improperly four, five or six years before. The authorities should then have the right to prosecute. If this is regarded as something for which there should be a penalty, I suggest to the Bill's promoter that we should not have too short a cut-off period, as that would prevent the prosecution taking action against people who should be punished but who committed an offence five, six or seven years earlier.

I appreciate the opportunity to contribute at this late stage to the debate on this important Bill, especially on amendments Nos. 8 and 9. As I served as chairman of the juvenile court for many years and then, in my capacity as a Minister, was involved in the early stages of consideration of this difficult issue, I am delighted that the Bill has reached a critical stage and looks as though it will pass successfully on to the statute book. Would that it had been a wider adoption Bill.

Undoubtedly, amendments Nos. 8 and 9 relate to the area that has caused most pain and suffering. They concern a vexed and sensitive question, because introducing criminal offences in child care matters is always a serious step. Too often, families felt provoked into abusing the rules and the system because of the resistance and insults that they received from local authorities and adoption agencies. I was greatly perplexed that, at a time when so much effort was going into creating new fertility treatments with in vitro fertilisation and other such steps, there was so much resistance and prejudice against intercountry adoption.

Of course it is a profoundly serious step for a child to leave its natural country and live in another land, but for those who saw the alternative—frequently, institutionalisation without health care, education, nurture or love—the opportunity to give a child a loving, caring home in this country proved irresistible. Too often, those families who tried to go through the proper channels found themselves rejected and resisted at every turn.

No one could condone taking a child from one country to another without using the proper processes, but I ask the Minister and the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten)—the Bill's promoter—whether there will also be a countervailing power to take action against local authorities that simply refuse to co-operate with intercountry adoption. I accept that many have changed their tune. To hear the British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering—

Order. I remind the right hon. Lady that we are considering a specific amendment, which is far narrower than the points that she is making at the moment.

I stand corrected, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but I hope that the House will understand the relevance to the amendments of what I am saying. My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) is discussing the issue of the six months and the three-year maximum. I believe that legislation should be passed only if it will be perceived as reasonable and will be acceptable to families and to those implementing it. The present unreasonable state of affairs has caused many people to feel affronted and provoked.

I hope that, if my right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border can achieve reassurances on several points, he will not feel the need to press his amendment to a vote, because it seems to me that, after three years, a child and a family should be free of the background threat that a prosecution might be lodged. I do not believe that a family can conceal a child for more than three years, and after three years, the child has become part of that family. If difficulties were emerging, almost certainly they would have come to the notice of health visitors, schools or social workers. Six months is necessary because, regrettably, it is possible to conceal a child for six months, and that child might well be at a particularly sensitive stage of development at which he or she needs the support of health visitors, teachers and other specialist providers.

2.15 pm

My right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border should not press this matter further, subject to reassurances from the Minister that the unreasonableness of the statutory agencies will be tackled and that there will be discretion over taking action against families. A criminal offence in such matters is extremely serious. The Campaign for Intercountry Adoption—which has members in my constituency—has made some important points about cases where it would be inappropriate to take a legalistic and persecutory approach. With a great deal of good will towards the Bill, I ask the Minister to offer some reassurance to help my right hon. Friend to withdraw his amendments.

These important amendments hit at the heart of the Bill—the prevention of a practice that no hon. Member wants to see continue: the practice of bringing children into this country without reference to the proper procedures.

The current procedures in this country are far too weak to deal with the problem as it stands. Existing legislation would not allow any mechanisms for the authorities to tackle a couple who had brought a child into this country and had sought to keep the child hidden here for six months. If that couple were successful and the authorities found out about the child after seven months, the authorities would have no powers to tackle them. That is wrong, and nonsensical.

As the right hon. Member for South-West Surrey (Mrs. Bottomley) said, we can all imagine circumstances where a child could be hidden for six months. The critical point in the Bill—and the reason why I hope that the right hon. Friend the Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) will withdraw his amendments, which would take away the power—is that it would provide the ability to extend the six-month period to three years. That would mean that we would not need to discover the event within six months, but that the provisions would kick in at the point at which the offence was discovered. If, after a year and a half, the authorities discovered that a child had been brought in, they would have the power to take action. That is what we all wish to see.

I understand the concerns of the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border about the three-year period, and his point that if individuals have broken the law, there should perhaps not be a limit at all. I thought that the right hon. Lady made the point very well that we can be satisfied that any problems or offences would have come to light in three years. Surely after three years it is reasonable that the family should be able to carry on without the threat of legal action. If abuse is discovered in the family after more than three years, other forms of law could kick in to tackle it. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendments.

The right hon. Member for South–West Surrey (Mrs. Bottomley) speaks with great knowledge and wisdom on child care matters, and she raised a number of issues concerning the amendments. I assure her and the House that the Government will keep all aspects of adoption law and practice under active review. One of the purposes of the Bill is to create a new responsibility for local authorities to operate an intercountry adoption service. No one will be able to opt out of legislation passed by the House.

The points made by the right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border (Mr. Maclean) were dealt with effectively by the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten). I remind the right hon. Gentleman that, under the Magistrates Courts (Procedure) Act 1998, there is a six-month bar on prosecutions for summary offences.

The Bill provides for a new summary offence, and to show the seriousness with which we will treat offences of bringing children into the United Kingdom outwith the regulations, we propose to extend to three years the period within which a prosecution can be made.

The amendments are directly contradictory: amendment No. 9 would require that proceedings could be brought only within six months of the offence being committed, which is the present situation, but amendment No. 10 would contradict that by providing that proceedings could be brought with no time limit at all. The right hon. Member for Penrith and The Border had better make up his mind.

Because of the current restrictions on bringing summary proceedings for these offences, no proceedings have ever been brought against a person for bringing in a child in breach of the adoption legislation. That situation is unacceptable and the Bill is designed to correct it.

This has been a useful debate. I tabled the amendments as probing amendments and I am very conscious of the wisdom of what my right hon. Friend the Member for South–West Surrey (Mrs. Bottomley) and the Minister have said. I was in toughening-up mode this morning. We spent the whole morning trying to get draconian new provisions into the Football (Offences and Disorder) Bill and perhaps I was being a bit too severe in trying to remove the three-year limit in this Bill.

I accept that in prosecuting family cases we need to have a different yardstick and a more sensitive set of rules than in prosecuting football hooligans. Following the wise words of reassurance, I am happy to beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Order for Third Reading read.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

The Bill has wide support from individuals and groups involved in adoption. I have been extremely encouraged by the cross-party support for the provisions throughout our proceedings, especially in the excellent Second Reading debate.

Many of us have been concerned about the recent increase in the number of couples who, in seeking to adopt children from a foreign country, have not had the best quality of service from local authorities—the Bill is designed to tackle some of those issues—but we would all be more concerned about those individuals who have gone down that route as a way of avoiding some of the controls that are in place for the adoption of children in the United Kingdom.

The Bill is an attempt for the first time to deal with the grey areas by proper regulation. The most pleasing provision is the adoption of the Hague convention, allowing the House finally to ratify it, having signed up to it in 1993. It is an embarrassment to this country that we have taken so long to ratify the convention, which will institute an agreement on the recognition of various standards. Given that it is based on the fundamental rights of the child, I hope that its ratification will mean that we have enshrined clearly the principle that the child's interests must be paramount in the way in which adoption takes place.

The Bill provides for ways in which we can stop the criminal activity of bringing children into this country by those couples who seek, by one means or another, to avoid going through the proper procedures. We have, rightly, good controls for adopting children within the United Kingdom, and it would be wrong to think that one can try to avoid those controls and get a second-hand or second-rate child from another country. That is why the Bill tightens the provisions on couples who may pay for private home study reports and bypass the social work system, as well as the provisions for individuals who bring children into the country.

The Bill also reminds local authorities of what is required of them and of how they should respond to those who go to them for advice and approval for adopting. I hope that the provisions will mean that the quality of local authorities' performance matches that of my local authority, Hampshire, which has become expert in managing the process, and that a culture will develop in which authorities take a positive attitude towards the whole question of intercountry adoption. We should also, because of changed and improved practice, see far fewer individuals trying to bypass the law and bring in children, late at night, in the boot of a car.

I believe that the Bill is both tough and tender, not only recognising intercountry adoption and trying to improve performance, but saying to those who want to hinder that performance that the strong hand of the law will stop them. Ultimately, the child's individual rights are more important than are those of people trying to adopt, for whatever reason. I hope that the House will pass the Bill, which I warmly endorse.

As the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten) said, the Bill aims to achieve two important objectives. The first is to introduce measures that protect children living abroad and who are to be adopted by people resident in the United Kingdom. The main instrument of achieving that objective is ratification of the 1993 Hague convention on intercountry adoption. Enactment of the Bill will enable the convention's articles to be subsumed within our own substantive law, and thereby to enhance the quality and effectiveness of adoption law.

The second important objective is to place intercountry adoption within a clear statutory framework, thereby enabling regulations to be made to ensure that, within these islands, only those who are approved as suitable to become adoptive parents by a local authority or adoption agency are able to proceed to complete the adoption process abroad. As the hon. Member for Winchester said, the Bill's provisions to introduce new offences are absolutely necessary if we are to protect the welfare of children, by preventing them being brought to the United Kingdom for the purposes of adoption without authority.

The Bill also reaffirms the Government's view that privately commissioned home study reports for the purposes of adoption—whether prepared in connection with the convention or not—are unacceptable. In future, only a local authority or approved adoption agency will be able to provide a home study assessment.

The Bill also provides, for the first time, that intercountry adoption is put on a sound legal footing. I believe that that should make the procedures for convention adoptions, and the majority of other intercountry adoptions, more straightforward and effective and less bureaucratic. I should like to emphasise, however, that the last thing intended in the Bill's preparation was that it should place obstacles in the path of those who wish to adopt from abroad. That is not our intention.

The Government support the Bill not only for its important measures, but because it will provide the facility by which people may be assessed and their application processed within a clearly understood and workable framework. I believe that the Bill will achieve all of that. I also believe that, ultimately, the provisions will enable us to deliver a better and more effective service to intercountry adopters.

I very warmly congratulate the hon. Member for Winchester on promoting his Bill. He has done the House a great service in giving us the opportunity to improve our regulations and law on the matter. I hope, as he does, that the House will now give the Bill a Third Reading.

I think that it was evident on Second Reading that the Bill has the support of the whole House. Today, we all wish it on its way with good speed.

Unfortunately, one or two comments that I made on Second Reading provoked a little confusion, particularly among Labour Members. It really does need to be made clear that—as the Minister has just said—the responsibility placed on local authorities by the Bill is very great. If the rights of the child are to be fully recognised, we must also develop an international standard by which the quality of those wishing to adopt is judged.

I believe that such an international standard would also enlighten those of us in the United Kingdom. The policy of too many local authorities—on matters such as age and interracial adoption, for example—is too restrictive, because they are spoilt for choice. When it comes to international and intercountry adoption, a child who is refused a home in the United Kingdom may be subject to much looser rules in another country. I therefore believe that we must address the issue as soon as possible, preferably as part of a much more comprehensive adoption Bill.

I remind the House that with this we are discussing the following amendments: No. 37, in clause 5, page 3, line 42, at end insert—

`(c) in the case of businesses or parts of businesses carried on solely or primarily in Northern Ireland, the Lands Tribunal for Northern Ireland.'.

I was concerned about non-application of the Bill's provisions to Northern Ireland, as the Bill applies them to northern Scotland—I mean to all of Scotland. If they applied only to northern Scotland, my relatives would not be so worried about them. I was trying to develop the argument that there is an inconsistency in this part of the Bill, as Scotland now has its own Parliament.

Object.