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Commons Chamber

Volume 335: debated on Tuesday 13 July 1999

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House Of Commons

Tuesday 13 July 1999

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

Prayers

[MADAM SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers To Questions

Environment, Transport And The Regions

The Secretary of State was asked—

Leasehold Reform

2.

What progress is being made on leasehold reform legislation. [89476]

(Ms Hilary Armstrong)

We are analysing the many responses to our consultation paper. We are proceeding as swiftly as possible, but, as my hon. Friend will appreciate, I cannot make any commitment on when we will be able to legislate.

My right hon. Friend is aware of the seven-year battle which has been fought by the Redditch Leasehold Action Committee on behalf of several thousand householders in my constituency. Their freeholds were sold from underneath them in bulk to private firms, which then profiteered by offering them back for sale at increased prices—in many cases, at more than 10 times the price. Does she accept that that situation could have been avoided by extending the right of first refusal to householders? Will she assure me that the proposal will be in Government legislation—and that such legislation will be introduced soon?

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend and to her constituents in Redditch, who have fought a long and determined battle, and who, I am pleased to say, have recently had some success in leasehold valuation tribunals. I am conscious of the points that she makes. In our consultation paper, we proposed that the right of first refusal should be extended to houses. We are conscious of the difficulties that some leaseholders have faced because of the lack of such a right. We will consult further on the details of the provisions that would be required, but my hon. Friend has my assurance that, in accordance with the consultation, we intend to move on the issue.

The Minister will know that the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 first gave leaseholders a right of first refusal when a landlord decided to dispose of his interest in a property. There is evidence that that was widely ignored by landlords. That led to considerable strengthening of the provision in the Housing Act 1996. Is she satisfied that the new measures in that Act are working well?

As I have said, leasehold valuation tribunal rulings have strengthened that part of the Act— the rights of people who live in houses, not simply of those who live in flats. We consulted on the whole subject, and that consultation has now finished. We have had a remarkably high number of responses, and we will reflect on them to see what strengthening is necessary in legislation.

Will my right hon. Friend assure me that, when there is a response from the Department to the consultation period and when it is preparing the way forward, it will also examine shared ownership schemes and sheltered schemes, where many of the problems about leasehold tenure that my hon. Friend the Member for Redditch (Jacqui Smith) mentioned also arise?

We know that there are particular problems in those areas. As my hon. Friend knows, there are problems all around. Again, he is someone who has consistently made strong representations on behalf of leaseholders. I congratulate him on that and I assure him that we will examine those issues. As I say, we have had a considerable number of responses to the consultation document and we will respond to them as soon as we are able.

Road Hauliers

3.

What representations he has received from road hauliers on his freight policy; and if he will make a statement. [89477]

12.

What recent representations he has received from the road haulage industry regarding the Government' s transport policies; and if he will make a statement. [89489]

I have received a number of representations from the Freight Transport Association, from the Road Haulage Association and from individual hauliers, both through the road haulage forum and directly. Prospects for the industry are very good provided that it stays at the leading edge of efficiency, good practice and business professionalism.

Given that it takes an hour for Southend hauliers to get out of the town as a result of the Government's incompetence over the M 11 link road, which has not opened—it is an absolute shambles—why have three months passed before the second meeting of the road haulage forum? What will the agenda be at that meeting? Who has been invited? Who wanted to be invited and has been refused? Will hauliers be afforded the opportunity of regular meetings?

The next meeting of the road haulage forum will take place on 19 July. I had hoped to have the meeting in June, but it proved impossible to find a date as the directors general of both the FTA and the RHA took leave, or were out of the country, and I was keen that they should be able to attend the meeting. The forum's membership is well known. Officials have been meeting in the intervening period to agree a number of position papers—their next meeting will be on Friday—to inform the discussions on Monday next week. Both professional associations have welcomed the forum and made it clear that they view it as the way forward for the industry, working in partnership with Government. It is about coherent pragmatic approaches, not pointless soundbites.

Is the Minister aware of predictions that the road haulage industry could lose 50,000 jobs because of the Government's policies? When will the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions stand up to the Treasury—which is pummelling the industry into the ground? Is it not time for a fair deal for motorists and a fair deal for the road haulage industry?

A fair deal for motorists would involve reducing congestion, and the Government have a congestion policy—unlike the Conservative party, which launched its proposals yesterday. The road haulage industry and any other industries that are considering their economic viability have to take into account all sorts of factors, not the least of which is the costs of running a business. Those costs are now lower in the United Kingdom than in other parts of Europe. Road haulage wages, for example, are lower in the United Kingdom than they are in Europe. The costs of establishing a business are lower in the United Kingdom than in Europe. As a direct consequence of the Government's policies, the United Kingdom has the lowest corporation tax levels in Europe.

All those measures will help our road haulage industry, as they will help other United Kingdom industries. They are all designed to make the United Kingdom much more economically viable than it was under the previous Government.

On behalf of Labour Members, I should like to congratulate my right hon. Friend on the freight transport policy being pursued by the Government. That policy is identified with increasingly moving freight transport from road to rail, and with extending rail facilities. Euroports—such as the one in my constituency—could be developed, and could assist in taking United Kingdom freight, on rail, to Europe; they show the best way forward for United Kingdom freight policy. Does my right hon. Friend accept that Labour Members firmly believe that we should continue with the Government's policy of encouraging freight transport to move from road to rail, as that would benefit all our communities and industries?

My hon. Friend makes a valid point—which is the crux of moving goods in the United Kingdom. We have doubled our spending on freight grants—in the past two years, we have spent £60 million—to support the shift of freight from road to rail or water. We are also committed to making still more funds available for the grant, if there is sufficient demand, in the next three years. Railtrack figures for 1998–99 show an 18 per cent. increase in railway freight volume.

We shall also give to the new Strategic Rail Authority objectives to promote rail freight transport. Meanwhile, the shadow Strategic Rail Authority will be able to make a start on strategic planning for rail freight growth. Rail freight transport is a key factor in reducing traffic on our roads and pollution, and in ensuring that, in future, we have a viable rail network. Our policy is common sense.

Does my right hon. Friend accept that—apparently unlike Conservative Members, as demonstrated in their recent publication—Labour Members believe that a continued free-for-all in road transport could have disastrous long-term consequences for the British distribution system and for freight haulage, particularly for the viability of the just-in-time system which is vital to Britain's distributive economy? What discussions has she had on ensuring the future viability of the British just-in-time system?

My hon. Friend has raised that issue with me before, and I have been discussing it with officials. The issue is important, particularly in the context of congestion. We must ensure that congestion on our roads does not lead to a reduction in the economic performance of our businesses. We must, therefore, adopt a commonsense and focused attitude in dealing with congestion issues—unlike Conservative Members, who yesterday published a document containing proposals that would lead to increased congestion, cost lives, and adversely affect the United Kingdom's economic performance.

Is it not interesting that Labour Members want to ask questions about anything but the state of the United Kingdom road haulage industry—for which the right hon. Lady is responsible? I welcome the fact that—at last, and about time, too—there will be another meeting of the road haulage forum. Will she give an assurance that that meeting will not be simply a delaying tactic, to string out the matter until the next Budget, when hauliers may be clobbered again?

How does it feel to be part of a Department that is consenting to the removal of ever more money from the transport industries by the Treasury, while the Treasury gives less and less in return? Is it not time that the right hon. Lady stood up for the industries that she represents, instead of increasing taxes and cutting investment?

I deplore the slurs on the directors general of the RHA and the FTA, and I am sure that their reasons for being out of the country were perfectly valid. I was anxious to ensure that my Department was able to take fully into account their representations on the road haulage industry. On expenditure on transport by this Government, I ask the hon. Gentleman to reflect on the remarks of the AA yesterday, which pointed out that the previous Government had taken thousands of millions of pounds out of transport, and that this Government were doing something to put those resources back.

Housing (Recycled Land)

4.

What progress he has made towards meeting his target for housing construction on recycled land in the east midlands. [89478]

The latest available regional information from 1994 shows that 37 per cent. of new dwellings in the east midlands were constructed on previously developed land. The urban task force, under Lord Rogers, estimated that 65 per cent. of new dwellings could be accommodated on recycled land over the next 20 years.

What reassurances can my right hon. Friend give the House, the local chamber of commerce and the Loughborough town centre steering group that those targets can be met, in view of the fact that many brown-field sites for housing and employment are under-used and lack investment? Following the Rogers report, what measures is my right hon. Friend likely to take to ensure that public-private partnerships bring some of that land back into use as soon as possible?

We will be responding to Lord Rogers's report, which has 105 recommendations and will form the basis of the forthcoming urban White Paper. The developments in Loughborough town centre are in line with Government policy. It is good that the town centre management scheme is working; the firm partnerships that are developing will start to overcome some of the adversity that the town has suffered. The development of the single regeneration budget schemes there will be of assistance.

Does the Minister accept that his answer was very disappointing? Does he accept that the target of 60 per cent. of land is insufficiently high? From statements made over the past few days, we know that the Government understand very little about the countryside. They pretend to the country that they are green, but they must think that we are green if they believe that they can build an enormous number of new houses on green-field sites while pretending that they wish to preserve England's green and pleasant land.

Here is a little bit of maths for the hon. Gentleman—65 per cent. is greater than 60 per cent. I just said that the urban task force has said that it can achieve 65 per cent, which is above the Government's target of 60 per cent. When the Government came to power, there was no land use databank. Despite all the allegations and the targets set by Conservative Members, they did not even know how much brown-field land there was to build on. It took this Administration to find out how much brown-field land there was. Based on that information, Lord Rogers has made some reasonable projections, which are much sounder than anything that came from the previous Administration.

A46

5.

If he will make a statement on the widening of the A46 between Newark and Lincoln. [89479]

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Ms Glenda Jackson)

The A46 Newark to Lincoln improvement scheme is included in the targeted programme of improvements announced in "A New Deal for Trunk Roads in England", which was published last July. As announced in December last year, the next stage for this scheme would be the making of the necessary compulsory purchase orders. Start of works would commence in 2001–02.

Would my hon. Friend care to comment on the fact that the Tories did nothing to attempt to cut the carnage on the A46 which links my constituents with the A1? Thanks to this Government, and to the work of my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Gillian Merron), we are at last seeing action to cut the high death tolls on that stretch of road. Does that not show that we are fairer to motorists?

My hon. Friend is entirely right and I pay tribute to the work that she and my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Gillian Merron) have done to ensure, as she so aptly put it, that the carnage on our roads is reduced. The Conservatives did nothing in that area when they were in power, and their newly published document makes it abundantly clear that they would be at the forefront of reintroducing carnage on our streets.

Regional Planning (East Midlands)

6.

If he will make a statement on progress with the development of regional planning in the east midlands. [89480]

Good progress is being made. I expect to receive the draft regional planning guidance for the east midlands from the east midlands region of the Local Government Association towards the end of this year. That draft will then be subject to wide consultations before selected matters are considered at a public examination in front of an independent panel next year. I hope to be able to issue the final guidance early in 2001.

I welcome the positive progress that has already been made through partnership working. Can my right hon. Friend tell the House how he will ensure that all factors are fully taken into account in the planning guidance, including economic, environmental and social factors, so that my constituents in Lincoln can look forward to the benefits of greater integration with the rest of the east midlands?

The way in which we are approaching regional guidance is by involving the local government associations, which are taking control of it. They are consulting with the partners and stakeholders in the various regions. In the east midlands, the Local Government Association is consulting the regional development agency, the CBI, the east midlands chambers of commerce, the House-Builders Federation, the Campaign for the Protection of Rural England, Friends of the Earth and a number of other user groups.

Traffic Congestion

7.

When he last met representatives from the Automobile Association to discuss his proposals to tackle traffic congestion. [89481]

I met representatives of the AA on Wednesday 7 July.

I thank the Minister for that answer. I am sure that she will not agree with me that it is very sad that she is willing to talk in soundbites about congestion, but not willing to put any investment into road improvements.

Can she tell the House whether the Deputy Prime Minister had an opportunity to discuss congestion problems with the RAC when he visited the British grand prix on Sunday? Was he able to see from his helicopter the people whom his party purports to represent, who were stuck in traffic jams on the motorways below him?

The hon. Lady's party yesterday published its new deal for motorists, promising investment in vital, undefined road improvements, funded by new innovative schemes—which were also undefined, but likely to cost a minimum of £10 billion. It also proposed that freight should be encouraged on to the railways in some unknown manner. It is not this Government who will do nothing about congestion: it is the Conservatives, whose proposals will lead to congestion. The hon. Lady asked about the RAC, which has been supportive of the Government in the development of the White Paper strategy for integrated transport. I remind her that, if a policy is to be developed by an Opposition, it should be costed. Otherwise, the only conclusion we can come to is that the Conservatives would be prepared to increase taxation, cut public expenditure—or both. If not, perhaps they do not know how to do their sums.

May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the vital role that public transport plays in tackling road congestion? My journey today to Westminster involved catching a train at 8.20 at Eltham station. Connex South Eastern could not get me to Charing Cross until 9.55. Such performance will inevitably have a damaging impact on how much traffic uses the roads in south-east London. The document that is about to be published by the Opposition, with the overt intention of placing them closer to the motorist, will merely lead to jams on our roads—and jam for inefficient, privatised rail services.

My hon. Friend makes a valid point. The mess on the railways inherited by this Government was very considerable, as a result of the fragmentation of the rail network and the absence of proper accountability for that network. The establishment of the shadow Strategic Rail Authority will provide an opportunity to put a proper rail network back in place, with targets for the rail operators and penalties for poor performance. Adequate public transport is vital if we are to reduce congestion on our roads, and it must be safe, efficient and pleasant to use. There was no chance of that under the previous Government.

Under the previous Conservative Government, £25 billion in extra taxes was levied on motorists. The present Chancellor has increased that amount. Given her responsibility for transport, will the Minister press the Chancellor, before the next Budget, to agree to return some of that money to motorists by abolishing the annual car tax on family cars?

It is interesting that the Liberal Democrats, who purport to be supporters of the environment, are taking that line. However, one of the proposals in yesterday's statement from the Conservative party was to reduce vehicle excise duty on vehicles more than 25 years old, which are the vehicles that pollute the most. That is a charter for the old banger. We want motorists to travel on well-maintained roads, in cost-effective vehicles that make travelling a pleasant experience again. As for fiscal policy, I suggest that people who want a reduction in the tax take should say where the money is to come from to fund public expenditure on health and education.

Housing (Recycled Land)

8.

If he will make a statement on progress towards meeting the 60 per cent. target for housing on recycled land in the south-east. [89482]

During the period 1990–94, an average of 51 per cent. of new dwellings in the south-east were built on previously developed land. Serplan has proposed in the draft regional planning guidance for the south-east to achieve a target of 60 per cent. of new development on previously used urban land, over the period of the plan, which is 1996–2016. The public examinations panel will provide advice to the Secretary of State on this matter in its report, which is due in September this year.

Does my hon. Friend agree that an important element in the solution to meeting the target is to bring empty and under-utilised homes back into use? For example, there are about 13,000 empty homes in Luton, of which only 150 belong to the public sector. Will my hon. Friend and his colleagues look at financial mechanisms—such as the VAT regime and loans to owner-occupiers—to enable owners to refurbish those empty homes and bring them fully back into use?

My hon. Friend is right to highlight the problem of empty properties. At present, there are about 753,000 vacant dwellings, across all tenures, in the country. That represents 3.6 per cent. of the housing stock. We aim to reduce that figure to 3 per cent. by 2005, which will then be one of the lowest levels in Europe.

We are taking a number of measures to reduce the total of empty properties. Action is encouraged through PPG3, the relevant planning guidance. Properties empty for more than a year are currently exempt from council tax, but that exemption will be withdrawn from April next year as an incentive for owners to bring properties back into use. These and other measures will be pursued by the Government to make better use of existing resources, and so help to achieve the target of 60 per cent. of housing on brown-field sites or in existing developed areas.

If, when the examination is complete, the figures show that there is sufficient brown-field land, will the Minister see what he can do to reduce the obligation placed on West Sussex county council by the Deputy Prime Minister? That obligation is to build an extra 15,000 homes over and above the already excessive number that the council is required to build. If some of the extra load is reduced, not only will rural West Sussex be protected, but the awful overstrain on our infrastructure will, to some extent, be mitigated.

The hon. Gentleman will know that West Sussex has several times challenged my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State in the courts. He will also know that it lost. The Government have set out new targets to increase the proportion of development on brown-field sites. We await the report on the public examination of the Serplan figures, and I cannot comment further until we receive it. Our keen objective is to maximise development on brown-field sites because that is in everyone's interest.

Did not Lord Rogers's task force conclude that there was no prospect of the Government hitting their national target of 60 per cent. under existing policies? Is the position not even worse in the south-east? Is it not likely that many thousands of new developments will occur on green-field and green-belt sites in the south-east? Why have the Government so far accepted only one of the 105 recommendations made by their own task force, and that only as a pilot?

The hon. Gentleman cannot have read Lord Rogers's report very carefully as it concludes that, under existing policies, the best estimate is that 55 per cent. of development would be achieved on brown-field sites, but that with changes in policy, including many of the new policies that the Government are introducing, it would be possible to achieve a higher percentage, as we intend. Only two weeks after the report's publication, we have already accepted one recommendation. The report contains 105, and we shall give them the consideration that they deserve before we make a judgment on them.

Park-And-Ride Schemes

9.

What guidance his Department gives to local authorities on the location of park-and-ride schemes. [89483]

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Ms Glenda Jackson)

Our guidance emphasises that schemes must be carefully designed and located to reduce traffic flows. They should be considered on their merits, case by case, and assessments should include consideration of alternative sites and the impact on local amenity.

What advice can the Minister offer local authorities such as Bournemouth, which face a choice between creating a park-and-ride terminus and protecting what is left of the green belt? Which should be their priority?

Existing guidance is clear. The use of green belt for a park-and-ride site should be examined exceedingly closely. Park and ride is not an appropriate use for green-belt land unless the benefits that would accrue are overwhelming.

Is my hon. Friend disappointed by the fact that there are too few park-and-ride schemes, which do a tremendous amount to reduce traffic congestion in our town centres? What steps can the Government take to encourage more local authorities to develop schemes to reduce congestion and improve public transport in town centres?

If there is a shortage of park-and-ride sites, it is yet another result of 18 wasted years of Conservative Government. They did nothing to create a properly integrated public transport system but, since coming into office, this Government have asked local authorities to prioritise the needs of pedestrians, cyclists and public transport. Authorities will submit local integrated transport plans this month, and we shall look out for schemes of the kind referred to by my hon. Friend, if they are appropriate to the local area.

The Minister has a great deal of enthusiasm for park-and-ride schemes, but park-and-ride transport strategies across the country are bringing cities such as Oxford to a standstill. The Council for the Protection of Rural England has criticised the damage done to green-field sites by park and ride. Transport 2000 has criticised the Government for cooking the books by misusing figures relating to park and ride. A new report from the university of London severely criticises park-and-ride schemes, arguing that traffic in urban areas increases—[Interruption.]

Order. The House is quite right to become restless as we have not yet heard a question from the hon. Gentleman.

With all that criticism of park and ride, will the Minister now review the policy and apologise to the people of Oxford for the considerable inconvenience that she has caused?

What I am aware of, as indeed the entire House and the whole country will be, is that the hon. Gentleman is simply not up to his brief. It is not the case that the park-and-ride scheme in Oxford has been anything other than a success. Not only is the hon. Gentleman not aware of the success of such schemes, but he is equally unaware of the Conservative party's newly announced policy in which it claims that such schemes should be provided free.

Telecommunications Masts

10.

What recent representations he has received concerning the siting of telecommunications masts; and if he will make a statement. [89484]

My Department received 269 responses to the consultation paper, "Telecommunications Development Control" published in July 1998 and 147 responses to the draft circular, "Land Use Planning and Electromagnetic Fields" published in December 1998. Since then, we have answered 10 parliamentary questions and responded centrally to some 140 letters regarding telecommunications masts.

My right hon. Friend recently made a welcome statement to point out the tightening up of the provisions within those areas. I am concerned about existing telecommunications masts, which may have been placed in areas where they are unacceptable. Many are in school playing fields, right next to schools and to residents. There is one in my constituency on top of a bakery, right next to a residential area, which seems a dangerous position. Are any moves being made to ensure an exclusion zone around telecommunications masts and will it operate for those already in existence?

I appreciate that there is public concern about this issue and we take that seriously. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Public Health and I will be writing to all hon. Members and to local authorities shortly to set out the Government's position on the issue. As the House is aware, our Departments issued jointly for consultation in December the draft of a circular on land use planning and electromagnetic fields. We are considering the responses.

Government experts tell us that the National Radiological Protection Board advises that the strength of radio waves at ground level and in areas normally accessible to the public is many times below the recommended guideline level and should present no health risk. However, we are aware of the public concern that there might be other risks to health, such as cancer. The Government consider it important that high-quality research continues to be carried out. We are involved in research in the United Kingdom and internationally. I stress that the NRPB advises that there is no firm evidence of a causal link between exposure to electromagnetic fields and cancer.

Could the Minister give an assurance that he will pay particular attention in his review to applications for sites within areas of outstanding natural beauty, including the Chiltern hills? Will he take careful account of the reports that pressure is being exerted to overturn the decision of the local planning authority on Chisleys wood in my constituency? That pressure is coming from Government Departments and the current tenant of Chequers. Will he ensure that he takes all steps within his Department to avoid any conflict of interest in determining the outcome?

It would be inappropriate for me to get involved in a site that was the subject of a particular planning application. There was wide consultation, to which the hon. Gentleman may or may not have responded. We got the support of local authorities, planning authorities and, indeed, the industry. I now believe that there is a sensible approach to the issue. Areas of outstanding natural beauty were taken into consideration in the consultation and the Government responded accordingly.

Strategic Rail Authority

11.

What progress he has made in setting up the Strategic Rail Authority. [89485]

The Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Mr. John Prescott)

We introduced the Railways Bill to establish a Strategic Rail Authority. It will provide a national vision for developing Britain's rail network and tougher regulation to put the passenger first.

I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer and for the way in which he is dealing with transport issues across the board. Does he agree that the Opposition's privatisation, which has made many profits, has meant that my constituents are still travelling on rolling stock that is 30 years old, and has led to late trains and overcrowding? Does he understand the need for action now rather than merely the theory?

We certainly do. The Railways Bill is designed to achieve that. The shadow Strategic Rail Authority is already working on those matters—monitoring the commitments that we received at the rail summit; identifying where and how the rail network needs to be developed; and beginning the process of franchise renegotiations. That will ensure higher priority for the passenger—rather than what we saw under the previous negotiations, which were more concerned with privatisation and a dash for cash.

Last year, I initiated an Adjournment debate on railway noise; since then, other debates have been held on that subject. What will the new authority do to prevent the disruption of the lives of so many people who live near railways and who are not taken into account by Railtrack and others when works are being carried out?

New and quieter trains will be introduced, instead of the old railway stock that we were left with and that was utilised by the privatised system. The purpose of the rail authority is to help with transport policy and to take into account the reduction of congestion. That is an important issue, especially in view of the fact that we have heard that the Opposition's new policy is supposed to help to reduce congestion. The description of that policy in The Times today as cheap populism is right. It will do little to reduce congestion; it will increase deaths on our roads and, frankly, will be neither cheap nor popular.

Will my right hon. Friend join me in congratulating the new integrated transport centre that has recently been opened at Whitby railway station? Is it not the case that, when the Strategic Rail Authority considers the development of integrated transport policy throughout the nation, our railways will need to be closely integrated? The public need more information and better access to public transport. That is what the SRA is about and that is what those policies are about.

The House is aware of my hon. Friend's expert knowledge of transport. We have seen the provision of many more services, and more people are travelling on trains, especially since we were elected two years ago. We can now see the whole integration of our system because of our requirement that trains and buses should connect. There is much more integration of the system than we have ever witnessed before.

Given the Deputy Prime Minister's strong anti-car policies, his trip in a helicopter to the British grand prix—that mecca of the finest gas-guzzlers in the world—was a thirsty way of travelling and was a mistake. Instead, should he not have gone to a cycle race by train to show us the new Labour way, and sent an apology to Bernie Ecclestone? Does he accept—[Interruption.]

Order. I will have order in this House—this is disgraceful behaviour.

Does the Deputy Prime Minister accept that his Railways Bill was cancelled last year by No. 10, delayed this year by No. 10, and may arrive, late and battered, some time? Does he know that the railway industry is fed up with his indecision and the uncertainty that he generates? With him, it is jams today and jams tomorrow, bash the motorist and bash the train companies. When will he listen to the advice of the Prime Minister and change policy to avoid standstill Britain? When will he give railway companies the assurances and certainty that they need to get on with the job?

The question reflected what The Times said of the Opposition's policy—cheap and populist. It does not address the substance of the issue, nor does it show any responsibility for those matters. We shall continue to put the serious arguments as to transport; we look forward to the debates that we shall have with the right hon. Gentleman. The Railways Bill is before the House, but the shadow Strategic Rail Authority is already working on the problems; it is beginning the renegotiation of the franchises, and considering the network and improvements to our railway system. The rail summit showed us the positive benefits of the targets that we set.

Sussex Downs Conservation Board

13.

If he will make a statement on the future status of the Sussex Downs conservation board. [89488]

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Mr. Alan Meale)

We are still considering the former Countryside Commission's advice on the protection of our finest countryside, including the future status of the south downs and its conservation board. We intend to make an announcement soon.

May I ask the Minister why it has taken so long to make a decision? It has now been 16 months since the lifespan of the Sussex Downs conservation board was extended. Will he or his successor remember, before arriving at a decision, that every local authority in Sussex and every Member of Parliament representing Sussex, with the exception of the Labour-controlled unitary authority of Brighton and Hove and the two Labour Members of Parliament, are in favour of retaining and strengthening the Sussex Downs conservation board, rather than giving away local democracy by opting for national park status?

We are aware of the deep feeling about the Sussex downs, and the hon. Gentleman is quite right to point out that there are different opinions on the issue. However, the reason for the Government's delay is that we believe in a working and living countryside, and we want to get the decision right.

Does my hon. Friend agree that what is really important is not the future status of the Sussex Downs conservation board, which has not been the most proactive conservation body ever known to man, but the status of the south downs themselves? Popular opinion in Sussex, as opposed to Conservative-controlled local authorities, is overwhelmingly in favour of national park status for the south downs as the only sensible option to protect one of the most sensitive areas of our country.

My hon. Friend is quite right that opinion on the south downs is almost equally divided, and strong voices are being heard by the Government. As I said, we are committed to a living and working countryside, and the Government have already given an extra £2.5 million to areas of outstanding natural beauty. We intend to get our decisions right on the matter.

First, I commiserate with the Minister on the fact that, unlike the Minister for the Environment, and despite a lifetime's effort, he does not rate a CIA file on his activities. It must be a blow to him.

Will the Minister explain why he is dithering so much on the question of the south downs? He cannot give a decision today, or even tell us when he plans to make up his mind. Will he at least give an end date by which he will have made up his mind, so as to end the damaging uncertainty that threatens the future of one of Britain's most important areas of natural beauty?

I can tell the hon. Gentleman that we treat the matter extremely seriously. We are aware of the end date for the present funding arrangements for the conservation board, which is 2001. There is no way that the Government will put at risk either the work of that body, or the right decision on the future of the south downs and other areas. I can also tell him that we are working feverishly to reach a position from which we can make a long-term decision, and we are determined to get that decision right.

Council House Sales

14.

What is his policy on imposing conditions on the sale of council houses; and if he will make a statement. [89489]

Local authorities can sell houses voluntarily and, in some cases, their tenants have the right to buy. In each case, it is up to councils to include such conditions in the sale as are appropriate and reasonable.

I thank the Minister for her reply. Is the Minister aware that Caradon district council in my constituency has recently failed in court to enforce a planning condition in respect of a former council home that is being used for letting, as that was not considered to be a business? Does she agree that that has widespread implications, in that a number of former council houses will be removed from housing stock and that, in future, more and more such properties may be used for businesses, rather than for housing?

I am sure that the House understands that, because the matter is subject to appeal and is likely to go before the courts again, I am not in a position to comment on it. However, the Housing Act 1985 gives councils and other social landlords freedom to include reasonable terms and conditions when selling a home under the right to buy. For example, in rural areas, councils can prevent buyers from reselling to people who have not lived or worked locally for the past three years. In small communities, that helps to keep a stock of affordable housing available for local people. However, it is a matter for the council to determine.

What assessment has the Minister made of the effect of the changed rules on the use of capital receipts from the sale of council houses on the level of interest repayments on local authority debt?

This is an issue not of the right to buy, but of how councils use and organise their debt sales. The whole debt portfolio is a matter for councils. I remind the hon. Gentleman that the debt that he so complains about was sanctioned by the previous Government. [Interruption.]

Order. There was an exchange between the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) and the Minister for Local Government and Housing that I did not hear.

I sincerely hope that it is not the case, Madam Speaker, but it seems that the Minister accused me of lying.

The hon. Gentleman implied that I had said something in my reply that I had not. I said that I hoped that he was not accusing me of lying and implying that I had said that debt had risen, when I had not said that.

Too many remarks are made from sedentary positions. I have said before that hon. Members who have something to say should wait to be called before they say it. If they have asked a question, it is right that they should listen fully to the answer.

Traffic Calming

15.

If he will provide additional funds to local authorities for road safety traffic-calming schemes. [89490]

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Ms Glenda Jackson)

Over the next three years, we are making an additional £700 million available for the implementation of local transport plans. The quality of local safety strategies will be a key consideration in the allocation of resources.

I thank the Minister for her reply and I acknowledge her personal endorsement of road safety schemes throughout the country. However, will she have a word with her colleagues in the Treasury and point out that money that is invested in road safety and, in particular, traffic calming will save money for the public purse, particularly the national health service? The cost of a fatal road accident is now £1 million, which could pay for 10 road safety or traffic calming schemes. Bearing in mind the fact that, in the past year, 1,000 pedestrians and cyclists were killed, does she agree that the money saved could be invested in saving lives and preventing injuries?

It is precisely because the Government are so aware of the benefit of traffic-calming schemes that we have not only found additional funding for local authorities, but changed the existing statutory procedures so that local authorities may introduce 20 mph zones or limits. As I am sure the hon. Gentleman is aware, traffic-calming measures have reduced accidents, injuries and deaths among our children by 67 per cent.

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is equally aware that the Conservative party's policy is to remove such traffic-calming measures, presumably because the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) wants to become known as the Herod of the 20th century by introducing another form of the massacre of the innocents on our streets.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, when the right hon. Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood) describes traffic-calming measures as impediments, that causes great offence, particularly to those people who have lost relatives on the roads? Will my hon. Friend say more about the exact mechanism for distributing resources to local authorities through local transport plans, which is a particularly important issue in my area, where there is a crying need for more traffic-calming measures?

My hon. Friend is entirely right. The right hon. Member for Wokingham is guilty of not only insensitivity, but, in my view, the advocacy of criminal policies on road safety. Local transport plans will be received this month, and mean that, for the first time, local authorities will be able to make the integrated, strategic decisions that can ensure that they will play their part in meeting our targets for the reduction in deaths and injuries on our roads.

Does the Minister accept that many Members warmly support the proposals put forward by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (Mr. Redwood)? In those proposals, he has represented many organisations that have considerable knowledge of motoring, the motorist and roads. Does the Minister agree that if, as she has announced this afternoon, she is prepared to provide over £700 million for local traffic schemes, she might consider increasing the amount of her money that her Department advances for the maintenance of this country's roads, which are deteriorating rapidly under her Government and contributing to the number of accidents and deaths?

I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman is unaware of the Government's vast increase in funding road maintenance, in marked contrast to the previous Administration, who slashed such funding year on year. We have increased the funding for the maintenance of local authority roads by 8 per cent. in one year. The right hon. Member for Wokingham may be an expert on motoring, but he is clearly an ignoramus on any of the measures that protect pedestrians—[Interruption.]

Order. That was quite unnecessary. I require the hon. Lady to withdraw that remark. [Interruption.] Order. I shall deal with this. I require the hon. Lady to withdraw the remark.

Of course I abide by your ruling, Madam Speaker, and withdraw the word "ignoramus". In fact, I meant to say "a comprehensive lack of knowledge".

Figures published this week show that the number of accidents in Derbyshire has fallen by 40 per cent. on roads with speed cameras since their introduction in 1993, preventing injury and saving the lives of 225 people. Labour Members welcome the investment in road transport announced by the Minister, but, in the light of the success of speed cameras, will she consider supporting proposals to allow income from speeding fines as a result of speed cameras to be ploughed directly into traffic-calming measures to save yet more lives?

My hon. Friend makes many valid points on the part that speed cameras can play in reducing the numbers of deaths, injuries and accidents on our roads. I am sure that she is aware that the issue of fines is part of on-going discussion between my Department and the Home Office. I am sure that she is equally aware that it is part of the Conservative party's transport policy not to increase the number of speed cameras.

Urban Task Force

16.

If he will make a statement on his plans to implement the urban task force's recommendations. [89491]

The final report of the urban task force, "Towards an Urban Renaissance", was published on 29 June. The urban White Paper will provide our main response to the task force's recommendations, and will be published in the next 12 months. In the meantime, we have invited comments on the task force report from interested parties.

In answer to an earlier question, the Minister suggested that Lord Rogers's task force had said that the Government would achieve the building of 60 or even 65 per cent. of new housing on brown-field land. The reality is of course quite different. Lord Rogers said that the Government would achieve only 55 per cent. of such building unless they accepted one of the task force's 105 recommendations.

May I help the Minister by suggesting that he might consider just one recommendation: the strengthening of the green belt in areas that are not technically green belt, such as the rural buffer zone that protects my constituency from the ever-westward expansion of Swindon? Will he protect Wootton Bassett from Swindon, or will he allow my constituency to be buried under concrete, as he is the rest of England?

The reference to 65 per cent. concerned the east midlands, in response to the specific question asked. The green belt would be subject to public examination, to which everyone could contribute. It is absolutely clear from Government guidance that the green belt is there and that we will protect it. Indeed, a Labour Government introduced it, as they did national parks and the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. We are very proud of what previous Labour Governments have done in land-use planning over the past half century.

Will my hon. Friend do as much as he can to encourage as wide a public debate as possible on Lord Rogers's report, since it is a most important document? If we do not get some of the things in it right, we will find the implementation of many policies, such as those protecting the green belt and others that we want, difficult to achieve. It is essential that we include the public in the debate about how to implement Lord Rogers's report.

I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. There will be a wide-ranging debate on the Lord Rogers task force and the report that it has produced. However, we shall be going wider than that as we produce the urban White Paper, which will be the first such document for more than 20 years. It will be taking on issues such as education, crime and a reasonable environment in our major urban areas where people will want to live, work and play, contrary to what the Conservative Administration left us to deal with when they left office.

Personal Statement (Mr Donald Anderson)

3.30 pm

With your leave, Madam Speaker, I wish to make a brief personal statement.

Since yesterday's debate on the eighth report of the Standards and Privileges Committee, I have seen a copy of the minute of the conversation between myself and Mr. Andy Henderson of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which took place on 8 February and which was referred to in yesterday's debate. I did not take a note of the meeting and, so far as I can recall, nor did Mr. Henderson. However, Mr. Henderson's minute goes beyond what I told the House about our conversation.

I have no reason to doubt that Mr. Henderson's minute is an accurate report. It must, therefore, qualify what I wrote to the Clerk of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee about my knowledge of the premature disclosure of the Committee's report on Sierra Leone, as recorded in the Committee's second special report. Mr. Henderson's minute also qualifies the statement that I made to the House yesterday.

I emphasise that, when I replied to the Clerk and when I spoke yesterday, I spoke in good faith. In yesterday's debate, I relied on the letter that the Clerk had received from Mr. Henderson, which I assumed to be the totality of the disclosure. I supported the release of Mr. Henderson's minute. However, I now understand that my letter to the Clerk and my statement to the House were not accurate. In the circumstances, I apologise to the House. I wish also to apologise to the House for my discourtesy in revealing to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office certain aspects of the report and of the Committee's deliberations prior to the report's publication.

On a point of order, Madam Speaker. You will recall that I was in the Chamber at 2.30 this afternoon. I was hoping to catch your eye to come in on the back of Question 1 in the name of the hon. Member for South-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Paice), who was not in his place. I am told that he was in his office throughout Transport questions. Is it not a grotesque discourtesy to the House that a Member should not be in the Chamber after he has tabled a question—

Order. It is not a matter for me whether Members are in the Chamber. I call their names if they are on the Order Paper, and that is the end of it.

Broadcasting (Religious Programming)

3.32 pm

I beg to move,

"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to remove restrictions on the ownership by religious bodies of broadcasting licences and to clarify the role of the Radio Authority and the Independent Television Commission in relation to the religious content of programmes."
I suppose that the first issue that must be addressed in such a debate is whether we are still a Christian society. Much has been made in recent years of the decline of religious faith and of attendance, and it is true that that has happened to some extent. However, if we stop people in the street, seven out of 10 will say that they consider themselves to be Christians. If we conduct a similar survey—this would be a national survey—we will find that only 22 per cent. of people say that they have no religious belief. About 4 per cent. will say that they have a religious belief apart from that of Christianity. I contend that we are a Christian society to that extent.

The Christianity of our society is embedded in our traditions, our history and, of course, our laws. We still have a law that requests and requires schools to have a daily act of religious worship. That Act may not be carried out in every instance in secondary schools, but our laws state that that is required. To that extent, we are a Christian society.

One would expect that to be reflected in our laws relating to broadcasting, but in fact religious broadcasters are put in a uniquely disadvantageous position. As more and more franchises become available, as more and more people are given the freedom to broadcast on cooking, travel or any other subject, and as the digital revolution progresses, one aspect of our society—religious broadcasting—is uniquely discriminated against and constrained.

The relevant statute that my Bill would amend is the Broadcasting Act 1990, which states in schedule 2 that no religious broadcaster may own a national radio licence or an ITV franchise, and, more importantly as the digital revolution unfolds, that no religious broadcaster may own a digital franchise. That places religious broadcasters in a uniquely disadvantaged position.

One can promote anything one likes. One can get a national radio licence to promote atheism, but one is prevented by law from promoting Christianity. The law is so draconian that, if a local vicar were asked to join the board of a television franchisee, that company would immediately lose its franchise. My Bill would repeal paragraph 2 of schedule 2 to the 1990 Act.

Under the law, United Christian Broadcasters, a small broadcaster in the constituency of the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Mr. Fisher), can broadcast gospel music, which is hardly alarming and is unlikely to undermine society, only to people who have a special decoder on their television set, which receives only the music, with no picture.

The situation is absurd and anomalous. That view is shared by 170 hon. Members from all parties who have signed a motion tabled by the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central to try to put matters right.

There is only one Christian local radio station in London, Premier Radio. Why are there 50 religious radio stations in France, but only one in the United Kingdom? The reason is that the codes are so tight that, whereas politicians or anyone else can go on television or the radio to raise funds for charity, to make exclusive claims or to recruit, religious broadcasters are not allowed to do so. If a religious broadcaster manages to get round all the difficulties of the law, the codes are so tight that it is virtually impossible to produce an interesting programme.

What happens abroad? I have already described France. In no other country in the western world is religious broadcasting as tightly constrained as in this country. In America, there are 1,600 Christian radio stations. People say that we need stringent laws because of all the abuses that have occurred in America. However, in recent years, there have been only two cases of fraud by Christian broadcasters, who were rightly convicted of misleading the public. In any system, there will be a couple of bad apples. Why should all religious broadcasting—Christian, Jewish or Muslim—be banned, because of the fear that religious broadcasters, uniquely, will somehow bamboozle the public?

It could be argued that religious broadcasting is available on BBC 1 and other existing channels, but that is true only to a limited extent. For instance, people who are elderly or disabled or who live in remote part of the countryside may want a Sunday morning act of worship on television, but it is not available except on high days and holy days. It was not available even on Christmas day. The service is very limited. People must tune in to radio at 8.7 am; there is no televised morning service. Out of all the countless hours of game shows, chat shows, trivia, consumerism, violence and materialism, surely 40 minutes on Sundays for morning worship is not too much to ask of the BBC. It simply does not provide that.

Those people say, "We simply cannot rely on the existing channels. Give us the right to broadcast on our own." The 22 per cent. of people who have no religious faith will not be forced to listen to United Christian Broadcasters or watch Christian television, but surely those people have rights, as does anybody else, and they should be allowed to exercise them. I believe that we are still a Christian society. Many people are denied any kind of effective religious broadcasting and they look to the House for a simple change of the law to allow them to have the same rights as everybody else.

3.40 pm

The existing law is anomalous, but we must address the question whether that anomaly gives rise to a particular benefit. There are Members present who would argue from different ends of the spectrum that there is a benefit—because Britain is either a secular or a multi-faith society—and that religious broadcasting is inappropriate. It is right, therefore, that those Members should express that view by voting to deny my hon. Friend the Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh) leave to bring in his Bill

Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 23 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of public business):—

The House divided: Ayes 138, Noes 9.

Division No. 233]

[3.41 pm

AYES

Anderson, Donald (Swansea E)Jenkin, Bemard
Arbuthnot, Rt Hon JamesJohnson Smith, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Atkins, Charlotte
Baldry, TonyJones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)
Beggs, RoyJones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)
Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)Kemp, Fraser
Body, Sir RichardKing, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)
Boswell, TimKirkbride, Miss Julie
Brake, TomLaing, Mrs Eleanor
Breed, ColinLaxton, Bob
Brown, Russell (Dumfries)Leigh, Edward
Burstow, PaulLewis, Dr Julian (New Forest E)
Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth)Lidington, David
Campbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NE Fife)Lilley, Rt Hon Peter
Llwyd, Elfyn
Casale, RogerMcCabe, Steve
Cawsey, IanMcCafferty, Ms Chris
Chapman, Sir Sydney (Chipping Barnet)McCartney, Robert (N Down)
McGrady, Eddie
Chope, ChristopherMacKay, Rt Hon Andrew
Clappison, JamesMackinlay, Andrew
Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)Maclean, Rt Hon David
Clarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)McLoughlin, Patrick
Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)McNamara, Kevin
Clifton-Brown, GeoffreyMcNulty, Tony
Collins, TimMadel, Sir David
Colvin, MichaelMalins, Humfrey
Cook, Frank (Stockton N)Mallon, Seamus
Cormack, Sir PatrickMorgan, Alasdair (Galloway)
Cotter, BrianOaten, Mark
Gran, JamesÖpik, Lembit
Crausby, DavidOrgan, Mrs Diana
Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)Osborne, Ms Sandra
Dalyell, TamPaisley, Rev Ian
Davey, Edward (Kingston)Plaskitt, James
Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)Rapson, Syd
Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)Robathan, Andrew
Davies, Geraint (Croydon C)Robertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry)
Day, StephenRobinson, Peter (Belfast E)
Donaldson, JeffreyRoss, William (E Lond'y)
Donohoe, Brian HRowlands, Ted
Evans, NigelRussell, Bob (Colchester)
Faber, DavidSt Aubyn, Nick
Field, Rt Hon FrankSalter, Martin
Fisher, MarkSanders, Adrian
Flight, HowardSarwar, Mohammad
Flynn, PaulSayeed, Jonathan
Forsythe, CliffordSimpson, Alan (Nottingham S)
Foster, Don (Bath)Singh, Marsha
Fraser, ChristopherSmith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)
George, Andrew (St Ives)Smyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)
Gibson, Dr IanStreeter, Gary
Gill, ChristopherSyms, Robert
Gorrie, DonaldTapsell, Sir Peter
Grieve, DominicTaylor, David (NW Leics)
Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)Taylor, John M (Solihull)
Hammond, PhilipTaylor, Matthew (Truro)
Harris, Dr EvanTaylor, Sir Teddy
Harvey, NickThompson, William
Heath, David(Somerton & Frome)Townend, John
Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)Trimble, Rt Hon David
Home Robertson, JohnTurner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
Howard, Rt Hon MichaelTyler, Paul
Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)Tyne, Andrew
Hume, JohnWaterson, Nigel
Hunter, AndrewWebb, Steve

Whitney, Sir RaymondWillis, Phil
Widdecombe, Rt Hon Miss AnnWilshire, David
Wilkinson, JohnWinterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
Willetts, David

Tellers for the Ayes:

Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)

Mr. James Gray and

Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)

Mr. John Bercow.

NOES

Ashton, JoeLevitt, Tom
Barnes, HarryMaxton, John
Bell, Martin (Tatton)
Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)

Tellers for the Notes:

Harris, Dr Evan

Mr. Desmond Swayne and

Illsley, Eric

Mr. Tim Loughton.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Edward Leigh, Mr. Mark Fisher, Mr. Donald Anderson, Mr. Frank Cook, Mr. Steve Webb, Mr. Colin Breed, Mr. Jeffrey Donaldson, Rev. Martin Smyth, Mr. Gary Streeter, Mr. Laurence Robertson, Mr. Gerald Howarth and Mr. Christopher Chope.

Broadcasting (Religious Programming)

Mr. Edward Leigh accordingly presented a Bill to remove restrictions on the ownership by religious bodies of broadcasting licences and to clarify the role of the Radio Authority and the Independent Television Commission in relation to the religious content of programmes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 23 July, and to be printed [Bill 138].

On a point of order, Madam Speaker. I apologise to you, and to the House, for not being in my place when I was called to ask a question at Question Time. It was nothing more than an oversight.

However, I was present to hear the hon. Member for Pendle (Mr. Prentice) raise the matter on a point of order. He said that I had apparently been in my office at the time when I should have been asking the question. That is true—as I have said, it was due to an oversight—but, while I was in my office, my secretary took a telephone call from a gentleman purporting to be from the Opposition Whips Office, and wanting to speak to me. As soon as he was put through to me, he put down the receiver.

It seems to me, Madam Speaker, that the information was obtained by subterfuge. I am sure that that is not an acceptable way for the hon. Member for Pendle to find out whether I was in the House.

I thank the hon. Gentleman. I wish that we could stop playing tit for tat through points of order that are disingenuous in the first place.

Orders Of The Day

Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) Bill

Order for Second Reading read.

Question, That the Bill be now read a Second time, put forthwith pursuant to Standing Order No.56 (Consolidated Fund Bills), and agreed to.

Question, That the Bill be now read the Third time, put forthwith, and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read the Third time, and passed.

Northern Ireland Bill (Programme)

Those Members who are concerned with proceedings on the Northern Ireland Bill will wish to know that a new version of the amendment paper, incorporating amendments tabled up to 2.30 today, is now available for them in the Vote Office.

3.55 pm

I beg to move,

That the following provisions shall apply to proceedings on the Northern Ireland Bill:—

Timing Of Proceedings

1.—(1) Proceedings on the Bill shall be completed at today's sitting.

(2) Proceedings on Second Reading shall, if not previously concluded, be brought to a conclusion four hours after the commencement of proceedings on this Motion.

(3) In Committee—

  • (a) proceedings on any new clause which may be selected relating to the operation of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 shall be taken first and shall, if not previously concluded, be brought to a conclusion five hours after the commencement of proceedings on this Motion; and
  • (a) remaining proceedings shall, if not previously concluded, be brought to a conclusion seven and a half hours after that commencement.
  • (4) Remaining proceedings on the Bill shall, if not previously concluded, be brought to a conclusion eight hours after the commencement of proceedings on this Motion.
  • 2.—(1) When the Bill has been read a second time—

  • (a) it shall, notwithstanding Standing Order No. 63 (Committal of bills), stand committed to a Committee of the whole House without any Question being put,
  • (b) proceedings on the Bill shall stand postponed while the Question is put, in accordance with Standing Order No. 52(1) (Money resolutions and ways and means resolutions in connection with bills), on any financial resolution relating to the Bill,
  • (c) On the conclusion of proceedings on any financial resolution relating to the Bill, proceedings on the Bill shall be resumed and the Speaker shall leave the Chair whether or not notice of an instruction has been given.
  • (2) On the conclusion of proceedings in Committee the Chairman shall report the Bill to the House without putting any Question; and if he reports the Bill with Amendments, the House shall proceed to consider the Bill as amended without any Question being put.
  • Questions To Be Put

    3.—(1) For the purpose of bringing any proceedings to a conclusion in accordance with paragraph 1 the Chairman or Speaker shall forthwith put the following Questions (but no others)—

  • (a) any Question already proposed from the Chair;
  • (b) any Question necessary to bring to a decision a Question so proposed;
  • (c) the Question on any amendment moved or Motion made by a Minister of the Crown;
  • (d) any other Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded; and on a Motion for a new Clause or Schedule, the Chairman or Speaker shall put only the Question that the Clause or Schedule be added to the Bill.
  • (2) If two or more Questions would fall to be put by the Chairman under sub-paragraph (1)(d) in relation to successive provisions of the Bill, the Chairman shall instead put a single Question in relation to those provisions.
  • Lords Amendments

    4. At the sitting on Thursday 15 July—

  • (a) any message received from the Lords relating to the Bill shall be considered forthwith without any Question being put; and
  • (b) proceedings on any message shall be brought to a conclusion, if not previously concluded, one hour after commencement.
  • 5.—(1) This paragraph applies for the purpose of concluding in accordance with paragraph 4 any proceedings on any message received from the Lords relating to the Bill.

  • (2) The Speaker shall first put forthwith any Question already proposed from the Chair and not yet decided.
  • (3) If that Question is for the amendment of a Lords Amendment the Speaker shall then put forthwith—
  • (a) the Question on any further amendment of the Lords Amendment moved by a Minister of the Crown, and
  • (b) the Question on any Motion made by a Minister of the Crown, That this House agrees or disagrees to the Lords Amendment or (as the case may be) to the Lords Amendment as amended.
  • (4) The Speaker shall then put forthwith—
  • (a) the Question on any Amendment moved by a Minister of the Crown to a Lords Amendment, and
  • (b) the Question on any Motion made by a Minister of the Crown, That this House agrees or disagrees to the Lords Amendment or (as the case may be) to the Lords Amendment as amended.
  • (5) The Speaker shall then put forthwith the Question on any Motion made by a Minister of the Crown, That this House disagrees to a Lords Amendment.
  • (6) The Speaker shall then put forthwith the Question, That this House agrees to all the remaining Lords Amendments.
  • (7) As soon as the House has agreed or disagreed to a Lords Amendment, or disposed of an Amendment relevant to a Lords Amendment which has been disagreed to, the Speaker shall put forthwith a separate Question on any other Amendment which is moved by a Minister of the Crown and relevant to the Lords Amendment.
  • (8) The Speaker shall put forthwith the Question on any Motion made by a Minister of the Crown for the appointment, nomination and quorum of a Committee to draw up Reasons and the appointment of its Chairman.
  • (9) A Committee appointed to draw up Reasons shall report before the conclusion of that day's sitting.
  • Miscellaneous

    6. If at the sitting today or on Thursday 15 July—

  • (a) a Motion for the Adjournment of the House under Standing Order No. 24 (Adjournment on specific and important matter that should have urgent consideration) stands over to Seven o'clock, and
  • (b) proceedings on the Bill have begun before that time,
  • the bringing to a conclusion of any proceedings in accordance with paragraph 1 or 4 shall be postponed for a period equal to the duration of the proceedings on that Motion.

    7.—(1) No Motion shall be made to alter the order in which any proceedings on the Bill are taken.

    (2) No dilatory Motion with respect to, or in the course of, proceedings on the Bill shall be made except by a Minister of the Crown; and the Question on any such Motion shall be put forthwith.

    (3) No debate shall be permitted on any Motion to recommit the Bill (whether as a whole or otherwise), and the Speaker shall put forthwith any Question necessary to dispose of the Motion, including the Question on any amendment.

    8. Standing Order No. 82 (Business Committee) shall not apply to this Order.

    9.—(1) The Question on any Motion made by a Minister of the Crown for varying or supplementing the provisions of this Order shall be put forthwith; and Standing Order No. 15(1) (Exempted business) shall apply to the proceedings on the Bill at the sittings today and on Thursday 15 July.

    (2) If at the sitting today or on Thursday 15 July the House is adjourned, or the sitting is suspended, before the time at which any proceedings are to be brought to a conclusion under paragraph 1 or 4, no notice shall be required of a Motion made by a Minister of the Crown for varying or supplementing the provisions of this Order.

    10. Proceedings on the Bill shall not be interrupted under any Standing Order relating to the sittings of the House.

    I am aware that we are asking the House to consider the Bill in a very tight time scale. From our point of view, it would be much more preferable if we had longer to scrutinise the Bill before debates began and intervals between stages, but the whole House realises why we have such a time scale.

    I apologise to the House for the lateness of the delivery of the Bill last night. I believe that it arrived in the Table Office at about 6.15. I am conscious that Members on both sides of the House wish to contribute, so I end my comments.

    3.56 pm

    The House surely cannot let the occasion pass without at least recording considerable disquiet at the way in which the Government propose to deal with the legislation. It surely must be the case that any legislation should be given proper scrutiny by the House, and that there should be a proper opportunity for Members to consider it, time in which Members can consult those who they think have an interest, time to consider amendments and time for a due process.

    That would be the case in any circumstance, but, in this of all circumstances, on this subject and at this time, all those matters become yet more important. However, we are faced with what I can describe only as a completely arbitrary and artificial deadline—one of many.

    We have had a number of deadlines on the matter. Who knows—there may even be more, but, because of the artificial deadline that is being imposed on us, on the House of Commons and on the parliamentary process by the Government, we are being forced to consider vital legislation, on which so much rests, in the most indecent haste.

    That would be bad enough in itself, but there is a risk in forcing to us consider the legislation in such undue haste. Hon. Members did not know even what was in the Bill until yesterday evening. You have just announced, Madam Speaker, that the latest set of amendments was available in a revised amendment paper at 2.30. What kind of way is that to make law? What kind of way is that to ask the House of Commons to make decisions?

    The risks that we run now are considerable. I find it shocking that we are apparently being forced to consider the legislation at the timetable in the motion. I hope just that we are able to do a proper job of scrutiny—although, for the life of me, I cannot see how—that we do not make some dreadful mistake by processing the legislation at the speed with which we are obliged to do it, and that it will not be seen as a precedent. It is bad enough doing that where there is a real requirement for speed. Where the deadline is totally arbitrary and artificial, the whole process is unacceptable.

    I want to record my disquiet and my opposition to this method of legislating. I hope that we never do it again.

    On a point of order, Madam Speaker. I, too, wish to protest at the manner in which the legislation is being dealt with, not least because it is basically an unconstitutional Bill, based on a hypothesis.

    If the hon. Gentleman wishes to make a speech, I shall be happy to call him. We have three hours to go.

    3.59 pm

    On behalf of the people whom I represent in the House, I should like to make my protest about the way in which the matter has been conducted. According to some press reports, when the draft Bill was tabled, it was not even written out or complete. The Government very kindly faxed us all in Northern Ireland a copy of the Bill, but the fax was so abominable that we could not read it. In fact, I offered the fax to an hon. Gentleman and asked whether he could interpret it for me, but he said, "No, I couldn't interpret that." How can we adequately represent the people of Northern Ireland when we have not before us what we have to discuss in this very important debate?

    I do not want to prolong my speech now, because it is more important that what time we have is used effectively and effectually. However, this is no way of dealing with a matter of such seriousness. We are supposed to be debating a failsafe Bill, but, in previous weeks, I have heard nothing but people conjecturing about the possibility of a failsafe situation.

    The right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble), the leader of the Ulster Unionist party, told us that he needed an assurance from the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) that he would see to it that IRA-Sinn Fein would be expelled from any Executive unless it had decommissioned by a certain date. Then, I read about the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Mr. Maginnis) talking about a mythical Mr. P. O'Neill, and the fact that the hon. Gentleman would be quite satisfied that we could move forward if that mythical Mr. P. O'Neill would only just write to him. Today, we come to this Bill.

    There is nothing in the legislation that really deals with the issue before us—one has only to read it to see that that is so. I suppose that the reason for that is that the Government are hooked to their own petard, because they cannot change the agreement. If they put anything into the legislation that will change the agreement, the parties to the agreement—especially Sinn Fein itself, and the Dublin Government—will of course have something to say. Those are the facts of the matter.

    Today, we are being pushed to deal with legislation that is different from anything that has ever been produced in the House of Commons on the standing of terrorists in a part of the Government and a part of Her Majesty's United Kingdom. Surely such a matter deserves time to discuss and debate properly.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Northern Ireland Bill

    Order for Second Reading read.—[Queen's consent, on behalf of the Crown, signified.]

    4.3 pm

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

    I am very grateful to colleagues for attending to this urgent business, and apologise for the speed with which it is being done. I know that hon. Members will appreciate the circumstances in which the Bill has been introduced and be anxious for the Good Friday agreement to be implemented in full.

    In the past 10 months, progress has been held up by the dispute over the formation of an inclusive Executive and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. There have been months of discussions, hundreds of meetings and hour upon hour of debate and negotiation, the sole purpose of which has been to find a way through the impasse which both sides of the community in Northern Ireland are able to support.

    As we are debating progress in Northern Ireland, I should like to register in the House the progress that has been made on marches in the past week. I think that everyone will be pleased with the progress that was made, on 12 July and in the preceding weeks, and will hope that that progress continues. I pay tribute to the Orange Order, which worked hard—as did the residents, but the Orange Order worked particularly hard—to ensure that this time of year was not violent.

    I say at the outset that I know that a number of issues and concerns have been raised about this Bill by the parties in Northern Ireland and people in the House—in particular, suspension versus exclusion, prisoner releases and the timetable for decommissioning. My intention is to cover the detailed points in the Bill, and then to address these concerns more fully.

    My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern and US President Clinton have all been actively involved in trying to help the parties to overcome their differences and, as almost anybody engaged in the process will acknowledge, they have worked very hard.

    The latest discussions began in Belfast on 25 June, when three important principles were agreed: that an inclusive Executive should be formed, exercising devolved powers; that all paramilitary arms should be decommissioned by May 2000; and that decommissioning should be carried out in a manner determined by the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, under General John de Chastelain.

    On 2 July, the two Governments put forward new proposals, based on those agreed principles. As the Prime Minister said in the House at the beginning of last week, the two Governments are proposing the following: the d'Hondt process to nominate Ministers in a new Northern Ireland Executive, to be run this Thursday; following that, devolution of powers will take effect from Sunday; and General John de Chastelain' s commission will then set out the steps required for, and the modalities for achieving, total decommissioning by all paramilitary groups by May next year. Literally within days of devolution, the process of decommissioning is to begin, as specified by the commission, and there is to be a start to actual decommissioning within a few weeks.

    The Commission will report progress in September, December and May, but can do so at any other time if it considers that commitments are not being fulfilled.

    That, Madam Speaker, is the sequence. In my view, it represents the best way forward. However, I recognise clearly that what really matters to people on both sides of the community in Northern Ireland is certainty. Nationalists and republicans require certainty that they will be welcomed alongside the Unionists. Unionists need certainty that they will not have to sit in an Executive with others if commitments on decommissioning are not met.

    The Bill provides that certainty. It contains a failsafe clause—an insurance policy, or guarantee—which says that, if commitments are breached, either on decommissioning or on devolving the institutions set up by the agreement, the agreement will be suspended. In effect, that will rewind the process to where it is today—exactly as the Prime Minister said. We will be back to direct rule, with the Executive brought to an end.

    May I make a little more progress, and then I will? The Bill sets out how this failsafe would work. Let me go into some of the detail, and I will then take an intervention from the hon. Gentleman.

    Clause 1 provides for the automatic and immediate suspension of the operation of the institutions established under the Agreement. This will bite if either decommissioning or devolution commitments are not met; in the case of decommissioning, for example, when the Decommissioning Commission reports that there has been a failure to meet a commitment or to take a step that it has laid down. The effect of suspension is that the Assembly will no longer be able to legislate, or to meet, apart from specific circumstances for which the Bill provides.

    In two seconds. Ministers will cease to hold office. The North-South Ministerial Council and the British-Irish Council will cease to function under the terms of a supplementary treaty between the two Governments. The draft treaty is available in the Library of the House.

    The Secretary of State referred to a few days and a few weeks. Can she tell us exactly how many days and how many weeks?

    I am sorry to say that it is not my decision. General de Chastelain, who is well respected on both sides of the community in Northern Ireland, chairs an independent body and it is his decision as to the time scale. However, he made the position clear in his report on 2 July in which he said that the process would start in a number of days, and actual decommissioning would follow in a number of weeks. He made it clear in the report that he will put down a timetable as to amounts, and it will be clearly laid out. The independent commission making that decision was agreed by all the parties, earlier in June, as the best mechanism to move forward.

    My right hon. Friend said that there would be a wind-back to the position that we have now, but that is not quite accurate. In fact, articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution would have been amended and the Anglo-Irish agreement ended.

    My hon. Friend makes a fair point, but, as those points were agreed so long ago, I assumed that they were taken for granted. He is right to say that that will happen, and that the changes to the constitution of the Irish Republic will continue regardless.

    The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister have rightly emphasised that the essential safeguard in this whole exercise of trust—because a certain amount has to be taken on trust—is the failsafe mechanism, which is the ultimate protection. I understand the difficulties and the independence of Sir John de Chastelain, but the House is being asked to assess the quality of that failsafe mechanism without, at the moment, being absolutely sure of the benchmarks against which it is to work.

    I told the Prime Minister, in a question on the statement he made, that it seemed to me that the only certain benchmark on which anybody could rely was May 2000. Could the Secretary of State arrange, either in her speech or before the end of the debate, for the House to be given the clearest possible guidance as to the thinking of Sir John de Chastelain? Without that, it will be extremely difficult to assess the quality of the failsafe mechanism.

    The right hon. Gentleman knows that General de Chastelain is independent. One of the difficulties of independent bodies is that one cannot tell them what to do, but I assure the right hon. Gentleman that the report that General de Chastelain gave at the beginning of July outlines clearly the stages that will be taken. As I have mentioned already, he has said that, after devolution, it will be a number of days before the process begins and at most a number of weeks before the actual process starts. In that report, he says that there will be a timetable with modalities, and outlines the amounts and the time scale that he thinks suitable. That will be there for everybody to see.

    General de Chastelain is strongly committed to making progress, and what he has said is there for everyone to read. He has also made it clear that additional reports will be published in September, December and May, and additional ones to those if he feels that commitments are not being made. For those eight months, there is a clear programme already in the statements that he has made.

    I wish to pick up the point about rewinding that my hon. Friend the Member for Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) touched on. It is possible to look over past events and to see how brilliantly the IRA has conducted negotiations. The communities on both sides have made major concessions to get to this position, but the IRA has not made any major concessions. The communities made those concessions in the hope that the weapons would be decommissioned.

    When there is rewinding, does my right hon. Friend agree that it would give rise to instability to rewind to the position today? Should we not also consider going back on the prisoner release system, so that, if the arms are not delivered, the IRA will lose some of the advantages they have gained in the past year?

    All sides have made progress and shown a determination to move forward. For example, the republicans and the nationalists have accepted the principle of consent and the changes to the Republic's constitution, both of which are big steps forward. Moreover, the Assembly, perceived as a partitionist body, has been accepted, even though it is not high on the nationalist agenda. It has not been easy for either side, but both have made progress.

    As for the point about prisoners, I hope that my right hon. Friend will allow me to make a little progress, as I shall address that matter in some detail in a minute.

    If the hon. Gentleman will give me a chance to make some progress and finish describing the content of the Bill, I shall surely take an intervention from him.

    All legislative and executive functions during the suspension period will revert to us here in Westminster. A review, under the terms of the Belfast agreement, will begin as soon as is practicable after the suspension.

    Clause 2 deals with the period of the suspension and the procedure for bringing it to an end. Clause 3 requires two meetings of the Assembly to be called during the suspension period—the first within seven days of suspension, without taking a vote; the second within seven days of the end of the review, when the Assembly will debate the outcome of the review and vote on any proposed action. Clause 4 lays down what would happen when devolved government was restored once the suspension was lifted.

    Clause 5 deals with the six north-south implementation bodies that will come into being at the point of devolution. As those bodies will have continuing administrative functions, it would not be practicable to suspend them immediately. However, there are two important safeguards.

    First, during the suspension, the Governments will not confer any new functions or policy directions on those bodies, nor will they establish any new bodies. Secondly, the draft treaty makes it clear that if, within four months, the suspension has not been ended, the two Governments will agree new arrangements to transfer the bodies' functions to the relevant Departments in Northern Ireland and in the Irish Republic. That is another example of rewinding to the status quo, as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has said.

    As I mentioned at the beginning, a number of specific concerns have been raised with the Government, and particularly with the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, my right hon. Friend the Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), during his consultations with parties, both here and in Northern Ireland.

    I shall deal first with the issue of exclusion, which is one of the matters that has been raised. The Bill means that, if anyone fails to meet commitments on either decommissioning or devolution, the Executive will not continue. This we can guarantee absolutely. The Executive will come to an end. That is clear, automatic and irreversible, unless the parties decide differently.

    What we cannot do is decide to form a new Executive ourselves. That can be done only by agreement between the parties. Even if we could provide for the automatic exclusion of a party, the same thing would happen. The others would still need to decide whether they wanted to go ahead on their own. There would be no basis under the Good Friday agreement for continuing unless an Executive, with representatives of both communities, could be formed.

    When the Secretary of State replied to the hon. Member for Hull, North (Mr. McNamara), I took it that she said that changes to the constitution of the Irish Republic would still go ahead. However, I am sure that she is aware that the Government in the south of Ireland have made a statement that the matter will be postponed for two years. I want to ask about something that is more important to me—the Government of Ireland Act 1920. What will happen to that? Will it be repealed, or retained?

    The Government of Ireland Act 1920 will be kept. I do not have the information that the hon. Gentleman says he possesses about the Irish Government changing the date of their constitutional amendment, which I am convinced will still happen according to the given timetable.

    The Secretary of State has spoken about exclusion. Will she confirm that a Minister can be excluded from a future Executive only if there is a cross-community vote in the Assembly under the Northern Ireland (Elections) Act 1998? The Executive can be suspended, but no one can be excluded unless there is a vote to exclude that individual, or an individual party, from holding office.

    That has always been the case. The new Bill focuses on the situation in which someone in the Executive fails to make the required commitment in line with the de Chastelain timetable, providing an automatic mechanism to mean that that person is out, the Executive stopped and the process suspended.

    The process means that the Executive is stopped, as a result of which people will not have to share a position on it with those who are not willing to decommission. Matters can proceed in Northern Ireland only when there is a collective Executive. If one party changes, whether it is loyalist or republican, there will be a knock-on effect. We cannot treat parties in isolation, because of the collective impact exclusion would have. That is why the entire Executive would be disbanded. The hon. Gentleman knows that matters would rewind to where we are now. No one would be worse off than they are at present.

    Several hon. Members have mentioned prisoners, and I understand the concerns that have been raised on both sides. Prisoner releases are difficult. We all find it hard to deal with them, but it is least easy for those families who have been victims of the troubles. Under the Good Friday agreement, the release of prisoners is linked to the maintenance of paramilitary ceasefires. That is reflected in the terms of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which makes it clear that one of the factors that I should take into account in judging whether ceasefires have been maintained is whether organisations benefiting are co-operating fully with the Decommissioning Commission.

    I can assure the House that, in the overall judgments that I have to make about whether ceasefires are holding, I shall pay increasingly close attention to the extent to which an organisation is co-operating with the commission. That test will become tougher as time goes on.

    The Secretary of State correctly says that one of the criteria that she must consider under the 1998 Act is whether an organisation is co-operating with the de Chastelain commission. May I direct her attention to clause 1(1)(a)(ii) of the new Bill, which makes one of the bases for a report a failure to take any step required by the commission? Anyone failing to co-operate with the commission would fall within the terms of the Bill, which provides for automatic suspension. Cannot the Secretary of State say that the remedy with regard to prisoners will be just as swift and certain as that provided by the Bill?

    I cannot rewrite the agreement, as the right hon. Gentleman knows. There is a clear relationship between prisoner releases and ceasefire; there is not that relationship between the accelerated release of prisoners and decommissioning. That is what the Bill states and that is my understanding of it.

    Those are matters of judgment; but the judgment as to whether a group is on ceasefire is part of the process of whether it is decommissioning in line with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning. If the group is said not to be following the directions of the decommissioning body, of course I will take it into account, but it is one of a number of factors. As I said, that factor will become more testing as time goes by.

    No, I want to make a little more progress.

    Finally, on a timetable for decommissioning, the agreement provides for the independent commission to have a key role. In its report of 2 July, it said that it is
    "prepared to define a timetable for decommissioning of arms by the main paramilitary groups",
    and that such groups
    "will be expected to adhere to it to ensure completion by…May 2000."
    If we want to go outside the de Chastelain process, one thing is clear: decommissioning will not happen. A process for decommissioning to take place alongside de Chastelain is outlined in the agreement.

    In articles in the papers and elsewhere, hon. Members have expressed the view that the process should happen more quickly. Unless it is in line with the Good Friday agreement, there is not a chance of decommissioning happening. That is what the parties have signed up to and that is our best bet for making progress.

    I am anxious to be clear before I vote on the timetable. Earlier, the right hon. Lady said that the Government cannot dictate the timetable. Now she has said that the Decommissioning Commission will produce one, but it has not already done so. Will it be possible by the time we vote tonight to know exactly we are being asked to vote for—exactly when these things will happen? If not, there surely cannot be any guarantee.

    I make two points to the hon. Gentleman. First, General de Chastelain has made it very clear that he will put in place a full timetable after devolution is in place and when he is talking to all the groups. However, in his statement of the 2nd, he made it patently clear that a decommissioning process will start within days of devolution and that the first act of decommissioning will be within weeks—[Interruption.] Hon. Gentlemen keep shouting, "How many days? How many weeks?" What we have here is the best chance—the best option—for getting not merely a token gesture of decommissioning but a process that will start now and will be completed by May 2000.

    Any past suggestion has been a token gesture. Why this is the best option that we have had to make real peace in Northern Ireland derives from the fact that it will be a timetable for complete decommissioning by May 2000. That is worth taking a risk for. It is a risk, I accept that. It is partially a risk—

    Let me finish. It is partially a risk because it is saying that, after d'Hondt on Thursday and devolution on Saturday, it will be a matter of days before the process starts and a matter of weeks before actual decommissioning starts. Is that too long to wait to find out whether this process can work? We will know who is serious—we will know which side is not going to fulfil its agreement—within weeks. That is worth doing to find out whether we can get real decommissioning.

    I will make a little more progress.

    As many people have said, the present difficulties in Northern Ireland are about confidence—about offering guarantees to both sides that devolution and decommissioning will happen. What this process offers is a legal guarantee to both sides. We have said before that the process needs more confidence and more trust. Over the next couple of weeks, with the legal guarantee that whoever does not fulfil either decommissioning under the timetable set by de Chastelain or the devolution commitment to put in place the institutions, we have a chance to see who is serious, who will honour their commitment and who will not. This is a chance and a test—

    I thank the Secretary of State for giving way. Does she realise that the impression that has been given over the past 12 months is that she, as Secretary of State, and others have been prepared to turn a completely blind eye to murder, beating and mutilation, and to the number of families who have been intimidated and driven out of the country? What does she say to those who formed that impression? How can she give us confidence that serious activity by terrorist organisations will not be ignored in the future?

    For the past couple of months, I have been implementing the Good Friday agreement, for which the people of Northern Ireland voted. In addition, the Bill gives guarantees to both sides that, if decommissioning is not honoured and if devolution is not honoured, they do not have to sit in the Executive with people who have not decommissioned. That is a worthwhile guarantee; within weeks, we shall know if that is serious.

    As for the hon. Gentleman's remarks about allowing murders to continue, I find that slightly offensive. I guarantee to him that, week after week, I ensure that I talk to the security forces and to the police. Ten days ago, the Chief Constable said that he thought that he disagreed with nothing that I have said or done. I have listened carefully to advice; I do not listen to gossip, rumour or unfounded allegations. However, I assure the hon. Gentleman that, if I receive evidence that people are murdering or beating, and if it is evidence that I can act on, I shall do so. I will not shirk that responsibility.

    I believe that the end is potentially in sight. At present, we have an historic choice before us. It will give us the chance to move forward in a way that has not been possible before. I commend the Bill to the House.

    4.32 pm

    I start on a personal note by thanking the Secretary of State, the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, the right hon. Member for Torfaen (Mr. Murphy), and the Prime Minister for the consideration that they have shown my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition and myself in taking us, step by step, through the latest developments. As I shall point out later, there are matters of doubt and disagreement, but we appreciate the courtesy that has been shown to us.

    The measure inevitably goes back to the Belfast agreement. I emphasise again that the Opposition wholeheartedly support the agreement; we supported it when it was brokered a year ago last Easter, and we do so unreservedly today. However, we have always maintained—as has the Prime Minister—that we cannot dine a la carte on that agreement. It only works if it all hangs together; it was a huge compromise and everybody has to play their part.

    We strongly endorsed elements of the agreement: the constitutional change in the Republic, which meant that it no longer had a legal claim over the north and that it allowed the people of Northern Ireland to decide their own future; and the setting up of a devolved Administration so that, after so many years of direct rule, the people of Northern Ireland—or, more significantly, their elected politicians—were able to have a considerable say in running their part of the United Kingdom. We were especially anxious to ensure that there would be decommissioning of all weapons illegally held by paramilitaries, whether republican or loyalist, and that there would be a total end to violence.

    What we did not like, but reluctantly swallowed because it was part of the total package, was the early release of terrorist prisoners back on to the streets. We fully understood when the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister started to release those prisoners back on to the streets after the House passed the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998: it was clear that the Government had to show their good will and their commitment to the men of violence before they would start to decommission.

    However, by the end of September, a significant number of terrorists had been released early and there was no sign of any decommissioning of illegally held arms and explosives by any of the paramilitaries whose political associates had signed up to the agreement. Since the end of September onwards, the Leader of the Opposition and I have continually called on the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State to halt the early release of terrorist prisoners until there is decommissioning of illegally held arms and explosives.

    A bargain was struck in Belfast last Good Friday, and both sides have to keep to that bargain for it to work—it has to be balanced. The Secretary of State says that decommissioning only had to take place over a two-year period ending May 2000. I put it to her that any reasonable observer would say that, if people are supposed to decommission all their illegally held arms and explosives over a two-year period, the fact that not one gun or one ounce of Semtex has been decommissioned after 14 months of that two-year period, which is the stage we are at now, indicates that the paramilitary parties have failed to fulfil their part of the bargain, so it would be right and proper for a halt to take place in the Government's early release of terrorist prisoners.

    The Good Friday agreement says that decommissioning is an obligation, not a precondition. We all want decommissioning to happen as quickly as possible, but there was no timetable in the Good Friday agreement. What the deal gives us is a timetable from next week for full decommissioning. That is the difference and why this is a good Bill to have.

    I put it to the Secretary of State that I wish that that were so, but there is no specific timetable in the legislation. If I catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I shall move amendments to the Bill—

    I shall respond to the Secretary of State first and then give way. There is no specific timetable in the Bill, and we want to ensure that there is. I shall elaborate on that later in my speech. Meanwhile, I give way to the hon. Member for Lagan Valley (Mr. Donaldson).

    On the question of what is meant by decommissioning and when it should happen, may I quote from a letter from the Prime Minister to my right hon. Friend the Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble), the leader of my party? It is dated 10 April—Good Friday—last year and is signed in the Prime Minister's own handwriting. It states:

    "Furthermore, I confirm that in our view the effect of the decommissioning section of the agreement, with decommissioning schemes coming into effect in June, is that the process of decommissioning should begin straight away."

    I entirely accept what the hon. Gentleman says: that the Prime Minister, who obviously and genuinely wants decommissioning to take place as soon as possible, just as I do, has made commitments—including the commitment in that letter to the First Minister designate—which, to be frank, have not been fulfilled.

    I shall give way once more but, because we are time limited, it must be the last time.

    I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he agree that one of the most telling factors in the referendum campaign were the public pledges given in the Prime Minister's own handwriting that there would be a direct nexus between decommissioning and the release of prisoners; and that those pledges remain dishonoured and unfulfilled?

    The hon. and learned Gentleman might recall that the Leader of the Opposition and I were campaigning for a yes vote in the Province on the same day as the Prime Minister made his handwritten pledges. I welcomed those pledges, and I think that they made a significant difference in ensuring a yes vote in both communities. Since then, many people in Northern Ireland who voted yes have felt badly let down. Today, we have an opportunity to put that right, if our amendments are passed.

    If we had been listened to, and if decommissioning had started because of the halt to terrorist prisoner releases, we would have no need for this debate and legislation today. We all want a devolved Administration in Northern Ireland, and we want it to include the maximum number of people of the widest diversity. We want it to be inclusive. We certainly want it to include all those who were elected to the Assembly and have sufficient seats to become Ministers under the d'Hondt formula.

    To ask the people of Northern Ireland and my Unionist friends to sit in a devolved Executive with Ministers who represent paramilitaries who have not begun to decommission is a very tall order, as I am sure that the Secretary of State will agree. That is why the Leader of the Opposition and I have continually said that everyone must jump together. In other words, Ministers should be appointed only when decommissioning has started. That is why I so strongly commended the Prime Minister's Hillsborough declaration, in which he and the Taoiseach said categorically, after lengthy negotiations with all the parties in Northern Ireland last Easter, that, if decommissioning started, ministerial appointments would be made.

    Sadly, through no fault of the Prime Minister, the Hillsborough declaration was not implemented. It is worth noting why. It was because the paramilitaries and their political friends, both republican and loyalist, refused point blank to decommission. The Prime Minister had, therefore, to go back to the drawing board and had extensive, and no doubt exhaustive, discussions with all the political parties in the Province.

    I should like to finish this point, and then I shall certainly give way.

    The Prime Minister had exhaustive discussions with all the political parties only a few weeks ago. At the end of those discussions, he came up with a blueprint that invited the House and Unionists to set up an Executive in which Unionists and others would sit as Ministers with Sinn Fein representatives, without any decommissioning. I found that unacceptable. However, the Prime Minister then said, "There will be failsafes. I am inviting you to set up the Executive and, within a few days, there will certainly be penalties for any of the paramilitaries who do not decommission." That, I reluctantly concluded, was the only way forward.

    We therefore supported the Government because, as the Prime Minister eloquently said on the steps of Stormont, in an article in The Sunday Times and at the Dispatch Box a week last Monday, that would put whoever was not prepared to move forward completely on the spot. Under those circumstances, providing that the agreement was legally binding, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State would have had our wholehearted support and we would have advised Unionists and others to agree to be Ministers in that Executive.

    I shall quote from the significant article by the Prime Minister in The Sunday Times of 5 July. He said:
    "Within days of devolution, the paramilitary organisations, including the IRA, must notify intention to decommission. If they don't there's a failsafe that unwinds devolution.
    Within weeks they must decommission. The process is then verified by an independent commission, headed by the highly respected General de Chastelain."
    I agree wholeheartedly with all that. The Prime Minister continued:
    "This failsafe will be put in legislation and made automatic".
    One can imagine our disappointment, then, when the failsafes were not included in the legislation that we finally saw early yesterday evening.

    I shall specify which failsafes are missing, and then I shall give way to the hon. Gentleman. I want to make it very clear why we believe that the failsafes promised by the Prime Minister are not in the proposed legislation, and why we shall be seeking to amend the Bill to ensure that they are. When the Bill is amended, we will vote enthusiastically for its Third Reading.

    Three failsafes are missing. First, there is no tight, transparent timetable in the Bill. We are being asked to rely on various remarks of the respected independent General de Chastelain, and hope that he will produce a timetable. That could lead to a fudge, and the Prime Minister knows that. We want a timetable in the legislation. Then we can judge whether any paramilitaries are failing to decommission in time. We must have a tight, verifiable timetable.

    Secondly, if the IRA fails to decommission on time—I sincerely hope that it decommissions so that Sinn Fein can play its full role in the Executive—it should be automatically excluded from the Executive. As the Bill is drafted, the whole Executive and the whole Assembly would be closed down and suspended. I have never known of a situation in which everybody is punished equally. Those who have done no wrong and who have fulfilled their obligations would be punished in exactly the same way as those who failed to fulfil their obligations by not decommissioning. That cannot be fair and equitable.

    We require a third and final failsafe. I hope that the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister will agree that only some of the paramilitary parties are the slightest bit interested in the Assembly or the Executive. Only the Provisional IRA, through Sinn Fein, is interested in the Assembly and the Executive, and only the Ulster Volunteer Force and the Progressive Unionist party are interested in the Assembly. None of the others has any political representation in the Assembly, so there is no punishment for them. As the Bill is drafted, the Loyalist Volunteer Force could fail to decommission on time and bring the whole pack of cards tumbling down. That cannot be right.

    It is not reasonable to ask the Provisional IRA to decommission, if we cannot be certain that the loyalist paramilitaries will also decommission. We would be asking republicans to disarm when their own people, as they would put it, would be fearful of attack from loyalist thugs, terrorists and paramilitaries but have no means of defending themselves.

    So, it is absolutely essential that, if any paramilitary group fails to decommission on time, its terrorist prisoner release is immediately halted by the Government. That is the only sanction that we have against them, and we need it not just to protect the democrats and the democratic process, but to assure the republicans that there will be loyalist decommissioning as well and that their own people will not be unduly exposed.

    The hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) has been very patient, and I shall now give way to him.

    I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way; I indeed have grown patient. Will he explain his espousal of the Hillsborough declaration, which was also espoused by the Unionist parties, with only a little token decommissioning, no de Chastelain report and a commitment to run the d'Hondt system on that Maundy Thursday and for an Executive to be up and running by the end of Easter, but his refusal to accept this proposal, which contains not only the de Chastelain report but the commitment of de Chastelain reports on four different occasions, a beginning, a middle and an end to decommissioning and a failsafe device if that is not met?

    I can straightforwardly explain that. In a perfect world all of us, including the hon. Gentleman, would prefer decommissioning to be going ahead at the same time as ministerial appointments, and that is why we supported the Hillsborough declaration.

    We are now being offered that Ministers be appointed to the Executive with no certainty that there will be decommissioning in future, and the possibility of a fudge. That fudge will be removed if our amendments are passed. It will then be legally binding that there will be a timetable, the exclusion of Sinn Fein if the IRA does not decommission, and the halting of terrorist prisoner releases for any paramilitary group, loyalist or republican, that does not decommission on time. These are true failsafes that would avoid a fudge and ensure that the proposed legislation moves forward.

    The Secretary of State and the Prime Minister are absolutely right when they say that there is a lack of trust. We know after nearly 30 years of troubles in the Province that trust is in desperately short supply. To paraphrase, Unionists do not trust the IRA to decommission at all, and republicans, and quite probably some constitutional nationalists, do not believe in their heart of hearts that the Unionists will ever agree to share power or to be Ministers in an Executive with nationalists or republicans, and certainly with Sinn Fein.

    The Secretary of State and I will never be able to persuade those people, because the trust is not there. The only way forward is to have legislation of the sort that is being introduced today, where there are copper-bottomed guarantees and failsafes in law so that those concerned are not taking my word for it, nor the right hon. Lady's, nor even the Prime Minister's or General de Chastelain's. They will have it in law, in statute and in an Act of Parliament that has been passed by the House of Commons that, if anyone reneges on his obligations, he will be fully penalised.

    It is a crying shame that that is not the position at present because there is a real possibility of moving forward in a way that we have been unable to do before, and having proper, inclusive, devolved government in Northern Ireland combined with the decommissioning of illegally held weapons and an end to violence. It is so close; it is a pity that the Bill is flawed and will not allow that to happen.

    4.52 pm

    As the Secretary of State said in her introductory remarks, the Bill is to give effect to the declaration made on 2 July by the Prime Minister in association with the Irish Prime Minister. In that declaration, the Prime Minister is asking us to take part in an Executive with Sinn Fein in advance of decommissioning. The right hon. Gentleman knows that we are reluctant to do so. Our reluctance will be portrayed by some as an unwillingness to share in an Administration with Catholics or nationalists. That is untrue.

    The d'Hondt formula, which will produce an inclusive Executive, was the proposal of the Ulster Unionist party. The concept of proportionality goes back to the proposals made by Jim Molyneaux, as he then was, and the hon. Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) to the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 1987. The administration of the shadow Assembly, over the course of the past year, has been conducted jointly by myself and the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon). Last Friday, our Ulster Unionist executive explicitly endorsed the concept of an inclusive Administration. I mention this so that no one should be taken in by the Sinn Fein lie on this point.

    Nor do we have an absolute objection to those with a terrorist past. We know that people can change and that having a past does not disentitle one from a future, but it places an onus on those concerned to show that the past has been left behind. I recall that, a few days after becoming leader of my party, I was happy to welcome into our headquarters a politician who was once a republican activist. I had good reason to know that he had left that past behind him. He is not the only former republican activist with whom I have been willing to work. Our problem is not with former terrorists; it is about taking an existing and active terrorist organisation into government, for that is what Her Majesty's Government now propose.

    To meet that concern, the Government offer what they call a failsafe mechanism. As I said on 2 July, that mechanism is flawed and unfair—unfair because, if Sinn Fein breaks its obligations, everyone in the Executive is ejected from office. As the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) said, the innocent are punished along with the guilty, and the democrats are treated as though they were indistinguishable from the terrorists.

    The fair response is obvious and has been mentioned. The offending party should be removed. If that were in the Bill, it would go a long way to making it acceptable, but it is not. Why not? The answer given by the Prime Minister in his newspaper article, to which we have heard reference, is that he cannot compel any party to remain in the Executive. In the circumstances, the implication is obvious. The implication is that the SDLP does not want to sit with us, if it means being apart from Sinn Fein.

    Why arrange matters in the legislation so that that position is concealed, while we are forced to a public choice? The answer to the second question comes from a study of clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill. They provide for a review, which is arranged and carefully structured to be equally open to two different outcomes. One is that Sinn Fein is excluded, and the other is that the default is waived and the original Executive is reconstituted.

    We are left with the suspicion that this arrangement has been made to hold out the prospect that we can be pressured into waiving the failure to decommission—that decommissioning can, as it has been throughout this process, simply be moved into the next phase. We are left with the suspicion that that is the Government's intention. I have tabled amendments that would cure that flaw, and I invite the Government to accept them.

    The mechanism itself is flawed. There is no certainty about it. Yes, the Secretary of State is made subject to a duty, and rightly so, because the Government know that after the way in which she has disregarded those matters which, under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, she should have taken into account, no Unionist would have any faith in her judgment.

    However, decommissioning itself is not subject to any precise duty. Clause 1(1) refers to commitments. Those are defined as commitments under the agreement or the joint statement, but does that involve any clear commitment, short of completing decommissioning by May 2000?

    The Secretary of State has attached weight to statements given by General de Chastelain who said that, in his view, the procedures should begin within a few days, and actual decommissioning should begin within a few weeks; but can it be said that there are commitments to that, and that those constitute commitments under the statement, for the purposes of the Bill? In any event, we know only too well how republicans can spin out procedures.

    It would be beneficial if people looked carefully at the decommissioning scheme. It does not refer to timetables. Timetables have been mentioned, but there is no explicit reference in the decommissioning scheme to a timetable. The nearest that we come to it is in paragraph 12 of the decommissioning scheme, which states:
    "The Commission may make such arrangements as it considers appropriate to facilitate the decommissioning of arms."
    I repeat:
    "such arrangements as it considers appropriate to facilitate"
    decommissioning.

    It may be possible to stretch that language to include a timetable, but can it then be said that there is a commitment to that timetable for the purposes of the Bill? The arrangements will have to be proof against legal challenge. A further flaw is that they depend on the judgment of the commission. Although I have every faith in John de Chastelain as a person, I am well aware of how procedures can be exploited and how timetables can be stretched. Again, I have tabled amendments on that which will cure that flaw. Again, we invite the Government to consider them.

    That is not the only flaw in the arrangement. As the right hon. Member for Bracknell has said, decommissioning must be mutual. We expect republicans to decommission. Equally, loyalists must decommission. It would be difficult to expect republicans to go through with decommissioning if loyalists refused to reciprocate. Although one has to say that republicans have a bigger arsenal and they could start, there must still be that mutuality. The Bill has a sanction for republican default—specifically Sinn Fein-IRA default—but there is no sanction for loyalist default or, indeed, default by the Irish National Liberation Army. It and the loyalists are not likely to be in the Executive and one loyalist party—and, indeed, the INLA's party, if it still exists—is not even in the Assembly. The only sanction there can be for other paramilitary groups is in respect of prisoners' release.

    The Secretary of State has hinted that that sanction would be applied in the exercise of her discretion under the existing legislation, but, as I pointed out to her, the sanction in the Bill against republicans is automatic. In my view, the sanction against other paramilitaries ought to be equally automatic and it is of course open to the Government to amend the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 to do that. Again, amendments have been tabled which would have that effect.

    There are other flaws—many others—but I do not want to go through them all in detail; I shall pick out just a few. The statement made by the Prime Minister referred to suspending
    "the operation of the institutions"
    of the agreement, but the legislation leaves out many of those institutions. It leaves out the civic forum, the Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission, the commission on policing and the revue of criminal justice. They are also institutions of the agreement. There is a simple message here, which I hope will have some appeal to Labour Members—one out, all out.

    Much worse than those omissions is what appeared on reading the Bill to be the deliberate continuation of the north-south implementation arrangements in direct defiance of the agreement. The Secretary of State has referred to a draft treaty lodged in the Library. That is the first bit of information that we have had about that. I shall endeavour, when I can, to look at that document to see whether it is effective. I am sorry that she did not see fit to inform us about that important matter on which we had already made representations to the Northern Ireland Office and the Government.

    Despite the flaws in this option, there are those who would say to us that we should put the matters to the test anyway. It has been said that we have nothing to lose and would gain by exposing republicans. I can see two ways in which it is possible that we could gain. First, if it were clear that actual decommissioning would occur—and did in fact occur within a few weeks, as I would define "few"—then not only us but society as a whole in Northern Ireland would gain, because we could then say that the situation had clearly turned the corner and we would be able to proceed in Northern Ireland in a wholly peaceful and wholly inclusive manner. That is a prize worth obtaining and there would be advantage—not only to us, but to republicans and nationalists as well. Indeed, I have not been able to understand why republicans have not been prepared to move on that matter with us, as we have repeatedly offered to do.

    I suspect that the explanation for republicans' failure to move with us on that matter is that they still have hopes of being able to bring the entire republican movement—their so-called army as well as their party, inextricably linked as they are—together into the heart of government. That would carry with it the danger of creating a Mafia state and it would also retain, if only for a future generation, the option of using violence to finish the job. That explanation, to our way of thinking, is reinforced by the complete absence of any evidence of what the Prime Minister called a seismic shift in republicanism. We have looked, and we will continue to look with an open mind, for signs of such a move. We would like it to happen, but we will guard against the wish being father to the thought.

    The second way in which it is possible that we would gain would be if, in the event of a failure to decommission, the SDLP decided to form an Administration without Sinn Fein, but in view of the structure of clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill, and the constant equivocation about that by nationalism generally, the prospect is not inviting. I do not want to go into too much detail on this issue, but I have to say that it is sad that a party that asks us to gamble cannot tell us what its position will be in certain clearly defined circumstances that are perhaps only a few weeks away. It is not a matter of prejudging something in unknown circumstances or writing a blank cheque, although we were offered one a few months ago. It would be easier for us all if the SDLP could muster a fraction of the courage that it attributes to us.

    Those two ways in which it is possible that we could gain from this measure now seem unlikely. In all other ways we would lose. Undertaking such a gamble would mean putting an enormous strain on society as a whole, and on Unionism in particular. In undertaking such a gamble, one would sacrifice an important principle involving the integrity of the democratic process. It is stated several times in the Belfast agreement that only those who are committed to peaceful, democratic means should hold office. It would clearly be wrong to place in government those with a private army.

    I can illustrate the problem that would arise quite simply. Under the Government's proposals, we could easily have in Belfast a Sinn Fein Minister of Health in charge of, among other things, an anti-drugs policy, while his colleagues in the IRA continued to use the threat of armed force—and, who knows, perhaps even the Minister's advice—to enable them to control and exploit the supply of illegal drugs.

    We summed up this whole issue in the phrase: "no guns handed in, no hand in government." We know that matters are not always as clear cut as we would like. That is why, on 10 April last year, we accepted an agreement that has unsatisfactory aspects, as the right hon. Member for Bracknell said. Moreover, the agreement's provisions on decommissioning contained ambiguities. I considered that there was enough time for republicans to establish their intentions, and I was fortified by the fact that the Prime Minister publicly shared my construction of those provisions as requiring a beginning of decommissioning in June 1998.

    The agreement divided Unionism. I thought that, as the benefits of the agreement came through, support for it would grow. Instead, over the past 15 months, the perception of Unionism has been that matters have not improved. None the less, I consider that what I did then was right. I still want the agreement to succeed, but I remain to be convinced that the right way to do it is through this hastily concocted scheme, which clearly has not been thought through.

    We must take account of the possibility that individuals or a movement are in the process of evolution, and that, given time and space, could change. We know that our objectives can be achieved in a variety of ways. If there was a clear, watertight scheme, in which there was at the outset an unequivocal commitment to change and a process that genuinely guaranteed to deliver that change, we would have to consider whether a scruple over a period of days could be justified. We do not have that option before us today.

    The House should seriously consider whether the haste with which this measure has been presented is really needed, or whether it would be better to have more time and to proceed on a sounder basis. I have no doubt that that would be a better way to proceed, just as I have no doubt that we should all tell the paramilitaries that the right way forward is not for democrats constantly to have to bend to the requirements of paramilitaries, but for paramilitaries to accept the opportunity this process offers them of becoming fully and genuinely partners in the democratic process.

    5.9 pm

    I should like to begin by expressing our deep appreciation and gratitude to the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and Ministers for the enormously detailed work that they have put into this matter—the most serious human problem facing this Government, as it was for previous Governments. We are deeply grateful to them for the efforts that they are making, particularly to break the present impasse. I regret that the debate is taking place, because if one were watching these proceedings and did not know Northern Ireland, one would get the impression that no progress had been made at all, whereas in fact there has been enormous progress in the past few years and the atmosphere on our streets has been transformed. I pay tribute to the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), who laid the foundations for this approach, and made an enormous contribution.

    In recent weeks, we have heard major statements from the business community, the trade union movement, community groups and the youth movement, calling on the political leadership to keep working to build on the progress already made rather than arguing and quarrelling all the time. I hope that we shall be doing that soon.

    As well as the transformation of the atmosphere on our streets, where there is now peace, what is interesting is the strength of the call from young people for a continuation of the process. Most people under the age of 30 have never known anything other than the troubles on our streets, and no one knows better than they how much progress has been made. The youth movement is sending strong messages to us.

    The most important aspect of what has happened is that, in the case of the Good Friday agreement, the final word was not with the politicians but with the people. That was an historic development: for the first time in our history, the people of Ireland—north and south—with a vote spoke on how they wished to share that piece of earth.

    Listening to some people, one would think that the agreement constituted the appeasement of certain extremists. Central to it, however, was a transformation of nationalist thinking right across Ireland, north and south—and that included Sinn Fein. It is totally accepted that it is the people of the island who are divided, and that agreement is the only way in which to solve the problem. That agreement must involve the allegiance and loyalty of both sections of our people.

    As the Secretary of State pointed out, what is central is the complete acceptance of the principle of consent by all the parties from the nationalist tradition. That is a major step forward. What has not gone, however—this is obvious from the debate, and has been mentioned by several speakers on both sides of the House—is the distrust that exists between both sections of our community. Given the centuries of quarrelling, it is natural enough, in a sense, for such distrust to exist; but part of our task for the future is to erode it.

    The people voted overwhelmingly for the agreement. We hear a good deal of talk about democracy here. If we are true democrats, what is our duty? It is to implement the will of the people in all its aspects and, therefore, to implement all aspects of the agreement. The two Governments have been dealing with the current impasse preventing such implementation.

    Is the hon. Gentleman telling us that, when the majority of people of Northern Ireland voted in favour of the Good Friday agreement, they were, in effect, voting for terrorists in government? Surely they were not; they were voting to remove terror from their community through decommissioning.

    To be honest, I do not need a lesson from you about such matters. I do not know how you interpreted my remarks in that way. What I am saying is—

    Order. I must remind the hon. Gentleman that if he says "you" he is addressing the Chair.

    I am sorry about that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but, as I said, I do not understand why I was interpreted in that way. I was saying, and saying very clearly, that it was our duty to implement the will of the people, which means implementing the Good Friday agreement in all its aspects. The basis of the agreement is the provision of lasting peace and stability on our streets, and the removal of violence from our streets for keeps. That is what it is about.

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that part of the difficulty that we face today is that the agreement that was endorsed in the referendum meant very different things to very different sections of the community, and the absence of clarity on what it actually meant means that all the chickens are coming home to roost today?

    I do not think that there are two meanings of the word "peace". The agreement meant peace and stability to the people and they came out in strength. Let me put it like this. Who could have thought five years ago that the people of Ireland as a whole—71 per cent. of the people of the north and 93 per cent. of the people of the south—would agree on how we live together in that island, and what democratic institutions should be there to represent them? That is the powerful progress that has been made. It is our duty not to let the impasse erode it.

    Of course, part of the task of moving forward, as I have already said, is eroding the distrust. There is one solid way in which to do that. When the impasse occurred, the two Governments met and set out three principles which all parties agreed to—the Unionists, Sinn Fein and ourselves agreed to those three principles. The first principle was moving into setting up the inclusive Executive. Of course, let us not forget that that is a very important factor in our future, because, for the first time in our history, all sections of our people will work together. It is by working together that we will start to see the real solution.

    The institutions that we are setting up are a framework. The first principle of our peace process is respect for our differences—no victory for either side. The second is the creation of institutions that can achieve that. That creates a framework, but it does not remove the distrust of centuries. That distrust will be removed only when both sections of our people start working together—as I often put it, spilling their sweat and not their blood. By doing that, we will break down the barrier. That is the first principle set out to us by the two Prime Ministers—to get inclusivity, because inclusivity is, indeed, important.

    Let me make it clear: there is no circumstance in which either my party or I would sit in government with any other party that is either engaged in violence or threatening violence. That has been our consistent position since we were founded as a party. As everyone knows, we have been in the front line against violence throughout our existence.

    The second principle that was agreed was that the decommissioning would take place by May next year, according to a timetable laid out in the agreement. The third principle was that it would be carried out by an independent commission of experts. The arguments about decommissioning that have gone on here today and in the past months were going on earlier, too. Remember that the talks process lasted two years. Going through all that, it was very obvious that we could not reach agreement on how to handle the decommissioning thing, and that the best way of dealing with it was to bring in an independent commission of experts.

    We have that commission of experts. Let those experts do the work and report. When they report, let us consider their report and let us take decisions based on the realities that they tell us, not on the distrust of both sections of our community.

    May I ask the hon. Member for Hume to whom he is giving way? [Interruption.] I apologise; I mean the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume).

    I will not make the remark that I was thinking of about all of them, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but let one of them go ahead.

    The hon. Gentleman says that his party would not sit in government with those who use or threaten violence. Would he, for the sake of clarity, interpret to the House whether he considers holding on to an arsenal of weapons to be the threat of violence?

    We are totally committed to the Good Friday agreement, which contains a total commitment to total demilitarisation, total disarmament and total decommissioning. We want to see that done, now. As we know, however, given our history, it is not an easy thing to do.

    Decommissioning is not the most important factor in ending violence, as one could decommission on Monday but secretly buy more guns on Tuesday—[Interruption.] That is true. What is very important is that those who say that they have ended violence mean it and are practising it. We want the gun to be taken completely out of our society, and, within the established time frame, we want there to be total demilitarisation, disarmament and decommissioning. We want that to be done to the satisfaction of a commission of experts. That is how we have approached the matter, and that is how we should approach it.

    Ultimately, we have to deal with the distrust. Therefore, the sooner we resolve this impasse, have an inclusive Executive, and start working together, the better.

    I also hope that the House—I am now appealing to Opposition Members—will keep bipartisanship strong. The issue that we are debating should never be a source of party politics. We want bipartisanship to be maintained, and I should hope that the issue—given the role of human nature in our terrible problem—rises above party politics.

    I should give some advice—

    The advice that I should like to give to both the Leader of the Opposition and his spokesman, the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay), is that you might occasionally check the opinions of other sections of Northern Ireland. The Leader of the Opposition should take a lesson from his predecessor, who not only laid the foundations for our peace process, but, throughout, kept himself fully informed of the opinions of different parties. Never yet has the Social Democratic and Labour party had a meeting with the new leadership of the Conservative party. What does that say about their real interest in our situation?

    I appeal to the Conservative leadership: get yourselves informed. If you were fully informed on the different shades of opinion, you might take a more sensitive approach to the problem.

    I hope that all of us will now take it as our duty to implement the will of our people and use all of our energies in doing so—to resolve the impasses to the satisfaction of all sides. The sooner that we do that, and the sooner we start working together, the sooner we will start really solving the problem.

    I should say that I hope that I shall listen to the words and advice of all hon. Members.

    5.23 pm

    If today passes with some well-meaning platitudes from all of us but without some hard questions, I think that we shall have lost a very precious opportunity. Today is a day to say what hitherto has not been said, and for more than one party present today to do what hitherto has not been done. For generations, men and women of both traditions have been murdered in Northern Ireland by paramilitaries. After years of work, with many of the people who have worked on both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland, we are on the verge of a settlement.

    Is it not perverse that, at the very last hurdle, it is one of the democratic political parties—the Ulster Unionists—that is being urged, quite predominantly, to take one more risk on the good faith of a paramilitary group, the IRA? We should not be surprised that that is so. It shows that democrats demand more of one another than they do of those to whom democracy has long been an alien concept.

    In our history, however, the House has often had to deal with unsavoury groups in a good cause. Making peace is a messy business, and no one should doubt that for a second. The trick is to bring the anti-democrats within the democratic embrace. That is why the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) and his party are today facing so much pressure. Before this day is out, other parties, such as the Social Democratic and Labour party, will face pressure as well on their views on the matter. But as that happens, let us not turn logic on its head. The democratic political parties do not have Semtex. They do not murder. They are part of the solution; they are not part of the problem.

    If we are to pressurise the democrats—and there is pressure on democrats—there must be safeguards for democracy. That is what the Bill is about. Essentially, the Bill is asking the democratic political parties to sit in government in Northern Ireland with Sinn Fein before the IRA has disarmed or destroyed a single weapon. It does so for this reason—explicitly to create the circumstances in which it is believed the IRA may disarm, or so we hope.

    When Mr. Adams and Mr. McGuinness say that they will use their influence on the IRA, why do we take them seriously? Who do we think they are? Why do we think that they have influence? To whom do we think they talk? It is said that Sinn Fein is no part of the IRA—although, in the parts of Northern Ireland that I have visited, there are many dogs on the street who would not accept that.

    If Sinn Fein had no influence with the IRA, it would be but a tiny political group, of much less importance than those represented in this House. If Sinn Fein does have influence with the IRA, however, let us realise with whom democracy will be sitting down in the power-sharing Executive. That is why Sinn Fein must be expelled if there is no disarmament by the IRA. I wish the Executive to succeed, but I wish it to succeed not for a day or for a month, but for good. In my judgment, it will never be secure if it is dependent on paramilitary organisations not returning to violence if they fail to get their way in the power-sharing Executive.

    The question before us today is straightforward. Should the risk be taken to go ahead? Let me pose four questions upon which the judgment on the Bill must be made. First, if the IRA does not disarm, is Sinn Fein automatically expelled from the Executive? The answer to that question is no. An expulsion mechanism is automatic, but expulsion is not. Expulsion ultimately depends on the Northern Ireland Assembly.

    General de Chastelain reports that the disarmament pledge has been broken. All institutions are suspended from Executive action. The Assembly, in a non-Executive role, can meet and debate this. The Governments review it and report. The Assembly then considers that review and decides. However, even then, the expulsion of Sinn Fein would need cross-party support, with 60 per cent. of both main traditions voting to expel—as would be the case, of course, with any Protestant paramilitary group as well.

    On this point, the leader of the SDLP, the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume), has been crystal clear all along, and he was equally clear again this afternoon—the SDLP will not sit down with terrorists. We can assume, therefore, that, in such circumstances, the SDLP would vote to expel. I accept unequivocally that that would be the position of the hon. Gentleman and his party.

    However, I hope that the SDLP will make a further contribution, which I believe would be of reassurance to this House and to other democratic parties—that, if those circumstances unfortunately arise and it passes a vote, with others, to expel Sinn Fein from the Executive, the SDLP will commit itself to stay in the Executive and the Assembly. If it does not, all of us in the House know that both those bodies will be unsustainable and will collapse.

    If we are to move forward, everyone in the House will have to take risks—there is no one for whom there is no risk. I hope that the risk that the hon. Member for Foyle will take on behalf of his party is to commit himself to keeping the Executive and the Assembly in being if it proves necessary to expel any paramilitary group—specifically Sinn Fein, because the IRA has not disarmed. If the hon. Gentleman does not do that, the danger is that the failure of a paramilitary group—the IRA—to disarm will bring down the democratic Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly, and democracy, this House, the process, Northern Ireland and the future will all be the losers. That is a crucial point.

    The second point concerns General de Chastelain. On behalf of this House, he will talk directly to the IRA and to the Protestant paramilitary groups. He will agree what we call the modalities of disarmament. I expect that he will agree that the paramilitaries can destroy their own weapons, provided that there is independent verification. That would be sensible and I would support it. We are not looking for artificial surrenders: we want the verified destruction of the weapons. It is clear from what has been said by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State that the paramilitaries are expected to notify an intention to disarm within days—but will not actually be expected to do so until some time next month. But what will be decommissioned and when will it be decommissioned? We need to know the answers.

    I have two questions directly for the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State. General de Chastelain has not yet made the agreement—I appreciate that point—but, when he does, will they encourage him to publish the full schedules of disarmament that he agrees, so that pressure for progress can be publicly seen to be put at all points in the future? That is critical. It is, of course, the general's decision. I appointed him, and I know the independence and the quality of the man. It is his decision, but I have no doubt that he will listen to the views of this House and to any views put to him by the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State. I hope that they will put to him the view of this House, which I hope will be their view, that publication of detailed schedules would add to the confidence in Northern Ireland and elsewhere that this process is going ahead properly.

    We need to know how many arms there are as far as the general can judge. The pike in the hedge point is a real one, because no one will ever know precisely what arms are held in Northern Ireland and in the Republic. However, a judgment can be made and we need to know what that judgment is, when the general expects the arms to be destroyed and how it will be done.

    Can the Government confirm—this is the second question specifically for them—that any breach in the disarmament schedule, at any time—not just at the outset—will lead to the expulsion mechanism being activated? I believe that the answer to that is yes, but I would welcome an assurance on that point.

    The third point is the contentious issue of prisoners. I believe that, thus far, nearly half the paramilitary prisoners have now been released, and nearly half the remainder still in prison may be released within the next year. I shall be specific: under what circumstances will the prisoner release stop? As I understand it, under the prisoner release legislation, it does not stop if Sinn Fein or any other group is expelled from the Executive. It stops only when the Secretary of State decides that a paramilitary group is no longer on ceasefire.

    Here is a real dilemma. The IRA might not disarm, but equally violence might not resume. In those circumstances, the ceasefire has not been broken and, in that scenario and under the present prisoner release legislation, prisoners could still be released. That is the position and it will not do. It cannot be acceptable. I ask the Government to make it clear today that, if any party is expelled from the Executive, the Secretary of State will make the presumption that the ceasefire is at risk and halt the releases immediately.

    That assurance needs to be bankable. There must be no ifs, buts or uncertainties. There must be no pleas for fresh negotiation, and no more time. I say that as much in the interests of democracy and of the Government as for any partisan reason. It would be indefensible if releases continued and the ceasefire was broken when the prisoners were out of prison. The Government must not put themselves in that position, as it would cause them to lose all credibility.

    In political terms, that is the Government's worry, not mine. However, in terms of the Government's capacity to move forward the process in Northern Ireland about which I care so much, I do not wish them to lose credibility with either side of opinion, in Northern Ireland or in the United Kingdom. I wish to continue to support the efforts that the Government are making to end the nightmare through which Northern Ireland has lived for so long.

    My fourth question is simple and straightforward, and it, too, is directed to the Government. Can they confirm later this evening that the British and the Irish Governments are wholly agreed about the legislation and about how it will work? There must be no dispute in the future if any of the mechanisms in the Bill come to be triggered.

    The Bill asks us to take on trust the actions of people whom we do not trust. However, if the assurances that I seek are given—if the disarmament schedule is published; if the Government make the cast-iron presumption that prisoner releases will stop if any party is expelled from the Executive; if all the political parties agree to sustain the Executive and the Assembly in being even after such an expulsion—I believe that a more balanced position will have been achieved. I believe there is a risk then to be taken that would be a reasonable risk.

    We are asked to put the paramilitaries to the test. To do so, we must first put ourselves to the test.

    5.37 pm

    I listened with interest to what the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), had to say. I recall that, after the Canary wharf bomb, IRA prisoners were still released under his early release scheme, even though the ceasefire was over. The right hon. Gentleman advocates a most dangerous course when he suggests that prisoners should be used as tokens in the bargaining process. That was not part and parcel of the Good Friday agreement.

    What we are witnessing is a complete change of position by the Opposition, and the ending of bipartisanship. I am one of the few hon. Members who can recall the negotiations that started from the Sunningdale agreement and later under Humphrey Atkins and James Prior. I also recall the arrangements that were undertaken then to try to achieve a settlement, a peace, an agreement. Throughout that time, the Labour Opposition supported every effort that was made. We did not attempt to rewrite the agreements that were reached, but that is what the amendments tabled by the Opposition would do. We did not act in the thoroughly irresponsible manner adopted by the Opposition as they attempt to rewrite the Good Friday agreement.

    My second point turns on what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said in response to my intervention earlier. She spoke about what would happen if the Executive were to fail after the Unionists had made the leap of faith and accepted its establishment. She said that the position would be rewound to the status quo, but that is not the case. In fact, what will have happened in those circumstances is that two of the most contentious points in the bargaining will no longer apply. The nationalists will have sacrificed their claims on behalf of articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution, as well as the protections that they felt that they had under the Anglo-Irish agreement. The arrangement is that, once the Executiveis formed, the new clauses will come into operation in the Irish constitution and the Anglo-Irish Agreement will fall. If the Assembly were then to fail, all the cross-border, north-south and east-west arrangements would disappear.

    The people who would benefit from that would be the Unionists. They would have achieved all of their bargaining positions, leaving the nationalists with nothing. It is not Unionist politicians who are making the leap in the dark. It is the nationalist politicians. We should recognise who is making the sacrifice. Demands have been made of my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume), and he has been asked to give undertakings. That asks far too much of him. The nationalists have put far more at risk than the Unionists. They are taking a far more deliberate gamble.

    Our focus on decommissioning seems to me to be a ghost come back to haunt us from the Washington talks and from the arrangements first made by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon. As my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle has said, decommissioning could happen tomorrow, but anyone with £100 could easily buy all the ingredients for a barrack buster or an agricultural bomb. We need to decommission not weapons but minds, and hearts, and knowledge. Our great reward should simply be that the guns and bombs are by and large silent. The most important thing that we can do is to maintain that degree of decommissioning.

    Like everyone else, I do not believe that the IRA should possess weapons. Arms should be given up, and the terrorists should never have had them. But the most important things we can do are to maintain the ceasefire and to build up goodwill on the streets of Northern Ireland.

    No.

    Maintaining the ceasefire is too important to allow us to make an Aunt Sally of decommissioning. As my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister said in an answer published in today's Hansard, we do not know what weapons the terrorists hold. We will never know whether they have disarmed, no matter what they say. We must get away from that mindset.

    In passing the Bill—I hope that we do—we must consider the full implications of clause 3. When the Unionists entered into agreements a few years ago, their initial demands were that we get rid of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which then happened, and that a devolved Assembly in the north of Ireland should be achieved. We must be careful not to fall into the trap of having an Assembly that would remain after all the arrangements had disappeared. If we accept that, the point of all the negotiations will have been lost.

    What did the Unionists want? An end to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and their own devolved assembly. Indeed, the House will recall that, before even the right hon. Member for Huntingdon could set about his arrangements, a forum had to be elected. No one had asked for it or wanted it, but again we met a demand made by the Unionists.

    We must put those matters on the record because it is important for us to realise that it is not merely one side that has made, or is being asked to make, the leap—there has been a considerable leap from the nationalist side.

    I shall make a point that some hon. Members will not particularly like. Again, it concerns the IRA, which is not an organisation for which I have any affection whatsoever. The activities of the Provisional IRA have set back the cause of constitutional nationalism by the length of time that I have been in this House. I have no particular brief for that organisation but, whether we like it or not, according to their own philosophy, members of the IRA regard themselves as an army. They believe that they have made a ceasefire and that they have not surrendered. They believe that they should see something tangible coming out of the Good Friday agreement. They believed that the Assembly was to be set up before decommissioning and that it was not, as my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have said continuously, a precondition.

    The arrangements that we are making today accept that belief and start with the Assembly first. Let us bear in mind the fact that, whether we like it or not, there is an organisation out there that has that mindset. That is what my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle has been grappling with for years to bring them into the democratic process. We have almost succeeded in doing so.

    In one sense, as has been said, we can push the Unionists too far. However, the people who speak for Sinn Fein or the IRA are also grappling with the problems of their own organisations, and we must understand that too. If we fail to understand the problems of the Unionists and those affecting Sinn Fein and the IRA leadership, we are in equal difficulty and we can equally flounder. That is why it is important that we should push forward with this legislation and say, "It is there. It cannot be altered."

    All sides are making a great leap of faith. Everyone has a great deal to lose, but if we go ahead, we all have a great deal to gain.

    5.48 pm

    Just before I came into the Chamber, a journalist asked me how many points out of 10 I would give the Secretary of State for her performance. After a moment, I gave her eight. If I had given her 10, there would be little room for improvement and she would become complacent and, also, I suspect that the Prime Minister has been helping her with her project work. Having said that, I am pleased with the work that she has done. In fairness, the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister have shown an unquestionable commitment to carrying on the work that their predecessors in the previous Government did to try to create a lasting peace in Northern Ireland.

    This debate is a predictable consequence of the Good Friday agreement. The deadline for decommissioning in the agreement was clearly May 2000, but no timetable was signed up to at that stage. I doubt that Sinn Fein would have signed the Good Friday agreement if there had been a timetable and, although I realise that some hon. Members are cynical about that, I look at the matter differently. A decommissioning timetable has now crept into the process, and has potentially been accepted by those who refused to accept it in the first place. We not only have the copper-bottomed deadline of May 2000, but we are beginning to set up a timetable that increases the chance that it will be met.

    As has already been said, it is true that decommissioning is more symbolic than practical. However, that symbolism is most important, and I am concerned that that has been missed by certain hon. Members. During earlier speeches, there were calls of, "How many days before decommissioning?". That ignores the fact that the failsafe mechanism that we are discussing today is itself symbolic of how far we have come overall.

    Another problem is that the process for the timetable has become fairly clearly defined; it is called de Chastelain—after the effective arbiter appointed by the previous Government and widely accepted as truly independent. One can disagree with that process, but that is a matter of judgment, not of principle. I disagree profoundly with the official Opposition, who have major concerns because the timetable is not before us. Given the extremely sensitive circumstances in which the matter has been negotiated, I feel that this is the strongest way in which we can realistically proceed at this stage. The timetable has not been specified, but the process through which a specific timetable could be drawn up could not be clearer. It is false to raise major concerns as to the matters that we are discussing based simply on the absence of that timetable.

    The right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) described the problem; it is not so great for mainland politicians as it is for those who have to sell in Northern Ireland the decisions made in this place. One of the most important points that he made was that having a past does not bar one from having a future. That symbolises the right hon. Gentleman's courage in leading his party towards a recognition of the importance of reconciliation. He also said that the measure before us was flawed and unfair—largely because of the blanket suspension if decommissioning does not occur.

    Without labouring the point, let me say that it is fairly easy to understand why the difficult negotiations that have taken place in Northern Ireland have led to exactly that result. One can question the tactics, but it is difficult to question the principle. The final step requires some faith. That step was inevitably going to be difficult, once the Good Friday agreement had excluded a timetable for decommissioning.

    It is perfectly valid to hold a different view from the one that I have described; those who are in the best position to hold that view are not mainland politicians, but those who represent Northern Ireland. I have a great deal of sympathy for the right hon. Member for Upper Bann who, every day, has to face up to, and justify, the decisions that he makes on behalf of his party and—in many ways—on behalf of Northern Ireland as a whole. However, the alternative to accepting the measure before us is not decommissioning—it is nothing at all. It is a stalling of the entire process. If the risks—which are small for us, but great for Northern Ireland's politicians—are not taken, the result does not bear thinking about.

    Prisoner releases and the decommissioning aspects of the Good Friday agreement can be linked. One can justifiably say that prisoner releases should be linked to decommissioning—but not now. That could have been done only when the original agreement was being negotiated. Although I have sympathy with the comments of the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay), I have no process to suggest—nor, I think, does the House—that could possibly link decommissioning with prisoner releases at this stage. I remind the House that prisoner releases were linked to ceasefires, not to decommissioning. Any argument that the two should be brought together would be tenuous in the extreme. [Interruption.] I hear cries of disagreement from hon. Members, and I shall be interested to hear their arguments. However, like all other hon. Members who are interested in these matters, I have read the Good Friday agreement and I defy anyone to show me any plausible or tangible link between decommissioning—specifically the process of decommissioning—and prisoner releases.

    The hon. Gentleman may have read the Belfast agreement, but he has clearly not read the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. That says that prisoner releases can be stopped if the Secretary of State recognises that an organisation is no longer on ceasefire. The Act defines how the Secretary of State will arrive at that decision; one of the conditions is that, if an organisation is not

    "co-operating fully with any Commission of the kind referred to in section 7 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997".
    That is directly linked to decommissioning.

    That would be the argument that I would expect to try to create that linkage. The hon. Gentleman is entitled to hold that view. However, as I said earlier, these are matters of judgment. In my judgment, and that of my party, it is far more important to assess whether the ceasefire is holding in line with all the conditions—for example, whether people are being shot or whether bombs are being planted for political motives—rather than on the narrow constraint of the definition of the decommissioning process. Others are entirely justified in holding different views—that is the purpose of holding a debate. However, I cannot subscribe to the belief that the lack of a timetable and the lack of specific action by the IRA at this stage are sufficient to claim that the ceasefire has been broken, and hence to trigger the necessary consequence of that—the cessation of the Good Friday agreement and the whole peace process.

    There has been criticism—which was rather disingenuous—of some of the risks and the decisions taken by the Secretary of State and the Government in relation to decommissioning. Prisoner releases also came into that matter. The irony is that many of the decisions that are now being criticised by the official Opposition are similar to some of those that were made by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) when he was Prime Minister, and was beginning the process that has come so far during the past few years. I have often said that one of the right hon. Gentleman's great achievements as Prime Minister was to begin the process that the present Government have continued. No one can take away his achievements; they made possible the measure that we are discussing today. However, let us remember the risks that he took; let us remember how many times things were leaked that could have been enormously compromising to his Government, if the then Opposition had chosen to make political mileage from them.

    I am a member of neither the Government nor the official Opposition, and I say in all sincerity—it is not a party political point—that the official Opposition need to think carefully about what they are trying to achieve when they condemn the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister for taking risks that are very much in the spirit of those supported throughout the House only three years ago. It is ironic that representatives of mainland constituencies sometimes feel so justified in challenging the risks that have been taken to try to secure peace in Northern Ireland. Although, on occasion, I may disagree with Unionists and members of the Ulster Democratic Unionist party, I very much respect the position from which they make their points.

    In that context, although Northern Ireland Members' judgment may differ from mine, they are entitled to hold their opinions, even if their views are contrary to the Government's position. They have difficult constituencies, and they have clear-cut positions on which they were elected. That is not true of the official Opposition, who repeatedly tell us that they are supportive of the Good Friday agreement, while trying to create artificial linkages, as I have described, in a way that is, to say the least, unhelpful to the process that we are trying to promote.

    I have nearly finished my speech, so I shall not give way.

    I counsel the right hon. Member for Bracknell to consider the consequences of the views that he expresses. He must recognise that the ripple effect of the official Opposition's statements reaches Northern Ireland.

    I hope that I do not sound harsh. I believe that, for all its faults, the Bill is not a matter that we should dismiss lightly, or criticise on the basis of false premises. The failsafe that we are debating and the Bill as a whole are not really about politicians, but about Northern Ireland, the Province, and the safety of its people.

    I agree with the right hon. Member for Upper Bann that the Good Friday agreement is flawed, but it is the best Good Friday agreement that we have. We have to recognise that, if we are to have peace, we have only one route. It is possible to argue that, if we are to have peace in the near future, we have only three days. If hon. Members' views differ from mine, I can respect that, but their views have to be based on judgment and, more to the point, they have to come up with a proposal that is likely to be more successful than the measure before us. Although we often hear criticism of the proposals, we rarely hear suggestions as to how they can be improved.

    I hope that hon. Members will think hard about the proposals and the views that they express. In addition, I sincerely hope that mainland politicians take care to ensure that all of Northern Ireland's politicians are given the room that they need to manoeuvre and to make the compromises necessary to make the Good Friday agreement work.

    6.3 pm

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. In her speech, the Secretary of State referred to a draft treaty between the British and Irish Governments and said that it had been placed in the Library of the House of Commons. I have just been to the Library to obtain a copy of that important document, but it is not available. We as a party were not informed that that document was going to be made available; then the Secretary of State informed the House that it was available in the Library, but it is not. Will the Secretary of State, as a matter of urgency, provide clarification as to when we can obtain a copy of that document?

    The hon. Gentleman has answered his own point of order. It is not a point of order, but a question to the Secretary of State, which she will have heard. I call Mr. Peter Temple-Morris to speak.

    To return to the debate after that interesting intervention, which I am sure will have prompt effect, let me say that it is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr. Öpik).

    I strongly agreed with the hon. Gentleman on one point, which reinforces a comment that I meant to make. Ever since crossing the Floor of the House, I have never tried overtly to attack my former party, for obvious reasons, not least the fact that I was so connected, albeit as a Back Bencher, with so many of the things that the Conservatives have done. However, as one who has sat on both sides of the House, I agree with the hon. Gentleman that the present actions of the Secretary of State and the Government are an ever more efficient execution of that which was so well started by my former right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major). There was an element of political semi-tragedy in the fact that, having started the process and having pushed it on its way, he lacked the political necessities to carry the policy through. The current Government have them, however, and are doing a good job.

    I do not want to pursue the matter in great detail, point for point, but I should make one generalised point about the rationale for the amendments offered by the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay). All I have to say is that I regret the amendments en bloc, because I do not think that they are practical or realistic at this stage. I would add one general plea for the record, which might be read at some time: if the major parties in House were to combine together on one of the most difficult political exercises undertaken within my political life—and, I dare say, that of others—the chances of success would be greatly improved.

    I well appreciate the history of the Conservative and Unionist party. However, the practical effect of that party's actions is that tonight, at a crucial stage, it has joined forces on the amendments with one particular element in an extremely difficult question. I well respect that element, but it would be far better to acknowledge that there are two sides to the process. If the amendments were agreed to, it would be an end to the process—it is as simple as that. Today, we should be trying to preserve the process and make it work.

    The right hon. Member for Huntingdon made one very interesting remark, which has relevance today. He said that the political trick in government is to bring the anti-democrats within the democratic embrace. I have already described how, for reasons that were not entirely his fault, to put it mildly, it was difficult for him to do that. However, now, through the Bill and through previous legislation and negotiations, the anti-democrats are coming within the political embrace, and they are doing so far more effectively than they ever have before; so the trick to which he referred is now being fulfilled. The right hon. Gentleman stated more eloquently than I could his views on the amendments. If, in their naked expression, they were ever passed, that would be the end of the game and of the trick.

    Let me comment briefly on the speech of the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble). Our feelings about the deal have swung from pessimism to optimism, so, when I came into the Chamber tonight, I hoped that we would see the spirit, or the glimmer of the spirit, of peacekeeping emanating from somewhere on the Unionist Benches. Instead, we heard the expression of a hardline approach that cannot make me other than pessimistic about the rest of the week.

    When the right hon. Gentleman says that the proposals are all about taking an active terrorist organisation into government, one wonders what on earth he has been doing signing the Belfast agreement and negotiating in some detail with that same organisation over weeks and months—and, incidentally, receiving a great deal of credit for doing so in both national and international press. Now that the crunch is here—now that, as the right hon. Member for Huntingdon said, the parties are so close together that it is almost agonising to wait for them to take the final leap—we see the all too familiar retreat.

    The right hon. Member for Upper Bann speaks of descending into "a Mafia state" and of using violence to finish the job. When he uses such emotive language, he appears to forget that the whole beauty of the agreement is that Ulster remains part of the United Kingdom, as the Ulster Unionist party wants. Hearing the right hon. Gentleman speak, one would have thought that he had forgotten that, if there was any question of a Mafia state arising, the British state would be all too ready to step in.

    Let me make a couple of substantive points. I actually came here intending to be nice to the Ulster Unionist party.

    No, I shall not give way for the moment—although I asked for that. Let me say something nice, and then I shall take an intervention from the hon. Gentleman. We debated matters together in great detail last summer, and I usually gave way when it was appropriate to do so.

    I agree with the Ulster Unionists' concerns that the process is aspirational, whether one is referring to the Sinn Fein declaration of 12 days ago or to General de Chastelain's report, as demonstrated by the use of phrases such as
    "offers promise that decommissioning will take place or can now begin".
    I agree also that a direct statement of any kind by the IRA would be of enormous assistance to the process. The right hon. Member for Upper Bann and his party are right to ask for such a statement, but it will not be made. We must realise, because of circumstances, that there are two sides involved and that the Ulster Unionist position stems from strength, not weakness.

    Under the process, the Ulster Unionists have secured the most enormous advances. Peace in Northern Ireland, too, has made an enormous advance. An example of that is the concession of the principle of consent, which my hon. Friend the Member for Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) mentioned. The Irish constitution—

    I shall finish my point. The hon. and learned Gentleman will have to contain himself for a little longer, although that is something that he does not often do.

    We have had—no one has underlined this point—a prolonged ceasefire by the mainline IRA, which is still continuing. With all due credit to the IRA, that ceasefire was maintained in the most strained circumstances for 16 months during the first phase of the process under the previous Government. The Unionists become the legitimate part of all this. On that point, I will give way if the hon. and learned Gentleman still wants to intervene.

    I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does he appreciate that the consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland is required only for the transfer of legal sovereignty, not for the creation of institutions that will create a functionally and economically united Ireland, in which their consent to a transfer of legal sovereignty will be either inevitable or unnecessary?

    That is really a distraction that would lead to the debate that we had, ad infinitum, with the hon. and learned Gentleman last summer. The whole point of the Bill is to devolve the democratic process to Northern Ireland with the consent of the House and, indeed, that of a considerable majority of the people in Northern Ireland. From what I have seen of recent polls, that process would also have considerable approval from those of the Unionist persuasion.

    I turn now to the republican position. I shall not refer to the nationalist position, which is so well represented in the House. The SDLP has played an outstanding role in starting the peace process and carrying it through. I do not want to place further burdens on the party, but I think that its important role is far from over. It will have to do serious work before we eventually reach a successful conclusion.

    On the republican position, I simply say that republicans have delivered two ceasefires. They have agreed to participate in the constitutional Government of part of the United Kingdom, which of course goes directly against their traditional attitude towards partition. That is a formidable concession by any standards.

    Bearing in mind who represents strength and who represents weakness in the process, at what price have the republicans made concessions? There is serious division in the republican movement when demands are made of it. That division is so serious that outbreaks of violence have already taken place. The co-operation of the security forces has been absolutely magnificent in keeping that violence down to a level that means, perhaps, that we are not aware of how bad it is.

    There is a possible split in the republican ranks. Anyone associated with the process will confirm that the split could occur at any time, while some would argue that the ranks have already split. Such splits have been envisaged from the very beginning of the process. The question as we come into the last lap of this stage—if I may put it like that—is what sort of split we are dealing with. The whole trick—to use the right hon. Member for Huntingdon's word again—is to get the majority to take the constitutional side. Bearing in mind the history that is involved, if that happened, the "war" would be over and a minority of a terrorist or, as I prefer to call it, criminal persuasion may increasingly become a law and order problem.

    If, however, as a result of the amendments that we shall consider tonight, the majority breaks away from the process prematurely, Mr. Adams and Mr. McGuinness will be neutralised. They would be so far neutralised that they might not even be leaders of a minority. The "war" would then begin again, and would continue to have serious political and criminal overtones. The House is, therefore, dealing with serious business tonight.

    I want briefly to describe the present position. The IRA can at no time be seen to surrender. That has been patently clear, and the IRA faces demands, if not for a pound of flesh, then for something that would resemble the surrender that the Unionists so frequently resisted some years ago. In that context, the amendments are fatal.

    After devolution, the situation will change dramatically. There will be visible signs of success. Sinn Fein will be in the system and the pressure will be on it. If anything goes wrong with decommissioning, aided and abetted by the failsafe mechanism that is so well placed within the Bill, the IRA will become discredited and, potentially, isolated and separated from the political process and its political allies and wing. If that happens and there is a split, the process will be able to work and Sinn Fein can be kept within the system or expelled, or it can withdraw, as it decides. The essential point is that, depending on what happens at the time, that should be a matter for the Assembly, and we should realise that any breach of the agreement will discredit the IRA.

    Finally, I turn to what has to happen now. One side must jump. There is no alternative. If Sinn Fein jumps too soon, that will be the end of Sinn Fein and of the peace process. The Unionists would jump from a secure, protected position with an opportunity to call the republicans' bluff. They would even jump with my blessing and my assurance that I shall do my utmost in the House to protect them, should anything go wrong. That is what the Bill is about.

    I tell the Unionists that, if they do not jump now, we will slide back into the war and violence that we have, mercifully, got away from in recent times. After a recurrence of that violence, we would return to a solution that would probably be identical to the one that has been before us since the peace process began—no doubt in the form of a Bill similar to the one that is before us today.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. It may be for the convenience of the House if I clarify the matter that I referred to earlier in respect of the draft treaty. I said earlier in the debate that copies were available from the Library. I understand, however, that they have been available instead from the Vote Office since 1.40 pm today. I regret any inconvenience.

    I am sure that the House is grateful for that information from the Secretary of State.

    6.19 pm

    It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Temple-Morris), who gave me my first job in politics nearly 40 years ago—a fact that no doubt causes him tremendous embarrassment today. It is a matter of great regret to me that he no longer sits on the same side of the Chamber as 1 do, although I deeply disagree with him on the subject before the House and, indeed, on several other subjects.

    This is the first speech that I have ever made in this House on Northern Ireland. My silence does not mean that I have not followed events in the Province very closely over the years. I supported the brave and bold initiatives taken by my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) when he was Prime Minister, and though I have considerable reservations about many of the decisions taken on Northern Ireland by the present Prime Minister, I believe that he was right to continue the process started by my right hon. Friend.

    For four years, I had responsibility on the mainland of Great Britain for the protection of our citizens from terrorist attack. It grieves me to say that I did not succeed in providing that protection. I had the dubious privilege of visiting South Quay immediately after it was devastated by an IRA bomb which murdered innocent citizens of our country. I visited the centre of Manchester shortly after it, too, was devastated by an IRA bomb. No one who shouldered those responsibilities or saw that devastation would want us to return to the situation in which those attacks took place. The desire for peace runs deep. We all want it; we should be prepared to take risks for it.

    We will never secure the permanent, enduring peace for which we all yearn until the terrorists have genuinely given up violence for good. That phrase has been much used over the years. It is an abstract form of words. If it is to be made meaningful, it must be accompanied by action. The action that can give it meaning is the handing over of the guns and bombs that have been used to perpetuate the violence. I have never heard any answer to the question, "Why, if the terrorists have given up violence for good, do they still need their guns and bombs?". I have never heard an answer to that question because, in truth, there is no answer to it.

    That is why I have watched in dismay as, 15 months after the Good Friday agreement, not a single bomb, not a single gun, has been handed over. Meanwhile, hundreds of prisoners have been released. Some of them were responsible for outrages committed while I was Home Secretary. Some of them would have been responsible for outrages against my constituents.

    Patrick Magee is widely known as the bomber of the Grand hotel in Brighton. What is not quite so widely known is that when he was arrested he was planning a series of bombing attacks on other south coast towns, including Folkestone. I have no idea whether recent reports of his intentions are true, but what is clear is that he and his murderous colleagues are now free to return to the guns and bombs that they used in the past at any time they choose. That is the background to the proposed legislation.

    The Prime Minister explained these latest proposals, which are enshrined in the Bill, when he made a statement to the House on Monday last week. He said:
    "I understand perfectly well why people will not accept undertakings, words, statements or any of the rest of it … we have learned often enough in Northern Ireland that we cannot pay attention simply to assurances."—[Official Report, 5 July 1999; Vol. 334, c. 643–52.]
    How right he was, and how apt his words were in relation to his own undertakings, words, statements and assurances.

    In his own hand last year, the Prime Minister wrote:
    "those who use or threaten violence must be excluded from the Government of Northern Ireland."
    But the effect of this Bill would be to include in the Government of Northern Ireland those who use or threaten violence. In his own hand, he also promised:
    "prisoners will be kept in unless violence is given up for good."
    But the prisoners have not been kept in, despite the fact that violence has not been given up for good. The truth is that the Prime Minister has broken his promises; on this, as on other issues, when he is put under pressure, his promises turn to dust.

    The Sunday Telegraph of 27 June carried an article by Jenny McCartney which identified in stark horror the kind of situation that could come about in Northern Ireland if an Executive were set up before terrorists had genuinely given up violence for good. The scenario that she describes is one in which Martin McGuinness, a man widely believed to sit on the IRA's Army Council—and to have sat on it when the bombs went off in South Quay and Manchester—is Northern Ireland's Minister for Education; not by any means a far-fetched scenario, since Sinn Fein is understood to want to hold the education portfolio.

    Jenny McCartney asks us to suppose that the IRA, which still holds its guns and bombs, remains active on the streets, as it is now; that its members patrol Belfast housing estates, intimidate families and quell any dissent; that gangs of masked men haul people from their houses in the middle of the night and beat or shoot them for some alleged offence.

    "Imagine", Jenny McCartney says, "that you're a teacher in a Belfast school, and one afternoon someone associated with the Minister for Education pays you a visit. He says that the Minister has certain ideas about a poster campaign or about a children's demonstration, and he'd be most grateful for your co-operation. Perhaps you don't like the idea. It might be too political and, in ordinary circumstances, you would politely refuse. But these are not ordinary circumstances. You are acutely aware of the Minister's paramilitary connections, and you're afraid that there could be nasty repercussions for yourself if you don't agree. So you say, 'Yes, of course; I'll see how we can set that up.'" In the course of that tiny, trivial exchange, Jenny McCartney says, and I agree with her, a very big thing has been lost—it is called freedom.

    These are not fanciful fears—I wish that they were. They are a realistic assessment of what could happen in a part of the United Kingdom if an Executive is set up before decommissioning takes place. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) and others of my hon. Friends, and the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble), have tabled amendments. They are similar in effect to the assurances that were sought by my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon. If accepted, the amendments would minimise the harm that the arrangements contemplated in the Bill would cause; they would mitigate the damage; they would minimise the risk. Without those amendments, the Bill does not deserve the support of the House.

    6.29 pm

    I hope sincerely that this legislation will never be used. It is a sad commentary on the situation that we are all in—those who live in Northern Ireland and those who legislate for it—that, at a time when people are about to enter a partnership, they want to know how they will deal with its demise. Perhaps it is an Irish thing, or maybe the Irish thing has permeated into British legislation. It is almost as if before the wedding, or before the wedding is consummated, the funeral cortege is arranged for either the bride or the bridegroom. That is what we are dealing with and that is where we are at.

    Many serious contributions will be made to the debate, but the nub of the problem is that the Bill is based on suppositions. It is legislation for "What ifs". It is a charter for the mistrust that is so obvious today. Would it not have been better to introduce legislation when the set of circumstances with which it had to deal had become clear? I believe that that would have been the proper approach. In that event, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) would not have been talking about "What ifs", and other hon. Members would not have been basing their valid arguments on suppositions. The problem is that we are faced with legislation that is geared to deal with what may or may not become a fact. Surely it is better to legislate on the basis of fact, once that fact has arisen, than on the basis of suppositions.

    I understand why the Bill is before us; let us understand the pressures under which it is being dealt with. The Unionist parties demanded that legislation be presented to deal with the failsafe clause. That is why the Bill is being presented now and not when the situation as to what has or has not happened becomes clear. On Second Reading, and when we deal with the amendments, we shall continue in terms of what may happen in future, what might happen in future and—what none of us has thought of—what may not happen in future.

    I support the Bill in so far as it is in accord with the two Prime Ministers' "The Way Forward" and with the Good Friday agreement. I support it when it is in accord with those documents. However, there is one part of the Bill that is not in accord with them, and I shall oppose that part. I have tabled a new clause in my opposition to it.

    From all of this we must retain the Good Friday agreement, "The Way Forward" and the means of solving our problems. As I have said, we are seeking to put in place new arrangements for failure before we even begin the journey that might bring us success. We are doing so in the dark, not knowing precisely what we might be dealing with. So be it; that is the decision that has been made. I am not happy that, only days before we may be going into government, we are busy making clear how little trust there is between all of us who will have to serve in government. It is hardly the prelude for which anyone would wish. So be it; this is the situation in which we must make decisions.

    I have listened with great interest to the debate, and especially to the contribution of the right hon. Member for Huntingdon who asked four questions. He put three questions to the Government, and I have no doubt that they will answer them. His fourth question was directed to the Social Democratic and Labour party. It was asked also by the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman, the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay), and by my hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Temple-Morris). I shall take up the point. I stand by the Good Friday agreement. It is the agreement to which I owe my allegiance; I do not owe it to the Opposition, to a Unionist party, and not even to a Government with whom I am proud to be associated. I want to preserve the agreement and take every step in accordance with it.

    The one way in which we can proceed in accord with the agreement is by means of a review, which is specified within the agreement. That is the only way in which "What ifs" or hypotheses can be dealt with in accordance with the Good Friday agreement. However, what is that review? I should have liked the right hon. Member for Huntingdon to be in his place. It is a collective judgment, but made by whom? Will it be made by the Government, by the Irish Government, by the SDLP, by the Ulster Unionist party, by the Democratic Unionist party, by the UK Unionist party, by Sinn Fein, by the Alliance or by the Northern Ireland women's coalition? A collective judgment must be made by all those parties, not by one or two of them, even if the two are the two Governments. The judgment must be made on the same collective basis that led to the signing of the Good Friday agreement.

    As I have said, I stand by the Good Friday agreement. I stand also by the need for a review. However, it is suggested that one of us should pre-determine the collective decision made in the review. That one party—for example, the SDLP—would have the audacity to pre-determine what all the parties and the two Governments might decide in the review and the shape of everything that ensued as a result of it.

    It is not merely a matter of pre-determining what the review might arrive at. There is a wish to pre-determine not only the judgment but the penalty. When asked to do that, I say, "Think carefully what you are asking. You are asking one political party to pre-determine the outcome of a review." That includes two sovereign Governments and all the other parties to the agreement.

    When are we being asked to make the judgment and decide the penalty? Are we being asked to do that when things happen? No. Are we being asked to do so a month beforehand? Not necessarily. Is it to be two months beforehand? Not necessarily. What about three months beforehand? Maybe. Is it to be by 22 May? Definitely. Is it wise to make a pre-determination of the judgment and the penalty 10 months before events take place in circumstances of which we are not aware? Those circumstances could change not only by the day but by the hour. So I say to those who ask for that, "Think of what you are asking for." It is audacious. It would be arrogance on our part to assume that right, and it is unthinking on the part of others to ask that we do so. It would negate the very essence of the review system in the agreement, it would negate the way forward as determined by the two Prime Ministers, and it would negate the Good Friday agreement.

    Penalty and judgment must be left until we know the circumstances. Note that I say "penalty"; I will not shirk that word. If those who make a solemn commitment under the agreement, which we stand by, subsequently renege on it against the wishes of nationalist Ireland or republican Ireland or Unionist Ireland, does anyone imagine that there will not be a penalty? Does anyone imagine that having broken faith and trust with all of us, such people will somehow escape unscathed?

    Unionism, too, will not escape unscathed. Throughout the debate, little attention has been paid to the fact that part of the failsafe clause relates to the failure to work devolution. There is some evidence that that is a possibility. We have had empirical evidence for 12 months. It is there to be seen. Have we heard from those on the Opposition Benches calls on the Unionist party not to break its commitment to work the agreement, when month after month that was the case?

    I say to those in the Ulster Unionist party: apply the same standards to yourselves as you are asking us to apply.

    I can assure you that if any party associated with paramilitarism breaks its word to the people of Ireland in terms of the commitment given in "The Way Forward", we will not ignore it. We will not shirk consideration of penalty, as we will not shirk consideration of penalty if the commitment is broken by any of the Unionist parties.

    Has any of the Opposition parties even questioned the situation in which two members of the Democratic Unionist party who could be in the Executive by the end of the week are on record as saying that they will not work parts of the agreement? Have you suggested any sanctions in your amendments to deal with that?

    (Mr. Michael Lord)

    Order. The hon. Gentleman is straying in and out of correct parliamentary language. I should be grateful if he would try to use it.

    You are correct, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I apologise to you and to the House.

    I ask hon. Members to consider that there are more implications to the matter than one. Let us not forget that we are all doing a serious piece of business today.

    I do not expect the Ulster Unionist party to renege on its commitment to devolution. I accept what the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) said earlier. I am not one of the people who question whether he will serve in an Executive with members of the nationalist or republican community. However, if there is to be a failsafe clause, let us all understand what it is and the implications of it.

    Those implications are far-reaching. We hope to take a step this week. I ask those on the Unionist Benches especially to take that step. I ask them seriously to consider the effects of their not taking it. I understand the difficulties of the Ulster Unionist party.

    I understand the difficulties of Sinn Fein as well. Do I take its word on decommissioning? I now have a way of finding out. I have a way of knowing whether it will or will not decommission. I have a way of measuring it, against the report of General de Chastelain. I have a way of measuring it in time, against the reports that General de Chastelain is to make in September, October, December and next May. I now have a way of finding out. It may not be the ideal way, or the way that would have been best suited had the legislation been introduced when problems arose and we knew what we were dealing with, but I have a way of knowing what will happen.

    If some of the amendments are carried—I hope they will not be—we will never know whether the IRA will decommission. There are those who want a statement from the IRA saying that it will. Those are the same people who do not take the IRA's word. I am not recommending trust in that or any other organisation. I am simply saying that, for the first time, we have an opportunity to establish whether decommissioning will or will not happen.

    For the first time, we have an opportunity to ensure that violent republicanism on the island of Ireland rids itself of illegally held weapons. That has never happened before. If it happens, it will be seismic for all of us. I suggest that, when we consider the implications of the Bill, we measure.

    The right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) told us of his experiences. They were touching experiences, and many of us have had similar ones. I have lived in South Armagh for 63 years. I know republicanism. I know violent republicanism. I know it well because I came from it. I know the psychology behind it, and I know what can and what cannot work with it.

    The agreement can work, despite the fact that the legislation should not have been introduced at this stage. It can work because of the absolute commitment of the Prime Minister and the Taoiseach. Dispute what they say; disagree with their analysis; question tactics and question strategy, but do not ever question the fact that those two men have set out together to put the issue to the test. They have given us all a means of moving forward into something that is absolutely new to all for us. It is so new that it is frightening to many because of its implications.

    I have heard two anecdotes today about what might happen if so-and-so from Sinn Fein became Minister for Health and so-and-so from Sinn Fein became Minister for Education. Does that not undermine the good arguments that have been put forward about how we deal with the coming together of Unionism and nationalism in Northern Ireland? That is so close that we are almost in touching range of it, although we could lose because of our own genuine convictions, which may be based on that which is not valid—and it is frightening, so frightening that it has frightened many, especially on the Unionist Benches. [Interruption.] I am referring not to the right hon. Member for Upper Bann, the leader of the Ulster Unionist party, but to some in his party who have not yet told the House what they will do if they enter an Executive and how they will work the agreement.

    I refer specifically to the Democratic Unionist party. I await its Members taking the opportunity to tell the House that they will work the agreement fully if they take their seats in the Executive and that they will join the right hon. Member for Upper Bann, myself, my hon. Friends the Members for Foyle (Mr. Hume) and for South Down (Mr. McGrady) and others in ensuring that those who break their word, given solemnly in the agreement, will not escape lightly. I address this question to Members across the Floor: is it conceivable to any Member of the House that those who have broken their word and their commitment and reneged on the agreement would be beneficiaries of the review, which is so necessary? I ask every Unionist Member of a political party who is present to think carefully about that.

    I ask Members to think carefully about some of the amendments—not those tabled by all the Ulster Unionist Members, but those tabled by the leaders of the Ulster Unionist and Conservative parties—and their implications. Before they vote, they should ask themselves one question: will agreeing to those amendments bring forward the day of which the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe spoke—the day on which he, I or anyone else will never again have to visit a scene of violence or violent death in this country or in Ireland? That is the question, and we have it in our hands to stop that violence now in a way that can be accounted for by all of us. By all of us, I mean Ulster Unionist Members especially. When they make their decisions, they must know that those of us who will be sitting in the Executive and involved in the review with them will not take lightly any breaking of word or commitment.

    6.53 pm

    The process of gentrifying members of Sinn Fein and elevating its leaders began many years ago. It started in secret meetings, but its first public manifestation came in 1993 in the joint declaration, which is sometimes referred to as the Downing Street declaration. The then Prime Minister recognised that it would not be palatable simply to bring those who were recognised as active IRA terrorists into the democratic fold as if nothing had happened—that there had to be a cleansing process and that Sinn Fein-IRA had to do something to make people believe that a change had taken place.

    The two Prime Ministers set down in paragraph 10 of the joint declaration the criteria that they would apply to bringing Sinn Fein-IRA into the political process. They first required that there had to be a "permanent end" to acts of paramilitary violence. Sinn Fein-IRA balked at the word "permanent". Months of clarification were required, because they were not prepared to sign up to anything that might be deemed to be a permanent end to violence. Automatically, Unionists gauged that their refusal to say that they had permanently ended violence was an indicator that they would turn the violence on again if things did not go their way and they wanted to apply more pressure.

    There have been many stages in the process but, to this very moment, the giving up of arms so that they could not be used in the future would have been the one clear indicator that Sinn Fein-IRA were putting violence behind them. Although that would not be a totally safe method of calculation, it would be a clear statement of intent that they were reforming their ways. That has not happened and I do not believe that it will.

    During the referendum campaign, when many of us said that the Belfast agreement was silent on those issues and that there was no requirement to decommission before the Sinn Fein-IRA representatives entered government and the prisoners were released, the Prime Minister came out with a lot of promises. As the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) said, the right hon. Gentleman made hand-written pledges that those who used or threatened violence would be excluded from the government of Northern Ireland and that prisoners would be kept inside unless violence was given up for good. In the House, he defined that as meaning decommissioning.

    At the Dispatch Box, the Prime Minister was asked by the Leader of the Opposition:
    "Will you agree with me that prisoners should not be released early until the organisations they belong to have substantially decommissioned their weapons?"
    The Prime Minister replied:
    "The answer to your question is, yes, of course it is the case that both in respect of taking seats in the government of Northern Ireland and the early release of prisoners—the only organisations that qualify for that are organisations that have given up violence and given it up for good."
    The right hon. Gentleman came to Northern Ireland and pleaded with the people that they should believe him and take his promises and pledges that violence would have to be given up, that decommissioning would take place and that no one would be released from prison or enter government unless that had occurred.

    We all know that our position has been vindicated. Although we find ourselves on the verge of government, Sinn Fein-IRA still have not decommissioned one bullet or one ounce of Semtex and they are being allowed into government under the Government's proposal without doing anything in relation to decommissioning. The Bill is therefore being introduced by a Government who once again find themselves toadying to the terrorists.

    On a recent visit to No. 10 Downing street, I remember being left open mouthed as I saw two members of the IRA Army Council roaming freely around the corridors in their shirt sleeves. The previous Government knew that those people were responsible for giving the instructions to launch a rocket at No. 10 Downing street, but this Government consistently go along with whatever Sinn Fein-IRA demand because they know that they have the capacity to carry out more violence on the mainland against the citizens of the United Kingdom.

    The Bill is unacceptable, and it would remain so even if the best of the amendments were accepted. That might make it less unacceptable, but it still would not be acceptable because it is predicated on the acceptance into government of Sinn Fein-IRA without any decommissioning whatever taking place. It merely—and in my view quite inadequately—purports to provide a failsafe against failure to engage in decommissioning ex post facto. So far from the Bill being a failsafe, it is a risk—as even the Secretary of State said from the Dispatch Box. That statement is a long way from the words spoken by the Prime Minister on the steps of Castle buildings, when he talked of the certainty that these measures would contain.

    The Bill suggests that the so-called failsafe is triggered—an unfortunate term—by a failure to keep commitments. The commitments that are expected to be kept are set out in clause 1. What commitments have the IRA or—on the other side of the coin—Sinn Fein made? They are not set down in the joint statement or in the Bill. Who made them? When were they given? The IRA certainly has not made any. In the last IRA statement about decommissioning that is on record, the issue was "firmly ruled out"; it was "a red herring"; and talk of a "gesture" handover of weapons was "fanciful." The statement went on:
    "The weapons belong to the revolution, not to any individuals."
    It added:
    "Nothing would be surrendered until all objectives are achieved.
    There is no commitment from the IRA that has to be kept.

    I suspect that the commitments referred to are not in the Belfast agreement, because that simply commits people to use any influence that they may have. No sanction is applied if they do not use that influence or if decommissioning does not take place. The provisional movement says that it will keep to the Belfast agreement, because that agreement does not require it to do anything more than to use whatever influence it may have.

    The commitment referred to cannot be a commitment contained in the report of General de Chastelain, because there is no such commitment in that report. It cannot be any commitment contained in the declaration of Sinn Fein-IRA during the recent talks process. In that declaration, they referred to decommissioning and said that
    "the full implementation of the Agreement would demonstrably facilitate the decommissioning process".
    After the agreement has been fully implemented and they have gained all the concessions, decommissioning might be facilitated.

    I thank the hon. Gentleman for his characteristic courtesy in giving way to me. I assure him that I have no wish to disrupt his speech, but I want to ask him a question. Is it his intention to take up a seat on the Executive or to refuse to take up such a position?

    It is clear that we are trying to ensure that the Executive will have excluded from it those who are still wedded to violence. In those circumstances, we would be delighted to take up a seat in what would be a more democratic process. I am sure that those are the circumstances that the hon. Gentleman envisages, and I hope that he will vote for that this evening.

    The Sinn Fein declaration went on to say that, against the background of the full implementation of the agreement,
    "we believe that all of us, as participants acting in good faith, could succeed in persuading those with arms to decommission".
    So the Sinn Fein statement contains no commitment to do anything other than say that decommissioning would be facilitated if it were given all the concessions contained in the Belfast agreement. In those circumstances it "could" succeed—not "will" succeed. Sinn Fein will not ensure that it does succeed, even though it has the capacity to do so.

    It should be remembered that all the personnel involved in the IRA army council were in Castle buildings and were capable of taking decisions on behalf of the IRA. They could have clearly indicated that they were prepared to decommission.

    I have followed the hon. Gentleman's speech closely. Would I be right in thinking that he has a problem with the very idea of sharing any power, authority or responsibility with any representative of the nationalist community? Would that be a fair summation of his views?

    No, but I would not expect to hear a fair summation of my views from the person who has just spoken. It has been abundantly clear from the moment that I stood to my feet that it is a requirement that those in government and exercising Executive power should be those who are exclusively committed to peaceful and democratic means. There is no commitment to peaceful and democratic means if one has an armed terrorist organisation at one's beck and call with tonnes of Semtex, thousands of rifles and handguns, and even surface-to-air missiles.

    The Bill is imprecise, weak and woolly. It has to be, because all roads lead back to the Belfast agreement, which is flawed. The bad judgment exercised a year ago still corrupts politics today. The agreement did not require decommissioning, so people are at present engaged in an exercise that requires something that they did not negotiate when they signed up to the Belfast agreement. There are no sanctions for those who do not decommission.

    Let us turn to the sanctions contained in the Bill. According to the Bill, a number of things automatically happen if the commitments are not kept. It is not those who have defaulted on their commitments but those who support the democratic process who will be punished. The Assembly will be suspended, but Sinn Fein-IRA were opposed to the setting up of the Assembly. It is strange to impose a sanction against those who do not decommission by bringing down the one part of the agreement that they did not want in the first place. There will then be a review.

    Which parts of the Belfast agreement did the hon. Gentleman's party want?

    It is remarkable that people who have been in the House over the past year are not aware that we fiercely contested the Belfast agreement, and asked the people of Northern Ireland to vote against it. I am glad to say that an increasing number of them have now changed their opinion. At the European elections in Northern Ireland, 60 per cent. of the Unionist people who voted, voted for candidates who were against the Belfast agreement and who asked people to vote for them by way of a referendum on those issues. Only time prohibits me from going into the by-elections that have taken place which show that movement.

    The Assembly will be suspended and no action will have to be taken to stop the Patten commission, which is part of the Belfast agreement, or to stop prisoner releases.

    On 5 July, Downing Street quietly whispered to several journalists that it was considering reviewing prisoner releases. That was on offer if the IRA did not decommission. The next morning's newspapers carried the stories:
    "Blair offers 'review' of IRA releases".
    An official said that
    "we will review prisoner releases"
    if the IRA refuses to give up arms. Immediately, Sinn Fein-IRA got agitated. They demanded a meeting with the Secretary of State to seek assurances on those issues. No one stopped to ask the question: why would they be concerned? If it was their intention to decommission, why on earth would Sinn Fein-IRA be concerned that, if the IRA did not decommission, prisoners would stop being released? They would be concerned only if it was not their intention to decommission. If they intended to decommission, it would not matter what the sanction was, because it would not be applied against them. Clearly Sinn Fein-IRA did not, and do not, intend to decommission. They recognise that such a sanction would apply to them.

    In reply to the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr. Öpik), let me say that it is clear from the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 that the Secretary of State has the power to stop prison releases if there has not been co-operation on decommissioning. That power is expressly contained in section 3(9)(d). It is not, therefore, a question of introducing a new factor.

    If anyone were to try to identify two issues in the Belfast agreement that were most closely in parallel, the issues concerned would be the issue of decommissioning and the issue of prisoner releases. There is a similarity. Both decommissioning and releases must be completed within two years; and nothing suggests that the Government should rush ahead on the release of prisoners while decommissioning lags behind. Indeed, there is no requirement for the Government to continue to release prisoners while decommissioning lags behind. There is a clear link. Certainly the sanctions should be applied in the current circumstances, and, along with others, I have tabled amendments on that very subject.

    I have to say that the Secretary of State not only could but should already have applied the section to which I refer. It involves other issues, such as on-going violence, support for organisations that are involved in violence, and support for organisations that are threatening to use violence.

    Everyone knows that the IRA killed Andrew Kearney. Everyone knows that the IRA murdered Eamon Collins, Brendan Fagan and John Downey. Everyone knows that the IRA was responsible for the shooting of some 48 people; for the beatings of at least 120 people; and for the recent attempt to kill Martin McGartland. Everyone also knows that, while people were sitting round negotiating in Castle buildings, the Garda Siochana apprehended two IRA men who were bringing components of a bomb into Northern Ireland with the intention of bombing the guts out of one of our towns. Despite all that, the Secretary of State says that she must view these things in the round—and, in the round, we find that things never happen.

    The Garda Siochana made it very clear that the Provisional IRA was responsible in terms of the attempted bombing. The two persons who were arrested applied immediately to be admitted to the IRA wing at Portlaoise prison. It is abundantly clear that the Secretary of State has the capacity to act, and the reason to act; but she has not acted.

    People ask why Unionists want legislative guarantees. Certainly, they could not depend on its being the view of a Secretary of State that such actions should be taken, or on the taking of such actions being the wish of a Secretary of State. As the only sanction in the Bill is a review, however, why cannot that review include an automatic expulsion of Sinn Fein-IRA?

    The reason is simple: the SDLP and the Prime Minister of the Irish Republic will not have it. According to Mr. Ahern, Sinn Fein must join the Executive, and there must be inclusiveness. Mr. Ahern agrees with Mr. Blair that Sinn Fein-IRA could be excluded from government. He has insisted that an inclusive body represents the only way forward, and has said that that is why in the Good Friday agreement—and again last Friday—it was carefully ensured that the emphasis is on inclusion rather than exclusion.

    This, incidentally, is the same Mr. Ahern who, on 14 February, said that
    "Sinn Fein should be barred from the new Northern Ireland government unless the IRA starts to decommission its weapons."
    Mr. Ahern also said:
    "Decommissioning in one form or another has to happen. It is not compatible with being a part of a government, and part of an executive, if there is not at least a commencement of decommissioning. That would apply in the North and in the South."
    One is inclined to ask what was responsible for this—I was going to say "change on the road to Damascus", but the change on the road to Damascus would not have been in this direction. What we have seen is a clear sea change of views on the part of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland. Was it caused by the threat of more IRA violence—by the knowledge that the IRA has the arms and the capacity to engage in such activities?

    Last week, when we met the Minister responsible for the talks process, I told him that, according to the de Chastelain report, the joint statement and the draft version of the Bill, it was perfectly possible for Sinn Fein to be in government on Thursday, and not to do anything other than appoint a person to talk to the decommissioning body about the modalities. The terms of the de Chastelain report suggest that the best way of setting a timetable is through discussions with the paramilitary organisations; but the paramilitary organisations can say, "Yes, we will do it, but the logistics mean that we cannot do it until April." Sinn Fein-IRA could be in government for nine or 10 months, until it found an excuse—perhaps the Patten report, or perhaps something else—to say that things had changed, and that the agreement had not been fulfilled. Nothing in the Bill, nothing in the joint statement and nothing in the Minister's position suggests that that could not happen.

    I asked the Minister to explain how such a scenario could be prevented. He could find no written evidence; he could only wave proudly a copy of a speech by the Prime Minister. As he will recall, I immediately pointed to other words of the Prime Minister—pledges that had not been kept.

    The bottom line is this. The only currency that any politician has, particularly a Prime Minister, is his word. In regard to these issues, the Prime Minister has devalued that currency, and he is no longer trusted by the Unionist community in Northern Ireland.

    7.16 pm

    Listening to the debate has made me think of other parts of the world where there has been conflict, violence and murder for generations. Other parts of the world have managed to come together, live together and rule their countries together. There is no reason why Northern Ireland should not be able to do the same, but that requires the building up of trust: it requires the making of that leap from time to time.

    I have taken account of what Opposition Members have said about their worries in regard to clauses 1 and 2, but, if the present Secretary of State or some future Secretary of State dragged his or her feet in regard to the implementation of the recommendation, what purpose could that serve? Why would any Secretary of State wish to do that? [Interruption.] Opposition Members grin and make sedentary comments, but I want an honest answer. Why would any Secretary of State not want to act, given that the actions of the Government, the Irish Government and the former Prime Minister have been intended to produce an agreement?

    I will give way to someone who will tell me why the Secretary of State would not want to act in that way.

    I suggest that the reason is this. Terror and violence—especially violence aimed at the City of London—have driven the process from the beginning. That is the fundamental reason. The agreement is not about a political settlement; it is about the conflict resolution between the British state and Sinn Fein-IRA.

    I can only say that, if the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks that the process is about giving in to fear of IRA action—[HON. MEMBERS: "Yes."] If hon. Members think that, they are dead wrong. What they are saying is ludicrous, and I cannot believe that the public generally, throughout these islands, agree with them.

    If Members of the Assembly are not committed to its success, the Assembly will fall apart in any event, regardless of what the Secretary of State does or says. It is necessary to build up trust, and to act together.

    Does not the intervention by the hon. and learned Member for North Down (Mr. McCartney) do a disservice to the people on the mainland, who stood up to terror, as did the people in Northern Ireland, and never gave in to all the terror that the IRA inflicted on innocent people? Therefore, it is most inappropriate to say that the agreement comes about simply because the British Government are frightened of the IRA. We stood up to terror for so long and we would do so time and again.

    I thoroughly agree.

    None of the events is happening in a vacuum. Everything that is going on in Northern Ireland is under the inspection of the world's media and of people who care about peace and freedom everywhere. Do any of the hon. Members on the Opposition Benches really think that, if anyone who had been appointed to senior office continued to support violence, that would not be noted and commented on adversely, with the person likely to be thrown out of office?

    I come from a nationalist family background. It is not easy for me to think well of people on the Unionist side, but I have met many of them over the years, especially since being involved in parliamentary politics. I know some people who have served prison sentences for acts of extreme violence and murder, yet, if those people have changed—I believe that they have—I would support their standing for election and their holding senior office in the Assembly. The point is not a person's past, but their willingness to change and to be part of the future, not the past.

    Life does not bring total guarantees. We are not talking about buying a fridge. In any step in life, nothing is guaranteed, but we take such steps because we are human beings and we wish to live and to get on with our lives. We want to live in peace with our fellow human beings.

    The debate has concentrated entirely on the history of nationalist violence. Listening to it, one would hardly believe that there had been any from the other side, but we all know that it has a long record of violence, too, so why not be honest about it?

    I did not read The Sunday Telegraph article that has been referred to, but I recently saw in another newspaper a photograph of a tiny toddler, who was far too young to understand the words on the bib around his neck: "Born to walk the Garvaghy Road".

    When I saw that picture, I thought, "For every toddler who is wearing such a bib, there is a toddler in a nationalist household somewhere being taught: do not trust these people. Do not hand the guns in. Hide them instead because you do not know what will happen."

    It was pointed out earlier that it is not so much about counting guns as changing minds. I thoroughly believe that. It is about changing minds and getting people to change their attitudes because that is what really counts.

    If Opposition Members do not support the Bill because of their ludicrous idea that it has been introduced because of fear of nationalist violence, I will not believe that that is an honest position. They are doing great discredit to good people on their own side. It was marvellous when the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) and the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) won the praise of the world for coming together to fight for peace. We should support their efforts and get behind them.

    Opposition Members will not get behind us, but what are they saying? Are they prepared to let things unravel again? We have still to hear positive proposals that are workable and bring together Northern Ireland in the way in which we want.

    The Scottish Parliament is up and running. The Welsh Assembly is up and running. All hon. Members are anxious to see the Northern Ireland Assembly up and running, but, to achieve that, a change in spirit and attitude on all sides is required.

    7.24 pm

    I hope that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Maryhill (Mrs. Fyfe) will forgive me if I do not follow her. We are limited in time and other hon. Members wish to speak.

    I disagree with much of the Prime Minister's policy, but I commend him for his persistence, perseverance and efforts in trying to bring a solution to Northern Ireland. We all recognise that he has built on the considerable and sustained work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major). We may be coming to a point where peace is possible in Northern Ireland and it behoves us all to help that process. That is not to say that the Prime Minister has not made mistakes along the way. Some of the wording of the Good Friday agreement was so poor and lacking in precision that it allowed all sides to interpret it differently.

    Some people will suggest that it is better to have any agreement, however faulty, than none. I am not one of those. In a Province where there has been some 300 years of distrust, any dispute as to the meaning of the words in an agreement gives rise to the suspicion of bad faith. I fear that the Belfast agreement and its consequence—the Northern Ireland Bill—may repeat that mistake.

    I held a position of profound juniority in the Northern Ireland Office, but I recognise that those who do not live in Northern Ireland cannot understand what it must be like for those who do, or what it must be like for Northern Ireland Members who have seen their family, friends, neighbours and constituents bombed, beaten, shot and terrorised. The only time when terrorism can be understood, if not condoned, is when there is no alternative, no democracy, no hope. That is not the case with the IRA in Northern Ireland. It has no such excuse.

    As a Conservative and a Unionist, I believe that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, but, as a democrat, I believe that, if the people of Northern Ireland want it otherwise, they should have it otherwise. Consequently, the IRA has no right to use weapons and no excuse to hold them. It should get rid of them if it wishes to be part of the democratic process.

    There are risks with the Bill. We all know from bitter experience that the IRA takes, takes and takes and gives nothing back, but is worth taking risks for the prize of peace. There are dangers, but those dangers are rather less real than some would suppose. Using the cold calculation of the balance sheet, I ask: what is the downside for Northern Ireland? What is the downside for the Ulster Unionists if the IRA refuses to disarm? Some gestures of symbolic significance will have been made, but nothing in practice will have changed, and the blame for the lack of disarmament will be fairly put on the IRA. The upside is different. If the IRA does surrender its weapons, the long-suffering democrats in Northern Ireland will have won a famous victory.

    There is no doubt that releasing murderers sticks in everyone's craw. Releasing murderers with no reciprocal action by the IRA has been a profound mistake. I regret the equivocation of the SDLP, which makes the Ulster Unionists' agreement to the Bill all the more difficult. I would prefer it if the Bill made it clear that terrorists had to disarm and that, if they did not, their apologists or spokesmen and only their apologists or spokesmen, would be ejected from the Assembly and Executive.

    Even if the Bill is not amended, however, I shall not oppose it. I believe that there is a chance of disarmament, and a chance of peace. Although I detest and distrust the IRA, I believe that it should be given a chance to change. We should determine to give peace a chance.

    7.30 pm

    On the subject of balance, it is a great pity that, on the Conservative side of the debate, so few of the colleagues of the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Sayeed) have taken the same thoughtful line as he has. However, others have lived up to their reputations.

    The right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) lived up to his reputation of not being able to see a belt without hitting below it. His imputation of dishonourable behaviour by the Prime Minister will be widely resented on both sides of the House and across the country. I do not think that I am anyone's idea of a slavish Government loyalist or any type of toady, but I do believe that the efforts of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and her Ministers have been widely admired, not only across the country but around the world. To do as the right hon. and learned Gentleman did in accusing the Prime Minister of having dishonoured his promises was unworthy of a man who held the high office that he held for so long in the previous Government.

    The right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major)—always less clear, more circumlocutory than the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe—left me unsure about whether he was supporting the Government's peace process—the words "like the rope supports the hanging man" came to mind—or whether he would be in the Government Lobby today, as the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire will be.

    Nevertheless, I was sure that the support—if it was there—offered by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon was far less unequivocal than the support that was given to him earlier in the process, in very dark and difficult times, by the previous Opposition Front-Bench team. At that time, the right hon. Gentleman, who was then the Prime Minister, was telling us that it would be gut-wrenching and turn his stomach to talk to terrorists. Later, of course, it emerged that that is precisely what he had been doing for quite a considerable time in secret, without informing the House or the country.

    Lord Whitelaw—whom we buried recently; that great statesman—had an even earlier try at lifting terrorist prisoners out of Long Kesh and bringing them to a posh house in Chelsea, to try to broker the type of peace that we now have so nearly within our grasp.

    I understand why the Ulster Unionists—

    No; I have no time.

    I understand why the Ulster Unionists take the position that they do—I know where they are coming from and the constituency that they represent. They are right to negotiate and haggle, to the last second, to protect the interests of their constituents, who are a vital and important part in the whole picture.

    What I genuinely cannot understand is how, today, the Conservative party—a once great national party; once a party of government—could make a turn to such breathtaking irresponsibility, playing fast and loose with people's lives—which is what they are doing—by becoming the mainland political wing of Ulster Unionism. They have shown that breathtaking irresponsibility by quibbling and haggling over how many days is "days" and how many weeks is "weeks", whereas Ireland has waited not decades, but centuries to achieve the type of peace that we now have within our grasp—[Interruption.]

    Unionist Members scoff, but they do not cut a very handsome figure. They should remember that the people of the United Kingdom mainland are those whose blood and treasure has to be expended to defend the Union and the Unionist population; who, for decades, have sent their soldiers on to the streets of Northern Ireland, to try to keep the peace and fight terrorism; and who have expended billions of our taxes to try to keep that peace. It is about time that Unionist Members remembered that they have to try to keep the British population on side as well, and stop being so selfish and irresponsible about it.

    It is simply not true that the nationalists and the republicans have given nothing in the process. It is simply to fly in the face of reality to assert—as has been done today—that, somehow, they have come out winners in the process. The republican tradition has abandoned for all time the notion that anything other than the consent of the majority of the people of the six counties can change the constitutional course of events. That is a monumental change in republican thinking.

    The Irish Republic has abandoned articles 2 and 3 of its constitution—[Interruption.] It has promised to do, and will do so, according to the terms of the agreement. Those articles were central to the very foundation of that state.

    The IRA has for a very long time been on a military ceasefire. When I heard the former Home Secretary recite the dismal litany of events to which he was witness—las all of us were—and all the blood and suffering that he saw in his time in government, I wondered how he could seem so sanguine about the possibility of returning to all that.

    In the 60 seconds left to me, I say only that, if the process all comes crashing down, the echoes will be long and loud in Ireland, both north and south, and here on the British mainland. Many more people will suffer the awful misery to which the former Home Secretary referred. Avoiding that is the prize in front of us—making all that a part of the troubled history of Britain and of Ireland, and looking forward to a new future. Only a madman would wish to take risks—

    I am sorry to say that I have no time. I have been told to sit down at 7.38 pm, although I have waited all day to make this speech.

    Only a madman would wish to risk bringing all that crashing down, rather than allow days or weeks to pass before we could see whether the promises that have been made are going to be kept.

    7.38 pm

    Like my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Kelvin (Mr. Galloway), I have been waiting all day—to reply to the speeches.

    The debate has been one of those occasions in the House that will be memorable. We have had a relatively short debate on an exceptionally important issue. I think that all the different points of view that have been expressed add richness, if nothing else, to the House and its debating facility. I think also that no one in the Chamber—from whatever party he comes, or whatever views he may have on the Good Friday agreement—is opposed to the search for peace in Northern Ireland.

    All those who have spoken in the debate want peace, although they may, of course, come from different directions on the issues. Most of them expressed a desire for a political settlement. Certainly, the bulk of those who have spoken want a political settlement that is based on the Good Friday agreement—for which the people of Northern Ireland voted overwhelmingly, by a 71 per cent. majority.

    A couple of weeks ago, the Prime Minister expressed three principles to the Northern Ireland parties. First, did they agree with an Executive which was truly inclusive? Secondly, did they agree that there was a need under the Good Friday agreement to decommission? Thirdly, did they agree that there was huge significance in the role of the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, headed by General de Chastelain? The parties were asked to address those issues. That was the basis on which the two Prime Ministers went into the negotiations in Castle buildings the week before last.

    We have looked today at certainty, testing, assurance and failsafe. Some of us think that we have got it right; others think that we were getting it right, but that we have not quite got it right. We will reflect on the points made during the Second Reading debate, and those to be made in Committee later this evening. Those points can be raised again—and addressed if necessary—in the other place.

    The right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) opened the debate, and talked about the Good Friday agreement being a huge compromise—which it is. In a sense, we have been talking today about the compromise between unionism and nationalism going forward. That makes legislation very difficult. We are not legislating for an Assembly in Cardiff or a Parliament in Edinburgh. The basis upon which the Bill is founded is the Good Friday agreement. That, in turn, is based upon an arrangement that means we can have devolution, and all the other institutions that go with it, only if we can carry through unionism and nationalism at the same time. That is extremely difficult, but it is vital in considering the Bill and anything else that appertains to the Good Friday agreement.

    The right hon. Gentleman referred to the slow progress on decommissioning, and he is right. We have had slow progress, although we have made progress, on various aspects of devolution, but that is not unexpected. After 30 years of conflict and distrust—and even longer periods of dislike, and even hatred, between the communities of Northern Ireland—who would have thought that this could have been done quickly?

    When George Mitchell said after the agreement was signed that the troubles were beginning and that the difficulties were starting in terms of implementing the agreement, he was right. In many respects, it is right that we negotiate hard and that we discuss with great intensity the matters that are before us—whether it is the number of Ministers in the Cabinet, the North-South implementation bodies or, vitally, the question of decommissioning and its relationship with devolution.

    The right hon. Member for Bracknell and others referred to a timetable, and we shall discuss that in greater detail later. However, I must stress above all that the Independent Commission on Decommissioning must be genuinely independent. We cannot compromise that. What we do in this House—legislating, as we do, for the British Parliament—is not enough on its own, because the agreement is based on an understanding between nationalism and unionism. So far—and so good—both nationalism and unionism have expressed the highest confidence in the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, and in General de Chastelain personally. I know that the right hon. Member for Bracknell shares that view. It is vital that that independence is retained.

    We will see in the debates to follow that the general laid down an indicative timetable, and referred to a timetable in paragraph 21. His statement on the Friday in question mentioned "days" at the beginning of the process of decommissioning, and "weeks" in terms of actual decommissioning taking place. We will return to that matter later, and in some detail.

    The right hon. Member for Bracknell referred to exclusion. The effect of excluding, expelling or suspending is all the same because, ultimately, we will end up in the same place. I repeat—we are dealing not with Cardiff or Edinburgh, but with Belfast and the agreement based on the concord between unionism and nationalism. We will end up all the time with review—inevitably, because that is what the Good Friday agreement said, and that is what the people voted for.

    If the process goes wrong, if decommissioning does not occur, if devolution does not occur, or if all other aspects of the agreement are not working, the only way in which we can resolve the matter is through review, according to the Good Friday agreement. We have a part to play, and that is why we are meeting today. Things have developed, in the sense that the purpose of the meeting of the two Prime Ministers at Castle buildings was to try to get out of the deadlock and the impasse. The sequencing of devolution and decommissioning is precise, as is the method by which we would contest those who would go back on their pledges.

    The right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble), in a powerful speech, referred to the commitment to inclusion, which he made eloquently. He and his party have said that they are not opposed to an inclusive Executive. He said that his party was concerned about the guarantees, the failsafe, the assurances and the certainties, but that the idea of an inclusive Executive was part of his party's policy. I agree with that entirely.

    The right hon. Gentleman was concerned that, while the review could lead to the exclusion of the offending party, it could lead also to his own party coming under pressure to overlook a breach and to move forward with the Executive unchanged. No one can be certain of the outcome of any review, but I can assure the right hon. Gentleman and his party that they will come under no pressure from this Government in those circumstances.

    The hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume)—who, with others, has been instrumental in bringing about this process—indicated, rightly, that people in Northern Ireland were not politicians and that they were anxious that there should be progress. I agree entirely. Outside this Chamber, and outside the Northern Ireland Assembly, there are 1.5 million people in Northern Ireland who want and deserve peace and political stability. A great burden lies on our shoulders collectively as politicians to try to ensure that that is achieved.

    It is important politically to remember that, if Sinn Fein advances politically, the party which has more to lose than any other is the SDLP, in the sense that the politics of Northern Ireland will result, inevitably, in people voting for nationalist parties and people voting for Unionist parties. The hon. Gentleman's points were valid, and we will look again at them.

    The right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) started this process and we pay tribute to him for that role, including his campaigning for the Good Friday agreement in the referendum in Northern Ireland. He helped to persuade many people to vote for it. He made a number of important points, some of which I shall try to answer.

    The right hon. Gentleman asked whether we would encourage General de Chastelain to publish the full schedule and timetable for disarmament. The joint statement calls for the commission to specify two key dates—when the process should start and when actual decommissioning should begin. It must be completed by May 2000, and the commission will report in September, December and May—and more often if necessary.

    General de Chastelain said in his report of 2 July that he was prepared to define a detailed timetable for decommissioning, following discussions with representatives of the organisations. Clearly, there will be a detailed timetable. Under the Bill, if the general lays down a timetable, it must be kept to, or he will blow the whistle. I recognise that the publication of the full timetable would encourage confidence. Equally, it is a matter for the general and his colleagues to decide whether they should do that. He has a vital, but delicate, task. He must command confidence on all sides if he is to succeed. I can ensure that the general sees the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman, and we will take it from there.

    The right hon. Gentleman asked whether any breach of the disarmament schedule would lead to suspension. The answer to that is yes.

    No, I had better press on. I have only five minutes left to answer everyone, and it is important that I reply to the points raised by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon. A breach of the disarmament schedule would lead to suspension. Failure to take any step specified by the commission leads automatically and immediately to suspension.

    The right hon. Member for Huntingdon asked whether prisoner releases would be stopped if a party were excluded from the Executive. We have already made it clear that, under the Good Friday agreement, prisoner releases are linked to the continuing ceasefires. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has already said that one of the factors to be taken into account under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 is whether an organisation is fully co-operating with the Decommissioning Commission.

    My right hon. Friend keeps the prisoner release scheme under close review on the basis of the best security advice available. Clearly, if the process is suspended because decommissioning commitments are not being met, that factor would weigh especially heavily on my right hon. Friend's judgment about the status of the relevant ceasefire. Equally, if the Assembly, on a cross-community basis, decided that a party should not hold office, that, too, would be a relevant consideration in deciding whether any linked paramilitary organisation is on ceasefire. I have not the slightest doubt that in any review that would follow suspension for that reason, that those other matters—especially prisoner release, but others as well—would be open to discussion.

    The right hon. Member for Huntingdon also asked whether we could confirm that the British and Irish Governments are agreed on the Bill. Our relationship as Governments has never been closer and we agreed fully on the way forward. We will work together to implement the proposals made by the two Prime Ministers.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) made the point about the silence of the guns. That is significant and nobody underestimates it. The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr. Öpik)—we thank him and his party for their support on the Bill—referred to civil society and the significant fact that the people in Northern Ireland want this to work. My hon. Friend the Member for Leominster (Mr. Temple-Morris) rightly emphasised the fact that the process is two-sided, and that we cannot go ahead without unionism and nationalism both agreeing on where we go. He also emphasised the principle of consent.

    I understand the feelings of the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) about the issue that he raised, especially because of his earlier ministerial position, but I suspect from his comments that he was not too keen on the idea of inclusivity in any event, even if we did not have this failsafe legislation in place.

    The hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) asked why we are legislating now. That is a fair question and we all hope that the legislation will not be used, but if it were and we were in a recess, it would difficult to recall Parliament to consider the matter. It is also better to have the legislation because a failsafe mechanism will give assurances to all concerned. The whole House will have heard the hon. Gentleman's assurance that, in a review such as that to which I and others have referred, the defaulters will not be the beneficiaries and his party will not shrink from penalties if necessary.

    The hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) talked about my waving papers at him in our meetings last week. We will be waving more papers at him during the Committee stage of the Bill, but I am not sure that he is keen on the whole business anyway. Certainly, I know that he and his party have made it clear that they are in favour of devolution to Northern Ireland. I only hope that he and his colleagues will be able to support devolution in Northern Ireland when that occurs.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Maryhill (Mrs. Fyfe) emphasised the need for trust in the whole process. She has been committed to the role of women in Northern Ireland, and I pay tribute to her for that. I thank the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Sayeed) for his support, despite his misgivings about the process and the Bill. My hon. Friend the Member for Kelvin gave his usual rousing speech.

    The people of Northern Ireland are looking to us in this Chamber and to the parties in Northern Ireland to settle this impasse and to break the deadlock. Unless there are any better ideas, this Bill is the best chance to ensure that devolution and decommissioning occur. Can anyone give me any assurance that any other idea would produce decommissioning better than the suggestions in the Bill? Is there any other way to test Sinn Fein on decommissioning? Is there any other way to bring nationalism and unionism together so as to ensure an opportunity to test the arrangements? I do not think so and, as a consequence, I commend the Bill to the House.

    Question put, That the Bill be now read a Second time:—

    The House divided: Ayes 312, Noes 19.

    Division No. 234]

    [7.55 pm

    AYES

    Abbott, Ms DianeBell, Martin (Tatton)
    Adams, Mrs Irene (Paisley N)Bell, Stuart (Middlesbrough)
    Ainger, NickBenn, Hilary (Leeds C)
    Ainsworth, Robert (Cov'try NE)Benn, Rt Hon Tony (Chesterfield)
    Alexander, DouglasBennett, Andrew F
    Allan, RichardBest, Harold
    Allen, GrahamBetts, Clive
    Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)Blackman, Liz
    Ashton, JoeBlair, Rt Hon Tony
    Atkins, CharlotteBlunkett, Rt Hon David
    Banks, TonyBoateng, Paul
    Barnes, HarryBradley, Keith (Withington)
    Beard, NigelBradley, Peter (The Wrekin)
    Beckett, Rt Hon Mrs MargaretBreed, Colin
    Begg, Miss AnneBrinton, Mrs Helen

    Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E)George, Andrew (St Ives)
    Brown, Russell (Dumfries)George, Bruce (Walsall S)
    Browne, DesmondGilroy, Mrs Linda
    Burden, RichardGodman, Dr Norman A
    Burstow, PaulGodsiff, Roger
    Butler, Mrs ChristineGolding, Mrs Llin
    Byers, Rt Hon StephenGordon, Mrs Eileen
    Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth)Gorrie, Donald
    Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)
    Campbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NEFife)Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)
    Grocott, Bruce
    Campbell-Savours, DaleGrogan, John
    Cann, JamieGunnell, John
    Casale, RogerHain, Peter
    Caton, MartinHall, Mike (Weaver Vale)
    Cawsey, IanHall, Patrick (Bedford)
    Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)
    Chisholm, MalcolmHancock, Mike
    Clapham, MichaelHanson, David
    Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)Harman, Rt Hon Ms Harriet
    Clark, Dr Lynda (Edinburgh Pentlands)Harris, Dr Evan
    Heal, Mrs Sylvia
    Clarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)Healey, John
    Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)
    Clwyd, AnnHenderson, Doug (Newcastle N)
    Coaker, VernonHesford, Stephen
    Coffey, Ms AnnHewitt, Ms Patricia
    Cohen, HarryHill, Keith
    Coleman, IainHodge, Ms Margaret
    Colman, TonyHoey, Kate
    Connarty, MichaelHome Robertson, John
    Cook, Frank (Stockton N)Hood, Jimmy
    Corbyn, JeremyHoon, Geoffrey
    Corston, Ms JeanHopkins, Kelvin
    Cotter, BrianHowarth, George (Knowsley N)
    Cousins, JimHoyle, Lindsay
    Cox, TomHughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)
    Cranston, RossHughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)
    Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)Hume, John
    Cryer, John (Hornchurch)Hutton, John
    Cummings, JohnIllsley, Eric
    Cunliffe, LawrenceIngram, Rt Hon Adam
    Cunningham, Rt Hon Dr Jack (Copeland)Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)
    Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough)
    Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)Jenkins, Brian
    Dalyell, TarnJohnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle)
    Darling, Rt Hon AlistairJohnson, Miss Melanie (Welwyn Hatfield)
    Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)
    Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Uanelli)Jones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)
    Davies, Geraint (Croydon C)Jones, Helen (Warrington N)
    Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H)Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)
    Dawson, Hilton
    Dean, Mrs JanetJones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)
    Dismore, AndrewJones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)
    Donohoe, Brian HJones, Martyn (Clwyd S)
    Doran, FrankJones, Nigel (Cheltenham)
    Dowd, JimJowell, Rt Hon Ms Tessa
    Dunwoody, Mrs GwynethKaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
    Eagle, Maria (L 'pool Garston)Keeble, Ms Sally
    Edwards, HuwKelly, Ms Ruth
    Ellman, Mrs LouiseKennedy, Jane (Wavertree)
    Ennis, JeffKhabra, Piara S
    Etherington, BillKidney, David
    Feam, RonnieKilfoyle, Peter
    Field, Rt Hon FrankKing, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)
    Fisher, MarkKumar, Dr Ashok
    Fitzsimons, LornaLawrence, Ms Jackie
    Flint, CarolineLepper, David
    Flynn, PaulLeslie, Christopher
    Follett, BarbaraLevitt, Tom
    Foster, Rt Hon DerekLewis, Terry (Worsley)
    Foster, Don (Bath)Liddell, Rt Hon Mrs Helen
    Fyfe, MariaLinton, Martin
    Galloway, GeorgeUwyd, Elfyn
    Gapes, MikeLove, Andrew
    Gardiner, BarryMcAllion, John

    McAvoy, ThomasReed, Andrew (Loughborough)
    McCabe, SteveRobertson, Rt Hon George (Hamilton S)
    McCartney, Rt Hon Ian (Makerfield)
    Roche, Mrs Barbara
    McDonagh, SiobhainRooker, Jeff
    Macdonald, CalumRooney, Terry
    McDonnell, JohnRowlands, Ted
    McFall, JohnRoy, Frank
    McGrady, EddieRuane, Chris
    McGuire, Mrs AnneRuddock, Joan
    McIsaac, ShonaRussell, Bob (Colchester)
    McKenna, Mrs RosemaryRussell, Ms Christine (Chester) Ryan, Ms Joan
    Mackinlay, AndrewSalter, Martin
    McNamara, KevinSanders, Adrian
    McNulty, TonySarwar, Mohammad
    MacShane, DenisSawford, Phil
    Mactaggart, FionaShaw, Jonathan
    Mahon, Mrs AliceSheerman, Barry
    Mallaber, JudySheldon, Rt Hon Robert
    Mallon, SeamusShort, Rt Hon Clare
    Mandelson, Rt Hon PeterSingh, Marsha
    Marsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)Skinner, Dennis
    Marshall, David (Shettleston)Smith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E)
    Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)Smith, Angela (Basildon)
    Martlew, EricSmith, Jacqui (Redditch)
    Maxton, JohnSmith, John (Glamorgan)
    Meale, AlanSmith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)
    Merron, GillianSmith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)
    Michie, Bill (Shef'ld Heeley)Soley, Clive
    Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)Southworth, Ms Helen
    Milbum, Rt Hon AlanSquire, Ms Rachel
    Moffatt, LauraSteinberg, Gerry
    Moonie, Dr LewisStevenson, George
    Stewart, Ian (Eccles)
    Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)Stinchcombe, Paul
    Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)Stoate, Dr Howard
    Morley, ElliotStott, Roger
    Mowlam, Rt Hon MarjorieStrang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin
    Mudie, GeorgeStringer, Graham
    Mullin, ChrisStuart, Ms Gisela
    Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)Sutcliffe, Gerry
    Murphy, Rt Hon Paul (Torfaen)Taylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)
    O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)
    O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)Taylor, Ms Dari (Stockton S)
    O'Hara, EddieTaylor, David (NW Leics)
    Olner, BillTemple-Morris, Peter
    Öpik, LembitThomas, Gareth (Clwyd W)
    Organ, Mrs DianaTipping, Paddy
    Osborne, Ms SandraTouhig, Don
    Palmer, Dr NickTrickett, Jon
    Perham, Ms LindaTurner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
    Pickthall, ColinTurner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
    Pike, Peter LTyler, Paul
    Plaskitt, JamesVaz, Keith
    Pollard, KerryVis, Dr Rudi
    Pond, ChrisWareing, Robert N
    Webb, Steve
    Pope, GregWelsh, Andrew
    Pound, StephenWhite, Brian
    Powell, Sir RaymondWhitehead, Dr Alan
    Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)Wicks, Malcolm
    Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)Wigley, Rt Hon Dafydd
    Primarolo, DawnWilliams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)
    Prosser, Gwyn
    Purchase, KenWilliams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
    Quinn, LawrieWilliams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
    Rapson, SydWillis, Phil
    Raynsford, NickWinnick, David

    Wise, Audrey

    Tellers for the Ayes:

    Wood, Mike
    Worthington, Tony

    Mr. David Jamieson and

    Wyatt, Derek

    Mr. David Clelland.

    NOES

    Beggs, RoyRobinson, Peter (Belfast E)
    Body, Sir RichardSwayne, Desmond
    Cash, WilliamTaylor, Rt Hon John D (Strangford)
    Donaldson, JeffreyThompson, William
    Forsythe, CliffordTrimble, Rt Hon David
    Gill, ChristopherWilkinson, John
    Hunter, AndrewWinterton, Nicholas (Macclesfied)
    McCartney, Robert (N Down)
    Maclean, Rt Hon David

    Tellers for the Noes:

    Paisley, Rev Ian

    Mr. William Ross and

    Robertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry)

    Rev. Martin Smyth.

    Question accordingly agreed to.

    Bill read a Second time.

    Further proceedings stood postponed, pursuant to Order [this day].

    Northern Ireland Bill Money

    Queen's recommendation having been signified—

    Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 52(1)(a),

    That, for the purposes of any Act resulting from the Northern Ireland Bill, it is expedient to authorise the payment out of money provided by Parliament of any expenditure incurred by the Secretary of State in consequence of the Act.—[Mrs. McGuire.]

    Question agreed to.

    Northern Ireland Bill

    Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 63 (Committal of Bills),

    That the Bill be committed to a Committee of the whole House.—[Mrs. McGuire.]

    Question agreed to.

    Bill immediately considered in Committee.

    [MR. MICHAEL LORD in the Chair]

    New Clause 1

    Suspension Of Prisoner Releases

    'Where the Secretary of State has made a suspension under section 1 of this Act, he shall also make an order under section 16 of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 suspending the operation of sections 3 and 10 of that Act.'.— [Mr. MacKay.]

    Brought up, and read the First time.

    8.7 pm

    With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 2—Prisoner releases—

    'Where section 1 applies the Secretary of State shall specify under section 3 of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 any organisation in respect of which the Decommissioning Commission has reported under section 1.'.

    [The Second Deputy Chairman]

    Amendment No. 10, in clause 1, clause 1, page 1, line 24, at end insert—

    '(ba) the operation of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 shall be suspended and all releases so far made under that Act shall be revoked.'.

    Amendment No. 12, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, at end insert—

    '(ca) the release of prisoners under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 shall be suspended in accordance with the powers available in section 8 of that Act; and'.

    Amendment No. 29, in title, line 2, after 'Ireland' insert

    ', the release of prisoners under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998'.

    I shall speak specifically to new clause 1 and to amendments Nos. 12 and 29. I note that this debate—[Interruption.]

    Order. Will hon. Members who do not wish to stay for the debate please leave quickly and quietly?

    I note that this debate will be truncated, and that there are only just over 50 minutes in which to hold it. I shall therefore keep my remarks brief, as I covered many of the points that I wish to make on Second Reading.

    My main point is simple: there have to be safeguards, the most important of which has to be that the paramilitaries go ahead and decommission on time. The Provisional IRA, which the Prime Minister has said is inextricably linked to Sinn Fein, should have a real incentive to decommission on time. If it does not, Sinn Fein will—if my amendment is accepted later—be expelled from the Executive. If the Ulster Volunteer Force, which has a direct link with the Progressive Unionist party that is represented in the Assembly, fails to decommission, the Assembly will be suspended. In the right circumstances, I believe that the PUP could be removed from the Assembly.

    However, the real problem is that other republican and loyalist paramilitary groups have no incentive whatsoever to decommission. They will have no political partners in the Executive or the Assembly. To ensure that they decommission, the Government must say—by accepting our new clause—that there will be an immediate halt to early release of their terrorist prisoners if these groups fail to comply with the decommissioning timetable. To do less would discourage them from decommissioning.

    I have already asked the Secretary of State to consider the position of the republican community, particularly that of the Provisional IRA. The Minister and I want the IRA to decommission all its illegally held arms and explosives between now and next May. But if the IRA were here tonight, its representatives would argue that to decommission or disarm when loyalist paramilitaries were retaining their arms would make their communities vulnerable. If the PIRA is to decommission, it is essential to ensure that everyone else must decommission too.

    The Minister is responsible for security in Northern Ireland, and he does not need me to tell him that there is an overwhelming desire in paramilitary communities—loyalist and republican—to get the boys out of prison.

    Every time the Government and the Prime Minister put a terrorist prisoner back on the streets of Belfast by releasing him early, they throw away a trump card. Some 277 trump cards have been thrown away to date, and only 120 or so terrorist prisoners remain for release.

    If decommissioning does not happen, it will be essential to halt terrorist releases. The people of Northern Ireland deserve nothing less. Only by halting releases can we provide the copper-bottomed failsafes that the Prime Minister has promised the people of Northern Ireland and the House of Commons.

    I urge the Minister to accept our new clauses and amendments, or to agree to produce his own. I readily admit that his amendments might be better drafted than ours, which we were able to draft only yesterday evening. Including new clause 1 and amendments Nos. 12 and 29 in the Bill would go a long way towards satisfying the Unionist community and democratic opinion that there are real safeguards against, and proper penalties for, all paramilitary groups if decommissioning does not occur.

    New clause 1 is precise in that only those paramilitaries who fail to decommission would be penalised. No one would be penalised for the faults of those who failed to fulfil their obligations. That is essential to the proper working of the Bill and to ensuring that Ministers are appointed to the Executive to provide proper devolved government for Northern Ireland.

    I agree with the general thrust of the remarks made by the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay), and I do not intend to rehearse in detail all the arguments that we have heard about prisoner release during the past year. I shall discuss instead the Bill's focus only on default by Sinn Fein and its lack of any effective provision regarding default by other paramilitary organisations. The Bill is seriously defective as it must provide for dealings with other paramilitary organisations. It is unrealistic to apply a sanction only to Sinn Fein, when the sanction can be applied to other groups only through prisoner release.

    8.15 pm

    I drafted new clause 2, and it will be no surprise to anyone to learn that I prefer my own drafting. I focused on section 3 of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. Subsection (9) directs the Secretary of State to take into account a number of factors, the fourth of which is whether an organisation
    "is co-operating fully with any Commission … implementing the Decommissioning section of the agreement reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland set out in Command Paper 3833."
    That touches precisely on the point that we are discussing. Suspension would arise only in the event of someone's having failed to carry out commitments entered into.

    Subsection (9) directs the Secretary of State to take into account a number of factors, which gives her a discretion but, if the Bill becomes law and the Government's hopes for it are realised, the situation contemplated in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 will have changed. Some decommissioning would be happening, and the onus on other paramilitary organisations to co-operate would have to be greater than it has been during the past 15 months. It seems right to raise the standard relating to what the Secretary of State should do.

    The Northern Ireland Bill provides for automatic action, and it seems appropriate to apply the same standard to sentencing. We should bring the provisions of the 1998 Act into line with the Bill that we are debating tonight. That would be consistent. I urge the Minister to contemplate new clause 2 very carefully.

    I am about to prove that at least one person—namely, me—listens to debates in the House. Until 7.55 pm, I was fairly convinced that it would be hard to connect decommissioning and prisoner release, but one Minister of State strongly implied in his Second Reading speech that a linkage could be made. I hope that the other Minister of State can clarify matters when he deals with the new clauses.

    I believe that it is difficult to connect the terms of the Good Friday agreement, including those on decommissioning, with prisoner release. The right hon. Members for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) and for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) have given their views, but I should be glad if the Minister clarified the position, to help us to understand whether we can expect some movement towards slowing down prisoner releases without the need for the amendments.

    I have two specific questions for the Minister. What is the Government's view of the new clauses in the context of the Good Friday agreement? Will he explain, following the comments of his fellow Minister, whether, even if they do not accept the new clauses, the Government are considering some linkage with prisoner release?

    I wish to comment briefly, as my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) and I tabled amendment No. 10, which is in this group.

    I feel strongly about this matter because the only real barrier that we have to make the paramilitaries and armed gangsters understand that the Government and this Parliament mean business is prisoner release. If those concerned have left violence and do not intend to go back to it, they should be prepared for decommissioning to take place. If it does not take place, we can be assured that they intend to keep their weaponry so that one day, at some time in the future, they can do what one of their spokesmen in the Assembly said that they would do—go back to doing what they were "best at". That was that spokesman's public statement. If that is so, the deterrent is necessary and it has to go farther than merely stopping the releases. They must be revoked. After all, if we are going to go back, we have to go back to where we started.

    There is now a strong argument to the effect that those prisoners who have got out have gone back to violence. Time will declare it. I have been seeking information from the police on this matter. We do not know what will be revealed in the days ahead, but I am sure that it will be revealed that some of them have already done so.

    My understanding of the trend of the hon. Gentleman's remarks is that he opposes prisoner release, even for organisations that are willing to decommission. Given that he is opposed to the releases in any case, is a sincere reservation behind the amendment?

    The hon. Gentleman should question the motivation of the terrorists, not my motivation. None of the people who are tied up with terrorism has said that they will decommission—none of them represented in the Assembly and none of them represented at the talks. The only people who have decommissioned are the Loyalist Volunteer Force, which was not in the talks and is not represented in the Assembly. The hon. Gentleman should get his facts right before he attacks my motivation.

    I am certainly not happy with armed gangsters being released on the streets when I see their attitude when they come out of prison, what they say and do, and the people with whom they associate. If the hon. Gentleman's mother or children had been murdered by one of those people, as has happened to my constituents, he would not want them to be walking about the streets. That is even more the case now when the organisations to which they belong are saying that they will not decommission. If they have given up violence for good, surely they should give up their weaponry and then they cannot return to violence. As I said, however, they tell us that they will go back to what they are best at. The time has come for the Government to call a halt to the whole charade of what is going on with those prisoners.

    The hon. Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) continues his fundamental opposition to the whole process. Clearly, if one is opposed in principle to the Good Friday agreement, one naturally also opposes prisoner release, for the reasons that the hon. Gentleman outlined.

    I have more difficulty with the position of the Opposition, which appears to be that they are in favour of the Good Friday agreement which, as several hon. Members have said, allows for the possibility that a failure to decommission will have consequences for prisoner release and other benefits that arise out of the agreement. However, the Conservative party has for some time now opposed prisoner releases, which are an essential part of the agreement. As I understand it, the amendment would harden the agreement as regards such releases.

    I may be able to help the hon. Gentleman, as he might not have been here for my speech on Second Reading when I explained this matter fully. The situation is simply this: the Belfast agreement stated that prisoners would be released over a two-year period from the enactment last July of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. It also stated that paramilitaries who signed up to the agreement would decommission all their illegally held arms and explosives during a two-year period, which concludes in May next year.

    The hon. Gentleman will realise that we are now 14 months into the two-year period for decommissioning and not one gun or ounce of Semtex has been handed in. He is a reasonable person. He must think it unreasonable that there has not been any decommissioning. At the same time, the Government have shown their good will by releasing 277 terrorist prisoners—loyalist and republican—back on to the streets of Belfast. That is not a fair deal and is therefore not comparable.

    I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention. None the less, the amendment would appear to seek to harden the terms of an agreement that was negotiated with great difficulty and under considerable stress. If we take a step back from the present fraught situation, we will see what ordinary people in Northern Ireland and Britain see clearly, which is that we are at a juncture where it is possible to take a chance for peace, or to go back to the eternal circle of haggling, renegotiating and redefining.

    I am sure that the hon. Gentleman appreciates the fact that the Prime Minister himself encouraged the pro-Union people and their representatives to believe that, if they said yes in a referendum, there would be a nexus or connection between the release of prisoners and decommissioning.

    The hon. and learned Gentleman is perfectly correct. The Prime Minister has stated on many occasions that decommissioning is an integral part of the process. However, the hon. and learned Gentleman must also be aware that every survey in Northern Ireland as well as in Britain shows that, for the sake of the people of Northern Ireland, people want the current proposals to be given a chance.

    The difficulty that I and many other Back Benchers have with attempts to tinker with the Good Friday agreement and to harden certain aspects of it is that we detect a certain begrudging attitude to the leap of faith that is needed by both sides to give the agreement a chance.

    Most of us have been reticent in speaking on the issue because we are reluctant to rock the boat and to intervene when we are aware that Front-Bench Members of all the parties are working hard to reach an agreed settlement. However, the overwhelming majority not only of the parliamentary Labour party but of the British people will be alienated, if, at this stage of the process, those on any side stand back and say that they are not willing to make that leap of faith to try to achieve the settlement—including decommissioning—for which we have all worked over the past 18 months. If we say that that is not possible because we want tinkering here or there, we must accept that it will be concluded that, as a people, we are not serious about peace.

    8.30 pm

    Is there not is a real danger in thinking that we can interpret the public mood? It is probable that there is an equally strong view in the country that, at this crucial point, people would expect some decommissioning at the next stage. Of course, the Ulster Unionists are unhappy with what was originally signed, in that there was no clear link between the whole process of prisoner release and decommissioning. However, the best interpretation that one can put on that is that there was a cock-up and that people did not notice.

    I think that the Ulster Unionists have taken the debate further today and are putting that behind them; they are assuming that the Bill will be enacted, and that, if people do not begin decommissioning within the timetable laid down by the commission, the prisoner release scheme will be reconsidered. They are not trying to renegotiate the original terms of the agreement—although they might feel that they were foolish not to have spotted the absence of a link—but the assumption behind the amendments is that the Bill will be enacted and that, if it quickly appears that, at some stage, there will be no decommissioning, those who do not decommission will be punished, not only by the review—

    Order. The right hon. Gentleman's intervention is gently turning into a speech. He must finish his intervention briefly.

    I shall just finish the sentence. We are debating whether, in the new situation, there should be a link; the old debate is now being put aside. Does my hon. Friend the Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer) not support the fact that there should be some link, and that those who do not disarm should not get their prisoners out?

    I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that courteous intervention. We would all accept that prisoner release may well depend on decommissioning as part of a general pattern of behaviour. However, the Good Friday agreement set up a delicate system of checks and balances—including not only decommissioning, but the ceasefire, co-operation with Northern Ireland and cross-border institutions, and other elements.

    We know the conflicting parties well enough to expect that each change in the process will trigger another change. If we say that the failure to decommission will have the concrete and guaranteed effect of suspending prisoner releases, we can expect that other aspects of the agreement will be called into question—especially the ceasefire. I think—as indeed do the great majority of people in the United Kingdom—that the achievement of the ceasefire has been worth all the concessions that have been made until now.

    In relation to prisoner releases, I point out, with all due respect to the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer), that public opinion in Great Britain is changing. Public opinion in Great Britain is becoming impatient that people such as Patrick Magee—a man who tried to destroy the British Government with a bomb—are being released, but the organisation to which he belongs has not decommissioned a single bullet. The hon. Gentleman should reconsider the issue of public opinion in Great Britain. May I recommend to him an article by John Lloyd in the current edition of the New Statesman, which I think that he will find edifying?

    In relation to the claims that public opinion is against any of the changes, is it not remarkable that more and more people from England are phoning and writing to us, telling us to stand fast because it is wrong to give way to terrorism? Will my hon. Friend persuade those who might not be in this place, and who regularly accuse Ulster Unionist Members of dealing with only one aspect of terrorism, that the amendments deal with all aspects of terrorism?

    I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention. That is precisely the point. As only one terrorist organisation in Northern Ireland will benefit from having seats in the Executive—that is Sinn Fein-IRA—we must find some means of urging the other terrorist organisations to decommission. There must be some penalty if that does not happen.

    The hon. Member for Broxtowe talks about balance, but we have had 14 months of the agreement and the problem is that there is no balance. He talks about the ceasefires but the ceasefires have been breached, whether or not the Government care to acknowledge that. There have been murders on the streets of Northern Ireland committed by all the terrorist organisations benefiting from prisoner releases. They have all breached their ceasefires, yet the Government have chosen to disregard that in relation to the legislative provision in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which places on the Secretary of State the responsibility to review on a regular basis whether the organisations benefiting from prisoner releases should continue to benefit in that way. With all due respect, I have to point out that there is a link between decommissioning and prisoner releases—it is in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act and it was put there by the Government. The link is there.

    The problem is that, under the proposals in "The Way Forward" document, the penalties that will be applied if parties are in default will not apply to all the parties, since not all the terrorist organisations are represented in the Assembly, let alone in the Executive. The hon. Member for Broxtowe says that we cannot tinker with the agreement, but I put it to him that "The Way Forward" does exactly that. It sets new deadlines for the institutions that are not in the agreement, and new timetables that are not in the agreement. Would we need "The Way Forward" if the agreement were delivering on all those aspects? Of course not. If it is right to tinker with the agreement on devolution, why should it not be right to tinker with it on prisoner releases? Surely the hon. Gentleman concedes that point.

    Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, in the House, in the debate on prisoner releases, the Prime Minister indicated that, if the prisoner releases were to be stopped or curtailed in any way, it would mean a return to violence? Therefore, terror is dictating the terms on which the whole process moves forward.

    I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for that intervention. Throughout this debate, I have heard Government Members give the warning that, if we do not do this and we do not do that, there will be a return to violence—yet the agreement requires all the parties to be committed to "exclusively … peaceful means". Surely such a commitment means that, in all circumstances, one takes the democratic and peaceful path, yet the hon. Member for Broxtowe warns us that, if we do not take the leap, there will be a return to violence. Is that a commitment to exclusively peaceful means? I do not think so.

    That commitment was required of Sinn Fein-IRA and the loyalist paramilitaries when they signed up to the agreement. Is the hon. Gentleman suggesting that they are about to breach their commitment if they do not get their way? What guarantee will the Unionist members of the Executive have? If, at some time in the future, we come up against a decision that has to be taken on an issue of government in Northern Ireland and the Republicans disagree with our position, are we to expect that, once again, whispered in the ear of the First Minister will be the dark mutterings, "If you don't do it our way, the boys might have to go back to doing what they do best"? That is what is being asked of us.

    The hon. Gentleman is stating most effectively, in summary form, the arguments that are being advanced by Government Members. Do not those arguments, in effect, amount to: "You'd better believe the IRA have given up violence because, if you don't, they will use violence again."?

    I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his intervention—of course that is what we are being told by Government Members. It is almost as if a gun is being put to our head, accompanied by the threat, "Sign up, or else." I know about threats—I have received them, as have my right hon. and hon. Friends. Some of us have had attempts made on our lives by paramilitaries, but not once have we raised a finger in retaliation against them. I chose the democratic and peaceful path when I entered politics, and I will not be deviated from that path, because I am committed to exclusively peaceful means.

    My hon. Friend is criticising, very correctly, the comments made by the hon. Member for Broxtowe. Those comments clearly demonstrated that the hon. Gentleman does not believe that there is, at present, a genuine commitment to peaceful means. He believes that, unless one acts in accordance with what are perceived to be the interests of the public, there will be a return to violence, but that is indicative only of his state of mind, and we must not regard his state of mind as being decisive in what will actually happen.

    I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. That is the reality with which Unionist Members are faced.

    I support the amendments on prisoner releases because people in Northern Ireland believe that there should be a balance, and the process should not be a one-way street. The hon. Member for Broxtowe said that the concessions had been worth while, but giving concessions meant anticipation that there would be a response, which included the decommissioning of illegal terrorist weapons.

    The hon. Gentleman sways back and forth between using the Good Friday agreement, which he opposed at the time, in his arguments, and opposing the content of the agreement. It is not at all clear how he has the nerve to oppose an agreement and then use its contents to criticise parties which supported it and made a commitment to peace—a commitment that he, by his opposition, has not made.

    With all due respect, that is a disgraceful remark. My family have suffered at the hands of terrorists, and I have buried members of my family. I joined the Ulster Defence Regiment, which is a legal organisation, to fight terrorism of all kinds, and I am committed to peace. How dare the hon. Gentleman make such a ridiculous, disgraceful accusation? If there is any honour left in him, he should withdraw that remark. I shall, however, deal with the point that he made.

    I have the nerve to oppose the agreement because I am a democrat. In a democratic society, I am entitled to vote against the agreement, but that does not mean that I do not accept the will of the people who voted for it. In this House, it is my duty to ensure that the people whom I represent get the best deal and that, where the agreement refers to decommissioning, decommissioning is delivered. When prisoners are being released, it is my duty to ensure that the people who suffered at the hands of those prisoners get the best deal in the form of commitments from those terrorists and the decommissioning of their weapons.

    I shall leave the hon. Gentleman with the following thought. Mr. Bernard McGinn is an IRA murderer who was recently sentenced to 490 years in prison. The Belfast Telegraph reported:
    "IRA killer Bernard McGinn laughed as he was handed three life sentences and a 490-year prison term yesterday—knowing that he would soon be released."
    I want to wipe the smile off Mr. McGinn's face because I want him to know that he will be released only if the organisation that he belongs to gives up violence for good and decommissions its illegal weapons. if it does not do so, Mr. McGinn should remain where he belongs—behind bars—for a long time.

    We do not have much time so I shall be as brief as possible.

    Accusations have been made during the debate that our amendments are outside the Belfast agreement and seek to wreck it. We state categorically that our amendments are within the confines of the agreement and the legislation that will emanate from that agreement.

    New clause 1 does two things. It calls on legislation that is already on the statute book—the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998—and it follows through, clearly and logically, assurances given by the Prime Minister on more than one occasion.

    8.45 pm

    I refer particularly to the Prime Minister's keynote speech at the Balmoral showground in Belfast on 14 May, in which he set out the terms on which parties linked with terrorist organisations would be eligible for prisoner release. The key was that those organisations would have been maintaining a "complete and unequivocal ceasefire". In determining what constituted that, one of the key factors was full co-operation with the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, which of course implements the provisions of the agreement.

    New clause 2 refers to the Secretary of State, at the time of suspension, specifying organisations, as defined in section 3 of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which deals with prisoner eligibility for release. A condition of such eligibility is that
    "the prisoner is not a supporter of a specified organisation."
    In subsection (8), a specified organisation is clearly defined as
    "an organisation specified by order of the Secretary of State; and he shall specify any organisation which he believes—
    (a) is concerned in terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland …
    (b) has not established or is not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire."
    Subsection (9) states that the Secretary of State shall take into account, when coming to that decision, that the organisation
    "(a) is committed to the use now and in the future of only democratic and peaceful means to achieve its objectives;
    (b) has ceased to be involved in any acts of violence or of preparation for violence;
    (c) is directing or promoting acts of violence by other organisations".
    That is the link between Sinn Fein and the IRA, which the Prime Minister still contends is inextricable—although the Taoiseach, Mr. Ahern, says that the two are separate. Subsection (9)(d)—this is the key point because it links legislation passed in this House to the Belfast agreement—states that the organisation
    "is co-operating fully with any Commission of the kind referred to in section 7 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997 in implementing the Decommissioning section of the agreement reached at multi-party talks".
    We would maintain that there is a clear link and that legislation is already on the statute book for the Secretary of State and the Government to act.

    We have a very few minutes to deal with this matter. A certain amount of heat has been generated in the debate so it is right, for a moment, to reflect on some of the sensitive issues with which we are dealing.

    The sensitivity of this issue of course impacts greatly on the victims—those who have suffered over the past 30 years. As the Minister with responsibility for victims, I have probably met more, either in groups or as individuals, than anyone else in the House, with the possible exception of one or two Northern Ireland Members. I understand only too well the hurt and grief that they have suffered. Some of them are speaking up for the first time about events that go back 10, 15 or 20 years.

    Much of that has been brought to the surface by the process of the release of prisoners—early or otherwise. It is not just the early release of prisoners that can impact on those who have suffered most. We as a Government have had to deal with that. I make the point again that, effectively, we inherited a blank sheet from the previous Administration on the issue. That is why there was recognition in the Good Friday agreement of this very important issue, which no one had addressed and which we had to pick up and take forward.

    At the same time, we had to take on board the other commitment that was placed on the Government—the one on the early release of terrorist prisoners. Everyone who was party to the agreement signed up to such an commitment. I accept that the hon. Members for Lagan Valley (Mr. Donaldson) and for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) do not support the Belfast agreement. We do not know whether they support some of it or none of it—in a sense, they have never quite specified—but we know that they do not want it to succeed. Given that, they cannot cherry-pick; they cannot say, "We like this bit, but we don't like that bit." They must understand the complexities that the two Governments and those who are engaged in the process must take on board. Prisoner releases are a critical aspect of that.

    After moving forward and implementation, we must consider what that means and how we interpret and judge whether groups are on complete and unequivocal ceasefire, and that is what the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 sets out. I accept that many Opposition Members did not accept the principles of that legislation although they were in line with what was set out in the Good Friday agreement. Many of those who defended the agreement voted against what became the 1998 Act, thereby cherry-picking and more or less leaving it to the Government to proceed with an undoubtedly vexed and difficult issue, primarily because of the impact that it has within the wider community.

    There is no direct linkage between prisoner releases and any other part of the agreement, including the political institutions. There are no linkages and no pre-conditions. We are talking of a totality and of everything being part of a whole.

    The hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Moss) spelled out the purport of new clause 1. He explained that the intention behind it was to suspend section 3 of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which sets out prisoners' eligibility for release, and section 10, which deals with accelerated release arrangements. That is a clear proposition. That is what the official Opposition want to happen, while saying that they still support the Good Friday agreement. There is an inherent contradiction in that position.

    No. There are only three minutes left to me.

    The right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) talked about important linkages in terms of republican terrorists who could be judged as somehow failing to meet their commitments under the agreement, and those of loyalists. We must recognise the importance of loyalist decommissioning alongside that of republican decommissioning. The right hon. Gentleman was right to raise the matter. There are some loyalist and republican groups which do not have linked parties even in the Assembly, let alone the Executive. However, all groups on ceasefire have a common interest in achieving decommissioning on a mutual and reciprocal basis. That is why they have a ceasefire in the first place. They find themselves being committed to the principle of the Good Friday agreement because movement is taking place. We are moving into a new political environment within Northern Ireland and so they sign up to that very principle.

    I suggest that loyalists know that there will not be republican disarmament without loyalists giving up guns at the same time, and vice versa. They each watch and study the other in trying to understand what the other is seeking to do. It is right that some groups will not be directly affected by suspension. However, the main purpose of suspension is to give the parties time and space to allow them to agree on how to deal with any breach of commitments, including sanctions on which they may agree. The suspension process involves those who are actually dealing with the issue—those who conceived the Good Friday process in the first place and those who have signed up to it. The issue returns to their agenda and they must deal with it.

    Will the Minister state unequivocally, yes or no, whether the clauses contravene the Good Friday agreement?

    The 1998 Act sets out the ways in which the Secretary of State would judge whether a group is on a complete and unequivocal ceasefire and whether it would be subject to that Act. We are dealing with complex issues and trying to make judgments. We are putting in place, through the failsafe, a new proposal that allows a judgment to be made by a body that everyone respects. We are allowing that process to be considered and—

    It being five hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of the Bill, THE CHAIRMAN, pursuant to Order [this day], put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

    Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

    The Committee divided: Ayes 147, Noes 349.

    Division No. 235]

    [8.55 pm

    AYES

    Ainsworth, Peter (E Surrey)Grieve, Dominic
    Amess, DavidGummer, Rt Hon John
    Arbuthnot, Rt Hon JamesHague, Rt Hon William
    Atkinson, David (Bour'mth E)Hamilton, Rt Hon Sir Archie
    Atkinson, Peter (Hexham)Hammond, Philip
    Baldry, TonyHawkins, Nick
    Beggs, RoyHeathcoat—Amory, Rt Hon David
    Bercow, JohnHogg, Rt Hon Douglas
    Beresford, Sir PaulHoward, Rt Hon Michael
    Blunt, CrispinHowarth, Gerald (Aldershot)
    Boswell, TimHunter, Andrew
    Bottomley, Peter (Worthing W)Jack, Rt Hon Michael
    Bottomley, Rt Hon Mrs VirginiaJackson, Robert (Wantage)
    Brazier, JulianJenkin, Bernard
    Brooke, Rt Hon PeterJohnson Smith, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
    Browning, Mrs Angela
    Bruce, Ian (S Dorset)Key, Robert
    Butterfill, JohnKing, Rt Hon Tom (Bridgwater)
    Cash, WilliamKirkbride, Miss Julie
    Chapman, Sir Sydney (Chipping Barnet)Lansley, Andrew
    Leigh, Edward
    Chope, ChristopherLetwin, Oliver
    Clappison, JamesLewis, Dr Julian (New Forest E)
    Clark, Dr Michael (Rayleigh)Lidington, David
    Clarke, Rt Hon Kenneth (Rushcliffe)Lilley, Rt Hon Peter
    Lloyd, Rt Hon Sir Peter (Fareham)
    Clifton-Brown, GeoffreyLoughton, Tim
    Collins, TimLuff, Peter
    Colvin, MichaelLyell, Rt Hon Sir Nicholas
    Cormack, Sir PatrickMcCartney, Robert (N Down)
    Cran, JamesMacGregor, Rt Hon John
    Curry, Rt Hon DavidMacKay, Rt Hon Andrew
    Davies, Quentin (Grantham)Madel, Sir David
    Davis, Rt Hon David (Haltemprice)Malins, Humfrey
    Donaldson, JeffreyMates, Michael
    Dorrell, Rt Hon StephenMaude, Rt Hon Francis
    Duncan, AlanMawhinney, Rt Hon Sir Brian
    Duncan Smith, IainMay, Mrs Theresa
    Evans, NigelMoss, Malcolm
    Faber, DavidNicholls, Patrick
    Fabricant, MichaelOttaway, Richard
    Fallon, MichaelPage, Richard
    Flight, HowardPaice, James
    Forsythe, CliffordPaisley, Rev Ian
    Forth, Rt Hon EricPickles, Eric
    Fowler, Rt Hon Sir NormanPrior, David
    Fox, Dr LiamRandall, John
    Fraser, ChristopherRedwood, Rt Hon John
    Gale, RogerRobathan, Andrew
    Garnier, EdwardRobertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry)
    Gibb, NickRobinson, Peter (Belfast E)
    Gill, ChristopherRoe, Mrs Marion (Broxbourne)
    Gillan, Mrs CherylRoss, William (E Lond'y)
    Gray, JamesRuffley, David
    Green, DamianSt Aubyn, Nick
    Greenway, JohnSayeed, Jonathan

    Shepherd, RichardTrimble, Rt Hon David
    Simpson, Keith (Mid-Norfolk)Tyrie, Andrew
    Smyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)Viggers, Peter
    Soames, NicholasWalter, Robert
    Spelman, Mrs CarolineWardle, Charles
    Spicer, Sir MichaelWaterson, Nigel
    Spring, RichardWells, Bowen
    Stanley, Rt Hon Sir JohnWhitney, Sir Raymond
    Steen, AnthonyWhittingdale, John
    Streeter, GaryWiddecombe, Rt Hon Miss Ann
    Swayne, DesmondWilkinson, John
    Syms, RobertWilletts, David
    Tapsell, Sir PeterWilshire, David
    Taylor, Ian (Esher & Walton)Winterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
    Taylor, Rt Hon John D (Strangford)Woodward, Shaun
    Taylor, John M (Solihull)Yeo, Tim
    Taylor, Sir TeddyYoung, Rt Hon Sir George
    Thompson, William
    Townend, John

    Tellers for the Ayes:

    Tredinnick, David

    Mrs. Eleanor Laing and

    Trend, Michael

    Mr. Stephen Day.

    NOES

    Abbott, Ms DianeClark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)
    Adams, Mrs Irene (Paisley N)Clark, Dr Lynda (Edinburgh Pentlands)
    Ainger, Nick
    Ainsworth, Robert (Cov'try NE)Clark, Paul (Gillingham)
    Alexander, DouglasClarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)
    Allan, RichardClarke, Tony (Northampton S)
    Allen, GrahamClelland, David
    Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)Clwyd, Ann
    Ashton, JoeCoaker, Vernon
    Atkins, CharlotteCoffey, Ms Ann
    Austin, JohnCohen, Harry
    Banks, TonyColeman, Iain
    Barnes, HarryColman, Tony
    Barron, KevinConnarty, Michael
    Battle, JohnCook, Frank (Stockton N)
    Beard, NigelCorbett, Robin
    Beckett, Rt Hon Mrs MargaretCorbyn, Jeremy
    Begg, Miss AnneCorston, Ms Jean
    Bell, Martin (Tatton)Cousins, Jim
    Bell, Stuart (Middlesbrough)Cox, Tom
    Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)Cranston, Ross
    Benn, Rt Hon Tony (Chesterfield)Crausby, David
    Bennett, Andrew FCryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)
    Bermingham, GeraldCryer, John (Hornchurch)
    Berry, RogerCummings, John
    Best, HaroldCunliffe, Lawrence
    Betts, CliveCunningham, Rt Hon Dr Jack(Copeland)
    Blackman, Liz
    Blunkett, Rt Hon DavidCunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)
    Boateng, PaulDalyell, Tam
    Bradley, Keith (Withington)Darling, Rt Hon Alistair
    Bradley, Peter (The Wrekin)Darvill, Keith
    Breed, ColinDavey, Valerie (Bristol W)
    Brinton, Mrs HelenDavies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
    Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E)Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H)
    Brown, Russell (Dumfries)Dawson, Hilton
    Browne, DesmondDean, Mrs Janet
    Burden, RichardDismore, Andrew
    Burstow, PaulDobbin, Jim
    Butler, Mrs ChristineDonohoe, Brian H
    Byers, Rt Hon StephenDoran, Frank
    Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth)Dowd, Jim
    Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth
    Campbell-Savours, DaleEagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)
    Cann, JamieEdwards, Huw
    Caplin, IvorEfford, Clive
    Casale, RogerEllman, Mrs Louise
    Caton, MartinEnnis, Jeff
    Cawsey, IanEtherington, Bill
    Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)Fearn, Ronnie
    Chaytor, DavidFisher, Mark
    Chisholm, MalcolmFitzsimons, Lorna
    Clapham, MichaelFlint, Caroline

    Flynn, PaulKhabra, Piara S
    Follett, BarbaraKidney, David
    Foster, Rt Hon DerekKilfoyle, Peter
    Foster, Don (Bath)King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)
    Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)King, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)
    Foster, Michael J (Worcester)Kumar, Dr Ashok
    Fyfe, MariaLawrence, Ms Jackie
    Galloway, GeorgeLaxton, Bob
    Gapes, MikeLeslie, Christopher
    Gardiner, BarryLevitt, Tom
    George, Andrew (St Ives)Lewis, Terry (Worsley)
    George, Bruce (Walsall S)Liddell, Rt Hon Mrs Helen
    Gibson, Dr IanLinton, Martin
    Gilroy, Mrs LindaLlwyd, Elfyn
    Godman, Dr Norman ALock, David
    Godsiff, RogerLove, Andrew
    Golding, Mrs LlinMcAllion, John
    Gordon, Mrs EileenMcAvoy, Thomas
    Gorrie, DonaldMcCabe, Steve
    Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)McCafferty, Ms Chris
    Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)McCartney, Rt Hon Ian (Makerfield)
    Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)
    Grocott, BruceMcDonagh, Siobhain
    Grogan, JohnMacdonald, Calum
    Gunnell, JohnMcDonnell, John
    Hain, PeterMcFall, John
    Hall, Patrick (Bedford)McGrady, Eddie
    Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)McGuire, Mrs Anne
    Hancock, MikeMcIsaac, Shona
    Hanson, DavidMcKenna, Mrs Rosemary
    Harman, Rt Hon Ms HarrietMackinlay, Andrew
    Heal, Mrs SylviaMcNamara, Kevin
    Healey, JohnMcNulty, Tony
    Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)MacShane, Denis
    Henderson, Doug (Newcastle N)Mactaggart, Fiona
    Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)McWalter, Tony
    Hepburn, StephenMcWilliam, John
    Heppell, JohnMahon, Mrs Alice
    Hesford, StephenMallaber, Judy
    Hewitt, Ms PatriciaMallon, Seamus
    Hill, KeithMandelson, Rt Hon Peter
    Hodge, Ms MargaretMarsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)
    Hoey, KateMarshall, David (Shettleston)
    Home Robertson, JohnMarshall, Jim (Leicester S)
    Hood, JimmyMarshall-Andrews, Robert
    Hoon, GeoffreyMartlew, Eric
    Hopkins, KelvinMaxton, John
    Howarth, Alan (Newport E)Meale, Alan
    Howarth, George (Knowsley N)Merron, Gillian
    Howells, Dr KimMichie, Bill (Shef'ld Heeley)
    Hoyle, LindsayMichie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)
    Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)Milburn, Rt Hon Alan
    Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)Mitchell, Austin
    Hume, JohnMoffatt, Laura
    Hutton, JohnMoonie, Dr Lewis
    Illsley, EricMoran, Ms Margaret
    Ingram, Rt Hon AdamMorgan, Alasdair (Galloway)
    Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)
    Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough)Morley, Elliot
    Jamieson, DavidMowlam, Rt Hon Marjorie
    Jenkins, BrianMudie, George
    Johnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle)Mullin, Chris
    Johnson, Miss Melanie (Welwyn Hatfield)Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)
    Murphy, Rt Hon Paul (Torfaen)
    Jones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)Naysmith, Dr Doug
    Jones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)
    Jones, Helen (Warrington N)O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)
    Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)O'Hara, Eddie
    Olner, Bill
    Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)O'Neill, Martin
    Jones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)Öpik, Lembit
    Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S)Organ, Mrs Diana
    Jowell, Rt Hon Ms TessaOsborne, Ms Sandra
    Keeble, Ms SallyPalmer, Dr Nick
    Keen, Alan (Feltham & Heston)Pearson, Ian
    Keen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth)Pendry, Tom

    Perham, Ms LindaSquire, Ms Rachel
    Pickthall, ColinStarkey, Dr Phyllis
    Pike, Peter LSteinberg, Gerry
    Plaskitt, JamesStevenson, George
    Pollard, KerryStewart, Ian (Eccles)
    Pond, ChrisStinchcombe, Paul
    Pope, GregStoate, Dr Howard
    Pound, StephenStott, Roger
    Powell, Sir RaymondStrang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin
    Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)Stringer, Graham
    Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)Stuart, Ms Gisela
    Prescott, Rt Hon JohnSutcliffe, Gerry
    Primarolo, DawnTaylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)
    Prosser, Gwyn
    Purchase, KenTaylor, Ms Dart (Stockton S)
    Quinn, LawrieTaylor, David (NW Leics)
    Rammell, BillTemple-Morris, Peter
    Rapson, SydThomas, Gareth (Clwyd W)
    Raynsford, NickTipping, Paddy
    Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)Todd, Mark
    Robertson, Rt Hon George (Hamilton S)Touhig, Don
    Trickett, Jon
    Roche, Mrs BarbaraTurner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
    Rooker, JeffTurner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)
    Rooney, TerryTurner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
    Rowlands, TedTwigg, Derek (Halton)
    Roy, FrankTyler, Paul
    Ruane, Chrisvaz, Keith
    Ruddock, JoanVis, Dr Rudi
    Russell, Bob (Colchester)Wareing, Robert N
    Russell, Ms Christine (Chester)Webb, Steve
    Ryan, Ms JoanWelsh, Andrew
    Salter, MartinWhite, Brian
    Sanders, AdrianWhitehead, Dr Alan
    Sarwar, MohammadWicks, Malcolm
    Sawford, PhilWilliams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)
    Shaw, Jonathan
    Sheerman, BarryWilliams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
    Sheldon, Rt Hon RobertWilliams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
    Short, Rt Hon ClareWillis, Phil
    Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)Winnick, David
    Singh, MarshaWise, Audrey
    Skinner, DennisWood, Mike
    Smith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E)Worthington, Tony
    Smith, Angela (Basildon)Wright, Anthony D (Gt Yarmouth)
    Smith, Jacqui (Redditch)Wright, Dr Tony (Cannock)
    Smith, John (Glamorgan)Wyatt, Derek
    Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)
    Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)

    Tellers for the Noes:

    Soley, Clive

    Mr. Mike Hall and

    Southworth, Ms Helen

    Jane Kennedy.

    Question accordingly negatived.

    Clause 1

    Suspension Of Devolved Government

    I beg to move amendment No. 1, in page 1, line 13, leave out from 'Commission' to end of line 16.

    With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 2, in page 1, line 13, after 'Commission' insert

    'and specifies the nature of that failure'.
    No. 3, in page 1, line 13, at end insert—
    '(iii) a failure within 4 days after Parts II and III of the 1998 Act come into force to appoint a contact person, give notice of intention to decommission arms and otherwise act in accordance with paragraph 7 of the Decommissioning Scheme made under the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997; or
    (iv) a failure within 4 weeks under Parts II and III of the 1998 Act came into force to decommission arms within the meaning of paragraphs 21 to 25 of the Decommissioning Scheme made under the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997; or'.
    No. 4, in page 1, line 13, at end insert—
    '(iii) a failure to commence actual decommissioning within three days of Parts II and III of the 1998 Act coming into force; or'.
    No. 5, in page 1, line 13, at end insert—
    '(iv) a failure to proceed with actual decommissioning in a regular and proportional manner so as to achieve total decommissioning by May 2000; or'.
    No. 6, in page 1, line 16, at end insert
    'or—
    (c) there has been a failure by the Decommissioning Commission to confirm a start to the process of decommissioning as specified in paragraph 3 of the Joint Statement within 4 days of the formation of the Executive.'.
    No. 7, in page 1, line 16, at end insert
    'or—
    (d). in reporting progress in September and December 1999 in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Joint Statement the Decommissioning Commission fails to report any actual decommissioning of weapons and explosives.'.
    No. 31, in page 1, line 16, at end insert
    'or—
    (c) a paramilitary organisation and its associated political wing do not state before midnight on 22nd July 1999 that they have renounced all violence for good, will physically begin decommissioning by 15th August 1999 and will complete the decommissioning of all their arms and explosives by 1st May 2000; or
    (d) a paramilitary organisation and its associated political wing have not before midnight on 14th August 1999 decommissioned 25 per cent of their entire stock of arms and explosives; or
    (e) a paramilitary organisation and its associated political wing have not before midnight in 30th April 2000 decommissioned their entire stock of arms and explosives.'.
    No. 33, in clause 2, page 2, line 31, at end insert
    'after either—
    (a) a paramilitary organisation and its associated political wing to which a suspended member of the Assembly, Minister or junior Minister, chairman or deputy chairman of a statutory committee belongs states that they have renounced all violence for good, will physically begin decommissioning by 15th August 1999 and will complete the decommissioning of all their arms and explosives by 1st May 2000;
    (b) a paramilitary organisation and its associated political wing to which a suspended member of the Assembly, Minister or junior Minister, chairman or deputy chairman of a statutory committee belongs decommissions 25 per cent of their entire stock of arms and explosives (provided that such decommissioning occurs before midnight on 31st December 1999); or
    (c) a paramilitary organisation and its associated political wing to which a suspended member of the Assembly, Minister or junior Minister, chairman or deputy chairman of a statutory committee belongs decommissions their entire stock of arms and explosives.'.

    Amendments Nos. 1 and 3 are in my name, and I intend to address my remarks primarily to amendment No. 3. Amendment No. 1 would remove subsection (1)(b). The reason for tabling that amendment was to try to get an explanation from the Government of what that subsection means, because it is misconceived, bearing in mind the fact that the Bill will take effect only after devolution has occurred. I cannot see how any party could fail to meet a commitment on devolution once it has occurred, so I should like an explanation of that.

    I want to concentrate my remarks on amendment No. 3, which relates to the question of time and timetabling. On Second Reading, the Secretary of State made copious reference to the comments of General de Chastelain of the Decommissioning Commission about the process beginning in a few days, and decommissioning starting in a few weeks. The right hon. Lady relied on that extensively.

    Winding up the Second Reading debate, the Minister of State spoke of a timetable coming from the Decommissioning Commission. He said that a breach of that timetable would constitute a breach of a commitment for the purpose of clause 1. I should be grateful to the right hon. Gentleman if he would spell out precisely how that result is achieved. Having examined the decommissioning scheme created by the Northern Ireland Office under the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997, I assume that the only paragraph on which a timetable could be based is paragraph 12, which states:
    "The Commission may make such arrangements as it considers appropriate to facilitate the decommissioning of arms."
    I suppose that a timetable could constitute an arrangement to facilitate the decommissioning of arms, but that strikes me as being quite some distance from a commitment the breaching of which, for the purpose of clause 1, would cause the suspension of all the arrangements. Surely some distance must be travelled from that permissive arrangement to the existence of a clear commitment.

    It is worth looking carefully at what has actually been said. On 2 July, General de Chastelain said:
    "What you have just heard from the Governments, taken in conjunction with our report, makes it possible for the process of decommissioning to begin, literally, a couple of days after devolution."
    Again, I feel that some distance needs to be travelled between that statement of what is "possible" and a clear commitment whose breach would lead to suspension, and I should be grateful for some elucidation from the Government.

    The general also said—this is in the final paragraph of his remarks—
    "My own assessment is that to retain confidence in the process, actual decommissioning would have to begin within a few weeks of the start of the decommissioning process."
    He had spoken of that beginning within a few days. Paragraph 17 of the commission's report states:
    "It is the Commission's considered view that the process of decommissioning begins in connection with a paramilitary group when it
    (a) gives an unambiguous commitment that decommissioning will be completed, and
    (b) commences detailed discussions of actual modalities—amounts, types, location, timing—with the Commission."
    That is the beginning of the process. There is talk of "an unambiguous commitment"; however, we may wonder whether unambiguous commitments will be given in terms that are satisfactory. In any event, the process is only to lead to the commencement of detailed discussions. It is only from that point that time begins to run for the general's "few weeks".

    It should be noted that the general said:
    "My own assessment is that … actual decommissioning would have to begin within a few weeks of the start of the decommissioning process."
    He was not, at that point, speaking for the commission. If the commencement of the process consists merely of discussions about modalities, are we required to believe that those discussions will be completed rapidly, that the timetable will evolve rapidly, and that it will be possible to say a few weeks later that there has been a breach of that timetable? That strikes me as an incredibly optimistic view.

    I know that the Government have prayed in aid the character of General de Chastelain on the basis of the confidence that he has retained among the various parties. He has retained that confidence, but an awful lot of weight has been piled on him, especially given his carefulness not to tie things down rigidly. The Government have given the impression that things are tied down very firmly—to a few days or a few weeks—but when we look at what the general has actually said, it is clear that there is no such precision or certainty. There is a danger that the public are being given the impression that the general has said things that he has not, in fact, said.

    9.15 pm

    The consequence of that is that the general's credibility and integrity may be put at risk by what the Government have done, have said and are doing in the legislation. Expectations are being created that may not be fulfilled. That is not fair to the general, or to the way in which he is proceeding on the matter. Therefore, it would much better for there to be a precise timetable in the legislation and a timetable that does not depend on the exercise of judgment.

    That is why, in amendment No. 3, I have spelt out two sub-paragraphs that deal with clear situations. The first is a failure within four days after the Act comes into force
    "to appoint a contact person, give notice of intention to decommission arms and otherwise act in accordance with paragraph 7 of the Decommissioning Scheme".
    Those are precise events—paragraph 7 talks about formal notice of intention to decommission and the appointment of a contact person. We can tell precisely whether or not they have happened. Four days is longer than the period mentioned to me in discussions in the period before 2 July, when we were talking about a few days, so I have given a more generous time frame than that mentioned to me by the Government in those negotiations.

    I have also provided for a failure within four weeks
    "to decommission arms within the meaning of paragraphs 21 to 25".
    Again, that is clear and precise. It does not depend on any interpretation by the general or others. Again, four weeks is clearly within the spirit of the discussions that we had before 2 July. Instead of putting an unfair weight on the general, we are moving to something that is precise and that can lead to the sort of action that the Government say that they wish to take under clause 1.

    May I ask the Minister for clarification about the Government's position on when the Good Friday agreement is not being kept to?

    I entirely understand the difficulty that we are in, which arises from the fact that the agreement defines the end date for the process—a process that most of us know cannot be done in 24 hours—but does not contain a start date for the process of decommissioning. Any reasonable member of the public would have expected, reasonably, that, as the Good Friday agreement contained an end date, that probably implied a start to decommissioning, which we already would have seen. I suppose that those who are more familiar with the complexities of politics in Northern Ireland than me or than the average member of the public would have realised that that was not good enough, but it seems absolutely clear that someone has to decide by what date decommissioning has to start if it is to end by the agreed date.

    The Government are saying, correctly, that, given the complexities of the situation, an independent body should decide the timetable, but surely they should at least say that the groups must act and that, if that body defines the timetable that is required to meet the clear end date for the process, those who do not observe that timetable are not in accord with the agreement. I should have thought that such a clear statement would be helpful to the debate. With regard to prisoner release, I cannot see how, if an organisation is not in accord with what an independent commission says is required to be within the terms of the Good Friday agreement, it can live up to the full terms of the ceasefire as defined in the legislation.

    In that regard, I noticed a lack of complete clarity in the words of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and detected firmer language by the Minister in his reply to the Second Reading debate. I should be grateful if I could be told exactly what the Government's position is on the matter, because I do not understand how people can be said to be obeying a ceasefire, or decommissioning, if they refuse actually to stick to the timetable and the terms laid down for the observation of the Good Friday agreement.

    The official Opposition have yet to convince me that they are able to behave in a bipartisan way by taking sides with one of the parties most intimately involved in the matter. I could understand someone taking sides in an argument after listening to both sides but I was horrified to hear earlier in the debate that the official Opposition have not even talked to the Social Democratic and Labour party. How can the official Opposition say that they are being helpful and bipartisan if they are being so one-sided?

    Order. The hon. Gentleman is going wide of the matters dealt with in this group of amendments, to which we must confine ourselves.

    Thank you, Mr. Martin, but that was my final question. Although I certainly heed your advice, I should still like to have an answer to the question.

    In the light of your ruling, Mr. Martin, I am not quite sure whether I am allowed to answer the question, although I should like to. Before doing so, however, I commend the rest of the speech of the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Dr. Turner). He is a reasonable man and has noted—as did the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) on Second Reading—that we are now 14 months into a two-year period in which decommissioning should be completed. Any reasonable Member would note that, after 14 months, there should have been substantial decommissioning. I need hardly remind the Committee that neither one gun nor one ounce of Semtex has been handed in by any of the paramilitaries who signed up to the Belfast agreement.

    If I may trespass a little on your good will, Mr. Martin, I should like to tell the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk that the Opposition regularly have informal discussions with individual Social Democratic and Labour party Members, as we do with Unionist Members. I think that Unionist Members will confirm that we have never had a formal meeting with them, but talk to them informally—as I talk to the hon. Member for South Down (Mr. McGrady) and other hon. Members.

    If the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) would like a formal meeting between SDLP Members and the Leader of the Opposition, we should very much welcome it. I see the hon. Member for South Down in the Chamber and think that he is nodding, so he has heard what I have said. I am very grateful to have cleared that matter up—although, in answering the question, I was clearly out of order, as the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk was in asking it.

    The official Opposition support this group of amendments—some of which we co-tabled, and others of which we tabled on our own. I should tell the Minister just why we believe that the amendments would provide vital safeguards or—to use the Prime Minister's words—"necessary failsafes".

    When, 10 days ago, the Prime Minister not unreasonably trumpeted his blueprint from Stormont's Castle buildings; when, subsequently, the Sunday before last, he wrote in The Sunday Times; and when, the Monday before last, he came to the Dispatch Box, he made it very clear to the people of Northern Ireland and to the House that, if he was going to ask Unionists and the House to agree to Ministers establishing an Executive including Sinn Fein Ministers before any decommissioning had occurred, there would have to be proper failsafes. On that basis, we said, "Yes, we can see that point, and we go along with it. The key failsafe will have to be a tight and transparent timetable."

    The Prime Minister was very helpful. He went into some detail and kept repeating the terms of the timetable, which were based on general remarks by General de Chastelain. The Prime Minister very clearly said, "Within two or three days, we shall know the answer to the question whether the IRA and Sinn Fein are serious about all that. They will have had to declare that they will decommission to the satisfaction of General de Chastelain. If they do not, they will be out of the Executive." The right hon. Gentleman went on to indicate that, within a few weeks, there would be actual decommissioning and that, in September—and again in November and December—the general and his commission would report back to say whether they were satisfied that not just the Provisional IRA but all other paramilitary groups, whether loyalist or republican, had proceeded to decommission. If any of them had not decommissioned, they would be penalised. That was a proper safeguard.

    We were delighted and, in our private discussions with Ministers, we made it clear that we understood that, in an ideal world, it had to be up to General de Chastelain to set a timetable—not up to the Minister, and not even up to the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) and me by way of amendment tonight. We said that the Prime Minister should invite the general to confirm the details of the timetable that he had broadly outlined two weeks ago by way of a memorandum to the Prime Minister, which then could be published and be part of a schedule to the Bill.

    We would then have a clear, transparent, tight and realistic timetable, and all of us could decide whether it had been kept to. With the best will in the world—I have the greatest respect for the Minister of State and for General de Chastelain—we cannot just take those words on trust. The only way in which things can move forward properly is by legislation—presumably, that is why the Minister is rushing this Bill through tonight.

    It is essential that the Bill contains the copper-bottomed safeguard of a clear timetable. I can see no good reason why there should not be a timetable, bearing in mind that the timetable in the amendment is similar to—in fact, is slightly more generous than—that outlined by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister promised us a timetable and, frankly, he has not given us a timetable in the Bill. That is why we have been forced to table amendments to include a timetable in the Bill.

    If there is no timetable, there can be no guarantees and failsafes, and those who would sit in the Executive as Ministers will not feel able to do so with Sinn Fein because they will not be absolutely certain that, if the IRA fails to decommission, there will be a timetable that has been breached. There is no definite watertight timetable. Give us a watertight timetable, and progress will have been made. It is to be hoped that, if that happened, we would then have the devolved, wide-ranging Executive that the people of Northern Ireland have deserved for many years. I urge the Minister to agree to the amendments.

    Before the right hon. Gentleman sits down, will he explain how he reconciles the fact that he seems to accept that it should be for an independent body to determine the timetable with the fact that the amendments for which he is asking us to vote contain a specific timetable imposed by the right hon. Gentleman in partnership with what will be seen outside this House as one of the protagonists to the argument?

    I praised the hon. Gentleman earlier for being a reasonable man, but clearly he has not been listening carefully to my speech. I was with the hon. Gentleman in much of what he said earlier, and I am anxious to take him along with what I am saying now. We acknowledge, and would prefer, that the independent commission, under the chairmanship of General de Chastelain, should set down the timetable. However, as that timetable has not been made precise by the Prime Minister requesting a memorandum from General de Chastelain, we have no alternative but to table the amendment as a poor second-best.

    I would be willing to withdraw our amendment—as, I suspect, would the right hon. Member for Upper Bann—if we had a guarantee that a memorandum from the general would be published and could be put in as a schedule to the Bill when it is considered in the other place on Thursday. I completely agree with the hon. Gentleman that that would be better. We have been forced to table the amendments because there is no timetable.

    9.30 pm

    I passionately disagree with the hon. Gentleman's implication that there was something wrong in me, as the shadow Secretary of State, signing amendments that were tabled by the First Minister designate of Northern Ireland, the right hon. Member for Upper Bann. If I agree with the amendments that the right hon. Gentleman is tabling, or with amendments tabled by the hon. Members for South Down or for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon), I shall sign them. [Interruption.] I can see that an offer is on the way and we shall have great meetings to conspire to table amendments in the future. I am glad to see both those hon. Members in their place. In all seriousness, I think that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk will, on reflection, see that that was not a wise thing to have said. It is right that right hon. and hon. Members attach their names to amendments on the basis of their merits, rather than on the basis of who else happens to have signed them. That is not how this place works.

    I shall conclude my remarks, because under the timetable, the Committee and Report stages will have to be concluded in under two hours and I note that other significant amendments need to be debated. I hope that we will come to those in reasonable time.

    Two of the amendments in this group, amendments Nos. 4 and 5, are in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) and myself. The purpose of the amendments is similar to the purpose of amendment No. 3 tabled by the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble). However, a quick glance shows that the timetable in amendments Nos. 4 and 5 might be considered more stringent than that in amendment No. 3.

    The fact that the purpose of the amendments is the same draws attention once more to the expectation, based on the word of the Prime Minister, that the legislation would contain some clear time limits for the commencement of decommissioning. People expected that, because that is what the Prime Minister said would happen. He made it clear that there were two certainties, and one was that decommissioning would take place within days and that the process would be under way. The general tenor of the Prime Minister's remarks was that we would be able to flush the IRA out.

    Instead, we are now being asked to take the word of General de Chastelain, which was casually thrown out during a news conference. We have some experience of the general on the subject of decommissioning. The world did not start this morning, and that issue has been around for a long time. The general has been at the forefront of much of the controversy that has taken place.

    Before the talks process began in 1996, many Unionists—indeed all of those on this Bench—said that they could not sit down and negotiate with Sinn Fein-IRA until decommissioning had not only begun but been completed. That was the position of all the Unionist parties and, I suspect, of some of the Tories present tonight. The general was one of a team, including Prime Minister Holkeri and George Mitchell, a senator from the United States of America. They were given the task of resolving the dilemma over decommissioning. Not surprisingly, they came up with a resolution. They determined, using their judgment, that the IRA was serious about decommissioning. We know how wrong they were, because decommissioning did not happen during the talks process.

    However, those people said, "Look, some people want decommissioning to happen before the talks begin, while others say that it should happen after the talks are over. The only proper way to move forward is for decommissioning to take place during the talks. On that basis, we should move forward." That was the basis on which the former Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major), decided that progress could be made.

    Why, therefore, do we now want a timetable? It is because we were given exactly the same promises in 1996, and they were defaulted on in the period 1996–98. It is not possible to abide by the promises and good will of others: we want the Bill to contain a timetable. The Prime Minister recognised that it was necessary to have certainty, and that the commitments should be given legislative effect.

    Everyone who has met the general would agree that he is a very pleasant man. No one could point to any dishonesty on his part, nor would any of us question his credentials. At the same time, however, we would be fools indeed if we were to let the future of this great principle—the principle of whether the democratic process should be contaminated with those who have not given up violence and have no intention of doing so—depend on his word or expectation. It is clear that we cannot do that.

    It has to be said also that the throw-away remarks were made by the general, not by the commission. The commission did not pronounce on a timetable: it made remarks only in its report. It stated:
    "The developments of 1 July give the basis for believing that decommissioning can be completed in the time prescribed by the Good Friday Agreement."
    That was as far as it went, although it added:
    "There is still sufficient time to do that, but there is a need to get started soon."
    The commission did not specify a few days, or any particular period. Worse than that, it went on to state:
    "While the Commission is prepared to define a detailed timetable for decommissioning of arms by the main paramilitary groups, it believes this will best be achieved in discussions with the groups".
    So, it is clear that the paramilitary groups will have an input into what the timetable should be. No doubt, the general suggested to the Government the same thing that he suggested to us when we met him, which was that the timetable in many ways depended on the logistics of the problem—on where the guns are and how they must be destroyed.

    Therefore, the general regards the issue of timetabling as one that is best discussed with the paramilitary organisations—or one that can be discussed only with them. For years, the paramilitary organisations have shown a propensity to put off the date on which actual decommissioning would take place. Is it unreasonable for Unionists to ask for specific dates to be put into the Bill, given that decommissioning was to have occurred during the couple of years of the talks process?

    Indeed, that was the requirement on which those talks were based. Even after the agreement was reached, decommissioning was to take place within a two-year period but, 14 months later, it has not even begun. In those circumstances, I do not think that Unionists can be accused of being unreasonable in asking for a starting date.

    That is all that we ask for: a starting date and a way to measure progress. That could be done on a monthly basis, for example—or on whatever basis is decided—so that a quota of arms could be destroyed in each of the months running up to May 2000.

    That is what the amendment would ensure. The Government would be hard put to say that Unionists are asking for something unreasonable, given the history of the problem and the fact that previous promises were not kept by the Prime Minister or during the 1996 talks.

    The hon. Gentleman said that a timetable was the only thing that is wanted. My suspicion is that, when the Unionists pocket such a timetable—if they ever do—they will want something else. Is the hon. Gentleman saying that a timetable is the only thing needed before he can support the initiative?

    Not only am I not saying that now, but I did not say it before. Had the hon. Gentleman been present for the Second Reading debate, he would have heard me say that the Bill would still not be a good piece of legislation, even if all the amendments were agreed. It allows Sinn Fein-IRA into government before any guns have been handed over.

    The Prime Minister must keep his word to the people of Northern Ireland. The right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) mentioned several occasions on which that word was given. The Prime Minister also spoke on "Good Morning Ulster" and on the radio in Foyle. Every time, he attempted to convince the people of Northern Ireland that it would be only a matter of days before the IRA's bluff was called on decommissioning. Well, we are calling the Prime Minister's bluff now. Let us see the timetable in the Bill.

    I have not taken part in many debates on Northern Ireland, although I have talked with many of my colleagues in the Unionist parties. I see the Bill as an opportunity for the people of Northern Ireland to have a continuing relationship with the United Kingdom, within the Union.

    I am concerned about the amendment, which I see as precipitate. The dictionary definition of the word "precipitate" is to force out deliberately, and that is what the amendment would do. Instead of moving us steadily towards including within the agreement more people committed to the Assembly and the resolution of the problem within the United Kingdom, the amendment would force some people out.

    The IRA and Sinn Fein are often named together, but Sinn Fein has clearly said that it is against the use of arms. It wants decommissioning, but it cannot make the IRA do it. To me and to people outside the Chamber, it seems logical that, if Sinn Fein is brought into the Assembly to participate in ministerial positions, the IRA will become more and more marginalised. We want to continue the period of peace that has existed in spite of splintering among, and intimidation and terror by, paramilitaries from both sides within their own communities, matters that I have raised in the House on behalf of Families Against Intimidation and Terror.

    The people of Northern Ireland, on all sides of the community, want steady progress towards conflict resolution. They do not want precipitate moves that force some people out of the agreement and out of the process. That would break the link between the Good Friday agreement and the wishes of the people of Northern Ireland and of the rest of the United Kingdom.

    If the amendment is precipitate, it is precipitation at the end of a very long process. Decommissioning, and the gradual move away from it, has been an issue for two or three years now. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the amendment is not so much a precipitate move as the end point of a slow and long-drawn-out process?

    The hon. and learned Gentleman knows how much I respect his views and his intellect, but he is wrong to talk about having reached the end of a process after a few years. Along with a Unionist councillor, I visited a museum in the Shankill where I saw photographs of the assembling of Carson' s volunteers to secure the place of Northern Ireland within the Union. The process did not even start there. It has gone on at least throughout this century. To lay down a timetable specifying four days or four weeks is to insult the memory of people from this and previous centuries who saw the process continuing for many years.

    We seem to ask only how people in Northern Ireland can move from conflict and violence to peace. Do Unionist Members think that Yasser Arafat trusts the Israeli Government just because there has been an election? Do they think that the Israeli Government trust the Palestine Liberation Organisation to work through a peace in the occupied territories in independent Palestine? They do not. Do Unionist Members believe that the PLO has no say over what happens in Hamas or Hezbollah? Of course not. But the process moves steadily forward because no one is erecting barriers or saying that, when a certain point is reached, it is, as the hon. and learned Member for North Down (Mr. McCartney) put it, the end point. If it is the end, it is the end of peace. If it is the end of the peaceful process, then it is the end of the credibility of the Unionist movement in the mainland of the United Kingdom and that is the great danger.

    9.45 pm

    I did not vote with the Government on the new clause because I thought that our position was wrong and that the agreement was not broken by that clause. I disagree with this amendment because it breaks the agreement.

    Under the agreement, an independent commission was set up. If we try to interfere with that, we are in a new ball game. The commission must have heard the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the Minister of State, in his excellent speech in summing up, saying that they expect movement on decommissioning within days and the first tranche of decommissioning within weeks. I do not think that, given the structure—

    I understand what my right hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) was trying to say. He is agreeing that a precipitate motion would prevent progress because it would impose barriers to it.

    I can understand the frustration of the leader of the Ulster Unionist party and I commend him for the hard work that he has done, along with the Prime Minister and others. I believe that those in his party who want barriers want the process to be derailed and, if they want that, they are not in the spirit of what the British people want—that includes the people of the United Kingdom. We want conflict resolution which enables people to move back and back—to soften the people concerned and draw them in. If the Assembly includes Sinn Fein people working alongside Unionists in senior positions, it undermines the IRA to the point where it can never use those guns and, therefore, its only way forward is to go with decommissioning.

    The Unionists are giving those people a way out, if they carry the amendment.

    I will not take an intervention now as I am sure that I will hear the hon. Gentleman's views in his speech.

    I asked the Prime Minister, when he made his statement, whether we could have clarification of the details of the failsafe mechanism. I raised the same matter in an intervention on the Secretary of State. I asked for the maximum clarification from the Government before we ended these proceedings.

    Further to a point that has just been discussed, this is not a precipitate issue in any sense. On the day of the Downing street declaration—12 December 1993—was a meeting of the British-Irish parliamentary body. We greeted with enthusiasm the announcement of the declaration by Albert Reynolds and my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) in Downing street. That afternoon, the parliamentary body debated that important development, which was welcomed by all sides.

    At that time, I raised what I thought was the most difficult issue that would have to be faced—that of decommissioning. Obviously it would have to be faced. That was generally agreed on the British side, although that belief was greeted by Irish Members of the Dail as a deliberate British attempt to wreck the whole proceedings. It then became clear to me that it would be a most difficult issue to face.

    In the end, that issue must be faced. Responsible Members of the Dail know that, even if they achieve a united Ireland, the last thing that they would want or would tolerate are private armies with substantial quantities of weapons available to dissident groups—ould threaten the very existence of that united Ireland. No parliamentary democracy could tolerate the existence of such weapons.

    Another reason why it is in the interests of everyone who is seeking to move forward in Northern Ireland and the island of Ireland for weapons to be removed is that there is no guarantee, as we debate this issue, that those whom we regard as the leaders of Sinn Fein-IRA will continue to maintain control of those stocks of weapons.

    We have moved far enough through the process to be aware of the dissident groups that exist already—whether Continuity, Real, Revenge or whatever new title has emerged for the splinter groups that may or may not be forming. We know of the allegation that one of those who joined the Real or Continuity IRA was the quartermaster of the IRA. We cannot keep on fudging—whether in the interests of Unionist, nationalist or republican democratic parties which aspire legitimately towards a united Ireland.

    Against that background, I have always considered the issue to be important—especially the last step. That comes as no surprise to any of us who have lived through many years of longing for an outcome of peace and for the resolution of this terrible period of conflict and sadness—a small part of my life was spent at the centre of those problems. No one, including my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon, was under any illusion that the last moment might be the most difficult one. It was often said that it would have to be imposed and that there would not be absolute agreement. I thought that, at least if that last step had to be imposed, it would be done fairly and with justice to either side.

    However, as my right hon. Friend pointed out, the measure is an imposition and we shall be trusting people whom we do not trust at present; we are asking democrats to go that extra mile to accommodate men who have been associated with violence, but who claim that they are becoming democrats. Under the Bill, we are preparing to trust them. If we do that, we must be absolutely sure that the basis for that trust is the fairest that we can achieve.

    I am grateful to the Minister and his colleagues for ensuring that those of us who take a close interest in these matters received a copy of the Bill—I received one last night. I heard the Prime Minister speak of his determination that there would be a failsafe mechanism; that people would be able to see clearly how the matter would be undertaken; and that there would be no uncertainty. There would be no risk because, if people embarked on the process, the failsafe mechanism would protect them. However, I turned page after page of the Bill and, when I came to the end, I realised that it contained no structure for a failsafe mechanism. I genuinely do not understand that. Ten days ago, the Prime Minister announced what the process would be. General de Chastelain and his colleagues have been working for about two years, and I fail to understand why the measure does not contain the essential ingredient for establishing the failsafe mechanism.

    There is a fund of good will in this House towards Governments dealing with Northern Ireland issues—indeed, I have drawn on it myself. I wholly accept that, in certain circumstances, Governments present legislation and ask for the co-operation of the House. In the peculiarly difficult and challenging circumstances of Northern Ireland, Governments are entitled to expect the co-operation of the House to an extent that would never be given to normal legislation of any other kind. The House of Commons has tended to show a sense of responsibility and a bipartisan approach on such occasions. The Government are drawing on that well of bipartisan good will tonight to achieve their objective and to help them to find a solution.

    In those circumstances, the House is entitled to expect the fullest information to make that judgment. In all seriousness, I have to say that the Government will be abusing that good will and the relationship that prevails in the House if the Minister is not able to state clearly how the system is going to work. I continue to believe what I said to the Prime Minister last week when he made his statement. I cannot conceive what tripwire there will be—we have not been shown one, and the House does not know what it is—short of the final deadline of May 2000, when everything is supposed to be complete.

    I strongly agree with a comment made by the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble). I know General de Chastelain: I knew him well at NATO, during my time as Secretary of State for Defence. He is a fine and honourable man. A man in his position should not be abused or taken advantage of. He has been asked to undertake a job which I hardly imagine he sought and which is as challenging a job as can be found—I suppose its only equal is to advise on the reform of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Anyone who knows Northern Ireland knows that such challenges have to be met, but they are not the easiest of undertakings. General de Chastelain has undertaken that job.

    The Minister will know that I am not known for taking one side or the other—I have been chased around Belfast city hall by a loyalist waving a Union Jack and accusing me of betraying the Union. I genuinely tried to ensure that, in finding a solution to the problems, we recognised the legitimate interests of both sides, including those of the Irish Government. I faced those problems during negotiations on the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which established the recognition of the legitimate interest of the Irish Government in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It also established the principle of consent, which the Government have paraded today as a key achievement and which Unionists should welcome and accept.

    It is against that background of having faced the challenges and having sought to respect the legitimate concerns of both sides that I make my comments tonight. I have to say that a great weight is placed on General de Chastelain, who has to take the responsibility for deciding, at some moment, that he will effectively torpedo the Good Friday agreement—that he has to decide that the offence is so great that he has to stop the whole process that is, as the Government describe it, the best hope for peace in our lifetime. What a responsibility to lay on him. In such circumstances, he needs some sort of bolster: the Government owe it to General de Chastelain to put in the Bill some sort of structure that he can stand by, defend and confirm.

    If it is left entirely to General de Chastelain to make up the rules and then to decide whether they have been implemented or not, he will not do it. That would be an impossible task and an unreasonable responsibility to lay on him. Knowing the way in which the House and the Government work, I suspect that the Minister will not have the authority to accept the amendment, although I dearly wish that he did.

    I do not claim that the amendment is the perfect solution, but I hope that, before the Bill returns from the other place, the Government will have read what I have said. I hope that the Minister of State will draw my words to the attention of both the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, and that they will acknowledge that I speak with experience of my time in Northern Ireland.

    I pray that something for which we have fought and worked for many years is not destroyed by one last fault. The Government must find a way to insert provisions that will give that necessary measure of confidence and set out a structure in which people can have confidence. Only then will the process have some real chance of working.

    10 pm

    Our difficulty in this debate is that the end to the conflict in Northern Ireland ultimately depends not so much on the individual terms of the Good Friday agreement or any additional terms that we may seek to impose, but on a development of trust between the parties.

    I shall illustrate my point with the example given by the right hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. King). If he, as a Conservative Member, were found to have in his home a weapon, perhaps a hunting rifle, I, as a Labour Member, would not feel threatened by him because it would never occur to me that he would use his weapon in a violent fashion. If, however, the right hon. Gentleman were in the habit of issuing violent threats and was known to support terrorist activity, I would feel a sense of deep unease when I met him even if I did not know that he had a weapon at home or whether he had voluntarily given up such a weapon, and I would be reluctant to work with him in a common Government. That is the basic problem faced by the Ulster Unionists, as well as by Sinn Fein and every other party in Northern Ireland.

    The difficulty that we face with the amendments is the same as that with the previous group of amendments—they seek to home in on, and to harden, a specific aspect of the agreement that is known to cause difficulty to a particular section of those involved in the process. That is why the amendments appear to be partisan and unhelpful.

    If General de Chastelain, considering the overall picture, judges that we are making genuine progress towards a civil society in Northern Ireland from which the threat of violence is banned, that will be a crucial step forward. It would be wrong if an amendment that we passed tonight forced the disruption of that process and the end of the Good Friday agreement. Conversely, if General de Chastelain detects that, on one side or another, there is no genuine commitment to the agreement and to peace, and that one party is not serious about the process, that will be a serious matter that will effectively end the process, regardless of whether a rifle or a pound of Semtex has been given up.

    Decommissioning is important, as we have all stressed several times, but it is one of a wide range of factors. I believe that, if we had nailed down the decommissioning aspect of the agreement, the critics of the agreement, whom we greet regularly on the Opposition Benches, would be raising other aspects of it because of their basic distrust of the other side, for reasons that we can understand, and their reluctance to reach an agreement with a commitment to a peaceful settlement. The amendment is understandable, but it is unhelpful because it seeks to solidify a particular aspect of the agreement at the expense of the more fundamental question of whether we can trust the parties.

    I fully agree with the need for a timetable for decommissioning, but having heard how the right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) first savaged and then praised the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Dr. Turner), I hesitate before I draw the Tory shilling.

    Everybody agrees that we need a timetable. On Second Reading, the issue hinged on whether the Government or an independent body should set the timetable. Both could work, but the Government are suggesting that an independent body, in the form of General de Chastelain's commission, should set the timetable, and I am inclined to agree, for one crucial reason. General de Chastelain has built up enormous credibility with both sides, and individuals and parties have sought to accept him as an effective, independent arbiter. Given the tensions that will unquestionably arise when the timetable is set, it is reasonable to allow General de Chastelain's independent commission to choose the route and the wayposts.

    I am therefore a little concerned that the amendments, if agreed, would demand us to do the job. As I said on Second Reading, much of this is about not principle but judgment. Therefore, there is space for people to differ. I still think that de Chastelain is probably in a very strong position to make this happen.

    Amendment No. 5 summarises what we would all like: a process that leads to May 2000 as the point of complete decommissioning. If right hon. and hon. Members are looking for a copper-bottomed assurance, I say once again that that deadline is it. We—as well as, indeed, the failsafe mechanism—are attempting to ensure that we end up with the desired result in May 2000.

    Putting that aside, I commend to the Government amendment No. 2, which I tabled. This is a matter of process. Clause 1 is so drafted that it requires the Decommissioning Commission to report a failure but not to specify its exact nature. Amendment No. 2 would put that right. Suggesting that may sound a little pedantic, but given the absolute necessity for us to be extremely clear at every point in our deliberations and, given the danger of any latitude in the Bill's terminology, I ask the Government to take seriously those five or six words, which would tidy up exactly what the Decommissioning Commission is expected to report.

    I was desperately keen to make a speech on Second Reading about the prostitution of democracy by allowing armed terrorists into government, but sadly, I was not called. I suspect that, if I tried to make such a speech now, I would promptly be ruled out of order. I shall therefore resist that temptation and speak instead to amendments Nos. 31 and 33, which stand in my name.

    Amendment No. 31 would achieve what other people have tried to achieve: confirm a timetable specifying when things must happen. Amendment No. 33 would specify what must happen before any sanctions that are imposed can be lifted.

    In fairness, I should remind the Committee that I voted against both the Good Friday agreement and Second Reading. I do not want there to be any misunderstanding about where I am coming from. None the less, I accept the democratic will of the majority, which is of course more than one can say about Sinn Fein-IRA. The key reason for being against both the Good Friday agreement and this Bill is that they duck the issue of decommissioning. The Good Friday agreement fudged the question in the hope that it would go away—but it has not—and the Bill tries to do exactly the same.

    I have listened intently throughout these debates to what others have said, and note that the Bill is supposed to provide a failsafe guarantee that decommissioning will occur. But, on Second Reading, the Secretary of State said that the Government do not control the timetable—I believe that those were her words. I also listened carefully to the explanation that General de Chastelain controls the timetable. Then I heard it explained that General de Chastelain has not specified a timetable. Rather than going down the route of what exactly he did say, I shall leave it to the words of the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), who spelled out in detail exactly General de Chastelain's real position.

    In the end, all that I have to go on are the words of the Prime Minister. If I understand him correctly, he has told us several times that, if we pass this Bill, there will be a commitment to disarm within days and a start to proper decommissioning within weeks, to be completed by May 2000.

    For the purpose of the debate, I am prepared to take the Prime Minister at his word. That is why I have tabled amendment No. 31. The Prime Minister said that there will be a commitment within days, and I take days to mean less than a week. If the agreement comes into effect on the 15th, I see no reason why we should not specify 22 July, which is days away, not a week, for a commitment. If that is what we are being offered, surely we can write it down.

    We were told that there will be a real start within weeks. To me, weeks mean less than a month. If there is to be a start within weeks, that means that it must be before 15 August, which is why I put that date in my amendment. If the Prime Minister is telling us the truth, there is no harm in accepting the amendment.

    We are told also—it is in the Good Friday agreement—that the completion of decommissioning will be by May 2000. It therefore seems simple to me to specify 30 April. That is how I arrived at that date.

    Tokenism will not do.

    I remind the hon. Gentleman that the date specified in the agreement is 22 May 2000.

    I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and he is right to correct me. If I could table an amendment to an amendment, I would willingly accommodate him. I hope that he accepts that the principle applies. Instead of 30 April—

    I made the point because the hon. Gentleman so clearly stated what days and weeks mean to him. The one date that we could be accurate about is the one specified in the agreement, which the hon. Gentleman got wrong.

    We are old sparring partners and I hear what the hon. Gentleman says and take it on the chin. I shall not pursue the matter, but I shall pursue the issue of tokenism.

    It is crucial that we do not say that a start equals one bullet. It seemed logical to me to specify 25 per cent. of all arms by 15 August, but it could be another figure. If the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) wanted to challenge me on that, I would allow him to do so.

    Amendment No. 33 deals with what must happen before any breach of the conditions can be rectified. Clause 2 merely provides that the Secretary of State can specify when the process comes to an end. That is not good enough. There must be clear indications of what has to happen before the Secretary of State can use the powers set out in the Bill. The date in the amendment is wrong, so if the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh wants another go, I shall willingly give way to him.

    We have been told today, and before, that we are within an ace of success and that there is only one more concession to make, just one more leap in the dark, and we shall be there. I do not like taking risks of this sort. I do not like leaps in the dark. That being so, my amendments are designed to provide a little more illumination.

    Although even contemplating the possibility of allowing armed terrorists into government sticks in my craw because it undermines everything in which I believe, if the House of Commons is determined to go down that track, I believe that we must be clear about what it is that we mean, and clear about the timetable. If the Government genuinely want a failsafe guarantee to everyone in this place, they will specify a timetable. If they will not do that, I can conclude only that, once agam, the Government are ducking and weaving and trying to make more concessions to terror.

    10.15 pm

    The Government want decommissioning and a timetable. The best way to achieve both is to do what is set out in the Bill. The essence of the argument concerns the role of the independent commission. From the beginning of the process, and certainly from the time that the Good Friday agreement was concluded and put to the people of Northern Ireland, who in a referendum agreed on decommissioning just as they agreed on the other parts, the intention was that decommissioning should be in the hands of an independent commission.

    We all know that the authority, integrity and wisdom of General de Chastelain and his colleagues are not in question. They have spent many months considering in enormous detail how they can deal with the problem of decommissioning—the modalities and so on.

    Trust and confidence have been mentioned by many speakers in this short debate. The right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) said that the last hurdle was decommissioning. I think that the last hurdle is trust, although decommissioning is part of it. The only way in which we will ensure that the terms of the agreement are implemented is by putting in place a genuinely independent commission.

    That Independent Commission on Decommissioning must set the parameters and specify how decommissioning is to be carried out. Why do we say that? There are two reasons. One is that that is set out in the agreement. The other is that all parties to the agreement wanted the commission to be independent because they would not trust us as a Government, any more than loyalists would trust the Irish Government as a Government. Our only hope of success in decommissioning is to ensure that the commission is genuinely independent of Government, although it reports to Governments, and that it sets the parameters.

    I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is rightly laying great stress on the role of the commission. Can he tell the House, now or later, whether the decisions of the commission are subject to judicial review? In other words, are the decisions of the commission final or are they open to review in the courts, with all the consequences that might follow?

    I shall return to the matter, but my initial reaction—I speak to a lawyer who is much more qualified than I am in these matters—is that the commission's decisions are subject to review.

    The agreement, as has often been said, is not a legal document. It is a political document. People voted for it because they thought that an agreement would bring them peace and stability. The question is how we can establish a commission that will attract the trust and confidence of those who must decommission, and those who want decommissioning to take place.

    I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is making the case that the commission is independent. The case has been made on previous occasions that the Government do not seek to influence the commission's judgments. That leaves me with a concern. Do the Government have any view on the timetable, or are they neutered on this fundamental issue? If they cannot lean on, or advise, or seek to persuade, the commission, and the decision is purely for the commission, is the right hon. Gentleman telling the House that, instead of supporting a timetable, as the Opposition do, he is moving even further—

    I shall deal with the points raised by the right hon. Gentleman, because it is important to state where the Government stand. Let me return to the independence of the commission, and how that was reflected in the negotiations two or three weeks ago. Schedule 2 is entitled "Text of the Joint Statement". Paragraph 3 refers to the devolution order, and paragraph 4, which refers to the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, says that

    "the Commission will have urgent discussions with the groups' points of contact. The Commission will specify that actual decommissioning is to start within a specified time. They will report progress in September and December 1999 and May 2000."
    Perhaps more significant is the commission's report, which was presented during the week of negotiations. Paragraph 21 says:
    "While the Commission is prepared to define a detailed timetable for decommissioning of arms by the main paramilitary groups, it believes this will best be achieved in discussions with the groups' various points of contact. Once such a timetable has been worked out, paramilitary groups will be expected to adhere to it to ensure completion by 22 May 2000, and the Commission will report on progress to the two Governments."

    Is the Minister saying that the timetable will be determined by the Independent Commission on Decommissioning, which will negotiate that timetable with the terrorist organisations?

    I am saying that the commission itself has worked out how best it can achieve its ends. It is saying to us that the best way to achieve those ends is finding the points of contact, ensuring that they are in place and discussing with them how best to proceed. I know that the hon. Gentleman is going to say, "Ah, they will do their best to prolong all this to ensure that it does not come within any specified time." All of us in the Chamber would agree that there has to be speed in this matter. The general himself said in his press statement that the process should begin within days—the person concerned should be identified and the modalities construed—and, after that, the first actual decommissioning should take place within weeks. Within that, he also specified September, December and May as dates for reporting progress.

    The Bill also ensures that the failsafe mechanism will come into operation at any point in between should the commission report that commitments are not being fulfilled. It seems to me that that absolutely ensures that decommissioning is achievable, and properly achievable, within the time limit. That is what General de Chastelain is saying, but it is important to understand that he also said that decommissioning could not be achieved in its entirety by May 2000 unless a start was made now. That is in the report; it clearly refers to the timing, scheduling and timetabling of decommissioning, for which he is responsible.

    Before I allow the hon. and learned Gentleman to intervene, I must say to the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) that he is a much better lawyer than I am. My understanding now is that the commission is immune from judicial review. [Interruption.]

    Order. There are too many conversations going on and the Minister should be heard.

    Paragraph 21 of the commission's report indeed says:

    "The Commission believes that the detailed modalities, the timetable, and the commencement of actual decommissioning should be agreed with the paramilitary groups as soon as possible."
    The Minister has said that that might take place within days, but will the failure of the commission to agree those matters within days constitute a breach of the agreement?

    The chairman of the commission will have to report to the Government and the Government will surely have to ensure that the failsafe mechanism operates if seriousness is not present and the chairman says, "Look, we are not getting anywhere and nothing is happening." One of the purposes of this process is to test people's seriousness about decommissioning and how it should occur.

    The right hon. Gentleman refers to testing the seriousness of those involved. In General de Chastelain's report, which accompanied the recent statement by the Prime Minister, the commission asked 10 political parties to confirm their views. It asked:

    "Is the paramilitary group willing to give the Commission a firm basis for expecting that decommissioning will take place within the timescale set forth in the Good Friday Agreement?"
    The commission said that there were no responses to that question from either the IRA or the UDA. That is what concerns us.

    The Secretary of State did not hear my earlier contribution. I believe that General de Chastelain is entitled to get reinforcement from the House, which should provide a proper framework that does not put the whole responsibility on him, because that is an unreasonable weight to bear. The House should give him a time scale that enables him to assert the independence of his commission and to establish fair rules within a framework that the House has agreed.

    In his report, the general makes it clear how best he will be able to achieve decommissioning. He says that the best way is to define a timetable for the main paramilitary groups. The commission

    "believes this will best be achieved in discussions with the groups' various points of contact."
    He is not going to be dictated to by those groups. He consults and discusses matters with them, but he and his two colleagues will, for their own integrity if nothing else, report to the Government on precisely how far the groups have gone. This legislation will come in at that stage.

    We must understand that, unless we respect that integrity and independence, we will not achieve decommissioning. Only through an independent commission will it be possible.

    The right hon. Gentleman has made much of the independence of the commission. The commission has already said that the first stage could take place in days, which is less than a week, and the second stage could take place in weeks, which is less than a month. If we were to put those dates on the statute, surely that would not impinge on the commission's independence.

    I do not know why we think that we can do it better than General de Chastelain. The agreement explained why we must have an independent body to deal with the issue. That independent body has already produced its report. Its chairman has said that decommissioning could start in days. We have also provided a failsafe mechanism.

    The right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) made a number of detailed points to which I should reply. He is right to say that subsection (1) bites after devolution. That is when the Secretary of State can act. Subsection (6) makes it clear that the commitments arise from the agreement or the joint statement.

    The right hon. Gentleman also drew the House's attention to the decommissioning scheme under the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997, which lays down how the process is to proceed. Paragraph 7 of the scheme says that it starts when someone approaches the commission on behalf of a paramilitary organisation and convinces it of the organisation' s intention to decommission.

    Under paragraph 8, that person acts in accordance with the scheme only if he complies with all its requirements. That links in with sub-paragraphs (1)(a)(i) and (ii). Once an organisation has made a commitment to decommission, if it breaches that commitment, it is caught under (1)(a)(i) or (1)(a)(ii) if at any time it does not take any step specified by the commission, such as one required under a scheme.

    The right hon. Gentleman also referred to paragraph 12 of the decommissioning scheme. The commission's ability to lay down a timetable does depends not just on that paragraph, but on the general duty to facilitate decommissioning. In the report, the commission made it clear that it is prepared to lay down such a timetable.

    We must leave it to the independence of the commission and the integrity of its chairman. When these negotiations took place, all the people concerned realised that decommissioning had to be carried out in a specified time. We all know that. Let us ensure that that happens.

    10.30 pm

    Question put, That the amendment be made:—

    The Committee divided: Ayes 145, Noes 352.

    Division No. 236]

    [10.30 pm

    AYES

    Ainsworth, Peter (E Surrey)Gran, James
    Amess, DavidCurry, Rt Hon David
    Arbuthnot, Rt Hon JamesDavies, Quentin (Grantham)
    Atkinson, David (Bour'mth E)Davis, Rt Hon David (Haltemprice)
    Atkinson, Peter (Hexham)Dorrell, Rt Hon Stephen
    Baldry, TonyDuncan, Alan
    Beggs, RoyDuncan Smith, Iain
    Bercow, JohnEvans, Nigel
    Beresford, Sir PaulFaber, David
    Blunt, CrispinFabricant, Michael
    Body, Sir RichardFlight, Howard
    Boswell, TimForsythe, Clifford
    Bottomley, Peter (Worthing W)Forth, Rt Hon Eric
    Bottomley, Rt Hon Mrs VirginiaFowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman
    Brazier, JulianFox, Dr Liam
    Brooke, Rt Hon PeterFraser, Christopher
    Browning, Mrs AngelaGale, Roger
    Bruce, Ian (S Dorset)Garnier, Edward
    Butterfill, JohnGibb, Nick
    Chapman, Sir SydneyGillan, Mrs Cheryl

    (Chipping Barnet)

    Gray, James
    Chope, ChristopherGreen, Damian
    Clappison, JamesGreenway, John
    Clark, Dr Michael (Rayleigh)Grieve, Dominic
    Clarke, Rt Hon Kenneth (Rushcliffe)Gummer, Rt Hon John
    Hague, Rt Hon William
    Clifton-Brown, GeoffreyHamilton, Rt Hon Sir Archie
    Collins, TimHammond, Philip
    Colvin, MichaelHawkins, Nick
    Cormack, Sir PatrickHeathcoat-Amory, Rt Hon David

    Hogg, Rt Hon DouglasRoss, William (E Lond'y)
    Howard, Rt Hon MichaelRuffley, David
    Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)St Aubyn, Nick
    Hunter, AndrewSayeed, Jonathan
    Jack, Rt Hon MichaelShepherd, Richard
    Jackson, Robert (Wantage)Simpson, Keith (Mid-Norfolk)
    Jenkin, BernardSmyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)
    Johnson Smith,Soames, Nicholas
    Rt Hon Sir GeoffreySpelman, Mrs Caroline
    Key, RobertSpicer, Sir Michael
    King, Rt Hon Tom (Bridgwater)Spring, Richard
    Kirkbride, Miss JulieStanley, Rt Hon Sir John
    Lansley, AndrewSteen, Anthony
    Leigh, EdwardStreeter, Gary
    Letwin, OliverSwayne, Desmond
    Lewis, Dr Julian (New Forest E)Syms, Robert
    Lidington, DavidTapsell, Sir Peter
    Lilley, Rt Hon PeterTaylor, Ian (Esher & Walton)
    Lloyd, Rt Hon Sir Peter (Fareham)Taylor, Rt Hon John D (Strangford)
    Loughton, TimTaylor, John M (Solihull)
    Luff, PeterTaylor, Sir Teddy
    Lyell, Rt Hon Sir NicholasThompson, William
    McCartney, Robert (N Down)Townend, John
    MacGregor, Rt Hon JohnTredinnick, David
    MacKay, Rt Hon AndrewTrend, Michael
    McLoughlin, PatrickTrimble, Rt Hon David
    Madel, Sir DavidTyrie, Andrew
    Malins, HumfreyViggers, Peter
    Mates, MichaelWalter, Robert
    Maude, Rt Hon FrancisWardle, Charles
    Mawhinney, Rt Hon Sir BrianWaterson, Nigel
    May, Mrs TheresaWells, Bowen
    Moss, MalcolmWhitney, Sir Raymond
    Nicholls, PatrickWhittingdale, John
    Ottaway, RichardWiddecombe, Rt Hon Miss Ann
    Page, RichardWilkinson, John
    Paice, JamesWilletts, David
    Paisley, Rev IanWilshire, David
    Pickles, EricWinterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
    Prior, DavidWoodward, Shaun
    Randall, JohnYeo, Tim
    Redwood, Rt Hon JohnYoung, Rt Hon Sir George
    Robathan, Andrew
    Robertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry)

    Tellers for the Ayes:

    Robinson, Peter (Belfast E)

    Mrs. Eleanor Laing and

    Roe, Mrs Marion (Broxboume)

    Mr. Stephen Day.

    NOES

    Abbott, Ms DianeBlunkett, Rt Hon David
    Adams, Mrs Irene (Paisley N)Boateng, Paul
    Ainger, NickBradley, Keith (Withington)
    Ainsworth, Robert (Cov'try NE)Bradley, Peter (The Wrekin)
    Alexander, DouglasBrake, Tom
    Allan, RichardBreed, Colin
    Allen, GrahamBrinton, Mrs Helen
    Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E)
    Armstrong, Rt Hon Ms HilaryBrown, Russell (Dumfries)
    Ashton, JoeBrowne, Desmond
    Atkins, CharlotteBurden, Richard
    Austin, JohnBurnett, John
    Banks, TonyButler, Mrs Christine
    Barnes, HarryByers, Rt Hon Stephen
    Barron, KevinCaborn, Rt Hon Richard
    Battle, JohnCampbell, Alan (Tynemouth)
    Beard, NigelCampbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)
    Beckett, Rt Hon Mrs MargaretCampbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NE Fife)
    Begg, Miss Anne
    Bell, Martin (Tatton)Campbell-Savours, Dale
    Bell, Stuart (Middlesbrough)Cann, Jamie
    Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)Caplin, Ivor
    Bennett, Andrew FCasale, Roger
    Bermingham, GeraldCaton, Martin
    Berry, RogerCawsey, Ian
    Best, HaroldChapman, Ben (Wirral S)
    Betts, CliveChaytor, David
    Blackman, LizChisholm, Malcolm
    Clapham, MichaelGriffiths, Win (Bridgend)
    Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)Grogan, John
    Clark, Dr LyndaGunnell, John

    (Edinburgh Pentlands)

    Hain, Peter
    Clark, Paul (Gillingham)Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)
    Clarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)Hall, Patrick (Bedford)
    Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)
    Clelland, DavidHancock, Mike
    Clwyd, AnnHarman, Rt Hon Ms Harriet
    Coaker, VernonHeal, Mrs Sylvia
    Coffey, Ms AnnHealey, John
    Cohen, HarryHeath, David (Somerton & Frome)
    Coleman, IainHenderson, Doug (Newcastle N)
    Colman, TonyHenderson, Ivan (Harwich)
    Connarty, MichaelHepburn, Stephen
    Cook, Frank (Stockton N)Heppell, John
    Corbett, RobinHesford, Stephen
    Corbyn, JeremyHewitt, Ms Patricia
    Corston, Ms JeanHodge, Ms Margaret
    Cousins, JimHoey, Kate
    Cox, TomHome Robertson, John
    Cranston, RossHood, Jimmy
    Crausby, DavidHoon, Geoffrey
    Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)Hopkins, Kelvin
    Cryer, John (Hornchurch)Howarth, Alan (Newport E)
    Cummings, JohnHowarth, George (Knowsley N)
    Cunliffe, LawrenceHowells, Dr Kim
    Cunningham, Rt Hon Dr Jack (Copeland)Hoyle, Lindsay
    Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)
    Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)
    Dalyell, TamHume, John
    Darling, Rt Hon AlistairHutton, John
    Darvill, KeithIllsley, Eric
    Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)Ingram, Rt Hon Adam
    Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)
    Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H)Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough)
    Dawson, HiltonJamieson, David
    Dean, Mrs JanetJenkins, Brian
    Dismore, AndrewJohnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle)
    Dobbin, JimJohnson, Miss Melanie
    Donohoe, Brian H

    (Welwyn Hatfield)

    Doran, FrankJones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)
    Dowd, JimJones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)
    Dunwoody, Mrs GwynethJones, Helen (Warrington N)
    Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)Jones, Ms Jenny
    Edwards, Huw

    (Wolverh'ton SW)

    Efford, CliveJones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)
    Ellman, Mrs LouiseJones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)
    Ennis, JeffJones, Martyn (Clwyd S)
    Etherington, BillJowell, Rt Hon Ms Tessa
    Field, Rt Hon FrankKaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
    Fisher, MarkKeeble, Ms Sally
    Fitzsimons, LornaKeen, Alan (Feltham & Heston)
    Flint, CarolineKeen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth)
    Flynn, PaulKennedy, Jane (Wavertree)
    Follett, BarbaraKhabra, Piara S
    Foster, Rt Hon DerekKidney, David
    Foster, Don (Bath)Kilfoyle, Peter
    Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)
    Foster, Michael J (Worcester)King, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)
    Foulkes, GeorgeKumar, Dr Ashok
    Fyfe, MariaLawrence, Ms Jackie
    Galloway, GeorgeLaxton, Bob
    Gapes, MikeLeslie, Christopher
    Gardiner, BarryLevitt, Tom
    George, Andrew (St Ives)Lewis, Terry (Worsley)
    George, Bruce (Walsall S)Liddell, Rt Hon Mrs Helen
    Gibson, Dr IanLinton, Martin
    Gilroy, Mrs LindaLock, David
    Godman, Dr Norman ALove, Andrew
    Godsiff, RogerMcAllion, John
    Golding, Mrs LlinMcAvoy, Thomas
    Gordon, Mrs EileenMcCabe, Steve
    Gorrie, DonaldMcCafferty, Ms Chris
    Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)McCartney, Rt Hon Ian
    Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)

    (Makerfield)

    McDonagh, SiobhainRaynsford, Nick
    Macdonald, CalumReed, Andrew (Loughborough)
    McDonnell, JohnReid, Rt Hon Dr John (Hamilton N)
    McFall, JohnRobertson, Rt Hon George
    McGrady, Eddie

    (Hamilton S)

    McGuire, Mrs AnneRoche, Mrs Barbara
    McIsaac, ShonaRooker, Jeff
    McKenna, Mrs RosemaryRooney, Terry
    Mackinlay, AndrewRowlands, Ted
    McNamara, KevinRoy, Frank
    McNulty, TonyRuane, Chris
    Ruddock, Joan
    MacShane, DenisRussell, Bob (Colchester)
    Mactaggart, FionaRussell, Ms Christine (Chester)
    McWalter, TonyRyan, Ms Joan
    McWilliam, JohnSalter, Martin
    Mahon, Mrs AliceSanders, Adrian
    Mallaber, JudySarwar, Mohammad
    Mallon, SeamusSawford, Phil
    Mandelson, Rt Hon PeterShaw, Jonathan
    Marsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)Sheerman, Barry
    Marshall, David (Shettleston)Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert
    Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)Short, Rt Hon Clare
    Marshall-Andrews, RobertSimpson, Alan (Nottingham S)
    Martlew, EricSingh, Marsha
    Maxton, JohnSkinner, Dennis
    Meale, AlanSmith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E)
    Merron, GillianSmith, Angela (Basildon)
    Smith, Jacqui (Redditch)
    Michie, Bill (Shefld Heeley)Smith, John (Glamorgan)
    Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)
    Milbum, Rt Hon AlanSmith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)
    Mitchell, AustinSoley, Clive
    Moffatt, LauraSouthworth, Ms Helen
    Moonie, Dr LewisSquire, Ms Rachel
    Moran, Ms MargaretStarkey, Dr Phyllis
    Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)Steinberg, Gerry
    Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)Stevenson, George
    Morley, ElliotStewart, Ian (Eccles)
    Mowlam, Rt Hon MarjorieStinchcombe, Paul
    Mudie, GeorgeStoate, Dr Howard
    Mullin, ChrisStott, Roger
    Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)Strang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin
    Stringer, Graham
    Murphy, Rt Hon Paul (Torfaen)Stuart, Ms Gisela
    Naysmith, Dr DougSutcliffe, Gerry
    O'Brien, Bill(Normanton)Taylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann
    O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)

    (Dewsbury)

    O'Hara, EddieTaylor, David (NW Leics)
    Olner, BillTemple-Morris, Peter
    O'Neill, MartinThomas, Gareth (Clwyd W)
    Öpik, LembitTipping, Paddy
    Organ, Mrs DianaTodd, Mark
    Osborne, Ms SandraTouhig, Don
    Palmer, Dr NickTrickett, Jon
    Pearson, IanTurner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
    Pendry, TomTurner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)
    Perham, Ms LindaTurner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
    Pickthall, ColinTwigg, Derek (Halton)
    Pike, Peter LTyler, Paul
    Plaskitt, JamesVaz, Keith
    Pollard, KerryVis, Dr Rudi
    Pond, ChrisWareing, Robert N
    Pope, GregWatts, David
    Pound, StephenWebb, Steve
    Powell, Sir RaymondWelsh, Andrew
    White, Brian
    Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)Whitehead, Dr Alan
    Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)Wicks, Malcolm
    Prescott, Rt Hon JohnWilliams, Rt Hon Alan
    Primarolo, Dawn

    (Swansea W)

    Prosser, GwynWilliams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
    Purchase, KenWilliams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
    Quinn, LawrieWillis, Phil
    Rammell, BillWinnick, David
    Rapson, SydWise, Audrey

    Wood, MikeWyatt, Derek
    Worthington, Tony

    Tellers for the Noes:

    Wright, Anthony D (Gt Yarmouth)

    Mr. David Hanson and

    Wright, Dr Tony (Cannock)

    Mr. Keith Hill.

    Question accordingly negatived.

    I beg to move amendment No. 8, in page 1, line 19, leave out from 'Assembly' to end of line 21.

    With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 37, in page 1, line 19, leave out

    ', except as provided by section 3,'.
    Amendment No. 9, in page 1, line 23, after second `Minister' insert
    'under sections 18 and 19 of the 1998 Act other than in accordance with section 3;'.
    Amendment No. 14, in page 2, leave out lines 8 to 10.

    Amendment No. 15, in page 2, line 8, after `practicable' insert
    'but no later than 7 days'.
    Amendment No. 16, in page 2, line 9, leave out from `shall' to end of line 10 and insert
    'serve notice on the Presiding Officer requiring him to move a motion for resolution under section 30(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.'.
    Amendment No. 17, in page 2, line 9, leave out 'take steps to'.

    Amendment No. 18, in page 2, line 10, at end insert
    'within four weeks of a suspension order being made.'.
    Amendment No. 38, in clause 2, page 2, line 32, leave out subsection (2).

    Amendment No. 19, in, page 2, line 33, leave out from `account' to end of line 34 and insert
    'the proceedings of the Assembly under section 3;'.
    Amendment No. 20, in clause 3, page 3, line 8, leave out from 'call' to end of line 9 and insert
    'a meeting of the Assembly within 7 days of the making of the suspension order and such further meetings as he considers appropriate.'.
    Amendment No. 21, in page 3, leave out lines 10 to 19 and insert—
    '(2). Unless the Assembly resolves otherwise on a cross-community basis, a party in respect of which the Decommissioning Commission has reported under section 1 shall be disregarded for the purposes of subsections (4) to (6) of section 4 as if that party had been the subject of a resolution of the Assembly under section 30(2) of the 1998 Act.'.
    Amendment No. 22, in page 3, line 11, leave out from `debate' to end of line 15 and insert
    'a motion for resolution under section 30(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.
    (2A) In the event of a resolution under section 30(2) the Secretary of State shall implement the requirements under section 18(2) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998.'.
    Amendment No. 34, in page 3, line 11, leave out 'but not' and insert 'and, if it chooses,'.

    Amendment No. 23, in page 3, line 15, at end insert—
    '(3) The review shall take no longer than three months.'.
    Amendment No. 24, in page 3, line 16, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
    '(3) Following the implementation of section 18(2) the second meeting shall be held within 7 days and at that meeting the Assembly shall debate any action proposed to be taken in consequence of that implementation.'.
    Amendment No. 35, in page 3, line 18, after 'and' insert `if it chooses'.

    Clause 3 stand part.

    Amendment No. 28, in schedule 1, page 8, line 11, at end insert—
    '4A.—(1) During a suspension period the Secretary of State may by notice served on the Presiding Officer authorise the Assembly to meet at such times and to conduct such business as may be specified in the notice.
    (2) For the purposes of sub—paragraph (1) the Assembly Standing Orders shall have effect subject to such modifications as may be specified in the notice'.
    New clause 3—Review process
    'Within seven days of the conclusion of the review conducted under the Validation, Implementation and Review section of the Belfast Agreement, the Secretary of State shall call a meeting of the Assembly for the purpose of giving effect to any action within its competence which may have been agreed within the review.'.

    As I said on Second Reading, we believe that the Prime Minister promised—outside Castle buildings, Stormont; in The Sunday Times article; and in his statement last week to the House—several failsafes that, mysteriously and sadly, do not appear in the legislation, therefore making the Bill incomplete. The failsafes—as the Prime Minister likes to call them; or the copper-bottomed safeguards, as I should prefer to call them—are just not in the Bill.

    This final set of amendments, which we believe would create a copper-bottomed failsafe, is based on a simple premise. The Bill currently provides—I cannot believe that the Minister believes that it should do so—that, if any paramilitary organisation, whether loyalist or republican, fails to meet its decommissioning obligations under General de Chastelain's timetable—when he eventually publishes it—the penalty will be a suspension of both the Executive and the Assembly.

    We will have the bizarre situation of one group failing to fulfil its obligations, and everyone else getting penalised. I can think of no other law or regulation under which those who get hurt or penalised are the innocent parties who have done nothing wrong.

    10.45 pm

    Is my right hon. Friend implying that, if the decommissioning body decided that one side or another had breached the terms, the whole process would rewind, rather than continue? I believed that the Prime Minister had indicated in his statement to the House after the Belfast talks that the process would continue without the offending party.

    Like my hon. Friend, I was here in the House when the Prime Minister made his statement a week last Monday. I recall that the Prime Minister said categorically that only those who had breached the decommissioning timetable would be penalised. To give an extreme example, the LVF might refuse to decommission and, in so doing, would bring down the Executive and the Assembly. I repeat to my hon. Friend that that is bizarre and wrong.

    Under the amendment, if the Provisional IRA failed to decommission within the timetable and failed to fulfil its obligations, Sinn Fein would be immediately excluded from the Executive. However, the Executive would remain in place and, after a reasonable period, the d'Hondt formula would be triggered again so that there would be two new Ministers replacing the two excluded Sinn Fein Ministers.

    That way, there would be a continued devolved Administration and Executive in the Province, and all the constitutional parties—who will have fulfilled their obligations—would not be penalised. Surely that is the right way forward, and it is the copper-bottomed safeguard that Unionists and others require to ensure that they can go safely into an Executive with Sinn Fein Ministers, knowing either that the Provisional IRA will decommission its illegally held arms and explosives quickly or that Sinn Fein will be removed from the Executive. They will not be in the invidious position of having to share ministerial responsibility with men of violence who are retaining a fully armed paramilitary organisation.

    If the Minister of State wants the process to succeed—and if, as I know that he does, he wants a lasting devolved Administration for Northern Ireland with the most inclusive ministerial team possible under the d'Hondt formula—it is essential that he accepts the amendment. Then, Unionists and others would have a copper-bottomed guarantee that, by taking ministerial appointments ahead of decommissioning, there will be either decommissioning or the expulsion of Sinn Fein from the Executive. It is simple, straightforward and right and, at this late hour, I plead with the Minister to accept the amendment.

    I went to some lengths on Second Reading to state that the review was the only way within the agreement under which, in accord with the agreement, an examination could be made of the reasons why a default was made by anyone who had contravened the commitment given in terms of either decommissioning or the non-working of devolution. I do not wish to repeat what I said then, but it is essential to point out that, if we are going to be consistent with the agreement, that review must be in place, and no other mechanism must be used until a mechanism is decided at that review.

    If we do not have a suspension, we might end up in the anomalous situation in which Ministers whose party was under consideration in the review for having reneged or defaulted participated in that review as acting Ministers. Is that the situation that we want?

    I do not want to see the suspension of institutions that I have helped in some small way to set up. I do not want to see any blockage in the working of the new Executive, which I hope will be set up this week, but I want to try to preserve the agreement, above all else, because it transcends any Opposition party position, or any Unionist position, or any position that might be adopted by us, this Government or the Irish Government. It supersedes all those considerations and that is why I believe that we must act in accord with the review, to be at one with the agreement.

    The purpose of new clause 3 is simple. It is to ensure that the Bill before us accurately implements "The Way Forward" document that was decided by the two Prime Ministers. Paragraph 5 of that document provides that, if the commitments in relation to devolution or decommissioning are not met, the Governments will
    "automatically, and with immediate effect, suspend the operation of the institutions set up by the Agreement."
    Suspension must therefore apply to all institutions in the same way. The Bill fails to achieve that.

    The Bill provides that functions in relation to the North-South Ministerial Council and the new British-Irish Council shall not be exercisable. That means that the Councils cannot convene or operate. By contrast, clause 3 provides that the Assembly not only can but must convene and operate, so we are faced with an illogical absurdity. On the one hand, the Bill suspends the Assembly and on the other it requires it to meet twice while in suspension.

    The first of those meetings is to be held within seven days to debate the situation that led to the suspension order and the review. Can one imagine what purpose that debate would serve? Would it have an adverse effect on the subsequent review? Would it encourage posturing and increased rancour? Would it divert the parties from what must be their essential task at that time—to work constructively within the review? I believe that it would have a tremendously detrimental effect. One can imagine the rancour that could be generated in such a debate.

    The debate would have no ending, because there would be no vote. It would carry no responsibilities, because the Assembly would be suspended even though it was required to meet by order of the Secretary of State. The Bill provides that the second time that the Assembly meets must be before the suspension period has ended, to debate and vote on any action proposed to be taken in consequence of the review. If an institution is to be suspended, is it not ridiculous for it to meet and vote during its suspension? All that is necessary is that, after the suspension period, the Assembly should meet to implement the conclusions of the review. Any meeting of the Assembly during a suspension period would contradict the terms of the document "The Way Forward", laid down by the two Prime Ministers at the end of the most recent negotiations.

    The amendments make it clear that the Assembly should not meet during the review. Only after the review has been concluded should the Assembly meet to debate and vote on measures then within its competence. If the amendments were accepted, the Bill would then be in accordance with "The Way Forward" document and with the agreement.

    That is the only way in which all the institutions established by the Good Friday agreement can be treated on an equal basis, as the agreement requires. The proposals in the Bill would favour the Assembly over all other institutions in a way that would be remarkably detrimental to debates and to the taking of decisions that are outside its competence in terms of the review. New clause 3 would bring the Bill back to the terms of the Good Friday agreement and the document "The Way Forward". I hope that the two Governments will consider it carefully.

    Although I cannot be sure, I suspect that I know why the Bill has been drafted as it has. I shall leave the Government with one last thought. There is an old saying in County Armagh, where I live, that is used often. It holds that nothing is ever enough for those for whom enough is always too little. That should be pondered seriously in relation to clause 3.

    The right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. Mackay) referred to copper bottoms and failsafes. When is a copper bottom not a failsafe? What is a failsafe's bottom made of? I fear that if we use such terms too much, the public will give us the bum's rush, which may be made of copper or something else.

    The collective effect of amendments Nos. 8 and 28, as set out by the right hon. Member for Bracknell, would not necessarily be what he intends. There is a possibility that the Assembly would end up running on an ad hoc basis. I am worried that it would sit on and off, according to official notices, and that it would rattle along without being master of its destiny but without being fully suspended. However, I know there is an underlying feeling that all sides should not be punished if one side fails to deliver. I can see some case for that proposition, but I look forward to hearing what other hon. Members have to say about it.

    None of the various approaches adopted hitherto have been very effective, and we must now recognise that we face a true deadline. That deadline must not slip, nor must it be so half-hearted that it can be negotiated around. A clear suspension at least has the benefit that it is unequivocal and less open to abuse.

    Amendments Nos. 17 and 18 would specify the terms of the review. Amendment No. 17 would omit from clause 1 the phrase "take steps to", although I understand why the Minister felt those words to be necessary. If amendment No. 17 were successful, clause 1(4) would state that the Secretary of State would initiate a review under the validation, implementation and review section of the Belfast agreement rather than merely taking steps to do so. Notwithstanding the reasons for inclusion in the Bill of the vague words "take steps to", that would make the clause clearer.

    11 pm

    Amendment No. 18 deals with timing. The Bill specifies no time within which the review must take place. If we do not set a deadline, we risk an open-ended start date for the review. The danger is that time will stretch while the review goes uninitiated for some reason. I note that amendment No. 15 also seeks to set a deadline: it suggests seven days, and my amendment suggests four weeks: I do not mind how long it actually is so long as the period is defined.

    Amendment No. 23 suggests that the review should have an upper time limit of three months. Again, the length of time matters less than the fact of its limitation. If we do not limit it, the process may stall as we wait for the result of the review. One of the Bill's weaknesses is the lack of a specified time duration for the review. We have seen how deadlines can slip, and enshrining them in the Bill would provide a powerful failsafe against ending up in the quagmire of a never-ending review.

    My right hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) succinctly expressed the arguments for the amendments that he and the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) have tabled. However, I dare to suggest that I can summarise them even more briefly: it is entirely unacceptable that everything should be suspended when what we should be demanding is the expulsion of offenders. It defies reason and logic to proceed down the Government's path.

    In this debate, as on Second Reading, the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) has totally failed to convince. It simply is not good enough for the Social Democratic and Labour party—even it can rightly boast about standing for democracy and against violence—to hide behind collective decisions, the findings of reviews and wide generalities. The hon. Gentleman has failed to say what the SDLP would do if the IRA did not abide by a decommissioning schedule. His party, much to its discredit, cannot answer that question and refuses to do so.

    The hon. Gentleman's amendment should be rejected because, among other reasons, it inspires a sense of déjà vu. The initiative begun by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. Brooke) and Lord Mayhew was scuppered by the SDLP because the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) had in mind a bigger picture—the inclusion of the IRA—and one feels that one is seeing an action replay of those events. Members of the SDLP are not prepared to answer a direct question. One fears that one knows the reasons why.

    I spent some considerable time on Second Reading giving the answer to that very question, which was raised by the right hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major). I took on the points that he raised directly. I am prepared to repeat those so that the hon. Gentleman can understand what I am saying, but I am not sure that it would be fair to all the other hon. Members who were present during the Second Reading debate to take up time at this stage.

    I know that the hon. Gentleman sometimes finds it difficult to understand Northern Irish politics, despite his practise at it. I will spend any time that he wants with him, privately or publicly, to show him that, in effect, we are not going to bow to pressure from either side, whether it is Sinn Fein or Unionist.

    The hon. Gentleman obliges and, once again, fails to give a direct answer, although the implications are obvious. The question that the SDLP continues to refuse to answer is whether it will support the continuation of Sinn Fein in the Executive in the event that the IRA does not abide by a decommissioning schedule—[HON. MEMBERS: "Answer."] The answer is not forthcoming. We must draw our own conclusions from that. I rest my case. The amendment of the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh is as deficient as the rest of his argument on the entire process.

    The whole purpose of this failsafe is suspension and there is an obvious reason for it. As I have said many times this evening, the situation in Northern Ireland is different from anywhere else. The Assembly is based on the agreement, which in itself is based on the concord—the agreement between Unionism and nationalism. It will not work otherwise and we all know that. If we think for one second that we can have an Assembly in Belfast that is like the one in Cardiff, we are fooling ourselves. It is not going to work like that.

    We cannot try it. As the hon. Member knows, this matter was put to the people. They believed that this was the best way forward to achieve that result.

    If we accept that as a reality—I think that we must—clearly, if we find that the commitment on devolution or on decommissioning is not met, we will have to suspend the institutions of the agreement. As we outlined, those institutions are the Executive, the Assembly, and the north-south and east-west bodies. Clearly, one would then have to go to the review that is set out in the agreement.

    The Bill also makes additional provisions—some that are not particularly pleasing to my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) and some that are not particularly pleasing to Ulster Unionist Members. So we may well have got it right this time—who knows?

    The Bill states:
    "The first meeting shall be held within 7 days of the making of the suspension order; and at that meeting the Assembly shall debate, but not vote on—
    (a) the situation that led to the making of the suspension order; and
    (b) the matters which fall to be reviewed under…the Belfast Agreement."
    The right hon. Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) rightly referred to the difficult situation with loyalist decommissioning, particularly as loyalism—in this sense—would have no members of the Executive, or in some cases even Members of the Assembly, who could be put out of it; yet if, as General de Chastelain's commission said, the Loyalist Volunteer Force or the Ulster Defence Association, for the sake of argument, failed to decommission and that was reported to the Government, the process would still come into operation. How do we show that the whole apparatus of government in Northern Ireland will have to be dealt with in the same way as those who are represented on its Executive will be? That is one good reason why the Assembly should meet.

    My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has powers to call the Assembly and to limit the time of its meeting, so that it will not go on endlessly—as one hon. Member suggested. The limit would be set by the Secretary of State and common sense would prevail. For example, if a loyalist group with no Assembly or Executive members had failed to decommission, we should not want the whole apparatus to be suspended for any length of time. However, it is important that the Assembly should deal with the issue and discuss it, and that the review should take place of how to deal with that non-decommissioning.

    It would be different if the IRA did not decommission, because Sinn Fein would be in government. That would clearly be more difficult to deal with; that is where the operation of the agreement comes in. It states that the two Governments and all the parties who sit in the Assembly—whether or not they are in favour of the agreement—will review where we go next. That will be the same—whether the effect is exclusion, expulsion or suspension. People will have to get round the table and find a way out of the impasse, deadlock or crisis in the process.

    That is why we cannot exclude specifically through the measure. We cannot prejudge or determine what the review will do, because it will include representatives of all the Unionist parties in the Assembly and of the two Governments. If the report was so dramatic, the review would deal with the matter and decide how to continue, under the arrangements in the agreement. Whatever happens, we must undertake that review under the terms of the agreement.

    It would be a good idea to have a meeting of the Assembly after a review. The Assembly would have the opportunity to debate and to vote on the results of a particular review. The most important reassurance for Unionists—indeed for all of us—would be that the suspension would be automatic. There is no doubt that, as soon as the commission reports difficulty, the suspension becomes automatic. If we were to use the provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, and the Assembly voted for the exclusion of a party from the Executive, the Executive would have to be suspended; d'Hondt would have to be invoked and the excluded Ministers would have to be replaced. The effect would be the same in both cases. However, the measure is in the spirit of the agreement; it allows for automatic suspension and for review. It also allows us to deal with the more difficult issues of loyalists who fail to decommission.

    Question put, That the amendment be made:—

    The Committee divided: Ayes 144, Noes 340.

    Division No. 237]

    [11.12 pm

    AYES

    Ainsworth, Peter (E Surrey)Duncan, Alan
    Amess, DavidDuncan Smith, Iain
    Arbuthnot, Rt Hon JamesEvans, Nigel
    Atkinson, David (Bour'mth E)Faber, David
    Atkinson, Peter (Hexham)Fabricant, Michael
    Baldry, TonyFlight, Howard
    Beggs, RoyForsythe, Clifford
    Bercow, JohnForth, Rt Hon Eric
    Beresford, Sir PaulFowler, Rt Hon Sir Norman
    Blunt, CrispinFox, Dr Liam
    Body, Sir RichardFraser, Christopher
    Boswell, TimGale, Roger
    Bottomley, Peter (Worthing W)Garnier, Edward
    Bottomley, Rt Hon Mrs VirginiaGibb, Nick
    Brazier, JulianGillan, Mrs Cheryl
    Brooke, Rt Hon PeterGray, James
    Browning, Mrs AngelaGreen, Damian
    Bruce, Ian (S Dorset)Greenway, John
    Butterfill, JohnGrieve, Dominic
    Chapman, Sir Sydney (Chipping Barnet)Gummer, Rt Hon John
    Hamilton, Rt Hon Sir Archie
    Chope, ChristopherHammond, Philip
    Clappison, JamesHawkins, Nick
    Clark, Dr Michael (Rayleigh)Heathcoat-Amory, Rt Hon David
    Clarke, Rt Hon Kenneth (Rushcliffe)Hogg, Rt Hon Douglas
    Howard, Rt Hon Michael
    Collins, TimHowarth, Gerald (Aldershot)
    Colvin, MichaelHunter, Andrew
    Cormack, Sir PatrickJack, Rt Hon Michael
    Cran, JamesJackson, Robert (Wantage)
    Curry, Rt Hon DavidJenkin, Bernard
    Davies, Quentin (Grantham)Johnson Smith, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
    Davis, Rt Hon David (Haltemprice)
    Donaldson, JeffreyKey, Robert
    Dorrell, Rt Hon StephenKing, Rt Hon Tom (Bridgwater)

    Kirkbride, Miss JulieShepherd, Richard
    Laing, Mrs EleanorSimpson, Keith (Mid-Norfolk)
    Lansley, AndrewSmyth, Rev Martin (Belfast S)
    Leigh, EdwardSoames, Nicholas
    Letwin, OliverSpelman, Mrs Caroline
    Lewis, Dr Julian (New Forest E)Spicer, Sir Michael
    Lidington, DavidSpring, Richard
    Lilley, Rt Hon PeterStanley, Rt Hon Sir John
    LIoyd, Rt Hon Sir Peter (Fareham)Steen, Anthony
    Loughton, TimStreeter, Gary
    Luff, PeterSwayne, Desmond
    Lyell, Rt Hon Sir NicholasSyms, Robert
    McCartney, Robert (N Down)Tapsell, Sir Peter
    MacGregor, Rt Hon JohnTaylor, Ian (Esher & Walton)
    MacKay, Rt Hon AndrewTaylor, Rt Hon John D (Strangford)
    McLoughlin, PatrickTaylor, John M (Solihull)
    Madel, Sir DavidTaylor, Sir Teddy
    Maginnis, KenThompson, William
    Malins, HumfreyTownend, John
    Mates, MichaelTredinnick, David
    Maude, Rt Hon FrancisTrend, Michael
    Mawhinney, Rt Hon Sir BrianTyrie, Andrew
    May, Mrs TheresaViggers, Peter
    Moss, MalcolmWardle, Charles
    Nicholls, PatrickWaterson, Nigel
    Ottaway, RichardWells, Bowen
    Page, RichardWhitney, Sir Raymond
    Paice, JamesWhittingdale, John
    Paisley, Rev IanWiddecombe, Rt Hon Miss Ann
    Pickles, EricWilkinson, John
    Prior, DavidWilletts, David
    Randall, JohnWilshire, David
    Redwood, Rt Hon JohnWinterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
    Robathan, AndrewWoodward, Shaun
    Robertson, Laurence (Tewk'b'ry)Yeo, Tim
    Robinson, Peter (Belfast E)Young, Rt Hon Sir George
    Roe, Mrs Marion (Broxbourne)
    Ross, William (E Lond'y)

    Tellers for the Ayes:

    Ruffley, David

    Mr. Geoffrey Clifton-Brown

    St Aubyn, Nick

    and

    Sayeed, Jonathan

    Mr. Stephen Day.

    NOES

    Abbott, Ms DianeBreed, Colin
    Adams, Mrs Irene (Paisley N)Brinton, Mrs Helen
    Ainger, NickBrown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E)
    Ainsworth, Robert (Cov'try NE)Brown, Russell (Dumfries)
    Alexander, DouglasBrowne, Desmond
    Allan, RichardBurden, Richard
    Allen, GrahamBurnett, John
    Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)Butler, Mrs Christine
    Armstrong, Rt Hon Ms HilaryByers, Rt Hon Stephen
    Ashton, JoeCaborn, Rt Hon Richard
    Atkins, CharlotteCampbell, Alan (Tynemouth)
    Austin, JohnCampbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)
    Banks, TonyCampbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NE Fife)
    Barnes, Harry
    Barron, KevinCampbell-Savours, Dale
    Battle, JohnCann, Jamie
    Beard, NigelCaplin, Ivor
    Beckett, Rt Hon Mrs MargaretCasale, Roger
    Begg, Miss AnneCaton, Martin
    Bell, Martin (Tatton)Cawsey, Ian
    Bell, Stuart (Middlesbrough)Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)
    Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)Chaytor, David
    Bennett, Andrew FChisholm, Malcolm
    Bermingham, GeraldClapham, Michael
    Berry, RogerClark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)
    Best, HaroldClark, Dr Lynda (Edinburgh Pentlands)
    Betts, Clive
    Blackman, LizClark, Paul (Gillingham)
    Blunkett, Rt Hon DavidClarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)
    Boateng, PaulClarke, Tony (Northampton S)
    Bradley, Keith (Withington)Clelland, David
    Bradley, Peter (The Wrekin)Clwyd, Ann
    Brake, TomCoaker, Vernon

    Coffey, Ms AnnHesford, Stephen
    Cohen, HarryHewitt, Ms Patricia
    Coleman, IainHodge, Ms Margaret
    Colman, TonyHoey, Kate
    Connarty, MichaelHome Robertson, John
    Corbett, RobinHood, Jimmy
    Corbyn, JeremyHoon, Geoffrey
    Corston, Ms JeanHopkins, Kelvin
    Cox, TomHowarth, Alan (Newport E)
    Cranston, RossHowarth, George (Knowsley N)
    Crausby, DavidHowells, Dr Kim
    Cryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)Hoyle, Lindsay
    Cryer, John (Hornchunch)Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)
    Cummings, JohnHughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)
    Cunliffe, LawrenceHutton, John
    Cunningham, Rt Hon Dr JackIllsley, Eric

    (Copeland)

    Ingram, Rt Hon Adam
    Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)
    Dalyell, TarnJackson, Helen (Hillsborough)
    Darling, Rt Hon AlistairJamieson, David
    Darvill, KeithJenkins, Brian
    Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)Johnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle)
    Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)Johnson, Miss Melanie
    Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H)

    (Welwyn Hatfield)

    Dawson, HiltonJones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)
    Dean, Mrs JanetJones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)
    Dismore, AndrewJones, Helen (Warrington N)
    Dobbin, JimJones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)
    Donohoe, Brian H
    Doran, FrankJones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)
    Dowd, JimJones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)
    Eagle, Maria (L 'pool Garston)Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S)
    Edwards, HuwJowell, Rt Hon Ms Tessa
    Efford, CliveKaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
    Ellman, Mrs LouiseKeeble, Ms Sally
    Ennis, JeffKeen, Alan (Feltham & Heston)
    Field, Rt Hon FrankKeen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth)
    Fisher, MarkKennedy, Jane (Wavertree)
    Fitzsimons, LornaKhabra, Piara S
    Flint, CarolineKidney, David
    Flynn, PaulKilfoyle, Peter
    Follett, BarbaraKing, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)
    Foster, Rt Hon DerekKing, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)
    Foster, Don (Bath)Kumar, Dr Ashok
    Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)Lawrence, Ms Jackie
    Foster, Michael J (Worcester)Laxton, Bob
    Foulkes, GeorgeLeslie, Christopher
    Fyfe, MariaLevitt, Tom
    Galloway, GeorgeLewis, Terry (Worsley)
    Gapes, MikeLiddell, Rt Hon Mrs Helen
    Gardiner, BarryLinton, Martin
    George, Andrew (St Ives)Llwyd, Elfyn
    George, Bruce (Walsall S)Lock, David
    Gibson, Dr IanMcAllion, John
    Gilroy, Mrs LindaMcAvoy, Thomas
    Godman, Dr Norman AMcCabe, Steve
    Godsiff, RogerMcCafferty, Ms Chris
    Golding, Mrs LlinMcCartney, Rt Hon Ian (Makerfield)
    Gordon, Mrs Eileen
    Gorrie, DonaldMcDonagh, Siobhain
    Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)Macdonald, Calum
    Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)McDonnell, John
    Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)McFall, John
    Grogan, JohnMcGuire, Mrs Anne
    Hain, PeterMcIsaac, Shona
    Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)McKenna, Mrs Rosemary
    Hall, Patrick (Bedford)Mackinlay, Andrew
    Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)McNamara, Kevin
    Harman, Rt Hon Ms HarrietMcNulty, Tony
    Heal, Mrs SylviaMacShane, Denis
    Healey, JohnMactaggart, Fiona
    Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)McWalter, Tony
    Henderson, Doug (Newcastle N)McWilliam, John
    Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)Mahon, Mrs Alice
    Hepburn, StephenMallaber, Judy
    Heppell, JohnMandelson, Rt Hon Peter

    Marsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)Salter, Martin
    Marshall, David (SheWeston)Sanders, Adrian
    Marshall, Jim (Leicester S)Sarwar, Mohammad
    Marshall-Andrews, RobertSawford, Phil
    Martlew, EricShaw, Jonathan
    Maxton, JohnSheerman, Barry
    Meale, AlanSheldon, Rt Hon Robert
    Merron, GillianShort, Rt Hon Clare
    Michie, Bill (Shefld Heeley)Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)
    Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)Singh, Marsha
    Milbum, Rt Hon AlanSkinner, Dennis
    Mitchell, AustinSmith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E)
    Moffatt, LauraSmith, Angela (Basildon)
    Moonie, Dr LewisSmith, Jacqui (Redditch)
    Moran, Ms MargaretSmith, John (Glamorgan)
    Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)
    Morgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)Smith, Sir Robert (WA b'd'ns)
    Morley, ElliotSoley, Clive
    Mowlam, Rt Hon MarjorieSouthworth, Ms Helen
    Mudie, GeorgeSquire, Ms Rachel
    Mullin, ChrisStarkey, Dr Phyllis
    Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)Steinberg, Gerry
    Murphy, Rt Hon Paul (Torfaen)Stevenson, George
    Naysmith, Dr DougStewart, Ian (Eccles)
    Oaten, MarkStinchcombe, Paul
    O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)Stoate, Dr Howard
    O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)Strang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin
    O'Hara, EddieStringer, Graham
    Olner, BillStuart, Ms Gisela
    O'Neill, MartinSutcliffe, Gerry
    Öpik, LembitTaylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)
    Organ, Mrs Diana
    Osborne, Ms SandraTaylor, David (NW Leics)
    Palmer, Dr NickTemple-Morris, Peter
    Pearson, IanThomas, Gareth (Clwyd W)
    Pendry, TomTipping, Paddy
    Perham, Ms LindaTodd, Mark
    Pickthall, ColinTonge, Dr Jenny
    Pike, Peter LTouhig, Don
    Plaskitt, JamesTrickett, Jon
    Pollard, KerryTurner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
    Pond, ChrisTurner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)
    Pope, GregTwigg, Derek (Halton)
    Pound, StephenTyler, Paul
    Powell, Sir RaymondVaz, Keith
    Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)Vis, Dr Rudi
    Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)Wareing, Robert N
    Primarolo, DawnWatts, David
    Prosser, GwynWebb, Steve
    Purchase, KenWelsh, Andrew
    Quinn, LawrieWhite, Brian
    Rammell, BillWhitehead, Dr Alan
    Rapson, SydWicks, Malcolm
    Raynsford, NickWilliams, Rt Hon Alan
    Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)

    (Swansea W)

    Robertson, Rt Hon George (Hamilton S)Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
    Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
    Roche, Mrs BarbaraWinnick, David
    Rooker, JeffWise, Audrey
    Rooney, TerryWood, Mike
    Rowlands, TedWright, Anthony D (Gt Yarmouth)
    Roy, FrankWright, Dr Tony (Cannock)
    Ruane, ChrisWyatt, Derek
    Ruddock, Joan
    Russell, Bob (Colchester)

    Tellers for the Noes:

    Russell, Ms Christine (Chester)

    Mr. David Hanson and

    Ryan, Ms Joan

    Mr. Keith Hill.

    Question accordingly negatived

    It being seven and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of the Bill, THE CHAIRMAN, pursuant to Order [this day], put forthwith the Question necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that hour

    Clauses 1 to 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

    Schedules 1 and 2 agreed to.

    Bill reported, without amendment.

    Order for Third Reading read.

    11.27 pm

    I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

    I am grateful to right hon. and hon. Members for their contributions to the debate on this Bill. I and my ministerial colleagues have listened carefully to all of them, which were honestly and often eloquently made by hon. Members of all parties. We remain of the view that the joint statement on which the Bill is based represents the best way forward.

    11.27 pm

    I am pleased to hear the Secretary of State saying that she and her ministerial colleagues will listen very carefully to everything that is being said throughout these debates because we sincerely believe that the three sets of amendments, which would provide the proper failsafes that the Prime Minister promised the people of Northern Ireland, and this House from the Dispatch Box, should be part of the legislation.

    I am at least heartened to learn that, on the ITN news at 11 o'clock tonight, the political editor Mr. Michael Brunson, presumably with the help of spin doctors from Downing street—apparently he was speaking from outside Downing street—said that the Government are now indicating that they will move on prisoner releases and will also take into account what my right hon. and hon. Friends and I have said. Whether that is true, I do not know. I hope that it is accurate.

    I hope that the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, who is in the House, have listened because, without our amendments, this Bill is so imperfect as to be irrelevant and there will be no chance of an Executive being set up. I want an inclusive Executive to be set up so that there can be a devolved Administration in Northern Ireland—that is what the people of Northern Ireland want—but we need proper failsafes in legislation. Let us hope that Mr. Michael Brunson is correct and, in fact, the Secretary of State is not yet fully informed of what the Prime Minister is doing. I hope that, in the other place, tomorrow and on Thursday, we will find that the Government have moved. If they have, it will be in everybody's best interests.

    11.29 pm

    Hon. Members have spoken with sincerity throughout all stages of our consideration of the Bill and that sincerity has been accepted by all those in the Chamber. The second common factor is that all of us, of whatever party, of whatever tradition and of whatever future we want to have together, do not want arms to remain in private hands.

    The substance of the Bill is how, after so many decades and so many recent months of stress and turmoil, to reach the point where the decommissioning of weapons and explosives takes place. However imperfect the Bill may be in the eyes of many, at least it gives us a yardstick by which, in the very near future, real measurement can be made of success. Alternatively, the failure to achieve decommissioning can be fully exposed.

    Many have spoken tonight of the lack of trust between the parties in Northern Ireland. That is so, and that is understandable. Many have produced litanies of the deaths, murders and other terrible acts of violence. I remember when we passed a Northern Ireland Bill that in effect, said that, after 30 years of intense violence, we would not be able to switch off violence at midnight on a given day. There is a history of violence within people, and some of it will continue. However, we must not let violence that is organised, approved and authorised by paramilitary organisations continue.

    Many members of those organisations will continue to engage in violence as a way of life in terms of drugs, extortion and intimidation, for example. That must not be confused with paramilitary violence aimed at destabilising the state. That is an entirely different concept. We as a society will suffer from the violence of individuals for many years to come. We will have to deal with it as a social issue. I do not want to have to deal with it as a paramilitary issue. That is what the Bill is about.

    All but one of the Ulster Unionist parties, including the United Kingdom Unionist party and the Democratic Unionist party, are opposed not only to the Bill or to the amendments to it but to the entire concept of the Good Friday agreement. That is fair enough. That is what democracy is about. But democracy has also said—71 per cent. of the north and 93 per cent. of the south—that the Good Friday agreement is the way in which we want to go forward as communities in the north and the south living in harmony together.

    There is distrust among us. The best way to test whether there is trust is to introduce a test, and we can do so within weeks. I will not argue whether that should be four weeks or six weeks in the context of our history, but we know that the test must take place within a short term when set against what we have suffered over 30 years and way beyond.

    I ask the House, particularly Opposition Members, to join in this last gesture before the test is put. Endorsement of the Bill will reflect the solidarity of the House and will reflect also the solidarity that we want to see in the north of Ireland. That will enable, 48 hours from now, the hunt to be run with some confidence of success.

    11.34 pm

    The Government Whip told us a few minutes ago that we had considered the Bill. That stretched the imagination because, as the House knows, we have gone only through the motions. There is much in the Bill that has not yet been explored. There has not been time to go through it in the necessary detail. It has long been evident to anyone who lives in Northern Ireland and who knows the situation there that there is no peace at present. In the longer term, it has long been evident that the litmus test of whether the IRA would come in from the cold and be part of the democratic process was weapons. The question of weapons always had the potential—

    My hon. and learned Friend says "Illegal weapons", and that is what we are always talking about. These are weapons that are held by the terrorist paramilitary organisations. Let us describe them as they are. We are talking of criminal elements that have used weaponry, murder and bombing as means to effect political change. I believe that it was not so much the weapons held by those people that have the potential to wreck the process, as the fact that they intended such an outcome to be an absolute certainty from the day that we embarked on the process.

    I have always believed that Sinn Fein-IRA are totally committed to turmoil and instability in Northern Ireland. They want to portray it as a failed political entity. They have made it clear that they do not want the Assembly. They want all-Ireland bodies.

    The issue of weapons should not be discussed in the House today. It should have been resolved early in the negotiations, then we would have known where we were going. It is the subject of debate today because of the failure to deal with such a crucial element at the beginning of the process.

    The Prime Minister told us that, if those people were kept out, there would be violence. He has not explained to anyone in Northern Ireland or the House how he will deal with violence if they must be put out next year or whenever—provided that they ever get in.

    It was evident to those of us who have been in this place for some time that there was never the slightest possibility of the Government accepting any amendments. The Bill has already been agreed with Dublin, with the White House, with the Social Democratic and Labour party and, for all I know, with Mr. Adams. Consequently, there was no chance that it would be amended.

    The hon. Member for South Down (Mr. McGrady) was present when his party leader spoke earlier. He was challenged on the question whether his party would put the gunmen out if they did not surrender weapons—a question that he has always failed to answer. Only one conclusion can be drawn.

    The net effect of the Bill is simple. At present, the parties in the Assembly can exclude those who do not live up to the standards that they are supposed to accept. The combination of the Ulster Unionist party and the SDLP could always have kept Sinn Fein-IRA out of office. For that matter, a combination of the Unionist party and the Democratic Unionist party could keep them out for up to 12 months at a time, renewable under the provisions of the 1998 legislation.

    The Bill shifts the onus to the Disarmament Commission report and to the Secretary of State, who then must act. Under the Bill, those people would be kept out for only a limited period—less than 12 months—after which time they could get back in again.

    The debate has been a whitewash exercise. Apart from allowing us to go through the motions and express our views, it has been a wasted day for the House.

    11.38 pm

    On Second Reading, we discussed in some detail the amendments proposed by the official Opposition and the Ulster Unionists. I said then that the difficulty seemed to be that the central issue of Northern Ireland peace was not weapons—the weapons are a symptom of the central issue, which is trust.

    If the politicians in Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland trust each other, the question of weapons will resolve itself. If they do not trust each other, they will need to be made to trust each other through the process, before anyone can feel safe. That is the reason why the assault from hon. Members who oppose the Good Friday agreement is so ambiguous, to put it politely. They say that they disagree with the agreement, yet they criticise the signatories to the agreement for not moving as rapidly as they had hoped.

    Let us accept that, if any of us were asked to work together on the basis of threats of violence, we would have the greatest difficulty in doing so. That would be the case regardless of whether we had weapons, whether we had given them up, or whether we had promised to give them up. The threats and the atmosphere of violence are the basic problem of Northern Ireland.

    We have allowed the debate to be hijacked by opponents of the Good Friday agreement. There is a good reason why decommissioning was not central to it—the central issue was the creation of trust between the parties. In their campaign against it, the Democratic Unionist party and the United Kingdom Unionists were successful in moving decommissioning to centre stage with the results that we see tonight. Okay, but, as we pass the Bill let us say that this is our best chance. The people of the United Kingdom have asked us to take that chance to try to achieve the peace and the trust that is so badly needed.

    Trust has another element—the trust between the British people and the Unionists in Northern Ireland who claim to call themselves loyalists. When they speak of loyalism, we expect a degree of loyalty to the interest of the United Kingdom, and that includes a peaceful settlement. We ask for their support to give the agreement the chance that it deserves.

    11.41 pm

    If what my right hon. Friend the Member for Bracknell (Mr. MacKay) has said about the television news is correct—I have no doubt that it is—it is an affront to the House that news of those concessions was given to television and not to the House when it was debating those very matters. Although that is an affront to the House, it is par for the course for the Government.

    The amendments, which might have made some sense of the Bill, were rejected. The arrangements contemplated in the Bill are directly contrary to the handwritten promises given by the Prime Minister to the people of Northern Ireland at the time of the Good Friday agreement. He pledged that
    "those who use or threaten violence must be excluded from the Government of Northern Ireland."
    The Bill's effect will be to include in the Government of Northern Ireland those who use or threaten violence. He promised that
    "prisoners will be kept in unless violence is given up for good."
    Violence has not been given up for good and the prisoners have not been kept in. I shall vote against Third Reading.

    11.42 pm

    We have had a full debate and the Government have had the opportunity to consider my brilliant amendments, which will no doubt be implemented through Government action. We have heard more about copper bottoms this evening than the average person hears in a lifetime and we have also left two questions unanswered.

    The first question concerns clarity about where the Government stand on the relationship between decommissioning and prisoner releases. I brought up the matter earlier to express my concerns. Although we obviously do not have much information, the Government have to be absolutely clear about where they stand on that central question.

    The second and more subtle unanswered question concerns whether there will be a time limit on the review process. If a suspension is called, the review process will present an opportunity for indefinite delay by those on the review panel. Once again, I counsel Ministers to take that concern seriously. If they look through the current specifications of the review process, they will see that it could be stalled because the review period is not defined. I strongly encourage the Secretary of State to think about what action she wants to take on that.

    Having said that, we must remember that the Bill is a pathway to peace. The ultimate copper-bottomed guarantee that something must happen is a date—May 2000, by which time decommissioning will or will not have been completed. It is said that, sooner or later, even the best strategy has to degenerate into action. In that sense, the Bill is only a piece of paper. Action has to come from it. There is an old saying that people cannot talk themselves out of a problem that they have behaved themselves into. We have done a lot of talking here in Parliament; the next step clearly will be taken in Northern Ireland itself, where politicians and paramilitaries must take forward what we have discussed today.

    I only hope that people are seized of the fact that we have just three days before the Prime Minister's final deadline. I sincerely hope that this one will be kept. More to the point, I sincerely hope that those in Northern Ireland in whose gift it is to deliver peace will take this opportunity to do so, because the people of Northern Ireland and of the United Kingdom as a whole will not take kindly to any further vacillation or obstruction of the peace process.

    11.45 pm

    The hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer) has lectured us about what people think. I am in a position to speak about how people think in Northern Ireland. At the European elections, the hon. Member for Foyle (Mr. Hume) was supposed to top the poll and wipe me from the political scene. I doubled my electoral majority over him, and he did not get his great prize of being first in Europe. Almost 70 per cent. of Unionist people voted against this agreement.

    Both Governments told us that the agreement should be supported by a majority of both sections of the community: a majority of the nationalists and a majority of the Unionists. It is clear that the majority of the Unionists do not go along with this agreement. We asked why. It is because they were conned by the Prime Minister when he made them all the promises that have been listed today. As a result of those promises, a wafer-thin majority of Unionists voted for the Good Friday agreement. That has changed. The Secretary of State and her Ministers know that it has changed. They can put all the opinion polls together and help people to make their decisions, but the people have spoken. I was told by the hon. Member for Broxtowe that a recent opinion poll in a Northern Ireland newspaper showed that he was right and we were wrong. That poll showed the very opposite: it showed that we were overwhelmingly right. In its editorial, the newspaper had to admit that those who had opposed the agreement had the people with them.

    That being so, the House can continue to set itself against the majority of the majority. Will that bring peace? Will that give confidence to the people? We need a review. [Interruption.] It is all right for the Minister to mutter, but what we need is a proper look at this agreement. It is sad that we were misled by members of the Front-Bench team. We were told that articles 2 and 3 would be proceeded with, but they are not being proceeded with and have been put on a two-year finger by the Dublin Government. They have announced that they will do nothing about articles 2 and 3 for two years.

    The Government of Ireland Act 1920 is the rock granite of our Province's constitutional position. Will it be taken away? Have we not the right to hold on to that, as people who prize our citizenship of the United Kingdom? Ulster has no debts to pay to the rest of the United Kingdom. It has paid its debts over and over again. [Interruption.] There are Scots men in the House who would also say that they have no debts to pay to the rest of the United Kingdom. As an Ulster man, I say that we have no debts to pay to this United Kingdom.

    I was told over and again by the hon. Member for Foyle in Strasbourg that the ceasefire was for ever, and that there would never be another bomb. I met him at a radio station on the day on which this city was bombed. I said, "What did I tell you, John? I said that the bombing would recommence at the will of the godfathers of the IRA."

    The bombing will recommence in every part of this United Kingdom when the godfathers decide. Mr. Adams made it clear, in the midst of the ceasefire, that the IRA has not gone away. How could it go away, when he is its leader and its champion?

    11.50 pm

    We have heard a good deal about failsafes and guarantees on Third Reading and, indeed, throughout the day. In the Bill, I see no failsafes and no guarantees.

    Labour Members may ponder on the history of rushed emergency legislation in the House. They may remember the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, which we all rushed back to pass last September. It was terribly important for that legislation to be rushed through in a single day. Since that time, 10 months ago, seven people have been charged and no one has been convicted. Rushed emergency legislation is generally to be avoided.

    We have heard today—from, among others, the hon. Member for Broxtowe (Dr. Palmer)—that this represents a tremendous chance that must be grasped. According to the Prime Minister, it is the chance of a lifetime. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) said earlier, the Prime Minister said that his pledge to the people of Northern Ireland was that
    "those who use or threaten violence must be excluded from the Government of Northern Ireland … prisoners will be kept in unless violence is given up for good."
    Violence goes on, day in day out, on the streets of Northern Ireland. There are beatings on the streets of Northern Ireland; there are murders on the streets of Northern Ireland. There is intimidation, there are exiles, there is targeting of members of the security forces, day in day out, on the streets of Northern Ireland; yet we continue with this trust. We have to trust the terrorists.

    Now we are asked for another leap of faith: another act of trust. We are told by the hon. Member for Leominster (Mr. Temple-Morris), "The war is over." He must have chosen those words advisedly. They were the words used by Sinn Fein in, I believe, 1993, when it sent my noble Friend Lord Mayhew—then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—the message, "The war is over." How is it possible to reach such an accommodation? The war was not over in 1993; the IRA retains its weapons. How can the hon. Gentleman use those words? It is not a leap of faith that we are requested to make, but a leap into the dark.

    The Secretary of State, with good intentions, says that we must have evidence; but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Major) said, even the dogs on the streets of Northern Ireland know who is responsible for certain acts. Let me ask the Secretary of State this: who is responsible for the murder of Paul Downey? Who is responsible for the murder of Brendan Fegan? Who is responsible for the murder of Eamon Collins, the IRA informer? Who attempted to murder Martin McGartland? Everyone in Northern Ireland knows; everyone in the RUC knows. How is it that the Secretary of State does not know? The Secretary of State is determined that she must have evidence, but we all know who is responsible for those acts.

    The Government are the dupes of the paramilitaries, both loyalist and republican—but it is not the loyalist paramilitaries who matter; only IRA-Sinn Fein will be a beneficiary of the Executive places. The Government are the dupes of McLaughlin, Adams and McGuinness, and I fear that that is to the shame of the Government.

    The Government must be motivated by good intentions, but are they really concerned with justice, with the rule of law, and with equity in Northern Ireland? They do not seem to be, in the Bill. The Government, and the democratic parties in Northern Ireland, have bent over backward to accommodate the terrorists. Surely there must come a time when there can be no further compromise.

    I will give Ministers credit for good intentions; I know that they are well intentioned. They must know, however, that the path to hell is paved with good intentions.

    11.54 pm

    During the past seven and a half hours, Opposition Members have attempted to expose the Bill's deficiencies. We stand by our arguments.

    One other dimension should be mentioned. Some of us oppose the Bill in principle. We oppose in principle the joint statement from which it emanates and the wider circumstances that have given rise to it. Some of us cannot and will not accept that political representatives of terrorist organisations should be offered places in government as an inducement to decommission their illegal arms—

    It being eight hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of the Bill, MR. DEPUTY SPEAKER, pursuant to Order [this day], put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

    Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time:—

    The House divided: Ayes 343, Noes 24.

    Division No. 238]

    [11.55 pm

    AYES

    Abbott, Ms DianeClelland, David
    Adams, Mrs Irene (Paisley N)Clwyd, Ann
    Ainger, NickCoaker, Vernon
    Ainsworth, Robed (Cov'try NE)Coffey, Ms Ann
    Alexander, DouglasCohen, Harry
    Allan, RichardColeman, Iain
    Allen, GrahamColman, Tony
    Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)Connarty, Michael
    Armstrong, Rt Hon Ms HilaryCook, Frank (Stockton N)
    Ashton, JoeCorbett, Robin
    Atkins, CharlotteCorbyn, Jeremy
    Austin, JohnCorston, Ms Jean
    Banks, TonyCotter, Brian
    Barnes, HarryCousins, Jim
    Barron, KevinCox, Tom
    Battle, JohnCranston, Ross
    Beard, NigelCrausby, David
    Beckett, Rt Hon Mrs MargaretCryer, Mrs Ann (Keighley)
    Begg, Miss AnneCryer, John (Hornchurch)
    Bell, Martin (Tatton)Cummings, John
    Bell, Stuart (Middlesbrough)Cunliffe, Lawrence
    Benn, Hilary (Leeds C)Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)
    Bennett, Andrew FDalyell, Tam
    Bermingham, GeraldDarling, Rt Hon Alistair
    Berry, RogerDarvill, Keith
    Best, HaroldDavey, Edward (Kingston)
    Betts, CliveDavey, Valerie (Bristol W)
    Blackman, LizDavies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
    Blunkett, Rt Hon DavidDavis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H)
    Boateng, PaulDawson, Hilton
    Bradley, Keith (Withington)Dean, Mrs Janet
    Bradley, Peter (The Wrekin)Dismore, Andrew
    Brake, TomDobbin, Jim
    Breed, ColinDonohoe, Brian H
    Brinton, Mrs HelenDoran, Frank
    Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E) Dowd, Jim
    Brown, Russell (Dumfries)Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)
    Browne, DesmondEdwards, Huw
    Burden, RichardEfford, Clive
    Burnett, JohnEllman, Mrs Louise
    Butler, Mrs ChristineEnnis, Jeff
    Byers, Rt Hon StephenEtherington, Bill
    Caborn, Rt Hon RichardFisher, Mark
    Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth)Fitzsimons, Lorna
    Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)Flint, Caroline
    Campbell, Rt Hon Menzies (NE Fife)Flynn, Paul
    Follett, Barbara
    Campbell-Savours, DaleFoster, Rt Hon Derek
    Cann, JamieFoster, Don (Bath)
    Caplin, IvorFoster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)
    Casale, RogerFoster, Michael J (Worcester)
    Caton, MartinFoulkes, George
    Cawsey, IanFyfe, Maria
    Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)Galloway, George
    Chaytor, DavidGapes, Mike
    Chisholm, MalcolmGardiner, Barry
    Clapham, MichaelGeorge, Andrew (St Ives)
    Clark, Rt Hon Dr David (S Shields)George, Bruce (Walsall S)
    Clark, Dr Lynda (Edinburgh Pentlands)Gibson, Dr Ian
    Godman, Dr Norman A
    Clark, Paul (Gillingham)Godsiff, Roger
    Clarke, Rt Hon Tom (Coatbridge)Golding, Mrs Llin
    Clarke, Tony (Northampton S)Gordon, Mrs Eileen

    Gorrie, DonaldMcCartney, Rt Hon Ian (Makerfield)
    Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)
    Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)McDonagh, Siobhain
    Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)Macdonald, Calum
    Grogan, JohnMcDonnell, John
    Hain, PeterMcFall, John
    Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)McGrady, Eddie
    Hall, Patrick (Bedford)McGuire, Mrs Anne
    Hamilton, Fabian (Leeds NE)McIsaac, Shona
    Harman, Rt Hon Ms HarrietMcKenna, Mrs Rosemary
    Heal, Mrs SylviaMackinlay, Andrew
    Healey, JohnMcNamara, Kevin
    Heath, David (Somerton & Frome)McNulty, Tony
    Henderson, Doug (Newcastle N)MacShane, Denis
    Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)
    Hepburn, StephenMactaggart, Fiona
    Heppell, JohnMcWalter, Tony
    Hesford, StephenMcWilliam, John
    Hewitt, Ms PatriciaMahon, Mrs Alice
    Hodge, Ms MargaretMallaber, Judy
    Hoey, KateMandelson, Rt Hon Peter
    Home Robertson, JohnMarsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)
    Hood, JimmyMarshall, David (SheWeston)
    Hoon, GeoffreyMarshall, Jim (Leicester S)
    Hopkins, KelvinMarshall-Andrews, Robert
    Howarth, Alan (Newport E)Martlew, Eric
    Howarth, George (Knowsley N)Maxton, John
    Howells, Dr KimMeale, Alan
    Hoyle, LindsayMerron, Gillian
    Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)Michie, Bill (Shefld Heeley)
    Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)Michie, Mrs Ray (Argyll & Bute)
    Hume, JohnMilburn, Rt Hon Alan
    Hutton, JohnMitchell, Austin
    Illsley, EricMoffatt, Laura
    Ingram, Rt Hon AdamMoonie, Dr Lewis
    Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)Moran, Ms Margaret
    Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough)Morgan, Alasdair (Galloway)
    Jamieson, David
    Jenkins, BrianMorgan, Ms Julie (Cardiff N)
    Johnson, Alan (Hull W & Hessle)Morley, Elliot
    Johnson, Miss Melanie(Welwyn Hatfield)Mowlam, Rt Hon Marjorie
    Mudie, George
    Jones, Rt Hon Barry (Alyn)Mullin, Chris
    Jones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)Murphy, Denis (Wansbeck)
    Jones, Helen (Warrington N)Murphy, Rt Hon Paul (Torfaen)
    Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)Naysmith, Dr Doug
    Oaten, Mark
    Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)
    Jones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)
    Jones, Martyn (Clwyd S)O'Hara, Eddie
    Jowell, Rt Hon Ms TessaOlner, Bill
    Kaufman, Rt Hon GeraldO'Neill, Martin
    Keeble, Ms SallyÖpik, Lembit
    Keen, Alan (Feltham & Heston)Organ, Mrs Diana
    Keen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth)Osborne, Ms Sandra
    Kennedy, Jane (Wavertree)Palmer, Dr Nick
    Khabra, Piara SPearson, Ian
    Kidney, DavidPendry, Tom
    Kilfoyle, PeterPerham, Ms Linda
    King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)Pickthall, Colin
    King, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)Pike, Peter L
    Kumar, Dr AshokPlaskitt, James
    Lawrence, Ms JackiePollard, Kerry
    Laxton, Bob
    Leslie, Christopher Levitt, TomPond, Chris Pope, Greg
    Lewis, Terry (Worsley)Pound, Stephen
    Liddell, Rt Hon Mrs HelenPowell, Sir Raymond
    Linton, MartinPrentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)
    Uwyd, ElfynPrentice, Gordon (Pendle)
    Lock, DavidPrimarolo, Dawn
    Love, AndrewProsser, Gwyn
    McAllion, JohnPurchase, Ken
    McAvoy, ThomasQuinn, Lawrie
    McCabe, SteveRammell, Bill
    McCafferty, Ms ChrisRapson, Syd

    Raynsford, NickStuart, Ms Gisela
    Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)Sutcliffe, Gerry
    Robertson, Rt Hon George (Hamilton S)Taylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)
    Roche, Mrs BarbaraTaylor, David (NW Leics)
    Rooker, JeffTemple-Morris, Peter
    Rooney, TerryThomas, Gareth (Clwyd W)
    Rowlands, TedTipping, Paddy
    Roy, FrankTodd, Mark
    Ruane, ChrisTonge, Dr Jenny
    Ruddock, JoanTouhig, Don
    Russell, Bob (Colchester)Trickett, Jon
    Russell, Ms Christine (Chester)Turner, Dennis (Wolverh'ton SE)
    Ryan, Ms JoanTurner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)
    Salter, MartinTurner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)
    Sanders, AdrianTwigg, Derek (Halton)
    Sarwar, MohammadTyler, Paul
    Sawford, PhilVaz, Keith
    Sheerman, BarryVis, Dr Rudi
    Sheldon, Rt Hon RobertWareing, Robert N
    Short, Rt Hon ClareWatts, David
    Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)Webb, Steve
    Singh, MarshaWelsh, Andrew
    Skinner, DennisWhite, Brian
    Smith, Rt Hon Andrew (Oxford E)Whitehead, Dr Alan
    Smith, Angela (Basildon)Wicks, Malcolm
    Smith, Jacqui (Redditch)Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)
    Smith, John (Glamorgan)
    Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
    Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)Williams, Mrs Betty (Conwy)
    Soley, CliveWinnick, David
    Southworth, Ms HelenWise, Audrey
    Squire, Ms RachelWood, Mike
    Starkey, Dr PhyllisWright, Anthony D (Gt Yarmouth)
    Steinberg, GerryWright, Dr Tony (Cannock)
    Stevenson, GeorgeWyatt, Derek
    Stewart, Ian (Eccles)
    Stinchcombe, Paul

    Tellers for the Ayes:

    Stoate, Dr Howard

    Mr. David Hanson and

    Strang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin

    Mr. Keith Hill.

    NOES

    Beggs, RoyRobathan, Andrew
    Chope, ChristopherRobinson, Peter (Belfast E)
    Davis, Rt Hon David (Haltemprice)St Aubyn, Nick
    Donaldson, JeffreySwayne, Desmond
    Emery, Rt Hon Sir PeterThompson, William
    Forsythe, CliffordTownend, John
    Forth, Rt Hon EricWardle, Charles
    Howard, Rt Hon MichaelWilkinson, John
    Howarth, Gerald (Aldershot)Wilshire, David
    Hunter, AndrewWinterton, Nicholas (Macclesfield)
    McCartney, Robert (N Down)
    Maclean, Rt Hon David

    Tellers for the Noes:

    Maginnis, Ken

    Mr. William Ross and

    Paisley, Rev Ian

    Rev. Martin Smyth.

    Question accordingly agreed to.

    Bill read the Third time, and passed.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Earlier this evening—when I believe that you were not in the Chair—the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) correctly drew my attention to a detail that I had got wrong in an amendment that I had tabled. I do not like making such mistakes, and I wanted to be absolutely certain that I was correct when I came to speak to the next motion this evening. Since the motion seeks to extend the powers of the Northern Ireland Act 1974, it seemed sensible to go to the Vote Office to make sure that I had a copy of the Act so that I would not make the same mistake. However, I was told by the Vote Office that no copies of the Act were available. May I therefore ask you how we can consider an interim extension to something to which we cannot refer this evening?

    The hon. Gentleman will find that there are copies of that Act, if not in the Vote Office, then in the Lobbies and other places. There are certainly bound copies in the Library and in various other places.

    Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker—

    Northern Ireland

    Motion made, and Question proposed,

    That the draft Northern Ireland Act 1974 (Interim Period Extension) Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 7th July, be approved.—[Mr. Paul Murphy.]

    12.8 am

    I do not believe that an order of this sort can be allowed to go through on the nod, and it is essential that we understand what we are being asked to do.

    If we pass the motion tonight, we will extend direct rule in Northern Ireland for a year and a day from the date when the d'Hondt process is to be triggered on Thursday. However, we have just spent the past eight hours passing a Bill that has been sold to us all as standing between us and the end of direct rule. We have been told time and again during those eight hours, "One more step, one more thing, one more concession—pass this Bill and direct rule will not be required after next Sunday."

    Yet five minutes later—and almost on the nod—the Government are prepared to say that that was all a charade and that it did not matter, because they now want the powers to continue direct rule for a further year.

    Earlier, we were chided on the grounds that some of our amendments were precipitate and causing problems. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the order is precipitate and could cause problems?

    It seems to me that the Government are speaking with forked tongue. For eight hours they have said that the Bill will solve the problem and, in the early hours of the next morning, they try to sneak through the reality—the extension of direct rule for a further year.

    To make matters worse, the Government were not even prepared to do more than move the order formally. They did not consider it worthy of even five words of explanation. They want to continue direct rule without telling us why, but they have to tell us why. If they do not, we have no alternative but to come to the conclusion that the whole episode earlier today was a charade.

    The Government must therefore tell us whether they want this order because they have already privately concluded that the Unionists will refuse to join an Executive with armed terrorists. Or is it perhaps because secretly they have already made up their minds that Sinn Fein-IRA will not decommission, so devolution will not happen? Is that the problem?

    The Government must explain whether the order is before us tonight because they have decided that the Unionists will not co-operate. If that is so, we have had a cynical pantomime today. The only explanation for the proceedings today would be that they were an attempt to force the Unionists into a position in which they had no alternative but to refuse to co-operate. That is cynical in the extreme.

    I am willing to give way to the hon. Gentleman if he wants to expLain to the House why we are being asked to continue direct rule within minutes of being sold a Bill which, it was claimed, would solve the problem. Would the hon. Gentleman care to tell us why we are being asked to do that?

    The hon. Gentleman seems to be trying to lay before the House several principles that suggest that he is the kind of gentleman who, having taken out fire insurance cover, would then be silly enough to throw away the fire extinguishers.

    I think I follow the hon. Gentleman's point. I have given the only explanation that has been offered. Ministers were prepared to push the order through on the nod.

    We must ask the Government whether it was in their mind this afternoon that they would need this order tonight because they were going to manoeuvre the Unionists into such a position that they could not join the Executive. If that is so, I can assume only that the Government have done that to the Unionists because the Government know that the Unionists are the democrats in this process. They play by the rule of law. Have we had this pantomime because the Unionists do not have a gun to hold to the head of the Secretary of State?

    Alternatively, the reason for the order could be that the Government have already made up their mind that the pantomime of passing a Bill with so-called failsafe mechanisms was worthless, as many hon. Members argued this afternoon. Did the failsafe mechanisms mean nothing? Was the talk of a matter of days merely weasel words? Was it meaningless when Ministers talked of a matter of weeks this afternoon? Did it count for nothing when they said that the process might be complete by May 2000? Is that the cause of today's pantomime? Had the Government decided already that there would be no decommissioning by Sinn Fein-IRA?

    If so, I say hallelujah—at last the Government have come to their senses and now accept what many have been saying for years. They should now tell us why they want this order. We have to consider what the order aims to achieve and not just let another year go by. If the House is to make a meaningful decision tonight, we must be clear about the objectives behind the order.

    The Northern Ireland Act 1974 allows the Government to continue to run Northern Ireland as a colony. Decisions are made in London about housing, education, and planning.

    If the Government are given half a chance, they will let Dublin run the whole shooting match. Some Labour Members have that as an objective, and I am grateful for that confirmation.

    The order asks us to continue to allow Northern Ireland's affairs to be run by unelected officials and to be overseen by politicians from Great Britain who come and go with monotonous regularity. I read in the newspapers that some will come and go again in a few days or weeks, if those words still mean anything to the Government. I wonder how my fellow Conservative Members would feel if their constituents in Great Britain were treated as colonials, as the order that the Government want us to nod through implies for Northern Ireland.

    I shall vote for the order with alacrity. Although my hon. Friend is right to point out that it denies the people of Northern Ireland proper local government, it at least allows the prospect of undoing the damage that hon. Members inflicted by voting for the Bill only half an hour ago.

    That is an intriguing and thought-provoking argument. If my hon. Friend develops it he may convert me to his view.

    As well as considering how we would feel if our constituents and local services in Great Britain were treated in the way that direct rule allows their equivalents in Northern Ireland to be treated, we should also consider how the Government have used the powers since they were last extended. They have used them disgracefully, to make concession after concession to the gunman and the bomber.

    I hold no brief for terrorists on either side. They are as evil as each other. The Government have shown no discretion in the evil people whom they allow out of prison early. The releases have applied to both sides of the despicable terrorist divide. If that is the way direct powers are used, it justifies their being described as disgraceful.

    Direct rule also allows the Government to invite foreign Governments to tell us how to run part of our country. I have always deplored that. To any American who considers the matter seriously I have always said, "How would you feel if we came to your country and told you to get out the red carpet for the Oklahoma bomber and make a hero of him?" That is precisely what foreigners have been telling us to do with terrorists in our country. Some members of the Government have used the direct powers to make as many concessions as they can to those determined to have a united Ireland by any means—the ballot box, the bullet or the bomb. Those people have been appeased by the powers of direct rule time and time again.

    Over the past year or so, we have also seen the release of terrorists. Some people may be tempted to believe that the release of prisoners, and everything else that happens in Northern Ireland, does not play with voters in the rest of the United Kingdom. That may be true. Perhaps English Members of Parliament like me take an interest in matters in which many of our constituents take none. However, many people in Great Britain are appalled by the early release of bombers, murderers and people of that ilk. We have heard today that the Government are not prepared even to contemplate stopping the release of yet more evil people; that will not go down well across the whole UK.

    Direct rule is to be used to undermine the very principle of democracy by allowing into a part of the Government of a part of the United Kingdom people who keep Semtex and guns and who are prepared to mutilate, torture and threaten. That is a disgrace. If extending the order will enable the Government further to appease the men of terror, I am against it.

    12.22 am

    I echo the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire). I find it puzzling, and not a little disturbing, that the Government are so arrogant as to place on the Order Paper an item such as this without seeking to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, so that they may expLain what it is all about. Mere courtesy to the House should lead the Government to spend a few minutes expLaining the object of the order and the reasoning behind it. To say nothing, and to assume that the House will simply nod the matter through, is arrogance of the worst kind. The Government should be held to account for their arrogance, and it may take us some time this evening to hold them properly to account.

    I am concerned by my hon. Friend's point about the apparent lack of availability of documents. It is normal for documents relating to a matter on the Order Paper to be freely available to hon. Members so that we may study them before participating in debate. If my hon. Friend is right to say that the original Act to which the order applies—the Northern Ireland Act 1974; the key to proper consideration of the extension order—is not readily and equally available to all Members, there is a real question over how far we can be expected properly to consider and debate the matter before we vote.

    I leave it to others to judge whether it is good enough to say that some copies will be available in the Lobbies or in the Library, but are we are expected to stampede out of the Chamber to lay our hands on the few copies available? Are we expected to crowd around the copying machine before—or, worse, during—the debate? I hardly think that either scenario would contribute to the quality of our debate or our consideration.

    We are in real difficulty here. As we get into the early stages of this debate, we are at a distinct disadvantage. We have not had the benefit of an explanation by the Government as to what the order is about, why it is on the Order Paper and why they want us to approve it. Also, we are handicapped by the lack of ready availability of a source document for the debate.

    All that would be bad enough, but when one looks at the words on the Order Paper, one sees that we are apparently being asked that
    "the draft Northern Ireland Act 1974 (Interim Period Extension) Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 7th July,"—
    as long ago as that—
    "be approved."
    The Order Paper continues:
    "The Instrument has not yet been considered by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments."
    I wonder whether there is something sinister behind this. The implication of that apparently simple little phrase is that such an order would normally be considered by the Statutory Instruments Joint Committee but that in this case it has not been and I can readily understand why. If the matter was only laid before the House as recently as 7 July, it is no wonder that the Committee has not been able to consider it fully and properly so that it may advise the House.

    The Government are trying to rush this matter through without having given the reasonable and normal opportunity for that Committee to consider it. That is my reading—

    Has the right hon. Gentleman read the title? It is an extension order to extend existing powers and to cover the predicament that might arise if anything went wrong.

    I assume that the hon. Gentleman is trying to be helpful. He seems to think that simply because it is an extension we need not bother too much about it. I do not know whether he thinks that his constituents will be happy if, when they ask him what he did about the draft Northern Ireland Act 1974 (Interim Period Extension) Order 1999 and say, "Don't you realise that it had not been considered by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments?", all he can say is, "Don't worry folks. It was only an extension order, so I did not bother to look at it.

    That may be good enough for the people of St. Helens, but it is certainly not good enough for the people of Bromley and Chislehurst. They will have expected me to consider the details of the matter on the Order Paper fully and properly. I expect that the constituents of most other hon. Members would feel the same. I cannot understand why the people of St. Helens are not interested in the reasons behind an extension order, but I defer to the hon. Gentleman and his understanding of the fact that his constituents have so little interest.

    The answer is simple. The people of St. Helens, South are very intelligent and I am sure that the people of Bromley and Chislehurst can understand the meaning of the order, even if the right hon. Gentleman cannot.

    I advise the hon. Gentleman to stop digging before he is called to account by his constituents.

    That exchange has made its own point. If Labour Members believe that simply because an order is an extension it does not require deliberation or consideration in the House, they have a different idea of their parliamentary duties from mine. I try to take seriously the matters that are laid before us by the Government. I assume that it is still the responsibility of this House to give these matters proper consideration. I would prefer that the documents were readily available. I would prefer that the Government initiated the debate by giving us an explanation of the matter before us.

    Does my right hon. Friend agree that what he has described—an unwillingness on the part of the Government to explain the nature of the order—is part of a pattern? I think that he is aware of last night's debate on the Ways and Means resolution for the Food Standards Bill, which involved a great deal of money. He will remember that it was not until the end of that debate, after a great deal of prompting, that Members on the Treasury Bench explained the Ways and Means resolution. This is part of a pattern.

    I regret to say that my right hon. and learned Friend is correct. Given that he is so assiduous in his parliamentary duties, he was in the Chamber last night and witnessed the fact that, yet again, the Government expected the House to pay little or no attention to the important matter before us. At the beginning of that debate, the Government failed, yet again, to offer the House the merest courtesy of an explanation—however brief—as to what the debate would be about.

    Having concluded my preliminary remarks, I want to get into the substance of the issue—the extension of the order. As we are in unguided mode, I can only guess what the order is about—it might take me some little time because I have not yet been told by the Government. I do know, because it is stated in the order, that:
    "The interim period specified by section 1(4) of the Northern Ireland Act 1974 shall continue until 16th July 2000."
    I did not need to be told that by the Government.

    However, I am left to guess why the order should continue until 16 July 2000. If we relate the order to our earlier proceedings today, we are forced to ask why, if the Government have such confidence in those matters, they should want to extend the order until 16 July. I could understand the argument for its extension to May of next year, because that date seems to have some relevance for the Government. I could even understand an extension for only a few days or weeks beyond today's date, if necessary. Why was the date of 16 July 2000 chosen? It seems to bear no relation to our earlier deliberations. We are left to wonder why the Government are extending the order at all, because we have not been told. However, even if we grant that the extension has a certain logic, we have not yet been told why the order will extend to that date.

    The House is entitled to ask such questions; in fact it is our duty to ask them. That is why we are all here—to ask questions of the Government of the day. The matter could probably have been dealt with much more briefly if the Government had had the courtesy and good sense to explain matters at the beginning of the debate. Who knows? That might have meant that some of us would not have to ask these questions, because they would already have been answered. The Government seem to want to prolong the proceedings unnecessarily by not offering us an explanation.

    I shall bring my questions to an end, as the lack of an explanation from the Government might mean that one or two of my colleagues may want to add their own questions.

    My right hon. Friend itemises some of the questions that should be put to the Government. Will he also invite the Government to explain the relationship between motions 6 and 7? I note that motion 7 may not be debated, but that it can be objected to. In order to avoid making an objection, which may be tiresome, it might be helpful if, when Members on the Treasury Bench are speaking to motion 6, they will tell us the relationship between that motion and—

    Order. The right hon. and learned Gentleman ought to know that we can deal only with one motion at a time.

    Indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I was about to be tempted to note in passing—but I resisted—that motion 7 intriguingly contains a reference to Friday 16 July. Is that the key to the as yet unanswered question as to why 16 July is referred to in the order? We still do not know. However, there is a hint of an explanation that there might be a connection between the two. You have said that we must not refer to motion 7, Mr. Deputy Speaker, although, regrettably, there will be no opportunity to debate it—only to vote on it. We shall have to make our own judgment on the matter.

    Does my right hon. Friend consider that the extension order provides a good opportunity to review how the arrangements have worked over the past 12 months, first, in respect of policies and, secondly, in respect of the individuals conducting those policies in Northern Ireland?

    I would that that were so. My hon. Friend has made a perfectly reasonable request, but we have no opportunity for such a review, judgment and evaluation process, which would enable us to put in context the measure before us. If we were able to do that, I would feel more comfortable when the House, as it must, divides on the motion and hon. Members express their views in the Lobby. However, we shall leave that for a little later—after we have had an explanation from the Minister at the conclusion of this brief debate.

    There are real questions to be asked, and the House is owed an explanation. We shall want to have on the record a statement of what the measure is about, because such matters should not be left to speculation of the sort in which I have necessarily had to indulge. Only when we have heard the Minister's explanation shall we be able properly to cast our votes on whether or not we agree with the Government. I await that explanation with eagerness.

    12.36 am

    I shall not detain the House long because I do not believe that we should look a gift horse in the mouth. I do not share the perspective of my right hon. and hon. Friends: as I said earlier, I shall vote for the measure with alacrity.

    The extension of the powers is all the more vital as a consequence of the Bill to which we have just given a Third Reading. I accept what my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne (Mr. Wilshire) has said about the way in which the powers have operated in the past. He has said, quite rightly, that they have denied the people of Northern Ireland a measure of local government that all our constituents enjoy. That is regrettable. However, we now have the basis for taking a step back from the policy that has been pursued over the past 18 months in respect of those powers.

    That policy has been to try to draw the terrorists into the democratic process—to entrap them with the trappings of democracy. However, the consequences of that policy are that the very reverse has been achieved. In the Northern Ireland Bill to which we have just given a Third Reading, we see that we have actually corrupted the democratic process by providing for continual compromise on the part of the democrats, so that they are, in effect, duped into giving credence to the posturing of the terrorists. We have corrupted the entire democratic process.

    The extension of the powers in the order gives us the opportunity in the year ahead, to 16 July 2000—I am not so taken by the theological questions surrounding that date as my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) is—to correct the mistakes that we have just made. I accept that the powers are necessary, I shall vote for them with enthusiasm, and I hope that I shall be able to do so soon.

    12.39 am

    This is a bizarre little debate—[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—although not because of the hilarity being evinced by some Government Members below the Gangway. As we approach 12.40 am on the following day, those of us who have sat here most of the time since 4 pm yesterday—Ministers, Front-Bench spokesmen, Unionists and others on both sides of the House, including myself—are wondering what has gone on. Only an hour ago—[Laughter.] The hon. Members who find this debate hilarious do not realise the importance of this measure or the Bill that we discussed earlier. Only an hour ago, the Government were arguing exactly the opposite of what they are now proposing, yet they expect the motion to go through without debate. That is pretty much a derogation of democracy.

    As we have heard, the Northern Ireland Act 1974 is not in the Vote Office and, regrettably, my hon. Friends and I—and, I suspect, most Labour Members—have not had time to read the 1974 debates on the original Act or the debates on it that have taken place every year since then. It would be interesting to know whether the Labour party opposed the measure when in opposition. I have no idea, but I should like to know, because I want to know on what basis the measure might have been opposed in the past.

    There is a perfectly sensible basis for opposing the measure, which is that there should be direct integration of the Province into the rest of the United Kingdom. That is a substantive issue, and if the Act is to be extended for another 12 months, that may be precisely the Question that we should consider.

    I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend, because, as it happens, I shall touch on that point later in my remarks.

    As I understand the issue without having read the debates in 1974, we are being asked to extend direct rule. Who in the House is in favour of that? I am not, because I would much rather see devolved government for Northern Ireland or, indeed, a Northern Ireland that is integrated with the United Kingdom.

    Does my hon. Friend realise that he has only just emerged from the Division Lobby where he opposed a measure that he rightly thought would include terrorists in that devolved Government, and that these powers are therefore all the more necessary?

    My hon. Friend is kind to think that I had not considered that, but the devolved rule that I should like to see is devolved government to democratic parties in Northern Ireland, not terrorist parties. I do not want general devolution. Along with every Member of the House, I want the Good Friday agreement to be implemented in full, but that does not include the measure against which I voted less than an hour ago or the Act that we are now debating.

    Who is in favour of direct rule for Northern Ireland? The Government, who have put forward the order, are not, and they have been arguing against that position for the past 12 hours. The Unionists are not particularly in favour of it. The Conservatives are not in favour of it; we want devolved rule. Sinn Fein certainly do not seem to be favour of it. So who is in favour?

    My right hon. Friend the Member for Chislehurst and Bromley, or wherever it is—

    A very fine place. My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) said that it was arrogant of the Government—which indeed it is—to spend eight hours arguing for one position and then suddenly introduce an order of this magnitude and expect it to go through on the nod. This is a very important order. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Gainsborough; no, Lincolnshire; no, Grantham—[Laughter.] I cannot think what Labour Members find so hilarious. [HON. MEMBERS: "You."] That is kind, but I never intended to be a stand-up comic. I can only suspect that the hilarity has something to do with the lateness of the hour and the way in which the previous hours have been spent.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) talked about the integration of Northern Ireland with the United Kingdom. That is a very reasonable position, and one that I would support, but it is very much against the Government's devolutionary tendencies. Surely that is a matter for debate, rather than merely for nodding through the House.

    What about other alternatives that have not been considered or even mentioned by the Minister, who simply proposed the motion formally? That is quite inappropriate. I know it is late, but this is an important issue. It is extraordinary that the Government intend to steamroller the motion through, as they do with so many other measures, even though they argued for entirely the opposite position for hours this afternoon and evening. The laughter of Ministers and others surely shows confusion in their minds.

    What do the Government really believe? They seem to be in a mess. Do they want direct rule for an emergency? They have been saying that Sinn Fein and the IRA are sticking to a ceasefire, so there is no emergency. The order provides for emergency legislation to deal with special circumstances. If the special circumstances have passed, why do we yet again require the order? The killings and beatings in Northern Ireland that I mentioned in our earlier debate are very important, yet the Government tell us that there is no emergency.

    I would like some consistency in Government policy, as I think would the more serious Government Members. That is not too much to ask. This is not some little order to be nodded through about whether—this is close to my heart—we ride bicycles on pavements. It is about the ruling of the Province of Northern Ireland—part of the United Kingdom—and affects millions of people. We should surely treat it rather more seriously.

    What does the order contain? What have we heard from Ministers about security and security policy? All such matters are relevant to the order, but we have heard nothing. What have we heard about schools, roads or health? We have heard nothing except the Minister move the motion formally. That is not good enough for me, for Northern Ireland, or for the constituents of Labour Members sitting below the Gangway, who seem to find the whole thing very funny. I do not know whether people in Northern Ireland will find it funny; perhaps they will read about it.

    We are told that all these matters should be dealt with by locally elected politicians in Northern Ireland. All we get from the Minister is one word. There must be some explanation—

    Order. The hon. Member keeps repeating himself. He should not do that.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I notice that the Order Paper says

    "The Speaker will put the Question not later than 1½ hours after proceedings begin".
    As a new Member, I would have thought that that probably gave you some discretion. In view of the quality of the debate, I wonder whether I may be allowed to move that the Question be put?

    There are occasions on which I wish that I had discretion, but I am afraid, even at this late hour, that I am in the hands of the House.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I plead with you to give the right to the people of Northern Ireland to be heard in this debate, and to let it continue for its full length.

    I know that, notwithstanding the barracking from the riff-raff on the Labour Benches, you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, will always—

    Order. The hon. Member should not use such terms. Perhaps he will withdraw his remark.

    I shall certainly withdraw it. I apologise if "riff-raff' is an unparliamentary term.

    I can tell the hon. Member that it is unparliamentary, and that he must withdraw it.

    I shall certainly withdraw it. I can think of many other terms to describe the hooting from Labour Members. I am glad that you use your discretion wisely, Mr. Deputy Speaker, unlike the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Dr. Turner).

    This is very important legislation. It deals with the governance of 1.5 million people in Northern Ireland and it is not to be taken lightly and dealt with late at night. It should be considered at much greater length.

    Before my hon. Friend resumes his place, will he at least favour us with an explanation of whether he is in favour of extending these powers? I am not clear, and perhaps I have not followed his argument. If he is in favour of extending the powers, will he tell us why?

    I do not want to go too far down that line. I do not think that the responsibility is on me to say whether I am in favour of the powers. The responsibility is on the Government to tell us what the powers will involve and to describe the purpose or intention of the order, given what has been said since 4 o'clock this afternoon. They should tell us what the consequences of the order will be. I very much hope that we shall hear rather more from the Government than we have heard so far.

    12.50 am

    I support the order. It seems sensible that the provisions should continue to be on the statute book. We all hope that the agreement succeeds, but, if it does not, the Province will still have to be governed in the short term and beyond. There are about 1.5 million citizens in Northern Ireland and it is an important part of the United Kingdom. If we have a problem in the Chamber, it is that we do not discuss Northern Ireland enough. I am talking not about security matters, although they are very important, but about health, education and welfare services—all the things that we implement under the guise of the extension order in the administration of the Province. It is a pity that the Minister moved the order formally.

    We have an hour and a half to debate the order, but we cannot use the full time to debate issues that concern the people of Northern Ireland. I rather suspect that they are concerned with unemployment, health, education and their children getting on. Those are the issues that concern all our constituents. It is a great pity that, as a Parliament, we have not had the opportunity to discuss these matters as fully as we might.

    There are about 1.75 million citizens in Northern Ireland.

    Will the hon. Gentleman accept that, if we go down this road again, Ministers should at least move motions in this place that the Northern Ireland Grand Committee might meet in Northern Ireland from time to time? Does he agree that they should depart from the over-long tradition of getting their officials to phone a Member a day or so before they visit the constituency? They then say, "If you want any other information, please phone us tomorrow."

    The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. I am glad that the former Conservative Government set up the Northern Ireland Grand Committee, but I think that it needs to be used rather more and that it should meet in Northern Ireland.

    I think also that the normal courtesies of a democratic Government should be extended to Northern Ireland. We hope that the Assembly will not fail, but, if it does, it will be wrong to fall back on direct rule without considering other options.

    There is no meaningful local government in Northern Ireland. People stand for election under party colours, sometimes under great threat from terrorists. Sometimes, they have to sit in a council chamber with terrorists to run footpaths and swimming pools. Some people risk their lives doing that. On the mainland, we do not always understand the difficulties that people sometimes face in participating in democratic life in Northern Ireland.

    About two years ago, I went on a trip to Northern Ireland. We had a look round Belfast city hall and we talked to some local councillors. They are frustrated because they want to take part in ordinary democratic life. They want to shape their communities, but they cannot do so because of direct rule.

    All politicians wish to make great leaps and to embark on big schemes. We hope that what we have been debating for several hours in the Chamber succeeds. However, small steps are also possible. If things do not work out, I hope that, when we debate the order next year, we shall consider transferring some meaningful powers back to local government in Northern Ireland. It is important that when people stand for election they are able to undertake responsibilities and shape their local community, and there are many who would like to do that in Northern Ireland.

    It is wrong not to debate how people are governed at a local level and the processes of the health boards and authorities in Northern Ireland. There are important health matters throughout the Province and these are not discussed in the Chamber. There are great black spots of unemployment. Yet we are being asked to extend the order without even a report about how things have gone over the past 12 months.

    There are 1.75 million people in Northern Ireland, as the hon. Member for Belfast, South (Rev. Martin Smyth) said, and the way in which they are governed deserves debate. We hope that progress will be made, but if not, we fall back on the order. Important issues are involved, but we have not had the opportunity to address them.

    I hope that I have made a serious point, in the early hours of the morning. There are 1.75 million people who deserve decent government. I hope that we do not have to fall back on the order. I would support it if there were a vote, because the Province's services must be provided. That would be the line for us, as responsible politicians, to take.

    If progress is not made on the political front, I hope that we will not simply nod the order through year after year, without addressing the real issues: how Northern Ireland is governed; how local politicians can be given responsibility; and how the degree of accountability can be increased not only at local level in the Province, but through the House, the Northern Ireland Grand Committee and other methods.

    I have spoken to one or two people who have been elected to 'the Assembly in Northern Ireland. They say that one of the best things that have happened since that occurred is that civil servants who work in the Northern Ireland Office have telephoned them and asked their opinions. They feel more included in the process.

    If the political process does not work and we fall back on the order, we should try to embrace those within existing democratic structures in Northern Ireland by integrating them far more in the decision-making process. It is a common criticism in Northern Ireland that civil servants and representatives from south of the border are consulted more than some of our democratic politicians from north of the border. I have concerns about the order, but I will support it in a Division. The future of 1.75 million people is important and is worthy of debate.

    12.57 am

    I entirely support the remarks of the hon. Member for Poole (Mr. Syms) on the government of Northern Ireland. In the earlier debate, I wanted to mention the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The House owes a great debt to the RUC. During the period of direct rule, the independent commission to deal with the RUC was set up.

    It seems strange to the people of Northern Ireland that we are told by the general in charge of so-called decommissioning that all decommissioning of terrorist organisations will be by mutual consent, yet terrible attacks have been made on the Royal Ulster Constabulary as a result of the setting up of the independent commission. The independent commission became a sounding board for protests from IRA-Sinn Fein. Instead of proper communications from the general public, there was a campaign to attack and discredit members of the RUC.

    People in Northern Ireland say that, before there is any change in the policing of the Province, there should be a rigorous campaign to deal with the terrorists who are still carrying out terrorism in Northern Ireland.

    I salute the members of the RUC and the Royal Ulster Constabulary reserve. I salute their mothers, their wives and their families, who every day send their loved ones out to work and do not know whether they will return in safety.

    The force, which has done its best in difficult times and has had a terrible job policing the Province because of the acts of terrorism carried out there, seems to have been the butt of attack because of the setting up of the commission.

    Recently, we had a visit from representatives of the Congress and the Senate in Washington, which I deeply resented. It was led by two prominent Senators and a Congressman and the most vicious attack was launched on the RUC. I did not see any defence made of the RUC by any Minister of the Crown. That most scurrilous attack called for its complete abandonment and said that all it did was discriminate against the Roman Catholic population of our Province. I say, "Hands off the RUC." Mr. Patten has become the Foreign Secretary of the European Union; his work is over and he has drawn up his report. We are waiting for it, and I understand from the information that it will be very damaging and will help to forward the republican agenda in our Province. I say to the Ministers of the Crown that they should be taking a stand for those who are seeking, in difficult circumstances, to police our Province.

    I should like to raise one other matter—a long-service medal for the firemen of Northern Ireland. There was—

    Order. It is a perfectly good thing that the hon. Gentleman has brought up the question of a long-service medal for the firemen, but perhaps it would be more appropriate to raise it in another debate. We are discussing an order that covers a multitude of matters, but he is going into specific detail.

    I have taken part in such debates for many years—perhaps for more years than you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. This debate was held every year and it used to be a proper debate. If any Minister of the Crown had stood by and said, "Formally," he would have had his head taken off. With respect, all that I can say to the House is that, tonight, I am entitled to roam over every part of the government of Northern Ireland—from Dan to Beersheba—because it is all included in the order.

    Order. The hon. Gentleman must recognise that I have allowed him to roam—[Laughter.] I have allowed him to roam, but he is going into great detail about a specific subject relating to Northern Ireland. I suggest that perhaps he finds another time to raise that matter.

    It is not often that anybody sends me to roam, Mr. Deputy Speaker. My hon. Friends have told me to come home quick; they must think that I would be contaminated.

    The fire services of Northern Ireland have done a magnificent job in protecting everybody's property. There was a move to strike a long-service medal for the firemen of Northern Ireland, but it was rejected when a head of steam was raised by a republican lobby. Ministers know something about this matter—I ask them to remember that those men deserve that medal, which is what they would receive if they worked on this side of the water—and I trust that it will be resolved satisfactorily and those who have served the people of Northern Ireland in that capacity will be the proud wearers of long-service medals. I thank you for your indulgence, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

    1.4 am

    I see from the Order Paper that the draft order has not yet been considered by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. As it happens, for a good many years, I have been a member of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. I was struck by the fact that the order has not been laid within the normal time scale. It may have been considered by the Committee today, but, due to my presence on these Benches, I was unable to attend that meeting. If not, it will come before the Committee in due course. When it does, no doubt we shall ask the usual questions. Such questions are all too frequent, because, through either incompetence or neglect, Departments often fail to produce statutory instruments in the proper time, so hon. Members do not have an opportunity to table motions either to condemn them, to commend them or to demand a debate on them. Occasionally, the Order Paper contains prayers asking that orders or statutory instruments be rescinded or withdrawn.

    This order is defective in a number of ways. The proper time scale has not been observed. It has come before the House before it has been considered by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. We have not had an opportunity to consider whether it meets the proper standards and falls within the power delegated to the Minister by the main legislation. Furthermore, it has not been signed by the Secretary of State, as it should be. I should be grateful for an explanation of why that has been neglected. It refers to
    "One of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State",
    but there is nothing above that, so we do not know which Secretary of State it should be. Any of them can legally sign it, but that has not apparently been done.

    The draft order states that it
    "shall come into force forthwith".
    Draft orders are usually laid some considerable time before the application date. The fact that this order must be brought into force forthwith shows that the Government have got the time scale wrong, as they have on a number of occasions. They were wrong over the time that it was to take before the new arrangements for the Government of Northern Ireland came into force. They clearly expected that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 would have been in operation by now.

    The hon. Gentleman has had a great deal of experience as a member of the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Will he confirm to the House that one of the advantages of a draft statutory instrument being considered by that Committee is that it can make a report to the House, which would inform our debate? As a consequence of the Committee not having considered this draft order, we do have the advantage of a formal report.

    The right hon. and learned Gentleman is correct. These instruments are carefully considered by the legal advisers to the Speaker, so that we can be certain that they fall within the law. That has clearly not happened in this case, and that is a matter of regret. No doubt, the Joint Committee will report to the House on this order in due course. As is far too often the case, it may castigate the Department concerned for its failure in this matter.

    As I was saying when the right hon. and learned Gentleman intervened, given the fact that this order has had to be introduced at the last minute, it is clear that the Government intended that the 1998 Act should be in operation by now, but it is not. Why not? That has been debated at some length today, and it is purely the fault of the Provisional IRA and the other terrorist organisations that have held on to their weaponry. This order has appeared in such great haste because it has become apparent to the Government that the IRA has no intention of co-operating on the surrender of weapons.

    That is also the reason why Mr. Ahern, the Prime Minister of the Republic, is now trying to make everyone believe that Sinn Fein and the IRA are two separate organisations. That is like saying that the yolk and the white are not part of the same egg. No one in this place, and no one in Northern Ireland, would accept Mr. Ahern's description of the two organisations. They are one and the same. They have been using the laws and rules of this country; they have been using the system to destroy the system. The sooner people understand that, the better.

    This is the interim period extension, for the 25th year in succession. Actually, we are talking about rather more than 25 years: the arrangement has existed since 1972, in its previous incarnation. The late Enoch Powell used to say that there was nothing so permanent as the temporary, and I think that this piece of paper proves the accuracy of that observation.

    There is no good reason why Northern Ireland should have had to suffer the problems associated with direct rule over the past 25 years, under Governments of both parties. The matter could have been resolved long ago. Means were set out whereby it could have been resolved—not least in the manifesto commitment given by the Conservative party at the time of the 1979 election, to which I often hark back. If implemented, it would have resolved the situation: we would have had some form of local administration at an early stage in that long period of Conservative administration of the nation. The Conservatives, however, broke that commitment when they were bombed.

    I well remember being out with Gerry Fitt and Airey Neave—whose crest is above the door of the Chamber—the day before Airey Neave was killed. We did a television interview; then we came back, and I talked to Airey. I was the last Ulster person who talked to him before his murder in the precincts of this building. It was clear that he understood what had to be done. The House, and the two principal parties in it, have assiduously avoided doing what is necessary for the last 25 years.

    In the last few months, many billions of pounds have been spent on bombing Kosovo in an attempt to get gunmen off the back of citizens there. We have spent the last 16 months trying to put gunmen on to the backs of the citizens of Northern Ireland, as rulers over them. That is repugnant to me; the whole legislative process in regard to this has been repugnant to me. I have seen and heard nothing today—or, indeed, at any time during the past 16 months—to make me change my mind. There are means of improving the government of Northern Ireland without any great difficulty. I hope and pray that, if there is a new Secretary of State, he or she will consider the ways in which the government of Northern Ireland can be improved, and avoid all the nonsense that we have had to suffer for many years which has cost us so dear.

    It has already been pointed out that Ministers have not given an account of how they have cared for the Province of Northern Ireland in the last year. I wish that they would. There will be other opportunities, but I think that, in this debate, Ministers should be prepared to say what has been accomplished to improve government, to improve the lot of the people of Northern Ireland, and to ensure that law and order is enforced throughout the Province. We know that there have been murders. Murders have been committed by the IRA, and by other terrorist organisations, but principally by the Provisional IRA—not only in Northern Ireland, but in the Irish Republic.

    I read in the paper that a drug dealer had been killed there a couple of weeks ago, with two barrels from a shotgun in his back. He was not the first, and I suspect that he will be the last. We all remember the so-called Direct Action Against Drugs organisation, which was so good at murdering drug dealers. In fact, it is nearly as bad as north London now.

    I suspect that if Ministers really put their minds to what can, should and must be done over the 26th year of the direct rule legislation and system in Northern Ireland, they will find ways to improve the government of Northern Ireland without engaging in what my former party leader used to call high-wire gymnastics, and summits that lead to nothing but many more newspaper sales the next morning and a lot of people staying up late, watching, and listening to, commentators make a very good living out of what they say on radio and television.

    If the two principal parties in the nation had done their job, those things would have long since been consigned to history. I hope that it is the last such order.

    On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. At the start of the debate, I raised with the Deputy Speaker who was then in the Chair the fact that no copies of the original Act were available in the Vote Office for us to consult. I raise as a matter of order the fact that the Vote Office has very helpfully found some copies. Hon. Members who were restrained from joining in the debate may wish to obtain copies, so that they can be better informed and then contribute.

    1.16 am

    I am greatly surprised and somewhat disappointed by the way in which this important order was presented to the House. I was surprised on two counts. First, the Minister who moved it formally normally affords a courtesy to the House by explaining the order. Secondly, it has been taken on the Floor of the House, not in Committee, where we usually take such orders.

    I should like an explanation from the Minister. It is incumbent on him to answer some of the points in the debate, but, principally, to say why the order has been taken on the Floor of the House late at night after a long debate on other Northern Ireland business. We have two orders in Committee this week. The one on Thursday has been moved from 10 o'clock in the morning to 9 o'clock. There is no reason why the order that we are discussing could not have been taken in Committee.

    Just to clarify the matter, had the hon. Gentleman not been informed before the debate began that the Government intended to take the order formally? My understanding was that he had been so informed.

    No, I had not been informed. That information was not passed to me. I can honestly say that that was not communicated to me.

    My right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Mr. Forth) asked a question about the wording on the Order Paper, which says:
    "The Instrument has not yet been considered by the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments."
    How significant is that?

    Not at all, the Minister says from a sedentary position.

    My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) asked a question about the next business on the Order Paper, which relates to a statutory instrument that may be laid this Friday. The date, 16 July, seems to be significant. It appears in the order that we are discussing and in the next business of the House. Without notice, a motion for approval of the said instrument at the sitting that day will be laid and taken without debate.

    Order. The hon. Gentleman will know that we cannot discuss business that is not before us. We must dispose of the business that is before us before we mention any other business on the Order Paper.

    I accept that, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but there is some significance in the date appearing in both the orders on the Order Paper.

    The Minister owes it to the House to give some explanation of why the order has been tabled today and moved formally without any explanation. It has been a long debate, and many questions have been asked. Obviously, it is important that the extension goes through. We will not oppose it because we recognise that we cannot have a vacuum in the governance of Northern Ireland, but the Minister should get to the Dispatch Box and explain why we are debating it tonight and the significance of that.

    1.19 am

    There is a difference between what we have done for 25 years and what we are doing today. Before I come to the reasons for that, there are a couple of technical points with which I should deal.

    The first point relates to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Today, the order went to the Joint Committee, which has been approving exactly the same order, without comment, for a quarter of a century. Hon. Members will find that the Joint Committee's report is in the Library with the Northern Ireland Act 1974, to which hon. Members have referred.

    The hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr. Ross) asked why the order has not already been signed. It has not been signed because it is an affirmative order and cannot he signed by the Secretary of State until the House has approved it.

    I may have misheard the right hon. Gentleman, but I think that he said that the order went today to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. If the order was laid on 7 July, why was it not sent to the Joint Committee on 7 July?

    I shall have to write to the right hon. and learned Gentleman on that matter, as it does not come within my purview.

    The order is usually taken on the Floor of the House; the hon. Member for North-East Cambridgeshire (Mr. Moss) was therefore mistaken about that. In addition, the order has been taken on the Floor of the House, not in Committee, because of the requirement that it be passed no later than 15 July.

    Surely the right hon. Gentleman will admit that the reason for the time scale of the all such orders is to ensure the protection of the citizen. The Minister may very well argue that that does not matter in relation to this order, but in relation to other orders it might matter a very great deal to the citizen. For that reason, the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments insists that proper procedures should be observed. Why will not the right hon. Gentleman observe them on this occasion?

    Obviously, that is a matter for consideration by the Joint Committee.

    I should like to try to explain to the House why we are dealing with this order differently from previous ones. Northern Ireland Members will certainly recall that, previously, our consideration of this order provided an opportunity to have a general, state of the nation debate about Northern Ireland. Today, however, we have already had plenty of debate; moreover, this order is rather specific.

    The order would extend the period of direct rule in the event of what we hope will occur, in two days, as devolution is passed to Northern Ireland. As the House will know, if the d'Hondt procedure is run on Thursday, an Executive will be established in Belfast. The intention is that, on Friday, a devolution order will be passed in this place and in the House of Lords, so that devolution will pass to Northern Ireland at midnight on Saturday-Sunday.

    Therefore, from the passing of that order on 16 July to Sunday, there will be two days in which, technically, there will be no Ministers of either the United Kingdom Government or the devolved Administration in Northern Ireland. Consequently, we shall have to cover two days, and that is what the order is all about.

    If all that does not occur—I sincerely hope that that is not the case—the order will continue, and direct rule will continue until such time as devolution is passed. Therefore, this order is very different.

    I am sure that all hon. Members want devolution to occur in Northern Ireland. The Government want it to happen as quickly as possible, and the plan is that it will happen this weekend. However, for those two days to be covered, it is necessary for this order to be passed. If it were not, we should have to govern by emergency procedures and without Ministers. That is the simple purpose of the order. There is nothing sinister about it: it is something that has to be done. I commend it to the House.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Resolved,

    That the draft Northern Ireland Act 1974 (Interim Period Extension) Order 1999, which was laid before this House on 7th July, be approved.

    Business Of The House (Statutory Instrument)

    Motion made, and Question put,

    That, if a Statutory Instrument relating to a Northern Ireland matter be laid before the House on Friday 16th July, a Minister of the Crown may, notwithstanding the practice of the House, make without notice a Motion for the approval of the said Instrument at the sitting that day.

    Delegated Legislation

    Motion made, and Question proposed,

    Food Safety

    That the Food Safety (Fishery Products and Live Shellfish) (Hygiene) Amendment (No. 2) Regulations 1999 (S.I., 1999, No. 1585) be referred to a Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation.

    Motion made, and Question proposed,

    National Health Service

    That the National Health Service (General Medical Services) Amendment (No. 2) Regulations 1999 (S.I., 1999, No. 1627) be referred to a Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation.

    Motion made, and Question proposed,

    That the National Health Service (General Medical Services) (Scotland) Amendment (No. 3) Regulations 1999 (S.I., 1999, No. 1620) be referred to a Standing Committee on Delegated Legislation.

    Petition

    Poole Hospital

    1.25 am

    I wish to present a petition of more than 16,800 names.

    The petition states:
    To the House of Commons in Parliament assembled.
    The petition of the patients, parents, relatives and supporters of patients and residents within the catchment area served by the Poole hospital cleft team
    Declares that the recommendations of the clinical standards advisory group for the relocation of the surgical and nursing care provided by the Poole hospital authority cleft lip and palate team to a centre in Bristol would be detrimental to the quality of care provided locally.
    The Poole team has been established for some 14 years under the guidance of a maxillofacial surgeon who is renowned internationally for his work in this field. This unit is already meeting the criteria as set out in the CSAG report and uses surgical techniques that minimise frequency of surgical intervention and produce excellent results.
    Therefore your petitioners request that the House of Commons urges the Secretary of State for Health to review the recommendations of the clinical standards advisory group to prevent the relocation and loss of service to the local community of this outstanding facility.
    And the Petitioners remain etc.

    To lie upon the Table.

    National Air Traffic Services

    Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.— [Jane Kennedy.]

    1.25 am

    NATS has considerable problems, but those problems are in no way a reflection on the highly professional body of people who operate the service. They provide a wonderful service, which is highly regarded internationally and has a good safety record, and are doing so under difficult conditions; they are struggling with outdated equipment and an ever-increasing burden, while managing the most dense air traffic in the world.

    Those are real problems, and they are compounded by the delay in the completion of the new air traffic control centre at Swanwick and in financing the replacement of other outdated equipment that is needed for control centres.

    There are perceived problems also—I call them perceived because they are, in a sense, artificial. They are financial problems and problems of governance. The principal problem is the restriction of Treasury rules on making available the capital needed urgently for investment in the system. That is creating great difficulties for the service.

    There is no question of the service being in financial difficulty, and its financial performance is extremely good. It does not cost the taxpayer a cent. In fact, in 1997 it made an operating profit of £70 million—so it actually provides an income stream to the Government. However, it does not have the capacity to invest, and that is a serious problem. The volume of traffic is mounting and the chances of breakdown in the system are increasing; investment is needed urgently.

    This ought to be a matter of grave concern for the Government, and I believe that it is. It is noteworthy that, in the weekend opinion polls, the Government were well ahead on every aspect tested except transport, where only a minority thought that the Government were doing a good job. I find that sad, knowing the amount of effort that this party and this Government are putting into transport and the importance that we attach to it. It is vital that we get such issues right.

    The Government have come up with one suggested solution for the problem, in a consultation paper which suggested a public-private partnership. I find the use of the words "public-private partnership" semantically puzzling in this context, because it would involve the sale of 51 per cent. of the service. That is not a partnership: it is selling control of the service.

    I suggest that the Government consider alternative propositions that have been put forward. The principal one is for a publicly owned corporation. The Government have set a precedent with last week's statement on the future of the Post Office.

    I shall now undertake a somewhat simplistic exercise by running two propositions past a few tests and seeing how they measure up. When we consider privatisation, we should note that there is no other example in the world that I have been able to discover of an air traffic control system that is operated on a private, for-profit basis. It would be unique.

    It is true that privatisation would provide a windfall income for the Government to reinvest in other transport projects. However, the income would probably fall far short of the real asset value of the air traffic control system. Set against the fact that the Government would lose the income stream that they currently enjoy from the ATCS, that suggests that privatisation would be neutral in financial terms.

    The most important criterion has to be safety, because that is the ethos of the entire service. Nothing else matters.

    I thank my hon. Friend for introducing the issue of safety. Does he agree that airports such as Gatwick, which has 27 million passengers a year—projected to rise to 40 million—need to be assured that we have the safest system in the world? Privatisation may not be the way to give them that assurance.

    I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. Gatwick will have 40 million passengers a year. I have lost count of the numbers at Heathrow, but its figure is double Gatwick's. The system is already on the edge at times. Privatisation will not help it to deal with those problems and will not give the public confidence in the safety of the system.

    Is my hon. Friend aware of the leaked memo from the Civil Aviation Authority's privatisation unit, which made it clear that whole or partial privatisation involved a substantial risk of a trade-off between profit and safety considerations? Does he agree that it is almost inherent in the proposals that the drive for profits and dividends could be a compromising factor in the all-important issue of aircraft and air traffic safety?

    I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, because I was just coming to that point and he has made it for me. The income of the ATCS is, essentially, fixed for years ahead, so the only way in which dividends can be found is by cutting costs. However it is done—by reducing staff or some other means—cutting costs could only compromise safety. Safety would no longer be the service's guiding ethos because commercial considerations would play a significant part, and they do not increase safety.

    The potential for generating accidents in an air traffic control service is worth pondering. Two fully laden jumbo jets colliding over a densely populated area of London would cause horrendous carnage. Any suggestion that such an accident resulted from a failure of an air traffic control system under privatised governance would lead to very serious questions being asked of the Government who had imposed that governance. I urge the Government to think very carefully before taking such a step, as safety has to be paramount.

    We all know that the proposed new airport at Swanwick is way behind schedule. If the system were put into private ownership, there might be a temptation to commission Swanwick prematurely. That facility is behind schedule at present in part because National Air Traffic Services will not commission it until it is 100 per cent. confident of its safe operation. A commercial enterprise could be tempted, for reasons of public relations or of cutting costs, to bring it into operation before it was completely ready and safe.

    Is my hon. Friend aware that the proposed new Scottish centre at Prestwick in my constituency has already been delayed for a number of years? It is possible that private interests would cause the new centre's operational capacity to be changed and thus cost many jobs.

    I am aware of those difficulties, which make up another specific element of the problems faced by the service.

    The regulation that would be required is another factor against privatisation. Railtrack provides a truly dreadful example of how poorly regulation works. The company is under severe criticism for failing to invest adequately in track maintenance and for its poor safety record. Meanwhile, its profits and dividends have increased.

    What about the criteria of value and fairness for passengers? Privatisation would not lead to greater safety for passengers, nor any cheaper flights, but it would disadvantage them by compromising their safety. Passengers would not feel too good about that.

    Finally, there are international considerations to take into account. Air traffic control is not limited to national boundaries. It has to operate in collaboration with the other European systems, all of which are in public control. A private operation would be in conflict with them.

    None of the negative factors that I have described would apply to a public corporation, which would offer many positive advantages. The public will know that safety is a public system's only ethos, and will therefore have greater faith in it. They will know that they are getting best value. There will be no need for a separate regulator, and no problem with international collaboration. On those simple criteria, the only possible conclusion is that a public corporation wins hands down.

    The Government have shown their willingness to adopt such a policy for the Post Office—probably because they realise how much we love the Post Office—by giving it its commercial freedom through the agency of a publicly owned corporation. That is marvellous, but much as we love the Post Office, we all love our own skins better and would feel more confident of their safety if they were in public rather than private hands.

    I speak on behalf of air traffic controllers, many hon. Members, and the vast majority of the travelling public in appealing to the Minister to look to a publicly owned corporation rather than towards privatisation.

    1.41 am

    The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions
    (Ms Glenda Jackson)

    I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Dr. Turner) on obtaining this debate and on choosing such a vital topic.

    Air traffic control is profoundly important. One of our key international obligations under the Chicago convention is to ensure the provision of air navigation services in national airspace. National air traffic control is a strategic activity with implications for the economy, security and public safety. Not only must it be done, but it must be done better than well.

    When the Government came into office in 1997, National Air Traffic Services' front-line staff were—they still are—doing a first-class job of moving traffic around safely and expeditiously. NATS's management was doing its level best on a furious catching-up job to compensate for underinvestment a decade earlier. However, the new en route centre at Swanwick was already late, and the proposed new Scottish centre at Prestwick seemed to be in jeopardy.

    It was apparent that Government financing procedures and the need to keep a tight rein on public expenditure were likely to pose problems for the delivery of NATS's investment requirements. NATS's customers were demanding high levels of investment in order to increase capacity and minimise delays but that charges should be kept as low as possible. NATS needed certainty of access to investment funding and sought greater management and commercial freedom to develop the business. The national interest required a safe and efficient air traffic control system that could underpin the national economy and meet the nation's security needs without prejudice to the United Kingdom's international relationships and other commitments.

    We clearly needed to look at how NATS was financed and managed, but we also had to take account of NATS's desire for freedom to expand in the longer term into European and worldwide air traffic control markets. NATS's technical expertise and ability to manage traffic went a long way towards making that aspiration realistic, but development clearly requires more than opportunity, commitment and excellence, and more than guaranteed access to capital to undertake major investment; it requires world-class financial, project and commercial management.

    We wanted a solution that would let us maintain and build on the excellent record of aviation safety in the UK; ensure that NATS had adequate funding for investment; provide NATS with commercial freedom and the skills to make best use of it; continue to meet the needs of commercial, military and leisure users in peacetime; and, where necessary, protect national security.

    The status quo was not a runner. Allowing borrowing freedom within the public sector—the independent publicly owned corporation which my hon. Friend mentioned—would meet the funding need, but not much more. A non-profit-making entity, be it public or private sector, would again meet some of the need, but not all. We looked again at the model originally proposed by the previous Administration—the so-called "privatised contractor"—and concluded that they were, for once in their life, right not to pursue that course.

    However, we thought it right to examine a public-private partnership, which could secure a genuine partnership between public and private sectors to deliver a safe, modern and efficient air traffic control system for the future. The proposal on which we consulted envisaged a continuing role for the Government through a 49 per cent. shareholding, a stake of up to 5 per cent. of the shares for NATS's staff, and a 46 per cent. private sector shareholding. It was designed to free NATS from the constraints of public ownership and allow important investment and management decisions to be taken on commercial grounds, so the new company would be able to invest for the future to improve capacity and service standards, which would benefit the travelling public and the national economy.

    Economic regulation would provide the right structure of incentives and disciplines to maximise efficiency and ensure more transparency in charges, which would benefit air users. It would separate regulation from service provision, and the Government's retained shareholding would bring financial benefits to the taxpayer, through the payment of dividends, plus the assurance that NATS would continue to act in the public interest.

    Therefore, the proposed public-private partnership offers a range of benefits to NATS, its staff, airspace users and the taxpayer. We understand the concerns expressed by NATS's staff. The prospect of change is always unnerving and the future of NATS has been in question for too long now. Staff have voiced concerns over safety and again, understandably, over their pension rights and job security.

    We have assured all employees that we are considering advice from our financial advisers on the options for the proposed employee shareholding. We announced on 14 June key principles for ensuring that the private finance initiative and PPP will secure fair treatment of the pensions of public servants transferring to public sector employees. The Government want employees' existing contractual terms and conditions of employment to be maintained, and welcome the commitment of the Civil Aviation Authority and NATS's management to full and proper consultation with the work force.

    Air traffic control West Drayton is in my constituency. What factors or arguments have been brought into play since a Labour Front Bencher at a Labour party conference stood up and said that we would not "sell the air"? If it is the spurious argument about introducing commercial management to make the system more effective and competitive in the international market, surely we have learned the lessons from Railtrack about how commercial management can undermine not only a service but safety.

    I am grateful to my hon. Friend for touching on that issue, as did my hon. Friends the Members for Crawley (Laura Moffatt), for Reading, West (Mr. Salter) and for Ayr (Ms Osborne) because that is the issue that was rightly at the forefront of people's minds.

    Our safety standards are some of the most stringent in the world. Our skies are safe despite the fact that air traffic is increasing by about 7 per cent. a year. In the main, that is a tribute to the CAA, which sets and monitors those standards and to NATS, whose ability to move traffic safely and expeditiously is arguably the highest in the world.

    NATS is subject to testing safety targets set by the Government and continues to meet those targets, and we are totally committed to maintaining and improving the United Kingdom's safety standards. Indeed, in view of the relentless rise in traffic levels, which is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, actual safety levels must increase. That is the overriding priority of our aviation policy, and I can tell my hon. Friends who have raised concerns about that issue that this Government would not have contemplated institutional change if we had thought that safety might be jeopardised.

    NATS's staff and some hon. Members have argued that a private sector NATS would put profits before safety. My hon. Friend the Member for Kemptown made that point forcefully. It is our view that it would not. The safety culture within NATS is very strong at all levels and the Government, the regulator and NATS together would ensure that that remained the case.

    One of the benefits of the PPP would be to ensure the separation of safety regulation from the provision of ATC services. That is something that airspace users would welcome and which the Environment, Transport and Regional Affairs Committee and the former Monopolies and Mergers Commission have been recommending for some years. It would make a major contribution to NATS's ability to deliver our ATC projects both now and in the future, enabling us to continue to handle safely the increase in flights that we expect. Correctly structured—and it would be—it would give NATS greater access to private capital for investment and the skills to use that capital to best effect.

    NATS would be the first to admit that mistakes were made with Swanwick. However, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Kemptown will be reassured to know that the centre is now on schedule to enter operation by spring 2002. Technical transfer—the point at which the system development is complete and satisfies its initial requirement—was achieved on time at the end of March. The new system is now being integrated into the rest of the UK ATC infrastructure; that should be complete by late next year. The year 2001 will be taken up with training controllers on the new systems before the centre enters operation.

    Prestwick and Swanwick are the pillars of NATS's two-centre strategy. NATS's commitment to the strategy is unwavering, as is that of the Government. I trust that my hon. Friend the Member for Ayr will take comfort from the fact that NATS plans to bring the new Scottish centre into operation in the winter of 2005–06. In April this year, we approved the negotiation of a multi-phase contract for the NSC with Sky Solutions. We expect agreement on phase 1—the detailed design of the building and systems, and some software development—this summer. We are appointing external project management experts to assist NATS.

    My hon. Friend the Member for Kemptown touched on the future of national air traffic control, not only on the future of NATS. He is right not to be too parochial; aviation is an international business. European air traffic levels continue to rise, and delays due to ATC causes are affecting the European ATC system at an alarming rate. The Kosovo conflict is part of the problem, even though combat activity has ceased. Capacity seems to be inadequate in some parts of Europe. Happily, the situation in the UK is much better; the UK is currently responsible for only 6 per cent. of the total delays across Europe. That is remarkable considering that traffic is at record levels in some parts of our airspace and well beyond forecast levels.

    Nevertheless, the UK is part of a whole, and we suffer knock-on effects from delays elsewhere. We believe that it is in the UK's best interests to seek an overall European solution to ATC delay problems. We think that political initiatives already under way should be strengthened. We are co-operating fully with European states at ministerial, official, technical, and operational level to develop solutions through harmonising and integrating national systems, in order to maximise the available capacity in the short term, and create more capacity in the longer term. The results of co-operation over about 10 years are feeding through to capacity increase, but traffic growth is rapidly outstripping the rate at which demand can be accommodated. We need to explore new and innovative measures.

    The introduction of radar after the second world war obviously vastly improved the controller's ability to retain an overall picture of his traffic and to effect safe separation between them. However, the basic principles remain: individual aircraft are separated from each other manually, and aircraft are obliged to fly predetermined routes through the skies.

    The European organisation for the safety of air navigation—EUROCONTROL—of which the UK is one of the most active members, has brought together all interested aviation parties, including the military, to develop a strategy for the future of air traffic management. Entitled "ATM 2000+", it looks at the period until 2015 and approaches air traffic control in a new light. Safety will always be paramount, but we can harness new technology. New developments can enhance the dialogue between pilot and controller. They can replace voice transmissions with data transfer, take full advantage of air navigation systems for ATC use, and utilise airborne safety net systems. In the ATC system of the future, the controller will take on a more strategic role, allowing airborne routing and flight profile freedoms, thereby gaining greater overall airspace capacity. Safety levels will be enhanced, and the controller will be able to intervene where necessary to maintain proscribed separation standards.

    For the future, we need an ATC system that can respond positively to rising traffic levels, improve safety levels to meet the requirements of increased volumes of traffic, and deliver a cost-effective service at a price the airlines are prepared to pay. That is the background against which we proposed a public-private partnership for NATS. What we want goes beyond financial freedom, important though that is. UK air traffic control must be a safe, effective and efficient part of the global system. We have not yet come to a conclusion on the precise future form of NATS, although we hope to do so shortly. However, the future of air traffic control is no small issue; we must be sure that we have the right answer, and we will.

    Question put and agreed to.

    Adjourned accordingly at five minutes to Two o'clock.