I wish to speak on a matter of some importance, and I am somewhat dismayed to note that a Minister is not yet here to reply. I hope that a Minister will attend and listen to what is said, rather than simply reading a prepared text.

This is not a party political issue. It is a time not for recrimination, but for common sense and justice. The incident occurred on the watch of one Government and must be dealt with on that of another. That is why I, as an hon. Member without a party, have the privilege of making the case for action by the Ministry of Defence. [Interruption.] I am delighted to see that the Minister has now joined us.

On 2 June 1994, the RAF Chinook helicopter ZD576 crashed on the Mull of Kintyre, killing all 29 people on board, most of whom were Army and police intelligence officers based in Northern Ireland. Why they were travelling together in one aircraft, and thereby presenting a potential target for sabotage, is another issue. The crash was the worst peacetime accident in RAF history, and inquiries were begun immediately. The helicopter was not carrying a black box recorder, and the only evidence was in the thousands of pieces of wreckage lying on the hillside.

The Scottish fatal accident inquiry said that the cause of the crash could not be determined, and the RAF board of inquiry concluded that the most probable cause was the crew's selecting an inappropriate rate of climb for safe overflight of the mull. However, it also concluded that there were

many potential causes of the accident,

and was "unable to determine" a definite cause. Because they were dead, the two pilots, Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Rick Cook, were not represented at the inquiry, and nor were their families. That was how the rules stood in those days.

The report was couched in terms of probabilities, rather than the certainties or near certainties that are required to sustain a verdict of gross negligence. The rules in force at that time stated that

only in cases in which there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever should deceased aircrew be found negligent.

However, two air marshals, Sir William Wratten and Sir John Day—the senior officer responsible for Chinooks—had the authority to overrule the verdict of the board of inquiry, and accused the pilots of "gross negligence" in not obeying helicopter flying rules. Sir William, who has now retired, has not changed his mind. Two weeks ago, he wrote in The Sunday Times:

we stand by every word we wrote.

I am grateful to the very honourable Gentleman and commend him for securing today's debate. However, I must apologise to him and other hon. Members—I am unable to attend the entire debate because I am chairing this morning's sitting of the Finance Bill Standing Committee, which begins at 10.30 am.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, in overruling the board of inquiry, the reviewing officers ignited a torch that has burnt vividly, and which has been fuelled by disinformation and the changing and progressively evasive attitude of the Ministry of Defence? That attitude has resulted in 90 signatures on an early-day motion, 60 letters to Ministers, 500 articles published in prominent newspapers and magazines in less than two years, and 100 reports on television and radio. Does the hon. Gentleman also agree, and will he impress on the Minister, that the torch of inquiry that has been fuelled by the disinformation and evasive tactics of the Ministry of Defence can be extinguished only by truth and openness?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention—he makes some sound points. Some people should be searching their consciences because, as I shall explain, this issue will not go away. It will remain until it is satisfactorily resolved.

The air marshals stood by what they wrote, but many people were disturbed by the ruling, and their doubts have increased as the years have passed. They include former and serving officers of the RAF, people with expertise in the flying characteristics of the Chinook, and, of course, the families of the two dead pilots—outstandingly well qualified young men, both cleared for special forces operations, who stood accused of killing 27 others. The verdict was close to manslaughter, or worse.

Ever since the verdict, the families, led by Michael Tapper, father of Jonathan Tapper, and John Cook, father of Rick Cook, have been campaigning to have it set aside. It dishonours their sons and is, in my view, unsafe. Concerns have been expressed by a growing number of parliamentarians and others, joined together in the newly-formed Mull of Kintyre group under the excellent chairmanship of Lord Chalfont. They include senior members of the House of Lords and of this House. I am delighted to see so many hon. Members in the Chamber today.

In the past year, 89 Members of Parliament signed an early-day motion, proposed by the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock), calling on the Government to reopen the board of inquiry. Only last week, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was Secretary of State for Defence at the time of the inquiry, went to see the Secretary of State for Defence to express his concerns about the massive uncertainty surrounding the case. That was a highly unusual turn of events, and I hope that its meaning was not lost on the Secretary of State and other Defence Ministers, including the Minister who is here today.

So far, the demand for a reopening of the inquiry has been stonewalled by the Ministry, on the grounds that there is no new evidence. I hope that the Minister will not repeat that argument today, because it is unsustainable. A mass of new evidence has come to light that undermines the verdict against the pilots, including the evidence of two accidents in the United State involving the same type of Chinook. That evidence was not available to the RAF's board of inquiry, because the accidents had not then happened.

The first accident took place in 1996. A US army Chinook crashed in Kentucky, killing all five crew members. Accident investigators ruled out technical malfunction and blamed the crew. However, a subsequent investigation revealed that a technical malfunction had been overlooked. The families successfully sued Boeing for more than $4 million. At this point, I should say that we are talking not about litigation, but about natural justice. The case showed that investigators can make mistakes.

The second case, which occurred in 1997 near Corpus Christi in Texas, was equally disturbing, although it involved a crash that, mercifully, did not happen. A Chinook was being flown by four experienced crew in clear weather. At 1,100 ft, it suddenly and inexplicably flipped upside down. What happened next is best described by one of the pilots, Pat Nield, in his own words:

The aircraft was tracked really smooth: it flew better than anything I'd ever flown out of Corpus. I was looking down at the map when I felt the nose pitch down, and I got a bit of a shudder. I looked up and saw that the airspeed had picked up…the nose pitched up and continued to yaw really strong. At this point I knew things were really bad. All of a sudden, the aircraft just snapped over, it felt like it went upside down. Maps were flying everywhere. I went ahead and got on the controls, but nothing would bite … I couldn't see inside the aircraft because everything was shaking too much. There was lots of noise, lots of vibration.

At about 250 ft above the ground, the pilots managed to wrestle back control of the aircraft and brought it safely down. Despite eyewitness accounts and months of investigation, the cause of the incident was never found. I ask hon. Members: if the crew had not regained control and had been killed in the resulting crash, who would have defended them against the charge of pilot error, or of gross negligence, in the absence of proof of a technical malfunction? What is the mindset in such cases—"blame the dead"?

In The Sunday Times last Sunday, John Nichol, a Gulf war hero and RAF navigator for 15 years, described a similar incident. A Tornado in which he was flying malfunctioned on take-off, but responded just seconds from disaster. He asked:

If I had not been so fortunate on the day my aircraft did something it shouldn't, I wonder who would be defending my reputation now.

That is the whole point. We have here a grave situation—which denies natural justice, and is of concern to all aircrew—in which pilots are presumed to be guilty unless proven innocent.

The hon. Gentleman is discussing technical concerns about the Chinook. Does he agree that his argument is enhanced by the work that has been carried out by many aeronautical experts, including my constituent, Captain Ralph Kohn, who is a fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society?

I am indeed aware of that. I shall discuss expert testimony later.

During the hon. Gentleman's powerful speech, he referred to other people's concerns. Contemporaries of the two pilots thought that they were very competent pilots, and share the concern on the grounds that, as they might put it, "There, but for the grace of God, go we."

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that point, but I should add that, shortly before the flight, one of the two pilots expressed concern about the condition of the aircraft in question.

The incident over Corpus Christi was an extreme case of what is called a UFCM—an uncommanded flying control movement—which occurs when, in effect, an aircraft takes on a life of its own and defies all the actions of its pilots. During the past seven months, with the crash of Chinook ZD576 in mind, I have set out on a patient paperchase and tabled many written questions to the Ministry of Defence about UFCMs. On 8 December 1999, I asked the Secretary of State for Defence whether he would list the incidents of UFCMs that were reported by RAF pilots since 1994 and break them down by helicopter type. The list of such movements in Chinooks is revealing and the numbers are eloquent. There were six in 1994, five in 1995, six in 1996, five in 1997, seven in 1998 and six up to the relevant date in 1999. There is a steady pattern, which suggests something disturbing and mysterious. There have been 35 incidents in all, the cause of six of which was never found.

On 28 January 2000, I tabled a written question asking whether the air accidents investigation branch, which acted as the technical adviser to the RAF board of inquiry, had

considered and…ruled out the possibility of an uncommanded flying control movement, that left no trace as having occurred prior to the fatal crash of RAF Chinook ZD576.—[Official Report, House of Commons, 28 January 2000; Vol. 343, c. 384W.]

The Minister for the Armed Forces said that he would answer my question in a letter that he would place in the Library. That letter said:

The possibilities of pre-impact systems jam or detachment of control pallet inserts were not positively dismissible—The Board could not dismiss other possible causes of a control restriction…but the most probable flight path of the aircraft indicated that the controls were functioning at impact…and the Board of Inquiry concluded that the most probable cause of the accident was that the crew selected an inappropriate rate of climb.

I draw the attention of hon. Members and the Minister to the language that is used by the board of inquiry. It is the language of probabilities. That language is not sufficient to sustain the verdict of gross negligence to which the air marshals put their names. I do not know them personally, and I have no doubt that they are honourable men, but why they departed from the safer area of probabilities to the less defensible ground of certainty or near certainty that is required for a conviction—make no mistake about it, a verdict of gross negligence involves a conviction —remains a mystery to me and to many others; hence the campaign, the unease among the families and hon. Members, the Mull of Kintyre group and this Adjournment debate.

I have seen an internal MOD memorandum advising that the best answer to my questions, and to other questions about the verdict of gross negligence, is the fact that, prior to the crash, no messages or signals indicating that there was an emergency on the Chinook were sent. My answer to that suggestion is that, as with the Kentucky and Corpus Christi incidents, no such messages would have been sent. The pilots would have been too busy fighting to regain control during the very few seconds that were available. It was literally a matter of life and death.

Most hon. Members, including myself, are laymen in these matters—we acknowledge that. However, the beginning of wisdom is to know how much one does not know. We pay heed to the experts, and our doubts were reinforced earlier this year in a report by three fellows of the Royal Aeronautical Society, who concluded that the verdict of pilot negligence in the case of the Mull of Kintyre crash was not sustainable in light of evidence that pointed to other problems that might have caused it. Air Marshals Sir William Wratten and Sir John Day resigned from the society, accusing it of bias and failure to publish relevant and balanced information. The case has shaken, and continues to shake, the aviation and aeronautical establishments and, I do not doubt, the Royal Air Force. The reputation of the air marshals is at stake and both men have served the state, but the pilots also served their country, with no less dedication, in the short time that fate allowed them.

I shall be brief. One of my other and, so far, unsuccessful campaigns is for shorter speeches and I want other hon. Members to have an opportunity to contribute. Before I finish, I have an interest to declare. With the hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key), whom I am delighted to see in his place, I am a patron of the Association of Air Force Wives. That admirable organisation, which operates regardless of rank, acts as a channel between the Royal Air Force and its families and helps the RAF to work better. It deals mainly with welfare matters but has a wider role in its involvement in the RAF's exercise of its duty of care. It is important not only to serving men and women, especially aircrew, but to RAF families. When bad things happen—as they do from time to time, because that is the way of the world—it ensures that matters are dealt with fairly, equitably, severely if necessary, but without prejudice. That applies especially in this case and as much to the dead as to the living—perhaps more to the dead, because they are not here to make the case for themselves. It is up to us to do that for them.

To those who argue that the Royal Air Force has better things to do with its time than to reopen an inquiry into a crash that happened six years ago, I would say that it has not, and that perhaps this case matters more than anything else. The way in which it is dealt with will tell all of us, especially serving aircrew, a great deal about the meaning of the duty of care in today's expeditionary Royal Air Force in the new millennium.

Repeated representations to the Ministry of Defence have been met with a blanket and unworthy refusal to reconsider. The argument is that the crash of ZD576 happened such a long time ago that the issue is time-expired and there is nothing more to be said about it. However, it is not time-expired and there is a great deal more to be said about it.

This is a matter of principle, honour and natural justice, which is never time-expired. It is not a commodity with a shelf life. It is the same yesterday, today and tomorrow. The board of inquiry should be reopened with a view to setting aside the verdict of gross negligence. I know that I speak for all members of the Mull of Kintyre group in insisting that the matter does not go away, because our swords will not sleep in our hands until it is properly dealt with.

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute briefly to the debate, which I congratulate the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) on securing. It concerns a matter so serious that it will return to haunt us again and again until it has been properly resolved.

I am sure that hon. Members will be aware that the appalling tragedy occurred in my constituency. On that fateful evening on 2 June 1994, a Chinook helicopter crashed into the Mull of Kintyre, killing all on board—25 passengers, Ulster's most senior intelligence personnel, and four crew. The pilots were highly experienced, having flown many hours in Chinook helicopters.

At the time, I was in close contact not only with the local emergency services but with the then Minister of State for the Armed Forces, the right hon. Jeremy Hanley, who promised a full inquiry. Not only was it necessary to try to establish the cause of the accident, but, in the immediate aftermath, the question was being asked why so many experts—the cream of Ulster intelligence—were crammed into one aircraft. We were subsequently told that that was not a departure from standard practice.

It was thought locally at the time that the helicopter might have been heading for Machrihanish RAF station because the normal flight path north to Inverness and Fort George would have been over the water following the west coast of Scotland. Why, therefore, did it not turn left as it would usually have done? My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) has also subsequently pursued the matter in the interests of justice.

It is not for me to rehearse all the technical details, but many questions remain unanswered. Was there an equipment failure? Were the pilots unable to manoeuvre the machine? Why was it flying so low? The weather does not appear to have been a crucial factor. I and my constituents remain deeply troubled that, in the absence of eye-witnesses to the crash, accident data and cockpit voice recorders, and despite the conclusions of the RAF's internal inquiry, which did not attribute blame, and the sheriff at the fatal accident inquiry in Paisley, which cleared both pilots of blame, the final verdict was, extraordinarily, that both pilots had been negligent to a gross degree. We were stunned.

The heather is now beginning to grow again on the scorched hillside where the memorial cairn stands. However, the scars on that hillside will never completely disappear, and the pain of the families and friends of the pilots will remain until this shameful and sorry affair is corrected. The verdict is a serious miscarriage of justice. The bottom line is that there is no proof positive that the pilots were negligent. So many people—experts, lay people, and my constituents who mourned deeply with the relatives—believe that the verdict, the accusation, is unsafe and should be withdrawn forthwith. I hope that the Ministry of Defence and the Minister—a considerate, thinking person—will look at the matter again. If they do withdraw the verdict, they will be highly commended and congratulated on doing so.

I shall let hon. Members into a not-too-well-guarded secret. When I spoke yesterday to the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell)—1 learned from a previous intervention that he is a very honourable gentleman, and I would certainly subscribe to that—he said that he intended to speak for 17 minutes. Not only did he do that, he also took all interventions. He has said that he is running a campaign for shorter speeches, and within his 17 minutes plus interventions he has covered practically all the ground that the rest of us might wish to touch on.

I wish to make a single point. There is a fundamental difference between the position of those of us contributing to the debate and the unfortunate position in which my hon. Friend the Minister finds himself. We are disputing the Ministry's finding that there was gross negligence on the part of the pilots. To win, we need only establish doubt in one area, however small. The Government, given the position that they have adopted, to which I shall return in a moment, have to refute everything put forward. They cannot concede any of the doubts that people raise. They are, therefore, in the position in which the country found itself in the inter-war period, when poor old Stanley Baldwin said to the nation, "The bomber will get through". As my hon. Friend the Member for Tatton said, this campaign will get through: doubt will be established to a degree that the judgment must be overturned.

The Ministry of Defence put forward three technical arguments in an attempt to shore up its position. It says that, if one examines the simulation model that the manufacturer constructed for all those who wished to observe it, one can conclude that there was nothing wrong with the aircraft itself. However, the simulation model assumed that the pilots were in control, and doubt has already been cast on that. It ignores what we know from the wreckage about the position of the rudder, it ignores what we know about the intercom being switched off, when it was assumed that it was switched on, and it ignores the huge surge that occurs in these engines some of the time. When the Ministry of Defence did its own simulation, it did not do it on a Chinook model, nor did it even use a twin-motor helicopter. Therefore, there is at least a question mark over the safety of the plane.

What about the software—the FADEC system? We now know, although the inquiry did not know at the time—it found differently from the Ministry of Defence judgment—that the Ministry of Defence was suing the software suppliers. Does that not suggest that only someone very foolish or with much to hide would continue to maintain the position held by the Ministry of Defence?

What about the tactical air navigation system? There is a dispute about whether it was switched on. Whether on or off, we know that it was not much good in detecting where the crash had taken place.

The Ministry of Defence depends on those three areas of technical information in rebutting the simplest of questions: is there not enough doubt to overthrow the Ministry's decision? Those three technical areas look pretty shaky to me, a layman.

My hon. Friend the Member for Tatton referred to the problems with the Chinook reported since the crash, and to the difficulties that pilots have had in flying it. In one example the pilot thought that the aircraft had turned 180 deg. The one thing that my hon. Friend may have missed saying was that, when the pilots got that aircraft safely back to base, no one could account for that extraordinary manoeuvre. As he said, had it crashed, there would have been an all-too-easy answer to put forward in the public debate.

We come to the extraordinary role being played by Sir William Wratten in the public debate in selecting information that is good for his cause, while accusing us of doing exactly the same. That brings me back to the point that I wish to contribute to the debate. If we merely want to establish doubt, selecting information is what we are about. Only if one is in what I regard as the impossible position of saying that there is not reasonable doubt here can one not be caught in the game of selecting information to support one's case.

Of course, the Ministry is up against it with the crash, which was the worst in peacetime. My hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute (Mrs. Michie) said that the plane was carrying some of the crown jewels of our security services, so one can imagine the horror back at base when what had occurred was reported, but that still does not account for the Ministry of Defence's stance.

At the moment, our campaign is focused narrowly on having an injustice rectified. However, what the Ministry must realise is that the longer the campaign goes on, the more serious the questions raised about the Ministry itself will be. We must ask whether Ministers would be able to overturn the decision, even if they wanted to, given the stance taken by senior officials in the Department. My experiences as a Minister do not rank with the seriousness of the matter, but departmental culture and the civil service hierarchy can lead such officials to take positions that thwart the wishes of Ministers.

Soon after the election, I asked the Department of Social Security to carry out a survey of fraud relating to family credit, a benefit that we were about to lose to the Treasury. In the 14 weeks towards the end of my period in Government, during which I had responsibility for dealing with fraud, I insisted that the benefit inquiry be undertaken. Not so long ago, I learned in this Chamber that, as soon as I had ceased to be Minister, papers went out to the Minister who succeeded me, and the decision was overthrown. I do not think for one moment that the Minister who succeeded me knew that the decision that he had made overthrew mine, but the Department was determined that the review should not take place, and it has not taken place.

Compared with what we are discussing today, that is an unimportant matter, but the Government should feel uneasy. We are coming to the end of the beginning of our campaign to have this decision overturned. The longer our campaign continues, the more serious it will become. It will move from a simple matter of rectifying a gross injustice to the more fundamental question of how Departments of State can operate against elected Ministers. If we do not win on the crucial point of natural justice soon, the campaign will fan out to the bigger issue. In that scenario, there will be some big losers.

I support the moves made by the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) to raise this issue. I was in the Ministry of Defence, as special adviser to the Secretary of State, when the crash happened. Since the general election in 1997, I have been on the Defence Committee and have supported my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) and the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Mr. Campbell) in the efforts that they and the hon. Member for Tatton have made to have the issue reopened.

The more I have examined the issue, the clearer it has become that the judgment of the Royal Air Force's board of inquiry and of the two senior officers concerned turns on the issue of doubt. At the fatal accident inquiry, the sheriff found that he could not, on the balance of probabilities, find the pilots guilty of negligence. The criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—was not used, so in effect that represents a criminal conviction hanging over the pilots' reputation, as the hon. Member for Tatton said. The RAF's regulations stipulate that there should be "no doubt whatsoever" if dead pilots are to be found guilty of gross negligence. The evidence simply does not stack up. The verdict cannot reasonably be sustained.

How did we get into such a position? As the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) said, we need produce only one interpretation of events that is realistic, or even possible, for that verdict to fall. A most experienced Chinook pilot, Squadron Leader Bob Burke, who has taken a prolonged interest in the matter, has described a scenario that would fit the description of the drama that may have occurred on the aircraft as it approached the Mull of Kintyre, and the reason why it did not turn to follow the sea route to Inverness, as expected. He said that seats in the Chinooks are dampened to work against the vibrations of the aircraft; if there is an on-board emergency, the dampening reinforces the bouncing motion, which makes control of the aircraft much more difficult. The hon. Member for Tatton said that the same thing had happened in an accident in the United States.

Reference was made to the Ministry of Defence briefing note, which stated that one reason for rebutting the views of those of us who have doubts about the accident was that no emergency signals were given. I understand that the IFF—identification friend or foe—setting was within one digit of the code used to signal an emergency on the aircraft; that is a small piece of evidence to rebut the Ministry of Defence position.

I want to examine the influences on Air Marshal Day and Air Marshal Wratten that led to their taking what now seems an extraordinary decision to overturn the verdict of the wing commander who conducted the board of inquiry and fly in the face of the evidence before them—in effect, to gainsay the sheriff who conducted the fatal accident inquiry. The first influence is the appalling embarrassment of the Royal Air Force being involved in an accident that killed the prime movers in internal security in Northern Ireland, which was a disaster for those operations. The second influence is the informal reputation of the special focus flight of the Royal Air Force—pilots who fly at the "full envelope" of their experience and ability. My experience is informal and entirely subjective, but their reputation when I was in the Army was that they were the best pilots. We would get them to do more for us than other pilots flying helicopters in the services because of their unique ability.

Perhaps it was thought that a lesson had to be learnt, that the culture in the SF flight had to be curbed, and it would be done on the back of the verdict. That may have been in the back of the air marshals' mind, but it would have been an unfair lesson if the verdict had been used for that purpose.

There is also the problem that if the pilots were not responsible, the focus would be on the management of the Chinook fleet. The Royal Air Force management was taking proper command decisions about the operational employment of the Chinook fleet at the time. There was the enormous difficulty of sending aircraft to Boeing to be upgraded from Chinook 1 to Chinook 2. There were all sorts of problems involved in bringing Chinook 2 into the fleet. There was thus an operational shortage of Chinook aircraft available for service on operations in Bosnia, Northern Ireland and elsewhere. I believe that the fleet was being flown with an acceptance of risk that those responsible would not have accepted in other circumstances. The decisions taken were entirely proper operational decisions.

There has to be a balance of risk in such circumstances, and if the helicopter is not working at its optimum but is still needed on operations in Bosnia, a decision has to be taken whether to use it. In my judgment, the proper decision was taken. If a small amount of risk has been accepted and an accident happens, one is faced with a problem. It takes a brave person to turn round and say, "Well, we knew we were managing this risk, but we accepted it, knowing that there were difficulties with how the Chinook 2 fleet was being brought into operation in the Royal Air Force."

I make those few points, which are based on my experience, simply to suggest why the air marshals may have arrived at their decision. One must accept the point that Air Marshal Wratten made in another inquiry. As I understand it, he refused to accept the verdict of gross negligence by a pilot in a single-seater aircraft, because he might have had an epileptic fit before he flew his aircraft into the side of a cliff. That is the standard of proof that he requires in such judgments. However, he says in this case that he was unable to find any explanation except gross negligence. That simply does not stack up. In this case, a verdict of "no doubt whatsoever" cannot be established.

The Ministry of Defence is understandably anxious to support the RAF chain of command. Of course Ministers do not want to let down air marshals who have put themselves in an exposed position. Perhaps it is to Ministers' credit that their initial reaction is to try to find ways of supporting the chain of command and discipline within the Royal Air Force. However, the verdict of "no doubt whatsoever" is simply not sustainable in this case, and it is time to reconsider it.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) on securing this debate. I am sorry that I missed his remarks because I was delayed. However, I have a rough idea of what has been said, as a number of hon. Members have been pursuing the issue for some time. When I first raised it in February 1997, in a debate on the RAF, I took the trouble of warning the relevant Minister that I planned to do so and I expected a reasonably full reply. To say that I was rather annoyed when I did not receive such a reply on the night of the debate is an understatement.

Those days are gone. Now we receive replies whenever we want them, and no end of briefings. In recent years, the Ministry of Defence has not been slow to make its case.

This is an unusual intervention. As the Minister who gave the hon. Member for Ochil (Mr. O'Neill) that reply in 1997, I want to take this opportunity to apologise to him. I was wrong to give an inadequate reply and in the stance that I took as a Minister. A gross injustice has been committed and it must be put right.

I am grateful for that intervention. It takes a great deal of political courage to make such a statement, and I appreciate it. I was not making cheap capital out of the issue, although I was rather annoyed at the time. I imagine that it is not easy for people to move from government to opposition. They must reflect on decisions to which they were party that they subsequently felt were wrong. It is significant that so many former Ministers think differently on this issue now that they have left office.

I shall not cover the technical details again, because we have already had the "too fast, too low, in bad weather" debate. Those issues have been addressed. The question of "no doubt whatsoever" must be the starting point.

There was some disquiet on the part of the Tapper family about what a fatal accident inquiry involved, whether a Scottish sheriff was like an English high sheriff and so on. I first became interested in the issue because of Mr. Tapper's concerns. I was able to allay the family's fears and I think that there was a sigh of relief when the FAI result came out. When they discovered the somersault that was done in the MOD following the board of inquiry, there was not just disquiet but anger. However, perhaps we have occasionally focused unduly on the plight of the two pilots and not thought enough about the two other service personnel who lost their lives, to say nothing of the 25 other people who were lost.

This morning, it was said that the incident was the biggest peacetime accident in RAF history. I do not agree that the accident took place in peacetime. We were in the middle of a war, and some of the most valuable assets involved in that war died as a result of the accident. At the time, most of us assumed that terrorist sabotage was involved. Thankfully, no such attack was shown to have taken place. It is significant that our debate takes place the day after the ground-breaking evidence about the armaments cache of the IRA was provided to the investigation team. Yesterday's evidence justifies the belief that that war may have ended. We no longer live in circumstances that could be regarded as war.

The hon. Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt) said that when the RAF's resources were placed under strain, judgments had to be made and equipment had to be employed even though the RAF was not 100 per cent. certain about its safety, if the risks were calculable and the chance of fatalities was assumed to be minimal. As I understand it, those harsh judgments must be made in times of such stress. That supplies a context for some of the decisions and the reactions of some of the personnel involved.

I do not question the probity of the individuals who took the decisions, but I associate myself with the criticisms of opinions presented as facts. Such criticisms have been made repeatedly in the columns of respectable journals such as Computer Weekly, which went to great lengths to examine the software debate.

I have always been uneasy about the decision. I am not in a position to say whether those men were innocent, and I cannot say that there is no doubt whatever. However, I think that we should reopen the issue and start an independent inquiry that is acceptable to all concerned.

For a long time, some felt that we should not rake over the coals again, because an inquiry would unduly distress the families of the 25 security personnel, disquiet those of the two other service personnel, and at best reach a verdict that was merely satisfactory to the families of Mr. Cook and Mr. Tapper. Those days are past. We are now hearing from several families who want to find out once and for all why their loved ones died and whether anyone was responsible.

The Government must take a step of the character that the Opposition Chief Whip showed this morning. I support the Government, and some of my closest and oldest friends have been responsible for laying out their case. I have had passionate and occasionally distressing arguments with some Ministers, but not with my good friend the Under-Secretary. My fierce arguments about the issue with previous incumbents have given me no pleasure.

The security argument that if this incident had been shown to be the fault of the RAF, it would have been a propaganda coup for the IRA, or the forces of terrorism in Northern Ireland, no longer applies. There was also an argument that, if it had been shown to be caused by narrow procurement considerations—the availability of kit, the expenditure on defence— people could have made great political capital out of that. Those issues are no longer relevant.

We must return to the fundamental point that a great deal more evidence has emerged since the decision was handed down by the air marshals. I am sure that the Minister will attempt to discredit some, if not all, of that evidence. Time will probably prevent him from dealing with it all. However, it is fair to say that the evidence must be looked at dispassionately. Too many people in the Ministry of Defence have a vested interest in continuing to rubbish the evidence without adequate examination. Such examination can be afforded only by a full, open, credible inquiry. The form of inquiry that was held behind closed doors at the MOD is now a thing of the past. The families concerned would now have access to legal representation and there would be a proper weighing of the evidence by people other than those who take the final decision. That was not available at the time of the inquiry, and it should be available now.

I urge the Government to consider carefully the possibility of setting up an inquiry that would enjoy the confidence of the families of all concerned, of service personnel and, indeed, of the air marshals, whose credibility would be put on the line. The wealth of evidence that has emerged since the original decision demands reconsideration, and I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will look sympathetically at this issue.

I am delighted to have the opportunity to take part in this debate, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) on securing it. This important subject has raised a great deal of concern among Members of Parliament as well as outside the House.

The concern relates to whether this is a case of the top brass in the armed services trying to divert blame from themselves, for their faults, on to those who, sadly, are no longer in a position to defend themselves. There are considerable worries that that might be behind the failure to reopen the inquiry.

My interest in the case first arose from a Public Accounts Committee hearing following a National Audit Office report on the way in which new military software and hardware was brought into use following its development. A large part of that hearing related to the Chinook accident. People outside this Chamber might think that they have identified the cause of this tragic accident as pilot error, but no one in this debate has suggested that the cause has yet been properly identified. I say that because I do not believe that it has been identified in any direction. I am not going to suggest that the cause has been identified as a technical malfunction. Everyone has accepted that it is at least possible that the cause was pilot error. However, the point is that there is no proof either way. A high degree of doubt still exists as to the real cause, and I want to concentrate on one significant aspect of that doubt.

The FADEC system—fully automated digital electronic control system—was introduced as a new engine control system in Chinook. The way in which that system was tested is of interest for today's debate. The system was to be tested by the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency based at Boscombe Down, which gave a contract to EDS-Scicon to look at the software. EDS-Scicon decided to use a system of testing known as static code analysis. Having tried to test the code by that method for some time, once those in the EDS-Scicon team had got through about 18 per cent. of the code they gave up. At one point they said that they were so concerned about the safety implications of their findings that they would stop testing and raise their concerns immediately with Hawker Siddeley, even though they had got only a short way through it. Later on they said that there was

an unquantifiable risk associated with the unverifiable nature of FADEC software.

They concluded that the rewriting of that software was—I use the word advisedly—"essential". When one is told that the tests on one's software have shown that its rewriting is essential, one can accept that suggestion, go through a rewrite and try to improve it; or one can do what the MOD did, which was to say that the testing method was unacceptable and use an alternative method.

Having seen that the static code analysis threw up a huge number of problems, the MOD decided instead to go in for dynamic testing of the code. It put the code through 70,000 hours of dynamic testing and, when that failed to throw up any problems, said that that proved that FADEC was a safe system for introduction. Since then, I understand that it has gone through over 100,000 hours of operational use, and the MOD is still saying that it has shown up no problems.

Those figures may sound large—testing a computer programme for several thousand hours without showing up any errors—but we have recently all become aware of a problem in the air traffic control system, which apparently showed up a fault in the software for the first time after 20 years. Those of us who have been involved in writing or analysing computer programmes know only too well that sometimes it takes a long time for a bug to show up and that sometimes circumstances occur so infrequently that a failure in the programme takes a long time to come to light. Therefore, the suggestion that the dynamic testing of this system over some 200,000 hours is sufficient to prove beyond all doubt that the system is safe in all circumstances seems a ludicrous exaggeration. The MOD should certainly take that into account in considering this sad accident.

The MOD's argument is that there has been no other FADEC-related failure and that, therefore, it must be a safe system. However, just before its meeting, the Public Accounts Committee was privileged to receive a letter from three members of the Select Committee on Defence, in which they made the following points. They say that after the Chinook Mk 2 was brought into operational service in November 1993

pilots experienced serious FADEC-related problems. Engines would cut out or suddenly run out of control. Sometimes these problems left no trace.

The members of the Defence Committee quoted from an internal MOD memo, dated 11 January 1995, in which Captain Brougham of the Procurement Executive stated that the Chinook Mk 2 suffered from

a series of problems…many of which were traced eventually back to software design and systems integration problems.

Indeed, according to the letter from the members of Committee, the board of inquiry concluded:

Nevertheless, an unforeseen technical malfunction, which would not necessarily have left any physical evidence, remained a possibility and could not be ruled out.

I do not suggest that any of that proves that FADEC was the cause of the accident. Sadly, we will probably never know whether that was so. Equally, however, we cannot say that FADEC was not the cause of the accident.

The issue is not simply a technical one concerning computer software, but one of fairness and justice. What happened is a travesty of justice, and the matter must not be left where it is. That would be grossly unfair—not only to the two pilots concerned, but, almost more importantly, to their families. The inquiry must be reopened.

We are not here today to question the honour or integrity of air marshals, nor are we discussing money or compensation. This is about natural justice, future morale in the Royal Air Force and a particular failure of Government. I congratulate the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) on securing this important debate.

I was surprised by Air Marshal Sir William Wratten's article in The Sunday Times of 18 June. He stated:

we stand by every word we wrote in reaching the judgment we did.

He then demolished his own case by saying:

there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise details of the events prior to impact.

He also said: Why they elected to ignore the safe options open to them and pursue the one imposing the ultimate danger, we shall never know.

But that is all that we are saying. The RAF's own rules state that there must be "no doubt whatsoever"—a higher standard of proof than that required for murder.

Sir William also wrote:

The evidence taken by the board of inquiry with witnesses under oath, cannot now be replaced by hypotheses.

Yet that is precisely what he and Air Marshal Day did when they overturned the verdict of the board of inquiry and substituted their own judgment. The air marshals have never explained why they did that—not even at the countless briefings that were given to some of us, and which they clearly found so laborious.

That is one of the many reasons why the board of inquiry should be reopened. I have a great deal of sympathy for the Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Kirkcaldy (Dr. Moonie). He has to hold the line maintained by his predecessors and others—including the previous Secretary of State, Lord Robertson, the right hon. Member for Hamilton, North and Bellshill (Dr. Reid), the hon. Members for Warley (Mr. Spellar) and for Newcastle upon Tyne, North (Mr. Henderson), Lord Gilbert and Baroness Symons. The members of the Mull of Kintyre group represent a greater continuity of interest and experience in this matter than current Ministers or most of the officials concerned. We intend to stay put for some time yet.

The Chinook crash verdict has all the hallmarks of a miscarriage of justice. Opposition Members believe that it should be overturned, or, if that is not technically and legally possible, that a new inquiry should be established. In the end, the Prime Minister will have to square up to this matter. Whatever Defence Ministers say, either an independent inquiry should be held now, or the verdict should be overturned. Otherwise, the issue will rumble on with claim and counter-claim, which will undermine RAF morale for years to come.

Like the right hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field), I too, as a Minister, have come up against the departmental culture and the civil servants who are the guardians of policy. Ministers come and go, but civil servants go on for ever. That is a great strength of the British system of government, but it can also be a great weakness. That weakness has been recognised by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who was Secretary of State at the time, by my right hon. Friend the Member for North-East Hampshire (Mr. Arbuthnot) who today gave a brave speech, and by Lord Trefgarne, who was also a Minister in the MOD. I, too have an interest in this matter—the reputation of Boscombe Down, where aircraft testing and evaluation are carried out, has been impugned.

Every time more evidence is produced, the MOD says either that it is not new or that it is irrelevant. The official line is to adopt a stonewalling position, but that is untenable. Sir Malcolm Rifkind said on "Channel 4 News" on 13 October 1999 that it was an error of judgment not to tell the fatal accident inquiry about the EDS-Scicon report, the 3 June Boscombe Down memorandum, which grounded the Chinook fleet, or the Textron case. I entirely agree. As recently as 19 June, on the "Today" programme, Sir William Wratten said:

We can never know precisely what happened.

Exactly so.

There are still some 38 Chinooks flying. No one suggests that they are unsafe aircraft, but it concerns me that the majority of them are still to be fitted with cockpit voice recorders or accident data recorders, which were promised for the fleet some years ago and mentioned in the Defence Committee's report. On 18 November 1997, I asked the Minister for the Armed Forces how the programme was going. I was told:

The equipment will be fitted to the first 6 aircraft by December 1998, and embodied on the rest of the fleet by late Spring 2000.—[Official Report, 18 November 1997; Vol. 301, c. 153.]

On 19 May 1999, I asked where we had got to in this regard, and the Minister for the Armed Forces referred me to a letter from Sir Robert Walmsley, which stated:

We now plan on having the first six helicopters fitted by late November this year. The plan to fit the remainder of the Chinook fleet by the end of 2000, remains as previously advised.—[Official Report, 19 May 1999; Vol. 331, c. 345.]

On 1 February, Baroness Park of Monmouth asked in the other place how things were getting along. She was told by Baroness Symons:

Cockpit Voice and Flight Data Recorders have now been fitted to four of the RAF Chinook Mark 2/2a Fleet … This reflects the six-week period required to fit and test each aircraft.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 26 June 2000; Vol. 614, c. 51W.]

Most of the RAF's Chinooks have not been fitted with that equipment. What is the latest position?

Much has been made of the Defence Committee's report on the Chinook crash on the Mull of Kintyre, which was published on 13 May 1998. It has subsequently become clear that the Committee was misled—unintentionally, I am sure—on at least five, if not six, major points. Nevertheless, events have moved on and new evidence has appeared. That is important—we should not simply let the matter run, and people should not continue to believe that what the Defence Committee was told was beyond doubt. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Rendel) for drawing attention to the fact that members of the Defence Committee are fully aware of that.

The many technical arguments that have been used, not least in the press, are at least as important as the moral arguments. They point to doubt in this context. In the case of the Chinook that crashed, there was no flight data recorder, no cockpit voice recorder, no radar trace, no emergency call and no information from the wreckage that showed for certain how the aircraft was performing on its flight path on the approach to the mull. However, the decision was taken to blame the pilots and thereby to exonerate the equipment. From little more than two pieces of information—a waypoint changed in respect of an unknown position and a height reading, also taken in respect of an unknown position— and in the absence of clear contradictory information, the MOD said that the aircraft was under control and travelling in a straight line directly towards the mull. Officials have made much of computer simulations, but they provided clues about the last three or four seconds only, and assumed that the aircraft was under control until that point.

The main issue is whether the pilots flew into the mull compulsorily or voluntarily, and no one can answer that on the basis of the wreckage. What is known is that the helicopter's FADEC engine control software had a history of problems, and some of the most serious design flaws were not drawn to the attention of accident investigators. In conducting its formal inquiry, the air accidents investigation branch relied on the assistance of FADEC's manufacturers, and was unaware that the Ministry of Defence was suing the manufacturers at the time of the crash for failing to show a duty of care in the design, development and testing of FADEC.

Those and many other concerns have not been addressed satisfactorily, and we are alarmed by the many incorrect statements that were made at various times.

Mr. Brian Trubshaw, the Concorde experimental pilot, who is a constituent of mine, wrote to me on 12 October 1999. The letter, a copy of which I sent to the Ministry of Defence, refers to the Chinook crash in the United States in 1996. It states:

Subsequent investigation found electrical failure and the pilots were cleared of blame. Boeing settled for $4 million. The Minister—

that is the Minister for the Armed Forces—

also makes no reference to Boeing's admittance that all Chinooks flying between 1992 and 1996 were subject to power problems due to salt water seepage, ZD576 flew over a lot of salt water.

It is clear that technical doubts exist about this particular Chinook.

Of course, my hon. Friend is right and I am grateful to him, because he has saved me the need to go into further technical detail. Surely we have established beyond reasonable question that doubt, at least, surrounds the matter.

Why does this issue continue to matter to serving RAF personnel and their families? If you are in any doubt, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you need only read the personal testimonies of service men in the RAF, and I shall quote from one or two. The first states:

After serving in the RAF myself for 12 years, I can't believe that the Government, MoD and RAF have ruined the reputations of a flight crew and their families in this manner. It makes me angry to think that the time I spent in the service of my country was for nothing…current service personnel and their families serving the country are apparently doing their "bit" for nothing.

Another e-mail states:

As a former Flight Lt who served at RAF Aldergrove at the time of the crash, I most certainly support your campaign to have the pilots names cleared…the techniques of half-truths employed by the MoD in this case came as no surprise.

This issue really does matter. According to one submission to the military pilots' internet site,

it may have been pilot error, it may have been something else. Until we know for sure what happened we can not blame the crew. A sad decision that reflects badly on both the Minister—

of the day—

and those who advise him.

RAF Odiham's Chinook Wokka website is very good, but if one turns to the Links page, one discovers that the official RAF Odiham site has been deleted. Why has it been deleted?

What is the way forward? In the other place, Lord Jacobs asked the Government a number of questions. He asked whether the deceased pilots could be found guilty of gross negligence if the inquiry were reopened under current rules, and if not, why not. The Minister of State, Baroness Symons, replied:

The terms under which the inquiry may be re-opened, in the event that new evidence came to light which justified that course, would need to be considered at that time.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 June 2000; Vol. 614, c. 29W.]

It seems that the Ministry of Defence is not closing the door on this inquiry.

There is one other clue to the way forward. William Tench, who was chief inspector of the Civil Aviation Authority in 1986, was commissioned in the late 1980s by Lord Trefgarne to review the procedures pertaining to service boards of inquiry. His report was never published, but it was critical of the process and stated:

involvement of some Station Commanders, Air Officer Commanding's Staff Officers and even the Commander-in-Chief, is an unwelcome intrusion upon what should be the complete independence of the Board of Inquiry.

The relevance to ZD576 is that both air marshals concerned were involved in the introduction of the Mk 2 into service and some believe that their independence was compromised from the start.

I hope that the Minister will now agree to publish the Tench report. It would be possible to reopen the inquiry. The Secretary of State recently wrote to my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Hampshire (Sir G. Young) and stated:

The power to convene, or re-open a Board of Inquiry may be exercised by any two members of the Air Force Board of Defence Council—of which I am a member. The other 10 members include

Air Marshal Day and the Minister for the Armed Forces, the hon. Member for Warley.

I believe that the answer lies in Ministers' hands. There is no technical reason why they cannot reopen the inquiry and, in the interests of the dead pilots and of the future morale of Royal Air Force personnel and their families, those Ministers should now do so.

May I apologise to the hon. Member for Tatton (Mr. Bell) for my inadvertent discourtesy in arriving late, and for the absence abroad on departmental business of my hon. Friend the Minister for the Armed Forces, who would otherwise have responded to the debate.

I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on securing the debate and my right hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Field) and others who have contributed to it. As we pass the sixth anniversary of the tragic crash on the Mull of Kintyre, the matter continues to attract attention. I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman's sincerity and the measured and thoughtful way in which he made his points.

Much has been said and written about the accident over the years, often reflecting the unswerving determination of the fathers of the two dead pilots to clear their sons' names. None of us can feel anything but sympathy for them and their families. Equally, we remember the families of the other 27 people who died in that crash on 2 June 1994.

The hon. Member for Tatton and others raised a number of issues and I shall do my best to respond to them. I hope that he will forgive me if I say that none of them is new. Sadly, some of the reporting in the media about this accident has not reflected the profession's high standard of regard for proof and accuracy to which he subscribed with such distinction over the years. I want to take the opportunity to correct some of the inaccuracies.

The circumstances of the crash, as established by the Royal Air Force board of inquiry are as follows. On 2 June 1994, Chinook ZD576 departed from RAF Aldergrove on a flight to Fort George, Inverness. The aircraft had a crew of four and carried 25 military and civilian passengers who were to attend a conference in Inverness. It took off at 17.42 and at approximately 18.00 it crashed on the Mull of Kintyre. All on board were killed.

Before departing RAF Aldergrove, the pilots obtained an accurate weather forecast for their flight. They elected to carry out the flight under visual rather than instrument flight rules. Under visual rules, aircrew must remain clear of cloud and are required to keep the surface in sight. The weather forecast was suitable for a flight under those rules, but it warned of poor conditions affecting the Mull of Kintyre, as is often the case, and a bad weather contingency plan would have been required. The highest point of the Mull of Kintyre is 1,463 ft above sea level. Instrument flight rules stipulate that an aircraft must be least 1,000 ft above the height of the highest obstacle along the intended track if the crew is not in visual contact with the ground. Transit across the Irish sea was uneventful and conducted in clear conditions, but, as forecast, there was very low cloud and poor visibility around the mull.

A witness reported that, at a distance of about two nautical miles from the mull, or about 40 seconds from impact, the aircraft was flying at a height estimated to be between 200 and 400 ft. The witness estimated that visibility was about a mile and noted that the mull was covered in cloud and fog. Other witness statements from those who were on the mull at the time, including that of the lighthouse keeper, also refer to the fog and poor visibility.

The first waypoint or landmark that the pilots entered on the on-board navigational computer was the Mull of Kintyre lighthouse. At 0.95 nautical miles, or about 20 seconds before impact, the crew released the computer from its fix on the Mull of Kintyre and set it to indicate the bearing and distance to the next waypoint at Corran, 87 miles to the north. At that point, the pilots knew how close to the mull they were, and, given the deteriorating weather and the strict visibility requirements of visual flight rules, they should have already chosen an alternative course. As they had not done so, they could—and, under the rules, should—have either turned away from the mull immediately or slowed down and climbed to a safe altitude.

At 15 to 18 seconds before impact, the aircraft was at a height of only 468 ft, as recorded on its tactical air navigation system. The pilots would have seen the same information on the radio altimeter, but even so, the aircraft was climbing only gently at that point. At four and a half seconds before impact, the crew performed an emergency manoeuvre and climbed about 150 ft in those final seconds. The aircraft crashed at a height of 812 ft, at a ground speed of 151 knots, or 174 mph.

The evidence given by the eyewitness about the situation 40 seconds before the crash, and the evidence that the crew reset the navigational computer about 20 seconds before the crash are telling indicators of the fact that, at the time, the pilots were not grappling with an in-flight emergency, yet they flew on, contrary to instrument and visual flight rules. The evidence is that they were already too close to the cloud-covered mass of the mull and were travelling too low and too fast. Had the aircraft been flying over the sea, as it should have been under visual flight rules, none of the relevant factors or scenarios would have had an influence strong enough to prevent such an experienced crew from maintaining safe flight.

Those are the findings of the Royal Air Force's board of inquiry, duly convened and constituted under statute for the purpose of investigating such accidents. The board of inquiry had available to it a wealth of expertise and experience in all the relevant disciplines, including helicopter and aircraft operations. In addition, there was the considerable technical expertise of the air accidents investigation branch. Other authorities, such as the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, and the manufacturers of the aircraft—of its engines, equipment and avionics—made evidence available to the inquiry. The board's findings, together with a mass of technical and supporting information, have been made public.

Two years ago, the Defence Committee produced a helpful report on the lessons to be learnt from the Chinook crash. The Committee considered the suggestion that the crash pointed to the existence of fundamental flaws in the design of the Chinook Mk 2 and its components, but found no compelling evidence to support it. The Public Accounts Committee, whose report we await, recently inquired into the Ministry of Defence's processes for the acceptance of equipment into service and took the Chinook Mk 2 as a case study.

I shall turn to the points raised today. I shall answer them as fully as possible, and I shall write to hon. Members on any matters on which I do not have the necessary technical information. The hon. Member for Salisbury (Mr. Key) raised a point about the Tench report. The report's recommendations were not acted on when it was issued in 1987. We cannot rewrite history. The board of inquiry was conducted under the procedures that existed in 1994, which also applied to other inquiries at that time. I am aware of requests for the release of copies of the report, but hon. Members will be aware of the convention that existing Ministers cannot be made aware of advice given to previous Ministers, nor of those Ministers' views on the report. That convention may exasperate us, but it has always been applied, irrespective of the Administration.

Officials are carefully considering whether the report can be released. I appreciate that it has been outstanding for a few months and I hope that the Department will provide an answer in the near future.

Much reference was made to uncommanded flying control movements and other technical problems with the Chinook. The AAIB investigated in detail all relevant technical aspects of the crash and carried out a thorough assessment of control system components, but found no sign of pre-impact failure or malfunction. The hon. Member for Newbury (Mr. Rendel), who went into detail on the matter, missed the point. He and others suggested that in less than 20 seconds after the waypoint change that preceded impact, there was a major emergency that cleared itself and yet left no trace. As Air Chief Marshal Wratten said, negligence on the part of the pilots preceded the waypoint change; had the aircraft been flying as it should have been over the sea under visual flight rules, or at safety altitude under instrument flight rules, any temporary problem of the sort described could easily have been dealt with.

I shall write to the hon. Member for Newbury on the technical points relating to the FADEC process and the checking of the software sensor, because it is not an appropriate matter for a debate when time is limited. He may, of course, distribute copies of my letter to other members of the Committee. The suit mentioned by the hon. Member for Salisbury concerned a case of negligence by the manufacturers during a ground test of one of the helicopters—it was not about the FADEC system itself. The IFF setting was considered by the AAIB but thought to be of no significance in the crash.

The hon. Member for Salisbury suggested that the Ministry of Defence was dismissive of information provided and did not give it proper consideration. I refute that: all arguments and theories were examined compassionately and in depth. Ministers and officials went to unprecedented lengths to explain the rationale behind the board's findings and will continue to do so whenever points are raised with us.

What I have said will seem unsatisfactory to those who believe passionately that the Ministry of Defence is wrong in this case. I came to my job after a lifetime in an occupation in which I was taught to question severely any information that I was given—I was taught always to be sceptical and to look for alternative answers. I adopted that attitude in considering the information before me recently. Somewhat reluctantly, as a natural sceptic, I concluded that the findings of Air Marshals Wratten and Day and the board of inquiry were correct, and that there was negligence on the flight prior to the vehicle entering cloud which, sadly, was responsible for the death of 29 people.

Order. The Minister described this as a Committee and said that the hon. Member for Newbury could pass a letter around. This is not a Committee, it is a Chamber of the House and if the hon. Gentleman wants the information to go to all Members he should put it in the Library.

The potentially devastating effects of world climate change through global warming are becoming increasingly clear. The world will be 3 per cent. warmer in a hundred years' time and the sea level is projected to rise by 40 cm by 2080. Sixty million people will be at risk of flooding and many will have to flee their homes permanently.

The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution has only recently underlined the starkness of the threat and the scale of the challenge. Refrigeration is contributing significantly to the problem. Under the Montreal protocol, chlorofluorocarbons and hydrochlorofluorocarbon refrigerants were to be banned because of their potential to damage the ozone layer. Most users of refrigerants decided to switch to hydrofluorocarbons, which do not deplete ozone; however, they have a significant global warming potential or GWP. The Government estimate that, on average, HFCs have 2,274 times the GWP of carbon dioxide. If anything, the trend of recent scientific research is to rate the GWP of HFCs ever higher.

As long ago as 1995, the United Kingdom Government panel on sustainable development recommended phasing out HFCs. Kyoto included HFCs among the emissions that must be reduced to stop global warming. As "Climate Change: draft United Kingdom programme" published in March stated, the trouble is that as the mass change to HFCs projections show, there is

a strong underlying upward trend in emissions, as HFCs are used as a replacement for ozone-depleting substances.

It continued that the Government

believes that this trend is unsustainable in the longer term and that action should be taken to limit the projected growth

A recent study by Atlantic Consulting concluded that, by 2010, HFCs might represent 4 per cent. of the United Kingdom's greenhouse gas emissions. On that basis, phasing out HFCs would help us to achieve more than a third of our legally binding target reduction of 12.5 per cent. of greenhouse gases.

We will not learn to live without refrigeration unless we really have to, so what can we do? Fortunately, there are alternatives: technically, they are known as NIKs—not in kinds— most of which are represented by hydrocarbons, or HCs. HCs do not damage the ozone layer; their GWP is negligible. They are extremely efficient and effective refrigerants and, most importantly, the technology is available and they are in increasingly wide usage. There is no refrigeration application for which NIKs cannot be used. That is why they are being used in supermarkets, petrol forecourts, art galleries, banks and people's homes, and even in the McDonald's restaurant in the famous dome.

The Government have toughened their stance on HFCs. In the same publication on climate change they said:

HFCs are not a sustainable technology in the long term—the successful phase out of ozone-depleting substances is being achieved with a range of technologies and HFCs are only necessary to replace ozone-depleting substances in some applications. The Government believe that continued technological developments will mean that HFCs may eventually be able to be replaced in these remaining applications. HFCs should be used only when other safe, technically feasible, cost effective and more environmentally acceptable alternatives do not exist. HFC emission reduction strategies should not undermine commitments to phase out ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal protocol. HFC emissions will not be allowed to rise unchecked.

The balance of evidence in the HFC debate has shifted. For many years, the discussion centred almost entirely around the availability of alternatives to HFCs. The HFC producers, of course, asserted that there were none. However, after years of successful development and use, much of it in the United Kingdom, it is clear that a range of alternatives is available and that the burden of proof is on the chemical industry to prove that HFCs are necessary.

That leaves us with two challenges. Those who make and profit from HFCs will want to fight their corner. They have alleged that HFCs will prove to be an insignificant part of the global warming issue. However, the current volume of HFCs in the atmosphere is 1.6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, which is rising by 5 per cent. a year. That is not insignificant. They have also said that the energy efficiency of HFCs more than offsets their direct GWP. Yet an analysis of some 50 studies of the relative energy efficiency of HFC and environmentally benign HC refrigeration shows that, on average, HCs give an improvement in energy efficiency of 6 per cent. in domestic use, 15 per cent. in commercial use, 9 per cent. in air conditioning and 10 per cent. in heat pumps.

It is true that HCs are highly flammable, but so are many other substances that we use every day. The technology is well proven and safe. In Germany, which has some of the strictest attitudes and laws on health and safety, more than 95 per cent. of domestic refrigerators use HCs, and after more than 70 million operational years, not a single accident has taken place. The polluters continue to promote their pollution, but I urge my hon. Friend the Minister to stand firm, because the Government's policy is right.

However, a second challenge awaits. How do we progress from having good intentions to achieving the needed market shift? I suggest that we consider incentives to change. Will my hon. Friend confirm that supermarkets that want to reduce their climate change levy might be able to negotiate away part of their liability if they use HCs in refrigeration? Will he consider including NIK refrigerant and air-conditioning systems in the technologies covered by the enhanced capital allowance scheme and in the definition of low-carbon technologies, which will determine eligibility to receive encouragement from the £50 million energy efficiency fund?

Will the Minister study the Danish proposal to tax the consumption of refrigerants in accordance with their global warming potentials? Lord Marshall had more than one economic instrument in mind when he examined the problem, and he was highly sceptical about the ability of voluntary measures to reduce HFC leakage.

Companies investing now should not be locked into capital stock that does not meet good environmental standards. Action taken this year can prevent pollution that will otherwise cause global damage in the next 20 years of equipment life. Developing countries such as China, India and Indonesia are moving straight from CFCs to HCs, without bothering with the now dated technology of HFCs.

I shall now speak wearing my Select Committee on Environmental Audit hat. Only some Departments and quangos are shaping up to the challenge by installing green refrigeration where possible. I do not yet see a central push covering all the Departments and the devolved Administrations. In hospitals alone, there must be enormous potential to convert refrigeration to environmentally benign systems. Is a mechanism available to co-ordinate such a scheme? That would show genuinely joined-up government, to use the common phrase.

I endorse the Government's policy. It is right to get tough on HFCs. I do not blame the manufacturers for defending their vested interests, and I am sure that my hon. Friend the Minister will listen carefully to their arguments. I urge him to consider a range of incentives to produce the market shift that we need to avoid decades of unnecessary pollution.

Last, but by no means least, it is pleasing that the United Kingdom is the world leader in developing the alternative technology. Our technical advantage presents us with an opportunity to take a rewarding industrial and political lead. The sooner we move, the sooner the benefit will arrive.

My hon. Friend the Member for Peterborough (Mrs. Brinton) raises an important matter. Global warming is probably the most important environmental issue facing the world. I shall begin by making a few general points about the action that the Government are taking to tackle the threat of climate change, then respond briefly to some of the points that my hon. Friend made.

Evidence mounts that climate change has begun. Globally, the past decade was the warmest recorded. In the United Kingdom, four of the five warmest years ever measured fell in the past decade. We are now continually reminded of our vulnerability to climate events. We cannot say for sure that events such as the storms that hit Europe at the end of last year or the floods that devastated Mozambique are the direct result of man-made changes, but we can expect such extreme weather events to become more frequent and more severe as temperatures rise.

Despite the milder winters that we have recently enjoyed, the United Kingdom will not escape some unwelcome effects, which could also involve huge costs. We know that we shall not be able to avoid some climate change. Greenhouse gases that have already built up in the atmosphere will make some rise in temperature and sea level inevitable. We must work together to ensure that we are best placed to adapt to the impacts that we cannot prevent.

However, all is not doom and gloom. The worst effects of climate change can be avoided if every country, Government, organisation and individual acts now to cut emissions. That will be a major challenge, but it is one to which we must all respond. At the Rio Earth summit in 1992, countries agreed voluntarily to return their emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The United Kingdom will be one of the few OECD countries to meet that target.

At Kyoto in 1997, developed countries agreed collectively to reduce emissions by 5.2 per cent. during the period 2008 to 2012. For the first time, targets will be legally binding and different countries have taken on different targets to reflect their national circumstances. Following our negotiations at European level, the United Kingdom agreed to a 12.5 per cent. cut. Although the Kyoto agreement was a significant step, it is only the first stage in an effort that will need to continue throughout this century and beyond. Much bigger cuts in emissions—perhaps 60 per cent. or more—will be needed globally if we are to avoid devastating climate change.

The draft climate change programme that we published on 9 March provides a new, strategic focus for action against climate change in the United Kingdom. It sets out the way in which we shall meet our Kyoto target and move towards our domestic goal of a 20 per cent. reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. It builds on the positive action that business, local government and other organisations are taking. It signals that changes will be needed in the long term. It also provides a framework that draws together existing actions and a series of new measures that will ensure that the UK's emissions continue to fall during this decade and beyond.

The draft programme covers all sectors of the economy, and we have focused on flexible, cost-effective policies that will be good for the economy and for people, as well as for the environment. The refrigeration sector, on which my hon. Friend focused, is important. We all recognise the huge social benefits that refrigeration brings. We all use and need refrigeration, but it has an impact on the environment in terms of energy usage and emissions of refrigerants. Over the years, the industry has made great efforts to improve the energy efficiency of refrigeration and air-conditioning systems, and we hope that improvements will continue to be made. However, we also face the challenge of reducing HFC emissions from refrigeration and air-conditioning equipment.

As my hon. Friend explained, HFCs are powerful greenhouse gases and, as they are increasingly being used as replacements for ozone-depleting substances such as CFCs and HCFCs, emissions are forecast to grow strongly in the near future. This trend is unsustainable in the longer term, and action must be taken to minimise emissions. That is why we announced our new position on HFCs in the draft climate change programme. I am aware of the concern expressed by industry in relation to this announcement, and I am grateful for this opportunity to explain what we are trying to achieve.

It is vital that our position on HFCs is seen as a whole, in the context of the proposed measures set out in the draft programme, which states that

HFCs are not a sustainable technology in the long term.

However, it also recognises that they are necessary to replace ozone-depleting substances in some applications, and that HFC emission reduction strategies should not undermine commitments to phase out ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal protocol. This is very important, as the new European Commission regulation on ozone-depleting substances, which comes into force later this year, will ban CFCs and introduce tighter controls on HCFCs.

For some, it will be necessary to switch to HFCs, but we are now asking industry and users to look closely at all the alternatives and select those that are more environmentally acceptable. Safety, technical feasibility and cost-effectiveness should be taken into account before investment decisions are taken. Some businesses have already made the move. I think that my hon. Friend mentioned the example of Iceland Frozen Foods.

I want now to respond to some of my hon. Friend's suggestions for encouraging the move to alternative refrigerants. In relation to the climate change levy, she mentioned reduced liability for supermarkets using hydrocarbons. Eligibility for a discount in respect of the levy is based on the sectors covered by parts Al and A2 of the Pollution Prevention and Control Regulations. That has a clear rationale, because it covers the main energy-intensive sectors, and firms covered by those parts of the regulations must operate in an energy-efficient manner not required of other firms. The climate change levy is designed to improve energy efficiency in the business and public sectors. The Government welcome improvements that may flow from using hydrocarbon refrigerants, but they do not intend to open eligibility for a negotiated agreement to those who take action in this area.

As I am sure my hon. Friend appreciates, decisions under the enhanced capital allowance scheme are a matter for the Chancellor. However, refrigeration equipment is one of eight technologies listed in the March Budget that the Government intend to make eligible for the enhanced allowances. Decisions on which low carbon technologies will be supported through the energy efficiency fund will be made in the light of the outcome of the forthcoming spending review, on which I am not in a position to elaborate.

As regards the tax on refrigerants, the Government share my hon. Friend's aim in tackling the issue of climate change and, as a matter of course, will keep a close eye on environmental developments and proposals in other European Union countries. I should add, however, that Lord Marshall's report focused on the business use of energy rather than on refrigerants. The Government have set out their environmental tax policy in their statement of intent on environmental taxation.

As regards the public sector's use of alternative refrigerants, Departments are encouraged to avoid HFCs wherever they can, although, as for other organisations, there may be occasions when a non-HFC solution is not feasible. My hon. Friend is right to identify hospitals as significant users of refrigerants, and I shall ask my officials to explore with their counterparts in the Department of Health the scope for further reductions in HFCs.

In the long term, however, as a result of continued technological improvement, HFCs may eventually be replaced in the applications where they are still needed. In the meantime, we shall discuss with industry the measures that can be taken to minimise emissions from these sources. We hope that that can be done by strengthening our voluntary agreements with industry.

The consultation on the draft climate change programme has now ended, and we are carefully considering the responses. We plan to publish a final programme later this year, which we hope will provide a framework that enables the United Kingdom to face the challenge of climate change and ensure that we safeguard our planet for the future.

Provision for people with multiple sclerosis is an issue that has concerned hon. Members of all parties throughout the lifetime of this Parliament, and doubtless before that. The specific issue of beta interferon has been raised a by a number of hon. Members. It was raised last year by the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow), and more recently by my hon. Friend the Member for Sutton and Cheam (Mr. Burstow).

Today's short debate is timely, given a recent leak from the National Institute for Clinical Excellence, suggesting that NICE will recommend that provision of beta interferon for new applicants should not be funded by the national health service. That announcement was one of the few that has made me genuinely angry since becoming a Member of Parliament, because the hopes and expectations of MS sufferers had been raised by the involvement of NICE. Given the drug's effectiveness for particular groups of sufferers—which I shall discuss in a moment—the assumption was that there would be a positive outcome. I know from first-hand experience that both those who receive and those who might receive the drug were angry at the leaked announcement.

In this short debate, I want to discuss three aspects. The first is the effectiveness or otherwise of beta interferon, the second is why and whether the drug should cost so much, and the third is the process through which any Government must decide whether to pay for expensive drug treatments of this type.

On the drug's effectiveness, I shall begin by reading an excerpt from a letter that I received from a constituent. She first contacted me more than two years ago, at a time when her health authority, Avon, would not pay for beta interferon, although she would have got it had she lived in a neighbouring authority. She and I, with the Multiple Sclerosis Society and others, waged a campaign and were delighted when Avon health authority agreed at the beginning of last year to fund a limited number of courses of treatment—about 12.

My constituent was one of those who benefited. She now receives beta interferon, and it is paid for on the national health service. She said that the drug

is effective in slowing down the progression of my disease.

During 1997 I suffered several attacks and was unable to work for three months. I was faced with the prospect of having to use a wheelchair within months. Since starting with Beta Interferon in December 1997—

at which point, she was paying for private treatment—

I have had only two attacks and I am still managing to walk and work.

It is easy for those who do not suffer from this disease unthinkingly to use the phrase "a relapse", but it is clear that relapses can be devastating to MS sufferers who, as a result, cannot work or look after their children. Any drug that can reduce the number and frequency of relapses will make more than a marginal difference to those concerned. I am not saying that beta interferon is a cure, but it is clear that, for some, it can bring about a real and substantial improvement in the quality of life.

My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the many MS sufferers who feel that beta interferon treatment results in reduced relapses. Does he agree that the Minister needs to explain why NICE has apparently refused to take evidence from MS sufferers on the drug's impact on the quality of their lives?

My hon. Friend makes an important point. Clearly, anecdotal, individual experience does not provide the cast-iron proof that, say, a double-blind controlled trial might provide. If a body that is charged with assessing the consequences of spending money on a drug does not hear at first hand about the effects of that drug and the benefits that it can bring to real people in their real lives, it misses part of the story. It is therefore regrettable that that does not appear to have been fed into the process.

After I had secured this debate, my office received a phone call from a head teacher in Essex, who said that three members of staff in his school suffer from multiple sclerosis. Two of them receive beta interferon, and have benefited greatly from it. One had previously taken six months' sick leave. Since receiving the drug, one has taken just two days off sick and the other has taken three days. Furthermore, they are less dependent on steroids.

The head teacher pointed out that at his school the public sector pays £150 a day for supply teaching, and remarked on the cost to children in terms of disruption. His closing comment was that, as an employer, he feels that the Government need to do some joined-up thinking. One of my concerns about the process is that the cost-benefit comparison does not take a broad enough view of the potential benefits to people who receive the drug—not only to their individual lives, but to society and the economy as a whole. NICE is receiving only a partial picture.

I discussed the drug with Dr. Malcolm Campbell of Frenchay health care trust, who is one of the leading MS specialists in my area. His key point was that there is no alternative to the drug. People who can benefit from it have access to no other form of treatment to make their relapses less frequent. I accept that NICE is considering general provision for people with MS, and that there is a strong case for greater and improved provision for such people. However, it is a false dichotomy to say that some people can have a drug that prevents the disease from progressing, slows it down or makes it less awful, or other people can have proper community care—as though there is a fixed pot for MS sufferers, which can supply drugs or support, but not both. NICE is not there to make those kinds of decisions.

The consultant said that in the rest of Europe about one in eight MS sufferers typically benefit from the drug, whereas in the United Kingdom the figure is around one in 30. That leads to a fundamental question. Is the rest of Europe wrong, in that the drug is being given to people who do not need it or benefit from it, or we are wrong? During last week's Prime Minister's Questions, the Prime Minister said that only 12 per cent. of sufferers in France, Germany and Italy receive the drug. However, in this country the figure is only 3 per cent. He argued that the treatment will not benefit everyone, which is true, but it could certainly benefit more people than are currently receiving it.

There is currently no viable alternative to beta interferon. It clearly benefits people who suffer from relapses followed by periods of remission. In the long term, the situation is less clear. The consultant told me that some people have been taking the drug for five years, and that we do not know much beyond that in terms of whether it wears off or has long-term beneficial effects. However, the potential is there, and it would be disturbing if funding were to be cut off at this stage.

I want to refer briefly to the vexed issue of the cost of the treatment. I believe that a figure of £10,000 for a year's course is frequently used. Dr. Campbell told me yesterday that £8,500 is now more accurate, because of the Government's efforts to put pressure on suppliers to bring the cost down. The Government are to be applauded for that. However, he also told me that whereas the figure is £8,500 in the United Kingdom, it is $8,500 in the United States. For some reason, the same drug is substantially cheaper in the US. I have been told that the same is true of Portugal, but I do not know whether that is so.

In all debates on expensive drugs, questions must be asked about the prices that are charged by drug companies and manufacturers, and whether the Government are doing enough to apply pressure to bring those prices down. I accept that companies need a return on their research and an incentive to do that research, but is the balance right? If they are prepared to sell the drug for $8,500 a year in the US, why should the figure in the UK be £8,500?

My final point concerns the process by which the Government, or any Government, should decide about such issues: the NICE approach, so to speak. The principle that there should be an independent body that can do what dozens of individual health authorities across the country cannot reasonably be expected to do—that is, to review the written clinical evidence, take oral evidence and spend time and money evaluating the clinical effectiveness of the drug—is right. It will help to reduce unevenness in this country, of which we are all aware.

Of what should the institute take account? I believe that it is taking account of matters that are not its legitimate concern. Hon. Members do not have the clinical expertise to judge whether the treatment works, although such evidence exists. It is widely accepted that it reduces the number of relapses by about a third.

Originally, NICE had a remit for clinical excellence and effectiveness, but its remit has been extended. In August 1999—I do not suppose that August is prime time for hon. Members to scrutinise legislation—a short statutory instrument was laid before the House stating that NICE's constitution should be amended. It stated:

after the words "promotion of clinical excellence" there should be inserted the words "and of the effective use of available resources".

In a sense, no one could object to that—rather like motherhood and apple pie, all of us approve of the effective use of available resources. The question is, who should decide what is available? The answer must be that the elected Government of the day, rather than clinicians, should do so. If NICE took such decisions, it would be second-guessing political decisions on the Government's behalf. For example, the Government could have decided to put up the standard rate of income tax by 1p, and they could have put approximately £2.5 billion into the health service, which would have increased available resources. NICE could say, "Available resources are greater, and the health service should pay for beta interferon," but would it do so in that context? That would affect the resources that were available.

What is going on? Are not the Government abrogating their responsibilities? No one doubts that such decisions are difficult, and that prioritisation is needed, but the Government should not palm off such decisions to what is, in effect, a quango. Should not the Government accept responsibility for such decisions? They should say to the electorate, "We shall increase taxation to pay for the expensive drugs that we want in the NHS, or we shall not increase taxation, and you cannot have those expensive drugs." People elect us to take such decisions—they should not be handed to an allegedly independent third party.

Obviously, the Government have increaed resources to the NHS. On transparency, does the hon. Gentleman agree that it would be helpful if the clinical guidelines on the overall management of MS, which the Government have asked for, were made available before a decision was taken about the availability of beta interferon?

I am sure that greater openness in this whole process would be advantageous. I have no problem with making more explicit the criteria that are used to take such decisions—in a sense, that is the thrust of my argument. A body is needed to examine clinical effectiveness and excellence, and it cannot exist in a world in which there are no financial constraints. Cost-effectiveness involves saying, "If £1 is involved, that is great, but if £1 million is involved, that is silly." We need to sort out the finer details concerning political priorities and available resources.

Why was the statutory instrument produced during the summer recess, when there was limited scope for scrutiny? I accept that the instrument was subsequently debated, but why was the provision introduced as an afterthought? My concern is that the Government felt that they had let the cat out of the bag—they had set up NICE and asked it to examine effectiveness, but they were worried that it would give the wrong answers. The provision was designed to stop it from doing so—that is what it was doing with regard to beta interferon.

I hope that the Minister will assure us that clinical judgments will be made by clinicians and that political judgments will be made by politicians. Those decisions affect my constituents and those of many hon. Members. I welcome the fact that many hon. Members have attended this debate in an effort to show their solidarity with those constituents who need beta interferon. I see many nods around the Chamber. I hope that the Minister agrees that clinical effectiveness is the key and that the Government will not simply say no and abrogate their responsibilities. They should take the political decision and decide whether money should be found for a treatment that many of our constituents need and expect.

I congratulate the hon. Member for Northavon (Mr. Webb) on securing this debate. This is a good time for me to place on record a few comments following the controversy aroused by the unauthorised release—the leak— of the National Institute for Clinical Excellence's provisional guidance on beta interferon.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that it was a leak, and that the Government do not intend to comment on it at this stage. There are further stages to be completed in the National Institute for Clinical Excellence's approval process. We have not made public comment on any of the draft appraisals so far circulated by NICE, and we do not intend to change our position on the issue. However, it is a matter of great public interest and I recognise how this discussion must appear to those who face this disabling condition and whose hope for any relief is entirely understandable.

Multiple sclerosis, as we know, is a disabling neurological disease affecting about 85,000 people in the United Kingdom. We have great sympathy for those patients and their families. It usually strikes early in adulthood, and affects about twice as many women as men. The course of the disease is unpredictable, and it varies in progression rate and severity between patients. It has a major adverse impact on the patient's quality of life, especially during relapses, which may require hospitalisation. Disabilities that arise can include weakness, chronic fatigue, impairment of speech, vision and movement, incontinence and complete paralysis, as the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Mr. Burstow) said. The hon. Gentleman also said that there was no cure for MS.

A variety of services exists to minimise the suffering from this distressing disease, including skilled nursing support, physiotherapy and symptomatic drug treatment to help to manage symptoms such as fatigue, spasticity, pain and depression. Acute relapses are managed, when necessary, with corticosteroids. All those provisions require close collaboration between primary and secondary care services, and the development of pathways of care that we are promoting is well suited to foster the right management of care.

There are three beta interferon products. They are licensed for the treatment of the relapsing remitting form of the disease and one of them, Betaferon, is licensed for the treatment of the secondary progressive disease. The treatments are targeted at modifying and possibly slowing the course of the disease. The beta interferons commonly cause some side effects. The cost of beta interferon treatment is about £10,000 a year per patient.

Clinical trials have shown that all three products reduce the relapse frequency in patients with the relapsing remitting disease. The drugs may also reduce the severity of relapse. Disability progression also appears to be delayed by active treatment, but the longer-term effects are not certain, in part because of the production of neutralising antibodies whose clinical significance is still uncertain. Studies of the secondary progressive disease also show reduced frequency of relapses. There are inconsistent findings in the available clinical trials about the effects on slowing the accumulation of disability in secondary progressive MS.

However, the experts have so far placed differing emphasis on the evidence from clinical trials. Some neurologists are keen to prescribe these products, at least to some patients, but others remain sceptical as to the value of prescribing beta interferon or argue that available resources for MS care would better be used in providing alternative forms of health care support such as specialist nursing or physiotherapy.

The various policies adopted across the country for the use of this treatment confirm that clinicians disagree. There is also widespread agreement that we do not know as much as we would like about the longer-term effects of prescribing beta interferon year after year. These differences in clinical opinion were graphically illustrated only last week in interviews broadcast on the BBC news, when two consultants expressed diametrically opposite views on the clinical value of the drug.

Betaferon was the first product to receive a licence, in 1995. Differing views about the evidence from clinical trials were apparent at the time. The previous Government issued guidance in 1995 that left many of the key decisions to be taken at a local level. It recommended that prescribing should be initiated by hospital neurologists when clinically appropriate and asked health authorities to develop local arrangements with hospitals for purchasing and prescribing the treatment. Resource implications were left for local assessment.

The emphasis on local decision taking is the origin of the lottery of care often referred to as postcode prescribing. We continue to receive a steady influx of complaints across a range of issues from patients and clinicians, who cannot understand why there are wide divergences in local policies. All health authorities currently have policies in place by which some patients can receive beta interferon, but some are more restrictive. The percentage receiving beta interferon varies from about 0 per cent. to about 7 per cent. That amount of variation has given rise to great concern.

Does my hon. Friend accept that the beta interferon decision will be critical to the future of NICE? If NICE loses public confidence over this issue, that will undermine its important work in providing medical solutions that are clinically rather than politically or financially led.

My hon. Friend will understand that one reason why I believe it is inappropriate for me to comment in this debate on what is currently a draft proposal is that the integrity of the NICE decision-making process must be seen to be intact and not subject to guidance, expressions of opinion or anticipation of outcomes from Ministers. The credibility of NICE is indeed important.

On this issue, as on a number of others, the Government believed that leaving decisions to local health authorities without any guidance or support was an evasion of the Department's responsibility at central level. That is the background to the development of NICE and the referral of beta interferon to it.

We have acknowledged on a number of occasions that priority setting is a necessary part of any health care system. It has always been done in the national health service and will continue to be. It is right and proper that priorities are set that make the best use of the NHS's available resources. We do not deny that difficult issues can arise that generate controversy, as when we are dealing with a devastating condition such as multiple sclerosis. That has been made worse in the past when the significance of the evidence has been uncertain.

That is the situation in which we found ourselves. It was an unfair situation and we were determined to tackle it. The National Institute for Clinical Excellence was set up to ensure that the NHS's resources could be used to maximum effect and to remove inconsistent and unacceptable variations in care.

Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be ironic if NICE were to replace a system based on postcodes with a system based on whether one developed an illness or medical condition before a certain date?

Let me deal with a number of issues that have been raised about affordability and with the comments about the patients receiving the drugs.

The institute's extensive programme of work will set clear standards to ensure that the NHS can focus on treatments that are clinically and cost-effective. It is right to have a single source of authoritative guidance and information to assist health professionals in making complex decisions about patient care. NICE has begun its work. Its guidance to date relates to a number of topics such as wisdom teeth, Relenza, on which the guidance has been restrictive, and ways of promoting the wider use of drugs and technologies such as taxanes and stents, for example.

The hon. Member for Northavon asked about affordability and the changes made to NICE's directions last summer. We have been over this ground before. We made it clear on many occasions well before last summer that NICE would advise on clinical and cost-effectiveness and would issue guidance to the NHS. As we have always said, it is right and proper that NICE should consider clinical and cost-effectiveness side by side.

The hon. Gentleman also said that Ministers should decide the level of resources that are available to the NHS. We have already done so. We recently announced the largest ever injection of resources into the NHS, amounting to an average growth of 6.1 per cent. over four years.

The Government have always said that NICE guidance would take account of cost-effectiveness. The amendment order that we laid in August was a clarification, because we recognised that the original wording of the establishment order did not fully reflect our policy intention to take cost-effectiveness, as well as clinical effectiveness, into account. The amendment simply ensured that the order reflected the policy position that the Government had previously taken.

The Minister gave the example of wisdom teeth, on which NICE had made a recommendation. Is there not a difference between that and beta interferon? The argument is that taking wisdom teeth out does not work, not that we cannot afford to do so. That does not appear to be the argument on beta interferon. Is there not a danger that NICE is taking a decision that should be taken by Ministers?

Of course I recognise the difference in magnitude between the issues of multiple sclerosis and wisdom teeth. The hon. Gentleman will understand that. We established NICE to advise the service on the clinical and cost-effectiveness of a range of treatments and procedures. We asked NICE to review all the evidence on the clinical and cost-effectiveness of beta interferon for MS and to make recommendations on its use, based on that evidence. Those conclusions were issued in confidence on 16 June. The process is still running, and it would be premature to comment further.

However, following the leak last week of the draft appraisal conclusions, the institute's chairman, Professor Sir Michael Rawlins, said:

In order to avoid any further uncertainty in the minds of patients and those who care for them, I have no option other than to confirm that the provisional opinion of the Institute's Appraisal Committee is that other than for those patients who are already receiving these medicines, they should not be made available at the present time. This is because, on the basis of a very careful consideration of the evidence, their modest clinical benefit appears to be outweighed by their very high cost.

Given what the Minister has just said, does he not find it surprising that NICE did not seek evidence directly from MS sufferers in making that determination?

The exact way in which NICE seeks information is its responsibility. However, I know that NICE consulted patients' organisations directly as part of the appraisal process. Given that the Multiple Sclerosis Society in particular is a highly respected organisation, I am sure that it will have made adequate representation—although I have not seen it—about the impact on patients. It is also worth noting that from the outset NICE has been structured, through its partners council and in other ways, to ensure that patients' interests are taken fully into account in the way in which it takes decisions.

The final judgment will be taken by NICE. The current period of consultation ends on 17 July, and NICE will listen carefully to all the comments that it receives from those consulted. The procedures then allow for an appeal. It is only after those procedures have been exhausted that NICE will reach final conclusions.

A number of other issues have been raised, but I am not sure whether I can deal with all of them adequately. The hon. Member for Northavon asked about NICE's role in considering wider costs and benefits to society in making its appraisals. Again, I cannot comment specifically on the draft appraisal that is the subject of this debate. However, we have made it clear that companies are free to submit any relevant evidence to NICE that they want taken into consideration. NICE's task is to consider the evidence of clinical and other health-related benefits of an intervention and to judge whether a particular treatment can be recommended as a clinical and cost-effective use of national health service and personal social services resources. That is our position, which we have set out before.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bethnal Green and Bow (Ms King) referred to our request to NICE to produce clinical guidelines. Our research and development division has undertaken some preliminary work on the guidelines which will shorten the period—

Order. Time is up.

I am grateful that this subject was chosen for debate. It will highlight Labour's policy on exclusion as it applies to Barnsley, and to my constituency in particular, and allow me to bring to the Government's attention the progress that has been made by the Communities that Care project, funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, which operates in the Worsborough electoral ward in my constituency. It will allow us to consider the scope of future developments as well as the important issue of funding that important project.

I shall provide some background information against which the economic and social dislocation of the area can be understood. In the mid-1970s, the area was prosperous. The fortunes of the local economy were linked to the energy economy, which was defined at that time in relation to two sources—coal and nuclear energy—based on the security of supply and sustainability. That provided stability for the local economy. However, after the Coal Industry Act 1980, the bitter wind of competition from imports began to be felt. In its wake came the 1984–85 miners strike and the rest is history.

Inevitably, the Barnsley economy was hit hard over the next decade by colliery closures that followed in the wake of the strike. More than 20,000 jobs were lost in mining and the multiplier effect made the blow much wider and much worse. The social structure came under great strain. Unemployment, poverty, low esteem, low educational achievement, substance abuse, family break-up and a general loss of community followed. That was made worse in a borough with the highest rate of disability in the country.

The local economy went into a severe depression and there was little help from the Tory Administration. Statistics collected by the local authority in the mid-1990s graphically show how depressed the locality had become. The average household income per year on the council estates was between £5,000 and £6,000. The average across the borough was £11,000, which compares with an average in Yorkshire and Humberside at the time of £ 18,300. Almost 30 per cent. of households contained a disabled person, 12 per cent. of the population were carers and the locality had, and still has, one of the highest mortality rates in England. I draw attention to that because I want to make a point about the health action zone.

It was estimated that the area needed to create 19,000 jobs over three years from the mid-1990s just to reach the average national level of employment. Not surprisingly, a great deal of the work that the local authority undertook was directed towards creating conditions to attract new companies to the area to bring jobs. There has been some success: brownfield sites have been cleared and new roads have been built to provide access to the sites and to a route that will link them directly to the M1. However, too few companies, particularly high-growth and high-value companies, are being attracted to the area. I understand that the local authority recently undertook a survey that shows that Barnsley has a deficit of 2,500 companies compared with similar areas.

Although the new deal is admirable, it is less effective in Barnsley than in an area with a solid industrial base. Consequently, far more people in the area are without jobs. Even unemployment figures hide the real extent of the problem. For example, Sheffield Hallam university carried out a study when the survey to which I have referred was undertaken. The university calculated that the real unemployment level in Barnsley was 24.6 per cent., whereas the official rate was 8.4 per cent.

It is now three years since the Labour Government were elected. The policies that they have pursued have brought improvements, but there is still a long way to go. The minimum wage, the working families tax credit and the increase in child benefit have all contributed to raising the income of the most needy households in the Barnsley borough. Figures from the Budget show that 2,875 households will benefit from the working families tax credit. Of the 15,366 pensioners who will benefit from the increased winter fuel allowance, 6,147 will enjoy a free television licence from this autumn. In addition, 11,200 people will receive the increased child benefit. Labour's approach to tackling inequalities is beginning to produce improvements in Barnsley.

Historically, low educational attainment was associated with the heavy industrial base of the local economy. Now, it is recognised that low attainment levels impact adversely on work force skills. The local authority has responded by setting an ambitious target of reaching the national average level of attainment within the next five years. The Government have assisted in that by establishing an education action zone. I visited the education action zone with other hon. Members to see the work being done. It was commendable.

Barnsley people suffer from poor health. It is estimated that the illness rate is 43 per cent. higher than the national average and that the death rate from heart disease is 25 per cent. higher than the average. For that reason, the borough was included in the South Yorkshire Coalfield health action zone. It is therefore disappointing that that zone's budget was cut by 24 per cent. with immediate effect from 21 June. That is a reduction of £789,000 on the programme budget of £3.037 million. I hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will raise that matter with Ministers at the Department of Health and urge them to reconsider.

Since the civic hall was mothballed two years ago, the town has lacked a sizeable theatre. That deprives local children of access to live theatre and excludes them from a cultural experience that most children take for granted. Last year, the Arts Council of England turned down the authority's bid for funding to renovate the theatre. That was disappointing. A new bid is to be made and I urge the Arts Council to address the problem of cultural deprivation in Barnsley and ensure that it has facilities for children to come into contact with live performances.

I recognise that closing the gap and reducing inequality in Barnsley will take time, but the figures that I gave show that a step has been taken in the right direction. Bringing about a cultural change and reversing the trend of the past decade will take longer and the Communities that Care project in Worsborough in my constituency, which is funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, is important. It also provides an opportunity to roll out the benefits of the project throughout the borough.

I shall outline the way in which the Communities that Care project works. It is one of three similar projects in the country and was the first to kick off. It is a long-term programme and the intention is to deal with the pressures and stresses that young people face in their communities. The project takes a new approach and an important factor is that it is owned by the community. At the core of the programme is the objective of building safer neighbourhoods where young people are valued, respected and encouraged to reach their potential. It is evidence based and founded on a partnership between young people in the community, the community itself, and the statutory and voluntary agencies. It encourages social commitment and achievement and takes a step-by-step approach to map out the risk and protective factors that influence young people in their community. The risk assessment group was assisted in its research by Oxford university. Sheffield university is also involved in evaluating the project.

A survey was carried out among 1,600 pupils at the two secondary schools. They were asked a series of questions about their attitudes, views, families and neighbourhood. Sixteen risk factors were analysed from the returns to give a picture of the risk and protective factors that were influencing the behaviour of young people in the Worsborough community. Following the prioritisation, five factors were identified as high-risk factors in the community: poor parental supervision and discipline; low achievement in school; disadvantaged neighbourhood; individuals, friends and peers condoning problem behaviour; and parents condoning such behaviour.

When the risk audit had been completed, the next step was to prepare a final strategy in the light of the evidence that had been collected from the survey based on an action plan. The purpose of the action plan is to increase the level of protective factors with the redirection of existing services to tackle risk and the introduction of a new focused intervention. It must be emphasised that the Communities that Care project is not trying to reinvent the wheel and I need to get it over to my hon. Friend the Minister that redirection of services and the focusing of intervention are planned in accordance with a menu. It is accepted that services are already being provided in that community—housing, education, social services and so on—but in the context of the Communities that Care project, the intervention is refocused to provide greater effect.

The project is working well. It started in 1998 and was funded for three years. The funding from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation will come to an end at the end of May 2001. Hearing what I have said, my hon. Friend the Minister may say, "What's new? We've been targeting communities in the UK for a number of years." I would not disagree with him, but what is new in this project is the way in which we can identify overlapping risks and protective factors. We need the community and the programme to proceed in an holistic way.

After three years' funding by the foundation, it is crucial to complete the project. All the research and analysis work has been done. Long-term implementation is now needed, and it must be assured. Various types of funding are available and can be applied for—for example, single regeneration budget and European funding—but the project's future must be more secure. I am aware that the Government's crime reduction strategy includes a £540 million fund for the Sure Start project.

Sure Start is aimed at families and children. It has been approved in Barnsley, but is not under way. Now that it has been approved, that gives us an opportunity to move forward. I ask my hon. Friend the Minister to consider ownership of the Communities that Care project after May 2001 and perhaps the extension of funding from the Sure Start project, so that we can ensure implementation and co-ordination of the Communities that Care project. I see no reason why we should not be able to extend the Sure Start scheme.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, West and Penistone (Mr. Clapham) on raising this subject. He is a persistent and persuasive advocate for his constituency, for Barnsley as a borough and for the coalfield communities as a whole. The way in which he keeps drawing the attention of the House to the needs of a community pushed flat on its back by Tory economic policies in the 1980s and 1990s is a credit to him and in the best traditions of Labour party representation in the House.

In passing, I pay tribute to the remarkable Rowntree family. Not only did they start the business that is now the biggest employer in my constituency—the Rowntree, now Nestle, chocolate factory—but, when Joseph Rowntree, the founder of the dynasty, came to retire, instead of keeping private control of his huge shareholdings in the business, which had grown so remarkably, he put them into trust. He set up three great trusts which, between them, are the biggest independent private funders of social research, and social development programmes, such as the Communities that Care projects, the first of which is running in Barnsley. That was his major legacy to social policy. His son, Seebohm Rowntree, did the three poverty studies in 1901, 1936 and 1952 in York, as a fairly typical town. From those studies developed so much of Labour social policy, especially of the post-war Attlee Government that created the welfare state. They were two great social reformers.

I was interested to learn about the Communities that Care approach, which I like. It is right to build multi-agency networks to tackle the causes of deprivation and to concentrate on young people. The point at which escape from a life of poverty is most possible is when people leave home. That is when they either move into work and escape from poverty, or fail to do so and become trapped in a lifetime of benefits. That fact is recognised strongly in "Opportunity for All"—the Government's strategy to combat and defeat poverty. Everyone in every part of the country should have the opportunity to get on and prosper.

The Communities that Care strategy identifies what it calls the risk factors—such as school failure, teenage pregnancy, sexually transmitted disease, drugs and crime—that undermine opportunity for all and the ability of individuals to surmount obstacles and make their way in life. It stresses the importance of skills, social inclusion and the protective factors that enable real opportunity for all. It also stresses the importance of listening to and taking account of young people's views, recognising and praising what they do, and allowing them to get involved in their neighbourhoods.

A similar approach was taken in the rejuvenation of the Bell Farm estate, which is one of the most seriously disadvantaged estates in my constituency. The project had some support from the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, but the key was to knit together the agencies and give a voice to local people, enabling them to shape changes to the streetscape and decide on changes to individual tenants' homes. That approach has worked well. At the beginning of the project, only 4 per cent. of people who lived on the estate thought that it experienced less crime than other parts of York. In other words, almost everyone thought that the estate was a crime hot-spot. At the end of the project, 53 per cent.—a majority—thought that there was less crime on the estate than elsewhere.

The foundation has moved on from the Communities that Care approach, but it follows the same precedent by giving people in disadvantaged communities the opportunity to express themselves and their solutions. That approach dovetails well with the Government's strategy on poverty. In February 1999, the Prime Minister set the Government the ambitious and challenging goal of seeking to eliminate child poverty within a generation. Until the Government published "Opportunity for All", which outlines the strategy for eliminating poverty, people were sceptical about whether that goal could be achieved. If it is challenging for the country as a whole, it is particularly challenging for communities such as that represented by my hon. Friend, but there is a determination in all parts of the country to achieve it.

My hon. Friend described the damage and devastation that the Conservatives' economic policies inflicted on Barnsley in the 1980s and 1990s. He described the consequences for the health of the population of Barnsley in particular, and gave many indicators. This morning, I discovered that 8.6 children per 1,000 live births die in Barnsley. That is the fourth highest infant mortality rate in the country, and compares with 5.6 per 1,000 in England as a whole. It reflects the burden of deprivation that a neighbourhood can face. That is why the health action zone—

I assume that my hon. Friend recognises the importance of trying to get the South Yorkshire Coalfield health action zone moneys back on track.

That is why I mentioned that. I clearly heard what my hon. Friend said, and I will ensure that his views are conveyed to the Department of Health. The health action zone was established to address such problems.

The basis for achieving the Government's strategy to reduce poverty is the provision of the right macro-economic framework. When the Labour party came to power three years ago, we inherited a legacy of boom and bust from our predecessors. In just three years, we have made a major change to the nature of the economy. There is more stability. Throughout the country, 1 million more people are at work than in May 1997, and unemployment is falling. That is true even in places facing the highest burden of unemployment, such as Barnsley. In May 1997, the Barnsley travel-to-work area had an 8 per cent. unemployment rate, which has now fallen to 5.8 per cent. That is significantly lower than it was at its peak in the mid-1980s. In 1984, it stood at 14.5 per cent.

I should emphasise that there is a great deal of hidden unemployment. The survey that was carried out in the schools at Worsborough showed that 50 per cent. of the households from which the children of Worsborough came had a head of the household who was not economically active.

My hon. Friend stresses the nature of the problem.

It is not only a matter of Government policies taking a broad brush approach to unemployment and creating 1 million jobs, but of providing jobs at local level and targeting help where it is needed. That is one of the achievements of the new deal. In Barnsley, 1,251 young people are now in work as a result of the new deal, and 1,158 are in sustained employment. The new deal has worked. It has made the difference between long-term unemployment and employment. Long-term unemployment among young people in Barnsley is now down to 251. Those 251 people are the hard core of those who are most at risk of a lifetime on benefits, and therefore a lifetime of social exclusion. That is what my hon. Friend has highlighted today.

A wide range of initiatives is making a difference, as my hon. Friend knows, because he has argued for them and secured them for his community. The local education authority has secured rapid improvement in the education indicators since 1997, when the Government came to power. The learning gateway is providing opportunities for 400 young people. My hon. Friend also referred to the single regeneration budget, the education action zone and the confirmation of objective 1 status for South Yorkshire.

I stress that the Government's strategy to combat poverty lays a strong emphasis on work, because for most people of working age that is the best route out of poverty. Benefit expenditure tackles the immediate needs of those who cannot work, such as children, sick and disabled people and pensioners, and the Government have done a lot for those groups. Child benefit, having been frozen for years by the Conservatives, has increased by 26 per cent. in real terms to £15 per week for the first child and £10 per week for subsequent children. As my hon. Friend said, 11,200 families in Barnsley benefit from that.

The working families tax credit and the minimum wage will, in October this year, guarantee a minimum weekly income of £208 for a family with one child and one person at work. Couples on income support with two children aged under 11 will, by next year, be £1,500 a year better off. Those measures, taken together, have lifted 1.2 million children out of poverty. The Conservatives trebled the number of children in poverty, and we are taking action to reduce their number.

We are providing more money, in real terms, for disability benefits, and £6.5 billion more for pensioners. We have started by helping the poorest pensioners. In Barnsley, 8,200 such pensioners gain the minimum income guarantee. They had a pension of £62.45 when we came to power; now it is £78.45. That is £16 more per week for the poorest pensioners in Barnsley as a result of Labour policies. Now we are targeting those whose incomes or savings put them just above the minimum income level, and they will get more too.