I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 6, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, after "medical", insert "or other reasonable".

Amendment No. 7, in page 2, line 11, at end insert—

'and any relevant medical condition or allergy to dogs (supported by such medical evidence as the licensing authority may prescribe) of the driver'.

Amendment No. 8, in page 2, line 14, after "vehicle", insert "or named driver".

Amendment No. 9, in page 2, line 15, at end insert—

'which period shall be not less than 12 months'.

Amendment No. 2, in page 2, line 20, at end insert—

'or

(c) at the time of the refusal the assistance dog was in an excitable, agitated or boisterous state which might have endangered the drivers ability to properly control the private hire vehicle.'.

Amendment No. 10, in page 2, line 20, at end insert—

'(8A) No offence is committed by a driver under subsection (3) if—

the dog is so large as not to be able to sit comfortably on the floor of the vehicle, or

the disabled person refuses or fails to require or fails to cause the dog to sit on the floor of the vehicle'.

My right hon. Friend the Member for East Yorkshire (Mr. Knight) has suddenly had to go to an unexpected and rather serious engagement in his constituency. A matter has come up, and I will willingly explain privately to any hon. Member the reasons why my right hon. Friend cannot attend today. He sends his apologies for not being here. I understand that as the amendment stands in my name as well as his, I am permitted to move the new clause and to speak to amendment No. 2.

Lest there be any misunderstanding, let me say first that I fully support the Bill promoted by the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) and wish it well; I hope that it reaches the statute book expeditiously. The purpose of the new clause and amendment No. 2 is to protect the security interests of the driver of a private hire vehicle.

I have received a briefing from the Royal National Institute for the Blind, in the names of its campaigns director and its campaigns officer, Mr. Nicholas Russell. I have been very much persuaded by what Mr. Russell has written, and it seems to me on balance that, provided that nothing to the contrary comes out of the ensuing debate and the Minister does not argue the other way, I should not seek to put either new clause 1 or amendment No. 2 to the vote, but should rather, with the leave of the House, withdraw the motion.

Before doing that, I shall mention the reasons why I have come to that conclusion. New clause 1, as the House will know, deals with the possibility of a guide dog vomiting, urinating or defecating in a vehicle. The driver would be able to recover the costs in civil law if necessary. I am not a lawyer, but I am assured that if that happened the owner of the dog would in any case be liable for a civil debt under the general law of tort. If that is the case, it would be extraneous to proceed with the new clause.

The new clause was not intended to suggest that such events would happen except in the most extreme and rare circumstances. I am deeply aware of how guide dogs are chosen and trained, and the care that goes into that, and I would not seek to suggest that it is the norm that a dog would do any of those things, or cause damage in the way described in the new clause.

Amendment No. 2 deals with the possibility of a dog being

"in an excitable, agitated or boisterous state",

and the same applies to that. Dogs are selected and extensively trained to ensure that they are of a placid temperament and know how they are expected to behave in cars. If, exceptionally, a dog became excited or boisterous, it would be retrained, and the RNIB assures me that if the retraining was unsuccessful the dog would be retired.

In the light of those assurances, and unless there is some legal point that might necessitate strengthening the defence for a driver in such exceptional circumstances, I shall not insist that the House divides on either new clause I or amendment No. 2.

Characteristically, the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) has made a very moderate speech—indeed, a good speech—in opposition to the new clause and amendment No. 2. However, there are some in the House today who may recall the passage of what was then the Disability Discrimination Bill. The Government of the day chose the right hon. Member for Richmond. Yorks(Mr. Hague) as the Minister who piloted the Bill through, and he did that extremely well. I led for the Opposition, and I leave others to decide what my performance was like. [HON. MEMBERS: "Tremendous."] I am sure that it is all on the record. However, I very much regret, as do Members who were involved in that Bill, including my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), who has done such a marvellous job in introducing this Bill, that we had to move the then Government on transport because it had not been included in the original draft Bill. So we made more progress on transport than was originally expected. However, we did not reach the issue in this Bill.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet for giving the impression that he will not press new clause 1 and amendment No. 2 to a vote because all the evidence is that the behaviour of guide dogs for blind people and hearing dogs for people with hearing impairments is normally impeccable. They are properly trained and their owners look after them. Were the new clause and amendment to be passed, the opposite impression might be given, which would do a great disservice to a progressive step forward.

The whole House respects the work that my right hon. Friend and the supporters of the Bill have done. However, does he agree that it is often human beings, particularly those who have had too much to drink or are intoxicated in other ways, who cause the offence to drivers of private hire vehicles? Yet the proposal before us implies that dogs or other animals are capable of the same behaviour that some people indulge in after a certain hour.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for underlining what I think would be the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow. Were we to adopt new clause 1 and amendment No. 2, we would impose on dogs something that we do not impose on people. Yet all the evidence is that some people—a minority—behave much more unacceptably than most dogs. Therefore, the proposals are unnecessary.

The experience of the House, not to mention that of individual Members, the advice of our constituents and of the RNIB, is profound. Nearly every day we are delighted to see a guide dog in the House. Very often, the guide dog behaves much better than the average Member, yet no one would seek to impose draconian rules on Members regarding their behaviour. It is certainly not necessary for that wonderful dog, which comes in with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department.

The hon. Gentleman is quite right in general terms. However, I recall one time when the guide dog of a very distinguished Member performed in this Chamber in a way that: I have never seen any right hon. or hon. Member perform.

I leave the defence of canines to their friends. It would be a dangerous path, and I am sure that you would not allow it, Mr. Deputy Speaker, were I to deal with the behaviour of every Member at every moment the House is sitting.

On the serious point, I think that we are making excellent progress.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for giving way. He is right that the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) was reasonable in his analysis of some of the defects in new clause 1. We have yet to hear the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore). However, does my right hon. Friend agree that the amendments would introduce uncertainty into the legislation and allow the unscrupulous minicab driver—I am sure that there are very few of those—to prevent those who use guide dogs or hearing dogs from taking them into the car? That uncertainty, which has not yet been touched on in the debate, is an added reason for rejecting the amendments.

My hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, West(Gareth Thomas) is absolutely right. He spoke, as always, very coherently. That takes me to my peroration.

The Bill is long overdue. Those who train guide dogs for blind persons and hearing dogs for persons with hearing difficulties do a first-class job. I want more training to take place. More people should have access to these dogs, and people with disabilities should not be restricted in using transport. As I said, I regret that access to minicabs was not included in earlier disability legislation. and it is important to welcome a measure that is long overdue.

This is an extremely important Bill, which I support. I am slightly perturbed by this group of amendments. I agree with the right hon. Member for Coatbridge and Chryston (Mr. Clarke) that the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) did a good job of demolishing the case for his new clause and amendment. Perhaps he was not in full possession of the facts when he appended his name to the new clause in the first instance and has had time for reflection since then.

I really cannot let the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) get away with that. I admitted that I was not a lawyer. I received legal advice, which I then understood. Irrespective of that, new clause 1 and amendment No. 2 were genuinely designed to strengthen the Bill, not destroy it. They might make it more detailed, admittedly, and would cover the rights of the vehicle's driver. However, having had other matters explained to me, on balance, I think that new clause 1 and amendment No. 2 are not necessary and are even irrelevant to the Bill's main purpose and objective.

I am most grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that explanation. Of course I accept at face value everything that he says about his intentions. I still have difficulty in reconciling the original intent of new clause 1 and amendment No. 2 with strengthening the Bill, but no doubt that point will be developed as we debate this further.

With all due respect to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon(Mr. Dismore), does the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome(Mr. Heath) think it possible that the new clause gives us a glimpse of the real meaning of compassionate conservatism?

That may well be the case, but as the hon. Gentleman says, he will have to apologise to the hon. Member for Hendon(Mr. Dismore), who appears to have joined the gang. I hope that the hon. Member for Hendon will have an opportunity to catch your eye later, Mr. Deputy Speaker. and explain his intentions.

While in no sense wishing to rise to the bait of the hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green(Mr. McCabe), do the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and other Members present for this fascinating debate agree that whether or not we accept the amendment and new clause, it is important for the credibility of the Bill that these difficult issues, analogous but not identical to some of those raised in Committee, are fully debated to sustain the future credibility of the Bill?

I am happy to accept that proposition. The hon. Gentleman will recall a similar balance of interests when we considered the Copyright (Visually Impaired Persons) Bill. That is one of the two Bills of the Session which, if they reach the statute book, will greatly advance the interests of those with visual impairment. It is important to reconcile conflicting interests in matters of this kind, so that everyone feels that their concerns have been properly heard and addressed in this place.

10 am

Nevertheless, I find it difficult to understand why an assistance dog should be singled out as an animal or sentient being—I use that term in its broadest sense to include some members of the human race who may use private hire vehicles—subject to specific treatment under the law in such circumstances. As was correctly said earlier, by the right hon. Member for Coatbridge—

And Chryston.

I apologise to the right hon. Gentleman.

As the right hon. Gentleman pointed out earlier, our experience and that of the trade shows that such problems are far more likely to be associated with human beings who may over-consume certain substances during an evening, hire a cab late at night and then find themselves indisposed. The likelihood of an animal being in that condition is much more remote, especially in the case of the best trained dogs in the country. They are wonderful creatures; they undergo extensive training and behave appropriately. It is somewhat perverse to single out that group for a specific requirement in the Bill.

Does my hon. Friend agree that there should at least be some test of reasonableness in the provision? Some of the folk that we are dealing with may not be able to see what condition the dog is in and may not fully anticipate what it might do in the vehicle. Such people should not be subject to harsh penalties if they behaved reasonably, whatever might have happened later.

My hon. Friend makes an interesting point. I am not a lawyer, but I suspect that the owner is responsible for the actions of their animal, irrespective of whether they can determine its condition in advance. I suspect that action under civil law and recovery of costs through tort would still be possible.

I agree with the line of the hon. Gentleman's argument about the new clause. Does he agree that it seems unfair to impose such a condition on the carriage of blind people and their dogs when, as far as I am aware, the same restriction and redress in law is not applied when a blind person takes his or her dog into a shop or workplace? Would that not be a brand new requirement under law?

The hon. Gentleman raises an interesting point that I am not qualified to address in detail, but I agree that the provision would be unique.

The counter-argument of course is that there would be a unique requirement under law that the private hire operator could not refuse carriage of the animal, whereas if it were of a different species or if the circumstances were different, he or she would be within their rights to say, "No, I believe that were I to carry a water buffalo in the back of my cab, it would be likely to cause damage to my vehicle so I am within my rights not to carry said animal." That clearly does not apply to a guide dog. [HON. MEMBERS: "What about children?"1 Indeed, the hon. Member for Glasgow, Cathcart (Mr. Harris) and my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) make the same point—we all know the dangers of travelling with children. However, that is to go a little way from the purpose of the proposal.

The new clause is not necessary. Damage caused to a vehicle by the animals described in the Bill is covered by other areas of law and cost recovery would be available to the driver. The new clause is at the very least otiose and possibly damaging to the interests of the Bill. I hope that the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet will withdraw it in due course.

We have heard relatively little about amendment No. 2, which raises different problems. It provides that there would be no offence if

"at the time of the refusal the assistance dog was in an excitable, agitated or boisterous state which might have endangered the drivers ability to properly control the private hire vehicle."

I could just about understand that provision in the case of a black cab hailed on the street, when the driver could assess the state of the animal, which would be standing at the kerbside with its owner, and could suggest that the dog was not in an appropriate state of mind to be carried in the cab.

Private hire vehicles would not normally be hailed in the street. however; indeed it is illegal. They are hired by a phone call or a visit to the company's office and it would be impossible for the driver—other than through a process of extra-sensory perception—to assess the state of mind of the animal in question. I cannot for the life of me understand the circumstances in which the amendment would be relevant other than as later rationalisation of a decision taken on other grounds. That would seem an unfortunate addition to the Bill as it would offer an avenue for abuse on the part of the private hire company.

I do not want to put words into the mouth of the supporters of the amendment, but perhaps their intention is to put the responsibility on to the person who is booking the private hire vehicle. The hirer is supposed to make the assessment when they book their cab. Does my hon. Friend want to question—as I do—whether the provision impugns the behaviour and sensible conduct of all owners of such dogs?

That would be one interpretation of the amendment, albeit a most unfortunate one if it were correct. I certainly would not want Members of this place to suggest that a person with a sensory impairment who was the owner or user of an assistance dog would be so lacking in proper care and consideration that they would hire a vehicle in the full knowledge that their dog was in a state quite alien to the normal conduct of such animals. However, my hon. Friend is right to say that that is one interpretation of the amendment.

I prefer to assume that the purpose of the amendment is to allow the operator or driver of the car to refuse carriage on the grounds of the boisterous or unruly behaviour of the dog. However, I do not think that the driver would be able to assess that.

Following the very logical arguments that the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome is putting to the House, I wonder whether he would agree that my constituents in Coatbridge and Chryston would find it very unusual if their Member gave support to an amendment that includes a split infinitive: "to properly control". Given the excellent Scottish education system, they would have some reservations about that as well, would they not?

I am most grateful to the right hon. Member for Coatbridge and Chryston, who has clearly had the benefit of an excellent Scottish education. I shall not go too far down the road of parsing the clause in question, but I have a difference with the right hon. Gentleman about the appropriateness or otherwise of the split infinitive. The split infinitive was commonly used in the authorised version of the Bible, and historically. It is only a Victorian invention that equated the English infinitive with the Latin infinitive, which of course could not be split because it was incorporated in a single word.

The same happens to be true of modern Greek, but that is by the by. I actually discussed this point with the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) in the Library this morning. There is not only a split infinitive in amendment No. 2; there also happens to be a dropped apostrophe, but that does not take away from the substance of the amendment, on which I hope to address the House later, if I catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

The hon. Gentleman has now raised a very important point indeed, because the fact that the apostrophe is not there means that we have no way of assessing whether the amendment refers to a single driver or plural drivers, and that would have an effect on the operation of the clause.

I want to bring my hon. Friend back to the question of reasonableness. Does he agree that a private hire driver expects wear and tear as part of the cost of the hire, and that includes wear and tear caused by people who make the seats dirty, and people who have accidents? These are things that happen in the back of a vehicle as part of the ordinary running of a private hire vehicle. Is it not wrong to penalise a particular group of disabled people when they have been acting reasonably? Reasonable wear and tear and reasonable accidents should surely not be included in the legislation.

I think that my hon. Friend is right, although when we look at amendment No. 7, which the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) was prepared to support, apparently without caring or troubling to look into its syntactical quality or grammatical errors—perhaps I do him a disservice; perhaps in the original form these errors were corrected

I was aware of the grammatical errors and I anticipated that the amendment might not be pressed to a vote. However, I believe that it raises some important issues, which we need to debate in the House, and should I catch your eye later in the debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I have some points to make on it, in response to some of the points that the hon. Gentleman has made already.

I am most grateful for that intervention; as a declaration of intent, it could not be bettered. I am not sure that it took the arguments a great deal further.

I do not want to take too much of the House's time this morning. I accept that there is an issue about the control of animals, or of children—or of adults if they are not entirely compos mentis, whether that condition is chemically influenced or otherwise—in a vehicle, but I consider that there are already proper protections under the law for circumstances in which that would apply. My argument, quite apart from what I have said about the point of assessment—which is relevant to a private hire vehicle that is not a black cab—is that I see very little reason to include in this legislation a specific prohibition or qualification in relation to something that applies much more widely than to those with some form of sensory impairment who make use of an assistance dog. Indeed, I would suggest—reasonably, in my opinion—that those who use assistance dogs and those with sensory impairments are the least likely among the general population to cause what one can only assume to be the mischief that the new clause and the amendments seek to remedy. That is the bone of contention and that is why I do hope that, in the fullness of time, the new clause and the amendments will not be pressed to a vote.

10.15 am

We have not yet had the benefit of the advice of the hon. Member for Hendon on the amendments that he has tabled, so it is inappropriate to deal with them in detail until he has had the opportunity to address the House. My only observation is that I hope that he will explain why he feels that the amendments are necessary, given what is already in the Bill, and particularly why he tabled amendment No. 7, which seems to be a reiteration of something which clearly—

Order. I think perhaps we should wait until we reach amendment No. 7 before we start to debate it.

I apologise, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I had understood that it was grouped in this group. Am I wrong?

No; the hon. Gentleman is quite right. It is my fault.

I am most grateful, Mr. Deputy Speaker. It is a great rarity for the occupant of the Chair to be wrong in any way in the Chamber and I do appreciate the immediate correction.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that although many of us may think that it is not necessarily a great rarity for the Chair to be wrong, it is a great rarity for the Chair to admit it so quickly and so—

Order. I think at this point we should return to the amendments.

I had no intention of following the hon. Member for Brent, North (Mr. Gardiner) down that road. In my experience it is certainly not a rarity; it is simply a rarity for there to be anything wrong with the judgment of the Chair in the first instance, and I would reject utterly any suggestion to the contrary.

I return to amendment No. 7, about which we have not yet heard from the hon. Member for Hendon. The point that I was seeking to make was that the amendment appears, as I read it, simply to reiterate and re-state in a different form a provision that is already in the Bill, which allows an operator to have a certificate exempting him from the provisions of the Bill for medical reasons. I am not clear—but no doubt we shall hear from the hon. Gentleman why I am wrong in my interpretation—why he wishes to re-state that in the Bill and why it is necessary to have a doubling up. Perhaps it is a belt and braces approach. Perhaps he is concerned that the subsection may be contestable in law and he would prefer to repeat the provision elsewhere in the Bill to enable him to direct his defence lawyers to a different part of the Bill in order to adduce additional legal evidence in the case. We do not know; we must wait until the hon. Gentleman makes his speech. We shall listen carefully to the arguments that he adduces in favour of his amendment.

In conclusion, this group of amendments, which may be well-intentioned—I am perfectly happy to accept that the amendments are well-intentioned—in fact does very little to advance the interests of a Bill which, as I have already said, is extremely important. Indeed, I consider that they are to its detriment. Worse, they single out a group of people—a group who are already singled out by virtue of their sensory impairment and their need for the help of assistance dogs—in what could be considered a discriminatory way. That is unjustified. It is not relevant to the operation of the Bill, should it become statute. I hope that, having heard the arguments in some detail, those who have tabled the new clause and the amendments will, having reflected on the matter—it appeared that the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet had done quite a lot of reflection in advance—feel it appropriate to withdraw the new clause and not press the amendments, so that we may make further progress with the Bill.

Before I start to justify my amendments and speak in favour of new clause 1, although perhaps not its precise wording, may I say that I very much sympathise with the aims of the Bill? I have read the briefing from the RNIB, and I very much hope that the Bill will pass today, although a number of issues need to be addressed. Even if the amendments are not accepted today, there will be an opportunity to consider some of the technical issues in another place if the Bill receives its Third Reading today, which I very much hope it will.

In response to the point made in an intervention by my hon. Friend the Member for Harrow, West (Mr. Thomas), I simply say that, although the Bill may become a little more complicated if some of my proposals are accepted, my objective is not to make it more complicated, but to ensure that we do not inadvertently create injustices for the owners and drivers of minicabs. Of course our job in the House is to try to ensure justice for those on both sides of any argument. Although it is the natural tendency of hon. Members to favour the less advantaged in society, such as those whom we are trying to help with the Bill—and rightly so—we must ensure, while doing so, that we do not inadvertently cause an injustice to someone else.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asks why we have singled out guide dogs. Perhaps he hinted at the answer in his own contribution: if someone wanted to take his pet water buffalo or warthog—or even his ordinary, small pet mongrel—in a cab or minicab, the driver would have the right to refuse to take him. I used to have a pet dog before being elected to the House. On one occasion, when she was in a slightly muddy condition, I tried to flag down a cab, but the driver refused to take her. She was called Griswald. She occasionally damaged the upholstery of my car, so I know that we need to address such issues.

Dogs could be refused passage, as, of course, could a drunk on a Saturday night. We are creating the right for people to insist on being taken. That is the right thing to do, but people must accept the consequences of any damage that may arise from insisting on exercising that right.

May I make it absolutely clear that I entirely understand that balance of interests? I think that I alluded to it in my comments. Before I was a Member of Parliament, I used to keep pigs. I never required a private hire carrier or black cab driver to try to take one of my pigs in the back of his cab.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman.

My hon. Friend refers to his own experiences of attempting to take his dog in a cab but being refused because the dog had muddy paws. Does he think that those who drafted the new clause considered that muddy paws equated to damaging a vehicle?

Muddy paws themselves cannot damage a vehicle. In fact, my dog had rather more than muddy paws on that occasion. However, if the muddy paws got on to the upholstery, the vehicle could be damaged. I have still got the car with the muddy paw marks in the back to prove it. Sometimes such marks do not come out.

What happened to the dog?

I am afraid that the dog died of old age in 1996, and I have not replaced her because, frankly, my lifestyle since being elected to the House would not allow me to look after a dog properly. As a responsible dog owner, I thought it inappropriate to get another one.

I am sure that all hon. Members would appreciate not only my hon. Friend's skills as a dog owner, but the fact that he has a legal background. Indeed, the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) said in his opening remarks that the current civil law of tort made provision for recovery of a debt if a vehicle is soiled. Will my hon. Friend confirm from his experience as a lawyer that that is the case now and that it would be the case if the Bill were to become a statute?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention. I shall come to that issue shortly, and there are some points to be made about the present legal position in the absence of the new clause.

The hon. Member for Northavon (Mr. Webb) suggested in an intervention that, if the dog owner were sight impaired or blind, he might not be able to see the condition of the dog. That is an important point, but it goes against the argument, which he was trying to advance, that the owner may not be aware of the condition of the dog at the time. The briefing from the RNIB says that that will be a very unusual occurrence and that it would arise only if the dog were ill, for example, because assistance dogs are properly trained and well behaved. I certainly take that point on board, but even if such occurrences are comparatively rare, it is important to ensure that the rights of the car owner or driver are protected, because the damage could be expensive to repair.

Does my hon. Friend understand that the difficulty that may arise is that, if a driver says, "I'm sorry. I am not going to take you and your dog because your dog is in a poor state and might damage my vehicle," the owner of the dog may be unable to assess whether that is the truth? That is a very serious loophole in the Bill.

If the new clause said that, I would agree with my hon. Friend, but I am afraid it does not. It relates to carrying the dog in the car, not to refusing to take the dog in the car. It would apply ex post facto, rather than on refusing to admit the dog. That is dealt with in amendment No. 2, which I shall come to later. So there are some important considerations to bear in mind.

There is a problem with the wording of the new clause. It refers to "the full cost", and there could be arguments about the full cost of restoring the vehicle to its previous condition. I would have preferred the new clause to refer to "reasonable cost", as perhaps that would be a fairer way to deal with the point made by the hon. Member for Northavon. The phrase "reasonable cost" would have been better, but perhaps we could consider that on another occasion.

Is the hon. Gentleman aware—the House should be made aware—that the Guide Dogs for the Blind Association has advised that dogs trained by it are covered by public liability insurance and that the cost of repairing any damage so caused would not fall on the blind person? So it seems that the point that he makes has been taken into account.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. When we debate amendment No. 2, I shall make a point about the definition of the term "assistance dog". That definition raises some issues that the hon. Gentleman might not have anticipated in making that intervention. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for drawing my attention to that fact, but of course public liability insurance applies only if there is liability in the first place. That point has been made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Gateshead, East and Washington, West (Joyce Quin), and the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet has referred us to the RNIB briefing, which simply says that such damage would be covered by the common law of tort. I should like to know a little more about that.

Before being elected to the House, I practised as a solicitor for 20 years in the law of tort, and I can envisage something of a minefield. For example, if a case were brought on negligence, the question would be whether the dog owner was negligent. The dog owner may well be able to say, was not negligent", for a variety of reasons. Could such an action be brought in contract? Doing so could be difficult because the contract may not be with the car driver and car owner, but with the minicab company, subcontracting the call to the car driver. So it may be difficult to bring the action in contract.

There is an argument about whether the dog owner would be liable under the Animals Act 1971. Hon. Members have said that the behaviour of guide dogs is always excellent, so it could be strongly argued that that Act may not apply because it normally clicks in when strict liability is involved and the species of animal has a propensity to behave badly. If the normal propensity of the breed or species of guide dog is to behave properly, it may not he strictly liable under the Act. It may come under other provisions, but then there are arguments about whether liability is involved.

Is my hon. Friend aware that taxis in some seaside towns, not least the towns of Scarborough and Whitby, display the terms of carriage, which often state the tine for soiling. Under the new clause, the terms of the contract would have to be made available in braille, and before a booking was made those terms would have to be explained. Does that not provide over-regulation, which I am sure my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow(Mr. Gerrard) does not intend?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He makes an important point, which relates to the distinction I was making between black cabs and minicabs. If a driver picks up a passenger off the street, the contract of hire is immediately between the passenger and the driver, who, as part of the contract, can specify the terms, which could include the need for liquidated damages should this problem arise. The difficulty in this case is that, first, the driver has no say in whether to accept the contract—we are making that clear in the Bill—and, secondly, the contract may not be between the driver and the passenger, and, thus, there is no privity of contract that can be enforced between the driver and the passenger, because the contract may be between the passenger and the minicab company, which subcontracts the hire to the driver. That is the problem that one can reach in contract.

Whether I am right or wrong, these points are arguable at law. I would hate the small claims court to have to adjudicate between a sight-impaired person and a minicab driver. It would be far better to have a very clear statutory term under which, if damage is done, the reasonable cost could be met, whether through the public liability insurance policy to which the hon. Member for Daventry (Mr. Boswell) referred, or by the owner of the dog.

My hon. Friend's argument, as I understand it. hinges on two things. One is compulsion—the minicab driver is compelled to take the dog or the animal—and the other is potential ignorance on the part of the passenger as to the condition of the dog. What I fail to understand—perhaps my hon. Friend will enlighten me—is why he does not envisage a minicab driver being able to say to the owner of the animal about to board his cab under compulsion, "Your dog looks a bit ropey to me, are you sure he is all right to travel?" The passenger, or potential passenger, is therefore made completely aware of the condition of the dog, and everything else will follow. I am not a lawyer, however, so I accept that I probably do not understand these things.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that point. That assumes, however, that the driver can see that the dog is ill. The dog may have an illness that is not immediately apparent to the driver. My point is that a whole series of arguments could end up having to he litigated on in the county court. In practice, however, we could deal with the problem very simply with a new clause along these lines. I fully accept that the new clause is not perfect in its current form, and that can perhaps be corrected in another place. Important issues need to be addressed, however, to make sure that we deal fairly with the obligation that we are imposing on the driver.

I thought that the hon. Member for Brent, North (Mr. Gardiner) was going to make the opposite point. Let us imagine that there is a blind person with a dog, and that a driver who does not really want to take that person pulls up and says, "Sorry guvnor, that dog looks a bit iffy to me, I won't take you," and drives off. If that loophole is put in the Bill under amendment No. 2, what can a blind person do? They cannot report the number of the cab that has just driven off. Does not that make a nonsense of the whole Bill?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. Those arguments come under amendment No. 2, and I shall address that point separately. At the moment, we are not dealing with those circumstances; we are dealing with circumstances in which the dog is in the vehicle and causes damage. That is not the situation pronounced on by my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, North (Mr. Gardiner), in which the dog has not got into the vehicle. We are talking about a situation in which the dog has got into the vehicle and caused damage. On the question of whether the driver can refuse to accept the hire, under the Bill in its current form he could not refuse to take the dog, no matter what was wrong with it.

I cannot allow my hon.—and learned—Friend to get away with that. His own justification for new clause 1 was on the basis of the compulsion on the driver to admit the passenger with the dog. He cannot, therefore, divorce the two elements that he has logically connected.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Of course, these provisions are not necessarily both acceptable in their current form, and I fully accept that those points need to be addressed separately. At the moment, we are dealing with the position in which the dog has caused damage to the vehicle. A separate issue arises in relation to whether a dog could be refused admission to the vehicle for whatever reason, but that is not the point that I am addressing in relation to new clause 1. I have probably exhausted my arguments on new clause 1, unless my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, North is tempted to intervene yet again.

I hesitate to intervene once again, but I think that it is incumbent on my hon. Friend to give the House an exposition. Again, I claim no particular knowledge of the law, especially of the law of tort, but perhaps we should consider the case of Rylands v. Fletcher. As I understand it, that case hinges on the obligation on a person to ensure that anything that comes from their property does not do damage elsewhere. I understand that that has caused many a legal case and much dispute. This is one occasion on which I would welcome listening to the perorations of my hon.—and learned—Friend.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that. As he will no doubt recall, Rylands v. Fletcher concerned the law of nuisance and the release of water. Of course, we are talking about a rather different release of water under this provision from that which applied in Rylands v. Fletcher. That case concerned a piece of land that was flooded by water that came from another piece of land. It is concerned with the principle of a hazard arising on one piece of land or property and affecting another. Cases have been brought in relation to damage by fire and so forth. I do not really think that the law of nuisance applies in the circumstances that we are debating.

I want to move on to amendment No. 6—I shall deal with the amendments in the order in which they appear on the amendment paper. I promise the hon. Member for Northavon (Mr. Webb) that I shall deal with his points in relation to amendment No. 2 when I get to it.

Clause 1(5) indicates that the only grounds for granting a certificate of exemption are medical grounds. That is somewhat restrictive, as there could be other grounds on which it would be perfectly fair to grant an exemption. My amendment would allow a licensing authority to take into account other reasonable—not fanciful—grounds. I shall give the example of someone who has a pathological fear of dogs. When I have been out door knocking and canvassing with my campaign team, one or two of them have been terrified of dogs when we knock on doors. I do not think that that is a medical condition—some may think that it is a natural reaction—but when a dog is barking on the other side of the door, they tend to run away and send me instead. I always take dog biscuits with me when I am out campaigning, just in case. That is a useful tip for all hon. Members.

I would not wish my hon. Friend to fall foul of the electoral law, but does giving biscuits to dogs when canvassing for votes constitute the bribery or treating of voters and their families?

At the risk of trying your patience, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I do not think that giving dog biscuits is treating.

Order. My patience is beginning to be tried. Will the hon. Gentleman return to the amendment in hand?

I give way again.

I cannot quite let the hon. Gentleman get away with the suggestion that a pathological fear of dogs is not a medical condition. If something is pathological, it is medical. If it is not pathological, it is not medical.

The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point. Perhaps I slightly overstated my case.

May I help my hon.—and learned—Friend out? Although the minicab driver may not have a medical condition and be able to obtain an exemption certificate, he may have a standing contract with someone who has an allergy to dogs. Does my hon.—and learned—Friend agree that such a circumstance presents the reasonable ground covered by the amendment?

I will come on to the issue of allergies shortly. I am dealing with the point that some people are frightened of dogs.

One of the weaknesses of my hon. Friend's argument is that unscrupulous taxi drivers may simply decide that they do not want to carry animals. It would be very difficult to prove that they are telling the truth about their pathological fear of dogs. Will my hon. Friend consider that point?

My hon. Friend has a point, and I deal with it in the amendment that considers the evidence that should be considered by the licensing authority. A pathological fear of dogs is an example of the circumstances that might not be covered by the provision in clause 1 for a new section 37A(5) that outlines the grounds on which an exemption might be granted. If someone is genuinely frightened of dogs

That is medical.

That person might not consider himself to be ill, so I am not entirely convinced that it is covered by the provision for medical grounds. The licensing authority should, however, be able to take account of such circumstances.

On amendment No. 6, the hon. Gentleman must convince the House that there are other reasonable grounds by which an exemption could be made by the licensing authority. So far, he has failed to give one example that has not been countered by the arguments of other hon. Members. He must come up with a concrete example before the House can accept the amendment. I ask him to do so.

I stand by my view that a fear of dogs is not a medical condition. The people with whom I canvass would not say that they are ill because they are frightened of dogs. They think it is a natural reaction. I take the point made by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome that people sometimes have a mental illness that creates such a fear, but people can have a genuine fear that does not go that far.

I would not dream of suggesting that my hon. Friend is making a meal of this, let alone a dog's breakfast. However, when people have a phobia, the treatment involves confronting them with the conditions that led to the phobia. Given the charm of guide dogs and hearing dogs, would it not be to the advantage of people with a fear of dogs to have more experience of dealing with them?

My right hon. Friend makes an interesting point. However, the first time that a driver is exposed to a guide dog should not be when he is about to take charge of a moving vehicle. Perhaps the RNIB could help people to overcome their fears through other programmes. However, the provision could create a hazard not only for the driver, the passenger and the dog but for other road users. The driver will be travelling along looking over his shoulder to see whether he will be attacked by what appears to be the placid dog sitting in the back.

I realise that my hon. Friend is trying very hard to justify the amendment. However, I find it difficult to accept that what he describes as a fear of dogs will not simply mean that the driver will refuse to carry dogs because he does not like them. My hon. Friend must establish the fact that such a fear will not be covered by the provision that relates to medical grounds. I suspect that the amendment would create a loophole so that drivers would be able to say, "I have a fear of dogs, but I have not been to the doctor about it." They would say that just because they simply do not like dogs.

My hon. Friend makes an important point. I do not dispute that it is a potential problem. However, it should be left to the discretion of the licensing authority to satisfy itself that there is evidence for a driver's claim that he is afraid of dogs. That point is covered in amendment No. 7, and that answers the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, who asked me what the purpose of the amendment was.

I am afraid that the House is not yet with the hon. Gentleman on this point. I understand his motives, and we are grateful to him for allowing us to debate the point. It has focused our attention on the matter in hand. However, I am concerned that we would place on the licensing authority an obligation that it would find almost impossible to carry out. It would find it impossible reasonably to assess someone's claims that he had a fear of dogs if there were no medical evidence to back them up.

I shall give way to the hon. Member for Castle Point(Bob Spink) and deal with two points at once.

I agree with the mood of the House. I am not convinced that inserting the words "or other reasonable" grounds would be a good move. It would provide an escape clause. We are aware that specific medical conditions such as agoraphobia and arachnophobia, which is the fear of a particular animal, exist. However, if someone had a true phobia of dogs, he would have sought medical help. He would have a medical history, so the fear would be covered by the provision relating to medical grounds. Can the hon. Gentleman not accept that the problem would be dealt with in that way?

I will deal with the point made by the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) when we consider the next amendment. On the other point, some people do not consider themselves to have a medical condition, but they are frightened of dogs.

I do not agree with the thrust of my hon. Friend's argument, but he is right on one point. It is perfectly possible to have a rational fear of dogs. For example, a person might have been bitten more than once or someone close to them might have been attacked. The fear would not constitute a medical condition, but it would he perfectly rational and understandable.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend. He makes succinctly the point that I have tried to make in the past few minutes. That is why a driver should be able to use other reasonable grounds for refusing to carry a dog.

rose

We will have one last round, before I move to my next point. I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Watford (Claire Ward).

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for allowing us to pursue the issue. My hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. McCabe) suggested that, if the driver, a member of his family or one of his friends had been bitten, we should perhaps consider that a reasonable ground for his refusing to carry a dog. However, that argument is not reasonable, because the fact that a member of his family or an acquaintance had been bitten should not allow him to continue his prejudice against dogs. Although my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) thinks that such circumstances justify the amendment, I believe that they merely highlight another weakness in it.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, but I think that she is wrong. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. McCabe). The fact is that people have a fear of dogs, and the question is whether they can satisfy the licensing authority that it is a genuine fear. If they cannot do that, they will not receive the exemption.

To suggest that an exemption can be allowed only on medical grounds boxes the driver in. There may be other reasons, as the hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton said. I cannot come up with another example now. I am focusing on the one that we are discussing because we need to make progress. It is wrong to say that there is only one reason why a licence exemption should be granted. I am concerned that there may be many other reasons that we cannot think of now, which if brought to our attention could properly be considered a fair reason for refusal. It is a matter for the licensing authority in the light of the evidence that is presented to it.

My hon. Friend has referred to the need for drivers or operators to persuade licensing authorities that they have a genuine fear of dogs. Does he realise that that would introduce a real inconsistency from one licensing authority to another? Such inconsistency would allow real loopholes. Unless we have exemptions that are based on medical criteria and which have some element of objectivity, there could be a serious weakness in the implementation of the Bill.

I hear what my hon. Friend says but I do not agree with him. Fear of dogs may be a subjective fear, but it is an objective issue for the licensing authority to determine from case to case. I do not see the issue arising very often. I believe that simply saying that there can be no reason other than a medical one is creating an injustice that we may not even be aware of as we consider the Bill.

The hon. Gentleman said that he cannot think of another reasonable reason, but that there might be one so we should accept the amendment just in case. That is not a persuasive argument for the House. Surely it is a matter of the balance of rights. There is the right of the person who cannot see to travel in the same way as a sighted person can travel versus the right of the person who is driving to avoid the discomfiture that he might suffer from a fear of dogs. We must find that balance. In saying what is reasonable, how do we measure fear? Where do we draw the line? A medical condition is definable and can be justified and argued. By introducing "reasonable", we are giving lawyers work. I think that we should reject the amendment.

The hon. Gentleman makes the valid point that the issue is where the balance lies. That was where I started my speech. Where does the balance lie in ensuring that we do justice between the two parties? I am concerned that we may end up creating an injustice by not allowing slightly more flexibility to the licensing authority.

My hon. Friend has pursued this point with some passion and at some length. I am interested to know his motivation. Is he expressing a concern, having read the Bill in detail, or has he received representations from minicab owners in his constituency or elsewhere, which have led him to pursue this point with passion?

The answer to my hon. Friend's question is simple. I have read the Bill and I perceive injustices and loopholes. We should address them today and give our concerns an airing. I will listen to the promoter, my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), when he replies. He may convince me that I am wrong, or he may say that he sees some merits in some of my points.

I move on to amendment No. 7. The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome asked me why we need it. I have been debating, in responding to various interventions, the question of medical conditions. The starting point is that clause 1(5) reads:

"If the licensing authority is satisfied…on medical grounds",

it should

"issue a certificate of exemption".

Clause 1(6) deals with the issues that should be taken into account in

"determining whether to issue a certificate of exemption".

The issues that should be taken into account all relate to the particular vehicle. They do not relate to the medical condition itself.

I am concerned that the licensing authority is not required to examine the medical condition on the basis of medical evidence. Almost everyone in the Chamber made that point to me during our discussion of amendment No. 6. There would have to be medical evidence to prove that there should be an exemption. However, the Bill does not provide that the driver must provide medical evidence to justify the reasons why he should be exempt. He could merely say, "I have an allergy to dogs" or whatever. The licensing authority would then say, "All right, fair enough." According to the Bill, the driver does not have to produce medical evidence to justify what he is saying.

If the taxi driver refuses to take the person who cannot see and his dog, how could the person who cannot see take down the taxi driver's number?

That is a rather silly intervention. The minicab will have been booked through the mini cab company, which will know the name of the driver who was allocated the job. That intervention is not pertinent to amendment No. 7.

Will my hon. Friend give way?

I shall develop my argument and then give way to my hon. Friend. I am concerned that subsections (5) and (6) do not sit together as well as they should. I am not sure why the physical characteristics of the vehicle, or kind of vehicle, are relevant to the medical condition. Yet there is no requirement to produce medical evidence. It seems that that is a loophole and something that a driver could exploit. He could give the licensing authority a great spiel about why he has a problem with dogs without having to justify that with medical evidence.

Many Members will be aware that my hon. Friend has great expertise in industrial and health and safety law. I return to my earlier intervention about the relationship between the subcontractor and the contractor. I followed my hon. Friend's argument. However, in terms of health and safety provisions at work, what is the liability in the relationship between the subcontractor and the cab hire company? Surely anyone who found himself in medical difficulties because of taking jobs that involved the carrying of a dog on many occasions could take some action against his employer or the person to which he was contracted, namely the minicab hire company.

My hon. Friend's intervention raises complicated areas of law, especially in relation to vicarious liability in terms of the main contractor and the subcontractor. I am sure, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you would not like me to go down that road. However, my hon. Friend has a valid point that needs to be addressed at some stage.

The purpose of health and safety legislation is to ensure that people do not get injured or ill in the first place. However, if they do get ill or injured, there must be compensation arrangements afterwards. In my view, the purpose of health and safety legislation is preventive rather than compensatory.

Is my hon. Friend not stating the obvious with amendment No. 7? What evidence does he have, for example, that the licensing authority does not currently require medical evidence to be provided? Is not the solution to his concern about the licensing authority to ensure that those who sit on the authority carry out a rigorous inspection? Perhaps the House might like to nominate him to sit on the licensing authority, but only if it meets on Friday mornings.

My hon. Friend may be interested to know that I was once a member of the Westminster City Council licensing committee. We had great fun considering the licensing of sex shops, but that is another story.

Perhaps I might answer my hon. Friend by putting his question back to him the other way round. There is nothing in the Bill that provides that the licensing authority should consider medical evidence. It is an open question. Some licensing authorities may say, "We take the driver's word for it." Other authorities may be more rigorous. We return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Gravesham about inconsistencies between the approach adopted by different authorities. If we include in the Bill a requirement that they must take into account medical evidence—they can specify what they want—that would address the issue.

11 am

The amendment deals with allergy to dogs. That is because the RNIB briefing dismisses the point about that being equivalent to carrying a passenger with a heavy perfume to which some people could be allergic. It is a little more complicated than that. We should take into account the possibility that someone has an allergy to dogs, because it is potentially dangerous if a driver is sneezing while driving.

Given the hon. Gentleman's experience of licensing, can he tell me how many cases of exemptions he thinks will be brought about on these grounds?

I have no idea, and I do not think that anybody knows. We know roughly how many minicabs there are and how many guide dogs there are, but we do not know, because the question has never arisen, how many people are allergic to dogs or have other medical reasons why they should not carry them. Nevertheless, it is something for which we should provide. In response to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome, the point of amendment No. 7 is that it would enable a licensing authority to require medical evidence in justification, whether it is a note from a GP or something more serious. At the moment, the Bill does not require that.

I wonder if I can help my hon. Friend as regards the scale of the problem that we are addressing. I am grateful to the RNIB for digging out the relevant Department of Health figures. I understand that approximately 4 per cent. of the adult population have asthma that is so severe as to require regular medical supervision, but of course the number of those whose asthma or other allergy would be triggered by dogs will be much smaller than that. Although I accept that such allergies are not to be sneezed at, there are not huge numbers of people who will be affected by the problem.

The RNIB briefing tells us that there are 150,000 private hire vehicles, and 4 per cent. of that figure represents quite a lot of people. I take my hon. Friend's point that not all of them will have a dog allergy, although some will, and perhaps he can do some arithmetic on that basis. However, a sufficient number of people will be affected to warrant our trying to ensure that their interests are protected.

The amendment does not specify the type of medical evidence that the hon. Gentleman would wish a licensing authority to take account of, so it is superfluous. Clause 1(5) says:

"If the licensing authority is satisfied that it is appropriate on medical grounds".

Given that, does the hon. Gentleman really believe that a licensing authority would not want to see medical evidence?

The simple answer is that we do not know. Some licensing authorities may have a very busy agenda to get through on the day the driver turns up and says that he has the allergy. Those of us who have been in local government know that many matters pass through relatively quickly without the scrutiny that they deserve.

I know that the hon. Gentleman served on Westminster city council, which is known for one or two methods that are not beyond reproach. Surely he would agree, on the basis of his experience and knowledge of local councils, which are for the most part the licensing authorities that we are talking about, that most of them would act in a responsible manner and would in no way wish to grant an exemption certificate that would disadvantage some of their own residents unless they were assured that there was evidence to back up the driver's claim.

The hon. Gentleman makes a fair point. Most licensing authorities would take their responsibilities seriously. However, given that subsection (6) specifies that the authority should take into account the characteristics of the vehicle, it seems peculiar not also to draw attention to the medical evidence that is required. That is putting the cart before the driver.

As for allergy, that can be a serious hazard for a driver, because if they are driving along the road sneezing they may lose control of the vehicle. That is an important factor that the RNIB, somewhat unfairly, discounted.

I am curious about this. If the hon. Gentleman is right that a driver would refuse to take a guide dog because he was worried that he would have an accident if he did so, which law would he have broken? Would he be driving with undue care and attention, or would he be in default of the Bill?

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, but he is not following the point of the amendment. We are dealing with an exemption for a driver who has a medical condition. If a driver were exempted, he would not be put in the position of having to take the dog. The problem is that if he took the dog because he did not have an exemption, what would happen to him then? He would not have broken the law under the Bill because he took the dog, but he could fall foul of the general laws relating to loss of control of the vehicle, careless driving or whatever.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Earlier I raised a point of order to say that 49 Bills are on the Order Paper for consideration today. Yesterday, the Leader of the House said that the Government are backing this Bill and the Commonwealth Bill. Is it in order for such lengthy debate to take place at this stage, preventing us from reaching other worthy Bills? Is there any mechanism whereby we can reach the other Bills, and what chance do we have of getting them through today?

The hon. Lady knows full well how these matters are normally dealt with. As long as hon. Members who are addressing the House are in order, it is not a matter on which the Chair should intervene.

rose

In fairness, I have dealt fully with the point of order.

If the hon. Lady is concerned to ensure that legislation is properly scrutinised, that is exactly what I am doing. As I said, I very much support the Bill, but certain issues need to be addressed.

On amendment No. 8, the certificate of exemption refers to particular vehicles, but does not say that the driver has to be named. It is relatively straightforward, and I hope relatively uncontroversial, that a certificate should say whom it is granted to as well as in relation to which vehicles.

Amendment No. 9 deals with the period of exemption. If an exemption is granted, it should be for a finite period, not indefinitely, and a period of 12 months would be fair in relation to people who have a medical condition that is transient, so that it is appropriate for the exemption to be re-examined from time to time.

Much play was made earlier about amendment No.2, which deals with the behaviour of dogs. I am glad that the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman) said that he is not going to press it, because, apart from the serious grammatical errors, it raises a rather different issue as regards the construction of the Bill.

We have assumed that the assistance dog is properly trained by the RNIB or whoever, and that it is a placid dog that does what it is told and behaves itself. We all know that dogs that are properly trained by a registered charity, such as the RNIB, behave. However, proposed new section 37A(9) does not stipulate that. Proposed new subsection (9)(c)states that an assistance dog is one that has been trained by a prescribed charity to assist someone with epilepsy or other stipulated conditions. The problem is that the definition of assistance dogs in the context of a blind or deaf person does not state that it has to be trained by a prescribed charity.

If the electors of Hendon decide that they have had enough of me, there is no reason why I should not set myself up as a guide dog trainer. I have no qualifications or skills to do that. I could claim that I have a dog that is trained to look after blind people, but it could be a lively dog that jumps around a lot. It could be Scooby Doo.

We have a serious problem to address. If the definition of assistance dog does not say that the dog has to be trained properly by a prescribed charity, there is a serious loophole in the Bill. An assistance dog that has not been properly trained by a prescribed charity could be excitable, agitated or boisterous. In those circumstances, the driver might be in a difficult position.

My hon. Friend mentions a loophole. On amendment No. 2, what would happen if a dog became boisterous or agitated during a journey? If the Scooby Doo dog becomes animated—although Scooby Doo is, of course, already animated—will the driver be able to stop in the middle of the journey and ask the passenger with said dog to leave? How would that affect the original contract?

My hon. Friend makes a valid and important point. Amendment No. 2 deals with the behaviour of a dog before it gets into the vehicle. It does not deal with what happens if a dog becomes agitated after it gets into the vehicle. I suspect that amendment No. 10 addresses that problem, although I accept that it may not be on all fours with my hon. Friend's argument. I would be much happier if the definition of assistance dog in amendments Nos. 2 and 10 applied to a dog that had been trained by a prescribed charity no matter what the disability. If we do not address that serious loophole today, it will have to be sorted out in another place.

The hon. Gentleman's point does not stand up to much analysis. All dogs that are trained for use by a blind or deaf person, or the people covered by proposed new section 37A(9)(c), will have a certificate to show that they have received full training. Should the driver of a private hire vehicle wish to question whether a dog was properly trained and thus came within the parameters of the Bill, he could ask for such a certificate. I should be surprised if the people who own the dogs did not have the certificate with them.

The hon. Gentleman misses the point. He is right to say that proposed new section 37A(9)(c) refers to a dog that has been trained by a prescribed charity. It covers people with, for instance, epilepsy and problems of mobility and manual dexterity. However, proposed new section 37A(9)(a) and (b) do not say that a dog has to be trained by a prescribed charity.

I fully accept that if the dog is trained by the RNIB, RNID or a similar organisation, it may have a certificate of training. I am sure that both the driver and the dog owner would be confident that the dog would not be boisterous and would be properly behaved, which was the point made by the hon. Member for Daventry. The problem is what happens if the dog has not been trained in those circumstances. If no training certificate can be produced, how can the driver be guaranteed that the dog will be well behaved?

My hon. Friend raises an important point and he has proved why it is important to scrutinise the Bill. Proposed new section 37A(9)(a) and (b) could provide an opportunity for an unsuitable person to train a guide dog for a blind or deaf person. However, surely a dog could not be trained to guide a blind person if it was boisterous by nature.

The problem is that that becomes a matter for the lawyers in relation to what is meant by "trained" and "guide". If there is a certificate to say that a dog has been trained by a registered charity, that would be conclusive. However, there is no provision for that. I think it is a drafting error that could be corrected in another place. I am sure that when my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow responds, he will tell us whether there are organisations that are not registered charities that do such work.

However, there is a loophole. As I said, there is no reason in principle why I should not set myself up as a dog trainer, although bearing in mind my experiences with Griswald it is clear that I would not be very good at it. She seemed to be trying to train me rather than the other way around, which is the problem with many pet dogs.

The hon. Gentleman says he thinks he has found a loophole, which he describes as a drafting error. Does he really think that lots of people are queueing up to pass off their dogs as guide dogs and dogs for the deaf? Does he have any evidence to back up that claim?

There is no reason for people to do that at the moment. However, we are talking about imposing an obligation on someone who is outside the guide dog loop. It is fine if someone who does not represent a registered charity agrees to train a dog and the deaf or blind person is happy with the dog, but we are proposing to impose an obligation on someone else who has to take it for granted that the guide dog is what it purports to be.

There are rules about allowing guide dogs into restaurants. I suspect we could he opening a can of worms for restaurants as well—if I can put it that way—if we go down the route of not specifying what we mean by a guide dog. The hon. Gentleman may well be right; perhaps it is belt and braces.

We are in the realms of the absurd. Is the hon. Gentleman seriously suggesting that we issue licences for the dog to show that it has been trained? That would be a dog licence in reverse because it would be attached to the dog rather than the owner. Who would issue that licence? Would we require an inspection department to check that the standards were being upheld? Would he call that department Ofdog or Ofwoof? Perhaps the hon. Gentleman could move on and let us make some progress.

Order. We are now straying far from the point.

I am pleased that you are getting into the spirit of the morning, Mr. Deputy Speaker. The intervention of the hon. Member for Castle Point (Bob Spink) was rather silly. The answer is simple: if the Bill stipulated that the dog had been trained by a prescribed charity, the problem would disappear. Both parties could thus have confidence, and the law would be confident that a proper arrangement was in place for the dog. I am not sure of the precise arrangements for a dog that the RNIB trains and whether it has a certificate, docket—or dogget—to prove it. If so, there would be a clear presumption that the dog was properly trained.

I want to revert to the serious point about the definition of an assistance dog. Let us consider dogs who are being trained but who are not yet fully trained to be guide dogs for the blind or for the deaf. The dog obviously needs to be exposed to circumstances that it will encounter later. It needs to be able to guide a person with a disability into a minicab or taxi or on to public transport. The definition in the Bill does not cover dogs that are being trained. Does my hon. Friend believe that we should consider that?

My hon. Friend makes an important point. I assume that part of a dog's training is in getting in and out vehicles, and that the driver will be part of the training set-up, and will therefore know the propensities of dogs that are being trained.

There are serious training problems. I shall not go into the matter in detail, but the Bill does not even define "dog".

Order. I believe that hon. Members know what a dog is.

When we considered hunting with dogs, the definition caused problems.

Amendment No. 10 does not go as far as amendment No. 2, but I believe that it should be accepted. The RNIB brief states that a properly trained assistance dog is required to sit on the floor between the owner's legs or lie down in the well of a cab. However, what happens if the dog is too big for the vehicle or if the person in charge of the dog refuses to make it sit on the floor? A dog can make a terrible mess by sitting on a car seat, especially if it is moulting. It is fair for the driver to be able to insist that the dog sits on the floor. That is also good practice.

The problem with amendment No. 10 is that it fails to deal with small private hire vehicles. A dog's inability to sit on the floor may be no fault of the owner, and may have nothing to do with the dog's size or its behaviour.

The amendment is trying to deal with that. The hon. Gentleman should consider it with proposed new section 37A(6), which refers to

"the physical characteristics of the private vehicle"

that could be a ground for exemption.

Amendment No. 10 refers to the dog being

"so large as not to be able to sit comfortably on the floor of the vehicle".

How can one ascertain whether the dog is comfortable?

A dog that is uncomfortable in a vehicle lets it be known pretty quickly. It will not stay put. We must also consider the animal welfare issues. If a dog is uncomfortable, it is not right to force it to go into the vehicle.

Who will determine whether the dog is comfortable: the person who is being guided or the driver?

The dog—although my hon. Friend has a point.

Perhaps proposed new section 37A(6), which deals with the physical characteristics of the vehicle, covers paragraph (a) in amendment No. 10. An exemption could perhaps be made under it if the vehicle were too small to take a dog. However, it does not cover paragraph (b), which relates to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Scarborough and Whitby made when he asked what would happen if a dog that initially sat on the floor tried to get on to the seat or started to jump about. Paragraph (b) would deal with a dog that started to misbehave during a journey because it would allow the driver to stop and require the dog to leave the vehicle.

I am reliably informed that few vehicles that are used as minicabs are not sufficiently large to take an alsatian, which is the largest assistance dog. Surely that practical point does not need to detain us for too long.

I agree, and I hope that the point will not detain us. My speech has been longer than I intended because I have taken a lot of interventions. The debate has been important because we have aired the issues well.

I appreciate that my hon. Friend is desperate to move on, but I want to consider his previous point. He said that amendment No. 10 would give the driver the power to stop the vehicle and order the blind person and the dog out. Does he seriously mean that he is prepared to table an amendment to a Bill that aims to protect blind and disabled people, to allow a driver to stop in the middle of nowhere and order the dog and the blind or disabled person out because the dog is irritating the driver? Is he seriously proposing that?

As my hon. Friend says, the Bill is about the "carriage of disabled persons", but the long title also refers to "carriage" of "guide dogs". We must therefore consider the animal welfare issues that affect the dog as well as protecting the disabled person who is being guided. As I said, perhaps proposed new section 37A(6) deals with the problem of the dog being uncomfortable in the vehicle, but the Bill does not cover paragraph (b) of amendment No. 10 and the problem of the dog refusing to sit or stay on the floor.

There are serious road safety considerations to be taken into account. The driver is responsible at all times for controlling the vehicle. The dog could jump about, try to get into the passenger's lap, or look out of the window. I admit that my dog used to do that. That could cause a serious problem for vehicle control. If the vehicle had an accident, the person who was hit would sue the driver. Would the driver have a claim against the owner for not controlling the dog? That takes us back to tort, which we discussed at the beginning of my contribution.

Everybody understands that a driver has a responsibility to his passenger and other road users for the safety of his vehicle and his conduct on the high road. None the less, a less nuclear approach might be to provide that the driver must stop the vehicle until the animal has been brought under control. As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. McCabe) said, it may be too much to evict the passenger and the animal from the vehicle.

In passing, I congratulate my hon. Friend on speaking for more than an hour and eight minutes, which was the record for a Friday morning.

My hon. Friend makes a tempting point and there is some merit in his argument. The point may well be one that is addressed in the other place. It is a question of doing justice and striking a balance between the passenger and the dog, the minicab operator and other road users. A slight difficulty arises—especially if the minicab driver is working to a schedule—of how to deal with a dog that cannot be brought under control. As always, my hon. Friend has come up with a sensible compromise in respect of the points that I am making. It is a shame that he did not table his own amendment to that effect, as we could then have explored that possibility.

In my amendments, I have tried to draw attention to one or two drafting problems in the Bill, and I am interested in hearing the response of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow. If, as I hope, the Bill proceeds to the other place, some of the points I have made might receive further consideration, although I hope that my hon. Friend and the Minister will be able to respond to them today.

So far, the debate has been fascinating. The group of amendments was introduced succinctly by my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman), and has been spoken to by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) at rather greater length—and, to be fair, in greater detail and with a lawyer's perceptiveness. It is also fair to say that the hon. Gentleman has triggered a clutch of questions and counterpoints, which is the proper role of the House of Commons. We sometimes hope that such matters might be dealt with more expeditiously in Committee, but we all agree on the importance of their being properly resolved before a Bill passes to the other place.

I did not have the good fortune to be appointed to the Standing Committee on the Bill, otherwise I would have made my points there.

As one who was a member of the Committee, I can say that it was the Committee's loss that the hon. Gentleman was not able to participate in our deliberations.

Conscious of the time. I should like to say on behalf of the Opposition that although the debate has been wide ranging, we should have some regard to the generality of the issues involved. I do not often quote my own remarks, but I shall do so briefly. In the Standing Committee, in response to comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for East Devon (Mr. Swire), I said:

"The legislation will allow us to prevent people from using the excuse of some theoretical inconvenience when there is no problem at all." —[Official Report, Standing Committee C, 12 June 2002: c. 12.]

That remains my strong view, and I know that it is shared by the Bill's promoter, who responded to my remark.

As all hon. Members have said, we want the Bill to succeed. As the right hon. Member for Coatbridge and Chryston (Mr. Clarke) remarked, it is all of a piece with the development of law from the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 through subsequent amending legislation. It would remove or repair an omission by including private hire vehicles in the provisions, along with public carriage vehicles.

A huge complex of law and practice is building up in the field of disability discrimination, dealing with the sensitive handling of guide dogs and other assistance dogs as well as the strict letter of the law, and nearly all of it seems to work perfectly well. This morning, only one reference has been made to the admission of guide dogs and assistance dogs to public restaurants; as far as I know, when that has happened, no major concerns of public health, order or nuisance have arisen. I see no reason why the provisions of the Bill should give rise to exceptions.

I believe that I am right in saying that under the existing law covering black cabs, only three drivers have required exemption. That is entirely proper and it reflects the scale of the problem that might be encountered if the Bill is passed. The problem will not be large, although I agree with the hon. Member for Hendon that that in no way absolves the House from the obligation to get the provision right.

I listened with great interest to my hon. Friend the Member for Chipping Barnet, whose introduction of the amendments was somewhat qualified, and to the extensive discussion of the whole group of amendments led by the hon. Member for Hendon. After listening to the latter building up his argument, the nearest analogy I could think of was a famous story of an Australian outback farmer in the 1920s. He ordered a new Rolls-Royce—no doubt, he farmed on a fairly large scale—and the company was intrigued by his special emphasis on having a glass partition; it was the main selling proposition. When asked delicately why the partition was so important, he is reputed to have replied, "Because it stops the sheep licking the back of my neck when I'm driving." With the greatest respect to the hon. Gentleman. I felt that the debate was starting to stray into that sort of territory. Of course there will be hard cases, but he is a lawyer, unlike me, so he knows that hard cases make had law. We have to think about them, but we also have to deal with them and get past them.

Broadly speaking, the exchanges, all of which were quite proper, struck a fair balance. As my hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point (Bob Spink) said. we are in the business of seeking a balance. He questioned whether, under amendment No. 8, it would be possible to put qualifications on the exemption certificate. When I revisited the provision, it looked to me as though we had a prescription for either the vehicle or the driver to be exempted, and I thought that that would probably cover all possible cases. No doubt the Bill's promoter, the hon. Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard), will be able to explain that point.

The subject with which the Bill deals invites a jocular attitude, and that has been the mood in the Chamber today, but a serious point has been made that whereas guide dogs normally behave in an exemplary manner, are trained to do so and can be proved to have been trained to do so, a bigger concern for cabbies and operators of private hire vehicles is the behaviour of the human cargo and the various things that can go wrong. I suspect that the many hon. Members who are avid readers of The Economist noticed the story in the American section last week about the United States hot dog eating competition. It was won—by a considerable margin—by a Japanese gentleman, who was, in the words of the newspaper, able only narrowly to avoid a "Roman incident".

I shall not dwell on that subject at length, but I am reminded of one of my modest attainments in Parliament. It is no great confession, but in the Jubilee Room some years ago I won the national biscuit dunking competition. I hasten to add, lest there be any question of interest, that I did it for charity and the only prize was the award of a golden biscuit. The runner-up. my hon. Friend the Member for Ribble Valley (Mr. Evans), was greatly distressed and was heard to say under his breath, "I'd like a blood test, please." On the whole, that was rather odd given that neither of us is a member of the union Amicus. Let me conclude that point by mentioning the fact that after my triumph. I was invited to comment in a television interview and in the best style of "Match of the Day" described myself as feeling as sick as a parrot.

People can be sick in taxis, as can dogs. What we must not do is use the pretext of an extremely rare occurrence to scupper, dilute or destroy this excellent measure. To the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) I say that I regard the Bill as a parallel to that other legislative brick that we laid this year, the Copyright (Visually Impaired Persons) Bill. I very much hope that the Bill before us today will succeed as well.

I want to touch on the case for any amendments of comfort along the lines of those proposed by the hon. Member for Hendon. We want to carry the minicab trade with us and meet its reasonable concerns, ensuring that people are not treated unfairly when they comply with the law. I believe that the Bill does that. Legislation prescribes that something should happen, and we should not need further legislation to absolve people who have found an excuse for it not to happen. As my hon. Friend the Member for Castle Point said, it is a matter of striking the right balance. Having listened carefully to the debate, I judge that we have got the balance about right.

There is a powerful business case for this, too. If cab drivers can be shown to be friendly and welcoming to people with assistance dogs, that is good business. There may be cases in which that cannot happen, and that is what the legislation is trying to pick up on, but to remove oneself from a significant section of the market, with perhaps 2 million visually impaired people in this country and a large number who may require assistance, though not all from dogs, would be a foolish business decision.

The hon. Member for Daventry (Mr. Boswell) has, as usual, made a thoughtful and intelligent contribution to our debate. His last point applies to regulation in general. Many people see regulation as damaging to business, but often it can promote business, creating a market and encouraging people to get involved. The hon. Gentleman was right to say that there is a business case, although that may not be the main point. The overriding case for the Bill is the need to end the discrimination that blind, deaf and other disabled people have experienced.

The hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) did the House a great service by bringing out some of the key underlying issues that faced those who drafted the Bill. It is worth pointing out, though, that the dogs in question are all exceptionally well trained. We have missed that point up to now. My partner's family have a dog called Sweep who was rejected as a guide dog because he was not up to the mark. He had been chosen as a puppy and had gone through the initial training, but had been unable to control himself—he had been too "boisterous", to use the word in amendment No. 2.

11.45 am

I want to draw the attention of the House to Canine Partners for Independence. Hon. Members are probably aware of Guide Dogs for the Blind and of the increasing number of dogs being used to assist people with hearing impairments, but they may not know of the CPI, which is a small but growing charity that shows how dogs can help people with disabilities in amazing ways: they can do shopping, load dirty washing into machines, open doors and call for lifts.

I want to focus on dogs calling for lifts. Dogs are trained to do that, which may go some way towards answering the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), who questioned the intentions underlying amendment No. 2. It might be possible for the operator to know whether the dog is in an excitable state when the lift is called for. To be serious, however, I would imagine that the operator receiving the call would have been trained to understand and accept such calls.

What exactly happens when a dog calls for a lift? I find that quite amazing.

I would love to be able to explain that in detail, but to save time I refer the hon. Gentleman to the website of Canine Partners for Independence. It may be that the hon. Member for Hendon will be able to elucidate further.

When the hon. Gentleman speaks of dogs calling for a lift, does he mean an elevator or a vehicle?

I was referring to a vehicle, but I am sure that dogs could call for an elevator as well.

I want to take the House through some of the processes that the CPI uses to train dogs. First, there is a selection at the puppy stage. Only puppies that show an aptitude for the tasks are chosen. The chosen puppies are placed with families that bring them up in a certain way for the first 12 months. Then, the one-year-old dog gets six months of advanced training in a training centre. That is a huge investment, and shows how seriously the CPI takes the job of training.

Afterwards, the disabled person and the dog are matched in a very careful and sensitive way. There is a two-week residential training course during which they get to know each other and learn the various commands, followed by a graduation ceremony if the dog is successful. Even after graduation, there is follow-up care and supervision. All that training has not been mentioned in the debate so far.

All of that underlines the most worrying aspects of new clause 1 and amendment No. 2.

The hon. Gentleman is making a constructive contribution, and setting the debate in the right context. Dogs for the Disabled is located just inside my constituency, near Banbury, so I can echo the experience that he has just outlined.

I am grateful for that. I do not know the dogs myself, but my constituent Pauline Hamblin works for the CPI and brought its good works to my attention. She was a great help in preparing for this debate.

The new clause and the amendments are not necessary. We should bear in mind the fact that the dogs are exceptionally well trained. The Bill should go onto the statute book as it stands.

Had the right hon. Member for East Yorkshire (Mr. Knight) been here, he would have been a little surprised at the slightly surreal contribution of the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Sir Sydney Chapman), who moved new clause 1 and proceeded to speak against it forcefully. I am in danger of doing the opposite—of opposing the new clause but speaking for it.

You will recall, Mr. Deputy Speaker, a story to which the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet referred. During a debate on education, I was an illustrious member of the Whips Office, sitting where the Government Whip is sitting now. The dog belonging to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett) unfortunately misbehaved by doing one of the things to which new clause I refers. At one point, it was suggested that we adjourn the House for a moment so that a clean-up might be effected; indeed, I believe that you were in the Chair at the time. However, in the end it was I who crawled along the floor with a cloth and performed the clean-up.

There was a sequel to that. Shortly afterwards, in September, I went on a parliamentary trip to the United States. The senator who introduced the British parliamentarians and said a little about their backgrounds eventually got to me. He looked down at his notes and said, "Mr. Jamieson, you're the guy who cleaned up the dog puke." So my claim to fame in this House is that I was the guy who cleaned up after my right hon. Friend's dog. One reason to smile on that occasion was that the dog threw up just as the hon. Member for Havant (Mr. Willetts) got to his feet to make his speech.

However, there is a serious point here. It is important that other people respect dogs that are kept for that purpose, and do not feed them without the knowledge of their owner. Indeed, that was the problem that gave rise to the incident to which I referred.

There is a further important and serious point that needs to be made. As a former Whip, the Minister will be aware that colleagues consider a Whip's job as involving all sorts of nasty things. He has just demonstrated that the reality of the Whip's job is to crawl around on the ground doing strange things. Is that not the truth of the job that he used to do, and which I now do?

The hon. Gentleman is perhaps reflecting his own role, rather than the one that I had. [Laughter.]

The Government believe that new clause 1 is unnecessary and we will not support it. It adds nothing to the general law of tort—a point on which there has been an interesting debate today. If a person or an animal over which he has control causes damage, a tort arises and the owner of the damaged property can sue for the cost of repairing or replacing it. That applies equally to a disabled person with an assistance dog and to someone with a pet dog.

Does the Minister agree that new clause 1 is not only unnecessary but could also prove dangerous? I know that he, like other hon. Members, has visited Gravesham. He will have seen that the cabs in that town are in pristine condition, but that is not always the case throughout the country. Perhaps some unscrupulous cab owners might use the new clause to get such passengers to pay for a clean-up that in reality had nothing to do with their dog. Indeed, such passengers would he unable to ascertain the truth of the situation.

My hon. Friend makes a good point, and it is a further reason to oppose the new clause.

The right hon. Member for East Yorkshire—in whose name new clause 1 has been tabled—may have thought that, by imposing an obligation on the driver of such a vehicle to carry a dog, the Bill will remove the driver's normal private law rights to sue for damage caused by passengers and their animals. However, we believe that the general law covering such circumstances does not remove such rights. I should also point out that new clause 1 is flawed, in that it does not state to whom the payment should be made, or by whom it would be recoverable.

Am I right in thinking that the driver's public law obligations in relation to the safety of his vehicle, for example, are not removed, and that if there is ever any doubt as to whether he should carry on driving, he would be fully within his rights to stop? Is not the provision concerned solely with discrimination, in terms of admitting a guide dog to a vehicle?

Yes, drivers are always responsible for conducting their vehicles safely and properly.

My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) made a brief and succinct contribution on amendment No. 2. In our view, the Bill already offers sufficient protection for drivers. It does not force drivers to carry dogs in circumstances in which they would normally refuse. For example, as was pointed out, they are not obliged to take a drunk or disorderly person, with or without a dog. Equally, they can refuse to take an unruly assistance dog. Refusing to take an unruly dog is not the same thing as refusing to take a fare. Because the passenger in question would be accompanied by an assistance dog, no offence would be committed in such circumstances.

If the Bill succeeds—it is my earnest hope that it should—we intend to issue full guidance to private hire operators and drivers, as well as disabled users, just as we have done in respect of taxis. The guidance will cover all the issues raised, and we believe that that will be more than sufficient to reassure people. In any event, I think it highly unlikely that the circumstances envisaged in the amendment will arise. No similar provision for taxis is made in section 37 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, so the amendment would create an imbalance in legislation. Of course, it may be felt that that is not good enough, and that we should look at the provisions afresh. In support of our position, I should point out that since April last year—when the provisions in section 37 began to apply to taxis—we are unaware of any cases of problems arising through the behaviour of assistance dogs.

The Minister said that the Government will issue guidelines to the industry and to other affected parties, but in his list he did not mention licensing authorities. Can he reassure the House that guidelines will be issued to licensing authorities, because that would deal with some of the points that the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) rightly raised?

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that all parties involved, including licensing authorities, will be issued guidelines.

As has been pointed out, the dogs in question are highly trained animals. It is therefore unsurprising that we intend that the provision cover only dogs trained by recognised bodies that are to be prescribed in regulations. It is therefore highly unlikely that they would behave in such a manner. If they did, they would be of little assistance to their owners.

I hope that I have given the House an explanation of why the Government believe that the new clause is unnecessary.

I hear what my hon. Friend says, but that is not in the Bill. It refers to prescribed charities in certain circumstances, but does not mention assistance dogs for the deaf or blind. That is a genuine drafting problem. If what my hon. Friend says is correct, so be it, but that does not appear in the Bill, except in connection with assistance dogs for people with other disabilities.

My hon. Friend has made his point, as indeed he did in his previous contribution. Notwithstanding that, we hope that the hon. Member for Chipping Barnet will seek the leave of the House to withdraw the motion.

This has been an interesting debate, and I shall try not to repeat what has already been covered by the speeches from both Front Bench spokesmen, because they have already dealt with some of the points that came up. Sometimes during the debate it has felt as if we were discussing something totally new that had never been thought of before, and that none of the potential problems had ever been considered. On the contrary, since the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 was passed we have had legislation imposing exactly the same obligations on the licensed cab trade as are proposed in the Bill. A great many local authorities already include the provisions in the Bill in their licensing requirements for private hire vehicles, and require drivers to take guide dogs.

The problem is not that that does not happen, but that it does not happen everywhere. There is inconsistency between one local authority area and another, so that people with assistance dogs, especially when they are travelling away from home, cannot be confident that they will be able to use private hire vehicles. The problem is the lack of consistency across the country.

The attempts that we have heard to construct convoluted scenarios for the problems that guide dogs might cause ignore the fact that we already have experience, and we are not dealing with something completely new. We may be spending too much time trying to find all the extreme examples of things that might go wrong with the Bill, when the fundamental issue is really very simple: rights of access for people with disabilities.

Does my hon. Friend agree that our hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) perfectly illustrated the fact that the only way one can tell whether a minicab driver has run over a assistance dog or a lawyer is that there would he skid marks in front of the assistance dog?

It would be dangerous for me to go down that road now, because I do not wish to upset the lawyers, especially while we are still debating the new clause and the amendments.

I want to address some of the issues related to new clause 1 and amendment No. 2 concerning damage, and dogs being excitable. A lot of them have already been covered: the legal advice that I have been given makes it clear that there is nothing to prevent someone from suing now, and the Minister agrees. Again, we have the benefit of the experience of the licensing authorities that already make that requirement. In the very unlikely event of a guide dog causing damage, there is nothing to stop people suing now, so it is unnecessary to add the provisions to the Bill.

Clearly it is important that excitable dogs should not make cars dangerous to drive, but as several hon. Members have already explained, the very nature of assistance dogs makes that scenario highly unlikely. We should also remember that private hire vehicle drivers are used to dealing with difficult situations and customers. Unfortunately for them, that is part of the business.

It is important to remember what the Bill actually says. There have been several references to the idea that a passenger would have the right to insist on being taken.

That is not strictly accurate, because clause 1 says that it will be an offence for the operator or the driver to refuse a booking for the sole reason that the person is accompanied by an assistance dog. That does not mean that someone with an assistance dog is in a privileged position compared with any other person trying to make a booking. The Bill simply brings parity.

There is nothing to say that a private hire vehicle driver has to accept every booking offered. If a driver is offered a booking to the airport and he does not want to drive all the way across London to Heathrow, he can say no. The Bill will simply stop discrimination. The driver and the operator will not be able to say, "I'm not going to take you because you've got your assistance dog with you." If, in the very unlikely circumstance that the driver turned up for a booking and the dog was unruly or the passenger drunk or abusive, there would not be the slightest problem if the driver refused to take them for that reason. It is an offence only if he refuses to take them because the dog is an assistance dog.

The definition of an assistance dog is the same as in section 37 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. It works for black cabs, and I see no reason why it should not work for private hire vehicles. The very detailed guidance issued by the Department to drivers, people with disabilities and the local authorities, which are the licensing authorities, covers the definitions clearly.

It would be a mistake to look for additional reasons for exemption. A number of issues were raised in relation to exemptions, such as phobias and medical grounds. The guidance issued under section 37 of the 1995 Act to licensing authorities for black cabs specifically refers to drivers having severe asthma aggravated by contact with dogs, allergies or acute phobias. Those are given in the guidance as the sort of reasons that would allow a driver to apply for exemption. The guidance also makes it clear that the driver would be expected to produce to the licensing authority the medical evidence required for such an exemption.

People have asked what is the point of the provision on having regard to the physical characteristics of the private hire vehicle in proposed section 37A(6). This relates to the driver's medical condition. As with black cabs, if a driver claims that he cannot have a dog in his cab because he is allergic, questions about the physical characteristics of the vehicle become relevant when considering whether a medical exemption should be granted. Is there a partition between the passengers and the driver, for example? Do the physical characteristics of the vehicle have a bearing on the medical condition that is being claimed?

We should get the scale of the exemption into perspective. I believe that so far three exemptions have been granted to drivers of black cabs. This will not be a huge problem—vast numbers of people will not suddenly require exemptions. We should recognise the scale of the problem and approach it with common sense. It affects about 5,000 to 6,000 people who own guide dogs—they are the people who suffer problems, not the drivers. However, there are about 150,000 drivers, and the average driver will never have to deal with this situation, or only extremely rarely.

I suspect that anyone who uses private hire vehicles, as I quite frequently do in my constituency, will soon realise which firms are reliable and which give a good service and they will use them. People who own assistance dogs will quickly learn where to go, and a pattern will emerge. I am sure that this already happens in areas that have licensing arrangements. Drivers who are happy to take assistance dogs will become known to customers and will frequently take them, while others will hardly notice any difference.

Some of the amendments are unnecessary, as they cover points that are already dealt with in the Bill; for example, the ability of a driver or operator to sue for damage if necessary, or to refuse carriage provided that the reason for refusal is not simply the assistance dog—he can certainly refuse to take an abusive or unruly passenger whether or not they are using an assistance dog.

Some of the points raised about exemptions and definitions may not be included in the Bill, but they are already in practice under section 37 of the Disability Discrimination Act and provisions for black cabs. We are familiar with them. We do not want to introduce inconsistency; what works for black cabs should work perfectly well for private hire vehicles and it makes sense to amend the Act in the form currently taken by the Bill to achieve that consistency for different classes of vehicle, rather than to make that aspect more complex. We should not look for problems that do not exist.

I have listened with interest and at length to the debate. It is good that we have held the debate because it has brought out certain problems that might be faced. However, I am entirely persuaded by the hon. Gentleman and the eloquence on both sides of the House, not least from the Front-Bench speakers, so I shall withdraw the new clause. I understand that if that is accepted by the House, amendment No. 2 will fall so I shall be in the happy position of knowing that a dropped apostrophe and a split infinitive are no longer in danger of getting on to our statute book.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment No. 3, in page 2, line 47, at end insert—

'(2) In Schedule 8 to the 1995 Act (modification of Act in its application to Northern Ireland) the following paragraph is inserted after paragraph 21—

"21A (1) In section 37A(5) and (6) for 'licensing authority' substitute 'Department of the Environment'.

(2) In section 37A(9) for the definitions of 'driver', 'licensing authority', 'operator' and 'private hire vehicle' substitute

"`driver"' means a person who holds a taxi driver's licence under Article 79A of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981(SI 1981/154(NI I);

"operator" means a person who in the course of a business makes provision for the invitation or acceptance of bookings for a private hire vehicle;

"private hire vehicle" means a vehicle which

seats not more than 8 passengers in addition to the driver; and

is licensed under Article 61 of the Road Traffic (Northern Ireland) Order 1981 to carry passengers for hire (but not to stand or ply for hire).'.".'

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 1, in clause 2, page 3, line 19, after "(2AB)", insert—

'Regulations under subsection (2AA) above may provide for the creation of offences and for making offenders liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale. (2AC)'.

The amendments are straightforward but important. As originally drafted, the Bill did not apply to Northern Ireland and Scotland because of their devolved powers. However, it is of some importance that we try to extend the provisions across the whole United Kingdom.

The Northern Ireland Assembly could have dealt with this matter but it would have taken some time. In fact, a couple of weeks ago, the Assembly unanimously agreed to urge us to amend the Bill so that its provisions would extend to Northern Ireland. That is the purpose of amendment No. 3. The Northern Ireland Department of the Environment will make detailed regulations for Northern Ireland so that there are parallels between licensed taxis and private hire vehicles.

Amendment No. 1 deals with Scotland and will correct a drafting error made in Committee when a clause was inserted to extend the Bill's provisions to Scotland but, unfortunately, omitted anything that made it an offence in Scotland not to comply with the provisions. We thus had the rather odd situation whereby a Bill applied to Scotland but if people chose not to obey it nothing would have happened. Amendment No. 1 puts that straight and ensures that, as well as the Bill applying to Scotland, there is also an offence for not complying with its provisions.

I hope that the House will support the amendments, which will give us consistency throughout the whole UK.

My hon. Friend has spoken to the amendments very effectively.

Amendment No. 1 is necessary to ensure that Scotland has parity with England and Wales in enforcing the provisions of the Bill. The Bill, which now extends to Scotland, amends the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and places a duty on drivers of private hire cars to take guide dogs and other assistance dogs and not to make a charge for doing so.

Enforcement measures are an integral part of the process and, as the Bill is drafted, there is now some doubt about the ability of Scottish local authorities and police to enforce its provisions. They felt that the Bill needed to be corrected and express provision made for this purpose; to do otherwise would render the Bill impotent in Scotland.

The amendment replicates the current offence relating to the duty placed on taxi drivers in Scotland, the penalty for which, on summary conviction, is a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

The Bill has been extended to Scotland and I am pleased to say that amendment No. 3 has been tabled to ensure that it extends to Northern Ireland as well. I am certain that all of us in the House would agree that disabled people who rely on assistance dogs in any part of the United Kingdom should enjoy the same rights as everyone else when they travel by private hire vehicle, and the Bill will now secure those rights.

At this point it may be appropriate for me to state, on behalf of the Government, the position of the Bill with regard to the European convention on human rights. It is the view of the Government that the provisions of the Private Hire Vehicles (Carriage of Guide Dogs etc.) Bill are compatible with the European convention on human rights.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 1, in page 3, line 19, after "(2AB)", insert—

'Regulations under subsection (2AA) above may provide for the creation of offences and for making offenders liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding level 3 on the standard scale.

(2AC)'.

—[Mr. Jamieson.]