With permission, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a statement on yesterday's events in Manchester.

I know that the House would want to reiterate the words of the Prime Minister in expressing great sadness, regret and outrage at yesterday's tragic events in Greater Manchester, which resulted in the death of Detective Constable Stephen Oake and the injury of four other police officers. Our deepest condolences go to Detective Oake's family; our thoughts must be with them and the injured and their families at this time.

Yesterday, I used my powers under the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to certify the detention, pending deportation, of two foreign nationals who are suspected of involvement in terrorism and of posing a threat to national security. The Greater Manchester police were acting with immigration officers in support of the operation to detain one of those individuals. Police in Manchester detained three men in total. The second national certified by me has now been detained in London. In total, 15 people have so far been detained under the provisions of the Act.

Greater Manchester police have activated their major incident procedures and are conducting a murder inquiry. I shall, of course, report further to the House when I am in a position to do so.

On 7 November, I outlined in a written statement the scale and nature of the threat that we face from international terrorists. In the past few months, my right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary and I have made it clear that that threat is a continuing and dangerous one. I know that the whole House supports the efforts of the police and the security services to detect and prevent terrorist incidents. Parliament has provided the authorities with extra powers through the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Antiterrorism, Crime and Security Act, and I regularly discuss with the security services and the police how those powers are being used and whether they are being used effectively.

Yesterday's events highlighted the ongoing threat that we face. In combating that threat, we rely on the bravery and commitment of police officers and security services in defending us against dangerous criminals and those who threaten the very safety of our country. I commend their bravery to the House.

As my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition made clear, we all share the Home Secretary's admiration for the efforts of police officers involved in protecting our lives against terrorism. Our condolences go to the bereaved and our thoughts are with those officers who have been wounded.

It is far too early to make comments or ask detailed questions about the operation, which clearly went badly wrong in some respects. I am sure that in due course the Home Secretary will give the House some information on the way in which the operation was conducted, on what can be done better to protect police officers under such circumstances, and on whether it is appropriate, in such circumstances, for them to be armed. However, this episode also draws our attention to wider questions.

For many months, I have been attempting to alert the Home Secretary and the Government as a whole—and the country as a whole—to the fact that although the Government very clearly have the protection of citizens at heart, and although they do have some machinery to achieve that effect, there are worrying signs that there is not yet the level of urgency that is needed to match the level of threat that the Government rightly acknowledge. The recent entry into Sizewell B power station by some protesters was a worrying sign; signs from the civil defence community that the level of preparedness on the ground is not all that it might be are also worrying.

I hope that the Home Secretary will tell us today that he will redouble his efforts to increase co-ordination to match the level of threat; but, beyond that, as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition pointed out in Prime Minister's questions a moment ago, this episode raises the question of whether our current chaotic system of asylum arrangements, of which the Home Secretary is very well aware and which he has attempted in one way and another to mend, notwithstanding the fact that his predecessor left them in probably the worst state of any country in the civilised world—

The right hon. Gentleman should not say things like that.

The right hon. Gentleman says that I should not say things like that, but they happen to be true, and have been known to be true. They have been known by the current Home Secretary to be true, which is why he has been trying to put them right. However, I regret to say that there is ample evidence that, at present, people are getting through the asylum system who do not have the best interests of this country at heart, and who intend to pursue terrorist activities. What will the Home Secretary do over the coming weeks and months urgently to intensify the security vetting of those who seek to enter this country? That is clearly the question that the House needs to ask, and it is clearly the question that the Home Secretary needs to answer.

I am deeply sorry that the right hon. Gentleman has chosen to attack the record and actions of my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary—[HON. MEMBERS: "Why"?] He inherited a system that was on the verge of breakdown. I, at another time—[Interruption.]

Order. Opposition Front Benchers have asked the Home Secretary several questions, so it is only courteous to listen to what the Home Secretary has to say.

At another time and in a more appropriate setting I shall be happy to explain why we had to put in place a new computerised fingerprinting operation, why we had to restore a system following the collapse of the computer that had been ordered in 1996 and why my right hon. Friend the Member for Blackburn (Mr. Straw) had to take the actions that he did; but let us deal now with last night's events.

The right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) is right to say that, as part of the inquiry, proper facts about what happened will be laid out. It is my understanding, however, that the initial incursion by a very large number of police, supported by immigration services, was made with the support of armed police officers and with the necessary body armour. It was subsequent events that led to the tragic death of Stephen Oake. It is my understanding also, and I think that it will be the understanding of the House, that the work of MI5 and of special branch and the police, leading to the arrests, shows how well our system is working in identifying and taking action against those who threaten our lives and security. It is precisely because we certificated those people whom we believed to be a risk that Greater Manchester police were acting on the advice given to me, through the security services. That affirms that the system is working—tragically, it led to the death of Stephen Oake—and underpins the fact that we are on top of those who threaten our lives and livelihoods.

We do not need to be reminded by the right hon. Gentleman that he has drawn my attention to the urgency of the matter. After all, the Government were held to account by the Opposition parties and by some elements of the press for what they described as acting too urgently and precipitately in autumn 2001. We were opposed for that very reason again and again in the House and we were ridiculed for it. In the past 12 months, certain elements of the Opposition and the press have constantly said that our action was disproportionate and that we did not have a balanced approach to the protection of our nation vis-à-vis the freedom of the individual. It is those who believe in global trade, global movements and the freedom of the individual who are now calling for even more draconian measures.

Let me deal head on with the issue raised by the Leader of the Opposition and, on his behalf, by the shadow Home Secretary, who must have to eat his words as he repeats his leader's decision to up the ante on asylum. Let us be clear about what we have done. We have introduced a warning system, whereby everyone who goes through the immigration process is identified to check whether they are on the security services' warning index.

I assure the House that, first, we will look into further refining that system by using the computerised fingerprinting and surveillance systems that Opposition Members so often oppose, which were in part introduced by the present Foreign Secretary.

Secondly, on 29 October 2001 I announced the introduction of a range of new processes—induction, reporting centres and an asylum registration card, which is now virtually completely in place—to make registration meaningful and enable us to track those moving through the asylum process. We strengthened the entire immigration process, as the Prime Minister reiterated, to ensure that those who commit a crime can be removed, that there is a fast-track system for doing that and that we can quickly reject those who come into our country clandestinely.

On the basis of expediency, the very people who have chosen to use asylum in the way they have this afternoon have opposed so much of what we have done. Let me make it clear that whatever the basis on which people enter our country—on a visa for tourism or for short stays, with a visa for a work permit or as asylum seekers—we will deal with them if they pose a threat to our country.

In the interests of community and race relations, however, let no one suggest that we can assume that asylum seekers pose the sole threat and that it is asylum that we need to fear. It is those people who use asylum and freedom of movement throughout the world and who organise against our interests whom we must fear. It is the people who are helping us to arrest, hold and secure those who pose that threat of whom we should be so proud today.

First, I join my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) and all my colleagues around the country, especially those in Greater Manchester and Cheshire, in associating ourselves with expressions by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary of love, sympathy and gratitude to Stephen Oake's family, and of support and solidarity to chief constable Mike Todd and all those who work with him in Greater Manchester police. Many of us have personal experience of their calibre and quality and want to put on record the debt we all owe them.

I endorse entirely the tone of the Home Secretary's response to the previous intervention. The raids in Wood Green, in Edinburgh, in Bournemouth and in Crumpsall yesterday show that the intelligence services and the police are very much in command of the situation. They are a tribute to the work done behind the scenes and in difficult circumstances, and the public need to know that the Home Secretary has every confidence that we are managing the terrorist threat and the threats from individuals to our liberties in a very professional, effective and advanced way. I share the right hon. Gentleman's views in that respect.

Will the Home Secretary deal with three matters that I hope are appropriate to raise now? Will he confirm that the police's view remains that the presumption should be that they are not routinely armed, but that any police force that feels that, to do their job, its officers need to be armed or to have special protective clothing or other protective equipment can use such equipment when the judgment on the ground is that it is appropriate? Will he also confirm that there are no restrictions on that?

Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman confirm that the reality today, even if it was not 50 years ago, is that the special branch of the Met, the National Crime Squad and the National Criminal Intelligence Service show that we have a level of national policing because there is national activity that has to cross the boundaries of police forces? Does not the reality of policing today mean that we must recognise, formally and openly, that, built on the foundations of local policing, we now need regional, national and international policing; and that unless that level of policing is fully supported, we will not be able to counter those who work internationally and are no respecters of police authority or police force boundaries?

Finally, while I share the Home Secretary's view that terrorism in this country is no more the province of asylum seekers than of other foreign nationals who come here or British-born persons who are persuaded of that awful route, is it not worth re-examining the recommendation of the Select Committee on Home Affairs that we could do well by toughening our border controls and replacing the three different agencies that share responsibility at our airports and seaports with one common border force? If the Home Secretary reconsidered that course of action, he would have considerable support. It would allow our liberties, including liberty of movement, to remain, but be the most effective way of ensuring that those who seek to undermine liberty are caught, dealt with and prosecuted according to law.

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's opening remarks.

It is not our intention that the police should be routinely armed, but our clear objective, and that of chief constables across the country, is that they should be able to make a local decision in the light of circumstances. I understand that the chief constable of Greater Manchester, Mike Todd, had made that decision in respect of the original incursion into the buildings last night.

Secondly, I share the view that we need the best possible co-ordination between existing crime and intelligence agencies. We are considering how to make sure that, as we do at European level and internationally, we do that more effectively nationally and regionally. SO13, led by David Veness from the Met, performs that role in anti-terrorist and special branch functions very well indeed.

On the third question, if memory serves, my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) raised that issue with me at the time of the proscription of the four organisations that we dealt with in the autumn. I said at the time that I did not rule out a change in the organisation of border and port controls. It is worth examining that, as we have in respect of security at airports, within the context of having a clearly focused, prioritised and objective way of using the services available to us to target those whom we know form a genuine risk.

Those people, whether in the press or in this House, who believe that we could surveil, secure details of and verify 100 per cent. the security ratings of the 90 million people who pass through our ports and airports each year are living in a totally different world. From talking to the Attorney General of the United States, it appears that the US takes the same view. Through intelligence work and security, we must take a prioritised and focused approach; it is the only way in which we can proceed, and it is all that we can do. Despite our best efforts and the efforts of those who work for us, in the end, in a global economy with global movements, we cannot create a fortress Britain.

I pay tribute to Stephen Oake and the other officers who were injured in my constituency last night. I wish particularly to pass on my condolences to the family. I have just realised, having read the front page of The DailyTelegraph, that I know Stephen's father quite well from the world of international sport. He chaired the Isle of Man commonwealth games committee and we worked together on the Manchester games and in the run-up to them. I therefore feel particularly emotional and upset. My thoughts are with Robin and the family.

I pay tribute to the refreshingly open way in which the new chief constable of Greater Manchester has provided a great deal more information than we have come to expect. I suspect that he has provided as much information as he can to reassure the local community and the country as a whole.

I live within a couple of hundred yards of where last night's incident took place. I know that the relationships in what is a very mixed cultural and ethnic community are extremely good. I ask my right hon. Friend to agree with me that there is a national problem of international terrorism, and that it is not a Manchester or north London problem.

Once again, we reiterate our condolences and understand my hon. Friend's words. I can confirm entirely what he said. The actions taken arising from the decision to certify one individual were taken on the basis that we want action wherever and whenever it is necessary.

Detective Constable Stephen Robin Oake was one of my constituents. He lived with his wife of 20 years, Lesley, and his son and two daughters in the village of Poynton in my constituency. He was a thoroughly committed, dedicated and brave career professional policeman. His father, as we heard from the hon. Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Stringer), was an assistant chief constable in Greater Manchester, following which he was chief constable of the Isle of Man constabulary.

I make a plea that the media and others respect the grief and the privacy of the Oake family. I ask for a total commitment from the Home Secretary and express the hope—I am grateful, on behalf of the family, for the sympathy that has been expressed by the Home Secretary, by the Prime Minister, by the Leader of the Opposition and by the spokesman for the Liberal party—that the Government, the House and all political parties will do all within their power to ensure that Stephen's life was not lost in vain and to ensure that terrorism does not succeed.

We all join the hon. Gentleman in requesting that the privacy and integrity of the family be respected and agree that we have an obligation, whatever debates take place across the Dispatch Boxes, to ensure that Stephen Oake did not die in vain. We must learn lessons from what is happening and what happened last night, and apply them in protecting ourselves.

Following the dignified and moving intervention of the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton) and the question of my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley (Mr. Stringer), may I say that the people of Manchester and the family of the murdered police officer, who are mourning that death and lamenting the injuries to the other police officers, will not take kindly to politicians seeking to score cheap political points over a deeply sad, tragic and alarming event? Hon. Members who seek to do so will win scorn rather than support.

I agree with what the hon. Member for Macclesfield and my hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Blackley said, but this terrible event demonstrates that terrorism knows no frontiers inside the country or outside it, and that the measures that we are taking against terrorism are justified.

I share entirely the points made by my right hon. Friend.

I, too, extend my condolences to the family of DC Oake. It may be too soon for the Home Secretary to comment, but I ask him to assure the House, if he is able to do so, that last night's tragic events were not in any way caused by a co-ordination failure between the security services, the local special branch and Greater Manchester police. Does the right hon. Gentleman feel that any lessons can be learned in improving that co-ordinaton, which might save other tragedies in future?

On the latter point, I think that there will be lessons to be learned; the review arising from the major incident report will highlight the lessons. I can give an assurance that co-ordination between the security services, SO13—the anti-terrorism branch—and the local police was very good, and that the initial incursion was a success. As I said earlier, arms and body armour were available and were used. It was a subsequent part of the process of dealing with the three people in the dwelling and with what was discovered that led, tragically, to Stephen Oake's death.

I join my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and the whole House in offering my commiserations to the family of Stephen Oake. Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is at times such as this that we are forced to focus on the great bravery that we ask of servicing officers in Greater Manchester police and in police forces generally? It is a dangerous job. Fortunately, this sort of tragedy does not happen too often, but it is something that is in the very nature of the role that the police perform.

My right hon. Friend had to act against those suspected of involvement in terrorism. Will he make it clear from the Dispatch Box that asylum seekers in Manchester or elsewhere in Britain are not collectively accused of involvement in terrorism? We must recognise that the vast majority of those who seek refuge in this country want to contribute to the British way of life and do not, sadly, as in this case, want to take from it.

I reiterate my hon. Friend's point. We must make it clear that we deal with individuals who threaten our lives, not with groups of individuals whom we can dub in a particular way at a particular time for a particular purpose.

We have all commented on police bravery. High-profile events such as yesterday's capture the headlines, but it is worth remembering those who lost their lives in less high-profile events because of the bravery that they showed. I think that our families would want us to do that as well.

Like my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton), I represent members of Greater Manchester police who live in east Cheshire. I know that Stephen's death will be felt deeply in the police community and throughout the Manchester area and the Cheshire area.

May I ask the Home Secretary about the nature and scale of the terrorist threat? I have heard informed Government sources say that there are about 1,000 people in this country who are potential international terrorist operatives. Is that figure really correct—are we talking about a threat of that magnitude?

I do not think that the hon. Gentleman seriously expects me to speculate on the number of people who may or may not pose a terrorist threat. What I can say clearly to the House is that anyone who is suspected of posing a terrorist threat, or who is suspected of dealing with or succouring terrorists, will of course be under surveillance and will be dealt with appropriately. There are no meaningful and verifiable figures of the sort used in the media, and I do hope that the considered and sensible way in which we have normally dealt with these matters in the House not only prevails here, but is reflected in the media. One of the great strengths of our country is that we are not just stoical; we deal with things with a clear and hard head, and we know what does and does not make sense.

May I also associate myself with condolences offered to the family of Stephen Oake, and to those officers who were injured? I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), in that the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman's response to today's statement constituted a misjudgment. Will my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary comment on the progress that is being made in international co-operation among law enforcement agencies, particularly within the European Union, to try to anticipate such threats, and to prevent the threats to our country and our way of life that the arrests of Algerian terrorist gangs in the past week have demonstrated?

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend's work in helping to secure precisely that co-operation across Europe, both in terms of immigration and of the policing and security services, and I thank her for it. We have been building on that through genuine cooperation between the services, and by enabling people to share data. Eurodac—the fingerprinting database that was announced only a day or two ago by the relevant Minister—assists us by enabling the sharing of that information and the tracking of those who pose a threat to us all.

May I add my condolences to those eloquently expressed by other Members; and can the Home Secretary say how long the suspected terrorists involved in this case have been in this country, and in the north-west in particular?

I can deal with the individual who was certified yesterday, and who was arrested in Manchester. He has been in this country, off and on, for about four years. He sought asylum and was refused, took his case to appeal, absconded and disappeared, and was then tracked. This is the real issue for the House: he was not let go and forgotten about; he was tracked by the security services, to the point where we were about to arrest and deal with him under legislation passed in autumn 2001.

In passing on my condolences to the Oake family, may I ask my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to look again at taking action against those who incite such violence? I am referring to Abu Hamza, for example, who, incidentally, was given permission to remain in the United Kingdom by the previous Government. May I remind my right hon. Friend that when Abu Hamza spoke in Burnley four years ago—Burnley is not that far from Manchester—he used language to incite precisely such violent knife attacks on what he called "non-believers"? What happened last night was exactly the sort of incident that Abu Hamza has been inciting for many years. Is it not time to take such threats and statements seriously, and to take action against Abu Hamza and others of his ilk?

My hon. Friend has been assiduous in rightly pursuing these incidents and issues—as have I—to ensure that the Metropolitan police and, where necessary, the security services evaluate the words and the actions of individuals such as the one mentioned this afternoon. We all know how difficult this matter is, given that there are those who are very careful not to overstep the mark. Baroness Thatcher had exactly the same problems with this individual—this is not a party political point—way back in 1990–91. Real attempts were made to deal with him, but his care in not crossing the line caused the then Government and the police to back off. However, make no mistake about it: every word and every action is being monitored, and we need to do so in a way that secures the confidence of people who are sick and tired of individuals like him abusing our hospitality.

May I briefly touch on one point that has been raised on several occasions? The fact that my right hon. Friend the shadow Home Secretary asks questions that occasionally discomfit the Government does not mean that they are illegitimate, and it is a pity that the manner in which his questions have been considered has created that reaction.

Yesterday's events in Manchester, about which people have spoken movingly, demonstrate—if ever it needed to be demonstrated—that the distinction between our domestic security and our foreign security is not a real one. I therefore suggest to the Home Secretary that he and his right hon. Friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary discuss a means whereby we can have a debate in this House during which the security of this country at home and abroad is considered in a calm, rational and mature atmosphere, so that the Government can explain their overall policy on international terrorism overseas, and its effects on our national security in this country. That would help us to avoid being reactive, and therefore ill tempered.

On the first point, I do not want to get sidetracked into considering the actions or words of the shadow Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin). I have reflected, however, on whether my first reaction if I were in opposition would have been to appear on "Newsnight" and to make the remarks about asylum that he made. I can only presume that the dramatic change of character and approach of the past few weeks has been engendered from elsewhere. I have a great deal of time for the right hon. Gentleman, and it is very sad indeed to see this transformation taking place.

On the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) about having a debate, we had a measured, sane and rational debate on 11 July, but as I have said before, I think that it was reported in only one column of one newspaper. I commend that newspaper—I think that it was The Independent—because it usually has a real go at me; in fact, I have never known it not to do so.

Secondly, we will shortly be debating the renewal of some of the powers in part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. I hope that that will also provide an opportunity to reflect on these matters, and that we are able, as we so often are, to transcend party politics in not only addressing the issues, but making sensible suggestions that a wise Government are clever enough to take on board.

I am one whose voice and vote have always supported the current Home Secretary in his attempts to deal with difficult questions, and for everyone in this House difficult questions do indeed surround this issue. As he knows, my constituency office deals with a high number of asylum seekers, the vast majority of whom are here genuinely. However, last week an Afghan refugee came into my office and said that he was claiming asylum as a former fighter with the Taliban. One needs to question whether this is a sensible system. If we have a war in Iraq, at the end of it supporters of Saddam Hussein would presumably be entitled to claim asylum in the west. This is a ridiculous position.

I do not consider that it is not possible for people to return to Afghanistan. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, I would not consider that it was impossible for people to return to a free and democratic Iraq. However, I take my hon. Friend's point entirely. Sanity has to prevail in the way in which we legislate and process matters, and in the way in which the judicial system deals with appeals. If the individual in question was trying to hide his intent or past history, he was not doing a particularly good job of it by coming into my hon. Friend's surgery and announcing his past endeavours.

Speaking as the wife of a former Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, which of course lost 302 officers at the hands of those involved in terrorist activity, may I say how desperately sorry I was that we learned last night of the murder of a young police officer doing his duty in Manchester? Mercifully, we have been spared such acts in Northern Ireland in recent years. I am terribly sorry for Stephen Oake's family that they have been put through such pain and suffering, as well as his colleagues and the community of Manchester. Such an event is a terrible tragedy in any community.

May I urge the Home Secretary to consult the present Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Hugh Orde, to see what lessons can be learned further to protect police officers, to ensure that there is no repetition of last night's appalling incident in Manchester?

Yes, I am very happy to do that. We all accept that the hon. Lady was closer to such events through her husband than any of us have been. We respect and understand her very strong feelings.

May I add my condolences to the family of Stephen Oake? [also pay tribute to the security and intelligence services, which have obviously twice now got the right information and managed to track down activity that is dangerous to all of us.

Nevertheless, will the Home Secretary answer the questions asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) from the Front Bench? Will he specifically tell me what his reasons are for not adopting a policy of securely housing all new applicants for asylum until either, under my proposed policy, their cases are determined, or, according to the advice that he received from his officials, at least until their identity has been determined?

First, I did not receive such advice. I am aware of the disclosure to the right hon. Lady under the appropriate Act and of the e-mail sent by a junior official shortly after I had made a statement to Parliament laying out how the induction reporting and ARC—application registration card—system would register and track those who came to the immigration service in a way that was not possible before June 2001. Secondly, I said that the logistical cost of providing wholly secure accommodation for every single asylum seeker and their dependents while they are assessed and their security rating is evaluated is enormous. As we have seen in respect of planning consents, we could still be in the process of trying to secure those centres without the reporting, the ARC card and induction in a way that would not have ensured our security—but might have made her feel better.

Having finished the admirable 20-day parliamentary police service scheme in Brixton only last Friday, may I express my especial sympathy to the family of DC Oake and to the officers who were injured in Manchester? It is our duty to the police service and the country as a whole to ensure that our systems of immigration control really work and that those who are in breach of the immigration regulations are returned promptly. In respect of applications for asylum, we must ensure that the provisions of the Dublin convention are upheld. Thus, applicants who come from EU countries should not, prima facie, have to be dealt with in this country, but should be returned to the EU country in which they first arrived.

I agree entirely. I know that the whole House will support the Government in future when we deal with those cases, as we had to with the Ahmadi family.

As someone who has been present at the scene of the murder of several police officers, I should like to join the rest of the House in expressing my sympathy for Constable Oake and my admiration for the security services in the success that they have achieved. However, when such an incident occurs, it is not currently clear whether the Security Service, the chief constable of the region concerned, or the national co-ordinator of the Metropolitan police's anti-terrorist branch is in charge. If some good is to come from the death of this brave constable, can we ensure that that situation is resolved?

The Security Service does its job in detecting, conducting surveillance and advising. The anti-terrorism branch works, as it always has, with the local police, as they are the enforcement and arresting authorities. The police are therefore co-ordinated through the anti-terrorism branch in incidents such as yesterday's. It obviously behoves those immediately in charge to ensure that at each stage of the process—there are different stages, as I am sure will become clear as the evidence emerges—the appropriate force is in charge of the aspect in question. I do not want to go further in that regard, as it is important that the major incident programme be undertaken. It is also important that the evaluation of the evidence from those involved be brought forward at a time when, after the terrible trauma caused to those who were present at the incident and had to deal with the attack on the officers who were injured, as well as the death of Stephen Oake, we can evaluate it more carefully.

The Home Secretary is undoubtedly correct to say that what has ended as a police tragedy began as a Security Service success, but does he recall a not dissimilar incident in a prison camp in Afghanistan, when an American interrogator was murdered by someone whom he was interrogating in circumstances in which one would normally have thought that violence was unlikely? Is not one of the lessons that should be drawn from what happened that the mentality of fundamentalist Islamic terrorists is such that they will lash out whenever they can, even if it is to their own obvious disadvantage? Should he not, without prejudging the circumstances of this case, perhaps consider when all those circumstances are known whether guidelines should be issued saying that people who are arrested on suspicion of such terrorist activities should be held in handcuffs until they are removed to a secure environment?

I am sure that the lessons of yesterday's incident will be learned and that there will be an evaluation of the process that took place in terms of the unhandcuffing of the individual who committed the act and obtained a knife. At this stage, I think that it would better if we said no more about the incident.

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement on missile defence.

The House will recall that in the defence debate on 17 October I described the work in the United States on the development of ballistic missile defence systems and the Government's thinking on the issue. Subsequently, on 9 December, as I informed the House during defence questions that day, I placed in the Library a discussion paper produced by the Ministry of Defence setting out the role that active missile defence might play within a comprehensive strategy for tackling the threat from ballistic missiles. On 17 December, I informed the House of the receipt of a request from the United States Government to upgrade the early warning radar at Fylingdales for missile defence purposes.

I have repeatedly emphasised that the Government would not respond to such a request without a further opportunity for discussion in the House. Next week's defence debate is a timely further occasion for the House to discuss the challenges that the United Kingdom faces in the new international security environment, including those posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology. I hope that the House will find it helpful if today I set out the Government's thinking on the US request.

The Government recognise that missile defence raises important strategic issues, as well as local concerns in North Yorkshire. Following the release of the discussion paper in December, with its invitation to all interested parties to contribute their views, we have had around 300 responses. In addition, I visited North Yorkshire last week, and heard the views of local people and their elected representatives, as well as meeting representatives from the planning authorities. We have taken those views into account as we have considered the central question, which is the key test that the Government will apply to the US request: would agreeing to the upgrade of Fylingdales ultimately enhance the security of the UK and the NATO Alliance?

The background to the US request is the marked increase in the threat to our security from weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The Prime Minister has described weapons of mass destruction as the key issue facing the world community. It is a real threat to our security, fanned by proliferation from irresponsible regimes. As we all know, threat is a combination of intention and capability. Intentions can be debated, but they can also change at very short notice. The evidence of expanding capabilities, therefore, cannot responsibly be ignored. The hard fact is that a number of states of concern are making major investments in developing ever-longer range ballistic missiles. We are not referring here to countries developing standard military technology against the risk of conventional conflict. These ballistic missile programmes are being developed solely in order to threaten the delivery of mass destruction—nerve gas, toxins, biological agents or even nuclear warheads. It is the combination of ballistic missiles and the possession of these weapons of mass destruction, together with the demonstrated willingness to use those capabilities, that makes Iraq the most immediate state threat to global security. Elsewhere, if North Korea ends its moratorium on flight testing, it could flight test a missile with the potential to reach Europe and the United States within weeks. Other countries may acquire similar missile systems, not least through the proliferation of missile technology from North Korea.

Based on the analysis and discussion that we have undertaken so far, I have therefore come to the preliminary conclusion that the answer to the US request must be yes, and that we should agree to the upgrade as proposed.

RAF Fylingdales has operated since 1963 as a ballistic missile early warning system, which together with other radars in the United States and Greenland provides tactical warning and attack assessment of a missile attack against the United Kingdom, North America or western Europe. It has been upgraded a number of times over the years. Many hon. Members will recall the old "golf balls" that were dismantled in the late 1980s and replaced with the existing pyramid-like structure. Indeed, a life extension programme is under way to maintain its capabilities to provide early warning and track objects in space. These missions will continue to be the primary function of RAF Fylingdales.

I have sought to dispel a number of misapprehensions about the US request in various meetings in North Yorkshire. The proposal is for an upgrade of the existing radar, not some massive new construction. No change to the external appearance of the radar should be involved. The upgrade essentially comprises modification to the hardware and software of the computers within the base. There will be no change in the power output of the radar, which is many times below statutory safety limits. We therefore believe that no health risk to people or livestock could arise. We have already explained to the local planning authorities that we see nothing in the upgrade proposals that would require formal planning consultation, and we have promised to provide them with full supporting evidence in due course.

The upgrade of the Fylingdales radar can and should be considered as a discrete proposition. It does not commit us in any way to any deeper involvement in missile defence, although it gives us options to do so, should we decide on that at a later date. It will not involve huge costs. The upgrade will be performed at US expense, and we do not expect any significant variation in the running costs of RAF Fylingdales, which, as is appropriate for an RAF station, we already bear.

Agreeing to the upgrade is not at odds with the wider approach of our NATO allies. The Prague summit agreed

"to examine options for addressing the increasing missile threat to Alliance territory, forces and population centres".

The Danish Government have received a parallel request to upgrade the early warning radar in Greenland.

Missile defence is a defensive system that threatens no one. We see no reason to believe fears that the development of missile defences will be strategically destabilising. Reactions from Russia and China have been measured. Missile defence would need to be used only if a ballistic missile has actually been fired. At that point, no matter how much we emphasise our other means of addressing the threat—non-proliferation, intelligence, law enforcement, conflict prevention, diplomacy and deterrence—those means will have failed and cannot be of further help. There would be no way of preventing a devastating impact without intercepting and destroying the missile. Once the missile is in the air, it is unthinkable that anyone could not want us to be in a position to shoot it down.

Those are the reasons for concluding that agreeing to the US request would not prejudice the UK's interests. But beyond that, the key consideration is that it would represent an invaluable extra insurance against the development of a still uncertain, but potentially catastrophic, threat to the citizens of this country. There is not yet an immediate threat to us of this kind, but there is a distinct possibility that this threat could materialise in the relatively near future. It would therefore be irresponsible for the Government to leave the United Kingdom without a route map to acquire a defence against this threat. An upgraded Fylingdales radar would be a vital building-block on which missile defence for this country and for our European neighbours could later be developed, if the need arises and if we so decide.

We are confident that agreeing to this request will not significantly increase the threat to the UK. The security interests of the UK are already closely identified with those of the US and other NATO allies. That will not change, regardless of decisions on missile defence. Keeping a low profile and hoping for the best is simply not an option. We also believe that any increased threat to RAF Fylingdales itself is negligible. For the foreseeable future, states of concern are very unlikely to have the sophisticated capability or size of arsenal to consider targeting specific points or military installations. Long-range missiles in their hands will essentially be weapons of terror, and, as with all military installations in the UK, the station is well defended against terrorist attack. But we must not forget that what drives the threat against the UK is not the deployment of missile defences, but those states of concern who develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

The upgrade would indicate no commitment to further involvement with missile defence deployments. Separately, we intend to agree a new technical memorandum of understanding with the United States that would give us full insight into the development of their missile defence programme and the opportunity for UK industry to reap the benefits of participation. But any UK acquisition of missile defence would be subject to a separate decision, at the relevant time. We must approach this in stages, considering each step in the light of how both the threat and the relevant technologies evolve.

The Government have not yet formally replied to the US Administration on their request to upgrade the Fylingdales radar. I await with interest the views that hon. Members will wish to put forward, today and in next week's debate. But it is only right that the House should know the Government's preliminary conclusion that it is in the UK's interests to agree to the request. From the UK's national perspective, this specific decision is one that has real potential benefits at essentially no financial cost. It will ensure that if, in the coming years, we find that a potentially devastating threat is becoming a reality, we have the opportunity to defend against it.

Weapons of mass destruction present the gravest risk to UK security. A ballistic missile launched at the UK is the most catastrophic potential threat to our people in the future. A Government's first duty is to protect their citizens, and that is a duty that this Government will not shirk from undertaking.

I thank the Secretary of State for giving me an advance copy of his statement. However, I start by lamenting the fact that Parliament seems to have been the last to know of this significant and controversial decision. By 5.30 pm yesterday, the Press Association wires were reporting that there would be a statement today and

"Mr. Hoon is expected to say…he is minded to accept the American request to use Fylingdales."

The way in which the announcement has been dribbled out is all too typical of the way in which the Government treat Parliament.

I welcome next week's opportunity for debate, but rather than a general debate, which will inevitably be taken up by other defence issues such as the preparation for military action against Iraq or the outcome of the NATO Prague summit, should it not be a specific debate on missile defence? Is that not what the House of Commons is truly for?

Her Majesty's Opposition have consistently made the case for missile defence. We therefore welcome the decision as far as it goes, as we believe that it is in the interests of British national security. Many of our European allies—France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece—are already involved in missile defence programmes, particularly theatre missile defence, some of them in co-operation with the United States. Given that some 276 Labour Members have signed an early-day motion against the Secretary of State's policy, does the right hon. Gentleman not recognise that he must now convince those who would prefer to believe that the Government are simply a slave to the United States agenda? After all, it was only on 10 May 1999 that his predecessor Lord Robertson said:

"We are not in favour of developing ballistic missile defence systems. We are in favour of the anti-ballistic missile treaty".— [Official Report,10 May 1999; Vol. 331, c. 10.]

Incidentally, that is a treaty whose demise the Government have now accepted without a hint of protest. It was only on 21 March 2000 that the then Foreign Office Minister, now Secretary of State for Wales, the right hon. Member for Neath (Peter Hain) said on the BBC's "Newsnight":

"I don't like the idea of a star wars programme, limited or unlimited."

Of course, we are not talking about "star wars".

The Secretary of State has spent most of the past year stonewalling on this issue, and I now welcome the refreshing tone that he has adopted towards British participation in missile defence. Does it reflect the fact that the Government are now confident that the technology will be successfully developed to make missile defence a practical reality? What Government control will there be over the use of the facilities at Fylingdales and the information gathered there? Is it possible that Menwith Hill will also be included in the programme at some future date?

On the wider issue, the Secretary of State says that the decision does not commit us to deeper involvement in missile defence, but why is it necessary to approach the issue, as he says, in stages? Surely the conclusion from his statement must be that we should be fully committed in principle to global missile defence now. What is the Government's policy on the possibility of having ground-based interceptor missiles on British soil, or sea-based interceptors on British ships?

The Secretary of State has made a clear case for missile defence. He refers to the possibility of North Korea representing potentially an imminent missile threat "within weeks"? What is the benefit of putting off those decisions? Full support for UK partnership with the United States on missile defence will not only enhance the opportunities for the British defence industry but is clearly vital for our national security. We therefore urge the Government to be candid with the House and to state now that a full commitment to missile defence is their real intention.

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman chooses to criticise the fact that, in a short space of time, the Government are making available a full day for debating defence issues. That will be an opportunity for right hon. and hon. Members to debate this and other issues. If the hon. Gentleman feels so strongly about the issue, it is open to the Opposition to use the time that they have available to debate the question as soon as next Monday, which is the next Opposition day. He and other Opposition Front Benchers can use that time to debate the issue in the way that he suggests is so important. I anticipate that he does not really regard the matter as so important; otherwise, he would use the time as he has advocated—[Interruption.] I look forward to any debate. As I said, the Government have made time available next week, and if the Opposition want an extra debate, I will be delighted to be here to respond to any motion that they care to put down.

On the hon. Gentleman's more detailed points about the process, it is important that he examine carefully the way in which the United States is approaching developing a missile defence system. The United States has taken outline decisions only, and has specifically indicated that it is important that there should be a test bed—for the moment, a Pacific test bed designed to provide emergency protection to the United States against the threat from North Korea. As a result, the United States has not taken specific decisions about the kind of system that it would ultimately like to deploy. Again, I have made the point to the hon. Gentleman and Opposition Front Benchers over many months that it does not make sense to anticipate decisions that have not yet been made in the United States. That remains the position. We are in close consultation with the United States about the development of these systems, but it simply does not make sense to anticipate decisions that it has not yet taken.

I thank the Secretary of State for the advance copy of his statement, but I must agree entirely with the view of the Conservative spokesman, the hon. Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin), that we already knew what he would say today.

The decision, whether one agrees with it or opposes it, has seemingly been made with an astonishing lack of consultation. It is a major strategic decision, and to suggest that it should be debated in an Opposition-day debate is outrageous. The Government issued the public discussion paper only last month, and the request was issued only last month, yet the House of Commons has still not had a proper opportunity to discuss the matter. The costs, the strategic dimensions and the feasibility of the scheme are not well understood by those on either side of the argument. Many questions remain unclear—not least the question of why the Secretary of State chose to announce the decision today.

If Fylingdales is to be upgraded, will Britain be protected by the current US missile defence scheme? If not, why are we participating? How will participation enhance the security of Britain? What is the position of our allies in NATO and our partners in the EU on this programme? Will they be participating? Have the Danes agreed that their site should be used? How much does the UK need to invest to be able to keep the option of participating in the future? What could be achieved by spending that money on other defence issues? Is there a risk of further terrorist attack at Fylingdales? Will extra security be required there? In short, is this a good deal for Britain? [HON. MEMBERS: "You tell us."] If Conservative Front Benchers will hold their lines, I will.

If the Secretary of State says that his preliminary conclusion is to say yes—that he is minded to agree—what might make him change his mind and say later that he does not agree? At the moment, while the Secretary of State may be minded to say yes, many on the Liberal Democrat Benches would be minded to say no. The reality is that, today, the House of Commons is being presented with a fait accompli.

To be fair to the hon. Gentleman, he is not noted for the kind of bluster that we have just heard from him—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh!"] No, I think it is important to be charitable to the Liberal Democrats from time to time. But it was not clear from the hon. Gentleman's contribution, if I can call it that, whether he was for or against the proposal. I assure him that there is a very large fence around RAF Fylingdales on which he can sit for as long as he likes, and which will protect him and the occupants of the base against any kind of terrorist threat or rhetoric.

This is a good deal for the United Kingdom. If the hon. Gentleman listened to the explanations that I gave, he will have heard me set out clearly the arrangements as regards support to the United Kingdom and other allies, which would be the key test for our decision.

As regards the protection of the United Kingdom, I made it clear that the test bed that the United States is developing in the Pacific is specifically designed to deal with the threat from North Korea. Clearly, as the system evolves and the United States learns lessons from the operation of the test bed, there will be an opportunity for coverage that includes the United Kingdom, as the request from the United States suggests. That is why I said that we were preserving an option to protect United Kingdom citizens.

I thank my right hon. Friend for coming to my constituency after his visit to the RAF station at Fylingdales on 6 January. He listened to local people, who are perhaps most concerned about the subject. As promised, I kept a record of the exchanges and presented it to the Defence Committee for consideration. On behalf of my constituents, and especially the people of Whitby and the Esk Valley, I welcome the opportunity to put some of the issues on the record in next week's debate.

My right hon. Friend knows of my engineer's scepticism about whether the system will work in the long run. He heard the views of the people who spoke to him at the Inn on the Moor in Goathland, which is two and a half miles away from the RAF station. They clearly expressed concerns, not so much about a ballistic attack on the base and the area but about a terrorist attack. As well as giving help and information to North Yorkshire police, will my right hon. Friend review the status of installations such as the mothballed station at RAF Staxton, for the protection of the area?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for organising several excellent meetings in North Yorkshire that produced useful and lively discussions that greatly assisted to clarify my thinking and the Government's decision.

As I hope I have made clear, the system that the United States is developing is evolving. Part of the reason for its request is to ensure the development of a comprehensive system. That will not be in place for several years. However, I have no reason to doubt the determination of the United States to make the system fully comprehensive and effective.

I have received no request from the United States about any other installations in this country.

As the Secretary of State knows, Fylingdales is in my constituency. He also knows that, by and large, I have supported his position. I support his statement, as will most right-thinking people in North Yorkshire, let alone Ryedale.

I urge the right hon. Gentleman to do three things. First, he should take every opportunity to confirm that his comments today mean that we have signed up not to missile defence but to an upgrade of existing radar, which has happened previously. The previous upgrade put millions of pounds into the local economy, and I do not doubt that that will happen again.

Secondly, will the right hon. Gentleman acknowledge that many local people will fear that what he has announced today is only phase 1 and that phase 2, involving missile defence, will follow? Will he therefore continue to consult local authorities such as North Yorkshire county council, the North York Moors national park authority and Ryedale council, as well as local people? I urge him to take them with him.

Thirdly, will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that, although he has denied the more lurid descriptions of what may have been involved in the decision, the local tourist industry is worried? Apart from Fylingdales, there is little else on the North York moors except sheep rearing and tourism. Will the right hon. Gentleman therefore urge his colleagues in the Government to help the local economy, tourism and our transport infrastructure? We are prepared to continue to accommodate the radar in our area, but we should like some Government recognition that we have other needs.

I pay tribute to the hon. Gentleman for his consistent approach. He has not ducked the difficult issues that are necessarily involved. I stress that we are discussing a specific request about the internal functioning of the radar and communications systems at RAF Fylingdales. As I learned when I visited the hon. Gentleman's constituency, local anxiety is sometimes about things that have not been determined and may never be determined. The United States is considering locating phase 2 largely at sea and may never require land-based X-band radars. The phrase, "X-band radar" was used regularly when I dealt with questions in North Yorkshire. It is important to deal with each decision at the stage at which it is presented. There is no need to go further at this stage and speculate as some perhaps less helpful commentators have done. I shall ensure that the hon. Gentleman's observations about the local economy are passed on to the appropriate Department.

Given the weight of expert criticism of missile defence, the unanimous conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the extent of anxiety in the House, and, according to repeated polls, the opposition of more than 70 per cent. of the British public, will we have an opportunity for a specific debate and democratic vote on the issue in the House?

I have outlined the nature of the debate that the Government propose. There will be an opportunity for my hon. Friend to contribute to it as he has done in the past. However, I do not accept his assertions about the weight of expert criticism. Even if it were overwhelming, my hon. Friend and other critics have to face the central point of my statement's conclusion. If a missile is in the air and targeted at the United Kingdom, threatening catastrophic consequences to the people of this country, does he seriously claim that we should not use every effort to try to protect them?

Would it not have been better for the Secretary of State to state clearly that, if the United States believes the system to be essential to its security and requests United Kingdom assistance, it would be politically almost inconceivable to deny the request given the importance of our relations? That would be more convincing than relying on the thin arguments in the consultation document and the serious doubts about the efficacy of the technology, especially the identification of decoy missiles, to which the document specifically refers. Can we be absolutely certain that subsequent developments, including any that involve Menwith Hill in my constituency, will be subject to a separate consultation and decision-making process?

No one who holds a position such as mine is in any doubt about the importance of our political relationship and close friendship with the United States. I do not qualify that in any way. However, as I have said on several occasions, it is important to show that this matter is of interest and beneficial to the people of the United Kingdom and to our wider relationships in the NATO alliance. That is the test that the people of the United Kingdom want satisfied. I believe that it is satisfied and I therefore recommend accepting the United States request.

I have received hundreds if not thousands of letters, including some from constituents of the hon. Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway). They all oppose national missile defence and upgrading Fylingdales. I do not think that those people are stupid or misguided. They point out that they believe that it will make them more of a target, and that far from protecting them it endangers them even more. They have a right to express that opinion. I agree with them. It is absolutely dreadful that once again we are acquiescing to President Bush's requests, in opposition to the people who elected us. The last opinion polls showed that more than 70 per cent. of the people of this country were opposed. The consultation has been a sham. I repeat the request of the shadow Secretary of State that we should have a debate purely on the implications of our going down this very dangerous path.

I dealt in my statement with the suggestion, which I recognise is made by those opposed to the proposals, that somehow certain parts of the country might become more of a target as a result of this decision. I dealt with those arguments. I do not believe that there is an enhanced specific threat to Fylingdales or the immediate area, or for that matter to North Yorkshire.

Equally, my hon. Friend must think through the implications of such concerns. There are, rightly, defence bases around the country. The armed forces are located in different parts of the United Kingdom. It is important that we recognise that the decisions that the Government take in relation to matters of this kind are in the interests of the country as a whole and of our national security, and it is right that each part of the country plays its part in contributing to that national security.

The Secretary of State has this absolutely right. I am sure he will agree that this is not the most difficult decision he will have to make this year. I agree with my right hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Mr. Curry) that it is inconceivable that we would have said no to the United States.

However, I think the need for British decisions is perhaps slightly closer than the right hon. Gentleman is letting on. The United States has made a great deal of progress—much faster progress than was originally envisaged—with its test programme. While it may not have decided what systems to deploy, I think it has taken a decision to deploy. At boost phase, missile defence benefits the whole world, because at that stage nobody knows exactly where the missile is going. The Secretary of State shakes his head, but I think that that is probably so. But if we are to defend against missiles in re-entry phase there is a need for locally based and probably ground-based interceptors. Does the memorandum of understanding with the United States to which the right hon. Gentleman referred effectively give us an option to use United States technology to base re-entry defence interceptors in and around the United Kingdom?

I assure the hon. Gentleman that I have, in the words of the Opposition Front-Bench spokesman, been entirely candid with the House. We have not received any further requests from the United States. We recognise that there is a range of options that the United States is looking at. That is precisely the purpose of the test bed that the United States is establishing. I entirely accept from the hon. Gentleman that the United States has made remarkable scientific progress in the work that it has concluded so far, but in many respects that has led it away from a decision to site X-band radar on land. It has given it a range of options that will allow a system to evolve and develop that may not require any further basing in the United Kingdom. I assure the hon. Gentleman and the House that as and when any such decisions are required in the United Kingdom the House will be the first to hear of them.

If the technology is successfully developed, what are the prospects of extending the missile defence umbrella to the United Kingdom and the rest of NATO?

That is one of the aspects of the United States request that have led me to conclude that this would be in the security interests of the United Kingdom, because, unlike the situation with an earlier version of these proposals, which was specifically entitled national missile defence—"national" referring to the United States—President Bush has indicated his concern that missile defence and the programme being developed by the United States should be made available to the United Kingdom and other NATO allies, should that be appropriate, and should those countries decide on it at an appropriate stage. That is a remarkably helpful offer for the United Kingdom.

Does the right hon. Gentleman accept that even those of us who doubt the cost-effectiveness and utility of missile defence think that he is right to respond positively to a proper request by an ally? Would he remind the House of, and put a note into the Library explaining, the precise command allocations of responsibility as between the United States and the United Kingdom within the Fylingdales base?

Those are matters that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is entirely right to raise. They are still the subject of further detailed negotiations. As regards the upgrade implications, the right hon. and learned Gentleman will understand that I shall not be able to inform the House of all the aspects, but I undertake to ensure that the House is properly informed of the general outline of those arrangements.

My right hon. Friend will be aware of the extensive press coverage that there has been, particularly in the defence press, about the development of X-band radar. Members of the Defence Committee this week received a document from Yorkshire CND raising concerns that the upgrade of RAF Fylingdales is part of the development programme for X-band. Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that it is not?

What I can assure the House is that there has been no specific decision about the deployment of X-band radar. As I have already said, the developments so far in the United States indicate that in fact an X-band radar may not necessarily have to be located on land, and certainly not anywhere in the immediate vicinity of RAF Fylingdales.

The Secretary of State's decision today is a wise and prudent precautionary measure that should have the full support of the House. Would the battle of Britain have been won in 1940 if Dowding had not been allowed to deploy radars around our coast from 1936? In these circumstances, surely vulnerability cannot be the best policy.

Not for the first time, the hon. Gentleman makes an appropriate historical analogy. As someone who has looked carefully at the history of that conflict, I think that he is absolutely right to recognise that as our technology develops we must use it to provide greater security for our people.

I would have liked to give a personal perspective on Fylingdales, but unfortunately my written request to the Secretary of State to visit was refused, unlike that of the hon. Member for Hereford (Mr. Keetch), I understand.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that his slavish devotion to American policy in this area adds further to global destabilisation? That destabilisation is evidenced by, for example, North Korea's alleged withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty, a treaty that the United States never ratified, following on from its abrogation of the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty. It is also reflected in the Chinese military's plan to reconfigure its nuclear forces to overcome missile defence, as and when it is ever developed, and most recently lately by the Indians, who are developing an Agni-3 rocket and are discussing dropping the nonuclear-first-strike option from their military planning.

In the Government's Gadarene rush to embrace every crackpot notion foisted on us by the ideologues in Washington, I should like the Secretary of State to point out where the independence of thought and the independence of policy are in the British Government, reflecting true British needs.

I am sorry to hear my hon. Friend and former Ministry of Defence colleague make those observations. I am sure that he would have had the opportunity to visit RAF Fylingdales when he was a Defence Minister, had he chosen to take it. Indeed, I do not recall his making those kinds of observations at that time. I accept that his views have changed in the interim, but even allowing for those changes I would ask him to look carefully at, for example, the details of the Moscow treaty. The views that he now espouses are the views of people who have long advocated the importance of reducing the numbers of offensive systems available to the then Soviet Union, now to Russia, and to the United States. The Moscow treaty, as a result of the confidence that the United States now has because of the potential developments of missile defence, has seen the most significant reduction of deployable defensive systems in history. That remarkable success is the result of the end of the treaty that he says should continue.

Again, looking at the missile defence situation, I simply do not understand—I am perfectly willing to hear any argument—why a purely defensive system attracts so much criticism. I could certainly understand my hon. Friend setting out criticism of the further development of offensive systems, but hardly of this kind of defensive proposal.

The Secretary of State should be aware that his statement will be greeted with dismay by many people in Wales, Scotland and other parts of the United Kingdom, not least among members of his own party. Given that the United States has refused to rule out the first use of nuclear weapons, will he not concede one fact: that missile defence is a misnomer—if it works, it might indeed be a defence, but it might also provide the very shield that the United States requires to launch the very first use of nuclear weapons?

The United Kingdom has also consistently refused to rule out a no-first-use policy, for understandable and clearly well-established reasons. The hon. Gentleman is perfectly entitled to his views and to express them, but, if he is to put them in the context of wider defence policy and thinking, he needs to set out more clearly his objections to what is, as I have just said, a purely defensive system that threatens no one and can ultimately only protect people in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, which are fully functioning democracies.

As the Government believe that what they have presented as the greatest threat to world peace—Iraq—can be eradicated by conventional military means, from whom do the Government believe that the threat will come that warrants an anti-ballistic missile system? It was not radar that won the battle of Britain, but Spitfires, so it is perfectly clear that radar alone will not act as a defence for this country. Are we considering a situation in which anti-ballistic missiles will be placed in the United Kingdom?

I am now at risk of sparking a historical debate, but I accept for the avoidance of doubt that a combination of radar, Spitfires and other aircraft won the battle of Britain.

As for Iraq, I set out very clearly in my statement that we regard the threat from Iraq as the single most significant threat, particularly if Iraq is allowed the opportunity to continue to develop not only its weapons of mass destruction, but its means of delivery. I am somewhat puzzled by my hon. Friend's question because, understandably, for reasons that I well recognise, she has been among the most assiduous opponents of any proposal to deal with the threat from Iraq by conventional means. She cannot have it both ways: she cannot argue against conventional means of dealing with Iraq, as well as against the proposal to defend this country and other countries against the threat that Iraq poses. One or other must be a way forward.

The Secretary of State and I have different ideas of candour. I do not think that it is particularly candid to come to the House on 17 December and say, "Surprise, surprise—we have just had a formal request from the Americans to upgrade the radars at Fylingdales" and then, eight sitting days later, come to the House and say, "We are minded to accept it." The fact is that this issue has been around for a very long time.

The Secretary of State's Parliamentary Private Secretary and I visited Washington and attended a briefing at the Pentagon in 1998, when it was made absolutely clear to us that the United States welcomed full British involvement in ballistic missile defence. It would have been much better had we been fully on board as early as possible, not least because the United States would have known in planning, preparing and designing the system that it could have relied on the United Kingdom as a full partner to base in the United Kingdom whatever would be required to make the system a success.

If the Secretary of State continues to insist that he will make decisions as he gets formal requests, he is, frankly, not being candid with the House. It is about time that he made it clear, as he did in making a strong case for the system, that the Government fully support it and are fully committed to it.

Not for the first time recently, I would urge the hon. Gentleman to look carefully at what I have said and to reflect on whether he is suggesting that in any way I have not been candid with the House.

On timing, I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will be able to look at the relevant White House website, which will indicate precisely when the President took the decision on the development of missile defence for the United States. He will see that that decision was taken towards the end of last year and that the request to the United Kingdom followed shortly after. I would be perfectly content with any criticism that might be made from the United States if in any way the hon. Gentleman could verify it, but he is wrong to try to interpret that. There is no such criticism; the United States recognises the contribution that the United Kingdom is prepared to make, and I understand that it is extremely appreciative of the decision-making process in which the United Kingdom has engaged.

If the technology works, why should it not be given to India and Pakistan?

What is interesting about my hon. Friend's question is that, if the technology can be made to work, the United States has indicated that, in quite a short timeframe, it would be willing to go beyond simply protecting United States territory and consider making such a system available to NATO allies. I see no reason in principle why, if such a system can be made to work, it should not be extended further, but that is obviously a matter for the United States.

I welcome the spirit of the Secretary of State's announcement this afternoon because it could have important benefits for the security of the United Kingdom and, indeed, for that of our NATO allies. In considering the whole issue, is it not important to recall that, throughout the cold war, the old Soviet Union maintained a BMD system of sorts—the ABM-1 Galosh system, which ringed Moscow—and that, even today under the new partly democratic Russia, elements of that system still remain in place? If it is all right for the Russians to have such technology in some form, should not we be thinking about it too?

The hon. Gentleman makes an extremely accurate and well-informed observation, with which I entirely agree.

Will my right hon. Friend acknowledge that this is an act of proliferation, that star wars technology, when eventually developed, can have an offensive capacity as well as a defensive one, that it will spur Russia and China to have serviceable nuclear weapons and that it will be another blow to arms control treaties? If, as the Prime Minister has said, the Government are passionately for non-proliferation, why were arms control treaties not even on his listen-back agenda for the United States that he announced last week?

I have debated such issues before with my hon. Friend. I entirely accept his sincerity, but, if he will forgive me for saying so, given that he has long and understandably argued against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which he has done in a very principled way, I do not understand why he regards the development of a defensive system as strategically threatening, particularly when Russia is cutting its deployable offensive systems as a result of agreements made with the United States.

If a missile defence system can be developed, it will not only act as a very clear deterrent to the development of long-range ballistic missiles, but, of course, encourage those countries—for example, North Korea—that could spend their hard-earned foreign currency much better on feeding their own people to do so. My hon. Friend could well apply the logic that he properly applies to such issues but reach an entirely different conclusion: that the development of missile defence systems was encouraging a reduction in proliferation.

The Secretary of State will be aware that there are several key United States bases in East Anglia and that they contribute a vast amount to the local economy. The overwhelming majority of people in East Anglia will welcome this strategic move as a good way to cement the special relationship. In his statement, he mentioned a new technical memorandum of understanding. Surely British businesses want not just an MOU, but firm assurances that they will be able to bid for some of those key contracts.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his observations. As I said earlier, such decisions are ultimately about ensuring national security, which includes East Anglia and other parts of the United Kingdom. Part of our approach is certainly to give opportunities to British industry, and there have already been discussions about the potential involvement of leading companies in the United Kingdom in missile defence. Obviously, we shall now wish to pursue that in the light of the decision that I have taken and the proposal that I have made to the House.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that China's rational response to the development of missile defence would be to increase the number of its missiles and warheads—possibly including dummy missiles—to get through an American missile defence system? If that is China's rational response—I believe that it will be—does my right hon. Friend accept that that could have a serious knock-on effect on other regional neighbours such as India and Pakistan, and on into the middle east? Does he also accept that that is why these systems are potentially so destabilising for the whole world?

As my hon. Friend will be aware from his time in the Foreign Office, China has had an extensive programme for developing ballistic missile defence systems for many years. Given that US proposals for missile defence have never been designed to deal with multiple missiles addressing a particular target, and that they are solely designed to deal with individual missiles from states of concern—which do not include China, as my hon. Friend will be aware—I do not believe that China would need to respond in any way to this proposal. Indeed, China has reacted in a very calm way to the United States' announcement, towards the end of last year, of its intention to develop missile defence systems.

The Secretary of State will be aware that, outside the ranks of the Conservative party, there is very little support for our involvement in George W. Bush's national missile defence programme. That is partly because there are technical doubts as to whether the system will actually work, and partly because, although the Secretary of State may not deem this to be proliferation, some nation states, notably China, certainly do, privately, deem it to be proliferation and, as has been said earlier, may well step up their response, which would destabilise things internationally. It is also because the real and present threat to the people of Britain is not a long-range missile from North Korea, but the kind of terrorism that we saw so tragically on 9/11, and the kind of terrorism that was identified last night. The question that many people outside the ranks of the Conservative party will be asking is whether, when George Bush says "Jump!", our only response is to be "How high?"

I fundamentally disagree with my hon. Friend. I have spent years travelling the country, visiting not only Labour party organisations up and down the United Kingdom but other groups as well, and it has not been my experience that there is very little support for the proposals. Indeed, my experience is that, when the threat is discussed, there is a completely different response: people want to know what we propose to do about it. My hon. Friend needs to look a little more carefully at North Korea. I would not place any confidence in decisions being taken there, not least because, if it goes ahead and abandons its commitment not to test-fly longer range missiles, the United Kingdom would come within range of a missile from that country. I think that my hon. Friend's constituents would want to know, as would mine, what action the Government were taking to deal with such a threat.

Given that national missile defence was originally aimed at protecting the United States, are there no plans for facilities similar to Fylingdales to be established elsewhere in Europe, so that both the United Kingdom and an enlarged Europe can be protected?

As I said in my statement, the United States made a parallel request to Denmark in relation to a radar facility in Greenland. As the US President has said, part of the process that the United States is undertaking involves the need to ensure that any deployable system would, as it is developed, protect not only the United States but its NATO allies.

May I urge my right hon. Friend to reconsider his interim decision? I acknowledge his duty to protect the citizens of the United Kingdom and that the system is a defensive system. Nevertheless, I believe that it will unwittingly add to proliferation. In his further assessment, will he look at the role of the military industrial complex and decide whether it is the real driver in this matter? May I also refer him to the then President Eisenhower's statement of 40 years ago, which highlighted the dangers of the military industrial complex being involved in just this kind of programme?

I appreciate the sincerity with which my hon. Friend puts his case, but I would invite him to consider this point. He says that missile defence might unwittingly add to proliferation, but it will be developed to protect democracies. It will be developed to protect the United States, the United Kingdom and members of the NATO alliance—a fundamental prerequisite of which is that its members should be democratic societies. My hon. Friend is saying that if we do not develop missile defence to protect those democracies, we will be relying on countries such as Iraq or North Korea—neither of which could remotely be described as democracies at present—not to threaten the United Kingdom. If I went to my hon. Friend's constituency and discussed those issues with his constituents, I am pretty sure on which side of the line they would fall, because I suspect that they are not greatly dissimilar to my own. They would say, "Why shouldn't you protect us against the kind of threat that could come from countries like North Korea and Iraq?" With the greatest possible respect to my hon. Friend, I do not think they would say that those countries could be relied on not to develop a threat to the United Kingdom and its citizens.

It is a very sad day indeed when a Secretary of State comes to the House 29 days after confirming that an application has been received from the United States to tell us that he is minded to accept it. Will he confirm that, in reality, the decision to go ahead with national missile defence was made a long time ago, and that it will mean that we are no longer able to support the ABM treaty? I suspect that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Harry Cohen) has said, in future, the Secretary of State will ask us to remove ourselves from a series of other disarmament treaties as well. Is this not the day on which the United States, with British support, has started proliferation again? This is not an interim or technical decision; it is a fundamental departure from the process of disarmament of the past 30 years in the direction of re-armament, and it is being done in a very dangerous way, which can only result in a similar response from China and other nuclear powers.

I believe that I have already dealt with most of the arguments set out by my hon. Friend. He has referred previously to support for the ABM treaty—I have mentioned this to him before—as though somehow the treaty still existed. It no longer exists. It was a treaty between the United States and, originally, the Soviet Union—now Russia, as its successor—and both parties now accept that it has served its useful purpose. In place of that treaty we now have something for which my hon. Friend has long argued: a very substantial reduction in the number of offensive systems. Given the consistency of my hon. Friend's approach to these matters, I should have thought that he would welcome the fact that the ABM treaty has been replaced, and that the Moscow treaty has allowed for that significant reduction for which he has understandably and rightly argued.

Will the Secretary of State concede that, had missile defence been in place, and had it worked, it would not have made a ha'p'orth of difference to the events of 11 September? Does he accept that it takes at least some explaining that, on the day on which the Prime Minister warned against weapons proliferation in an international context, we are signing up to something that will require us fundamentally to breach the outer space treaty, because missile defence will require the militarisation of space in ways that will take us not only into a vast territorial unknown but into a political unknown, allowing weapons use from space? To settle some of the wagering that has been taking place on the Back Benches, will the Secretary of State confirm just how many nanoseconds it took him to say yes to the United States' request for a further annexation of facilities in the United Kingdom—the 51st state of the USA?

My hon. Friend always manages to put his difficult questions with a good deal of courtesy. I can assure him that, as yet, the Government have no plans to install any facilities in Nottingham, South, but I am sure that, if he requests it in his normally persuasive way, that decision could be reconsidered.

More seriously, I do not understand the argument that the terrorist threat manifested in the appalling events of 11 September should take overwhelming priority in relation to any other threats that might happen in the world. I accept that there is an appalling terrorist threat—we have seen the tragic consequences of it in recent times in this country—but to suggest that that means that we should ignore all other threats, if that is what my hon. Friend was doing, is simply wrong.

We have a responsibility to protect the citizens of this country against all the threats that we reasonably detect and to take appropriate action. That is what we are doing. I shall report to the House regularly on developments that the United States proposes, including any that have implications for the outer space treaty. However, I do not approach the matter in the same way as my hon. Friend; I approach it in a way that I believe is in the interests and for the protection of the people of this country.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001; to make further provision relating to the confiscation of intoxicating liquor held by or for use by young persons in public and certain other places; and for connected purposes.

The Bill's aim is simply to restore to the police the power to remove all alcohol from young people in public places so that they do not consume it, get into trouble and cause mayhem in our communities. Let me first establish evidence of current youth drinking habits. The health and science section of the 11 January edition of The Week, under the heading "Teenage binge-drinkers", states:

"British teenagers are drinking more heavily than ever before—and they do it with the sole purpose of getting seriously drunk. Alcohol consumption among children aged 11 to 15 has almost doubled in the past decade…Of the 85 per cent. of 15-year-olds who drink, boys admit to consuming an average of 13.8 units a week—the equivalent of seven pints of lager—and girls 10.7 units. Most of this drinking occurs in just two nights."

Andrew McNeill of the Institute of Alcohol Studies said:

"What we're seeing is an epidemic of binge-drinking. By the time you're 15, getting slaughtered is a central part of your social activities."

I was inspired to do something about this partly by Peggy Grant, who sadly passed away on 23 December. When Peggy was Castle Point's mayor in 1995, she went on to the streets on dark, cold, wet nights at 9 and 10 o'clock, although she was 70, to meet, talk with and understand young people. She tried to solve the problems that we are all so vividly aware of to help the kids and the rest of the community. She found that alcohol was a major contributor to those problems. She had courage, enthusiasm and genuine warmth. She also had dedication, determination and great dignity as mayor of Castle Point. She cared for young and old alike, and was a role model for all politicians—a truly great Conservative mayor who will be much missed in Castle Point.

In 1995, there was, remarkably, no law to prevent young people and children from abusing alcohol in public places. So, with Peggy Grant's encouragement, I introduced a private Member's Bill to give the police powers to stop under-age alcohol abuse and take back control of our streets. My Bill was enacted in 1997 and it worked well across the nation, but then new Labour became the Government and the then Home Office Minister—not, I hasten to add, the Minister for Policing, Crime Reduction and Community Safety, who is in his place—issued a press release stating that the under-age drinking confiscation measure, which meant my Bill, showed

"Labour's determination to crack down on crime and disorder". That was pure, unadulterated new Labour duplicity.

Last year, the Government's Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 removed the power that I had given the police to take unopened cans and bottles of alcohol from youngsters in public places. That was pure, unadulterated new Labour stupidity. The Prime Minister then claimed that he was giving all possible powers to the police to tackle antisocial behaviour, street crime and drugs. That was pure, unadulterated new Labour hypocrisy.

To claim that my Bill was a new Labour initiative and try to take credit for it was a lie; to remove police powers to take alcohol from young children on our streets was stupid; and to claim that all is well and that all is being done on our streets is hypocrisy. So there we have it. New Labour says that it listens and that it acts to tackle crime. It says that it will protect our children and our communities, but it is simply arrogant, stupid and hypocritical—and the Prime Minister is personally responsible.

Let me set out some evidence on under-age drinking. A constituent who said that she would be honoured to be named in this place—I shall just call her Rosemary, however—bravely wrote to me to say:

"The recent change in law has undoubtedly confused youngsters in believing that it is now legal to smoke cannabis in public. I have observed over the past weekend two separate groups of youngsters in the bus shelter outside our house so doing…I wonder how many of them would actually indulge if they were not swigging alcohol at the same time.

It is my opinion that the overindulgence of alcohol is to blame for our youngsters experimenting in the first place…This does not only pertain to the 'odd joint' but harder drugs…crime, and mindless vandalism, the latter of which we see all too frequently…clear rules and laws must be set out to protect our youth and our future society from the somewhat soft approach of the left wing!

My husband and myself do not want to live in fear of street crime but it is always now in the front of our minds."

The House should listen to Rosemary's wisdom.

Let me set out what Basildon's Evening Echo said on 25 October. An article by Gary Pearson says:

"As many as 40 areas in Castle Point may be plagued with the problem of boozy youngsters, according to Tory councillor Bill Dick.

The St. Peter's ward representative voiced his concerns about drink-fuelled teenage nuisance after residents complained".

In another edition, the Evening Echo reported:

"Sgt Matt Bell, of Southend's Licensing Unit, said: 'We all know that there is a link between alcohol consumption and violence."'

On 12 April last year, Inspector Steve Rawlings of Castle Point police wrote to me:

"Youth nuisance and associated damage is a major problem…In the last few months I have spent many thousands of pounds in police overtime to try to resolve the problems…I am sure alcohol will only fuel the situation again. It is unfortunate that the powers you fought so long and hard to get introduced have once again been watered down, to make them virtually useless.

I refer of course to the seizure of alcohol from juveniles. The power was used to good effect during last year…but now its effectiveness has been substantially reduced. As we can now only seize open containers, it will mean that if we find someone with a four pack of lager, and only one tin is open, that is the only one we can seize leaving them with the remainder."

Those may be children of nine, 10 or 11 who are out at 10 o'clock on a Friday night. Inspector Rawlings continues:

"Isn't it a wonderful use of police time making us return four times (and maybe more) to carry out what we used to be able to do on the first occasion."

Bournemouth's The Daily Echo ran a campaign called "Where are your children?", which was launched just after my private Member's Bill became law. It said:

"Children as young as 13 are hitting the bottle in an epidemic of under-age drinking in Bournemouth.

Now police—increasingly on the receiving end of violence and abuse from drunken teenagers—have begun a major crackdown using new powers to seize alcohol from youngsters."

They were using my Bill. The newspaper continued:

"In just two and a half hours, 51 young people aged between 13 and 17 were stopped and searched and alcohol with an estimated value of £110 seized.

A search of a 15-year-old boy also revealed a craft knife capable of inflicting serious wounds."

The hon. Member for South Ribble (Mr. Borrow) told me that his local police are ignoring new Labour's new law and continuing to take unopened cans and bottles from youngsters in public places.

Thus the Government have contrived to make criminals of the police and to help youngsters into crime and drugs. All of us in this place know that the first use of drugs by young people most often takes place under the influence of alcohol. Such is the reality of a bankrupt, arrogant Government who have simply stopped listening.

This raises the question of why the Prime Minister removed the police power last year. Did he think that the police were improperly harassing young drunkards and thugs on our streets? Or he is simply out of touch? Or does he simply not care?

Perhaps the Government will now revert to the common-sense law that worked so well: my original Bill. They may use the Licensing Bill, although I doubt that that would be terribly appropriate. In the meantime, I ask the House to support my new Bill giving the police powers to stop out-of control, dangerous under-age drinking on our streets.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Bob Spink, Mr. David Amess, Mr. Peter Lilley, Mr. Frank Field, the Rev. Martin Smyth, Mrs. Angela Browning, Andy King, Andrew Mackinlay, Mr. Henry Bellingham, Mr. Elfyn Llwyd, Sir Nicholas Winterton and Miss Ann Widdecombe.