What estimate he has made of the expected cost to the Government of maintaining a military presence in Iraq in financial year(a) 2004–05 and(b) 2005–06. [173149]

Before I answer Question 1 may I apologise for the absence of my hon. Friend the Minister for Veterans, who is representing the Government at today's commemoration at Monte Cassino?

Of the £3.8 billion the Chancellor has set aside for operations in Iraq, £850 million was spent in 2002–03 and a further £1.5 billion was drawn down in supplementary estimates in 2003–04. Precise future costs are difficult to forecast.

After that vague reply on the future, why can the Secretary of State not be as honest with the House about the cost of the war as Mr. Rumsfeld is being in the United States? Will he confirm that net costs to the taxpayer currently run at about £125 million a month, excluding Ministry of Defence and Department for International Development costs incurred through the occupation?

The hon. Gentleman knows that I am always honest with the House. The figures that he sets out are roughly consistent with those that I indicated for 2002–03 and 2003–04. He is an economist by trade, but I am sure that he is good at long multiplication.

Will the Secretary of State promise the House that, whatever else may be skimped on and however much it costs, equipment to protect our forces, from the searing, debilitating heat in Iraq from June to September will not be skimped on? We ask a great deal of our soldiers, who should not suffer in that heat because we have failed to act.

I am grateful for my hon. Friend's concern and know that he speaks from a good deal of experience. I assure him that all MOD Ministers and, indeed, the chiefs of staff are prepared to make such an undertaking and that conditions for soldiers in the field today are infinitely better than they were when he served his country.

What is now our mission in Iraq?

Our mission in Iraq is to restore Iraq to the Iraqi people, to ensure a peaceful handover on 30 June and to ensure, as best we can, that we build a democratic, effective society in Iraq that allows it rightfully to rejoin the international community.

The right hon. Gentleman knows that the sums are very large. He will understand that many hon. Members feel that we should not be in Iraq in the first place and are concerned by the lack of a clear strategy. Does he think that the budgetary proposals should be subject to a specific vote in this House of Commons?

Such opportunities are, of course, available, if hon. Members choose to use the procedures. The right hon. and learned Gentleman has been in the House a great deal longer than me and probably knows the rules better than I do. Such opportunities are available to hon. Members, should they choose to pursue them.

If he will make a statement on manning levels in the RAF. [173150]

On 1 April 2004, the trained strength of the regular Royal Air Force was 48,740, which represents a deficit of 830 against the current requirement.

The reduction in the RAF's manning requirement, some 4.5 per cent. over the past four years, is the largest out of all the services. Despite that, the manning deficit is, as the Minister says, growing. Does he consider that effective management and, given the proposed base closures and the scrapped Typhoon and joint strike fighter orders, does he have any idea of future RAF required numbers?

The hon. Gentleman lives in a dream world and is extrapolating his argument from predictions. Recruitment for all three services clearly faces some difficulties and we throw a lot of effort at it. The more people speak up for the armed forces, the greater the chances of success; constant carping and criticism undermine both retention and recruitment.

Is the Minister aware of the concern in Norfolk about the proposed closure of RAF Coltishall and the removal from service of the Jaguar? That comes on top of the Eurofighter, which has had its cannons removed on cost grounds, and the joint strike fighter, which is apparently too heavy to land with a full payload. Does he feel that he is letting the RAF down?

I know who has let down the RAF in the past and we are recovering from those errors of judgment, which occurred across the three services. Again, the hon. Gentleman bases his arguments on press speculation, and I suggest that he wait for a decision—if a decision is made—and make a judgment call on it. His approach adds to the negativity created by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly).

The Minister knows that large-scale restructurings are taking place among various trade groups in the Royal Air Force and that the defence airfield review teams—DARTs—have been examining different base structures. I am sure that he agrees that it is important to have a communications strategy to tell people on the bases about impending changes in a robust and informative way. Is he confident that such a communications strategy exists to minimise unnecessary anxieties on bases such as RAF Lossiemouth and Kinloss?

I would be worried if we were not communicating the matters that we are currently considering. Of course, the end-to-end strategy, which takes into account land and air, has identified significant areas of potential efficiency within uniformed personnel and the civilian support elements, whether directly in support or in industry. I hope that the hon. Gentleman would support such measures to ensure that we extract maximum efficiency so that every pound that has been spent goes to the front line. That is part of what drives our actions. I shall examine existing communications because I appreciate that much effort has gone into ensuring that our people are fully aware of why we are acting, the possible consequences and the benefits that can flow from it.

Since manning depends on the aircraft available, when does the Minister expect the Typhoon and the seriously overweight joint strike fighter, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr. Djanogly) referred, to be in full operational service? Is not it the case that, if the proposed savage cuts reported in the press occur, they will reduce the RAF to a level below the critical mass necessary to maintain a credible air superiority capability for the United Kingdom?

The answer has not changed from that about which the hon. Gentleman has been told. There is nothing new to change the in-service date. Again, he refers to press speculation and extrapolates from that a doom-laden scenario for the RAF. Let us talk up the RAF for a bit.

If he will make a statement on the progress made in delineating tasks between the EU and NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. [173151]

Work continues on the precise delineation of tasks between the EU and NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina in anticipation of the withdrawal of the stabilisation force, SFOR. We would expect the EU force in Bosnia to provide the security framework to enable political and economic development to continue. NATO's continuing role will be to focus on defence reform, including advising the Bosnians on NATO accession and some operational tasks, including counter-terrorism and support of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Does the Secretary of State agree that, if the EU is to take over the principal stabilisation role from NATO by the end of the year, as planned, the EU force will have to have sufficient manpower and resources to carry out its job effectively and that there should be no overlap, turf wars or differences of approach but co-ordination and co-operation between the EU and NATO in Bosnia? Will a British officer command the EU force?

Let me deal with the general principle first. The hon. Gentleman is right that there needs to be absolute clarity about the responsibilities of the EU force and any continuing EU activity in the area. That is why, as I said to hon. Members a few moments ago, we are engaged in detailed discussions to prevent any such overlap and confusion of roles. We are working towards that before any decision is made on the future of SFOR, as he acknowledged in his question. That decision has not yet been made.

My right hon. Friend knows that the EU wishes to be perceived as a major player in the international sphere on maintaining security. Does he believe that that is sufficient reason for dividing security between the EU and NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Since we are considering a Berlin-plus operation, will any non-EU European NATO allies be involved in it?

In a sense, my hon. Friend answered the first part of his question with his reference to Berlin-plus. Arrangements have been established to allow the EU to take advantage of the military assets available to NATO. That was part of the agreement known as Berlin-plus and it will underpin any EU operation in the Balkans. It is important to recognise that not all EU members are necessarily members of NATO. It is right that we should take advantage of their military capabilities to develop the sort of operation for which Europe in particular should be responsible in its sphere of influence. The Balkans is clearly within that. It is right and proper that, if it is decided to end SFOR, the EU should take over.

What assessment he has made of the(a) adequacy and(b) availability of British infantry to respond to additional urgent deployments. [173152]

A number of British infantry units are routinely held in reserve at very high readiness to deploy. This ensures that the Army always has prepared troops available to respond to additional urgent deployments. The adequacy of this system was perfectly illustrated by our extremely swift response to the recent difficulties in Kosovo. The spearhead land element, in this case the 1st Battalion the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment, deployed to theatre in less than 24 hours, undertaking its first patrol the very next day.

That of course is nothing new, but given the massive overstretch facing the infantry battalions of the British Army as a result of the concurrent operations overseas, and the fact that they now face the prospect of non-combat activities in the UK to deal with fuel tax protesters and possibly another firemen's strike, at what point does the Secretary of State anticipate that infantry availability will run out?

The absolute determination of the Opposition to talk down the skills and successes of our armed forces is remarkable. I have just given the hon. Gentleman an excellent illustration of just how ready and available our armed forces are. Within days, they are able to go out on patrol and conduct extremely effective operations in Kosovo, but what happens? The hon. Gentleman talks them down. That is becoming typical of the Opposition as a whole.

Will the Secretary of State give the House a vote on the possible deployment of more troops to Iraq? If not, will he give us an assurance that any such deployment will be in the areas where our troops are now, and not in the positions that the Americans are asking us for?

My hon. Friend has been in the House for much longer than I have and knows full well that decisions on whether votes are taken are a matter for the House. We keep under constant review the question of the number of troops required in Iraq. We have from time to time increased that number in response to specific requests from commanding officers on the ground. Nothing has changed about the situation. I am sure that she and other hon. Members recognise that, if there were an urgent request fore extra troops, it would be the responsibility of the Government to satisfy that request, before the possibility of any House of Commons vote.

In how many countries are British troops currently deployed?

Quite a number.

I thank the Secretary of State for that accurate answer. Members on both sides of the House recognise the fact that infantry battalions are the workhorses of the British Army. They are vital in both military operations and peacekeeping. There are few other armies in which the infantry can move as easily from one aspect of operations to another as our troops can. However, the select Committee, the chiefs of staff and the former Chief of the Defence Staff have all indicated time and again that the Army is suffering from serious overstretch particularly in the infantry. The decision to put the 1st Battalion the Black Watch on stand-by for reinforcing Iraq is an illustration of just how serious that situation is. That regiment has just returned from a tour of duty in Iraq and is now the UK land forces training battalion at Warminster. If the MOD now has to deploy training units, what infantry will be left for further urgent deployments?

Here we go again. The Opposition are absolutely determined to talk down every aspect of the considerable success of the armed forces. Whenever I give illustrations—as I do repeatedly from the Dispatch Box—of just how successful we are, not only in the armed forces but in the management in the Ministry of Defence, all we get from the other side is this determined effort to run down our armed forces.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, if we ask our armed forces to undertake duties on behalf of our country, we should reward, defend and protect them? If it comes to a point at which they are overstretched, can he estimate how much it would cost to equip and man the extra five infantry regiments that the Opposition are talking about, and where would the money come from?

My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the fact that the Opposition appear determined to cut the size of the defence budget. In those circumstances, I am sure that the people of this country would draw the appropriate conclusions about whether they could possibly trust this country's defence to the Opposition.

If he will make a statement on the security situation in Iraq.[173153]

If he will make a statement on the situation in Iraq. [173157]

The whole House will join me in condemning the recent violence and especially the bombing in Baghdad this morning that resulted in the death of Iraq governing council member Izz al-Din Salim. The undemocratic actions of a minority, often perpetrated against fellow Iraqis, will not deter them or the coalition from continuing down the path that we have set out to achieve a democratic transition in Iraq.

Away from the headlines, we are continuing to make steady progress in Iraq. Some 80,000 Iraqi police are helping to provide security to their people. Almost 20,000 reconstruction projects have been completed. Following years of neglect, Iraq's infrastructure is being modernised, with bridges, pylons, railways and water pipelines being constructed right across the country. But we recognise that improving the security situation is crucial to the continuing success of reconstruction. This continues to cause concern, with more than 100 engagements between insurgents and coalition forces just the weekend before last.

On 1 July, authority will pass to an Iraqi interim Government, who will prepare the ground for full elections to a transitional assembly some time around the turn of the year. Iraq will then have, for the first time in many years, a representative, democratic body, chosen by all the people, working on behalf of the entire country. In preparation for this, many Iraqi Ministries have already passed to Iraqi control.

I am grateful for the Secretary of State's detailed reply, but does he understand that most people now regard the Government's approach to Iraq as increasingly incompetent? The Government seem to be acting on a day-to-day basis, rather than working to any coherent strategy. Ministers seem not to understand what is going on; they seem more concerned about how they explain that the buck does not stop with them. Does he understand the serious effect that that must be having on the morale of our troops in Iraq, who continue to do the most courageous and professional work despite the lack of political backing from their masters?

The strategy has been clearly set out on many occasions. I was able to repeat only the highlights. No doubt in the forthcoming debate, we will have the opportunity to identify precisely what the Opposition are complaining about. Aside from the bluster that we sadly have heard repeatedly from the hon. Gentleman, and consistently from Opposition Front Benchers, I have not a single idea as to what the Opposition say about Iraq.

Further to the Secretary of State's answer to the hon. Member for Halifax (Mrs. Mahon), when the House consented last year to committing British troops to war in Iraq, it did so on the basis of that country possessing weapons of mass destruction and progress being made in the wider peace process in the middle east. Progress on both fronts has been difficult to come by. Does he accept that, if a more substantial commitment of British forces is to be made, or if those troops who are already there are to be used differently, it is essential that the House has a say in that first?

It is important that I correct the hon. Gentleman. As he will recall, if he checks the record, we committed forces to Iraq to deal with the failure of Saddam Hussein's regime to co-operate fully with international resolutions, particularly those set out by the United Nations. Certainly, they concern weapons of mass destruction, and efforts are continuing to identify the nature and location of those weapons. However, the hon. Gentleman must understand that we have to deal with attacks on coalition forces, and, as we have seen so tragically this morning, attacks on individual Iraqis, who are all trying to rebuild that country.

The simple question for the Liberal Democrats is, what action would they take now? It is all very well trying to rewrite history, as the hon. Gentleman has done, but what would they do with the situation that British forces now face?

May I put to the Secretary of State a point that I have put to him before? Mass unemployment among Iraqis gives a real kick to the lack of security in Iraq and the American policy of privatisation and favoured contractors does not provide jobs for Iraqis. Will he, on behalf of the UK Government, put distance between the UK and US policies, so that we argue for jobs for Iraqis?

My hon. Friend needs to recognise that the largest single employer in Iraq is the coalition provisional authority, which is the authority responsible for the distribution of large amounts of international aid, the great majority of which comes from the United States. The CPA employs large numbers of Iraqis on reconstruction projects of the kind that I have just set out.

Saddam Hussein is going to be returned to the Iraqi interim government in six weeks. Who will guard him: Iraqis or coalition personnel?

Some of those details are still to be resolved between the Iraqis and coalition forces, but I emphasise that there will be a full transfer of authority on 30 June. It is for the Iraqis to determine the way ahead on these matters and the British Government in particular will co-operate fully in that respect.

Can the Secretary of State assure me that, in the current security situation in Iraq and in any anticipated developments over the next few months, British deployments will still be for six months only, and not for nine months?

Decisions of that kind are taken in response to circumstances on the ground, but I have not seen any need to change the current length of deployments.

The Secretary of State will know that some people argue that the British Government should distance themselves from the Bush Administration in their policy on Iraq. Does he believe that to do so, far from assisting the establishment of security in Iraq, would further undermine the likelihood of security and stability for the people of Iraq?

I agree entirely. We are working together as a coalition and all those who make complaints must answer the question of what they would do. Anyone who seriously suggests early withdrawal from Iraq must recognise that they would be responsible for any conflict that followed.

My right hon. and hon. Friends will wish to associate themselves with the remarks made by the Secretary of State about the dreadful bombing in Iraq this morning.

Given that it is hard to exaggerate how disastrous the last two weeks have been for the Government, and now that their policy on post-conflict Iraq has been so brutally exposed by the absence of any clear political strategy, will the Secretary of State take this moment to set out to the House and the wider country the Government's strategic objectives for the next 45 days until the transfer of power and for the subsequent period until elections?

I answered that question right at the start of Question Time, but I shall take the opportunity to repeat myself, as I shall again in the debate to follow. It is important that we are able on 30 June to hand over to the Iraqi people not only sovereignty, but authority—the ability to take real decisions on the future of their own country. That will lead towards a situation by the end of this year or early next year in which there can be elections and a Government elected for all the people of Iraq. As we do that, we need to become less and less responsible for security as more and more Iraqis assume that responsibility for themselves. We will, however, be there to assist the Iraqis in delivering that security for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

The truth is that the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have accepted almost limitless liability for what happens in Iraq in exchange for very little control over events. At one moment the Prime Minister claims that he is in discussion with the Americans over further troop deployments, but within hours his spokesman denies it. The next moment we are told that we are staying to see this through, but we are subsequently told that the Prime Minister and President Bush are speeding up plans to withdraw troops from Iraq and hand over security to the Iraqis. What kind of message does that send to our troops on the ground and to the Iraqis themselves? Are the Iraqis to co-operate with the coalition, or should they simply sit out our presence and hope for the best when we leave? Does the Secretary of State agree that the absence of a clear political strategy has been the single most serious failing of the occupation? Let us not make it the main feature of the post-occupation period, too.

Order. I must say that in future I expect shorter supplementaries.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. The hon. Gentleman was clearly warming up for his speech later.

The importance of this matter should not be underestimated. I cannot understand from the Opposition what they would do differently. It is all very well to stand there blustering about the absence of a clear political strategy, but one has been set out time and again.

Clearly, we have responsibilities to the Iraqi people to ensure that there is the possibility of reconstruction and improvement in the face of determined terrorist attacks, not only against coalition forces but against the Iraqis themselves, as the events of this morning so vividly and tragically demonstrated. It is important that the Opposition think through their opposition; at the moment, they are simply opposing, with nothing whatsoever constructive to say.

Whether UK armed forces personnel have been based at the Abu Ghraib detention facility since 1 May 2003. [173154]

Three members of the United Kingdom armed forces were based at the Abu Ghraib detention facility between January and April 2004.

The US Administration have admitted the use of so-called stress positions in the interrogation of Iraqi detainees, a practice that they say has now stopped. Did the service personnel mentioned by the Secretary of State report the use of those techniques? If so, to whom did they report and what action was taken? Is there any evidence that stress postures were used by British service personnel in the interrogation of Iraqis at any other detention centre?

This matter has already been reported to the House but I repeat the information so that the hon. Gentleman is not in any doubt. The investigation by the US authorities was into events that took place between October and December 2003. As I have told the House already, the three British service personnel were at Abu Ghraib for a limited period after the events under investigation and did not, therefore, witness any of the events that have been the subject of so much speculation in the press—to which, from the way in which the hon. Gentleman asked his question, he is clearly trying to add. Moreover, the American investigation was already under way by the time that those three service personnel arrived at the facilities. Given that, it would be remarkable if they had seen any of those so-called techniques in use. They had no complaints and they did not report the use of such techniques to the American authorities because they did not witness their use. Nor did they report them to any UK authorities.

Can my right hon. Friend confirm that all allegations of mistreatment by British troops of Iraqi citizens are thoroughly investigated?

I can give that assurance. The moment that serious and substantial allegations are made, proper investigations have got under way. Those investigations continue. Should they lead to a situation in which it is judged by an independent prosecuting authority that charges should be preferred, that would obviously follow.

After 30 June, when we will rightly pass authority for so much to the Iraqi council, will the Abu Ghraib detention centre and other detention centres be staffed by Iraqis?

I have indicated to the House that those are matters that are still under discussion, but in principle the answer is yes. Authority will pass to the Iraqis to be increasingly responsible for their own affairs and it is obviously important that that is seen to be the case on the ground. However, I emphasise to the House that matters are still subject to negotiation.

I am sure that my right hon. Friend will agree that it is essential that we are seen to be behaving correctly in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. In his discussions with our coalition partners, will he ask them to ensure that we are aware of any future allegations of systematic misconduct that may be laid against any member of the coalition?

Certainly it is important that there is a full and frank exchange of information when such issues arise and I take note of my hon. Friend's suggestion.

What arrangements have been made for counselling troops in units that have suffered casualties in Iraq. [173155]

Military personnel deployed to Iraq receive pre-deployment and post-deployment briefing on mental health issues. Trained mental health professionals have also been deployed and are available to military personnel in theatre. However, psychiatric debriefing is not routinely offered to individuals or units who have been exposed to combat.

Surely when young servicemen lose colleagues in the theatre of war, they should not so much be offered as receive, from non-military personnel, guidance, help and support. They should be able to work through their anger and distress and that should not be recorded as a weakness by military personnel.

There are extensive arrangements in place to deal with all those issues. Procedures were put in place after the last Gulf war that were found to have no real clinical advantage and as a result they were not continued. It is about ensuring that, if a request for help is made, it is made available. It is also about monitoring by senior officers and others in the chain of command of what is happening to those under their command. The way in which we handle such situations is very sensitive and they are taken seriously, but no significant complaints—or any complaints—have been made to date that would support the way in which the hon. Gentleman has raised that question.

May I ask my right hon. Friend about the recording of casualties in Iraq? Does he feel that there is a moral, if not necessarily strictly legal, obligation on the occupying forces to record civilian deaths as well as military deaths; and does he feel that the failure to record Iraqi civilian deaths has an adverse impact on Iraqi people's perception of the occupying forces?

The question was about the counselling of our troops. I do not know whether my hon. Friend is suggesting that their being asked to do certain things, then doing them, causes them additional stress.

On the counting of civilian deaths, Iraq is a most difficult environment in which to operate. Where face-to-face conflict has taken place, there may be no indication that a civilian casualty or death has occurred, but a body is then removed from the scene and buried almost immediately. Some people are saying that we should take those bodies out of the ground and examine them for medical and other evidence. That is a completely nonsensical approach.

This is a very difficult situation and we do our best to ensure that proper counting takes place. Indeed, we are currently trawling all our records to ensure that we have not missed any matters that may have been reported. We are trying very seriously to deal with this, but I hope that my hon. Friend recognises just how difficult the environment is.

On behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, I associate myself with the Secretary of State's remarks about this morning's appalling outrage in Iraq.

The Minister knows that in addition to the casualties in Iraq from the initial war-fighting phase and the ongoing peacekeeping support operation, several members of the British forces have tragically been killed in accidents. What facilities for counselling are available to their families? Given that our forces are effectively on duty in Iraq for 24 hours a day, does he agree that the partners of any British troops killed in Iraq should be entitled to a full war pension?

We have identified some shortfalls in the way in which the counselling of families is approached. That is why the point-of-contact approach of those who report injuries or fatalities to families has been looked at again to see whether there is a more appropriate way of dealing with such situations and to ensure that all personnel who have to carry out an undoubtedly very difficult task are appropriately trained and understand the sensitivity of the issue. It is a learning process, and we have taken on board some valuable lessons in recent months and years. That process can never rest, because we are likely in future to turn up new problems that we must revisit. We have to try to get it right at all times and to understand the sensitivities involved.

As regards pensions, I will write to the hon. Gentleman.

If he will make a statement on his assessment of the reports by(a) the International Committee of the Red Cross and(b) Amnesty International on the role of British troops in operating prisons in southern Iraq. [173156]

If he will make it his policy to ensure that all reports received from Amnesty International and the International Committee of the Red Cross concerning the behaviour of British forces are drawn immediately to the attention of Ministers. [1731591]

The Ministry of Defence receives millions of individual items of correspondence each year. Clearly, it would be impractical for Ministers to see it all, and we must therefore rely on officials' judgment to select those items that require ministerial attention. Some correspondence and reports from organisations such as those mentioned in both questions will fall into this category; others can be dealt with by officials. However, I would normally expect Ministers to see the kinds of reports that were mentioned.

I have seen two reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross that deal with the role of British troops in operating detention facilities in southern Iraq. One raises two serious issues affecting UK armed forces that had been dealt with well before the report was received; the other is a more recent working paper.

I am not aware of any Amnesty International reports that deal specifically with the way in which we operate our detention facilities, but it has reported allegations of abuse in UK custody that have been investigated and replied to. Two recent reports from Amnesty make serious allegations about the conduct of UK personnel more generally, covering the period since British troops went into Iraq. Those are being investigated and will be dealt with in the same way.

The Secretary of State's reply is somewhat different from the one given by the Minister of State during the debate on Thursday, which, as regards Amnesty International, was merely centred in a one-page letter sent about seven months ago about one incident. Should not reports from Amnesty International be seriously considered by the House? Traditionally, Amnesty International has been held in the highest regard by the labour movement, so what it has to say should be taken on board and examined.

I emphasise that we have received a number of reports, letters and a dossier from Amnesty International—some from the UK section and at least one letter from the Italian section. Each was replied to, once appropriate investigations were completed; for example, the most recent letter we received from Amnesty prompted us to conduct yet a further investigation of all our files relating to Iraq to establish whether Amnesty had raised any new matters in its correspondence. One of the problems that we have faced with that particular organisation is that it has recycled many previous cases in new items of correspondence. Nevertheless, we treat each of those matters very seriously and give each the appropriate investigation.

The Secretary of State's attitude to this question today is rather different from that of his Minister of State last Thursday. In the words of the popular song, "Sorry may be the hardest word", but would not the Minister have been well advised to use that word last Thursday rather than seeking to twist the word "report" away from any recognisable dictionary definition of it? Would not the Secretary of State, too, be well advised to say sorry to our troops in Iraq for his failure to put proper procedures in place to ensure that he and his Minister of State were fully aware of accusations, ill founded or well founded, made against those troops by reputable international organisations?

I do not accept that for a moment. I am sure that if the hon. Gentleman understood more about the way Departments operate he would thoroughly understand that Ministers have investigated those matters, in detail and at length, whenever allegations have been made at an appropriate stage.

Could the Secretary of State help me? I am very, very confused as to what happens to reports from the International Committee of the Red Cross. The reports are obviously serious and important and come from an international organisation of enormous repute, so can he tell us what has happened to those officials who apparently decided either that Sir Jeremy Greenstock did not need to see the reports or that they were to be sent to joint staff headquarters, the Foreign Office basement, or wherever? What procedures have been put in place to ensure that in future Ministers—Ministers—see such reports when they are produced?

My hon. Friend asks a fair question about the situation. We ask officials to exercise their judgment.

When officials in the Ministry of Defence saw the report they judged, in the light of the two serious allegations concerning UK soldiers, that those matters were well in hand; indeed, investigations had begun about five months before. Nevertheless, as I made clear in the answer that I have just given the House, it is important that Ministers see such reports and appropriate action has been taken to ensure that that happens in the future.

It is surely unacceptable for the Secretary of State to try to use his officials as a bombproof shelter for him and his fellow Ministers. Is it not a fact that anybody with any appreciation of the situation in Iraq must know that the worst thing for coalition aims is that abuses of this sort rally the population behind the insurgents? It should have been blindingly obvious that those reports should have been at the top of the Secretary of State's agenda; and his failure, and that of his colleagues, to treat them with due gravity is partly responsible for the fact that, having won a military campaign, we are now losing the political settlement afterwards.

I suggest that the hon. Gentleman discuss with those of his Front-Bench colleagues who have some experience of government what happens when officials assess reports. In this case, I have taken appropriate responsibility. I am not—as the hon. Gentleman is—seeking to blame officials. Officials looked at the report and made their judgment. I accept that they must exercise their judgment and that Ministers are responsible for their judgment. That is what happened in this case, and no matter the amount of effort by the Opposition to turn this into some sort of ministerial responsibility as far as the actual decision is concerned, it simply will not wash. The hon. Gentleman should talk to those who have been in government. We can all recall occasions on which Conservative Members have had to come to the House and apologise for their failures in government, so the hon. Gentleman really ought to know better.

Does the Secretary of State agree that the work of the Red Cross and Amnesty International in highlighting abuses across the world is held in very high regard on both sides of the House and that there is an urgent need to investigate these allegations? However, does he also agree that they remain allegations and that, until they are proven otherwise, it is of great disservice to the troops who are still serving in Iraq and to their families back home to pretend otherwise?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I thank him for that note of common sense in this debate, a note of common sense that the Opposition have sadly been incapable of demonstrating on this issue, as they are determined to score very poor political points. It is important that the people against whom allegations are made be given the opportunity of responding to those allegations and that thorough investigations be conducted. That is precisely what the Government set out.

How many British armed forces personnel are deployed to the Gulf region. [173158]

There are some 10,000 British armed forces personnel deployed to the Gulf region.

I am grateful to the Minister for that answer, but may I refer him to the reply that the Secretary of State gave to my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Norfolk (Mr. Simpson)? Despite what the Government say, a number of units have received unofficial warning orders to go to the Gulf as reinforcements. One of those units is that fine regiment, the Black Watch, which neither I nor any of my colleagues would dream of talking down. The fact remains that colleagues and friends of mine in that regiment tell me that, because of Government indecision, they are having to train almost in secret for these operations and they are making very unfavourable comparisons with precisely the same level of Government dithering that went on before the war started last year. Will the Minister now come clean and give our soldiers the warning orders that they require so that they can be launched properly prepared and properly trained into dangerous circumstances?

I am surprised at the hon. Gentleman, given his experience of the Army—if certainly not of government. If he is alleging that we do not properly train our service personnel and that we put untrained personnel in harm's way, he has forgotten everything that he knew when he was in the armed forces. I do not know whom he has spoken to who says that that is now our approach. We will always train our personnel to the best of our ability and their abilities. Once any decision is taken to deploy our troops, the best and most available troops will be ready and trained to take on whatever tasks are available. We saw that to great effect in the recent deployment to Kosovo.

The House would agree that the breathtaking incompetence verging on treachery that was displayed by certain sacked newspaper editors has imperilled large numbers of British troops not only in the Queen's Lancashire Regiment but elsewhere and has, therefore, made greater deployments to southern Iraq more likely. Specifically, will the Minister comment on the suggestions that, as Spanish troops are withdrawn, the sphere of responsibility of British forces will be widened to include Najaf province and Najaf city? What would the implications of that be?

We have made it clear all along that an issue has to be dealt with because of the withdrawal of Spanish forces. That area is now covered by US forces, and we have said that how we deal with the issue in the longer term must be the subject of discussions within the coalition. I am sure that my hon. Friend understands the reasons for that. If and when we announce any change to our posture, the House will be duly notified, as my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has said.

What(a) special and(b) specific training has been given to non-Royal Military Police soldiers who are being employed as guards in detention camps in Iraq. [173160]

Specialist handling of detainees by non-Royal Military Police soldiers is provided by members of the Adjutant-General's Corps (Military Provost Staff)—the AGC (MPS)—who receive training relevant to their role running the military corrective training centre in Colchester. The expertise of the AGC (MPS) is in the field of custodial care.

The United Kingdom is bound by military law to include the law of armed conflict in military training programmes, which includes the handling and treatment of prisoners of war. All personnel are trained to observe the values and standards expected of the British Army, which includes the concepts of decency and respect for others. During pre-deployment training all units are briefed on procedures for dealing with prisoners of war and, since October 2003, each combat unit is mandated to have eight to 10 senior non-commissioned officers trained in the handling of prisoners of war.

Up to a point, that is a good answer, but can I probe a little further? As I understand it, a large number of people employed as prison guards in the detention camps, who are guarding not prisoners of war but civilian detainees, are not from the Adjutant-General's Corps. For how long is the ordinary infantry soldier, who did not join to be a prison guard, trained? How many ordinary infantry soldiers are acting as prison guards? For how long are they expected to act as prison guards?

The hon. Gentleman asks some impossible questions—I mean, how long is a piece of string? On the basis of what my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said about the new provisions post-30 June, we will, of course, alter some of the characteristics on which his questions are based.

On the extent of the training, the hon. Gentleman will know from his experience that the training process runs right through from phase 1 to when people may be required to undertake that custodial role. They are made aware of the culture into which they are going and the nature of the approach that they have to adopt towards anyone who is in their custody, which is to accord them the highest respect, both in human rights terms and in other ways.

Our detention centre has an extensive programme that takes account of all that. It is why the ICRC's second report, which has been mentioned, said after that inspection that the conditions are fairly good. We cannot go further than that because we do not discuss the detail of ICRC reports, but I am confident that we are putting in a lot of effort. That is why we have put an additional resource in the hands of combat units that may arrest people by giving each combat unit senior non-commissioned officers who have specialist knowledge and skills

What(a) civil service and(b) military responsibilities he plans to relocate from London and the south-east to the northern regions of England. [173161]

The Ministry of Defence continually examines ways of improving military capability and value for money for the taxpayer, including the size and location of our estate. We are now undertaking further examination of where estate rationalisation may be possible, and we will, of course, take account of the Lyons Review.

Will my right hon. Friend pay tribute to the important role performed by the Defence Vetting Agency? Does he recall how efficiently the agency created its new headquarters at Imphal barracks in York and the assistance it got from the York Inward Investment Board, or york-england.com as it now calls itself? Will the MOD continue to work with the York Inward Investment Board on the possibility of bringing more jobs to Yorkshire?

My hon. Friend is right. The Defence Vetting Agency is a good example of the transfer of staff to the regions, in this case York. He refers to york-england.com, which is very active in ensuring that there is a collective view on how the opportunities that Yorkshire and the northern region for which it has responsibility can best be served. There was a meeting between MOD personnel and york-england.com at a seminar on 5 May, and relocation opportunities were discussed in the light of the Lyons report. Those ongoing contacts will be maintained.

To assist the Minister with that task, should he not be aware of the number of military personnel and civilian personnel at the four existing defence establishments in the Vale of York? Will he therefore reconsider his reply to me and give me those figures at the first available opportunity?

I do not have the figures to hand. There is a significant military presence, with a good number of military bases, within York and the immediate surrounding area. I think there are about 14,000 military personnel in and around the York area. I shall write to the hon. Lady with the precise figures.

What role the armed forces will play in the 300th anniversary celebrations in Gibraltar. [173163]

As I was able to set out on my recent visit to Gibraltar, the armed forces are playing a full part in commemorating Gibraltar's tercentenary this year. Bands of the Royal Marines, the Royal Engineers and the Royal Air Force, the Royal Gibraltar Regiment and other military units from the United Kingdom, Royal

Navy ships and the Royal Fleet Auxiliary are taking part in a total of more than 20 events throughout the year.

Will my right hon. Friend restate his commitment to Gibraltar and ensure that it remains an overseas territory?

My hon. Friend campaigns tirelessly on behalf of the people of Gibraltar and I commend him for his efforts. I am delighted, not least in this tercentenary year, to commit myself and the Ministry of Defence, on behalf of the Government, to continuing good relations with the people of Gibraltar.

What his policy is on the positioning of wind farms near military ranges. [173164]

The Ministry of Defence fully supports Government policy and targets for renewable energy. We do not oppose wind farm developments unless the safety of MOD personnel or the public, UK defence systems or our operational capability appear to be adversely affected. That applies to both onshore and offshore developments.

Is the Minister aware that there is a helicopter range just off the coast of Somerset, and that West Somerset district council is about to receive an application for 12 wind turbines, 300 ft high and 128 ft across, just down the coast from the range? Has the Minister not thought what damage could be done, first to the helicopters and secondly to the wind farm, should things go wrong?

I have. As I made clear in my answer, we have to ensure that there is compatibility between these twin objectives. I am advised that we have received applications for some 15 wind farm developments in Somerset; all the 11 objections raised were connected with radar interference, and none related to interference with range activities. It is not only the Ministry of Defence that is concerned about radar interference; civilian operations can also be affected by wind farms. We have to weigh our clear objective on renewable energy against the way in which wind farms can affect military or civilian overflights.

In that case, does my right hon. Friend recognise that it would be helpful if the Government were involved in the research on the effect on radar of wind farms at sea? It is clear that sufficient work has not yet gone into ensuring that we are well aware of the impacts of those structures, both on shipping and on radar installations.

My hon. Friend is very experienced in these matters, and I bow to her greater immediate knowledge. She may have seen some research that I have not seen. All of us in the Government must make sure that we have a guaranteed approach that takes into account all the points of scientific and practical interest

which must be resolved. I am sure that those who have direct responsibility for carrying out the risk research will hear what my hon. Friend says, and I know that she will continue to pursue Government action on the matter.

The Government have just announced a major increase in the deployment at RAF Scampton. Star Energy has made an application to site half a dozen wind turbines, each as tall as Lincoln cathedral, within half a dozen miles of that major RAF base. Will the Minister explain his strategy? Will his officials take an interest in the matter? Is there a minimum distance requirement connected with radar or operational safety with which he can acquaint the House? This is obviously a matter of the utmost importance.

The hon. Gentleman is right: it is a matter of the utmost importance that when we are relocating activity, in this case in the RAF, we take account of the region into which it is being moved. New applications for wind farms are covered by the response that I gave to the previous questions: we need to make sure that there is compatibility between the twin, or in some cases multiple, objectives that the Government are trying to deliver. We therefore take an interest in these matters. A decision has been made about RAF Scampton and is in the process of being finalised, and any change to the environment is something in which we would take a close interest.

I have selected the amendment in the name of the Prime Minister.

I beg to move,

That this House notes with concern the deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the Middle East and the impact on public opinion in Iraq of the reports of mistreatment of Iraqi citizens and detainees; believes that progress in Iraq is only possible if the role of the United Nations is expanded and enhanced and the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis on 30th June is real and visible; recalls that on 18th March 2003 when this House endorsed military action against Saddam Hussein it did so on an understanding that progress on the road map for a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians would be a priority for Her Majesty's Government; expresses its disappointment that recent events have made the achievement of a negotiated two state solution more difficult and less likely; recognises the bravery and professionalism of British armed forces serving in Iraq in difficult and dangerous circumstances; calls upon Her Majesty's Government not to commit any further troops unless requested by United Kingdom commanders in Iraq for the purposes of securing the safety of British forces and the fulfilling of Britain's legal obligations under international law towards the inhabitants of Iraq; and further declares that any such troops should remain under United Kingdom operational command and within the area currently under United Kingdom control.

It is worth recalling that we went to war against Iraq on a threat and a promise. The threat was that of weapons of mass destruction, and the promise that of progress in the middle east peace process. But neither threat nor promise has been fulfilled. No weapons of mass destruction have been found. and none appears likely to be found now. The Iraq survey group has disappeared from view and its head has resigned. The road map has been rolled up. Unilateral action by Mr. Sharon has been approved and a negotiated settlement in the middle east seems further away than ever.

There is more. The coalition of which the United Kingdom is a member is shamed and embarrassed by the treatment of detainees while in the custody of the United States, and we may yet suffer domestic shame and embarrassment when current inquiries are completed. Here in the United Kingdom, there is no acceptable explanation of why Ministers did not see communications from the Red Cross and Amnesty International. The handover date of 30 June now depends on the efforts of Lakhdar Brahimi and the United Nations—the same United Nations that was sidestepped by the coalition in spring 2003. There is some irony there, which will, not doubt, not be lost in Manhattan.

Violence in Iraq is on the increase, as British troops found at the weekend when they had to bayonet their way to safety. The tragic death this morning of the head of the Iraq governing council is yet another demonstrable success for terrorism. In the minds of many Iraqis, the army of liberation is delivering much less than it promised. At Falluja, the United States has had to acknowledge the failure of the doctrine of decisive force. Thousands of Iraqis have died since March 2003, but we do not even afford them the dignity of keeping an accurate estimate of their numbers.

It is indeed a brave new world, and it is hard not to be angry—angry for Britain and its reputation; angry for the brave young men and women who are serving in difficult and dangerous conditions in Iraq; angry, too, for a House of Commons that was persuaded to support military action on a flawed prospectus and, as we now know, with no clear strategy for the aftermath of conflict.

We were told last week—the reports were, no doubt, inspired by the Government—that extra troops were to be deployed to Iraq, perhaps in Najaf. However, there were reports this weekend that, on the contrary, we were no longer in for the long haul and that we were talking about withdrawing troops before 2005–06. Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the Government owe the House an explanation of their strategy and of what we are planning to do with a country for which we have taken responsibility?

There is no way to answer the hon. Gentleman's question other than in the affirmative. I shall set out some conditions that are appropriate in the event that additional troops are thought necessary, but he has put his finger on something that I hope the Secretary of State will explain, not just to the House but to people outside.

It is hard not to be angry that, in the name of a coalition of which the United Kingdom is a member, detainees have been subject to degrading and inhumane treatment, for which no one takes political responsibility. Asking Private Lynddie England to take all the blame seems a little unfair.

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree with the proposition that, if the United States Government deny people in Guantanamo bay their civil and legal rights, it is perhaps not surprising that junior soldiers feel the same way, and that that is a severe indictment of that Administration?

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has made that point on previous occasions in the House and I have supported him on some of those occasions. There are still British citizens in Guantanomo bay and they are entitled to due process and a trial according to the accepted principles of law. If no such trial is available to them, they should be returned to the United Kingdom so that we can consider whether or not there are adequate grounds for prosecution.

I am angry about these matters, not because I was deceived, but because my scepticism and that of many others is increasingly justified. I am angry because our relationship with the United States, put into sharp focus in recent times, should be a partnership of influence, and we should not be so subordinate that we often appear to be subservient. What sort of relationship is it if we are actively discouraged from public criticism of the US Administration and their ultimate responsibility for the

humiliation or, as one writer put it, debauchery towards the Iraqis in their custody? In the House, we have to rely on the feline ambiguities of the Leader of the House.

While concurring with the sentiments of the right hon. and learned Gentleman about Guantanamo bay and the mistreatment of detainees there and in Iraq, does he not agree that all decent people in the House and beyond hope and pray for peace and democracy in Iraq? Is it not distasteful that his party is putting success or failure in Iraq at the top of its Euro-election campaign agenda, so that real failures such as the assassination this morning or imaginary failures such as the forgeries in theDaily Mirror are desirable to fuel electoral success? Is that not shameful opportunism when there is a need for genuine debate?

I have not met a single elector who objects to the issue of Iraq being raised in relation to the European elections. In the course of the campaign, I have met many people who wish to raise the question of Iraq and Britain's role. They wish to express their anxiety about the nature of present events and the long-term consequences for the United Kingdom.

What sort of relationship allows Members of Congress more licence to criticise the Bush Administration than it does the British Government? The harsh, unpalatable truth for Washington is that only the United Nations can save us all. All the coalition eggs are well and truly in the UN basket. If Brahimi fails, what is the alternative strategy? I do not have an answer to that question, but those who took military action against Iraq ought to have one, because it is by no means certain that the efforts of Lakhdar Brahimi will be successful.

Ambassador Brahimi has been asked to appoint an interim Government who are truly representative of the Iraqi people, and we all hope that he succeeds. There is more hope if he appoints that Government rather than the coalition, but that does not address the problem of troop withdrawal. We have not said that if the interim Government ask us to withdraw our troops we will do so; we have said that we hope that that would come about. Mr. Brahimi had the same authority in Afghanistan, but he had no authority over the US troops, and the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. His authority to appoint an interim Administration does not necessarily mean that we will get an exit strategy for our troops, but that has not been made clear.

My view is that it would be difficult for a provisional Government, appointed by Lakhdar Brahimi, to exercise the sort of responsibility that the right hon. Lady suggests, but I am in absolutely no doubt whatsoever that, when we get to the stage of a democratically elected Government of the Iraqi people, that institution must have total responsibility for the conduct of Iraq. Indeed, at that point, I would say that

the United Kingdom and others should begin a phased withdrawal of their troops. The responsibility for Iraq, given to the Iraqi people, must be whole and complete.

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I will continue.

In New York, we should be arguing for a Security Council resolution that is maximalist, not minimalist—arguing along with France and Russia for the maximum transfer of authority to the provisional Government—but the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi people must be about substance, not simply ceremony. The raising of flags and patriotic music will be no adequate substitute for real authority.

The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) mentioned the exit strategy. Let me suggest principles that should most certainly apply. First, all our effort should be directed to supporting the United Nations in establishing a provisional Government, to whom as many functions as possible should be transferred. Secondly, once a provisional Government have been established, all our efforts should be directed to supporting the United Nations in the preparations for the elections. Thirdly, as soon as an Iraqi Government have been democratically elected, under United Nations supervision, United Kingdom troops should begin a phased withdrawal.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware no doubt that the Iraq governing council, no less, has accused the United Nations of massive institutional fraud over the oil-for-food programme—a fraud that is estimated to be about $64 billion. Bearing it in mind that that fraud has directly enriched Saddam Hussein and his supporters, undoubtedly involves members of the Security Council and, indeed, the UN itself and has probably provided money to fund the very insurgency that our troops are now fighting, does he believe that the UN is an entirely suitable body to carry out that task?

I ask the hon. Gentleman to suggest an alternative. I do not know that there is any queueing up, and I do not know that there is any alternative strategy on offer either. He is quite right to point to the disgrace of the fraud in relation to the oil-for-food programme. Perhaps he should consider whether he is entitled to say that members of the Security Council may have been involved—that is a rather sweeping statement—but he is certainly right to highlight the fraud. I for one am most certainly disappointed that the extent of the fraud was so considerable and that moneys may well have been diverted in the directions to which he has referred, but if he has an alternative to Lakhdar Brahimi, let us hear it, because it is only in him, in the United Nations and in the Secretary-General of the United Nations that any prospect rests of keeping the date of 30 June, chosen not for its intrinsic merit, but rather for its importance as a signpost in the American domestic political campaign. That date can be kept only if the United Nations ensures that it is kept.

The one thing that puzzles me about the line of argument that the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his fellow Liberal Democrats advance is that the United Nations—while it may or may not have some moral authority, depending on one's point of view—has no resources other than those provided by its membership. There is no army or police force belonging to the United Nations. Where are the army and the police force that he wants and needs to enhance the security situation in Iraq, outside the current coalition? There are no volunteers who will simply put on blue berets and come and do the job that he wants them to do.

I do not think anyone has suggested a blue beret force in the circumstances of Iraq.

Who is going to do it?

Exactly. As the hon. Gentleman says, who is going to do it? It is not possible to have a blue beret force, but we could have had a Security Council resolution in the same terms as that which was adopted for the first Gulf war, which provided that all necessary means should be used for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, which accepted that the United States would be in command, but which insisted that that force had to report back and be subject to the authority of the Security Council. That most certainly would have been a much more politically attractive solution than the one that was arrived at, of a self-generating coalition going in the circumstances that we now know and side-stepping the United Nations.

Is the right hon. and learned Gentleman aware that there are a number of countries with distinguished United Nations military service that have said that they would be happy to commit troops in a circumstance that was fully authorised by the United Nations—countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia, which have a particular credibility in the Muslim world? Would that not be an attractive proposition, to try and get the maximalist United Nations mandate that is propounding, and help us move with international credibility to a new phase of peacekeeping?

There is no doubt that if such countries were to become part of a coalition authority, they would require a maximalist United Nations resolution, but I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that there is the possibility between now and 30 June, for example, of putting together a UN force with blue berets. In my judgment that is not practical. That is why I have referred not only on this occasion but on others to the advantage of an arrangement similar to that used in the first Gulf war.

I am touched by the right hon. and learned Gentleman's faith in United Nations resolutions. How would he answer constituents of mine, refugees from Iraq, who said that if one mistake was made, it was in the first Gulf war, when we stopped at the border in compliance with the UN resolution?

If I may say so, I do not think that the hon. Lady was in the House at that time. She would not have found much support for that view. She would not have found much support for that view from President Bush's father or from Mr. John Major, who was the Prime Minister at the time. The consequence of doing what she suggests is that the coalition that had been created for the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait would have broken up. In addition, the Iraqi forces at that time were much more effective than those we found when the military action took place last year and there would have been the risk of very substantial casualties. The arguments against going to Baghdad in 1991 were overwhelming at the time, and in my judgment have not been diminished in any way since.

Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that if the occupation continues after 30 June, and all that the Iraqi people are being offered is another appointed Government—appointed by whoever—that will be viewed by the Iraqi resistance in rather the same way as the Vichy regime was viewed by the French resistance in wartime France?

But it is not practical to have elections between now and 30 June. That is the date of the agreed handover to a provisional Government.[Interruption.] It might meet the hon. Gentleman's point if there were a sufficient and detailed commitment to—[Interruption.]

Order. Allow the right hon. and learned Gentleman a hearing. It is unfair to him when there are so many conversations going on.

What would meet the hon. Gentleman's point would be if it was clear that the move towards elections was serious and was being undertaken; that there was voter registration and that the necessary institutions were being established. But I do not think that it is possible to achieve what he would like to achieve in the time available.

As soon as an Iraqi Government have been democratically elected, UK troops should begin a phased withdrawal. But in the meantime, I am firmly of the view that we should commit no further forces to Iraq unless at the request of British commanders on the ground; unless for the purpose of securing the safety of existing British forces in Iraq; unless for the purpose of fulfilling legal obligations incumbent upon us under international law, including, if necessary, a fresh resolution from the Security Council; unless any such troops remain under United Kingdom operational command; and unless any such troops are deployed within the area currently under United Kingdom control.

There should be no question of British forces extending their role and responsibility in Iraq. There should be no question of British forces providing a substitute for any forces that may have been withdrawn

by other coalition members. We have made more than an adequate contribution. I suspect that many hon. Members think so; I am certain the whole country thinks so.

Operational command of such troops should remain with United Kingdom commanders. General Sir Michael Jackson, with characteristic frankness, a fortnight ago described differences in doctrine between ourselves and the United States and we have seen illustrations of those differences. We should not put our forces into a position in which they may have to choose between following an order or following their training and their instincts.

It is now commonplace for some to argue for immediate withdrawal. To those I say this: consider the consequences of that. Inevitably, terrorism and violence would flourish and instability could easily spread throughout the region. But more significantly, the United Nations' effort, which is the only political track presently available, would be fatally undermined.

To be against immediate withdrawal is not to be in favour of an open-ended commitment. The Iraqi people must be given the responsibility for themselves and their government as soon as possible. I commend the motion to the House.

I beg to move, To leave out from "House" to the end of the Question, and to add instead thereof:

"welcomes the work being done by the UK and its Coalition partners to establish stability and security in Iraq; regards any mistreatment of Iraqis by Coalition forces to be unacceptable; recognises the bravery and professionalism of British forces in Iraq in assisting the Iraqi people in rebuilding Iraq; applauds the work of the UN Secretary-General's special adviser, Lakhdar Brahimi, for his contribution to helping establish a sovereign Iraqi Interim Government which will assume power by 30th June; and supports the Government in its efforts to secure a new Security Council resolution and deliver the wishes of the Iraqi people for a sovereign, stable and democratic Iraq."

On behalf of the Government, I should like to repeat our regret following the death this morning of Izzedine Saleem, president of the Iraq governing council. Our thoughts are with him and with his family at this terrible time, to whom we extend our condolences.

Izz al-Din Salim was a tireless advocate for Iraq and for its people. He was exiled from his home by Saddam Hussein and, until last year, lived in London, where he worked as a writer and activist in the service of his people. When the former regime fell, he returned to Iraq as head of the Islamic Dawa party in Basra, where he earned the respect of local people and the coalition.

Izz al-Din Salim's death is an enormous loss to Iraq. It is too early to say whether this morning's attack was specifically targeted at him. In any event, it is a further tragic demonstration of the callousness of the minority who seek to challenge the rule of law and undermine the establishment of a democratic, peaceful Iraq. It demonstrates why we are determined to deal with those who perpetrate these criminal acts of terrorism. It demonstrates that these attacks are against the Iraqi people themselves, just as much as against coalition forces. We are working with the Iraqi people, and together we will succeed.

Izzedine Saleem's death also demonstrates why the coming months are critical for the future of Iraq.

I join my right hon. Friend in offering my condolences to the family of Mr. Salim. I spent half an hour talking to Mr. Salim last Thursday. He was a gentle scholar who had contributed a lot to the governing council and to the future of a democratic Iraq. It was said earlier that his death was a triumph for terrorism, but it is the complete opposite. It will be a triumph for terrorism unless we stay the course, and Mr. Salim and all the members of the governing council, and all those who are fighting for the future of a democratic Iraq, would, I think, feel exactly the same. We must stay the course.

Like me, my hon. Friend has met a number of members of the governing council, which is united in its determination to resist terrorism and criminal acts. I emphasise that the attack was against the Iraqi people, whom we cannot afford to let down, and I entirely support my hon. Friend's point.

We are attempting to transfer authority, after decades of tyranny, to an elected, representative Government in Iraq. I specifically refer to the transfer of authority, rather than simply sovereignty, because sovereignty resides with the people of Iraq and cannot be taken from them, although their rights have frequently been usurped over the years.

On 30 June, authority in Iraq will pass to the Iraqi interim Government; the extent of the authority that we will be able to hand to them has been subject to recent debate. On 1 July, the coalition provisional authority and the Iraqi governing council will dissolve. The interim Government will, however, initially limit themselves, by confining their work to the effective day-to-day administration of Iraq's affairs, which is only right. Decisions about Iraq's longer-term future should be left to the elected transitional Government—as every Iraqi to whom I have spoken agrees. That is why we are moving forward with that strategy, and the Iraqi people should have the opportunity to choose those who will decide their future.

To what extent will the interim Government have strategic control of the new multinational force after the transfer of sovereignty?

I hope that my right hon. Friend will accept that I will deal with the precise security arrangements in a moment. Obviously, some discussions about the precise level of control remain, but I assure him that we are alive to the issue. We will try to find a sensible solution that meets the needs of coalition forces and secures their safety, but recognises that authority has properly passed to the Iraqis.

I have received several e-mails from constituents over the past few days claiming that the British Government are about to send 4,000 extra troops to Najaf. Will my right hon. Friend confirm or deny that point?

Again, my hon. Friend anticipates a passage in my speech that I shall reach in a moment. As I have done on a number of occasions, I assure her and the House that the Government have taken no decisions on any number of extra troops. I will inform the House in the usual way as soon as any such decision is taken, if it is taken.

My right hon. Friend says that the nature of the Iraqi Government is a matter for Iraqis. Does he have a view on whether that Government should be secular? Would he be concerned if religious parties were to form a Government next January?

In a different context, my hon. Friend would be the first to say that the nature of any Government should be a matter for the people in question, and that is my answer to him.

On the constitution and an elected Iraqi Government's right to decide the nature of the state, is it true that, once elected, the Iraqi Government will not have the right to rescind previous changes such as the wholesale privatisation of the public sector in Iraq?

An Iraqi Government will consider such matters when they are established with democratic legitimacy conferred by elections. The interim Government's main task, acting under the transitional administrative law that we and the Iraqi leaders worked so hard to agree, will be to prepare the ground for full elections to a transitional assembly around the turn of the year. For the first time, Iraq will have a representative body chosen by all its people that works for the country as a whole. The assembly will be responsible for choosing a transitional Government and for preparing a constitution in time for general elections towards the end of 2005.

Ambassador Brahimi made it clear that elections cannot be held without security. If an interim Government are appointed, there may be so much chaos that elections are not possible. Does my right hon. Friend share that worry, and what should be done?

I do not share that worry, but it is a risk that we have to address. That is why our forces, alongside Iraqi forces, are working so hard to deal with the security situation. I am sure that my right hon. Friend would support them in their efforts to do that precisely to allow elections to take place in accordance with the schedule.

It has always been our intention to involve the United Nations in the process. We are working towards a new Security Council resolution. We expect it to be agreed before the transition and to emphasise the new arrangements for full Iraqi authority. Any new resolution will take account of the views of United Nations Security Council members, other international partners and, most important, the Iraqi people. We expect that it will clearly mark the next stage in the transition towards democracy in Iraq, confirm the mandate of the multinational force and specify the future role of the United Nations, including support for the political process and assistance in preparing elections.

Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that one of the strategic purposes of the resolution must be to attract other countries, which do not currently do so, to provide soldiers for Iraq? Consequently, the language and the nature of the resolution must be drafted with that principally in mind.

I would regard that as an incidental advantage of such a resolution; I would hardly describe it as the main reason for it. If, as a result of passing a new Security Council resolution, other countries are willing to deploy their forces to Iraq, I will strongly support it. I am sure that that also applies to the Iraqi people.

United Nations international staff are already operating in Iraq and in the region. One team, headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, has been consulting Iraqis on the formation of the interim Government; the other, headed by Carina Perelli, has been examining options for the electoral process.

We also believe that the United Nations has a vital role to play in preparing for elections and giving advice on the constitutional process in 2005. We would welcome United Nations involvement in the full range of humanitarian and reconstruction tasks in Iraq. We very much value the United Nation's constructive attitude towards Iraq's future, expressed by the Secretary-General down. It is all the more commendable following the terrible tragedy that the United Nations suffered last August.

Regrettably, as we make both political and economic progress, some continue to oppose the process: former Ba'athists, terrorists and others willing to use extreme violence, sometimes for personal gain. I assure the House that we will not allow the violent few to hold hostage the prospects and fortunes of the many Iraqi people who want peace and progress. We are determined to do what we can to provide security in Iraq, for it is only within a secure and stable environment that reconstruction and political life can flourish.

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for saying that. It will be essential to have troops on the ground to ensure that that happens. I have constituents who are currently serving in Iraq and are worried about the possible extension of six months to nine months. Will he answer that point?

I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman was not present during Defence questions, when I dealt with that. There is no reason at this stage to extend the usual tour of duty for British soldiers in Iraq. However, if circumstances on the ground make it necessary, we will have to make that decision. However, no such decision has yet been made.

The continuing violence must hugely worry civilians in Iraq. I realise that it is not Government policy to count the number of civilians killed and injured, but will coalition forces undertake that now, or in future under the authority of the United Nations, to build confidence among Iraqi civilians that things are getting better, not worse?

As I believe was suggested earlier, it is extraordinarily difficult to count precisely the numbers killed or injured when engaging coalition forces. Perhaps I could give my hon. Friend an example from recent events. Yesterday, British forces were attacked in al-Amarah with 15 mortar rounds. I am pleased that they were able to respond effectively. Two British soldiers were wounded and several militia—we estimate 30, but that is necessarily an estimate that cannot be made with great precision—were killed. The right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) came pretty close to suggesting that British forces in that position were required to go back into danger and ordered to count the dead bodies of those who had attacked them in the first place. I simply appeal to him to be realistic.

If that was the inference that the right hon. Gentleman derived from what I said, let me say that I did not intend in any circumstances to give that impression. There is, however, a legitimate question as to whether we keep a count of the civilian casualties, because of their nature and because of the consequences for public opinion in Iraq and elsewhere in the middle east.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman leapt to his feet in a passable display of indignation, but I wonder how he would, in practice, do what he suggests. It is all very well to make these suggestions, but somebody actually has to do it. I have said that we do our very best to make a reasonable estimate of the number of casualties, but when soldiers come under attack, they return fire. They cannot be expected to go back and count precisely how many people they have killed.

If the Secretary of State were to instruct troops to go back to count the casualties, does he think that people would believe the numbers that were given?

I think that we have probably dealt with this issue in sufficient detail, although I see that another hon. Member is anxious to intervene.

I am rather disappointed that, in the debate so far, we have been so negative about the role that UK troops have played in Iraq. I believe that we have done a magnificent job. Will the Secretary of State advise the House of the role that he foresees over the next six weeks and beyond 30 June for British forces, who I believe are the finest in the world? We need to say that, to give them encouragement for the very difficult work that they are undertaking. I have a great belief in our forces.

I entirely agree. I was rather allowing the facts of the engagement I mentioned to speak for themselves. British forces came under attack from an overwhelming force. They were ambushed and responded in kind, achieving a considerable military success, at a cost of two lightly wounded British casualties. That was a remarkable success. I also agree with the hon. Gentleman's other observations about the abilities of Britain's armed forces.

This weekend, Basra and Nasiriyah saw a number of attacks against the coalition resulting in injury to three British soldiers and the loss of one Italian soldier. Right hon. and hon. Members may have seen reports over the weekend of a failed mortar attack against British forces in Basra that resulted in three Iraqi civilians being killed and three more wounded. This tragic incident highlights once again the indiscriminate nature of the attacks being carried out, not only against coalition forces but against the Iraqi people themselves.

The Falluja brigade has been formed from former Iraqi soldiers. It is a temporary organisation designed to provide security in the town, patrolling alongside US forces. Our objectives in Falluja remain unchanged: to ensure that armed groups can no longer intimidate local people and to confiscate heavy weapons from lawless insurgents. In Najaf, we should remind ourselves of what lies behind the recent tensions. Iraqi prosecutors investigating the murder of a senior cleric, Ayatollah Abdel Majid al-Khoei, have strong grounds for the arrest of a number of suspects linked to al-Sadr, including al-Sadr himself.

In the meantime, al-Sadr's illegal militia have been harassing local people in several cities, including Basra and al-Amarah, unlawfully occupying public buildings and terrorising women on the streets and in universities. We have attempted to disarm al-Sadr's militia peacefully and, when necessary, by force. Our efforts are having some success. We judge that al-Sadr's support, while vocal and violent, is indeed limited and may well be on the wane. In both Falluja and Najaf, we continue to seek political solutions where possible and will, of course, respect the nature of the holy sites.

What care is being taken not to damage the great shrines at Najaf and Karbala? Apart from any cultural considerations, risking such damage really is playing with Shi'ite fire.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend about the sensitivity of the holy sites, which is why we are taking great care to respect them. This also seems relevant to the attitude of the Shi'a towards al-Sadr himself, because the overwhelming majority of them do not support or approve of his behaviour. In that disapproval lies the political solution that I have set out.

I listened with interest when the Secretary of State said that, in certain parts of Iraq, the Government and the Army will seek to find political solutions. To what extent are the Government determined to apply the lessons learned in Northern Ireland—some of which have been very useful and constructive—to the situation in Iraq? Or does he feel that there are no comparisons to be drawn?

There are never exact comparisons, but I certainly believe that British troops on patrol in Iraq daily apply the lessons that have been learned so painfully over a long period in Northern Ireland. The other, wider point to make is that there will not ultimately be a military solution to this kind of crisis. Whatever security action we take on the ground has to be supported and complemented by an appropriate political process. That is precisely the strategy that I am setting out on behalf of the Government.

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Perhaps I may make a little progress. I have given way a number of times, although I will give way in due course.

Security sector reform is a crucial part of our strategy to allow the Iraqi people to rely less on coalition forces. We are making strong progress, and our armed forces are playing a vital role. As the House will recall, I announced last year that we would send extra forces to Iraq for just that task. They are supported by civilians from the United Kingdom and by contributions from our allies, and are doing an excellent job. It is not just the coalition in Iraq that recognises the importance of this work for Iraq's future. A substantial police training centre for Iraqi officers is operating in Jordan and producing large numbers of graduates each month. Other countries have also privately offered help, and we are exploring their proposals.

There are now close to 80,000 trained Iraqi police, as well as tens of thousands of other security personnel, including border guards, facilities protection staff and civil defence forces. In the British area, more than 12,000 police have been recruited, and we have trained some 8,000, either in Jordan or in the police training centre that we established with our Danish coalition partners. Six battalions of the Iraqi civil defence corps—some 5,000 people—have been recruited, trained and equipped, as have 5,000 border police, which is some 60 per cent. of the assessed requirement. Raw numbers, however, can seldom provide the full picture.

On the ground, real, tangible progress has been made, with Iraqi police on patrol across the country. Those police are an enormous credit to Iraq and have shown great bravery and resolve in the face of vicious attacks. For example, after the recent terrorist outrages in Basra, which killed more than a dozen schoolchildren, the Iraqi police stabilised the situation and are now investigating. The Iraqi Ministry of Health, which has fully passed to Iraqi control, provided medical care on the scene.

The Secretary of State is describing the action that has been taken on security and military grounds, but it is quite clear that one of the problems that we have had in Iraq is the concept of the coalition forces being occupiers. The UN resolution refers to them as occupiers. All of us in the House are supposedly politicians, and we know that we have to win people's hearts and minds. Will he give the House some idea of the thinking and the work that is being done to win the hearts and minds of Iraqi people, so that they cease to see the coalition as occupiers and regard us as part of the process that will lead sooner, rather than later, to their liberation?

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's observation. He will know, probably as well as I do, that the word "occupier", which is not the happiest word in this context, is one that we are required to use by virtue of the Geneva conventions. It sets out our status. Obviously, that will change on 30 June, which is why we are working in such a determined way towards that date. However, he is also right, in the sense that we are helping with the reconstruction of Iraq. The coalition provisional authority reports that around 20,000 reconstruction projects have been completed—building Iraq's infrastructure, generating jobs and getting its economy moving. The United Kingdom is involved in some 2,700 of those projects, and every day the quality of life in Basra gets better.

Following the same theme as my hon. Friend the Member for Banbury (Tony Baldry), this is a very valuable description of the security situation, but it seems to be in pursuit of a totally unchanged political policy. I detect no tone of any change. After June, as we get a UN resolution, what attempts are going to be made to internationalise the problem? Does the Secretary of State agree that we need the support of the Russians, the French, the Muslim countries, if we can get it, and perhaps some Asian countries? Are other countries going to be involved in the political resolution, or will that remain totally in the hands of the occupying forces and people who are free to contribute troops and money, if they wish to join in?

At least two of the countries that the right hon. and learned Gentleman mentions—Russia and France—will have to sign up to the Security Council resolution, so they will be engaged in a debate, and indeed in the political process set out in any new Security Council resolution. As I indicated to the House earlier, one of the incidental benefits of such a resolution is the possibility of more countries providing troops on the ground and, therefore, more countries being prepared to engage in the reconstruction effort.

That is crucial in providing employment for Iraqis, which gives them a stake in the development of their country and which is proving remarkably successful. I can give the House a long list of achievements. About 90 schools have been refurbished in our area of responsibility and a further 140 refurbishment projects are under way. We have completed 65 general health projects, 16 hospital projects and 32 health centre projects. A programme is under way to refurbish something as mundane as petrol stations in southern Iraq. Some 21 berths in Umm Qasr port are open to deep-draft ships. A grain-receiving facility has been renovated and can now process up to 600 tonnes of grain an hour. A whole range of projects has been set up across the country to deliver precisely the improvements asked for.

Should not my right hon. Friend correct the misleading impression given by the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), that only British and American troops are in Iraq? I have just come back from Budapest, and I know that Hungary has troops in Iraq under Polish command, whom it will continue to keep there. Some 27 other countries have troops in Iraq. Should not that fact be spread more widely by the Government to counteract the propaganda that only Britain and America are there?

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that 30 countries are providing troops and sharing security responsibilities as they work closely alongside Iraqis. I would be willing to see that figure enlarged by other countries providing forces to Iraq.

There has been speculation in recent weeks that more UK forces may be on their way to Iraq, either to replace Spanish troops who have recently left or to provide more command capability. In fact, US forces have replaced the Spanish contingent. As far as our own area is concerned, we judge that we have sufficient forces in Iraq, although we always keep that under close review.

We are considering, with partners, the levels and disposition of forces in the context of the crucial period we are now entering, from the establishment of an interim Government through to the election of a transitional assembly and Government early next year. We have not yet reached any conclusion on what that may mean for our own military contribution. If we decide to make any significant change, we shall, as I have already indicated, inform the House in the usual way.

Winning hearts and minds is one of the important things that British troops have to do. Recent events have made that far more difficult because of stories appearing in newspapers that have proved to be false. I am the Member of Parliament who represents Fulwood, which is home to the Queen's Lancashire Regiment. Does the Secretary of State accept that the great anguish and frustration felt by members of the regiment and their families has been relieved by the fact that the stories proved to be fake? Will he assure the House that theDaily Mirror is fully complying with the investigation now taking place so that those who are culpable may be brought to justice and so that everyone may know that what was published in the newspapers over the past two weeks put the lives of our servicemen, which were already at stake, under even greater tension?

I, too, have received strong representations from the hon. Gentleman's constituents and from those of surrounding constituencies that provide recruits for the regiment. The Mirror group has certainly said that it will fully co-operate with the investigation, but I have not yet seen the results of that.

rose—

I must make progress. A great number of hon. Members want to speak, but I shall give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman.

I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman. I wish to raise a matter on which he may need some notice before replying, but which is germane to the debate.

A story is running on the wires, on Associated Press in particular, that a roadside bomb containing sarin nerve agent has exploded in Iraq near a United States military convoy. Brigadier-General Mark Kimmitt said:

"The Iraq Survey Group confirmed that a 155 millimetre artillery round containing sarin nerve agent had been found. The round had been rigged as an IED (improvised explosive device), which was discovered by a US force convoy. A detonation occurred before the IED could be rendered inoperable. This produced a very small dispersal of the agent."

There were no casualties.

As we are constantly talking about weapons of mass destruction, I thought that the right hon. Gentleman should have the chance to take advice on that incident and inform the House of the background to it.

I am grateful to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for setting out that information for the benefit of hon. Members. I have been in the House since business started today, so I have not had an opportunity to receive that information. In due course, no doubt, I shall be able to verify it. It certainly indicates the kind of risks and threats that coalition forces face and the extreme lengths to which some fanatics who oppose us are prepared to go to cause loss of life.

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

I really must make progress and reach a conclusion, so I hope that my hon. Friend will forgive me if I do not give way.

I regret that allegations in recent weeks about the conduct of some coalition forces have marred our record in Iraq. No one who saw those photos from Abu Ghraib could fail to, be shocked. The President of the United States and the United States Defence Secretary have apologised for any mistreatment, and I am fully confident that the United States' investigations will be comprehensive and thorough. Mistreatment of prisoners is wholly unacceptable. In an environment where insurgents are prepared to murder police officers, humanitarian aid workers, civilian contractors and innocent children, our own standards cannot be allowed to fall. Allegations have also been made against UK forces and they are investigated as soon as they are received.

Hon. Members have rightly raised concerns about the effect that recent allegations will have on our standing in the Islamic world. I can assure the House that we are considering how we can ensure that we make it clear to the Iraqi people how seriously we take these charges, and how determined we are to deal with them. The governor of Basra, however, whom I met only a few weeks ago, has said that he has not registered a single allegation of human rights abuses by British forces.

We will continue our mission in Iraq. I have no doubt that when we succeed—and succeed we shall—the lives of ordinary Iraqis will be improved beyond anything they could have dreamed of under Saddam Hussein. We are making further progress every day. It would be wrong of us to falter now.

rose—

Order. I think that the Secretary of State has finished.

I, too, wondered whether the Secretary of State had finished or was giving way yet a gain.

I welcome the debate, although it is a disgrace that it is not being held in Government time. Had the Government had the courage to initiate such a debate, and as Iraq is not for them or us a cynical European or local government election issue, we could have had a full day's debate on this important and urgent matter.

As both the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and the Secretary of State indicated, this debate is being held in the grim shadow of the tragic assassination today of Izz al-Din Salim by those who still seek to prevent the peaceful return of Iraq to the Iraqis They must not be allowed to succeed.

I shall start with two comments. First, we were right to support the Iraq war. The threat posed to international peace and security was acknowledged and real. Iraq and its peoples needed rescuing from Saddam. Those two facts were not going to change and if we had not done it last year, we would still be looking to do it in the future, at almost certainly greater risk and cost. It is worth remembering that, if the Liberal Democrats had had their way, Saddam would still be murdering his people, still destabilising that volatile region, still posing a threat to international peace and security and still requiring to be dealt with.

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

I give way to the right hon. Lady, who voted for the war in the Cabinet.

We do not have votes in the Cabinet. We do not have much discussion, either. Everyone tends to justify their own actions, but surely the lesson is that being willing to use force to back up the authority of the UN to support the people of Iraq in getting rid of Saddam Hussein, perhaps by indicting him, could have been done more carefully, in a more considered way and with more international co-operation. The people of Iraq would be much better off if that had happened. Should we not all face up to that and stop trying to justify every position that we have taken in the past?

I will take a lot from the right hon. Lady but I find it difficult to take that when she stayed in the Cabinet throughout the war, regardless of the fact that there had been no second UN resolution.

Support for the war, however, does not and cannot entail placid acceptance of everything that has followed. That support cannot—nor should it, in a democratic Parliament—inhibit us from criticising the conduct and drift of the post-conflict programme.

Secondly, the Prime Minister hit rock bottom last week when he inferred that our criticism of him was a criticism of our armed forces. We have always made it abundantly clear that we not only support the effective and courageous manner in which our armed forces are carrying out their responsibilities in Iraq in the face of great difficulties and dangers, but are immensely proud of their professionalism and dedication.

The whole House will share my disgust at the malicious attempts in some quarters to damage the reputation of our armed forces in Iraq by making untrue or faked allegations that also endanger their lives. With the editor rightly gone, I hope that theDaily Mirror lessons have been well and truly learned. Of course, where there are serious and genuine allegations of abuse, those responsible must be rooted out and dealt with firmly and effectively. We can have no time for such people.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that at the time when war was embarked upon, Iraq represented a real danger to other countries. Can he tell me of any country, apart from Israel, that recorded in any international forum any threat that it felt itself to be under from Iraq?

The words that I used were, "The threat posed to international peace and security was acknowledged and real." That is because during the previous 12 years, 17 United Nations resolutions had been passed under chapter VII of the UN charter, which relates to threats to international peace and security and which allows, under article 43, for military action to be used to deal with such threats.

rose—

I want to make a little progress. This is not our debate and I am conscious that many hon. Members want to speak. Those who know me will be aware that I am usually very generous in taking interventions.

rose—

However, I shall give way to my old friend, the former Chancellor.

I am grateful for that privileged treatment and I shall try not to abuse it.

Given that I agree with my right hon. and learned Friend that our attitudes today cannot be determined by whether we were in favour of the war in the first place, does he agree that even if the war was justified, the present situation has been made infinitely worse by the painful lack of planning for what was to follow after the occupation and the incompetence with which the interim Government have at times conducted themselves in trying to impose security on the country? Is it not important that the House should address itself to the problem that we now face: how do we get from being an unpopular occupying force to being part of a genuinely international effort to create a stable Iraq?

My right hon. and learned Friend has either been reading my mind or reading my notes from a distance, because he pre-empts what I am about to say.

This debate is important because of the crisis of public confidence that has been brought about by the lack of direction, lack of candour and general incompetence in the Government's handling of Iraq. That has its roots in the Prime Minister's refusal to hold a proper inquiry into the Government's use, in the run-up to the war, of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction. It has been further deepened by the incredible failure of the Prime Minister and his senior colleagues to keep abreast of the serious reports on prisoner abuse by the Red Cross and Amnesty International, and by the extraordinarily conflicting reasons for that failure that were given in the House last week—including, as hon. Members may—recall, the Secretary of State for Defence saying that he had not read the Red Cross report because it had been given to the Government in confidence. That is compounded, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) says, by the Government's failure a year ago to set out a clear post-conflict plan—for which, incidentally, I had been calling—since the debate in this House on 24 September 2002.

Strategy is still being developed on the hoof. Last Wednesday, the Foreign Secretary chose to announce—not in this House, but on "BBC Online"—that British—troops would leave Iraq if the new post-30 June interim Government asked them to do so. Having called for the transfer of power to be real, not cosmetic, Conservative Members welcome that announcement—but why was it not made in Parliament and why was it not made earlier? There remain other unanswered questions that I shall come to shortly.

Today, we find Downing street apparently briefing about—hon. Members can choose their phrase depending on the newspaper that they read—"gear—changes" and "new exit strategies". To me, exit strategies are redolent of failure at a time when we need a clear, positive plan with a clear end game for achieving our overall objective: to return Iraq to the Iraqis under a representative and democratic Government.

If we are to understand the strategy, we first need to know the full details of the handover on 30 June. To whom will it be made and who will have been responsible for making that decision? Given the role of the United Nations representative in the handover, what will be the role of the coalition in the run-up to the handover?

We believe that, even in the remaining six weeks, there is still a need for a high-powered United Kingdom political representative in the coalition, working alongside General McColl on the military side, to ensure that the UK political voice is clearly heard and heeded.

We need some answers now, to show that the handover will be a real transfer of sovereignty. How does the Foreign Secretary's statement on withdrawing UK troops if requested by the interim Government conform to what I understand was the crucial Brahimi agreement with Ayatollah Sistani, which was reported in Sir Jeremy Greenstock's article inThe Economist on 7 May, namely, that the unelected Government who will emerge from the handover and precede elections will not have sovereign freedom to affect the future of the Iraqi state? How is that consistent with saying that they can decide whether coalition forces stay or go?

We also need a clear security strategy to restore public order and stability in Iraq, not least, as has been said, because of the forthcoming elections next January. What will be the position of our troops if we are asked to remain after 30 June? Will they be, in the old phrase, "in aid of the civil power" at that power's request? What is a realistic assessment of when Iraqi security forces will be capable, in terms of numbers and training, to impose and maintain the necessary degree of security? Despite the fact that the Secretary of State told us again today that no decision has been made about whether further deployments of British troops will be needed, what is the likelihood of a requirement for more UK troop deployments and in what capacity? We should at least be given an indication.

Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that it is one thing if further troops are necessary at the behest of British commanders to secure the safety and positions of British forces, but that many of us would be gravely concerned if there were to be an open-ended commitment for the deployment of British troops anywhere in Iraq at any time?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that question. He, too, must have such good eyesight that he can read my notes. I was just coming to a point that has been discussed over the weekend and raised in the debate: whether the House should vote on future deployments. I am firmly of the view, which I suspect is shared by my hon. Friend, given what he has just said, that the House should never try to second-guess operational decisions or requirements on the ground. However, where a decision is to be taken that would substantially or materially change the nature of our military involvement, which could include a request to undertake operations that are outside our current area or not under our command, seeking the opinion of the House would probably be justified. That does not indicate that we would oppose such deployment, but that we should want to consider it on its merits.

I welcome the statement that the right hon. and learned Gentleman has just made. Does he agree that the information that he gave the House earlier shows that there has indeed been a substantial change in the level of danger into which we are sending our troops? Does he also agree that a valuable precedent was established when the House voted to send our soldiers to Iraq to kill and, tragically, to be killed? Is it not clear that many of the assumptions on which those decisions were based were false and that there is a need for a new decision if more troops are to be sent?

I do not accept that our troops were sent to Iraq to kill and be killed; they went there to restore stability and democracy in that sad country after many years of a vicious and evil regime. I have said what I said about voting. I very carefully judged my words and do not want to add or detract from them.

We need a credible economic strategy to create employment and to remove a major cause of resentment, which is itself a recruiting sergeant for dissent and worse. Lack of income is fostering enormous resentment in various parts of the country. As Jeremy Greenstock wrote, the guiding slogan for the coalition should be "security and jobs, stupid".

What plans are there to promote a comprehensive, long-term, job-creating investment programme? What plans are there to ensure a credible humanitarian strategy? For instance, what is the current situation in the hospital in Basra in relation to reported shortages of personnel and equipment?

Would not reconstruction be more acceptable locally if it was bottom-up rather than applied top-down?

We also need to ensure that anything that is done by the coalition that is not consistent with the objectives for which we went to war ceases. The objective of removing the threat posed to international peace and security by Saddam Hussein has been achieved, but the objective of creating a stable, democratic and prosperous Iraq is not yet achieved.

My right hon. and learned Friend needs to be very careful. The stated purpose for going to war was to ensure compliance with United Nations resolutions. I did not happen to agree with it, but that was the stated purpose. No doubt the restoration or creation of democracy was an intended by-product, but it was not the lawful justification for the war.

My right hon. and learned Friend has, on many occasions, made the case against regime change. The terms of the United Nations resolutions acknowledged and recognised that Saddam Hussein was a threat to international peace and security and was required to be dealt with. That was the justification upon which we backed the decision to go to war. Indeed, I understand from the Foreign Secretary that that was also the position that he took at the time.

We should, however, acknowledge, as the Secretary of State for Defence did, the substantial body of work of reconstruction that is actually being, carried out in Iraq. Electricity is now more equitably distributed and more stable than it was under Saddam Hussein, who used to feed most of it into Baghdad for political reasons. Basra alone now receives 21 hours electricity each day, and the sweet water canal system that provides drinking water to 1.75 million residents of Basra city has been renovated. The number of telephone subscribers, including mobile users, is 33 per cent. greater than it was before the war. Some 2,500 schools have been refurbished and 70 million textbooks have been reprinted. Almost all of Iraq's 240 hospitals are functioning, more than 1,200 clinics are open and more than 3 million children under the age of five have received vaccinations. That is solid progress and we should recognise and welcome it.

As several hon. Members have said, however, we must recognise what is undermining those efforts. In the vital battle for hearts and minds, perception matters. How the coalition is perceived matters, so how the coalition acts matters, too. There is a difference between what is seen as an army of liberation intent on restoring the state to its people and what is seen as a conquering army with all the heavy-handedness that can accompany that. I am always wary of commenting from afar on specific military actions without experiencing the real threat on the ground and the nature of the insurgents that are being faced. Nevertheless, I believe that the military conduct of United Kingdom forces has, in this regard, been exemplary.

Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

I shall not give way again because, as I said, many other Members wish to speak in the debate.

There is no doubt that confidence right across Iraq has been shattered by the horrific incidences of prisoner abuse, particularly in the Abu Ghraib prison. We roundly condemn them. Such behaviour has no place in the conduct of the army of a democratic state. They are not only unacceptable in themselves, but highly damaging to the coalition's credibility in Iraq. One thing that would help to prevent further such abuses is, independent monitoring of all detention facilities in Iraq. When the Minister replies to the debate, can he specifically confirm that all and every part of coalition detention facilities throughout Iraq are open to unfettered inspection by the Red Cross? I repeat: all and every part of coalition detention facilities. Perhaps he can also clarify whether, after 30 June, responsibility for these detention facilities will pass from the coalition to the interim government.

I come finally to the underlying theme of this debate—the Government's relations with the United States. I bow to no one in my belief that our special relationship with America is crucial to our national interest. I believe in a true partnership with America, based on shared values, shared traditions and, frequently, shared interests. Shortly, Europe will be reminded of what, 60 years ago, the United States, as liberators, did for our war-ravaged continent and the debt of gratitude that we owe to them. Our relationship, however, must always be, as it always has been, a partnership in which frankness is at the core.

We are constantly given the nudge and the wink that that is the case for the Prime Minister, but we are never given the evidence. Even the closest of allies have differences of opinion and emphasis. A candid friendship, except when confidentiality is essential, should not be afraid of such differences—and the advice that follows on from them—being known.

The Prime Minister, however, seems to have established a new doctrine of international relations. He never admits in public whether the differences even exist, let alone the discussions he has had on them. That reticence is not necessary. Margaret Thatcher let Ronald Reagan clearly know of her displeasure at the United States invasion of Grenada in 1983. She quickly made her concerns known after the Reykjavik summit in 1986 between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. How can the British people ever know what influence a British Prime Minister has brought to bear on our American allies if he never discloses it? Is it surprising that people wonder whether any influence has been brought to bear at all?

Although the outlook in Iraq is, for the moment, bleak, we must never fall into the Liberal Democratic trap of just being negative. With them in power, Saddam would still be in place, he would still be murdering and he would still be threatening. Thank goodness he is not. Of course, things could be better. If the Government had planned more effectively when we pressed them to, if they had not dithered on the way forward and if they had not been so incompetent in keeping a grip on what was happening in Iraq, things today would be better. However, although time is short, we can still get it right. The cause we fought for was right and the objectives at which we are still aiming are right. For the sake of the people of Iraq and of international peace and security, we must ensure that they are achieved.