Evidence relating to the systematic falsification of Cambodian official documents related to the adoption of children;

Evidence relating to the extensive involvement of adoption facilitators in the adoption procedure in Cambodia even though Cambodian law expressly forbids facilitators participating in the adoption process;

Evidence relating to the procurement of children for intercountry adoption by facilitators, including by coercion and by paying birth mothers to give up their children; and

Concern about the prevalence of children trafficking and corruption generally in Cambodia.

The temporary suspension will take effect immediately and will be imposed on all UK applications to adopt children from Cambodia where the prospective adopter has not yet received a matching report from the Cambodian authorities. This is the latest point in the adoption process in Cambodia where a temporary suspension could take effect before a Cambodian adoption certificate is issued.

Although the UK authorities could intervene where a prospective adopter applies to bring a child into the UK there is a considerable risk that tho child might be left in the situation where they have been legally adopted in Cambodia, and as such are no longer an orphan but are unable to enter the UK with their adoptive parents. This would pose a significant risk to the individual child and would clearly be unacceptable.

I intend to consider reviewing the temporary suspension when the Cambodian Government pass new adoption legislation or if there is another development I consider to be significant, for example if Cambodia were to implement the 1993 Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in respect of intercountry adoption.

Only in exceptional circumstances will I consider that the temporary suspension should not apply in a particular case. Any decision relating to a particular case will of course take account of what is in the best interests of the child and all the facts of the particular case.

We have discussed at length the difficult question of how we can best inform the public about the threat from terrorism in individual countries. As I said in my statement of 1 April, our travel advice needs to strike a balance between danger and disruption: making put lie safety its prime concern while minimising the disruption which terrorists want to cause. Our advice must inform people of the threat from terrorism and, when the threat is acute, it will inevitably lead to some disruption in travel in the interests of public safety. But at the same time we must make sure we do not do the terrorists' work for them by causing too much of the disruption which they seek.

I have therefore decided that in future, in the case of intelligence-based terrorist threats, we shall advise against travel only in situations of extreme and imminent danger—if the terrorist threat is sufficiently specific, large-scale or endemic to affect British nationals severely (option E on page 22 of the review). The factors which we shall consider in reaching this judgment will include the specificity and credibility of the intelligence information, the recent history of terrorist incidents in the area, the likelihood that the threat could affect British nationals, and the level of protection from the threat available to British nationals. One reason for making this change of emphasis is to maintain the credibility of our advice. I am concerned that many people continue to travel despite our warnings against all essential travel. The public will be better served if such warnings are used more sparingly. I should add that we shall continue to prescribe against travel in cases of non-terrorist threats (coups, civil unrest, natural disasters) on the same basis as before.

I have also decided to accept the recommendation on page 28 of the review to establish a standing advisory council of travel advice users. Details of membership, timing and agenda are still to be finalised, but the council would bring together representatives of the travel and insurance industries, NGOs and others to advise on issues arising from travel advice and its implementation. It would not be consulted on individual travel advice changes, which would continue to be the responsibility of officials and, ultimately, myself.

I have also asked my officials to implement a number of recommendations from the review, and from the subsequent consultation, to make the travel advice pages clearer and easer to use. Although we have achieved considerably greater clarity over the last year, further refinements have been suggested to ensure that those who consult the FCO website or the telephone call centre take away the key points.

One fact that has emerged clearly from the review is that, while our travel advice service is heavily used, many different types of customer use it for widely varied purposes. Inevitably, we cannot satisfy all the demands, some of which are mutually exclusive, but I am confident the adjustments outlined above will improve the overall quality of service and level of customer satisfaction.