With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on Iraq.

I know that I speak for the whole House in offering our condolences and deepest sympathies to the family of Kenneth Bigley. Throughout their ordeal, the Bigley family have conducted themselves with the greatest dignity, courage and strength. I also want to pay tribute to the dedication and professionalism of all those who worked to support Mr. Bigley's family and to try to secure his release—our officials in Baghdad, Bangkok and London, police officers from Merseyside and the Metropolitan Police Service and, if I may make a particular point, the Muslim Council of Britain, which was indefatigable it its work to try to secure his release. I thank the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell), as well as the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram) who, because of a bereavement, cannot be present today, for the restraint and co-operation that they and their parties showed throughout.

The House will understand that there is a limit to the information that I can give about the events leading up to the news of Mr. Bigley's death last Friday. However, at the beginning of last week, an individual approached the British embassy in Baghdad, presenting himself as a potential intermediary with the captors. Messages were exchanged with the hostage-takers in an attempt to dissuade them from carrying out their threat to kill Mr. Bigley, but at no stage did the hostage-takers abandon their demands relating to the release of women prisoners, even though they were well aware that there were and are no women prisoners in British custody in Iraq. These communications were fully in line with the Government's long-standing approach to kidnapping—while ready to receive messages from kidnappers, we cannot negotiate with them. Kenneth Bigley's family in Liverpool and his wife in Thailand were kept fully aware of our communications with that intermediary.

On Friday afternoon, the intermediary provided us with proof beyond doubt that Ken Bigley's captors had carried out their threat to kill him. On Friday evening, I travelled to Liverpool to convey our sympathies and condolences to Mr. Bigley's family. Kenneth Bigley was a decent man who was in Iraq for no other purpose than to earn his living by working for the benefit of the Iraqi people. His capture, the ordeal imposed on him and his family, and his murder were acts of utter barbarism. Our thoughts and prayers are with Mr. Bigley's family and friends.

I should now like to turn to the report of the Iraq survey group on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction which, as the House will be aware, was published last Wednesday, 6 October. The full text of the report is available on the internet, and I have attached to the written text of my statement, which is available now in the Vote Office, the Iraq survey group's "Key Findings".

The report concludes that by the mid-1990s, Iraq was essentially free of weapons of mass destruction, but it goes on to describe a sophisticated and systematic campaign by Saddam Hussein to bring down the United Nations sanctions regime and to reconstitute his weapons programme. It shows how Saddam Hussein subverted the oil-for-food programme in order to reward people

"for their service and efforts in undermining the resolve of the international community to enforce UN Security Council resolutions".

The report goes on to state that the

"ISG assesses that Saddam clearly intended to reconstitute long-range delivery systems and that the systems potentially were for WMD".

It continues:

"Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a CW effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favourable".

I should like to give just one more example. The report says that the

"ISG judges, based on available chemicals, infrastructure, and scientist debriefings, that Iraq"—

in 2003—

"probably had a capability to produce large quantities of sulphur mustard within three to six months."

The report provides chapter and verse as to why the policy of containment was not working. Indeed, in July 2000, as it makes clear, the ruling Ba'ath party newspaper Al Thawra

"claimed victory over UN sanctions",

and in August 2001 the Iraqi Foreign Minister claimed that United Nations sanctions efforts had "collapsed". Saddam Hussein's regime was dedicated to deceiving the international community, and it was working flat out to undermine containment and rebuild the weapons capability that it had already used on its own people and neighbours.

As the Prime Minister did in his speech at our party's conference, I of course accept that some of the information on which we based our judgments was wrong. But before turning to that, I want to pay tribute to the work of Britain's intelligence services, which is usually done in difficult and dangerous circumstances around the world. Their successes and contribution are necessarily often unsung and unrecognised, but yesterday the European Union recognised a key success from the same people in the British intelligence service in respect of Libya. When we lifted our sanctions on Libya, it was through our intelligence people—the same people who had detected through the same methods the fact that Libya was developing an unacceptable and large programme of WMD—and by ours and others' diplomatic efforts that we managed to ensure that Libya is safe and is brought back into the international community.

The House will recall that the Butler committee concluded, among many other things, that the validity of the line of reporting that included the 45-minute intelligence had come into question. It further concluded that reporting received from a liaison service on Iraqi production of biological agent was "seriously flawed". The House will now wish to be aware that the chief of the Secret Intelligence Service has written to my right hon. Friend the Member for Dewsbury (Ann Taylor), the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, formally withdrawing those two lines of reporting.

But I do not accept, even with hindsight, that we were wrong to act as we did in the circumstances that we faced at the time. Even after reading all the evidence detailed by the Iraq survey group, it is still hard to believe that any regime could behave in so self-destructive a manner as to pretend that it had forbidden weaponry, when in fact it had not. It is still hard to comprehend the logic of Saddam's behaviour in resisting UN inspections in 1998, and indeed driving out the inspectors, when he could have demonstrated that he had no weapons of mass destruction. He could even more easily have given the United Nations the full co-operation demanded by resolution 1441—the kind of access and ability to interview key scientists that has now allowed the ISG to reach the verdict that he had no WMD stockpiles, but which UNMOVIC was denied.

Even in the few days before the conflict, Saddam refused our offer to meet a handful of tests that would have shown that he had no WMD, such as delivering just 30 scientists for interview outside Iraq, completing the destruction of the illegal al-Samoud missiles or surrendering all anthrax or providing credible evidence of its destruction. Those were just a few questions drawn from the 173 pages-worth of unresolved issues and questions that the United Nations weapons inspectors were detailing four months after the passage of resolution 1441. In the circumstances, deciding to give Saddam the benefit of the doubt would have required a huge leap of faith. We would have had to conclude that all the intelligence—not only ours, but that from many other agencies around the world—was wrong. We would have had to decide, with no evidence, and despite Saddam's resistance to inspections, that he had in fact disposed of his WMD without telling the UN.

Instead, we made the judgment that it would not be safe to turn away and leave Saddam re-empowered and re-emboldened. Although we can now plainly see that some of the intelligence was wrong, I continue to believe that the judgments that we made and the actions that we took were right. Let it never be forgotten that the whole of the international community, including all 15 members of the UN Security Council, concluded from its own evidence, and not from our intelligence, that Saddam posed a threat to international peace and security, and it did not resile from that conclusion in the four months after resolution 1441.

On the current situation in Iraq, I travelled to Iraq last week and met the President, Prime Minister and other Iraqi politicians including Kurdish and other leaders in the north of Iraq, members of the Interim National Council, UN Special Representative Ashraf Qazi and the UN elections team. The elections to be held next January were one of the key themes in my discussions. Logistical preparations are moving ahead: voter registration is in hand, information on the elections is beginning to be distributed and training for national election staff is also on schedule. I stressed to UN Special Representative Qazi the vital importance of the UN increasing its presence on the ground in Iraq in the run-up to the elections. It is crucial that the UN plays its full part in advising on the electoral process in Iraq, a point that I have since reiterated to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

The greatest difficulty faced by Iraq's Government in preparing for elections is, of course, the security situation, especially in the Sunni areas in the centre of the country where the violence has been concentrated. I was impressed by Prime Minister Allawi's determination to improve security. His strategy is threefold: first, substantive political engagement with Sunni leaders to persuade them that their interests are best served inside rather than outside the political process; secondly, rapid progress on reconstruction to improve people's daily lives; and thirdly, strengthening and accelerating the training of Iraq's security forces so that they can play the lead role in tackling the insurgency.

That approach is, I believe, beginning to pay off, with welcome progress in the Sunni town of Samarra and in the predominantly Shi'a suburb of Baghdad, Sadr city. Falluja remains the most acute concern, and we will continue to support the Iraqi Government as they work to tackle it. However, despite the security situation in some parts of the country, all the Iraqi politicians whom I met, who came from many parties and who included Prime Minister Allawi, were committed to national elections going ahead in January as planned.

Local elections are already being held in the south of the country, and the Iraqi people are showing a real appetite for choosing their leaders and holding them to account, an experience which has not occurred in the living memory of almost every single Iraqi. Successful national elections would deal a huge blow to the terrorists and insurgents who reject the ballot box and who seek to rule with the bullet and the bomb.

It is worth remembering that some—not to say many—warned that security would prevent elections in Afghanistan, and I remember dealing with that matter in this House not many months ago, but over the weekend we saw a huge turnout. In Iraq, although security is of course important for elections, only progress with elections can deliver lasting improvement on security, allow civil society and businesses to grow and enable trade unions, journalists, women's groups and all those denied the right to exist under Saddam to emerge from the darkness of his terrible regime.

It is vital that Iraqis take the lead in building stability and in shaping their political future, but they will continue to need the support of the international community. I therefore welcome the support of the group of Iraq's neighbours for both the Interim Government and an inclusive political process in Iraq, and their efforts to improve border security and stop terrorists getting into the country.

The international community meets in Tokyo tomorrow to review progress on reconstruction in Iraq. Already, projects to rebuild Iraq are employing almost 500,000 Iraqis who were not employed before. Preparations are also well under way for an international conference on Iraq to be held next month in Egypt, which was envisaged by Security Council resolution 1546, and which I shall attend.

The United Kingdom will continue to play a leading role in the international effort to support Iraq. I here pay tribute to the bravery and dedication of all the British personnel in Iraq, military and civilian, which I again saw for myself last week. Their work is vital as the Iraqi people seek to defeat the men of violence and to build a peaceful and prosperous future for their country.

I thank the Foreign Secretary for his statement and for his courtesy in making a copy available in advance.

I join the Foreign Secretary in sending our deepest condolences to Ken Bigley's family. They have borne their tragedy with great dignity and courage. We are all revolted by the barbaric cruelty shown by his kidnappers, and we stand with the Bigley family at this difficult time. I also add our thanks to all those who worked so hard in trying to secure his release.

Can the Foreign Secretary tell us what confidence he has that al-Zarqawi and his fellow murderers can be captured and brought to justice? Can he give any details about the part played by Ministers in the Government's efforts to secure Mr. Bigley's release? Does he believe that the Government could have done anything more to help Mr. Bigley, especially during his brave escape?

Our troops are carrying out, in very difficult circumstances, and with great courage and self-sacrifice, counter-insurgency and other operations in Iraq. We again pay tribute to their bravery and loyal service. But can the Foreign Secretary tell us more about the chain of command that exists in Iraq? What is the relationship between British troops, the other troops in the coalition forces and the Interim Iraqi Government? What are the means through which the British Government can influence operations carried out by the Americans?

The January elections are an important step in reaching the goal of a stable, democratic Iraq. What lessons can be learned from the picture that is emerging from the recent elections in Afghanistan? Why have we had no statements to the House on that important developing situation?

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that the situation in Iraq would now be far less grave had there been proper planning for post-war reconstruction, as we repeatedly urged for months before the conflict began and thereafter? As Sir Jeremy Greenstock and the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) have confirmed, there was no adequate plan. When will the House and the country receive a proper explanation for that serious omission?

I come to the Iraq survey group's report. The House will recall the Prime Minister's words of 30 July last year, when he said we should

"wait and see when they"—

the ISG—

"come up with their report what the true facts are."

We have waited and now we have seen.

The report alleges an appalling corruption of the sanctions regime, including the provision of oil vouchers to officials in countries that were blocking United Nations decisions. Were the Government aware of that corruption at the time the alleged events took place? What does the Foreign Secretary believe that it tells us about the way in which the UN operates?

The report's findings are dramatic: that Saddam Hussein has had no weapons of mass destruction for several years. Yes, he had a horrifying track record and the risks of leaving him in place were very great. He was a dangerous presence in the world's most volatile region. The world is better off without him. Those were all powerful arguments for going to war. But that is not the case that the Government made. The Prime Minister told us that

"the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt . . . that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons"

and that he was

"in no doubt that the threat is serious and current."

He told us that Saddam's WMD programme was "active, detailed and growing", and that it was

"not shut down; it is up and running".—[Official Report, 24 September 2002; Vol. 390, c.3.]

But the Iraq survey group found no such thing. How did the Prime Minister get it so wrong?

We have reluctantly come to accept that when the Prime Minister comes to the House to talk about health or education, he spins and twists and bends, because that is what he does. However, on issues affecting the safety of the nation, the public expect the truth. All the way through, the intelligence advice to the Prime Minister was couched in caveat and caution. However, in the hands of this Prime Minister, caveats were stripped away and cautions were removed.

While the Joint Intelligence Committee told the Prime Minister that intelligence was sporadic, patchy and limited, the Prime Minister told us that it was extensive, detailed and authoritative. He did not behave as a British Prime Minister should. The next time that he comes to the Dispatch Box to commit British troops, who will believe him? That is why the British people must receive a full explanation and a full apology—not an apology for the intelligence but an apology for the way in which the Government conveyed the intelligence to the country. That is the apology for which we are waiting. Will the Foreign Secretary now make that apology?

I thought that the hon. Gentleman started quite well, and I thank him for what he had to say in respect of the Bigley family. I will come on to the further episodes of flip-flop that we have just seen.

On the hon. Gentleman's points about the Bigley family, he asked me whether I have confidence that al-Zarqawi can be captured. All that I can say is that al-Zarqawi's apprehension remains a key priority for all the coalition forces and for the Iraqis—most of al-Zarqawi's victims, like most of the other terrorists' victims in Iraq, are Iraqis. Those elements are not going at the multinational force, but are trying to stop democracy in Iraq—so it is in everybody's interest that he should be captured.

The hon. Gentleman asked about Ministers' role in Iraq. I can only say that by chance I was in Iraq on a long-planned visit when we got news from the intermediary. I was therefore able to be fully involved in discussions about the decisions made, and to ensure that the Prime Minister was fully involved, too. The hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not go into more detail than I have already offered the House. He asked whether there was any more that we could have done. In the circumstances, we did a lot, but it ended tragically. I rack my brains, as everyone does, about whether there were other things that we could have done. I do not think that there were, but I want to make it clear that there will be a full internal review of what we have done, to examine whether we could have done other things that might have made a difference, although I genuinely do not think so.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the chain of command, which is set out in the relevant paragraphs of United Nations Security Council resolution 1546, and the two letters sent by Prime Minister Allawi and Secretary of State Colin Powell to the Security Council. They work well, and we have a three-star general, General McColl, who is embedded in the key central command in Baghdad, to whom I talked while I was there, as well as our day-to-day operational command in the areas that we control in the south. One of the things that caused anxiety when resolution 1546 was being developed was whether the Iraqis would have sufficient say over key and sensitive operations such as Falluja. I am satisfied that they do.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether there was proper planning for reconstruction. There was proper planning—the problem was in relation to implementation of that planning. I accept, to put it at its mildest, that there were clearly lessons to be learned. One of the things that was unanticipated, however, was the speed with which the Saddam regime would collapse.

Turning to the ISG report, the hon. Gentleman asked me whether we were aware of the corruption. We had intelligence that suggested corruption, but we did not have explicit evidence, which required full access to all the documentation held in the relevant Ministries in Iraq. That was why we did not surface it.

The hon. Gentleman went on to make extravagant and completely unjustified comments about the Prime Minister in relation to the intelligence that we made public. I make two points to him on that. First, there was a huge demand from March 2002 for us to put before the House a summary of the intelligence that we had seen. That came from the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Opposition, and the House as a whole properly asked to see the case. That dossier, as the House is well aware—there have now been three inquiries into its provenance—accurately reflected the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time and was signed off by it. Secondly—I will place these documents in the Library and make them publicly available—the House should be aware that we sought to cross-check the dossier with many people. One of my officials in New York showed Dr. Blix section 6 of a slightly earlier version of the dossier, which I am very happy to make publicly available so that it can be contrasted with the final published version. My official wrote a letter on 12 March 2002 to my then private secretary, the full text of which I will publish, which stated:

"On the whole, Blix liked section 6—he felt it did not exaggerate the facts, nor revert to rhetoric, probably both desirable for its credibility."

That referred to the section on Iraqi chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes—the current position. It is important that the House fully understands that the evidence that we put forward was a view that was widely shared at the time by other foreign intelligence agencies, as well, as it happened, by Dr. Blix.

This is a rather ambivalent occasion on which the House is both united and divided. Truly, the murder of Mr. Bigley was an act of gross inhumanity and barbarism. Words are inadequate to describe the fear, humiliation and pain that he must have experienced as his life was cruelly and wantonly taken from him—an act later to be made the subject of a macabre video.

As the Foreign Secretary has generously acknowledged, the Liberal Democrats supported the Government on this matter. I hope that he will understand when I say that we did so with a heavy heart, because we could foresee the consequences. Like the Foreign Secretary, we, too, wish to acknowledge the dignity and courage of Mr. Bigley's family, on whose emotions his captors played with a total lack of moral scruple.

I very much regret that in spite of the spirit of the first part of the Foreign Secretary's statement, I am unable to share the Government's conclusions about the ISG report. The Foreign Secretary acknowledges that the report shows that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and no programmes of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. He tells us that there was an intention. There was indeed an intention, but, to quote the report, there was

"no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions".

That prompts me to ask the Foreign Secretary how the regime can be said to have been working flat out to rebuild its WMD capability if it had no strategy or plan for doing so. Does he now accept that there was no "real and present danger", no "serious and current threat", and, as revealed by the leaked Foreign Office documents, from some of which the Foreign Secretary emerges with some personal credit, the true objective, 12 months in advance of military action, was regime change? Does he accept that regime change is illegal in international law, as is military action based on an unspecific intention to acquire weapons of mass destruction in future?

First, I thank the right hon. and learned Gentleman for what he had to say in respect of the Bigley family. As I said, notwithstanding other differences on Iraq, I greatly appreciate that the whole House and the whole country came together as they did. It made my life a lot easier having the full co-operation of the right hon. Gentleman and also the right hon. and learned Member for Devizes (Mr. Ancram).

Let me deal with the ISG report. For the convenience of the House, I have appended the relevant document to the written text of my statement. The right hon. and learned Gentleman is right to say that there was no formal written plan, but that needs to be seen in the context of the ISG report.

Back of an envelope.

The hon. Member for Colchester (Bob Russell)—I almost referred to him as a right hon. Member, but I do not want to undermine the integrity of the Privy Council. [Interruption.] Hon. Members say that it is just a matter of time. The hon. Gentleman said that there was no plan, but in fact there was. It is clear from the ISG report that Saddam operated at the level that he did, not by formal written documents, but by making clear his intentions to others and by running a reign of terror. In discussing the ISG's conclusions in an interview with Jon Snow last week, David Kay, Duelfer's immediate predecessor, said:

"This regime of Saddam Hussein acted as if it had weapons."

That is the point. It was that behaviour that made matters so difficult for both Governments and for the inspectors.

That leads me on to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's final point, concerning whether Iraq was a danger. Well, the whole international community came to that judgment. As page after page of the ISG report shows, Saddam was working to degrade the sanctions effort by playing it long with, and seeking to divide, the international community, and by seeking to bribe many of its key actors. At the same time, he was working to maintain his capability of rebuilding very quickly his chemical weapons programme in particular, and part of his biological weapons programme. By God, if he had been allowed to succeed, he would indeed have re-emerged very quickly as a greater threat than before.

It is of the utmost importance that the full election timetable be continued until January—even if there are certain no-go areas, where there will have to be some postponement—because any major postponement would be construed as a victory for the insurgents. I was struck by my right hon. Friend's saying that he stressed to the UN Secretary-General that it is vital that the UN increase its presence. Does that imply that he is currently not satisfied with the number of UN personnel present? Of course, the movement of key personnel is restricted to the green zone because of the outrage in August last year. If my right hon. Friend is so dissatisfied, what are the prospects of the UN increasing its presence?

My right hon. Friend is absolutely right about postponement—we have to drive ahead with this timetable. The UN's presence is not as adequate as we all hoped, including the Secretary-General. The key problem is security and ensuring close protection for deployed UN personnel, so that they can get outside, and for their bases. This morning, I was on the telephone to one of the contributor countries to the multinational force—I shall not mention which one—to ensure that it provides active support and supplies protection equipment for one of the countries that, we hope, will be deployed very quickly. The situation is, I think, going to get better. Meanwhile, I pay tribute to one member of UN personnel who is already on the ground: Mr. Carlos Valenzuela, the UN elections expert. He is doing a brilliant job in guiding and advising the already established independent elections commission for Iraq, and he is ensuring—until now, at least—that the elections programme is on time.

The report states in its key findings that, if Saddam had acquired weapons of mass destruction, he would have used them primarily against Iran and Israel and to improve his status in the Arab world. Does that not again highlight the importance of the middle east peace process, and is it not essential that we do something now, together with our European Union partners, rather than waiting until after the American elections in November?

I completely agree that a resolution of the entire middle east problem, and above all of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, is fundamental to stability in that region and in the rest of the world. The European Union is doing what it can, but it is just a fact of life that the United States is one of the four key partners in the Quartet. Everybody in the EU understands that unless we can bring the United States with us, our ability to influence one of the key parties to the conflict—Israel—is limited.

I fully accept the statement of my right hon. Friend that, at the time of the invasion, there were questions unanswered. Will he accept in return that, whatever else the ISG report might show, it comprehensively demonstrates that there was no immediate threat from Iraq? Would it not have been wiser to give Hans Blix the extra few months that he asked for to find the answer to those very questions?

On the current position in Iraq, has my right hon. Friend seen the recent figures from the Iraqi Ministry of Health, our own allies, which show that two thirds of the civilians killed in the last six months died as a result of coalition bombing? Will he redouble his efforts to convince the Pentagon that, if we are to succeed in winning over Iraqi opinion, they need to show the same restraint shown by British forces, and to remember that they are in Iraq to keep the peace, not to wage a war?

In a spirit of friendship and comradeship, I will not embarrass my right hon. Friend by pointing out all the things that he said when he was in my position about the threat posed by Saddam and his weapons—[Hon. Members: "Go on."] No, I will leave that aside. The heart of the argument in March 2003 was whether we could allow Dr. Blix and his colleagues more time to complete their inspections. The problem was that, although we wanted to allow Dr. Blix more time, there was not an effective international consensus for doing so. I made a statement on 10 March that year, following the failure on 7 March in respect of the six—just six—key points that the Security Council published for Saddam to consider. We would have accepted his agreement—we were going to take yes for an answer—and I should also point out that Dr. Blix went through those six key points. The whole purpose was to establish a clear template by which we could judge whether or not Saddam was complying with Security Council resolutions. It was Saddam who refused.

Meanwhile, there was a fact of life that we had to deal with. One permanent member of the Security Council said that "whatever the circumstances"—the exact phrase used—France would veto any decision in respect of military action. The only reason we got inspectors back into Iraq, following their being driven out by Saddam in late 1998, was thanks to the massing of troops and the threat of military action. A failure to follow through that threat would have led not to Dr. Blix being able to complete his task, but to the degradation of the whole policy of containment. Saddam would have got what he wanted.

That was the argument, and I accept and respect the fact that my right hon. Friend took a different view. But I can honestly say that I have been through this issue many times, and that we did our best to persuade Saddam to give us a yes for an answer. We would have taken it, and no, we would not then have sought regime change. It would have been impossible for the Prime Minister or me to come to this House and seek support for military action if Dr. Blix had at any stage said that Saddam had complied. However, he had not.

The Foreign Secretary will remember, because he was involved in events at the time, that about nine years ago, in good faith and based on repeated personal assurances from the highest possible official advice, I made a statement at the Dispatch Box that turned out to be untrue. Within days, I came back to the Dispatch Box, put the truth on the record and apologised to the House of Commons, simply because I believed—I was advised at the time that there were other ways of correcting the record—that we degrade public life if we do not adhere to truth. Why will not the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister please now apologise for giving information to this House that was not true?

I remember the case when the right hon. Lady came before the House then and she did well, but I also remember plenty of occasions when I was Home Secretary when I apologised to the House for the sort of disastrous thing that used to happen more often when she was running the Home Office than when I was. I once described it as "business as usual" at the Home Office, and I recall her castigating me for doing that on four separate occasions in one week.

I am the first to make an apology when I feel that it is due, but I must tell the right hon. Lady that the position is rather different here. The Prime Minister has already made it clear in his speech at the party conference that

"The evidence about Saddam having actual chemical and biological weapons, as opposed to the capability to develop them, has turned out to be wrong. I acknowledge that and accept it."

He then went on:

"And the problem is, I can apologise for the information that turned out to be wrong, but I can't, sincerely at least, apologise for removing Saddam."

That is the position, and I am happy to repeat it here.

My right hon. Friend knows that deeply held views expressed in the House on both sides of the argument are to be respected. That is certainly my position. A local doctor working in a hospital in my constituency who comes from Iraq is in regular contact with his family there. They know what is going on and they are constantly telling him that life is much better for them, that they now enjoy a sense of freedom and a decent future at last. What troubles me about the whole debate is that such quiet voices are not getting through. I am not looking through rose-coloured spectacles about what is happening in Iraq, but I believe that we need to listen to those quiet voices.

I agree absolutely with my hon. Friend. The security position is very difficult in some parts of the country, but many of the Iraqis to whom I spoke, who represented a wide range of parties, made exactly the same point as my hon. Friend.

I want to apologise to my right hon. Friend the Member for Livingston (Mr. Cook) for omitting to answer his question about the casualty figures. I have not seen those figures. We keep a close eye on the figures provided by the Iraqi Ministry of Health and by one of the independent websites. I will follow it up, write to my right hon. Friend and place the letter in the Library of the House.

Does the Foreign Secretary agree that if the present appalling level of violence continues in Iraq, there is little prospect of achieving long-term, enduring political stability or successful economic reconstruction? Is it not the case that the violence will be significantly reduced only if there is a radical increase in the number of trained and effective security forces available to the Iraqi Government? Does the right hon. Gentleman see any prospect whatever of achieving that?

There are signs, notwithstanding the difficulties of the security situation, that the multinational force and the Iraqi security forces are getting on top of it by a combination of tough security measures and a political process—the two go together. That is how some semblance of stability in Samarra and how understanding between the leaders in Sadr City and the MNF were achieved. A huge amount of effort is going into the training and equipping of the Iraqi security forces—the army, the Iraqi national guard and other paramilitary groups, the facilities protection force and the police. The numbers are rising rapidly, but I entirely accept the burden of the right hon. Gentleman's point—that the quicker the Iraqis become wholly responsible for their own security, the better.

I support everything that my right hon. Friend has said today and I particularly welcome his comments about the Muslim Council of Britain and its role in the efforts to save Ken Bigley. It is important for the House to focus on the way in which Islam does not agree or go along with the activities of the organisations that perpetrate such actions.

Does my right hon. Friend intend to have any further conversations with Dr. Blix to go over some of his statements made at the time to compare them with his current statements? It would be worth trying to establish where exactly Dr. Blix stands now on some of his earlier statements before and after the inquiry.

On the last point, I made sure some time ago that Dr. Blix was made aware of our intention to publish the material in due course. It was also considered by the Intelligence and Security Committee and by the Butler committee, which is useful. Dr. Blix's opinions in September 2002 were a matter for his own judgment, and he came to a different judgment from ours, but it is important for everyone to understand that, far from the dossier being some sort of confection, it was based on the best available judgments not only of ourselves but of the wider international community, including the intelligence agencies of countries that were not in the end supportive of our approach, and of people in the United Nations. Everybody assumed that Saddam had these weapons and made their judgments on that basis. Everybody also assumed that he would become an even bigger threat if the UN measures were not successful.

On my hon. Friend's point about the Muslim Council of Britain, I entirely endorse what he said. I hope that we can acknowledge the efforts of the Muslim Council of Britain in one particular respect by not falling into the trap set by the terrorists and adorning or dignifying them with the label "Islamic terrorists". They are no more Islamic terrorists than Irish terrorists were Christian terrorists. They are simply terrorists, evil people, and everything that they do defies and defiles the values of Islam.

I accept the good faith of the Foreign Secretary, so will he accept the good faith of those of us who voted against the war and acknowledge that we were not just star-struck Arabists or pacifists? Does he accept that we may have had a point in saying that the invasion would make international terrorism worse, and does he think that we may have a smidgen of an argument when we say that the continuing presence of western troops in a Muslim country is a gift to Arab terrorists and extremists? What is his exit plan and how are we going to get our troops out of the morass after the elections in January?

I have argued with those like the hon. Gentleman who have taken a different view, but I have never challenged their good faith. I am glad to hear that he does not challenge mine, the Prime Minister's or the Cabinet's. For the record, I have never thought of the hon. Gentleman as a star-struck Arabist or a pacifist. I reserve my contempt for those who took one position before and during the military action and a different position after it.

In Afghanistan, the great fear is of abandonment by western troops, not of occupation. I accept that it is different in Iraq, which is why we are moving rapidly to hand over responsibility to the Iraqi security forces. Resolution 1546 provides that the mandate of the MNF will run out at the end of next year or the end of the political process, which is more or less next year. It would then have to be renewed; otherwise the troops would leave automatically. We are working towards a sensible and orderly process negotiated with the Iraqis. They do not want us to leave until they feel fully capable of running their own security affairs themselves.

People are wondering why we cannot have a debate on Iraq. The ISG report certainly demolishes the Government's case for going to war and we are also seeing daily bombing of cities and heavily populated areas such as Sadr City, Falluja, Samarra and others, which is resulting in the huge loss of civilian lives. Are the Government taking account of how many civilians are dead, or of how many women or children are dead or injured? Iraq Body Count estimates about 15,000 losses, and we have heard reference to the Iraq health group, according to which two-thirds of the casualties over the last three months have been civilians. Surely the House should be debating Iraq when those killings are taking place in our name.

As my hon. Friend knows, what is debated on the Floor of the House is a matter for the Leader of the House, but I will ensure that her views are put to him. I profoundly regret any loss of life, in Iraq or anywhere else. However, let us be clear that in certain parts of that country the MNF and the Iraqi security forces are dealing with the most unpleasant terrorist insurgency. It is the terrorists—not the MNF, the US, the UK or the Iraqi security forces—who are using suicide bombers to blow up streets full of women and children. They are deliberately seeking to undermine the recruitment of security personnel to the Iraqi police by means of terrorist outrages against them, and to prevent the political process from taking place. The culpability for most of the deaths lies with the terrorists.

The Foreign Secretary is clearly right to say that the Joint Intelligence Committee signed off the dossier but, as the Hutton process exposed, that dossier's language was considerably strengthened as a result of representations to the JIC made by Alastair Campbell and other spin doctors. In the light of the findings of the Iraq survey group, does the right hon. Gentleman think that the intervention by Alastair Campbell and the other spin doctors made the intelligence more accurate or less accurate?

First, I believe that the role of spin doctors can be overspun. Palpably, there are many lessons to be learned from the fact that some of the intelligence turned out to be wrong, but some of the intelligence—such as that received about Iraqi missile systems—turned out to be amazingly accurate. However, I accepted the intelligence without too much inquiry because of everything else that I knew, from perfectly public sources, about the record of Saddam, who continued to defy Security Council resolutions for many years, even though he could have put himself in order. Also, as late as 7 March 2003, Dr. Blix published a 173-page report in respect of unanswered disarmament questions, in which he stated that there was a strong presumption that 10,000 litres of anthrax remained in Iraq. I am very proud of our intelligence service and I remind the hon. Gentleman that it had made very accurate judgments, on a similar intelligence base, about Libya, the A.Q. Khan network and other matters. That is why I, and the rest of us, accepted the intelligence.

One of my many Iraqi constituents asked me over the weekend whether people in Britain understood that the nightmare endured by Ken Bigley's family had been a daily occurrence for families—including his own—in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. He went on to discuss with me the difficulties encountered when a body such as the UN tries to deal with a person who is a psychopathic killer and who is in breach of both the resolutions and the ceasefire. To me, that was always more important than the question of weapons of mass destruction. People like Saddam Hussein are intelligent and brutal, but also deeply unpredictable. Saddam succeeded in fooling the international community in respect of WMD, but does my right hon. Friend agree that what made him dangerous was his unpredictability?

As with my hon. Friend the Member for Crawley (Laura Moffatt), I wish that more people were listening to the authentic voice of Iraqis, both here and in Iraq. Life there is getting better. One Iraqi told me that Saddam was the biggest terrorist of all, and that 300,000 people, including many members of his own family, had been murdered and dumped into mass graves. My hon. Friend is also right to say that, although there might be lessons for us to learn—and there are—it is also plain that there are lessons to be learned about the UN system, and to be learned by those who did not support effective action. As I recall, in the middle of 2001—before 11 September—a number of Security Council members were willing to work with Saddam to allow the sanctions regime to degrade, even though they knew that he was in clear breach of all sorts of obligations. The UN suffered from that, as did international peace and security. I hope that the high-level group established by Kofi Annan will find a way through these difficulties and learn some lessons so that we have much better ground rules for taking decisions in the future.

I pay tribute to the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister for their personal involvement in trying to secure the safety and release of Mr. Kenneth Bigley in Iraq. I disagreed with both of them at the beginning of Mr. Bigley's ordeal, but by the end I believe that they had done everything possible to secure his freedom. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that a new international summit on Iraq, as outlined by Senator John Kerry, would be helpful in increasing the involvement of the UN?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his generous remarks, which are much appreciated. However, I hope that he will forgive me if I do not get too involved in the debates currently taking place between the two leading presidential contenders. An international conference called by Egypt is being held next week, and will involve Iraq's neighbours, the P5—the permanent five nations on the Security Council—as well as Egypt and some other countries. There is no doubt that the more we can involve the international community and get it on board in this matter, the better it will be for the Iraqis.

The Butler report concluded that the allegation that Iraq tried to purchase uranium from Niger was well founded, yet the ISG was unable to find any evidence to support the allegation that Iraq had tried to buy uranium from abroad in the period after Desert Storm. Which of those conclusions does the Foreign Secretary support?

I simply say to my hon. Friend that that shows the difficulties faced by our intelligence services. We expect them to operate as effectively as possible but, by definition, they do not deal with established truths. They deal with fragments of information that they then have to put together to make judgments. Without their efforts, Britain would be a far less safe place and would have suffered many more terrorist outrages. To put it bluntly, people must understand that.

The Butler committee went into these matters in great detail and I respect its judgment, although I acknowledge that the ISG's conclusion was slightly different.

May I associate myself unreservedly with the remarks made by the Foreign Secretary and my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Devon (Mr. Streeter) about the incident connected with the death of Mr. Bigley, and with the remarks that the right hon. Gentleman made about our forces in Iraq? There can be no controversy about that matter.

I supported the Government in the Lobby in March 2003 because I believed that the Prime Minister had advanced a case for war that was based on the unvarnished truth. However, the Government's current justification for the invasion of Iraq is markedly different. Will the Foreign Secretary give me an assurance that what the Prime Minister told the House in March 2003 was based on the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

I am grateful to the hon. and learned Gentleman for the first part of what he said, and I fully understand why Opposition Members might be tempted to raise questions about the good faith of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister or other members of the Cabinet. However, I do not believe that British politics is helped by that, or that there is any foundation for such claims. My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister acted in complete good faith and there have been three separate forensic inquiries into the basis of the September dossier and much else besides. If the hon. and learned Gentleman looks at the motion put before the House on 18 March last year—the terms of which were discussed with the Opposition in advance—he will see that it was based on Saddam's breach of his Security Council obligations and on his failure to comply. That remains as true today as it was on the day when we voted for that motion.

On the issue of an attempt to procure uranium from Africa, the Iraq survey group confirms the view of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which was presented to the UN Security Council before the war, that there was no evidence to support those allegations. However, Butler, while restating the IAEA view, comes to the opposite conclusion without giving any logical argument to justify that view. Does not that call into question the credibility of the Butler report and its conclusions on that and other issues? Why was it that the Government insisted that that allegation was correct, but omitted to mention that Iraq had no need to procure uranium from Africa because it had stockpiles of the stuff?

With respect, I am not entirely clear what point my hon. Friend is trying to make. If it is clear that the basis for intelligence was wrong, it has been withdrawn. I have announced two withdrawals today. Butler analysed the information with great care, including all the intelligence that formed part of the dossier. Together with his colleagues, who included two right hon. Members of this House, he reached conclusions that were his conclusions, and not the Government's. If he had come to different conclusions, we would have accepted them.

All that this shows is the great difficulty of making cast-iron judgments in an area of intelligence. Nevertheless, people have to understand the importance of intelligence. The same intelligence services have a fantastic record of accuracy. In some of the dossiers they have worked on, such as Libya, they have been in error only in underestimating rather than overestimating the problem.

On behalf of my party and my hon. Friends in the Scottish National party, I wish to associate myself fully with the condolences expressed to the Bigley family.

Today's statement has done nothing to justify the attack on Iraq. The Foreign Secretary referred to an intention to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction and intentions to resume a chemical weapons effort. As an upholder of international law, will he now lobby the United Nations to legitimise any further attack on a state based on its perceived future intentions, as revealed ex post facto?

That has never been the basis for action. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that chapter 7 of the UN charter sets out the circumstances in which the Security Council can declare a threat to international peace and security and authorise military action in that respect. I do not wish to detain the House, but I could do so with an account of the negotiating history that led to the operative paragraphs in resolution 1441 in November 2002. The hon. Gentleman and others need to look again at the motion that we put before the House, with Opposition support, on 18 March 2003. We invited the House to agree to military action overwhelmingly because of Saddam's failure to comply with Security Council resolutions. It was not to do with intelligence but with his failure to comply. That was the case then, and not a single word of the ISG report or any other confounds the conclusion that the House rightly reached on 18 March.

I feel a great sense of outrage that the UN was corrupted by Saddam Hussein's regime. I cannot believe that any hon. Member believes that Saddam worked so hard, using money and influence, to corrupt the UN into deciding to lift the sanctions because he wanted to improve the welfare of his people. Anybody who believes that is living in a fool's paradise. I wish to ask my right hon. Friend whether we can we examine the role of France and Russia on the Security Council. It would not have been possible to obtain a second or third resolution by the Security Council, because whatever Iraq did, France and Russia would have blocked the resolution. The corruption by members of the Security Council, by officials of the UN and by the regime deserves the fullest investigation. For example, when will the oil-for-food programme investigation reach a conclusion?

My hon. Friend makes some important points. She is right to say that an element of naivety existed in attitudes to Saddam. It would not have been okay if we had simply walked away, but that was the only alternative. We sought rigorous inspections, backed by the threat of military force and a clear ultimatum to use it unless Saddam complied. That is what France—leaving aside Russia—said that it would veto in any circumstances, and that meant that Saddam thought that he was off the hook, as he would have been. France and other countries would have rued the day that they allowed that to happen, because he would have emerged much stronger as a result of his degradation of the UN by beating the resolutions.

Several inquiries are taking place, including one by the UN itself. It is important that we do not prejudge that, but on the basis of the evidence in the 1,000 pages provided by Duelfer, several individuals have a big case to answer.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will be aware that thousands of jobs depend on air bases at Kinloss and Lossiemouth in my Moray constituency, and that grave concern is felt about potential cuts or closure under the ongoing airfield review by the Ministry of Defence. Since last night, the media have been tipped off that an announcement was set to be made about the review process. In fact, several media representatives called me at 11.20 this morning, quoting from a letter by the Minister of State about the bases in my constituency. I only received a faxed copy of that letter an hour later and the hard copy has still to arrive on the board. Is that an appropriate way for a Department to deal with important constituency concerns, especially when hundreds if not thousands of jobs are at stake? What remedy is available to Members to ensure that such cynical media management does not continue?

I am deeply concerned about that situation if it is true. Men and women in the hon. Gentleman's constituency are genuinely worried about their future. He and the House should be the first to know. If the media want to know, we provide passes and the facilities of the Press Gallery to them so that they can hear what Ministers have to say. I would hope that the hon. Gentleman will go to the Table Office and inquire into the situation. I hope that it is noted that I expect statements to be made to the House, not elements in the media to be tipped off, especially about matters as serious as job losses.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. I am sure that the House will have welcomed your strong stand and your admonishment of the Government. May I draw to your attention the fact that the Ministry of Defence is scheduled to make several ministerial statements on the Order Paper today, but there is no reference to the future of Lossiemouth, Kinloss or any other Royal Air Force airfield?

That is why I am so angry. I have noted that fact.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. May I ask for your guidance on whether we will have a statement on the breaches of security that took place in this House during the demonstrations by the Countryside Alliance? Are we in a position to understand precisely how members of the public were able to get into this Chamber?

This matter is being considered by the Joint Committee on Security. The hon. Gentleman will appreciate the difficulty that I have, because security matters should not be openly discussed on the Floor of the House. The matter is being considered and I ask the hon. Gentleman to bear with me.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. During the statement, you will have heard my question to the Foreign Secretary about an apology to the House from the Prime Minister for a statement that proved invalid. The Foreign Secretary's response, which you will also have heard, was that the Prime Minister apologised to the Labour party conference. Is it your view, Mr. Speaker, that the House and the Labour party conference are synonymous?

As the right hon. Lady knows, when I became Speaker the Labour party and I parted company—on perfectly good terms of course, but we parted company.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to establish Civil Welcoming Ceremonies, Responsibility to Children Agreements and Coming of Age Ceremonies; to make provision as to their conduct; and for connected purposes.

During my time in Birkenhead, my constituents have almost refashioned the way in which they see my role. Twenty-five years ago, when they first elected me to represent them in the House, most of the agenda was class politics. My constituents were concerned about whether I could help them achieve a new house, gain a welfare benefit or protect their job. That agenda has been transformed, almost beyond recognition.

Increasingly, in place of that class politics, my constituents ask whether I can help them to stop people behaving in an uncivilised way towards them, their families and their local communities. In the 25 years I have been the Member for Birkenhead, I have witnessed the replacement of class politics by the politics of behaviour.

There was no one point when it was clear that that transition had taken place. At first, I tried to justify gross incidents of incivility as exceptions, but I can remember the occasion 10 years ago when a group of decent working-class pensioners came to see me and I realised that politics had changed for the worse and, certainly in the short term, for good. They explained the nightmare they were living through: young lads who ran across their bungalow roofs, banged on their windows, peed through their letter boxes and jumped out of the shadows to try to give them heart attacks. They explained that the police were powerless to act to give them the sort of life that they expected. Those pensioners were the bedrock of our country. They had always worked hard and added more than they ever expected to take out, yet they found that the world in which they believed they would end their days was fast crumbling before them.

Both the last and the current Governments have attempted to respond to that changed situation—the politics of behaviour. Almost all of us welcomed the measures that the previous Conservative Government and this Labour Government have taken. The Government are rightly concerned as to whether we can hold the line more effectively against uncivilised behaviour.

The Bill begins to redress the balance. As well as holding the line even more effectively, we need to look at the root causes and to consider why we are increasingly surrounded by constituents who make pleas to which we can only partly respond. The very nature of politics is changing because the agenda has changed.

In the past, we took it for granted that people's behaviour had nothing to do with politicians. We had a peaceable kingdom because families, largely, functioned to ensure that although each of their members thought they were the most important person in the world, they realised that there were three or four other people in the household who thought that, too, and that an agreement had to be struck. In coming to those agreements in our families, we were all taught the social skills that enabled us to go into the wider community and behave in almost as civilised a fashion as in our families.

During my time as a Member, we have witnessed first a small but now, sadly, an increasing number of families who have no idea that their duty is to teach their offspring those common virtues. We have never had to deal with the issue, but now because families, supported by trade unions, Churches, friendly societies and mutual aid societies, all singing from the same hymn sheet, sadly, do not carry the weight they once did, we as politicians have to turn to that most difficult task.

Although any politician who thinks there is a panacea for such a fundamental issue should be led quietly away, put in a dark room, given a high dosage of pills and asked to recover, that does not mean that we should not attempt to build up a more effective programme. In the next parliamentary Session, the Home Office will give us another Bill on antisocial behaviour, and I hope that my Bill gives a flavour of some of the measures that we should like to see in that Bill.

I accept that, sadly, there is a slow walking away in this country from the role that organised religion played in the way we govern our behaviour. I do not believe that, as individuals, we have much chance of reversing that, but the Bill takes what were religious ceremonies and secularises and universalises them. It accepts that although those ceremonies were religious in intent, they also had a civic value in binding people to the wider community where they were treasured as individuals but to which they had responsibilities.

Part of the Bill takes the idea of baptism and secularises it, not to replace baptism where it occurs but to have a ceremony that adds to it. When the British Expeditionary Force went to France in the first world war, more than 99 per cent. of our soldiers were baptised. When we sent our forces to Iraq, fewer than four in 10 were baptised.

The Bill would provide for a ceremony that was once universal, to remind children and families that there is a wider community beyond the importance of the family. It would universalise that idea in a welcoming ceremony. In place of a hurried and unimportant entry in the registry of births, there would be a public ceremony in which we would welcome the child into the community. We would say what we want the child to achieve and set out the resources that we want, to ensure that parents can bring out the best in their child.

Likewise, the Bill would universalise the Jewish coming of age ceremony, the Bar Mitzvah—although without the presents. It is important that all our children know that there is a point when they begin to move from childhood to adulthood, and that as they make that move, so we expect their behaviour to change from the innocence—we hope—of childhood to an awareness of the greater responsibilities of adulthood.

No one would pretend that the Bill, even if it is embraced as enthusiastically as I hope it will be by the House, presents the panacea. However, I hope that it will do two things. First, I hope that it will give some idea of the positive measures that the Government will include in the new antisocial behaviour Bill, so that while we are more effectively holding the line against uncivilised behaviour we also look at its deep-seated root causes and prepare to deal with them.

Secondly, to help concentrate the Government's mind on their task, I hope that, before they publish their Bill, a number of like-minded Members will introduce a much more comprehensive measure than mine, which will both hold the line, because that is what our constituents most want us to do, and look at those root causes, because they want us to do that, too. Where families have failed, politics might achieve, so I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Frank Field, Ross Cranston, Mrs. Ann Cryer, Ms Meg Munn, Mr. David Kidney, Mr. David Willetts, Tony Wright, Mrs. Louise Ellman, Mrs. Alice Mahon and Angela Eagle.

Rite of Passage (Welcoming and Coming of Age)

Mr. Frank Field accordingly presented a Bill to establish civil welcoming ceremonies, responsibility to children agreements and coming of age ceremonies; to make provision as to their conduct; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 15 October, and to be printed [Bill 160].

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

The Bill represents a historic step on what has been a long journey to respect and dignity for lesbians and gay men in Britain. It is a natural progression in our vision to build an inclusive society. As such, it builds on reforms that began back in 1967 with Leo Abse's private Member's Bill, backed by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins. The Government's commitment to equality has been strong and unequivocal. We have equalised the age of consent, outlawed discrimination in the workplace on the ground of sexual orientation, secured protection from homophobic hate crimes and supported the abolition of section 28.

In creating a new legal relationship for same-sex couples, this Bill is a sign of the Government's commitment to social justice and equality. It is also a recognition of the realities of modern Britain. Across this country today thousands of same-sex couples have made the decision to share their lives, their home, their finances and the care of their children or of older relatives. They may have loved and cared for each other for many years, yet their relationship is invisible in the eyes of the law. The Bill sends a clear message about the importance of stable and committed same-sex relationships.

Will the Minister recommend to the Treasury that carers, those being cared for and family members living together in their own family units should have the benefit of inheritance tax relief and capital gains tax relief?

No, I will not. It is rather unfortunate that some Opposition Members have chosen to use an important equality Bill to pursue their campaign about inheritance tax. I will come back to some of the amendments that have been made in the Lords.

The Bill sends a clear message about the importance of stable and committed same-sex relationships. It marks a major step in helping such couples gain greater social acceptance of their partnership and overcome the distressing consequences for many people of their legal invisibility.

During consultation we heard and were moved by the personal stories of difficulties faced by same-sex couples precisely because they lacked a way of obtaining legal recognition of their relationship. They included terminally ill people and their partners who had to face not just the heartbreak of death and separation but the added trauma of being unable to leave a shared home or pension benefits. One man who had been involved in a major car accident was shocked to find that it was not his partner but his parents who were consulted about his medical treatment, that his partner might have faced difficulties registering his death and that although they had shared their lives he and his partner had no way of safeguarding their shared interests. Fortunately, in that instance, the parents were supportive through a difficult time, but that is not always the case.

Another man, on the death of his partner, found himself excluded from funeral arrangements and thrown out of his home by relatives of his partner who had had no contact with him for many years. Another person had to buy the couple's joint possessions from the parents of his deceased partner. A woman was kept away from her partner's funeral. These are the inhumane consequences of the invisibility of same-sex relationships.

The points that the Minister is making are valid, but do they not equally apply to platonic companions who share a home together and suffer equally?

I do not believe that some of the issues that I have identified do apply. There is a particular significance to a partnership between two people who have chosen to share their home and their life, to love each other and to care for each other. I will deal with the issue of other types of carers, which I take seriously, later, but to conflate the two is to do justice neither to the same-sex couples whom the Bill seeks to serve nor to carers in the sort of relationships that the hon. Lady describes.

The Minister describes a loving couple who have lived together for many years, sharing their house, their lives, their food. Do her arguments apply to the elderly sisters in my constituency who have lived together for 40 years and care for each other and love each other in a very real way as much as they do to lesbian couples?

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman was listening carefully when I identified the specific problem for same-sex couples—the legal invisibility of their relationship. Of course there are issues about sisters living together, but their relationship is not invisible—it is already recognised by society, and often by the law.

No.

The hon. Gentleman is plain wrong: of course their relationship is recognised in law.

The Bill would allow same-sex couples security in life, peace of mind in the event of a partner's death and fair treatment should their relationship break down. It provides the opportunity to enter into a legal relationship in which rights are balanced with responsibilities and the couple's commitment is recognised in law—giving solutions to the practical problems that too many people face—and makes an important statement about this country's support for stable, long-term committed relationships. These are the marks of a civilised and humane society. They are the principles that we set out to fulfil with this Bill, yet others have sought to wreck the principles on which the Bill is founded.

Before the Minister goes into more detail, may I ask her about Northern Ireland? I understand that this is a reserved matter so, conventionally, what happens there will be determined here. The Liberal Democrats are keen to see the legislation implemented in Northern Ireland. Will the Minister give an assurance that that is the Government's intention?

I can give the hon. Gentleman that assurance. It is the Government's intention that, under this Bill, not least given some of the issues that I have identified, the new legal ability to gain recognition for one's relationship will operate across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The Minister will be aware that in all political parties in Northern Ireland there is opposition to this Bill. She will also be aware that in the consultation 86 per cent. of the answers were no. Why is the Bill not going to be left until the Assembly is up and running again so that the people of Northern Ireland can make the decision themselves? [Interruption.]

Well, Mr. Deputy Speaker—

I had nothing—

Order. I am not quite sure who has finished and who is starting.

The hon. Gentleman is right about the responses to the consultation, although I can report to the House that, as of today, we have received nearly 400 letters of support for the Bill from Northern Ireland, and there were 462 responses to the original consultation. The hon. Gentleman is wrong, therefore, to suggest that there is no support for the Bill in Northern Ireland. Given the universality of some of the issues that I have described, it makes sense to legislate, as we propose with the Bill, for England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

I welcome this groundbreaking Bill, but one issue—survivor benefits in occupational pensions—has worried a lot of people. Will my right hon. Friend take another look at the Bill, because it will create an inequality of treatment between same-sex couples and married heterosexual couples in relation to survivor benefits under occupational pension schemes? Will she see whether she can iron out that manifest discrimination?

My hon. Friend and other Labour Members have certainly worked very hard to raise that issue. Given that, as I have said, the Bill is about equality, I can undertake, as she asks, to look in considerable detail at the way in which we are able to provide, as we are in the vast majority of provisions in the Bill, equality in relation to survivor benefits under pension schemes, difficult though some of the issues may be.

The Minister has several times used the word "equality". Will she be very specific? Is the equality that she seeks that whereby a homosexual relationship based on commitment is treated in future in exactly the same way as marriage in law?

If the right hon. Lady looks at the Bill, she will see that, in the vast majority of cases, it is the Government's intention that those people who enter into a civil partnership will receive the same rights and take on the same responsibilities as those that we expect of those who enter into civil marriage.

It would surely be much fairer to Members on both sides of House if the Government came clean and announced that they support gay marriage. Why will they not do so?

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman heard me make the important point that civil partnerships under the Bill mirror in many ways the requirements, rights and responsibilities that run alongside civil marriage. I recognise that hon. Members on both sides of the House understand and feel very strongly about specific religious connotations of marriage. The Government are taking a secular approach to resolve the specific problems of same-sex couples. As others have said, that is the appropriate and modern way for the 21st century.

I wish to move on to the amendments—frankly, they are wrecking amendments—passed in another place. Our belief, which is supported by many hon. Members on both sides of the House, is that certain amendments passed in another place render the Bill unworkable. Those amendments would allow close relatives over the age of 30 who have lived together continuously for 12 years to form civil partnerships. Of course, we recognise that there are genuine concerns about the position of carers. That is why the Government introduced the first ever national carers strategy and ensured that the carers grant that we introduced to provide vitally needed breaks is six times higher this year than it was in 1999, and it is why we supported the private Member's Bill proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Aberavon (Dr. Francis), but this Bill is entirely the wrong place to deal with those concerns. Parents, children and siblings already have legally recognised relationships to one another that are widely acknowledged and accepted in society.

The Opposition amendments passed in another place would also lead to myriad legal absurdities. A woman who formed a civil partnership with her grandfather would have her own mother as her stepdaughter. A grandfather could leave a survivor's pension to a civil-partner grandson. That turns pension provision on its head and could cost the taxpayer £1 billion a year and the private sector some £1.25 billion a year.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that those amendments can fairly be described as wrecking amendments, designed to prevent the Bill from becoming effective, and that they were tabled in that form by people who are afraid to come out and express their real motive, which is to oppose equality?

My hon. Friend makes a fair point. As I have said, those amendments fail to recognise the principles on which the Bill is based and they will lead to some of the legal absurdities that I have outlined. I hope that all hon. Members will be honest about their real views, their real motivations and their real objectives in what they propose.

Is the Minister seriously telling the House that three bishops who voted for the amendments so ably moved by my noble Friends in the other place were engaged in a wrecking process? If so, they and their parishioners ought to be told that.

I was saying precisely that the effect of those amendments would be to wreck the Bill. Those who voted for them, whatever their motives, need to be aware that that would be the effect of the amendments. I was going through the legal absurdities. For example, a son in a civil partnership with his elderly mother could lose entitlement to jobseeker's allowance, based on his mother's ability to support him financially. That would take our social security system back to the 1930s. Even more bizarrely, if he then wanted to marry someone else, he would have to live separately from his mother for at least two years, or he would have to prove her unreasonable behaviour. For those reasons and many others, the amendments stand condemned by the TUC, citizens advice bureaux, the Solicitors Family Law Association, the Law Society, Stonewall and many others, but, worst of all, they stand condemned by the very people whom they purport to help—carers. Carers UK believes that the amendments may even harm the position of carers and create new problems for them.

The House will also be aware that those amendments have rendered me unable to declare under the Human Rights Act 1998 that the Bill is compatible with the European convention on human rights.

The Minister is being very generous with her time in giving way. Will she confirm that one of the issues for carers is that they will lose their entitlement to benefit if they register such a relationship because joint incomes will be taken into account? Some of those whom the Bill is directly designed to help would lose the most.

The hon. Gentleman points out yet another difficulty with trying to impose an ill-thought-out wrecking process on a Bill that was intended to deal with another problem. He is absolutely right.

My right hon. Friend refers to the European convention on human rights. As I understand it—perhaps she will correct me if I am wrong—heterosexual couples can take advantage of the Bill only if they are aged 30 and have been in a relationship for 12 years. If so, does that not breach the European convention on human rights, as it is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation?

My hon. Friend is right. That is precisely one of the reasons that make the Bill in the amended form incompatible with the convention. For all those reasons and many more, we will seek to reverse those amendments and restore the Bill to its original purpose.

Is not the truth of the matter that those who tabled those amendments in the other Chamber did so because they do not believe that homosexuals are equal to heterosexuals, and that, unfortunately, that includes many of the bishops?

As I suggested earlier, I hope that people will be honest about their motivation today—I suspect that my hon. Friend is right about some people's motivation.

I acknowledge concerns expressed by hon. Members and those in another place about the vulnerable position of unmarried opposite-sex couples, many of whom are under the misapprehension that they enjoy more rights than they actually do. That is the very reason why the Department for Constitutional Affairs is running a campaign to inform cohabitants of the significant differences between their rights and responsibilities and those of married couples. We agree that there are aspects on which all couples who live together need protection, especially those with children. That is not a matter for the Bill, but the Government are mindful of the issue, which is why we recently asked the Law Commission to carry out a project on cohabitation for inclusion in its ninth programme of law reform.

The Minister will be aware that page 12 of the report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights referred to the undertaking that the Government have given, but said that it did not go far enough and asked for more information. What information have the Government provided in response to paragraph 26 of the report?

I have replied at length to the specific issues raised by the Joint Committee and I am sure that it will have ample opportunity to consider my responses. The Bill will provide the same opportunity for same-sex couples to gain legal recognition of their relationship as currently exists for opposite-sex couples through the route of marriage. That does not mean that all same-sex couples will choose to enter into that arrangement, just as not all opposite-sex couples choose to marry. However, same-sex couples currently have no route of legal recognition, so the Bill will put that right.

I shall now turn to the detail of the Bill. Part 1 defines civil partnership and makes the point at which a civil partnership is formed and ends clear. It makes it clear that a civil partnership may be formed in the UK, or overseas under UK law, and that same-sex relationships that are registered under the law of another country may be treated as civil partnerships under UK law. Part 5 provides a way of identifying those overseas relationships that can be treated as civil partnerships, and deals with the jurisdiction of UK courts in overseas cases and the recognition of orders made by courts abroad.

Part 2 sets out the procedure for forming and terminating a civil partnership in England and Wales and some of the rights and responsibilities that will flow from that relationship. The rights and responsibilities are serious, so entering a civil partnership will represent a major commitment. The registration process will be delivered by the local registration service, and there will be a formal, court-based process for dissolution if a civil partnership breaks down. That process would involve both rights and responsibilities for the civil partners involved. The provisions will ensure that civil partnerships are entered into seriously, that they cannot be exited lightly and that the rights and responsibilities that same-sex couples are given support them in their lives together.

Does the Minister share my disappointment that the Scottish Parliament is not considering the Bill, despite the fact that it has the competence to do so? There are differences involving dissolution and registration in the Scots courts. Is it the case that the Scottish Parliament is afraid to deal with the issue and is thus happy to let the Government pass legislation on its behalf?

I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. As we consider the Bill in more detail, I have no doubt that any hon. Member who so wishes will be able to examine the detail of how we are responding to the specific nature of Scots and Northern Irish law. However, both legislatively and for the people who will be affected, it makes sense to legislate through one Bill because of its complex legal implications.

Further to the point made by the hon. Member for North Tayside (Pete Wishart), surely the situation illustrates the grown-up nature of the devolution settlement. The Scottish Parliament and Executive indicated well in advance their intention to pass a Sewel motion if the Bill was to their satisfaction. That allows Scottish Members, such the hon. Gentleman and me, to participate in the debate in the knowledge that the Bill will be applied in Scotland, although it might seem on the face of it that the debate relates to England and Wales. We should celebrate the situation as a success of devolution, rather than criticising it.

My hon. Friend is right. The Labour party has a grown-up approach, and I hope that all parties will adopt that approach.

After going through the process, same-sex couples' relationships will no longer be invisible and their duties and obligations to each other as civil partners will be significant. They will have responsibilities during their relationship, during the dissolution of their relationship—should that be necessary—and on the death of a civil partner. The provisions span registration, dissolution, property and financial provisions, measures to protect the interests of children and amendments to intestacy rules. They will directly resolve many of the problems that same-sex couples face, including issues of housing and tenancy, domestic violence and fatal accident claims.

Parts 3 and 4 deal with provisions relating to Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. Although there are differences between the provisions for civil partnership in parts 2, 3 and 4, most of the differences are procedural and reflect distinct legislative history and legal systems. As we have heard, the Scottish Parliament has debated a Sewel motion and agreed that Scottish provisions should be included in the Bill.

Part 6 ensures that references to certain familial relationships in legislation, such as step relations, can be read as including relationships that arise through a civil partnership. Parts 7 and 8 deal with several discrete areas of legislation that must be amended to reflect the existence of the new legal relationship of a civil partner. For example, schedule 24 will ensure that income-related benefits rules treat same-sex couples in the same way as opposite-sex couples. Child support rules will assess civil partners in the same way as married people, and civil partners will be entitled to most state pension benefits from the date of commencement of the Bill. The Bill also contains powers to require that pension benefits provided to married people are made available to civil partners from the date of the Bill's commencement, notwithstanding the commitment that I made earlier.

I must inform the House that the Government will move several amendments during the Bill's passage through this House. Most of them will be minor and I will write to hon. Members with detailed explanations of them. The great majority were tabled for consideration in the other place, but because of the impact on the Bill of the amendments passed on Report, which would fundamentally change the nature of civil partnerships, it was impossible for us to proceed with them.