On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), the Prime Minister said that only a few dozen Ilois islanders would apparently come to the United Kingdom. He should have been aware that there are about 4,300—

Order. That is not a point of order; it relates to the Prime Minister's reply. Take it up with the Prime Minister.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. A few minutes ago, the Prime Minister stated that there would be no reduction in the size of Her Majesty's armed forces. You will recall—

Order. This is not a continuation of Prime Minister's Question Time.

rose—

Order. I am trying to answer a point of order. The hon. Gentleman is a bit quick.

If there is any concern about the Prime Minister's reply, drop him a note, and I am sure that he will answer.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. On 19 October, I wrote to the Minister for Local and Regional Government about the people from Diego Garcia, who were referred to in Prime Minister's questions, asking him urgently to contact Reigate and Banstead council to provide advice and assistance. It is simply unfair that my constituents and those of my other hon. Friends whose constituencies are in Surrey should be faced with footing the bill for an event that is entirely of the Government's making—

Order. I am going to stop the hon. Gentleman. If he and other hon. Members who represent the area have a difficulty and a concern about these matters, I am very generous in offering Adjournment debates, particularly when a group of MPs is interested. The hon. Gentleman should raise the issue in an Adjournment debate.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I ask for your protection for the proper role of the House of Commons. At 9 o'clock this morning, the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs announced a major change in environment policy and did so to a collection of journalists and pressure-group people. That change is an application for an increase in carbon emissions—

Order. I am going to interrupt the hon. Gentleman. He applied to me for an urgent question. When I refuse an urgent question, I do not give any reason why, and I do not expect hon. Members to try to raise the issue on a point of order. The Minister to whom the hon. Gentleman refers has made a written statement to the House, and he is perfectly entitled to pursue that matter through oral or written questions.

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will recall that last week I raised the issue with you of Ministers talking to the press and issuing press releases on changes in Government policy without coming to the House first. Today, lots of newspapers report a change in Government policy on forced marriages for Asians—a very important issue—and again, the Home Secretary has not sought to come to the House to make a statement but has talked to the press first. I suggested to you in my point of order last week that, if that continued to happen and your ruling on this matter was continually flouted, you should bring certain Ministers to the House and ask for an explanation. I ask for your further ruling on this matter.

I understand from the Clerk that there is a written statement about that matter, so the Minister has acted properly, but I undertake to look at the material that the hon. Gentleman has if he sends it to Speaker's House.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make St. George's Day a public holiday in England in place of the May Day public holiday.

My Bill would designate St. George's day, 23 April, as an annual national public holiday in England. If that date were to fall during a weekend, the following Monday would be a public holiday.

I thank you, Mr. Speaker, for the opportunity to introduce a Bill on an issue that I sincerely believe to be dear to the hearts of many. The date of 23 April, as the day of the patron saint of England, means a great deal to people throughout our green and pleasant land, but sadly it has become undervalued in recent times. Before I ask the House to vote in favour of giving the people of England a new public holiday to recognise St. George, I should perhaps say a little about the great man himself.

George lived during the 3rd and 4th centuries and spent much of his time as a warrior in the area that we now know as the middle east. He became widely known for his chivalrous behaviour, protecting women and fighting evil. He was noted for his dependence of faith, might of arms and largess to the poor. Devotion to George became commonplace during the 10th century—some 500 years after his martyr's death. The stories of George slaying the dragon emerged later as his legend grew. It is believed that his adoption as a patron saint of England first occurred in 1061 when a church in Doncaster was dedicated to him. As crusaders returned from the middle east, they brought with them stories of the great George and his bravery on the battlefield. Indeed, the red cross on the flag of England might have come into being at the same time.

If the Bill were to reach the statute book, it would not be the first time that St. George's day was a public holiday in England. In 1222, at the Council of Oxford, 23 April was declared a public holiday. The popularity of the day quickly grew in England and it was soon celebrated every year with feasting in towns and cities throughout the land. In 1348, King Edward III introduced the battle cry, "St. George for England", and after the battle of Agincourt in 1415, St. George's day became one of the main features of the year. St. George became the patron saint of England around that time, but it is not clear exactly when. Sadly, the traditions have slowly died away over the centuries, but I am glad to stand before the House today as part of their resurgence.

I believe that all constituents of English Members would be delighted if St. George's day were reintroduced as a national holiday. However, I make it clear that I am also in favour of extending the same rights for St. Andrew's day in Scotland and St. David's day in Wales, but as you will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, I shall leave that to other hon. Members, although I am sure that some of my reasoning would be valid in all parts of the United Kingdom.

The history of the day rightly has religious significance, but I am certain that the legend of St. George and 23 April could be celebrated in such a way as to ensure that everyone felt included. If the day were again to become a public holiday, it could be one of the most inclusive days in our calendar because many existing public holidays are significant to only the Christian faith. As a national holiday for England, St. George's day could become a wonderful springtime celebration, in which everyone takes part in being proud of our history, culture and English heritage.

However, it is not just me who wishes formally to recognise the day. Many people and organisations are clamouring for St. George's day to be given adequate recognition. Only this week, a third of members of the Trades Union Congress voted in favour of reclaiming the day for public enjoyment and celebration. The Royal Society of St. George is also doing an enormous amount to promote St. George's day. Indeed, it is fast becoming a national event. In my constituency and home town of Romford, Havering council ensured that the flag of St. George was displayed throughout the marketplace on 23 April as traders proudly displayed the flag from every stall, as schools held competitions and as children around the borough dressed in red and white specially for the occasion, while red roses were handed out at railway stations by my local St. George's committee.

Many people already choose to celebrate St. George's day because they know that it represents the true spirit of England. To make it a public holiday would be a wonderful opportunity for all the people of England to participate in events and parties celebrating our nation. A fine example of that in practice is Ireland and Northern Ireland, where St. Patrick's day—17 March—is famously celebrated. The people of both sides of the border have a day off, enjoying time with their families and taking part in parades and other celebrations.

In Switzerland on 1 August this year I was pleased to attend its celebrations of Swiss national day. Flags were displayed from every balcony and there were open air concerts, firework displays, alpine bands parading through the streets and the sound of cow bells echoing from every mountain. Gibraltar's national day on 10 September is a magnificent celebration of the Gibraltarian people, showing not only their pride in being British, but also their love of their homeland—the rock itself. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and scores of other countries also celebrate their national days in style. It is no coincidence that all those nations have a strong sense of national identity and pride, something that can only be a source of strength and unity in any country. I hope that England will follow their example and give this country an annual day to remember and cherish.

However, some of those things have been associated with less desirable elements. A tiny minority have used the symbols of our patriotism to promote causes of fear and intolerance. It is high time that we reclaim the flag of St. George and his truly English values for all the people of England. It is time that we promoted pride in our nation; pride in our flag; pride in our English way of life. I would even argue that our country is crying out for an opportunity to celebrate all those things.

As such, recent performances in the Olympics, success in the rugby World cup and the resurgence of England's football team in recent years have all led to the St. George cross becoming a near permanent feature in many high streets, pubs and clubs all over England. It seems that the people of England crave an occasion on which they can show their pride in St. George, their flag and, most importantly, their country. I suggest that 23 April would be the ideal day to allow our nation to come together and celebrate the country of which we are all proud. I ask hon. Members to join me in crying for God, Harry, England and St. George and vote in favour of the Bill. I commend the Bill to the House.

To return from planet Zarg where we have spent the past 10 minutes, the hon. Member for Romford (Mr. Rosindell) failed to mention one aspect of his Bill. The motion states:

"That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make St. George's Day a public holiday in England in place of the May Day public holiday."

[Hon. Members: "Ah!"] Judging from their reaction, I suspect that that bothers my hon. Friends and, I believe, other hon. Members. It will be interesting to see whether, in the Division that will follow, Tory Front Benchers will go into the Aye Lobby to attack the labour movement and working people, or whether they will join us in the No Lobby. May day is part of the history of the labour movement, the Labour party and trade unions. The public holiday was introduced by the 1974–79 Labour Government, but it was always an aspiration of the labour and trade union movement to have a May day holiday in the years when miners were being slaughtered by the hundreds in work, and when there was a battle for improved working terms and conditions. Although it was not fundamental to people's lives, it was always a dream to have such a holiday.

May day also has religious connotations, and is a celebration of the Virgin Mary and St. Joseph the worker—[Interruption.] I can see that that reference has gone down well among the Tories, as it always does. The Bill is an attack on working people, and the dreams and aspirations of the labour movement, which has been in existence for more than 100 years. In fact, the ambition to make May day a bank holiday predates the foundation of the labour and trade union movement, and is something that many Labour Members would defend as long as we have breath in our bodies. Finally, I was born into the labour movement and I intend to die in it, although not just yet. This is an over-my-dead-body issue, and I will defend May day as long as I live and breathe.

Question put, pursuant to Standing Order No. 23 (Motions for leave to bring in Bills and nomination of Select Committees at commencement of public business):—

I beg to move,

That the programme order of 14th June 2004 in relation to the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords] be varied as follows—

Consideration and Third Reading

1. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Order shall be omitted.

2. Proceedings on consideration shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.

3. The proceedings shown in the first column of the Table shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the time specified in the second column of the Table.

TABLE

4. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings on consideration are commenced.

Throughout the deliberations on the Bill, we have always tried to achieve consensus, and I think that for the most part we have managed to do so. There has been good communication and consultation throughout. I know that the Opposition have views about programme motions. I hope that they will not divide the House, but if they do so, we will continue to have constructive discussions later.

I am grateful to the Minister, who is right that we have had a great deal of consensus during the passage of the Bill. That is quite right, because of the sensitive subject matter and the fact that the Government have tried to do something in this area. However, this Bill started its passage back in December last year in another place. It has taken a long time to get here and it has been changed many times on its way. As late as this morning, we are seeing fresh announcements from the Home Office that concern the subject matter of the Bill. The motion is most inappropriate in this case because it will not give us an opportunity for proper discussion. I have no choice but to divide the House as a matter of principle.

I think that it is important for us to programme the proceedings, but I would be grateful to know whether my hon. Friend the Minister can assure the House that we will have enough time to discuss the need for mandatory risk assessments in family court proceedings, because there are concerns about children who have been killed when courts have ordered residence or contact orders that have been unsupervised.

The hon. Member for South Swindon (Ms Drown) has raised an important issue—one of many substantial issues that will not, sadly, be adequately debated in one day of Report and Third Reading. That is the real problem: we simply do not enough time to do justice to what is a very important and complicated Bill on which many people will wish to put to the Government serious arguments about its application in due course. That is why the Liberal Democrats also oppose the motion.

I anticipate that we will get to the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for South Swindon (Ms Drown). I certainly hope that we will do so, and that we will get to a great many others as well. The sooner we can proceed to those discussions, the better.

Question put:—

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government new clause 11—Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: information.

Government new clause 12—Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: representations.

Government new clause 13—Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: information.

Government new clause 14—Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: representations.

Government new clause 15—Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: information.

Government amendments Nos. 34 to 39.

The first group consists exclusively of Government amendments and new clauses. The amendments may appear detailed and complicated, but they seek to achieve a simple aim and, I believe, a shared aim, namely, that victims of serious sexual or violent offending should have the right to information about the release of the offender, whether the offender has received a prison sentence or has been dealt with under mental health legislation.

The amendments combined effect is that when the court sentences for a serious sexual or violent offence, the local probation board acquires a duty to identify the victim of the offence. If the victim wishes, they can be kept informed about decisions in relation to the offender's release. They have the right to make representations about measures to be taken for their protection and to be informed about those measures. That duty already exists under section 69 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 in cases in which the offender receives a prison sentence. These provisions extend it to cases in which the offender is dealt with under mental health legislation, whether or not the offender is under a prison sentence.

The amendments consolidate section 69 of the 2000 Act with new provisions covering the three powers in the Mental Health Act 1983, under which such offenders may be detained. Those powers are first, a restricted hospital order; secondly, a transfer direction with restrictions, which is made by the Home Secretary to transfer a mentally disordered prisoner to hospital for treatment; and thirdly, a hospital direction, which is made by the court to direct admission of a prisoner to hospital at the time of sentencing. Those provisions are necessarily lengthy, because they cover each detention authority separately. However, their combined effect is that whichever the detention authority—even if it changes during sentence—the victim retains the right to be informed that a decision on release is being made and to make representations about conditions for their protection and that of their family.

The Home Secretary, the mental health review tribunal or the parole board may take decisions on the discharge of mentally disordered offenders and the provisions place a duty on each decision-making body to advise the relevant local probation board. The probation board can then pass the information on to the victim to enable the victim to make representations or simply be advised of the discharge and conditions, if they so wish.

For each of the three powers in the 1983 Act, there are two sets of provisions. The first enables the identified victim to make representations about the conditions of the offender's discharge through the local probation board and requires the local probation board to inform the victim whether any conditions will apply in the event of the offender's discharge. The local probation board must also advise about the end of restrictions on the offender and give any other appropriate information. In turn, both the Home Secretary and the mental health review tribunal are required to give the local probation board the information on discharges to enable the victim to be kept informed.

The Minister will recollect that one of the problems when we discussed the matter in Committee was the extent to which information can properly be provided to victims about the mental health condition of somebody who might be released. An improvement in a person's mental condition often leads to release to taking place, and it is not clear from what the Minister has said how information will be provided in practice. Is it not the case that a person's medical condition is confidential between that person and those who treat them? How will the Government reconcile providing information with respecting patient confidentiality?

Patient confidentiality clearly raises some issues, but conditions can be laid down in relation to a particular offender when they are released from prison or hospital. A line must be drawn, but the provisions that we are introducing today make it clear that victims can be kept informed, where that is their wish, about whether the offender is released from hospital or prison. Although the provisions are complex and lengthy, I am convinced that they give us the cover that we need.

The second set of provisions requires the local probation board to keep the victim informed of decisions on discharge, and the Home Secretary and the mental health review tribunal to provide the board with the information that it needs to meet that requirement.

The remainder of the amendments are technical changes to clauses 36 to 40, to effect the structure.

I do not want to take up the House's time. I am grateful to the Under-Secretary for taking on board the point that emerged in Committee that victims need to be kept informed about the release of patients who may be subject to restrictions under the Mental Health Act 1983. I hope that he will forgive me if I emphasise that the rules are complicated; I trust that they will achieve the desired effect. I have no reason from reading them to believe that they will not.

At the risk of repeating of myself, there is an issue about the amount of information that can be provided. I want to highlight the point so that it is placed on the record. It is clear that, in many cases, the release of someone who may have committed a violent offence may be intimately linked to the extent of the improvement of their mental condition while under treatment in hospital. Yet difficult ethical issues surround the amount of information and reassurance that can be provided to a victim about the offender's mental condition. I do not know how that will be resolved in practice. I do not know whether guidelines will be issued about the amount of information that can be supplied.

I can envisage a position whereby those who treat a patient, who is subject to restriction, in a mental hospital or psychiatric unit will feel constrained about what they can properly say without breaching patient confidentiality. That is not to diminish what the Government are trying to do, but I wonder whether it will prove problematic in practice. I assume that a victim can be given only the barest information that someone is due to be released and that the authorities are satisfied that that person does not currently pose a risk. The victim will inevitably ask, "Why do you believe that?" With the release of an ordinary prisoner, it might be possible to provide more information, but in the case that we are considering, there may be some problems with giving the information that people want. That is a problem for the Under-Secretary and it will be interesting to observe how the provisions work in practice. Subject to those comments, I welcome the amendments.

I also welcome the proposals' intent. I share with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) the view that there may be difficulties in implementation. Obviously, when conditions attach to an individual's release, specific information can be given to the victim. Indeed, new clause 13 lists such information. There is an ancillary matter, which is associated with the point that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield made, about medical assessments of the perpetrator's current mental condition. That is more difficult to define.

Are there any restrictions on the victim's use of information? In some circumstances, victims may wish to go to the local press and media and broadcast the fact that the person who caused them or their family a great deal of grief and anguish is to be released and is in the vicinity. It is an understandable reaction and, whatever conditions apply, they may believe that they have a story to tell. It may be published and that could pose difficulties for the offender's rehabilitation. One can foresee great difficulties only too easily.

However, if the information is given on restricted terms—I am not clear from the amendments that that is the case—further questions arise about the extent to which the information can be shared with, for example, Victim Support, which might be a helpful organisation in the circumstances; a local general practitioner; anyone who might want to provide counselling to the victim; or the local police, who were not directly involved in the case but have a locus standi.

We have important concerns about the operation of the proposals but we do not oppose the intent, which is clearly right.

The provisions do not allow for the disclosure of personal medical information or specific information about an individual's mental health. They ensure that the victim has the right to make representations about the conditions that will apply when the offender is released. They can be given simple factual information, namely, that the individual has been released from hospital or prison and the details of any prohibitions on contact.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) asked about restrictions on the use of the information. I need to check that and I shall contact him later. I understand that there are no strict legal limits, although it is good sense that people do not share the information. The point of providing it is to reduce rather than accelerate anxiety. If the information is passed to the media, it can serve only to heighten anxiety. That is not in the victim's interest. Of course, it would be useful if a victim could disclose the information to Victim Support and get some additional support. I shall examine the hon. Gentleman's point. As far as I can tell at this stage, there are no strictly enforced legal limitations, but common sense dictates that the closer the information is kept, the better.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11 — Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: information

'(1) This section applies if section 36 applies.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—

(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 36(4), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 36(6), or

(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to receive that information.

(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps—

(a) to inform that person whether or not the patient is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge;

(b) if he is, to provide that person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family;

(c) if the restriction order in respect of the patient is to cease to have effect, to notify that person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect;

(d) to provide that person with such other information as the board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board—

(a) whether the patient is to be discharged;

(b) if he is, whether he is to be discharged absolutely or subject to conditions;

(c) if he is to be discharged subject to conditions, what the conditions are to be;

(d) if he has been discharged subject to conditions—

(i) of any variation of the conditions by the Secretary of State;

(ii) of any recall to hospital under section 42(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20);

(e) if the restriction order is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the Secretary of State, of the date on which the restriction order is to cease to have effect.

(5) Subsections (6) and (7) apply (instead of subsection (4)) if—

(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal by the patient under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or

(b) the Secretary of State refers the patient's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).

(6) The tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board—

(a) of the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) to (c);

(b) if the patient has been discharged subject to conditions, of any variation of the conditions by the tribunal;

(c) if the restriction order is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the tribunal, of the date on which the restriction order is to cease to have effect.

(7) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board of the matters specified in subsection (4)(d) and (e).

(8) The duties in subsections (3) to (7) apply only while the restriction order is in force.

(9) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section [Victims of persons subject to hospital order with restriction order: representations](8).'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12 — Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: representations

'(1) This section applies if section 37 applies.

(2) If—

(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 37(3) to the local probation board mentioned in section 37(2) or the relevant local probation board, and

(b) it appears to the relevant local probation board that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence,

the relevant local probation board must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.

(3) If the representations are about a matter specified in section 37(3)(a), the duty in subsection (2) applies only while the limitation direction given in relation to the offender is in force.

(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board if he is considering—

(a) whether to give a direction in respect of the offender under section 42(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (directions lifting restrictions),

(b) whether to discharge the offender under section 42(2) of that Act, either absolutely or subject to conditions, or

(c) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, whether to vary the conditions.

(5) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board if—

(a) an application is made to the tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or

(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to the tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).

(6) Subsection (7) applies if—

(a) the relevant local probation board receives information under subsection (4) or (5), and

(b) a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—

(i) when his wishes were ascertained under section 37(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 37(3)(a), or

(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the relevant local probation board or the local probation board mentioned in section 37(2).

(7) The relevant local probation board must provide the information to the person.

(8) The relevant local probation board is—

(a) if the offender is to be discharged from hospital subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area;

(b) if the offender is to be supervised on release by an officer of a local probation board, that local probation board;

(c) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital, prison or other place in which the offender is detained is situated.'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13 — Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: information

'(1) This section applies if section 37 applies.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—

(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 37(2), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 37(4), or

(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to receive that information.

(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps—

(a) to inform that person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge;

(b) if he is, to provide that person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family;

(c) if the limitation direction in respect of the offender is to cease to have effect, to notify that person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect;

(d) to inform that person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any licence conditions or supervision requirements in the event of his release;

(e) if he is, to provide that person with details of any licence conditions or supervision requirements which relate to contact with the victim or his family;

(f) to provide that person with such other information as the board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board—

(a) whether the offender is to be discharged;

(b) if he is, whether he is to be discharged absolutely or subject to conditions;

(c) if he is to be discharged subject to conditions, what the conditions are to be;

(d) if he has been discharged subject to conditions—

(i) of any variation of the conditions by the Secretary of State;

(ii) of any recall to hospital under section 42(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20);

(e) if the limitation direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the Secretary of State, of the date on which the limitation direction is to cease to have effect.

(5) Subsections (6) and (7) apply (instead of subsection (4)) if—

(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or

(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).

(6) The tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board—

(a) of the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) to (c);

(b) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, of any variation of the conditions by the tribunal;

(c) if the limitation direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the tribunal, of the date on which the limitation direction is to cease to have effect.

(7) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board of the matters specified in subsection (4)(d) and (e).

(8) The duties in subsections (3)(a) to (c) and (4) to (7) apply only while the limitation direction is in force.

(9) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section [Victims of persons subject to hospital direction and limitation direction: representations](8).'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14 — Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: representations

'(1) This section applies if section 38 applies.

(2) If—

(a) a person makes representations about a matter specified in section 38(3) to the local probation board mentioned in section 38(2) or the relevant local probation board, and

(b) it appears to the relevant local probation board that the person is the victim of the offence or acts for the victim of the offence,

the relevant local probation board must forward the representations to the persons responsible for determining the matter.

(3) The duty in subsection (2) applies only while the restriction direction given in respect of the offender is in force.

(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board if he is considering—

(a) whether to give a direction in respect of the offender under section 42(1) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (directions lifting restrictions),

(b) whether to discharge the offender under section 42(2) of that Act, either absolutely or subject to conditions, or

(c) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, whether to vary the conditions.

(5) A Mental Health Review Tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board if—

(a) an application is made to the tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or

(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to the tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).

(6) Subsection (7) applies if—

(a) the relevant local probation board receives information under subsection (4) or (5), and

(b) a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—

(i) when his wishes were ascertained under section 38(2), expressed a wish to make representations about a matter specified in section 38(3), or

(ii) has made representations about such a matter to the relevant local probation board or the local probation board mentioned in section 38(2).

(7) The relevant local probation board must provide the information to the person.

(8) The relevant local probation board is—

(a) if the offender is to be discharged subject to a condition that he reside in a particular area, the local probation board for the area;

(b) in any other case, the local probation board for the area in which the hospital in which the offender is detained is situated.'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 15 — Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: information

'(1) This section applies if section 38 applies.

(2) Subsection (3) applies if a person who appears to the relevant local probation board to be the victim of the offence or to act for the victim of the offence—

(a) when his wishes were ascertained under section 38(2), expressed a wish to receive the information specified in section 38(4), or

(b) has subsequently informed the relevant local probation board that he wishes to receive that information.

(3) The relevant local probation board must take all reasonable steps—

(a) to inform that person whether or not the offender is to be subject to any conditions in the event of his discharge;

(b) if he is, to provide that person with details of any conditions which relate to contact with the victim or his family;

(c) if the restriction direction in respect of the offender is to cease to have effect, to notify that person of the date on which it is to cease to have effect;

(d) to provide that person with such other information as the board considers appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.

(4) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board—

(a) whether the offender is to be discharged;

(b) if he is, whether he is to be discharged absolutely or subject to conditions;

(c) if he is to be discharged subject to conditions, what the conditions are to be;

(d) if he has been discharged subject to conditions—

(i) of any variation of the conditions by the Secretary of State;

(ii) of any recall to hospital under section 42(3) of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20);

(e) if the restriction direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the Secretary of State, of the date on which the restriction direction is to cease to have effect.

(5) Subsections (6) and (7) apply (instead of subsection (4)) if—

(a) an application is made to a Mental Health Review Tribunal by the offender under section 69, 70 or 75 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (c.20) (applications concerning restricted patients), or

(b) the Secretary of State refers the offender's case to a Mental Health Review Tribunal under section 71 of that Act (references concerning restricted patients).

(6) The tribunal must inform the relevant local probation board—

(a) of the matters specified in subsection (4)(a) to (c);

(b) if the offender has been discharged subject to conditions, of any variation of the conditions by the tribunal;

(c) if the restriction direction is to cease to have effect by virtue of action to be taken by the tribunal, of the date on which the restriction direction is to cease to have effect.

(7) The Secretary of State must inform the relevant local probation board of the matters specified in subsection (4)(d) and (e).

(8) The duties in subsections (3) to (7) apply only while the restriction direction is in force.

(9) The relevant local probation board has the meaning given in section [Victims of persons subject to transfer direction and restriction direction: representations](8).'.—[Mr. Heppell.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1 — Parental contact with children after separation in cases involving ill-treatment of the child or another person (No.1).

'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 insert—

"(8A) Allegations of ill-treatment made in section 8 proceedings

(1) Where it is alleged that a party to the proceedings has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall, as soon as practicable, determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings, whether the allegation of ill-treatment is proved.

(2) Where the Court is satisfied that a party to the proceedings (in this section referred to as the abusive party) has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall not—

(a) make any order granting the abusive party residence of the child; or

(b) make any order granting the abusive party contact (other than supervised contact) with that child, unless the child wants to see the abusive party and the Court is satisfied that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of or contact with the child.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection 8A(1), where in any section 8 proceedings,

(a) the court is unable to determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings whether or not an allegation of ill-treatment is proved; but

(b) the Court is satisfied that there is a risk of harm to the child,

the Court may make any order under this Act that it considers necessary to protect the child.".'.—[Mr. Dawson.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 2—Parental contact with children after separation in cases involving ill-treatment of the child or another person (No.2).—

'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 insert—

"When determining whether the child will be safe if contact or residence is granted to the abusive party, the Court shall, so far as is practicable, have regard to the following matters:

(a) the nature and severity of the ill-treatment;

(b) how recently the ill-treatment occurred;

(c) the frequency of the ill-treatment;

(d) the risk of further ill-treatment occurring;

(e) the physical, sexual or emotional harm inflicted on the child or harm suffered by the child as a result of seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person;

(f) whether the other party to the proceedings—

(i) considers that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of, or contact with, the child; and

(ii) consents to the abusive party having residence of, or contact with, the child;

(g) the wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and having regard to the age and maturity of the child;

(h) any steps taken by the abusive party to prevent further ill-treatment from occurring;

(i) any matters as the court considers relevant.".'.

New clause 5—Use of recovery orders—

'In Part I of the Family Law Act 1986 (c.55) (child custody), after section 34 insert—

"34A Use of recovery orders in cases involving either allegations of domestic violence or a potential risk to the child

(1) If an applicant claims that their partner has abducted a child of the family, the court may grant a recovery order if the applicant already has a residence order in their name.

(2) If there is no residence order in favour of either parent, the court may grant a recovery order.

(3) The recovery order will require both parties to attend court within 24 hours of the discovery of the child, or the first working day thereafter.

(4) Before returning the child to the applicant or giving the applicant any information as to the whereabouts of the child, the police must—

(a) check their records to see whether either party has committed acts of violence;

(b) check to see whether either party is included on the register of domestic violence perpetrators;

(c) having located the child without notifying the applicant of the child's whereabouts, make enquiries with regard to the child's welfare.

(5) If records show that the applicant has a history of violence or the police have concerns about the welfare of the child if the child is returned to the applicant, the police will—

(a) not remove the child from the respondent;

(b) advise the respondent to seek legal representation;

(c) notify the court of their action immediately.

(6) If there is no record of violence and no reason to believe that the defendant or the child is at risk, the police will return the child to the applicant.

(7) Ex parte residence or contact orders should only be made if there is evidence that a party is wilfully refusing to attend court.'.

New clause 18—Use of recovery orders in cases involving either allegations of domestic violence or a potential risk to the child—

'In Part I of the Family Law Act 1986 (c.55) (child custody), after section 34 insert—

"34A Use of recovery orders in cases involving either allegations of domestic violence or a potential risk to the child

(1) If an applicant claims that their partner has abducted a child of the family, the court may grant a recovery order if the applicant already has a residence order in their name.

(2) If there is no residence order in favour of either parent, the court may grant a recovery order.

(3) The recovery order will require both parties to attend court within 24 hours of the discovery of the child, or the first working day thereafter.

(4) Before returning the child to the applicant or giving the applicant any information as to the whereabouts of the child, the police must—

(a) check their records to see whether either party has committed acts of violence;

(b) check to see whether either party is included on the register of domestic violence perpetrators;

(c) having located the child without notifying the applicant of the child's whereabouts, make enquiries with regard to the child's welfare.

(5) If records show that the applicant has a history of violence or the police have concerns about the welfare of the child if the child is returned to the applicant, the police will—

(a) not remove the child from the respondent;

(b) advise the respondent to seek legal representation;

(c) notify the court of their action immediately.

(6) If records show that the respondent has a history of violence and the applicant has no history of violence, the police will return the child to the applicant and notify the court.

(7) If there is no record of violence and no reason to believe that the respondent or the child is at risk, the police will return the child to the applicant.

(8) If records show that both the applicant and the respondent have a history of violence, the police will immediately seek further instructions from the court and, if necessary, take appropriate steps to protect the child.

(9) The court shall not grant interim residence or contact orders unless there is evidence that a party is wilfully refusing to attend court.

(10) The court shall not disclose the address of a women's refuge publicly or give this information to any applicant or respondent or to their legal representatives.".'.

New clause 19—Parental contact with children after separation in cases involving ill-treatment of the child or another person (No.2)—

'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 insert:—

"Section 8A Allegations of ill-treatment made in section 8 proceedings

(1) Where it is alleged that a party to the proceedings has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall, as soon as practicable, determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings, whether the allegation of ill-treatment is proved.

(2) Where the Court is satisfied that a party to the proceedings (in this section referred to as the abusive party) has inflicted ill-treatment on the child or on another person, the Court shall not—

(a) make any order granting the abusive party residence of the child; or

(b) make any order granting the abusive party contact (other than supervised contact) with that child,

unless the Court is satisfied that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of or contact with the child.

(3) Notwithstanding subsection 8A(1), where in any section 8 proceedings—

(a) the court is unable to determine on the basis of the evidence presented to it by or on behalf of the parties to the proceedings whether or not an allegation of ill-treatment is proved; but

(b) the Court is satisfied that there is a risk of harm to the child,

the Court may make any order under this Act that it considers necessary to protect the child.".'.

New clause 20—Mandatory risk assessment checklist—

'After section 8 in Part II of the Children Act 1989 and following the proposed section 8A outlined above insert—

"Section 8B (Mandatory risk assessment checklist)

8B(1) When determining whether the child will be safe if contact or residence is granted to the abusive party, the Court shall, so far as is practicable, have regard to the following matters—

(a) the nature and severity of the ill-treatment;

(b) how recently the ill-treatment occurred;

(c) the frequency of the ill-treatment;

(d) the risk of further ill-treatment occurring;

(e) the physical, sexual or emotional harm inflicted on the child or harm suffered by the child as a result of seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person;

(f) whether the other party to the proceedings—

(i) considers that the child will be safe while the abusive party has residence of, or contact with, the child; and

(ii) consents to the abusive party having residence of, or contact with, the child;

(g) the wishes of the child, if the child is able to express them, and having regard to the age and maturity of the child;

(h) any steps taken by the abusive party to prevent further ill-treatment from occurring;

(i) any other matters as the court considers relevant.".'.

Amendment No. 59, in page 2, line 24, clause 1, at end insert—

'(7) If an offence has been committed under this section, a court before which a person has applied for an order under section 34 Family Law Act 1986 (on applications in private law for the disclosure of information as to the whereabouts of a child and orders authorising the taking charge of and delivery of a child) should have regard to this offence before granting the order.'.

Amendment No. 12, in page 3, line 4, clause 5, after 'dies', insert 'or is seriously harmed'.

Amendment No. 13, in page 3, line 11, after 'death', insert 'or serious harm'.

Amendment No. 10, in page 3, line 17, at end insert—

'( ) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d)(ii), in determining the reasonableness of the steps which D could have been expected to take, the court shall have particular regard to the extent to which D has been subjected to domestic violence or is in fear of being subjected to domestic violence.'.

Amendment No. 14, in page 3, line 22, at end insert 'or serious harm'.

Amendment No. 15, in page 3, line 32, at end insert 'or serious harm'.

Amendment No. 61, in page 4, line 5, at end insert—

'(8) For the purposes of this section, a person (D) who is a victim of domestic violence should not be regarded as having caused or allowed a child or vulnerable adult (V) to be injured or killed unless there is clear evidence that this person (D) actively contributed to the injury or killing of a child or a vulnerable adult (V).'.

Amendment No. 62, in page 5, line 36, clause 9, after 'death', insert 'or suicide'.

Amendment No. 72, in page 5, line 36, after 'death', insert '(including suicide)'.

Amendment No. 63, in page 5, line 36, leave out

'a person aged 16 or over'

and insert 'an adult or child'.

Amendment No. 1, in page 5, line 36, leave out 'aged 16 or over' and insert—

'(other than a person aged 16 or under in respect of whom a Serious Case Review has been undertaken)'.

Amendment No. 64, in page 33, line 15, clause 50, at end insert—

'(3) The Secretary of State may make grants to voluntary organisations under this section for the purpose of providing appropriate protection and support services for children who have suffered impairment due to seeing or hearing ill-treatment of another person. Any payments will be subject to such conditions as he considers appropriate.'.

First, I should like to acknowledge the work of Women's Aid Federation of England, which campaigned assiduously on contact in relation to domestic violence. I want to acknowledge its work in helping to develop the worthy amendments and new clauses.

I make no apology for returning to this issue, which I raised on Second Reading and in Committee. Everyone should acknowledge that, in recent years, at least 28 children have been murdered by their fathers during the course of contact visits, and we really should not leave the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill without fundamentally addressing that issue by changing its provisions.

The hon. Gentleman will recollect that he raised this matter in Committee. At that time, it was my impression that he might have had the support of a majority in Committee for his point of view. However, he did not put the matter to the vote. I wonder whether that was because he had received an assurance from the Government, which has not yet been honoured. Is that why he has had to bring the matter back on Report? What is his reason for returning to it now, given that he did not take the opportunity to press it to a vote in Committee?

I regret to inform the hon. Gentleman that I did not have the majority of the Committee on my side. That was made very plain to me during that memorable afternoon. Would that I had.

I am quite surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman say that. I was flabbergasted that he did not take the opportunity to press the matter to a vote in Committee because, between those Members on our side and those on his side who had spoken to the amendment, we had a majority. I was therefore very surprised to see him duck the opportunity.

I think that the hon. Lady is talking about a different amendment. The one about which she was most critical of me related to part 8 reviews and domestic homicide reviews. I can assure her that I am telling her the truth on this matter. My hon. Friends in the Whips Office know that I have voted against the Government on occasion.

If my hon. Friend could have won the vote, he would have voted.

I think we must respect the sedentary intervention of my hon. Friend.

I hope that we can move forward on these amendments today. The Government tell us that the paramountcy principle outweighs current case law, to which I have referred and which, frankly, does not protect children. I do not trust that case law, which seems to operate against the best interests of children. I honestly do not trust judges to listen properly to children who have experienced abuse. That is hardly a criticism that can be made solely of the judicial profession, but it is very clearly the case.

Women's Aid has been assiduous in bringing forward young people and putting them into contact with parliamentarians, who are outraged that those young people's voices have not been listened to, and that they or their younger brothers and sisters have been placed in considerable danger and acute risk by the decisions of adults who have not listened to their very real concerns. We shall not get any further forward in this regard without the implementation of section 122 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, which would ensure the separate representation of children in private law. This would ensure that the interests of children would be properly promoted in the family courts.

Of course these decisions are some of the most difficult that anyone in public life could ever be called upon to make, and of course honest mistakes will be made, but surely we should work on the principle that it is a child's right to have contact with both parents as long as it is in the child's best interests. I am quite sure, however, that the only way for Parliament to insist that the right of children to be safeguarded is upheld is to pass new clause 1, which promotes the safety of children in contact hearings where domestic violence has been alleged and to support new clause 2, which sets out a helpful checklist to assist courts in that task.

Those amendments support the paramount principle of the Children Act 1989, that decisions should be made in the best interests of the child, and if the Opposition are serious about equal parenting, the amendments are a vital safeguard that they should incorporate in any such approach. Every single Member of the House will be concerned about this issue; every single member of the House should support the amendments.

As I think the hon. Gentleman is aware, I have considerable sympathy for the intention behind his amendments, which we also had a chance to look at in Committee. We fully accept that the need to protect children from violence, including violence from one or other parent, is a very important matter. We are also aware of the risk—we know of such incidents—of children being exposed to possible violence during contact with a non-resident parent. I know that that is a matter of particular concern to the hon. Gentleman. I believe that he may be involved with the passage of the Children Bill, and I should like to offer him some reassurance. The hon. Gentleman is correct that we advocate equal parenting and are in favour of the principle that the normal place of residence of a child is with its parents when living together—a principle to which I think he would not take exception. We also believe that in the event of parental separation, every opportunity should be given to competent and caring parents who are non-resident to provide an input into their child's upbringing. However, we are not seeking to undermine in any way the anxieties that he has expressed in the particular context of the amendments.

The question does arise—I suppose it will arise also on equal parenting but I think it arises more in this context—about whether the framework of proposals that the hon. Gentleman has put forward are necessary to ensure that the court has proper regard to possible abusive relationships within the family unit of the person seeking contact. My own experience of doing family legal work, admittedly mostly before the enactment of the Children Act 1989, is that such considerations were very much at the forefront of any decisions that were taken about whether contact should be allowed or residence altered. The checklist that the hon. Gentleman has provided in new clause 2 is the sort of checklist that I would expect the court to go through anyway.

indicated assent.

I am glad to see that hon. Gentleman agrees. Although I do have sympathy with the thrust of his amendments, I shall wait with interest to hear from the Minister whether he thinks that their incorporation is a necessity, because, as I think I made clear to him earlier, in my opinion the Children Act as currently drafted does already provide that those issues should be addressed. We also have to bear in mind—I am sure that the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) will agree about this as well—that it is an unfortunate feature of many a marriage or relationship break-up that false accusations of abusive behaviour are used by one party or another as a form of leverage in order to try to deny the other party contact or residence with the child. Of course, I accept that the terms of the amendments tabled by the hon. Gentleman would not prevent the court from considering that possibility.

Order. I think that the hon. Gentleman is referring to amendment No. 10. We have already debated new clause 10.

I do apologise. I was indeed referring to amendment No. 10. For a moment, I thought I was completely out of order and was seeking to refer to something to which I could not make reference. That has been known to happen. I am grateful for the correction, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Amendment No. 10 relates to a person causing or allowing the death of a child or a vulnerable adult. The Minister will recollect that there was considerable debate on this matter in Committee. The Government have set on a perfectly good course of seeking to deal with the problem that arises where two people are charged with murder and it is clear that one or other of them must have done it but completely unclear as to which one. In those circumstances we have had instances where the two carers or parents involved have been acquitted because it has been impossible to tell who was responsible. Clause 5 attempts to deal with that by creating a new offence where a child or vulnerable adult dies as a result of the unlawful act of a person who was a member of the same household and had frequent contact with him.

We are not opposed to that clause. We do, however, have concerns, as the Minister knows, about how it will operate, because one of the effective consequences of the clause is a degree of reversal of the burden of evidential proof, because it effectively compels people to give evidence against each other or to face the consequences of their silence.

The amendment that we have tabled on Report deals specifically with the issue of those who may have been subject to domestic violence, because it is quite clear from recorded cases that there may well be instances where a person has acquiesced in violence being perpetrated against a child in the household because they themselves are in fear of violence, and we do not feel that clause 5 as currently drafted has sufficient regard to that contingency.

We are seeking to insert after clause 5(1)(d)(ii) a requirement that, where a person has frequent contact with the child, in determining the reasonableness of the steps which the defendant could have been expected to take, the court should

"have particular regard to the extent to which"

the defendant

"has been subjected to domestic violence or is in fear of being subjected to domestic violence",

because it must be the case that where someone has been in fear of violence or subjected to violence, they will be in a much less favourable position to take effective steps to protect the child from the risk. It is that point which we think the court should have very much in mind when the time comes to direct a jury, at the end of a jury trial, in respect of such matters.

I concede that it is already possible that that could happen because a judge may do it of his own motion. But although a judge may do it of his own motion, if Parliament thinks that it is a matter of sufficient importance that we should highlight it, I do think that there is a very good argument for including it in the Bill.

Is the hon. Gentleman not concerned that if we include this caveat, defendants might seek to claim domestic violence to escape from the seriousness of what has happened, when, in effect, the introduction of this offence is intended to make people face up to the responsibility of having been involved in or having caused the death of a child?

I understand the hon. Lady's point, but I do not think that that is a particular risk. It is the sort of assertion that may be made in any event and it will not contribute to people deciding to assert it more frequently. The question that we must ask is: in cases of serious domestic violence that may be perpetrated against one person by their partner, are they in as good a position as others to fulfil the legal obligations that we place on them in relation to the offence that we create in clause 5? I would have thought that the hon. Lady would have no difficulty in agreeing that such a person, because of their vulnerability, would be poorly placed to provide protection to a child who was also suffering abusive behaviour and domestic violence from their partner. That may be a matter for mitigation of sentence at the end of the court case. But the question arises: should it also provide a possible defence?

We are creating a very unusual offence—an offence of negligence that places specific burdens on an individual. If that individual does not discharge those obligations, and even if they are not the person who was responsible for the injuries, they are still guilty of an extremely serious offence for which they can go to prison for a very long time. I look to the Minister to give the House his views on the matter.

Does hon. Gentleman feel that the Bill as it stands reflects the seriousness with which people should rightly regard child abuse, and does he believe that it is important that people should not be given any opportunity to excuse their complicity in child abuse? Surely, there should be a spur to a woman to help herself out of a violent situation if she felt that a child was being hurt as well.

The hon. Gentleman makes a good point, but it is worth bearing in mind the nature of this offence, which is punishable by a period of imprisonment of up to 14 years—it is not a slight matter, it is extremely serious—and which can be committed by an individual without their having done any positive act of violence whatever against the child in the family. That is a fairly unusual state of affairs and it is a very unusual offence under our laws.

I understand why the Government have introduced the offence, but it is worth bearing in mind whether it will act fairly, as it has the potential to be used to send people to prison for an extremely long time, when there may be doubt—or it may ultimately become clear—that they were not responsible for the injuries sustained by the child, which may or may not have caused death. In those circumstances, is it right that we should convict a person if it becomes clear that that person was the subject of serious domestic violence during the period when their alleged negligence—that is what it amounts to—took place, which was possibly meted out from exactly the same source as the violence being perpetrated on the child and that led to its death? That is the issue.

I would feel more comfortable were amendment No. 10 accepted because I do not think that it undermines the intention behind the offence in clause 5. It provides a proper safeguard, however, against what are often tragic situations.

I want to return to the new clause tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson). I have tabled terribly similar clauses, which are as close to his as makes no difference, although I am grateful to the Table Office for noticing the difference.

I, too, want to pay tribute to Women's Aid. I cannot imagine that anyone in the Chamber who considered the Bill in Committee and who has an interest in the hugely important question of domestic violence does not appreciate the number of years and the amount of effort that Women's Aid has contributed to ensure that we, for example, are concentrating on this issue today. Without its determination and campaigning record, we would not have focused on the issue as strongly. It has done an extremely good job and I owe much of what I will say on various amendments this afternoon to its work.

The difficulty with contact and domestic violence can best be summed up simply in some figures. In 2002, there were 61,356 contact orders, and contact was refused in only 518 cases; in only 0.8 per cent. of all cases. Notwithstanding that, the family court welfare service says that it is dealing with about 16,000 disputed contact cases a year in which domestic violence is an issue. In some recent research, the Department for Constitutional Affairs has found that allegations of domestic violence feature in 23 per cent. of contact and residence cases.

I appreciate and respect the welfare principle, but those on the ground are satisfied that society at large is still at the slightly curious stage—curious to those who are very acquainted with the issue of domestic violence—at which truly domestic violence is not given the priority that it ought to have, because, to some extent, it is still an emerging issue. Although it is now known that it exists, and the figures are bruited around, its impact on individuals, particularly on children, is not yet appreciated to the fullest extent. That must be right; given the figures that I have just mentioned, it sounds as if a disproportionate amount of contact is being granted in cases in which there is undoubtedly at least an allegation of domestic violence. In 16,000 cases, however, the family court welfare service says that domestic violence is involved, which seems to go beyond allegations. One is therefore very concerned that the welfare principle is not safeguarding children when domestic violence is on the scene. Once I have set that out, it is clear that these new clauses and amendments are important, at least in testing how the Minister's thinking has moved on since Committee.

The welfare principle, of course, is open to a multitude of interpretations. If one has a strong, old-fashioned view—such views take a long time to die—that what is absolutely paramount for the welfare of a child is that it should be kept in touch with both its parents, almost come what may, that is one's interpretation of the welfare principle; one will give too much precedence and too much priority, in the light of what we know about domestic violence, to ensuring that that occurs. One will devalue contraindications of that.

That is a huge worry, and I have strong concerns, based on a certain amount of experience, that the judiciary—not all of its members, by any means, but some, particularly older members—has a fixed view as to the importance of fathers in families. Nobody gainsays that, but it is allowed to take precedence over examining more closely and thoroughly the impact on children of what domestic violence has taken place; they must find out that it has taken place to act on it. The same clauses and check lists have therefore been tabled again to say to the Minister that, on the figures that I have put forward, the welfare principle does not seem to be enough, and to ask what more we should be doing.

It is a good thing that section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires the courts to take into account the fact that children have witnessed abuse. That is important and puts the issue of domestic violence well up the agenda. Another fact that cannot be overlooked is the impact of the new court application forms that the Government introduced after the Act came into force. The form contains specific and fairly detailed questions about allegations of domestic violence so that the allegations are drawn out and the issue identified at the outset and dealt with.

I agree with the hon. and learned Lady. In such circumstances, is it not all the more desirable for us to make plain in the Bill that the issue needs attention? If we do not, there is precisely the risk that the truth will only emerge subsequently, and will not be dealt with properly at trial.

I do not deny that the hon. Gentleman has a point. My amendment is intended to add weight to it. The hon. Gentleman knows, however, that judges tend to see what is in statute as being more important that any other possible factor. That is what makes me shrink from naming domestic violence specifically; other factors may have equal potency for one or other of the parties. Nevertheless, it scares me stiff—I put it as bluntly as that—that if special resources are not put into cases of this kind, women who have done nothing other than suffer from domestic violence will be convicted. I invite my hon. Friend the Minister to tell us what he thinks he can do.

I listened carefully to the hon. Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) and the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). My party and I agree with many things that they said. I only wish that Ministers listened more attentively to the views of people with real experience, who have a cogent story to tell.

I tabled a number of the new clauses and amendments in this group. New clause 5 deals with the important issue of recovery orders. My hon. Friend the Member for St. Ives (Andrew George) has been required for parliamentary duties elsewhere, but I know he would have been delighted to speak about a matter that he has pursued personally for some time, a matter that is of great importance to many of those who have informed our debate from outside. Women's Aid in particular is very concerned about the way in which the recovery order provisions currently work.

I think I should put on record the circumstances of what is probably the most tragic case of its kind, the case that occasioned my hon. Friend's interest. In 1997 Georgina McCarthy and her son, then aged one, fled to the Penzance branch of Women's Aid following domestic violence at her home. Her husband, Paul Russell, then used section 33 of the Family Law Act 1986 to apply for information on the child's whereabouts. In that instance Georgina McCarthy's solicitor managed to prevent the address of the refuge from being revealed, but later Georgina was warned that her husband was coming to Penzance to find her. She knew that if she moved elsewhere, section 33 would again be used by her husband to enable her whereabouts to be disclosed; so she decided that moving was pointless. At least in Penzance she had contact with the police, Women's Aid, her solicitor and her barrister. Tragically, it was the wrong decision. On 9 May 1988, her husband found her and killed her in front of the child.

I begin my response to what has been a wide-ranging discussion over a fairly short time by acknowledging the deep commitment and experience of many Members in respect of these issues, which is reflected in the amendments that they tabled.

I pay tribute to Women's Aid and to the other organisations that have helped to inform our discussions today and in Committee. I should gently say to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) that of course Front Benchers have listened to such organisations; it would be a foolish Government who did not listen to organisations that are in daily contact with those who are at the sharp end of such matters.

The Government are committed to facilitating contact between the child and the non-resident parent where that is in the best interests of the child, and where doing so is safe for the child and for all family members. I know from today's discussion and earlier ones that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) in particular hold very strong views on this issue, as well as considerable experience. I hope that they will forgive me if I tell them that the Government's position remains the same as during our earlier discussions.

The Government are not trying to be deliberately awkward or difficult. Section 1 of the Children Act 1989, which requires courts to treat the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration in making any decision about their upbringing, is central to our policy. We consider that to be the right principle, and we do not want it to be diluted in any way. Of course, we want that principle to work in practice, and we must continue to monitor what happens and to make the necessary improvements. I am grateful for the comments that my hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar made about the improvements that we are achieving.

The new forms, which will be in use from January 2005, will ensure that courts are aware of any allegations of domestic violence from the start of a case's consideration. The commencement at the same time of section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 will strengthen the definition of harm, so that harm caused to a child by their seeing or hearing violence towards another will also be considered. In other words, not only direct violence to the child but violence witnessed by the child will be taken into account. Crucially, the courts will decide whether domestic violence has occurred before making orders on contact and residence.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar asked what more we can do, and it is clear that we need to do whatever is required. She is right: we need to train the judiciary and to continue to ensure that attitudes change. We will continue to monitor the situation and we will, of course, consider further evidence from Members of Parliament and voluntary organisations, but the core of our policy is the belief that it is not the Government's job, in enacting legislation, to choose between parents: rather, our job is to place the best interests of the child at the heart of our policies.

I am mystified by the constant recourse to the paramountcy principle. I firmly believe that everything that I have advocated this afternoon is entirely in line with, and supports, the paramountcy principle, and that it gives good guidance to the courts in order to ensure that they consider the best interests of the child.

What we need in legislation is absolute clarity about our starting point in policy, which has to be the best interests of the child. We believe that if we start from there, and if we adopt from next January the rigorously enforced and improving system that I outlined, in conjunction with the new procedures that we are putting in place, the protection of children will be enhanced and increased, but I repeat that we need to make it clear in legislation that our starting point is the welfare and best interests of the child.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome mentioned recovery orders. Before a recovery order can be made, there must be a part 1 order. If either party is worried that the provisions of the part 1 order are no longer relevant—there might be new evidence or new concerns—they can return to the court and seek a variation of the contact or residence order if, for example, they have concerns about domestic violence, or if evidence of an offence has emerged. That would have to be done through a variation of the part 1 order. I should impress on the hon. Gentleman, who brought to our attention a deeply tragic case, that parties are not required to disclose their addresses to the court. That is an important protection, particularly for those who feel vulnerable.

I turn to familial homicide, about which a number of Members spoke, and to amendments Nos. 12, 13, 14 and 15. They reflect the real determination, which is shared throughout the House, to do everything we can to solve the so-called "Which of you did it?" cases without unduly penalising those who have themselves suffered domestic violence. The issue is: how do we get the balance right? The question of whether the offence should be extended to cover not only death but serious harm—

Will the Minister clarify his point about people not being expected, or legally required, to give their address in court? In some instances, judges have forced people to give names and addresses in open court, so I am slightly bewildered by his comment.

I am happy to say again that parties are not required to disclose their addresses to the court, and I am perfectly happy to put that in writing to the hon. Gentleman if it will help to clarify matters.

The courts must surely have such people's names and addresses; the issue is whether they are given to other parties.

I apologise if there has been some slight confusion. The judge will of course have such information; the question is how that information is then handled, and it certainly should not be made public. I hope that explanation helps the hon. Member for Portsmouth, South (Mr. Hancock).

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome argued consistently in Committee and today for the offence of familial homicide to be extended to cover not only death but serious harm. The borderline between death and serious injury can of course sometimes be a narrow one.

I hope that the hon. Gentleman does not feel that I am trying to string him along when I say that I would not want completely to rule out extending the offence at a later stage. At this stage, however, as we begin to put the new offence in place, there are major arguments in favour of restricting the offence to death.

I appreciate the Minister's point. He refers to old and established law, but the fact is that the maximum penalty for that offence is entirely different from what we are imposing in respect of the new offence under the clause.

Indeed, and that reflects our concern about death and the fact that someone has taken an action that has resulted in someone's death. That requires the most severe penalties from the courts, which is why I argue that we need to have the more serious offence in place, without ruling out the possibility that we may eventually extend it, but not now. We need to get the new offence working in our legislative system.

The problem of working out who committed the offence is less likely to be a problem where the victim has been injured but survived. The victim might be in a position to give evidence about who caused the injury. Other witnesses within the household might come forward to protect the victim from future harm. Both those arguments make for a different situation: the victim is still about, requiring and receiving the protection of others within the household.

I hear what the Minister says about the review being ongoing and I note his willingness to return to the matter at a later stage. I gave the examples of a child who is rendered comatose or incapable of communication by an act of violence inflicted by one or two partners and of a baby who cannot give evidence in court. Would those partners be prosecutable under the offence as it stands? I have already argued that I believe that they should be.

I simply say to the hon. Gentleman that his examples are compelling, which is why I do not rule out extending the offence at some time in the future. It is important, first, to put in place the new offence. Let us get that right first and see how the provision operates. If appropriate, we may return to the problem at a later date.

We agree about the need to protect the victims of domestic violence and we are sympathetic to the concerns that lie behind amendments Nos. 10 and 61, but it is important to be clear, as I tried to explain in Committee, that however dreadful the experience of being a victim of domestic violence, people are not absolved from the responsibility to do what they can to protect a child or vulnerable person who is depending on them for help.

The Minister touches on an important issue. Under clause 5(1)(d)(ii), the accusation relates to the failure

"to take such steps as he reasonably could have been expected to take to protect"

the victim from "risk". What is regarded as being "reasonable" in that context, and to what extent is reasonableness affected by the circumstances in which individuals find themselves? Surely the whole point of the amendment is to highlight that what is reasonable for a person who is suffering from domestic violence is likely to be different than for someone who is not.

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman highlights clause 5(1)(d)(ii), as I was just about to go on to precisely that provision. A person will not be guilty of an offence unless they have failed to take such steps as they could, in their circumstances, reasonably be expected to take to protect the victim from risk. It is for the court to determine what that means; it is not a matter for Parliament to rule out. That is the key point. Including the provision in the Bill means that the courts will be able to take serious domestic violence into account. In many cases, I am sure that the court will take those circumstances into account, but in the end it is for the court rather than the House to decide.

The practical effect of the amendment would be seriously to undermine the reasonable steps test. It would make the offence less clear. Amendment No. 10, in particular, refers to someone who is

"in fear of being subjected to domestic violence",

but that could apply to a very large number of defendants. Furthermore, there are other vulnerable groups: there may be children or vulnerable elderly relatives in the household, so why should they not also be excluded? The reasonable steps provision is the best way to deal with the problem, rather than excluding one particular group, however sympathetic we are to them.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar spoke about the links between domestic violence and sexual violence. She is right to draw our attention to that, and I hope that she is reassured that the Government understand the connection. We are trying, off the back of the sexual offences legislation that we passed last year, to drive through a series of policies and initiatives. My hon. and learned Friend will know that we are developing a network of sexual assault referral centres, far more than were in existence when we debated the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The first £4 million from the victims fund will go to organisations that work on behalf of the victims of sexual offences. I hope that she appreciates—I know she does, as I often speak to her about these matters—how much is being done to deal with the connections that she spoke about.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome touched briefly on domestic homicide reviews and the particular case of children. He mentioned it briefly, so I shall respond briefly. Concern was expressed at some length in Committee and it is only right to put matters straight. The concern was that the deaths of children might not always be reviewed, especially when a child or family had not come into contact with social services before the injury or death.

I wrote to members of the Committee on 13 July and I say again today that amendment No. 1 is unnecessary because any death of someone aged under 16 that met the criteria for a domestic homicide review would already have to be the subject of a serious case review. Indeed, Government guidance published in 1999, entitled "Working Together to Safeguard Children", sets out the criteria for serious case reviews and makes it clear that agencies should always conduct a review where abuse and neglect are known or suspected to have been a factor in the death. That includes all cases where a family member has killed a child, even if there was no history of abuse and no contact with statutory agencies.

I mentioned the issue briefly because I hoped that the Minister would be able to satisfy me entirely on it, and he now has. However, he has not entirely satisfied me about amendment No. 10 and I still intend to press it to a Division, if possible.

Whether a glass is half full or half empty is a judgment that I suppose we all need to make. My final point to the hon. Gentleman on this matter is that under the new arrangements envisaged under the Children Bill, all unexpected child deaths will be investigated by local screening teams and wherever it appears that abuse or neglect may have played a part in the death the case will be referred to the local safeguarding children board for a serious case review. The Government are therefore confident that all unexpected deaths will be checked and, if necessary, reviewed so that no cases can fall through the net.

Finally, in connection with her amendment No. 64, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar spoke about the payment of grants to voluntary organisations supporting children who have suffered after witnessing the treatment of others. However, the purpose of clause 50, to which the amendment refers, is to provide statutory authority for regular Government grants to voluntary sector bodies, and that is consistent with Treasury best practice. The clause already provides that the Secretary of State may pay grants to any organisation that appears to him to assist victims, witnesses or other persons affected by offences. Children who have been affected by offences as set out in the amendment are definitely included in that definition, so it is unnecessary to mention them specifically on the face of the Bill. Of course, we will need to watch carefully and make sure that the right amount of money goes to the organisations involved.

I am sorry to be slightly out of step, but my hon. Friend said that this was his final point and I want to take him back to the question of familial homicide. I am attracted to the idea of putting domestic violence on the face of the Bill because that would make all the parties in any case that might involve domestic violence aware that it is highly relevant. As a result, they will look for it. I appreciate that judges and juries will take domestic violence into account if its occurrence has been brought out into the open, as my hon. Friend said. However, as I noted earlier, women cannot talk about domestic violence or domestic sexual violence, except in very sympathetic circumstances. That is especially true in the aftermath of a trauma such as the death of a child, and such matters often do not come out in time for a trial.

I do not expect my hon. Friend the Minister to have a solution to that problem now, but I want him to think about it, as I do, because it is a real concern.

I do indeed think about these matters, as they are very important. My point is simply that it may be very relevant that domestic violence has occurred, in which case the court will take that into account. In resisting these amendments, we are saying that such violence cannot be used as an excuse always and in every case. My hon. and learned Friend is referring to those vulnerable individuals who will need support whether they are victims or witnesses, and that opens up a broader discussion about the criminal justice system as a whole. We are getting better at supporting people but we need to improve that, so that people in court are able to deal with, and speak about, these matters.

I just want to repeat my final point on the previous matter, which is that we will need to ensure that an appropriate amount of money goes to those organisations working with children.

In summary, I hope that it has been evident from what I have said that I sympathise completely with the motives behind some of the amendments under discussion. However, much of what they seek to achieve will be achieved by the Bill, although some of the amendments go further than what we feel can be justified as necessary. Therefore, I ask that the amendments be withdrawn.

This has been a good debate, and I am grateful for the support extended by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird) and by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath).

I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) supported new clauses 1 and 2. I know that he is an experienced and extremely learned practitioner in the courts, but I sometimes think that he is a little too sanguine about how well they operate. In response to his concerns about whether these amendments are necessary, I simply refer him to some of the statistics quoted by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar, and to the abuse experienced by women and children on contact visits. I also point to the number of contact orders made on schedule 1 offenders, and to the horrendous fact that there have been 28 child deaths in recent years.

Reference was made to the question of false allegations. Public inquiries into child deaths over the years have made it clear that an undue emphasis on not being misled by false allegations can lead professionals and practitioners to ignore the very real facts about serious abuses.

I am very sorry that my hon. Friend the Minister cannot accept new clauses 1 and 2. They are entirely in line with the Government's thinking and would only strengthen section 1 of the Children Act 1989. The paramount interest of children should always be served when courts make decisions about their future. The amendments would clarify those best interests and focus the efforts and attention of judges on them. They would make sure that judges were not swayed by the real pressures exerted by the well articulated and strongly expressed views of warring parents.

My hon. Friend the Minister feels that the Government have enough in the way of powers to deal with the very serious problems that arise, but the evidence that I quoted comes direct from the Government and is more recent than the Committee stage of this Bill. The Government have acknowledged that guidelines have not worked completely effectively so far in ensuring that children are safeguarded in contact and domestic violence cases.

Section 120 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 is a great improvement, but there is also a heavy reliance on guidelines. Given the serious facts of abuse, and the fact that children's experiences and voices are not heard properly and fully by the courts, I am not certain that my hon. Friend the Minister can be fully satisfied that the Government do not need the measures envisaged in new clauses 1 and 2. Those measures are not being urged on the Government only by hon. Members here today; the need for them has been made clear by organisations outside the House that have daily contact with people going through some of the most horrendous experiences that can be imagined.

I will withdraw new clauses 1 and 2. There has been some discussion about my mathematical judgment in previous stages of the Bill's progress through the House, but I am well aware that I need to take into account forces outside the Chamber.

I am the first to acknowledge that, in the context of the debate, the mathematical calculations are rather stacked against the hon. Gentleman unless he has Front-Bench support.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, and I appreciate what my hon. Friend the Minister said about serious case reviews, of which Opposition Members were so critical in Standing Committee. I am pleased that that has been resolved and that we have made some significant progress on the matter.

The Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs is about to embark on an inquiry into the work of the family courts. I have no doubt that the question of children and vulnerable adults will come up again and that the Committee will have an opportunity to talk to ministerial colleagues and to the president of the family division of the High Court and her colleagues.

In the hope that we are making some progress, and in the knowledge that progress will be very carefully scrutinised both in this House and outside it, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion and clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3 — Amendments to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 to extend the category of witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying

'(1) Section 17 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (c.23) (witnesses eligible for assistance on grounds of fear or distress about testifying) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (4) insert—

"(4A) Where the complainant in respect of proceedings relating to any form of molestation, including violence, involving a complainant, a cohabitant, a relevant child or associated persons, is a witness in such proceedings, the witness is eligible for assistance in relation to those proceedings by virtue of this subsection unless the witness has informed the court of the witness' wish not to be so eligible by virtue of this subsection.

(4B) For the purposes of this subsection, 'cohabitant', 'relevant child' and 'associated persons' mean a person as defined by section 62 of the Family Law Act 1996 (c.27) (meaning of 'cohabitants', 'relevant child' and 'associated person') as amended by sections 2 and 3 of this Act.".'.—[Mr. Heath.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.