On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Will you hold an inquiry in light of what happened in questions to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster? It is a rather serious matter that all six questions on the Order Paper were tabled by Conservative Members. I wonder whether something has gone wrong with the shuffle because I cannot believe—

Order. I think that the hon. Gentleman is going a bit too far. I assure him that it was a very fair random ballot.

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision for a warning symbol to be prominently displayed on the packaging of pharmaceuticals which act on the brain and central nervous system so as to impair dangerously the consumer's ability to carry out certain activities; and for connected purposes.

A psychoactive pharmaceutical is one that has a direct action on the brain and thus exerts clinical effects such as reducing depressive symptoms or anxiety, or inducing a good night's sleep. They are also used to treat panic attacks, post-traumatic stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorders and allergies. The direct action on the brain needed to alleviate the symptoms also has the potential to affect other nervous functions involved in the accurate performance of the tasks of daily living—whether at home, on the roads or in the workplace—including the rate of information processing, alertness and attention, visual processes, motor co-ordination and memory. I would hazard a guess that many have used such perfectly legal drugs without knowing that if they were then to take to the roads, their judgment could be just as impaired as it would have been if they had been drinking alcohol to such an extent that they were well above the legal limit.

Over a five-month period, Professor Hindmarch of Surrey university conducted a pilot study in which blood samples were collected from people at two hospitals who had suffered accidental injuries. The results implied strongly that the presence of tricyclic antidepressants and benzodiazepines led to an increased risk of accidental injury.

In a different pilot study, information on contributory factors in road accidents was collected by 15 police forces in 2002 and 2003. The influence of drugs was recorded as a contributory factor in about 1 per cent. of injury accidents, which was on a par with the effect of excess alcohol, although it is not clear what proportion of those drugs were legal or illegal. In 2001, the Transport Research Laboratory published a study to measure the incidence of drugs in fatal road accidents. A study published in 1989 found a 5.5 per cent. incidence of medicinal drugs and a 3 per cent. incidence of illegal drugs. Those figures were relatively low compared with the 35 per cent. incidence of alcohol. However, the 2001 study, which was based on results collected between 1996 and 2000, found that the incidence of drugs in the blood samples of road traffic fatalities was three times higher than in the previous study, while the incidence of alcohol had fallen.

A Canadian study of fatal road accidents in 1981 found that drivers who had used benzodiazepines were found culpable in 98 per cent. of the cases examined. Drivers involved in fatal road accidents who had been taking antihistamines were found culpable in 72 per cent. of cases.

There is no defined limit of drug use as there is for alcohol, and no such clear cut test as the random breath test. Moreover, the law does not make a distinction between illegal or misused drugs and over-the-counter or prescription drugs that are taken as directed by a GP or other medical practitioner.

Just as we have come to welcome a culture that emphasises the need for warnings about alcohol levels—a culture in which driving while drunk is no longer tolerated and for most employees drunkenness at work is a dismissible offence—it is time to ensure that those using psychoactive drugs are aware of their effect. The Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency provides advice to medical professionals. Doctors and pharmacists should provide information when dispensing prescriptions or other medicines. The Department for Transport is researching UK health professionals' attitude to providing fitness-to-drive advice to the public, including an examination of advice given in relation to medication. However, that is not enough.

Clearer labelling seems to me to be an excellent way of both alerting the public about the unexpected hazards of what they are taking to cure their ills and promoting a clear safety message by triggering the need to consider the risks before driving or embarking on potentially hazardous work. Who would be willing to wield a dangerous power tool if they knew that their reactions might be seriously impaired? Now, a pharmacy sticker might state, "Do not drive if you feel drowsy," or "May cause drowsiness," but by the time that someone feels drowsy, it is already too late—the safe limits have been exceeded. Inside the package, there may be a tightly folded patient information leaflet. If one is able to unwrap it, one might find print so small and illegible that one needs a magnifying glass to read it. To those of our fellow citizens or visitors to our shores who speak little or no English, it is of no use at all, and as the language used is rarely plain English, it is of little use to the rest of us. Such warnings are not adequate: the labelling is ambiguous and unhelpful and the patient is extremely unlikely to have insight into the actual level of drowsiness caused in the brain. My Bill would require the external packaging of medicines known to have an effect on judgment to be prominently marked. I propose a red triangle, meaning simply that use of the medication could seriously impair the user's judgment.

The main classes of medication—there are others—that would fall into the red triangle category would be benzodiazepines and tricyclic antidepressants, both of which are available only on prescription, and antihistamines, which are available over the counter to treat common complaints such as hayfever and conjunctivitis. A report compiled by Loughborough sleep research centre identified medicines available over the counter that have the potential to cause drowsiness and therefore to be hazardous. The literature makes it clear that one antihistamine sub-group, the classical H1 receptor, is especially sedating—it is even used for the relief of temporary sleep disturbance in some cases. The impairment caused by the recommended dose of at least two of the drugs is greater than that caused by the legal blood alcohol concentration limit for driving in this country. The elderly are especially vulnerable to the sedative effects of those drugs.

I do not suggest that the drugs are dangerous in themselves or that their use should be curtailed, either in prescription or in over-the-counter sales. Instead, because they will continue to be used regularly by large numbers of people, I advocate a red triangle marking to stand as an unambiguous warning that the ability to drive or to work safely might well be impaired on taking the drug. That would give users more control over their activities and an option to seek different medication if appropriate. Choice and control are paramount in avoiding preventable accidents.

That view has already been adopted in other countries. In Canada, a warning symbol was introduced under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 1996. The European Commission has acknowledged the benefits of such a system and referred to the need for appropriate labelling of medicines in the European road safety action programme for 2003 to 2010, which aims to half the number of people killed on the roads by the end of that period. In countries such as France, the Netherlands and Denmark, a clear system of symbols is used: green if it is safe to drive, amber if caution is needed, and red to show that one must not drive. Red triangle symbols are in use in Denmark, France, Italy and Norway, and other versions of the symbols are used in Austria, Belgium, Italy and Spain. The UK is lagging behind.

We need to place on certain medicines a visible warning that will leave no one in any doubt about their potential effects. The red triangle is an obvious visible warning stating, "Be careful what tasks you choose to do. Do not drive. Do not operate machinery." We need to act now to cut deaths and injuries on the road, in the workplace and at home. I hope that my Bill to achieve those objectives will find favour with the House today.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Mr. Andrew Dismore, Ms Karen Buck, Mr. Stephen Pound, Mr. Martin Salter, Sir Archy Kirkwood, David Hamilton, Dr. Alan Whitehead, Angela Eagle, Miss Anne Begg, Alan Keen and Mr. Neil Gerrard.

Pharmaceutical Labelling (Warning of Cognitive Function Impairment)

Mr. Andrew Dismore accordingly presented a Bill to make provision for a warning symbol to be prominently displayed on the packaging of pharmaceuticals which act on the brain and central nervous system so as to impair dangerously the consumer's ability to carry out certain activities; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 20 May, and to be printed [Bill 50].

I beg to move amendment No. 350, page 9, line 15, at end insert

'situated in the Palace of Westminster'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment No. 328, in clause 23, page 10, line 16, leave out from 'appointment' to end of line 20 and insert

'as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 329, page 10, line 26, leave out subsection (4).

Amendment No. 341, in schedule 7, page 156, line 7, leave out

'President of the Supreme Court'

and insert

'senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 342, page 156, line 8, leave out

'Deputy President of the Supreme Court'

and insert

'second senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 343, page 156, line 13, leave out from beginning to end of line 43 on page 158.

Amendment No. 344, page 159, line 24, leave out from first 'the' to end of line 31 and insert

'senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 345, page 159, line 33, leave out paragraph 8.

Amendment No. 346, page 160, leave out lines 6 to 19.

Amendment No. 347, page 161, leave out lines 1 to 33.

Amendment No. 330, in clause 25, page 11, line 17, leave out from beginning to 'will' in line 18 and insert

'The Commission must ensure that among them the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 331, in clause 27, page 12, line 36, leave out

'judges of the court would between'

and insert

'Lords of Appeal in Ordinary would among'.

Amendment No. 333, in clause 54, page 24, line 20, leave out subsections (3) and (4).

New clause 6—Appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—

'(1) Section 6 of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876 (39 & 40 Vict. c. 59) (appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary by Her Majesty) is amended as follows.

(2) After 'unless', insert—

"(1) he has been recommended for appointment in accordance with section 23 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (selection of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary); and

(2)".'.

Amendment No. 334, in clause 62, page 27, line 9, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 335, page 27, line 20, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 336, page 27, line 31, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 337, page 28, line 5, leave out 'Supreme Court judge' and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 365, page 28, line 5, leave out

'judge of the Supreme Court'

and insert

'Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 338,page 28, line 7, leave out 'to the Court' and insert

'as a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary'.

Amendment No. 368, in schedule 15, page 225, line 12, leave out from beginning to end of line 43 on page 226.

Amendment No. 340, in clause 120, page 52, line 25, leave out subsections (4) and (5).

Amendment No. 369, in title, line 2, leave out from second 'to' to 'to' in line 4 and insert

'make provision in relation to the appointment of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary'.

This is a long list of amendments. They have been grouped correctly, although they deal with two separate issues. Amendment No. 350 deals with the issue of where, if there is to be supreme court, it will sit. Other amendments represent an attempt by the official Opposition to rewrite part of the Bill to retain the Law Lords while, at the same time, ensuring that there is an adequate independent commission for their appointment, as provided for in the legislation.

Amendment No. 350 would insert in clause 20, page 9, line 15 a requirement to situate the supreme court in the Palace of Westminster. Prior to the Bill's introduction, there was a great deal of discussion about the fact that a supreme court was needed, allegedly in part because the facilities in the other place were insufficient for the Law Lords. However, during the course of that debate, a strange situation arose. The Law Lords who are keenest to establish a supreme court, because they believe that there should be a separation from the House of Lords, are least enamoured of the Government's proposals to rehouse them in another location. The Government have a problem, as a sunrise clause in the Bill expressly provides that the supreme court will not come into being until suitable premises have been identified to house it. On Second Reading, the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, the hon. Member for Shipley (Mr. Leslie), said with apparent certainty, although without making an official announcement, that the Government intended to house the new supreme court, which essentially takes over the role of the Law Lords with only a small amendment to their powers, on the other side of Parliament square in Middlesex guildhall, which is currently used as a Crown court. That building has been described by Lord Bingham, the senior Law Lord, as wholly unsuitable for the use of the new supreme court.

That should come as no surprise. When we consider the way in which the Law Lords operate, it is clear that theirs is a highly informal, Committee-based system of legal reasoning, which prides itself on the simplicity of the manner in which business is conducted. Complex rules of procedure are not necessary, nor is hierarchy. The Law Lords discharge their responsibilities as a corporate body. They can decide who will sit on an individual panel to deal with cases, and they do it in a Committee Room atmosphere, to which the public have access. Moreover, they can shift Committee Rooms in the other place if there is a need to accommodate more of the public to listen to the arguments. As was also pointed out in the course of debate in the other place, the nature of the argument that takes place in front of the Law Lords tends to be of quite an academic, if not esoteric, description, and is unlikely most of the time to have huge appeal to members of the general public. It is not the sort place where one will watch people being cross-examined on evidence.

I am glad to join debate with the hon. Gentleman again. I, too, have practised in Middlesex guildhall in my previous life and I have formed an entirely different view. The building is entirely adaptable. There are several courts and other rooms, it is over the road from Parliament and, most important, it is a distinct building—a distinct institution—so making the point that I thought the hon. Gentleman supported: that there should be a clear separation between Parliament and the legislature, and the courts. That is the obvious way to achieve it.

I shall not be drawn into a discussion at this stage about the separation of powers, in which, as I indicated previously, I do not believe. I accept that we have a serious disagreement about the need to set up a supreme court at all. However, I want to make it clear—which is why I tried to split this argument from the argument on amendment No. 328 and amendments consequential upon it—that my arguments on amendment No. 350 are based on the premise that we are setting up a supreme court. I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. I do not believe that Middlesex guildhall, without major adaptation, is a suitable environment.

Before my hon. Friend completely destroys the image of Middlesex guildhall, will he keep in mind that it acts as a symbol of something very important—historic Middlesex? Although its county council was abolished and the guildhall is therefore no longer required, Middlesex still exists. Middlesex guildhall is important and needs to keep that name, to keep the history alive.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend, who represents a seat which historically formed part of Middlesex and still does. If one goes into the building, one notices that it is redolent with civic pride relating to the county of Middlesex. There are coats of arms associated with the county and a host of carving that highlights the traditions of the county, all of which have been easily adapted to the environment of a Crown court. Historically, many Crown courts have sat in shire halls in the same way as takes place in Middlesex guildhall. It is a perfect environment for a Crown court, but we are setting up the supreme court of the United Kingdom. Either we must take out the stained glass, remove the carving and alter the interiors so that they correspond to the idea that the new members of the supreme court who are enthusiastic about it have about their functions, or we are putting them into a building that is the very opposite of what they wanted.

It is a matter of slight speculation, but one can draw some inferences from what Lord Bingham said as to what those Law Lords who are in favour of turning themselves into a supreme court want. My impression is that they want a building that is distinguished in appearance, probably modern if it could be found—[Interruption.] Well, a number of buildings have been floated as proposals ranging from Somerset house to Middlesex guildhall, and in each case, I have detected objections, both from public utterances and from what I have picked up in other circumstances, to the effect that none of them quite reflects the image of the court that they want to put forward. I have some sympathy with that. It is clear that they want the Committee Room-appearance of the courtroom, with the judges not on the dais but down at the same level as the practitioners, to be preserved. In an ideal world, they would want some facilities for the public so that the place is user-friendly to those coming in and to suggest something accessible, informal and modern, and even some sort of interpretation centre—I do not mean that in any way pejoratively—to give people an impression of what the new court will do. I have great difficulty imagining all those things in the context of the setting of Middlesex guildhall, and so does Lord Bingham.

Unlike my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), I have no legal background, but I have some architectural background, and my ancestor, Sir William Chambers, designed Somerset house, which I have been all over. I can give the hon. Gentleman an absolute guarantee that English Heritage would never permit the sort of changes that he is suggesting. If he is saying, as he was a few moments ago, that members of the supreme court might seek a modern environment, is he really suggesting that the other end of this place provides that?

I shall come on to that in a moment. One thing on which I agree with the hon. Gentleman is the problems relating to any changes to Somerset house. I am perfectly aware of that, and am familiar with Somerset house, which is a magnificent piece of architecture. As I understand it, Somerset house was unsuitable for that reason. The Minister will correct me if I have it wrong, and he may take the opportunity of this debate to enlarge on the Government's approach, as Parliament is entitled to know a little about their background reasoning and the options rather than just hearing it at third hand through the press.

Any changes to Middlesex guildhall will also pose problems with English Heritage. We may have the opportunity to hear more from the Minister as we discuss the matter in Committee, but my understanding is that any alteration poses considerable difficulties, and from my knowledge of the building, I have no problem in understanding why. It would need substantial adaptation, including the moving of the woodwork and many internal fittings, which remain an integral part of its structure and have adapted well to its role both as a Crown court, and in the past, as a shire hall. The Government have not addressed those genuine problems.

I smile at the idea that the Conservative party is resisting a change of use to Middlesex guildhall when I seem to remember that it was responsible for a change of use to County hall over the river into something far further removed from civic pride than is being suggested for the guildhall. There may be good reasons for suggesting the guildhall. If the hon. Gentleman does not want it to be the guildhall, but if we are to have a supreme court outside the Palace, will he tell us where he suggests that it should go?

That raises some interesting questions—[Interruption.] Well, my simple answer to the hon. Gentleman is that I have not the slightest idea. While I can see that if the Government were prepared to fork out £250 million a suitable site could be found on which to erect a building that would correspond to the idea held by those Law Lords who wish to move, the Government have not suggested that they will fork out that sum, although I have a funny suspicion that by the time this process is finished we will be moving rapidly in that direction.

I want to compare Middlesex guildhall, which is the offer on the table—not the other ideas, which might be costly but have some validity—with what is available down the Corridor. It is a fairly remarkable set-up. It is within the Palace at the other end, and has succeeded over the past hundred and something years in accommodating the Law Lords. First, it has provided them with their own rooms, which most of them find agreeable, as they have said, and private rooms in which to work. Secondly, it has provided them with a Committee Room, which I have been in and sat in for work purposes as well as seen in the context of being a Member of the House. That Room is entirely suitable, pleasant and at the same time quite an informal environment. Thirdly, it has succeeded in various offices in providing all the necessary support services for the Law Lords. There is a fantastic library of national quality and standard, which also provides the House of Lords with its Library, sensibly avoiding a duplication of resources. There is an amazing office at the bottom of the Victoria Tower, where judgments can be produced and distributed, and which, once one knows where it is, is a hive of activity and industry. There appear to be motivated staff who are happy to work in the building.

Overall, those facilities are provided for the princely sum, on which the Minister will correct me if it is wrong, of £168,000, leaving out the judicial salaries—[Interruption.] Indeed, there are no overheads because of the duplication of the function that the building must already perform as a House of Parliament. That seems to me a jolly sensible use of public money. The Minister will have to persuade me, before I return to my constituents in Beaconsfield, that there really is some purpose in spending between £30 million and £50 million, with running costs of between £5 million and £8 million—it is not quite clear—to set up a separate structure to deliver exactly the same service.

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman has had similar experience to my own when I held accommodation responsibilities—that there is considerable pressure from the existing membership of the House of Lords for offices and other accommodation at the other end of the building. Were the change to take place, which Liberal Democrat Members support, it would release some of the pressure at that end, and might make it more possible for more parts of that House and its support staff to be within this building, which would clearly be to the advantage of Parliament. Has he taken that into account?

Yes, I have. The hon. Gentleman makes a perfectly valid point: if the Law Lords were to leave the House of Lords and move into a supreme court, some accommodation would be freed up. I have to say that it is minimal in comparison with the costs of setting up the new supreme court elsewhere. I suppose that the key issue, on which I am sure that he will agree, would be whether it would enable Millbank to be given up, or something of that sort. I have a question mark over that, because I need only compare what is available at Millbank with the amount of space that the Law Lords take up to make me think that that is improbable. The Minister may be able to help us in the course of today's debate. I see him smiling, and I think that the answer is that it is improbable. I wait with interest to hear how Millbank can be squeezed into the pint pot that is available down at the other end of this building.

Another fact to consider is that this building has a long and historic association with the dispensing of justice, which has nothing to do with the Law Lords being Members of the House of Lords. There have been courts in this building or on this site for almost 1,000 years. Justice was dispensed at Westminster under the Saxon kings—certainly by the time that William Rufus had built Westminster Hall in the 1090s—and that practice continued until the 1860s. There really is a long association, and it is sensible to preserve that if possible.

But we have available a much cheaper option—a building owned on behalf of the public that could provide the benefits of a court that was somewhere else but nearby, and independent and perceived to be independent, but without the costs, other than those of internal refurbishment.

I entirely disagree. To begin with, there will be knock-on costs because the courts that currently sit in Middlesex guildhall will have to be found alternative accommodation. They are very busy Crown courts, and have been ever since they were set up. My fundamental point is that although Middlesex guildhall is a lovely building, there is no comparison, in terms of status, between it and this building. The only similarity lies in its Gothic revival historicity. That is not necessarily a bad thing. Nevertheless, it would be clear to anyone entering it that the Law Lords are occupying an old shire hall—albeit rather tastefully designed—of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. That is not adequate for a supreme court. I would much prefer to leave the Law Lords down at the other end of the Corridor. Anybody who sees the unusually informal way in which they operate there would be completely comfortable with the idea of their continuing to do so. We are going to waste money on something that will be unnecessary even if a supreme court is set up.

Amendment No. 328 and the long list of consequential amendments that flow from it would radically alter the Bill. They return to a lengthy debate in the other place about whether we need a supreme court at all and whether it would be possible to preserve the existing structure of the Law Lords. The Law Lords themselves appear to be fairly evenly divided. Given the pressure for this move that the Government have exercised in the public sphere, it is remarkable that they have not succeeded in securing more than 50 per cent. support for it from the Law Lords. The truth is that the Law Lords function very well, as the Government repeatedly acknowledge, and that the Government's desire to get rid of the Appellate Committee is a piece of theoretical mumbo-jumbo that is completely unnecessary in practical terms.

We are told that a separation of powers is required to send out this great signal that the judiciary is free of the Executive and Parliament. However, I worry much more about the signs of frequent interference in the independence of the judiciary by the previous Home Secretary than about where they sit and whether they are Members of the House of Lords. Judges have to exercise self-restraint in everything they do, to the extent of their private conversations at dinner parties, because in an age of mass publicity something that they have said, or has been said about them, could be seen to undermine the impartiality with which they discharge their office. They have succeeded in doing that, year in, year out—it has been impossible to find examples of where they have not. Where there has been any statement by a Law Lord or any other judge that might interfere with their ability to deal with a case, the general rule has been that they have not sat on it. The one exception is that of Lord Hoffman's involvement in the Pinochet case. However, the exception proves the rule, and that might equally well have applied had there been a supreme court. The fact that they are Law Lords makes no difference at all.

The Government seem to think that Law Lords are put into a peculiarly delicate position because they should not be able to listen to, participate in and vote on debates in the House of Lords. There is nothing wrong with that. Indeed, in terms of voting they are extremely circumspect, virtually to the point of self-denying ordinance. Convention absolutely underpins the quality of our administration in this country. One of the things that worries me most about this Government is their absolute hatred of convention. They showed long ago that they could not be trusted to respect any convention in the book whatsoever. We had enough difficulty in persuading them to observe the convention of taking this Bill on the Floor of the House.

The Government want to create a whole series of mechanistic structures that are designed to ensure the Law Lords' apparent independence but will not make a blind bit of difference to the way in which the public perceive their work. I believe that we will lose out in two ways. First, their participation in the legislature is rather a good thing. The opportunity for them to express, as they always do in a very careful and moderated way, any doubt or anxiety that they have about a piece of legislation that might, for instance, undermine the rule of law, sends a powerful signal to the Government that they should think very carefully about what they are doing. That is an intensely useful structure in a parliamentary democracy.

Secondly, the Law Lords have an opportunity to be receptive to what other people are saying. I do not want to suggest that judges are isolated, because they are not. The majority of the judiciary, outside of the Law Lords, operate in a world where they come into frequent contact with large numbers of people. For instance, the lives of those in the High Court are centred around the law courts in the Strand, which gives them a continuing connection with members of their own profession that they tend to find very useful. However, the Law Lords, by virtue of being here, have never had that contact in the same way. My impression, from conversations, is that they value working in a building with other people whose sole focus is not the law. They value the opportunities that that provides for gaining understanding from, for example, attending meetings about issues of public concern. That gives them an important focus, which helps them in their judicial work.

Yet all that will be blown away, first by getting rid of their status as Law Lords and secondly, by moving them out of the building. Some of the ethos could probably be preserved by creating the supreme court but leaving its members in the building to enjoy its facilities. Again, that would be cheap but we would lose something by removing their right to sit and debate. There is a way round that. I agree that we need an appointments mechanism for the supreme court. The majority of the amendments that the Opposition tabled try to preserve the structure while enabling the Law Lords to remain in the House of Lords.

The second issue that we need to consider is the position in respect of Law Lords being made life peers. New clause 7 is a probing amendment on that. At what stage would that happen? Would they be made life peers when they cease to sit as members of the supreme court? Could they be made life peers while they are sitting? Could the president, but not the other members, be made a life peer? We need some clarification from the Government about those matters.

As I understand it, it is not intended that the Lord Chief Justice should cease to be a peer but perhaps the Government intend that to happen. That must follow if we are moving towards a total separation of powers. I hope that we can engage with that in debate. [Interruption.] I hear the Under-Secretary saying, "suspended". That highlights the Government's approach: one can be a life peer but one cannot sit while serving as a judge. That is bizarre. What if someone who has been a life peer is appointed as a judge? That person will have engaged in public debate, yet is viewed as suitable to act as a judge. That underlines why the Government's attempt to produce clarity creates nothing but a silly mess.

I wish that the Government would reconsider their obsession with the separation of powers, which, as I have often said, derives from poor old Montesquieu's failure to understand how the English judiciary worked in the 18th century. The discovery that the judiciary was not an arm of the Executive amazed him with delight when he came to England. However, he built that up into the separation of powers, which is different from judicial independence.

I have outlined the reasons for the amendments and I hope that we will have an opportunity to consider the two issues carefully. I want to emphasise again that they are distinct. The issue of where the court should sit would apply if there were a supreme court. One could continue with the Law Lords and move them into another building—there is no reason why one could not do that. Amendment No. 350 therefore concentrates on location. I am anxious about the possibility that we may wait a long time before the sunrise clause comes into operation, unless the Government have made a clear decision about the Middlesex guildhall. The Under-Secretary will help us with that.

The wider issue is the Government's monumental waste of public money, in which they specialise. The first example of that is the dome. It is interesting to note that the Lord Chancellor was associated with that, although he treated it as a rather difficult client for whom he had no personal responsibility. The second example is the Scottish Parliament building, which was started before the powers had been transferred to Edinburgh. I suspect that we are moving towards more major Government expenditure to achieve a result that could be obtained by continuing to spend overheads of £168,000 per annum. I do not understand where good government lies in that and I look forward to the Under-Secretary's response.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) began with the location of the court. He rightly said that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords currently operates in a seminar style. I have appeared before the House on several occasions and my experience is of academic, to quote the hon. Gentleman, discussion. It is the sort of discussion that needs close interaction and a dialogue between counsel and the members of the Judicial Committee. There is nothing inconsistent between that style of judicial decision making and a new location.

I do not want to challenge anything that the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying, but in what kind of forum should a judge be able to say, "The law requires decision X, whereas justice would require decision Y."?

Judges already do that in the context of their judgments, although they might not put it in exactly those terms. The Law Commission, for example, will often draw on what judges have said about changes in the law. A judge might say, "I have to decide this case in this way, but there is a problem with that." That is something that the Law Commission should look at. That judge might suggest that justice required a change in the law, although, as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said, judges have to be extremely careful about what they say.

It is difficult to characterise the times in which we live. In a decade's time, when the supreme court is up and running, we might look back and see this as a fundamental revolution in our constitution. However, the proposal seems to me to be the kind of pragmatic, incremental change that is characteristic of constitutional change in this country. Today seems to be an appropriate time to make that change and I support the Government's proposals.

It is a pleasure to intervene in this debate at this stage, having not taken part in it earlier—perhaps a greater pleasure than for those other Members who have laboured day and night over the Bill. I shall be brief, but I shall also be slightly self-indulgent, because this is an enjoyable extra to my normal duties. I have declared an interest, in that I am a member of the Bar. Although I do not currently practise, I am still a member of chambers, so, like the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), I have performed over the road at the Middlesex guildhall in its capacity as a Crown court.

I want to address the two questions raised by the amendments, but I have one preparatory comment. The good knowledge of history that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield demonstrated reminded me that this place now lacks the kind of great historical contributions that used to be made here. He also reminded me of his very-much-still-alive predecessor, Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, formerly Peter Brooke, whose knowledge of London and Westminster history was without parallel. We miss him, although those at the other end of the building still have the benefit of hearing from him.

On the venue for the supreme court, my hon. Friends and I have always supported the idea that there should be a supreme court and that it should be visibly and organisationally separate from the working of the legislature. On Sunday, there was an insert into the "Politics Show" on television; I discovered that it is running a series of them. Last week's asked, "How Conservative are the Conservatives?" This week, it was, "How Liberal are the Liberals?", and next week it will be, "How Labour is Labour?" As I was listening to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, it struck me that, if ever we wanted an illustration that the Conservatives were still Conservative, he would be a living manifestation that that was the case.

We need to scrutinise the argument for keeping an arrangement that grew up for a reason that has now changed. The reason that the courts were in this building, a royal palace, was that the king was the fount of justice. He invited the courts to sit in Westminster Hall and we are proud of Westminster Hall's history, both its conservative and its progressive, radical history. That must include its most radical moment of all, when King Charles I was sentenced to death in the hall attached to this building.

That was the reason for the courts being here and when the fire happened in the 19th century, the opportunity was taken to move almost all the courts to the new law courts in the Strand. The only court that remained here was the Law Lords. They represent the highest court in the land and effectively form the supreme court, but they are also members of the legislature, which is part of the other historical anomaly.

The hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) rightly said that no other place in the world had the same judicial arrangements as ours. Well, no other place in the world has the same parliamentary arrangements as ours, namely an elected Chamber at one end, and at the other, a Chamber that is, with the exception of nearly 100 people who are the elected residue of the hereditary peers, all appointed. One historical anomaly is that, when the senior judges were appointed, the same group of people were appointed to be Members of the House of Lords. We delude ourselves if we imagine that the judges are regular, active participants there, because they are not. They are given that job incidentally, having been appointed as senior judges. They may incidentally contribute to debate and some benefit may result from their being able to talk to legislators, but I envisage much greater benefit from a separate supreme court elsewhere.

I am entirely in favour of people being able to see the supreme court in action, but its work will be similar to that of the Law Lords, and that—as many Law Lords have acknowledged—does not attract much wider public interest, because of its extremely academic and slightly esoteric nature. The High Court in the Strand offers more opportunity for excitement. That will continue to apply wherever the court is, and in whichever building it sits.

The hon. Gentleman is right, to an extent. People can no longer come here to see whether someone is sentenced to death or not. They cannot come here to discover whether a conviction for one of the gruesome murders featured in the tabloids will be overturned by the court of criminal appeal. Nevertheless, great constitutional judgments of our day such as the one in December are important, not only to academics but to a huge number of people.

I believe that the first point is made. Let me deal with the second tangentially. My colleagues and I want a mostly elected second Chamber. I should like 80 per cent. of its members to be elected, with a residual number of appointees. That debate is, of course, as yet unresolved, although we hope it can be resolved in the next Parliament, whatever the outcome of the election.

With a minority of appointees, it would be possible to secure the expertise of those in the legal and judicial professions. A nominee might have been a member of the supreme court or been nominated by the judges. With the disestablished Church that some of us favour, denominations of the Christian and other faiths could be equally represented. We need not lose the voice of judicial experience in a second chamber, but the representatives should not be trying to do two jobs at once. It is clearly unfair for someone to be legislating at one moment and judging at the next. There is no weakness in a system whereby judges come fresh to the law and interpret it—they need not have sat through the debate. If the Lord Chief Justice or the president of the supreme court wants to issue a warning that the Government are behaving inappropriately, he or she can do so by calling a press conference or making an announcement, or as part of a judgment.

Then there is the question of the venue. There is no magic in establishing the supreme court in the Middlesex guildhall. I have no absolutist view on that, but take a pragmatic, sensible view on what constitutes an appropriate location. Of course a supreme court could sit at the end of this building without going anywhere else, but if we are to start with the new structure clear, it is surely better on balance for us to vacate space that has been accidentally occupied in this building and move to a convenient location nearby at no huge public expense, if that is possible. It would then be possible to consolidate all the other activities of Parliament in this building. We have "outhouse" buildings that we rent to accommodate people, such as No. 7 Millbank and the buildings in Abbey gardens. Perhaps we could save those costs. Filling the space will be no difficulty in practical terms.

If it is decided that a move would be better, or possible, where should the move be to? It would be logical to choose somewhere near the centre of traditional power in the land. We have Government in Whitehall and the legislature here at Westminster, so the logical venue for the supreme court is close at hand. What are the options? I suppose there is the chapter house of Westminster abbey, although it is not terribly convenient. The court could squat in some of the rooms at Westminster school, although the school might have something to say about that, or we could ask the General Synod of the Church of England whether some hot desking would be possible in Church house. The Synod might not think that appropriate, but I believe that Church house has been used on a temporary basis before: I think that during the war Parliament moved in when this place was bombed. We could talk to the Methodists very nicely—Central Hall Westminster is capacious. It would even be possible to book a few rooms at the Queen Elizabeth II conference centre.

All those are options, but directly opposite us—on the other side of Parliament square—there happens to be a building that was originally the shire hall for the very county in which Parliament was for hundreds of years. It is, indeed, the very county in which Parliament still is, for the old county of Middlesex includes this place. The government of Westminster has moved up the road to less pleasant-looking premises in Victoria street, the city council offices, but that building was our county headquarters. Moreover, it is a court building. It is not as if it would be taken from local government to become a court. Of course some adaptations would be necessary, and I support the Law Lords' wish to retain the style that they have had before, but I cannot believe that that would be impossible in the Middlesex guildhall.

I have only one other thought. I have not gone around with a questionnaire consulting Law Lords or anyone else, but the only other building with a logic to it—if it were adaptable—would be the Privy Council building in Whitehall. It is near enough, and part of the Government's complex of buildings. I should be interested to learn from the Minister whether that has been considered. I share the view that buildings further afield, such as Somerset house, are inappropriate.

I feel that the proposition that the Middlesex guildhall could be adapted is reasonable. I note that the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs—chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith), who has had to leave the Chamber—decided that it was entirely reasonable, and I hope that it could be adapted at minimal cost. I should also be interested to know what contingency arrangements are in hand for moving the current work of the courts. I have three Crown courts in my constituency just over the bridge: the inner London court of session, which has been there for many years; Southwark Crown court, which is extremely busy; and Blackfriars Crown court. There are spaces in London for other courts. The courts administration could doubtless be adapted and, if the presiding judges were given due notice and help from the Minister's Department, appropriate buildings could be found.

There is a cost issue and it is true that we ought not to spend huge sums. If we were starting from scratch, we could build a new building, but no one is saying that we should do so. I assume that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield is not suggesting that it is Conservative policy to build a new building for a supreme court. The right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) has not added the associated cost to the list of additional Conservative expenditure, which will of course be balanced by £35 billion-worth of Conservative cuts. In the light of such cuts, it would be difficult to squeeze out of the Tory budget money for a new building.

I was amused to hear the hon. Gentleman refer to £30 million costs as minimal—he is being very liberal with the largesse involved. We want the court to remain in the current building because that is the proper setting, but if it is the Government's wish to splash out public money, in our view, the building that has been identified—notwithstanding what the hon. Gentleman says—is wholly unsatisfactory.

We can debate that issue and express our views but, in the end, if the Government get their Bill, they can implement the proposal.

In a rare moment of accord, we have tabled no amendments in Committee to a Government proposal—[Interruption.] No, that is no precedent for the future —not even for the short period before we are the Government and Labour are the Opposition. [Interruption.] That period may be shorter than Labour Members think. That said, I shall not be distracted into too much preliminary electioneering. The reality is that the Bill contains a contingent proposal: there will be a supreme court, but only if it moves from this building. I am surprised that the Government are being so definite about this proposal. I can see the logic of it in one sense, but as the hon. Member for Beaconsfield will agree, it is entirely possible to have a supreme court—the most important point—without moving it immediately, which is a less important point. We must get the priorities right.

I turn to the bigger issue, with which amendment No. 328 deals: whether we have Lords of Appeal in Ordinary or supreme court judges, with all that that entails. My hon. Friends and I approach this issue from different traditions and perspectives, but we share the common view that there is merit in having a supreme court. As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) said on Second Reading, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary are certainly not "ordinary" and therefore have an anomalous name. The role that they fulfil would be more clearly perceived as judicially independent were we to bite the bullet and adopt the proposal before us.

This is not a new proposal that the Government have just dreamed up—it has been around for a long time, and we Liberal Democrats are glad that they have grasped this issue. Implementation of such a proposal is overdue. It would make it clear that there is a difference in democracies between government, legislature and the courts. It is important that those elements be separated, because at the moment, there are all manner of anomalies, such as the Lord Chancellor having three jobs and the Law Lords acting as legislators. That is why we will vote against the amendments if they are pressed to a vote. We hope that we can proceed to a satisfactory solution that will cost the taxpayer little money, but which will give us clear judicial independence, separation of powers and a separate, self-contained place in which the Law Lords, in their new role as the supreme court, can do their work.

The hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) advertised his speech as a short one, but it ran to 19 minutes; mine will be shorter than that. The first question to ask is why we are paying the price of a ministerial brainstorm that occurred during a botched reshuffle. Abolishing the Lord Chancellor and the issues arising from that proposal have resulted in a Bill of 227 pages. The major associated cost—[Interruption.] I do not intend to be interrupted too much by the Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary. The major associated cost is the capital cost, but there are also high recurring costs.

When the Law Lords appeared before the Constitutional Affairs Committee—I am very grateful to them and to the Lord Chancellor for doing so reasonably frequently—Lord Bingham said that the current arrangements passed the Bingham "pudding test", but not Bingham; in other words, appearances seem to be more important than anything else. If the issue is separating the place where the highest court will sit from the Palace of Westminster, I should point out that in doing so we would be separating it from the legislature, not the Government. I was intrigued by the idea, as advanced by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey, of locating the court in a Government office. It would be far better to locate it in the legislature instead, but perhaps we can sort out that difference of opinion later.

We could say that the Lord Chancellor's house need not be used by the Lord Chancellor. It could be defined as being outside Parliament, but still fall within the Palace of Westminster security screen. As a result, there would be no additional costs. In other words, we could deal with the situation by changing people's perception and altering the definition, in the same way as—as has been suggested—we could change the name from Lords of Appeal Ordinary to supreme court justices.

The Government seem not to understand the difference between continuity and improvement and change. They have shown a lack of respect for an institution that has worked pretty well and they are obsessed with constant change. As a constituent of mine wisely said, if they were half as good at delivering results economically and effectively as they are at launching their ideas, life would be likely to improve. Not a single improvement will follow the high cost, disruption, argument and delay in which the Government's proposal will result. A far better idea would be to say that we prefer that the Law Lords do not vote in the upper House. That could be done by convention and, through a minor adaptation, we could establish that the Lord Chancellor need not sit on cases. The third problem could be solved by defining the place where the Law Lords meet as theoretically outside the Palace of Westminster. The only remaining issue would then be the best way of appointing the judges—an issue with which different clauses deal.

I hope that the Committee will forgive me but I will have to leave the Chamber at 2 o'clock because the Constitutional Affairs Committee, which has contributed to this debate, will be in session and it needs to be quorate.

I endorse and support what my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) said earlier. I am stimulated to say something else, as well, by the contribution of the hon. Member for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley), who is of course a member of the Constitutional Affairs Committee. My right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) has left to prepare for the meeting to which the hon. Gentleman just referred, so I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is still here to hear what I have to say.

The role of the Constitutional Affairs Committee in preparing for this debate has been an extremely useful innovation, and we owe it to its members to take their advice very seriously. I am sorry that Conservative Front Benchers have not done so, because a considerable section of Members support the proposition before the Committee. The hon. Gentleman may want to comment on the fact that the Select Committee did not divide on paragraphs 37 to 54 of its report, which endorse the proposal for a supreme court that is separate from the present legislative role of the Law Lords.

To avoid having Divisions all the way through our proceedings, the hon. Gentleman will want to advise the Committee that unfortunately, it was necessary during our Select Committee proceedings to have two votes on paragraph 55, which in essence deals with this issue. The hon. Gentleman is not reflecting fairly, therefore, the decent, gentle and courteous behaviour of the Select Committee.

I am surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman make that point because I have read the report very carefully. It is true that there were some Divisions on paragraph 55, which dealt with the actual location of the court, but the principle of setting up the supreme court is dealt with in the earlier paragraphs.

I want to respond to the particular point about using this building for this particular purpose, while still maintaining the separation of powers, to which I and my colleagues are very much attached. I accept that there is an argument for doing so in the transitional period. That is why I want to deal with what the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) referred to as the sunrise clause. My colleagues and I have some concerns about it—it is clause 120—because it provides a safety valve that could easily become a blocking mechanism if particular members of the judiciary decided that the accommodation was unsuitable, not ready, or not of the sufficient calibre, standard or quality to which they were attached as residents of this building. The hon. Member for Worthing, West has made an important contribution in that it would be perfectly possible during the transitionary period to use this building until the Middlesex guildhall is available.

The hon. Gentleman puzzles me now, because the recommendation in the report wholly endorses the need for a sunrise clause and states that no supreme court should come into operation until a new building has been identified. Is there not some inconsistency between what the Select Committee said and the hon. Gentleman's current view?

Not at all. I want to make it absolutely clear that my colleagues and I are not seeking to exclude the sunrise clause. What we are saying is that the Government owe it to the Committee now to explain precisely how they intend to handle the transition. That is a perfectly reasonable request to put to the Minister, and it is in those terms that I draw his attention to the possibility that the sunrise clause could be used as a blocking mechanism, which I believe would be very damaging to the reputation of Parliament. It would allow one part, albeit an extremely important part, of our body politic to hold up the will of Parliament. I hope that the Minister will respond to that particular point.

I believe that the Select Committee's other comments are admirable. The Committee came down firmly in favour of Middlesex guildhall as an appropriate location, which I believe is a measured and sensible recommendation. The Committee also gave considerable thought to the interim arrangements that will apply until the recommended building is ready. I hope that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has read that section of the Select Committee report. I endorse the Select Committee's measured approach—I include Conservative members of the Committee in my praise—and I greatly prefer it to the apocalyptic approach of Conservative Front Benchers.

It has been interesting to hear the debate so far, not least because the arguments both for and against have been put forward so well by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) and by the hon. Members for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) and for North Cornwall (Mr. Tyler). I agree with many of the points that those Members advocated, though my reading of the amendments before us is rather different from that of Conservative Members, particularly regarding the entire deletion of the creation of a supreme court in one form or another. I accept some of the points made about particular aspects of the building, appointments to the supreme court and so forth, and I shall try to deal with them in turn.

At present, the highest Court of Appeal in the land sits as a Committee of Parliament—the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. To anyone except a seasoned observer, it can appear that a legislative body is interpreting legislation. The status quo thus has potential flaws that could cause difficulties. About half of the present Law Lords are now reported to be uncomfortable with their position in the legislature, which potentially conflicts with their judicial role. They have had to exercise a self-denying ordinance in recent years in order to avoid speaking or voting on legislation that might later prejudice their objective application of those laws.

Although the present system works, the time has now come to make improvements. Part 3 of the Bill, from clause 20 onwards, therefore proposes the creation of a new supreme court for the United Kingdom that is separate from Parliament, removing the potential conflict between the legislative and judicial roles of our most senior judges, and providing greater clarity and visible independence for our highest court.

Ideally, the functional separation of the judiciary from the legislature and the Executive is a cardinal feature of any modern, liberal and democratic state that is governed by the rule of law. Pragmatically, the business of justice should be, and should be seen to be, independent of the business of Government and the business of Parliament. That was argued strongly by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey. The interpretation and application of laws should not be undertaken by those intimately involved in making the laws. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has welcomed the proposal because it reduces the prospect of a critical judgment in the future that a free and fair tribunal should not be prejudiced by preconceived potential bias. Greater clarity is necessary for public confidence and for our continued reputation in the wider world.

Specifically on the comments by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about the location and nature of the prospective building, we believe that a new supreme court must be established in an acceptable way, in a manner fitting to the principles of the highest court in the land and the dignity commensurate to its status, while simultaneously securing value for money for the taxpayer.The Bill places the Lord Chancellor under a duty to provide appropriate accommodation and facilities—and here the sunrise clause 120 additionally ensures that commencement will not occur until those facilities are available. I am glad that the Select Committee commented favourably on those arrangements—in particular on page 20 of its report. To explain a little further, the arrangements were made in order to placate some of the concerns expressed in the other place—that there might be a hasty removal or eviction of the Law Lords from the House of Lords to somewhere they regarded as unsuitable. Ministers will approve the new building and ensure that consultation with the Law Lords takes place throughout the process until they become supreme court justices.

The Government announced in December—I believe on either 14 or 19 December and in a written ministerial statement—the preferred option of Middlesex guildhall, the Crown court that we now see on the opposite side of Parliament square, as the new, separate supreme court building. I am sorry that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that I somehow sneaked this out on Second Reading, because there was, as I said, a voluminous written ministerial statement about it. Never mind, but that statement would probably answer many of the questions that the hon. Gentleman put to me today.

The advantage of this particular site—I have advocated it throughout as the most obvious choice—is, of course, its prime constitutional location in Parliament square, with legislature, Executive, the Church and now the judiciary to be represented on all four sides. Furthermore, that location would represent a potentially vast improvement on the cramped conditions of the present accommodation in the House of Lords. Middlesex guildhall is already owned by the Department for Constitutional Affairs and is used as a Crown court.

I understand the concerns expressed by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield, who quoted the concerns of Lord Bingham, but they relate to the building that is used now. I believe that it is perfectly possible to strike the right balance between preservation of the key features—we would need planning permissions elsewhere, which is one of the reasons why the Middlesex guildhall remains our preferred location at this stage—and the more traditional approaches of the Law Lords who prefer to sit in panel and have a more open and transparent method of conducting their hearings. I believe that Middlesex guildhall can be refurbished and changed to meet those concerns. I also believe that that location will provide good value for money, in being a refurbishment rather than a new building. It also has the architecture most likely to galvanise widespread recognition and respect among the general public. We know that it also has the support of the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs.

Another oddity is that our constitution means that the proposed court will not be a supreme court so much as the final Court of Appeal for the UK. Moreover, in the Strand there sits already the supreme court established by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1891. The Government have not explained what they intend to do with that, but it is one reason why it might have been appropriate to call the supreme court's judges Lords of Appeal—whether in Ordinary or not.

Some courts are commonly called supreme courts, although they are not used as such, and we have suggested that they be called superior courts. The supreme court will be the UK's final Court of Appeal, but it will not take on what are regarded as the functions of the US Supreme Court. Our supreme court will act as the Court of Appeal for cases produced in all of the UK's different jurisdictions. The proposed title is the one that will best fit its functions.

We consulted widely about the name change. The proposal to adopt the title of Supreme Court Justice received widespread support from those who responded to the consultation process.

My party supports the proposal for a supreme court, with supreme court justices. However, will the term for those who do the Appeal Court job remain Lords Justices of Appeal? In any case, the supreme court will be able to do its job properly only when we have our own Bill of Rights.

The hon. Gentleman may be the Liberals' liberal, but the changes on the tables are enough for now. I shall stick to them.

Various amendments apply to the appointment process for Lords of Appeal and Law Lords. However, increased transparency in the appointment process is not the only requirement when it comes to reforming the system. We want there to be a separate court, so it would therefore not be enough merely to change titles. The court must be separated from Parliament.

I appreciate that the amendments envisage retaining an appointments procedure, but that mechanism is rendered ponderous by the requirement that there be a president of the supreme court, and a deputy president. At present, the senior among the corporate group of judges is, by convention, the one who presides and undertakes a certain amount of regulatory function. The provision in the Bill represents quite a change, as we shall discuss at more length in the debate on clause 21 stand part. However, I should be grateful if the Minister would say why the Government have decided formally to appoint a president and a deputy.

The proposed president of the supreme court will have different functions and characteristics from the present senior Law Lord. We believe that the job will merit its own appointment process. The appointment process for supreme court justices will have to be more transparent and formalised than at present, and I know that the hon. Gentleman agrees with that. That reform is well worth while.

Although the amendments are founded on clear principles, I hope that the Committee will reject them. We need to move away from having a legislative body that interprets and applies the laws that it passes. It must not be perceived to do that, so we must secure the functional separation of judiciary and legislature. The highest court in the land must have clarity, transparency and visible independence. These are high constitutional matters, although the hon. Member for Beaconsfield suggested that they were academic and esoteric, without great importance for the public at large. He said that the expenditure incurred by the reform was not necessary, and it may be true that the constitutional environment just at the moment is placid and calm. However, we should not ignore the potential problems in the system or shy away from making improvements.

I do not disagree with the last part of the Minister's peroration, but he did not understand at all my use of the words "academic" and "esoteric". I was talking about how members of the public might regard the deliberations of the court, but I did not intend to diminish the importance of what it does. In its current form, the court performs vital work. It will continue to do so in any new form that it might be given.

I understand what the hon. Gentleman says, but his earlier comments betrayed a view that these issues are remote and distant from the public at large. They are fundamental and that is why they require attention, even if they seem from time to time to be academic. They are central questions and my point is simply that it is important to keep the health of our institutions in prime condition. We should not accept a conservative attitude from the Opposition. We have a duty to maintain the health of our institutions as best we can and that is why a new supreme court is necessary. I hope that the amendment will be withdrawn or, if not, rejected.

I am a practising solicitor and, technically, a solicitor of the Supreme Court. The Minister may wish to consider the fair point made by the hon. Member for Southwark, North and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) that there are complications surrounding the use of the words "supreme court". Those will need to be dealt with if the Bill is passed in its current state.

The arguments against the creation of the Government's new supreme court were eloquently set out during the Bill's passage through the other place.

I need to correct a comment that I made earlier. I said that we would change the colloquial term Supreme Court, covering the High Court and Appeal Court, to the superior courts. In fact, the title in England and Wales will be the senior courts and in Northern Ireland it will be the court of judicature. I wanted to put that on the record.

I thank the Minister for that clarification.

Arguments against the creation of the new supreme court were set out on Second Reading in this House and by my hon. Friends the Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Worthing, West (Peter Bottomley) today. Because the Government will not drop this divisive proposal, my hon. Friends and I feel that we must speak out again in the hope that some sense might prevail. We remain convinced that the creation of a new supreme court would not only be a pointless and costly exercise, but cause significant damage to the excellent position we enjoy now.

Despite all their attempts to convince us otherwise, the Government's proposals to scrap the judicial functions of the House of Lords in favour of a new supreme court are unnecessary. The hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) spoke about the chances of the Bill leading to a fundamental revolution. This Bill will not do that. It is a damp squib or, at best, what my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West described as change for change's sake. The proposed court would exercise the same role already carried out by a combination of the existing Appellate Committee and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Under clause 21, the existing Lords of Appeal in Ordinary would, logically, become the first judges of the supreme court. Legal rulings by the Law Lords already command the highest respect in this country and around the world. Indeed, there is no suggestion from any quarter that the existing Law Lords are anything other than excellent at their work, and the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North made that point earlier.

What is the justification for wrecking the present arrangements? Again, we come back to change for change's sake and the Minister citing what he thinks is a modern, liberal separation of powers. Not only would the move to a new supreme court do nothing to improve the Law Lords' reputation, the opposite might be the case, as Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead rightly pointed out in the other place. The Appellate Committee's esteemed reputation might not pass seamlessly to a new body. The proposed supreme court would not begin its life as a supreme court as the term is understood in almost any other jurisdiction. It would not have the power to override parliamentary supremacy and strike out legislation as unconstitutional. The question then arises as to whether we would be swapping the prestige of our present Appellate Committee for a court perceived, as the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf said, as a sort of "second class" supreme court.

The Government justify the new supreme court on the grounds of ensuring the independence of the judiciary, yet concerns about that have never been more than anecdotal. No one has seriously suggested impropriety on the part of the Law Lords.

What of the Human Rights Act 1998? I concur with the view expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield on Second Reading when he suggested that only the fact that the Lord Chancellor sits as a judge—we are all happy to change that—could, arguably, provide grounds for a human rights challenge. That aside, one can point to the fact the despite all the scaremongering, no legal challenge has ever been made to allege that our existing arrangements do not ensure a fair trial, in line with the European convention on human rights. The need for greater separation of powers in the British system is also a spurious justification for a supreme court. As Lord Kingsland said in the other place,

"the argument that the separation of powers requires these reforms proposed by the Government is wholly unsustainable."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 12 February 2004; Vol. 657, c. 1222.]

Democracy has long been upheld in this country without the requirement for the type of rigid separation of institutions favoured in, for instance, the United States. Even if some notion of political correctness were to require such separation, would not the link between the legislature and the Executive be rather more pressing? However, there are no plans—as far as I know—to remove the Executive from this place, notwithstanding the fact that it has vastly more impact on the affairs of the legislature than a few Law Lords in the other place.

Before the hon. Gentleman reaches his coda, I have a question for him. I know that he lives in Huntingdon and represents it, but has he ever calculated the distance between the House of Lords and the proposed new premises? By my calculations, the distance is about 100 yd. That is hardly an ivory tower, miles away, far out of sight and mind.

Many Members have spoken about the special historical significance of these premises. Indeed, the hon. Gentleman pointed out that the execution warrant of Charles I was signed in Westminster Palace, so he makes my point for me.

As Lord Rees-Mogg stated in the Select Committee in the other place, there must be serious concerns about the developments that would follow the creation of a supreme court. Would such a court begin to debate whether it should in fact respect the very cornerstone of our British constitutional system—the supremacy of Parliament? As we shall no doubt consider in detail in relation to clause 109 later on, the other place would also lose the valuable input of the Law Lords.

There are so many more arguments that can be ranged against the Government's supreme court proposal, but I cannot sit down without touching on one of the most significant—the cost of the supreme court. Members will need no reminding that the Government's estimates—or should I say the estimate emanating from the ex-Minister for the dome?—are a capital outlay of £30 million. The Minister said that refurbishment would be cheaper than new build, but let us see where the Government get to. We say it will be £50 million, and how much more? Who knows? On top of that, there will be yearly running costs of £8 million, as my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield made clear, compared with only £168,000 for the Appellate Committee at present.

I repeat what I said on Second Reading—that we will be far from surprised if those figures do not grow significantly by the time the money is actually spent. How can those costs be justified to the British public when, as my hon. Friend said, we can all agree on much more pressing uses for that amount of money? Without even venturing beyond the bounds of the justice system, there would be many better uses.

This unnecessary new supreme court is not a priority for the people of Britain and does not even command the full support of the Law Lords. It will damage our constitution and the high regard in which the Law Lords are held at present. The Government should desist from their attempts to force the proposal through during the remainder of this Parliament. Our view on the proposal could not be stated more clearly and simply than by quoting the Government's former Chancellor, Lord Irvine:

"a sufficient case has not been made for the abolition of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and its replacement by a separate new supreme court."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 10 June 2002, Vol. 636. c. WA3.]

The Government have completely failed to convince us on this issue and we ask that amendment No. 350 be put to the vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

Clause 21 provides for the first judges of the supreme court to be the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary who hold office at the date of commencement. This is a one-off provision to allow for the transition of members of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords to the supreme court. The effect of the clause is that, on establishment of the court and immediately before commencement, Lords of Appeal in Ordinary will become the first supreme court judges. The senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary before commencement will become the president, and the second senior Lord of Appeal in Ordinary before commencement will become the deputy president of the supreme court.

The clause will ensure a smooth transition between the present arrangements and the new ones, which is very important. In the same way as the supreme court will take over the jurisdiction of the Appellate Committee, the judges who sit in one will move to sit in the other. They have already been selected as the judges best suited to sit in the UK's highest court, and it would be unnecessarily disruptive to suggest that any separate selection procedure was necessary to identify the first members of the new supreme court. Schedule 9 provides detailed arrangements for the handling of cases that might be in progress at the time of transition. That is why the clause should stand part of the Bill.

I am grateful to the Minister for outlining those arrangements, but I return to a point that I raised in an earlier debate that can be raised now just as easily. I hasten to add that this is not an objection to the Government's position—I simply want a bit of clarification.

Currently, there is no president or deputy president of the Law Lords, although I understand that, in practice, they operate an informal system by which the senior Law Lord discharges certain duties and has responsibilities for the good organisation of their work. Despite that, it is an exceptionally collegiate structure, which marries very well with the informality that we debated earlier, and I get the impression that both Government and Opposition Members wish to preserve that in the new supreme court structure.

The Government are sufficiently comfortable with those arrangements to make the point in clause 21 that in any transitional provision the senior Law Lord and the second senior Law Lord will simply become president and deputy president respectively. However, when we go on to consider the process for selecting the members of the court, we realise that all this will become quite complicated. Not only a system for selecting ordinary members of the supreme court but a special system—or at least a similar but particular system—for selecting the president and the deputy president will be required. I want to draw the Minister a little on the Government's reasons for wishing not only to set up a supreme court but to create those two formal positions, rather than relying on the more informal structure that pertained previously.

As an unrepentant conservative who sees absolutely no need for the changes, I underline the point that my hon. Friend made when he talked about the collegiate nature of the body. I do not want a supreme court and I see no need for one. It is being visited on us unnecessarily. If we are to have it, we do not need to formalise its structures in the way that the Minister outlined and the Bill proposes. I do not want a proliferation of titles, as the members of the collegiate body are equals. I would prefer the informal arrangement that pertains at present to pertain in the supreme court.

We do not propose to end the collegiate nature of the final court of appeal in our country—far from it. However, we want to make important improvements to the system. Clause 21 has not been over-criticised, not least because Conservative Front Benchers have realised that there is virtue in bringing greater transparency and formality to the appointment process, rather than having candidates emerging and then being appointed by Her Majesty on the advice of the Prime Minister without a clear and transparent process.

I am all for emerging.

We will have to see whether the hon. Gentleman ever emerges in that context. We certainly do not want the proliferation of titles. Indeed, the title of Lord of Appeal in Ordinary needs to go, and we need to use the simpler title of supreme court justice. However, we debated that earlier.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) asked several questions. We need a separate process for the appointment of the president and deputy president of the supreme court, although the process will be similar to that for any member of the supreme court. The holders of the posts will have slightly different jobs. The president will chair the selection committee to select new members and will determine whom to invite to serve as acting judges or on the supplementary panel. He or she will make directions about the composition of sitting panels and will make rules of the court. He or she will also have additional functions specifically pertaining to guarding the independence of the supreme court, namely the appointment of the chief executive, officers and staff. He or she will be involved in consultations around those areas and will work closely with the chief executive on the administration of the court's operation. Given that the post is different, it merits specific attention, instead of simply having an individual emerging from the body.

I think that our proposals are pretty straightforward. When establishing a new court, we have to start somewhere. Clause 21 thus makes provision about the first members of the court at transition, with the existing senior Law Lord becoming the president and existing Law Lords becoming justices of the supreme court. The clause is the right way to proceed and I commend it to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 4 — Representations to the Northern Ireland Assembly

'(1) The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland may lay before the Northern Ireland Assembly written representations on matters within subsection (2) that appear to him to be matters of importance relating to the judiciary, or otherwise to the administration of justice, in Northern Ireland.

(2) The matters are—

(a) excepted or reserved matters to which a Bill for an Act of the Northern Ireland Assembly relates;

(b) transferred matters within the legislative competence of the Northern Ireland Assembly, unless they are matters to which a Bill for an Act of Parliament relates.

(3) In subsection (2) references to excepted, reserved and transferred matters have the meaning given by section 4(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c. 47).'.—[Mr. Leslie.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5 — Northern Ireland Act 1998: excepted and reserved matters relating to Supreme Court

'(1) The Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c. 47) is amended as follows.

(2) In Schedule 2 (excepted matters), after paragraph 11 insert—

"11A The Supreme Court."

(3) In Schedule 3 (reserved matters), after paragraph 14 insert—

"14A The following matters—

(a) rights of appeal to the Supreme Court;

(b) legal aid for appeals to the Supreme Court.".'— [Mr. Leslie.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

In the Northern Ireland Act 1998, areas of legislative competence are divided into three categories. I know that the right hon. Member for Upper Bann (Mr. Trimble) will know this backwards, but partly for my own benefit, I shall elucidate. The first category is transferred matters, which are the responsibility of devolved government in Northern Ireland, when that is functioning. The second category is reserved matters, which include policing and justice, on which the Northern Ireland Assembly may legislate with the consent of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and subject to parliamentary control. Reserved matters are listed in schedule 3 to the 1998 Act. The third category is excepted matters, which are responsibilities retained by the British Government. They are listed in schedule 2 to the 1998 Act.

The Northern Ireland Assembly, when active, has the power to make primary legislation conferred on it by the 1998 Act broadly according to those three distinctions. New clause 5 will simply ensure that the new UK supreme court will be identified as an excepted matter in schedule 2 to the 1998 Act. It also makes it clear that rights of appeal to the UK supreme court and legal aid for such appeals will be reserved matters under schedule 3 to the 1998 Act. That is the current situation that applies to the House of Lords. Legal aid is already dealt with by Orders in Council, and the Northern Ireland courts are a reserved matter. We are taking the opportunity to clarify the situation by amending schedule 3.

I wish to ask a question about terminology, although the Minister may have dealt with it in earlier proceedings on the Bill. The phrase "Supreme Court" in new clause 5 refers to the body that will unfortunately replace the House of Lords in its judicial capacity, but does not refer to the Supreme Court of Northern Ireland, which presumably will require a new name in the same way as the Supreme Court of England and Wales will require a new name. What will the new name of the Northern Ireland body be?

The body will be called the court of judicature in Northern Ireland—for completeness, the body in England and Wales will be the senior court.

By making the change to schedule 3 to the 1998 Act, new clause 5 will ensure that the position of the new UK supreme court will exactly reflect the current status of the judicial function of the House of Lords, so the status of the final court of appeal for Northern Ireland will not be altered. The new clause reflects and preserves existing devolution arrangements, so I hope that the Committee will accept that it is effectively a consequential aspect of the wider principles that we debated earlier.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 37 — Jurisdiction

I beg to move amendment No. 366, in page 17, line 23, leave out 'An' and insert 'No'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 367, in page 17, leave out lines 24 and 25.

The clause sets out the jurisdiction of the so-called supreme court. In its present form, it provides for final appeals in civil cases in Scotland, which currently lie to the House of Lords, to lie instead to the new supreme court. Amendments Nos. 366 and 367 would, in effect, delete that provision by amending clause 37 so that no final appeal in civil cases in Scotland would lie to the supreme court. I made a detailed speech on Second Reading setting out my thoughts on the clause and it would not be appropriate to go over the same ground at length today, but I shall state briefly the principal reasons behind the amendments.

First, the amendments would end the 18th-century anomaly whereby final right of appeal in Scots criminal law cases lies—quite properly—in Scotland, but final appellate jurisdiction in Scots civil law cases still lies south of the border. In post-devolution Scotland, that arrangement is illogical, unnecessary and undesirable. The second reason relates to the structure of the court and the system that will be operated as a result. In Scotland, serious concerns have been voiced by senior legal figures about the negative impact that the new supreme court system will have on the integrity of Scots law. I submit that those concerns have not been sufficiently addressed in the Bill.

It is clear that the new supreme court will not be entirely distinct and separate in all respects from the administration of justice south of the border, as is required by the 1707 treaty of Union. We see, for example, that the new Lord Chancellor—a Department for Constitutional Affairs Minister—will not only be responsible for appointing the chief executive of the supreme court but will retain some functions relating to the working of the judiciary in England. In addition, funding for the supreme court will, in effect, come within the DCA's overall budget. The proposals for the court therefore fall foul of the treaty of Union by not providing a system that is entirely distinct and separate in all respects from the administration of justice south of the border.

It is time to repatriate to post-devolution Scotland final appellate jurisdiction in Scots civil law cases. The Bill as it stands represents a missed opportunity, which the amendments are designed to rectify. Given the constitutional importance of the matter, it is a great pity that no other Scottish Member from the other parties has bothered to turn up to this key debate, just as they did not turn up for Second Reading.

As the hon. Lady knows, I am not a Scottish Member, but does she agree with me that it is incredible that there are no Conservative Back Benchers present? After the fuss they made yesterday about the constitutional importance of the Bill, they cannot be bothered to turn up to listen to this important debate.

I had not noticed that, so I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for pointing it out. It is indeed rather odd, given that the Conservatives argued at great length on Second Reading for the time for consideration of this important Bill to be extended. Not only are there no Conservative Back Benchers present, but the sole Scottish Tory MP, the so-called shadow Secretary of State for Scotland, the hon. Member for Galloway and Upper Nithsdale (Mr. Duncan), has not bothered to turn up either.

Given the constitutional importance of the clause and the fact that it relates directly to the integrity of the Scots legal system, I shall seek to divide the Committee on the amendment.

I oppose the amendments. I do so, first, for selfish reasons. English law has benefited enormously from the Scots' contribution in terms of both personnel and the substantive law. For their contribution of personnel, we need only look at the great jurist Lord Reid—a Scottish Law Lord, a former Advocate-General, I believe, and a Member of this House. For their contribution to the substantive law, I mentioned on Second Reading the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson: we have benefited because civil cases have come from Scotland and, conversely, Scotland has benefited as well. Because of the way in which jurisdictional limits operate in courts in England, the smaller cases, but cases that none the less involve important points of principle, do not always come to the highest courts. The Scots civil cases that come to the House of Lords provide that opportunity for law making. Returning to personnel, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, an eminent Law Lord, is an example of one who can bring that dimension of Scots law—the heritage from Roman law—to decision making in our highest court of appeal.

When considering devolution cases, the House of Lords and the Privy Council have been highly sensitive to the Scottish dimension. Not only has there been a substantial Scottish presence on the relevant appellate body but there has been a majority of Scottish judges deciding devolution cases in the Privy Council. Let me quote a Scottish advocate, Aidan O'Neill QC, who wrote:

"The somewhat surprising (and surely unintended) result of this might be thought to be an effective Scottish take-over of England law when matters of Convention rights are raised in the UK Privy Council".

I simply do not understand the rationale behind the amendments.

The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware, since he has quoted a senior advocate, of the serious concerns expressed by the Faculty of Advocates about the proposals in general. As for his specific point about the composition of the panel and the number of judges, the faculty expressly called for a majority of Scottish judges on the panel dealing with Scottish cases.

As I said, that has happened in a number of the important devolution cases. I repeat, I cannot see the rationale for the amendments.

I endorse every word that the hon. and learned Gentleman has said. I agree that the fact that there is in the Law Lords at present, and will be in the supreme court, the ability to apply common principles to civil jurisdiction in England and in Scotland has been of inestimable advantage to the development of our jurisprudence over the centuries. The fact that the two systems are different but based on the same philosophical principles means that the tension in differences of approach can be examined and ideas that start in one country can be adopted by the other. Such things are what the substance of being a united kingdom is all about, but at the same time they allow within the framework of the devolution settlement—and did so even before devolution, as can be seen in the preservation of the sole right to criminal jurisdiction in Scotland—the autonomy of the different parts. That is one of our great national success stories.

I disagreed profoundly with the hon. Member for Perth (Annabelle Ewing) when she described the arrangement as an 18th-century anomaly. She might think it anomalous today, but it certainly was not anomalous in the 18th century. It was the logical thing to do in view of the desire of the two Parliaments coming together, and that desire has continued ever since. If the amendment is pressed to a Division, I shall vote against it.

I support entirely the thrust of the arguments made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and the hon. and learned Member for Dudley, North (Ross Cranston) against the amendments. There are huge benefits in a system that allows one of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary—under the Bill, they will become supreme court justices—to come from Scotland. They have always played a significant part, and have made a contribution. Scotland has been well represented at that level. The last Lord Chancellor but one was a Scot. The highest reaches of the United Kingdom legal decision-making process has benefited from Scottish participation.

The logic of the argument made by the hon. Member for Perth (Annabelle Ewing) is that there would be no such participation, and Scots would not be nominated at that level. That is an implication of independence— a country pulls itself away entirely—but we have benefited greatly from that mixture.

The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Bill includes an express provision that the judgments of the new court outwith their jurisdictional aspects are not to be binding but merely persuasive. How do his arguments sit in light of that fact?

With respect to the hon. Lady, that is not particular in relation to Scotland. There has never been perfect unity—we are a united kingdom to which four different countries contribute. The Scottish position is different from the Northern Irish and the Welsh position. Like my colleagues, I believe that it is better to take the Scottish contribution to our legal system up to the top. We have benefited significantly from that contribution, and some of the greatest jurists have been Scots. The United Kingdom should continue to benefit from that at the highest possible level.

I agree with everyone who has spoken except, of course, the hon. Member for Perth (Annabelle Ewing). It is a pity that she decided to divide the Committee before hearing the rest of the debate.

Is the Minister aware that the Scottish Parliament has had an opportunity to debate this fully? Scots law will be protected under clause 37.

My hon. Friend is right. On 19 January, the Scottish Parliament passed a Sewel motion endorsing the establishment of a UK supreme court, with 63 votes in favour and 56 against. That was the decision of the Scottish Parliament, I am glad to report.

The amendments would simply remove Scottish civil appeals from the jurisdiction of the UK supreme court. Clause 37, and schedule 8, which it introduces, make provision for the jurisdiction of the new supreme court. We propose that its jurisdiction will be the same as the jurisdiction of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords in appeals from England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, together with the jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in relation to devolution issues. The supreme court will be a superior court of record, as are the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Clause 37 is critical, because it ensures that current jurisdictional arrangements are preserved, thereby ensuring consistency in approach between the new and the old regimes for people seeking a judgment from the highest court in the land. Those arrangements include the appeal process and the types of appeal from each jurisdiction, including leave requirements and routes of appeal.