I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make provision for the recovery of certain prosecution costs in proceedings for offences giving rise to a confiscation order.

In 2001, we introduced the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, whereby the assets of people convicted of serious crime, such as money laundering, could be seized, so that they did not just go to jail and still keep the fruits of their crime to reward them when they came out. That Act has been very effective in hitting criminals where it hurts, but I want to identity two areas where that legislation could be improved by letting others take action and recover their prosecution costs, which they are currently unable to do.

Last weekend, I visited a constituent who had been the victim of identity theft. In 2001, she moved house and changed all her details to the new home address. In January 2003, a new account was created using her old details, but the crime did not come to light until last December, when she applied for a new mortgage and was refused because of the debts incurred on the stolen identity. As requested by the credit card company, she reported the crime to her local police, but their civilian staff refused to issue a crime number because they said that a crime had not been committed.

When the inspector went round yesterday, he said that no crime had been committed against the police, so no action was to be taken. He said that it was the bank's responsibility to deal with the fraud and my constituent's responsibility to tell the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, the Passport Office and the Department for Work and Pensions about the new identity that might be being used. However, credit card reference agencies will not do anything about the matter because there is no crime number and the police say that it is a victimless crime, so organised criminals are getting away with lots of money. Ironically, this all happened on the same day that Thames Valley police had its web page hacked into.

The national high-tech crime unit is trying to tackle precisely such crimes—the crimes that the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 was designed to stop. If local police cannot take action owing to a lack of knowledge and lack of resources prioritised on the matter, I argue that we need to empower other bodies to do so, such as financial institutions and banks. The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins), will know that I have consistently argued that the directors of security of banks and communications service providers should be given special constabulary powers to collect evidence and initiate prosecutions, because they are often the people who detect crimes and have the tools to collect evidence and track the money. Those people could play a strong role in not only the detection of crime, but the prevention of crime. We should copy the example of Canada, which has given such people special constabulary status. They do not go on the beat, but use their skills to fight crime.

There was a story in the Washington Post last week about a gang that stole 145,000 identities in one hit. We are not at that stage yet here, but we might be if we do not take effective action. It is estimated that the current cost of intellectual property crime is about £11 billion and that the Exchequer loses £2 billion in unpaid value added tax alone. Such matters will become crucial during the next Parliament.

A couple of years ago, Waltham Forest borough council's trading standards department took action against pirates and counterfeiters on its patch. The prosecution was successful, so it applied under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 for assets to be seized, which they duly were. To give an idea of the scale of the task, the prosecution costs were £90,000. One can thus imagine the council's consternation when it found that it was unable to recover the prosecution costs because the assets had gone to the Treasury and there was nothing against which the council could claim.

If the Crown Prosecution Service had undertaken the prosecution, the costs would have been recovered, with the money obtained through the normal channels. However, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 does not allow non-central Government organisations to recover costs. Those organisations include local authorities and private sector organisations that might take action against organised crime and get a confiscation order, such as the British Phonographic Industry and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Piracy is rife in the music industry. The BPI could take serious action against the pirates—not the 16-year-old kids downloading in their bedrooms, but the piracy industry that has been built up. The sale of pirated DVDs in markets throughout the country costs £400 million a year.

Globalisation means that if we are to continue to enjoy our standard of living, intellectual property and its protection will be vital. The crime is not victimless. More than 1 million jobs in our creative and high-tech industries depend on us taking action. Counterfeiting and piracy are major sources of organised crime, so we will have a serious problem if we let the problem grow. I argue that closing the loophole and allowing non-governmental organisations to recover their prosecution costs would be a first, yet crucial, step in the fight to secure our future.

I go further by suggesting to the Government that we should allow such organisations to retain a percentage of the assets seized—I argue that the figure should be 10 per cent. If we did that, the police would be able to create more computer forensic officers. It would also give trading standards departments an incentive to take action because only the best, such as that in Waltham Forest, do so at present. We must encourage others to take action. I am a great believer in incentives, and I am convinced that any money that the Treasury might lose in the initial period would be more than recouped by the assets seized in the extra prosecutions that would be brought.

Our record as a leader in those industries and the protection that we give our constituents have been jeopardised because everyone is waiting for someone to take action. We should support and encourage trading standards officers who are prepared to act, and they should not have to face the barriers that are an unintended consequence of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. My Bill highlights a problem that will become more visible in the coming years. It closes a loophole and, I suggest to the Minister, it proposes a way forward. I therefore commend it to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Brian White, Janet Anderson, Mr. David Amess, Claire Ward, Helen Jones, Mr. Huw Edwards, Mr. Richard Allan, Bob Spink, Paddy Tipping and Jim Dowd.

Proceeds of Crime (Compensation of Prosecution Costs)

Brian White accordingly presented a Bill to amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to make provision for the recovery of certain prosecution costs in proceedings for offences giving rise to a confiscation order: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 8 April, and to be printed [Bill 88].

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

From time to time, an event of such serious public concern occurs that the Government establish an independent inquiry, the aim of which is to establish the facts, to decide what, if anything, went wrong and, if appropriate, to make recommendations aimed at preventing a recurrence. The Bill is designed to reform the arrangements for conducting such inquiries. I should make it clear that it is not concerned with planning or licensing inquiries, or with inquiries set up by public bodies such as local authorities. Nor does it deal with inquiries conducted by parliamentary Select Committees. It creates a comprehensive new statutory framework for inquiries set up by Ministers to look into particular events that have caused public concern.

The Government and others want inquiries to be as effective as possible, and that is obviously the aim of the Bill. At present there is a mixture of powers available for Ministers to set up statutory inquiries. The first legislation allowing Ministers to set up inquiries of a general nature was the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, which created a procedure separate from Parliament to carry out independent and non-partisan inquiries into any

"definite matter of urgent public importance".

Alongside that Act, other legislation developed, giving Government Ministers additional powers to order inquiries in particular areas within their remit such as policing, health or child protection.

In 1966, a royal commission headed by Lord Justice Salmon reviewed the workings of the 1921 Act. Based on that and on his later report of 1969, a White Paper was produced in 1973 setting out various proposals for legislation, but they were never taken forward. A mixture of powers are therefore available to the Government to call statutory inquiries and in many cases, they have proved quite adequate and suitable. For instance, the Stephen Lawrence inquiry was conducted under the Police Act 1996, and the inquiry into children's heart surgery at Bristol royal infirmary was conducted under section 84 of the National Health Service Act 1977. Other inquiries such as the Bichard inquiry into matters arising out of the Soham murders have conducted effective investigations on a non-statutory basis, as everyone involved was prepared to co-operate. However, we can see that deficiencies in the legislation could prevent us from setting up inquiries in the most effective form.

The Minister is explaining the history of the matter, but does he recognise that concern has been expressed even by some of his noble Friends, such as Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws—distinguished lawyers with experience of inquiries—that in the Bill the Government are writing themselves too big a blank cheque to change the terms of reference? The danger is that in the Bill the Government may be getting away from the concept of independence in inquiries.

I do not accept that we are moving away from independence in the conduct of inquiries. The Bill has as much to do with consolidating and bringing together many of the basic commonsense rules about how inquiries should operate—some of the standing orders, so to speak, setting out how inquiries should proceed. I understand that there are concerns about public access, which I shall deal with later, but I do not accept that independence need be jeopardised in any way.

My hon. Friend gave an interesting catalogue of various inquiries that have been held. Can he explain to the House why the existing legislation is not sufficient to deal with the Pat Finucane inquiry?

It is tempting to be drawn into specific examples of inquiries that may or may not need to be held, and clearly, the Finucane issue exists. We know that an inquiry has been on the cards. The Bill would facilitate that by putting on a proper, more comprehensive footing our ability to conduct an effective public inquiry in circumstances where national security issues may well arise. Obviously, that would bring into question the point that the hon. Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) raised about public access. I hope to expand later on the rationale behind the Bill.

Does the Minister accept that under the 1921 Act, both Houses of Parliament decide whether the inquiry goes ahead, whereas under the current proposal, it is the Minister who decides? Does the hon. Gentleman think there is any merit in returning to the issue and thinking again about whether Parliament should be involved? Many of the issues that might require an inquiry are complex, in the public domain, important and serious, and Parliament might want to have a say.

Parliament is entirely free to undertake its own parliamentary inquiries, parliamentary commissions and so forth, if it so wishes. What we are discussing today are the circumstances and rules surrounding ministerial inquiries conducted by the Executive. We have made a number of changes in response to the debate that took place in the other House with respect to ministerial statements that we think we should make to set out the arrangements for the inquiry, laying the report before Parliament and so on. Ultimately, reports to Ministers and the Executive can be questioned in Parliament through the natural process of accountability.

The Minister has been generous in giving way. I am still not clear why precisely the Government have made the change so that a resolution of both Houses is no longer required in order for an inquiry to be set up on a matter of public importance.

It is not the case that a resolution of both Houses is at present automatically required for all inquiries. Many inquiries can be preceded by resolutions of both Houses, but there are various loopholes in the legislation that allow other inquiries to be set up without parliamentary resolutions. If we can get into the detail of the Bill, particularly clause 7, which was introduced in the other place, we can start to investigate in a little more detail why, in certain circumstances, we would not want parliamentary resolutions—for instance, they can take time to be passed through both Houses, and sometimes we need to expedite the commencement of an inquiry. We should recognise that it is the role of the Executive to make sure that we can investigate problems and ensure that they do not recur, and we can be held accountable for that in Parliament.

The Minister has insisted that increased Government powers to amend inquiries' terms of reference will not compromise inquiries' independence. If that is his contention, will he prove it by giving the House an undertaking not only that the Government would consult the chairman of the inquiry in those circumstances, but that they would obtain the chairman's approval before proceeding?

When Ministers decide to establish inquiries, we want to facilitate those inquiries' smooth operation, which means working in partnership with inquiry chairmen. From time to time, circumstances mean that inquiries must be suspended or even ended, and we can all envisage circumstances in which costs or policy changes might need to be considered. The Bill contains such provisions, although we do not envisage their being required in most circumstances. We have tried to bring the legislation together so that everyone can see the rules, so that we know how the rules operate and so that the framework for public inquiries proceeds on an open basis.

An amendment accepted in the other place means that Ministers will have to make statements whenever they set up inquiries. However, it could be any sort of statement, including a written statement. On such important matters, surely the House has the right to question Ministers on what they are setting up and on how it will work. Will the Minister consider that point again?

If Parliament wants to consider any statement, it must find time to debate it, and it would be wrong of me to dictate to it how it should consider particular inquiries. All inquiries are not the same, and they can cover big matters of public policy or specific individual tragedies. Parliament might want to debate some inquiries in more detail than others, so a rigid approach would be wrong.

The new responsibilities for Ministers are a key element of the Bill. When Ministers set up inquiries, the Bill requires them to consult inquiry chairmen about the terms of reference, but it does not refer to consulting other people. Inquiries are set up in response to issues of public concern, so members of the public should surely have a say on the terms of reference, which will in turn reassure them about the independence of that inquiry.

Under the 1921 Act, the Government are responsible for setting the terms of reference, because public inquiries ultimately report to Ministers and to the Executive. I share my hon. Friend's views to the extent that we want to gain as much public confidence as possible when inquiries are established. However, all inquiries are not the same, and sometimes we must act speedily, which does not allow for widespread consultation. In many other cases, we hope that there will be time for widespread consultation, in which case the terms of reference will be as open and as transparent as possible, within the normal restrictions and exemptions.

I have no doubt that the many interventions that the Minister is taking will shorten the debate, because he is answering important questions. On the apparent centralisation of control to Ministers in some cases, I am concerned that if an inquiry is granted under duress, its terms might be limited to protect the Government or a Department from a bad outcome. What is his response to those hon. Members who are nervous that over-centralising the decision-making process could prevent us from getting to the heart of the matter in cases such as the deaths at Deepcut barracks?

It is tempting to go into particular examples, but I will not do so because we are discussing the general framework for all inquiries. On Ministers setting terms of reference, the provision is not a substantive change from the arrangement in the 1921 Act, other than the fact that we are consolidating the legislation in this Bill. From time to time, inquiries must be held in part, or perhaps in whole, in private session, and all hon. Members can envisage good reasons for doing so, such as national security or the protection of the interests of certain individuals in vulnerable circumstances.

When Sir Michael Bichard gave evidence to the Public Administration Committee, he underlined the importance of getting the terms of reference right:

"Terms of reference are therefore . . . not something just to be nodded through".

The chairman of any inquiry should be involved from the outset in setting the terms of reference.

My hon. Friend has made a perfectly reasonable point. I have not yet had an opportunity to pay tribute to the Public Administration Committee, which has produced a report on the issue. The Government do not agree with the Committee on every matter, but we share its general intentions. Where possible, we want to make sure that inquiries uncover any difficulties, expose problems to a wider audience and identify potential solutions. That is our collective objective.

rose—

rose—

I shall give way to the Chairman of the Public Administration Committee, because I referred to it.

I will not interrupt the Minister if he is about to pay tribute to the Committee's work. Under the 1921 Act, tribunals retain complete control of their proceedings. Under this Bill, that control will be shared with Ministers on a range of fronts. Whatever view we take on that matter, surely the difference is fundamental.

I am not sure whether the matter is as clear-cut as my hon. Friend has suggested, because the Government set the terms of reference under the 1921 Act. However, we want to ensure that we enter into a partnership arrangement with the chairman, who, incidentally, might not always be a judicial chair, in setting up and running inquiries. There are also good reasons why the Executive should have a hand in setting and framing how inquiries operate, given that such inquiries might investigate issues of national security.

It is always a pleasure to joust with the Minister, but notwithstanding his soothing bromides, I remain suspicious. Will he tell the House of the circumstances in which, rather than merely adding to the terms of reference of an inquiry, the Government would subtract from them? How might that eventuality arise, because the Bill appears to allow for it? I am not happy about that matter and hope that the Minister will satisfy me.

I am not sure whether the subtraction or addition of terms of reference is a mathematical equation. The Bill requires co-operation between the inquiry chairman and the Minister to whom the report will be given. All such matters cannot be dealt with statutorily, but the flesh that this Bill puts on the bones will help.

I will not get into a semantic dispute about addition and subtraction on the one hand or narrowing and broadening on the other. The central point is obvious: in what circumstances might it be necessary for the Government to remove a term of reference? If the Minister wants that power, which he may be justified in seeking, he should be able to explain the scenario in which the need could arise.

It is tempting to get into hypothetical scenarios, although we all know that we should not necessarily hypothesise on these particular issues. I can, however, envisage circumstances in which the outcome of a court case resolves a question that formed part of the terms of reference at the outset of a long-running public inquiry and does not need to be investigated in a duplicative manner. I hope that we will be able to go into that in more detail in the Standing Committee, on which I know that the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) will be very keen to serve.

Will my hon. Friend give way?

I wanted to make a little more progress, but of course I shall give way.

My question arises from a matter that my hon. Friend has elided—the national security exemption. Will he confirm that there will be no way of challenging a Minister's decision to exclude matters on national security grounds; that there will be no independent third party to whom one can appeal to suggest that the desire to exclude a matter on such grounds is being used as an excuse in order to prevent further awkward questions being asked; and that historically, some of these matters have been of the utmost importance and relevance in seeking and finding the truth about situations? If the Minister seeks to maintain this exemption in the broadest possible terms, the whole purpose of public confidence will be lost.

I understand my hon. Friend's point. Ministerial decisions, which must of course always be reasonable, may often be judicially reviewable, but in circumstances relating to national security we may sometimes need to have restrictions on public access to certain information. That does not mean that an inquiry will not be able rigorously to investigate what goes on—it simply means that there might be restrictions on access to that information in the public domain. We hope that the presumption will be that public access is the norm—we do not want blanket restrictions to be imposed where they are not necessary. My hon. Friend will understand that there are sometimes serious national security issues. We have recently debated many pieces of legislation in respect of which we could envisage scenarios where certain pieces of information would not be best disclosed in the public interest.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that reply. Does that mean that the tribunal chairman will have access to all that information, even though members of the public may not have such access? Will he have access to anything he wants to know without any restrictions being placed upon him in terms of national security?

Yes, of course the inquiry will have access to the information—that is my point. The restrictions would relate to what was publicly available. Of course we want an inquiry to be able to look into these matters even when they relate to national security and we need restrictions on what can be disclosed in the public realm.

Non-statutory inquiries have taken place in certain circumstances in the past. We feel that although co-operation was possible in some cases, we now need to put public inquiries and inquiries of this nature on to a better, sounder, statutory footing so that they can have more powers to get to the bottom of difficulties and to ensure that their investigatory strength is greater. For instance, there is currently no power to call inquiries into deaths in custody or other events of concern in prisons in England and Wales. The inquiry into the death of Zahid Mubarek in Feltham young offenders institution has had to begin on a non-statutory basis despite the clear value of having statutory powers available for it.

Nowadays, statutory inquiries can span several subject areas. For instance, the Climbié inquiry was set up under three separate pieces of legislation. The fact that the statutory powers vary slightly from piece to piece can create potential risks to the effectiveness of an inquiry. There is also the possibility that a future inquiry might need to span devolved and reserved business that falls within the responsibility of two different Administrations. One way of dealing with some of those problems would be to make greater use of the 1921 power, but in recent years it has been used very rarely. As the Public Administration Committee commented, the 1921 Act is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as bringing a panoply of procedural requirements and a whole array of attendant lawyers with it. The Act has never been updated either to reflect the 1973 White Paper or to take account of the more recent legislation on devolution.

There has also been concern here and in the other place about the cost of some inquiries. The Government are absolutely clear that inquiries must have all the powers and resources necessary to get to the truth, but it is entirely proper that the best use be made of public money in doing so.

With all those issues in mind, my Department and its predecessor have been reviewing the legislation for some years. In February last year, the Public Administration Committee announced its review of the use and effectiveness of independent inquiries into matters of public concern and asked for responses to a paper containing a series of questions about the conduct of inquiries, many of which overlapped with the work that we have been doing in our Department. Accordingly, the Lord Chancellor, my noble Friend Lord Falconer, decided to submit a full response to the questions from the Committee and obtained the Committee's agreement to publish the consultation paper, which was based on our response, in order to invite wider public debate. That was published on 6 May last year. It suggested that the conduct and effectiveness of inquiries could be improved if the 1921 Act and much of the specific legislation were replaced by the single statute that we have before us today.

At the same time as requesting written responses, we invited people who had been involved with inquiries in the recent past, including a number of distinguished former inquiry chairmen, to join in discussion groups. The discussions and written responses supported our view that the time was right for new legislation on inquiries and showed general support for the views expressed, as set out in the summary of responses that we published on 28 September. We also worked closely with the devolved administrations to create a system that takes account of their responsibilities. We were then ready to bring forward this Bill to provide a comprehensive statutory framework for major inquiries across the United Kingdom. The Public Administration Committee has published its report, which the Government welcomed in their response. I am sure that both documents will help to inform the debate.

On inquiries that stretch from here to one of the devolved nations, such as Wales, can the Minister assure the House that there will be more than simply consultative input from the Welsh Assembly, for example, and that it will have some decision-making authority as the terms of reference are established?

Yes. Through the Bill, we are trying to create a statutory framework whereby the devolved Assemblies will have greater powers for their own inquiries. It is indeed one of our intentions to help to close that particular loophole in the legislation.

Clause 1 sets out the power to establish an inquiry. It is deliberately drafted more widely than the provision in the 1921 Act, so that it can be used for any future situation in which a substantial statutory inquiry may be needed. The Bill does not replicate the 1921 Act's requirement for parliamentary resolutions to authorise use of the powers given by that Act. That was inserted to prevent unjustified inquiries being initiated and has, for most recent 1921 Act inquiries, been taken as a formality.

Clause 3 provides for the appointment of an appropriate person or panel of people to conduct an inquiry. That clause should be read in conjunction with clause 10, which stipulates that the Minister must have regard to the need to ensure that the inquiry panel has the necessary expertise to undertake the inquiry. As clause 12, which deals with the appointment of assessors to assist the panel, also provides, we want the most appropriate people to conduct those inquiries.

Clauses 4 and 5 deal with the appointment of the panel and the setting of the terms of reference, ensuring, as I said earlier, full consultation with the chair of the inquiry. As a result of further Government amendments brought forward in the other place, clause 6 contains a duty on the Minister to make a statement about any proposed inquiry to Parliament, or the relevant Parliament or Assembly in the case of inquiries set up by the devolved Administrations. I believe that that requirement provides sufficient opportunity for parliamentary scrutiny of proposals to set up an inquiry.

Clause 7 is the result of an Opposition amendment that was carried on Third Reading in the other place. It provides for arrangements for inquiries relating wholly or mainly to allegations of ministerial misconduct. The Government continue to have genuine concerns about the drafting of clause 7 for several reasons. For example, there would be great pressure to use that procedure for almost all inquiries. I have a real concern about the definition of "misconduct", which its current framing leaves open. We already have the ministerial code of conduct, which sets out the standards that the Prime Minister expects of his Ministers. I have yet to be convinced that any formal resolution requirement, which does not appear in the majority of inquiry powers in existing legislation, contributes more meaningfully to parliamentary scrutiny of inquiries.

I am sure that the Under-Secretary will concede that the Government parliamentary draftsman drafted clause 7.

Yes, in response to the nature of the debate, with which I take issue, in the other place. I do not believe that a particular desire for such a routine resolution, which defines almost all inquires as potentially relating to ministerial conduct, would necessarily be in the best interests of getting on with the thorough investigation that some inquiries carry out. Perhaps Parliament takes the view that ultimately everything is to do with ministerial conduct. I envisage a cumbersome and possibly confused picture if we accepted that broader definition of ministerial accountability and responsibility for all issues. That is one of reasons why I take issue with clause 7 as it is drafted.

Clause 11 concerns the arrangements for the appointment of judges to inquiries—a matter about which considerable discussion has already taken place, especially in the other place. The Government had already included a requirement in that clause for consultation with the Lord Chief Justice or other appropriate senior member of the judiciary. The Government remain of the view that, on issues of such national importance, we must leave the individual judge to decide whether he or she should accept the appointment.

Clauses 13 and 14 provide for suspending and ending an inquiry. As a result of debate in the other place, Government amendments were tabled to ensure that the Minister gives notice to Parliament to explain the reasons for suspending or ending the inquiry before it has reported. Indeed, that point has already arisen in today's debate.

Clauses 16 and 17 allow for the conversion of another type of inquiry into one under the Bill. That is not a transitional provision—existing inquiries can carry on as they are by virtue of clause 45. The conversion powers are included in case they are needed in future, for example, to convert an inquiry that is set up on a non-statutory basis when it becomes apparent that the power to compel witnesses to attend and the production of evidence would aid the inquiry in fulfilling its terms of reference.

Clauses 18 to 24 cover inquiry proceedings. They will be supplemented by rules of procedure made under clause 42, which should contribute significantly to the effectiveness and smooth running of future inquiries. Rules could cover topics ranging from legal representation to management of the records of the inquiry. A memorandum setting out some detail on the expected content of the rules has been placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

Clause 18 introduces an important new duty on inquiry chairmen to conduct proceedings with fairness, but also to have regard to the need to avoid unnecessary cost to all participants, whether they are financed by public funds or not. I am sure that hon. Members will recognise the sense of that.

When and on whose advice was it decided that clause 42(5) should provide for the use of the negative rather than the affirmative procedure?

There are well-established rules and conventions about when orders require affirmative or negative procedures. If every order came before Parliament under the affirmative procedure, Parliament would quickly become bored and clogged up with them. On balance, it is right that some, albeit important, matters should be subject to negative procedure. We took advice on that from parliamentary counsel in the normal way. Clearly, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in the other place has examined the matter during the Bill's passage so far.

Clauses 20 and 21 cover public access to inquiry hearings and evidence. We aim to create a sensible framework and, for the first time, set out what factors are be taken into account in decisions on public access. The decision about whether a specific inquiry should be held in public or in private can sometimes be controversial, and I am sure that hon. Members will wish to examine those provisions closely.

I should like to make two things about the provisions clear at the outset. First, the starting point in the Bill is that an inquiry will be held in public. Secondly, nothing in the provisions prevents the inquiry panel from seeing whatever evidence and witnesses the panel considers necessary. That is important. I know that hon. Members believe that it is far from unusual for inquiries to be held in some privacy, but sometimes it is required. More than a third of the major inquiries held since 1990 have had some sort of restrictions on public access, for a wide variety of reasons. Sometimes, the Minister setting up the inquiry has chosen the restrictions; in other cases, it has been the chairman's decision.

Clauses 22 and 23 cover the powers that an inquiry can use to require the production of evidence and are similar to the provisions in existing legislation. The powers can be exercised only within the terms of reference. Later clauses cover enforcement, which can be done by the High Court or through prosecution.

Clauses 28 to 32 deal with inquiries by or involving devolved Administrations.

I was reading clauses 29, 30 and 31 and I am confused. Surely the competence for matters that relate exclusively to business that is devolved to the Scottish Parliament and Executive should be that Parliament's. Are we not trespassing on matters that are not our competence under devolved constitutional legislation?

We can still hold those inquiries, but we must recognise that legislation on what is devolved and what is reserved has moved on from what the 1921 Act envisaged. That is one reason for the basic necessity to update the legislative framework. For example, if the Dunblane inquiry had been held today, it might well have been more appropriate for it to be set up by the devolved Administration. Some inquiries may involve UK-wide issues. A Sewel motion has been passed by the Scottish Parliament, which has examined the Bill's application to Scotland. We therefore have general agreement with the devolved Administrations about how to proceed. There is no great contention with them.

Many of the remaining clauses deal with further details of inquiry procedures and funding. For example, clause 39 aims to ensure that challenges to inquiry procedures will come before the courts promptly, minimising the potential for disruption and delay. There are general provisions on legal costs, which will be tackled in more detail in the rules of procedure.

Over the course of Committee proceedings, I have no doubt that the provisions will be debated in greater detail. However, the aim of the Bill is fundamentally to rationalise inquiry legislation to provide a suitable basis for a wide range of inquiries into events that have caused public concern. It draws together and replaces much of the existing legislation on inquiries, incorporating key aspects of current legislation, such as the power to compel witnesses. It provides clarity on points that have not, until now, been covered in general legislation, such as the duty to publish a report.

The measure also contains new provisions that are designed to improve the effectiveness of inquiries and keep costs under control, including a power to make rules of procedure under secondary legislation. Those matters might well be technical, but the time has come to modernise that part of our constitution, and I therefore commend the Bill to the House.

It is timely and right to consider the future legislative framework for inquiries, and to revisit the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921. We want to see a more effective and streamlined inquiry procedure, so we welcome the opportunity that the Bill gives us to consider how to achieve that, but we have concerns over the extent of the powers to be granted to Ministers. Those concerns were also raised in the other place. We also believe that Parliament should play a central role in public inquiries.

In their consultation in 2004, the Government recognised that we have a long-standing practice of setting up formal, open inquiries into matters of serious public concern. We can be proud of our record in that regard. I noticed that the Public Administration Committee's report stated:

"The tradition of public inquiry has become a pivotal part of public life in Britain, and a major instrument of accountability. Some of the basic principles on which British inquiries are based are reflected in practice elsewhere . . . In the United States, with its powerful Congressional committees, the British system is viewed as a model of robustness".

It is important to have in place mechanisms to enhance open government and to improve accountability. We need to be able to uncover the failings in our institutions and public bodies. That involves establishing the facts, deciding what went wrong and, crucially, having a truly independent inquiry to make the necessary recommendations to put matters right.

We agree that there are shortcomings in the existing legislative framework for tribunals. There is a patchwork of provision, with the most serious matters being dealt with under the 1921 Act. There are other important Acts of Parliament involved, some of which have been mentioned today. The Stephen Lawrence inquiry was conducted under the Police Act 1996, and the Kennedy report on Bristol royal infirmary was conducted under the National Health Service Act 1977. There have been many examples of inquiries that were not statutory at all, the most obvious recent ones being the Hutton inquiry and the Soham murders inquiry.

The Saville inquiry into Bloody Sunday and the Shipman inquiry were recent examples of inquiries conducted under the provisions of the 1921 Act, but there have been only 24 inquiries conducted under that Act. Perhaps the Minister will confirm that one of the main motivations behind the Government's decision to introduce the Bill was the widespread criticism of the length of time taken by the Saville inquiry, of its huge cost, and of the cumbersome directions relating to the procedure involved. Although the establishment of the inquiry was announced in January 1998, it was nine months before any oral evidence was taken. The opening statement alone took nine weeks, and we are told that it is hoped that the report will finally be produced later this year, almost eight years on. The inquiry is thought to have cost between £155 million and £250 million. A leading QC has said of the cost:

"I don't think that any sensible, civilised society and modern democracy can spend that amount of money on a public inquiry, no matter how important it is."

The hon. Gentleman will also be aware of the widespread belief that, as we already have a pretty good picture of what happened on Bloody Sunday, we did not need to do a tremendous amount of digging to find witnesses who were willing to come forward. Does he agree that we need to be assured that the Bloody Sunday inquiry would have been significantly cheaper and faster if this legislation had been in place?

We are all aiming for the goal of streamlined, effective and fair inquiries.

Since the Government set up the Bloody Sunday inquiry, there has been a marked reluctance by the Ministry of Defence to co-operate with it, including the withholding and not keeping proper charge of evidence. Guns that formed part of the evidence were destroyed, for example. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that reluctance, and the whole atmosphere in the Ministry of Defence in relation to the inquiry, have accounted for at least a third of the time that has been wasted?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for giving his opinion on that matter. Personally, I would not take that view. I believe that the system set out in the 1921 Act provides for a very cumbersome way of conducting an inquiry. I could cite the views of various lawyers and others who have been involved in inquiries, all of whom feel that the time has come to have another look at the Act.

Gaps have been created by the piecemeal way in which the subject-specific powers to establish inquiries have been granted over the past 30 years. The Government's consultation paper recognised that problem. The Minister mentioned the Victoria Climbié inquiry, which was chaired by my constituent, Lord Laming. He showed that, while the problem of an inquiry having three or four subject areas was not necessarily insuperable, it was none the less difficult for such an inquiry to achieve satisfactory results. There is a strong case for looking again at that issue.

To sum up the need for change, Lord Justice Clarke said in the final report of the Thames safety inquiry in 2000:

"The time has come when it would be desirable to set up a statutory framework for inquiries generally. There is at present no generally applicable statute which covers public inquiries. The 1921 Act has been shown over the years to be much too restricted and cumbersome. In my view, a statute should be enacted to give power to the appropriate Secretary of State to order a public inquiry. The statute should also set out the powers of the inquiry, which to my mind should be as flexible as possible."

We have reservations about some of the Government's proposals. My noble friend Lord Kingsland pointed out on Second Reading in the other place that, at its heart, the Bill shifts the responsibility for establishing a public inquiry from Parliament to the Executive. The initiative will lie squarely with the Minister, who will decide whether an inquiry should be established, what its terms of reference should be, and who should sit on it. Parliament will be sidelined.

The Minister will know that, under the 1921 Act, a resolution of both Houses is required to establish inquiries into matters of urgent public importance. There is no such mechanism in the Bill. That is all the more worrying when we consider that the Public Administration Committee said:

"Our research has . . . revealed a long-term diminution in Parliament's role in the process of public inquiries. We regard this as a serious development, and one which needs to be addressed urgently."

The Committee's report went on to say that the Bill

"finally removes the opportunity for formal parliamentary involvement in inquiries . . . We are deeply concerned that the Government's Inquiries Bill threatens the last remaining role for Parliament in the inquiry process."

These are serious concerns that must be addressed.

Although the Bill will provide an overarching structure for inquiries and streamline the processes involved, which is good, it will be a backward step to take Parliament out of the equation. If we can persuade the Minister to keep the amendment made in the other place, the House will have the opportunity to approve the arrangements for inquiries into ministerial misconduct, but we would like all inquiries to have that approval.

The hon. Gentleman's story about the 1921 Act could be told quite differently. In 1921, Parliament effectively started to contract out the business relating to inquiries, retaining its presence only in the most formal way. Surely the challenge now is not to reclaim that moment of abandonment but to reclaim the territory itself.

The hon. Gentleman makes the point that I was trying to make. Parliament should be involved in the process.

The Minister mentioned clause 6, which provides for Ministers to make a statement here about an inquiry, but that could be a written statement. There would be no guaranteed opportunity for the Minister to be questioned. The House should have the opportunity to question Ministers on the setting up of inquiries into important matters.

Perhaps I did not make the point clearly enough. There is of course nothing to prevent Parliament from scrutinising, debating or looking into ministerial decisions to establish inquiries, or passing resolutions, which would then have an effect on the Government. Parliament is sovereign in our constitution and it has that capability. Does the hon. Gentleman understand my argument about the dangers of too much rigid, inflexible statute, which might in some ways inhibit the discussions in Parliament? The 1921 Act was framed in such a way in an attempt to prevent such contracting out by non-parliamentary inquiries at that time.

Without in any way suggesting anything about the Minister, who everybody accepts is acting fully in good faith and is to be trusted on these issues, there is out there among the public concern about inquiries following recent events. On issues to do with inquiries, it is not enough for him to say, "Trust me, trust this Government." Parliament needs to have a say, too. That is our view.

There are other questions to be resolved, many of which involve the balance of power between the Minister and the person chairing the inquiry. The Bill, in its original form, was riddled with discretionary powers for the Minister to override and overreach the traditional work of the chairman. We need to get this balance right, especially when considering those aspects of the Bill that relate to the terms of reference and to disclosure and publication of evidence. I shall not quote it, but the Public Administration Committee made that point very effectively. I hope the Minister will respond to those concerns.

The list of problems with the Bill does not end there. The degree of ministerial discretion over the publication of the inquiry's final report needs to be looked at very closely, and we want to be sure that there are adequate safeguards against whitewashes. The Bill also raises a number of practical issues, and we will need to look closely at how it affects existing inquiries. If Ministers are to require existing inquiries to be brought into the new rules—converting them, to use the language of the Bill, and I would be interested if the Minister has any thoughts about what sort of inquiry might be converted—the Government have to tell us what that means in practical terms for those inquiries. I have certain concerns about exactly what will happen in those circumstances.

I welcome the fact that the Bill was amended in the other place. There are a number of welcome changes: the Minister has to consult the inquiry chairman before suspending the inquiry, although we would like that to be a matter of agreement rather than just consultation, and has to consult the existing inquiry chairman on the proposed conversion. I question whether that is strong enough. Should not the inquiry chairman have to agree to the terms?

Further changes will provide greater public access to inquiry proceedings and information, but we shall look to achieve a presumption of access, although we fully accept that there may be circumstances in which that cannot happen. Further changes will also be needed to ensure proper openness and accountability.

Many changes made in the other place are the result of strong debate, and they were made despite opposition from those on the Government Benches. The amendment proposed by Lords Kingsland and Goodhart on inquiries where ministerial misconduct is the issue was passed in the other place. It is an important amendment. The Minister says that the Government are not happy with the drafting, but it was drafted by the Government parliamentary draftsman and taken on by the Opposition in the other place. It means that in cases of alleged ministerial misconduct we have a procedure for Parliament to have a say in how such inquiries are conducted.

My noble Friend Lord Kingsland noted that there is ample scope for the new provision to be strengthened. If the Minister is not happy with its wording, is he saying that he will table his own amendment to tackle the concern expressed in the other place, or is he saying that he simply wants to reverse that amendment? It would be a great pity if such an important Bill could not make fairly consensual progress through Parliament at this stage in the parliamentary year, given what might happen in the next week or so.

A further amendment means that if a Minister wants to appoint a judge as a member of an inquiry panel, he or she must first consult the appropriate judge, such as the senior Law Lord in the case of the Law Lords. That is an important change. It helps to ensure that, in circumstances where it is inappropriate for a judge to chair an inquiry, we can avoid situations that might be harmful to judicial independence.

My hon. Friend is alluding to the many amendments made in the other place, to which the Minister made no reference whatever. Does that mean that the Minister does not accept that those amendments improve the Bill or that he intends to reverse them in Committee?

The Minister said that he has concerns about clause 7, but it would be a pity if he did not table his own amendment to replace it, meeting the point raised in the other place. He certainly did not say that he intends to try to reverse other amendments, but no doubt we can have the final word on this during the winding-up speech, based on the strong arguments made from the Conservative Benches.

There are unfinished matters. There is scope for curtailing the freedom granted by the Bill to Ministers to seek to interfere with an inquiry once it has been established. We are worried about that and will table amendments on it in Committee. There is also scope to tighten up the provisions on the composition of inquiries, determining when they are to terminate and the extent to which Ministers will be free to interfere on matters of evidence, privacy and the final report. We also need to consider the inclusion of the so-called restriction notices and the extent to which that is well balanced. We want a better inquiries procedure. All areas can and must be thoroughly scrutinised in Committee.

The Bill attempts to provide a framework to reform an area of law that we accept needs to be reconsidered. It presents an opportunity, but we must be sure that in making the necessary changes we do not tip the balance too far in the wrong direction—not too far in favour of the Executive against Parliament, not too far in favour of Ministers against the inquiry chairman and members, and not too far in favour of secrecy against openness and accountability.

May I say first that the perception of public inquiries among people in the north of Ireland, where I come from, is somewhat different from the general view of public inquiries carried out in England or Scotland or Wales? That is the case owing to the very nature of events and circumstances there, but the essence of the need does not change with circumstances or timing.

On the very day that I entered the House, the Westland affair was being debated. We remember the inquiry on it, and we have gone from one inquiry to another. Indeed, it is almost as if there are those who perceive the use of public inquiries as a cranks' charter or a means of having an unhealthy view of events. It is neither, and it cannot be in any normal society. Nor should it be allowed to become the plaything of public opinion, political parties, Governments, the legal profession or any institution, because public inquiries are what they say they are: inquiries for the public, by the public, in the interests of the public and of nothing else except justice.

For that reason, I want to root my remarks in what the Joint Committee on Human Rights states, as it says succinctly what must be said. It says of an inquiry that

"it should provide an independent and effective investigation following any death which may have been caused by the actions or neglect of agents of the state. The Article 2 duty to investigate requires that there must be an inquiry on the initiative of the state; that the inquiry must be independent; that it must be capable of leading to a determination of whether any use of force was justified, and to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the death; that it must be prompt and proceed with reasonable expedition".

I want to refer to some instances in relation to public inquiries that do not meet those criteria and that became part of the whole political negotiations.

It is a matter of record that, at the negotiations in Weston Park in summer 2001, the Government, in the form of the Prime Minister, made a commitment in relation to at least three requests for public inquiries, with regard to the deaths of Patrick Finucane, Rosemary Nelson and Robert Hamill. That is on record and, for that reason, it is crucial that I refer to them not simply because they are a Northern Ireland matter but because the implications that are entailed are crucial to everybody, wherever they live, because that independence to which the Joint Committee's findings refer and the criteria required by the House in terms of those recommendations are at stake. It is crucial that we do not see either the Finucane or other cases as simply another whinge by Northern Ireland Members, depending on their political persuasion. I emphasise that, because it goes to the heart of what we are considering.

At those meetings in Weston Park, the Prime Minister gave his word that, if an international judge appointed by the Government to investigate those cases recommended a public inquiry, one would be held. That was a solemn undertaking from the Government, given by the Prime Minister. The exact wording in the Weston Park document states:

"In the event that a public inquiry is recommended in any case, the Government will implement that recommendation."

Those matters were considered by Judge Cory, an international jurist from Canada; he made recommendations in relation to public inquiries and we must examine how the reasons for those measure up against the duty to investigate in articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights.

Sir John Stevens, who cannot be accused of being partial in Northern Ireland terms, and who was a police officer of the highest renown, commented in relation to the Finucane case that he found

"collusion, the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, and the extreme of agents being involved in murder".

He added that

"the unlawful involvement of agents in murder implies that the security forces sanction killings."

The enormity of that, in terms of what we are discussing today, is fairly obvious to all of us.

In effect, an inquiry has not yet been held in that case, 17 years afterwards, which hardly complies with the Joint Committee's requirement that it be

"prompt and proceed with reasonable expedition".

That is because of the way in which, when that inquiry is held, the finger might point not just at policing or the security services but at those in a much more senior position and still holding senior positions in the administration. That might go as far as ministerial positions. That is why it is crucial that there be independence in relation to public inquiries, and that that independence should not just be a moveable feast between a Minister and the inquiry chairman but absolutely sacrosanct, both in terms of the inquiry and in terms of their independence of pressure from any ministerial figure.

The Ministers with whom I have discussed this matter know that, when it comes to the Finucane inquiry, it will be a series of withholdings of information under the new legislation, because it will be impossible, as they say in their terms, to give the information required. In a civilised, normal country, what Government can look themselves in the mirror and do away with that independence, as in clause 20, knowing full well that when this inquiry is held, if it is ever held, after 17 years, it will be a series of refusals by Ministers of the information that is so central to it?

In those circumstances, two matters come into question. First, given the abnormality of the situation that pertained in Northern Ireland at the time—it is far from normal as of yet—is it right, 17 years after the event, to introduce this type of legislation and apply it to circumstances then, when the type of conclusions that justice would demand will patently not be reached? Secondly, is it right that, in effect, a Prime Minister—not a Minister of State or Secretary of State—said in the negotiations, eyeball to eyeball, over a table, "I give my word"? I know the Prime Minister to be an honourable man. I know that, when the time comes, he will show that he will keep his word. However he can only do that if, in effect, he ensures that all the information that is required by that tribunal, when it is set up, is made available to it and will not be the subject of refusal by any Minister.

I believe that the Prime Minister made that arrangement in good faith, and I look forward to its being kept to in good faith. It is not just the Prime Minister's word that is at stake here, because the arrangement was negotiated by him jointly with the Irish Government, who stand guarantor in relation to those three inquiries. If they are not dealt with in the way that was expected then, we shall have to wonder whether those who gave their word did so as a matter of expediency, to buy time until a change in the legislation provided protection for the information involved.

I do not mean that cynically or harshly. I simply want to put on record that a deal was made and, when deals are made, they must be adhered to. If they are not, people lose the trust of those around them—and in the delicate circumstances surrounding the political process in the north of Ireland, and indeed the peace process in the north of Ireland, there is only one thing that any of us have: the fact that we can be trusted, and that when we give our word we keep it. When we say something and write it down formally in a statement, we abide by it.

I am very concerned about clause 20. I see shadows of last week's debates. I see ways in which the clause could be used not to further the aims of a public inquiry as defined in the Joint Committee's report but to ensure that what might eventually emerge causes the least possible embarrassment to the Government involved.

I sincerely hope that that does not happen. I sincerely hope that, in this country as well, the absolute integrity of public inquiries is maintained and protected. But it is not possible to play around in Northern Ireland. It is not possible to take away the integrity of public inquiries in the north of Ireland and believe that the integrity of inquiries in England, Scotland and Wales will not be affected. The rot will set in, and it will diminish public inquiries everywhere—and not just public inquiries, but all who will be involved at ministerial level in preventing the availability of full and proper information.

I hope that both Ministers will think about that. I hope that they will listen in Committee. I hope that they will put what I have said about Weston Park and the Prime Minister's commitment to the test. I hope that they will go to the Prime Minister and say, "Prime Minister, did you give that commitment? Prime Minister, did you write it on that piece of paper? Prime Minister, did you agree it with the Irish Government?" When the Prime Minister says yes—I know him to be an honourable man, and he will have to say yes—that must be the cue for ensuring that, after 17 long years, at least there will be honesty and integrity in the handling of an inquiry. The inquiry into the death of Patrick Finucane will unearth a good many dangerous things, but let us have it done. Let us be sure that it is dealt with. Let us not try to keep the cover on this one, or it will seep insidiously into every other inquiry.

The Liberal Democrats broadly welcome the Bill, because it simplifies and consolidates existing legislation on public inquiries, as the Minister explained at the outset. As the Minister said, it is tempting to talk about specific cases, but we must resist the temptation to bang the drum for our own preferences and particular cases that we feel should be dealt with. What the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) said about the Pat Finucane case is relevant. One test of the simplified legislation will be whether inquiries that many of us feel should have been handled expeditiously involve less of a requirement to lobby and to apply political pressure on the Government.

This is a much better Bill than the one initially introduced in the other place. The amendments made there will ease some of the concerns about lack of parliamentary involvement in the process. We had an interesting exchange with the Minister earlier, in which he tried to reassure us that the Bill would not over-centralise the decision-making process relating to the creation of inquiries in the future. I hope that he is right. One of my main worries is that the Government might be able to protect themselves from potentially damaging findings by future inquiries by limiting the terms of reference consciously to achieve that aim.

The case of Deepcut barracks is one reason for my interest in the Bill. I shall not rehearse the full history of the Deepcut case, but it involved the deaths of four young people at the barracks during a period beginning in 1995 with the death of Cheryl James, the daughter of two of my constituents. The salient point in this context is the difficulty that many of us who have campaigned for a full independent public inquiry have experienced in getting the Government to co-operate.

The hon. Member for Hull, North (Mr. McNamara) has been one of the leading figures in the call for a public inquiry. As he knows, we were repeatedly told by Ministers that there was no need for an inquiry because there was nothing more to investigate, but as recently as yesterday the Select Committee's report on the duty of care in the Army confirmed that we were right to persist in pushing the Government towards a full independent public inquiry. After many years of resistance on the part of the Army and the Ministry of Defence, it now transpires that there were facts that had not entered the public domain in the past pertaining to the duty of care and its failure in the Army. We have thus been entirely vindicated.

I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman. I thank him for his kind words, and I agree with what he is saying—but the problem is that if we secure our public inquiry as a result of the Bill, the Ministry of Defence will draw up the terms of reference with no acknowledgement of the position of the families.

That is true. I ask for the hon. Gentleman's forbearance: I shall return to his point shortly.

If the Bill made it easier and quicker for us to secure a full independent public inquiry in similar circumstances without the heartache, pain and extensive investment of time—and, I have to say, money—that the parents have experienced, it would be a very good Bill indeed. However, for precisely the reason given just now by the hon. Member for Hull, North, I fear that as it stands there is a danger—here I use the Deepcut example again—that the MOD will have a disproportionate opportunity to define the terms of reference in such a way that it could protect itself from the worst findings that a fully independent inquiry might produce.

I ask the Minister to consider and to respond to the point that the hon. Member for Hull, North and I have made. What reassurance can he give that the Bill will make it easier, rather than more difficult, for parents in the circumstances that I have outlined to get the answers and the closure that they have reasonably asked for? In other words, how can we be sure that we are more likely to get the kind of answers that are slowly seeping out of yesterday's Defence Committee report on, and the ongoing investigation by Nicholas Blake QC into, the deaths at Deepcut barracks? How can we be sure that such answers will be more forthcoming, rather than less, if the Bill is enacted?

On a connected point, will the Minister give us an assurance that we will not have to go through some dozen separate inquiries as a result of the MOD's—and, indeed, the Army's—resistance at every stage to being more open about its information on Deepcut? Will the Bill open doors rather than close them, and will it ensure that families and other interested members of the public have more opportunity to secure a justified public inquiry, instead of feeling left out? To me that is the core question, and an appropriate one to ask at this strategic Second Reading stage. I hope that the Minister can respond, and that in doing he will use Deepcut barracks as an example.

It is also clear that someone must initiate a public inquiry, and that person will almost always be a Minister. The debates in the other place were very helpful in showing the differences between public inquiries and inquiries by Select Committees. While the latter perform an extremely useful function, in the circumstances that we are discussing today, it must be right that such inquiries be initiated by a Minister—if the Minister is indeed at the very heart of the issue. But let us remember that, as the hon. Member for North-East Hertfordshire (Mr. Heald) and his colleagues pointed out, the Minister must not operate in isolation. It would never be right for Ministers to use that power in such a way as to protect themselves or their Departments.

I accept that if Ministers set up the inquiry, it follows that they must also set out its terms of reference. But it is also important that they consult widely on those terms of reference, so I welcome the Government's amendments in the other place, which were tabled after considerable pressure from Liberal Democrats and Conservatives. The amendments stipulate that before a Minister sets out or amends the terms of reference, he or she must consult the chairman of the inquiry. It is extremely important, to ensure that there is confidence in the inquiry process, that this provision be included in the Bill, and I welcome the Government's decision to do that.

Does the hon. Gentleman feel that there is a case to be made for consulting Parliament not only when the terms of reference are established, but if they are subsequently changed?

I certainly do, especially when the issue in question is controversial, or when the inquiry's outcome could prove damaging to the Government of the day. Those are the times of greatest pressure on Ministers, who will unquestionably be under a degree of pressure to protect the Government's interests, even when doing so is in conflict with those of the public. With the best will in the world, no Minister will be free from such pressure, and the best legislation would ease it by putting in place statutory requirements that ensure both that there is transparency, and that the principles of democracy are upheld. There can be no better place to do that than in this Chamber.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the amendment tabled in the other place by our noble Friends Lords Kingsland and Goodhart—it is now clause 7, which provides that there must be a resolution before both Houses if ministerial misconduct is the issue—constitutes a very important protection?

That is absolutely right, and in another place my noble Friend Lord Goodhart and others were indeed apprised of the need to modify the Bill in exactly that way.

I am grateful to the Government for listening—to a degree—to these concerns and for amending the Bill to a large extent. The Minister is now required to make a statement to Parliament on the establishment of an inquiry, its terms of reference and chairman, and the composition of the panel. It is fundamental that Parliament be kept informed of the inquiry process, and I am pleased that the Government have recognised Parliament's role in this respect. However, it is a matter of slight regret that they did not automatically come to the view that that was necessary, and had instead to be forced in that direction by the Opposition parties.

As I have said, I understand why Members are calling for us to enshrine in statute certain procedures that make Ministers accountable before Parliament, but in fact such arrangements already exist, as we know. To include every such mechanism in statute would give rise to the danger of missing out other things, or of the legislation becoming too rigid, which is why we have compromised in the Bill. Not everything needs to be included in it.

The Minister makes a reasonable point. This has to be a question of degree, and I myself have sometimes criticised legislation for being over-prescriptive or tactical when it needed to be strategic. However, the following two points, which many Members have made, are matters of principle: first, that of Ministers being accountable to this House, especially when there might be a vested interest in protecting the Government from the possible outcome of an inquiry; and secondly, that of ensuring that consultation really does mean that Ministers are obliged to take genuine account of feedback on the breadth of the terms of reference. Those are indeed principles, rather than simply tactical matters, but in fairness I must add that the Government have moved somewhat on these issues in another place. The recorded comments of the Minister—and, I hope, of another Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, the hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr. Lammy), who will wind up the debate—will act as a useful precedent in interpreting what to expect in terms of parliamentary etiquette.

I also concur with those who said that a written statement would probably not be sufficient—certainly not for any public inquiry of significant import. Again, there is plenty of parliamentary precedent for statements being made in the Chamber. For example, the Under-Secretary of State for Defence felt it necessary to announce the Nicholas Blake inquiry into Deepcut on the Floor of the House. That was beneficial because certain matters were subsequently explored and clarified in this place. Secondly, there was a public interest in ensuring that the Under-Secretary's proposals were transparent. Both things would have been more difficult to achieve had the statement been written rather than oral. I hope that the Minister who winds up will confirm that the default assumption will be that public inquiries will be announced on the Floor of this House, rather than in written statements.

Another crucial anxiety, to which reference has been made, concerns the power to maintain secrecy by restricting public access to hearings and evidence, and the possibility of withholding parts of reports from publication. There are of course circumstances in which withholding such information can be justified. As the Minister correctly said, one such example involves matters of national security; another is when the report in question contains information about a vulnerable individual or a witness. As this is a Bill for all circumstances and all possible future inquiries, it is right to make provision accordingly.

The Government took a constructive approach in listening to the arguments advanced by my noble Friend Lord Goodhart and people on the Conservative Benches in favour of bringing the Bill under the scope of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. It is now clear from the Bill that the power to withhold information does not override that Act—another significant improvement made in the other place.

On the whole, a public inquiry will be implemented in the public interest, so it is important that information from such an inquiry should not be restricted in the Government's interest. However damaging that information may be to the Government of the day, we must make sure that nothing in the Bill enshrines the opportunity for the Government to protect themselves from any such damaging information. The Government must not be allowed to withhold information on those grounds. We have talked about that at some length, and I am sure that Ministers are clear about the views expressed on both sides of the House.

Another criticism levelled at the Government is the fact that the Bill was introduced before the Public Administration Committee had completed its report, "Government by Inquiry". The Committee recommended an amendment to the Bill, under which investigations into ministerial misdemeanours should be Committees of Parliament. On Third Reading in the other place, my noble Friends supported an amendment tabled by the Conservative peer Lord Kingsland to allow a Minister setting up an inquiry to move a motion before the relevant Parliament or Assembly approving the proposal for the inquiry to be held and approving the terms of reference and identity of the chairman. The amendment, which is now clause 7, is absolutely vital in safeguarding the involvement of Parliament and, I believe, public trust in the inquiry system when ministerial behaviour is under investigation. The reasons for that are obvious.

The hon. Gentleman's words suggest that Ministers must come to Parliament with the relevant motion, but in the words of clause 7(2), the Minister may do so "if he sees fit". In other words, it is at the Minister's discretion, so the provision is not as strong as the hon. Gentleman suggests.