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Commons Chamber

Volume 438: debated on Wednesday 2 November 2005

House of Commons

Wednesday 2 November 2005

The House met at half-past Eleven o'clock

Prayers

Mr Speaker in the Chair

Oral Answers to Questions

Wales

The Secretary of State was asked—

Rail Freight

1. What representations he has received on encouraging rail freight in Wales; and if he will make a statement. [22525]

As part of the public consultation on the draft Transport (Wales) Bill, I received several comments about rail freight. I support the Welsh Assembly Government in encouraging the carriage of more freight by rail.

I thank the Secretary of State for that response. Given his comments, will he please use his good offices to ensure that the Conwy Valley line is strengthened for freight? A freight support grant is available, but I understand that there may be a complication on the Cheshire side. That needs to be addressed before the slate waste disposal scheme can work. It is very much a win-win scheme, which uses slate waste for building materials. It will be good for the environment and in every way. I urge him to do what he can to assist the project.

I am happy to do that and to agree with the hon. Gentleman. The scheme is dear to his heart and that of his constituency and I support it, as do the Welsh Assembly Government, who are looking into the costings that Network Rail has provided. So far, the five grant-supported projects for freight on rail in Wales have taken about 24,500 lorry journeys off Welsh roads each year. That bears out his admirable point about the environment.

I welcome the reduction in the use of road haulage, but does the Secretary of State accept that we are still under-utilising the rail network in Wales? For example, far too much road haulage goes into mid-Wales when there is a perfectly acceptable rail line. Would he be willing to hear representations about how local people and experts in mid-Wales, who understand those matters, envisage the enhancement of rail freight in and out of mid-Wales?

Either the Under-Secretary or I will be happy to see the hon. Gentleman about that and to hear any representations. However, I am sure that he acknowledges that the Government are spending a huge amount of additional money on investment in the railways. Indeed, we are spending £87 million every week to improve the railways. There has been a 37 per cent. increase in the amount of freight moved by rail since we came to power. That figure will continue to rise—I hope that it does in Wales, too.

A14

2. What discussions he has had with the Secretary of State for Transport on the importance to the Welsh economy of the A14 road. [22526]

None specifically about the A14, but I recognise that it is a route of strategic importance used by hauliers travelling between Wales and the ports of Harwich and Felixstowe.

Kettering may not be in Wales, but it has an annual eisteddfod. The Under-Secretary is right to identify the A14 as a major strategic road. Will the Secretary of State take the opportunity of the next discussion in Cabinet about the UK roads network to press for urgent measures to relieve the congestion on the A14 around Kettering?

The hon. Gentleman knows that in his Adjournment debate the Minister for Local Government responded to his concerns about the road. The A14 is part of the trans-European road network. It has a strategic role in connecting the ports of Felixstowe and Harwich not only with Wales, but various parts of the UK. I understand that the Highways Agency is considering the possibility of widening the A14 Kettering bypass. That should tackle the problems that he highlighted.

Understanding, as the Under-Secretary does, the importance of the road network to the Welsh economy, does he agree that dualling the A40 through Pembrokeshire is vital for the long-term economic success of our county? Does he further agree that the Welsh Assembly's decision not to support that important project is economically illiterate?

No, I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman's assessment, given that the bulk of the upgrading of the A40 is in my constituency, as he well knows. Although I have some sympathy for the arguments that have been presented, the cost benefits of dualling the section all the way from St. Clears to Haverfordwest do not stand up. It is far better to get the improvements in place as quickly as possible at a reasonable cost so that we experience the benefits of the road improvement.

Office Allowances

3. Pursuant to his oral answer of 20 July 2005, Official Report, columns 1240–41, what discussions he has had with the National Assembly for Wales Government on the use made of office allowances. [22527]

Periodic ones. I believe that regional list Assembly Members are abusing taxpayers' money by setting up rival offices to constituency Members by whom they were defeated to help them to reverse the results next time.

Members' allowances in this House have been in the news during the past week. Does my right hon. Friend agree that we should be vigilant in ensuring that expenditure incurred by Members of Parliament is used to serve our constituents rather than to promote the particular interests of individual political parties?

I completely agree with my hon. Friend. It is significant that, of the 20 list Assembly Members representing regions of Wales rather than constituencies, 15 have established constituency offices, funded by taxpayers, in the seats where they were last defeated, in order to run campaigns to try to reverse those results. That is a misuse of taxpayers' money. It is interesting that in Scotland and New Zealand, there are different—

Because the Government of Wales Bill will deal with this matter when I introduce it in a few months' time.

Welsh Language Act

4. If he will make a statement on the application of the Welsh Language Act 1993 to the work of (a) central Government Departments and (b) other public bodies. [22528]

Government Departments are not required to have a Welsh language scheme. However, it is our practice to observe the principle that, in the conduct of public business in Wales, the Welsh and English languages should be treated on a basis of equality. Public bodies that provide services in Wales can be required by the Welsh Language Board to prepare a Welsh language scheme.

I thank the Minister for his answer and I am grateful for the fact that he supports the Welsh Language Act, notwithstanding the fact that Rhodri Morgan and others voted against it at the time. Does the Minister acknowledge that there are many people such as myself, who had a Welsh-speaking mother, who would dearly love to learn the language that was originally the British language? Will he join me in praising organisations such as the many Wlpans, and Nant Gwrtheyrn on the Llyn peninsula, which provide training of that kind?

I congratulate all those who have been part of the remarkably successful turnaround in the fortunes of the Welsh language. It now plays a more prominent role in our national life than at any time in living memory. According to the 2001 census, 21 per cent. of the population of Wales can now speak Welsh, compared with 19 per cent. in 1991. Twenty-six per cent. of people under 35 can now speak Welsh, an increase of nine percentage points on 1991. In 2006, Welsh will also appear on all UK passports.

Does my hon. Friend agree that we have demonstrated a commitment to the Welsh language, with even more people speaking it and being encouraged to speak it, without feeling that their Government and the people who look after them are not interested in it? Since 2003, the Assembly has invested £28 million in achieving the goal of a truly bilingual Wales and I think that we should applaud that.

I totally agree with my hon. Friend. Some of those who argue for a new Welsh language Act should be very careful. The reason that the language has had this renaissance is that the existing legislation is not prescriptive and places no statutory requirements on the private sector. Those who argue for new provisions should be careful, because trying to impose such statutory requirements on private businesses would be detrimental to the progress that we have made.

Following the chaos surrounding the Department for Culture, Media and Sport's failure to produce a Welsh version of the licensing application form, will the Minister consider including in his bluffer's guide to devolution—which I understand he is circulating among his Cabinet colleagues—an idiot's guide to the Welsh Language Act, so that no further abuse by central Government of the Welsh language can take place?

There was certainly no abuse by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport in relation to the Licensing Act 2003. It worked very productively with the Welsh Language Board, over a very short period, to address that particular problem. Currently, nine Government Departments have approved schemes, and the Department for Constitutional Affairs and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs are actively preparing schemes in consultation with the Welsh Language Board. The board has issued notifications to a further three Departments—the Department of Health, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and the Central Office of Information—to bring forward Welsh language schemes.

Why did the chairman of the Welsh Language Board write that it

"would be better to keep a number of decisions relating to language policy at arm's length from the Government"?

Is it because Rhodri Morgan's plans to absorb the Wales Tourist Board, the Welsh Language Board and the Welsh Development Agency are in tatters? Despite the rude response thrown back at the Secretary of State, will the Minister again give Rhodri Morgan the helpful advice to think long and hard before proceeding?

The hon. Gentleman might not agree with the proposal to bring the Welsh Language Board within the direct remit of the Welsh Assembly Government, but colleagues on the Labour Benches and on the other side of the House want to end the quango state in Wales. That is part of that programme. Bringing the work of developing and promoting the language into the Welsh Assembly Government will ensure that that is mainstreamed across all aspects of government and activity in Wales.

Why does the Minister not agree that Rhodri Morgan's plans are in tatters? The Minister talks about the quango state, but the Assembly voted to send back the plans for the Welsh Language Board until the functions were properly explained. Jane Hutt refused to confirm whether the Wales Tourist Board will be replaced by a Welsh Assembly Department for tourism and leisure, and recently the Secretary of State told the hon. Member for Caernarfon (Hywel Williams) that the Welsh language is in better health than it has been for a long time. I hope that it is in better health than the people of Wales, as the number of fluent Welsh speakers is only just larger than the number of people on health waiting lists.

Those are obviously matters for the Welsh Assembly Government, but they have made it absolutely clear that the merger is there to strengthen the support for the language across government in Wales and to improve democratic accountability. The motion that the Tories, Plaid Cymru and the Liberal Democrats supported, in some unholy alliance, only asked the Assembly Government to do what they intended to do in any case—that is, deal appropriately with the regulatory functions of the Welsh Language Board.

CAFCASS

5. What discussions he has had with ministerial colleagues in Wales about the operation of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service in Wales. [22529]

I have regular discussions with the Assembly Minister for Social Justice and Regeneration to discuss a range of issues. That includes the operation of the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service in Wales.

Is my hon. Friend aware that CAFCASS Cymru, which works with some of the most children and families in Wales, has no waiting list in terms of allocating workers in both private and public law? Does he agree that that is a huge step forward and that the agency needs to be congratulated on its achievements, especially in view of the recent chequered history of CAFCASS?

I certainly join my hon. Friend in congratulating CAFCASS Cymru. Since its transfer to the National Assembly for Wales, it has far exceeded performance targets on referral time of cases to guardians. That results in children—many of whom are extremely vulnerable and may be victims of abuse and family break-up—being helped far more quickly. Six thousand children a year will benefit from this improved service. The transfer has been a really great success and all staff should be congratulated.

Police Forces (Reorganisation)

In the light of recommendations made recently by Her Majesty's inspector of constabulary, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has asked the police service to come forward with firm proposals for the future of policing in England and Wales to meet the new challenge of terrorism, serious crime and drug trafficking.

One of the chief constables has already estimated that the cost of that reorganisation will be £10 million to £12 million, plus the entire reserves of all four police authorities in Wales. Can the Secretary of State demonstrate his undoubted command of mental arithmetic and tell us how many police officers could be trained and put on to the crime-ridden streets of Wales for the same sum that will be needed to create this unaccountable bureaucratic monolith?

First, as a Gwent MP, I am sure the hon. Gentleman will want to join me in congratulating Mike Tonge, chief constable of Gwent, who is today receiving the Queen's Police medal in recognition of his distinguished service.

As regards the hon. Gentleman's rant on this matter, may I invite him, instead of ranting, to display a bit of objectivity? On the figures he quoted from the chief constable of South Wales, which were given at a private meeting to which the hon. Gentleman was invited, she said that her best estimate was that the start-up costs would be about £10 million. She could not be certain, so the hon. Gentleman has upped that figure by a couple of million. She also said that she thought the savings would be three times as much. Why did the hon. Gentleman not raise that point and why did he not make it in the very biased account he gave to the South Wales Argus the other day?

Is it not true that the forces of Wales have the best record of any in the United Kingdom, especially Gwent and Dyfed-Powys? This reorganisation is being forced on Wales for the benefit of English cities. If there is a need for a special emphasis on the problems of serious crime, drugs and terrorism, why not form a special unit and leave those splendid forces intact?

My hon. Friend will surely join other hon. Members, especially Welsh Members, in wanting a Welsh police service that is not only doing a very good job, as in Gwent, on neighbourhood policing and other matters, but that can also confront the new challenges of terrorism, drug trafficking and international serious crime. The fact is that apart from the South Wales force, which is near the optimum number suggested by Her Majesty's inspectorate of constabulary to fight those challenges, none of the other forces is anything like the size necessary to do so. We should consider the all-Wales option, but keep the principle of local neighbourhood policing sacrosanct and make sure that, as in Gwent, there is an element of regional accountability still built into the system, so that the identities of the regions currently organised into police forces are maintained, especially in north Wales.

The police grant has been insufficient to meet some of the demands of the police authorities, such as pensions. As a result, the council tax precept has gone up by much more than inflation, on top of the recent rebanding of properties. What assessments has the Secretary of State made of the effect of the possible amalgamation of police forces on a potential rise in council tax across Wales?

I have made no such assessments. As I pointed out earlier, however, considerable savings will be possible, which will enable resources to be released not only to fight the new threats, but to make sure that we have as many police officers as possible on the ground in our neighbourhoods. Since our Government came to power, Wales has had 950 extra police officers and 270 extra community support officers on patrol. We are driving that forward with even more recruits and even more effective neighbourhood policing in future.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that, in line with the strategic reorganisation of the police, it is also vital that we continue the strategy of neighbourhood policing? Will he join me in applauding the work of my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett), who as Home Secretary did so much in driving forward the agenda of community safety and community policing?

Indeed, I am happy to do so. My right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett) did a great job in making sure that neighbourhood policing was a priority of every police force, which is increasingly the case. We much regret the fact that he is no longer able to discharge his responsibilities. In any future reorganisation of policing, neighbourhood policing must remain the bedrock, and the basic police command units will continue to take that agenda forward.

Obviously, I will have an input from Wales, as will the Welsh Assembly Government. Indeed, the Home Secretary has written specifically to the Welsh Assembly Government inviting their views and an Assembly Committee is currently considering the matter. We need a police system in Wales that meets the big new challenges. A terrorist suspect has been arrested recently in Cardiff, and others are known to be active in south Wales. We need to deal with the problems of drug trafficking and serious organised crime, and the Labour Government are doing that. If Plaid Cymru wants to opt out of confronting those challenges, that is a matter for it. We are rising to meet those challenges and we want a good police service in the whole of Wales that confronts those big challenges and preserves community policing.

Housing (SIPPS)

7. What representations he has made to the Chancellor of the Exchequer about the effect on the affordability of housing in Wales of the changes in the rules for self-invested personal pension scheme investment in residential property. [22531]

I have made no direct representations. There has been widespread speculation about the impact of the new rules that will allow self-invested personal pensions to be invested in residential properties. Government guidance sets out the implications of putting a residential property into a SIPP. It is unlikely to be an appropriate investment for most people, but the Government will keep the matter under review and will not hesitate to act if there is evidence of abuse.

Average house prices in Wales are already seven times average incomes. Is it not inevitable that new money flooding into—[Interruption.]

Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

Is it not inevitable that new money flooding into the holiday homes market will push up prices further? How can the Secretary of State support an arrangement that will make it even more difficult for hard-working Welsh families to enter the housing market?

I note the hon. Gentleman's point, but he and his colleagues are in danger of sounding like salesmen for SIPP providers. They should not overstate the impact of SIPPs on the rural housing market. There are significant drawbacks for investors wishing to place a second home in a SIPP. For instance, a property placed in a SIPP will be owned by the trustees of the SIPP, not the individual.

An investor would not be able to stay in a second home free of charge. He would either pay the full commercial rent or face a 40 per cent. charge for a benefit in kind. In most cases, the property would have to be sold before the pension could be drawn, so the investor would not be able to use it as a retirement home unless he could raise enough money to buy it from the SIPP. Those rules and others ensure that assets put into a pension fund give people a secure retirement income, and are not a means of subsidising second homes.

Welsh Regiments

8. What recent discussions he has had with the Ministry of Defence on the merger of Welsh regiments; and if he will make a statement. [22532]

The intention to merge the Royal Welch Fusiliers and the Royal Regiment of Wales was announced in July 2004, with a view to implementation by 2008.

I understand that discussions on the important detail of badge insignia are ongoing and very positive. A wide range of people have been involved in the decisions. Will my right hon. Friend ensure that any future reorganisation or reconfiguration of Welsh regiments involves an input from Welsh Members of Parliament before the Army Board makes its recommendations, so that the expression of a wide range of opinions can prevent a repetition of the debacle over names?

I shall be happy to take up the matter. I understand that individual regiments have been involved in determining dress regulations for the new regiments. As my hon. Friend says, the discussions are ongoing and I cannot comment further, but his point is valid. I am sure that he will join me in congratulating all the Welsh soldiers who are serving abroad and doing a first-class job.

Why did the Secretary of State not help? The Welsh Assembly refused to support Ty Gwyn, a unique post-traumatic stress disorder unit for veterans, which needed £75,000 to continue its important work. There is a waiting list of ex-servicemen who need to use Ty Gwyn. Why is it that the Welsh Assembly can buy a 32-acre rainforest site in Ecuador, but cannot support a nursing home for ex-servicemen in Wales?

In view of your earlier suggestion, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that the hon. Gentleman take the matter up with the Welsh Assembly Government.

Patient Funding

9. What discussions he has had with the National Assembly for Wales Minister for Health on the rate paid by the Assembly to English hospitals for the treatment of patients in Wales. [22533]

I have regular discussions with the Assembly's Minister for Health on a range of matters, including the provision of services in cross-border areas.

The Royal Shrewsbury hospital loses £2 million a year by treating Welsh patients who come across the border. The Welsh health authority in Powys pays a different rate per person from that paid by Welsh authorities. How can the Secretary of State reassure me that the Royal Shrewsbury will not continue to lose £2 million a year because of that anomaly?

As the hon. Gentleman knows, there are serious problems affecting the Shrewsbury and Telford Hospital NHS Trust. I have seen the report on its financial performance and I do not recognise the figure of a £2 million loss per year. I understand, however, that this issue has been discussed and an agreement reached on the new contractual arrangements for this year and next. There appears to be no further problem in this regard.

Cleaner Neighbourhoods

10. What discussions he has had with ministerial colleagues on progress towards cleaner neighbourhoods in Wales. [22534]

I have regular discussions with ministerial colleagues about matters affecting Wales. The Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005, which received Royal Assent in April, contains a range of measures to improve the quality of the local environment.

Fly-tipping is a major problem in my constituency—so much so that Afon-y-felin primary school had to join forces with the local Assembly Member, councillors and even the First Minister to help clear up an estate. What powers can be given to local authorities under this new proposal to help them to tackle fly-tipping, rather than requiring children in local communities to tackle it?

I congratulate my hon. Friend's school, which is actively involved in addressing an issue that is clearly of great importance to everyone. Figures show that a fly-tipping incident occurs in the UK every 35 seconds. Last year in Wales, there were more than 30,000 such incidents, which cost in excess of £1.6 million to clear up. Since June, fly-tipping has become an arrestable offence. The most serious cases can now attract a fine of £50,000 or five years imprisonment. The 2005 Act clearly has the teeth to tackle this problem.

Prime Minister

The Prime Minister was asked—

Engagements

Before listing my engagements, the House will know that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has resigned. Whatever mistakes he has made, I have always believed, and believe now, that he is a decent and honourable man who has contributed a great deal to his country, and who has overcome immense challenges that, frankly, would have daunted the rest of us. He can be proud of his record in British public life. [Hon. Members: "Hear, hear."]

I also know that the whole House will join me in sending our condolences to the family of the British soldier killed in Afghanistan at the weekend. He was doing a vital and important job, and his country can be very proud of him.

This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others, and in addition to my duties in the House I will have further such meetings later today.

I echo and sympathise with the views expressed by my right hon. Friend. Will he accept that he speaks for all when he condemns the appalling, dreadful and truly disgraceful statement of the Iranian President, who expressed his wish that Israel be wiped off the map? Will my right hon. Friend also accept that his further remarks at Hampton court over the weekend carried an implicit threat of military action against Iran? Does he share my view that the people of this country are in no mood for a military adventure in Iran, and if he does, will he explain his remarks at Hampton court?

I am very happy to say that, first, I did not talk either explicitly or implicitly about a military threat to Iran, but what I did say was this. Iran has to realise that the international community cannot tolerate continuing conduct that, frankly, is supporting terrorism around the world; that is supporting terrorism not just in the middle east, but elsewhere; and that is in breach of its nuclear weapons responsibilities and obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency. I did want to make it clear, and I do so again now, that the statements by the Iranian President in respect of Israel are completely and totally unacceptable. Obviously, as I made clear at the press conference, we want to discuss this with other allies and with other members of the Security Council. Nobody is talking about military threats, invasion of Iran or any of the rest of it. What we are saying, however, is that the Iranian Government have got to understand that the international community simply will not put up with their continued breach of the proper and normal standards of behaviour that we expect from a member of the United Nations. The most important thing at the moment is that that is a unified message, and that it goes out not just from this House and this country, but right across the world.

I join the Prime Minister in expressing our sympathy and condolences to the family of the British serviceman who lost his life in Afghanistan over the weekend.

This has been an extraordinary week for the Government, and for the Prime Minister. We have seen the slow seepage of his authority turn into a haemorrhage. We all acknowledge the honourable way in which the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions has decided to resign, and I pay tribute to him for that—but the key question now is for the Prime Minister. Does he think that in his handling of this affair, his judgment has been at fault in any way?

Let me tell the right hon. and learned Gentleman exactly why I did not believe that the allegations against my right hon. Friend warranted his dismissal. Perhaps, with the frenzy that is going on around this, it is just as well for the House and for members of the public that I should explain why not.

Basically, there were three sets of allegations—[Interruption.] Perhaps I could be allowed to detail the reasons why I decided not to dismiss my right hon. Friend. There were three sets of allegations. One was that he had not sought the advice of the independent advisory committee, which he should have done. That is a breach of the ministerial code, it is true, but I did not believe that it warranted dismissal, for these reasons. First, I could discover no impropriety or wrongdoing in his doing that. [Hon. Members: "Oh!"] Secondly, he had registered those jobs with the Register of Members' Interests. It arose out of a misunderstanding in the correspondence, which I have looked at myself and believed was an honest misunderstanding on his part. It was clear to me that even had he been in touch with the advisory committee, as he accepts he should have been, the most that would have happened is that his taking up one of those jobs would have been delayed by a few weeks. In those circumstances, I did not believe that that warranted his dismissal.

The second set of allegations was in respect of the register of shareholdings in DNA Bioscience. My right hon. Friend was supposed to follow a particular procedure for Ministers when they come into Government. He followed that procedure completely. Therefore I could find no breach of the ministerial code in respect of that.

The third and most serious set of allegations, which were made by the shadow Leader of the House, was that my right hon. Friend, while a member of the Government, had had discussions and made representations on behalf of a firm that either had or was trying to get a contract from the Department for Work and Pensions. Had that allegation been true, it certainly would have been a dismissible offence. I looked into that allegation and found it to be completely untrue. Therefore it would not have been right, in these circumstances, for him to resign. That is why I did not dismiss my right hon. Friend under the ministerial code.

The Secretary of State has resigned, and I do not intend to pursue those matters this afternoon. I quite understand why the Prime Minister's judgment in these last few days has been awry. I can entirely sympathise with his desire to cling on to the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett). Is it not a fact that he was one of the Prime Minister's last remaining allies in Cabinet?

My right hon. Friend resigned for the reasons that he gave: with the frenzy surrounding him and his job, it became impossible for him to carry on doing that job properly. The reason why I outlined the specific allegations about him is that I think that in fairness to him, people should understand that a lot of what has been written about him in the past few days has, on my investigation of the facts, turned out to be completely untrue. However, for the reasons that he has given, he has resigned.

I would simply put this to the House: sometimes on these occasions, the degree of pressure to which people are subject is absolutely extraordinary. We should just occasionally reflect on that, and when it involves somebody who has done an immense amount for this country we should say, as he goes from Government, that he goes, in my view, with no stain of impropriety against him whatever.

If the Prime Minister had recalled some of the words that he used in opposition, he might have found it difficult to repeat the words that he has just uttered today. He did not answer the question that I put to him, and I shall resist the temptation to ask him to name his remaining allies in the Cabinet. The truth is that the Prime Minister has lost both his allies and his authority. Let us look at some examples of that.

Last week, the Education Secretary was squabbling with the Deputy Prime Minister about school reforms, and the Health Secretary and the Culture Secretary were at loggerheads with the Defence Secretary over the ban on smoking. This week, the Prime Minister is at odds with everyone else over his proposal to ban drinking on public transport—at the very moment when he is introducing 24-hour drinking in our pubs. What has happened to his authority?

I shall deal with each of those claims in turn. On schools, we are in favour not just of investing in them but of reforming them too. We have a programme that we will carry through, because this party believes in improving the quality of schooling in our country. We will do that, and we will carry it through.

On the so-called proposal to ban drinking on public transport, I had indicated already that we should not accept it. However, as often happens when such a proposal is put in the newspapers and we point out that it has not been accepted, we are accused of making a U-turn.

Leaving that to one side, I can tell the House that over the next few months we will carry through our programme on schools and health service reform, and that new proposals will be brought forward on antisocial behaviour and crime. Today, of course, we have a very important debate on terrorism. All those proposals will be carried through, because we believe in them and because we believe that they are right for the country—and at least we have a programme that we are carrying through.

Does the Prime Minister really not see that this week marks the beginning of the final chapter of his Administration? Will he be the last person to recognise that the departure of his key ally means that there is no longer any doubt that the sole source of authority in his Cabinet is the Chancellor of the Exchequer? For how long will this country have to put up with this lame duck Prime Minister, in office but not in power?

We shall see, over the next few months, exactly what happens—in respect of the programme that has delivered the strongest economy that this country has had for years, of the programme that has delivered the best primary school, GCSE and A-level results, of the programme that is delivering the biggest falls in NHS waiting times that this country has had for 20 years, and of the programme that is allowing us to increase the numbers of police and ensure that crime falls.

That is the record on which this Government will be judged. It is a record that we can be proud of, and it stands in stark contrast to the Leader of the Opposition's record when he was in government.

By the end of the year, the Government look set to reduce NHS waiting times to no more than six months. However, is my right hon. Friend aware of the work of John Petri, an orthopaedic surgeon in the James Paget hospital in my constituency? He has no waiting lists at all since he introduced a dual system of operating, using two theatres and two teams, which means that he does not have to wait for the next patient. Is not that an example to be followed and commended? Will my right hon. Friend meet John Petri to discuss how that innovation can benefit the whole of the NHS?

I shall be very happy to do so. In terms of policy, the picture that my hon. Friend presents is replicated around the country. When the Labour party came to power, many people were waiting more than 18 months for operations, and tens of thousands were waiting for more than a year. From December, the maximum wait will be of six months, and that has brought the waiting list down very sharply. As my hon. Friend said, there are now parts of the country in which we are getting rid of waiting almost completely. In the next three years—by 2008—patients will have a maximum wait of 18 weeks between the door of the GP and the door of the operating theatre. That will effectively get rid of the NHS waiting lists that we inherited after the years when the Conservative party was in government. Frankly, when all the rest is said and done, that is what matters to the people of this country.

On behalf of my right hon. and hon. Friends, I wish to share the sentiments so properly expressed by the Prime Minister about the loss of life of the British serviceman in Afghanistan in the past few days.

On the issue of the day and what the Prime Minister has said about the ministerial code of conduct, does he agree that it seems absurd that an ex-Minister is obliged to seek advice, but is not obliged to take that advice? As a result of this experience, will the Prime and the Cabinet Secretary urgently address that issue?

It is clear now, if it was not before, that when Ministers leave office, they are expected to take the advice of the independent advisory committee. Obviously that has to be made clear, although I would say that it is fairly clear now.

The Prime Minister is ignoring the fact that ex-Ministers can seek advice but not take it. That is a ridiculous state of affairs for a ministerial code of conduct.

It was well reported recently that the former Secretary of State for Work and Pensions and the Prime Minister disagreed about incapacity benefit reform. May we have an assurance that the No. 10 machine will not seek to impose its will as to the reform of incapacity benefit on whoever occupies that office later today? That is what people out there actually care about.

Again, when we get back to policy, I can tell the right hon. Gentleman that the Liberal Democrats now oppose every single reform in the public services or on welfare. It is absurd to say that incapacity benefit, which now costs £13 billion a year and leaves 3 million people economically inactive, does not need reform. It does need reform and this side has the courage to do it. As ever, when it comes to a policy decision, the Liberal Democrats lack that courage.

2. Will my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister join me in congratulating schools in my constituency on the genuine increase in standards that they have achieved since 1997? [Hon. Members: "Urgh!"] They are too eager. However, does my right hon. Friend recognise that before 1997 we spent years fighting the Tories' policy of offering unfair financial inducements to schools to opt out of local authority control? Will he give the House an assurance, therefore, that in any future education reforms the Government will not offer, directly or indirectly, any unfair financial incentives to schools to opt out of local authority provision, nor to any outside organisations such as private companies or trusts— [23740]

I assure my hon. Friend that there will be fair funding for schools and no return to unfair funding. In particular—and this is the major point of difference with us—the Conservatives have said that they want a free-for-all on admissions. I emphatically disagree with that. We should not have a return to selection at age 11. That would do damage to the children of this country and their future prospects. However, we will empower schools to become self-governing trusts if they wish to do so and enable them to have outside partners. We have already done that in respect of specialist schools and city academies, which has been highly successful, but we need now to take it to a new level. Alongside the investment will come reform, but it will be reform designed for equity and fairness and not a return to the unfair policies of the Conservatives.

Since new Labour came to power in 1997, the Government have created 700 new criminal offences. Will the Prime Minister help the House by putting a monthly aide-memoire in the Library, so that we know how many offences have been created each month? That is urgent, bearing in mind the exotic jurisprudence in the current Terrorism Bill.

I will tell the hon. Gentleman exactly why we are legislating on antisocial behaviour. It is because we believe—at least, on this side of the House—that it is a crucial issue for people and that they want protection in their local communities. The fact that he and his party oppose the measures says a lot more about them than it does about us, when we are trying to help people who are fed up with hooligans making their lives hell in their local communities, drug dealers living in their streets and people being drunk and disorderly, with the police able to do little about it. We will continue legislating on those issues because it is the right thing to do to protect people in this country.

As for terrorism, each Member of this House will have to take a decision on the Terrorism Bill later today—[Interruption.] Let me say this to Conservative Members, because we need to be very clear about why we are legislating to strengthen anti-terrorist laws in this country: we are doing it because the police and the head of anti-terrorist operations say that they need the powers to protect British citizens. Of all the things that we should debate today, that is what is important to people's lives. We will do our best to protect the people of this country. Hon. Members should think carefully before they vote against the express desire of the chief of the Metropolitan police, the head of anti-terrorist operations and the people who are charged with protecting our country.

3. Will people who kill while driving carelessly now go to prison rather than face a paltry fine? Following some tragic accident fatalities in my area, can the Prime Minister assure me that the Road Safety Bill will force the courts, at long last, to take those devastating and avoidable deaths on our roads seriously? [23741]

I know that my hon. Friend has been leading the campaign on this issue with great distinction. It is worth pointing out that last year more than 13,000 fewer people were killed or seriously injured on our roads than the average number in the period 1994 to 1998, so it is obvious that strengthening the law has led to gains being made. Following public consultation earlier this year, new measures are being introduced to strengthen the framework of offences to deal with bad driving and to help to create safer roads for everyone. We shall try to introduce those measures through amendments to the Road Safety Bill. I entirely understand my hon. Friend's question: if such a massive effect were being felt in any other area of public life, people would take account of it when making decisions. That is why it is important that we get the amendments right. I am sure that we will.

4. Why does the Prime Minister think that it is so widely felt that his presidency of the European Union has been a failure? [23742]

I should have thought that the hon. Gentleman would rejoice if I had managed to fail—it would be a feather in my cap. We have not yet completed the European presidency: it lasts for six months and we are at month four. After the December summit, we might be able to judge the success of our presidency. One thing of which I am very proud is that we managed to open accession negotiations with Turkey and Croatia. Contrary to his views—that the EU is a waste of time and we should not have such a thing—the fact that so many countries want to join the EU shows what a strong institution it is, despite all its difficulties.

5. Despite the tough new regulations in the Fireworks Act 2003, I am continuing to receive numerous complaints about the misuse of fireworks. At the weekend there was an horrific incident in which a Yorkshire terrier was killed when a firework was tied to its leg and ignited. Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is time to consider an outright ban on the sale of fireworks to the general public? [23743]

The most important thing is that we have introduced new legislation and created three new offences. We have to wait and see what happens before we can make a judgment on the legislation. However, I think that to ban the sale of fireworks altogether would be a step too far.

There continues to be widespread concern about the plight of the less well-off and most vulnerable in our society.—[Interruption.] When there are millions—[Interruption.] When there are thousands of people worried about the clawback of money because of the failure of the tax and benefits system, does the Prime Minister believe in accountability, and if so, whom does he hold responsible and when will he hold them responsible?

The hon. Gentleman is correct that there are of course difficulties, as there are with the payment of any benefit, but let us be clear about this. As a result of the tax credits, literally millions of families in this country have an improvement in their standard of living. Pensioners have been lifted out of poverty as a result of pension credit—[Interruption.]

Order. Mr. Luff, there is a lot of shouting, and your voice rises above all the shouting. You ought to be quiet.

We have over the past eight years lifted 700,000 children out of poverty, and 2 million pensioners out of acute hardship. That has partly been done as a result of the payment of tax credits. So the hon. Gentleman is right to say that we must of course do more to help the poor and disadvantaged in our country, but I point out to him that when his Government were in power they froze—[Interruption.] They do not like to be reminded of what they did in government.

That is right, eight years—and in eight years we have lifted 2 million pensioners out of acute hardship, and who put them there? In those eight years, while we have been lifting those people out of poverty, every single measure has been opposed by his party. So I agree that we need to do more for the poor and disadvantaged, but the only way they will get more is to keep this Government in office.

6. Salford is the 12th most deprived local authority area in the country. In the past, deprivation in our area has been reflected in the level of GCSE and other test results. This year, Salford achieved an 8 per cent. increase in our GCSE results and a 5 per cent. increase in key stage 3 English. Is my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister satisfied with those results, and can he tell me how they can be continued? [23744]

My hon. Friend is of course right: not merely has the Cambridge assessment confirmed the improvement in teaching, but it comes on top of the Ofsted report that confirmed exactly the same. The truth is that teaching is getting better, the results are getting better, and the reason is that this Government have invested in education and changed the education system. So whereas when we came to office just over half of 11-year-olds were getting the right literacy and numeracy results, now the figure is three quarters. That, again, is the difference between a Labour Government who care about education and a Conservative Government who in the years before we came to power cut funding per pupil.

7. According to the Children's Society, every year 100,000 children run away from home. Many turn to rough sleeping, crime, drug taking, alcohol abuse and prostitution. Many are hurt and harmed as a consequence. At the moment, there are just seven refuge beds across the country to meet that massive need. Those beds will not be funded after March next year; Government funding is to stop before that is evaluated. Will the Prime Minister look to stop the cut in funding in March so that the beds can be properly evaluated and we can have a proper network of safe accommodation for children who run away? [23745]

We have of course invested a large sum of money in that. The rough sleepers initiative has cut the numbers sleeping rough very considerably. We will continue to invest; we have obviously got to make sure that it is in the right way that yields the result. The hon. Gentleman is right in drawing attention to the problem, but we will solve it only by continuing the policies that we have set out. I am not aware of the particular issue that he has raised—I will get back to him on the detail—but more money has been invested in social housing and in providing for people, particularly young people who might run away from home, than by any Government for years, and we will continue doing that.

8. My right hon. Friend will be aware that more than six months have passed since the collapse of MG Rover in my constituency. May I ask him to do two things? First, will he recognise the contribution that the taskforce set up by the Government has made towards helping the region and beyond to tackle the effects of that closure; and, secondly, will he recognise that there is still a large number of people who are without jobs, mainly concentrated in the area around the plant, and that they still face real problems? Does he agree that the south-west Birmingham area needs a major regeneration programme not only to help MG Rover workers still without jobs to get back to work, but to regenerate the entire community? [23746]

First, I pay tribute to the work that my hon. Friend has done for his constituents through the MG Rover TaskForce. I congratulate the members of that taskforce, because Advantage West Midlands, Birmingham city council, the Learning and Skills Council and Jobcentre Plus have pulled together in a remarkable way to achieve the result that he described. I am pleased that 3,000 or more ex-MG Rover and supply chain workers are now in new jobs, but we need to do much more. We will invest in the new science and technology park, but we will also make sure that the programme of support that we introduced for those workers when they were made redundant continues. We will also make sure that we put the investment into Advantage West Midlands to allow it to attract new jobs for the future.

9. Prime Minister, you visited Rochdale on 21 April, and you gave your personal commitment to the Manchester Metrolink, including the three lines to Rochdale and Oldham. Was that electioneering? If not, can you tell us when we will be given a statement and— [23747]

10. Is my right hon. Friend aware that the family courts routinely expose children to the risk of abuse and even death at the hands of violent parents, according to a new report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Court Administration, which says that the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service is putting children at risk by not assessing the risk of exposing them to parental contact orders with violent parents? Does my right hon. Friend agree that we urgently need safety measures in the forthcoming Children and Adoption Bill to safeguard our children against such violence? [23748]

We of course are concerned by the finding of the Inspectorate of Court Administration report that there is such a strong presumption by the courts that there must be contact with both parents that concerns about violence and children's safety are overridden. We remain utterly committed to the principle that the welfare of the child should be paramount in the consideration of the courts. We recognise that more needs to be done to address domestic violence concerns, so we will look carefully at any amendments to the Children and Adoption Bill that are tabled on the subject.

BILLS PRESENTED

Osborne Estate

Mr. Robert Flello presented a Bill to make provision in relation to the Osborne Estate: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 20 October, and to be printed [Bill 75].

Estate Agents (Redress Schemes)

Mark Tami, supported by Chris Ruane and Mr. Iain Wright, presented a Bill to confer power to require estate agents to belong to an approved redress scheme; to make provision about redress schemes and their approval; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on 20 October, and to be printed [Bill 74].

Road Traffic Regulation (Location Filming)

Mr. Iain Wright presented a Bill to enable orders under section 16A of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 to be made in connection with location filming; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on 14 July, and to be printed [Bill 76].

Family Law (Property and Maintenance)

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to abolish the common law duty of a husband to maintain his wife; to abolish the presumption of advancement in relation to married or engaged couples; to amend the Married Women's Property Act 1964; and to make provision as regards property derived from an allowance made by a civil partner for the expenses of a civil partnership home or for similar purposes.

The Family Law (Property and Maintenance) Bill is a technical but plucky little measure that is intended to abolish or equalise three relatively minor rules of law that treat husbands and wives unequally. The changes are needed to enable the United Kingdom to ratify article 5 of protocol 7 of the European convention on human rights. The UK Government have given a commitment to ratify that protocol, and they must do so on a United Kingdom-wide basis. Delay in amending the law in England and Wales also delays ratification in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

The text of article 5 to protocol 7 is entitled "Equality between Spouses". It states:

"Spouses shall enjoy equality of rights and responsibilities of a private character between them, and in their relations with their children, as to marriage, during marriage and in the event of its dissolution. This Article shall not prevent States from taking such measures as are necessary in the interests of the children."

The three relatively minor rules of law to which I referred are, first, the common law duty of a husband to maintain his wife. I should make it clear that this has nothing to do with so-called common law marriages. It has to do with legal marriages. Both husbands and wives have access to statutory remedies in the courts for obtaining maintenance or ancillary relief, as it is called, in the unfortunate event of the breakdown of their marriage. For example, statutory remedy may be obtained through the Domestic Proceedings and Magistrates Courts Act 1978, and via the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973.

In addition, there is a common law duty, as we lawyers call it, for a husband to maintain his wife, yet—unequally—there is no corresponding common law duty for a wife to maintain her husband. In order to equalise the position between spouses, clause 1 would abolish that superfluous common law duty. Thus both husbands and wives would, equally, obtain maintenance through the statutory remedies.

The second change introduced by the Bill would be the abolition of the common law rule on the "presumption of advancement" between husbands and wives. Again, that has nothing to do with so-called common law marriages. It has to do with legally married husbands and wives. At present, there is a common law rule that states that where there is no evidence to the contrary, if a husband transfers property to his wife, he is presumed to be making her a gift. However, if a wife transfers property to her husband, the presumption is that no gift is intended, and instead the wife is basically presumed to be making a loan. Clause 2 would abolish this archaic rule, so that there would be no presumption in favour of one spouse on the basis of gender.

The third rule change would be to money or property that is saved up or brought from what is termed a "housekeeping allowance". Under section 1 of the Married Women's Property Act 1964, as all right hon. and hon. Members will recall, if a husband pays a housekeeping allowance to his wife, any savings or property derived from that housekeeping allowance belong to the husband and wife in equal shares, unless they have a specific agreement to the contrary. So if, for example, the wife saves her housekeeping allowance from the husband and buys a sofa, that sofa will belong to the couple equally.

However, if the wife pays a housekeeping allowance to the husband, the money or property derived from it belongs to the wife only. So if the husband saves his housekeeping allowance, the sofa would belong to the wife alone. Such inequality cannot be right in this day and age. Hence, clause 3 would amend the provision, making it apply to both spouses equally, so that property derived from a housekeeping allowance is jointly owned by the husband and wife in equal shares, regardless which of them paid and which of them received the allowance.

The intention of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was that civil partners should have parallel rights to those of married couples. Therefore it is necessary for an amendment to be made to the Civil Partnership Act 2004. That would be achieved by clause 4, which would extend the equal provision—the jointly owned sofa, so to speak—to civil partners in England and Wales and in Northern Ireland. As I understand it, the law in Scotland already applies equally to husbands and wives, and has been applied to civil partners, so no amendment is required in respect of Scottish law.

The Bill should not be controversial. It removes discrimination against men and would be a relatively straightforward means of advancing the Government's laudable equality and human rights agenda.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Rob Marris.

Family Law (Property and Maintenance)

Rob Marris accordingly presented a Bill to abolish the common law duty of a husband to maintain his wife; to abolish the presumption of advancement in relation to married or engaged couples; to amend the Married Women's Property Act 1964; and to make provision as regards property derived from an allowance made by a civil partner for the expenses of a civil partnership home or for similar purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 2 December, and to be printed [Bill 73].

Orders of the Day

Terrorism Bill

[1st Allotted Day]

(Clauses Nos. 1 to 4, 23 and 24)

Considered in Committee.

[Sir Alan Haselhurst in the Chair]

Clause 1 — Encouragement of Terrorism

I beg to move amendment No. 79, in page 1, line 8, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

'(b) at the time he does so, he intends or is recklessly indifferent to the fact that the publication will be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement or inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.

(c) it is not necessary that the prosecution prove that he intended to cause, encourage or induce the commission, preparation or instigation of a specific terrorist act'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 18, in page 1, line 9, leave out from beginning to 'a' in line 12 and insert—

'(i) he intends it to be, and

(ii) it is likely to be'.

No. 62, in page 1, line 9, leave out from beginning to end of line 10 and insert 'he intends'.

No. 97, in page 1, line 9, leave out from beginning to end of line 14 and insert—

'he intends to incite or induce any other person to commit or prepare to commit an act of terrorism or a Convention offence; and

(c) he thereby causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed.'.

No. 1, in page 1, line 9, leave out from 'believes' to end of line 10.

No. 2, in page 1, line 10, leave out

'has reasonable grounds for believing'

and insert

'is reckless to the consequence'.

No. 3, in page 1, line 12, leave out 'are likely to' and insert 'would'.

No. 63, in page 1, line 12, leave out 'are likely to' and insert 'will'.

No. 37, in page 1, line 12, leave out 'a direct or indirect' and insert 'an'.

No. 21, in page 1, line 13, leave out 'encouragement or other inducement' and insert 'incitement'.

No. 22, in page 1, line 14, at end insert

'and intends that his statement shall have that effect'.

No. 4, in page 1, line 15, leave out subsection (2).

No. 99, in page 1, line 16, leave out 'encouraging' and insert 'inciting'.

No. 95, in page 2, line 5, at end insert

'and

(c) thereby causes a danger that one or more acts of terrorism or Convention offences may be committed.'.

No. 85, in page 2, line 6, leave out subsection (3).

No. 6, in page 2, line 6, leave out from second 'the' to 'must' in line 8 and insert

'question of what constitutes recklessness as regards the consequential effect of a statement on members of the public'.

No. 7, in page 2, line 12, leave out 'subsections (1) and (2)' and insert 'subsection (1)'.

No. 54, in clause 2, page 3, line 5, leave out 'a view' and insert 'intent'.

No. 23, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, at end insert

'and intends at the time that his conduct shall incite acts of terrorism by some or all of the persons to whom matter contained in paragraphs (a) to (f) of subsection (1) is or is likely to be available in consequence of that conduct.'.

No. 20, in clause 2, page 3, line 12, at end insert—

'where the conduct was intended to be a direct or indirect encouragement or inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of an act or acts of terrorism or if in all the circumstances it should have been apparent to the accused that it was likely to be so.'.

No. 24, in clause 2, page 3, line 14, leave out

'direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement'

and insert 'incitement'.

No. 78, in clause 2, page 3, line 16, leave out

'likely to be understood as such'

and insert 'intended to be'.

No. 25, in clause 2, page 3, line 16, leave out 'encouragement or other inducement' and insert 'incitement'.

No. 26, in clause 2, page 3, line 19, leave out subsection (4).

No. 96, in clause 2, page 3, line 26, at end insert—

'(c) thereby causes a danger that one or more acts of terrorism or Convention offences may be committed.'.

No. 51, in clause 3, page 6, line 12, leave out subsection (8).

No. 52, in clause 20, page 17, leave out lines 38 and 39.

New clause 2—Protection for Media—

'Nothing in Part 1 of this Act will be an offence if it is demonstrated by an accused person that his conduct was in the course of reporting of news through a news medium.'.

Our consideration begins with clause 1, which provides the offence of the encouragement of terrorism. Specifically, it seeks to widen the scope of incitement by moving from direct incitement to commit a criminal offence to indirect incitement. Conservative Members believe that a change in the law can properly take place to allow indirect incitement to become a criminal offence, and that proposition may attract universal support.

The issue that we must consider this afternoon is how the Government have chosen to draft clause 1. There are two areas of concern: first, the intent that is required for an offence to be committed; and secondly, whether the glorification of terrorism should form a separate and discrete part of an incitement charge.

I find clause 1 almost impossible to read and understand. I do not know where the Government found their draftsman, but if ever there were an unintelligible document, it is clause 1, which is extremely convoluted. It moves from an offence based on a person's knowledge or belief to an offence based on "reasonable grounds for believing". The offence is committed if

"members of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are likely to understand it as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences."

The Minister must clarify what the Government are trying to achieve—the explanatory notes are no help whatever. Do the Government want the offence to be committed by specific intent, which is common ground, and can it be committed by recklessness? By my reading of clause 1, it can also be committed negligently. If my reading of the provision is incorrect, I should be grateful if the Minister would indicate as much at the earliest possible opportunity. My reading of the provision is that it is much wider than an ordinary recklessness test, because it combines the fact of a person's committing the offence only on the basis of having "reasonable grounds for believing" with the fact that members of the public need merely be "likely" to understand that incitement was the intended consequence. That combination, which I could describe as the double whammy of clause 1, goes much further than I would consider suitable and proper.

Part of the problem in this breathtakingly badly drafted clause is that the Government do not specify to which members of the public it refers; it is a catch-all. Is not it readily imaginable that people who might take offence are people who are obviously uninitiated, peculiarly excitable, or in some other way lacking a level head? That is a very low threshold on which to bring about the instigation of criminal proceedings.

My hon. Friend makes a good point. The clause is indeed unclear as regards members of the public. We must bear it in mind that the Government are saying that the individual who is making his comment of encouragement of terrorism should be mindful of every possible range of public opinion. I do not necessarily disagree with that, but it then reverses the onus back to saying that we have to be jolly careful not to criminalise what may merely be a negligent statement. Heaven knows we have enough examples of Ministers standing up in this House and accidentally saying things that they subsequently have cause to regret.

As a relatively new reader of the details of the Bill, it seems to me that the distinction is between intent and effect. My hon. Friend may wish to consider a situation in which one person has a highly malicious intent to incite people and to celebrate terrorism but whose style of doing so is so objectionable to the ordinary person that it is counterproductive because it revolts them, as against another person who makes ill-judged comments about the political situation in the middle east that might be construed as encouraging people to have recourse to terrorism. Which of those two, if either, is covered by the Bill, and is it principled to draw a distinction between them?

My hon. Friend, very properly, muddies the waters even further by illustrating the complexity of the situation. On the face of it, a jury considering this offence will be asked not to decide whether members of the public were influenced but whether it was "likely" that people who heard the speech would have concluded that it was

"a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement"

to commit a terrorist offence. In regard to that, they will, as the clause says further on, have to consider all the surrounding circumstances.—[Interruption.] The Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety says something from a sedentary position, but I did not quite hear it.

I do not find myself in disagreement with that approach, but it brings me back to the point that I made to my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (John Bercow)—if a jury is to be given such a test, which is not subjective but objective, it becomes very important that we criminalise those who intend to commit the offence, not those who end up doing it by accident. That is the root of my anxiety.

As the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) suggested, this might happen inadvertently in less than thoughtful circumstances. Is the hon. Gentleman aware that Universities UK fears that it might happen in extremely thoughtful circumstances, namely in the process of the publication of research and the encouragement of academic debate? It states that the Bill

"opens the question as to whether an individual student who may disagree with a lecturer's personal political view could be reported and then prosecuted for glorifying terrorism . . . It seems highly likely that students undertaking courses like International Relations, History and Politics may be exposed to or research on texts that could fall foul of Clauses 1, 2 and 6 of this Bill."

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right and anticipates one of the things that I was about to say. The academic world has indeed expressed serious concerns especially, in the context of our debate, about clause 2, to which I hope we may have time to move. It is also right that that anxiety relates to clause 1, because the possibility plainly exists that during robust academic discussion in a tutorial or public seminar views may be expressed that would then be criminalised. We all remember that Sir Thomas More was eventually convicted of treason because when he was incarcerated in the Tower of London he was visited by the then Attorney or Solicitor-General—I cannot remember which—

I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend.

Sir Thomas was visited by the then Attorney-General for Wales who engaged in what was then called making case, which was an academic dialogue about royal supremacy. In the course of that, Sir Thomas, responding to what he thought was an invitation to academic discussion, succeeded in incriminating himself, having studiously avoided doing so previously. That may appear to be a long time ago.

It was a long time ago but the powers of the state have if anything increased since then, and not diminished. It is not for the House to pass legislation that has unintended consequences. One of our problems, which applies to the whole Bill as well as to clause 1, is that we shall, I fear, be given yet again the classic response from the Government that we need not worry too much because the Director of Public Prosecutions will make jolly sure that only the right cases are prosecuted.

It certainly is not, because it is not the business of Parliament to create law that is discretionary in its application.

It is even less reassuring when we contemplate that in respect of overseas terrorism it is the Attorney-General who gives the consent.

The hon. Gentleman is making a very good speech. Does he understand why the phraseology in subsection (3) of clause 1 is that the public "will understand a statement" whereas in paragraph (b) of subsection (1) it is that the public "are likely" to understand a statement? As the hon. Gentleman made a lot of money from such distinctions in a previous life, does he have any idea why the Bill is not even internally consistent?

No, I have not. Furthermore, if the hon. Gentleman were to consult the explanatory notes, he would be none the wiser.

The issue is serious, and I will return in a moment to how we might be able to improve this part of the measure. Before I move on to glorification, I must make this point to the Minister: the Government must explain fully who they intend to be caught by these provisions and in what circumstances, so that the Committee can make a judgment, first, about whether we want the offence to be one of specific intent only—for which there are some powerful arguments, despite the wording of the amendment. Failing that, there may be arguments for providing a recklessness test. Having prosecuted in the past, I am mindful that people may properly escape justice by resorting to fanciful arguments about their motivation, even though it was pretty clear, so I accept that it is a legitimate point of discussion.

I have to tell the Minister, however, that there is a big difference between recklessness and negligence. My reading of the provisions is that they provide for the closest thing to an offence being committed by negligence that I have ever seen, even though the Minister may argue that that is not the intention of the Bill, but as she is not shaking her head vigorously at me in a negative, I have a fearful suspicion that that may be exactly what the Government were intending.

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman's line of thought, and I remind the Committee that if the recklessness test were included, there is a body of law to explain precisely where we stand on recklessness, thereby making the clause quite simple to operate. Why are the Government including such a nebulous clause, whereby the offence could border on negligence, when the recklessness test could be imposed, as it is for many other offences on the statute book?

I agree with the hon. Gentleman and knowing of his background in practising the law, I can see exactly where he is coming from. I always found the test of recklessness to be readily comprehensible. It is right to say, however, that for reasons that I do not fully understand there has been a tendency, on several occasions before the introduction of the Bill, to drop the use of the word and replace it with the gobbledegook before us. In that respect, the Bill is not a complete novelty, but I am bound to say that I do not like it; the blurring of the edge between recklessness and negligence is something that successive Governments have attempted in several different fields where it suits them, because they have come to the conclusion that it will facilitate convictions. In some cases, they have done it deliberately, for example, in the offences of reckless driving and dangerous driving—a change that Parliament could assess—but in this context the Government have not explained what they are about.

Is not my hon. Friend being a bit too generous to the Government on this point? My understanding of clause 1 is that a person who writes in laudatory terms about historical terrorism is caught by the clause. It does not matter whether they are negligent, reckless or acting with intent. If they were simply describing in laudatory terms what happened in Cyprus when the EOKA terrorists prevailed, they could be caught by the measure.

Yes, my right hon. and learned Friend is correct and, as I hope I indicated, I want to move on to consider the glorification parts of the clause, which can be looked at separately.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for generously giving way again.

Surely, the nub of the problem is that there is a difference between asking a jury to discern intent, which is not an unreasonable request, on the one hand, and expecting it accurately to assess likely consequences on the other. That is an extremely dangerous challenge for the jury—in essence, a political challenge—and in fact people are usually much more resistant to propaganda than they are given credit for being.

My hon. Friend makes a good point. Equally, it is right to point out that we quite frequently have to ask juries to make an objective assessment of a set of facts, and it is my experience that, precisely because juries are robust, if they have any concerns about the matter they will acquit and throw out the charges. Indeed I suspect that if the Bill were to get on to the statute book in its present form, because, mercifully and thankfully, we have a jury system a large number of cases would be slung out. That is not what the Government intend; they intend something completely to the contrary, but the jury system exists precisely as that safeguard.

I have a question about paragraph (c) of the amendment:

"it is not necessary that the prosecution prove that he intended to cause, encourage or induce the commission, preparation or instigation of a specific terrorist act".

Can my hon. Friend give some explanation of that, as I thought that the whole purpose of the amendment was to produce an intent rationale?

I understand my hon. Friend's point, but the amendment covers "a specific terrorist act". If the Bill provided for a requirement to show that the person making the speech wished for the blowing up of the Houses of Parliament on the evening of 5 November, conviction would be unlikely unless the person said, "And everybody should go and blow up the Houses of Parliament on the evening of 5 November." I therefore accept that the Government are entitled to introduce a measure that provides for general incitement—for example, a speech that requires every right-thinking person to consider whether to become a suicide bomber and thus force the British Government to change their policies. However, that is sufficient and there is no need to show that a specific incident or offence is about to be committed. That is the reason for paragraph (c) in the amendment.

I wonder whether I may tease the hon. Gentleman a little further along that line. I believe he accepts that those who said a couple of weeks ago that the clause contained no intent element were wrong. The question is, should someone be allowed to advance as a defence the claim that there was no intent and that they did not believe that their words would lead to an incident?

I understand the hon. Gentleman's point—I have been trying to deal with it for the past 20 minutes. It is clear that part of the offence is specific intent, for which clause 1(b)(i) provides. Under it, people can know or believe that they are trying to incite terrorism and they can be convicted for it. However, as the hon. Gentleman says, the Government wish to widen its scope. To what point is it being widened? I believe that it is being widened well beyond the recklessness test—the old test that was often put into statutes to ensure that someone could not wriggle off the hook by saying, "Oh well, I may have said people should blow themselves up in Kensington high street, but I didn't really mean it." There is a difference between that and negligence, which may constitute a negligent comment of the kind that many a Minister or Member of Parliament has made on the Floor of the House and regretted afterwards. The Minister must deal with that distinction this afternoon.

Glorification is a completely separate issue. We know the origin of the glorification provisions. The Bill started out with a completely separate offence of glorifying terrorism and received massive public criticism. Consequently, the Government conducted a classic piece of new Labour dissimulation. On the one hand, they announced that they were backing down in the face of the criticism, but, on the other, they tried somehow to save the Prime Minister's face by ensuring that glorification survived. I strongly suspect that there were long and disputatious moments in No. 10 Downing street between the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister.

Indeed. I simply do not understand what the Government are trying to achieve. If an act of glorification amounts to incitement, direct or indirect, a jury will find no difficulty in considering that as part of the total case. There is, therefore, no need for a separate subsection, which specifically draws attention to glorification as a way in which the offence might be committed.

Many people have glorified acts of terrorism. Hon. Members glorified—or at least expressed approval of—the actions of members of the ANC fighting apartheid in South Africa, even though those actions involved the use of violence.

Expressing views about the ANC is far removed from the clause—[Hon. Members: "No, it is not."] It is. The nature of the state is different. The Bill covers people saying, "Acts of terror are great and you should copy them." The clause is not only about glorification; it provides for emulation. There are two tests. The clause is completely different from what the hon. Gentleman claims.

If, for example, I had said in a public speech to a community of Bosnians in this country at the time of the first Yugoslav war that the acts of those in Bosnia who resisted the Serb forces of the Yugoslav Government were worthy, and that they were conducting themselves honourably and laudably in protecting their community from state aggression, and the speech was a clear encouragement to people to go out and join them—or people inferred that from the words—should that be criminalised? As the clause stands, it is likely to cover the glorification of Robin Hood.

That is a red herring. My reading of the clause is that it covers someone who stands in front an audience and says, "Suicide bombers are wonderful and you should go and do the same." It covers glorification and emulation.

I understand the hon. Lady's point, but it is adequately covered by clause 1(1), which we have just discussed. We have had a disagreement about whether we should include an offence of specific intent, negligence or recklessness—we must consider that this afternoon—but clause 1(1) covers glorification adequately. Introducing the separate glorification subsection adds nothing except to suggest that laudatory talk—no more—about the activities of individuals in foreign countries, where the acts would be likely to take place, should become a criminal offence. That is undoubtedly a major infringement of free speech because no specific offence is being incited. It may be in breach of article 10.2 of the European convention on human rights on freedom of expression. It adds nothing to the Bill. The Minister made a sedentary comment about "in existing circumstances", but invoking Robin Hood may apply to existing circumstances.

My right hon. and learned Friend is right. The fact that one is invoking historical figures is no reason why that may not have an existing application.

May I try to offer a little assistance on the intervention of my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble), who has a fine record on the ANC? Would not the following statement undoubtedly be caught by the Bill? I quote:

"The campaign to destroy government property by the ANC fighting against the Apartheid Regime is an example of justifiable violence against oppressive and tyrannical government."

That covers emulation.

The hon. and learned Gentleman has given a perfect example. The statement would be caught by clause 1 as it stands. The hon. Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) shakes her head. I assure her that it is not some cussedness on our part that suggests that it is the case; I genuinely believe it. Many Labour Members' assessment is identical to ours.

I am at a great disadvantage here because I am not a lawyer, but a comparable example might be when someone says, "Look at so-and-so, who blew up a radio mast. Why don't you go out and do the same thing?" That would encourage people directly. It would involve glorification and emulation, which, in simple terms, means copying.

I understand the hon. Lady's point, but that is not, to my mind, what glorification is about. Indeed, the more I listen to her, the more I believe that she is making a powerful case for taking glorification out of the Bill altogether.

That is exactly the point. The hon. Lady seems to be oblivious to the fact that if she had made the statement that she has just made anywhere other than in the Chamber, she would already be guilty of the crime of incitement. Therefore, why on earth are we discussing this measure? It clearly broadens the interpretation beyond what anyone would consider reasonable in terms of the right to free speech.

The hon. Gentleman is right. It is impossible to understand what the Government are trying to do, except for broadening that interpretation. I regret having to say so, but this is all the more sinister for being so opaque.

Is not the problem that, in the example given by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews), if one deleted the words "destruction of power lines"—or whatever—and inserted the words "killing of civilians" and "oppressive regime", the Government certainly intend to catch that under clause 1? The only thing that would prevent someone from being prosecuted for using such language in the South African context, or in the context of suicide bombers, would be the decision of the Attorney-General. In effect, a political judgment would be made about whether someone was to be prosecuted? Is there a way round that?

The right hon. Gentleman is quite right. One difficulty is that the discussion on the definition of terrorism—to which he has paid a great deal of attention—has been deferred until tomorrow's debate. I tabled an amendment, which I deliberately tried to introduce into clause 1, so that we might have that discussion at the same time as our deliberations on the clause, although I do not criticise the Clerk for having moved the amendment away.

The right hon. Gentleman highlights the fact that it is possible to look at this issue from another angle, which involves the definition of terrorism. At the moment, however, we have to proceed on the basis that the Government's definition of terrorism is extremely wide. Moreover, they are seeking for the first time to create a worldwide jurisdiction with the capacity to criminalise anyone in the world for making a comment that falls within the UK definition of terrorism, which is intended for conditions in this country. I have to say to the Minister that that is a bold thing to try to do.

Indeed, and pregnant with disaster, if the Government get it wrong. It will not be adequate to fall back, as the Government will, on the argument that that will not matter because the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney-General will be able properly to interpret the will of Parliament. We cannot do that.

Does this exchange not reinforce the hon. Gentleman's earlier point that the second part of clause 1 is really designed to get the Prime Minister off the hook of having too glibly come up with a new crime, without considering the consequences? Is the hon. Gentleman not also right to point out that giving people the protection of the Attorney-General is completely unfair, because they will have to judge the mind of the Attorney-General in deciding whether they might face prosecution?

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is right. There are often accusations that the application or interpretation of the law by law enforcement authorities can be selective. The truth is that, as in all human affairs, that probably does happen. The Bill creates the grounds for a wholly selective legal application, and I remain profoundly unconvinced about the desirability of the glorification clause. Everything that we have discussed today, including the matter raised by the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham), could be dealt with if the glorification clause were removed.

The hon. Gentleman said something earlier with which I wholly agree, namely that many Members on both sides of the Committee are more concerned about the issue of glorification than they are about many of the other provisions in the Bill, not least because many of us have taken part in the fight—not necessary the physical fight, but the ideological one—against oppressive regimes around the world.

I want to tease another response from the hon. Gentleman. He says that glorification is a stand-alone issue, but in fact the clause is worded to contain three lock-ins that have to go together. First, there has to be

"direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism".

Then there has to be glorification, as well as the emulation element. The three things go together. Glorification is not a separate offence in itself.

If it is not a separate offence, why is it there? What is the point of having clause 1(2) unless the intention behind it is to highlight a particular area and to give a steer to the judge and jury. I see the Minister nodding: that is obviously exactly what is intended. I do not agree with that. The jury should decide what incitement is. In some cases, jurors might conclude that a form of exhortation or glorification amounted to incitement; in other cases they might decide that it did not. That should be a jury matter, not a matter on which the Government impose their view, especially as that would have the capacity to distort the entire concept of the legislation.

Can the hon. Gentleman think of many circumstances in which an act could be interpreted as glorification without it being possible to infer that people were being encouraged to emulate it?

I can envisage circumstances in which people might wish to glorify past events. We are talking about existing circumstances, but that is rather loose terminology. It might be possible to have an ongoing conflict in which violence was not occurring. Any glorification of the recent events in that conflict would therefore be seen as having relevance to existing circumstances. That is an example. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is likely that the glorification of a specific activity will be caught by the legislation anyway. That is all the more reason why it should not be highlighted. We have no business doing that.

It might be argued that an academic treatise was precisely the kind of example in which glorification would not imply any desire to emulate an activity. The hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant) wrongly takes comfort from the notion of an interlinkage—in a sense, a mutual dependence—between the three separate concepts that he mentioned. May I suggest that it is not a good idea for there to be three such concepts in any one clause—let alone a subsection—and certainly not when there is no requirement to prove intent?

I agree. On academic treatises, it is quite common, particularly in philosophy departments, to ask university undergraduates to produce essays on the question of whether violence is ever justified. I seem to remember writing one myself. It is not difficult to put together a coherent academic argument, based on recent examples, that good might have come from the use of violence. Such writing would be caught by the operation of the Bill. An academic treatise might reach the conclusion that political violence, including acts of terrorism, was justified in some circumstances. Irrespective of whether the context was a foul regime, or of whether in practice the violence involved attacking the security forces while respecting civilians, such a treatise would be caught by the Bill as it stands—

The Minister shakes her head in disapproval, but that is what the Bill currently says and there is no escape from that. The Minister might have all sorts of other explanations to advance as to why we should vote for the measure, but that is not one of them. What the Bill says at present precisely catches such examples.

I want to move on briefly to cover the amendments that have been tabled and then give other hon. Members the opportunity to participate. As I said, amendment No. 79 would replace the existing tests to make it quite clear that there were two tests—one of specific intent and one of recklessness. I am always conscious, particularly late at night in my room at the House of Commons, that drafting could be wrong, but that is the intention behind the amendment. It would therefore make a concession, which I am mindful the Committee might not wish to accept, that recklessness could be an ingredient of this offence, rather than it involving merely a specific intent. I hope the Minister specifically tackles that matter when she responds to the debate.

Amendment No. 1 would remove everything except specific intention. Therefore, there would have to be a specific intention to carry out the offence. Indeed, I rather thought that this would be the lead amendment for the purposes of this afternoon's proceedings, which is why I tabled it first. Although that has not happened, I might want to commend such a possibility to the Committee. I want to listen to what the Minister has to say in respect of that. Amendment No. 2 deals with another example of recklessness and would remove the likelihood altogether.

Amendment No. 4 relates to glorification. This is, for me, a key amendment because it would remove the glorification provision in its entirety. I simply say to the Minister that, at this stage, I will need a lot of persuading not to put that to the vote when the time comes—with the leave of the Chairman of Ways and Means—because I believe the amendment is critical. I shall be interested to hear Members' views.

Amendment No. 6 tries to define recklessness according to its impact on members of the public, so it can be linked to the previous amendment. As will be seen, it involves the consequential effect of the statement on members of the public. In a way, that provides an alternative approach to that of the Government. My concern, as I said, is that I find the Government's wording extremely woolly, and I much prefer the old clarity, which seemed to exist in earlier legislation and which we seem to be abandoning so quickly. Amendments Nos. 54 and 78 also deal with the issue of specific intent. Finally, amendment No. 26 has been tabled by Government Back Benchers.

Those are the amendments that I am putting to the Committee, and the view I take at the moment is that we must restructure the way in which clause 1 is worded. We must ensure that it is clear. We must decide whether it should involve an offence of specific intent only or whether we want to add anything to that. I have an open mind on whether we should do so. Above all, I take the view that the glorification provision ought to be deleted.

I want to speak to the amendments that stand in my name and the names of others. I can deal with them compendiously. They relate to the question of specific intent. They do not descend to deal with recklessness, which in my view would be wrong in a criminal statute of this kind. They would both remove the words "encouragement or other inducement" and replace them with the old and well-known rubric in the criminal law—namely, "incitement"—and remove the odious provision relating to glorification.

If I may, I shall being by speaking to my first amendment. When we pass a criminal statute, it is always as well to look at the acts that will be criminalised by that statute—not the acts that the Government intend to be criminalised by the statute, because the courts do not look at the Government's intention. Indeed, they are proscribed from doing so. We should consider a small litany of the statements that will, without a shadow of doubt, be caught by clause 1. The first—it might be recognised by many—fell from the lips of an important person not so long ago, who said, "In view of the illegal occupation of Palestinian land I can well understand how decent Palestinians become terrorists." That statement was made by Cherie Booth, Queen's Counsel and the wife of the Prime Minister. When she made it, I agreed with the sentiments she expressed and leapt to her defence, because she was criticised throughout the press, and indeed in the House, for making it.

Indeed, I went on the radio and, in a trenchant debate with the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe), pointed out that it is possible in this world to hate the sin and love the sinner. I can say in passing that that is the only occasion that I can remember when I have ever been on the media and supported somebody who inhabits No. 10 Downing street. But I did my best to do so. This morning, on the "Today" programme, the Home Secretary said, in his inimitable way, "This will not be caught by the Act." Well, I would like to debate that with the Home Secretary—he is not here, of course—and with the Minister so as to find a single part of the clause that offers any comfort to anyone delivering that public statement.

Such people must consider, reasonably, that there will be someone out there, listening to them, who, having heard them express that, will be encouraged to commit an act of terrorism. "Encouragement" is, of course, the word involved here. One takes a harmless analogy: I can imagine people saying, "There is legislation that the Government try to pass that is so awful that it can be understood that even loyal and decent Back-Bench Labour MPs oppose it." I have sympathy with that. It undoubtedly encourages me, on occasion, and I have a number of letters not markedly different from that in my postbag in respect of the Bill. That statement is undoubtedly caught, and there is no defence. There is no proviso in the Bill that would enable Cherie Booth, QC, if the director chose to prosecute her, to defend herself.

Taking the proviso of the director, while that prevents a prosecution from being started, it does not make the initial statement lawful, with the consequence that fear of prosecution stands as the real curtailment on freedom of speech.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman has, as always, anticipated a great deal of what I am going to say. In fact, I hardly need say it. However, in due course I shall come to correspondence that I have had with the British Library on precisely that point.

A public statement—one we have touched on already—that "The campaign to destroy government property by the ANC fighting against the Apartheid Regime is an example of justifiable violence against oppressive and tyrannical government," has all the necessary elements of this offence. In so far as one can even begin to interpret "glorify", it certainly glorifies what the ANC did, and contained within it there is also the statement that others should emulate it if they find themselves in that particular position. It would lend to them encouragement.

I can remember—I wish to plead guilty to this now—during the ANC struggle in South Africa meeting ANC members who came to this country who were going back to South Africa to continue that campaign. I make no bones about it: I offered them not only encouragement, but succour, victuals and my humble hospitality. I did so with a clear conscience, and I always will. Under the provisions of the Bill, I could be arrested tomorrow.

I have much sympathy with what the hon. and learned Gentleman is saying. Can he clarify for the benefit of us lay people that any such act of condoning or supporting terrorism would not have to be specific to any particular act that that person might commit, or that another person might commit, but that it would be a kind of fishing expedition for the future? Unless we all signed up today to say that we would never under any circumstances condone any use of violence or acts of terrorism—although I hasten to say that none is anticipated on my part or that of most contributors to the debate—that would by itself constitute or run the risk of constituting some endorsement or glorification of terrorism for the future.

The hon. Gentleman is right. That is the horrendously, deliberately and expressly wide nature of this part of the Bill.

Another example would be that of a proposer of a university debate—I think that I have also done this myself—speaking to the motion, "This House would become a suicide bomber," and delivering, one hopes, a particularly cogent speech, not believing it for one minute or intending that it should happen, but knowing that there is a student audience out there that includes near-radicalised or semi-radicalised people who might listen to the words and be encouraged to commit terrorist acts as a result. That would be caught under the Act, without a shadow of a doubt. One would have to rely on the Director of Public Prosecutions to exercise his imprimatur to avoid it.

A teacher or tutor distributing terrorist propaganda to a class studying history in the middle east would be caught under the Act without a shadow of a doubt.

My hon. and learned Friend might be coming on to deal with great works of literature. I am thinking, for example, of Sartre's magnificent trilogy that tries to work out existential philosophy through a description of 1930s history. In that, he delivers a paean to the revolutionary fighting spirit of those in Barcelona fighting tyranny. He ends the book with a great nihilistic act of self-destruction, in which the hero takes a machine gun and mows down Germans in front of him from a church tower, and is eventually killed himself. Has he considered the implications for such great works of literature, which seem to incite violent acts in precisely the terms of the clause that he describes?

I have done so, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Undoubtedly, the dissemination of those works would be caught under the Act, and I am pleased that he chose that particular great author because of the existential nature of what we are debating.

Does the hon. and learned Gentleman accept that the glorification of the Catholic martyrs, which is intimately connected with their persecution during the 16th century, and the beatification and enhancement to sainthood of people such as Edmund Campion, would also fall into that category, specifically because they were convicted of treason?

I am grateful for the cornucopia of examples with which I am being showered, all of which are absolutely sound. With no doubt, that is what the Government will criminalise.

Any newspaper that puts a Hamas propaganda leaflet on its front page, either to debate it or attack it, will also almost certainly be guilty under the Act. Yesterday, I received the careful letters that the British Library has sent to the Home Secretary expressing fear and apprehension that by sending works of art and historical or modern works to other libraries or those who demand them it will fall foul of clause 2. When I spoke on the phone to the author of that letter, I could offer him no comfort whatever that he would not be prosecuted under the provisions of the Act.

When the hon. and learned Gentleman began, he said that the old-fashioned offence of incitement would cover what it is necessary to cover in this field. He might have heard me mention earlier that 700 new criminal offences have been introduced by this Government. That surely must stop. I agree in every way with what he is saying. He is a learned man who knows how these things work. The provision is an absolute nonsense. In responding, can he tell me what view he has on the enforceability of such law extraterrestrially?

The extraterrestrial aspect had not occurred to me. With great respect, I have a wide-ranging view of this legislation, but it stops somewhere around the Olympian height. In any event, I am enormously grateful, as always, for the hon. Gentleman's support on the broad aspects of the debate. As to the general enforceability of the provision, we all know, as the Home Secretary says in his inimitable way, that it will not be enforced—that is what he means. We cannot pass legislation like that. He has a charming way of dealing in public debate with those who point out to him that such an activity will be criminalised under the Act—he says, "No, it won't." That is it—he makes an ex cathedra statement, says that we are wrong, and passes on to the next prosecution.

The hon. and learned Gentleman and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) have made a forceful argument. Over the past few years, however, some seriously inflammatory statements have been made by Omar Bakri Muhammad and others. I have complained about that, and the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) has been complaining for years about it. Every time that I have raised the issue, including with the Foreign Secretary when he was Home Secretary, and asked why no action is being taken against such people, we are always told that there is insufficient evidence or insufficient laws on the statute book to deal with it. Can the hon. and learned Gentleman, as a lawyer, assist the Committee to understand how, with the plethora of laws to which he has referred, the Government have been singularly incapable of dealing with such people, and yet another piece of legislation is proposed for us, which we know is also unlikely to be enforceable?

If I can employ a well-known legal term, the answer that the hon. Gentleman has been getting is absolute rot. There is an abundance of weapons in the prosecutor's quiver to deal with that. Why Bakri in particular has not been prosecuted, and why those acts have not been prosecuted under the incitement provisions, is a matter of complete bemusement to me. Yet we are told that we have to wait because we need a new law.

The amendments tabled by me and others would go a considerable way to redressing the matter, as they introduce into the Bill an element of intention. Intention is well known in the law—juries deal with it all the time. As to how one proves it or gets inside a man's head, it is simple—one listens to what he says and the context in which he says it. One then says that, in those contexts, he manifestly intended to ferment terrorism or terrorist acts. That is not difficult, and I cannot understand for a moment why the Home Secretary will not accept it, particularly as it is already enshrined within European jurisprudence.

In the circumstances, the next of our amendments is less important. Why should we not replace "encouragement or other inducement" with "incitement"? I would like the Minister to answer, on the basis of heads, pins and angels, what is the difference between encouragement or other inducement and incitement? The Government tell us that the purpose of the Bill is to create indirect incitement as an offence, so why not use the words "indirect incitement" instead of indulging in encouragement and inducement?

While we are on semantics, the next amendment is to remove completely the odious glorification provision. At least we no longer have "exaltation" as well—no doubt that is a favourite word of the Prime Minister's, but it has disappeared. Such semantics and verbiage might be appropriate to Frederick Handel or William Blake, but they have no place whatever in the sterile world of criminal jurisprudence. We might glorify God, but we do not glorify what men do, and nor do we exalt it. Those words have no place in criminal jurisprudence, and should be expunged from it immediately.

This is, in truth, the worst part of the Bill. Most of the media interest has centred on the three-month period, which is itself an affront, but this is the worst part. The three-month period can be changed at the drop of a hat, but once this provision is on the statute book we will let loose into criminal law something that all of us, in the course of our lives, will have cause profoundly to regret. I urge the Committee to join my colleagues and me in pressing amendment No. 79 to a Division in due course.

Let me first offer a few words of reassurance to the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews). I detected a real note of concern in his voice when he told us that, in rushing to the defence of Cherie Booth, QC, he had blotted his copybook by defending someone residing at No. 10 Downing street. My understanding is that, while Cherie Booth's husband's place of work may well be No. 10 Downing street, she actually resides at No. 11. Whether he acted intentionally, recklessly or negligently, I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has maintained his proud record.

The kindest thing that can be said about clause 1 is that parts of it are opaque. Other parts border on the impenetrable. In my view and that of my colleagues, it fails a basic test. One of the fundamental principles of natural justice is that law should be clear enough for citizens to be able to regulate their conduct according to it. Subsection (1) uses the words

"members of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are likely to understand it as".

That means that someone could find himself negligently contravening clause 1, which is why we cannot support it in its current form—notwithstanding the consensus referred to by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), in which I would wish to join him.

The Minister will say that it will be all right on the night, because the Solicitor-General or the Attorney-General will determine which prosecutions can proceed, and of course Law Officers and Governments always act sensibly in such cases. Like the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow), I do not find that particularly reassuring. It is not for the House of Commons to pass legislation under which the citizen must second-guess the judgment of a Law Officer before deciding whether his conduct will bring him before the courts.

One might ask whether this really matters. We have heard, and will no doubt hear again, all the Government assurances, but where the law is opaque and difficult to understand, it is also difficult to secure convictions following prosecutions. If members of a jury cannot see the sense in what is being done by the prosecutor, they will acquit. In framing clause 1 as they have, the Government seek to defeat their own purposes. At the very least, the clause ought to contain a substantial element of intent which is not there now. That is the purpose of our amendment No. 18, amendment No. 79—tabled by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield and his colleagues—and various other amendments.

It cannot be acceptable that an offence attracting such a substantial penalty can be committed negligently. The next question to consider is whether recklessness can be imported. Here I tend to agree more with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield than with the hon. and learned Member for Medway, but I do not consider the issue to be one of great substance. The important point is the presence of a substantial element of intent. Whether an objective or a subjective test is applied to establish that intent—which is where recklessness comes in—can be considered another day. Viewing the matter from my perspective as a former prosecutor, I think that if the offence is ever to be made workable, the recklessness option ought to be available to the prosecuting authorities.

The Government have moved substantially since the early days when glorification was first mooted as an offence in its own right, and the Liberal Democrats welcome that. Nevertheless, if the Committee supports amendment No. 4 and removes the glorification provision, we shall be doing the Government a favour. The provision seems to me to have no purpose, other than to save the Government's face to some extent, given that the Prime Minister started this hare and set it running. Of course glorification will be there as an adminicle of evidence that can be considered by the jury, but including it in the Bill adds nothing and, indeed, widens the scope to an unacceptable degree. When we see it in a context of a Bill that does not, in my opinion, give a proper definition of terrorism, we find ourselves in an exceptionally difficult position.

This morning, the Home Secretary got into some difficulty on the "Today" programme when the interviewer referred to the hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Adams), who was considered by many to have glorified terrorism on a number of occasions in the past. Indeed, I think that, even if the clause were amended comprehensively, much of what the hon. Member for Belfast, West did in the past would still be caught. It must also be said, however, that the hon. Member played a significant role in the ending of terrorism in Northern Ireland. Perhaps we should pause for thought before considering the full import of what will be achieved by the creation of offences such as this.

The question for the Committee is this: does subsection (2) add or subtract anything? I do not think that it adds anything, but it contributes massively to the lack of clarity in clause 1, and I therefore believe that it should be removed.

The hon. Gentleman says that the subsection does not add anything. What he means, surely, is that it extends the range of activities that will be caught by clause 1.

That is true. When I said that the subsection did not add anything, I meant that it did not add anything positive. It adds a great deal that is negative. As I may have already said, it contributes substantially to the lack of clarity in the Bill, but it does not add anything that we want.

The lack of a proper definition of terrorism, along with the wide jurisdiction envisaged in the Bill, raises serious concern in my mind about the possible implications for free speech. The defences in subsection (5) are very tightly drawn. I defy anyone to explain to me why paragraph (a) is there or what it means: it is one of the more impenetrable provisions. Paragraph (b) makes it a defence for a person to show that the statement in question did not have his endorsement, while paragraph (c) makes it an offence for him to show that

"in all the circumstances . . . it did not express his views and . . . did not have his endorsement."

That leaves a big gap that remains to be filled in relation to terrorists or freedom fighters who are the subject of a report such as a documentary. One thinks of the many despotic regimes around the world now and throughout history. One thinks of John Pilger's documentaries about Vietnam and of the current situation in Uzbekistan. It is right that people should know what happened in Andijan on 13 May in a way that, frankly, they currently do not. It is difficult to see how a person making a documentary about a volatile and emotive situation such as that in Uzbekistan would not fall foul of the clause. The defences listed in subsection (5) might well be breached.

Is it not clear that the Minister let the cat out of the bag in winding up last week's Second Reading debate when she accused those of us who referred to the international scenarios that the hon. Gentleman has just depicted as seeking to distinguish between a "good" terrorist and a "bad" terrorist? I hope that the hon. Gentleman agrees that the precise point that we were seeking to make is that there is a distinction between not a good terrorist and a bad terrorist, but a terrorist and a freedom fighter. The Minister's mistake is to take a Euro-centric view of the world.

That is but one of the many mistakes that we might identify in that speech. My recollection is that the Minister went further, saying that only those who sought to resist by non-violent means could be given support. That is palpable nonsense. The difficulty is that the distinction that the hon. Gentleman seeks to draw between terrorists and freedom fighters, for example, is not always apparent at the time. It is an awful lot easier to judge that distinction with the benefit of hindsight and the clarity of history, but the clause makes no allowance for that point. In the case of Uzbekistan—my working example for the moment—we are relying extensively on the Uzbek Government for information on what happened in Andijan. That makes such judgments all the more difficult.

The hon. Gentleman is right: the benefit of hindsight is very great indeed. But even if one does not work on the assumption that history tends to be written by the winners—I do not offer myself that protection—we can safely say, for example, that Burma is an illegitimate state. In such circumstances, to criminalise someone who supports the attempts of the Karen National Liberation Army to overthrow that illegitimate state is wrong.

Indeed, and my own views on Burma are on the record, as are the hon. Gentleman's. The real difficulty that all who value democracy face if we pass this clause is how one resists an illegitimate Government once they have taken control of the mechanisms of the state. So far as I can see, the Government have so far provided no answer to that question. They have introduced a very wide-ranging Bill that would cover such situations, because it seeks to achieve a worldwide jurisdiction, regardless of the locus of the incident complained of. The hon. Gentleman is doing the Committee a great service in bringing this fundamental flaw to its attention.

The opening paragraph begins in a fairly straightforward way:

"In the Lenin Barracks in Barcelona, the day before I joined the militia, I saw an Italian militiaman standing in front of the officers' table."

It goes on to offer both encouragement of, and glorification of, what was to follow:

"Something in his face deeply moved me. It was the face of a man who would commit murder and throw away his life for a friend—the kind of face you would expect in an Anarchist, though as likely as not he was a Communist."

The encouragement and glorification is found at the end of the paragraph:

"Obviously he could not make head or tail of the map; obviously he regarded map-reading as a stupendous intellectual feat. I hardly know why, but I have seldom seen anyone—any man, I mean—to whom I have taken such an immediate liking."

That is the opening of an illustrious and well-known book written by Mr. Blair—Eric Blair. Those who find it easier to recognise him as George Orwell will also recognise that it is the start of "Homage to Catalonia", a book that unambiguously sought to praise those participants in the civil war in Spain who attempted to create a republic. Blair himself was open about, and proud of, his own involvement in that process as a "brigadista".

I am not sure that the family tradition of such political alliances still continues, but throughout the recent history of this country—and certainly within the Labour and internationalist movements, and in the history of our literature—"Homage to Catalonia" has been regarded not as a revolutionary tract, but as an honourable, distinguished and legitimate book. However, it falls foul of the Bill's definitions of acts of incitement of, and encouragement of, terrorism.

"Homage to Catalonia" was on the book list when I was doing my A-levels at Llanrwst school. It is a great book, but perhaps we should remind ourselves that the same author wrote "Nineteen Eighty-Four".

Had I read out a passage from "Homage to Catalonia", I would have chosen precisely the one that my hon. Friend chose. Is it not a fact that the Independent Labour party, which was part of the Labour party, glorified what was happening in Barcelona during the Spanish civil war—such as the violence committed against Franco—and that sections and individual members of the Labour party actually raised money to arm those in Barcelona who were resisting fascism, and sent over International Brigade troops? Did not distinguished Labour party and trade union members fight in Spain in a manner that would now be described as terrorism? If that happened now, the Labour party would doubtless be prosecuted under this Bill.

That is absolutely true, and it is precisely the reason why I and other Members from all parts of the House have tabled amendments to a clause that is an absurdity.

What the hon. Gentleman says about literature is entirely right, but does he not agree that precisely the same point applies to any historian writing in laudatory terms, and in an historical sense, about struggles in any part of the world?

I completely accept that point, which was also made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews). He said that the British Library cautioned the Government about the draconian consequences that would follow, were this House daft enough to pass legislation that included such terminology.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway also drew our attention to the question of fund-raising for such causes. I do not doubt the generosity of his hospitality toward those Members who were involved in the anti-apartheid struggle and supported the African National Congress. I suspect that he, like many of us, contributed cash to that process—cash that supported the ANC's work. To do so would now be seen as actively encouraging the actions that were then taken.

The huge danger is that the Government are treading into such areas without thinking through the consequences. The question has been raised of the position of Members of this House and members of the wider public who take issue with the actions and very existence of non-legitimate regimes throughout the world.

It is true that that case can be made about Burma, which has a wretched regime. Do we wish to make it a terrorist offence actively to speak about events in that country, and to encourage the resistance movement in such countries to pursue regime change? It is crazy to land ourselves in the position of gagging society and not allowing people to pledge their support or call for international support for those in domestic troubles who seek to free themselves from tyrannical regimes.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is a curious paradox here, in that on the one hand, it appears that it is proper for Governments to wage war to procure regime change in Iraq, whereas on the other, if we recommended that the citizens of Iraq should have risen up to destroy Saddam Hussein, we could be prosecuted in this country for doing that?

Indeed, that is a paradox. We seem to have drifted into the dreadful position whereby over the past few years, the international perspective has drifted away from a presumption that all countries should be held accountable to the international courts and the Geneva conventions. Instead we are allowing ourselves to drift into a world where the rules are written by the rich and powerful. If someone is in a position to conduct an illegal war and pursue regime change on that basis, they subsequently rewrite international law to justify that. But to invite, encourage or support people within tyrannical regimes to do precisely the same thing becomes a terrorist act. That is nonsense.

Does my hon. Friend recall the first President Bush, at the end of the first Gulf war, urging the Iraqi people to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein? Has he considered the possibility that had this Bill been in place at that time, the President would have been guilty of an offence under British law, and subject to seven years' imprisonment?

Indeed, there are considerations that might make me think again about the unexpected virtues to be found in such a Bill—but I doubt whether that is the sort of person who would be hauled before the British courts.

The President would have been fighting a legal war—unlike the one that his son pursued—but, given the international scope of the Bill, he would simultaneously have found himself on the wrong side of the domestic law of the United Kingdom. Even somebody pursuing an internationally legal action could find that action illegal under this ridiculous Bill.

That highlights the paradoxes and absurdities in the Bill.

A couple of weeks ago, Parliament added to the list of proscribed organisations an Uzbek organisation calling for the removal of the Karimov regime and free democratic elections. Apparently we did so on the advice of the intelligence services that the group in question was responsible for acts of terrorism within its own country. Two days later, in The Guardian, the then British ambassador to Uzbekistan took issue with that and, as someone who had visited the sites where it was claimed that acts of terrorism had taken place, said that they all bore the hallmarks of Government killings, with an attempt to set up the notion that they had been committed by terrorists, although there was no evidence to support that claim.

We know that Uzbekistan is a regime with a wretched record of persecuting its own citizens, torturing them and boiling them in oil. It is a horrible regime by any standards, and we ought to be able to call on the international community and the domestic communities to remove it—but under the definition in the Bill, we would not be allowed to do so.

The far-reaching consequences of the Bill in its current form are so draconian as to provide legislation that could virtually have been drafted for us by al-Qaeda. If we want to see acts that destroy the framework of liberties, confidence in democracy, accountability to the judiciary and rights of representation, they are to be found enshrined in much of the panic legislation that has been pushed through this House as an extension of the war in Iraq in the form of a war on our own liberties. We are doing what al-Qaeda sought to do by other means, and society will not thank us for it.

Those who say that there are lock-in provisions in the preconditions about encouragement, glorification and emulation need to look at clause 1(4), which points out that it is

"irrelevant . . . whether any person is in fact encouraged or induced by the statement to commit, prepare or instigate any such . . . offence."

So it does not matter what people do; it is the act of saying or writing that constitutes the criminal offence—indeed, the terrorist offence—under the Bill.

I know that my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway ducked the question about extraterrestrial activities—I assume that that should have been "extra-territorial"—but I want to draw the attention of the House to the fact that an in-house consequence would follow from the Bill, under the current definition of terrorism. I know that we will come to that at a later stage, but people such as myself who have pledged to be part of the Green Gloves campaign against the growing of genetically modified crops, were they to be allowed in the UK—those of us who will doubtless go out and seek to remove those crops and replace them with organic non-contaminating crops—would be in breach of the Terrorism Bill; and also if we made the intellectual and political case for doing that.

There are many people outside the House who are extremely happy to see the definition of terrorism widened in a way that will allow global corporate interests to define civilian and domestic opposition to the policies that they are trying to push through, not as acts of resistance by consumers but as acts of environmental terrorism—a phrase that they are already beginning to use. They will use exactly the same terms as appear in clause 1, and say that people are guilty of acts of encouragement, glorification and encouraging others to emulate what they have done—and thus are committing terrorist offences.

The dangers of criminalising the whole framework of social protest and resistance within our own society is a dreadful draconian step. I would love it if the Bill would allow us to prosecute the President of the United States, but he will not be brought before the courts. Neither will the Baptist minister in the United States who, interviewed on Channel 4 News last week, openly said, with regard to the 7/7 bombings in London, that the only shame about it was that 1 million people were not killed. He said that England deserved to be bombed in that way. Will he be branded as a terrorist? Will he be brought to trial before the UK courts? No.

The Rev. Pat Robertson, the head of the Christian Coalition in the United States, will not be brought to trial here either, although he has openly, on television, called for the assassination of the elected President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. No one like that will be brought before the courts, but Muslim lads in this country making similar claims or criticisms about events in the middle east are precisely the ones who will be picked up. They will be defined as being in breach of the terms of the Bill, because it is not directed at crazy mullahs who are notionally on "our" side, but only at the crazies on other people's sides.

The real danger is that the Bill is a first step down the path that leads us away from judging people on what they do. In the end, we will all be judged—by our own courts or by international courts—on the acts that we commit. However, we are starting to move away from that premise and to judge people, in broad and speculative terms, on what they say.

The next step will be to judge people on what they think. For me, that is the hallmark of a society that is beginning to retreat from the founding and fundamental principles of an open and democratic society, and to take its Parliament, institutions and citizens into dark days of tyranny. That is why I urge the House to support amendments that will change this absurd clause.

I strongly disapprove of some of the shocking statements made by extremist preachers in recent years that have been reported in the newspapers. Offence is caused to the public when the events of 9/11 are referred to in a way that seems to heap praise on the perpetrators. In addition, great grief is caused to the victims of events such as the bombings on the London underground when they read that preachers are allowed to say things that appear to extol the virtues of the people who carried out those acts.

In most circumstances, moreover, inciting people to violence in the cause of some political purpose, however worthy, is something of which the law and Parliament ought to disapprove. Certainly, I strongly disapprove of inciting people to indiscriminate violence against members of the public in any part of the world. Many hon. Members feel sympathy for the various causes of struggling or oppressed peoples around the world, but I trust that none would give encouragement to those wanting to blow up school buses, for instance, in the territory of some odious regime.

I will in just a second. I think that the body of law that we have in this country protects us quite adequately against such extremes. I always concede that the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) is an up-to-date, practising and very distinguished lawyer, whereas I am very out of date and long extinct, at least in legal work. I shall not repeat what he has said already, but I have no doubt that no prosecutor would have any difficulty when it came to producing an adequate charge under the general heading "incitement to violence". Such an offence is quite easily covered by the ordinary law of the land, and under the terrorist legislation that the House has passed over recent years.

It is interesting to note that, until recently, no one was prosecuted for such incitement, even though some cases have been very blatant. For example, preachers have used very extreme language that must have caused offence. Their praise for the work of "heroic" terrorists must have been calculated to incite others to repeat and emulate it. The attitudes of the Government, the police and the prosecuting authorities have undergone a remarkable change in recent times. I have no doubt that some of the more blatant cases have not been prosecuted because the police and prosecuting authorities have decided—as a matter of public policy—that, however offensive statements might be, it would do more harm than good to bring them before the courts.

I cannot agree with an approach that I consider to be unbelievably nervous and cautious. I should be very surprised if Home Office Ministers had not been involved in discussions in which it was decided that the good that might be achieved by making martyrs of some preachers by sending them to prison—and there is no doubt those drawn to self-publicity would quite enjoy that martyrdom—would be outweighed by the trouble that would be stirred up among the extreme elements of misguided youth in our cities. With hindsight, I say that that decision may not have been wise.

It is extraordinary, however, that the Government's opinion has swung so far away from that position that, as a matter of public policy, we now have to add a new offence that goes far beyond what is necessary to cover incitement to violence by extreme religious and political leaders. The Bill will make unlawful quite ordinary—albeit controversial—statements that many people in this country might make in the course of exercising their undoubted right of free speech.

It is totally unnecessary to introduce the indirect offence of encouraging terrorism, especially when the Bill uses such mild words to describe what a person might do. Plainly, clause 1 has been designed to make it extremely easy to convict people for making comparatively moderate statements.

This Committee stage is subject to a guillotine and, although I accept that the Government have been more generous than has been the case in the past, there is no point in my repeating the countless examples that have been given in the debate already of the words from literature, for instance, that would be caught by clause 1. As has been noted, the words of the Prime Minister's wife would also be caught.

The whole point of the clause appears to be to make a new offence of encouraging, directly or indirectly, the preparation or commission of an act of terrorism. Yet the word "encourage" is not especially strong. Warm words might be sufficient to trigger the offence of encouragement. For instance, a person might say that he or she understands why a course of action is taken, or that the shock or dismay caused might not be too great. There is no need for someone to urge another to go out and perform a terrorist act, as the use of polite and understanding language could clearly be taken as encouragement by someone already inclined to perform such an act.

What on earth is meant by the term "other inducement", in the context of someone who is starting to think about preparing an act of terrorism? Perhaps the draftsmen had in mind newspaper stories—I suspect that they are somewhat exaggerated—that suggest that a vision of heaven is held out to some misguided fanatics, who consequently believe that they will enjoy all sorts of earthly and sensual delights if they die as martyrs.

As my hon. Friend says, such people are offered paradise as an inducement to commit an act of terrorism. However, it is still a big step for the young people concerned to take, even given the visions of pleasure that are held out to them.

Another problem has to do with what will happen if someone says, "Well, I don't agree but I'm sure God will forgive a person's sins if he performs a terrorist act." Is that an inducement to go out and prepare to commit an act of terrorism? I think that it is, which proves my point that the Bill will catch words that are really quite mild.

I think that we should stick to the words used by the Prime Minister's wife, with whom I often sympathise. She is subjected to more public criticism because of her marriage than would be the case if she were a public figure in any other circumstances. In last week's debate on Second Reading, the Home Secretary merely asserted that the Bill would not catch what the Prime Minister's wife so famously said. I have not the first idea why the right hon. Gentleman asserted that. We need to hear some supporting argument, as I believe that it is clear that what she said would be caught by the Bill.

I shall come to that in a moment, but for now I want to endorse what has been said by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and by the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, among others. I agree that it is completely unacceptable that a person could commit the proposed offence merely through carelessness or negligence. If it is judged that there is reasonable cause to believe that a member of the public might feel a bit encouraged by something that is said to him or her, that amounts to what I suppose we are meant to regard as a serious criminal offence.

That is completely unacceptable, and the proposal should never have been presented to the House. For me, the strongest point in the discussion about clause 1 is that the intention to incite terrorism must be the minimum requirement in an offence of indirect incitement. The role of intention is fundamental in the creation of an offence of that kind. If intention were necessary, it would explain why the provision is not otiose because it would provide an alternative form of words to those already on the statute book. I would accept that it should be an offence for someone to intend to incite someone else to act in preparation for or commission of terrorism. As it is, I think that that is already covered, but I would not object to the provision. I would regard that as a grave offence and it should carry heavy penalties, unless it is part of some absurd drunken outburst, but the provision would touch on all sorts of forms of words and mean that all kinds of literature, speeches or stray remarks could be seen as encouraging preparation for terrorism if some member of the public happened to hear them and was affected in that way. That is unacceptable.

When we have put such points to Ministers, the response has been—as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) just pointed out—"Ah, but the Attorney-General would not prosecute." In many cases, this House rightly passes laws, but because we know that the law might be exploited and ridiculous litigation might result—because people with particular interests might use it against their rivals in some political or religious dispute—we make it a condition that the Attorney-General, as a Law Officer of the Crown, is the only person who can bring a conviction. That removes the abuse of the threat of prosecution and the Attorney-General can ensure that a prosecution would involve a serious issue of public policy before it is brought. However, I have never known that practice to be taken to the lengths to which it is taken in the Bill. The need for the Attorney-General's approval should not be used to try to rescue a uselessly drafted piece of legislation that might criminalise works of literature. The examples already given have illustrated the absurdity of the clause. It should not be an answer to say, "Well, of course, all kinds of extraordinary things might be made unlawful by the Bill, but let us just pass this catch-all legislation and rely on the wise Attorney-General to ensure that only serious criminals face prosecution." I strongly urge against such an approach to legislation.

Throughout today, we should apply the test that the Government have applied when exhorting us all not to be soft on terrorism and to pass various other aspects of this legislation. If we are all fearful of the increased risk of terrorism—I suspect that we will face it for many years to come—we should ask of the proposals whether any sensible person would feel any safer if they were passed. That is the right test, and I would advise the most nervous of my fellow citizens, who lie awake at night worrying about the threat of terrorism, that they should not be deceived into thinking that clause 1 would make the slightest difference to their predicament. It is ridiculous and absurd, and it should never have been brought before us.

The Bill has been dragged together to give the impression of a dynamic and tough Government who are taking firm action in response to the recent outrages. If all they can produce to demonstrate firm action is this absurd legislation, the House has a duty to throw it out. If the Government begin the four days of proceedings on the Bill by defending such a provision, I fear what they will say when it comes to other significant elements within it.

I am grateful to be called to speak in this highly important debate on proposals that, if they were accepted without change, would threaten the very civil liberties that every Briton expects. I shall begin by making it clear that I believe that there is no excuse for terrorism. Terrorism is evil. Terrorists take the lives of innocent men, women and children. Terrorists maim and injure innocent men, women and children. There must never be any excuse for them and, when caught, they must face the severest punishment. There must be a war on terrorism so that we can continue to live in a free society without fear. We must be tough on terrorism. We must punish those who threaten the order of democracy and freedom in this country by undertaking terrorist activities. And if I thought for one minute that these clauses would reduce terrorism, I would vote for them—but I do not.

The question is whether the provisions would reduce terrorism or encourage it. In my opinion, an offence of encouragement and glorification of terrorism would encourage terrorism rather than reduce it. The provisions add nothing to the existing law that is in place to deal with terrorist suspects. These additions to the current terrorism legislation would do little or nothing that cannot be achieved by existing laws.

The proposed offence of encouragement and glorification of terrorism would restrict the freedom of speech that we have in this country. Moreover, this offence would further disillusion those people who are targets for terrorist propaganda—those groups in our communities who feel that they have been denied the opportunity of free speech on this issue. That could encourage them to support, rather than prevent them from supporting or even committing acts of terrorism.

If someone glorifies terrorism in any way, they could be charged under the current offence of incitement to commit an existing terrorist offence or—perhaps better—their comments could be exposed and dealt with freely in our society, which allows for argument and debate. What we as a country need to do is expose those people who glorify terrorism, and then present our arguments to them through the television, radio, newspapers, the internet and even in the local pub. Line by line, we should expose why their views on terrorism are wrong, flawed and evil. It is free speech, argument and leadership that win people over. It is regimes such as Stalin's, Hitler's and Saddam Hussein's that think that people can be won over by denying free speech. If Governments restrict people over what they can say, they tread a dangerous path indeed.

We have been here before. The hon. Member for Belfast, West (Mr. Adams), who appeared to be a spokesman for the IRA—undoubtedly terrorists—had his free speech restricted. We all remember the ridiculous occasions when he appeared on television with his voice dubbed by an actor because of the restrictions imposed by a previous Government. When we finally heard the real voice of the hon. Gentleman, it was less eloquent than that of the actor. But those restrictions succeeded only in giving credence to the IRA. Had we instead argued the case against his views, we would have exposed the IRA and not acted as a recruiting sergeant. Why have we not learnt from that episode? Trying to silence people in such circumstances does not work. It allows extreme minority arguments to grow out of proportion, and it plays into the hands of terrorists.

I would have preferred it if some practical solutions to the problems of countering terrorism had been included in the Bill. We have heard much talk about counter-terrorism methods through the law, but what exactly has been done in practice to improve security on the tube since 7 July?

Order. This is a wide set of amendments, but the hon. Gentleman is going even wider. Will he please bring his attention back to the amendments?

I was just trying to say that there are better ways to approach the issue than to attack the freedom of every person in this country to say what they feel. I do not understand how banning the glorification of terrorism will prevent terrorism. It plays into the hands of the people who want to do such things. That is an Alice-in-Wonderland approach—completely the wrong way round.

The provisions should be rejected for three reasons. First, they are unnecessary; there are laws already in place, so why create new ones? Secondly, they restrict the individual's freedom of speech. The third reason—to my mind, the main one—is the great danger that the provisions will encourage rather than reduce terrorism.

Order. Before I call the next speaker, it might help the Committee if I say that the winding-up speeches are likely to start at around five minutes past 3. Several hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye; they should bear the time constraints in mind when they speak. I call Mr. Llwyd.

I am obliged to you, Mr. Forth.

I rise to speak to amendments Nos. 62 and 63, both of which stand in my name and the names of my colleagues in Plaid Cymru and the Scottish National party. Picking up the remark made by the hon. Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone) that we do not need new legislation, I shall go through the existing legislation.

By virtue of section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, it is already an offence to

"encourage, persuade, or endeavour to persuade . . . any person, to murder any other person".

Under section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, it is already an offence to counsel or procure any other person to commit any indictable offence. Under the common law it is an offence to solicit or incite another person to commit any indictable offence. Under section 59 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to incite

"another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the United Kingdom".

Under section 1A of the Criminal Law Act 1977, it is an offence to conspire with others to commit offences outside the United Kingdom. Under section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to invite support for a proscribed terrorist organisation.

Taking into account that raft of existing legislation, my firm belief is that we do not need new legislation. It would be far better to enforce the current law properly. The knee-jerk reaction of the present Government is always to create a new offence.

Is the hon. Gentleman saying that the points made by other hon. Members in relation to George Orwell, Uzbekistan and Burma are not relevant to the debate because powers already exist?

I believe that, under existing legislation, inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation is an offence, as is conspiring with others to commit offences outside the United Kingdom and inciting another person to commit an act of terrorism wholly or partly outside the UK.

This an important point. A host of speakers have suggested that the Bill will create a new problem by widening the remit, but the hon. Gentleman is arguing that the powers already exist. Is the hon. Gentleman countering the point made by those other speakers?

The problem with the Bill is that it widens the remit and lowers the threshold of proof. "Conspire", "incite", "solicit" and "invite" are legally definable words, with specific intent attached. In clause 1, however, we have a mish-mash whereby someone could find him or herself in prison for seven years for negligently having supported some form of terrorism in the past. The National Library of Wales is extremely concerned about scholars there writing about acts of alleged terrorism in days gone by, because those treatises and scholarly works may well be caught up in this ridiculous, uncalled for Bill.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that Labour Members fail to understand the Opposition parties' view that the clauses are dangerous, and is not his point that they are also unnecessary?

They are unnecessary, but if we are to have them, for heaven's sake, let us have a proper legal basis for the offence. We should adopt the traditional route of mens rea—a guilty mind. At the very least, there should be the intent to commit an offence, rather than stumbling into it. On that point, I pray in aid of my amendments, which would introduce a requirement of intent and replace "are likely to" with "will", a letter of support from the Law Society of Scotland, which came to me via my good friend the hon. Member for Moray (Angus Robertson). The hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) asked why there is a difference between clause 1, which refers to what members of the public "will" understand, and other clauses, which refer to what they are "likely to" understand. I have not heard his question answered by a Government Member.

All the amendments in the group row in the same direction. My hon. Friends and I do not intend to press our amendments, because their purport is covered by other amendments, not least the ones tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews).

We have been drawn into the Bill—I shall not say dishonestly, because that would be unparliamentary, but let me say that we have been drawn into it slowly but surely by the Home Secretary. On 20 July, he said:

"indirect incitement, when it is done with the intention of inciting others to commit acts of terrorism—that is an important qualification—will become a criminal offence."—[Official Report, 20 July 2005; Vol. 436, c. 1254.]

That is, more or less, where the argument has focused today. On 6 October, in relation to amended draft clauses for the Bill, the Home Secretary stated that

"the offender must have also intended to incite further acts of terror".

The requirement that a person can be guilty of encouraging terrorism only when they intend to encourage further acts of terror is also found in article 5 of the Council of Europe convention on the prevention of terrorism, which requires signatories to criminalise

"the distribution, or otherwise making available of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence."

The explanatory notes state that clause 1

"has been introduced to implement the requirements of Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism",

but as drafted, the clause contains no such requirement on the prosecution to prove that the accused intended to incite or encourage further acts of terrorism. Under the clause, it is sufficient that a defendant merely had "reasonable grounds" to believe that another member of the public, however unreasonable that hypothetical person may be, might understand his or her words as a direct or indirect encouragement to prepare, commit or even instigate an act of terrorism.

I am saddened by the fact that we are debating the Bill today. Such a Bill does nothing for Parliament. Only a few months ago, Parliament sought to criminalise Brian Haw, the protester who sits outside Parliament—and a right dog's breakfast Parliament made of that. Given the curtailing of every debate in this place, it is no wonder that we have been making rotten law. Rotten law is one thing, but a law that might criminalise and imprison a person for seven years for saying, without thinking about committing or intending to commit an offence, something that might be offensive is more than rotten: it is undesirable and insidious, as well. I am embarrassed by the whole process and I do not think that we would have slipped into this sort of debate 10 years ago.

The Government want to act tough. Every time, they react by creating a new offence. Earlier today in Prime Minister's questions, I referred to 700 criminal offences that have been introduced—seven per month, or almost two a week. That is ridiculous, and of all the new offences, the ones set out in the first clauses of this Bill will be the worst. If the hon. and learned Member for Medway presses his amendment, I hope that many hon. Members on both sides of the Committee will vote in favour of it, because he is absolutely right. We should appreciate the fact that he speaks from experience and vote accordingly.

Throughout this debate we need to focus our minds on the problem that we are trying to solve; otherwise, we shall get into an abstract debate about the legislation. Despite the argument that some right hon. and hon. Members have made that there is no case for any change in the law, I think that there is broad agreement across the Committee that there is a particular problem that we are anxious to tackle, and that if current legislation is not satisfactory, we need in principle to consider new legislation. That particular problem is the role played by those who are attempting as we speak to draw young people in this country into active involvement in terrorist activity of the sort that we saw in London in July. There is a reasonable case for saying that in practice we have found existing legislation inadequate to deal with that, and that we should introduce new legislation. I hope that the Government will today recognise the extent to which the willingness to consider new legislation is accepted on both sides of the Committee, and therefore accept the strength of criticism of the way in which they have gone about trying to legislate for that change.

There are a number of real problems with the legislation. At the end of the day, the test of it will be whether the number of young people in this country brought into terrorism is reduced by at least one. The test is not one of elegance or of accord with international treaties. We have some problems, because we know relatively little about the path that is followed by a person who ends up becoming a suicide bomber. We believe that the radical extremist preachers or agitators play a role in that process, but we are not quite clear what role they play and what other processes those young people undergo before becoming suicide bombers. One thing we do know, though, from the Home Office/Foreign Office assessment of young Muslims in extremism which was leaked a few months ago is that one of the motivating factors is a belief that our laws are not even-handed—that they are biased; that they betray double standards.

If we pass the Bill in its current form, to give any active encouragement directly or indirectly to, for example, the resistance in Chechnya—not all of those involved are the murderers of Beslan; a variety of groups are involved—would clearly be an offence. However, it would be perfectly legal in this country to stand up and say, "The problem with the Russians in Chechnya is that they haven't yet killed enough Chechens." There would be no bar on saying that or indeed on urging the Russian Government to kill more Chechens. That seems to represent a lack of symmetry in the law, which is uncomfortable.

That is not a debating point. Such an imbalance in the law is exactly what is exploited in every community. Every single one of us who has ever sat down with Muslims in our communities who are not terrorists has heard them say that the trouble is that there are double standards. The Government's decision to entrench those double standards further is very dangerous, as is the reliance on the Director of Public Prosecutions. We have all chucked around fantasy cases such as prosecution of the President of the United States, but the truth is that such cases will not arise. Cases will be brought only when the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Attorney-General decides politically which type of agitation we wish to prosecute.

That is very different from the role played by another controversial Bill, the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill, under which, as the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) was saying, we are asking law officers to set a threshold of seriousness below which trivial cases will not be prosecuted. This Bill is not about a threshold of seriousness. It is about asking the DPP or the Attorney-General to make a political choice about which type of encouragement to violence we wish to prosecute and which we do not. My concern is not so much how many cases will come before the courts, because there will be very few, if any, but the way in which that will be presented in the country by those who are trying to draw our young people into terrorist activity.

A case could be made for dropping the entire exercise of clause 1 and related clauses. I am reluctant to do that. I am persuaded that there is a case for setting some standard or limit on what can be said in these areas that is clearly and demonstrably supportable, but it must be based on the problem that we are trying to tackle and solve. That problem is not animal rights extremism or the Provisional IRA—we did not have the Act when the Provisional IRA was setting off bombs, but the Home Secretary retrospectively sought to use that as a justification for these clauses—but al-Qaeda's type of terrorism and in particular its wilful use of the slaughter of civilians as a tactic.

I shall not test your patience, Mr. Forth, by going into the debate that we will have tomorrow on the test of terrorism, but we have two problems with the clauses that we need to consider together: first, the threshold for prosecution is too low; and secondly, the definition of terrorism is too broad. The Government need to indicate clearly a willingness to deal with both those matters.

The case put by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about qualifying an absolute dependence on intent with the concept of reckless indifference has quite a lot to commend it. There is a serious issue with an intent-only test failing to get prosecutions in circumstances where most people would think that that would be reasonable. I hope that the Government will indicate some willingness to look seriously at that. The case has been well made that if juries are capable of judging whether someone has shown encouragement or inducement, or has negligently encouraged terrorism, they do not need the guidance of the clause on the glorification of terrorism. Juries are capable of working it out for themselves or they are not.

We need to be clear that the test is not whether people like us are offended or scared by people whom we see interviewed on "Newsnight". That is not the test or the purpose of this legislation; it is whether we prevent any young people from being drawn into terrorism. My fear is that, as currently drafted, the clauses are likely to make things worse rather than better.

I shall speak to amendments Nos. 97, 95 and 96, which are in my name, and wish to do so in the context of the Home Secretary's declaration on the front of the Bill that, in his view, its provisions are compatible with the European convention on human rights.

I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. We will no doubt produce a report on this issue, and I do not claim that my views are those of the Committee, but we have heard a great deal of evidence and opinion on whether the measures in the Bill—particularly clause 1—are compatible. I want to give the Committee some information with which I agree and which suggests that they are not compatible.

The Government claim that clause 1 seeks to implement article 5 of the European convention on the prevention of terrorism, which they signed on 16 May 2005. Indeed, paragraph 20 of the explanatory notes states:

"The offence has been introduced to implement the requirements of Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of Terrorism . . . This requires State parties to have an offence of 'public provocation to commit a terrorist offence'. This new offence supplements the existing common law offence of incitement to commit an offence."

In fact, article 5 does not end at that point. It is headed "Article 5—Public provocation to commit a terrorist offence" and continues:

"For the purposes of this Convention, 'public provocation to commit a terrorist offence' means the distribution, or otherwise making available, of a message to the public, with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist offence, where such conduct, whether or not directly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed."

It is critical that we understand the difference between the wording of the article that the Government seek to implement and the wording of clause 1. Article 5 clearly requires specific intent, which we have discussed, whereas under clause 1 it is sufficient for the perpetrator to have "reasonable grounds" for believing that

"members of the public to whom the statement is or is to be published are likely to understand it as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences."

My amendments are distinct from other amendments in the group, because they require the intended outcome as the commission of a terrorist offence, not just its preparation or instigation. To borrow the wording of article 5, they deal with an act that

"causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed".

In his evidence to the Joint Committee, the Home Secretary made it clear that the clause will apply not just to so-called Islamic terrorists but to animal rights terrorists. I urge the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) to bear that in mind. My constituency is plagued by animal rights terrorism, and people who defend animal rights make the point that violence begets violence, so violence against animals warrants a response. They believe that research laboratories are either a legitimate target for action or—this would be a lesser incitement—places of torture and that it is therefore legitimate to damage them. I clearly do not support such statements, but the Committee should bear it in mind that, according to the Home Secretary's declaration, the Bill is intended to cover that general incitement.

In arguing that the Bill does not comply with the European convention on human rights we should remember how much store the European Court sets by its case law and jurisprudence on freedom of speech, particularly article 10.2 of the ECHR. In paragraph 2 of its ruling on the case of Ceylan v. Turkey it said:

"Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and each individual's self-fulfilment."

Consequently, any proposed restrictions must be subjected to close scrutiny to determine whether the measure is both necessary and proportionate, and complies with the grounds on which the right may be limited under article 10.2.

On the questions of necessity, clarity and intention, clause 1 fails the test, as it does on the issue of using the right words for the danger of causing someone to commit a terrorist offence. It therefore falls short of our duty to comply with the ECHR. In a recent case, el-Faisal used language that, the Government would accept, should be caught. He was convicted under existing law of a number of offences, including solicitation to murder under section 4 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, as the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) said. That provision is likely to be used in a current sub judice case. The question of whether clause 1 is necessary is therefore key.

There are problems with intention, and I shall not repeat what has been said. However, the minimum requirement is that the clause should provide for intention. As for the causal link with violence, clause 1 merely requires that "members of the public" to whom a statement is published are likely to understand it as "encouragement" to undertake terrorist acts. There is no requirement to show that anyone is, in fact, encouraged by the statement, and causality is further attenuated because members of the public can include anyone in the world, depending on the way in which the statement is published. There are therefore concerns that the provision is too wide to fulfil our obligations. Paragraph 100 of the explanatory notes to the Council of Europe's convention on the prevention of terrorism states that

"the result of such an act must be to cause a danger that such an offence might be committed. When considering whether such danger is caused, the nature of the author and of the addressee of the message, as well as the context in which the offence is committed shall be taken into account in the sense established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. The significance and credible nature of the danger should be considered when applying this provision in accordance with the requirements of domestic law."

No such provision appears in the Bill, so amendments Nos. 97, 95 and 96 seek to introduce one. Will the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety explain why she has not used the wording of the convention on the prevention of terrorism? Does she believe that it is equivalent to the wording of the Bill? No one who gave evidence to the Joint Committee thought that it was, and the wording of the clause is wider than the wording of the convention.

Finally, are we talking about what is know as an "apologie du terrorisme" in European case law? The language of the convention avoids such terms and phraseology, and there is no evidence that such terminology should be included. Is it right for the Government to use terms that many people deem equivalent to such language? Justice says that if clause 1 is not to breach the right to free expression under article 10.2 of the ECHR, a court would have to agree that the restrictions that it imposes on free expression are made in pursuance of a legitimate aim. I accept that the Government are pursuing a legitimate aim in the clause, but we must consider whether they strike a fair balance between the fundamental right to fair expression and a proportionate attempt to pursue their aim. My view—and I fear that this may well be happen if the clause is passed unamended—is that the European court will not find that to be the case, so I urge the Minister to clarify the thinking behind the provision.

I urge the Committee to support my amendments, as we must make sure that we protect freedom of speech. We should recognise that the Government have a legitimate aim, but it must be balanced by other rights. The amendments achieve that, but the clause does not.

Order. I intend to call the Minister to make her winding-up speech at about 3.10 pm. Three experienced Members are seeking to catch my eye. I shall say no more than that, and leave decisions to them.

I speak as the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, where two of the four outrages on 7 July took place. I am proud to represent a substantial number of the emergency personnel who worked so hard in desperate difficulties that day.

For me, as for everyone in the Chamber, it is not a question of whether we try to counter terrorism but of how best we try to do so. It is worth remembering that no mature democracy has ever been overthrown by terrorism—not a single one. The misguided individuals directly involved in terrorism may believe that they can achieve that, but the people behind them, who want to cause us to bring our institutions into disrepute, do not. One of our great claims is that, broadly speaking, we have an open society in which people can say what they think. Rightly, we have constraints on that, and incitement to violence by word of mouth or by written material is already an offence. There is therefore no need to introduce an additional clause. It is unnecessary, but if it were introduced it would be exploited by the people behind the terrorists, to illustrate that we are a set of canting hypocrites whose laws are not even-handed and involve double standards in their application.

We must remember that if we want to make sure that we minimise the possible sympathisers with terrorists currently in our country, we must convince those people that they are full-blown British citizens with the same rights as everyone else, and that they are not likely to be discriminated against by the police, through the laws or in any other way. If we pass the clause as drafted, we will be doing just that and doing what the enemies of our decent standards want us to do.

As a member of the anti-apartheid movement all my adult life, I contributed money, organised meetings and went on marches. I am proud to say that when I was in South Africa a few years ago and somebody attempted to introduce me to a member of President Mandela's first Cabinet, they responded, "It's all right—I know Frank. I slept on his floor when I was in exile." I would have been caught by the new law. If I were caught by the law for supporting the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, it would be a very bad law.

The case has been made from all parts of the Committee that the glorification provision should be eliminated from the Bill. Little more needs to be said, save that what was left in the Bill if it were taken out would provide a reasonable basis on which prosecutions could take place. By keeping glorification in the Bill, we merely make the provisions of clause 1 indefensible.

There is another issue, which I touched on in relation to the Catholic martyrs of the 16th century. In the context of Islamic fundamentalism, there is the question of glorification, its relationship to martyrdom and the connection between Islam and politics. As Gandhi once said, those who do not understand the connection between religion and politics do not understand what religion is all about. In relation to the criminal law of terrorism, it is extremely dangerous for us to get into the difficulties inherent in mixing up the glorification of acts that are themselves connected with a religious view of life.

I refer to one or two cases in which the argument for removing the glorification provision is well made. In the trial of Tom Paine for publication of "Rights of Man" in 1792 and ever since then, English law has never penalised those who praised conduct that would be described as deplorable. Instead, we have convicted those whose language, by intention or foreseeable effect, leads to the commission of violence or disorder.

That principle was applied in the case of Rex v. Caunt in 1947 in a decision by Mr. Justice Birkett. In that case, the editor of a local Morecambe newspaper was prosecuted for seditious libel, alleged to have been committed when he published an anti-Semitic article after the public hanging in Palestine of two young British sergeants. In many respects the article was no less provocative than some of the broadcasts that we have heard recently on the BBC and other channels, but Mr. Justice Birkett advised the jury that they could not return a verdict of guilty on the ground that the editor's intention was to provoke merely hostility or ill-will between Jews and non-Jews—more was required. Mr. Justice Birkett said that

"sedition has always had implicit in the word public disorder, tumult, insurrections or matters of that kind".

The gentleman in question was acquitted when the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.

The principle that Mr. Justice Birkett applied was sound. If we include the glorification provision, we will create a new crime of uncertain definition, which will be thoroughly counter-productive.

I know you want me to be brief, Mr. Forth, and I will be. In any event, I had the good fortune to speak in the Second Reading debate.

I find myself in total agreement with the right hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Frank Dobson). His criticisms of the Bill, and especially of the clause, are shared widely among hon. Members. I suspect that the Government will be alarmed by the fact that in this afternoon's debate not one voice has been raised in favour of the Government's position.

The right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) posed the right questions for the Committee to address: first, is the threshold of the Bill too low; secondly, is the definition of terrorism too broad; and, thirdly, will it prevent anybody from being drawn into terrorism? When we consider the amendments, we should address precisely those questions. I share the right hon. Gentleman's view, so I support the amendments tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) and by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve).

As for whether the threshold is too low, I say it is manifestly so. There ought to be the specific intent referred to by the hon. and learned Member for Medway. The glorification clause set out in subsection (2) should be struck out because it goes far, far too wide and would penalise many statements made by hon. Members over many years in many different circumstances.

I am well aware that we will address the second question—the broadness of the definition—in some detail tomorrow. Suffice it to say that I find it extraordinary that we are not making allowance for acts that many people would characterise as those of freedom fighters. It is bizarre, as I observed to the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson), that it is legitimate for the Government to go to war against Iraq to procure regime change, yet if we had urged the citizens of Iraq—as we did, incidentally, in the first Gulf war—to rise up against the regime of Saddam Hussein, we would have been committing an offence under the Bill.

My final point addresses the last point made by the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen: will the Bill prevent anybody from being drawn into terrorism? I believe not, because I think it will create martyrs. However, we must consider the proportionality of the response. If a catch-all provision of the kind contemplated in clause 1 and in particular in subsection (2) also renders unlawful many acts that in all conscience should never be treated as unlawful, even if it did prevent one person from being drawn into terrorism, it would be wrong.

Even if it is true, as I acknowledge, that the filter of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Attorney-General is available in appropriate cases—which will prevent prosecutions in the majority of cases, as I said before—nevertheless, the fear of prosecution will be a real check on free speech. Societies that undermine free speech are beginning to destroy the process by which they remain democratic. We go down that road at our peril.

I have listened carefully to all the contributions to this afternoon's debate, which has been fascinating, although we strayed into existential philosophy at one point. I will do my best to answer the serious points about the threshold, the requirements for offences and the safeguards to protect people from inappropriate prosecutions.

I want to discuss the framing of clause 1. In framing the Bill, we have been very conscious of our obligation to our partners in the Council of Europe. In order to ratify the Council of Europe convention on the prevention of terrorism, we must create an offence of incitement to terrorism, whether direct or indirect. Several hon. Members, including the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) and the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), have said that existing laws are sufficient because we have sufficient powers on the statute book to achieve our objective. There is an offence of directly inciting people to murder, but there is no offence of directly inciting people to terrorist acts. In other words, there is an offence of direct incitement to get someone to do a specific thing, but we do not have an indirect incitement offence, and in order to ratify the Council of Europe convention, we must introduce one.

I am pleased that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has said that he supports indirect incitement becoming a criminal offence. Opposition Members are clearly divided on the matter, as are hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. Some hon. Members genuinely think that we should have on the statute book an offence of indirect incitement in accordance with our convention obligations and our international obligations—in those terms, it would be an offence of public provocation, and in terms of the UN Security Council resolution, it would be an offence of glorification. To those hon. Members who do not believe that we need an offence of indirect incitement, I say that the Government believe that such an offence is necessary. We will discuss glorification, but we must have an offence of indirect incitement.

What about the question of intent, which was raised on Second Reading as well as today? The Government ignore that part of the convention.

I shall deal with that issue in detail and hope to convince hon. Members that it is a matter not of ignoring the convention, but trying to get a practical law that actually works. I am interested in the matter, despite our forays into existential philosophy.

I will give way to the hon. Gentleman, but I am disappointed that he has not been in Committee for the whole debate. Today, we have had a really good argument, which I have followed from the beginning. It is important to develop arguments in Committee, so I will be disappointed if he does not make a serious point.

The Minister is most unfair, because I have sat through 95 per cent. of this afternoon's proceedings. I may have been inconspicuous. If what Cherie Blair said would not be criminalised under clause 1, will the Minister provide a single, concrete example of indirect incitement to terrorism that would be criminalised and that would not be caught by existing statute?

The hon. Gentleman is a very conspicuous character, so if he had been in Committee for 95 per cent. of the debate, I would have noticed. I will come to the comments that have been made about various people's statements—for example, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) raised that very issue. It is invidious for Ministers to stand at the Dispatch Box and say what is criminal and what is not, because those are matters for the courts to decide.

There are very serious concerns whether people can say, "Wasn't it fantastic what happened on 7 July?", knowing or believing that the people to whom they are speaking will be encouraged to emulate that behaviour. That is the territory in which we find ourselves, and the issue is very serious. Some of the fanciful suggestions that we have heard this afternoon have not helped to advance the argument.

It is already an offence directly to incite a person to commit a specific act of terrorism. What is not an offence is to incite people to engage in terrorist activities generally or to incite them obliquely by creating a climate in which they may come to believe that terrorist acts are acceptable, and we are trying to close that gap. I take the point made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) that we must get our legislation into such a shape that we can target particular kinds of mischief. I shall address some of his serious points about intention and the threshold, because I am interested in introducing practical, effective and workable legislation that protects the citizens of this country, and I know that he shares my aim.

The hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) raised the question of the difference between freedom fighters and terrorists several times on Second Reading, and I know that he feels strongly about the matter. I am genuinely surprised that he has not tabled an amendment seeking to define "freedom fighter", although he may find it difficult to construct such a formulation. It is too late for him to table an amendment, but no doubt he will participate in tomorrow's debate on the definition of terrorism.

It is difficult to draw the line on what people may or may not do. Nothing in the Bill will prevent people from holding, expressing or disseminating the view that using violence for political ends is legitimate in certain regimes. I have some difficulty with that argument, because I think it wrong to encourage people to kill and murder others in such circumstances. The Bill will not affect the ability to say that people who are fighting oppression should be supported. It will prevent people saying such things, when they know, believe or have reasonable grounds for believing that the people to whom they are speaking are likely to see such remarks as an inducement or encouragement to emulate that behaviour. The legislation is precise, and it is targeted at people who know that when they say such things, they might not incite people to a specific terrorist act, but they are creating a climate in which resorting to terrorism is seen as a valid response. The definition in clause 1 is tight.

We have heard some examples today where it was implied that somebody expressing sympathy and understanding for how somebody becomes a terrorist would be caught in the same way as somebody who glorifies and extols terrorism and who incites people to become terrorists. There is a substantive difference between those two approaches. Does the Minister think that the Bill encapsulates that difference?

We have heard some fanciful suggestions this afternoon—historians writing about the 19th-century struggle in Ireland, those who celebrate the Easter rising and African scholars who write about the Mau Mau in Kenya. I say to the hon. Members who have raised those issues that the Bill does not cover such areas. We are discussing people who make statements knowing or believing that the people to whom they are speaking want to emulate terrorist acts.

If my right hon. Friend thinks that there is an easy distinction to be drawn in the manner suggested by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich, West (Mr. Bailey), will she take her mind back to what was referred to on Second Reading as the Jenny Tonge test, which she said would not be caught by this Bill? I took the liberty of looking at the BBC website reports around the time that that was said, and it had 12 pages of people suggesting that that was an encouragement to terrorism. There was also a Member of this House—I will not name the person—

I will not name the Member because she is not here. She said:

"It recognises that her statement was irresponsible and gave the green light to terrorism."

Does not that show that there is no easy distinction to be drawn, which is why the clause is so dangerous?

I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman.

I want to deal with the points made by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway.

On a point of order, Mr. Forth. I believe that the Minister, whether intentionally or not, has misled the Committee.

The Minister has given the wrong impression of the offence in clause 1. She said that the offence was committed if the person "knows or believes" that what he or she is saying would incite, but she does not refer to the lesser test, "has reasonable grounds for believing."

In everything that I have said so far I have referred to "knows or believes" or "has reasonable grounds for believing." If I did not do so at that particular point, it is not because I was seeking to ignore that provision.

My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway asked whether the statement by Cherie Blair would fall into that category. There are six tests: first, whether somebody knew or believed, or had reasonable grounds for believing; secondly, the likely effect; thirdly, the context under subsection (3); fourthly, whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction; fifthly, whether it is in the public interest; and sixthly, whether the director of public prosecutions gives his consent. Those are six safeguards, or hurdles, to try to ensure that we are absolutely targeted at the mischief that we are dealing with. Several hon. Members said that I seek to rely only on the consent of the DPP, but clearly I do not. A range of safeguards and requirements need to be fulfilled in order for the offence to be completed.

The atmosphere must have somehow spoiled the right hon. Lady's judgment. Although I do not take it too personally, she upbraids me for failing to table an amendment on the distinction between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. First, I am content with the very well crafted amendment No. 69 to clause 20, tabled in the name of the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham), the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee and, secondly, I identify myself with the sentiments expressed in amendment No. 75 to clause 33. Why does the Minister think that there is something wrong about approving of, or providing succour to, those who favour violent action against an illegitimate state rather than against civilians?

I do not accept that the matter is as clear-cut as the hon. Gentleman would like to portray it. He will know that if people seek to attack the apparatus of the state, they could well injure innocent civilians in the neighbourhood. If someone attacked a state railway, an innocent person could be involved. From day one, he has sought to portray this as black and white, with very clear distinctions. This is complex legislation in which we are trying to ensure that we deal with complex situations. I respect the hon. Gentleman, who holds these views very strongly, but he will understand that complexity. Simply to say, "Freedom fighter or terrorist?" is an over-simplification of the complex international issues that we find ourselves having to deal with in this modern world, with the modern version of terrorism that we are seeking to combat.

The Minister is as close we have got so far to an explanation of why the Cherie Blair remark would not be caught by the Bill. I should make it clear that I am not singling out the Prime Minister's wife. I do not agree with her sentiments, but I would strongly defend her freedom to utter them. The Minister rattled through, perfectly accurately, the six tests that have to be satisfied. Can she indicate which of those would be failed for the purposes of prosecuting the Prime Minister's wife? The Cherie Blair remark seems to satisfy the tests that she trotted off.

Not at all. I do not propose to repeat myself; I have enough points to make already. I am surprised that the right hon. and learned Gentleman is at variance with his own Front Benchers, in that he does not support the offence of indirect incitement that they have said would be a useful addition to our law to catch people who make such statements.

No, because I want to talk about intent.

Clause 1 provides in essence that encouragement is committed if a person makes a statement to people who are likely to understand it as an inducement to carry out terrorist acts. A person does that, first, if he knows or believes that the effects of his remarks on his audience are likely to be that they will understand them in that way. I do not think that anybody could object to that; indeed, I do not think that Opposition Front Benchers object to it. I would say to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield that the phraseology, "knows or believes", embraces the concept of recklessness that features in amendments Nos. 79, 2 and 6. That is absolutely right, because the law on recklessness was reviewed in the case of R v. G last year. There is now a subjective test of whether the defendant knew of the risk and, if he did, nonetheless unreasonably took it. The point about recklessness is covered in the legislation.

Amendment No. 20, which was tabled by the Liberal Democrats, covers similar ground. I hope that they will withdraw it.

The second set of circumstances in which a person can commit the offence—this is subject to more debate—is where he has reasonable grounds for believing that the effect of his remarks on his audience is likely to be that they will understand them as an encouragement to commit acts of terrorism. That imports an objective test of his belief. From what Members have said, one could think that this is a completely novel formulation in this Bill, but it is not. In fact, a change was recently introduced in the offence of rape whereby there is an objective assessment of somebody's belief. The person is no longer able to say, "I believed there was consent"; the test is whether he had reasonable grounds for believing in that consent. That is an objective test. There is also precedent in relation to money laundering offences in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Such tests have been introduced in various areas.

I point out to my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen and other Members that I know that there is concern about including intent in the convention offences, and recklessness—it is right to include that and it has support—as well as whether we move further, to the possibility of negligence and whether the offence could be carelessly committed. Some of those points have legitimacy and I want to look at them carefully, but I want an offence where we can prosecute people who create a climate within which people feel that terrorist action is a valid response to their concerns.

I want to look carefully at those points but I am absolutely determined that we ensure that we have an offence on which we can prosecute. For too long, we have not had such provisions on our statute book, which has meant that people can get away with saying the kind of things that we have all heard, and which concern our constituents, without our being able to prosecute.

It took a moment to follow the Minister's argument but, if I understand her, she is conceding that, as drafted, the offence goes beyond recklessness and could be committed negligently. I should be grateful if she would confirm that, as it heightens and crystallises my anxieties about the measure.

I am not prepared to say that I think that it goes as far as negligently. It includes recklessness, and clearly includes intent. The provision also includes the objective assessment of "reasonable grounds" for belief, which has precedents in our sexual offences law and other laws, so the formulation is not novel in those terms. I shall not say that it goes as far as negligently but I am prepared to say, especially to my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen, that there are legitimate concerns and I shall continue to discuss the issue with him and people who share those concerns.

My right hon. Friend is possibly aware that I had been contemplating voting against the Government for only the second time in 13 years, so I am grateful for the indication that she is, if I understand her, willing to look again at the wording of the clause. That is welcome, but I must tell her in all seriousness that if Members who follow her lead on that today find that we are confronted with exactly the same wording on Report it would be a somewhat unsatisfactory outcome, given what she has just said.

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I entirely take my right hon. Friend's point. That is not my intention. My intention is to engage constructively and in a proper fashion on those issues.

I have very little time and I want to turn to the amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) and his suggestion that there should be an extra requirement that something that caused a danger that a terrorist act or a convention offence would be committed should be an offence. That would place an impossible burden on the prosecution, as it would have to show that a real danger that a terrorist act would be carried out had been caused. That relates to the audience; we should be aiming our legislation at the person making the statements, not at the audience. I ask him to think carefully about that as the amendment would impose a burden.

No, I want to make my final point.

The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe said that the clause was absurd and ridiculous. Lord Carlile, the independent reviewer of the legislation, said:

"In my view this proposal in its revised form is a proportionate response to the real and present danger of young radically minded people being persuaded towards terrorism by apparently authoritative tracts wrapped in a religious or quasi-religious context."

The provision is neither absurd nor ridiculous; it is a genuine attempt to deal with a real mischief in our communities.

The debate has indeed been fascinating, but the Minister seemed to illustrate the muddled thinking from which the Government are suffering when it crystallised around what a freedom fighter and a terrorist might be. The description that she provided for the Committee was that if an Iraqi had stood up at a public meeting in the middle of the 1990s, or indeed in 1998, and said that conditions in Iraq were such that the violent overthrow of Saddam Hussein was necessary and that people should take active steps towards it—a policy that at the time was at least tacitly supported by the Labour Government of the late 1990s, when some military action was being taken against the Iraqis by the use of air strikes—that person would now be committing a criminal offence. That may be a new Blairite doctrine. I do not know, because the Prime Minister has said on several occasions that the rules of the game have changed. However, if that is the case, we need a proper debate about it, because the Government are introducing that offence by the back door.

I appreciate that we shall have an opportunity tomorrow to consider definitions of terrorism, but at present terrorism is undefined, except by our domestic circumstance, and the Government, by passing the Bill and clause 1, will without the slightest doubt criminalise those who even negligently call for action to be taken in such circumstances. We can see that from the debate. For the Minister to come to the Committee and ask us to approve that is breathtaking.

We said at the outset that we want to work constructively with the Government, but we are in Committee and, apart from Report, this is our last opportunity to do something about clause 1.

I am glad that the Minister said that she will consider the problem of the wording of clause 1 and whether the negligence extension is justified. However, she has known about Members' anxieties for some time, yet no concrete proposals have been presented to us this afternoon to solve or remedy the problem. That makes my life—and that of any hon. Member who wants to provide some broad support for the Government's aims but is anxious about the detail—difficult. Those points were well made in the debate by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) and my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Bone). As the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) said, if we get it wrong, we will make things worse.

I listened carefully to the comments of the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen in a debate on terrorism and community cohesion in Westminster Hall last week. From my experience of contact with the Muslim community in Britain, I agreed with almost everything he said. It is worrying that, at this stage of our proceedings, the problem remains and the clause is so poorly drafted.

If the Minister intends to make a concession, why cannot she accept amendment No. 79? It takes the first necessary step. Two more steps are needed—one relates to terrorism and the other to glorification—to make the Bill workable and fair. We need a tight recklessness test on specific intent, not the existing loose, opaque and wide-ranging catch-all provision. I regret that it has taken a long debate to extract from the Government just how wide-ranging the clause is intended to be. Any hon. Member who is considering what to do this afternoon should bear it in mind that clause 1 criminalises negligence. On the whole, we are reluctant to do that in this country.

I am sorry to tell the Minister that I shall seek to press amendment No. 79 to a vote. I invite all hon. Members who are worried about the wording to join me in trying to get it improved. No one can claim that amendment No. 79 would wreck the Bill—it would do no such thing. It leaves clause 1 in a perfectly workable condition but makes it clear that the offence of encouragement cannot be committed by negligence.

The other matters that we have considered include the provisions relating to glorification. The Minister has not provided a single justification for keeping those provisions in the Bill. As was rightly said in the debate, the concept of glorification is alien to our legal system. Why retain it when it will cause the endless problems that the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen highlighted? It could easily be removed, leaving a perfectly workable clause. Again, nobody can claim that we would wreck the clause. I therefore hope that, after we have voted on amendment No. 79, we will have the opportunity to vote on amendment No. 4, which would ensure the removal of the subsection relating to glorification.

I am conscious that the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) has also tabled well-reasoned amendments, which he presented with his usual cogency, that seek to restrict the operation and scope of the Bill. On that basis, if we are unsuccessful on amendment No. 79, I shall have no hesitation in supporting the hon. and learned Gentleman if he chooses to move amendments Nos. 21 or 22, although I suspect that he will not be allowed to move both of them. Their purpose is to restrict the offence to one of specific intent only. I would much prefer to see the Bill in that shape at the end of this afternoon than in the incoherent and, frankly, frightening shape in which the Government have left it.

The Minister and I agree that the basic intention behind the Bill is to ensure that terrorism is curbed, and that those who might be encouraged to engage in it should be discouraged from doing so. However, as the Minister knows from other debates that we have had on these issues, the best way of doing that is to persuade the communities from which terrorists are drawn that they should not succumb to their blandishments, and that it is better to achieve that by voluntary means than by coercion. Clause 1 has a coercive quality, particularly in relation to glorification, that goes well beyond the point to which it should go. For those reasons, I urge the Government to think again on this matter. If they do not, they will find themselves being increasingly obstructed as the Bill progresses. If they would only listen, we could make some progress.

It being three hours after the commencement of proceedings in Committee, The Chairman, put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [26 October]

The Chairman then proceeded to put the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that hour.

Amendment proposed: No. 22, page 1, line 14, at end insert

'and intends that his statement shall have that effect'.— [Mr. Marshall-Andrews.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

Amendment proposed: No. 4, in clause 1, page 1, line 15, leave out subsection (2).—[Mr. Grieve.]

On a point of order, Mrs. Heal. Is there anything in our procedures that would allow a time-out for the Home Office and the Government Front-Bench team, and for the Home Secretary in particular to consider after that succession of votes whether he has the assent of this House to proceed with the controversial aspects of the Bill?—[Interruption.]

Order. I am replying to a point of order and I want the hon. Member to hear the reply.

There is no need for that to happen. We will now proceed with the business as planned.

Thank you very much, Mrs. Heal. In all the time that I have been here I can never remember during votes, while sitting as the House or as a Committee, Whips standing at the doors of the Chamber to try to influence the result. Please would you—[Interruption.]

In the past, Whips have always been at the entrance of the Chamber, outside its confines, giving advice. Would you be kind enough, Mrs. Heal, to consult the Speaker so that we can have an authoritative ruling on whether Whips are able physically and verbally to influence or intimidate Members from within the Chamber? [Interruption.]

Order. I have received the point of order and I have to tell the hon. Member that where Members of this House stand and position themselves is entirely up to them.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 2 to 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 23 — Extension of period of detention by judicial authority

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment No. 9, in page 22, line 3, after 'to', insert 'a'.

Amendment No. 10, in page 22, line 7, leave out 'special' and insert 'any'.

Amendment No. 92, in page 22, line 10, at end insert

'In sub-paragraph (4) of paragraph 29, at the beginning insert "subject to sub-paragraph (3AB) of paragraph 36.".'.

Amendment No. 29, in page 22, line 10, at end insert—

'(4A) In subparagraphs (1) and (5) of paragraph 36 (period for which warrants may be extended) for the words "judicial authority" substitute "High Court Judge.".'.

Amendment No. 28, in page 22, line 19, leave out 'three months' and insert '28 days'.

Amendment No. 30, in page 22, line 28, leave out 'judicial authority' and insert 'High Court Judge'.

Amendment No. 31, in page 22, line 33, leave out 'judicial authority' and insert 'High Court Judge'.

Amendment No. 11, in page 22, line 33, leave out 'special' and insert 'any'.

Amendment No. 93, in page 22, line 36, at end insert—

'(3AB) where the new specified period will end more than 14 days after the relevant time

(a) judicial authority means—

(i) in England and Wales, a judge of the High Court

(ii) in Scotland, a judge of the Court of Session

(iii) in Northern Ireland, a judge of the High Court of Northern Ireland.

(b) the specified period may only be extended—

(i) pending the result of an examination or analysis which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining relevant evidence

(ii) for the purpose of decryption of electronic data with a view to obtaining relevant evidence

(iii) for the purpose of obtaining relevant evidence from outside the United Kingdom or from records within the United Kingdom which can not reasonably be obtained without such an extension of the specified period.

(c) the specified period may only be extended if the judicial authority is satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility of the detainee being charged immediately with another offence relating to the terrorism or a terrorist act.

(d) the judicial authority must approve the nature of any further questioning of the detainee during the new specified period.'.

Amendment No. 32, in page 22, line 45, after 'authority', insert 'or High Court Judge'.

Amendment No. 16, in page 23, line 11, at end add—

'(8) The judicial authority for the extension of any period of detention under Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000 shall be a senior circuit judge.

(9) An appeal shall lie from any decision of the judicial authority to a judge of the High Court.'.

Amendment No. 12, in clause 24, page 23, line 19, at end insert—

'(1A) In Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000, in paragraph 23(1) (grounds on which a review officer may authorise continued detention), at end of paragraph (a) add "but after the expiry of a period of fourteen days detention no further detention shall be authorised solely to obtain evidence by questioning.".'.

Amendment No. 13, in clause 24, page 23, line 28, at end insert

'but after the expiry of a period of fourteen days detention, no further detention shall be authorised solely to obtain evidence by questioning.'.

Amendment No. 17, in clause 24, page 23, line 40, at end add—

'(6) The Secretary of State shall, prior to the coming into force of sections 23 and 24, carry out a review of Code C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and produce a separate code to cover all detention under the Terrorism Act 2000 lasting for longer than seven days.

(7) Such code shall include provision to allow for the questioning of a terrorist suspect after charge, subject to leave being obtained from the judicial authority, and any such questioning shall be treated for all evidential purposes as if it had taken place prior to charge.'.

New clause 1—Extension of period of detention by judicial authority: duration—

'(1) The provisions of section 23 of this Act shall remain in force until one year after their commencement and shall then expire unless continued in force by an order under subsection (2) below.

(2) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument provide—

(a) that all or any of those provisions which are in force shall continue in force for a period not exceeding twelve months from the coming into operation of the order; or

(b) that all or any of those provisions which are for the time being in force shall cease to be in force.

(3) No order shall be made under subsection (2) above unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.'.

New clause 3—Disapplication of Human Rights Act 1998—

'Sections 23 and 24 of this Act shall take effect notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42).'.

New clause 4—Definition of 'judicial authority'—

'For the purposes of sections 23 and 24 of this Act, "judicial authority" shall mean, in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, a person designated by the Lord Chancellor only where he is satisfied that the judge or magistrate in question has appropriate experience of determining terrorist cases and shall include judges of the Crown Court and High Court.'.

New clause 5—Detention under the Terrorism Acts—

'(1) Where under the Terrorism Act 2000, an Act amending that Act, or this Act, a person is in police detention or is otherwise detained, he shall have the right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, or other prerogative remedy and to a fair trial in accordance with due process and the rule of law.

(2) Subsection (1) shall have effect notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42).'.

We now have to consider clause 23 and the extension of the period of detention by judicial authority from 14 days to the Government's proposed 90 days. A large number of amendments to the Government's proposals have been tabled and I shall come to those in greater detail in a moment. However, I should like to deal first with some of the principles that are involved. As the Government acknowledge, this country has always been firm and resolute in maintaining civil liberties, none of which is more important than the expeditious charging or release of individuals who are arrested. The grounds on which someone is arrested need be no more than the reasonable suspicion that an offence has taken place and that the arrested person is connected with it. The purpose of the initial police inquiry is to ascertain whether there is evidence on which a charge can be brought. If so, thereafter, the person is in the hands of the court system as the case proceeds to trial.

The Home Secretary will acknowledge that the proposals drive a coach and horses through that principle. We are not talking about 24-hour detention without charge or even the seven or 14-day detention period to which we have progressed, but a possible three-month detention—the equivalent of a six-month sentence passed after conviction. During that time, the police and prosecutors can look for evidence against the person in detention. The Government have a great deal to justify if they wish to proceed down that road. They cannot pray in aid other countries' systems to justify their proposals, which are entirely unprecedented in common law jurisdictions. In Australia, despite the terrorist threat, 24 hours remains the period for which someone can be held before charge or release. Even in countries where Ministers have suggested that arrangements are much more flexible, there is a system of inquisitorial inquiry that takes place only after the threshold for charge has been reached. In most instances, the period for which someone can be detained before charge remains extremely short. The Foreign Office has published a useful document on the subject, which I commend to all hon. Members. The present 14-day detention period in this country is at the limit of practices elsewhere, and the three-month proposal takes us outside accepted international practice.

Hon. Members should remember that, of 895 people arrested until September 2005 under terrorism legislation, only 23 have been charged. The figure may have changed in the past eight weeks, but I am not aware that it has done so. In the past, arrest was, quite understandably, regarded as something that could be used reasonably frequently because the period for which someone could be detained while initial inquiries were made was very short. Indeed, all the codes that were drawn up under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and augmented to protect people in police detention were designed for short periods of detention, including opportunities for intensive questioning that disrupted the suspect's life and could last up to 18 hours in any day.

The Government's proposals in the Bill simply extend the period of detention to three months with a few safeguards, to which I shall return in a moment. However, they do nothing whatever to address the way in which a completely new regime of detention is to be organised. To take a practical example, very few police stations are suitable places in which to detain someone for three months—I am not even sure that Paddington Green is suitable. If we allow a detention period of up to three months, a suspect could be questioned for 18 hours a day, with the consequence that any confession or information obtained would be slung out by the judge as soon as the case came to court.

I can think of few proposals that seem to have emerged so quickly and been presented to the House with so little back-up as to how they would be implemented. The justification that the Government offer is that the Association of Chief Police Officers requested the measure. There was then the suggestion that it was supported by the security services. I noticed with great interest today that when the Prime Minister was asked about that at Prime Minister's Question Time, he told the House about the ACPO support but studiously avoided mention of any other supporting organisations, notwithstanding the fact that the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety had suggested earlier that such support from the security services existed. Will the Home Secretary confirm that the proposal is merely ACPO-generated?

In relation to any operational benefit that the provision might bring the police, will that not be more than offset by alienation among the very community whose support the police need if they are to bear down on future terrorist activities?

I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. If this proves to be a system whereby people are detained for 40, 50, 60 or 70 days and released because, unfortunately, the evidence is not there, the impact on their relatives, and from their relatives into the wider community, could not be worse in undermining respect for the rule of law. We know, because the issues that we are considering have been driven by Muslim terrorism, that one of the things that have made this country such an attractive place for people to come, settle, live, work and bring up their families is the rule of law that we have sustained. So when it is suggested that we can, in a rather cavalier fashion, breach the principles of the rule of law to allow for quite long-term detention without charge, the Committee must approach that with great caution.

Has my hon. Friend noticed that the Government constantly repeat the excuse that the police want more powers? Does he agree that the police always want more powers? That is their institutional bias, but usually the solution is not more legislation and more procedures, but better use of existing legislation and existing procedures. Will my hon. Friend ask the Government to come up with a better excuse for authoritarian measures than that the security services and the police want more powers, which we have heard before?

I agree entirely with my right hon. Friend. The police should be listened to carefully, but the House of Commons and the Government should not give them a blank cheque. I regret to say that all my experience over the years that I have been involved in politics at local or national level suggests that we will end up with a police state—very nicely, by a series of ratchets. That is the logical consequence of such measures. [Interruption.] My right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) says a police state without the police. That is indeed one of the problems that we need to bear in mind. There is in many quarters a low opinion of the ability of the police to deal with certain sorts of crime, and very low levels of respect. That is allied to the perception that the police may be turning into persecutors of those who are innocent.

As a Member with a substantial Muslim community, I have not received one submission from my local Muslim community in opposition to the clause. My experience is that the great majority of the Muslim community want a legal process that enables us to identify those who are glorifying violence and exhorting people to violence, and that will provide the evidence to put those people away. Does the hon. Gentleman agree?

I am diversity spokesman for the Conservative party, which involves my contacting numerous Muslims both in organisations and as individuals, and that subject has frequently been raised as a source of anxiety.

I represent an inner-city constituency, which contains about 10 mosques. I have received many representations from members of the Muslim community against the proposals, which will disproportionately affect members of the Muslim community and members of the Asian community.

I take the hon. Gentleman's point. In fairness to the hon. Member for West Bromwich, West (Mr. Bailey), it is, of course, right that the Muslim community wants to see terrorists brought to justice and removed from the communities in which they may be living. Anybody who applies their mind to the statistic that I have read out—895 arrests and 23 charges—will see that the justice and policing systems are perfectly fallible in a human way, which is inevitable. If we are sending out a message that, far from picking up terrorists, we are picking up and releasing young men who turn out to be uninvolved and that no proof can be shown against them, people will get irritated, alienated, angry and upset—the very recruiting grounds from which some of our problems of terrorism currently come.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that many members of the Muslim community—there is only one mosque in my constituency—have given up writing to Labour Members, who they know will not defend them on a fundamental civil rights principle, and are addressing their complaints and issues to Opposition Members?

That may be the case. All I can say is that we should approach the subject with a great deal of seriousness.

Is there not a danger that if the police can hold a suspect for up to three months, they will feel that they have quite a lot of time and will not pursue the investigation with the urgency that they currently adopt? In some cases, an individual suspect will lose their liberty while time is wasted.

As we know from personal experience, work expands to fill the time available, which must apply to the police. Allowing the police to hold a suspect for up to three months sends them the thoroughly undesirable message that they can be slow in their work.

As we said to the Home Secretary on Second Reading, I am mindful of the fact that problems may arise in a number of areas. Breaking encryption codes has been adduced as an example of something that may take longer than 14 days to achieve, but I am not sure about that point, because there is a separate offence of failing to provide an encryption key. Indeed, the Bill will make that offence punishable by five years' imprisonment in a terrorist case, which we support, and it will certainly enable a holding charge to be brought if somebody does not provide the encryption key to their computer.

I want to make it clear to the Home Secretary that I am mindful of the fact that further information sometimes needs to be obtained from abroad, which can take time. One of the problems is how suddenly we have moved from 14 days in which to do such work to 90 days, which is not a slight increase.

My hon. Friend has tabled amendments Nos. 12 and 13. Amendment No. 13 states:

"but after the expiry of a period of fourteen days detention, no further detention shall be authorised solely to obtain evidence by questioning."

May I take it from that that 14 days would not be regarded as the limit in those circumstances? What limit does my hon. Friend regard as necessary to accommodate the serious points that have been made by the police, the security services and others?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for intervening on a point of very great importance. As drafted, the Bill simply takes the old rules and extends them, with one or two very minor adjustments, to three months. One of the grounds it gives for continuing detention beyond 14 days is the need to continue questioning a suspect. If one has not found out what one wants from a suspect in 14 days of questioning, I cannot think of a conceivable legitimate reason that, on its own, can be a ground for further detention.

Of course I accept that one might want to question the suspect if new evidence has been obtained or if some new matter is to be put to him, but to say that he can be detained beyond 14 days merely for questioning strikes me as a very unpleasant concept—yet that is what would result from our passing the clause as it stands. That is why I tabled an amendment that would still allow detention—one of the safeguards that I shall discuss in a moment—but would make it clear that one of the grounds for going to a judge and saying, "We want to keep him for more than 14 days", cannot be, "We just want to keep him so that we can ask him some more questions." There must be a reason for asking those questions—for example, because fresh material has come to light.

The hon. Gentleman knows that the purpose of detention is not just to question but, perhaps, to obtain evidence, or other purposes. He described it as a blank cheque, but it is not, as he well knows—the proposal is for 90 days. How would he feel as a legislator if after 40, 50 or 60 days without any evidence being found somebody was released and killed dozens of people?

I have to accept that in this country today there are likely to be, for all I know, a large number of people who have committed undetected crime, including crime of very great seriousness. In some cases, the police may well have suspicions about such individuals, but that does not justify their arresting or charging them. The logical conclusion of the hon. Gentleman's argument is that detention without trial of those who are suspected of one misdemeanour or felony after another can be allowed.

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is no logic in choosing 90 days that would not apply to 120 days, 360 days or permanent detention? Moreover, if the 850 people who were released after 14 days were unhappy about the inconvenience, they would be considerably more unhappy if they were in prison for 60 or 70 days, and would not the effect on community relations be very severe?

I agree. Indeed, my right hon. Friend the Member for Haltemprice and Howden asked the Government to give examples of cases where 14 days had been insufficient, the person had been released and evidence had come to light over the following few weeks that would have justified a charge. I believe that I am right in saying that he was given just one example. One has to query on what basis the Government wish to extend the powers, and the duration for which they wish to do so.

I want to bring the hon. Gentleman back to his important point about encryption and section 53 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. The Bill would increase the penalty from two years to five years for offences under a section that gives the police the power to charge someone who refuses to hand over the encryption key. However, after five years that section has still not been brought into force. The Government are withholding from the police a crucial tool in their fight against terrorism, and are now asking us to increase the penalty for that offence.

The hon. Gentleman is right. I never cease to be amazed at the number of hours that I have spent in Committee labouring over various Bills only to discover either that bits of them were never implemented or that we were amending bits that had not yet been implemented. Indeed, on one occasion, we were repealing provisions that had not been implemented. Such is the astonishing volume of business transacted by the Government that appears to have little effect, despite the amount of effort and the hours spent by Members.

Does the hon. Gentleman face the same dilemma as me? When we are dealing with legislation on terrorism, I am disposed to give the police, and indeed the Government, the benefit of the doubt, but a change from 14 to 90 days surely requires a rationale. If the only rationale is that the police are asking for the change, it is difficult for any of us to justify a move from 14 days. Do not the Government have a responsibility to show us why they require the additional time? They cannot simply say that they need more time to look at closed circuit television footage or to make inquiries abroad; they must be able to tell us why that requires 90 days rather than 30.

I agree entirely with the hon. Gentleman, whose comments highlight the problem. I want to make it clear to the Home Secretary that the Conservatives have never said that there can be no movement from 14 days. As he can see, we have deliberately not tabled amendments suggesting other periods, as it seems to us that the first thing that the Government must do is to engage in dialogue with the Committee about why the period of 90 days has been chosen and why other possibilities, ranging from 15 days to 90, would not be equally feasible and meet their need. I am conscious that Labour Back Benchers have tabled an amendment that provides for 28 days—an interesting period, because it strikes me, from my discussions with members of the legal profession, that it is probably at the outer limit of what would currently pass scrutiny under the European convention on human rights. That is a subject to which I shall happily return.

If by any chance the Committee were to move to 28 days, does my hon. Friend agree that revised codes would be required to ensure that questioning was not over-intrusive at the latter stage of that period?

I agree entirely. That is included in one of my amendments.

I want to move away from the generalities and pause to consider the individual amendments so that the Committee can understand our approach.

The hon. Gentleman said that he would discuss warrants for further detention, but I have listened carefully to his remarks and so far he has not done so. Does he agree that the judicial procedure for which those warrants provide is a substantial safeguard against detention for an extended period with no authority at all?

The hon. Gentleman is right. There is a procedure, especially under clause 24, to deal with scrutiny of the grounds for continuing detention—the amendments cover clauses 23 and 24. I am pleased that the procedure is in the Bill, but I have to point out to the hon. Gentleman that similar provisions already exist. Our amendments aim to provide more safeguards in that process.

We do not need to look to the future to realise that the relationship between the public and the police is delicate. We only have to go back to 1984–85, a period that many Members will remember; the divisions that were caused between the police and the public in mining communities still exist today. It is extremely important that we get the measure right, as if a number of people are arrested in particular areas, with a 90-day penalty, I envisage the same divisions occurring.

I agree that policing in this country has always been done by consent—that is the fundamental basis on which it happens. There are occasions—I acknowledge that the miners' strike was one—when the principle of consent is seriously eroded. We can argue about necessity, but I do not dispute that the miners' strike caused such an erosion, and there are plenty of other examples. It has occurred in some ethnic minority communities and it happened before the Brixton riots. One might say that that is sometimes inevitable, but one should always bear it in mind that it happens and consider the consequences. Far from making the country a safer place, it contributes to some of the problems from which we suffer. Once consent is withdrawn, policing has to become more heavy-handed, the local community participates less, general crime rates increase and communities begin to suffer badly, becoming thoroughly dysfunctional. We must have regard to that because if we do not, we simply dig a hole for ourselves.

Again, the hon. Gentleman appears to pose a theoretical argument. The Muslim community in my constituency is most active in calling for more police in the local community—Bill or no Bill.

The hon. Gentleman misses the point. I cannot think of any law-abiding community in this country that does not call for more police. Indeed, that reinforces the Government's signal failure to implement community policing. However, in communities where a breakdown in relations occurs between the police and the local people, more police are not requested and people complain about routine and regular police action. That has happened on numerous occasions. Frankly, if the hon. Gentleman has not witnessed it, he must live on another planet. I witnessed it when I stood as a candidate in south London in the late 1980s for a constituency that included Brixton, and I have witnessed it in my work in the past three years when I have travelled to areas where there is poverty, deprivation and large ethnic minority populations.

No, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will excuse me.

Amendment No. 8 is a probing amendment, and is designed to discover the reason for the decision that applications for a warrant of extended detention should no longer be made only by the police but by the Crown prosecutor. The Home Secretary may have some perfectly sensible answers, but I wanted to know the reason for the extension—it is not clear—and what role the Crown Prosecution Service and similar services in other parts of the country will play in determining applications. Hitherto, applications have been made by the police. Of course, I know that the Crown Prosecution Service plays a greater part in the charging process, but I hope that we can have some explanation.

We tabled amendment No. 9 because the Bill is poorly drafted and the amendment deals with one example of that. The sentence to which it applies makes no sense and I assume that the word "a" is missing. However, it highlights the fact that the Government have plunged into legislation in some haste.

Amendment No. 10 is important. It deals with the way in which the court should regulate the process whereby extended detention takes place. The Bill provides that the police or the prosecutor can ask for an extra seven days. I cannot understand why seven days have been chosen. If someone has been in custody for 32 days, I can think of no reason why the court should not be entitled to say, even in ordinary circumstances, "You can have another 48 hours and no more." Under the Bill, the court can do that only if special circumstances warrant it.

Let me give a first example of our attempts to improve the Bill. If the Government are to depart from the 14-day rule, the court must play a much more proactive role in determining whether days of detention are justified. Indeed, there is an argument that that should apply to the seven-day rule before the first extension. Simply returning to court on a weekly basis and asking for another seven days is not good enough. The amendment seeks to provide a greater opportunity for the court to exercise its discretion.

Amendment No. 12 deals with a point that we discussed earlier—namely, that it is quite wrong that further detention should be allowed solely to obtain evidence by questioning. Of course I appreciate that questioning is an important part of ascertaining whether an offence has been committed, but the reality is that the vast majority of those arrested for alleged terrorist offences usually decline to comment. Alternatively, they might be wholly co-operative because they believe that they will be able to exonerate themselves by providing a complete explanation. I cannot believe that 14 days is not long enough for that process to take place. If detention were to be allowed beyond 14 days merely for questioning, the courts would soon start to find such conduct oppressive.

Would not this provision apply if information came to the police within that period as a consequence of forensic testing, and gave rise to the need for further questioning of the individual concerned?

That might well be possible, but my amendment would not prevent that from happening. It would allow further detention, and questioning, to take place, provided there were some reason for that questioning, rather than for the purpose of obtaining evidence solely through questioning. For example, if the police were to say that they would have the results of forensic tests coming from another country in four days' time, and that they wanted to put those results to the defendant, I would not have any problem with extending the detention accordingly. I do, however, have a problem with the suggestion that the purpose of the extended detention should be solely to continue to ask questions, when there is no basis for doing so. The Home Secretary might come up with a different formula, but we need to look at this provision.

Amendment No. 13 deals with the PACE codes. I think that the Home Secretary would agree that the codes, as they stand at present, are not designed to deal with people under long-term detention. We need a completely separate set of PACE codes to cover terrorist cases in which detention is to last more than seven days. For example, the number of hours in a day for which a person can properly be questioned ought to be drastically reduced from the present amount. That would be as much in the interest of the police and those making the inquiry as of the defendant or suspect.

The process of questioning is not designed to break someone down. We are not dealing with Guantanamo-style interrogation here—at least, I hope we are not. I hope that the process is designed simply to enable someone to answer allegations that have been made against them. However, there is a long history of people confessing to things that they have not done—not necessarily as a result of police culpability—because the environment of being held in a police station is, by its nature, oppressive. Those people might be suffering from personality problems, or whatever it might be that makes them susceptible to doing that. Nothing is better designed to create a miscarriage of justice than the coming together of those different circumstances.

So, we need new PACE codes. I cannot do anything to incorporate such codes into this Bill, because they have to be passed by the House by means of a statutory instrument. However, I am seeking an assurance from the Home Secretary that there will be new PACE codes, and that they will reflect the extended period of detention.

The hon. Gentleman's argument is based on the premise that the extra time is required solely for questioning, but if he looks at the Bill he will see that the further detention of a suspect may be deemed necessary

"to obtain relevant evidence whether by questioning him or otherwise".

This is not just about questioning; it is also about giving the police time to find evidence elsewhere. The hon. Gentleman should stop basing his argument solely on the questioning element.

If I might say so, if I had intended to interfere with the right to detain somebody for other reasons, I would have spelt it out in my amendment. I have not done so, precisely because I accept that there may be reasons, in those circumstances, for detention being justified.

The other part of amendment No. 17 deals with the fact that I believe that the PACE codes could do with being reviewed in terms of the questioning that can take place of an individual after charge. Historically, there have been good reasons for not allowing questioning after charge, except in exceptional circumstances, but if that needs attention perhaps the Committee should consider providing it.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, who is being extremely generous in giving way. It is clear from previous amendments, particularly amendments Nos. 12 and 13, and from what he has said today that going beyond 14 days is not a point of principle for him and that he would contemplate it. However, does he agree that 28 days, which he says is perhaps at the edge of what might be allowed under European conventions, might be a suitable compromise and much better than his proposed new subsection (7) in amendment No. 17, which represents changing the principle as opposed to the number of days involved, whether 14, 28 or 90—that is, questioning after charge? I would find that much more undesirable, and I thought he would as well.

I am not sure that it would be a huge change in principle, because if the hon. Gentleman looks at paragraph 16.5 of PACE code C he will see that questioning after charge is already possible. My understanding from the police is that it is being used increasingly frequently, and in my view perfectly fairly. However, there are issues, one of which is whether an adverse inference should be drawn from silence to further questions after charge.

I say to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) that my view is that if there is a satisfactory judicial safeguard of being able to apply to a court for permission to question again, giving valid reasons for it—provided that is done in the presence of a solicitor and within all the other safeguards—I do not see why some questioning should not take place after charge. If there was silence, an adverse inference could be drawn from it.

I do not believe that that would be such a departure from principle as the hon. Gentleman fears. In practice, this is an incremental change, and there is an argument that the protection, while important, may be quite archaic in relation to how it was introduced. While I do not want it to disappear entirely, if there is a choice between charging somebody with, for instance, a lesser offence and wishing to revisit the circumstances while he is detained, probably in custody pending trial, I am much more comfortable with that than keeping somebody for 90 days without charge. We ought to consider that.

We can also consider who reviews the process. My view is that it should be done by a senior circuit judge—Lord Carlile shares my view—and there should be a right of appeal to the High Court. Currently, a circuit judge may undertake the review, but that can also be done by a district judge. The supervision of that process ought to be taken to a higher level.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving way. Does not Lord Carlile also say that he has no problem with 90-day pre-charge detention; he is just concerned about the safeguards that are in place? The hon. Gentleman is prepared to cite Lord Carlile in one example; why is he not prepared to do so in that important example?

I have no reason to doubt Lord Carlile's sincerity in presenting his proposals. He says a great deal on this. If the Home Secretary provided all the safeguards that I want, that would be a constructive step in deciding whether 14 days could be extended. The ball is very much in the Government's court. We have a problem because it seems that the safeguards are not being provided and a huge extension is being sought. I do not regard that as satisfactory.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for giving way. Has he not made an important point on Lord Carlile's proposals, because what Lord Carlile says is based on the assumption that all the proper safeguards are in place? As the Bill stands, we cannot say that the safeguards he contemplates are in place.

No, they are not. The Home Secretary asked for a real effort to be made to try to achieve consensus. That requires listening in Committee, as there is no other point at which we can make representations, and coming back expeditiously with ideas. Otherwise, we are left with the impression that this is a one-way system in which we are asked to make the concessions and the Government give us nothing in return. As I said to the Home Secretary, the Bill must be in proper condition when it leaves this House, not at some mythical point in the future.

New clause 1, tabled by Government Back Benchers, to which I have readily added my signature to those of my hon. Friends, provides a mechanism for a sunset clause on the extended powers, which will be renewable by statutory instrument. In the past, that is how we have dealt with extraordinary terrorist powers, and I very much hope that that is how we deal with such powers in future. If we embark beyond 14 days, we are moving into uncharted waters, which causes many Members on both sides of the House a great deal of disquiet. I therefore hope that the Home Secretary will acknowledge that if the powers are introduced in any shape or form, it will be on the basis that there will be an annual debate in which Parliament can bring them to a halt if it is unhappy with their operation.

My hon. Friend very shrewdly avoided the elephant trap that had been laid for him by the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris) and I hope that he will not now fall into an alternative trap. May I put it to him that it is not merely a question of safeguards or of the existence of a sunset clause, valuable though both those things can be, but of the evidential base, if such base there be, for an extension of time? It is not a matter of saying, "Some people think two plus two is four, others think two plus two is six, so we will compromise on five." It must be a matter of principle, and the Government have not yet made a case, by providing examples, for any sort of extension. We cannot accept some sort of cobbled-together compromise in the name of a quiet life.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and that brings me to the conclusion of the points that I wanted to make.

We will listen to what the Home Secretary has to say in response to what I think will be widespread disquiet about the proposals. That will colour what we do at the end of the debate. There are several options. There is an amendment allowing for 28 days' detention. I indicated that I did not want to get drawn into the question of periods, but if I remain dissatisfied at the end of the debate about three months' detention, 28 days is certainly a lesser evil and more readily controllable. On top of that, we will have to consider seriously whether we can support the clause at all. While there might be justifications, if the Government cannot give them in the course of debate, there can be no basis on which we can sign up to it. If we simply allow it to drift to Report next Wednesday, all that that does is to defer the clash that will come.

In the past, when dealing with these Home Office Bills, I have on several occasions ended up standing up at the Dispatch Box late at night on ping-pong between this House and another place, which has acted as the only protector of civil liberties in this country. I do not want to do that again if I can avoid it. It is an unsatisfactory process, as the Home Secretary acknowledged the last time it happened, just before the general election. I therefore hope that the Home Secretary will take in good part the comments that have been made and respond positively. But if, as I slightly fear, the Government simply intend to bulldoze their way towards 90 days, without providing the foundations for doing it and the safeguards that should surround it, we will not be able to support him, and indeed we will oppose him vigorously.

I want to speak to the amendments tabled by me and my hon. Friends, which relate particularly to the period of 28 days and annual renewal.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) concluded his remarks with a reference to the House of Lords. Clearly, some Members outside the Government—perhaps in the Government as well—have no reservations at all about the 90 day-period, are absolutely happy with it, and so be it. We do have reservations. Obviously, I have many reservations, to say the least. However, I do not work on the assumption that it does not matter what we do here, because we know that the House of Lords will not agree to 90 days. My view is not that we should leave it to the House of Lords but that the elected Chamber should try to reach a consensus, which is why I have tabled amendments in what I hope is a constructive way.

I accept that the issue is controversial. Detaining people without charge is in itself controversial. I have gone along with it on the basis that we face an acute terrorist threat. I am not one of those who have, at one time or another, minimised the terrorist threat. Indeed—not just shortly before 7/7 but in the Home Affairs Committee and in questions to Ministers, under the previous Administration as well as since 1997—I have referred to the threat of terrorism and the fact that people come into this country who want to cause maximum damage. I leave aside those who were responsible for 7/7. I wondered why such people had been allowed into the country in the first place.

Perhaps we can reach a consensus, however difficult that may be. I am willing to go along with the notion that a longer period than 14 days is required. I do not stand fast on the 14 days, or I would not have tabled my amendment. There are those who oppose any increase, including, perhaps, other Labour Members, and there may be some who argue that there should be no period of detention at all. There are also, as I have said, those who are happy with what the Government propose. My view is that a direct increase from 14 days to 90 is not justified. I have heard no justification, apart from the Home Secretary's statement that the police happen to share the Government's view. I do not think that that is sufficient justification. I do not think that jumping from 14 days to 90 is justified simply because the Home Secretary has been told—and if he says he has been told, I am sure that he has—that the police asked for the extension. That does not strike me as right, or as fulfilling the functions of the House of Commons.

My hon. Friend is probably aware that the police have given their reasons for supporting the 90-day period. First, it would allow time for computers to be decrypted. Secondly, it would give them time to gain access to difficult sites where forensic evidence might be stored, such as tube trains. Thirdly, it would allow time for difficult negotiations with other police forces around the world, in which communication might be difficult and interpretation might be required. Does he not accept those technical grounds? Perhaps, rather than engaging in a Dutch auction to decide on the number of days, we should accept the police's technical reasons.

Would my hon. Friend say the same if the police favoured four months, six months or nine months? Of course the police will try to justify the extension. We all recognise that they have a very important role to play in defending our country, but I do not agree that the fact that the police have said this, that and the other is sufficient reason for the House to go along with it.

What my hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Mr. Hendrick) says is not borne out by statistics. Since the change in the law in 2004, there have been 11 instances of detention for 13 to 14 days, and in all of them the detainee has been charged. There have been 12 instances of detention for between seven and 13 days, and in all of them the detainee has been released without charge. In none of those cases has someone been rearrested once the computer has been decrypted or further evidence has been gathered. I know of no case from the past two years in which an extension to 90 days would have been justified.

I refer the hon. Gentleman to last Wednesday's debate and to his exchange with the Home Secretary, who said:

"In Committee, on Report and otherwise, I am ready to be flexible in discussions, if we can reach an agreement. Furthermore, it would be better if the House resolved the matter rather than left it to the other place, but that requires both sides of the House to work constructively to reach agreement."—[Official Report, 26 October 2005; Vol. 438, c. 332.]

Has there been any constructive engagement with the hon. Gentleman?

Any private conversation that may or may not have taken place between my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and me will remain private. I see no purpose in having private gatherings—if there were any such gatherings—and then telling the House of Commons. But I am sure that in responding to the debate, my right hon. Friend will explain again what he said last week, and I will listen very carefully.

I have repeatedly been asked whether I will force the amendment to a vote. I do not know. I am minded to do so at this stage, but I am a flexible sort of person—as I have always been—and I shall listen very carefully to what my right hon. Friend says. The gap between the Government and me on terrorism is pretty narrow. We recognise the dangers, and that certain emergency powers have to be taken. We recognise that 7/7 is not necessarily a one-off, leaving aside 21/7, which we must not speak about because it is sub judice. Does anyone in this House believe that there is no acute terrorist threat? Does anyone believe that the massacring of totally innocent people that took place on 7/7—they included Muslims, as well as Christians, Jews and Sikhs—cannot happen again this year? The differences between my right hon. Friend and me are pretty narrow, but they are extremely important, otherwise I would not be speaking to these amendments.

I have no doubt about my hon. Friend's genuineness and sincerity in this matter. The police have made a case for a maximum period of 90 days. He may have some difficulty with that, but what persuaded him that 28 days is the right figure?

My hon. Friend will be pleased to know that it was not a research assistant, because I do not have one. The period has been increased from seven to 14 days and in my view, doubling it to 28 days is reasonable. There is no great mystery here; no one is suggesting that anything underhand has happened. I feel that 28 days is a reasonable compromise. I doubt whether my hon. Friend will agree, but he has made his point.

Is it not true that the 90-day proposal will violate article 5.3 of the European convention on human rights? My friend will have studied these matters, and we heard from the Opposition that 28 days takes us to the outer limits of what is acceptable. Does he share that view?

Whether the proposal infringes the ECHR is entirely a matter for the Home Secretary. No doubt my hon. Friend will put that question to him in due course.

My hon. Friend rightly described himself as flexible, so I put the following point to my honourable, flexible Friend. The 28 and 90-day periods have been discussed at great length in public and behind the scenes. The argument for a 90-day period is based on certain evidence put forward by the police, but some of us are struggling to understand in what way the 28-day period is scientifically accurate. Many Members are worried that establishing a 28-day period following discussions in the House today will not give the police and the intelligence services the flexibility that they need.

My hon. Friend is reiterating the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Preston (Mr. Hendrick). My hon. Friend the Member for Ogmore (Huw Irranca-Davies) is clearly satisfied with 90 days; indeed, if the period in question were longer, he would probably argue that the police consider it necessary in the circumstances. If he is satisfied with 90 days, as he clearly is, and if there is a vote, no doubt he will vote accordingly.

My hon. Friend is being very generous in giving way, and I do not think that there is a great deal of difference between our positions. However, although he said, correctly, that the idea of 90 days had been put forward by the police, he did not acknowledge that Lord Carlile, an eminent expert on this subject who has been involved in reviewing terrorist legislation, totally concurs and supports that limit. Surely that gives the 90 days further credence.

Does my hon. Friend also accept that for an innocent person, as the vast majority are, the suggested limit is 14 days too long?

No, I do not.

The Bill provides that detention would be divided into steps of seven days, and extensions would have to be applied for from a "judicial authority". Some of my amendments say that that should be a High Court judge. I hope that there will be no controversy or opposition to that from the Home Secretary. After all, if we are to detain people for such a time, the judge involved must rank higher than a district judge.

As the hon. Gentleman may know, I tabled a fairly similar amendment, and there are one or two others as well. The key factor is that there are High Court judges who would be completely inappropriate for such an exercise. Does he agree that it would be better to be sure that the person involved had been designated by the Lord Chancellor, as prescribed in the legislation at large, on the basis of appropriate expertise on terrorist offences? There is a cadre of people who are particularly well qualified.

That may be the position that the hon. Gentleman takes, but my point is that we should have a High Court judge, whether designated or not.

I thank my hon. Friend for his generosity in giving way. Does he accept that with the 7/7 bombings, it took two weeks for the emergency services to gain access to all the sites, and a further six weeks for them to complete their examination? Had there been a surviving culprit—which of course there was not—28 days would have been too short. Does he agree that our experience of terrorist incidents so far points to the need for a period longer, on a renewable basis, than 28 days?

What we can be certain of is that the 7/7 bombings took place despite what was already on the statute book.

I was listening carefully to what my hon. Friend said about High Court judges, but can he draw a distinction for the House showing why a High Court judge is necessary, as throughout the judicial system we accept that judges at all levels can send people to prison for much longer than 90 days? Why would we need a High Court judge for just 90 days?

If I may say so, with all due respect to my hon. Friend—whom I genuinely respect—that is the most surprising intervention that I have had. Here we have people who are being detained with no charge whatever. We recognise the necessity to detain them, although certainly not for 90 days—but my hon. Friend then asks why we should worry about what sort of judge is involved. We worry because we are concerned about the rule of law. We worry because we want to ensure that, as far as possible, people who are being detained in that extraordinary situation have their cases examined by the highest possible category of judge.

I find my hon. Friend's question surprising, because this is a parliamentary democracy: our job is to defend the rule of law and the idea that in the main, people should not be in prison, or detained in any way, unless charges are brought. My hon. Friend says, "Why worry about it?" Why not let it be dealt with by some junior magistrate, perhaps, and have done with it?

No, I shall make some progress now.

Home Office figures show that 357 people were arrested between January 2004, when the 14-day maximum detention period came into force, and September of this year. Of that total, 36 people were held for more than seven days. Last year, moreover, nine people were held for 13 to 14 days. So far this year, two people have been held for the same period of time. All 11 of those held for the longer period have been charged. It is interesting to note that the 14-day period has been in operation only since January last year. That is less than two years, but today we are being asked to jump straight to extending the period to 90 days.

I have said already that we are concerned with the rule of law, but if we are not also concerned with civil liberties, we should not be here. Our job is to marry up the rule of law and civil liberties, in the circumstances of the acute terrorist danger that faces this country. Those who are content with the 90-day proposal clearly believe that it strikes a proper balance between civil liberties and safeguarding our country, but I do not agree. It is essential that we in the House of Commons are extremely careful about detaining people for a period when no charge is made.

It is true that, in previous periods of British history, it has been necessary to detain people. I was about 13 or 14 when I learned about what happened in 1939, when the country faced the gravest possible danger. At that time, the leadership of the Mosleyite gang was locked up, under what were known as the 18B regulations. In the circumstances that prevailed at that time, I am sure that the decision of the House of Commons was absolutely right. Incidentally—and I am not trying to make a party-political point—one Conservative MP who was also detained tried to table questions from Brixton prison. As I understand it, the Speaker of the day ruled that he was not in a position to do so.

The terrorist danger today is acute, but the situation is very different from the circumstances of 1939. We must try to find consensus and a reasonable compromise in this matter. As we have heard in interventions, some hon. Members believe that setting a maximum of 90 days' detention is the right way to proceed. Clearly, I do not believe anything of the kind.

I hope that we can reach an agreement on 28 days, and that the Home Secretary will recognise the result of our deliberations. If there were to be a free vote on this matter tonight, does anyone doubt what the House's decision would be? Would we opt for 90 days, or 45? I think that the answer is pretty obvious, unless it is argued that those of us who support the amendment do not recognise the extent of the terrorist danger that we face as clearly as others do. However, I do not believe that that argument would be correct.

For 30 years, the IRA was committed to terrorism, and it carried out terrible bombings and other atrocities on the mainland and in Northern Ireland. In that period, we did our best to protect the Irish community. We made sure that ordinary Irish people were not stigmatised or held in any way responsible for what that bunch of murderous gangsters was doing.

In the same way, we must extremely careful in our approach to the Muslim community. We know where the terrorist danger comes from. When the IRA was committed to terrorist action, it was no use looking for Muslims, Hindus or anyone else to blame, as we knew that the terrorism was being carried by people from Northern Ireland or the Republic. Similarly, we know that the terrorism that we face now is being perpetrated by a small number of people who are totally isolated, from both the Muslim community and from wider society.

If we pass into law measures that are seen by the Muslim community as against their interests, we could be in danger, if we were not very careful, of antagonising the very people whom we want as our firm allies—even though that would be the opposite of our intentions. The overwhelming majority of Muslims are against terrorism, just as the overwhelming majority of Irish people said time and again, whenever given the opportunity, that regardless of their views on Northern Ireland and whether there should be a united Ireland, they saw no justification for what the IRA was doing.

I hope that, in reaching a consensus on a sensible approach to this matter, and if my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary shows the necessary flexibility and understanding of our concerns, we will be careful not to antagonise the very people who need to be protected. As I said earlier, Muslims were among the victims of 7 July who were as innocent as anybody else. As regards the vote, I shall listen to what my right hon. Friend has to say. It would not do any harm to resolve this issue once and for all tonight, but if he indicates that 90 days will not be the final result—

No, I am coming to a close now. If my right hon. Friend also says that on Report he will come much nearer to our position, it will be for the House to decide whether we should divide on the issue.

I have read carefully the hon. Gentleman's proposals and listened to what he has said. They would offer an opportunity to the House to achieve an early resolution of the issue if he were minded to press the matter to a Division and Members felt that it was worth doing. Without it, the danger is that relations will become more corrosive. That is a real threat if the Government do not start to listen to the fears that are being expressed.

One of the ironies of this situation is that I am as certain as I can be that if—heaven forbid—we had a Tory Government, they would have proposed 90 days and there would be far more vehement opposition to that proposal from the Labour Opposition Front Bench than anything I have said today.

No, I am concluding my remarks. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary will have the opportunity in a few moments' time to demonstrate that he understands our concerns and to show flexibility. We can then reach the sort of compromise that is essential on this issue.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick). If the Home Secretary or the Government had any doubt about the disquiet felt on both sides of the House—I doubt that they did—about this proposal and others in the Bill that have already been debated, they will have been disabused of that doubt by the result of the Division earlier and by the speech that we have just heard and interventions in it by Labour Members.

I wish to pick up two points from the hon. Gentleman's remarks. First, he asked for consensus and compromise. I am wholly in favour of consensus on this issue and it is important that we reach it. I am less convinced that compromise would be consensus on this issue. It worried me slightly when the hon. Gentleman said that if the Home Secretary were to come some way towards 28 days, we would make progress. That sets new parameters for that compromise of between 90 days and 28 days. Some of us believe that if something is wrong, it is wrong. It is as simple as that.

No. The hon. Gentleman might at least allow me to make my introductory comments.

Secondly, the hon. Member for Walsall, North said that there was very little that divided him and the Home Secretary. I hope that very little divides hon. Members on the sensitive issue of terrorism. I hope that we are all aware and convinced of the serious threat that this country faces. I hope that we are all convinced of the need to take the most appropriate and effective action to combat that threat. The point on which we differ is whether the Government's proposals are the right response to the latest event or to likely events.

My party and I are not convinced of the case for 90 days. In fact, I suspect that the Home Secretary is not convinced. There are media reports drawn from what appear to be wholly credible sources that he said,

"I believe there is room for debate about whether we should go as far as three months".

That suggests the presence in his mind of doubt regarding the appropriateness of the proposals.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The right hon. Gentleman is a Home Secretary with whom we would like to do business. We believe that there is a degree of consensus between us—the same could not always be said of previous Home Secretaries. We have had more difficulty with some of his predecessors.

What we cannot accept is that the new proposal for 90 days should be proceeded with on the simple assertion that it is necessary. The matter is not trivial; it is extremely important. The question facing us is whether we detain someone without trial and without charge for three months. That is not the British way of doing things. That is not how we conduct judicial processes in this country. Let us be clear: if we allow the 90-day detention period, we have allowed at least a partial victory for the terrorists.

That brings into question some old-fashioned concepts that I believe are still important, and I am happy to know that other hon. Members agree with me. Those concepts include liberty, justice and the rights of the citizen, whoever they may be, to a proper hearing before the law. That there are a few who would support 90 days—or 90 years—if that is what the police asked for trivialises the debate. This is a serious debate, which we should approach in a sensible manner.

No one wants to play politics with the issue and I take the hon. Gentleman's word regarding his sincerity. The Liberals say that they oppose on principle an extension beyond 14 days, so am I correct in assuming that if the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) is pressed to a Division, they will not vote for it?

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman thinks that he is making a clever point, but I assure him that he is not. The principle is that we in this country do not hold people without charge and without trial. That is the starting point, which is mitigated by the necessity of concluding investigations and of proceeding in a judicial way. If, as I hope he will, the hon. Member for Walsall, North presses his proposal, the question facing us will be: is it better to have 90 days, as in the Bill, or 28 days? I take the view expressed by the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who is now grinning, thinking that she made a clever point. Twenty-eight days is 62 days less than 90 days and is therefore to be preferred, but it is still not what we want in the Bill. We have made that abundantly clear throughout our proceedings.

Why was there no dissent from the Liberal Democrats in principle on the extension of the time limit from seven to 14 days?

I thought that I had just dealt with the principle involved, which, as I say, is about the balance that we must all strike between the appropriate civil liberties of the subjects in this country and what is required for the defence of our wider liberty—our safety. We are debating where that balance should be struck.

No, I will not give way; I want to make progress.

In support of his proposals, the Home Secretary has prayed in aid jurisdictions other than our own, but the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) was right to say that that is not a proper comparison. For a start, we can compare ourselves only with other common law jurisdictions. We can compare ourselves with a jurisdiction that is based on a wholly different premise of law only if we take a holistic approach to its proceedings. Simply isolating one procedure from many gives an entirely false impression of other jurisdictions.

Did not Lord Carlile say in his report that he would be far more comfortable with the proposed changes if the process were not adversarial but inquisitorial, similar to that in other European jurisdictions?

Lord Carlile did say that, and I will come to other things that my noble Friend has said, because so far in this debate his name has been taken in vain.

What is proposed is a judicial innovation, but there are others that we would like in order effectively to combat the threat of terrorism. The measure cannot be considered in a vacuum and to say that it is the one thing that is needed in order to allow the police to do their work ignores all the legislation over recent years that successive Home Secretaries have brought before the House to be voted through and enacted. Indeed, that claim ignores various other measures in the Bill.

Let us deal with the critique of the proposals and for a moment assume that the 90-day period has been made law. Lord Carlile said:

"I question whether what is proposed in the Bill would be proof to challenge under the Human Rights Act given the length of extended detention envisaged."

That is not the ringing endorsement of the proposal that some Labour Members have suggested. Lord Carlile went on to set out clearly his preferred alternatives in order to provide the safety locks for the 90-day detention period:

"Detention for longer periods, certainly over a month, and beyond the slightest doubt three months, requires a reassuringly strong system of protection for the detained person."

He listed some of the things that he would want:

"Where detention beyond 14 days is to be applied for, the introduction of one of a small group of security-cleared, designated senior circuit judges as examining judge"—

would be required. That point was referred to earlier. He continued:

"That judge to be provided with a full and continuing account of all matters involved in the investigation in question.

The introduction of a security-cleared special advocate, also fully briefed as to the investigation, to make representations on the interests of the detained persons and to advise the judge.

The judge to have the power to require specific investigations to be pursued if reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of his/her jurisdiction.

Suitable opportunity for written and oral defence representations against extended detention, with oral hearings at the discretion of the judge.

Weekly decisions with reasons if extended detention granted.

The keeping of a written record (if necessary protected from disclosure for the purposes of any subsequent trial) of the judge's activities in a case.

Appeal with permission to the High Court."

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the fact that Lord Carlile highlighted the need for a special advocate goes to the heart of his anxieties that the mere extension of detention time could be subject to abuse, and that the need for a special advocate highlights the highly unusual nature of the procedure that the Government are seeking to adopt?

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. This is a base level against which we can measure the proposals. Without all those safeguards, we have a non-starter—something that is clearly outwith the provisions of the Human Rights Act. Therefore, we should not even be considering such a proposal. Indeed, the suggestion that we include such proposals in the Bill does not bear a moment's examination.

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the length of time that it takes to investigate terrorist offences has created a new situation? As I said to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick), after 7/7 it took two weeks to access the sites and a further six weeks to make complete examination. A total of 42 days was required for investigation, so a 14-day limit would have been counter-productive. Suppose the Tavistock square bomber did not get on a No. 30 bus but instead walked the streets of London and was arrested the same day without any evidence on his person. He would have had to be released before the second incident on 21/7. Does the hon. Gentleman not accept that there are new circumstances in which a longer period is required to complete an investigation of terrorist offences?

I do not want to reduce the hon. Gentleman's proposition to the absurd, but exactly the same arguments would apply if the investigation took 365 days or two years. It is our responsibility in the House to achieve a balance, but as I shall explain, there are alternatives that allow for proper investigation without a substantial departure from the traditional law of this country as proposed by the Home Secretary.

Having dealt with the ways in which Lord Carlile does, and does not, agree with the Home Secretary's proposals, does the hon. Gentleman agree that a number of hon. Members will be impressed by the fact that the police have endorsed a 90-day detention period? Although they may have reservations about such a long detention, they may be persuaded to support the Government by the police endorsement. The police deserve the respect of every hon. Member for the difficult job that they do, but it is not for them to lay down the law. It is for us to make the law. The job of the police is to enforce the law that we lay down—it is not to make fine distinctions between civil rights and the law. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is our job to protect civil rights? If the House starts to detain fellow citizens in prison without charge for 90 days it is going down the wrong road.

I agree. I have worked closely with the police over the years. As the hon. Gentleman may know, I was chairman of a police authority and I have worked with the National Criminal Intelligence Service. I have a great deal of respect for the police but, equally, they have a distinctive approach to the matter. They rightly wish to secure successful prosecutions and to protect the public but they always want increased powers. It is the job of the House and, indeed, the Home Secretary to assess the balance between those proper requests for additional powers and their effect on the liberty of the subject.

To return to the point made by the hon. Member for Battersea (Martin Linton) about the length of time needed for investigation, a puzzling argument has been made about the time needed to crack an encryption. I am not an expert on the subject, and do not pretend to be, but specialists tell me that it does not take 14 days but perhaps 14 years to solve an encryption without the key. People can make educated guesses to decipher an encrypted message, but their investigation will not be completed in a comfortable period of 90 days. Why, as I said earlier, has an offence that we put on the statute book with the passage of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 lain idle for five years? Why on earth have people not been prosecuted for refusing to give an encryption key? If that is not the problem, what is the argument about?

The hon. Gentleman is extremely generous. The idea of the provision is obviously that it pre-empts the use of computers in that way. We know that information can be stored, coded and encrypted, so the legislation is there before the bombs go off, not after the bombs go off. That is the whole point.

I do not begin to understand what the hon. Gentleman meant in that intervention, so I cannot respond to it.

My hon. Friends and I have tabled two amendments in this group. Amendment No. 92 is a paving amendment; amendment No. 93 is the substantive amendment. We have attempted to put in some of the safeguards that my noble Friend Lord Carlile of Berriew suggested. Amendment No. 93 raises the decision–making authority from a district judge to a High Court judge, which will inevitably be conceded by the Government. It would be helpful if they did so now.

The amendment suggests three scenarios for an extension of detention—delays due to forensic analysis, one of the possible problems that was identified earlier; delays due to encryption, which, as I said, I find difficult to understand, but I am prepared to accept that that may be an issue, which can be pursued; and delays due to the need to gather international data or mobile phone records, which I accept may take a certain amount of time when authorities abroad are involved.

The amendment lays down the condition that the judge must satisfy himself that no other charge is possible. That comes back to the potential for prosecution under section 53 of RIPA. It also takes account of the other terrorist offences covered by the Bill. There is a further requirement for the judge to vet police lines of questioning, which relates to the issue raised by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield about the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 protocols, which will need to be revised. I hope we will get a clear indication of how they will be revised if the proposal is accepted.

On encryption, it is possible for someone to walk off the street into a store and buy a 192-bit encryption device, which is based on American military technology. Our security services are able to access that technology and counter it. They need the initial period of a few weeks to work out what the code is. I appreciate that the hon. Gentleman keeps referring to the maximum pre-charge detention as three months, but he does not emphasise that that is a maximum. There are weekly reviews. By their own admission, the police do not expect, other than in the most exceptional circumstances, the period of detention to be anywhere near that long. It is entirely misleading not to make it clear that there is constant review throughout the process and that three months is a maximum.

We are giving a power. We have no idea how it will be used. If the House gives a power to the investigating authorities, they can use it as they see fit. The hon. Gentleman may be right that it will be used on relatively few occasions. He may be wrong about that. I start by considering the power that we are giving, which is the capacity to detain for 90 days without charge. That is a very serious matter indeed.

No, I must make progress.

On the other point made by the hon. Member for Wansdyke (Dan Norris), as I understand it, the encryption can be removed either in a relatively short period or not at all. If someone is serious about stopping a criminal offence and putting someone before a court, there is a perfect pretext, if I may say so, if they refuse to give the key to the encryption. I cannot for the life of me understand why that is not used.

No.

Why are we proposing safeguards to proposals that we reject? Because our job is to improve the Bill in Committee. I hope that that will be accepted at face value. The sunset clause that was mentioned is a further substantial improvement to the Bill.

I shall repeat the second question in case of any doubt: do we support 28 days in preference to 90 days? Yes, of course, because it would be a move in the right direction. That does not mean that we accept 28 days; it means that 28 days is preferable to 90 days, which, as far as I am concerned, is a no-brainer.

We are sincere in our view that the best outcome is consensus across this House and between the Houses, and I repeat that there are better ways of achieving the objective. It has been mischievously suggested that we are discussing minor offences in other parts of the legal spectrum, but we are discussing lower-order terrorism offences. The Home Secretary knows our view that if there is no prima facie case for a lower-order offence such as acts preparatory to terrorism, there is no argument for holding a suspect. We must examine ways of exempting lower-order terrorism offences from bail, because I accept the Home Secretary's point that it would be a major difficulty if we were to go down that escalatory route without proper bail conditions.

The threshold used by the Director of Public Prosecutions in charging guidelines should be re-examined. Where there is a reasonable likelihood that admissible evidence will be available, then proper grounds exist for a charge, which is a power that is not being used sufficiently at the moment.

If we do not reach a consensus, there will be increasing frustration that we have not been able to find a satisfactory way through this maze. The Bill is unacceptable for all sorts of reasons. If we have the opportunity, we will support amendment No. 28 to reduce the period to 28 days. [Hon. Members: "Oh."] For goodness' sake, that is hardly a revelation—I have said it at least six times. Whether or not amendment No. 28 is accepted this evening, we shall vote against clause 23, because the Government are employing the wrong approach. Even at this late stage, we hope that a consensus is reached in this House rather than in another place in order to find a way to produce acceptable, effective and appropriate defences against terrorism.

I hope that it will help the House if I set out the Government's attitude to the amendments and new clauses in this group before the debate concludes.

On amendment No. 9, I want to express my appreciation to Conservative Front Benchers for spotting a typographical error and correcting it. In the spirit of consensus that orients everything that we do, we urge the House to accept amendment No. 9.

It is worth setting out the background to amendment No. 8, which I am glad the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has acknowledged is a probing amendment. Both the police and the Crown Prosecution Service have suggested that it should be possible for Crown prosecutors or their territorial equivalents to make such applications, because in complex terrorist cases the prosecutor will be closely involved from an early stage. The prosecutor will advise the police on which evidence might be useful in court and which might not, and will work with the police in determining which leads might be the most profitable to follow up. Crucially, the prosecutor will also confer closely with the police on the question of when there is sufficient evidence to justify bringing a charge. So the prosecutor will be very familiar with the case and well placed to make an application to the judge for extended detention. I hope that on that basis the hon. Gentleman will consider withdrawing his probing amendment.

On amendments Nos. 12 and 13, I want to make it clear that the purpose of clause 24 is not to change things but to put beyond doubt what had until recently been believed to be the case. The position was thrown into doubt by an application for judicial review decision case in Northern Ireland. In that case, an individual was being held while DNA samples were being analysed, and he challenged the legality of his continued detention. He was released on the advice of senior Crown counsel. Prior to that, it had been thought that continued detention for such a purpose was lawful—that remains the view on the mainland—but we want to put the matter beyond doubt. Clause 24 therefore sets out the grounds on which a person may be detained. Again, I hope that in the light of that explanation the hon. Member for Beaconsfield will withdraw his probing amendment.

I now turn to the substance of the debate—the relationship between the length of pre-charge detention and the protections and safeguards that are in place. In this context, I want to comment on Lord Carlile's report to express appreciation for his approach in conducting it and to indicate our attitude on several of the proposals that have been made, which overlap with some of the amendments.

Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 suggest that the extension of somebody's period of detention could be dealt with in a more flexible way. There is force in those arguments, and we are prepared to consider that with a view to coming back on Report with an agreed way forward on the matter.

On the level of the judge who takes the decision, we support Lord Carlile's proposals, as I said on Second Reading. That is the subject of amendments Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 16. We are ready to table an amendment and intend to do so on Report. I take very seriously the point made by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash). It is important that the judge is a specialist in this field. We shall ensure that the hon. Gentleman's comments are taken into account in the proposal that we make on Report. On the general range of issues involved in this matter, I can give the House the assurances that have been sought from me in a variety of ways.

As the Home Secretary knows, before this debate the Attorney-General expressed concerns about these issues. Has the Home Secretary had an opportunity to speak to him, or to other Law Officers, to reassure him?

The Attorney-General can speak for himself, but yes, I have spoken about this to the Law Officers, including the Attorney-General. His view is that the changes that I am suggesting we table on Report will go a long way towards meeting any of the concerns of those in the legal system and in this House.

On amendment No. 17, which deals with the relevant PACE—Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—code, I understand the points that are being made, and I am again prepared to say that we are ready to come back to the House with a solution that will deal with this in an effective way. We acknowledge that the concerns raised by Opposition Front Benchers are genuine, and it is our job to try to deal with them. That is not as straightforward as it might sound, because it is a question of precisely which PACE code would operate, but I am prepared to give an assurance that we will consider the issues that have been raised.

I hope that the Home Secretary does not think that I am being churlish, but I feel bound to ask him why, in view of the fact that these issues were well ventilated before today, they were not included in the Bill when it was first published. [Interruption.] After all, the Home Secretary had a draft Bill that came in for a considerable amount of criticism. The Committee is a late stage in the passage of a Bill to give assurances about what will happen. Can the Home Secretary assure us that all this will be in place for the Report stage next Wednesday?

I hate to say that my hon. Friends, in accusing the hon. Gentleman of being churlish, are being churlish themselves, but perhaps I can be churlish in return by saying that we have said from the outset, as the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) knows well, that we are ready to debate those questions in the round. As a number of colleagues on both sides of the House have recognised, there is a relationship between the safeguards and protections that are thought to exist and the length of time that should apply. I will not say that it is a trade-off—that is not quite the right way to put it—but there is a relationship in how they are all taken forward. That is why I am taking this opportunity to set out the Government's position in what I hope is a holistic way. We can thus see how things relate to one another in the proper way.

The Home Secretary gave us an insight into the opinion of the Attorney-General, who has been reported as expressing grave reservations, but the Home Secretary said that the Attorney-General is now of the view that some of the present shape of the Bill goes a long way towards meeting judicial concerns. Is that a full and rounded picture of the Attorney-General's current position? The Bill may have gone a long way, but is he satisfied that what is before us is likely to comply with our human rights obligations?

The Attorney-General is completely satisfied on that point, and it is precisely because he is that I could put a certificate on the Bill.

I shall give way again in a moment.

I was saying that I was prepared to look at the points raised in amendments Nos. 10, 11, 29, 30, 31, 32, 16 and 17 and at ways of coming back on Report with the changes that are needed. To be candid, I should like to do that on the basis of consensus in the House, a point to which I shall return in a second.

I want to make some observations about Lord Carlile's criticisms, which came into the discussion. In paragraph 61 of his report, Lord Carlile said:

"I am satisfied beyond doubt that there have been situations in which significant conspiracies to commit terrorist acts have gone unprosecuted as a result of the time limitations placed on the control authorities following arrest."

I hope that the Liberal Democrats will think carefully about those remarks when they decide to vote against clause stand part.

In paragraph 111 of the report, Lord Carlile stated:

"I regard the current proposals . . . as providing a set of useful and necessary additions to the law to counter terrorism."

I want quickly to go through Lord Carlile's criticisms of the procedures.

The first was that clause 5, which deals with acts preparatory to terrorism, is too narrow and does not cover facilitation offences. We believe that those offences are already covered by existing law and we shall discuss that with Lord Carlile. On clause 6, he argues that "training for terrorism" is too wide and should not have worldwide extent. We do not agree; without its wide geographical scope the clause would have little point, as most terrorist training takes place abroad.

Lord Carlile questions the necessity for clause 8—"Attendance at a place used for training"—as there will be offences of giving and receiving terrorist training. We want clause 8 to deal with that issue, because we want to cover all those who attend terrorist training camps and to avoid people being able to claim that they were there only in a journalistic or humanitarian capacity.

Lord Carlile raised five points sharply about clause 23, which we are currently debating. The first was that pre-charge detention beyond 14 days should be authorised by a senior circuit judge, with appeal to a High Court judge. I have acknowledged that, and agreed as early as Second Reading that we would take steps to implement that recommendation.

The second point was that there should be an opportunity for a defendant to make representations against continued detention, with oral hearings at the discretion of the judge. That process happens already, but if clarity is needed to show that it happens we shall be prepared to offer it.

Thirdly, Lord Carlile said that there should be weekly decisions about extensions of detention, with reasons given in writing. The Bill already provides for weekly decisions, although I have to add the qualification that I have just made in response to amendments Nos. 10 and 11: reasons are given, although not normally in writing. It would be possible to require that, but the reasons could be only that the test in the legislation was satisfied. We are ready to consider that, although we do not believe that it is necessary.

We have more difficulty with Lord Carlile's recommendation that the judge should supervise the investigations and require specific lines of inquiry to be pursued. Amendments Nos. 92 and 93 deal with that. That would effectively introduce the continental system of investigating magistrates. As I have said in the House and elsewhere, I personally have sympathy with that approach, especially in some cases. However, there is currently no consensus about such a dramatic change in our legal system. It would not be sustainable for us to try to legislate to that effect. That is a difference of opinion with Lord Carlile, not on principle—I am sympathetic to his position—but because the reform is so substantial compared with how we have done things in the past that we could not simply introduce it in the Bill.

Lord Carlile's final point is that special advocates should be able to see all the intelligence material, make representations on behalf of the detained and advise the judge. That follows on from the recommendation to introduce investigating magistrates. Without them, there is no need to "advise the judge". The detained person is already entitled to legal representation, so it is difficult to understand precisely what special advocates would add. Again, I am prepared to consider that if there is a way of dealing with the point directly.

I have heard the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash).

I have dealt with the general points about protections and safeguards before tackling the specific points about time.

I hope that the Home Secretary will forgive me if I seek clarification of something that he has already tried to explain. Will he concede the principle that the judge should be able to say that detention should not simply be for another seven days but should be able to require a return in 48 or 72 hours if he believes that that shorter period is appropriate? Is the Home Secretary prepared to include that in the Bill?

I am prepared to discuss doing precisely that with the hon. Gentleman and other colleagues. There is an advantage to what he suggests. He is right to highlight giving more flexibility to judges to decide how to supervise the process. The fact that the time period is under judicial supervision is not highlighted enough. We are now suggesting that it should be supervised by a High Court judge. That is an important part of the process, which should reassure some who have been worried. To avoid doubt, I stress that the police perceive judicial supervision to be important. If colleagues read the evidence that the police gave to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, they will find that the police set out the advantages of that process for an investigation.

I am especially grateful that the Home Secretary went through all that Lord Carlile had to say instead of cherry-picking, which is unhelpful to both sides of the argument. He said that he agreed with some recommendations but not others—we are in the same position.

I wish to make two points. First, the proposal for judicial supervision of an investigation is a substantial judicial innovation, but no greater than 90 days of detention without charge. Secondly, I ask the Home Secretary to be fair in acknowledging that Lord Carlile said that some cases had not been successfully prosecuted in the absence of the new offences that the Bill introduces. They provide new opportunities for prosecutors to bring people before a court.

They do, and the hon. Gentleman is right that Lord Carlile's report was produced before the Bill was published. Nevertheless, the core question remains: is there an ability to charge? Earlier, the hon. Gentleman cited the encryption cases and outlined his concerns about them. I can do no better than quote from the speech that the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson), who is in his place, made on Second Reading. On encryption, he said:

"The reality might be different. Three people might be responsible for what was intended to be a series of suicide bombings, two of whom might have given up their lives in the process. Those two might be the ones responsible for the encryption, and no matter what legal redress one might have against the remaining person, he could not decode the files even if he wanted to."—[Official Report, 26 October 2005; Vol. 438, c. 388.]

The point that I am making in quoting the hon. Gentleman is that I agree that the number of times on which any pre-trial detention would be needed would be narrowed, but the circumstances might still exist in which we were unable to bring charges, even in relation to lower-level terrorist charges.

As the Home Secretary knows from discussions that we have had on this matter, the question of the Human Rights Act 1998 has been raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) and by Lord Carlile. My new clause 3 would disapply the Act for this purpose. Let us consider the possibility of our getting a 90-day limit—the Home Secretary knows that I have considerable sympathy with the proposals relating to the upper limits—but of the matter then being referred to the courts. I think that the Home Secretary is being a little optimistic, given that Lord Carlile's report—which the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome did not mention—specifically states:

"I question whether what is proposed in the Bill would be proof to challenge under the Human Rights Act".

I am sure that the Home Secretary realises that there would be a serious problem involving huge delays if there were to be such a challenge in the courts and, irrespective of what he says about the Attorney-General's view, the provisions were to be struck down. We would lose a vast amount of time and place the public at serious risk if there were a successful challenge.

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman's general support for our proposals. However, I would not advise the House to accept his new clause, because it would not be correct for us to suspend the operation of the European convention on human rights in this context. He has asked a series of hypothetical questions about what might happen if cases were taken to the European Court. Of course, everyone will have a different opinion on that, and he is right to cite what Lord Carlile has said. My duty before the House is to say explicitly that I have given the Bill its certificate based on advice that I received, including that of the Attorney-General, that it was compliant with the European convention. That is the basis on which I operate.

On the question of safeguards, I am always ready to look at review procedures, sunset clauses and so on, but I do not hold out a great deal of hope that that will be the path to resolving the issues that have been raised. They are genuine issues, and this brings me to the points raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick). I want to pay respect to the way in which he has conducted his discussions on the Bill. I can reveal to the House that we have had private discussions on it, and that my hon. Friend is absolutely principled in what he is saying. He has put forward his views consistently, and with no spirit of political intrigue or anything of that kind. He approaches the matter in an entirely proper way.

My hon. Friend raised an important additional point, which I also mentioned on Second Reading, as did the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. It is very important that the elected Chamber should try to reach consensus on this matter. There are a range of different opinions in this complex matrix of issues about lengths of time and about safeguards, and I completely agree that that is the approach that we should try to take. Why do I say that? Not simply because it is politically more convenient, but because it is very important indeed that this democratic House should speak to the nation in a direct way when dealing with terrorism. It is difficult for us to reach agreement, because there are genuine differences of opinion, but my starting point is that we should try to do so, and that is what I want to do. It is critically important for right hon. and hon. Members to talk to their constituents and their communities. My hon. Friend's concerns about the alienation of the community are real ones, and they have been echoed by other hon. Members. We need to address them with our constituents in the best possible way.

My only cavil with my hon. Friend's remarks is that I think that he traduces the police a little when he suggests that they have not proposed the 90-day period in a considered way, and that my ministerial colleagues and I have not considered the police's proposal in a serious way. I certainly have, and I and my ministerial colleagues right across the Government have tried to analyse carefully what has happened. The police have given the best of their professional advice. That is what they should do. That is how they operate, and that is their responsibility. That is what they have done, and the suggestion that they have not operated in a professional way is not right.

Many Members have said that the police are alone in wanting this extension, but the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety made a remark some days ago indicating that more than the police within the security apparatus are involved in that. Can the Home Secretary help us on that point?

The police believe that 90 days is right, and the Crown Prosecution Service believes that 90 days is right, for the very detailed reasons that I gave in an answer a moment ago. The security services believe that an extension is right and support the recommendation that 90 days is right, but they do not believe that they are professionally competent to judge whether 90 days is right compared with other times. That issue led to confusion in discussing those matters, not least in front of the right hon. Gentleman's Committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee, but the whole of the services involved in this support the police position.

However, it is the police and the CPS that have the responsibility for conducting these situations. Therefore, all other services have said, "While we support the case for change in general from what we have seen, and while we support the particular police proposal of 90 days, we think that that particular proposal comes from their policing and prosecutorial experience."

I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way. He has told us that the CPS in England and Wales supports 90 days. What view has he obtained from the Lord Advocate and the Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland?

I believe that that is their position as well, but I must not mislead the House. I have focused more, in a way that the hon. Gentleman will think outrageous, on the position of the CPS, but I commit to write to him with clarity on that point as he has just raised it with me.

I am grateful to the Home Secretary, who is being very generous in giving way. If this provision went through and someone were detained for 90 days and then released due to insufficient or no evidence to bring a prosecution, should they, or would they, have any right of redress if they had lost their job or experienced substantial loss of earnings or other inconvenience?

Not under these proposals. However—again, I emphasise the point, because it was raised with me by the Home Affairs Committee—we are ready to look at that if positive proposals are made in this area. But I must say again, and emphasise it very strongly, that we are talking about a tiny number of cases under very deep judicial scrutiny throughout the whole process that operates here. That point was made in interventions earlier, and it is the key point.

The position of my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North is clear and his point was well put. In this serious matter, all of us—every single Member, accountable to their own electorate and constituents—has to weigh the relationship between the operational and professional advice we have had from the police and prosecutors, which takes a certain direction; the issues of principle, which motivate many of us in different ways, and possibly in ways that will be different for different people in the way that they operate; the safeguards that I say I am ready to talk about in respect of how we move forward; and, of course, the issues of politics.

Politics should not be too much a part of this. It is always part of what we do, by definition, and it is a great thing—[Interruption.] There is nothing wrong with that; I very much agree. We are in politics, and it is a worthy and noble life. That is what we should do. I hope that the politics here is the fundamental elected representational politics of the relationship between us—all of us, from whatever party—and our communities and the people we have to deal with. I hope that people will talk to their own communities about these issues as the Bill goes through the House.

The crux of the matter is the issue of the maximum period for which it should be possible to detain a person. As the Committee will be well aware, the Bill extends the maximum duration for which a terrorist suspect may be detained prior to charge from 14 days to three months. I emphasise that the Government believe, and I believe, contrary to some assertions, that there is a compelling case—the word "compelling" was one used by the hon. Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten) on Second Reading—which is strongly supported by the police, for change in the interest of offering the best possible protection for the people of this country.

At the service yesterday in St. Paul's, I talked to people who suffered from the bombs in London. I can tell the Committee that they want protection so that this kind of thing does not happen again. We all want that, but we have to think how to do it. That is why the police, by the way, have come to their view. They are thinking, "How can we do it? What should we do? How should we address this going forward?" That is why they have made the proposal.

I remind the Committee that the factors in consideration include the need to intervene early in terrorist cases; the complex and international nature of the networks; the volume of material; and the increasing use of technology such as encryption and computers. The case for an extension was set out clearly some considerable time ago, and we have published it fully.

Despite what the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) said about the clause stand part debate, I believe that there is now widespread recognition in the House that an increase beyond 14 days is necessary. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North for acknowledging that in his amendment. There is also a growing understanding, although I know that the Liberal Democrats in particular do not accept it, that the alternative solutions put forward do not solve the problems. We must face up to the time issue in a direct way.

I acknowledge, however, that the House has not reached a consensus on the Government's proposal to increase the maximum period to three months. My view is that we ought to seek consensus because we need the strength of a consensus decision, as I have described. I regard the police case as persuasive—I think that it is the right case—but I must also acknowledge the fact that many people have expressed strong reservations.

My view is that the issues should be resolved in the House. My proposal, which I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North to accept if he is ready to do so, is that we engage in urgent discussions with colleagues on both sides of the House to see whether we can reach consensus on a figure of more than 14 days. On that basis, we would bring forward a Government amendment on Report containing whatever that agreed figure was. Of course, if agreement could not be reached, the amendments now before the House could also be tabled on Report for debate.

In the trade-off between the protections and safeguards that I described and the length of time, however, I believe that genuine discussion across the House is beneficial. I do that in a spirit of flexibility and openness. I also believe that all Members would benefit from another week to discuss the issues with constituents, local police, local community organisations, and perhaps the mosques in a given constituency. Parliament will do its job better if those discussions take place.

I am grateful for what my right hon. Friend has said. There is undoubtedly an argument to resolve the issue tonight on 28 days. At the moment, because of the Government's position, I doubt whether there is a majority for 28 days. Therefore, on the basis that the Home Secretary will put forward a figure of substantially less than 90 days on Report, there is a case for allowing the matter to go forward to Report and then to table amendments accordingly. I emphasise again, however, that if it is a question of 90 days being dropped, and of 80 or 75 days being put forward, that is totally unacceptable. If we are to get a consensus, my view is that 28 days is the preferred figure. My right hon. Friend can always come back to the House later, perhaps in 12 months, and say that it is essential to increase the period, and we can consider the matter then. On that basis, I would be willing not to press my amendment.

I very much appreciate my hon. Friend's approach. To give him the assurance that I think that he seeks, however, it is my view and the Government's entirely genuine view that we need to seek this consensus and get an agreement to deal with these various matters. I hope that colleagues will reflect on what he has said when they consider what to do later this evening. I assure the House that we will continue the discussions.

On that basis, I have now set out the Government's view on all the issues. I ask the House to accept amendment No. 9 and invite those in whose names the remaining amendments and new clauses in the group stand to withdraw them.

The whole House will have been impressed by the Home Secretary's flexibility. To give credit where credit is due, he is clearly listening to many people's concerns. I am torn between my instinct to support the objections to the Bill that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has put with great clarity and force, and my experience and knowledge, which pull me in the other direction.

We have heard a lot of talk from a lot of Members, all of whom have a little bit of knowledge about computers or encryption, this or that. If I may proffer some advice, a little knowledge is a very dangerous thing. It is not one issue or another that has led not just the police but—I am glad to have had the Home Secretary's confirmation—the security services to the unanimous view of all those who work in this area that an extension of time is needed, and that it is up to the police to suggest what that period should be.

What we are discussing, in a vastly more technological age and in the face of a threat to the country that is completely different from any it has experienced in the past from, for instance, the Irish—an entirely international threat, with no boundaries recognised—is the turning of intelligence that can be gathered into evidence that can be used to prosecute. Trying to achieve that strikes me as not a libertarian but a practical issue. If it now takes longer, because the process is so much more complex, to produce from intelligence evidence on the basis of which a person can be charged and convicted properly in court, that seems to me a perfectly reasonable way to proceed.

I hope that in the discussions that the Home Secretary has told us he will have with our Front Bench, the Liberal Democrat Front Bench and all who have expressed an interest, he will be able to pray in aid some of the reasons why the security forces feel as strongly as they do. I know that they are reluctant to divulge their reasons, but perhaps we could be given some indication.

When citizens' lives are at stake, Members must think very carefully before rejecting the advice of professionals who have all the facts at their disposal, and who make honest and straightforward recommendations to the Government of the day, using professional knowledge and expertise that we, inevitably, cannot share.

I must begin by declaring an interest. I practised for 20 years as a criminal defence barrister in the chambers of Mike Mansfield, I am married to a lawyer, and my mother-in-law was a magistrate who served the east end for some 20 years. More important, however, I represent an area that lost 12 people on 7 July. Many more were injured, and many, many more were very frightened by what happened.

I am grateful for the opportunity to explain why, despite what I am sure my constituents would, on the whole, want me to do, I cannot give wholehearted support to the Bill. I have grave reservations about the idea of locking people up for 90 days when there is not sufficient evidence on which to charge them. I was glad to hear from the Home Secretary that he would listen to us, and consider what constitutes a proper amount of time. Personally, I do not think that people should be locked up for 14 days without being charged, let alone 28 days, but compromise is essential. We must reach a consensus, which is why I attached my name to the amendment proposing a 28-day period of detention.

I do not think it would be in the interests of my constituents for the Bill to proceed in its present form because I genuinely do not believe that it would make my constituency any safer. The way to make a constituency safer is to hold its communities tight and close. That would make the constituency healthier and a better place in which to live, but it would also make it safer, because it would enable us to trust each other. We can give information to the police when members of our communities are threatening us. If we separate our communities so that we cannot trust each other, we will not make them any safer.

Our criminal justice system is based on the idea that we can—and do—make mistakes. Experience from my chambers—which dealt with the cases of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four and Stephen Lawrence—demonstrates that it can make mistakes. What concerns me deeply is the possibility that some scared, innocent Muslim teenager will be arrested on the say-so of someone else and a police officer's hunch, and locked up for 90 days. If that teenager is then released and returns to City and Islington college, what will others in the college have to say about British justice, and to what extent will we be divided among ourselves?

We are all trying to do the right thing. We are all coming from the same direction. I know that throughout the summer the Home Secretary and many of his Ministers have worked hard, as have many members of my party, to ensure that we work with our communities, but if we make a mistake we may end up divided.

I also speak as a member of the Anglo-Irish community. I was too young at the time to have any memory of internment—I am not suggesting that this provision is anything like internment—but we have a collective memory and we have to learn from our experiences. When I was a teenager, I certainly felt that an unfair law was being directed at families such as mine. As a result, we were not quite needed or wanted. We were marginalised by such legislation, and I am deeply concerned that this Bill might be seen as a direct attack on our Muslim communities—on my constituents and their younger brothers and sons. That is why I have such concerns. It is wrong in principle to lock someone up for 90 days when there is not enough evidence to charge them; nor, to take a pragmatic approach, does it make us any safer.

I was elected less than six months ago. I was not elected to vote with the Tories, and I certainly was not elected to vote with the Liberal Democrats. I do not want to do that. I want to vote with my Government, and I want them to do the right thing. I am very glad to hear that they are thinking again about what the right thing to do is on this really important issue.

At the end of yesterday's service, which I attended with the Home Secretary, the Prime Minister and a number of other Members, prayers were said. One prayer was led by the Rev. Nicholas Wheeler, who ministered to the victims at King's Cross. His prayer, in which I joined, was:

"God of truth . . . we thank You for the women and men of the police and security services, who brought order out of chaos that dark day. Guide them as they endeavour to make London a secure place for all, in which law and liberty work together for peace. Receive our thanks and hear our prayer."

I know that the Home Secretary believes in that. I do, too, and I certainly hope that in this next week we can reach agreement, and that it is on a 28-day maximum.

I am very pleased to follow the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry). I share her distaste at voting with the Liberals, but I am sorry that she happened to use this occasion to mention it. Those of us who have had the privilege of being in this House for as long as she doubtless will be recognise that when appalling things happen it is all too easy to move too far down a particular road in order to compensate for one's failure to handle the situation sufficiently early.—[Interruption.] Although what happened in London is wholly different from events such as those that led to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, or from the Marchioness disaster and the decisions taken after—[Interruption.]

Order. I do not want a conversation going on below the Gangway. It is disturbing the debate, which hon. Members should respect.

On every such occasion, we sought to take action because public opinion demanded it, and because the circumstances were so peculiar a response was demanded of the kind that we would not normally accept. That is why I disagree with my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates). This is a moment at which this House has to be very careful about taking at face value the good, sensible advice of those whose only commitment is to telling this House what they would in all circumstances most want. It is we who must strike the balance. It is we who must try to understand that it is not just about wishing to prevent this immediate terrorist outrage; we must also ensure that the community in which we live is less likely to support, even tacitly, terrorist activities. In that context, the Northern Irish parallel is vital. In the north of Ireland we have, on occasion—my party has been more guilty of this than any—made decisions on the basis of the immediate threat that have undermined our ability to deal with the longer-term threat, because whole communities have ceased to believe that the law is equally on their side. For me, that consideration meant that I had to vote against the Bill in its entirety.

We will defeat terrorism in the end only when the communities within which the terrorist hides, or upon whose tacit support the terrorist depends, withdraw any scintilla of support. In this case, we start with a community that is determined to exclude the terrorist, and which knows that terrorism is not the way to respond, however strongly they may feel—and I share those strong feelings—about the way in which western nations have operated, particularly in the middle east.

Those of us who were against the war, and who are unhappy about the uneven-handed attitude, particularly of the United States, to Israel and Palestine, understand why those people should be concerned—and we are proud that our Muslim minority have stood firm against terrorism. I want to keep them there, and I think that we are more likely to do that if we extend the number of days for which people can be locked up without charge by as little as is necessary.

Apart from the appeal to "those who know"—an appeal that I have always found rather difficult to take—I have heard no good reason for extending the number of days at all. However, I too would be prepared to go for a compromise, so long as the period was as limited as possible. I hope that those on my party's Front Bench will not be led astray to move too far in the direction of the 90 days, because in the end every extra day for which an innocent person is held in prison without trial increases exponentially the possibility that that person will go back to his or her community and say, "This system does not work. It means that people like me have been held unnecessarily, when I am guiltless."

Finally, I say this to the Home Secretary: the difficulty for his case is the experience of the past year, when so few people have been held for the longer period, when those who have been held for that period have so rarely been charged, and when severe damage has already been done to community relations in the communities from which they come. I beg him to realise that the balance that is necessary must be one that takes strong account of the fact that, as the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury said, we want to build within this country communities that differ but which share one thing—that the rule of law is established for all of us and protects us all equally. It must not be seen as something that affects some people in a way in which it does not affect the majority.

The contribution made by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) was extremely good, especially when he said that a certain Conservative even tried to send questions to the House of Commons from prison. I think that that was a former Member for South Midlothian—the last Conservative ever to represent my constituency.

I have one or two observations to make. I have grave reservations about the three-month lie down—or lock-up, as it should commonly be called. I come from a mining community, and the point that several hon. Members have made about community involvement is really important.

If the police begin to arrest certain members of the community who are not charged after a period of detention, that will infuriate the other members of the community. As I said earlier, there remain deep divisions and hostilities between miners and police in Scotland's mining areas. The police have had to work extremely hard in the 21 years since the miners' strike.

I may be the only hon. Member who has been locked up—[Interruption.] Perhaps that is not the case, but a provision exists in Scottish law called the 110-day petition, under which a person is held on remand. I am disappointed that the Home Secretary has not taken account of the Scottish approach, as I am worried about what happens when a person is detained without trial.

I was in prison for more than two months before my trial, when the jury—that is, the people—took only 25 minutes to find me innocent. I am therefore not a huge supporter of the great Scottish legal system, and I have grave concerns about it. However, the serious point is that it is bad enough for a person who is wrongly sent to prison and who then has to fight against the charge levelled at him: much worse is the problem faced by the person who is sent to prison without being told what the charge is. It is possible that such a person might leave prison without ever being charged, and that is intolerable. We must do all that we can to ensure that that does not happen in this case.

I do not want this Government to repeat the mistakes made by the Conservative Government of the 1980s. We must not become isolated from the communities in this country. We must work with the people in the communities and carry them with us. If one person is detained in prison without trial, under the circumstances envisaged by this Bill, that is one person too many.

It is possible that some hon. Members may not know what happens in prison. Every weekday, I was locked up for 21 hours out of the 24, and at weekends I was locked up for 23 hours. I could not leave the cell, but that is what happens to people who are awaiting trial and who are innocent. It is intolerable that the Government propose to put people in that position while they are waiting to be interrogated by the police, sometimes with representation and sometimes without.

I want to make one final appeal to the Home Secretary. He said that a mechanism would be established that would allow cases to be reviewed by a judge, whose seniority has yet to be decided. I have concerns about judges, and who will monitor the decisions that they take? Will the legislation be reviewed, say, in six months from now to ensure that we are not going down the wrong road? If too many people are being detained without trial, that will show that there must be a fault in the system. In that case, the provision should be brought back for discussion in this House.

Having set out those reservations, I look forward with interest to the comments that will made by hon. Members of all parties if the Government's proposal is accepted by the House.

I shall keep my remarks brief, because I know that other hon. Members wish to speak. My point goes back to my exchange with the Home Secretary. We hear now that the Attorney-General provided the basis on which the certificate of compatibility was granted. In the past, we have had opinions from the Attorney-General, but this matter is so important that we should be told on what basis the certificate of compatibility has been given. Lord Carlile of Berriew made a general point about whether the provisions would be challenged under the Human Rights Act 1998, but I believe strongly that any limit above 14 days would run a severe risk of being so challenged. Whether I agree with that upper limit or not, such a challenge is likely to be made.

Such a challenge could come in various shapes or forms, and I wish to know what the Attorney-General had to say on that. In particular, did he consider the possibility of a challenge not only under article 5—which is frequently mentioned and concerns deprivation of liberty—but article 3, some of which can be subject to derogation and some of which cannot? Did he consider article 10, which deals with freedom of expression? I could mention other counts on which a challenge could be made to the provisions of the Bill as it stands and any limit above 14 days is liable to be subject to such a challenge.

Chaos would result if the legislation were struck down, as the Belmarsh decision struck down the compatibility provisions in previous legislation. Lord Hoffmann, and eight out of nine Law Lords, spoke with great vehemence about the need to reverse the previous decision on the Belmarsh case on the ground of incompatibility. Only a short time earlier, Lord Hoffmann said in another case that, legislation, if clear and unambiguous, would be constitutionally acceptable even if it were inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1998 and that the courts would have to follow the later legislation.

Irrespective of what the Home Secretary has said, if the Bill were to include the words suggested in my amendment that

"this Act shall take effect notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998",

the judges would be under an obligation to give effect to the legislation irrespective of what the European convention on human rights said and irrespective of the HRA. I appreciate that, in the past few months, the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister—and my right hon. Friends the Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) and the Leader of the Opposition—have all stated that, if necessary, they would repeal or amend the Human Rights Act 1998. That was actually in our manifesto. This is a practical example in which such considerations come into play. I wish to know whether the Home Secretary will keep open the idea of amending the Bill in the way that I have described, because only that will ensure that the provisions will stand up—if a time limit over 14 days is imposed—and will not be successfully challenged.

This is a serious matter. A huge amount of time and effort has been put into the proposals and it would be a waste if they were struck down by the Law Lords in such circumstances as I have described. It would also expose the British public to considerable danger because, in the years that would elapse, it would be likely that people who should be detained would get away.

I wish to detain the Committee for only a few moments to raise just two points with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. At the start of the debate, I was much in favour of the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick). I pay tribute to him and to my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry) for their contributions to the debate. I was pleased to hear what the Home Secretary had to say. I am glad that he will continue the discussions in the coming week, although I fear that we are merely putting off this particular debate for seven days.

I wish my right hon. Friend to take note of two points in the coming seven days. First, the new laws will have a disproportionate effect on the Muslim community and the Asian community. I am not a Muslim, but 12,000 members of the Muslim faith live in my Leicester, East constituency. Although they have not written me letters, they have made representations to me regarding my discussions with them and their concern about the way in which the Government have reacted to the events of 7 July. Rightly, they condemn terrorism and the 7 July attacks, but there is concern about an apparent gap between what we decide here and the community outside the House. I welcome the Home Secretary's assurance that he intends to go out to the community to explain why the measures are needed, but it is important that he recognises that it is the Muslim community and the Asian community generally that will be most affected if the Bill is passed.

Only last week in Leicester, I was contacted by members of the Muslim community whose houses had been raided by the police, not under terrorism legislation, but under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. I contacted the police to find out why, but was not given an explanation sufficient to enable me to explain to those members of the community why that had happened. They said to me, "The powers are already there. Why are more needed?" It is not only up to Members of this House to explain to the community; the Government have a leading role to play in ensuring that that happens.

My second point is on the Attorney-General. I was concerned to read in newspapers about the Attorney-General's concerns about the proposals, specifically the one on detention for 90 days. The Home Secretary told the House that the Attorney-General believes that his proposals today go a long way to deal with the problem. The right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) asked the Home Secretary whether the Attorney-General was completely satisfied. I should like the Attorney-General's advice to be made available to the House. At the very least, a Law Officer should have been present for our debate. I accept that the Attorney-General cannot be here because he is a Member of the other House, but the Solicitor-General ought to have been here so that Members of this House could question him about the Law Officers' advice and whether the criticisms they made in the memorandum that was sent to the Prime Minister and copied to the Home Secretary have been met. It is not that I doubt my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary—I am sure that he was absolutely truthful.

It is also astonishing that no Minister from the Department for Constitutional Affairs is present to inform the House of the feelings of the judiciary.

In that vein, does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is surprising that the Home Secretary does not seem to know the views on these important matters of the Lord Advocate or the Procurator Fiscal Service in Scotland?

To be fair to the Home Secretary, he made it clear in response to the intervention by the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) that he was focusing on the Crown Prosecution Service and the English situation, but he promised to answer those points. Of course, the advice of the Lord Advocate and the Procurator Fiscal Service is important to Scottish Members, but as an English Member—if I can call myself that, rather than a British Member representing a city in England—let me say to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary that it is important that we hear the advice of the Law Officers. There are mutterings from the judiciary: we have already heard from Lord Steyn and former Law Lords. It is important that we get the whole view of the Government. I do not mind if that is represented by the Home Secretary's coming to the Dispatch Box, but he needs to come with that information to satisfy me and others who are still gravely concerned about what the Government are proposing.

I appreciate the helpful nature of the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) and the fact that the Home Secretary has been helpful in responding, saying that discussions will now take place, but having listened to the debate for some positive, decisive arguments one way or another about the precise time, I fear that no such arguments have arisen. If we are not careful, we will all be in a well-intentioned bargaining process.

A period of 28 days has been proposed by the hon. Member for Walsall, North, which I would vote for, because it is shorter than 90 days, but are the Government to come back with 50 days, intending to settle for 35? Is the House to be involved in the process? Will another range be tabled on Report? We are reduced to that. I accept that everybody is trying to do their best, including the police who have given the advice. The trouble is that the Committee does not want to be seen to be rejecting the police's advice following such serious allegations, but we have been given no concrete reasons why 90 days will be all right.

Having listened to the debate, I have come to the conclusion that there is no scientific explanation; these figures are being plucked from the air. We have been told a little about encryption, about which I know nothing, and about the complicated and international nature of these forms of crime but, as has been pointed out, there will be occasions when it might take 150 days to sort out some such process. We have always traditionally taken the risk of releasing people before we have been able fully to unravel the evidence. We are being asked to make a totally arbitrary judgment in reaction to the latest advice.

If there is no certain scientific answer to help us, we must ask what we are doing to the process in carrying out such bargaining. What are we doing to some of the fundamentals of our criminal law on which we have always relied? We are in danger of doing serious damage. We keep bouncing up the period of time. As the hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Hamilton) startlingly reminded us, we are talking about people being locked up all day and, potentially, repeatedly interviewed for a very long time before they are released without charge because somebody finally realises that they have arrested a man of a similar name or have been misled by malicious information—and an innocent man is let free.

The basic process of English law has until very recently been that no one could be held for more than 48 hours without charge. That included holding people suspected of serious offences such as murder and arson, and those suspected of being dangerous and of having committed widespread crime. They could not be held unless they were charged and, once they were charged, the police could not carry on questioning them except under severe constraints. That was regarded as an important principle of our law.

Under the pressure of Irish terrorism, we went to seven days as recently as the Terrorism Act 2000. In 2003, we went to 14 days, and that came into effect only in January last year. The arguments put by the previous Minister of State in 2003 are exactly the same as today's. We were told that there were forensic difficulties and difficult cases, and that 14 days was required. Suddenly, since then, with no change in the concrete evidence, with no specific example before us and with nothing to say that things have become dramatically more complicated, we are whizzing up to 90 days. We are radically changing one of the fundamentals that we thought was a protection for the individual citizen in our criminal justice system, and we should not do that too lightly.

I agree with the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry). My first reservation rests on the terrible damage that will be done the first time that an innocent man has to be let free without charge after three months in prison. It is not internment, it is not the Birmingham Six, it is not the Guildford Four, but it will be serious, particularly if it happens a lot. That is what terrorists look for, because they exploit such injustices and make great use of them. I fear that the use of such measures will become routine. I am sure that the police will behave very well over the next two or three years and have regard to the sensitivity of the issue. The powers will be used in only a few serious cases. In five or 10 years' time, however, there will be many more cases. The composition of the House of Commons will have changed, and it will be concerned about a different kind of serious crime. It may argue that child rapists and other offenders can be held for 90 days.

The police will say that they should have such powers. Under the old system, they did not start to investigate someone at the point of arrest. The investigation team obtained most of the evidence before they arrested their suspect. They had 48 hours in which to interview him, and if they could not get anything out of him, they had to set him free. I predict that, in five or ten years, it will be routine for police to say, "We have a good tip-off that Mohammed is responsible. Bring him in, and we'll start investigating." After 90 days of repeated questioning and the removal of kit from the suspect's house, they will find that they have the wrong Mohammed. That poses a serious danger to provisions to protect us against terrorism and is an affront to our justice system. The Committee should argue that the period of detention has frequently been increased in recent times, including under the two most recent pieces of terrorism legislation, so it does not accept that there is a case for extending that period beyond 14 days.

I have listened carefully to the debate. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary invited to us to reflect on the proposal from our constituents' perspective. I would like to say a few words from the perspective of the people of Leeds, a city that was shocked and traumatised by what happened in the summer. I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Emily Thornberry), who said that, if we are to make our communities safe, we must build trust within them. Over the years, we have made a fair effort at that in Leeds, and there is generally good trust between all the communities in my constituency as we have tried to work together.

Encouragingly, having spent weeks in my constituency over the summer break, I have seen that trust built up and strengthened through the traumas that we have faced. Despite that trust, the events of the summer in Leeds came as a complete shock out of the blue. The community was unsighted and the events were totally unexpected. The families of the bombers themselves did not know that terror bombers were living in their midst. I am therefore a little surprised to hear Liberal Democrat Members and others say that nothing needs to change at all, because that is not the sentiment in my constituency. On the morning of 12 July, my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary alerted me to the fact that No. 12 Alexander grove—a house on the very edge of my constituency—would be raided by the police as it was a suspected bomb-making centre used by the London suicide bombers, whose homes were to be searched that morning. In the Burley Lodge area of Leeds, 420 of my constituents were immediately evacuated. The police knocked on their doors and told them that they had only a few minutes to leave because there was a dangerous bomb in the neighbourhood.

After many hours, the police forced an entry into the house in Alexander grove—it was feared that a bomb would be tripped and so on. The furniture had been removed, but they found a household bath full of chemicals. They had to work out the composition and combination of the chemicals and, crucially, those materials were of a different type from those used by previous bombers in Britain such as the IRA. The scenario was quite different, and it took more than 14 days to make the house safe with the help of chemists and other specialists before the forensic investigation could even begin. If a single suicide bomber had survived and been taken into custody, how on earth could the forensics have been completed in time to bring a charge? I simply do not understand the rationale of people who hold fast to the 14-day limit and will not contemplate any movement whatsoever.

I pay tribute to the courage of the security services and the police. They had to manage the situation in the neighbourhood in extraordinarily difficult circumstances, keeping people away from their homes for two days and explaining to them to the best of their ability that they were trying to make the place safe. In my visits to the neighbourhood since they returned home and in the surgeries that I have held in the Burley Lodge centre, I have asked people how they see things. They tell me that the context has changed since 9/11 and since 7 July. They think that the international context has changed as well, with transnational terrorists who move across borders and operate in the new world of IT, international mobile phones, encryption and so on. They say they hope that Parliament will take more time, if necessary, to get it right, because what they need most of all is for their communities to be made safe for everyone.

I thank the Home Secretary for the statement that he made in his contribution, although I regret that the moves, particularly on procedure, could not have come earlier, especially as the criticisms were well known to the Home Office. Nevertheless, I welcome the fact that, even at this late stage, those moves were made and there was an offer to review the safeguards for any continuing detention. Moreover, if we are moving in that direction, as I mentioned earlier, we should think of extending that to the period beyond seven days, let alone 14 days. The Home Secretary may wish to consider that, as it relates specifically to terrorist offences.

I am mindful that, in the concessions that he made, the right hon. Gentleman covered most, if not all, the amendments that we had tabled both as probing amendments and to improve the safeguards in the Bill. For those reasons, I seek to press only amendment No. 9, which I understand is accepted. I am pleased that, in a small way, I may have contributed to achieving greater consensus throughout the House. I seek leave to withdraw amendment No. 8 which, as the Home Secretary rightly noted, was only a probing amendment.

That leaves the issue of the duration of any extended period. Again, it is with some regret that I see that, despite criticism from an enormous number of people across the spectrum, the movement by the Government has come only when the Government appeared to be facing defeat if they did not do something about it. I regret that because I had hoped that, in building consensus, we could do better.

If the Government are genuine in their desire to hold consultations with all parties in the House and will do so—the Home Secretary has given me an assurance privately behind the Speaker's Chair that that will take place within the next few days, so that it is not a last-minute matter on Tuesday night, and that all the amendments that are tabled will be given to us with proper time to consider them—the proper way of proceeding at this stage is for those consultations and talks to take place.

It seems to me that if, in those consultations, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats hold on to 28 days, we will get 28 days.

We have approached the matter from the position that we do not like any extension of 14 days. Our earlier willingness to support the hon. Gentleman's amendment, if it was pressed, was based, first, on the desire to reach a consensus with the Government if it were possible to maintain it, and secondly, on the belief that 28 days was not some trade-off or Dutch auction, but the outer limit of what is acceptable. I emphasise that to the Home Secretary. If he were to say 21 days, I would be a much happier man. We pitched the limit very precisely because we thought it the proper place to do so.

I would much prefer not to see this aspect of the legislation happening at all, but if it is to happen, and if the Government are sincere—I trust the Home Secretary in a way that I do not trust every Minister—we will work with the Home Secretary to try to achieve the consensus that he has always desired and to make sure that the legislation commands widespread support not only in this House, but in the country.

May I echo the hon. Gentleman's remarks about the helpfulness of the Home Secretary's comments? We have made a significant move forward—perhaps a greater concentration on the possibilities of consensus has been occasioned by the result of the earlier vote. The outcome is welcome, and let us move forward on that basis. I join the hon. Gentleman in feeling that, if the proposed discussions are a genuine attempt to establish consensus on this difficult issue, it is not appropriate for us to press our amendments this evening. I will not recommend to my hon. Friends that they vote against the clause standing part of the Bill, on the basis that we will return next week, when we will have an opportunity to make our points.

I agree with the hon. Gentleman and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 9, in clause 23, page 22, line 3, after 'to', insert 'a'.—[Mr. Grieve.]

Clause 23, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Committee report progress; to sit again tomorrow.

Petitions

Council Tax

I beg leave to present a petition, which forms part of the IsItFair council tax protest campaign, on behalf of nearly 400 of my constituents from Braintree, Witham and a number of surrounding villages.

The petition declares:

That the year-on-year, inflation-busting increases in Council Tax are causing hardship to many and take no account of ability to pay; further that the proposed property revaluation and re-banding exercise will make an already flawed system even worse.

The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons votes to replace Council Tax with a fair and equitable tax that, without recourse to any supplementary benefit, takes into account ability to pay from disposable income. Such tax to be based on a system that is free from any geographical or politically motivated discrimination, and that clearly identifies the fiscal and managerial responsibilities of all involved parties.

And the Petitioners remain, etc.

To lie upon the Table.

Bromsgrove Station

I, too, beg leave to present a petition to the House of Commons. It states:

The petition of the commuting public of Bromsgrove declares that the train platform at Bromsgrove railway station is in urgent need of lengthening; that demand for commuting down to Worcester or into Birmingham from Bromsgrove has rapidly increased over recent years; that presently too few trains stop in peak hours to give commuters any real choice of services; that those which do stop are appallingly overcrowded as longer trains are forbidden from stopping due to the length of the platform; and draws attention to the recently published west midlands route utilisation study, which put the lengthening of the platform at Bromsgrove station as the top priority for rail infrastructure improvements in the entire region.

The Petitioners therefore request the House of Commons to call on the Department for Transport to now instruct Network Rail to start work on developing a scheme to deliver platform lengthening at Bromsgrove station so that commuters can look forward to a rapidly improved service.

And the Petitioners remain, etc.

To lie upon the Table.

Small Sub-Post Offices

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Cawsey.]

Let me say, Mr. Deputy Speaker, how grateful I am for the opportunity to raise this most important issue on the Adjournment. I am moved to do so because I have been approached by Mr. Gary Coyle, the sub-postmaster of Sutton Valence, which, as the Minister will not know, is a most picturesque village on the borders of my constituency. It was once in my constituency, and I was very sad to lose it.

Sutton Valence post office is well known in the local area because it is the centre of village life. When I first went to live in Sutton Valence 18 years ago, it had several shops. There was a baker, a village store, a newsagent, and of course the sub-post office; today, only the sub-post office remains. If it went out of business, there would be no natural hub of village life in Sutton Valence, and many vital services would not be provided. That is true in one Kentish village on the borders of my constituency, but it is also true of many sub-post offices in many other villages in my constituency and across the entire country.

The little sub-post office in Sutton Valence has survived while others have closed because Gary Coyle has been full of every last initiative. It has a flourishing retail business that sells everything from woolly jumpers to pencils; it has the lottery—I have bought my own tickets there many a time, some of them very successful—it takes in cleaning, because the nearest dry cleaners is a long way away; it takes in villagers' photographs to be processed; and it advertises, because if one wants to find an electrician in the village, one naturally goes to the post office to read the little postcards at the front.

I am sure that I am describing to the Minister a scene that he knows very well. However, that scene is seriously under threat. That is why Gary Coyle set up postmasternetwork.co.uk, which assists sub-postmasters all over the country in considering how they can diversify to prop up what is becoming an extremely difficult business to run. Why is it becoming so difficult? The Government are always to blame, of course, but on this occasion they must take a certain share of the blame, inasmuch as there has been a withdrawal of benefits paid through the post office because most pensions are now paid directly into bank accounts.

I have no objection to that. I am not saying that it is wrong or foolish, but merely that it must be acknowledged that it has had quite an impact on sub-post offices, particularly on little rural ones. Not only has the postmaster lost the commission that he would have got for distributing those benefits, but because people no longer go to the post office to collect their pension, or whatever it may be, they are not in there to buy other services. The throughput of customers has drastically decreased and most sub-postmasters cannot make a living simply from the revenue they receive from the post office.

There are lots of things that sub-postmasters could do, however, and lots of things that they would like to do. They are not being miserable and saying that there is nothing they can do. They say, "There is plenty we can do. Why won't you, oh Government, via the Post Office, let us do it?"

Cash machines are an example. A cash machine is an enormous convenience, but never more so than in a rural area. The option is often a bank five miles or more away in the next town or big village. That is certainly the case for my constituents. The nearest cash machine is probably in Headcorn, which is four or five miles down the road. That is fine for people who have an automobile, or for people who go out to work and will be passing a cash machine anyway, but for the people about whom we should be ever more concerned—those who do not have transport and who live in villages to which public transport is extremely bad—the more conveniences they have on their doorstep, the better for them, and not just for the sub-postmaster.

Sub-post offices may not set up cash machines, however, and they have to obtain a special waiver from the Post Office to see through to completion the contract for any existing arrangements. That is bad for the sub-post office, because it takes from it the revenue it would receive from whoever supplies the cash machine, but it is also appallingly bad for people who live in the village and depend on the cash machine.

Some particularly enterprising sub-post offices would like to act as bureaux de change. After all, part of their raison d'être is handling money. They have security arrangements; they are used to all that type of thing and would love to act as bureaux de change. Come on, we are talking about Kent. We come out of the channel tunnel with our pockets bursting with euros so we want to go to the sub-post office to change them—[Interruption.] The Minister laughs, but why should not we change our euros at the sub-post office? Can somebody tell me? I do not know why, but the Post Office says, "No".

Then there is the choice of mail providers. The Government have instructed Postcomm, which is the mail regulator—although I do not need to tell the Minister that—to prepare the mail market "for competition". Fine. Sub-postmasters welcome that. "Yippee", they say, "we will now be able to offer our customers, to their benefit and ours, a choice of mail providers." People could take their packages to Sutton Valence and send them via the Royal Mail, TNT or someone else. No. That is not allowed either under Post Office rules. Sub-post offices can deal only with the Royal Mail. So much for preparing the market for competition.

The Post Office, due to its near-monopoly position, takes other unfair advantage of small sub-post offices. I have already mentioned one survival strategy for many of those little sub-post offices: the lottery. The Minister will know that shops supplying lottery services have to stay open well beyond core post office hours, yet the Post Office still takes 20 per cent. commission on all lottery tickets issued, despite the fact that sub-postmasters are carrying out that business in their own time. It is not as though sub-postmasters even make that much per ticket, but to pay 20 per cent. commission to the Post Office, which, I think, also owns 20 per cent. of Camelot, is extremely questionable.

Sub-postmasters are keen to advertise financial products, but they are not allowed to do that either, so they are losing yet more revenue. I do not suggest that they should give advice about financial problems—I can see the difficulty with that. I am talking about advertising and acting as an intermediary for financial products. Again, however, everything is loaded against small rural sub-post offices. If a sub-post office operates in a general store, such as Tesco, it can advertise Tesco financial services.

I had a meeting last Friday night in my constituency with nearly 20 sub-postmasters and mistresses and they expressed many of the concerns that the right hon. Lady is eloquently bringing to the House's attention. She spoke of the many roles that sub-post offices could take on but are not currently permitted to accept. Is she, like me, concerned about the failure of the Post Office and the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency to share out as widely and fairly as they could the option for people to get their tax discs renewed locally?

The hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which adds to the list that I gave. I am sure that other hon. Members could chip in with points of their own. Anybody who has a rural constituency knows that we are considering a big, big issue, which causes genuinely serious concerns to sub-postmasters, who worry about whether they can stay in business.

Because of the restrictive practices, the Association of Convenience Stores, supported by the postmaster network that I mentioned earlier, presented a complaint to the Office of Fair Trading. They requested that some of the restrictions in the Post Office contract should be withdrawn because they were deemed to be unfair. I agree with that. Consequently, a preliminary judgment has been made by the Office of Fair Trading. I understand the limitations that the Minister faces in responding, but I need to refer to the judgment to put it in context.

The OFT, which was tasked with examining the restrictions in the sub-postmaster contract, has ruled in its preliminary judgment that Post Office Ltd should continue to benefit from exclusions under certain prohibitions of the Competition Act 1988. The main ground for that is that Post Office Ltd provides services of general economic interest. The outcome of the definition combined with the judgment is that sub-post offices will be prevented in future from offering facilities to mail service providers other than the Royal Mail and from offering products and services across the network to replace the loss of previous Government business.

The position can only get worse if the Government do not show a genuine will to handle it. The Post Office currently circulates a contract, which it demands that sub-postmasters sign. The Minister will say that one is free to decide whether to sign a contract, but what are people to do if they do not sign it? They cannot operate if they do not sign it, so they lose their homes and their businesses. In many rural areas, postmasters of small post offices have mortgaged their private homes to keep the business going.

It is wrong that the Post Office, with all its power and its monopoly position, can squeeze out small operations, which may be modest but are the world to an awful lot of constituents.

I have far too much respect for the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) to congratulate her, as is customary, on securing this evening's debate. She would not want praise for mere good fortune in the draw. However, perhaps she will allow me to congratulate her on choosing a topic that is at once so broad that every hon. Member will have an interest in it and so narrow, being the subject of an on-going complaint to the Office of Fair Trading that, as Minister, I am precluded from saying almost anything interesting about the specific matter she has raised.

As it is perhaps the only time this evening that I may be able to, let me expand on that by explaining that the restrictions in sub-postmasters' contracts with Post Office Ltd, which limit the extent to which certain services and products can be offered through a sub-postmaster's associated retail business, are the subject of the complaint that the Association of Convenience Stores made to the Office of Fair Trading, as the right hon. Lady outlined, in a letter dated 30 November last year. The Office of Fair Trading reached a provisional decision on 27 September this year to close its file on the matter, but invited the Association of Convenience Stores to make observations on its findings and provide any further relevant information before a final decision is reached. I understand that the Association of Convenience Stores has confirmed its intention to submit such further information, and that a deadline of 25 November has been set for that.

The unfortunate—or perhaps fortunate—effect of this is that, as the matter is effectively sub judice, it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment in any way on this issue or that case. I can, however, comment on what I take to be the underlying concerns expressed by the right hon. Lady, which I share, in respect of two things. The first is that sub-postmasters should be properly remunerated for the work that they do, and assisted to run a commercial operation. The second is that the Post Office should seek to provide an improved service to people qua customers without imposing unsustainable losses on them qua taxpayers.

The future of the Post Office is an issue of relevance and concern to every Member of the House. We all share concerns for the future provision of services in our constituencies, and recognise that, until 1999, when the Government launched the £500 million investment fund for information technology, there had been underinvestment in the business for decades.

Advances in technology, greater mobility, and changes in shopping and financial habits have resulted in a growing proportion of people simply not using the post office as they did in the past, for many reasons. The right hon. Lady referred to the direct payment of benefits, and I wholly accept that that has had a major impact on the decline in volume. However, this is not just about the changes in benefit payment arrangements, which were completed in April. The decline started well before the move to direct payment, and applies not only to those payments but to a much wider range of services, including Girobank, National Savings transactions, telephone bill payments and postal orders.

For many reasons, custom has declined sharply across the network, and the right hon. Lady was right to point that out. If the Post Office is to thrive, it needs to change significantly. The Government want to see a post office network that can prosper on the basis of today's and future needs, not on the needs of 20 or 30 years ago. However, we also have to face up to present reality. The rural network is currently subsidised by £150 million a year—a total commitment of £750 million to 2008. The directly managed Crown offices lose £70 million a year, and the deprived urban network sustains a £40 million a year loss.

Several important steps to restructure and revitalise the post office have already been taken, but the future of the network rightly remains an issue of national debate, and it is clear that there are still major challenges to be faced.

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, and even more grateful to the right hon. Lady for her intervention on my behalf.

The Minister has rightly pointed out that the Government will support the rural network to the tune of £150 million a year until 2008, but postmasters and postmistresses in my constituency are worried about what will happen after 2008. Many of them are considering whether they should retire now or later, and whether their business will be a viable going concern in the future.

Of course they are, which is why the Government are considering carefully what to do at that point.

The post office network has been contracting since the 1960s. Between 1979 and 1997, Conservative Governments presided over 3,500 closures, and in all that time produced no policy on how to ensure that the network could continue to remain relevant into the 21st century. There have been reductions in post office usage, some of which were caused by the absence of investment. Above all, however, changes in lifestyle and habits mean that our constituents do not use the post office as much as they used to. This is fundamentally about ordinary people, our constituents, making choices about how they want to conduct their business.

Private business people run 96 per cent. of the nation's post offices. They have invested not only their own money into their businesses but also a great amount of care and effort to help the post office network to achieve its highly regarded status. But with declining profitability in the network as a whole, the viability of many individual offices has taken a severe knock. Decisive action, in the form of the urban reinvention programme, was taken to restructure a sector of the network in which there was extensive over-provision, with the aim of better matching supply to demand and of creating the viability necessary for a sustainable network for the future.

The Government committed £210 million to facilitate that restructuring, which took 2,500 offices out of the urban network, but ensured that 99.3 per cent. of people in urban areas still live within 1 mile of their nearest post office.

We now need to address the issues facing the social network of sub-post offices in rural and urban deprived areas. It is no longer clear that the needs of those communities or the most disadvantaged are best served by the current traditional, costly and inflexible structure. We need to find innovative and more cost-effective ways to deliver post office services, and we cannot ignore the fact that large numbers of rural offices have a tiny number of customers.

Indeed, earlier this year I had the opportunity to visit one such post office in the constituency of the right hon. Lady, as she knows, where there were, on average, fewer than 12 customers a day. That is not uncommon. The truth is that there are 800 offices averaging fewer than five customers a day and generating average losses of more than £6.50 per customer visit. That means that for every customer who pops in to buy a first-class stamp, Post Office Ltd. could give them a book of six stamps, a loaf of bread, a pint of milk, a bag of sugar, a packet of bacon and a big box of tea bags and still lose less money. I have the bill here to prove it.

Even in the busiest rural offices, the revenues to Post Office Ltd from transactions are less than the cost to it of providing the service. The Department of Trade and Industry, together with other Departments and the devolved Administrations, is assessing and analysing a range of financial, economic and demographic data on the rural and urban deprived sectors of the network to establish a clear picture of usage, transaction volumes and costs. In addition, Post Office Ltd is running a series of pilot trials of alternative innovative means of delivering services to rural communities.

The focus of those pilot trials is to test a range of alternative methods of delivering those services to smaller communities, in particular to explore different approaches to achieving acceptable standards of service from the traditional post office. With so many rural post offices now having a small customer base, it is essential to recognise that the rural network must have the flexibility to adapt to the changing needs and circumstances of the communities in which they are located.

In politics, we frequently expend our energy on the structure of the delivery mechanism rather than the quality of the service we are delivering. In recent years, we have all perhaps tended to focus too closely on the size of the network. The debate needs to move on. We need to focus much more clearly on provision of and reasonable access to post office services, paying particular attention to innovative methods of delivering them.

Research conducted for Postcomm shows that most customers quickly adapt to changes in service provision. The pilot trials that Post Office Ltd is conducting will give further useful insights into how best to deliver services and the fluidity and adaptability of people's behaviour where a "core and outreach" approach is offered. I will be particularly keen to see how we might be able to improve both quality and service and the number of people we can reach. In this, I shall want to compare provision of a fixed outlet in a small village serving only a few customers each day with an outreach or mobile service that can visit not only that village, but the five or six surrounding villages whose inhabitants travel to the nearest large town for their postal services.

I want to move on to some matters that the right hon. Lady will find helpful, but I shall give way briefly.

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way, particularly as he is so reluctant to do so. Does he not accept that more people would be likely to use the sub-post offices for postal services if they were also going there for other services such as cash, euros and so on?

There has been a long tradition of local grocery stores, card shops and so forth also having a post office counter located within them. That has increased footfall for such stores, and that franchise arrangement has proved very satisfactory for those local traders. The right hon. Lady might agree that it is a strange franchise where one takes the most respected brand in the market, which the Post Office is, and uses it to generate footfall in one's own retail outlet, be it a grocery shop or a card store, but is paid for, rather than pays for, that franchise.

Postcomm, in its advice to Government on the future of the rural network, made 19 recommendations. The major strands of its advice were: that Government needed to clarify their primary reason for maintaining a physical network of offices, that they should end the policy of preventing avoidable closures in the network, and that alternative means of delivery should be introduced to ensure continued access to services, particularly for vulnerable groups. While Postcomm advised that its recommendations should be enacted in relation to the network from April 2006, the Government decided that more time was needed fully to understand the impact of the pilots being trialled by Post Office Ltd. before coming to any final decisions. Accordingly, a two-year extension of the annual support of £150 million, subject to state aid clearance, was announced in Parliament in September 2004. The Government want to be sure that we have considered all angles before taking a decision about the future of the network.

Postcomm recommended that the Government should clarify their primary reason for wanting to maintain a physical network of post offices. I completely agree that it is of fundamental importance that we have a clear vision for the network of tomorrow. Without it, the network is likely to contract in an unstructured way, hitting the most vulnerable groups in our society the hardest. If we do want to maintain a physical network, over and above that which Post Office Ltd would run commercially, we must be able to justify the high costs that that would incur.

Postcomm also recognised that it was becoming increasingly difficult to find suitable people interested in taking on full-time post offices when they came on to the market. That is why it recommended the removal of the policy to prevent all avoidable closures. As a result, we will review that policy in light of the pilot report. In the meantime, however, we have adapted the interpretation of the policy to allow Post Office Ltd more flexibility to retain service provision in a location without the absolute need for that always to be on the same basis as that in relation to the departing sub-postmaster or mistress.

Inevitably, however, there are post offices that cannot be retained no matter how much effort is put into finding a new sub-postmaster or sub-postmistress. Increasingly, that is likely to be more common. Rural post offices must be sustainable. At present, however, the number of customers is simply too small to make such businesses attractive. One customer every hour and a half might give a whole new meaning to the phrase, "an unhurried retail environment", but it is hardly an attractive business proposition. That said, we must not make the mistake of believing that this is a problem only for the smallest rural outlets with high fixed costs and low footfall. In all but 1 per cent. of the 8,000 rural offices across the country, it costs Post Office Ltd more to provide the service than it takes back over the counter. Post Office Ltd loses money on the other 99 per cent. of those rural post offices. That indicates clearly that this is not simply a structural matter of outlets and fixed costs but equally about contracts and variable costs.

That is why I am pleased to tell the House that Post Office Ltd has been working closely with the National Federation of Sub-Postmasters to move sub-postmasters' remuneration to a more transaction-based and commercially-oriented structure, with the fixed payment element much reduced. It is important that a mutually beneficial relationship continues to develop between Post Office Ltd and sub-postmasters and mistresses—a relationship that rewards delivery and thus incentivises a more commercial approach. The new contract has been implemented across the urban network, and in my view it will be important to maintain this impetus and to examine carefully the scope for further broadening the transaction-based contract structure to the rest of the network.

Post Office Ltd is at a key point in its development, particularly in relation to generating new income from the financial services and other products that it has recently launched. It has already had considerable success in showing customers that post offices are no longer simply places to visit to collect pensions or benefits, but now a good place to get foreign currency, ask about car insurance or top up credit on a mobile phone. All those services are being provided through Post Office Ltd. The company is working hard to build on that success, to ensure that post offices remain relevant and are not left behind in a rapidly changing marketplace. Looking ahead, the greatest uncertainty, I believe, is customer behaviour. It will be customers—our constituents—who largely dictate the future of the business.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at five minutes to Eight o'clock.