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Commons Chamber

Volume 439: debated on Wednesday 9 November 2005

House of Commons

Wednesday 9 November 2005

The House met at half-past Eleven o'clock

Prayers

Mr Speaker in the Chair

Oral Answers to Questions

International Development

The Secretary of State was asked—

Malawi

Malawi had a poor harvest earlier this year due to severe drought. Almost 2 million people have received food aid since June and that figure will rise to more than 4 million before the next harvest in April 2006. A new assessment published this week indicates that some additional maize is needed due to an increase in the price. The Department for International Development's commitment of £15.2 million to help deal with the food crisis is the largest donor contribution and we are ready to do more if required.

This year's harvest in Malawi was exceptionally poor and the Secretary of State will be aware that there are another five months until the next one. The situation is bad and getting worse. Given that the Church of Scotland estimates that some 5 million lives may be at risk in Malawi, what steps can he take to ensure that those people are not left to die?

I share the hon. Gentleman's concern about the seriousness of the situation. The harvest was down by about a quarter and Malawi now seems to suffer a very severe drought every 10 years. However, the assessment system for anticipating the scale of the crisis has worked quite well. We currently estimate that, overall, about 4.4 million people will require food. Of course, the problem is not just the failure of the harvest but the impact of AIDS on people's capacity to cope, along with the high price of maize. From memory, maize costs some 16 kwacha per kilo in the north of the country and 46 kwacha per kilo in the south, where the problem is most acute. Trying to bring down the price so that people can afford to buy maize is important, but above all, it is about ensuring that food is distributed. I spoke to the Malawian President last week, and to the Finance Minister this morning, about the situation. The steps that are being taken suggest that the international community and the Government of Malawi, working together, will be in a position to deal with the crisis, but we keep the situation under very close review.

Drought is not the only cause of the food crisis in Malawi—a population weakened by AIDS is one that cannot get good agricultural yields. What longer-term help will my right hon. Friend's Department give to increase irrigation in Malawi, so that farmers are less subject to the vagaries of rainfall?

My hon. Friend makes a good point about the importance of ensuring that farmers have the means to get the most produce out of their land. That includes trying to harvest water where possible, but drought clearly makes doing so difficult. It is also about providing and distributing seeds and fertilisers, and part of the money that we have made available in response to the current crisis is for that purpose, so that farmers, particularly those who may have had to eat the seeds or who cannot afford to buy fertilisers, are in a better position in the new planting season to plant and—if the rains come, which I hope they will—to get a better yield next year.

The Secretary of State will be aware of the Scottish Executive's useful and timely mission in Malawi just now. Can he assure me that he, his Department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office are doing all that they can to encourage and support the Scottish Executive in that mission? Does he further agree that the success of the mission demonstrates that the Scottish Parliament and other devolved institutions have a real and meaningful role to play in international development?

I welcome the initiative on the part of the Scottish Parliament and Executive to build on the historic links between Scotland and Malawi. My view is very simple. In the field of development—in trying to help people around the world to build for themselves and their communities a better life—there is more than enough work to be done, so I welcome the Scottish Executive supporting health and civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and others. Everybody wants to contribute and we should welcome that fact.

My right hon. Friend is right to concentrate on the long-term solution to the situation in Malawi, but is he aware that the World Food Programme estimates that it is $165 million short this year, while there is a food surplus in South Africa, just a few hundred miles away? Will he apply pressure internationally to ensure that enough money is put into the WFP, so that that short-term solution to the situation faced by 2 million Malawians is brought to fruition sooner, rather than later?

The overall position is that the United Nations Malawi appeal asked for $88 million, only about half of which was directly related to the food crisis; the rest was for funding other development and humanitarian activities. The UN has received $29 million so far, but the Government of Malawi have received $60 million, so, overall, Malawi has $89 million with which to respond to the crisis, rather than the $88 million that the UN asked for. I know from talking to the Malawian President and Finance Minister that every effort is being made to procure maize from wherever it can be found. Indeed, part of the procurement process in which DFID and the European Union have been engaged is resulting in trucks carrying maize entering the country almost daily. I also pay tribute to the United States of America, which is doing a great deal in this crisis.

The Secretary of State's Department has been criticised for the use of consultants in Malawi and for the extensive expenses that were built up. Can he tell the House how many consultants his Department employs around the world and what safeguards are in place to ensure that their expenditure is effective?

The number varies from time to time and I will see whether I can come back to the hon. Gentleman with a figure. DFID's total expenditure on consultants as a proportion of our bilateral budget has fallen from 10 per cent., as I recollect it, in 1997–98 to about 5 per cent. now, so it is a falling share compared with the position that we inherited in 1997. We use consultants for a range of activities, partly to help deliver programmes and partly to give us advice.

In respect of Malawi, I have to say that some of the criticism was ill founded, because the training programmes that the National Democratic Institute was engaged in were supporting civil society and parliamentarians in Malawi to think about how they could do their jobs more effectively. That included hiring rooms for training courses and feeding people who were attending them—a normal day-to-day activity that Members of the House and of all organisations engage in. The feedback from participants in those programmes was that that support and training was very helpful in assisting them to do their job as elected representatives.

AIDS

2. What steps have been taken to improve the working relationship between the UN and international donors in respect of responses to AIDS. [25986]

The United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, chaired the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria replenishment conference in London in September. International donors, including ourselves, pledged $3.7 billion. A further conference will be held next year. At the same time, donors and UN agencies discussed progress of the global task team in improving AIDS co-ordination and we are continuing to play an active part in that team.

Does my hon. Friend agree that not only that working relationship, but that of the sexual and reproductive health stakeholders and HIV/AIDS stakeholders needs to be improved? I hope that the Secretary of State will assure the House that he will engage the UN at the very highest levels to help secure a target for reproductive health within the millennium development goal framework. Will he also report back on progress and the success that he achieves?

My hon. Friend will know that we and the European Union collectively have long thought that there should be a target on reproductive health in respect of the millennium development goals. The outcomes document from the millennium review summit called for universal access to reproductive health by 2015. We are discussing with the UN secretariat and a range of other players in the UN how best to take forward that commitment.

May I commend the work of World Vision, with which my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) and I travelled to Mozambique in the summer to see its work for children orphaned by AIDS? In the Minister's dealings with the UN and international donors, will he urge them to stress to recipient Governments that commitments to children suffering from or orphaned by AIDS and to the most vulnerable people affected by it should be met, as it is all too easy for those commitments to fall behind in comparison with those of more vocal sufferers?

I join the hon. Gentleman in paying tribute to the work of World Vision, which has been particularly active in campaigning to highlight the needs of orphans and vulnerable children affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. He may know that we have committed, with UNICEF, to host its annual global partners forum, which looks at the specific needs of orphans and vulnerable children. This year, we will look at some of the blockages in getting the aid through to the non-governmental organisations working with orphans and vulnerable children at the grass roots. I am sure that he will also be aware that we have committed £150 million over the next three years specifically for assistance to help orphans and vulnerable children affected by AIDS.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for the points that he has made. Will he confirm that, in the meeting with UNICEF, he will look into how aid is provided, particularly at feeding programmes through community-based groups in African countries to support orphans and vulnerable children affected by HIV/AIDS?

I recognise the campaigning work that my hon. Friend has done on this issue. As I told the hon. Member for North-East Bedfordshire (Alistair Burt), we will consider what further action we can take to speed the delivery of aid to grass-roots NGOs of the type that my hon. Friend has worked for and consistently advocated. On my recent visit to Malawi and Zambia, I saw that delivery is speeding up, but more remains to be done. As she says, that will be the focus of our global partners forum meeting with UNICEF in February.

Effective prevention, education and treatment in respect of HIV/AIDS are essential if we are to progress control of the disease, and Opposition Members welcome the aspirations in that regard at the G8 summit and the global fund replenishment summit. Increasingly, however, DFID's budget is being spent through partnerships with Governments, multilateral organisations and institutions, and NGOs—channels that have minimal accountability. Will the Minister say what progress DFID has made since the critical report of November 2003 in monitoring and evaluating the channels through which British taxpayers' money is spent? How will partnership performance be assessed and resources allocated to ensure maximum prevention, and maximum treatment, of HIV/AIDS?

I do not accept the hon. Gentleman's premise that there is minimal accountability for the aid that we dispense through budget support or multilateral organisations. There is a whole process of auditing and assessing how the Government deliver aid and whether our arrangements are appropriate. Where our arrangements in-country are not appropriate, we will not dispense aid through budget support but work through NGOs or UN organisations.

I absolutely accept the point about the need to continue to focus on prevention of HIV/AIDS as well as on treatment. Over the past two years, significant attention has rightly been given to the question of how we get more access to antiretroviral drugs. We need to continue that work and to return to the question of how we can ensure that people have more access to the various prevention measures, such as condoms. We must also step up our research into developing a workable vaccine and an effective microbicide. In the run-up to world AIDS day, we are hosting an event for EU Development Ministers to look at that precise issue.

Africa (Children's Literacy)

The education for all global monitoring report, published today, highlights the continuing problem of children learning to read and write in sub-Saharan Africa. The UK is helping African countries to strengthen basic education, particularly for women and girls. For example, in Zambia, where we support teaching children to read and write in their mother tongue before learning English, the programme has dramatically improved literacy rates.

There are two objectives in the children's literacy strategy—to ensure that low literacy levels are lifted and, as my right hon. Friend noted, to close the gender equality gap. One of the millennium development goals is to close that gap by 2015, so will he say what progress is being made in that direction?

I share my hon. Friend's concern about the need to close the gender equality gap and to get all the children in sub-Saharan Africa who are not attending primary school into classrooms. Fulfilling those objectives depends on the capacity of the Governments of developing countries to raise the finance, employ the teachers and build the schools. In particular relation to girls, the task is to address the other factors that prevent girls from getting to school. Something as practical as a lack of toilet facilities can make parents reluctant to send their daughters to school. Another factor could be the lack of clean water, because if water has to be fetched and carried from somewhere else, we know that that burden falls on girls and women. If girls have to fetch and carry water, they cannot go to school.

School fees present another obstacle that has to be overcome, as they prevent poor families from sending their children to school. If those poor families have to make a choice, they may choose to pay fees for a boy but not for a girl. Those are the problems that we must address if we are to help developing countries reach the 2015 target.

Is the Secretary of State worried about the brain drain of teachers who leave Africa in favour of other countries? That will affect progress towards achieving children's literacy in Africa. What steps could be taken or incentives offered to encourage trained teachers to remain in their countries and help increase literacy across Africa?

I share the hon. Gentleman's concern about the problem. As he knows, the real problem involves the factors that drive teachers and other skilled professionals out of developing countries, such as poor pay and working conditions, and the lack of opportunity for career and professional development. In the course of 2005, various commitments have been made to help developing countries improve pay and working conditions for teachers and provide more career and professional development, and the British Government have also increased aid to that end. Another obstacle is the lack of housing for teachers in rural areas: if there is no house to live in, is it any wonder that teachers are reluctant to go and work in a remote rural community? That is what we have to address, and our increased aid is supporting that effort.

For example, the new President of Burundi has just abolished school fees. On the first day, 500,000 children turned up for school, 300,000 of whom had not been to school before. Although there is still the same number of teachers in the schools there, we have given the country some financial assistance to help it to begin to address that enormous challenge.

Will the Secretary of State consider the BBC World Service, the Open University and the British Council coming together to create a web-based system to help literacy in Africa? Is there something we can do to enable that?

I welcome all steps and measures that those interested in the future of Africa's development are willing to take. In order to get access to the web, of course, people need a computer and electricity. We therefore need to recognise the order in which things have to change if students in Africa are to be able to take advantage of proposals such as the one that my hon. Friend suggests. When I was in Rwanda a week ago yesterday, I visited a school that has got some computers in use and hopes to get access next year to the internet for the first time in its students' lives. A very small number of children have access currently. Let us hope that we can see more taking advantage of it in the years to come.

Millennium Development Goals

4. What discussions he has had with the United States on progress towards the United Nations millennium development goals. [25988]

My right hon. Friend and I regularly hold discussions with members of the United States Administration on development issues, including progress towards the millennium development goals.

Given the enormous support shown for the millennium development goals by young people throughout the country, including those at Nairn academy, is it not disappointing that the Government have so far failed to use their leverage through the European Union and the G8 to convince the US to pay its fair share towards those goals? Rather than being seduced by the proximity and glamour of US power, should not the Prime Minister be using his influence on President Bush to persuade America to meet its international obligations?

The hon. Gentleman will know of the concern of the Prime Minister and the rest of the Government about the lack of sufficient progress towards the millennium development goals, which was why we made Africa a key issue on the agendas of our G8 and EU presidencies this year. I am sure that he would want to pay tribute to the Prime Minister for his success in persuading the President of the United States to announce a doubling of aid to Africa between now and 2010.

Does my hon. Friend agree that, if we are to reach the millennium development goals, both the European Union and the United States need to make meaningful reductions in tariffs and subsidies at the ministerial conference in December, as well as giving special differential treatment to the poorest nations?

I agree that the trade talks in Hong Kong are hugely important. Although the movement that we have seen from the United States, and indeed from the European Union, is welcome, we want more movement from the US in terms of agricultural subsidies. We want stronger references to cotton and to special products if we are to achieve from the trade talks the outcome that we want and that is genuinely in the interests of developing countries.

In considering the millennium development goal of eradicating poverty, does the Minister agree that the recent declaration of an emergency in Africa over tuberculosis, which is closely linked with the AIDS epidemic, is of serious concern? It is killing 500,000 people a year. What is his Department doing in response to that emergency, and would he be willing to meet a delegation of parliamentarians, including myself, who recently visited Kenya, where we saw the impact of the disease and where life expectancy for a man is down to 41 years and falling?

Either my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State or I would be happy to meet the delegation.

The hon. Gentleman is right to raise TB. Along with malaria and HIV/AIDS, it is having a devastating impact on Africa and, indeed, many other parts of the world. He will be aware of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. We hosted the replenishment conference for that fund in September and raised $3.7 billion for it. There will be a further funding conference next year, and we hope that further funding will be pledged.

Kashmir Earthquake

5. What objectives he has set in providing assistance to the authorities in Pakistan and the victims of the recent earthquake. [25989]

DFID's response to the south Asia earthquake helped to save the lives of those affected and will continue to support them through the winter months. To date, we have allocated £33 million for the immediate relief effort and are prepared to do more. Our immediate assistance has included search and rescue, provision of tents, blankets, tarpaulins and other supplies, funding of air transport, including helicopters, and support to the United Nations, Red Cross and non-governmental organisations. In addition, the European Commission has pledged €93.6 million for relief and reconstruction. The UK's share of that is £11 million.

Hon. Members on both sides of the House will recognise that President Musharraf was right when he paid tribute to the role of the British Government and to my right hon. Friend. However, as winter approaches, many hundreds of thousands of people still face terrible conditions and possible death and the international community has not put in the effort that our Government have done. Will my right hon. Friend ensure that the money pledged by the EU and other donors is delivered—and soon—because time to rescue the people in the mountains is disappearing quickly? [Interruption.]

I share my hon. Friend's view about the race against time in which the world community and the Government of Pakistan are engaged to save the lives of those who will otherwise freeze to death or die of respiratory tract infections because they are out in the cold when winter arrives. I assure the House that we will deliver every penny that we have promised and the record so far shows that that is the case. We have made a great effort to bring the scale of the crisis to the attention of others in the international community. Nobody can be in any doubt about the short time left. That is why we need more money from others in the international community and more help on the ground to turn that money into support that gets to people in the remote mountain communities of Azad Kashmir and North-West Frontier Province.

In the Government's capacity as president of the European Union, what efforts has the Secretary of State made to secure a fitting response from those member countries, highlighted by Oxfam and others, that have failed to donate to the Asian earthquake appeal? Is he aware that Spain, Portugal, Greece, Finland and Austria have contributed no additional funds?

I can tell the hon. Gentleman what we have done. Two days after the earthquake struck, we issued a presidency statement and I have now written twice to EU Development Ministers. Along with Jan Egeland, I briefed them at the informal meeting of EU Development Ministers in Leeds on 24 October. The issue was also raised by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary at the General Affairs and External Relations Council on 18 October. Every country should look deeply into its conscience and ask itself if it is doing all that it can to help people who are in desperate need.

May I suggest to the Secretary of State a specific way in which he could assist with that matter? After the Asian tsunami, the EU considered several trade measures to improve market access for the affected countries. Will he press the EU to liberalise its trade with Pakistan to promote economic recovery in that country? In particular, will he consider the inclusion of Pakistan in the generalised system of preferences—the GSP-plus—from which it was excluded earlier this year?

I am sure that, as the European Union considers how it may provide support to the reconstruction process, it will be happy to look at all possible measures. Issues, and some difficulties, would arise from the proposal that the hon. Gentleman makes, but I simply say to him that the task of reconstruction will be big and take a long time. Our immediate concern has to be with helping to save the lives of those who are in desperate need as we speak. The time will come for reconstruction and my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will attend the conference in Pakistan on 19 November. We will make a commitment there to support the reconstruction, in the same way as Britain has played an honourable role in helping to save the lives of those affected by that terrible catastrophe.

I agree with the Secretary of State about the ongoing gravity of the situation, but he should bear in mind the fact that small charities such as Shelterbox are delivering more tents than big Government in the UK. When it takes three weeks to deliver Chinooks to the region, does the Secretary of State agree that lessons need to be learned from the response to the emergency? When the dust settles, will he review the speed and effectiveness of the emergency response from this country—non-governmental organisations and Government?

I am happy to review the effectiveness, but I emphatically reject the implied criticism in the hon. Gentleman's comment that somehow the British Government have been slow. The fact is that we were the first country in the world to send search and rescue teams. We have provided 5,500 tents, 27,000 blankets and 30,000 tarpaulins. We could do that so quickly precisely because we had prepared and we had those things in stock. We have now funded 65 flights for the Disasters Emergency Committee, helping the NGO sector to bring in supplies. We are currently trying to find a way to lift the shelterboxes waiting to go. I simply ask Shelterbox to link up with one of the DEC agencies, as that is the most effective and easiest way of getting help to the region.

Prime Minister

The Prime Minister was asked—

Engagements

This morning, I had meetings with ministerial colleagues and others in addition to my duties in the House. I will have further such meetings later today.

The parliamentary skills group, which I chair, has just published a report showing that MPs and businesses are concerned about funding and training in adult skills and learning, especially given the huge proportional rise in the population of older people that will occur over the next 10 years. Does the Prime Minister agree that we need to get rid of age barriers in apprenticeships and training, and does he accept that the Government need to bring the same passion and commitment as they have to other areas of education, and improve even on what they have already done in funding further education?

I agree with my hon. Friend and I welcome the publication of his report. We have increased funding for further education and training by almost 50 per cent. in real terms; indeed, over the next few years about £1 billion extra will go to that sector. I am delighted that, last week, figures showed that the milestone of 1 million adult learners achieving their first qualification had been exceeded. All that is good news, but my hon. Friend is absolutely right: we have to show the same commitment to adult skills and adult literacy and numeracy as we are bringing to the investment and reform programme in our schools.

Every Member of the House is united in a desire to take effective action against the new terrorist threat that—[Interruption.] There are people on the Benches behind me who fought terrorism on the streets of Northern Ireland and that response is disgraceful.

Since the Terrorism Bill was first presented to the House it has been amended to provide for High Court supervision of detention, annual renewal and revisions to the code governing the questioning of suspects. Does the Prime Minister agree that those changes, following on as they do from debates in the House, represent an improvement to the Bill?

We have made changes to try to reach a compromise; that is true. But I want to explain to the right hon. and learned Gentleman and to his hon. Friends why I believe this is so necessary. Let me emphasise again to the House: this proposal did not originate with the Government; it originated with the police and those responsible for anti-terrorist operations in our country. If I may quote from those responsible for conducting those operations, I will do so. The chief constable of Manchester, for example, said:

"The reality of the terrorism threat that we currently face is so horrendous in terms of the implications that we are having to intervene far earlier in the investigation than we ever would have during IRA campaigns . . . because with mass casualty terrorism we cannot afford to take any chances."

Andy Hayman, who is the senior police officer charged with leading anti-terrorist operations in this country, said:

"We are not looking for legislation to hold people for up to three months simply because it is an easy option. It is absolutely vital. To prevent further attacks we must have it."

That is the police saying to us that they need these powers to prevent terrorism in this country. In the last week, we have learned that, since 7 July, two further terrorist plots have been foiled in this country. Yesterday, Australia announced—[Interruption.] Well, perhaps those who foiled the plots might have their advice taken a little more seriously. Secondly—[Interruption.] Did the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr. Walker) just say, "A police state"?

Order. The hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr. Walker) must not shout at the Prime Minister, and Government Back-Bench Members must not shout at the Leader of the Opposition.

We are not living in a police state, but we are living in a country that faces a real and serious threat of terrorism—terrorism that wants to destroy our way of life, terrorism that wants to inflict casualties on us without limit—and when those charged with protecting our country provide, as they have, a compelling case for action, I know what my duty is: my duty is to support them, and so is the duty, in my view, of every Member.

Let me repeat that we all accept that we face a new threat of terrorism and that we all want to take effective action against that threat. Let me remind the Prime Minister of what he said in the past in relation to anti-terrorism issues. He said:

"The view of the police must be taken into account, but . . . the objections received from a very broad range of opinion on these proposals should be properly tested."—[Official Report, 9 March 1994; Vol. 239, c. 302–3.]

And what we seek to do—this ought to be capable of cool and rational debate—is to test the extent to which the 90-day proposal can be justified. So let me ask the Prime Minister this specific question: can he identify a single case in which it has taken the police 90 days after arresting a suspect to find evidence sufficient to charge that person with a terrorist offence?

I really have to say to the right hon. and learned Gentleman that I find it quite extraordinary that he seeks to suggest that there is somehow no evidence that the police are putting forward for the case that they are making. They have put forward detailed reasons as to why they believe these powers to be necessary. For example, just this last weekend, we arrested people on a terrorist operation. There were 750 gigabytes of data—that is 66,000 ft-worth of data—that would be printed out and have to be investigated. Just with the events of 7 July, there are two warehouse-fulls of exhibits.

We know that each of these terrorist operations has links to abroad. We know, for example, that it took two weeks, just in respect of the bomb factories in Leeds, to make them safe. That is what the police have set out time and again. That is why it is important that they have this power, as they say, to make our country safer, and they have given details of why they say that these powers are necessary.

Yes, it is true that we have agreed a sunset clause. Why? Because it is important. If people have these concerns, and I understand them, let us test it over the year. Let us see if the worries that people have are justified, or not. That is a reasonable thing to put forward. We have an independent review of the system—Lord Carlile will also report on it—but let us send out a signal from the House that, when it comes to defeating terrorism, we are going to give the police the powers that they need and back them.

Does not the Prime Minister recognise that it is the duty and responsibility of every single Member of this House to test the arguments that are put forward by the police? The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have published various papers from the police. None of those papers includes a single case about which the police say that it took 90 days after arresting someone to find the evidence required to charge them. I think that there is a general mood in the House for an increase in the time during which the police should be entitled to hold people without charge. The question is whether that period should be 90 days.

I ask the Prime Minister again a very specific question. Can he provide the House with a single case in which it has taken the police 90 days after arresting a suspect to find evidence sufficient to charge that person with a terrorist offence?

I suggest, before we have the vote, that Opposition Members and the right hon. and learned Gentleman once again read the report that Andy Hayman provided that gave precise examples of the circumstances in which he needed a detention period of up to 90 days. There is an idea that the police have simply put this forward without any proper evidence and we have simply sat there and said, "Well, if they want it, we'll do it." This has been done on the basis that the police have put forward a cogent and intelligent argument as to why they need the power.

Let me quote again from the Association of Chief Police Officers terrorism committee—[Interruption.] Perhaps hon. Members will just listen to this. It said:

"We were asked for a professional opinion. And it's not just the Police; it's prosecutors; it's the security services. It's the professionals that are actually involved on a daily basis in trying to protect this country from terrorism . . . This is what we actually need."

In those circumstances, I appeal to the House to have some sense of responsibility here—[Interruption.] This is an occasion when it is important that we do what is responsible, right and necessary to protect this country's security.

We have already indicated that there will be a sunset clause, so we can judge what happens over the year. Every seven days that someone is held, they will go back in front of a High Court judge. Hon. Members talk about civil liberties, and of course it is important that we protect the civil liberties of terrorist suspects. It is also important that we protect the civil liberties of this country and the right to life and protection from terrorism. That is why we have put the proposals forward. We do that in a reasonable way and I ask, yet again, for the right hon. and learned Gentleman's support.

We all want to fight terrorism effectively, but we do not have to look very far beyond our shores to see what happens if minority communities are alienated. What is likely to be the state of mind of someone who spends the equivalent of six months in prison on the basis of no evidence whatever and is then released without charge? What will that person's friends, relatives and community think? How likely would we be to receive intelligence from such communities? How does the Prime Minister think that we can effectively fight terrorism without intelligence from those communities?

The Prime Minister referred to the document from Mr. Hayman. I have read the document very carefully. It refers to the difficulties caused by the inability of the police to question after charge; we have tabled amendments to deal with that. It refers to the difficulties caused by the disclosure regime; that, too, can be remedied. What it does not do is justify 90 days. Does not the inability of the Prime Minister to identify a single case in which the police have needed 90 days go to the heart of his failure to justify the 90-day period? Does that not prove beyond doubt that the Home Secretary is right when he says that there is nothing crucial about 90 days?

First, Andy Hayman's letter and document set out very clearly why the 90 days are necessary. Let me explain again the basic argument of the police. Most reasonable people would see what they are trying to say. Because of the nature of the new terrorism that we face, because the terrorists want to kill people without limit—in July they killed 50 people in London, but they would have killed 500 had they been able to do so—when the police are investigating whether or not a conspiracy is taking place, they are naturally inclined to charge these people, to take them and arrest them, earlier than they otherwise would. If they make a mistake about the particular gestation period of the conspiracy and they get it wrong—they might think that the conspiracy is in its early stages, but in fact it is well advanced—we could end up with mass casualties on our streets. For that reason, the police say that this is a completely different situation.

We need to be able to lift these people earlier and accumulate evidence to charge them after arrest. The number of people, for example, who have been kept for over seven days since the new powers were introduced is just over 30, so we are not talking about large numbers of people, but they may be the crucial difference between saving this country from a terrorist attack and not doing so. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that we will alienate minority communities, but it is sad that he should make that argument—[Interruption.] The Muslim community in this country is as determined as any other part of our community to defeat terrorism. Its members do not want to be told that they are against this because it alienates them—they want these people dealt with and arrested. In the end, if this is the best argument that the right hon. and learned Gentleman can make, I suggest that he and his colleagues ask themselves whether they really think that this is where the Conservative party should be.

I agree with the Prime Minister that we face a new situation, which is why we and a majority of hon. Members on both sides of the House accept that there is a case for extending the period. The question that we face, and the question that the Prime Minister has not specifically answered, is why the period should be 90 days. In September, the Home Secretary said that he would seek to compromise, and that he would not rule out a detention period of one month. Last month, he said that 90 days was "not a God-given amount". Last week, he said that the figure of 90 days was "not crucial". On Monday, he said that he would table an amendment to reduce the period from 90 days. Why was that amendment not tabled?

For the simple reason that all the way through we have said that 90 days are right. It is detention of up to 90 days: every seven days the person has to be brought back before the court. The right hon. and learned Gentleman asked why 90 days—it is for the very reasons that the police have given. That is the right period to allow them to conduct their operations and investigations properly. That is where the 90 days comes from. I am afraid that in the end he and his hon. Friends must decide whether on this particular issue they are going to back the police and those charged with fighting terrorism in our country, who tell us—in my view, rightly—that they need this power to make our country safe. He and his hon. Friends must make their decision today. We have made ours: we believe that this is right for our country, we believe that it is necessary to protect our country from terrorism, and I am only sorry that he does not agree.

Three and a half years ago Derbyshire police conducted an undercover operation to map drug activity across the county, including the town of Ilkeston in my constituency. As a result of that intelligence, scores of arrests were made. Last Friday The Independent labelled Ilkeston "cracktown", based on that 2002 information and not reflecting the current situation. Will my right hon. Friend assure me that resources to support drug users and target drug pushers remain a high priority, and will he condemn such shoddy reporting, which demeans local communities and refuses to recognise the progress made?

I am sure my hon. Friend is right to say that it is important that we continue to target those engaged in drug abuse, particularly the link with crime. I shall look into the situation that she describes and perhaps write to her about it.

Returning to the exchanges over the proposed terrorism legislation, the Prime Minister will surely acknowledge that a great deal of the Bill commands widespread support across party and throughout the House—for example, the inclusion, which I raised with him here at the beginning of this calendar year, of the new acts preparatory to terrorism. So there is much on which we can reach agreement, but he must surely understand that there were those who thought we would have an opportunity to record a vote last week, which we did not because of what the Home Secretary had to say. He told the House—in all sincerity, I am sure—that he would have urgent discussions with colleagues in his own party and other parties to see whether consensus could be reached. Is the Prime Minister seriously saying today, when we will come to the vote later, that the Home Secretary ever thought that a consensus would be reached over 90 days?

As the Home Secretary has explained, it was not possible to reach a consensus. I am sorry about that. The right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are in exactly the same position as the Conservative party. They will have to make a decision today. When he says that they agree with large parts of the Bill, that is fine. Perhaps they do. According to the police and those charged with fighting terrorism in this country, however, this is not a peripheral matter. It is central and vital. It is not just about my leadership; it is about the leadership of other political parties too. It is about the leadership of every single person in the House, who will have to make a decision today about the interests of this country. I know where I stand on that.

When the Prime Minister properly speaks of parliamentary responsibility, will he acknowledge that it is the responsibility of Parliament, of course, to take into account the advice coming from the police, but equally to take into account the advice that comes from Law Lords such as Lord Steyn and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who have described detention without charge for 90 days as "exorbitant", "unnecessary", and "intolerable"? Even if the Prime Minister is successful in getting the measure through today, he will not carry it in the House of Lords. What will he do at that juncture? Will he seek a fresh consensus or will he ram it through with the Parliament Act?

In exactly the same way as hon. Members will have to make up their minds, so will the House of Lords. Whatever Lord Steyn may say, I prefer the advice of the police and those charged with looking after the country's security. The House of Lords will have to make a decision. All of us have to make that decision. The right hon. Gentleman asks whether we should simply accept what the police put forward. We are accepting what the police put forward because, to any reasonable person, the reasons they give are compelling. We face a different type of terrorism. It requires them to arrest people earlier, to develop the evidence and to charge them later. That is why they need the power. In circumstances where we know and it is accepted that we face a continuing terrorist threat in this country, I find the position of the Liberal Democrats unsurprising, and I find the position of the Conservative party surprising. Whichever it is, sometimes it is better to lose and do the right thing than to win and do the wrong thing.

May I tell my right hon. Friend that I, for one, will support the Government in the Lobby this afternoon? Does he agree that those who oppose the Government may well end up with something a lot more tragic than egg on their faces? However—there is always a "however"—I cannot offer the same support for the Government's proposals on schools. Does he agree that there should be the same discussion, consultation and willingness to listen on that issue as there has been on the Terrorism Bill?

I think that I shall take those one at a time. I am grateful for my hon. Friend's support on the anti-terrorism measures. On schools, we will have an opportunity to talk to people about the implications of the proposals, which are essentially about empowering schools and parents to do the best for their children. That is the right thing to do, and it builds on the specialist schools programme, which has been immensely successful in my hon. Friend's constituency and elsewhere.

2. Two years ago, my constituents could see their local GP at their local practice on a Saturday morning: when will they get that opportunity again? [25955]

We changed the out-of-hours service in the hon. Gentleman's area and elsewhere because GPs wanted that change as part of their new contract, but other provisions are in place for out-of-hours services. A large number of GPs were already opting out of out-of-hours services, which is one of the reasons why we had to make the change. GPs in this country are virtually the best paid in Europe and have a responsibility to provide proper services, which is why in certain areas—for example, where there are closed lists—we are bringing in other providers.

Does the Prime Minister appreciate the concerns about collusion in the past between state forces and various paramilitaries in Northern Ireland? With the publication of the Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill today, we now have collusion on the past between the state and Sinn Fein. Does he accept that victims, including victims of state collusion, will be not only deprived of justice, but even denied truth?

As the hon. Gentleman knows, the proposals are part of the continuing process to bring an end to terrorism in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday agreement, of which he and I were part, contains provisions on prisoners that deal with the question of the so-called on-the-runs. The situation is different, because the measures that we are introducing are designed to end terrorism, not to further it.

3. What message is the Prime Minister sending out to our brave troops in Iraq, when their colleagues who served so bravely in Northern Ireland face potential prosecution under the Government's historic review, while IRA terrorists who have murdered people are likely to be pardoned? Is that not a colossal disgrace? [25956]

The premise of the hon. Gentleman's question is actually wrong, since no one is excluded from the provisions. What is important in Northern Ireland today is that we continue to make progress towards peace. The process has been very successful over the past seven or eight years, and we want to continue it. British officers do not face the risk that the hon. Gentleman has described.

As the father of four young children and someone who, when he goes back to his constituency, is a hindrance rather than a help in getting the kids ready for school, may I warmly applaud yesterday's publication of the Government's Childcare Bill, under which local authorities will have a responsibility to ensure that a range of high-quality child care facilities are available? Will the Prime Minister assure me that funding will be available for local authorities to ensure that that Bill will be as successful as other schemes, such as Sure Start?

Extra funding is being made available as part of an extension to child care over the next few years that effectively means a new frontier for the welfare state, where wraparound child care will be available from eight in the morning until six at night, which will help people to balance work and family life. That is why I welcome yesterday's proposals.

4. As the Government are planning a reform of the incapacity benefit system with the introduction of personal action plans for individuals and the possible sanctioning or withdrawal of benefits for those who do not participate in that activity, can the Prime Minister give the House the assurance that there will be adequate resourcing of rehabilitation and other support services to meet this additional need? [25957]

The purpose of the reforms is to do two things: first, to ensure that we continue pathways into work, which gives people on incapacity benefit support and help in leaving the benefit and getting back into the workplace—all the evidence is that that is best for them as well as for the country—and secondly, to ensure that people get on to incapacity benefit only if they are genuinely entitled to it. That is the reason for tightening up the gateway. We have put an awful lot of money into the new deal and other programmes designed to help people off benefit and into work. It has been very successful; indeed, it is the reason why we now spend about £5 billion a year less on benefits than we did in 1997. That is the spirit in which we will take forward incapacity benefit reform. I think that most hon. Members who know about the issue know that reform is necessary.

On the proposals that are before the House today, I wonder whether the Prime Minister's constituency mailbag is the same as mine. Much to my surprise, not a single person, even from the usual sources, has opposed those proposals. Can the Prime Minister understand any hon. Member in this House continuing to fly in the face not only of professional advice but of their constituents—[Interruption.]

I agree with my hon. Friend. Opposition Members will have to make up their minds, as will every Member of this House. When we are debating these issues and Opposition Members are shouting out things about a police state and so on, that is very telling indeed. I am delighted to know that the vast majority of Labour Members will go through the Lobby with the Government today.

BILL PRESENTED

Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill

Mr. Secretary Hain, supported by the Prime Minister, Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Secretary Clarke, Mr. David Hanson, Mr. Shaun Woodward and Bridget Prentice, presented a Bill to make special provision about certain offences committed, or alleged to have been committed, before 10th April 1998 in connection with terrorism and the affairs of Northern Ireland; and to provide for the amendment of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed. Explanatory notes to be printed [Bill 81].

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Today the Government have published a Bill that will loose murderers on to the streets of Northern Ireland. Should not the Government come to the House today to let us know that immediately so that we can compare the call made by the Prime Minister to obey the police, at a time when the police are rejected in Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State goes against what they recommend?

The hon. Gentleman is a very experienced Member of this House, and he will know that having been presented, the Bill will be debated fully. He will have an opportunity to air his grievance, as will other Members from his party.

Prison Reform (Mental Health)

I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision for the mental health and special learning needs of convicted prisoners; and for connected purposes.

The Bill is specific in trying to address the problems that affect a significant proportion of our prison population. I introduce it because I believe that the way in which our penal system cares for those with mental health needs at the start of the 21st century is a stain on our society.

Daniel Meehan, a young constituent of mine, had always been a troubled young man. He had a history of mental illness and drifted in and out of prison throughout his adult life. Daniel had been diagnosed as suffering from a series of mental illnesses, including the antisocial personality disorder, Tourette's syndrome, from the age of 17. He had spent around half his life in prison but he never received the help and treatment that he needed to tackle his problems.

Instead of rehabilitation, Daniel was left exposed and fell foul of the problems that, all too often, vulnerable people face in prison. He developed a heroin addiction while in jail and started to abuse alcohol. In September last year, on his discharge from prison, he was left homeless, without his medication or even any clothes. He was bailed by the courts to his father's address. When his father was not at home, he looked for somewhere else to stay and, as a result, he was rearrested for breaking his bail conditions and taken back into custody. His mother and sister desperately tried to arrange specialist care for Daniel and eventually arranged for a social worker to visit him in Lewes prison. However, on the same day the social worker was due to visit, he was moved to Her Majesty's prison Weare, a floating prison off Dorset.

Neither the social worker nor Daniel's family had been made aware of the transfer, yet the prison system somehow expected a prisoner with a long history of mental illness to rearrange the appointment himself. Daniel's complex needs were never properly assessed. Alone and without the support he needed, Daniel died at his father's house in January this year, aged 29. The coroner returned an open verdict on the death, but to most of us who had seen his case develop, we have no doubt that suicide would have been the more appropriate verdict.

Daniel's family freely admit that he was a difficult man, but time and again, over almost 10 years, the prison system consistently failed to address his problems. As Daniel's sister, Mrs. Meehan-Bissett, said:

"Prison was not the answer for someone like Daniel, he needed rehabilitation. He died due to neglect. The prison authorities cannot be bothered with someone like Daniel . . . There needs to be somewhere for people like Daniel to go. If you need to lock them up, lock them up, but not without anything to do all day."

The Government response to the Home Affairs Committee report on the rehabilitation of offenders, which was published in January 2005, stated that there were firm commitments that, by 2004:

"All prisoners with severe mental illness would be in receipt of treatment and that no prisoner with a serious mental illness would leave prison without a care plan".

In Daniel's case, it is all too clear that those rules were not followed. Many hon. Members are aware of similar cases from our constituencies, so it is important to understand the extent of the problem.

Last year in a written answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan), whom I am pleased to see on the Front Bench, the then Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health, the hon. Member for South Thanet (Dr. Ladyman) said:

"A survey of mental ill health in the prison population of England and Wales, undertaken in 1997 by the Office for National Statistics, showed that around 90 per cent. of prisoners sampled displayed evidence of at least one of the five disorders—personality disorder, psychosis, neurosis, alcohol misuse and drug dependence—considered in the survey. There will, at any one time, be around 5,000 prisoners with a severe mental illness".—[Official Report, 2 December 2004; Vol. 428, c. 247W.]

Similar findings were published in a report by the Prison Reform Trust, supported by the Nuffield Foundation, into the mental health of women prisoners. It found that two thirds of women in prison show symptoms of at least one neurotic disorder such as depression, anxiety and phobias. More than half suffer from a personality disorder. Yet, among the general population, less than one fifth of women suffer from those disorders.

The report found that half the women in prison are on prescribed medication such as anti-depressants or anti-psychotic medicine and there is evidence that the use of medication increases while in custody. Of all women who are sent to prison, a terrifying 40 per cent. say that they have attempted suicide at some time in their life.

Research by Oxford university into suicide rates for younger offenders is even more shocking. The analysis of suicide rates in England and Wales from 1978 to 2003 found that the difference was particularly striking in 15 to 17-year-olds. Offenders in that age group were 18 times more likely to kill themselves than those in the general prison population. Depressingly, the report concluded that

"half those who commit suicide in prison have a treatable mental illness."

If those illnesses were indeed treatable, it means that those suicides could have been prevented.

The problem goes far beyond mental health; there are also too many prisoners who have serious learning difficulties. According to Home Office statistics, the prevalence of poor educational attainment among prisoners is shocking. Fifty-five per cent. of prisoners had a reading ability of level 1 or below—the educational level for an 11-year-old. That proportion rises to 67 per cent. in young offenders—in other words, two thirds of young offenders have the reading ability of an 11-year-old or younger child. In spelling, 79 per cent of prisoners were at level 1 or below, with that figure rising to 87 per cent. in young offenders. In numeracy, those rated at level 1 or below represented 69 per cent. of the general prison population, and 78 per cent. of young offenders, so the frightening truth is that about three quarters of young offenders are illiterate and innumerate. Despite this, however, the average time for education in prison was under six hours a week per prisoner in 2002, and only slightly higher in young offender institutions. As a result, most of them are almost as illiterate and innumerate when they leave prison as when they start their sentence.

This Bill is not about making excuses for those who break the law. One essential pillar of prison is that it should act as a deterrent to those thinking of committing crime and punish those who have broken the law. But prison works only if it also rehabilitates. As one governor said to me:

"We are very good at incarceration, but not at rehabilitation."

A prisoner without rehabilitation is a prisoner who will offend again. So, the mental health and learning needs of prisoners must be addressed if we are truly to have a prison system that meets those two core goals.

The Bill that I am proposing is a simple one. Where it has been established that a criminal has mental health needs, there would be a legal requirement for those needs to be professionally and thoroughly assessed at the start of their sentence. For all prisoners, an assessment would be required of their educational needs. Those with mental health requirements would be detained only in an establishment with specialised facilities, and with staff trained to deal with them. A pathway programme of support would have to be developed to ensure that their mental needs were met. Those needing educational attention would receive a more focused programme of tuition, instead of the haphazard tuition that they currently receive, and it should focus on skills training as well, to give them some hope of employment when they leave. As prisoners with mental health problems are now treated by the NHS, the primary care trust budgets covering this treatment should be ring-fenced to ensure that the funds to finance prisoner care cannot leak away into other areas of health care.

The objective of the Bill is not to create prison asylums surrounded by barbed wire—far from it. The Bill seeks to ensure that prisoners with mental health needs are kept in an establishment in which those needs are addressed first and foremost, and which works to support their rehabilitation. In no way does it undermine the principle that many people need to be kept away from society, for the good of society and for their own good, but it does mean that they will be given the care and medical support that they need.

I have visited a number of young offender institutions. They are the most depressing places I have ever been to, and I certainly do not know how we can rehabilitate someone if we lock them up in a 9 ft by 5 ft cell for 18 hours a day or more. When those prisoners have mental health problems or special learning needs, this becomes a hopeless task unless rehabilitation is at the forefront of the approach. Through specialised and focused rehabilitative methods, the prison system can make major inroads into reducing reoffending, but rehabilitation must be more responsive to the often complex problems of prisoners, which have all too often contributed to their being in prison in the first place, and will have them returning there time and again if they go unresolved.

The case of Daniel Meehan is a tragic one. A young man with profound mental health needs died because he did not receive the help that he needed. At the start of the 21st century, that is something that should shame us all. We have the power to do something about this. I commend the Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill ordered to be brought in by Charles Hendry, Peter Bottomley, James Brokenshire, Annette Brooke, Chris Bryant, Mr. Edward Garnier, Mr. Dominic Grieve, Mrs. Eleanor Laing, Julie Morgan, Mr. Andrew Lansley and Tim Loughton.

Prison Reform (Mental Health)

Charles Hendry accordingly presented a Bill to make provision for the mental health and special learning needs of convicted prisoners; and for connected purposes: And the same was read the First time; and ordered to be read a Second time on Friday 14 July, and to be printed [Bill 82].

Terrorism Bill (Programme) (No. 2)

I beg to move,

That the Order of 26th October 2005 (Terrorism Bill (Programme)) be varied as follows:

For paragraph 3 (proceedings on consideration) substitute—

'3. Proceedings on consideration shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table and shall be brought to a conclusion (so far as not previously concluded) at the times specified in the second column.

Proceedings

Time for conclusion of proceedings

Amendments relating to Clause 23, new Clauses

Three hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration.

Amendments relating to Clauses 1 to 22, remaining proceedings on consideration

Three hours after the commencement of proceedings on Amendments relating to Clause 1.'

I know that Opposition Members object frequently to every programme motion, but I suggest that even they would find it hard to fault this one. The effect of this programme motion is to increase the amount of time that the House will have to consider this Bill on Report.

The House will recall that the programme motion passed after Second Reading allocated us six hours in total for Report. However, any votes in the middle of that would have eaten into that six hours. Without wishing to reveal any secrets or pre-empt later debate, the considered and careful judgment that I have reached is that it is unlikely that the House will reach complete agreement today without any Division.

Accordingly, the motion provides that we begin on amendments to clause 23 and the new clauses that have been tabled. We have three hours for that part of our proceedings. Once that concludes, any votes that are necessary will take place, and they will not cut into the House's remaining time. Once all the votes have taken place, we will then have a further three hours on the remaining groups of amendments, followed by whatever Divisions are required. I hope that the whole House will recognise the benefits of that.

I will not seek to divide the House on the programme motion, but I should point out to the Home Secretary that although we welcome the concession that has been made, the practical reality is that we still have far too short a time to consider the amendments tabled for this afternoon. Even at this late stage, I hope that he might consider taking advice on whether further time can be made available. Let me explain why.

We will start with a debate on the period of detention, which is a subject of considerable controversy. Given the way in which the procedures of the House operate, and the fact that the Government have tabled amendment No. 55, which changes the period from three months to 90 days, anyone wishing to have the 28-day amendment considered must first vote on Government amendment No. 55. We will therefore have to have two votes, whereas one on the 28 days alone might have been necessary otherwise. I am not clear as to why that has come about, except to provide a delay mechanism in the time that the House has for consideration. As a consequence, the reality must be that new clause 8 on stop and search, which was tabled by a Government Back Bencher, and which, I believe, merits the consideration of the House, is most unlikely to receive any consideration whatever. In the context of trying to build consensus, that must be highly regrettable. There is no reason why that should have to happen.

When we move on beyond the three-hour break, when we will probably have had a couple of votes, and the stop and search matters will not have been considered, we will have five groups of amendments to consider, all of which are of importance, and three hours in which to do it. We might well have time to deal with the offences under clauses 1 and 2, which remain controversial because the Government concessions do not appear to change radically the way in which indirect incitement to terrorism can still be committed negligently. If we have a full debate on that subject, however, which greatly exercised the Committee last week, there must be a danger that we will never get to the glorification clauses, which, as we know from last week, were the subject of enormous controversy. If the Home Secretary wishes to avoid the suspicion that the Government are trying procedurally to close down the debate on those clauses, it would be wise to give us more time. Without filibuster in any sense, we will have difficulty in reaching those clauses.

I worry, and I shall judge the matter by what happens this afternoon, that we might see a procession of Government Back Benchers put up to prolong the debate on offences under clauses 1 and 2, so that debate is prevented on the question whether a glorification element in incitement to terrorism should remain in the Bill. That would be a scandalous state of affairs. I look to the Home Secretary to provide guidance, as the debate takes place, to ensure as far as is possible that that does not happen.

My hon. Friend will agree that it is important that our proceedings today should be intelligible to the country at large. Given that we have no fewer than 60 amendments and new clauses to consider, and only six hours in which to do so, the arithmetic is obvious. Does my hon. Friend agree that having fewer than 10 minutes for the consideration of each amendment is a travesty of parliamentary scrutiny, and that if the public knew what was taking place, they would be appalled by it?

I entirely agree. Even if Members act with reasonable expedition, the second part of the motion in particular is flawed in terms of allowing scrutiny.

Even after the glorification amendments, there are important amendments dealing with the endorsements of publications and the defences that may exist, issues that were of great concern to the House last week. There is also the question whether there should be any defences in relation to training for terrorism: there are currently none. Last but not least, although last week the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham)—in a very powerful speech—expressed concern about our failure to define terrorism correctly, that is the last item that we shall have time to consider today, and the reality must be that we shall never reach it at all.

I do not disagree with anything that the hon. Gentleman is saying, but does he agree that if the House cannot debate these matters adequately, that will encourage even closer scrutiny—if such is possible—in the other place, and the inevitable amendments? Such scrutiny, however, should be carried out by the elected House and not the unelected House.

I do agree. As I said to the Home Secretary last week, the controversial nature of the Bill makes it immensely desirable that, if at all possible, this House should reach an agreed position so that we can all vote for the Bill on Third Reading tomorrow. But to do that we must debate, and if the debate is curtailed so that important parts of the Bill are never considered at all, that will place those who wish to consider them in great difficulty. As the Home Secretary knows, because the Bill is so controversial, there must be a risk that the other place will take over the responsibility that we have shirked—and that we shall find ourselves involved, as we have too often in the past, in late-night spats as we try to sort out the differences between this House and the other place. Let me say sincerely to the Home Secretary that I think that that can be avoided, or largely avoided, if there is sufficient time, but I do not think there is at present.

The hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) said that it would not be our fault if there was ping-pong—that it would be the fault of the other place. As my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) pointed out, however, if we had not debated the Bill adequately that would be our fault. It was clear in Committee that the provisions relating to offences committed abroad were an extremely controversial part of the drafting, and would merit discussion and refinement on Report. The other place will have to consider the provisions if we fail to do so.

I agree—all the more so because it seemed to me during last week's debates that we were moving towards the possibility of agreement. Members of the other place do bother to read Hansard, and if they see that important matters raised in Committee—[Interruption.]

Order. I know that the hon. Member for Blyth Valley (Mr. Campbell) gets very excited sometimes, but a little calmness might help the situation.

If Members of the other place see that important issues raised in Committee and postponed until Report because the Government said that they would respond positively have not been debated at all, not only will that send a pretty dreadful signal to the public and the electorate of our country about the way in which we conduct our business, but it will make it inevitable that Members of the other place will try to second-guess and look again at what has happened here.

We will not divide the House, because I want to get on, but even now I urge the Home Secretary to consider whether we cannot have more time. I also seek an assurance from him that we will do our level best to get through all the groups of amendments.

I took exception to very little that was said by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). Like him, we consider the timetable motion defective, but like him I see no reason for us to divide the House on it. I accept the Home Secretary's point that some small measure of protection for the business has been made available, and that small amount of extra time is indeed welcome. Nevertheless, without second-guessing the way in which today's business will proceed, I think it very likely that we shall not go beyond the first string of amendments before the first knife falls after three hours. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield pointed out, that will leave the stop-and-search provisions proposed in new clause 8 entirely undiscussed. Surely that is too important a subject to leave this House without any proper discussion being placed on the record.

I also think that a great deal of important business will remain undiscussed under the second group of amendments. The House will have to choose between holding its tongue and restricting its comments on clause 1 and the question of intention if we are to secure any meaningful discussion on the crucial question of glorification. As a result, questions as fundamental as the definition of terrorism itself will almost certainly be left undebated. As a result of that, the only meaningful scrutiny will be carried out in the other place. If the Government are content to proceed in that way, they cannot then complain that the unelected House has interfered with or changed the Bill when it makes the amendments that are inevitable.

The programme motion strikes me as an exceptionally inappropriate way for the Government to order our business. I hope that, even at this stage, they may see sense and allow further time tomorrow if necessary.

I do not wish to be churlish, and I congratulate the Home Secretary on producing a programme motion that is an improvement on the previous position. I certainly will not vote against it, and I am happy to congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on having listened to the complaints that we made before the general election about the time allocated to a similar Bill. He has tried to respond according to the standards of today's practice, and the House is in his debt to that extent.

It is, in fact, the standards of today's practice on which I wish, briefly, to comment. As well as trying to avoid being churlish in the House—I hope—I try to avoid overdoing the "senior Member of the House" bit, and lamenting the fact that things are not what they were. But things are dramatically different from what they were, and I cannot hold my tongue on this occasion.

I believe that if such a controversial Bill involving such changes in individual liberty had been produced 10 years ago by a Conservative Government with such a timetable, there would have been a major row. Twenty years ago, such an allocation of time for a Bill of this kind would have been regarded as laughable, and it would not have been entertained by the usual channels during the Thatcher Government. Thirty years ago, if a Conservative Government had proposed a Bill of this kind, several days of debate would have been allowed before any guillotine curtailing debate would have even been contemplated. Had anyone tried to force through a guillotine of this severity, I should have expected the sitting to be suspended as Labour Members caused disorder and began to run away with the Mace, or something of the kind, to give visual expression to their constitutional outrage.

There is a serious point behind all this. I think that the House is becoming accustomed to a shortness of debate and a lack of scrutiny of legislation that is on the verge of becoming ridiculous, given the complexity of this Bill. I see no reason whatever why the House should have to rise shortly after 7 pm today and at a similar time tomorrow. The suspension of the rule to allow us at least to sit on through the evening until such time as the Government's business managers decide to try to call a vote to end the debate would constitute a very elementary extension of debating time, which would cause merely minor inconvenience to a few Members and no real affront to the House.

I also agree with the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael) that the present situation underlines the case for not tampering with the powers of the House of Lords. I strongly believe that the House of Lords should be reformed; it lacks legitimacy and we need a much stronger Upper House. If this House is to continue to deal with matters of this importance in such a cursory fashion, it becomes all the more important that the whole Bill be properly scrutinised, and that the Lords force us to look again at, and to discuss in more detail, some of the other very serious aspects of this Bill.

I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke), although I recall that it was the noble Lord Heseltine who had a fondness for wielding the Mace. Apart from that—[Interruption.] Ron Brown played a secondary role in Mace-wielding. I never wielded it at all, as I remember, but never mind.

I support the comments of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), and I have a very specific reason for being concerned about this programme motion—[Interruption.] During last week's debate—at which I seem to remember the hon. Member for East Renfrewshire (Mr. Murphy) was not even present—the Home Secretary was forced to concede, by letter to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Carmichael), that

"I can confirm that the Lord Advocate has not been asked for, or expressed any view on the proposed extension of the maximum period of detention without charge."

That admirably candid admission on the part of the Home Secretary is somewhat at variance with the briefings from the Scottish Executive, and was extracted after debate.

Understandably, many Scottish colleagues who are interested in whether the senior Scottish law officer has been consulted on these matters wanted to pursue the same question today in respect of stop-and-search, glorification and the commission of offences abroad. If this timetable renders reaching these crucial matters impossible, the right of Scottish Members to find out whether the Lord Advocate has been consulted on them, and how this Bill interrelates with Scottish criminal law, will also be curtailed.

Of course, the Home Secretary would be straying out of order if he gave us that information in discussing other amendments to, and clauses and passages in, the Bill, but I fear that this timetable will make it simply impossible to pursue the entirely legitimate questions of whether Scotland's senior law officer has been consulted on any of the Bill's crucial parts, and whether the Home Secretary was in blissful ignorance of the Lord Advocate's advice on glorification, the commission of offences abroad and stop and search, as he candidly admitted he was in respect of 90-day detention.

In terms of the protection of the House, this programme motion deals with key matters. In terms of the protection and legitimate rights of Scottish Members, and our ability to question what bearing Scottish criminal law has on these proceedings, this motion is far too strict.

I have yet to be able to take part in debates on this Bill because of other duties in the House, and I shall be very brief.I want to endorse most strongly everything said by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke). During Question Time today, the Prime Minister left the House in no doubt that he believes this to be the most important issue that the House currently faces. I agree. I want to treat the votes in this debate as free votes. I want to try to vote in what I consider to be the national interest, regardless of party, and I know that many Members in all parts of the House take a similar line, whatever view they may reach on the question of 90 days, 28 days and the other issues before us—[Interruption.]

However, if the Prime Minister truly believes that this is the most important issue—[Interruption.] The Home Secretary is busy talking at the moment and it would be quite a good idea if he listened. If the Home Secretary genuinely wishes to create a consensus—he has tried to listen on certain occasions, and this programme motion is a modest advance on what we had before—it is an insult not just to this House but to the people whom we represent to deny this House the opportunity adequately to discuss crucial aspects of this Bill that will affect, in one way or another, directly or indirectly, a vast number of our constituents. We are likely to take decisions today that could have a profound effect on the structure of our society, our criminal law and many other things. We should be able to debate these issues, as we could in former days, at not inordinate but adequate length. There is absolutely no opportunity afforded in this programme motion to debate issues such as glorification and stop and search at adequate length.

Even at this very late stage, I appeal to the Home Secretary, through you, Mr. Speaker, the defender of the interests of this House, to stop sidelining Parliament and to allow this House—which has, or ought to have, primacy within Parliament—adequately and properly to scrutinise, so that the other place can then concentrate more properly on what it ought to deal with: the detail and minutiae. As it is, we are giving the House of Lords the duty and obligation to examine matters that we have addressed for not even half a minute. That is disgraceful.

Over the past eight years, we have seen a progressive sidelining of Parliament and an over-mighty Executive seeking to use their muscle. Yes, I accept that the Prime Minister believes that he is acting in the country's interest. I am one of those who have never impugned his good faith on these issues, but I say through the Home Secretary to the Prime Minister, who is not here, that he is not behaving as a Prime Minister who honours parliamentary democracy ought to behave. He should recognise that in a parliamentary democracy, a fragile thing that our forefathers fought for—[Interruption.] Indeed; our foremothers also fought for it. The Prime Minister should recognise that in such a democracy, it is crucially important that we, who between us represent all the people of this country, should have adequate opportunity to debate the crucial issues of the day. This programme motion does not give us that opportunity.

I fully accept why my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who has handled this matter with great sensitivity and skill from the Front Bench, is not going to seek to divide the House. I certainly will not seek to do so from the Back Benches—even though we should divide—because we need to move on to the issues of substance. The fact that we cannot move on to all those issues is not only regrettable, but a blot on the Government's democratic integrity. I again appeal to the Home Secretary, even at this late stage, to let the House sit until at least 10 o'clock tonight, thereby giving us another three hours over and above what the Order Paper allows.

I simply do not believe that there is enough time to understand the unexplained contradictions between the philosophy behind this legislation and that behind the Northern Ireland peace process. I have persistently sought to work constructively with the Government, and particularly the Northern Ireland Office, to ensure significant progress in Northern Ireland, and to that extent I agree that the Government can take some credit for what has happened there, but I find very frustrating the virtual absence in these debates—probably owing to time pressure—of any significant explanation as to why the Home Office takes such a different approach to this legislation from the one we are expected to support for Northern Ireland.

The Government need the time to explain why, for example, internment, which was universally regarded as having failed in the Province, is now proposed as a solution to international terrorism. There is a grain of explanation in the form of a comment yesterday by the Under-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Woodward):

"The Government are looking at a specific UK threat from a kind of terrorism different from that being discussed here."—[Official Report, Standing Committee E, 8 November 2005; c. 15.]

Well, it does not seem very different to the victims of terrorism in Northern Ireland. If the Government want our support and sympathy in these difficult times, they need to provide themselves with enough time to explain the apparent contradictions writ large—certainly in the eyes of Northern Ireland residents—as the Government increasingly try to suggest that there are two different kinds of terrorism. Furthermore, and perhaps ironically, only today Northern Ireland offences legislation is being published—

Even more contradictions are thrown up by other legislation, but I shall not go into them now, Mr. Speaker.

The Secretary of State should realise that his decision on the time for debate necessarily prevents a profound understanding of why the Government believe that they are being consistent and joined up in their thinking with regard to Northern Ireland terrorism and international terrorism. Of course the Government can force these things through in a short period, but I warn the Home Secretary that if he insists on doing so with inadequate explanation, not only will he create resentments in the Chamber, but the ramifications of the programme motion for today's Bill are likely to cause significant and practical obstructions that could well prevent the Government from passing other Bills that they desperately want passed in respect of Northern Ireland.

Let us have a fast debate if that is what the Home Secretary wants, but let us recognise that the Government will pay many times over in delay and obstruction, particularly in the other place, because our good will on Northern Ireland matters has been utterly exhausted.

It was right for the Government to take the Committee stage on the Floor of the House, because the Bill affects every one of us and all those we represent. No one assembled here in the House doubts the importance of the issues before us. In fact, the Bill has many of the features that would, in the old days, have made it be viewed as a constitutional Bill. As a general rule, such constitutional Bills of major importance were never guillotined. Every one of us should have the opportunity to justify, query or give reason to our anxieties about the Bill. I am struck by the fact that we have not concluded any detailed scrutiny of the substance of the Bill before our consideration on Report and before Third Reading.

My concern is that the debate is so staggered or staged that it seems almost impossible to reach some of the key concepts within the Bill. I therefore want to ask the Government whether this is an act of cynicism. Is it a deliberate attempt to ensure that the House will not be able reach the provisions on stop and search, or perhaps on commission of offences abroad or glorification? I believe that denying the House of Commons the proper opportunity to examine the Bill does not serve the Government's own cause of arguing their case to the country.

I want briefly to reinforce the point made by the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack)—that the House should be involved and at the heart of scrutiny of this legislation. In particular, after eight years in this place, I saw last week that the House of Commons was finally adopting a supreme role in trying to revise and improve the Bill. As I said in an earlier intervention, it became apparent to the House last week that in respect of the commissioning of offences abroad, there was greater concern than had first appeared when the Bill was probed in Committee. It is disappointing that the Government are introducing a programme motion that almost guarantees that there will be no follow-on from last week to this week. That effectively hands back to the House of Lords the job of scrutinising the detail of legislation—a major error.

At business questions last week, my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) made the point that the Government should find more time to debate the Bill. It is not yet too late for the Government to recognise that, if the House is to build on what happened last week and to remain the dominant scrutiny Chamber, more time is required to debate the Bill on Report.

I agree with those who have argued that the programme motion is unsound and unsatisfactory. It may represent an improvement—a modest one, at that—on previous procedure, but in view of previous procedure, that does not say much for it.

I do not mind vouchsafing to the House, if you will permit me, Mr. Speaker, that at 7.29 yesterday morning, my wife gave birth to our second child—Frederick James, weighing in at 8lb 6oz and born in an excellent national health service hospital. You will appreciate, Mr. Speaker, and right hon. and hon. Members throughout the House will understand, that I am very keen indeed to take a decent period of paternity leave. Moreover, I have already informed my Whips—I emphasise, informed my Whips—that I intend to do so.

I happen to believe, however, that the issue—or, rather, the set of issues—before us today exceeds in importance any other issues before the House now or for the foreseeable future. To that extent, I agree with what the Prime Minister said at Question Time. Some of us had the privilege of contributing to the Queen's Speech debate earlier this year, and in that debate I made the gentle observation that if the Government were confident of their case on legislation to be put before the House, they should not be afraid of debate, but allow time for arguments and accept that other legitimate points of view can and should be put forward.

In the context of the programme motion, my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) raised the question of whether the Government were deliberately seeking to circumvent debate. The question has been implicit and sometimes explicitly asked as to whether Ministers are afraid of the arguments. My honest view is that the Prime Minister is not afraid of the arguments and I do not think that the Home Secretary is afraid of the arguments. I am not even going to accuse the Home Secretary, in the context of the programme motion, of engaging in some sort of deliberate Machiavellian parliamentary contrivance. If I were so to suggest, it would probably be unworthy.

What I am going to suggest is something that I think is at least as serious. The charge is not that the Government are afraid of debate or that they are trying to shut people up. The charge is that the Government are, frankly, careless of and insensitive to the wishes of Back Benchers who want the opportunity to put their legitimate point of view and to receive responses to it. It seems to me that that was the kernel of the argument developed by my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack), who is recognised throughout the House as a truly outstanding parliamentarian. He knows that there is a history in this place of considering these matters seriously and at length.

I say in all sincerity to the Home Secretary, whose sincerity I respect and whose patriotism I acknowledge: what harm would be done either to the Government or to the national interest if we were to debate the Bill tonight until 10 o'clock? What would be the harm if the Government were to acknowledge that there was a welter of different opinions around the House and to let us have another day for debate? What damage would be inflicted; what disadvantage would be incurred?

If the Home Secretary is looking just a bit irritated, as I suspect he is, it might be because he thinks that he knows that he has got it right, that the Government know what they are doing and that hon. Members must be told to let the Government get their business through. What I would say to the Home Secretary is that he should accept that in this, the cockpit of parliamentary democracy, we should debate the issues fully and comprehensively. We should have that opportunity, but we are being denied it. If I am prepared to stay here until 10 o'clock at night or to have another day's debate on issues that are far more important than most matters that the House will consider, why are Ministers not prepared to allow that? Why cannot we have a proper representation on the Government Front Bench for these important debates?

Might I say that there was a time in the House—a time that my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire will well recall—when on occasions of this sort, the Prime Minister was customarily in his place to hear the arguments and listen to alternative points of view? What is happening to our parliamentary democracy?

I am extremely grateful to my hon. Friend, who makes a very important point. I well remember the days when Jim Callaghan, the late Lord Callaghan, would sit in the Chamber for an hour or two at a time to listen to even rather insignificant debates. Other Prime Ministers have done the same, but not Lord Callaghan's successor.

I only wish that this Prime Minister would do that. I repeat that I respect his motivation, and think that he is motivated by the highest considerations of national protection and public service, but neither he nor the Government have made much of a case for the central components of the Bill. Why cannot the Prime Minister be here? If he respected the House, the House would respect him.

I endorse what has been said so far, and wish to make two other brief points. I also have a question for the Home Secretary which I hope will shorten the debate to come.

Colleagues from three different parties on the Opposition Benches have argued that they accept that the programme motion gives more time for debate, but that we will still be hugely constrained. The Government's approach has two obvious defects. First, people outside the House who are not satisfied with Parliament and who have little respect for it will be able to say much more easily that we do not do our job properly or thoroughly and that we rush through important legislation. The central proposition for debate today is that we should make the period for which a person can be detained without charge six times as long as it currently is. Surely that merits a debate that is not constrained? There is no need to constrain debate, and the view that the Government should adopt a different approach is widespread.

Secondly, the Government and the Home Secretary often criticise the House of Lords for being unelected and for interfering in the decisions of the elected House. It is impossible to criticise the Lords validly if this House cannot debate properly all the propositions that the Government put to it. The House of Lords then has an additional duty to make up for our failure in that respect.

The House of Lords does not have a guillotine procedure. The debate there will go on for as long as people want to contribute to it. If ever there were a Bill that needed to be debated at somewhat greater length—and for which time was available—this must be it.

I turn now to my question for the Home Secretary, which follows the question posed by the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond) about the advice of the Scottish law officer. The right hon. Gentleman's answer to that question might shorten debate later: his answer to my question will do the same, and make it easier for him to make his case.

The Home Secretary got into difficulties last week when it came to explaining the legal advice that he received and its provenance, but my question does not ask him to reveal the content of the advice from the Attorney-General. It is this: who gives him advice as to whether the Bill, or any part of it, complies with the European convention on human rights? Is it internal legal advice from his Department—

Debate is important, quality and brevity are desirable. Long-windedness, repetition and mere quantity are not desirable.

Question put:—

Orders of the Day

Terrorism Bill

As amended in the Committee, considered.

Clause 23 — Extension of period of detention by judicial Authority

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments Nos. 52 to 55.

Amendment No. 1, in page 22, line 19, leave out 'three months' and insert '28 days'.

Amendment No. 33, in page 22, line 19, leave out 'three months' and insert '60 days'.

Government amendments Nos. 56 to 58.

Amendment No. 29, in page 22, line 36, at end insert—

'(3AB) Where the new specified period will end more than 14 days after the relevant time—

(a) the specified period may only be extended—

(i) pending the result of an examination or analysis which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining relevant evidence, or

(ii) for the purpose of obtaining relevant evidence from outside the United Kingdom or from records within the United Kingdom which cannot reasonably be obtained without such an extension of the specified period;

(b) the specified period may only be extended if the judicial authority is satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility of the detainee being charged immediately with another offence relating to terrorism or a terrorist act;

(c) the judicial authority must approve the nature of any further questioning of the detainee during the new specified period.'.

Government amendments Nos. 59 to 61.

Amendment No. 63, in page 23, line 6, at end insert—

'(6A) After paragraph 37 insert—

"37A (1) Any detained person who has been released—

(a) in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 37 having been detained for not less than 14 days, or

(b) owing to the effluxion of time

("the ex-detainee"), shall be entitled to claim full compensation for his financial losses resulting from his detention.

(2) The Secretary of State shall, within 3 months of the coming into force of section 23 of the Terrorism Act 2005, make regulations establishing a compensation scheme for ex-detainees.

(3) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2) shall be made by statutory instrument and shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.".'.

New clause 1—Extension of period of detention by judicial authority: duration—

(2) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument provide—

(a) that all or any of those provisions which are in force shall continue in force for a period not exceeding twelve months from the coming into opertion of the order; or

(b) that all or any of those provisions which are for the time being in force shall cease to be in force.

(3) No order shall be made under subsection (2) above unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.'.

New clause 4—Disapplication of Human Rights Act 1998—

'Sections 23 and 24 of this Act shall take effect notwithstanding the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42)'.

New clause 7—Duration of Section 23—

'The provisions of section 23 of this Act shall remain in force until one year after their commencement and shall then expire.'.

Government amendment No. 62.

All the amendments in this group relate to the complex and contentious question of pre-charge detention in terrorist cases. Government amendments Nos. 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60 and 62 provide that extensions of detention beyond 14 days must be approved by a High Court judge or, in Scotland, a judge of the Court of Session. That responds directly to concerns raised in the Chamber at Committee stage. Any application that would extend detention beyond 14 days will need to be made to the senior judge. If, for example, on day nine, the police thought that they needed only another couple of days before they would be in a position to release a suspect or suspects, they could still apply to a district judge. If, however, the police were clear at that point that they wanted a further seven days, the application would need to be made to the senior judge.

I am grateful to the Home Secretary for giving way at this early juncture. Why is application in Scotland to be made to a court of civil jurisdiction—namely, the Court of Session—for what is essentially a criminal matter?

Following our exchanges in Committee, I set out clearly to all Scottish Members—I think that the hon. Gentleman will have received my correspondence—the range of issues relating to that particular set of questions. I believe that that addresses the question that he has raised. If not, and he is indicating that it does not, I shall come back to him on the point later in the debate.

In Committee, it was suggested that it was not only the level of judge that was important, but his experience of handling terrorist cases. It was suggested that there should be a cadre of judges designated for that purpose. We have explored that suggestion with the Department for Constitutional Affairs, but it and the judiciary rejected that approach, so it has not been pursued.

Another option raised in Committee, following Lord Carlile's recommendation, was for decisions to be taken by senior circuit judges, with an avenue of appeal to a High Court judge. In our view, that would lead to an appeal in virtually every case with the cases eventually being decided by a High Court judge, so we have achieved the same result with fewer hearings. I can easily explain the effect of the amendments and I have also dealt explicitly with the proposals made by the hon. Member for Stone (Mr. Cash).

It was also suggested that judges should give reasons for their decisions to extend detention. The clear advice we have is that that would open up an avenue of appeal. There is also the risk that the judge might have decided to grant the extension on the basis of sensitive material, so we have decided not to proceed with that suggestion.

Can the Home Secretary amplify the exact procedure before the High Court judge? Will it be possible for submissions to be made by the person under detention pending charge? Will he be represented? How will the procedure operate and will the Government publish further material on that point, if necessary?

The answer is yes. On the procedure, I shall come shortly to the codes of practice that will apply—a point that the hon. Gentleman pressed in Committee and to which I am keen to respond.

I turn to Government amendments Nos. 51 and 58. As the Bill is currently drafted, extensions of pre-charge detention are for seven days unless there are "special circumstances" that warrant a lesser period. The amendments remove the word "special" so that a shorter extension period would be granted if the judge felt that circumstances warranted it. The amendments are identical to ones tabled by the Opposition in Committee, so we are responding to the debate on that issue.

The Home Secretary will know that successive Chief Constables in Northern Ireland have had to fight terrorism in that part of the United Kingdom. What view does the present Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Orde, have on the renewal of detention every seven days and extensions to 90 days if needed?

The hon. Lady has more personal experience of the dilemmas caused by such questions than most hon. Members. I have spoken to Sir Hugh Orde on that point, because of his particular experience. He was unequivocally clear, and he authorised me to say so in the House, that the legislation is—in his experience and from his point of view—necessary, and that includes the extension to 90 days. He is also of the view that the seven-day review by High Court judges is the right way to proceed, and that the flexibility that I am discussing is necessary. I hope that Members from Northern Ireland will take account of those views when they vote this evening.

Can my right hon. Friend tell the House whether any of our police officers have suggested that we have a power of internment? If they did, what view would the Government take of it?

Since I have been Home Secretary, there have been no suggestions from any source, the police or the security services, that internment be adopted as a measure to deal with any of these questions. Were that suggestion to be made, I would consider it, but I am sure that the House will agree that the assessment of the operation of internment in the period in which it operated was that it was a counter-productive approach to terrorism in the circumstances. By the way, I reject the rhetorical comment—made not by my right hon. Friend, but by others—that the measures we are discussing today can in any sense be equated with internment. That is simply not the case.

Further to the point raised by the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon), Sir Hugh Orde will appear before the Northern Ireland Affairs Committee this afternoon and will doubtless be asked many questions. Are there any chief constables who take a directly contrary view on this issue?

I am not aware of any. I have not personally spoken to every chief constable, so I cannot put my hand on my heart and say that not one of them takes a different view, but all the chief constables to whom I have personally spoken about it take the strong view that the provisions are necessary. The Association of Chief Police Officers also strongly takes that view, which is held most strongly by those people who have been most directly involved in fighting terrorism.

The Home Secretary has just said that the Chief Constable of Northern Ireland had reached his conclusion based on his experience. The letter that we received from Hayman of the Met said that the experience in Northern Ireland was totally different and not relevant. We now face new circumstances. What relevant experience has the Chief Constable had? Does he believe that the new powers are necessary in Northern Ireland and, if so, did the Home Secretary refuse to give him those powers?

I regret to say that the right hon. Gentleman has misunderstood the point that Assistant Commissioner Hayman made. His point was that the modern terrorism that we face is different in certain important respects from the terrorism that we had to face in the past in Northern Ireland. It is the case that the modern terrorism that we face is a challenge for police in Northern Ireland today in a very direct way, which is why the Chief Constable is entitled to make his comments, not as a point of general principle but in terms of dealing with the modern terrorism that he has to face.

The Home Secretary may recall that under schedule 8 it would be open to the judicial authority to exclude any person to whom the application relates—the suspect—or anyone representing him from any part of the hearing. How can he reconcile that with the provisions in the European convention on human rights on fair hearings?

I shall come on to the amendment tabled by the hon. Gentleman in a few moments. I believe that the two can be reconciled, which is why I have provided the certificate for this legislation.

In answer to the earlier question from the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), I want to say a few words about codes of practice. He also raised the point with me last week. In Committee, it was suggested that we needed a code of practice to govern the treatment of those held under the Terrorism Act 2000. We welcome that suggestion. Powers for that already exist in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Under section 66 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the Secretary of State can issue a code of practice in respect of those detained under schedule 8 to the 2000 Act if he so wishes. Existing PACE code C already applies to those detained under the Terrorism Act 2000, but we can see grounds for having a separate code for that purpose, as the hon. Gentleman argued earlier in our proceedings.

Such a code would be laid before Parliament and be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Similar provisions exist for a code that would relate to the Northern Ireland (Police and Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland)) Order 1989. In Scotland, codes of practice are not generally used. Instead, the Lord Advocate, as the head of the systems of criminal prosecution and investigation of deaths, has a statutory power to instruct the police in relation to the investigation and reporting of crime under section 12 of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 and section 17 of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967. Constables must perform their duties subject to the directions of chief constables, and chief constables must comply with all lawful instructions, in relation to the investigation of offences, from the appropriate prosecutor.

The Lord Advocate takes the view that it would be inappropriate to have different powers and periods of pre-charge detention in Scotland from the rest of the UK in terrorist investigations and, in considering appropriate guidance to chief constables in the Scottish context, he would want to maintain a consistent position north and south of the border, as far as possible. His officials would expect to work closely with Home Office officials on the preparation of a code of practice for England and Wales and any equivalent guidance to be issued by the Lord Advocate in Scotland. For those reasons, we are not tabling amendments at this point, but I can give a firm guarantee that the appropriate codes and their equivalent will be brought forward.

The Home Secretary will remember that last week we discussed the possibility of altering the rules about interviewing detained people after charge so that it facilitated inquiry after charges had been brought. Will that be part of the subject matter of the codes that he is bringing forward and, if so, does not it have some bearing on the total length of time for which we may need to detain people?

I do not expect that aspect of the code to deal with the particular point that we debated. Unless I have misunderstood the hon. Gentleman, I think his position is that we need, because of the particular situation of a possibly extended period of pre-charge detention compared with existing detention, to have a different approach to PACE in certain regards. I shall say later—

I shall give way when I have finished what I was saying to the hon. Gentleman.

The question of judicial scrutiny is important and becomes more and more pressing at each stage of the process, as time moves on, and the judge needs to deal with that directly as we move forward. I am ready to have discussions on that point, too. The proposal is not designed to address the issue of questioning pre and post-charge that we have already discussed.

That is an extremely important point, which was twice raised by Mr. Hayman in his letter. It was raised during the Privy Council briefing that the Home Secretary organised for the Leader of the Opposition and me. The question of interview post-charge has clearly had a major effect on the attitude of the police to charge and to the proposal that we are discussing. It is clearly the case that if we alter the ability of the police to interview after charge, it will open up to them much evidence and procedure that will act to stop terrorism. Can the Home Secretary please give the House an undertaking that he will put that in process?

I agree with all that and, as I said to the House both on Second Reading and in Committee, we think the case for the right hon. Gentleman's point is well made. Application of the procedure that he set out may mean that it would be less necessary in a given case, and thus there would be fewer cases where there was an extended period of pre-charge detention. The key point, however, is that it does not remove the need for pre-charge detention in certain circumstances, although I agree that the number would be limited. Nevertheless, I accept the integrity of his point; the view is shared across the Government that we need to achieve the state of affairs that he described. It is none the less important to note that there are implications for other aspects of the conduct of our legal process and they, too, need to be considered.

We have heard a lot about the views of the police on the extension of the detention period. Given that my right hon. Friend cannot tell us what the Attorney-General has told him, has he spoken to the Director of Public Prosecutions? The Solicitor-General, who has responsibility to the House for the views of the Crown Prosecution Service, is sitting next to my right hon. Friend. What are the views of the DPP about the 90-day period? Secondly, given that the provision will disproportionately affect members of the Asian community, what steps will my right hon. Friend take to ensure that when the police have those additional powers they will engage fully, at a local level, with the Asian community?

I can give my hon. Friend the specific assurance that he seeks on his first point: the CPS strongly supports the proposed extension to 90 days. I have said that throughout the debate, because the experience of prosecutors intimately involved in such difficult cases has led them to the same conclusions as senior police officers involved in the process. That is their clear and unequivocal position, explicitly and directly.

I want to finish answering my hon. Friend's question. His second point was very important. Without any encouragement from me, the police, over a period of 10 to 15 years—perhaps since Scarman, perhaps for even longer—have been working extremely hard to transform their relations with various minority ethnic communities in particular cities. Obviously, that is patchy and there are areas where not as much has been done, but some of our great metropolitan forces have made massive strides in developing relationships between operational policing and particular communities that did not exist previously. Moreover, the major faith leaders, nationally and locally, in most of our communities—not all—are working hard to find ways to co-operate in addressing the issues on a basis of respect for different faiths. To be candid, the comparison that was made earlier with current events in France is utterly unhistorically based when we consider our achievements in the UK.

I agree with my hon. Friend that we need to re-intensify our efforts to ensure that police relationships with various ethnic minority communities and faiths are substantial and real in every community in the country. Much work is already going on, but I can give him an assurance, without qualification, of the key importance of that point.

The Home Secretary was right to seek the views of the CPS in England and Wales, and it is right that the House should listen to them. Having done so, however, why did not he seek the view of the Lord Advocate with regard to the necessity and workability of 90-day detention in the context of Scots law?

I set out as clearly as I conceivably could the precise process that we followed in trying to obtain those views. That was the right approach. I set that out both in what I said earlier and in the letter that I sent to Members of Parliament from Scotland. I believe that we have gone about things in the right way and we are establishing properly based legislation for the whole United Kingdom.

May I take the Home Secretary back to the issue of the Lord Advocate? From what he told the House a moment or two ago, it appears that the Lord Advocate's view is that the period should be the same both north and south of the border, and that the authorities in Scotland should co-operate with the authorities in England, but it does not appear that the Lord Advocate endorsed the principle of 90 days. Is that correct?

The Lord Advocate endorsed the view that it should be the same north and south of the border, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman said—[Interruption.] That is the case. Our proposal is that there should be a 90-day period south of the border, so the Lord Advocate thinks that there should also be a 90-day period north of the border.

How has it transpired that the Lord Advocate, Scotland's senior Law Officer, expressed to the Home Secretary the view that the period of detention pre-trial should be the same north and south of the border, but at no stage in that correspondence or discussion expressed a view about how long that period should be? Does not the Home Secretary accept that many of us find that an incredible state of affairs?

I am always ready to accept that the hon. Gentleman leading the Scottish National party finds things incredible, but the fact is that I do not think it is incredible; it is a perfectly reasonable state of affairs.

I will give way later.

Amendment No. 63, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Rob Marris), addresses an important point that a large number of people have raised with me—compensation in the event that someone was held incorrectly. The amendment provides that those held for more than 14 days and released without charge should be entitled to compensation. That is my hon. Friend's principal proposal.

I have much sympathy with the idea, but there are some issues regarding its implementation. Thus far, we have never paid compensation, other than in cases involving malpractice, to people tried and acquitted, even though they may be held in custody for far longer periods than we are considering in these circumstances. We may or may not agree with the justice of that position, but it has been the case for a long time. We need, therefore, to consider carefully the precedent that we might set if we agreed to the amendment. However, I accept, first, that my hon. Friend is making a serious point and, secondly, that by hypothesis we would be dealing with a very small number of cases indeed—the very small number of cases where people are held, say, for more than 28 days pre-charge and within that group the very, very small group of people who were wrongly held and subsequently not charged. For that reason, because the provision would apply to such a small group of people, I am prepared to look carefully at my hon. Friend's suggestion and will report back to him and the House as soon as I can. I hope that he will understand that we need to take the operational implications fully into account, so I cannot give him an unequivocal commitment at this stage, but on the basis of that proposal, I ask him to consider withdrawing the amendment.

I want to take my right hon. Friend back to the point about interviewing a person who has been charged already. My understanding is that, under existing arrangements, if new and significant evidence becomes available, it is possible for the police to apply to re-interview. Is that not the case? Does that not cast some doubt on the case for 90 days?

I do not think that it casts any doubt whatever on the case for 90 days, but my right hon. Friend stated the situation quite correctly. I have just checked with my colleagues—

Some colleagues have a wonderful tendency not to allow me to answer my right hon. Friend—which I will. I shall then consider—I make no commitment—the merit or otherwise of giving way further. Let me try to answer the question that she fairly raises with me. She is fundamentally right in her analysis that it is possible in certain circumstances to re-interview. She is also right in that the Government are considering whether such circumstances could be—[Hon. Members: "We cannot hear."] I beg hon. Members' pardon.

My right hon. Friend is also right in that we are looking carefully, as I have told Opposition Members, to extending the case more widely. She is also right in her implication that, if we were to succeed in doing that, it might reduce the number of people whom we had to hold in pre-charge detention for longer than the current period. All those points are correct. They do not, however, obviate the central point that, even all that said, there will still be cases where it might not be possible to operate in that way. That is why the power that we seek is needed.

Would the Home Secretary care to comment on the view that has been expressed to me on the questioning of suspects after charge by Professor John Spencer, QC, who is one of the leading experts on the law of criminal procedure in this country and, indeed, throughout Europe? He says that the so-called

"rule that suspects may not be questioned after charge is one that has no clear legal basis, whether in statute or case-law."

He goes on to say that the only possible basis that he can think of is the existence of paragraph 16.5 in PACE code C, to which he refers, and that the conclusion that we must draw is that the power already exists, without primary legislation, for the Home Secretary to create a situation in which terrorist suspects can be questioned after charge, so this part of the Bill has no point whatsoever.

The hon. Gentleman totally misses the point. It is necessary, even under the PACE code that he describes, that a charge should be in place to go through that process. The hypothesis that we are discussing is that, in a number of cases, there is no possibility of charging on a short-term basis.

I want to move on to the central question of this part of the debate: amendments Nos. 1 and 33, which deal with the length of time for which an individual can be held. That has been a subject of massive debate in the country and in the House. We debated it last week. I said in the House that I thought it important to try to get consensus in the House, and that has been my approach throughout.

The Prime Minister has sought to make this debate a simple matter of party politics, something with which some of us do not agree. Does my right hon. Friend recall that, when he gave undertakings in the House to find a consensus, we understood that it would be not just with Opposition parties, but that he would seek a consensus of which we on the Labour Benches who had some objections and concerns would become part? I put that to him before he goes on with his prepared speech.

My hon. Friend makes two points, one of which I do not accept and the second of which I do accept. I simply do not accept her description of the Prime Minister's motivation in terms of party politics. I do not think that it is accurate; I do not think that it is his personal motivation; and I certainly do not believe that it is the Government's motivation. As I said on Second Reading, in Committee and at other times, the question that all Members must address is how can we do our duty as Members of Parliament in dealing with the national interest and national security.

I do not doubt for a second that these are difficult questions for all of us—for my hon. Friend, for myself and for every other hon. Member—but I do not believe that we have at any stage taken this issue from the point of view of party politics. Some have interpreted it that way. We have only to look at the media on any day of the week to see that they provide a prism through which they say that all this debate is about party politics in some respect or another. I have tried personally, when interviewed on the media, to rebut that suggestion because I do not think that it is true. I do not mean that I think that it is right but not correctly done; I think that it is an inaccurate description of the state of affairs.

I now turn to the point about consensus, about which my hon. Friend asks me. I believed and hoped as late as last Thursday that we could achieve a consensus with the main Opposition parties about the length of time that should be used. I also agree with her point that I was talking about consensus with Labour Members as well as with the Opposition parties on this question. That is what motivated me in the way that I operated. She may recall—I think that she will—that I asked every Member of the House to go back to their constituencies last weekend and take the view of their constituents, talk to them and ask their police and whoever else about these questions. I hope that she would agree that many Members have done precisely that: they have gone back and talked to people—I am sure that she is one of those who have done just that—and everyone will make their judgments on that basis.

When I had the meetings with the leadership of the Opposition parties at 11 o'clock last Monday morning in my office—I do not think that the hon. Members for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) and for Beaconsfield, who were present for the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives, would contest this—they said that for their part there was no circumstances under which they would consider extending beyond 28 days the amount of time for which detention might operate. That was their considered view. There was a discussion about the period between 14 and 28 days. I was of the view, which has been my view throughout, that 28 days is not long enough to deal with the police case that we have, but I was ready to entertain discussions of a shorter period that could arise. I said that publicly in a variety of circumstances.

I shall give way when I have finished what I have to say on this.

I then came to consider the best way to deal with this situation, and the view that I came to was that there ought to be three key areas in which I ought to try to respond to the House, the first of which is the whole area of scrutiny, which we have been talking about already: the role of the High Court judge, the PACE code and the various safeguards in place, which are changes from the position when I was speaking in the House last Thursday.

The second group of issues are those that we will debate later this afternoon relating to intent, glorification and the definition of terrorism—the range of issues that my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham) particularly was pressing from our side of the argument and, in fairness, which were expressed by a number of hon. Members on both sides of the House. I felt that I should try to respond to those points, and I believe that we have done so today, although they will be debated later in the process.

Finally, against all my best instincts—I am not a great fan of sunset clauses in general—I thought that the way to deal with the uncertainty that my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) and many other Labour as well as Opposition Members have about the length of time was to say that there would be a period, 12 months, after which clause 23 would run out and the House would decide, on the evidence and on the basis of what had happened in those 90 days, whether or not it should be extended. I am ready to commit, and do commit, to a report to the House on the operation of the law on the 90-day period when the House has to decide it.

I will give way in my own time. I have seen the hon. Gentleman, who is a very persistent popper up and down, which is very nice.

First, on reporting to the House about the operation of the 90-day period, I commit to do that so that every hon. Member can consider it. Secondly, at the behest of my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen, I have agreed that Lord Carlile should conduct a review of the definition of terrorism within that year, so that that conclusion would also be considered by the House when it comes to that point. Thirdly, as the House already knows, not as a result of this process, Lord Carlile will report on the operation of the control order regime during the course of that year, so that we can have a discussion in the round on those questions.

The view that I came to—perhaps it is the wrong view, or not; people will have their own view—was that that approach was a better way to address people's concerns than by introducing another figure, and I shall tell the House why. Many hon. Members on both sides of the House told me to avoid, if I possibly can, a Dutch auction of the numbers that are being pushed around in different areas. Some say 42 days; some say 60; or whatever it might be. I thought that that was quite a powerful point, and I thought about it over the weekend. I am also aware that many hon. Members came back after those consultations saying that we should take the 90-day period. That is how I got to the position where I am now. It may not satisfy my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood, but I hope that she will accept that I have tried hard to fulfil what I said on that occasion.

It is right that at Monday's meeting I said to the Home Secretary that our position continued to be that 28 days was the limit of what was acceptable. The Home Secretary indicated that he would incorporate several concessions in the Bill and told those present that he would table an amendment to determine whether a period between 28 and 90 days could form the basis of a compromise. I should be grateful to know why that proposal disappeared during the six hours that followed. There was never any suggestion that it was linked to the other concessions that he was making. When I spoke to him, it appeared that it would be part of a total package that we could consider—so what happened to it?

I am glad to set the historical record straight. I think that the hon. Gentleman will concede—he will correct me if I am wrong—that at no point during the meeting held in my office last Monday morning did any representative of the Opposition parties raise the idea of a sunset clause or a review—[Interruption.] I beg your pardon, Madam Deputy Speaker. The matter was raised on the Floor of the House, but not during that conversation.

I said to the Opposition parties that morning that I would spend the rest of the day talking to colleagues in the House to test their opinions. I personally attended at least three meetings of Labour Members at which we discussed their views of the state of affairs. A lot of people put their views strongly, but there was not unanimity. Some people strongly felt that we should support the police and go for 90 days, while others strongly felt that the period should not be extended at all. We had frank discussions.

After those meetings and discussions, I had to come to a view on the best course of action to follow, which I did at about 8 o'clock that night. I went for the option of putting the sunset clause before the House because it seemed to be the best way of addressing the matter and enabling all hon. Members to examine the practice of the system and reach a view on how to take things further forward.

In that recitation of what happened on Monday, the Home Secretary conveniently overlooked the fact that after the meeting with my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and the spokesman for the Liberal Democrats, he told the media that he would be tabling an amendment to provide for a shorter period of detention. How long did the Prime Minister have to detain him before he decided not to proceed with that amendment?

The right hon. and learned Gentleman is entirely correct that I did say that to the media after the meeting. He is also entirely correct that I was present at the meeting of the parliamentary Labour party meeting that the Prime Minister attended at which precisely these questions were discussed. I will address the question of detention that the right hon. and learned Gentleman raised with the Prime Minister earlier today. I can give him the example that he seeks from evidence given by Peter Clarke to the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

To answer the right hon. and learned Gentleman's earlier question, I shall quote what Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke said about whether the time period would make a difference. DAC Clarke said that he could point to a particular case as an example of terrorists evading justice because of the lack of such a provision. He said:

"had we had this provision in 2002, the outcome of a recent court case, the so-called ricin trial, might have been very different. Mohamed Meguerba was one of the suspects in that case and it is likely that we would have held him or applied for his detention for sufficient time to find that his fingerprints were on the ricin recipe and he would have stood trial as a main conspirator in that case had he not fled the country. As it was, he was not available to stand trial and so the jury were not able to benefit from his presence in the court. I cannot say whether the jury would have come to a different decision"—

of course he could not—

"but I think it would have been possible for the prosecution to present the case in a way which was easier for the jury to understand".

That is a compelling argument that 90 days might have made a difference and allowed things to be dealt with far better.

The Home Secretary will know that I originally raised this matter with the Prime Minister months ago. I asked for a briefing to test whether, if a 90-day period had been in force, it would have led to the apprehension of people who could not otherwise have been apprehended. The Home Secretary must know that the case to which he refers does not in any way justify the 90-day period. The evidence did not take 90 days to materialise. Will he now confirm—the Prime Minister refused to do so earlier today—that there is not a single case to which the police or anyone else can point in which evidence that became available 80 or 90 days after arrest was sufficient to charge the person who had been arrested?

It is striking that the right hon. and learned Gentleman makes his point in such a way. He is right in one essential respect: we tried to work with him and his colleague, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), over the summer to address these questions. He is right that we organised a briefing on Privy Council terms to consider such questions for him and his right hon. Friend. He says that he is not convinced by the case. He is entitled not to be convinced by the case—that is his right—but I believe that the case put by DAC Clarke to the Joint Committee on Human Rights was a powerful and effective argument for a 90-day provision.

Like many hon. Members, I have not been party to any of the discussions since last week, about which I make no complaint whatever. The Home Secretary's comments a few moments ago suggested that his approach to other parties and his Back Benchers was made on the basis that the Government were sticking to 90 days, but asking whether they could get 90 days so long as they improved judicial review, or added a sunset clause. In other words, they were saying, "Take the pill; we'll try to put some sugar on it." However, although he has cited one case—I shall not go on about that because I am making an intervention—he has not addressed the fundamental case. If it is to be the rule that after people have been held for 14 days and there is still no evidence to justify charging them they may be held for 90 days, what is the argument for 90 days? He says that he deplores Dutch auctions, but the time period—three months in all—seems to have been plucked out of the air. A man could be repeatedly questioned during that time in the hope that something would turn up that would enable him to be linked with a terrorist plan.

I give credit to the right hon. and learned Gentleman for his consistency because he made that argument in Committee, too. He also voted against the Bill on Second Reading, as he was entitled to do. My answer is the same argument that has been put through the whole of the debate. There is a compelling case for extending the current 14-day period.

The police and the prosecution service have come clearly and unequivocally to the view that in their professional judgment 90 days is the appropriate time. The suggestion of the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) that the police and the prosecution service have simply plucked some figure out of the air is utterly wrong. The reason the Prime Minister asserted today during Question Time—

I will give way in my own time, when I have made my own argument, to the people to whom I think it is worth giving way. [Hon. Members: "Ooh!"] There we are; that is what I will do—I think that that is called parliamentary democracy, Madam Deputy Speaker.

I am making the point simply and straightforwardly that we should take the professional judgment of the police, who actually deal with situations such as the one at Russell Square tube station, and the advice of the prosecutors extremely seriously.

I give way to the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd), who was another participant in the Monday meeting.

I was grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for agreeing to meet me and my hon. Friend the Member for Dundee, East (Stewart Hosie) on Monday morning. He said earlier that he was not in favour of a Dutch auction, having thought about the matter at the weekend, but he gave all those present at the meeting on Monday the clear impression that he would table an amendment to provide for a shorter period of detention. Indeed, some of us were surprised that such an amendment was not tabled that day. When was he overruled by the Prime Minister?

The hon. Gentleman is entirely wrong. I said I would continue to consult for the rest of the day, which I did, and I then tabled my amendment.

With great respect, my right hon. Friend has been misled on the ricin case, because the individual who fled the country while on bail was released by the police after two days in custody, not after 14 days. It cannot therefore be argued that they could have charged him if they had been able to hang on to him for 90 days. Will he confirm that that is the case?

I can confirm that that is the case, but the specific example I gave demonstrates that there are cases in which the police, when making a judgment about whether to charge someone, can reach a decision that, in my opinion, is damaging to the course of justice.

It is not just the police and the prosecution authorities who support the Government's position but Lord Carlile—

I should have thought that the name of Lord Carlile would have some resonance among Opposition Members. He is the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and he said that there should not be a Dutch auction in Parliament on the numbers, which is exactly what is happening. He also said that

"as a maximum three months is probably a practicable and sensible option, all other things being equal."

Is that not a judgment to which we should give considerable weight?

In my opinion, it is. Lord Carlile also said:

"I am satisfied beyond doubt there have been situations in which significant conspiracies to commit terrorist acts have gone unprosecuted as a result of the time limitations placed on the control authorities following arrest".

Lord Carlile has played an admirable and outstanding role, despite being a Liberal Democrat, in seeking to get terrorism legislation into a coherent form. We should take seriously everything that he says, which is why I have tabled a number of amendments on Report to try to meet some of his concerns. It is incumbent on others, particularly Liberal Democrat Members, to look at what he says in the round and to act accordingly.

May I caution my right hon. Friend not to overstate his case? I do not question the integrity of the police in proposing 90 days, and they may well have a good case. However, according to documents released to the Home Affairs Committee, when the Government agreed to support the 90-day proposal, they had received only two documents from the Association of Chief Police Officers—the ACPO press release of 21 July and a two-page summary of two difficult cases, neither of which is analysed to provide a case for 90 days. It would be better if my right hon. Friend did not overstate the strength of his case, and would he not have done better to ask the police to provide a more substantial report before making a decision?

I accept part of my right hon. Friend's rebuke, as it is important not to overstate the case. However, it is also important not to understate the case. It is important to understand all sides of the case. I have tried throughout—whether successfully or not, others will judge—to put the case in a balanced way and to respond to the debate. I shall continue to do so, but I take my right hon. Friend's point that it is important to address all these things in the round, which is one reason why I decided that a sunset clause—generally, I do not support such provisions—was an appropriate way to proceed and would allow a detailed assessment of the measure by the Home Affairs Committee and others.

Over the weekend, I sought the views of South Wales police and had a detailed discussion about the measure with them. They have no interest whatsoever in obtaining those powers for themselves, even though that is how the debate has been played. They are reassured, however, that the powers are in the hands of the judiciary, who will oversee the process and review it every seven days or sooner. I acknowledge what my right hon. Friend the Member for Southampton, Itchen said, but South Wales police are convinced that there are rare circumstances—we hope, however, that we will never have to use the measure—in which 90 days will be required. I urge my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary to consider that view, and not to backtrack too easily.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend, and I should like to pick out a couple of points. First, he used the word "rare". We are talking about a very small number of cases indeed, but by hypothesis we are trying to deal with some of the most dangerous people in the world. Secondly, we have not made as much of judicial oversight as we should have done, but we should address the powerful issue of a High Court judge reviewing the detention either every seven days or on the more flexible basis that I set out. It is very important indeed that we look at this in a balanced way, which is another argument for the sunset clause—something to which, as I said, I am not usually sympathetic.

Order. The Home Secretary has been generous in giving way, but I urge hon. Members to make brief interventions, as we have a time limit on the debate.

I have attended meetings with the police, and have paid attention to the Hayman review. However, why do the British police need that period, when police forces across Europe—I discount the example of France, because the French cannot teach us much about law and order at the moment—have not taken such powers, even though other countries, particularly Spain have experienced similar problems?

The fact is, we have very different legal systems, which is why it is difficult to make comparisons. However, to use the example of France, this morning I spoke to Lord Carlile, who had had a conversation with a judge in Paris about that very question. Following a low-level charge—association with "malfaiteurs" or something similar—there can be an investigation of up to four years. Those are the comparisons that we need to make.

I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend. Can he confirm whether, in the past 18 months, people held for 14 days under existing terrorism laws have been charged in all cases, and that no one has been set free after being held for that period? Have individuals who have been charged after 14 days been satisfactorily charged? If so, would not 28 days have been a good extension to offer?

I understand the case that my hon. Friend is making, and the facts that she cites are correct. In one case, a serious situation could have arisen near to the end of the detention period. I draw her attention to Lord Carlile's assessment of the argument that she made, and his conclusion that 90 days is appropriate.

Earlier, my right hon. Friend referred to the evidence of Mr. Clarke to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Mr. Clarke emphasised, however, that we are talking about a maximum period of three months:

"I certainly would not envisage the three months becoming the norm."

He also stressed the strain on police officers, who were

"sleeping on the floor, not going home, just ploughing their way through this vast amount of data".

Those officers

"would rather serious criminal investigations were conducted in a slightly calmer and more ordered atmosphere than that."

Without an extension, could the present situation not lead to a miscarriage of justice, because the police cannot investigate properly or effectively, and are unable patiently to work their way through the evidence?

My hon. Friend is correct, and I am grateful to him for expressing it that way. His point about miscarriages of justice is central to our discussion.

My right hon. Friend has been challenged strongly by the Leader of the Opposition and others for not tabling an amendment today proposing a detention period of fewer than 90 days but more than 28 days. Is not the real political point, however, the fact that the Opposition parties have already stated in principle that they would not support a detention period of more than 28 days, irrespective of the case made by the police?

My hon. Friend is right. I am not sure whether the phrase "challenged strongly by the Leader of the Opposition" is a contradiction in terms, although that may change after the Conservatives sort out their leadership.

Is it not important to understand that at the end of the 14-day initial detention period, in no circumstances will there be any application for further detention beyond seven days, and that judicial oversight then kicks in? In the debate we seem to have become fixated on the maximum period and to have ignored the importance of judicial oversight throughout the process.

My hon. Friend is correct and he makes the point accurately. I agree. Perhaps it is my fault that much of the debate has focused on the maximum period, rather than on the process of ensuring that the maximum is not reached.

I shall make some progress, but before I conclude I shall give way to one or two of those who want to intervene.

I emphasise, as I said on Second Reading, that we are dealing with a very different threat now from the one we faced in previous decades. Recent terrorist plots have been designed to cause mass casualties with no warnings—I emphasise, no warnings, sometimes using suicide and with the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons.

Some hon. Members have commented that terrorist cases are no more difficult to prosecute than complex fraud cases, but I argue that there is a very substantive difference between the two. In complex normal cases, the police may build a case before arresting an individual. It may also be possible to catch criminals red-handed in the act of committing a crime such as fraud, as the repercussions are not so great if the crime is committed. The need to ensure public safety by preventing mass casualty attacks that could be catastrophic in their effect means that it is necessary to make arrests in terrorist cases far earlier in the process than in other cases. That often means that much less evidence has been gathered at the point of arrest, so more time will be needed to gather sufficient evidence to charge a suspect.

Moreover, terrorist networks are often international, which means that highly complex inquiries have to be undertaken in many different jurisdictions. I remind the House again of the investigations into the events of 7 and 21 July, which yielded 38,000 exhibits that filled two warehouses, and so on. Terrorist networks are also now highly capable of using technology. In recent cases a large number, sometimes in the hundreds, of computers and hard drives have been seized. Much of the data on such computers and hard drives have been encrypted and take time to decrypt. The data then need to be analysed to incorporate the outcome of that analysis into an interview strategy.

Following the debates in the House and the request from hon. Members in all parts of the House for more substance, over the past few days I have consulted advisers from the National Technical Assistance Centre, whose experts deal with the hardest and most important decryption jobs. Their advice has been unequivocal. A 14 or even 28-day period will not allow them the time they need adequately to investigate the most heavily encrypted data. They have made it clear to me that the use of advanced encryption technology by those who pose a threat to law and order or the security of the country is becoming more widespread and is growing rapidly. Encryption is more pervasive, more complex and easier to use than ever before.

That poses a significant challenge to police and investigators on two fronts. First, it means that even sifting the evidence to identify which computers require specialist investigation and decryption usually—the experts' word—takes a number of weeks. Each computer must be examined to assess what data can be easily gleaned and where heavyweight code-breaking is required.

Secondly, even after the protected data sources have been identified, significant additional time may be needed to decode potential evidence. NTAC has advised me that this is an extremely challenging and time-consuming task, running in the majority of the hardest cases into weeks at the very least, and often even into periods of months. Taking all this together, the technical judgment of the professionals is clear and simple. They need more time to be able to deal with such challenges. We must honour that.

Forensic requirements, too, are more complex and more time-consuming. My right hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, West (Mr. Battle) made a tremendous speech last week about the bomb factory in his constituency and the issues raised by that case. We should take seriously the professional advice of the investigators, the police and the prosecutors about the time needed to enable investigators to reach conclusions.

I shall give way now for the last time, then I shall wind up.

Has my right hon. Friend had a discussion with the chief constable of west Yorkshire about how he and his force will handle the potentially difficult situation following the arrest of, say, someone in Bradford and the 90 days before charge? The family of that person, his biraderi and his community will have no explanation why he is being held. That could prove extremely difficult. What advice would my right hon. Friend give the chief constable in that situation?

I have had such conversations, and that goes partly to the answer that I have to my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Keith Vaz) in response to his intervention. I am glad that on 7 and 8 July and the subsequent weekend, there was a substantial programme of discussions between the police and the various communities in west Yorkshire, which were particularly affected. That was extremely impressive. I spoke to many people at the time who were committed to discussing exactly the question raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mrs. Cryer) with the communities from which the individuals came and which were most affected, in the same way as the issues in other cases were raised in Gloucester and other parts of the country. There is only one answer: intensive discussions between the police and the local community, local community leaders and local faith leaders. I say with humility that I do not need to give advice on that to, for example, the west Yorkshire force, because I believe it is committed to doing it, but my hon. Friend is right to say that if we make the changes here, it intensifies the need for such discussions.

On community involvement, does the Home Secretary accept that if the legislation is passed, it will harden support within communities surrounding terrorist cells, because it will turn people into martyrs? Undoubtedly, people will be detained on a week-on-week basis, released and found to be innocent. They will go back into those communities and say, "Look, this is the sort of state we are talking about and working against." Surely it will be hugely counter-productive.

That is a serious point, to which I want to give some time. What my hon. Friend says is utterly wrong. It is totally wrong. If one talks, as my hon. Friends and I have done, to Muslim communities throughout the country, one finds that they are absolutely clear without equivocation that they want no part of this terrorism, they want no identification of the terrorism with what they do, and they want to take that forward. If my hon. Friend takes the trouble to examine the responses of even the families, let alone the families and friends, of those directly involved in the events of 7 July, he will see that many of those individuals were deeply shocked and felt betrayed. It is not true that the action that might be taken gives rise to the kind of threat that my hon. Friend describes.

We have heard a great deal in the debate, rightly, about the issues and the implications for the police. What we have not heard in the debate are the issues and implications for the families of those who may be detained for up to 90 days. What are the financial implications? The people who are detained may be innocent. My right hon. Friend mentioned the possibility of compensation, but that does not help the families while they are living through the 90 days. The person detained may be the only breadwinner in the family, or the family may be on benefit. Has my right hon. Friend had discussions about those implications?

My hon. Friend makes a serious point. As I said in response to the amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton, South-West, there are many issues of the type that my hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Chris McCafferty) raises, which it is important to address. That is why, in responding to the amendment, I committed myself to look carefully at how we deal with the question of compensation, including any hardship that might arise.

I think that my right hon. Friend misunderstood the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Mark Fisher). There is no doubt that Muslim communities stand four-square against terrorism, but there is also no doubt that a large section of Muslim youth, who are against terrorism, is profoundly alienated from the system, as it sees it. The co-operation of that section of Muslim youth in intelligence gathering is vital, and the danger is that the Bill will alienate it.

I apologise to my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Mark Fisher), if I misunderstood him. We have had discussions with the Muslim community, including a series of working groups to identify the best way to deal with the issues raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Northfield (Richard Burden). I acknowledge that we must address the existing and potential alienation of young people from those communities.

I have been speaking for an hour, and, in the interests of debate, I shall not give way again, because I have been generous in giving way throughout. In conclusion, there are some people who argue that this has been a politically partisan exercise. I put it to the House that that is the opposite of the case.

I have said that I will not give way any more.

It is the obligation of every hon. Member to understand the threats to national security and to equip our security forces with the ability to deal with that in the best and most protected way. Moreover, I say to all those who have doubts about the time period that the whole purpose of the sunset clause is to provide an opportunity carefully to analyse how the period has worked, so that this House and the other place can make a decision on that matter in a year's time, which will allow us to test the hypotheses and concerns that various individuals have genuinely raised. Even the putative leaders of the Conservative party should think hard about their responsibilities on such matters, too. [Hon. Members: "No!"] Yes they should, because they have ducked the issues, and the House should not duck its responsibilities now.

I start on a sad note, because the Home Secretary's comments about this not being a politically partisan exercise were undermined by his final remark. I am conscious that I am speaking on behalf of a party that has seen friends and colleagues murdered by terrorists. The names are familiar to all hon. Members: Airey Neave, Ian Gow and Anthony Berry. This party has first-hand experience of terror, so the House can draw its own conclusions when it faces silly and, frankly, contemptible accusations that any party, least of all mine, is soft on security.

The war on terror is, after all, a battle of hearts and minds. The Government have passed five terrorism Acts since they came to power—the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998, the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and, finally, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Those Acts contain many worthwhile provisions, but none of them prevented the atrocities of 7 July, so let us not pretend that we can win the war on terror by passing every single law that the Government throw up. We will win the war by actually being tough, rather than just talking tough.

There is a lot that the Government could do. They could secure our borders by introducing a new border control force, which is something that we have often proposed, but they will not do it. They could fund the security services properly by scrapping plans for identity cards and spending the money on intelligence, but they will not do it. They could help to convict terrorist suspects by allowing the authorities to submit phone-tap evidence in court, but they will not do it. They could appoint one, single Minister to take control of our fight against terrorism, which has happened in other countries, but they will not do it.

We will take no lessons from the Government about being tough on terrorism, because they have failed to take on board many of our proposals, which, although our proposals were not especially innovative, would have brought us into line with the rest of the world. On the crucial matter before us today—the period for which a suspect can be held without trial—we want toughness that will work.

Like all hon. Members, we have been searching for a workable proposal and we welcome the Government's changes, which we proposed in many cases, such as better judicial scrutiny, new police and criminal evidence codes, which we hope—the Home Secretary did not address this point—will facilitate the interview of suspects after they are charged, and a clause, which is not a sunset clause, that requires the annual review of the legislation. It is right to point out that all those provisions were obtained only through parliamentary pressure from both sides of the House. The Government should also listen to what the House of Commons is saying about the duration of detention. On their own, those improvements to the Bill do not remove our responsibility to ensure that the detention is as limited in time as possible.

It is worth grasping what is at stake right at the start—the imprisonment of men and women without trial in the country that invented habeas corpus. We all accept that, when national security is imperilled, our instinctive support for civil liberties must be qualified and that detention without charge must sometimes happen. That means getting a difficult balance right, because if the period of imprisonment is too brief, the civil liberties of suspects may be protected, but the lives of innocent people may be endangered. If the period of imprisonment is too long, locking up people without charge risks becoming the first resort of the authorities rather than the last. In those circumstances, innocent people are imprisoned. We should remember that a 90-day detention is the equivalent of a six-month jail sentence, and the risks include not only an affront to justice, but a public backlash, in which case legislators' mistakes will become recruiting sergeants for terrorists. The House knows the serious consequences for our national security and our civil liberties if we get the balance wrong in any direction.

Given that the British judiciary has demonstrated in the past that it is robust in defending human rights against Government legislation, does the right hon. Gentleman not think that the fact the whole process will be subject to judicial oversight after 14 days provides adequate procedural protection? If he does not think that, does he agree that the one-year sunset clause is a further failsafe device?

The answers are no and no.—[Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) wants me to give way, I will do so. He does not.

Think of the decision facing the judge when the police say, "We think that this person is a possible terrorist, but we have not got to the bottom of the evidence." Is that the test that we should use in this country to imprison people? I hardly think so. The sunset clause is actually a review clause. What will happen next year? The crisis and the political difficulties will have gone, and the provision will be rolled forward.

My apologies. The right hon. Gentleman suggested that the provision could become the first resort of the authorities, but once again, a Conservative Member is painting a picture of a police state. The provision will include judicial oversight by High Court judges. Is he suggesting that the judiciary will use the provision like a police state, because my right hon. Friend knows that that is preposterous?

The hon. Gentleman will start terrible rumours if he is not careful.

The initiative will lie with the police. When the Cabinet Office gave me a Privy Council briefing on the matter, I expressed my concern that the provision will take the pressure off the police to resolve situations quickly. After all, even 14 days is a damaging experience for someone who is innocent, so 90 days is an enormously damaging experience that could wreck lives, ruin jobs and destroy relationships. We must understand that this is a fundamental British freedom that should not be thrown away lightly.

We recognise the Government's difficulties on this. It is of course a matter of judgment. We acknowledge that the world has changed since the IRA halted its terror campaign. New technology brings new security challenges. As the Home Secretary said in relation to the National Technical Assistance Centre, the police and security services need more time to scour CCTV footage and to crack encrypted messages. The international dimension of Islamist terrorism also brings new challenges. That is why my hon. Friends made it clear in Committee that we agree with the Government that the current 14-day limit is too brief and propose its extension to 28 days. I believe that that proposal will find widespread support among Members around the House, including on the Government Benches. But the proposal before the House is not ours but the Government's. The Government propose a full 90 days. The House must therefore ask itself this question: have Ministers made a robust, convincing and evidence-based case, not for an extension, as there is a case for that, but for 90 days? I do not believe that they have.

Does the shadow Home Secretary agree that sometimes even Metropolitan police commissioners can get it wrong, as happened in my constituency recently when someone was shot at Stockwell tube? Local people were told for some time that that person was a terrorist, but we then found that everything was absolutely wrong—

I will not talk about that particular matter, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the hon. Lady makes an important point. There have been well over 800 arrests for terrorist offences in the period since 9/11, yet in that time only between 20 and 30 convictions have been obtained. There is great scope for error here. The fact that this is a very difficult area of policing, as the Home Secretary said, makes the risk of error even greater.

We heard last week that 28 days was at the outer limits of what would be acceptable under the European convention on human rights. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we should have the written opinion of the Attorney-General before we proceed?

I will call the hon. Gentleman my hon. Friend if he is not careful. If he waits for a moment I will come to that point.

It is of course correct that this is an extremely difficult issue, but 90 days was proposed because the police made the initial request. Why is the right hon. Gentleman rejecting the police's request for 90 days and trying to impose his own arbitrary deadline of 28 days?

The point was made best by the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, the right hon. Member for Southampton, Itchen (Mr. Denham), who said, quite rightly, that while a case for some extension had been made, there had been no attempt at all to quantify it. I have been through Mr. Hayman's evidence in some detail. The only quantification concerns a fictional case, not actual cases that have been presented, or might have been presented, to the courts. That includes the case to which the hon. Member for Sunderland, South (Mr. Mullin) referred, in which the suspect went off to Algeria having been released after two days.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that Gareth Peirce, a solicitor who has been involved in many of these cases from the Birmingham Six onwards and who has taken part in an analysis of the detention of people up to 14 days, says that for 95 per cent. of the time, detainees are not questioned but held for hours and even days in their cells? It has been suggested that the police may feel that they have a very long time and therefore not use it, but the evidence is that they are doing that already.

The right hon. Lady reinforces my point. I should make it clear that I do not blame the police for that. They often face scarce resources and many pressures on their time. If they are counter-terrorist police, they will be trying to deal with other issues, perhaps an immediate risk to the public. All those reasons may lead to an extension beyond what is necessary.

The question before the House is this: have Ministers made a robust, convincing and evidence-based case for 90 days ? Indeed, have they even made a case of which they themselves are convinced? The Attorney-General's spokesman has said publicly that he, the Attorney-General, is not convinced of the case. He is one of the Government's most senior Law Officers, but however senior he may be, he is not the Minister in charge of this legislation—that responsibility falls to the Home Secretary.

Before I give way to my hon. Friend, I must allow myself enough time to comprehend his question. I may need to seek an extension of my speech.

Last Wednesday, in Committee, the Home Secretary withdrew the 90-day proposal—scarcely a sign of confidence in it. On Saturday, he said publicly that 90 days was not crucial. On Monday, he emerged from the Home Office to announce that he would table amendments to reduce the time limit from 90 days, but those amendments were never tabled. We have heard his account of it, but the whole House knows the real reason. By yesterday, only a day after the Home Secretary signalled his desire to listen to the mood of the House, listening was off the agenda, because he had lost control of the matter. The whole House knows who has seized control and who has brought back the 90-day proposal that was withdrawn last week and introduced the fig leaf of the so-called sunset clause. The Prime Minister, not the Home Secretary, has brought back the 90 days—the same man who, as Leader of the Opposition, twice failed to support a Conservative amendment on the prevention of terrorism Acts.

The right hon. Gentleman will be aware of the disquiet among some of his closest colleagues about his party taking a position that is not that proposed by the police. In his discussions with the police over the past three months, has he heard any specific proposals from anywhere within the Association of Chief Police Officers that would match his proposal of 28 days, or for any period less than 90 days?

My conversations with the police have been in order to seek evidence to support any case. I will tell the hon. Gentleman as much as I can about the Privy Council briefing, which was informative, inasmuch as it demonstrated that there was no substantive case for 90 days. The suspect who ran off to Algeria was released after two days. It was intimated that the evidence material to that case was found after a few weeks, not after 90 days. On the decryption of hard disk data, we suggested using the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which puts a four-year sentence on withholding decryption codes. We suggested increasing that sentence, and that does now appear in the Bill. Then the police said, "If we charge them, we can't interview them", so we raised the possibility of interview after charge.

All those things may be incursions on civil liberties, but they are much smaller incursions than those in the Bill. What worried me in my discussions with all the authorities—counter-terrorism authorities, agencies, police, the Home Office—was that they were not looking for the least harmful outcome: they were looking for a simple headline outcome. I was very unhappy about that, and I told the Home Secretary so.

The right hon. Gentleman has made that argument frequently. Does he accept that there are easily imaginable circumstances in which those who have the encryption key are dead and it no longer exists? In those circumstances, his solution of forcing people to give up the encryption key simply would not succeed.

We are considering circumstances after arrest. When one times the arrest will be dictated by what has been done with the encryption codes. There is a series of other options. For example, surveillance can be used before arrest. I could devise a fictional circumstance, such as that in Mr. Hayman's letter, that argues for 10 years' detention. The Government must focus, as I have asked them to do probably a dozen times, on providing serious evidence, which we will consider seriously. Until then, we must go for what was described by a Labour Member as the outer limit of what is acceptable.

On the Attorney-General's position, my right hon. Friend may know that I received a reply from the Solicitor-General about compatibility with convention rights. It states:

"Given the long-standing convention on not disclosing the content of Law Officer advice or whether or not such advice exists, it would be wrong to comment further on this issue."—[Official Report, 7 November 2005; Vol. 439, c. 2W.]

My right hon. Friend rightly said that the Secretary of State takes responsibility. Does he agree that "Erskine May" and other authorities clearly state that the Secretary of State can decide to release that advice if he deems it expedient to do so? Will he ask the Home Secretary why he does not?

The Secretary of State can release advice if it is expedient to do so and, I suspect, if it is helpful to his case, which "Erskine May" does not add. We can easily work out why he does not want to release information.

The right hon. Gentleman allows me, through his reference to the role of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition, to make a point that I tried to raise with the Home Secretary. He will remember that, during the 1980s and 1990s, out of sincerely held conviction and principle, the Labour party consistently voted against the renewal of the terrorism legislation that related to Northern Ireland. At no time in that period, when Labour Members' attitudes were clearly based on conviction and principle, did anyone accuse them of being complacent or pathetic. Such words lie ill in the mouths of those who criticise others whose opposition to the Government's proposal is equally based on sincere conviction and principle.

The right hon. and learned Gentleman makes a good point.

Before 7 July, I analysed most of the instances of terrorism in the western world since 9/11 and examined the behaviour of the Opposition in the countries where they happened. I concluded that it was possible in some cases for Oppositions to score political advantage. Indeed, there was a change of Government in Spain. However, I also concluded that, whenever Oppositions did that, there was at least a risk, and generally a probability, that the primary beneficiaries were the terrorists, not western civilisation. I therefore took a stance for which I have been criticised—I believe by hon. Members of all parties but certainly by Conservative Members—of supporting anything that the Government introduced that I believed would be effective against terrorism.

We support much of the Bill—indeed, we are the originators, along with the Liberal Democrats, of approximately two thirds of it. It is unfortunate that the Liberal Democrat senior home affairs spokesman is not here today.

Yes, the hon. Gentleman is ill. He would doubtless confirm that I suggested that the Bill be published in September and introduced in the House before Christmas. The original proposal was to introduce it after the Carlile review next January. We have, therefore, been helpful in all sorts of ways. Numerous conversations have taken place with the Home Secretary and the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety, as well as other Ministers, to ascertain whether we could find solutions to the problem. There is evidence of that, too, and it reflects well on the Home Secretary from time to time. He altered the glorification clause to reduce the extent of its damage. I suspect that that will happen again.

Throughout the process, there has been an almost extreme attempt to help the Government within the limits of the duties of the House. The first duty of the House is to protect the liberty of the British subject. I do not often agree with Liberals, but I agree with the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) that the comments of the past few days have, at the very least, not been up to the standard of the past four months' co-operation.

My right hon. Friend is explaining to the House the alternative means of meeting the need that the police have identified. Is not that the fundamental duty of the House? It is for us to decide how best to meet the need that the police identify. It is not for the police to tell the House how to legislate. Is not it a pity that, for the first time in my long history in the House, it appears that a fairly concerted effort has been made to bring pressure on hon. Members not to examine the problem carefully but to accept a solution offered by those whose job is not to find such answers?

My right hon. Friend is right. I had some doubts, which I did not express, about the constitutional propriety of the process. The police have a task to perform. Their primary task is to protect the citizen from crime, including terrorism. They will get the most powers that they can to achieve that end. Our job is to balance that important task with other important considerations. In the modern world, this country is defined by its institutional history—its history of liberty, judicial process, the presumption of innocence, the right not to be locked up without trial. We point at other countries in scorn about those matters. We should not throw away that history easily, least of all on the judgment of those whose task is difficult and important but should not make us overturn the fundamental duty of the House.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that a suspect who is detained and released without charge after 89 days will do more harm to community relations than a suspect who is detained and released without charge after 27 days? Are not the Government in danger of having an encrypted community relations policy?

My hon. Friend is altogether too clever for me, but he makes a good point and I shall revert to it shortly.

I wonder what conclusion my right hon. Friend would have drawn if he had been part of the cross-party delegation to South Africa last week. We were conducted round the prison at Robben Island by a former prisoner who commented, "This all happened in the days when we locked people up for 90 days without charge."

Yes.

The Prime Minister is on the record as saying that the case for the extension to 90 days is "compelling". He clearly believes that there is such a case, just as he believed in those famous weapons of mass destruction. However, the proven case for 90 days, like that for the weapons, simply does not exist. I am willing to give way now to any hon. Member who can cite a single terrorist incident in this country that would have been averted by the 90-day proposal rather than by good police work or implementation of laws that are already on the statute book.

We do not know, because it never happened. The right hon. Gentleman has suggested that arrests should be made later, following further surveillance and so on. If he had taken the trouble to speak to local police chiefs, as many of us have, they would have told him that this measure is about the prevention of terrorism, not its detection. Therefore, it is not always possible for the police to wait until they have all the evidence necessary to make an arrest if they need to make that arrest quickly. Does he agree that that is a fair and reasonable stance to take?

It is interesting that the hon. Gentleman, who is the Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Attorney-General, appears to be making a case for internment. I will pass over his slightly fatuous comment about whether I have spoken to any police chiefs recently. Perhaps he does not know what my job is.

I thank the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. I was intrigued by his answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann) about his discussions with the police to support his case for 28 days. What discussions has he personally had with the terrorism experts on his own police force? What did they say to him that would provide a strong evidence-based case for 28 days?

If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I thought that talking to the terrorism experts in the Cabinet Office and the Home Office was probably better than talking to the terrorism experts on Humberside. Important as they are to my people, they are not necessarily the people I want to talk to on this particular issue.

Is the right hon. Gentleman, who is a neighbour of mine, telling me that he did not speak to the ACPO terrorism representative for the north of England, who is a member of the Humberside police force?

I have talked to Sir Ian Blair, to Mr. Fox and to a whole series of people whom the Home Secretary organised for me. I took the view that that was quite enough, thank you very much. Let us be clear that the hon. Lady does not misrepresent the point that I am making. She seemed to suggest that I was looking for a case to support the proposal for 28 days, but I have to tell her that I was not. I was looking for any case whatever to support any extension. I did not find any such case at all until last week, when Mr. Hayman's document came out. I grant the hon. Lady that that letter makes some case for some extension, but I have not yet seen any case for 21, 28 or 90 days.

Referring back to the intervention by my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer), may I, too, tell my right hon. Friend how I deplore the way in which chief constables have been drawn into this political argument? It is the first time in my 22 years in the House that a chief constable has ever contacted me to seek support for a particular clause in a Bill in favour of the police. I received a letter from my excellent chief constable, for whom I have enormous regard and respect, in which he asked me to support the extension. He said:

"The new challenges we face have evolved faster than the legislation and these new powers are therefore necessary."

I wrote back to him, saying:

"If I may say so, I am more likely to be swayed by you than by Charles Clarke! Please will you explain to me why it must be 90 days, not 28? Or would you perhaps be willing to settle for a doubling to 28?"

I have had no reply.

My hon. Friend makes that case better than I could have done. The simple truth is that, in all the interventions that I have allowed, I have not yet heard the case that any terrorist incident would be prevented by an extension even to 28 days, let alone 90.

Will the shadow Home Secretary continue to press the Home Secretary on the issue of lack of evidence, and particularly on the point that, if the vast majority of developed countries do not require a 90-day provision, why should we?

My hon. Friend makes the point that I am about to come to. The case for 90 days has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, as Sir Ian Blair himself conceded only yesterday.

I will give way shortly, otherwise this speech will consist entirely of responses to interventions.

It will doubtless be argued that what the police want, the police should have. What the police want carries real weight on this side of the House, but it is not in itself conclusive. If the police want 90 days and are given it because we do not want to stand in their way, what would the House say if they were to come back and ask for 100 days, 180 days, 360 days or two years?

While we are at it, another point raised by the Minister was about the security services. Let no one claim that the security services want 90 days. Whitehall officials have reported that the security services have made "no recommendation" on the detention period. To return to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Billericay (Mr. Baron), let no one claim, either, that we need to bring our periods of detention into line with those of other countries. In Australia, where a murderous terrorist plot has just, mercifully, been foiled because of vigilant police action, there is fierce debate about an extension from two days to 14 days. Most of the other countries with similar judicial systems to ours have smaller, not greater, rights to detain without trial. On the evidence that we have, 90 days is simply too long, and too long by an order of magnitude.

The relative leisure of the three-month time scale, compared with the present 14 days—or for that matter, 28 days—risks the imprisonment and consequent release without charge of innocent people. Those innocent people will be drawn disproportionately from one section of the community and there is a real risk in that community of a backlash on an unprecedented scale, not to mention the affront to justice that would be felt by all.

When this matter was raised with the Home Secretary, it was clearly a sore point, because he went into his high-decibel overdrive, as he sometimes does. He started talking about how the leaders of the community were entirely onside against terrorism. Of course they are. Of course the heads of the Muslim communities, in particular, are onside against terrorism. They fear this more than we do, I suspect. The problem that they face is the problem of radicalisation—indeed, unknown radicalisation—of very small but dangerous parts of their own community, involving young men in their community. We must not make those community leaders' job more difficult, or, indeed, almost impossible.

Does the shadow Home Secretary agree that the security services and the police forces are finding it incredibly hard to recruit employees from the ethnic and Muslim communities because of the isolation that they feel? Would not the 90-day provision increase that problem, rather than decrease it?

My hon. Friend makes a good point.

It was clear from the beginning of this process that the majority of the British people actually favour 90 days, and I think that we should recognise that. I have been accused of opportunism; it is an odd kind of opportunism that takes the unpopular side of the argument, but never mind. A large number of people favour 90 days—perhaps this is true in the Muslim community as well—but they will do so only until the day it goes wrong, and we find that someone has been held for three months, lost his job, broken his family, yet comes out innocent. If he did not hate Britain when he went in, I suspect that he would have a grudge when he came out. That is the situation that we have to look forward to. In the aftermath of 7 July, I quite understand the imperative, but we must be absolutely balanced in the way we approach this issue, and think forward.

Not at the moment.

We need to exercise foresight in regard to the consequences of these measures, which, although they might have the best of intentions, could go wrong.

Putting the powerful point that my right hon. Friend has just made together with his previous point, does he agree that the crucial point about the success in Australia, and the fact that that country gets away with requiring only a moderate number of days' detention, is that the Australians have prevented radicalisation through not having human rights legislation that blocks them from getting rid of known agitators and troublemakers?

I am on record as having said that we need either to reform, replace or repeal the Human Rights Act 1998, for precisely that reason. Beyond that, I had perhaps better not be tempted further.

I will give way to the hon. Member for West Bromwich, West (Mr. Bailey). This will be the last time, then possibly the hon. Gentleman, then that is it.

The right hon. Gentleman is very generous. He has been making the case that the extension to 90 days will radicalise young Muslims. Will he explain how 90 days would radicalise them, yet 28 days would not? Or would they perhaps be a little less radicalised?

The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. On Second Reading, I said that I did not really see an argument to go beyond 14 days, and one of the fears was that locking people up for a month is still harmful. The only reason that I would go to 28 days is that the Home Secretary has given an undertaking that the powers will be used extremely sparingly. The trouble with 90 days is that even one mistake will be a disaster. The hon. Gentleman is right that it is a judgment call, but in the balance between liberty and security, this country should always err on the side of liberty.

Anybody who is asked whether they agree with the detention of terrorists will answer, "Yes of course." Our concern is not the detention of terrorists but the detention of people who are not terrorists. That is what will have an effect on the communities of which the right hon. Gentleman speaks.

The hon. Gentleman makes the point well. The real risk is that, if we detain and then release one suspected terrorist without charge, we radicalise 100 further people—the terrorists of the future. The Bill is dangerous in that respect. The proposal is simply wrong: it will damage liberties, rights and a system of justice fundamental to the British way of life. It will be counter-productive and ineffective.

I said that I would not give way to the hon. Gentleman. If he has a problem with the word "not", I will help him later.

The Bill will be counter-productive and ineffective. Far from being tough on terror, it might turn out to be a gift to the terrorists. That is why we cannot support it today.

I welcome the Home Secretary's comments about High Court judges and the use of the sunset clause. I tabled amendments about that for Committee, and like many, if not all my hon. Friends, I am very pleased about my right hon. Friend's comments.

There is, however, one outstanding issue on which agreement has not been reached: detention for 28 days. Apart from anything else, had we been able to reach agreement on that, the House of Commons would be virtually united, and the proposal would go to the other place and almost certainly be accepted.

I will do so in a moment.

One thing should be made absolutely clear: there is no division among us about acceptance of the terrorist threat. As far as I know, no Member of the House is saying that that terrorist threat is exaggerated. Even if the attacks on 7 July had not happened, we know that there are mass murderers who want to bring death and destruction to our country.

Clearly, those of us who have said that, in all the circumstances, the current detention period of 14 days should be doubled to 28 days accept that the police should have that facility. The right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) said that he was not too happy about a further 14 days, and none of us are particularly happy about a further period of detention in which no charges are brought. I voted for 14 days because of the terrorist threat, however, and am willing to see that doubled, as I have said from the beginning, and I am hopeful that my amendment might be carried today.

My hon. Friend will be aware that a number of us are totally opposed to 90 days and unhappy with the alternatives proposed. Can he explain to the House how the number of 28 days came to be presented and what its significance is, as some of us are quite puzzled about that?

I was asked that question in Committee and pointed out that it did not come from one of my research assistants, if only because I do not have a research assistant. I do not know whether it is a unique form of advanced mathematics, but given that we already have 14 days, and in view of the acute terrorist threat and the police request, I thought that it would not be unreasonable—being a very reasonable and flexible person—to double that to 28 days. If that does not satisfy my hon. Friend, there is nothing that I can do.

Is my hon. Friend therefore telling the House that he feels that the terrorist threat in this day and age is only twice as bad as before? If he wants Members to support 28 days, he ought to give an evidence-based case.

I did not think that there would be any controversy about the acute terrorist threat. Anyone who tried to make out that those of us who put a different view do not recognise the acute terrorist threat would be silly. For heaven's sake, let us consider what happened on 7 July, when so many totally innocent people were massacred. Let us not go down that route.

Not at the moment.

This debate is not about the Prime Minister's authority or the standing of the Government. If some of the media, the Opposition or Whips want to play it that way, it does not mean that they are right. I do not challenge the authority of the Prime Minister in any way. I want him to stay in office, and I want this Government to succeed. I spent 18 years in opposition, and I certainly do not want a change of Government. That might clarify the position for some of my hon. Friends who think that I am playing a different game.

What this debate is actually about—it might seem odd or eccentric to mention this—is trying to reach the right balance between our traditional liberties, the rule of law, habeas corpus, and at the same time, in reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Cleethorpes (Shona McIsaac), trying to protect this country from acts of terror. As far as those who are in favour of 90 days are concerned, the balance has been reached. Clearly, however, I and my hon. Friends have tabled the amendment, on which I hope there will be a Division, because we believe that the balance has not been reached with 90 days.

It should be borne in mind that not a single life destroyed by the mass murderers on 7 July would have been saved if the clause had been in operation. In view of what I have just said, I am not putting that as an argument for not having detention for 14 days or 28 days, but we should bear the point in mind.

Is it not the case that the 90 days might not have saved lives in the 7 July attack, but that that detention period might save lives in future, given the time taken to investigate atrocities that have taken place?

The point has already been made: if we readily accept 90 days, and if the police say at some future stage that they need four, five or six months, will we simply turn round and say, "The police have required this, there is an acute terrorist threat, and we will agree"? At what stage will we say that the period of detention should be shorter than the police want? I happen to believe that 28 days is a reasonable compromise.

Another factor that should be borne in mind is that of those who were held for up to 14 days and subsequently released, no one was later charged—the very point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Tooting (Mr. Khan) in Committee. I repeat: no one who was held for up to 14 days and subsequently released was later charged, despite, no doubt, ongoing police investigations. If I may say so, we should exercise a little caution, a little hesitation, before agreeing so readily to 90 days.

Of course the police have a perfect right to request more time. I shall not go into whether the police should be lobbying for it, because I think that that is irrelevant, as are the Prime Minister's authority and the Government's standards. I want to deal with the crux of the matter. What should concern us is the balance to which I have referred.

In a moment.

As I have said, the police have a perfect right to ask for more time. I am not criticising the police. I do not dispute the obvious fact that they have a vital job to do in defending our country from death and destruction. Who would dispute that? But just as the police have a right to express their view, we in the House of Commons have a duty to weigh up all the factors before reaching a decision. That is our job—and, no matter how many times it has been mentioned, we should not overlook the fact that three months' detention is the equivalent of six months' imprisonment without remission.

Is my hon. Friend aware that, in concluding that 28 days was about right, he was in complete agreement with the European convention on human rights? As far as I am aware, the United Kingdom has not just signed but ratified the convention, and has not applied for a derogation in order to enact this legislation.

That is a good point. I am glad that I am in agreement with some people, as I sometimes appear to be in agreement with hardly anyone.

The right not to be imprisoned without charge, the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, and habeas corpus itself are all basic to our very democracy. They had to be fought for. My hon. Friends and I can take some pleasure in the fact that our people did that. Even before our party came into existence, the radicals of earlier centuries fought for those rights. We cannot dismiss that out of hand. We cannot say that because of the acute terrorist threat and all the problems that we unfortunately face, those rights should be seen in a different light. They are fundamental to our democracy and to the rule of law. That is why we should be very hesitant indeed about locking people up for 90 days.

It has been pointed out that 90 days is a maximum, but a maximum is a maximum. Some people may well be held for that period. What if they are innocent? How would we like to be locked up for a period of up to 90 days if we were innocent of a charge? We can imagine the antagonism and hostility that would be felt by people who had been so detained, and we can imagine the effect that that would have. We must be very, very careful to avoid arousing unnecessary bitterness and hostility in people who are innocent.

The hon. Gentleman is making an extremely good speech, and many Members on both sides of the House will wish to support his amendment, but may I draw his attention to a procedural point? Before we can support his amendment, amendment No. 55 must be defeated. Unless we can defeat that Government amendment, we will not have an opportunity to support the hon. Gentleman's excellent proposal.

How could I possibly disagree with that? I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman has made the point, though.

We have been told that every seven days the matter will be submitted to a senior judge. I said that it should go before a High Court judge, and I am glad that the Home Secretary has agreed to my suggestion, but in my view not even that constitutes sufficient protection, or sufficient justification for the 90-day provision.

I think I know the views of my two hon. Friends. May we just work on the assumption that I do not agree with them on this point?

I do not accept for a moment that there is any question of a police state. I do not believe that my case for 28 days is so weak that I have to exaggerate. Nor do I believe that detention of this kind is like internment in Northern Ireland. Let me say this, however. For the entire 30 years, I was involved in the denouncing of IRA murderers and the atrocities that they committed. Who would deny—and I include Conservative Members—that internment served the interests of the IRA? Would anyone now deny the obvious?

I know that we are not discussing internment, but is there not a danger that the Muslim community, the overwhelming majority of whom are as opposed to terrorism as we are, will nevertheless feel that they are being penalised and discriminated against? I again emphasise that their opposition to terrorism is no less than ours. Of course, among the victims of 7 July were Muslims, Christians, Jews, Sikhs, Hindus—the terrorists make no distinction. Indeed, if we said to the mass murderers, "There are Muslims who will be your victims," their response would be, "If they're good Muslims, they will simply go to paradise earlier." So we know the sort of people whom we are dealing with.

No. I have limited time, and the House will perhaps be pleased to hear that I am concluding.

I accept that at this moment, I am probably putting forward a minority point of view so far as the country is concerned. Like all politicians, I would much rather be able to say that majority opinion is with us. I could quote opinion polls on various controversial topics that we debated in the last Parliament and on other occasions. I shall not mention those topics now, as they might provoke a certain reaction from the Opposition. I have to accept that the opinion polls on this subject are probably right: that those of us who are urging acceptance of 28 days are, at the moment, probably in the minority. However, if the time ever comes when the House of Commons takes decisions not on their merits, but according to the latest opinion polls, what certain tabloids are saying and those who argue, "Lock them up and throw away the key", frankly, for all the good that we are doing, we might as well pack it in and go home. We have to decide according to the issues.

How many times in the past 30 or 40 years have we taken a minority view on hanging and anti-discrimination measures, for example? Then, we were almost certainly in the minority, but we took a point a view. We did not simply follow public opinion: we led. That was our job and responsibility, and on this issue we should again give a lead.

We and each successive generation of parliamentarians are the custodians of our liberties and freedoms, all of which are very precious to us. How we combine that role with dealing with the terrorist threat is of course a decision to be reached by the House of Commons now, and I have no doubt that that issue will arise again in future. I have not been lobbying my hon. Friends. The Whips have, and that is their job. I do not complain: Whips of all Governments lobby, and ours would be odd Whips if they did not. To those of my hon. Friends who are sure about 90 days, I say, fine. But I ask those who have hesitations—who, on a free vote, would not dream of voting for 90 days—to leave aside the fact that, as we all know, 90 days or anywhere near it will not be accepted by the Lords. There will be movement back and forth between the two Houses and the Government will give way, so, one could argue, why not give in now to the elected House of Commons? To those who have hesitations—who feel, that, on balance, 90 days is excessive—I beg of you: do not vote in the Division Lobby for what you do not believe in.

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick). In considering how they should discharge their duties in this House, Members—particularly new Members—would do well to remember the last few minutes of the hon. Gentleman's textbook contribution. He is right: we have to do what is right, even if it is unpopular. The Prime Minister said at Question Time earlier today that he would rather be right and lose than the reverse—a position with which Liberals and Liberal Democrats have become very familiar in the past 80-odd years.

Given that the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) referred to the absence of my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten), I should first apologise to the House on his behalf. He has not been well this week, which is why he is absent. Such absence is, however, no indication whatsoever of a lack of commitment to this issue, about which he feels passionately.

I do not feel any embarrassment in admitting candidly to the House that this is one of the most difficult issues with which I have had to struggle since being elected to this place in 2001. With the exception of the debates and votes in the run-up to the war in Iraq, this is by some considerable margin the most difficult decision that we have faced. Liberal Democrat Members realise and understand the nature of the threat posed by terrorism to our society and our democracy. We understand that the consequences will be severe in human terms if we get it wrong. However, we remain of the view that before going down the road that the Government have proposed for us, there must be solid evidence to justify it, and we remain of the view that, as of today, such evidence has not been provided.

I understand that it is widely alleged that the 7 July bombers were under some sort of surveillance and that there is enough evidence to suggest that they could have been charged with raising money for terrorism or other offences. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, if that is the case, we must have a thorough inquiry to learn the lessons? If it is true that we could have prevented what happened, looking further into what happened on 7 July might lead us to some answers regarding what we are debating today.

The right hon. Lady makes a fine point and I would not dispute her conclusions. Indeed, the question of investigation is ongoing and I feel rather suspicious about those who have sought to thwart any such investigation.

The hon. Gentleman talks about the need for solid evidence and most of us would agree with that. Already in our legal system, however, is a recognition that getting the necessary evidence is not as straightforward as we would like. For example, we know that only 1 per cent. of people are convicted in child protection cases, but we also know that child abuse is widespread and a terrible thing. Our legal system deals with that by having common law family courts that are able, if necessary in the most extreme circumstances, to take children away from people who might harm them. We have a special system. Despite what the hon. Gentleman says about the need for evidence, the key is that we cannot always prove matters as simply or straightforwardly as we would like, even though we know that bad things are happening. Surely, terrorism provides a similar example: we know that terrible things can and may happen, so we have to ensure that our legal system can deal with them appropriately.

My experience as a court solicitor suggests that if the hon. Gentleman believes that we can derive a legal system that will catch everyone who may ever have done something wrong, he is hopelessly optimistic.

The hon. Gentleman has already made three interventions in his one and I have to tell him that the protections and devices that the legal system has already produced in respect of child abuse—I agree that it is a horrific area—all involve judicial supervision.

If the hon. Gentleman can contain himself, we have taken his example as far as we can and it has always been determined by the courts at a very early opportunity. The parallel, I have to say, simply does not work.

I want to say a few words about communication, or perhaps the lack of it, between the Home Office in London and the Crown Office in Edinburgh. It will not have been lost on the House that the Home Secretary was asked three times—by myself, by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and by the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond)—why the Lord Advocate was not asked for a view on the suitability and workability of 90-day detentions without charge in the context of the Scottish legal system. It will not have been lost on the House that on three occasions he gave no answer to that very straightforward question. I do not understand how the Lord Advocate can be asked for an opinion about the desirability of a uniform law to cover the whole of the UK without then being asked for a view on the issue of 90-day detentions. My suspicion is that the Government did not ask because they knew that they would get an answer that they did not like.

What does the hon. Gentleman think would be the likely reaction of the House if a Home Secretary were to reveal that he had not asked the opinion of the senior Law Officer in England before producing a measure such as this? Should not hon. Members reflect on that as they consider what is being said?

I hope that hon. Members will reflect on that. I am a Scottish Member of this House, and for me the blatant disregard for the office of the Lord Advocate—never mind the incumbent—is disgraceful and distasteful.

The House must strike a balance in the proposition being considered today. Much has been said about the views and role of the police in this debate, and we may return to that on Third Reading. Liberal Democrat Members have listened to all the contributions that have been made to the debate. We have listened to the police, and will continue to do so: that process must go on. However, we have also listened to people in those communities who believe that they have most to fear. They already feel marginalised and threatened by what they see on the streets and in the pages of the newspapers, and believe that they are most likely to be the victims of 90-day detention. The possibility that young men will be arrested and held for up to a maximum of 90 days before being released without charge will create martyrs in those communities.

Has the hon. Gentleman given any consideration as to whether evidence gathered during 90 days of detention, with close questioning that might last up to 18 an hours a day, might be acceptable in a court of law?

That is a good point, and I shall deal with it in the course of my speech. The House will recall the process by which we arrived at the current rules of evidence and procedure, and the reasons for their introduction.

Does my hon. Friend accept that the concerns are not only about communities that may be different from our own and which may subscribe to another faith? All hon. Members know that constituents regularly come to see us when a family member has been detained unreasonably, as they see it, for only 12 or 24 hours. The question that we should ask our constituents is, "Would you find this proposal acceptable for your family—for your brother, son or daughter?" Invariably, they would answer, "No, we would not."

My hon. Friend reminds me of the old adage that a conservative is a liberal whose house has been broken into, and that a liberal is a conservative who has been caught speeding. He is absolutely right, though: we must approach this matter from a personal and individual perspective. To suppose that we are dealing with an amorphous mass of people in our communities who carry red terrorist labels that we can all read easily is a dangerous line of thought.

No. I need to make some progress, as I have been speaking for 10 minutes already and the House's time is limited.

What I am saying should not amount to a revelation to the House. It is no flight of fancy, because we have been here before. As others have remarked, detention without charge is not a novel concept. We tried it in Northern Ireland, and the hon. Member for Walsall, North has noted already that we know what the consequences were.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it is rather strange that, on the very day the Government are asking us to allow people to be detained without charge for 90 days, they should produce a Bill that will allow people who have done some dreadful things but who have never been charged—or who have been charged and have escaped—to be released? Is not there some element of hypocrisy about that?

The hon. Lady and I have dealt with sufficient Northern Ireland business in the past for her to know my general view on those matters. I am not going to say it is hypocrisy, but, yes, I think it must be said that there is an inconsistency of approach between the two Bills currently before the House, a point that will not be lost.

No, I have to make some progress in the interests of allowing others to speak.

We are charged as parliamentarians with listening to all contributions to debate and to striking a balance between conflicting and competing demands. That is what the Liberal Democrats have done. We have reached the conclusion that the Government have got the balance wrong and that 90 days will do more harm than good.

I attended the Press Gallery lunch yesterday and heard the Metropolitan Police Commissioner address it. He talked about how it was necessary to question a suspect, often on forensic or other evidence, especially after a charge. His position was that the police would be barred from doing so. I accept that that is difficult under the laws of evidence as they stand, but on the basis of my understanding of the law of England and Wales, I must say that it is not already impossible. Even if it were, or if there were difficulties, those difficulties could be removed by the Home Secretary coming forward with revisions to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act code under which questioning is carried on.

In Scotland, in my view, there would be no barrier to interview of suspects under caution. That is already done, and it might even be possible to give two procurators fiscal powers to raise a new petition with new charges on which they could conduct a judicial examination. That is not beyond the bounds of possibility.

I must say this about the commissioner's comments yesterday: I question his reliance on the point about questioning suspects on new evidence. The notion that somebody who has been prepared to blow themselves up will, after 10 weeks in custody, somehow be ready to co-operate, having seen the error of their ways with the police, when confronted with a piece of forensic evidence, I find difficult to accept. That sort of spin and overselling should give us pause for thought. In my view, and this was the point raised by the hon. Member for Dundee, East (Stewart Hosie), it seems likely that the only basis on which that evidence might be forthcoming would be if the suspect had been ground down in the course of the 90 days, and that would constitute evidence that was unfairly obtained and which, as a result, would be inadmissible. That might leave us in a position in which the only time a suspect spends in custody is the 90 days prior to charge. How does that help the fight against terrorism? In our view, the bulk of cases are already adequately dealt with under the 14-day provision, and that will be sufficient.

That brings us to what my hon. Friends and I will do tonight about the different votes available to us. We shall first oppose Government amendment No. 55, which seeks to replace three months with 90 days, for what that is worth. If we are successful, we shall support the hon. Member for Walsall, North on amendment No. 1. Hon. Members must be clear that we can get to a vote on amendment No. 1 only if we first defeat amendment No. 55.

The hon. Gentleman has put a passionate and cogent case for having absolutely no extension, not least because of what he sees as the impact on our Muslim communities. I urge him and his colleagues, therefore, to stick to their principles and vote for no extension. To do otherwise would turn all the arguments he has put forward entirely on their heads.

I do not think I need take any lectures from the hon. Member for "loyalty, south-west" about sticking to my principles. But let us deal with principle. What is the principle at stake here? There is no principle that says that 14 or 28 or 90 days is right. The principle at stake is that nobody should be deprived of their liberty unless there is evidence on which to do so. The question is whether that is an inviolable principle, and clearly it is not; that has always been our position. That was why we supported the extension to 14 days in the first place. The question then is where the line should be drawn and how we reach that point. A responsible parliamentarian can get to that point only by relying on the evidence provided, and that is the weakness of the Government's case. They simply have not provided the evidence.

The hon. Gentleman is right to say that we must avoid circumstances in which people are detained with no good reason and that the length of time—14, 28 or 90 days—is not the issue. However, surely the review clause, which would bring the provisions back to Parliament with a report about how the powers had been used and give us the ability to change the law if necessary, provides protection and would mean that the police and the judges would ensure that people were detained only when absolutely necessary.

If that has been the price of the hon. Gentleman's support today, he has sold himself too cheaply. Review is meaningless. We know how review will work in this place and we know the pressure that will be applied. It is incumbent on us, for the sake of those people who may be caught by this legislation in the next 12 months, to get it right now, not to wait for some review in a year's time. However, the hon. Gentleman does me and the House a favour, because he calls the provision a review clause, and we must be clear that that is exactly what it is. The Government's amendment is no sort of sunset clause.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that this House cannot abdicate its responsibility to judicial oversight, because sometimes the judiciary gets it wrong? I think of the case of the Birmingham Six and Lord Denning's comments about the "appalling vista", which led him to ignore overwhelming evidence that those men were innocent and to keep them incarcerated for many years longer.

The hon. Lady makes a fine point and I commend her for it. The judiciary does occasionally get things wrong. Any system run by people for people will occasionally make mistakes.

My own experience of time limits that operate in Scots law does not reassure me that the Government's proposals for judicial oversight every seven days provide any meaningful protection. I have seen several applications brought before the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland for extensions to the 110-day limit on custody that have been nodded through. We must not forget that judges watch the television and read the newspapers like the rest of us. They are as susceptible to pressure from the media and the prevailing circumstances as anybody else, and we know that that has happened in the past.

If we move to 28 days, it is important that locks and safeguards be put in place. A simple change to 28 days is not a deal that we should accept. As outlined in amendment No.29, the least that we want is that

"the specified period may only be extended . . . pending the result of an examination or analysis which is to be or is being carried out with a view to obtaining relevant evidence, or . . . for the purpose of obtaining relevant evidence from outside the United Kingdom or from records within the United Kingdom which cannot reasonably be obtained without such an extension of the specified period".

That would make it clear that any extension to 28 days would be allowed only in very narrowly circumscribed situations. The decision should be taken by a judge and he should be satisfied that no other terrorist offence can be charged. The judge must also approve the nature of any further questioning. I suggest that those would provide meaningful safeguards, whatever length of time the House opts for today.

We live in an ever changing world. That is the justification given for the Bill, but it is why we need a proper sunset clause—not the one that the Government are trying to sell us.

I am now in my second Parliament. For much of my time as a Member, I have heard comments about the strength of the House. Its standing has often been traduced and demeaned. Our debate today offers us an opportunity to put that right, to tell the Government that they have got it wrong and for the House to stand up against the Executive. I hope that we shall not pass up that opportunity.

I rise to defend and support the 90-day proposals outlined in clause 23.

I have probably put more written questions to the Home Office in the past four years than most of my colleagues in the House put together. I am passionately interested in the activities of the Home Office, especially the processes and procedures that the police and other criminal justice institutions employ in the execution of their duty. I have frequently and regularly met operational officers, officers who write operational guidelines and the officers and agencies who review them.

My interest, for constituency reasons, has centred on the investigation of serious sex offences, and I have spent years trying to ensure that the practices and procedures employed in the investigation of those serious crimes are robust. But they are not: procedures are constantly revised in the light of operational experience. The procedures and guidelines governing the investigation of such crimes were laid down years ago. With hindsight, they proved open to abuse by many different parties, but I know absolutely that when the police first got to grips with the reality of the undisclosed sexual abuse in the UK, they pulled together existing informed knowledge—as they will in relation to terrorism offences. They did so because that is their professional duty, and that is what the authorities have also done in the face of the growing spectre of terrorism.

It is a source of regret to me that with few exceptions, few of my colleagues in the House have ever troubled themselves to object to, or scrutinise, the practices and procedures employed by the police in the interrogation of sex offenders. I understand that, but colleagues are far quicker to leap to the defence of terrorist subjects, and their rights, than to those of a serial sex abuser. Why? Terrorists and sex abusers violate everything that we hold dear. Why do we operate double standards for scrutiny of the legal procedures governing sex abuse and terrorism investigations?

I have worked with the hon. Lady and have publicly praised her for her work in support of people wrongly accused of sex abuse. However, the case that she purports to make—that those wrongly accused of sexual crimes were the victims of inadequate policing—does not assist her arguments in favour of the Government's proposals. Surely, she needs to be careful about translating her antipathy towards police behaviour in sex cases into support for possible police behaviour in terrorist cases.

I accept those words of caution and I understand what motivates my colleague, the hon. and learned Gentleman, in saying them, but I am trying to demonstrate that when our country is faced with people who commit heinous crimes, the police have to settle down and begin to develop guidance and procedures to tackle those crimes.

We all expect, and hope to achieve, a state of perfection in such operational guidelines, but we never reach it. I know that from my experience of dealing with how sex crimes are investigated. When the police ask for 90 days, they do so because they think they need 90 days—not 28 days. I also know that when they make that consideration they have not carried out the objective research that we would expect of them to justify that period, but they are providing us with their best view at the time. I am interested in giving them the tools for the job.

If I may, I shall continue.

I intend that we go back and check how well the procedures are being executed. Members have welcomed judicial review, and I am glad that we are giving the police the opportunity of judicial review, but we must not emasculate them at this point. We would not argue in the House for such leverage in relation to sex abuse. We would say that those involved must do the very best that they can because of the individual's potential to inflict huge damage on our society.

I am bewildered by some of the arguments about terrorists that I have heard in the House. They may well be innocent individuals, but let us not forget that people are arrested in this country every day although they are innocent of the crimes that have been committed. We arrest them not for the joy of it, but because we believe that they may have committed a crime. We do great injustice to that individual, their family and their society, but we would not resist doing what we need to do to protect the greater good. So I will vote today for the 90-day period. Although I suspect that I know the weaknesses of the police and the criminal justice authorities better than most other hon. Members, I still will not deny them this opportunity.

Will the hon. Lady tell me the difference between what she proposes, which is to take precautionary action because of someone's potential, and internment?

The difference is the issue of scrutiny. The police have sought judicial review of the suggested procedures and their decisions in relation to this case. I applaud that. I regret the fact that we have that system in these cases, and not in others. I think that I have said all that I need to say about my view on this. We must support the police and our Home Secretary. He does not come to the House in an attempt to negate his role and authority; he comes here seeking our support following the advice of the people who are there to defend us. I shall not stand in their way, and I ask colleagues today to consider their position and support our Home Secretary and the police as they try to fight this invidious threat to our country.

In my brief remarks last week, I said that we must think very carefully before rejecting the advice of professionals. I am also on record as saying that, so far as I am concerned, the case for an extension from 14 days is irrefutable, but I have yet to hear enough convincing argument that 90 days is a totally justifiable time, which will guarantee that the police and security services can do all that they need to do to turn intelligence into evidence that can support charges. It is simply their best professional estimate, and we must respect that. Indeed, the Home Secretary has said since last week that the 90-day figure is not crucial. So we are dealing with an estimate and it is up to us to make a judgment.

One of the reasons why so much heat has been generated about this issue is that the Government have, only very late in the day, realised the necessity to explain and persuade. I accept that the Home Secretary has made genuine attempts in the past few days to explain more fully why this is the Government's position, but it has been too little, too late for many hon. Members. I am personally better informed than I was last week—I stress that I am speaking entirely for myself, because the Intelligence and Security Committee has not come to a view on this matter—but I believe that there is much more that can and should be put into the public domain in a more comprehensive effort to explain the complexities of the problems that face the police and the security services and why their professional advice is what it is.

To be fair, the Home Secretary has gone further this afternoon than he went last week, but what we really need is a comprehensive description of the whole complexity of the problem, and what we are getting is bits and pieces—the Metropolitan Police Commissioner comes to the Press Gallery; the Home Secretary comes here; someone else gives an interview to a newspaper—but until someone produces the whole argument, I do not believe that any hon. Member can come to a complete and proper judgment. Whatever the result of the vote on the amendment may be, I urge the Home Secretary to do that before the Bill is considered further in another place and returns to the House. I shall be very happy to explain to and discuss with him some of the arguments that should be made public, but that would have to come from the Government, rather than from me.

I am not going to vote against the proposal tonight because if it were defeated, we would simply vote on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) and the House would inevitably have to make another choice that would not be factually based. The hon. Gentleman said when he spoke to the amendment that he had decided on a figure of 28 days only because it was double the last one, not because there was a compelling argument that it was the right answer.

In Committee, many hon. Members agreed that the worst thing would be simply to arrive at a figure around which there was consensus, but which was not based on the needs and complexities of the situation that have led the professionals to tender the advice that they have. I am completely satisfied that an extension is fully justified. I am also satisfied, from what I have been told, that an extension to 28 days would be wrong and would not give the police and security services the tools that they need to cope with such a complex matter.

My right hon. Friend has the advantage of serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee. I am listening to him with enormous respect, as I always do when he speaks on such matters. Does he agree that it might be a good idea for the Home Secretary to arrange briefing sessions for Members of Parliament through which we could meet the commissioner and others and be told a little more about the situation?

I do not dissent from what my hon. Friend says. Irrespective of how it is done, something needs to be done because there has been a lack of information for some time.

Let us look at the situation realistically. If the Government are defeated on the first vote and the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Walsall, North is pressed to a Division, there is little doubt that it will be passed because everyone agrees that the police need more time. However, if that amendment is incorporated in the Bill, there will be absolutely no chance of getting it out. That might be what some people want, but it is not what I want because I know that the amount of time proposed in the amendment is inadequate. I still believe that provided that we can move the debate on, sensible people will be persuaded by fuller disclosure and argument.

In common with my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack), I always listen to my right hon. Friend the Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates) with respect on such subjects. My right hon. Friend said that the Government have not made their case and then went on to say, with a degree of certainty in his tone, that 28 days was patently inadequate, so will he be good enough to enlighten the House as to why? It is not at all clear to me how he knows that 28 days is inadequate.

As I was saying earlier, this is something that the Government must explain. I know about certain matters that are not in the public domain. I shall not put them in the public domain because I have been told them in confidence. I believe that those matters could be made public without damaging national security, but I am not allowed to make that judgment. It is for the Government to make that case, and if they do, I am sure that people will listen.

The right hon. Gentleman and I have worked together a great deal on such matters. I counsel him of the danger of giving the impression that information has come to light in discussions at which both of us have been present that is significantly different from information that is now in the public domain and that would force anyone who heard it to reach a different conclusion. Such information has not had that effect on me.

I am not saying that the information is significantly different, but that there is considerably more information than has been put in the public domain. I believe that that would help people to make a judgment. It might well be that the right hon. Gentleman will reach a different judgment from me at the end of the day. It is our right to do that, but it is everyone's right to have in front of them as much information about the complexities of the problem as is humanly possible without damaging national security. We have not reached that stage yet. It is something that the Government must do because no one else can do that for them.

I am terribly keen to bring my remarks to an end, but I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve).

Is not the logic of my right hon. Friend's argument that the Government should not have drafted any clause on detention without charge whatsoever without first providing the information that he says is helpful? Is not the problem that the House will be called on to make a decision this afternoon that is likely to be long lasting? In such circumstances, is it not right for people to err on the side of caution when giving powers that might prove to be unjustified and unnecessary?

I agree. The Government have got themselves into this mess, and they have to get themselves out of it. I tried to make that point earlier in moderate terms, because their explanations are a case of too little and too late. We should not get ourselves into a situation which we cannot climb out of without giving the Government one more chance to be much more upfront and open about what they can tell us. Reasonable people will then be able to make a judgment on a much better basis than any judgment they will make today. I am quite certain, however, that if we were to support the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Walsall, North, we would make the wrong decision, send the wrong signals, and we would live to regret it.

I shall confine my remarks to amendment No. 63. I shall not accept interventions, except from Front-Bench spokespeople or from my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Lynne Jones), who tabled the amendment with me.

I do not know whether its wording is right, but amendment No. 63 seeks to provide compensation for anyone who is released without charge after being incarcerated for more than 14 days but fewer than 90 days. They would receive compensation for financial losses. I apologise to Scottish Members, because I am a solicitor in England, so I am not using the terminology applicable in Scotland. However, people who are detained would not receive damages for injuries to feelings and so on—they would be compensated only for financial loss if, for example, they lost their house or job, and were thus deprived of their income.

As my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State acknowledged, the amendment would affect an extremely small number of people, as we are told that only a few people are likely to be held for more than 14 days and released without charge. Only a small proportion of that minority are likely to get into difficulties and be able to prove that they had suffered financial losses. The Bill is extraordinary legislation, and I do not intend that my amendment should be used as a precedent by people remanded in custody and acquitted, as their situation is not extraordinary.

People who have been convicted and imprisoned wrongly, such as the surviving members of the Birmingham Six, received compensation. My hon. Friend the Member for Calder Valley (Chris McCafferty) helpfully mentioned the financial hardship faced in detention by people who are held without charge for more than 14 days. My amendment does not cover such individuals—it deals only with losses suffered after the event—but my hon. Friend made the case for such compensation. I am heartened that the Secretary of State agreed to look carefully at the amendment. It is a pity that he could not make a greater concession, but that is the nature of politics. I remind him and other Front Benchers that I am seeking genuine progress on the issue before the Bill leaves the other place.

I do not speak as a lawyer, although eminent lawyers have participated in our debate. I am certainly not a human rights lawyer like the hon. and learned Member for Redcar (Vera Baird), who may well have campaigned against measures such as the Bill. I speak as someone who served in Northern Ireland, and was involved in the implementation of a number of counter-terrorism measures. I often had to stand on the streets of Northern Ireland while members of the Labour party voted against important measures. Many members of the security forces risked their lives to work within the law, and we did so because we believed that gathering evidence before arrest was the best way to prevent and counter terrorism. Royal Ulster Constabulary officers and many other people in Northern Ireland learned that there are no shortcuts to counter-terrorism. One cannot wipe the slate clean or try to outmanoeuvre the terrorists in minutes or days, as we have seen in four days of debate on the Floor of the House. Have we forgotten the lessons that we learned in Malaya, Northern Ireland and even in Basra? Terrorism is defeated by winning hearts and minds, when the communities themselves stop people committing such acts. If the Government think that they will bring communities closer to the forces of law and order by incarcerating people for 90 days without trial they are badly mistaken. It is from communities that we get informers and tip-offs, and it is from the communities that we recruit members of the police forces and the security services that, in the end, defeat terrorism.

I will not give way at the moment.

It is important that we do not forget those lessons. If we alienate people, they will not come forward. I am not saying that people in communities will ignore someone walking down the street with a bomb, but they will ignore the signs. They will ignore the individual in the mosque who is starting to stir up trouble. I know from my own experience that when we had heavy-handed regiments in parts of Belfast or in East Tyrone, the information dried up. People did not pick up the telephone to let us know that there were people down the road behaving suspiciously.

The Government have argued that there is a difference between the terrorists in Northern Ireland and those whom we face now. Yes, of course, what the terrorists are trying to achieve by killing innocent people and how they are trying to achieve it is different, but the cause is not. The way to solve terrorism is no different. It is only when communities engage with the forces of law and order that we start to head such people off. Whatever has caused the current problems in France, how much will the Algerian community, the north African and Muslim communities help the forces of law and order in the next year or two? The answer is very little. We must be careful how we proceed if we take individuals out of communities, which will be predominantly Islamic communities, some in my constituency, and hold them without charge for 90 days.

The Government have so far failed to give us a case that would be solved by detention for 90 days. I am not arguing from the human rights point of view. My hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash) would probably disagree with some of my suggestions, which go further than he would. Some of the Government's reasons are entirely bogus. Let us consider one: encryption. The Home Secretary will know that in some serious crime cases, investigators have failed for two years to crack the computer encryption. The Government cannot guarantee that every encrypted device will be unlocked in 90 days, so are we to expect that they will return in a year and ask for the power to lock people up for a further year because a new encryption technique has been invented? Is that what they are trying to say?

Let us examine some of the other issues. I, like a number of my hon. Friends and probably Labour Members, received the letter from the chief constable or perhaps the template of such a letter, urging me to support the measures. I rang the person I was told to contact, who was one of the heads of special branch. I said to the police officer concerned, "Let's look at some alternatives. Let's look at interviewing under charge." He said, "That would really help to move matters along."

I said, "What about some of the restrictions on informers, because of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000?" Some people might think that was a good thing. The Royal Ulster Constabulary and the Police Service of Northern Ireland did not think that those restrictions were good. It is interesting that the Home Secretary said in the House today that the police say we must, so we must, but when the police said we must not restrict special branch in Northern Ireland, the then Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland ignored those wishes.

I asked the police officer, "What about Iraq?" He replied, "Without the Iraq war, we probably wouldn't have had quite so many people queuing up to take part in some of the current problems". We must recognise that part of the problem we face today is due to previous legislation and current issues leading up to the debate today. The answer is not for the Government to come back to the House, take a short cut, lock people up for 90 days without trial and expect everything to be hunky-dory.

If we take such a short cut, I am almost certain that we will have to return to the issue. We will still have bombs on the underground and terrorists preparing for attacks, because the causes still exist. What I learned in Northern Ireland is that as long as there is a cause, people will queue up to replace those who have been incarcerated, so we should not start with the principle that we learned so wrongly in 1972—that internment is the solution.

The right hon. Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Clare Short) does not know this, but when I served in Northern Ireland, I knew her very well—she used to move around in a black Ford Escort. It was my job to know such things, and I also know that it took years to solve terrorism in Northern Ireland.

If we act on the preventive principle, where will we stop? Why not go on to serious crime? Why do we not lift all the armed robbers? Why not go on to benefit fraud? Where do we draw the line on such issues?

The hon. Gentleman asks why we should not extend the power further. Does he accept that in their evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights the police explicitly excluded extending those powers to non-terrorist offences?

I am grateful for the intervention. I remember that a year ago the police said they wanted 14 days. The police are trying to achieve the best route for themselves, but sometimes they get it wrong.

Is it not always true that there are two arguments for destroying human rights: one is, "We have never had a situation like that before"; the other is, "We have no intention of making it worse later on"? Both those arguments are very dangerous, and this House should not accept them.

I agree. It is ironic that the Northern Ireland (Offences) Bill, which tries to win hearts and minds in Northern Ireland, has been laid before the House today, while the Prime Minister is trying to attack hearts and minds in Islamic communities up and down the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister learned one lesson in Northern Ireland, which he has chosen to ignore, perhaps because of The Sun.

My hon. Friend is making a superb speech. I put it to him that the intervention by the hon Member for Wolverhampton, South-East (Mr. McFadden), who will see the point if he reflects on it, was extremely injudicious. Precisely the same argument could, and in due course will, be made in relation to members of paedophile rings who download and study computer files. At present, no request for detention for 90 days without charge has been made by the police, but if we start on the slippery slope, we will go further down it.

My hon. Friend is right. If we accept the preventive principle, where will we stop?

Detention for 90 days is an affront, and it will not cure the problem. Yesterday, I heard Commissioner Blair speak to the Press Gallery. Ironically, most of his speech was about communities—how Operation Trident works with the communities in areas of inner-city London to defeat drug dealing and gang warfare—but he chose to disregard the importance of communities in solving terrorism.

Counter-terrorism is about two things. First, it is about information and getting ahead of the terrorist cycle—being there when terrorists are preparing and catching them red-handed. Secondly, it is about prevention, and if one risks people who will help—informers—one extends rather than defeats terrorism.

In many ways, this debate is very sad. This Bill will have a marginal effect on our overall security and the balance sheet is depressing. The truth is that the Prime Minister and Ministers have expended more effort on winning the votes of MPs than they have on winning the hearts and minds of young Muslims, and more energy has been expended on getting MPs into the Lobby than has yet been spent drawing young people in our communities into dialogue and debate.

The cross-party approach that was rightly struck in July is now self-evidently in tatters, with hon. Members being urged to vote for party advantage. The stakes have been raised to a height that is not justified by the intrinsic merits of the issue, the handling of which has damaged the fight against terrorism. That need not have happened.

We are here because no demand was made for the most basic explanation from the police about why 90 days are needed. All that the Home Office had received in writing when the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister backed 90 days was an ACPO press release and two sides of A4 detailing two cases, neither of which made the case for 90 days. There had been no proper police working group, no systematic assessment of their experience and international experience, no discussion of options, and no evaluation of the difference between 30, 60, 90 or 120 days.

The House deserves better than that. The lack of confidence and trust that has run through today's debate comes from that basic decision to back 90 days before receiving a proper assessment. We are now in a difficult situation. My personal view, which will shape my vote, is that had that proper assessment been made it would have supported an extended period that went beyond 28 days. I entirely agree with the right hon. Member for East Hampshire (Mr. Mates), with whom we have discussed the matter. I will vote for 90 days because the choice is between that and 28 days, and I am sure that 28 days is too short.

In that case, why have I made such a critical speech? It is because the process matters. Casual decision making, poor-quality discussion and a lack of proper assessment might have got us broadly to the same right place as a proper assessment, but the difference between a good process and a bad one matters.

I will not give way, as I want to make progress.

If the Government and police between them could not produce a proper assessment, the House should do that in the months to come. I intend to consult members of my Select Committee on requesting that we should carry out the inquiry into the police case that the Government should have carried out. I hope that we can join members of other relevant Select Committees to do that.

I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman, because I hope that other Members may get in.

We need not be in this situation. If Ministers had told the police in August when the ACPO press release arrived, "We will give your ideas a fair hearing, but do the assessment and produce the evidence", in my view this House would be agreeing an extension significantly beyond 28 days—

I said that it is my view. I believe that we would have been doing this with none of the controversy or damage. I hope that the lesson is learned. The energy that has been put into this parliamentary debate should be directed out there in communities winning hearts and minds in the battle against terrorism.

I wish to make a few simple points about the relationship between the Bill and the Human Rights Act 1998. The Leader of the Opposition, the shadow Home Secretary, the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have all said that if necessary they would amend that legislation.

If ever there were a case for disapplying the Human Rights Act, especially article 5, to a measure, it is this Bill. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made it clear that there were serious problems with the Bill's compatibility with article 5. Lord Carlile made a similar point. We know that the Attorney-General has given an opinion. The Solicitor-General claims that he has not given an opinion. The Home Secretary clearly said in the House that there was an opinion before apologising for the fact that he should not have said that.

Unless the Human Rights Act is disapplied to the Bill, the debate will have been a waste of time because the Law Lords will apply it, thus preventing the measure from being compatible with it. When that happens, it will render the whole exercise a complete waste of time. We must disapply the Human Rights Act.

I want to say at the outset that I shall support the Government in the Lobby this afternoon. However, I have tabled an amendment, which would provide for a period of detention of up to 60 days. The reason for tabling amendment No. 33 is simple: we support the Government's position because we believe that the case is compelling and we want to support the police.

Like other Lancashire Members of Parliament, I have a letter from the acting deputy chief constable of Lancaster, Julia Hodson, who urges us to support the Government so that she and her colleagues can protect the public in the way that they wish. My plea is simple: if amendment No. 55 falls—I sincerely hope that it does not; it has my support—28 days is not long enough because, as a Liberal Democrat Member said, it is insufficient for the police to do their work. In their recent evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the police referred to one case in which, if they had printed out the computer data that they had recovered, it would have made a pile 66,000 ft high. That is the sort of challenge that the police face and they need our help to meet it.

If amendment No. 55 falls—I reiterate that I hope it does not—I hope that hon. Members will have the opportunity to vote on amendment No. 33.

The Government have treated the House badly in their handling of the matter. They have not briefed Members adequately. Had they done so, we might have reached a collective view. I appeal to the Home Secretary to do that even at this late stage, before the Bill completes its passage because it will come back, mark my words.

The grotesque juxtaposition of introducing the on-the-runs measure today side by side with the subject of our debate—

It being three hours after the commencement of proceedings, Mr. Speaker proceeded to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [this day].

Amendment agreed to.

Mr. Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.

Amendments made: No. 52, in, clause 23, page 22, line 10, at end insert—

'( ) In paragraph 36 (applications for extension or further extension), omit the words "to a judicial authority" in sub-paragraph (1), and after that sub-paragraph insert—

"(1A) The person to whom an application under sub-paragraph (1) may be made is—

(a) in the case of an application falling within sub-paragraph (1B), a judicial authority; and

(b) in any other case, a senior judge.

(1B) An application for the extension or further extension of a period falls within this sub-paragraph if—

(a) the grant of the application otherwise than in accordance with sub-paragraph (3AA)(b) would extend that period to a time that is no more than fourteen days after the relevant time; and

(b) no application has previously been made to a senior judge in respect of that period."'.

No. 53, in page 22, line 11, leave out 'paragraph 36' and insert 'that paragraph'.

No. 54, in page 22, line 13, leave out 'new specified period' and insert

'period by which the specified period is extended or further extended'.—[Mr. Charles Clarke.]

Amendment proposed: No. 55, in clause 23, page 22, line 19, leave out 'three months' and insert 'ninety days'.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

Amendment proposed: No. 1, in page 22, line 19, leave out "three months" and insert "28 days".— [Mr. Winnick.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

Amendments made: No. 56, in clause 23, page 22, line 28, after 'authority', insert 'or senior judge'.

No. 57, page 22, line 33, after 'authority', insert 'or senior judge'.

No. 58, page 22, line 33, leave out 'special'.

No. 59, page 22, line 36, at end insert—

'( ) In sub-paragraph (4) of that paragraph (application of paragraphs 30(3), and 31 to 34), at the end insert "but, in relation to an application made by virtue of sub-paragraph (1A)(b) to a senior judge, as if—

(a) references to a judicial authority were references to a senior judge; and

(b) references to the judicial authority in question were references to the senior judge in question."

( ) In sub-paragraph (5) of that paragraph, after "authority" insert "or senior judge".

( ) After sub-paragraph (6) of that paragraph insert—

"(7) In this paragraph and paragraph 37 'senior judge' means a judge of the High Court or of the Court of Session."'.

No. 60, in clause 23, page 22, line 45, after 'authority', insert 'or senior judge'.—[Hazel Blears.]

New Clause 1 — Extension of period of detention by judicial authority: duration

(2) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument provide—

(a) that all or any of those provisions which are in force shall continue in force for a period not exceeding twelve months from the coming into operation of the order; or

(b) that all or any of those provisions which are for the time being in force shall cease to be in force.

(3) No order shall be made under subsection (2) above unless a draft of the order has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.'. —[Mr. Winnick.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Clause 1 — Encouragement of terrorism

I beg to move amendment No. 34, in page 1, line 5, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

'(A1) This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to publish such a statement on his behalf; and

(b) at the time he does so, he intends the statement to be understood as mentioned in subsection (A1) or is reckless as to whether or not it is likely to be so understood.

(1A) For the purposes of this section the cases in which a person is to be taken as reckless as to whether a statement is likely to be understood as mentioned in subsection (A1) include any case in which he could not reasonably have failed to be aware of that likelihood.'.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 19, in page 1, line 5, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

'(A1) This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.

(1) A person commits an offence if—

(a) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to publish such a statement on his behalf; and

(b) at the time he does so, he intends the statement to be understood as mentioned in subsection (A1) or is reckless as to whether or not it is likely to be so understood.

No. 14, in page 1, line 6, leave out from 'statement' to end of line 7 on page 2 and insert

', which may include the glorification of the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of acts of terrorism or Convention offences, or causes another to publish a statement on his behalf; and

(b) at the time he does so he—

(i) knows or believes that members of the public to whom the statement is addressed or is to be published will, or

(ii) is recklessly indifferent to the likelihood that such persons would,

understand it as a direct or indirect encouragement or inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.'.

No. 2, in page 1, line 8, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

'(b) at the time he does so, he intends or is recklessly indifferent to the fact that the publication will be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement or inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences.'.

No. 21, in page 1, line 9, leave out from 'believes' to end of line 10.

No. 64, in page 1, line 14, at end insert

'and

(c) either—

(i) he intends that the statement will have that effect, or

(ii) he is reckless as to whether the statement will have that effect upon reasonable members of the public.'.

Government amendments Nos. 35 to 43, 49 and 50.

The amendments respond to points that were raised in Committee and seek to allay some of the concerns that were expressed then. They also, I should point out, build on some of the concepts—[Interruption.]

I am only sorry that this debate is not as much of a draw as the main attraction earlier, but I will do my best to make it as interesting as possible. The amendments build on some of the concepts in the amendments tabled in Committee by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) and his hon. Friends.

As the House will recall, we had quite a lengthy debate in Committee on the issue of intent and, more particularly, how we ensure that the offence of encouragement to terrorism in clause 1 of the Bill is workable—which is what I said I wanted it to be—but does not cast its net unduly wide. I undertook to examine that issue further because I wanted to ensure that we did not catch people who clearly were not in any way intending to encourage others to commit acts of terrorism. We have gone back to the drawing board and come up with a formulation that we hope meets those objectives.

The key amendment in this group is amendment No. 34, which replaces clause 1(1). It provides that the offence in clause 1 can be committed in only two circumstances. Both of those circumstances were in amendments that we discussed last week, so the concepts have already been properly explored. The first set of circumstances is where a person makes or publishes a statement and intends it to be understood by its audience as an encouragement to carry out acts of terrorism. I do not think that anyone could object to that being a criminal offence, and we have put the word "intends" on the face of the Bill so there is complete clarity about the conduct that is meant.

The second set of circumstances is where a person makes or publishes a statement and is reckless as to whether or not it is likely to be understood by his or her audience as an encouragement to carry out acts of terrorism. Again, for clarity, we have put the word "reckless" on the face of the Bill, and that was a word drawn from Opposition amendments in Committee.

We have also defined "reckless" for these purposes as being a case where the person could not reasonably have failed to have been aware of the consequences of his action. Again, I am sure that no one could object to this provision. If an individual makes a statement encouraging others to commit an act of terrorism and could not reasonably have failed to realise the likely consequences of his actions, that should clearly be an offence.

I was grateful to the Home Secretary when he said that he would amend the original clause 1, because it was very badly drafted, but I have some concerns about the amendments. The definition of "reckless" is completely contrary to the definition of recklessness in the recent case of R v. G and seeks to substitute the recklessness test in Caldwell, which has been discredited by the courts. It is extraordinary that Ministers should adopt a test for recklessness that the courts have said is the wrong test.

As I continue, I hope that I will be able to convince the hon. Gentleman that the formulation that we have now covers intent and recklessness. It is important that we have an objective qualification of recklessness, but the words used raise the threshold and reverse the presumptions in the provisions. That series of tests should be sufficient to convince the hon. Gentleman that we have moved away significantly from the negligence test about which he and other hon. Members expressed concern in Committee. I hope to be able to convince him that the present formulation, which includes intent, recklessness and an objective assessment of recklessness, is sufficient to meet his concerns as well of those of the Government that we have a formulation that enables us to have some prosecutions of people who are clearly committing criminal acts.

Is not the difficulty that the right hon. Lady is trying to encompass with the same clause both a subjective and an objective test? In legal terms, that seems absurd.

No, I hope that as I develop my argument the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that the provisions deal with intent and recklessness, with an objective assessment of recklessness at a higher threshold. I am really trying to achieve a formulation that will command the support of the whole House. I was concerned about negligence, and I shared those concerns, so we want a formulation that lifts the threshold but still enables us to prosecute people who, through their statements, are encouraging others to commit terrorist acts. That should command broad support.

I want to amplify those comments. We cannot allow people who could not reasonably have failed to realise the likely consequences of their actions to get away with that simply by saying that they did not know what effect their actions might have. That would enable people who have encouraged or glorified terrorism to get away scot-free, without paying the penalty for their actions, by insisting, regardless of all the evidence, that they did not know the possible consequences of their actions. A provision that they should be caught if they could not reasonably have failed to know the consequences of their statements is the right way to avoid that situation.

I think that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said that juries are capable of considering such issues in context, and the provisions deal with the context and circumstances. The court will take all that into account. If we have only a subjective test, people will be able to say that they did not realise what the effect of their actions would be. We would then find it incredibly difficult to prosecute people who genuinely were encouraging other people, indirectly, to commit terrorist acts.

Every day of the week, juries conclude that people are not telling the truth when they claim not to have foreseen a consequence of their acts; otherwise, there would be no convictions at all. Why should the Government tinker with a definition that was approved by the other place? The House of Lords said that the Government's definition of recklessness in the provision is unjust and should not continue.

We explored those issues in detail in Committee and, as I told the hon. Gentleman then, if he looks at rape and other sexual offences, he will find that there is an objective test of recklessness. In rape, an offence is committed only if the person carrying out the act does not reasonably believe that the victim consents. A person charged with rape cannot say that they believed they had consent; they have to prove the objective test that their belief was reasonable. There is thus well-established law that it is perfectly proper to have an objective test of recklessness and that we should not simply believe what a defendant says were the circumstances. The formulation of subsection (1A) moves things up a field, as the hon. Gentleman will acknowledge. We are not saying simply that there should be a reasonable belief, but that the defendant could not reasonably have failed to appreciate the effect of his words. We have genuinely tried to achieve a tight formulation that still enables us to prosecute. That is a perfectly legitimate objective for the Government and I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept it, despite his forensic examination of the legal niceties. That is legitimate, because we are talking about criminal offences, but it is my job to try to ensure that we have law that is practical, effective, workable and takes us away from the negligence provision, which I acknowledge was a concern. I think we have a good formulation.

As a matter of some pride, I state that I am not a lawyer, but that does not preclude me from having legitimate concerns about the construction that the Government are proposing. I am unhappy—as I was on a previous occasion—about the reference to a statement and how it will appear to, or be interpreted by, "members of the public" to whom it is addressed. The provision does not specify which members of the public; it does not specify that the statement should be made to a majority of the public, nor does it have the general threshold of right-thinking people. Is there not a danger that it is too wide?

As I say, we covered a lot of this ground in Committee, and I have genuinely tried to narrow the provision's ambit while trying to ensure that it is workable. I point out amendments Nos. 35, 41 and 42 to the hon. Gentleman. Again, they make an important clarification to the Bill. They make it clear that, for an offence to be committed, the audience has to understand that what is being said is an inducement for them and no one else to commit terrorist acts. For example, no offence will be committed if a member of an audience at an academic lecture thinks, "Well, I am not encouraged to commit terrorist acts, but I can quite imagine that, if this sentiment was expressed at a gathering of young Muslim men, it could have an encouraging effect on them." I think that that is implicit in the drafting, but those amendments make it absolutely explicit that the likely effect must be on the people to whom the statement is addressed. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that that is another attempt by the Government to try to narrow the provision's ambit and focus it on the mischief to which this part of the Bill is addressed: those who directly or indirectly incite people to commit acts of terrorism. I hope that he will give us credit for seeking to narrow the ambit of the offence in those terms.

Will the Minister address a not-so-hypothetical example that concerns a lot of people? Given the state of the middle east at the moment, if someone—for instance, myself—says, "I can well understand why decent Palestinians become terrorists", they would still fall foul of the test. In making that statement, I must be taken to know that someone may well be encouraged to act because they are mad or highly radicalised. In those circumstances, I would be reckless according to the Bill. I should very much like the Minister to address that point and, if she would be good enough later to take another intervention, to ask her about amendment No. 64, which I tabled, and what is wrong with it.

Again, we have trawled over this ground to a large extent, but the offence has two limbs: the making of a statement and the likely effect on the audience. If someone says that they could not reasonably fail to understand or appreciate the effect of a statement on the audience, that is a fair test about the circumstances in which they make that statement.

I think that I went through with my hon. and learned Friend last week the number of hurdles that we would have to overcome to bring a successful prosecution, and the provision will be even tighter now. Someone must have an intention or be reckless, and there is an objective test of recklessness. The statement must be likely to encourage others. There must be a realistic prospect of conviction. The prosecution must be in the public interest and the Director of Public Prosecution's consent is needed.

For my hon. and learned Friend simply to make a statement with which someone could empathise or sympathise without knowing or being reckless in its effect on the audience does not fit the definition and formulation that we propose. With respect, he is stretching the definition and the circumstances to an untenable extent if he examines the current formulation. I know that he does not like the whole principle of the clause, but he is stretching things beyond the bounds if he is saying that he understands why people might find themselves in that kind of mindset. That will not make him fall foul of such a criminal prosecution.

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. However, bearing in mind the criteria that she has laid down for a prosecution to be brought, does she agree that a prosecution could only ever be successful if the prosecutors could deliver before a jury witnesses who had been influenced by what had been said?

I am glad that the hon. Gentleman appreciates that the formulation that we propose for the clause is fairly tightly drafted and does not cast the net too wide. Clearly, the individual circumstances are important. I have been asked on many occasions to speculate on what kind of phrases might make people fall foul of the provision. The only example that I have felt comfortable giving is where someone says, "Wasn't it a fantastic thing that happened on 7 July?" knowing that the likely effect is to encourage their audience to engage in acts of terrorism. We are genuinely trying to aim this legislation at that kind of formulation, not at all the wider examples. Sometimes, the offence has been stretched beyond the realms of possibility, and we have genuinely tried to narrow it down to the mischief that we are trying to target. The amendments narrow the provisions on the audience itself. The likely effect on the audience is the second limb of the offence, so there is a consideration of what is done and the likely effect of that on the audience.

I hope that I can be constructive on this point. The Minister will be aware that I have tabled amendment No. 64. It would add to the recklessness test a determination of whether a person

"is reckless as to whether the statement will have that effect"—

an encouragement or an inducement—

"upon reasonable members of the public."

That measure would deal precisely with the problem, because if I said something that I thought that a reasonable member of the public might take to be an inducement, I would be guilty—I could understand that. The problem that we all have at present is that if I say something that I know that a very unreasonable member of the public might take to be an inducement, I would undoubtedly be caught.

I refer my hon. and learned Friend to amendments Nos. 35, 41 and 42, which address the effect on the audience to which a person was speaking. We have narrowed down the provision so that we are not considering mythical people who might be radicalised or mentally unstable, such as those in the examples that he gives, but the audience that is being addressed.

I do not think that that deals with the issue. I acknowledge that the Minister has worked hard to try to improve the Bill. I am happy to concede her good intent, but that does not mean that the result is satisfactory. I repeat the point that was implicit in what the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) said. When a statement is published, its audience is necessarily wider and larger than that for a statement that is not published. Unless a more reasonable amendment is agreed to, surely we could be considering a mad, neurotic, or frankly hypersensitive individual who could be influenced to behave in a particular way, although that individual might well have behaved in that way anyway. The provision is too broad and an amendment such as that which the hon. and learned Gentleman has in mind would narrow it substantially.

I do not propose to narrow the offence to the point at which it would become impossible to prosecute. As I have said on several occasions, there is a real problem with people making statements that they know will encourage others to undertake terrorist acts. We need legislation that is focused on such mischief and able to deal with it. The hon. Gentleman might wish to narrow the offence even further, but I think that our formulation will address people's genuine concerns. He raises the prospect of one person who might take a statement in such a completely unreasonable way. I have set out the fact that there will be seven hurdles before there is a prosecution, so the likelihood of a prosecution for a criminal offence in such circumstances would be infinitesimal. It is not the business of the House to make legislation in such terms. There is a broad and reasonable case for our formulation. I have gone this far, but I am afraid that I shall go no further, not even for the hon. Gentleman.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that the formulation of some of the Government's proposals is similar to that of race relations legislation, in which there is a consideration of intent, recklessness and the impact on an audience, which is a crucial aspect of making such legislation work properly and ensuring that its implementation is reasonable?

My hon. Friend is right. She takes an approach that I hope that the whole House will adopt. She takes a practical approach to our legislation by trying to ensure that it works, but that it does not have unintended consequences, such as those raised in Committee regarding the negligence test, which I have tried to address today.

In response to an amendment that I tabled in Committee, I think that the Minister indicated that there was a problem with specifying the qualification that there must be a danger of a terrorist offence being committed. Would not adopting such a provision, which is in the Council of Europe convention on the prevention of terrorism, deal with the problem that has been identified regarding one person who hears a statement? If there had to be such a danger, it would deal with the argument on prosecutions that she is trying to address.

I remember our discussion in Committee. I think that the response that I gave to the hon. Gentleman then still stands. If an actual danger had to be proved, it would set the threshold too high and the prosecution would find it difficult to bring a case. We are trying to get the balance right so that we can use the legislation to prosecute people who are causing a real problem in this country, yet ensure that we do not inadvertently bring people into the net who quite properly should be allowed to say the things that they want to say. That is at the heart of the Bill—we are trying to get the right balance between the correct security measures and the protection of liberty and freedom of speech. I am trying to draw that balance correctly without erring in favour of either priority. I do not want the Bill to be a piece of legislation under which people can still say those things with impunity because they are clever enough to formulate their words knowing that they will have an effect on other people but that they will escape prosecution themselves. It is not in the interests of anyone in this country to allow that situation to continue. Most of the remaining Government amendments in this group are consequential, as the meat of the argument is contained in Government amendment No. 34. We have found a formulation that works, and I hope that it will be accepted by all hon. Members.

Amendments Nos. 19, 14, 2 and 21 would all have the same effect. Instead of allowing a recklessness test that would cover individuals who could not reasonably have failed to realise the likely effect of their actions, they limit the offence to people who intend or can be shown to have known the likely effect of their actions. As I said, that recklessness test is subjective, as opposed to objective. I have received advice that the formulation in subsection (1A) of amendment No. 34 is drafted to reflect the Caldwell case. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) will know more about that than I do, but it is right to include such a test. If we simply used a subjective test, individuals who brazenly encourage terrorism would be able to argue, despite the fact that they could not reasonably have failed to understand the likely effect of their comments, that they did not foresee the risk that members of their audience would be encouraged to commit acts of terrorism. The difference between that subjective test and the test in the Government amendments is crucial to the success of the legislation. Without an objective test, people could simply say that they did not intend their words to have a particular effect on their audience, and that they did not have any idea what would happen. We all know of individuals who have made such statements, but we have found it impossible to prosecute them. We want to make sure, however, that we can do so in future.

We have tightened the provisions in clause 1 considerably, but we have preserved the integrity of the offence so that the measure is effective. Briefly, Government amendments Nos. 49 and 50 deal with a minor but important matter. Clause 18 provides that, if a corporate body is guilty of an offence under part 1, a senior officer of that body is also guilty. Originally, his connivance, consent or neglect was required, but hon. Members expressed concerns about an offence committed by negligence. As a result, the Government amendments tighten the provision and remove the neglect limb, so I hope that they will be welcomed by Members on both sides of the House.

As I said in my intervention on the Minister, I wanted to welcome the Home Secretary's conversion on clause 1 in the light of last week's debate. Indeed, when I saw him on Monday I was overwhelmingly grateful because during a wide-ranging discussion he accepted the argument that the drafting of clause 1 was too loose. It took us some time to tease out the implications last week, but the upshot of our debate was that the offence could be committed as a result of negligence. Mindful of the amendment that I tabled last week, the Home Secretary accepted that the offence should only be committed intentionally or recklessly. I was pleased with that result, and I thanked the Home Secretary. However, when I looked at the draft of amendment No. 34, I discovered that it reads very well only until the end of subsection (1). Subsection (1A) says:

"For the purposes of this section the cases in which a person is to be taken as reckless as to whether a statement is likely to be understood as mentioned in subsection (A1) include any case in which he could not reasonably have failed to be aware of that likelihood."

I always understood that in the normal test of recklessness, the word was to be given its ordinary English meaning. The problem has arisen because for a period of 20 years, which I suspect was an aberration, as a result of the Court of Appeal judgment in Caldwell, it became possible for a person to act recklessly even though he never foresaw the risk of something occurring. In a sense it was an objective test. The jury could say, "We accept entirely that in doing what you did, you never foresaw the risk of something occurring, but we can say that you are guilty nevertheless, because when we look at the facts, we think we would have foreseen that the risk would occur."

That decision stood until last year, when the House of Lords examined it again in a case called R v. G. As the Minister knows, before the House of Lords looked at it, the test in Caldwell had come in for massive criticism over the years from both academic and judicial authorities. In R v. G the House of Lords looked at the entirety of it, and the upshot was that the authority of Caldwell was wholly overruled.

It is worth considering the reasons why the Law Lords decided to do that. They stated, first, that while the most obvious culpable state of mind was an intention to cause an injurious result, knowing disregard of an appreciated and unacceptable risk of causing an injurious result or a deliberate closing of the mind to such a risk would be readily accepted as culpable also. But it was not clearly blameworthy to do something involving a risk of injury to another if, for reasons other than self-induced intoxication, one genuinely did not perceive the risk.

Secondly, the Caldwell formulation was capable of leading to injustice. Thirdly, the criticism of Caldwell by academics, judges and practitioners was not to be ignored, and fourthly, it was clear that the majority's interpretation of "reckless" in Caldwell had been a misinterpretation of Parliament's intention in the Bill at that time, which was to leave the essential law unchanged. Therefore the test of recklessness should return to what it had been historically for many years before the Caldwell decision took place.

I have a slight criticism, which is that it took me a phone call to the draftsmen in the Home Secretary's office to get finally an admission that it was true that they had put in not the current test of recklessness, but the old test of recklessness. I know the Government do not like the judiciary, and perhaps the House of Lords particularly, but that is a crazy course of action to adopt.

In her comments, the Minister said, "We've done it in other cases, like rape." Yes, I acknowledge that. When we considered changing to an objective test in rape cases, there was considerable debate in Committee. The reason we chose to do it was the nature of rape as an offence, its seriousness and all the surrounding circumstances. To equate rape with words used by an individual seems a very poor comparison. The equation given in the discussion in R v. G refers to criminal damage, which is a good example of the narrow boundary between negligence and recklessness.

Where somebody is to be criminalised for something they said, on the basis that it might indirectly incite terrorism, we would be in danger of perpetrating injustice unless we said that the test that a jury has to apply is the current test, not the old test. The Minister will have to provide a compelling justification for me to be willing to accept the amendment. I questioned the draftsmen about the amended version. I do not think there is any difference between amendment No. 34 and the original draft. If there is, it is minute.

The real criticism of the earlier draft is that it was incredibly sloppy, because the Minister—I hope that she forgives me for saying this—was attempting to conceal what the Government were trying to do, which is why we ended up with the opaque language that I complained about last week.

Amendment No. 34 is not opaque. It makes it clear what the Minister intends, which is an objective recklessness test to allow a jury to conclude that although somebody had not been reckless in their own mind, they should still be criminalised. I do not want to labour the point, but that is a bad test to apply in this context.

I am not a lawyer, but I understand the differences between honest and reasonable belief and between intent and recklessness. What does the hon. Gentleman say about race relations legislation, under which somebody may not intend to discriminate, but, if the consequences of their action are discriminatory, can still be done for discrimination? The race relations legislation on what people believe, what people say and the consequences of, for example, name calling is similar to the powers in the Bill.

The hon. Lady is right: there are other examples where we have kept a test akin to recklessness, but made it objective, not subjective. That explains the recent trend of using the legal gobbledegook of "reasonable grounds for believing" and "likely"—those two concepts are currently used married together.

The Minister expressly consented to putting the word, "reckless" into legislation, but having given with one hand, she is taking away with the other, which is incoherent. In light of the decision of the House of Lords in R v. G, the drafting is also unsatisfactory. Indeed, I am almost forced to conclude that if that is really what the Minister wants to do, it would be better if the word, "reckless" did not feature.

I used to report such cases when I was a reporter in the 1980s, which is a very long time ago. That stuff is not recent, and it has not led to a spate of groundless prosecutions.

I accept that point, but the Minister seemed to hint that if we introduce a recklessness test, as defined by the House of Lords in R v. G, it would present insurmountable obstacles to prosecution and that all sorts of unsavoury people who had said things that they should not would get off. I do not accept that argument: when a defendant goes into the witness box and says, "I acted honestly when I walked out of the shop with the goods under my arm. It was all a mistake," juries have no difficulty in examining the circumstances and saying, "Actually, you were dishonest, and that is a crime of specific intent."

One can still be convicted under the subjective test. All that needs to be shown is that the defendant must have foreseen a risk in the course of carrying out a particular activity. It is even easier to convict under the subjective test, so I do not accept that it will lead to people whom the Government want to criminalise being acquitted. Consider the example of a foreign preacher who does not know much about life in Britain and who has come over on a visit. If he said, first, "I never intended to incite terrorism," and secondly, "I never foresaw that there was a risk of inciting terrorism," the jury could say, "Although we see those words as incitement, we understand that he is telling the truth." The question is this: if the person is telling the truth about it, is it right that he should be landed with a criminal conviction?

That is why I propose, unless I am persuaded otherwise, to vote with some reluctance against amendment No. 34 and invite the House to vote on my amendment, which has exactly the same wording except that it leaves out subsection (1A), which does all the mischief. However, I am conscious that other amendments would have a similar outcome, and I shall listen carefully to what Members say about them.

We discussed this matter at the meeting on Monday with the Home Secretary and his team. Members seemed broadly happy that the Government were going in the right direction. By and large, we were satisfied by the inclusion of intent and recklessness and the removal of negligence, and the subsequent amendments whereby actions had to be emulated by individuals and the content of information had to be useful to individuals. I think that I paraphrase accurately. Is the hon. Gentleman's concern merely that the wrong recklessness test is included, or does he have some deeper objection?

The amendment suggests that we have the wrong recklessness test. If Members disagree, they will support amendment No. 34. It is very odd for the Home Secretary to use the word "reckless" and then to qualify it in a way that makes nonsense of a recent court decision by the House of Lords that says that that is unfair and should not be used. To say that that is cocking a snook at the judges is a bit of an understatement.

Article 5 of the convention refers to intention. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that if the Government claim that they are fitting in with that provision by saying that the offence has to be intentional, they can do that with a subjective recklessness test but if they introduce the objective recklessness test that he described their actions would be outside its terms? Those of us who are interested in human rights believe that it is wise to stick to what it says in article 5.

I see no necessity to adopt amendment No. 34 in order to comply with the convention test.

I do not want to take up any more of the House's time, as there are many other amendments that we want to consider.

I should like to speak to amendment No. 64, which stands in my name and those of several others. In doing so, I am afraid that I must criticise not only the product of the Home Secretary's labours but the amendments tabled by the official Opposition.

I can do so quickly by referring back to my intervention on the Minister, to which, with great respect, she did not respond. At the risk of wearying the House, let me repeat the now-famous Cherie Booth test regarding what she said in public and whether it would be criminalised. I can put it into my own mouth to make it even more uncomfortable. All I need say is that given the present situation in the middle east, I can understand how perfectly decent Palestinians can be turned into terrorists. When I say that, there is not the slightest doubt that I perceive the possibility that some people, when they read that statement, will be encouraged to carry out terrorist acts. I do not intend that they do, and I do not want them to, but I must encompass in my thinking the possibility that they will be out there. The balance is that my freedom to make such comments is worth risking the possibility that some people will be encouraged.

I have heard my hon. and learned Friend make much more provocative and inflammatory statements. I do not understand how that statement could be perceived as intending to encourage people to commit acts of terrorism.

I am sorry that we will not have a meeting of minds. It is a matter of semantics more than anything else but I can conceive of a Palestinian terrorist bomber who was in this country saying, when interviewed by the police, "I believe we have considerable sympathy from politicians in this country. I remember hearing Cherie Booth and Bob Marshall-Andrews saying that they had sympathy with our plight in the middle east. I was encouraged by that." If my hon. Friend the Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) cannot understand that, there is no point in repeating it. It appears self-explanatory to me.

Surely there is a difference between trying to understand the causes of terrorism—we must include journalists, academics and politicians and our statements on the Floor of the House in that—and encouraging it. Surely understanding is a legitimate defence. Understanding is nothing to do with encouraging. I fail to understand how my hon. and learned Friend can make that elision.

I am sorry because my comments will be repetitive. If I am a seriously radicalised Muslim who is contemplating carrying out acts of terror, the fact that someone in a public position and a politician indicates that they have sympathy or understanding for such actions is likely to encourage me.

If one says, "I fully understand but in no way endorse and could never support such a move", it is clear that there is no encouragement. However, if someone makes the abstruse statement, "I understand" one has to make quite sure what is meant—the world is full of understanding people.

As always, I respect my hon. Friend's comments. If one couched a statement in those terms, I agree that one might be able to enjoy a defence under subsection (3), which provides for considering the totality of the comments. However, one cannot legislate on the basis that everybody will understand the precise nuances of a statement. If, through inadvertence, one stops simpliciter at, "I have some sympathy or understanding", one is undoubtedly caught under clause 1.

Is not the problem for the hon. Member for Wakefield (Mary Creagh) the word "encouragement"? As the hon. and learned Gentleman said, his comments could be taken as encouraging by those who wished to perceive them as such. However, if the word "incitement" were used, it would be hard to argue that saying that something "could be justified" in some theoretical way constituted incitement, even though some might consider it an encouragement. It is unfortunate that we have lost the opportunity to narrow the wording.

I entirely agree. Incitement is a concept that is well known to the criminal law and in common law. It has been with us for hundreds of years and there is absolutely no reason why it should be changed. "Encourage" is an extraordinarily weak word. To my knowledge, it is almost unknown in criminal jurisprudence because it is so weak, and because the concept of encouragement is so wide. I am not going to repeat this argument; if people do not understand it, they do not understand it. However, I vividly understand that if I expressed such a sympathy, it would be a form of encouragement for someone whose mind was already tainted.

Is the fundamental problem here not that the Bill would criminalise us because we implied something, but rather that we might be found guilty because someone else inferred something from us? Is not that the fundamental weakness of the legislation?

Yes, it is. The convoluted drafting of clause 1 is going to be nightmare for anyone who has to deal with it in the courts. On the other hand, in a spirit of good will and compromise, I have not touched that provision in my amendment. I have simply added to it two completely unobjectionable paragraphs that would deal precisely with the point that I am making. This would simply import into the Bill the provision that recklessness would apply only if what someone perceived as likely was inducement or encouragement to reasonable members of the public.

If I say something that I perceive may induce or encourage reasonable members of the public to commit terrorist offences, I ought to be prosecuted for it. I accept that immediately. But I should not be prosecuted for saying something that I genuinely believe may encourage someone whom I do not intend to encourage but who I know may be encouraged by what I say because of their state of mind—however mad, irrational or evil they may be. I would be caught under the existing provision, and we should not allow that.

I hope that amendment No. 64 commends itself to the Opposition. I am going to ask them to smile upon me—because they will be given the first bite of this particular cherry, although the cherry might be too small for two bites to be taken from it—and to allow the amendment to go through.

Because of the procedure involved, the first bite of the cherry will involve getting rid of Government amendment No. 34, without which nothing more can be done. If we do not succeed in doing that, we shall not be going anywhere anyway.

That may well be right. That could be the solution.

In the argument that I have just postulated, the problem with the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis), well intentioned though it undoubtedly is, is that even leaving that recklessness—as in the case of R v. G—in the Act means that I would be caught, because I undoubtedly would foresee the possibility that someone out there would be comforted or encouraged by what I say. In those circumstances, I would be caught by recklessness, either under the old Caldwell recklessness or under R v. G, because a subjective test would be applied to me and I would own up. I would be guilty, under the Bill. I would have no choice but to say, "I'm sorry, it's a fair cop, guv. It shouldn't be, but it is."

Under the test that I am proposing in amendment No. 19, if the people who were listening were unreasonable, that would give a perfectly good defence because the speaker would argue that they had no reason to foresee the consequences of their words. It would not be reasonable to expect someone to foresee the consequences where unreasonable people were involved.

I profoundly disagree with the hon. Gentleman. I would foresee the consequences on unreasonable people. I would foresee the consequences of what I say on both reasonable and unreasonable people, and on the mad and the halt and the lame and everyone else. I would perceive it to be quite clear that they would be induced in those circumstances. It is to everyone that the statement is being made, and I must be taken to understand that it will have an effect on everyone—reasonable or unreasonable. I hope that that answers the hon. Gentleman's point.

The Government are developing a prodigious talent for snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. They undertake a listening exercise, and agree that something is wrong with their Bill and try to find a way to resolve it. They go almost all the way towards securing the support of Members in all parts of the House, then they ruin it by quite extraordinary drafting. That is very regrettable. I would have hoped that last week's debate, which was perhaps in rather more high-flown terms than we are mustering this evening, might have persuaded the Government that they had to do the job properly. The result of last week's vote might have indicated that were they not to do it properly, the Bill was highly unlikely to survive in this House or another place without further amendment. I regret that the Minister has come to the House with a rather unacceptable amendment.

I want to return to the origins of what the Government are trying to do, with which I have a number of problems. First, I do not understand why the current incitement offences on the statute book are insufficient to deal with the issue, apart from the fact that they are not prosecuted. Many of us find ourselves increasingly impatient because the police and prosecuting authorities do not use the offences already there to deal with the problem. Undoubtedly, incitement offences could have been used on occasions against prominent individuals who would be caught by the prospective legislation.

Secondly, as the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) pointed out, incitement is the correct term in the context of such an offence, rather than encouragement. It worries me that such a mild term is used in a way that is open to all sorts of constructions, which we have yet to learn, as the matter has not been before a court. I also worry because we have still not secured—and I do not think that we will do so this evening—an adequate definition of terrorism and terrorist offences. Potentially, therefore, an offence can be drawn from a much wider field.

I do not know whether the Minister intended—or whether she was simply wilfully reckless in the matter—to bring forward an amendment with a self-contradictory internal structure. As the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) ably set out, it applies two conflicting tests—the objective test of recklessness and the subjective test of recklessness—in relation to the same clause. It is recklessness of a high degree to consider what the court has expressly rejected and then to introduce that in new legislation, as though nothing had happened and it had never been considered. That might be part of the Prime Minister's declared policy, as expressed at Prime Minister's questions today—that he would prefer to listen to police officers than Law Lords. I am sure that that will endear him to those who will consider this Bill later. Perhaps he believes that Law Lords simply do not understand law in the same way as police officers do. I must, however, counsel Home Officer Ministers that that is not a sensible way of approaching the issue.

Does the hon. Gentleman accept that it is appropriate to have an objective recklessness test in the sexual offences field, and in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 relating to money laundering? A range of issues in legislation have an objective recklessness test.

There are a number of points to make. First, we are dealing with a constraint on freedom of speech, which does not apply to those other offences. In the sexual offences legislation, we are dealing with a specific issue of an interaction between two people in which the critical issue is consent, and in which one person's word will often be used against another's, and in that instance it is absolutely appropriate for the jury to come to a view on an objective test. I really do not understand how the Minister can come to the Dispatch Box, apparently briefed by her civil servants, to proclaim proudly that what she hopes to enact is that which is within the Caldwell case, which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has described as something that leads to injustice. The Minister parades case law that has apparently been interpreted as leading to injustice as an argument for including it in the Bill. The House deserves rather better than that.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield made an interesting point about what a cleric newly arrived in the country might understand the clause to mean. As he said that, it occurred to me that the cleric might be quoting holy scripture. [Interruption.] The hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Mahmood) feigns incredulity, but I could quote a large amount of holy scripture that would fall within the constraints of the clause. That worries me. It also occurred to me to wonder—this too is an aside—what the position of an interpreter would be. Does an interpreter publish the words that he is asked to interpret? At what point does his understanding of what he has been asked to interpret become a potential offence under the clause?

Let us suppose that someone is called in to interpret a speech given in Arabic by a cleric to a British audience. As the translation proceeds, he realises that his action constitutes an incitement to terrorism. He will have to stop. That must be the answer, because otherwise he would commit the offence.

I agree that he would have a duty to stop, but that is asking a good deal of someone providing a simultaneous interpretation.

Someone using a religious script would be fine. The issue is the interpretation of that religious script at a meeting, and whether it might constitute an incitement to terrorism. Unless the hon. Gentleman can give a quotation from any religious book that he chooses which shows that simply reading it would constitute incitement, he should withdraw what he has said. Members of my community, certainly, would be quite offended by it.

I am sorry that the hon. Lady feels affronted or insulted. I do not know what her community is, but I can say that it is fairly easy to identify scriptures in my tradition which, if delivered to an appropriate audience, might—in terms of an objective test for recklessness rather than clear intent—[Interruption.] For instance, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. In the context of someone discussing an atrocity elsewhere, that could be interpreted as falling within this definition.

That sort of language should not be protected simply because it is in holy scripture if it constitutes indirect incitement according to a narrow intentional or subjective recklessness test. The problem lies not with the fact that it is scripture, but with the width of the law. The fact that it is scripture should not confer on it any protection or any extra liability.

Order. I think the hon. Gentleman must first reply to the intervention from the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris). He may then be generous enough to give way to the hon. Lady.

I am grateful to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I was wondering whether I would be required to give a sedentary response.

My hon. Friend the Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) is absolutely right. There are circumstances in which scripture could clearly be used as an incitement to violence, and there are times when that should be prosecutable, but there are also times when, under an objective test of recklessness—when it is not the speaker's intention to incite or encourage such an act in any way—scripture could fall foul of the clause. That is a serious matter.

The Government are keen for there to be a read-across between this part of the Bill and an equivalent part of the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. We know that that is part of the game-playing, aimed at including an identical definition in two controversial Bills so that they can be used in conjunction with each other.

We have limited time and I do not want to speak at length to the amendment in my name, but I should point out to the hon. and learned Member for Medway that although I am always encouraged by his arguments and he made a cogent case, I have a serious concern with his amendment, which is the use of the word "reasonable" and the phrase

"whether the statement will have that effect upon reasonable members of the public."

By definition, we are dealing with unreasonable members of the public in talking about incitement to terrorism. I appreciate that his test will be whether he, as the speaker of such a statement, would have expected

"that effect upon reasonable members of the public",

but I can foresee circumstances in which the effect will be on those who are distinctly unreasonable, in that they are predisposed to committing acts of terrorism. That is a flaw in his definition, but he may disabuse me of that view.

Strangely enough, I agree, but I do not entirely understand why it is a flaw. I do not see why it should be a flaw to restrict the criminal offence of doing something recklessly—in other words, perceiving the likely consequences of an action but doing it in any event—to its effect on reasonable people. The point is that if I perceive that there may be unreasonable people out there who will receive such a statement as encouragement or inducement to such behaviour, but I go ahead and make that statement, I commit the offence under the terms of the Bill. So every single such statement will be caught, because I must be taken to understand that what I say may be so received by unreasonable people.

I do understand that point, but it underlines how difficult it is to construct an offence in the terms in which the Government wish to construct it. That is the underlying problem with the lack of definition—a lack of definition that we have seen elsewhere.

For the purposes of this evening, I am more attracted, for purely practical reasons, to the prospect of voting down Government amendment No. 34 for reasons that I have already adduced. Because amendment No. 19 uses the Government's own wording—up to the point at which it goes barmy—for the purposes of this evening it is a very satisfactory amendment to the Bill. It can then be further considered in another place, where we may be able to construct a better alternative to the whole offence that will secure the Government's objectives without giving rise to the unforeseen—or perhaps all too easily foreseen—consequences that the hon. and learned Member for Medway and I fear will otherwise arise. So I intend to advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to vote against the Government's amendment and to support, if he chooses to press it, the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield.

I will not detain the House for long, but it is right that I say a few words. I seek acknowledgement from the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) that the Government have attempted to narrow this clause to intent to recklessness. Yes, we have an objective test, but it is that the person

"could not reasonably have failed to be aware".

I seek from the hon. Gentleman at this late hour some acknowledgement that that formulation constitutes a higher threshold than the previous one, and that the Government have therefore moved significantly on this issue to try to ensure that recklessness is included, but that the realistic prospect of successful prosecutions remains. The hon. Gentleman should acknowledge that this formulation is different and is not simply an objective recklessness test, because it also raises the threshold test.

I did acknowledge earlier, I hope, that there appears to be some slight difference between the test in amendment No. 34 and the test in the Bill as originally drafted. Certainly, if I may say so, this provision is much clearer, which is in itself a commendation. I would also like to put it on the record that I do not believe that either the Home Secretary or the Minister tried to deceive me; I think that there was a genuine misunderstanding between us as to what the Home Secretary was actually conceding. I also hope that the Minister will understand the reasons why, when I was talking about recklessness, I meant the common-or-garden English term as interpreted currently by the courts. It is for that reason, and because it will not do any harm to the successful prosecution of offences, that I prefer my version in amendment No. 19. With some regret, therefore, I have to vote against amendment No. 34.

I understand the hon. Gentleman's position, in that he is struggling with modern drafting. All I can say is that our formulation meets the objectives that we want to achieve—to make practical, effective and workable legislation. Who knows? In time to come, perhaps even the hon. Gentleman will be a little more comfortable with some modern attempts at the drafting. I commend the amendment to the House.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 15, in page 2, line 14, leave out 'subsections (1) and (2)' and insert 'subsection (1)'.

No. 4, in clause 2, page 3, line 21, leave out subsection (4).

No. 6, in clause 3, page 6, line 15, leave out subsection (8).

No. 12, in clause 20, page 17, leave out lines 34 and 35.

No. 31, in page 19, line 4, leave out clause 21.

No. 30, in clause 21, page 19, line 8, leave out from 'which' to end of line 25 and insert

'a person whilst acting in the capacity of a member of that organisation commits an offence under sections 1 or 2 of the Terrorism Act 2005.'.

No. 13, in page 19, line 10, leave out from 'include' to end of line 25 and insert

'unlawfully expressing approval of the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism.

(5B) The expression of approval is unlawful for the purposes of subsection (5A) if there are persons who may become aware of it who will infer that what is subject to an expression of approval is conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances.'.

These amendments address the important issue of the encouragement of terrorism. As the Minister will know, we have supported provisions on indirect incitement, even if we have had differences of opinion on whether it can be committed recklessly and what the definition of "recklessness" should be. The difficulty we have is with clause 1(2), which seeks to introduce into the definition of incitement statements that indirectly encourage the commission or preparation of acts, or glorify

"the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the future or generally) of such acts or offences; and . . . is a statement from which those members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances."

The difficulty, which was highlighted in Committee, is that the concept of an offence—[Interruption.]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman. The hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) should not be discussing matters in sub-committee while this debate is taking place.

The concept of unlawful glorification is alien to our law. On the whole, if people wish to go out and glorify something, they are free to do so. Indeed, as the House will be aware, the origin of the provisions seems to have come from a decision by the Government at some time in the summer that they wanted to make glorification a separate offence. That attracted much adverse public comment and, as a result, the Government decided shortly before the Bill was published—a previous draft Bill contained the separate offence of glorification—to collapse glorification into the single offence of encouragement of terrorism.

The impression that was given at the time was that glorification had disappeared, but unfortunately it has not. It is present as a distinct subsection in clause 1. It is difficult to understand why it has been left there. I can easily think of examples of someone glorifying something that might amount to an incitement to commit a terrorist offence, because the words of glorification could clearly relate to incitement. But if there is indeed no incitement, to identify glorification as a form of incitement and as something that is likely to be understood by members of the public

"as indirectly encouraging the commission or preparation"

of an offence seems quite wrong. It imposes a burden on anybody who wants to glorify historical events to think carefully, because they may find themselves liable to criminal prosecution and subject to a term of imprisonment of seven years. That is not a reasonable way for Parliament to proceed.

If somebody incites terrorism, even by indirect means—oblique references, nudges, winks or suggestions that terrorism is an appropriate remedy—I am happy to criminalise them and happy that they should go to prison for seven years if the offence is serious enough. But it is not right that the mere glorification of the commission of a terrorist offence, which, under the Bill, could include the past activities of Robin Hood, Wat Tyler or Guy Fawkes, should be sufficient to found the basis of a criminal offence, if the statement was one from which

"members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated".

I am sure that there was a Wat Tyler society when I was up at Oxford and, as I said on Wednesday, many student societies of a slightly anarchic kind might have dinners or meetings that glorified Wat Tyler or John Bull—names that used to have a great appeal for Labour Members, which has disappeared under new Labour.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the provision would apply not only to Guy Fawkes and Robin Hood but, at least in theory, to Gerry Adams? There is a difficulty for the Prime Minister and the Government, as it is unclear that the Prime Minister would not fall foul of his own law, given the fact that he has often praised, and expressed admiration for, the contribution of a man who is unquestionably a former terrorist. The courts could have a field day with the Prime Minister, who could end up behind bars as a result of the provisions.

The hon. Gentleman raises a possible unintended consequence. In fairness to the Prime Minister, I do not think that he has ever commended Mr. Adams for having committed terrorist offences. He has commended him for being a reformed terrorist, which is a slightly different concept—if indeed, Mr. Adams is reformed, a subject on which there is always a certain amount of speculation, given his membership, certainly in the past, of the IRA army council.

The scope of the definition of terrorism, which is linked to our other debate, is so wide that it encompasses all historical characters who took up arms against the state in any setting whatever.

I was struck by the hon. Gentleman's recollections of his student days. When he was at Oxford, did he ever see a poster of Che Guevara in a heroic pose? Did he share that experience—The hon. Member for East Lothian (Anne Moffat) says that this is serious. Taking away people's liberty is serious.[Interruption.]

Che Guevara was a student pin-up when I was at university; indeed, there were Che Guevara societies. There were commemorations of what people claimed was his heroic death and life, and of the fact that he was a freedom fighter or, as some would say, a terrorist, using force to combat what were regarded as capitalist and tyrannical regimes. There is no doubt that if someone were to glorify the activities of Che Guevara at a meeting where

"members of the public could reasonably be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as conduct that should be emulated in existing circumstances",

they would commit an offence. Furthermore, in relation to the term, "emulated in existing circumstances", one has to ask: existing circumstances, where? These are issues that the Minister really must address.

I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman recalls the statement that Churchill made in the middle of the war: "set Europe ablaze." That is what he said when he gave the job of running the Special Operations Executive to Hugh Dalton, who was a previous Member for my constituency. The SOE supplied the explosives for the resistance in Europe. That is particularly close to my heart since my Danish uncle used those explosives to blow up Nazi trains to disrupt Nazi communications. Would the hon. Gentleman like to comment on that example?

The hon. Lady makes a serious point. During the war, the Germans described those who were resisting them as terrorists. Indeed, that issue was not necessarily free of difficulty. I am half French by background. General de Gaulle had concerns that the violence being used by the resistance in France should be proportionate and focused, otherwise those involved could be reasonably classified as behaving as terrorists. Indeed, he tried to moderate them by saying that they should use complete force only when the liberation was at hand and it could be shown to produce a military goal. I simply cite that as an example of the very difficult grey areas that we must consider.

We still have a realistic case in Northern Ireland. A significant section of the community no doubt will hold commemorations to glorify the actions of the men of 1916. Clearly, that has a resonance with what is going on in our streets and towns in Northern Ireland today. Equally, others will celebrate the work of Carson and his volunteers, who defied Parliament and the Government. No doubt, that will have a resonance among many people in the streets and towns of Northern Ireland as well. The only defence that the Government have is that the DPP might not take a case to court in those circumstances. That is hardly a safe way for us to proceed, is it?

The hon. Gentleman is quite right. Of course, the commemorations of the Easter rising that are due to take place next year, sanctioned by the Irish Government, are undoubtedly a glorification of the actions of people who were regarded at the time as terrorist and, indeed, treated as terrorists during the rising by a large section of the Irish population. That is a simple truth. Subsequently, partly because of the folly of the British Government, those involved were turned into heroes, but that is not how they were viewed when the rising occurred. That absolutely epitomises the nature of the problem that we face.

The Government's response has tended to be that we need not worry because the DPP or the Attorney-General will deal with this problem in his selective application of the law, but that is not good enough. Glorification as an offence has no place in our law. I do not want to take up the House's time tonight—this issue has been rehearsed before—but the simple and easy solution is for Parliament and hon. Members collectively, and in no spirit of hostility to the Government, to say that we understand the origin of the idea that they have proposed but that, in truth, we do not care for it.

If the Government are not willing—I think that they are not—voluntarily to get rid of subsection (2) and the other subsections derived from it, we must do the job. That requires a vote, which is what amendment No. 3 is all about. I hope that the House, which has shown its independence today, will simply say that, of course we support the offence of indirect incitement to terrorism, but this glorification notion is a muddle. It will not help to prosecute those who need to be prosecuted. It will cause endless bother and send out a slightly tacky signal about how Parliament and the Government view individuals who express opinions in a sense about past events. We can deal with clerics, British National party leaders and others who may wish to invoke terrorism, violence or whatever they wish to do quite easily by keeping the Bill while deleting subsection (2) and the related subsections. That is why I commend amendment No. 3 to the House.

I entirely concur with the hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). There is no place for the offence on our statute book. I do not see the point of it, and that is not because I lack any vigour on fighting terrorism. I simply do not believe that it is a useful addition to the offences available to the police and prosecuting authorities to reduce the likelihood of terrorism.

Let us make no bones about this. The provision is clearly a vestigial remnant of an idea that must have sounded good on the day on which it was put forward by the Prime Minister, but that has been expunged elsewhere. The fragment of the Prime Minister's idea remains in the Bill, but I hope that we will clear it up today, which is why we have put our names to amendment No. 3.

The offence might have looked appropriate in 17th century legislation because it is the sort of thing that Parliament passed at that time. Parliament could afford a little imprecision in its terms in those days because it knew that it had a compliant judiciary that could be relied on to do the Executive's bidding. I can imagine some of my ancestors being prosecuted for glorification. They were transported as slaves after the rebellion in 1685. We had a wonderful judicial system in those days, as defendants were advised not to plead their innocence before the court because that would waste the court's time. We have moved on a long way since then.

The provision is drafted in such imprecise terms that it undermines the Government's rational case behind other measures in the Bill. Its chilling effect is that it has the capacity to worry a great many people who will never be prosecuted under the Bill. We have considered such an effect when we have dealt with other legislation. The fact that it might be possible to bring a perverse prosecution under the Bill could mean that people would think it better not to say what they had intended to say. However, that would lead to the serious curtailment of our free speech.

The Government have provided for other offences in the Bill. We have just debated the encouragement of terrorism. I have already said that I would prefer that activity to be termed as incitement because encouragement is a loose term. However, the concept of encouragement is a million times better than the strange offence of glorification. Labour Back Benchers made many valid contributions when we last discussed the matter and pointed out the dangers of the imprecision that was inherent in the measure.

I hope that the Government will be prepared to think again even at this late stage. I do not think that those in the other place who are well versed in law—certainly better versed than I am—will wear it for a moment. The provision will be struck out there, but as I have said on many occasions, it would be preferable for the elected House to do its job. Ministers claim to be looking for consensus on the Bill, but they know that there is a general consensus on the proper requirement to deal with people who incite terrorism in this country. They should listen to others and acknowledge that the provision will not achieve what they want.

We have heard fanciful and hyperbolic examples of what could be caught by the offence. Although they are useful for illustrative purposes, I do not think that anyone seriously assumes that the Attorney-General would prosecute anyone for the flimsy reasons that have been adduced as behaviour that could be caught by the offence. Of course, such prosecutions would not be brought. When we are legislating in the House, particularly when we introduce new offences that curtail the power of free speech, which some of us hold dear, we must be extremely careful and precise. We should know what is intended in the measures, and if we use hyperbole to illustrate our case we should do so with the intention of bringing the House to its senses so that it can understand the consequences of ill-considered legislation.

My hon. Friends and I have tabled amendments Nos. 31 and 30, which deal with the use of the word "glorification" in clause 21. I urge the Government to reconsider its inclusion, because we have terms to proscribe organisations under the Terrorism Act 2000. Only a few weeks ago, the Minister submitted to the House a further list of organisations that should be proscribed under that Act. The House agreed with her, albeit with concerns about one organisation. Generally, however, it was happy to accede to her view that those organisations should be proscribed under that legislation. If she is going to extend the terms of proscription to include the vague concept of glorification, a vast number of organisations around the world could be caught. Some of those organisations may have had a presence in this country, but that will not be the case for many of them, as we learned from the order that was laid before the House only a few weeks ago.

If we widen the scope of proscription, there will be intense diplomatic pressure on the Government to proscribe many organisations of which we know little. Another country's Government, for example, may say, "We have a problem with a certain organisation, which spends all its time saying what a wonderful thing it was that the statue of our President was blown up last week. That is entirely unacceptable. If Her Majesty's Government are serious about terrorism, when will you take the necessary steps to proscribe that organisation?" If we wish to maintain a good diplomatic relationship with that country, the pressure on the Home Secretary to accede to that request will be very strong indeed.

Is there not an important reason why this is not just a passing thing that can be ignored? The difficulty with effectively buying prosecution in this way is that we create circumstances in which political decisions appear to be made. Of course, that is not the case, but that is how it appears to other countries when they see that one organisation is subject to the law, but another is not. That is very dangerous: not only does it bring pressure to bear on the Government but it makes people feel hard done by if their organisation is dealt with in that way, while another is not.

The right hon. Gentleman is right, and the provision will prejudice British interests in future. People whom we call terrorists today may be freedom fighters tomorrow and the Government the day after. The measure therefore puts the country in the difficult position of receiving requests that we cannot possibly fulfil in the interests of justice, but with which diplomatic pressure and the immediate national interest will urge us to comply. That puts the Home Secretary in a difficult position for the sake of a definition that is not worth the candle. If terrorist and other organisations are covered by the wide definition of support for terrorist activities in the Terrorism Act 2000, it is right that we should proscribe their activities in this country. However, we do not need the flimsy excuse of glorification to extend those provisions, because the House has shown that it is prepared to act responsibly when presented with information by the Government, even when, for reasons of security and the need to protect the provenance of the information, it cannot be given the full facts. The House has been prepared to take on trust the advice of this very Minister in extending the provisions of the Terrorism Act. That trust may be strained if we accept the provision, as the grounds for proscription would then be that much weaker. That worries me because it is a serious step that the Government are taking in these instances, and we wish to protect the strength of the arguments behind it.

For those reasons, we will support the hon. Member for Beaconsfield if he chooses to press his amendment this evening, but I hope the Government will pre-empt that by saying that they will reconsider the clause and do the job that at earlier stages they implied that they might do, and look again at clause 21, which is unnecessarily widened by the provision.

If the Government were prepared to look again at the provision, that would be sensible. Clause 21 presents slightly different difficulties. There is agreement that the clause has some merit, but in its current formulation it is fundamentally flawed.

Precisely so. That is why I hope that even at this late stage the Minister will give an assurance that she will look again at the clause. I treat such assurances with a little more scepticism now than I did last week, because sometimes the assurance and even the statement in public of an intention to revise do not quite materialise in practice. Nevertheless, I am prepared to take at face value any assurances that the Minister is likely to give this evening. The House will wish the Bill to be improved in the way that has been suggested, and if the House does not demand that in the Division Lobbies this evening, I am confident that the other House will.

I support my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) on his amendment No. 3. I would support him in the Division Lobby if he pressed the argument that we should remove the subsection referring to glorification because, as he said, of its dangerous vagueness.

I spoke on the subject last week during the Committee stage, so I will not repeat the arguments that I advanced and the examples that I gave of incidents that might be caught by the Bill, such as people holding dinners in favour of one national hero or giving speeches in praise of another historic hero. I trust that the Minister will address herself to some of those when she replies.

I agree with the Liberal spokesman, the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), that one or two of the examples that we bandied about were rather fanciful. I doubt whether Robin Hood would fall within the clear definition of a terrorist, but some of the others were quite serious. I spoke last week about the Irish examples that could be cited on both sides of the political divide that has hitherto existed in Ireland, and there are other international ones as well.

In addition to adopting the arguments that I made last week, which were not met, I seek clarification about how international the application of the clause will be. I cannot anticipate a later group of amendments that deals in general with the commission of offences overseas, but in trying to envisage the problems that the insertion of the term "glorification" might create, it is important that we get clear in our minds whether we are speaking of incidents involving glorification in this country, or whether we are still liable to find that people are being prosecuted on allegations that they have glorified various violent people in their own territory, far away from this country.

The Government have tabled, and we will discuss later, amendment No. 48, which seeks to move towards some of the arguments that we used last week about extra-territoriality. The Bill will now apply only to offences committed by foreign nationals overseas if the offence falls within clauses 1 or 6. We are debating clause 1, which, as I see it, will continue to be enforced extra-territorially in this country in respect of an offence

"so far as it is committed in relation to any statement, instruction or training in relation to which that section has effect by reason of its relevance to the commission, preparation or instigation of one or more Convention offences".

We are discussing the power being applied extra-territorially only in so far as we are discussing a breach of a UN convention or the European convention on human rights, which this country is obliged to enforce extra-territorially. I regret to say that I have not had time to look up the relevant conventions, but I suspect that the Government's choice of phrase is not a word-for-word match. I am unsure whether a foreign national would suddenly be charged with an offence because they had said or done something in their own country before coming here that would amount to an offence if it had occurred in this country.

I shall move on to one of the more tricky examples. If someone in the Caucasus were to praise the Chechen rebels and their struggle against the Russian authorities, they would arguably commit an offence, although they might not appreciate it at the time. They would have praised the commission of an act, because they would undoubtedly have praised people who had participated in terrorism in circumstances in which it might be inferred that they were encouraging other people to join. It is almost certain that they would not have the first idea that they were breaking British law or were making themselves liable to conviction in a British court when they stood up to speak in some far-away town in the Caucasus and became carried away with their own version of patriotic fervour.

Such a person might come to this country and find that the Russian Government were demanding of the British Government that they should be arrested and dealt with on an extra-territorial basis, because they had committed the act of encouraging terrorism. If that is the case, I regard it as wholly objectionable, although I do not support anybody encouraging the commission of indiscriminate acts against civilians anywhere in the world, and I do not object to the law being enforced against such people.

A Bill that seeks to define the encouragement of terrorism in such general and uncertain terms should not be allowed to create an offence of worldwide application. Furthermore, the British Attorney-General should not be put in a situation in which he or she is subject to political pressure from a foreign Government to start arresting people who come here, because, in that Government's opinion, one of their citizens has committed an offence under the Bill.

Clause 1 would be improved by the deletion of subsection (2), but the key point is that subsection (2) should not be applied to the opponents of President Chavez in Venezuela or those who lead uprisings in Chiapas in Mexico or in the Caucasus. It would be preposterous if the Government were still contemplating the possibility of using that vague wording to start arresting people, if such people were unwise enough to visit this country after making over-stirring and over-excited speeches in the country from which they came.

Would not the Government have to take for granted the information laid before them by a foreign Government? I am thinking about the wholly unjustified attempt to prosecute a Belgian priest in the war-torn areas of Rwanda. It would not be helpful if this Government were pressurised by such a Government to take action against such a person, because we would be unable to make a judgment, except on the advice of the foreign Government who were demanding action.

I agree with my right hon. Friend. That is one reason to be particularly cautious when hon. Members try to claim extra-territorial jurisdiction and give it to our courts. The problem with any offence of any kind that is committed outside the United Kingdom is that it is extremely difficult to get evidence in order to try the case properly and fairly before a British court. It is, however, likely in such cases that a Government who felt a sense of grievance would find it less difficult to start producing what they would describe as "prosecution evidence" than an unfortunate dissident citizen who was suddenly arrested and faced a charge in this country. I am sure that the Government of Russia would facilitate the attendance of whoever had overheard this stirring speech made on the occasion of some dinner in Georgia, or wherever, and would be able to provide the prosecution authorities in this country with the necessary evidence. The unfortunate man who suddenly found himself arrested—

Order. I think that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will anticipate why I have intervened at this point. I understand that when he began his speech he put it in the form of a query to the Minister. He is, as I think he knows, very much dealing with a group of amendments that comes a little later on. He should therefore be restrained in what he says.

You have been indulgent, Mr. Deputy Speaker. However, I trust that it is in order to press my question on the Minister, because a judgment of the desirability of the clause in its current vaguely drafted form is more clearly made if one knows whether it has a purely domestic application to British events or a worldwide application that might be evoked in circumstances such as those I am describing.

As I understand it, the Bill certainly has an extra-territorial application. Interestingly, although the Government have made some concessions in restricting extra-territoriality for some offences, they have not done so for the offence in clause 1. The points raised by my right hon. and learned Friend are entirely apposite—one can make a speech in the Caucasus and be prosecuted for it in Britain.

I accept your doubtless correct ruling, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that I should not press the detail of my question much further.

I heard the opinion expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield. It looks to me as though clause 1 is relevant only insofar as it is relevant to the application of the convention, but that is not wholly clear, and I hope that the Minister will clarify it. As she knows, I do not like the references to glorification in any event, and the whole thing is made more undesirable, unattractive and fraught with political risk if it turns out to have universal application.

The word "glorification" is pretty unusual. Its only regular use is in the formularies of the Church of England and the Church of Rome, where it has a particular religious meaning. If one walked down a high street saying, "I'm just about to go and do a bit of glorification", it would be thought at least a bit odd.

The problem with the provision is that it is left over from a previous attempt to try to react satisfactorily to the understandable anger of people in Britain about the seeming ability of clerics from various organisations, among others, to talk in a hot-headed manner and thereby seemingly encourage people to accept actions that are manifestly dangerous and unpleasant. The Minister needs to be very careful about things that are left over and no longer of any use. The appendix, for example, is a particularly nasty part of the body in the sense that it causes a great deal of harm to no discernible good effect. That is because it is left over from a use that it once had but does not have any more. It would have been much better had the Almighty so organised the process of evolution that we got rid of it altogether. I suspect that that is precisely what we should be doing with this part of the clause. It would be much better to get rid of it altogether because the residuum is not sufficient to grant any important advantage.

I have tried hard to invent a case that could properly be prosecuted with the possibility of seven years' imprisonment and could not be prosecuted under any other subsection in the clause, let alone the rest of the Bill. So far, I have been unable to do so other than by reaching to those furthest shores that some people have visited in explaining why glorification is so dangerous to history teachers and so on. It is almost impossible to imagine circumstances in which the provision creates any additional defence of freedom or opposition to terrorism that could properly be used. It does not make sense.

Introducing into British law an offence of glorification is seriously dangerous. The word "glorification" is so loose, difficult to define and varied in people's understanding of it that it will become a dangerous precedent for the Government.

My right hon. Friend referred to ecclesiastical language at the beginning of his speech. Is not it dangerous, when those who mean us harm already try to use religion inappropriately to justify their actions, to use terminology in our legislation that would perhaps enable them to do that more, rather than less, easily?

My hon. Friend has put his finger on the reason for my unhappiness with the word. He is right that, if ever there were a subject about which our language should be clinical and avoid overtones that might have the effect that he described, we are considering it. He is right to point out why it is so dangerous.

However, it is also dangerous for another reason. If glorification were some residuum of a law that was passed in 1734 and somebody suggested that it would be a good idea to get rid of it because it was no longer useful or might be used badly, the answer would be the same as the one the Minister has given in previous debates: it is perfectly safe because nobody could use it and there is always the gate of the Director of Public Prosecutions and others. That works if it applies to a provision that has been in desuetude for a long time. However, we are proposing a new provision. It would be difficult in 2006 to say that we did not mean legislation of 2005 to apply to a case. We could not claim that it was a jeu d'esprit or a little twiddle in an otherwise dull Bill. It would be hard to argue that. The intention to include it in such a serious measure is therefore genuinely problematic for the Government. Let me define the three specific problems.

First, the Government should not underestimate the extent to which the Director of Public Prosecutions can be perceived by those who do not understand the process as a political figure. We all have experience in our lifetimes of examples when, because the Director of Public Prosecutions has or has not allowed something, it has been suggested that Ministers have leaned on him. That is a mean, unpleasant and unfair suggestion but it should nevertheless be avoided rather than encouraged.

Secondly, the provision becomes an even greater danger if extra-territoriality—I am delicate in my references because of your earlier, proper restrictions, Mr. Deputy Speaker—turns out to apply to the extent that my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) suggests. Those who may wish to put pressure on the Government are even less likely to understand the independent position of the Director of Public Prosecutions if they are from countries where such an independent position does not exist. The example given by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) of the Russians and the Chechen rebels, or my own example of the Rwandan authorities and the Belgian priest, would in those circumstances become even more germane. The Government would be likely to have pressure brought to bear on them by people who were not going to take seriously the fact that this great independent figure, the Director of Public Prosecutions—so unknown anywhere else—was the gate that had prevented a prosecution from taking place.

Thirdly, I beg the Minister to recognise that this legislation as a whole has struck a very sharp note for many people among the ethnic minorities in this country. The Home Secretary was utterly right, in answering an earlier intervention, to point out the enormous support for law and order and the opposition to terrorism that we find among the Muslim community. Unfortunately, he was not answering the question that he had been asked. It was a very good answer to a question on that subject, but that was not the question that the hon. Member for Stoke-on-Trent, Central (Mark Fisher) had asked him. I am not going to stray from the subject of glorification, Mr. Deputy Speaker—

Order. I am very grateful that the right hon. Gentleman has glorification very much in his sights. I was beginning to worry that he had moved on to a Third Reading speech, and our Third Reading debate is tomorrow.

Be it far from me, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

I was trying to say that what was true in that discussion becomes germane when we think of glorification. I cannot believe that a simple explanation or understanding of the word "glorification" would be universal among the Muslim community. It might be, among some people, but that would be unusual. I do not know what its translation into the various languages involved would be, and it would be improper to refer to them in the House in any case. However, glorification is a concept that is not easy to pass around between those who have lived all their lives knowing it in its ecclesiastical context, and far more so for those who have had no such knowledge. There is a real problem that glorification could easily be misinterpreted by those in the ethnic community when they came to explain to their friends what the word meant.

This is one of the most dangerous parts of the Bill. If the word "glorification" were misinterpreted by some, it could lead to people expecting a prosecution, because of the way in which they had interpreted it, only to have that expectation dashed because this curious figure, the Director of Public Prosecutions, had said, "No, this is the sort of glorification that you can go in for. There are other sorts that you cannot go in for." The prosecution would therefore be prevented.

The whole of the Bill has been overshadowed by the misinterpretation of many of the Government's views. There is so much misinformation out there, and if we consider that alongside our discussions of other Bills—which we shall no doubt discuss again here—we see too many opportunities for misunderstanding being opened up among the minorities in this country. Clarity and sharpness in the language that we use is absolutely essential, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) so clearly pointed out.

I turn now to the breadth of the circumstances in which the concept of glorification could be used. Unlike some of her colleagues, the Minister is not someone who eschews history. There is a tendency on the Labour Benches to talk as though nothing that happened before last week actually counts or has any real reference to today. I am one of those who thinks that if everyone learned a bit more history, they would have a bit more humility about the excellence of today's ideas. History is important, and many of us like to be pretty biased about our history. I am pretty biased against Carson, and pretty much in favour of a number of those people whom I would see as freedom fighters in earlier years in Ireland. I have a pretty clear view of that, and history is made much more interesting if one takes sides in relation to it.

I have therefore been guilty of an offence under the Bill over many years, although I hope that the DPP will not enforce it against me. In my enthusiastic pursuit of history, I have glorified a number of people who, in fighting for freedom, behaved in a way to which we would probably object today, largely because we live in a democracy and there are alternative ways of putting one's case forward. One of the things that the Government have found so difficult throughout consideration of the Bill has been to understand that in many cases people have had to take action in a way that has meant the loss of life, because there was no other way of righting terrible wrong. In such cases, the fault lies with the system and the Government, rather than with those who took up arms to uphold such a right.

Does my right hon. Friend agree that there is a strange sense in the Bill, and particularly in the glorification clause, of a refusal to recognise that the use of force to remove a tyrannical regime can ever be justified?

I find that particularly peculiar from a Government who have entered, in my view, an entirely illegal and immoral war, and who have explained it, with hindsight, precisely on such grounds. The Government must accept, however, that there are cases today, and there have been cases in the past, in which such action must be justified. I could not discuss the regime in Burma without giving evidence of the fact that I think that it ought to be overthrown, and if it were overthrown, and in the course of that some activities that would be terrorist in this country took place there, I think that I would condone them.

Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that 1.8 billion people in the world today live under military dictatorships or one-party states in which there is no political opposition? We are not talking about a tiny minority but a large proportion of the population of the world today.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. What we must do—I have been accused in the past of doing it—is to put ourselves into the situation. I seem to remember an occasion on which I graphically explained why I thought a certain product was safe by doing that. I believe that that is the only thing that a politician should do. When I say that I think this or that, I must ask whether I think it in relation to me. Earlier, many of us voted against the 90 days. In doing so, I was not thinking of people a long way away but of what I would think, or of what my children would think, if they were arrested and locked up for 90 days. Many people, I am afraid, think about what other people, whom they do not really like very much, might think.

The same is true with glorification. What would I think were I living under a military regime? I think that I would be bound to take part in activities that the regime would certainly see as terrorist. I hope that I would be brave enough to do so—that would be my only problem. If I cannot glorify those who are brave enough to do so, however, I lack an important part of my freedom of expression.

My right hon. Friend mentioned Burma, and to do so in my presence is to do the equivalent of pricking me with a needle. I entirely agree with what he said about glorification. May I put it to him that if one believes as strongly as I do that the savage and bestial military junta in Burma is among the most oppressive and sadistic regimes in the world, it is not difficult to persuade oneself that the Karen National Liberation Army and others who are engaged in a sometimes violent attempt to overthrow it are engaged in activity that we should glorify and of which we can be proud? If the Government cannot see that, they do not see much.

The Government cannot turn around and say, "We are allowed to do that. This refers to something quite different." I very much dislike the idea of extending the Government's powers so that they can decide what is and is not suitable for me to glorify.

That is my first objection. My second is this. If the clause does not refer to that, how can it refer to anything that is not covered by the rest of the clause, which deals with the encouragement of terrorism? That is the distinction that seems to me so difficult. If it does mean something different, what it means seems to me to be something that should not be made illegal and punishable by seven years' imprisonment. It is part of life that we must put ourselves in the position in which others find themselves and, in doing that, we may have to glorify actions which we would not only consider entirely wrong in our own democratic society, but might well not have the guts to perform ourselves, in view of fatal flaws that might result from not having been pressurised in the same way.

There is, then, a genuine present reason for the amendment. Let me end by suggesting a reason from the past. I was lucky enough to be taught history very enthusiastically. Part of my historical bias arises from a wish to fight out again the issues that mattered at the time. The glorification clause could so easily be seen as a restriction. I am sure that that will not be the case in the classroom or the local authority, but I warn the Minister that the BBC and organisations that deal with the national press are all too likely to say, "I think this may be a bit dangerous. Let's not do it quite like that." Our experience of people allowing the public to see what an abortion is actually like—which is not glorification—shows what happens if organisations such as the BBC and ITV are allowed to control the expression of powerful feelings and emotions more than is absolutely necessary.

For obvious reasons, I am rather opposed to attempts to blow up Parliament. I also happen to think that Guy Fawkes was encouraged by the establishment of the time. It seems to me that Lord Cecil, in the good tradition of that long-standing family, was right in the middle of it, and I have no doubt that he knew what was going on and encouraged it. I am not as unhappy about Guy Fawkes as some would be, simply because I think he was a cat's paw whose activity was much closer to the Reichstag fire than people are normally allowed to believe.

Would my right hon. Friend care to pay tribute to Lord Monteagle, who came from my constituency and is still revered there? It was he who gave the warning about the gunpowder plot that saved our predecessors.

Order. May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to do no such thing? I think that he has pushed this to the limit.

I shall not glorify any of those people, thus protecting myself from the clause.

There are circumstances in which terrorism is seen in different lights in different places. In democracies, people have a right to expect an obedience to the law that they do not have a right to expect in military dictatorships. In today's world, we have a right to expect obedience to the law in a way that would not have applied in Britain 100, 200 or 300 years ago—not necessarily mainland Britain, but certainly the island of Ireland. It ill behoves us to pass legislation that is the Prime Minister's appendix: the bit left over, an entirely different piece of the jigsaw that has unfortunately been left there and will, if we leave it still, have much the same effect as a grumbling appendix. We do not need it but we need to deal with it, and the only way to do so firmly is to cut it out.

It is a privilege to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer). My objection to this clause is largely based on the fact that it is a pointless excrescence and a wholly unnecessary appendage. It resides in the Bill solely for the reason that the Government announced over the summer that they would criminalise glorification, and so had to leave some reference to glorification in the Bill.

It is clear on examining the relevant part of the clause that, in any event, it is used only as an example of the kind of conduct that the clause proscribes in an earlier part. It is an inclusive statement that simply points the way to the all-embracing umbrella section, which makes it an offence indirectly to encourage a terrorist act. As my right hon. Friend said, it is a pernicious and pointless appendage that has no place in legislation made by this House.

The common law has always been extremely careful to ensure that the proscription of speech is precise, carefully targeted and narrowly defined. That is why the common law has always proscribed the incitement of specific acts of violence. On examining the common law offence of incitement, one sees that the ingredients require that an accused person must—must—have incited a specific act identifiable and particularised by the Crown in the indictment. But the clause and this specific section of it simply enable the glorification of a type of conduct, with no need for a specific act to have been encouraged or incited.

The dangers have been dwelt on by Members in all parts of the House, but my right hon. Friend put his finger on a particularly important point. Among the many examples that Members have used, we have heard some that are fanciful and others that are more realistic. The glorification of some heroes of the past has been dismissed by Ministers as the product of fevered fantasy, but the truth is that a more subtle and insidious danger arises from this clause remaining in the Bill.

Let us suppose that a speech was made at Hyde park corner by an English nationalist who wished to sing the praises of Hereward the Wake. That it should even be thought that the glorification of the conduct of Hereward the Wake—who led an uprising, as I recall, against the Normans—could in any respect be in danger of being criminalised or made illegal by this Bill might attract from us smiles and a degree of risibility, and we would doubtless be right. The Director of Public Prosecutions would greet with consternation and dismay any lunatic who even proposed the idea that a speaker on Hyde park corner singing the praises of Hereward the Wake might invoke the penalty under this clause.

Let us suppose that the speaker on Hyde park corner was not white. Let us suppose that he was a Muslim, and that he was glorifying and praising not Hereward the Wake, but the actions of Saladin. Let us suppose that he was holding out for emulation the actions of Saladin in the wars that he fought against Christian civilisation for two or three decades or more. Let us consider the circumstances of the time and take into account the particular factors of the speaker's audience, which might include not only ordinary Londoners going about their business, but one or two Muslims, perhaps some of the Arab race and some who were susceptible to the message of waging a crusade against Christian civilisation. The speaker might notice them coming from the local mosque; he might see them gathering around his soapbox on the corner of Hyde park. I do not know whether there is, in fact, a mosque local to Hyde park, but let us suppose that there is one and that gathering around our speaker is a crowd of turbaned Arab and Muslim people.

Still, our Hyde park speaker continues to sing the praises of Saladin and begins to discern the murmuring and sussuration—[Hon. Members: "Ooh!"]—yes, sussuration and I shall be providing a few more soon. He senses the restiveness of his audience and begins to see that, although he has perfectly innocent intentions, his praise of Saladin—a great hero of the Arab race—is beginning to excite an intemperate reaction among his audience. Perhaps, we might say, a wise speaker would button his lip. A wise man would cease to speak at that point, climb down from his soapbox and immediately go silent. However, it would be too late, for he would already have committed a crime because he would have glorified in circumstances where he could see—[Interruption.] I notice that the Minister is looking at me in consternation, but for 23 years I have practised law in the criminal courts of this country, and let me tell her and Government Members that more stupid prosecutions have been brought than that—far more.

It may interest Government Members to know that I spent most of my time defending lost causes. Perhaps that is why I am a Tory.

Here is my point, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We cannot look lightly on a clause of this type in this Bill, which could on so slender a footing lead someone into the commission of a crime, even if unwittingly and inadvertently, even if the person did not mean or intend it, or even if the circumstances gathered around him were not of his own volition and cause. It would be crazy for the House to allow such a clause to pass.

I may be wrong, but I recollect that Winston Churchill once said that if he had been a Boer, he would have fought in the field against British forces. If that is correct, how would that be viewed in relation to the clause?

He was not a bore, but I may be one. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that Churchill's comment, particularly if made among the right audience—that is what is so pernicious about the offence; it depends so much on unpredictable local and special factors—could have fallen foul of the clause. It depends not only on the factors of one's audience, but on who is doing the speaking. If I spoke praise of Saladin, it is likely to excite little impression on the minds of radicalised youth, but if I happened to be an imam and started to talk about Saladin, the code that I might be using could fall foul. That is effectively what the offence is designed to tackle—using code to incite or encourage terrorism. That is the meaning of the phrase "indirectly encouraging". It refers to encouragement by a sort of code. If I were an imam praising Saladin to my congregation, I would be committing an offence under the clause.

Does the hon. Gentleman believe that any of his examples could possibly pass the test that the Attorney-General would set before sending them on for prosecution? Also, he has told the House about his legal background. If I ever find myself in trouble, will he assure me that he will not offer his services?

Yes, the right hon. Gentleman probably could not afford them.

The point about the Attorney-General's discretion is a very serious one. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal said, the Attorney-General will have to decide when a form of speech is an offence under the clause. Will that depend on the race of the speaker or on his religion? The answer is yes: no impression would be excited if I were to praise Saladin in such circumstances, but it would be if I were an imam. The context would be wholly different. The Attorney-General will have to decide the factors involved, and there is no place in our law for a discretion of such width.

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a danger that our opponents, enemies and people who want to act against the state might be encouraged to make such statements and provocations? In that way they could force the Attorney-General to make a decision and thus drag the matter into the political firmament.

I entirely agree that that is one more danger.

In conclusion, the Home Secretary said earlier that the proposed offence was intended to deal with the creation of the moral climate that allowed terrorist acts to be committed. However, to legislate to prevent the creation of a moral climate, as opposed to the incitement of specific acts of violence in specific circumstances, is to go too far. I urge the Minister to think again. If the amendment is pressed to a vote, I urge the House to support it.

I am grateful to be called to speak in this debate, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but perhaps not so grateful to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox). However, I shall do my best.

I fully understand the Government's inclination to respond to people's heightened emotional state in respect of terrorism and to respond to those who talk about terrorism in positive terms. We all find such talk very distasteful, but the Government appear to be falling into the trap of making something distasteful into something illegal. There is a big difference, and my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) raised the fundamental issue about the clause when he asked what sort of action would be covered by the word "glorification" that would not be covered by "encouragement" yet still attract punishment under the criminal law.

I believe that no action meets the circumstances of that definition. If that belief is correct, the Government are creating with this clause a piece of law that can have only two possible fates—it will be misused, or it will not be used at all. If the latter is the case, the provision will simply gather dust. Prosecutors will not use it because it is inappropriate to put before a jury, but either fate is unacceptable for a facet of the criminal law.

My second concern has to do with the points raised already about the role of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I understand the Government's argument that there is no need to worry about the clause because, although it may be completely inappropriate in all sorts of circumstances, the DPP will put his foot down and prevent it from being used. That seems a profoundly unfortunate position for a Government to be in when proposing a clause to be part of the criminal law. It may be that the DPP currently in office will be able to protect us from all the different situations in which a glorification charge would be inappropriate. It may also be that the next three or four holders of the office will do so. Surely, however, we in this House must make law that will stand as good law, and not simply as law that needs to be propped up by the DPP, or, worse, law from which the DPP needs to protect us. It is fundamentally unsatisfactory to propose legislation that would have that effect.

If we are to look beyond the immediate compass of the current situation—I accept that that situation makes the Government worry about how we deal with it—it must surely be right to construct legislation today and this week that will stand the test of time and enable us to be confident that it will not be misused in future. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Suffolk, Coastal said, the concept of glorification—indeed, the term itself—does not currently form part of the criminal law. It seems to me that there is good reason for that: it is too broad, too ephemeral and too difficult to define, and if that is so, the fact that it has no place in the criminal law is frankly because it deserves no place there. It will create difficulties in the future. I ask the Government to reconsider that part of this clause.

The Minister knows that there is a good deal of support for a great part of the Bill, and even for a great part of the clause. I fully appreciate that those who encourage terrorism should be penalised. We can, however, do that without needing to criminalise a concept called glorification, and I invite the Minister to consider what it is that is glorification but is not encouragement but should still be criminal. That is the crucial point of the debate, and without an answer on it, we cannot be confident that the clause should remain.

I am grateful to those who tabled the amendments for allowing us to revisit this area. I shall endeavour to respond to the contributions made, which have ranged from Wat Tyler to Hereward the Wake through all points in between. I am grateful to hon. Members who acknowledged that some of the examples given have been—I think this was the term used—fanciful. I am grateful, too, for acknowledgements that this is a serious matter, although I must tell the hon. Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox) that terrorism is a serious issue and the tone in which he made some of his contribution really did not reflect that seriousness.

I remind the House that we had a pledge in our election manifesto to outlaw the glorification of terrorism. We originally had a stand-alone offence but have come now to the formulation in clause 1. Lord Carlile, our independent reviewer of the legislation, says that

"in my view, this proposal in its revised form is a proportionate response to the real and present danger of young radically minded people being persuaded towards terrorism by apparently authoritative tracts wrapped in a religious or quasi-religious context".

So, Lord Carlile agrees that in the revised form—not as a stand-alone offence but as something encapsulated in clause 1—the response is a proportionate one.

The Minister must explain what its purpose is. If glorification can amount to incitement without being separately spelled out, the subsection simply is not needed and produces a misleading impression and places emphasis on a particular activity, when all sorts of other activities could also constitute incitement to terrorism.

The hon. Gentleman must have a little patience and allow me to explain the point. He has made that point on innumerable occasions, and I shall deal with it. I repeat that Lord Carlile thinks that the provision is proportionate and the proper thing for us to do.

It is right to highlight "glorification" in clause 1 and I direct the hon. Gentleman's attention to clause 1(2) which says that, for the purposes of direct or indirect incitement,

"offences include every statement which . . . glorifies the commission or preparation . . . of . . . offences."

The use of the word "include" means that we do not have a stand-alone offence of glorification, but statements of glorification are included within the ambit of the direct or indirect incitement in clause 1. That is the point that the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) made in his thoughtful contribution. It is important to include reference to glorification for the very reason that it is a new concept to our courts and, therefore, we need to provide the courts with a guide to the kind of behaviour that we are trying to ensure is covered through the direct and indirect incitement provision.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said that he found the provision "a distasteful concept". Well, most of us would find statements that glorify, praise and celebrate terrorism in a way that is likely to encourage others to emulate terrorism more than distasteful. We find them completely unacceptable. The hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth was generous enough to acknowledge that we do now face a new kind of threat from international terrorism, including people making the sort of statements that we have not heard in the past. Therefore, although the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer) was kind enough to say that I am not the sort of person who ignores history, I am the sort of person who wants to ensure that our law is fit to address some of the new threats that we face as well as our experience in the past. There is universal acknowledgement in this House that the threat that we face from international terrorism now is significantly different from threats that we have faced in the past.

I appreciate what the Minister says and what she is attempting do. However, given the wide definition of terrorism and the link to the very broad definition of glorification, the danger is that the Bill will catch not the people she is seeking to catch, but others. If I may give a more contemporary example, thousands of honest citizens in the UK supported the Chilean refugees who were on the run from the Pinochet regime, which deemed them to be terrorists. Is not that the problem with the Bill?

We debated that point at great length in Committee and we went through all the different examples. The glorification part of this offence also has to fulfil the other provisions of clause 1. That means that there has to be intent, or recklessness, or the objective definition of recklessness. A statement also has to be one that encourages terrorism and encourages people to emulate such behaviour. The offence contains a series of different elements that have to be completed before there is any prospect of a prosecution.

Several hon. Members have suggested that the only safeguard is the Director of Public Prosecutions. That is not the case. There is a series of seven hurdles, which I have now set out three times at the Dispatch Box, of the different component parts of the offence, all of which have to be completed before a prosecution could be brought. Someone would have to condone or glorify terrorism in such a way that the persons hearing his statement would be encouraged to commit an act of terrorism or emulate that behaviour. It is not simply glorification or condoning that form the offence, because there is the second limb of the likely effect on the audience and what it would be encouraged to do.

It is helpful to have the list that the Minister has given. However, someone might say, to a person who was here in the circumstances I described a minute ago, "What you faced was terrible. I hope that you go home, take your country back and make it democratic." That short conversation would fulfil all the obligations for the offence, except the decision by the DPP.

My hon. Friend the Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody), who is no longer in the Chamber, made an important point earlier when she said that someone could preface their remarks with the statement that they do not condone or endorse acts of terrorism or encouraging people to kill others. They could express sympathy and even support for the activity, but not in a way that encourages people to commit acts of terrorism.

I am interested in the Minister's endorsement of the words of the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mrs. Dunwoody), as she has just provided a let-out for every person who wants to incite terrorism. If all that is required to get around the clause is to preface one's remarks with that saving clause, why are we passing clause 1 into law? That is a classic illustration of the muddled thinking behind the Government's approach. The Government should remove glorification and stick to incitement, with proper terminology. They will then have an offence that works, that bites and, moreover, that commands widespread respect.

It will be no surprise for Members to hear that I do not agree with the hon. Gentleman. Yet again, he is stuck in the traditional analysis—we can do things only in a certain way, because that is how we have always done them. He is not prepared to look at some of the novel challenges and threats that we face in this new situation, or to try to adapt the law to ensure that we meet those threats in a proper way.

I want to press on.

Unfortunately, there are young and impressionable people in our society who can all too easily be manipulated by people preaching or advocating a message of hate. Such people can create the climate of hate in which terrorism can more easily flourish. That is what we are trying to tackle with the offence. I remind the House that the terms of the offence are clear. Simply condoning terrorism, or even glorifying it, will not be sufficient to constitute a criminal offence. The glorification must take place in such a way that the person making the statement must intend it or be reckless as to its effect. The statement must have an effect on the audience, who must be encouraged to emulate the behaviour. Because the offence includes all those components, it would address all the illustrations bandied around the House to express genuine or, in some cases, not so genuine concern.

The offence is complex. It has two limbs: what someone does and what the effect is. That combination should be sufficient to reassure people that we are trying to focus on the mischief of those who make statements to vulnerable young people that could draw them into extremism, without casting our net so wide that we catch people where it is inappropriate. I have genuinely tried to formulate the provisions so that they attack that mischief, which I hope everybody acknowledges is a real threat to us, but without drawing people in too widely.

Does the Minister accept that the Burmese regime would consider that I was glorifying terrorism when I initiated an Adjournment debate to congratulate the Karen people on fighting for their freedom?

There is a difference between expressing support for people's actions and that further step where a person makes the statements that they intend or are reckless about and that they know are likely to encourage others to engage in acts of terrorism. That is what the provision is aimed at and it is perfectly proper to bring it into effect.

Some Members have suggested that the provisions are unnecessary. If that were the case, we would not have included them. They provide the courts with a useful guide as to the type of conduct that Parliament wants to cover in the new legislation. Moreover, if they were to be removed at this stage the courts could interpret that as meaning that we did not intend such conduct to be covered. If the provisions were removed, I am concerned that courts could consider that acts of glorification, celebrating, exalting and praising terrorism were not the type of behaviour that should be covered under direct or indirect incitement. They are an important illustration to the courts of the type of behaviour that we want to cover.

The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 provides an analogy—albeit on a difference scale—that helped me to understand the clause, as the Act includes a description of the type of conduct involved in harassment. When the concept of harassment was introduced, it was new to the courts, so the Act described the type of conduct that would be covered, to assist and guide the courts in interpreting that criminal offence.

This provision is certainly similar because it would tell the courts that we are considering behaviour that glorifies, celebrates or exalts terrorism and that it should be included in direct or indirect incitement in accordance with clause 1, so it is very helpful indeed. Any suggestion that praising Robin Hood would fall into that category is very far of the mark.

I understand that the Minister is saying that the glorification provision is designed to be a guideline and an assistance to the courts—I follow that argument—but does she not accept that, as a result of what has been said in the debate, if for no other reason, problems are associated with glorification that are not associated with encouragement? I simply return to a point that has been made many times to which I have not yet heard the answer. What does glorification give us that encouragement does not?

As I have tried to explain, the glorification provision is a guide to the courts that the behaviour of celebrating and praising terrorism is the kind of conduct that would meet the direct and indirect incitement definition, so it is a useful addition because we now face the threat of people glorifying terrorism. Those people are very careful to try to ensure that they do not fall within the criminal definition, so it is important that we can tell the courts which sort of behaviour we want to outlaw.

The hon. Member for Beaconsfield said that, if someone's glorification of terrorism amounted to direct or indirect incitement, such behaviour should be criminalised. That is exactly what we seek to do in subsection (2), which says that glorification includes the behaviour set out in clause 1. He has said that he accepts that such behaviour ought to be criminalised. I can therefore see no reason why he has a problem with the glorification provision. I cannot understand his fundamental objection, other than that he finds the concept of glorification distasteful. I am afraid that we are here not to legislate on the basis of what he finds distasteful in terms of a concept of English law, but to set out what we think is important in tackling this very real mischief.

Should public support for the violent overthrow by long-suffering citizens of a brutal dictatorship ordinarily be criminal?

What should be criminal is the indirect incitement and the encouragement of people to commit acts of terrorism. Clearly, when we come to the other clauses—we may not have a chance to debate them—I want to deal with the points about extra-territorial jurisdiction made by the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe (Mr. Clarke) and the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal (Mr. Gummer). Again, with some of the amendments that we have introduced, we have tried to narrow the scope of those offences to try to reassure hon. Members that they are targeted at the specific mischief. However, if the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow) is asking whether I can pick and choose between regimes or perhaps between a good terrorist and a bad terrorist, I repeat that it is wrong for people to encourage others to undertake terrorist acts. As I have said, it is a slippery slope—

Hang on a minute.

As I said in Committee, we are on a slippery slope if we start to try to pick and choose between different regimes.

I wholeheartedly welcome the commitment made by the Home Secretary today to refer the thorny issue of the definition of terrorism to Lord Carlile and to ask him to report to the House within a year. That issue has exercised many of us, and it is a very difficult one to get right. I cannot think of anyone better than the noble lord, given his track record, to report to us. I am extremely grateful to my right hon. Friend and to the Home Secretary for recognising that concern and for at least giving us a possible way forward.

I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that contribution. He will know that we have put a copy of the letter from the Home Secretary to him in the Library. The letter sets out the fact that there will be consultation with those in the House who can make a relevant contribution, such as Chairs of Select Committees and no doubt other hon. Members who will want to get involved in the review process. That will be a practical way of reviewing the legislation—[Interruption.]

Goodness me, what a choice before me. I give way to the hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack).

Does the right hon. Lady agree with me that it would be rather a good idea if the people of Zimbabwe rose up and overthrew Mugabe?

I am genuinely surprised at the hon. Gentleman. I do not think that it is a good idea in the House of Commons to get involved in making such statements. On reflection, do we want to get into the business of encouraging people to carry out violent acts against other individuals? There might be circumstances in which we can have that debate. Our legislation is focused on situations in which individuals either deliberately or recklessly encourage people—especially our young people in this country, who can be vulnerable to being drawn into extremism—to engage in terrorist acts. There is a real danger of that in this country given the new threat of international terrorism that is facing us all. It is not just a threat; I remind the House of what has happened in this country. We face a serious situation.

Order. It is entirely in the Minister's hands to decide whether to give way. Once again, may I ask for the level of conversation to be reduced?

I was going to address the points made by the right hon. Member for Suffolk, Coastal and the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe.

I do not think that the right hon. and learned Member for Rushcliffe is in the Chamber, but it was good that he popped in to see us. He will know that amendment No. 48 is an attempt to narrow the extra-territorial jurisdiction. The measures in clause 1 that we are discussing would apply only to convention offences because if we are to be able to ratify international conventions on the matter and comply with our international obligations, we have to ensure that there is extra-territorial jurisdiction. Other states will be doing exactly that, too. There are circumstances in which we refuse to extradite people to states in which offences take place, such as for human rights reasons. We thus must have the extra-territorial jurisdiction to allow us to carry out a prosecution here for an offence on which we are unwilling to extradite for good reasons. We have tabled further amendments on extra-territorial jurisdiction to narrow its reach as an attempt to address genuine concerns that were raised about the worldwide jurisdiction of the Bill.

The hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) talked about pressure from other Governments and raised the question of the glorification of proscription offences in clause 21. We will make a proper and full assessment of organisations, without any preconceptions, to examine the criteria that apply to proscription. We will then reach a proper view on the basis of the evidence. Clause 21 addresses the fact that promoting or encouraging terrorism will include glorification. It is proper for us to say that if organisations glorify terrorism, they should not operate in this country and draw young people into extremism.

The final point that I wanted to make was—

It being three hours after the commencement of proceedings on amendments relating to clause 1, Madam Deputy Speaker put the Question already proposed from the Chair, pursuant to Order [this day].

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

Madam Deputy Speaker then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.

Remaining Government amendments agreed to.

European Commnunity Documents

Motion made, and Question put forthwith, pursuant to Standing Order No. 119(9) (European Standing Committees),

Nominal Quantities for Pre-packed Products

That this House takes note of European Union Document No. 15570/04, Draft Directive laying down rules on nominal quantities for pre-packed products, repealing Council Directives 75/106/EEC and 80/232/EEC, and amending Council Directive 76/211/EEC; and supports the Government's aim of substantial deregulation, so that most products should be free from restrictions as to quantity.—[Gillian Merron.]

Question agreed to.

Petitions

IsItFair Campaign

I wish to present a petition on behalf of the Weston-super-Mare senior citizens forum and the Winscombe and district senior citizens forum, of which I have the honour to be president.

The petition declares:

That the year-on-year, inflation-busting increases in Council Tax are causing hardship to many and take no account of ability to pay; further that the proposed property revaluation and re-banding exercise will make an already flawed system even worse.

The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons votes to replace Council Tax with a fair and equitable tax that, without recourse to any supplementary benefit, takes into account ability to pay from disposable income. Such tax to be based on a system that is free from any geographical or politically motivated discrimination, and that clearly identifies the fiscal and managerial responsibilities of all involved parties.

And the Petitioners remain, etc.

To lie upon the Table.

I wish to present a petition of about 50 of my constituents representing the IsItFair council tax protest campaign. The petition declares:

That the year-on-year, inflation-busting increases in Council Tax are causing hardship to many and take no account of ability to pay; further that the proposed property revaluation and re-banding exercise will make an already flawed system even worse.

The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons votes to replace Council Tax with a fair and equitable tax that, without recourse to any supplementary benefit, takes into account ability to pay from disposable income. Such tax to be based on a system that is free from any geographical or politically motivated discrimination, and that clearly identifies the fiscal and managerial responsibilities of all involved parties.

And the Petitioners remain, etc.

To lie upon the Table.

I have a remarkably similar petition signed by 594 residents of my constituency. The petition declares:

That the year-on-year, inflation-busting increases in Council Tax are causing hardship to many and take no account of ability to pay; further that the proposed property revaluation and re-banding exercise will make an already flawed system even worse.

The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons votes to replace Council Tax with a fair and equitable tax that, without recourse to any supplementary benefit, takes into account ability to pay from disposable income. Such tax to be based on a system that is free from any geographical or politically motivated discrimination, and that clearly identifies the fiscal and managerial responsibilities of all involved parties.

And the Petitioners remain, etc.

To lie upon the Table.

Identity Cards

I am delighted to present a petition of more than 1,000 signatures that has been collected from around the country by Mr. Christopher Gill, Matthew Illsley and other members of the Freedom Association, an organisation of which I am proud to be a supporter. It declares:

That identity cards are in principle un-British and in practice will prove to be grossly expensive, utterly ineffective and intensely illiberal. The Petitioners further declare that if ever introduced in the United Kingdom, such cards and the accompanying identity register will have a disastrous impact upon law-abiding subjects seeking to exercise their traditional and hard-won freedoms.

The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons refuse to pass the Identity Cards Bill.

And the petitioners remain, etc.

To lie upon the Table.

Bruche Police Training Centre

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Gillian Merron.]

After the excitements of today, my hon. Friend the Minister and I come along like sweepers-up after the Lord Mayor's procession. I am grateful to have the opportunity to discuss the closure of the Bruche police training centre and its effect not only on the people who work there but on those who live in the surrounding area.

The training centre at Bruche has been a feature of Warrington life for a good many years. It provides the residential stage 2 of foundation training for probationary officers. It is a large site that caters for the needs of several police forces and employs, I believe, 60 people directly, with about 55 working for contractors. I say, "I believe", because it has proved extremely difficult to get accurate information from Centrex on such matters. There are also 70 police officers stationed there, as well as about 10 security staff.

Because of the position of the site in the midst of local housing, the prospect of its closing became a matter of concern to staff and to people in the area when it appeared that changes to police training meant that recruits would no longer be sent for residential training at regional centres. However, it has proved extremely difficult in the run-up to the announcement of closure to get accurate information about what Centrex plans to do. I had raised the matter on several occasions, but I reverted to it with a number of parliamentary questions, which I tabled in July last year because the staff from the centre had approached me, greatly concerned about their future.

Unfortunately, answer came there none from the Home Office. I wrote again in August and, after much to-ing and fro-ing, I received a reply on 18 November. It stated:

"It has not proved possible to respond to my hon. Friend in the time available before Prorogation."—[Official Report, 18 November 2004; Vol. 426, c. 2080W.]

That is extraordinary. If the Home Office cannot answer a simple question in more than four months, I worry about the rest of its work. On 26 November that year, I received a letter from my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety, in which she apologised for the delay and said that the Home Office had lost sight of the questions over the summer months.

The letter raised more questions than it answered, however. It said that the matter had been given detailed consideration over the summer. If that was true, I do not understand why I did not receive an answer to my question in November. The letter was unenlightening in other respects. It said that Centrex had been discussing what should happen to police training with the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities and other stakeholders. I am never sure what "stakeholder" means. It is one of those words that, like some of Lewis Carroll's verse, means whatever one wants it to mean. The letter mentioned neither the trade unions at the centre nor the staff. They were not mentioned in a parliamentary answer that I received later that month.

I was approached again by the staff, who were concerned that they could not get information about what was happening. I tabled another question to ask who had been involved in the meetings and what options for the future of the centre had been discussed. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary will be pleased to hear that the Home Office answered that. I suppose that that is a step in the right direction. However, I was not much further enlightened because, again, there was no mention of what was happening or of any negotiations with the staff. That is unacceptable. The staff have families to keep and bills to pay, just like the rest of us.

I know that the Home Office will say that that was the responsibility of Centrex, but it cannot be shrugged off in that way because, after all, Centrex is a non-departmental public body which manages public assets and has strong links to the Home Office. If no one at the Home Office asked what steps were being taken to consult and inform staff, they should have done so. They should be reminded that we are in the 21st century with a Labour Government, and it is unacceptable to treat people in that way.

The failure of Centrex to be open about what was happening caused a great deal of consternation in the local area. The centre is set in the middle of a lot of local housing. Rumours circulated about what would happen to it. That allowed some evil-minded people to spread the rumour that it would be turned into an asylum centre. I am glad that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety quashed that rumour in a letter to me on 13 July this year. However, the anxieties remain and they need to be tackled.

Not only was Centrex less than open about its plans, it sometimes actively misled people. In November last year, it told the Warrington Guardian, my local newspaper, that the centre was "absolutely not" closing in 2006. In the same letter on 13 July, in which my right hon. Friend dealt with the rumour about the asylum centre, she wrote that

"there are currently no immediate plans to close the Bruche training centre."

A week later, on 21 July, Centrex sent out an e-mail at 6.4 pm—only four minutes after the House had risen for the summer recess—announcing the closure of three training centres, including Bruche.

I find it astonishing that a public body should behave in that way. I can think of no explanation for that other than a desire to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. That is not surprising when Centrex and the Minister—presumably relying in good faith on what it had told her—previously said something entirely different. Centrex also wrote to me on 21 July announcing the closure. In that letter, it responded to a letter that I had sent to it on 26 June. However, it responded to it in a postscript, which I am afraid is typical of the kind of dismissive attitude that my constituents have had to put up with all the way along.

I am sorry to say that that kind of attitude extended even into parts of the Home Office. When I rang the private office of the Minister of State the day after the announcement, I received what I can only describe as a curt dismissal. I asked to speak to the Minister and was told that she was in her constituency. When I suggested that her staff contact her—she was in Salford, after all, not Timbuktu—I was told that I should write in. To her credit, the Minister did telephone me, albeit a week later when I was no longer around. However, I have to say that I have never before encountered that sort of behaviour from the private office of a Minister. It is entirely unacceptable for Centrex and the Home Office to behave in this way when we are talking about people's livelihoods and the future of their communities. I hope that this can be prevented from happening again.

I wrote again to the Minister on 26 July—there has been a lot of correspondence on this matter—to ask why I had been told that there was no immediate prospect of the centre closing, when in fact the announcement was made a week later. I also raised my concerns about what I saw as an attempt to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. The answer that I received was very revealing. It said:

"Given the timing of my letter and of the announcement, it would have been more accurate to have said that no decision had yet been taken."

It certainly would. However, I give Ministers credit by assuming that, if they sign a letter, they will have checked the facts and that that is what they have been told. We need to know what happened to change matters between 13 and 21 July. Until that is cleared up, we are all left with the impression that Centrex has been, and is continuing to be, less than frank about its plans.

I was also concerned about what was said in that letter about parliamentary scrutiny. It said that the decision to close the centre had been taken at the Centrex board meeting on the morning of 21 July. It went on to say:

"The timing of the announcement relates only to the timing of that decision."

But it does not. If the decision was taken in the morning, I can see no reason to wait until just after the House had risen for the recess to announce it. I have asked for the reason, and I was told by the Minister that she was

"certainly clear that Centrex had not timed the announcement to avoid parliamentary scrutiny".

If the Home Office is "certainly clear" about that, it needs to give me the information as to why, because I have not had it, and neither have the people I represent.

I received a letter dated 5 September, signed by the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), in the absence of the Minister of State. The explanation that I was given was that

"it would have been unacceptable either to make an announcement before the board had made a decision or to delay the announcement until after the parliamentary recess."

Frankly, that is Home Office gobbledegook. A decision cannot be announced before it has been taken, and no one suggests that it can. However, there was an alternative—a third way, if you like. It could have been announced when the House was sitting.

I am equally concerned that that letter shows an unacceptable attitude towards parliamentary scrutiny. It goes on to say:

"I do not believe that it is an announcement that needed to give consideration to parliamentary timetables".

I beg to differ. When my constituents are losing their jobs, and when decisions are being taken that will affect a whole area, it is not only the right but the duty of their Member of Parliament to raise the matter in the House. My constituents would expect no less. I am very disappointed that any Minister should think differently. That was a most unfortunate turn of phrase to use.

Because of all this, and because of the way in which Centrex has behaved since the announcement, it is difficult to have faith in what it is doing. I still have staff approaching me who are very demoralised about what is happening, and people who live in the area are deeply concerned. The chief executive of Centrex wrote to me in August to say that he had briefed the staff on what was happening, and that he had set up a programme board. He did not, however, answer any of the points that I put to him about what was happening to the staff or about the future plans for the site. He told me that I would get information about those matters at the appropriate time. I happen to think that the appropriate time to answer queries from a Member of the House is when they are asked, not when some unelected person decides to answer them. That is treating my constituents with a fair amount of contempt, which is unacceptable.

Since then, Centrex has not engaged with the local council's redundancy support service, the job centre or our economic development authority, until yesterday, when it sent an e-mail to the council in response to an e-mail that had been sent weeks earlier, saying that it looked forward to working with Warrington borough council. It is a miracle what getting an Adjournment debate can do, but I would prefer not to have to have one every week to ensure that that process continues.

The sad thing is that we have a good record in Warrington of getting people into jobs following redundancy, but engagement between all the partners involved is needed. If I make a comparison with what happened when Marks and Spencer closed a call centre in my constituency, there was immediate engagement with all the partners in the area, and we had a lot of support from my right hon. Friend the Member for North Tyneside (Mr. Byers), who was then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. I expect a public body to do no less than that.

I want to turn to the future of the site. As I said, it is surrounded by housing, with only very limited access. When it was transferred to Centrex, I understand that the written-down value was £3 million. It might now be worth much more, depending on the future use of the site. I wonder whether my hon. Friend can tell me what will happen to any windfall profits from that, whether local people will be able to benefit in any way, and whether any of that will be used to help to find jobs for the staff involved.

There is a further problem, however. As well as the rumours that have circulated about this site, there is a real concern about over-development in the area, which I believe is well founded. The adjoining roads already have a lot of traffic problems. For any future development at the site, we need proper community engagement. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State said in one of the numerous letters that we exchanged, the date of which now escapes me, that she was

"keen that there should be proper community engagement"

in any future planning application. I would like to see that keenness translated into reality, however. Although I know from the parliamentary answer of 17 October that Home Office officials and Centrex have had discussions about the future of the site, there has been no contact with the local planning department, let alone with people in the community.

I therefore hope that my hon. Friend will accept that this matter has so far been very badly handled. It has not increased confidence, either in the staff or the community, about what Centrex will do in the future. We now need to put that right. I hope that he can assure me that he will ensure that Centrex now engages with all local partners in order to make sure that the proper procedures are in place to find jobs for people who are made redundant at that site. Far from dismissing concerns raised with it, I hope that it will now engage with the local community and have a proper discussion on what should happen there in future, so that whatever is done with the site, it can be for the benefit of the local community and not to their detriment. I look forward to hearing the Minister's reply.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Warrington, North (Helen Jones) on securing the debate. She has raised an issue that is of concern locally and to her, and I am glad that she has had an opportunity to raise it in a characteristically forthright way.

Let me give some of the background to the decision to close Bruche and the other training sites that my hon. Friend mentioned. Given the points that she raised and the copious correspondence between her and Home Office Ministers, I should say something about how the decision was made.

Until recently, police probationer training was split between an officer's home force and the Central Police Training and Development Authority, known as Centrex. Once officers are recruited, they undergo two weeks of induction and familiarisation in their own forces. They are then sent to Centrex for 12 weeks' residential training, which is followed by a couple of weeks in their own forces learning about local procedures before they go out on patrol with a tutor constable for 10 further weeks.

That system is now changing. In the summer of last year, five forces began piloting the initial police learning and development programme. That moves stage 2—the residential stage with Centrex—back into the force. Officers learn in their own force and their own community, often in conjunction with members of that community. That is a huge change in the system and the culture, but I believe that it will help to foster a meaningful connection with police officers in training and the communities that they will serve. It is important for the police service to develop a culture of training and qualification so that we have a fully professional service. I am pleased to say that the Adult Learning Inspectorate has evaluated the effectiveness of the pilots. It considers them to have been highly successful, and welcomes the enthusiasm and commitment of the staff involved in the programme.

Working to identify and address the huge challenges involved in the change, the Government and the police service are rolling the programme out across all the forces in England and Wales. Thirteen forces have already gone live, and nine more will adopt the same approach over the next five months. From April next year, the remaining 21 forces will be ready to go live. We are changing pretty dramatically the way in which probationer police officers are trained. One of the main consequences of that approach is that officers will no longer be sent to Centrex for their initial training. The last probationer officers to go through the old system will leave Centrex on 26 May next year.

Centrex has a number of sites around the country. Three have been used almost exclusively to provide foundation training: Ashford in Kent, Cwmbran in south Wales and Bruche in my hon. Friend's constituency. There are two other sites, Ryton near Coventry and Bramshill, where Centrex's headquarters are sited. They will continue to be used for other purposes because they are multi-functional sites.

For all those reasons, the chief executive of Centrex and his senior management team have been considering the future needs of the Centrex estate for some time. They reached what I judge to be the entirely logical and sensible conclusion that there was no value-for-money argument for retaining the three sites at Ashford, Cwmbran and Bruche. On 21 July, the Centrex board considered a paper from the chief executive that recommended the closure of the sites. I should explain that the board consists of a number of independent members, including the chair, and includes representatives from the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Association of Police Authorities and the Home Office.

The Centrex board agreed with the recommendation from the chief executive that the sites should be closed. Home Office Ministers were made aware of the decision as soon as it was made, and the chief executive then informed the staff. He wrote to staff, spoke to them directly by means of a DVD, and later visited each site in person to discuss the implications with them.

Police staff at the three sites have been given notice that their posts are likely to become redundant by 26 May 2006. On or before that date, up to 175 seconded police officers will return to their forces. Forty of those officers are employed at Bruche, and 40 further police staff at Bruche have been given notice that they are likely to be made redundant. In addition, between 30 and 40 subcontracted workers involved in security, catering and so on face redundancy.

Shortly after the chief executive informed the staff, he contacted Members of Parliament representing the areas affected to make them aware of the announcement. A public announcement was made once staff had been informed, and the head of Bruche training centre also wrote to local residents.

I want to make it clear to my hon. Friend that Home Office Ministers apologise for any difficulties or misunderstandings that occurred as a result of correspondence, particularly the letter sent on 13 July by the Minister for Policing, Security and Community Safety, my right hon. Friend the Member for Salford (Hazel Blears). That reply followed a conversation between the Minister and my hon. Friend, in which she raised some of the concerns that she has outlined this evening. It is true that in that letter, my right hon. Friend said that

"there are currently no immediate plans to close the Bruche training centre".

Of course, when she wrote that letter on 13 July, that was true. Although discussions were taking place within Centrex, no decision had been taken, and none was taken until 21 September. As my hon. Friend pointed out, such a decision is entirely a matter for Centrex, as a non-departmental public body; indeed, Home Office officials were informed of it only after the meeting on the morning of 21 July concluded. I am pleased that my right hon. Friend the Minister has been able to write since and to set the record straight.

My hon. Friend also raised the concern that the timing of the announcement, which was made on the day that this House rose for the summer recess, was such as to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. My right hon. Friend the Minister explained in her letters, and in answer to parliamentary questions tabled by my hon. Friend, that the decision was taken by the Centrex board on the morning of 21 July. Quite apart from the fact that, as my hon. Friend pointed out, it would have been impossible to make an announcement about a decision that had yet to be taken, it would of course have been wrong to make a public announcement until the staff themselves had been made aware of that decision. My hon. Friend will agree that it would also have been wholly unfair to hold back that decision or any announcement until October, when the House returned from its recess.

I understand what the Minister is saying, but does he agree that what happened was at the very least unfortunate, and will he give an assurance that the Home Office will do its best to avoid such things happening again in future?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for making that point, because it is precisely the one that I was going to make. This was not in any way an attempt by Ministers to avoid parliamentary scrutiny. However, there is a lesson to be learned here for Government agencies, including non-departmental bodies of this kind. When they are taking such key decisions, they should have half an eye on the fact that Ministers and Parliament may need to be informed, and they should also keep an eye on the parliamentary calendar. Although I cannot give specific assurances about particular bodies, this is a lesson that the Home Office and perhaps other Departments can learn. We need to ensure that a connection is made between decisions taken outside Government Departments, and the importance of Ministers being accountable and able to explain those decisions.

I turn to the future use of the site, which my hon. Friend also mentioned. Rumours circulated that plans were already in place to turn the centre into one for use by asylum seekers. As she has made clear—I thank her for doing so in the manner that she did—there are no such plans, as my right hon. Friend the Minister also pointed out. No decision has yet been taken about the future use of the site. The centre will be in use and fully operational until roughly the middle of next year. It will of course need to be put up for sale before we can know who is likely to purchase it. Only then will we begin to know its possible future uses.

My hon. Friend rightly points out that any future change in use would require planning permission. It is important that both she and local councillors in the area are fully committed to consultation with local residents on any proposals. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend and her colleague councillors for the assiduous way in which they will follow up this issue.

Finally, my hon. Friend is quite right that the staff of Bruche—both the current staff and their predecessors—should be commended for the tremendous work that has been done over many years. They have trained many thousands of police officers, who have worked in my hon. Friend's, my own and many other constituencies. We are deeply grateful for that. We owe them a debt of gratitude and all the help and support that we can provide to enable them to find alternative employment. It is important that Centrex adopt a positive and proactive approach to providing support and help for those trying to find new posts. That will include consulting Jobcentre Plus. I noted my hon. Friend's comments about other local economic development agencies. No stone should remain unturned in our efforts to find suitable employment. Centrex is taking a number of initiatives: paying for a consultant to work with the staff, opening a careers room, offering other employment training opportunities and developing links with other local employers.

In closing, I would like to reassure my hon. Friend that every effort will be made to ensure that those who face redundancy can work through this period. Hopefully, with some new skills and new opportunities, they will be able to find local employment. As my hon. Friend rightly says, they have bills to pay and families to keep, so we are obliged to try and help them to remain in employment.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at one minute past Nine o'clock.