On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I would be grateful if you could offer me some guidance on how to ensure that right hon. and hon. Members do not abuse their parliamentary allowances in respect of the free postage that MPs are allowed. I have given notice to my neighbour the right hon. Member for Redditch (Jacqui Smith) that I would raise the issue of her use and potential abuse of the free House of Commons postage in her constituency of Redditch. She announced in a newspaper a few weeks ago that—

Order. I will give the hon. Lady some guidance. This is not something that she can raise as a point of order on the Floor of the House. The Serjeant at Arms is responsible for postage and she should take the matter up with him.

Further to that point of order, Mr. Speaker. Are you satisfied that the Serjeant has adequate powers to deal with Members when allegations are made about this or that violation of allowances? You will realise that it puts any Officer of the House in a difficult position when they are asked to discipline or reprimand a Member. Are you satisfied that the Serjeant, who you have identified as responsible for this matter, has all the powers that he needs to ensure that there is no abuse of postage or of other allowances?

The right hon. Gentleman knows that I should not be drawn into this argument. My opinion should not be sought at this stage on the Floor of the House. What I will say is that the House gives the Serjeant at Arms powers and if it feels that those powers are inadequate, the matter can be raised with the House of Commons Commission—and I know that the right hon. Gentleman is a very active member of it. If the House feels that more powers should be given to the Serjeant at Arms, it is up to the House to proceed as I have said, and I serve the House in this matter.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 8—Power of members of staff to search students etc. for weapons—

'After Section 85A of the Further and Higher Education Act (c. 13) insert— "85AA Power of members of staff to search students etc. for weapons

(1) A member of the staff of a further education college who has reasonable grounds for believing that a student at the college may have with him or in his possession—

(a) an article to which section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33) applies (knives and blades etc.), or

(b) an offensive weapon (within the meaning of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953), may search that student or his possessions for such articles and weapons.

(2) A search under this section may be carried out only where—

(a) the member of the staff and the student are on the premises of the college; or

(b) they are elsewhere and the member of the staff has lawful control or charge of the student.

(3) A person may carry out a search under this section only if—

(a) he is the Principal of the college; or

(b) he has been authorised by the Principal to carry out the search.

(4) A person who carries out a search of a student under this section—

(a) may not require the student to remove any clothing other than outer clothing;

(b) must be of the same sex as the student; and

(c) may carry out the search only in the presence of another person who is aged 18 or over and is also of the same sex as the student.

(5) A student's possessions may not be searched under this section except in his presence and in the presence of a person (in addition to the person carrying out the search) who is aged 18 or over.

(6) If a person who, in the course of a search under this section, finds—

(a) anything which he has reasonable grounds for suspecting falls within subsection (1)(a) or (b), or

(b) any other thing which he has reasonable grounds for suspecting is evidence in relation to an offence, he may seize and retain it.

(7) A person who exercises a power under this section may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances for exercising that power.

(8) An authorisation for the purposes of subsection (3)(b) may be given either in relation to a particular search or generally in relation to searches under this section or to a particular description of such searches.

(9) In this section—'outer clothing' includes an outer coat, a jacket, gloves and a hat; 'possessions', in relation to a student of a college, includes any goods over which he has or appears to have control.

(10) The powers conferred by this section are in addition to any powers exercisable by the member of the staff in question apart from this section and are not to be construed as restricting such powers.".'.

Amendment No. 22, in clause 41, page 41, line 17, leave out

'has reasonable grounds for believing'

and insert 'believes'.

Amendment No. 26, in page 41, line 35, leave out paragraph (a).

Amendment No. 27, in page 41, line 41, leave out from 'a' to end of line 42 and insert 'second member of staff'.

Government Amendments Nos. 78 to 81.

I support Government new clause 9 and resist Opposition new clause 8. I shall also convey my position in respect of the other amendments in the group, which I particularly look forward to debating with the hon. Members who tabled them.

On Government new clause 9, we agree entirely that the power to search students and learners for weapons should be extended to further education colleges. We discussed this issue in Committee, when I gave a commitment to consider it further, and I have duly tabled a Government new clause on Report. Given the increasing number of pupils under 16 who are, or will be, attending courses at college under arrangements made by their school as part of their compulsory education, it is of course right that this power be extended to FE colleges. It is essential that there be a level playing field for schools and colleges, and this new clause will remove the anomaly of a person in school perhaps enjoying a higher level of security than his or her counterpart on a similar course at an FE college. I hope that the Opposition are satisfied with the new clause, that it meets all their expectations, and that in the circumstances, they will not feel the need to press their amendment on this issue to a vote.

I am afraid that I am going to resist Amendment No. 22, which would actually reduce protection for a pupil who is searched. Under it, a member of staff would be able to search a pupil simply if they believed that they had an offensive weapon; they would need no grounds, nor any reasonable grounds, for that belief. Requiring reasonable grounds offers a pupil protection against arbitrary searches. That is a normal standard that we adopt in many different circumstances, and we want to keep that safeguard. Removing it could harm pupils' and parents' trust that school staff will act reasonably. On that basis, I ask the Opposition to withdraw the amendment.

I also urge the House to resist Amendment No. 26, which would remove paragraph (a) from clause 41. Removing this paragraph would cause uncertainty to both the pupil and the member of staff, and reduce safeguards for both. The Government are introducing an amendment to replace line 20 on page 42 of the Bill with a definition of which items of outer clothing staff may require a pupil to remove.

I ask the House to enable us to give further consideration to Amendment No. 27, which would change the wording of the provision relating to the additional person who must be present when a pupil's possessions are searched from a

"person . . . who is aged 18 or over"

to a "second member of staff".

Such an amendment would ensure that both adults involved are members of staff, and not, for example, volunteers or parents; however, it does not prevent the presence of such people in addition to the two members of staff. We are prepared to consider this issue further, and in doing so we will want to consider requiring that the second person who must be present at a personal search also be a member of staff. If there is to be this extra safeguard, it is probably more important that it exists during a personal search than during a simple search of possessions. We also want to consider whether equivalent amendments should be made to the provisions relating to FE institutions and attendance centres, to ensure coherence and consistency throughout the Bill. On that basis, I ask the Opposition to withdraw their amendment, but I happily undertake to examine the matter further, and to consider whether we can build in the safeguards that the amendment is designed to introduce.

Government Amendments Nos. 79 and 81 provide a clear definition for the meaning of "outer clothing" in respect of searches conducted at schools and attendance centres. This definition will make it clear to both staff and the person being searched which items of clothing they may be required to remove during a search. We have added shoes and boots to the list, which is an important practical change. The amendments also provide that any item of clothing worn over a shirt or blouse—a jumper or pullover, for example—can be removed. Amendments Nos. 78 and 80 correct a minor drafting error. I look forward to the debate on these amendments and new clauses.

We begin our deliberations with a discussion on the vexed but important issue of being able to search children to ascertain whether they are carrying weapons upon them. The Government have introduced a new clause. In effect, it extends the right to search to those who are undergoing further or higher education. As for new clauses 9 and 8, my hon. Friends and I will undoubtedly accept that there is sense in what is proposed.

I shall speak briefly to amendments Nos. 22, 26 and 27, all of which are in my name and the names of my hon. Friends. At the same time, I shall comment on some of the Government amendments.

Amendment No. 22 relates to clause 1 and the issue of whether a member of staff should have reasonable grounds for believing that a pupil may have a weapon with him or her. My amendment would leave out the words "reasonable grounds for believing" and insert "believes". We believe that a fairly tough and vigorous approach should be taken to the entire issue of knives and other weapons being carried by school children. The purpose of inserting "believes" instead of "reasonable grounds for believing" is to strengthen the position of the member of staff concerned before a search takes place, and not to put too great a burden on the teacher. If it is the case that the member of staff has to have reasonable grounds to believe, he or she may be expected to go through some sort of mental gymnastics before concluding that it would be right to search the child—for example, "What grounds do I have? Are they reasonable? Would they be open to challenge later?" We are very used nowadays to children being able to challenge members of staff. I want to put that person in a slightly stronger position so that they could perhaps avoid unnecessary challenges in due course.

The Minister, who is not happy with my amendment, talks about pupil protection and the need to ensure that trust is not damaged. However, we are dealing with a serious problem. In a sense, I want to give members of staff stronger powers to do what they think is right even if, from time to time, the grounds on which they want to search someone may not always be deemed to be reasonable by outsiders.

For example, what is the position of a member of staff when a pupil comes up to them and says, "I think that so and so may be carrying a weapon"? Is that a reasonable ground for a search? What about a member of staff who overhears one pupil talking to another about carrying weapons? Would that amount to a reasonable ground? What about a bulge, for example, where a knife might be kept in a young man's trousers? Would that amount to a reason for a member of staff saying, "I think that there may be a ground for a search. I believe that there may be a knife there. I am going to search." That decision would be reached without having to examine the whole issue of reasonable ground.

The purpose of amendment No. 22 is to strengthen the position of the teacher rather than to weaken it.

I was a teacher, and often taught in circumstances that were somewhat stressed. Removing "reasonable" puts the person who is trying to dissolve the conflict or resolve it at great risk. I do not understand why "reasonable" should be removed from any power that is given to a person in authority. That does not make sense to me as a former teacher.

I understand what the hon. Gentleman is saying. The other side of the argument is that I do not want to put too great a burden on teachers in terms of always having to justify their actions. We seem to be in a world nowadays where the burden is always on the teacher to justify what he or she is doing rather than on the pupil or the parent. The purpose of my amendment is to toughen up the clause, to strengthen the position of teachers and to help them avoid challenges at a later date by some aggrieved child or by a parent who says, in terms, "Justify this search by proving reasonable grounds. If you don't, I will bring some sort of case against you." I do not want teachers to be put in that position.

Does my hon. Friend accept that amendment No. 22 is reasonable because a teacher would use the power in the presence of someone else, who is clearly defined? That in itself would be a form of control.

My hon. Friend is right. There are burdens on teachers to ensure that they do the right thing. As he readily says, they cannot do the search alone. There are already duties on a teacher without imposing on them too high a burden.

Amendment No. 26 relates to clothing. We had a serious debate in Standing Committee about the clothing that could be removed during a search. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I recall vividly that while we debated this Bill in one Committee Room, another Home Office Bill, on which I also had to serve, was being debated in another Room. A similar provision on searching through clothing was proposed in the other Bill. One of them—I forget which—mentioned the removal of a hat. The other one did not. I rely on the Minister to remind which it was.

The serious point is that the Minister is trying to reach a position in which a proper—a full and thorough—search is made. As we said in Committee, the search must be realistic, by which we mean fairly full. To take an obvious example, if a child is required to remove only an outer coat, it is possible that a weapon might be concealed further down in their clothing. The Minister has to strike a balance. Her proposal goes further than the position taken in Committee. To that extent, I welcome what she said and thank her for it.

Amendment No. 27 is important. I am grateful to the Minister for the courteous way in which she received it. We are, after all, talking about searching and the need for the search to be carried out in the presence of another person. The Opposition agree with that concept, but it occurred to me shortly after proceedings in Committee that there could be serious disadvantages if the Bill were left in its current form, with the search taking place in the presence of another person who is aged 18 or over. That is a wide provision and could involve someone who is not a member of staff and teacher trained, such as a parent or a member of staff in the catering department who has no skills in dealing with pupils. Strictly speaking, it could involve another pupil at the same school. I do not think that the Minister intends the second person involved in the search to be another pupil who happens to be 18 or over.

I thought that that was unsatisfactory and still do. The Minister said that she will look more closely at the matter, perhaps with a view to the Government tabling an amendment that is drafted in the same or similar terms as mine. I do not propose to ask the House to divide on the matter, but I do ask her to consider the position carefully, and I know that she will.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the Government also need to consider religious dress and that they should be sensitive to those who wear religious dress to school? Given that they have tabled the new clause, which relates to higher education, is not it the case that we now have a new problem of adults who carry religious knives? That is a sign of adulthood in Sikh communities such as mine in Shropshire. It is important that those communities are not offended and that the Government realise that Sikh male adulthood includes carrying ceremonial knives.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend who raises the important issue of apparel—for want of a better description—that might be important to someone in relation to their religious beliefs. He is right to say that the House should be sensitive to such issues, which are very important to some members of our community. It is not unknown for members of certain religions to carry small knives, but I have to say to my hon. Friend that I cannot immediately form a decisive view on that issue except to say that it is an offence under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to carry a bladed article in a public place. All of us would wish to ensure that the law was properly upheld and enforced in that respect.

The new clause deals with the power to search school pupils for weapons. It is not appropriate for the Government to introduce this clause as a flagship proposal to address the problem of knives in schools. As with so much of the law, it is a question of properly enforcing the existing laws of the land. For example, it is already an offence under section 139A of the Criminal Justice Act for a person to have a bladed article on school premises. Furthermore, under section 139B, a constable already has a power to enter school premises to search them and any person on them for any article to which that section applies. Tens of thousands of schoolchildren are carrying knives on school premises, disguised in their clothing, and it distresses me that the existing law as laid out in section 139 is not properly enforced.

I asked the Minister some weeks ago if she could provide figures for the number of occasions on which a constable has entered school premises to conduct a search of a school pupil. The Minister was not able to tell us how many times that has happened. I asked the Minister in a written question earlier in the year about the current powers of head teachers to search and suspend pupils whom they suspect of carrying a form of weapon. The Minister replied that state and independent school head teachers may search a desk or locker without the pupil's consent, search a bag or jacket with consent or ask the police to do a personal search.

We think that we have a problem with young people carrying knives, but it is now critical and needs to be addressed seriously. A Youth Justice Board survey last year showed that 1 per cent. of pupils aged 11 to 16 have, at some time in the previous year, carried a knife in school for offensive reasons, and 2 per cent. had done so for defensive reasons. I checked with the Library the number of schoolchildren of that age in the state sector, and it is more than 3.5 million. Even if one chooses a smaller number of children, if 1 per cent. of children carry a knife for offensive purposes, it means that more than 20,000 children are carrying knives in schools for offensive purposes. If 2 per cent. do so for so-called defensive purposes, it means that more than 40,000 children aged between 11 and 16 are—according to the Government's figures—carrying knives for defensive reasons. It is a horrible statistic: 60,000 children are carrying knives in our schools, yet what is the prospect of their being charged or prosecuted for that offence under existing law? We need only look at the figures.

Over the last few years, how many of the 60,000 children who, according to the Government's figures, were carrying knives, were charged with and convicted of having a bladed article on school premises? In the past five years, fewer than 100 children were charged with that offence, and of those sentenced only nine received a custodial sentence. That is an astonishing statistic, which means that carrying—

Order. I remind the hon. Gentleman that the amendments are about the powers to stop and search and he has gone on to custodial sentences, which are beyond the scope of the amendments.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I am anxious not to stray from the basis of the clause, which relates to search, so I shall come back to the point.

Does my hon. Friend agree that there is little point in the Government legislating to provide teachers and members of staff with the authority to search pupils unless there is a result when the search discloses a bladed weapon? No doubt that is what my hon. Friend is pointing out to the Minister.

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that intervention, and also for his contribution in Committee. As he rightly says, there is no point in giving teachers those powers unless there is some result from their being used in practice. That is why I was illustrating that the Government's track record to date is so abysmal. The offence of carrying a knife on school premises already exists, but there is only one chance in 2,500 of a pupil being prosecuted for such an offence under existing law and only one chance in eight that any of those prosecuted will be sent to prison. The situation is terrifying.

It is all very well for the Government to bring forward a so-called flagship policy of searching children for knives and giving head teachers the powers to do so, but the Government should be deeply ashamed of the fact that knife carrying in schools has risen so dramatically over the past few years, causing so much fear to so many people, yet it is under-prosecuted by the authorities. The culture of the blade is indeed with us.

In Committee, I briefly raised with the Minister a particular case relating to search and I want to raise it again today. Some weeks ago, Opposition Members were horrified to read a newspaper report that a council was forced to pay £11,000 to a boy expelled for taking a knife to school. Apparently, the council was ordered to apologise to the teenager and to pay his mother £5,000 compensation for anxiety and uncertainty, plus £6,000 for home tuition for her son. Not surprisingly, teachers reacted with fury. If that is what happens when somebody is expelled from school, it is a very sorry situation.

Carrying a knife in school is a serious matter that should result in prosecution of the child, yet the reality is, as my figures show, that it is simply not happening. To return to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) made, it is almost a waste of time giving the Government further powers if they do not use their existing powers properly. My general proposition is that although there are more than 60,000 offences a year of carrying a knife in school, the number actually being taken to court is paltry in the extreme.

The hon. Gentleman referred to a newspaper article but drew the wrong conclusion. He did not tell us who was the author of the decision. If the power to expel a pupil exists and someone—not the pupil or the Government but, presumably, someone in a judicial position—made a judgment to overturn the initial decision, I do not understand why the blame should lie with the Government who gave those powers or with those who used them.

The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point, but I lay the example before the House this afternoon so that it can understand that knives in school are a serious problem and to tell the House that I for one—I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would take the same view—believe that giving compensation to a mother and son for distress in a case involving the carrying of a knife is a very sorry situation indeed. I accept the point that he makes; but, nevertheless, I want to ask the Minister whether she will be kind enough to comment on that case—she did not do so in Committee—and say how it squares with Government policy. That concludes my remarks on my amendments.

We find no reason to challenge the Government amendments, certainly not those in this grouping. Searches by a second member of staff are an important issue, and I very much hope that—if not today, certainly when the Bill reaches another place—the Government will introduce a suitable amendment to give the duty to a second member of staff. I appreciate what the Minister has said about clothing—she has toughened up that clause—but none of this will count for anything in life unless it is acted on.

I stress that, if we are giving this power to teachers, it is vital that education authorities and teachers get to grips with the problem of the knife culture in school, which is almost out of control, and use, as well as the power to search pupils, the existing criminal law, which is ready to be enforced. It is simply not right that a handful of charges have been brought under the existing law. A much stronger enforcement of current legislation is needed.

I wish the clause good luck, and I wish the teachers who have to enforce it good luck and good fortune in the very difficult task that they have to carry out, but my final wish is that the culture of the blade, which dominates our schools at the moment, can as quickly as possible be stamped out by whatever means are necessary.

I rise to speak to new clause 8, tabled by the Liberal Democrats, which hon. Members may notice is not a million miles different from Government new clause 9. I very much welcome the Government's tabling of that clause, because it acknowledges the concern that we expressed about not giving further education colleges an equivalent power, thus sending out a worrying signal that only school pupils need protection and possibly even giving the impression that colleges are a soft touch. More 16 to 18-year-olds in full-time education attend further education colleges and sixth form colleges than schools—701,000, compared with 345,000—and 120,000 14 to 16-year-olds choose to study vocational courses at college. So we very much welcome those powers being extended to teachers and head teachers at further education colleges.

On amendment No. 22, tabled by the Conservatives, I find myself in agreement with the Government, as there is more protection and greater safeguard in having reasonable grounds, rather than in simply believing. However, I welcome amendment No. 27 and the Government's response, in which the second person might be a member of staff. That is an intelligent and probably better way forward. The extra clarification about the definition of outer clothing can only be helpful—the more definition, the better.

I shall not extend my remarks interminably, but I wish to comment on the assertion of the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) that 60,000 children are carrying knives. If that figure is correct, would 60,000 prosecutions really be the answer? I would prefer those children to be searched by their head teachers and staff, because that would be a more personal and connected way of addressing the matter.

Does the hon. Lady accept that it might take only some token prosecutions before those carrying knives at school learned that there would be a penalty for that? There would thus be no requirement for 60,000 prosecutions.

I totally agree that there should be some prosecutions. The Government are often guilty of not enforcing current legislation. However, I would be totally opposed to installing knife arches to detect knives, because that would cause all children to be treated as though they were criminals. It is right to proceed along the lines of members of staff performing searches, rather than using other methods. However, we must take things forward and some prosecutions must be brought.

May I respond briefly to the points raised by the hon. Members for Woking (Mr. Malins) and for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone)?

The hon. Member for Woking spoke to amendment No. 22, which would remove the words

"has reasonable grounds for believing"

from clause 41. I cannot accept the amendment. We are trying to strike the right balance among the rights and responsibilities of students, their parents and teachers. It is proper that staff should have reasonable grounds for their belief. In any event, courts would be likely to understand any belief as being reasonable belief, because that is the way in which they interpret matters. The process must be in line with the European convention on human rights. There is little merit in adopting the lower burden of belief in such circumstances. It is important that the relationship between pupils and teachers be maintained so that we have the maximum possible trust among students and parents.

The hon. Gentleman also talked about ceremonial knives, as did the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard). I understand that the Department for Education and Employment issued detailed guidance in 1997 on ceremonial knives. I understand that such a knife will not be considered an illegal blade if it is very small and in a sealed covering. There has never been a problem with ceremonial knives. We are addressing a problem of an entirely different character. The guidance has been perfectly satisfactory at dealing with such situations, so I would not want the House to have any impression that we must address a problem involving the carrying of ceremonial knives.

Are you confident about the question of weapons? A pair of scissors was recently used as a weapon in a school. Children often have access to compasses, dividers and other equipment that can be sharpened and readily used as a weapon. I am worried that we are addressing only the knife culture, while a sharpened blade from a sharpener can be used as a weapon just as easily. Are you confident that all those things can be addressed? Will it be possible to look reasonably for a pair of compasses on someone's person? We need to move forward, so I would like your views.

Order. The hon. Lady is a new Member. It is not for me to make a judgment on these matters, but for the Minister.

Clearly we are trying to ensure that searches can be carried out so that we can confiscate both knives and bladed weapons from students who unfortunately bring them to school. We had a lengthy discussion in Committee about whether it would be possible to use a sharpened blade from a pencil sharpener as a weapon. There have been dreadful events in recent times—we heard at the weekend about a young girl who was attacked—so we want the Bill to provide schools with powers to search. We will never be able to anticipate all the different weapons that may be used, but we are determined to try to make sure that schools can not just search pupils but confiscate items that could be made or adapted for use in violent situations.

Before my right hon. Friend leaves the matter of ceremonial dress, will she include the sgian dubh, which is often part of a Scots person's full ceremonial dress?

As I said, there has never been a problem with ceremonial weapons, and I would not want any hon. Member to think otherwise. The Criminal Justice Act 1988 introduced the offence of having an article with a blade or point in a public place, and it also includes the defence of possessing such an article for religious reasons. We contemplated that provision, and I believe that the guidance is sufficient.

To pursue that point, my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) talked about the culture of the blade and said that it must be challenged. However, the Minister has not explained how an individual armed with a pair of scissors, a compass or a Stanley knife, which has a short blade, will be dealt with. Those people will quickly learn the new law, and arm themselves with such implements. How will she address that threat?

Having a blade on school premises is an offence, and any other material that could provide evidence of that offence could be seized. If an individual was even contemplating using any other pointed articles, those items could be seized and confiscated as a result of the search. Schools and teachers will have the necessary powers to be able to take potential weapons away from people, which ought to make our school premises significantly safer in future.

The hon. Member for Woking raised the case of someone who was excluded from school. I should put on the record the fact that compensation, as I understand it, was awarded because of the failure to provide alternative education provision rather than anything to do with the seizure of the knife. Schools obviously have powers not just to conduct searches under the legislation but to exclude pupils for violent activity, including the carrying of knives on the premises. We would certainly support teachers and head teachers who take such action to exclude pupils, but the compensation in the case mentioned by the hon. Gentleman was payable, I believe, for the failure to provide education provision rather than because of the initial decision to exclude. We would not want teachers to shy away from exclusion in such circumstances.

The hon. Gentleman spoke about the importance of schools and the police working together closely, and I can confirm that police officers are stationed in 400 schools across the country, where they can build extremely good relationships with both teachers and pupils. Police officers who are based full-time in schools have had a significant impact on the likelihood of violent incidents occurring in school. They can often nip problems in the bud, and do excellent educational work with pupils to show them that the carrying of knives and other weapons is not the way to resolve conflict. Basing police officers in schools is therefore an extremely good idea.

The right hon. Lady is making an excellent case both for Government new clause 9 and for the presence of police officers in schools—an initiative that is working well in my south Essex constituency. Can she explain to the House exactly what happens if, during a search on a pupil, a weapon is not found but other contraband, illegal substances or materials are found?

If there is evidence of offences that have been committed, the police would take the action that they usually take in those circumstances. We have introduced powers for searches for alcohol and tobacco in the possession of under-age youngsters, as well as for other substances. If the police found illegal substances they would retain them and dispose of them in the normal manner, just as they would for anyone else who had committed an offence. The age of criminal responsibility in this country is 10, and if people are found to have committed criminal offences the police will take appropriate action as a result of the evidence that they find.

The Minister remarked on the number of police present in schools, which we all applaud. However, in what percentage of schools across the country are police present for much of the time? Does she, like the Opposition, think that it is a good idea to try to encourage a much greater take-up of that facility?

Apart from the fact that my maths is not up to it, I do not know the total number of schools so I cannot give a percentage figure now, but I shall endeavour to find the hon. Gentleman some details. We encourage schools to have extremely close relationships with the police service. I find that police officers stationed in schools often build a relationship with pupils that diverts them from becoming involved in crime, antisocial behaviour and other activities that cause problems. Of course we now have 13,000 extra police officers, so there are more to go around our schools than there were a few years ago. With the advent of 24,000 community support officers and the ability to have a neighbourhood police team in every community by 2008, I anticipate even more schools being able to develop a better and more positive relationship with their police services.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment No. 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out clauses 1 to 11.

New Amendment No. 2, in clause 1, page 2, line 2, after 'subject's', insert 'knowingly'.

Amendment No. 3, in clause 1, page 2, line 3, after 'entering', insert

', and attempting to purchase alcohol in or consuming alcohol in,'.

Amendment No. 4, in clause 1, page 2, line 4, leave out from beginning to end of line 8 and insert—

'any premises, other than a private dwelling, for the purposes of purchasing or consuming alcohol.'.

Amendment No. 28, in clause 1, page 2, line 20, at end insert—

'(5) Before making a drinking banning order, a court may receive a report from an appropriate officer about the proposed subject of the order, which contains information about the subject and, in particular, about whether there is any reason to suspect that he may be—

(a) suffering from substance addiction (including alcohol dependence);

(b) a person falling within section 1 of the Mental Health Act 1983; or

(c) suffering from any other recognised physical or mental illness or condition which could either—

(i) affect his ability to restrict his intake of alcohol,

(ii) cause him to engage in criminal conduct while under the influence of alcohol, or

(iii) affect his ability to comply with a drinking banning order.

(6) In subsection (5) above "an appropriate officer" means—

(a) where the proposed subject is aged 18 or over, an officer of the National Offender Management Service, a doctor or a social worker of a local authority social services department;

(b) where the proposed subject is aged under 18, a social worker of a local authority social services department or a member of a youth offending team.

(7) If the court determines that the proposed subject of a drinking banning order may be a person falling within subsection (5)(a) to (c) above, the court shall not make a drinking banning order unless satisfied, on receipt of medical evidence, that—

(a) his ability to understand and comply with the order will not be significantly restricted by reason of his being a person falling within subsection (5)(a) to (c) above; and

(b) compliance with the order, either alone or in combination to any other order or sentence to which he is subject, would not have a deleterious effect on his mental or physical health.'.

Amendment No. 13, in clause 2, page 3, line 3, at end insert—

'(6) For the purposes of this Act, "disorderly" shall mean conduct which would offend a reasonable person but which falls short of a criminal act.'.

Amendment No. 5, in clause 5, page 4, line 26, leave out

'under the influence of alcohol'

and insert 'drunk'.

Amendment No. 6, in clause 5, page 4, line 28, after 'consider', insert

'on any application by the Crown'.

Amendment No. 30, in clause 6, page 5, line 19, leave out subsection (9).

Government amendment No. 42.

Amendment. No. 14, in clause 11, page 9, line 16, at end insert

'"disorderly" means conduct which would offend a reasonable person but which falls short of a criminal act.'.

Government amendments Nos. 43, 44, 82, 83 and 86 to 93.

We come now to one of the Bill's main purposes, which is to tackle alcohol-related disorder. I should say at the start of my remarks that I hope to divide the House on new clause 1 if the Minister does not accept it. I have some hope that the Minister will accept it, based on her comment a few minutes ago that my amendment No. 22 was one that she was inclined to accept in due course. In my many years in this House only extremely rarely have the Government accepted anything that I have said—perhaps it is a fault in my arguments. However, it is terribly encouraging to start the debate this afternoon with the Minister saying that she approves of what I have said so far in relation to one amendment.

I shall explain new clause 1 and speak to Conservative amendments Nos. 1 to 4, 13, 5, 6 and 14, then say a word or two about Liberal Democrat amendment No. 28. New clause 1 is simple: it would amend the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 to enable an antisocial behaviour order made under that Act to be made for a minimum period of three months, rather than two years, as now. Linked with the new clause is amendment No. 1, which would omit clauses 1 to 11.

I make two general propositions in this, the most important debate of the day. The first is that although alcohol-related disorder on our streets is a major problem—not ameliorated by the Government's plans to introduce extended drinking hours, which many people including the police regard as a retrograde step—and one that is getting worse by the day, not enough is being done to address it. The second general proposition is that the existing law is entirely satisfactory when it comes to dealing with alcohol-related disorder. That general theme lies behind new clause 1, which seeks to alter the period of time for which an antisocial behaviour order must be made.

When we discussed antisocial behaviour orders in Standing Committee—I think that it was at the first sitting on 13 October—my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Mr. Prisk) asked the Minister to reflect on the fact that using existing law is often better than creating new laws. Our general proposition was not only that an antisocial behaviour order can do exactly what a drinking banning order purports to do, but that it can do more and that it may be effective. If that is right—we thought that it was and still think that it is—why give the police yet another power in relation to drink?

The Minister seemed to indicate in Committee that antisocial behaviour orders are not applicable to the kind of activity—alcohol-related disorder—covered by the Bill, and when we asked her why, she pointed out two differences. First, she said that an antisocial behaviour order can be imposed on anyone from the age of 10 upwards, whereas a drinking banning order can be imposed only on over-16s. That is not an argument, however, because if we were to use antisocial behaviour orders in drink-banning situations, we would have a wider, better, less-limited power. I illustrate that point by saying that a lot of under-age drinking involves not 16 to 18-year-olds, but 14 and 15-year-olds, so the Minister's argument fails.

The Minister's second point against the use of antisocial behaviour orders was that under current law—the Crime and Disorder Act 1998—the minimum period for an antisocial behaviour order is two years, whereas for a drinking banning order it is two months. That is a statement of the law, but we can cover the point by simply amending the 1998 Act to enable an antisocial behaviour order to be made for a more flexible period of time, which is the result that new clause 1 attempts to achieve.

Earlier, I advanced the proposition that the existing law on alcohol-related disorder in our towns and cities is voluminous.

Is not a further reason why antisocial behaviour orders may not be suitable the amount of evidence required to issue them, as opposed to the evidence required to issue drinking banning orders? The Bill states that someone need only engage in criminal or disorderly behaviour on one occasion for a drinking banning order to be applied for, whereas an antisocial behaviour order requires a longer period of evidence gathering.

With respect to the hon. Gentleman, that is not right. Both of those orders must be made by a court upon the production of evidence that satisfies the court that the appropriate order should be made.

A third reason why an antisocial behaviour order could be more appropriate than a drinking banning order is the consequences of a breach. As I understand it, the penalty for a breach of a drink banning order is not the highest. Under clause 10—the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—a person who is the subject of a drink banning order is guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a fine: not a fine or imprisonment, but just a fine. The clause imposes a drink banning order and effectively says to the person who is its subject: "Breach this order and the result will be a fine", whereas the breach of an antisocial behaviour order can, and often does, result in a custodial sentence, and rightly so.

Let me illustrate further my proposition that existing law deals with problems of the sort that the Minister is trying to deal with. Some months ago, I asked her what powers courts have to ban defendants from entering licensed premises—because, let us make no mistake about it, that is what the drink banning order purports to do. She replied:

"Under the provisions of the Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980 a court can make an order prohibiting a person from entering specified licensed premises, following conviction for an offence committed on licensed premises involving violence or threats of violence."

New The power already exists. Undoubtedly a great number of orders should have been made under the 1980 Act, but how many have been made? The Minister went on to say that

"antisocial behaviour orders . . . introduced under . . . the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and first used in 1999 can also be used to prohibit certain people from entering certain specific areas or premises."—[Official Report, 12 July 2005; Vol. 436, c. 908W.]

If an antisocial behaviour order that carries a custodial sentence in the event of a breach can be used to prevent certain persons from entering certain areas or premises, what does a drink banning order add, if anything, to the existing law?

We suffer from a surfeit of laws. The House of Commons passes law after law, and the trouble is that they pile up and fall into disrepute, and quite often existing legislation that is perfectly fit for purpose is not properly used.

One of the difficulties that we noted when antisocial behaviour orders were first introduced was the substantial delay before courts started making such orders on a regular basis. Does my hon. Friend think that that might happen with drink banning orders; and if it did, would not that undermine the Government's proper desire to deal with such problems instantly?

My hon. Friend is right. Such situations are becoming increasingly common. As we all know, in their early years antisocial behaviour orders were barely used at all. I remember the then Home Secretary telling the Home Affairs Committee that he thought that thousands would be used in the first year or two, but such is the bureaucratic nightmare involved that only a few hundred were used in that period. The use of antisocial behaviour orders has increased a lot in the past couple of years, and I congratulate the Government and the courts on that. There is always a very slow run-in period before such orders are used to their full effect. It could properly be said that antisocial behaviour orders are now the norm rather than the exception in such cases, and breaches usually result in a custodial sentence. So his parallel point about the drinking banning order, which, according to the Government, we need to cure an immediate problem quickly, is correct. If the antisocial behaviour order is anything to go by, it will be years before the drinking banning orders get under way and are used to their full effect.

The hon. Gentleman has just said that the most dangerous time is when people are tipped out of pubs at 11 pm and 12 am and gravitate towards the centre of towns. Surely that is an argument for extending the licensing laws and for more flexible licensing laws so that people are chucked out at different times of night?

The Government continually argue that the new licensing laws will lead to a continental café culture, whereby everybody comes out of the clubs and behaves beautifully. However, the hon. Gentleman is naive if he believes that extended licensing hours will help. I understand that the Government always support the police and, if the police say something, the Government appear to believe that it must be right. The police have said that they are terribly worried about late drinking hours and the Judges Council has made a statement to the effect that alcohol consumption over a longer period of time—the extended licensing hours—is much more likely to fuel alcohol-related crime. I therefore urge the Government, even at this late stage, to think again, given that so many people are against them on permitting alcohol to be drunk round the clock.

The problems of alcohol-related disorder are clearly there for all to see, but there is already a range of offences and orders to cover everything that happens on our streets in relation to drunkenness and drunken crime, and according to the Home Affairs Committee, which is dominated by Labour Members, those powers are grossly underused at present. So what is the point of introducing a new Bill with a complicated new kind of order when the existing law is wholly adequate?

New The whole issue is about the proper enforcement of those existing laws, and I shall give the House some examples. If a person is drunk, there is an offence of simple drunk. If they are drunk and disorderly, there is an offence of drunk and disorderly. It is interesting to speculate on the number of people who are prosecuted for being drunk or drunk and disorderly. In truth, the numbers are dropping dramatically, yet there is more drunkenness and disorderliness on our streets. Why, then, have the prosecutions dropped from about 124,000 in 1980 to fewer than 44,000 in 2001? I suspect that the Government would answer that most offences of drunk and disorderly are dealt with by issuing fixed penalty notices. That can sometimes send the wrong signal, however, because some people deserve to appear in court.

When we referred to fixed penalty notices at the Standing Committee's second sitting, I remember the Minister saying:

"From January to August of this year, 86,000 fixed penalty notices were issued across the country".

When I asked her how many had been paid, she replied:

"Something like three quarters: 50 per cent. straight away and 25 per cent. after a little delay".—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 18 October 2005; c. 63.]

I then referred the Minister to a written question that I had put to her Department in June this year. I had asked for the total value of fixed penalty notices handed out by the police in the Greater London area in the past 12 months, and the percentage that remained unrecovered. One would have thought that the Minister's answer to that question would have been the same as the one that she gave in Committee. However, her answer was that the total value of fixed penalty notices issued was not collected centrally. So, in fact, she was able to tell us very little about the effectiveness of fixed penalty notices.

Apart from the offences of drunk and drunk and disorderly, there are the offences of common assault and actual bodily harm, as well as four or five offences under the Public Order Act 1986, ranging from riot right down to using abusive words and behaviour. And so the list goes on. Offence after offence can and should be used by the Government but they are simply not being used at the moment.

Antisocial behaviour orders are the subject of new clause 1, and I believe that changing the time for which they operate from a minimum of two years to three months could fit the bill. I want to ask the Minister some specific questions. Does she accept that an antisocial behaviour order can prohibit persons from entering specific areas or premises? Does she also accept that such an order could prevent a person from entering a licensed premises? She must accept that the answer is yes to both those questions. Will she therefore tell me how many such orders forbidding persons to enter such licensed premises have been made so far by the courts? How many have been breached? How effective have they been? How many people have been sent to prison—as is possible under an ASBO but not under a drink banning order—for such breaches? Will she also confirm that another restriction that can be laid upon an individual is, before trial, to impose bail conditions forbidding a defendant from going into specified premises?

The Minister has said that antisocial behaviour orders are not appropriate for dealing with alcohol-related disorder. May I gently suggest to her that she is completely out of step with the courts, which, I can tell her from my own experience, are using ASBOs to deal with exactly the sort of alcohol-related disorder that we are facing? I repeat the point that they are stronger than drink banning orders, simply because the penalty for breach can be up to five years in prison—I will be corrected if I am wrong—whereas the penalty for breach of this drink banning order is only a fine. That troubles me, because if the breach only results in a fine, our means courts will be flooded with cases of people who have a drink banning order made against them, who breach it, and who do not pay the fine, which is the maximum sanction. That is the reality. If you and I were to know, Mr. Deputy Speaker—I knew at one point—the percentage of unpaid fines in the Greater London area in a particular year, we would be absolutely astonished at the volume of them.

The question of breach is important. The Minister said, during the Committee's third sitting, I think, on 18 October, that custody is not appropriate if people have merely breached a community penalty. I happen to take a different view, and I wonder where she has been all this time—in fact, in courts up and down the land, breaches of community penalty often result in a custodial sentence, not least for the original offence.

I want to speak briefly to some other important amendments. The purpose of new clause 1 and amendment No. 1 is my fundamental one of saying that the proposed legislation is unnecessary and that the problems addressed can be dealt with fully under existing law. For that reason, I want to press new clause 1 to a vote.

Under clause 1, prohibitions under a drink banning order

"must include such prohibition as the court making it considers necessary, for that purpose, on the subject's entering premises in respect of which there is a premises licence authorising the use of the premises for the sale of alcohol by retail; and . . . club premises".

My amendment No. 2 is a reasonable provision that seeks to insert into the clause the word "knowingly", because as we all know, some premises such as garages are licensed to sell alcohol, and it is entirely possible to enter a garage premises to get petrol unaware that it also holds a licence and sells wine and spirits.

More importantly, amendment No. 3, on which I am considering asking you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, whether you would permit a separate vote, would simply insert into clause 1(3) the words,

", and attempting to purchase alcohol in or consuming alcohol in,"

That gets us round the problem, which we discussed ad nauseam in Committee, whereby supermarkets, under clause 1(3), would be covered by the ban. Let us remember that the court "must" include a prohibition, not "may". People would therefore be banned from going into supermarkets and corner shops. Would people living close to the only village shop or post office , which might sell alcohol, be banned from going into them? What about garages, sports clubs, hotels, restaurants and cinemas? We are talking about premises that by and large are not remotely connected with the fuelling of alcohol-related disorder, but that are licensed premises, and would therefore be caught under the provision prohibiting people who are subject to a drink banning order from entering them.

During the second sitting of the Standing Committee, Conservative Members raised the issue of the premises that would be covered. We all know that the premises that cause the real problem in terms of alcohol-related disorder are pubs that behave irresponsibly. What about the premises that I listed earlier? Would a court ban people—as it appears it would have to—from entering all licensed premises?

Having listened to the argument, the Minister said:

"On 26 October I, the Home Secretary and Ministers from the Department for Culture, Media and Sport will meet the chief executives of the large supermarket chains, to talk about the issues that the hon. Gentleman has raised. I think that most people accept that they are a problem."

I now ask the Minister to respond fully to my request, and to tell us exactly what happened at that meeting.

If memory serves me right, in Committee, when we discussed what constitutes "disorderly" behaviour, the example that was given was six youngsters under the influence of alcohol outside someone's house. The hon. Gentleman says that such people are simply exhibiting high spirits. Would he tell a constituent who complained about such a situation that the youngsters in question were just in high spirits, or that they were being disorderly?

I say now exactly what I said in Committee. Let us consider the example of six 18-year-old youngsters who have been to a 21st birthday party and are under the influence of alcohol. [Interruption.] Let me finish this point. Let us say that there are some high spirits and that—in keeping with the example given in Committee—they were making a bit of a noise running across the road. If it is not a criminal offence, it does not deserve the sort of sanction that this Bill provides for. That is why we have the criminal law, by the way. There are many decent, high-spirited people who behave in ways that do not break the law, and as far as I am concerned, let them do so. The law is the law, and normal high spirits should not—I repeat, not—be punished by a drinking banning order, which is a very punitive measure indeed.

Is that what the hon. Gentleman would tell his constituents?

Yes, it is. I would tell them that normal high spirits are entirely to be accepted. If the hon. Gentleman is saying that under his Government, normal high spirits should be punished by a punitive order, I disagree with him wholeheartedly.

Two weeks ago, a constituent came to my surgery who is being plagued week in, week out by a group of youngsters consuming large quantities of alcohol. The hon. Gentleman describes such behaviour as high spirits, but my constituent does not, given that she is being woken up at 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning. Are the Conservatives now happy for law-abiding people such as her to be kept awake all night by "high spirits"?

Oh dear—the hon. Gentleman misses the point altogether. The people keeping that person awake all night are almost certainly drunk and disorderly, and the police—[Interruption.] Forgive me, is the hon. Gentleman saying that those people are not disorderly?

My constituent is saying that week in, week out, she and her neighbours are being harassed by people who are perhaps not completely drunk according to the hon. Gentleman's argument, but who are clearly causing a nuisance in that neighbourhood. Is he saying that such behaviour is acceptable?

The hon. Gentleman, who was a valued member of the Committee, is not doing himself justice. If the conduct amounts to a criminal offence, it is a criminal offence. I am in no doubt that he is familiar with sections 4, 4(1)(a) and 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, and he will doubtless intervene to tell me whether he believes that they cover the situation about which he is talking. [Interruption.] Does he want to tell me what he thinks about my observation that those sections apply? Yes, he does.

Anyone can be a clever lawyer—there are too many in this place—but the point is that this Government are trying to tackle disorder on estates. Frankly, by referring to such hooligan-style behaviour as "high spirits" the hon. Gentleman shows just how out of touch he is.

The hon. Gentleman is letting himself down time and again, and I will be doing him a service if I do not give way again. I repeat: the behaviour that he is talking about is a criminal offence, and what we want is proper enforcement of the existing criminal law. We need to distinguish between criminal acts, and high spirits that do not amount to a criminal act. If such behaviour amounts to a criminal act, let those guilty of it be prosecuted; if it does not, there is no point in a harsh sanction.

Does my hon. Friend agree that the sort of behaviour that Labour Members are describing sounds very much like antisocial behaviour? If that is so, is not an ASBO the appropriate remedy?

My hon. Friend is right. If the behaviour is not thought by the police to warrant prosecution in a particular case, an ASBO is a relevant application.

May I also let myself down by asking the hon. Gentleman to clarify the difference between high spirits and disorder? Will he give a practical example of what the difference is?

I shall link drunk and disorder, which is an offence. I have already said that the number of prosecutions is lamentably low for that offence. The hon. Gentleman must understand that there is a difference between something that is not an offence and something that is an offence.

What is the difference?

If a person in the street is drunk—I cannot make it much simpler than that—and is then disorderly, that is an offence of being drunk and disorderly. [Interruption.] The line lies where the police and the courts—thank God, we still have the courts—choose to draw it. Genuine high spirits, which do not amount to someone being drunk and disorderly, are not a criminal offence. I hope that the hon. Gentleman understands that.

Is not a material factor the regularity with which the bad behaviour takes place, which is damaging a community's quality of life? If there are high spirits on one occasion, that is one thing; if there is repeated bad behaviour in a particular area, that should be tackled by the use of ASBOs.

My hon. Friend is right. I cannot make the point to Labour Members more clearly than I have. If there is an offence under the Public Order Act 1986 or under any other legislation, it should be prosecuted. If there is no offence, there should be no prosecution. We must never forget, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright) has said, that there is the availability of the ASBO, which if granted—

The Opposition were against ASBOs.

The hon. Gentleman was not, I think, a member of the Committee that considered that Bill, so he is not able to say that. If an ASBO is made and it is breached, that can result in a custodial sentence.

First, the reality is that we have a huge amount of alcohol-related violence, and it is becoming worse by the month under the Government. Secondly, there is no doubt that there is a huge amount of existing law relating to drunken violence that is not being enforced by the police. Thirdly, an ASBO covers the process that the Government want to include in their new Bill. We need only to amend the ASBO legislation to permit orders to be made for a shorter period of three months. In one fell swoop we would overcome the Minister's apparent objection in Committee.

The Minister must understand that the purpose of the orders is to ban people from purchasing, or attempting to purchase, alcohol rather than entering premises that may have a particular licence. I know that the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) will be making her comments on behalf of the Liberal Democrats on amendment No. 28. I have much sympathy with that amendment and I hope to be able to respond to her as the debate progresses.

I shall speak to amendments Nos. 28 and 30 and comment on other amendments in the group. With the permission of the House, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I shall probably put amendment No. 28 to a vote at the appropriate time.

Amendment No. 28 is an attempt to ensure that a drinking banning order is not applied inappropriately—a point that, to some extent, we discussed in Committee. There are cases where an individual, through a number of conditions, is rendered incapable not just of complying with an order, but of understanding it. In such cases, a person may suffer from substance addiction, including alcohol dependency, or have a mental condition such as Asperger's syndrome or Tourette's syndrome.

The amendment that we tabled in Committee stated that a court "must" have a report on each individual who appears before it. The Minister argued that the paperwork involved would create too heavy a bureaucracy and delays would occur. She said that drinking banning orders were meant to be a quick and effective punishment without being as cumbersome or severe as antisocial behaviour orders, which carry a much longer and more severe penalty.

As suggested by the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) in Committee, the amendment now says that courts "may" ask for a medical report so that they can be satisfied that the individual can understand and comply with a drinking banning order. I was persuaded by the Minister's argument about bureaucracy, and she offered to include in the guidance the need to consider asking for a medical report. On reflection, however, I decided that simply to place it in guidance is not enough of a safeguard for an individual who is thus incapacitated. I have modified the amendment to put the measure on the face of the Bill to ensure that all courts and advocates refer to it and recognise its relevance.

Guidance for mental health problems is used to support antisocial behaviour order legislation, but it has not worked. One does not have to look far to find examples of ASBOs being served inappropriately. The British Institute for Brain Injured Children provided me with many examples, one of which in particular stuck in my mind. A 14-year-old boy was given an ASBO that included a curfew. He had to stick to it, but he had a mental age below that of a seven-year-old and could not tell the time. The boy and his family needed help to deal with their problems, and an ASBO was inappropriate in enabling them to receive guidance and support.

With the amendment changed to "may" instead of "must"—I hope that the Minister is in a good mood—the judiciary would be able to avoid using a drinking banning order inappropriately while ensuring that the process was still quick. A doctor or GP should also be able to give their opinion to a court to speed that process further. If drinking banning orders are to work in the way envisaged by the Government, they should be swift procedures, more akin to parents grounding their naughty children. It should be a short punishment that is not meant to last a lifetime but to shock them into realising the error of their ways. We need to be sure that the vulnerable are adequately and properly protected.

Amendment No. 30 returns to the issue of publicising individuals who are subject to a drinking banning order. The Government want to disapply the blanket ban on the publication of names and photographs of defendants under 18. We think that that contravenes the United Nations convention on the rights of the child. That is applied to the criminal law, and we are considering the civil law, but such publication would break with the spirit of the convention. We want to protect young people.

I was surprised by the Minister's view in Committee that it was appropriate to put photos and names in the press. She argued that if I wanted the measure enforced, I should be happy with that, because the more publicity that names and faces received, the more likely it would be that the individual would be recognised going into an area where he should not be. However, it would be far more appropriate to give that information to interested parties, such as licensees, local authorities and police, rather than pillorying those people in the press.

Is it now Liberal Democrat policy not to name and shame individuals? In Durham, some estates are plagued by certain individuals. Is the hon. Lady saying that they should be protected?

We should comply with the spirit of the UN convention on the rights of the child. Interested parties, such as estate wardens, should be informed because they could work with the police to enforce a drinking banning order. We should not simply name and shame, like in the olden days in the stocks and by pillory. Publicity could also be self-defeating. ASBOs have become a badge of honour for some young people, and drinking banning orders could be prized in the same way. We know that young men can be competitive about how much they drink.

Will we see Liberal Democrat "Focus" leaflets published to highlight the fact that Liberal Democrats now oppose naming and shaming individuals? How will people on the estates plagued by certain individuals be able to help the police if the individuals cannot be identified? The hon. Lady's proposal is totally unworkable.

I remain convinced that informing interested parties would be more valuable than placing notices in the press, as suggested by the Minister. Publicity might be self-defeating, because the resulting celebrity might encourage youngsters to break their drinking banning orders. It would be far more appropriate to notify only those interested parties who could help the police.

New clause 1 proposes that an ASBO should last for only three months, but that is far too short a term in which to change behaviour—and that has to be the objective of any such order. We need to produce a cultural change. An ASBO lasts two years, but a year would be just right. I would prefer to see far more work being done with those who are served with ASBOs or drinking banning orders. If that happened, the length of the order could be modified according to improvements in behaviour.

We discussed the definition of "disorderly" for some time in Committee. I am not unattracted by the Conservative definition, but it is very vague and did not get any clearer despite all our attempts. The Government are trying to achieve the difficult job of pinning the definition between the criminal and the high-spirited, but I was concerned when the hon. Member for West Lancashire (Rosie Cooper) said that behaviour that constitutes disorder and should be banned included:

"generally running about, running across roads and shouting to one's friends".

She elucidated further that

"It may be seen as . . . threatening and people are disturbed by it."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 18 October 2005; c. 35.]

Drinking banning orders may cross several fine lines, but we will have to see how they work in practice. I am inclined to give the Government the benefit of the doubt until we see how drinking banning orders work. The terms are ill defined, but I understand that the nuisance created in some cities has now gone beyond the pale and it is that mischief that—[Interruption.] I have always acknowledged that such behaviour has gone too far. I want to see how the Government's plans will tackle it, and I am not convinced that they will achieve their aims without stepping over the line into an authoritarian approach. However, I assume that the matter will be kept under review and that if there is a step too far, we shall retreat—

Soft on crime.

No, Liberal Democrats have a well-balanced view of life and have nothing whatever to be ashamed of. I have always been proud of our position, which is, in the end, common sense.

Given the length of some of the speeches, I shall conclude my remarks. I hope, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that you will allow us to vote on amendment No. 28.

I have little sympathy with the Liberal amendment, No. 28. I believe in naming and shaming individuals who indulge in loutish behaviour and damage other people's lives.

I want briefly to support the new clause, the logic of which is clear. There are too many complex laws and we are making too much law. New laws take time to bed in and become effective—if they ever do—so using existing ASBOs is the rational way to deal with the problem and improve the protection we offer communities that suffer from loutish and unacceptable behaviour.

Lowering the height of the hurdle from two years to three months, as the new clause proposes, is the rational way forward. It will make ASBOs more attractive and promote their use, so that the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the courts are encouraged to implement them to increase protection for residents and people whose quality of life is regularly damaged by bad behaviour and nuisance on our streets.

I support the new clause and hope that the House will accept it on a Division. It is rational and common sense, and we should adopt it.

We have trawled over some of the ground we covered in Committee, but we now have a clearer idea of the views of all the parties. The purpose of the Bill is to try to ensure that we protect the law-abiding majority of decent people from the kind of behaviour that the hon. Member for Castle Point (Bob Spink) just mentioned.

New clause 1 and amendment No. 1 would reduce the minimum length of an antisocial behaviour order from two years to three months. It would remove all the provisions relating to drinking banning orders, on the basis that the Opposition feel it would be appropriate to use ASBOs rather than drinking banning orders in all circumstances—[Interruption.] I hope to cover every point that the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) made and to rebut some of the things that he got wrong.

Technically, it would be possible to reduce the length of ASBOs and simply provide conditions tailored to drink issues, where that is the problem behaviour, but that would do no service either to ASBOs or to the proposed new orders. In Committee, I talked about the need for courts to consider making a drinking banning order on a basis that is much more proactive than that for their current consideration of ASBOs.

Antisocial behaviour orders cover the spectrum of antisocial behaviour. The motivations that drive that behaviour will be very varied. Those receiving ASBOs will often have poor educational records, a history of truancy, problems at home, parental issues—a range of different things lead up to their offending behaviour. That is why ASBOs are fairly complex, with a range of prohibitions to try to target the antisocial behaviour. As Members have said, the complex nature of ASBOs meant that they were slow to take off when they were originally proposed in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. We have made them simpler, but they remain significant and serious orders. Courts need to be pretty well convinced of the case for making an ASBO; indeed, some of my hon. Friends might say that courts, local authorities and the police are not using the powers to their full extent in many areas, although I am pleased to say that the situation is improving.

ASBOs take time to have an effect, and the community must be protected in the interim, so simply reducing the time limit for ASBOs is not the right remedy to the problem that we face. It is important that we have a fairly simple order—the drinking banning order—that is designed to tackle the problem of binge drinking and the violence that emanates from the people who indulge in it.

Let us not forget that, in other circumstances, binge drinkers can often be fairly responsible citizens who have decent jobs, good wages and normally conduct themselves as decent members of society. They go out and drink far too much in far too short a period. They deliberately go out to get as drunk as they possibly can. They get involved in a fracas about a kebab or which person they will take home for the evening. They get involved in a fight in the taxi queue. They are then suddenly involved in the kind of violence and disorder that no one wants to happen.

My right hon. Friend is right, and one of the contributory factors is the irresponsible attitude of retailers who have happy hours and buy-one-get-one-free promotions. They have a responsibility as well.

My hon. Friend is right, which is why we have been working with the industry to try to ensure that we can introduce provisions on happy hours. We have had a dreadful situation in this country. During some happy hours, people are told, "Drink all you can for £10", and I saw a sign saying, "Girls drink free until midnight", which is a recipe for mayhem and bad behaviour—not just among the girls, but more generally, too. That is why I am pleased that several of the big chains have recently decided to outlaw the kind of irresponsible promotions that we have seen in the past, and I expect many more of them to take that action.

There is a significant difference between ASBOs and the orders that are proposed. We are asking the courts to use drinking banning orders much more proactively. Whenever they hear a case in which someone has been involved in violence while under the influence of alcohol, they should consider whether it is appropriate to make a drinking banning order. No great big, convoluted and complicated application is necessary, and the remedy is fairly simple. The whole idea is to try to get people to change their behaviour and to make them realise that going out on Friday and Saturday nights, getting into a completely drunken state where they cannot remember what they have done and getting involved in violence and disorder will simply not be tolerated and the court will make an order to do something about it.

I understand a great deal of what the Minister is saying, but is not the logic of her remarks that those who deserve a drinking banning order are behaving antisocially? That is why the court wants to mark their behaviour as antisocial. In those circumstances, would it not make more sense to call the behaviour what it is, by using an antisocial behaviour order?

The description "drinking banning order" is very graphic and pretty easily understood. One of the prohibitions that the court must consider is banning people from premises that sell alcohol. The whole idea is for the order to contain prohibitions that tell people that they are not allowed to go to their favourite bars and clubs. That is quite a disincentive to carrying on in a drunken way. People may also be prohibited from going out with their regular group of friends, with whom they go out and create mayhem in communities.

The hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) asked whether the order will become a badge of honour. The prospect of not being able to go out to their favourite pub or club on Saturday nights, perhaps for three months over the summer, can have more impact on young people than many of the other things that we pass in the House. That will help to change behaviour.

Does the Minister agree that, rather than introducing drinking banning orders and such measures to tackle the problem of binge drinking, it would make more sense to allow other measures time to work before opening up bars and clubs to 24-hour drinking?

The hon. Lady repeats the assertion about 24-hour drinking. I am sure that she knows that a tiny minority of licensed premises will have those extended licences. We will see flexible licensing hours. As my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire, North (Jim Sheridan) said, rather than everyone being tipped out on to the streets at the same time, people will have their exit from pubs and clubs staged, and we hope that they will behave better.

On that basis, I ask the hon. Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) to withdraw the motion. I have been sympathetic to his earlier amendment, but I am afraid that he has run out of luck now. I cannot accept that we should simply have ASBOs, rather than the new drinking banning order, which will be of significant use in dealing with such issues and is welcomed by the police and local authorities.

The hon. Gentleman asked what the penalty for a breach of a drinking banning order would be and whether it could be a custodial sentence. I must correct him for the record. I made it clear in Committee:

"There will . . . be potential for offenders to receive custodial sentences for persistent breaches of the community sentence imposed for breach of a drinking banning order."—[Official Report, Standing Committee B, 18 October 2005; c. 91.]

He will know from his extensive experience that the courts will have the power to make a community order as well as to impose a fine. There would be a range of options including curfews, exclusion orders and unpaid work. In Committee, he welcomed the range of options available to courts through community orders because that meant that magistrates could respond more flexibly to the kind of mischief and problems with which we are trying to deal. He was not correct if he thought I said that there could never be a custodial penalty, because clearly there could.

The Minister advanced the same argument in Committee. She might remember that I asked her a question about the matter. Does she accept that it would be perfectly feasible for people to breach the community penalty that they received for breaching a drinking banning order, yet to be able to continue with the drinking banning order? In other words, they could decide not to drink, even though they would have breached their community penalty. If people can do that, does it not underline the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Woking (Mr. Malins) that the response to the breach of a drinking banning order should directly be a custodial penalty? Such an option would remain available, would it not?

No. We have a taken a view on this and do not think that there should be a direct custodial penalty. A community order can be made and if the case returns to the courts after the breach of that order, it will be for them to decide the appropriate penalty. It is perfectly proper for the courts to do that. That will sharpen up the distinction between antisocial behaviour orders and drinking banning orders. I am sure that hon. Members are not in the business of saying that people should go to prison for up to five years if the breach of the order has been to enter the single pub or club from which they have been barred from entering. It is important that penalties are proportionate to the breaches that they address.

The hon. Member for Woking has alleged on several occasions that prosecutions for being drunk and disorderly have decreased dramatically in recent years. In 1997, there were 31,891 such prosecutions and in 2003, there were 31,343. The number of prosecutions has stayed pretty constant. As he knows, some 86,000 fixed penalty notices have been issued for a range of offences, so there are more sanctions against drunk and disorderly behaviour than there were in the past.

The hon. Gentleman repeated a point that he made in Committee about a parliamentary question that he tabled and my response to it. The reason for the discrepancy was the fact that the question related to Greater London and my response in Committee related to national figures. I pointed that out in Committee, so I am surprised that he simply tried to repeat his point today to no good effect.

Opposition amendment No. 4 would change the definition of premises to which prohibitions might apply. The Bill currently provides that a drinking banning order prohibits an individual from doing things described in the order. The prohibitions must include whatever the court considers necessary with regard to the subject entering premises that sell alcohol and club premises. The definitions of the premises are in line with those in the Licensing Act 2003.

We had a general discussion in Committee about the possibility of people being banned from supermarkets or garages. It is unlikely that the courts would want to ban individuals from entering supermarkets unless that proved absolutely necessary due to the circumstances of a specific case.

If the intention were simply to stop a person from obtaining alcohol, that would not be sufficient under the Bill. The Bill gives the courts flexibility. They may impose a whole range of prohibitions, such as not going out with certain groups of people to certain premises, but they must include a prohibition on entering specific licensed premises. People will thus be stopped from entering the bars, pubs and clubs to which they really enjoy going. That is an attempt to change their behaviour, which is an important aspect of the Bill.

The Minister said that the order must include a prohibition preventing someone from entering certain licensed premises. Can she specifically tell the House whether a drinking banning order can forbid someone from going into a supermarket to buy alcohol, but not simply from going into a supermarket? Can she confirm on the record that that is the case?

If the hon. Gentleman looks at the Bill, he will see that clause 1(2) states:

"Such an order may impose any prohibition on the subject which is necessary for the purpose of protecting other persons from criminal or disorderly conduct by the subject while he is under the influence of alcohol."

"Any prohibition" may therefore be imposed by the court. Clause 1(3) lists the mandatory requirements of such a prohibition. A supermarket prohibition could therefore be made under clause 1(2), but not under clause 1(3)(a) or (b).

Under amendment No. 28 the hon. Member for Hornsey and Wood Green seeks to reintroduce an earlier amendment that required the court to receive a report on the subject's mental and physical health and substance addictions. We had a long discussion about that Committee, and I accept that the hon. Lady has changed "must" in her earlier amendment to "may". However, local authorities already have a duty under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 to assess anyone who may be in need of community care services. If there is any evidence to suggest that someone is suffering from a syndrome or problem that prevents them from understanding the order social services authorities must make sure that they are subject to an assessment, which should run alongside the collection of evidence and an application for an order. I do not want inordinate delay and a bureaucratic system. Drinking banning orders, as we have discussed, are meant to be a short, sharp shock. They enable the court to deal proactively with someone accused of committing an offence under the influence of alcohol. If we include a panoply of provisions to cover the handful of such cases, the courts will be inhibited from using the power to protect the decent, law-abiding majority. We must be aware of vulnerable individuals, but we must not predicate all our legislation on one or two specific cases; otherwise we will undermine its very purpose.

Does the Minister not accept that the judiciary, in its judicious interpretation of the phrase that the court "may" require a report, would apply the provision only to cases where they deemed it necessary to receive a medical report? Such a requirement would therefore not have an adverse effect on the vast number of drinking banning orders that may be imposed.

The hon. Lady knows that the courts have discretion when looking at the cases that are brought before them. They must be satisfied that two requirements are met: first, someone must be guilty of offending behaviour; and, secondly, it must be necessary to make the order. The court will consider a range of factors when deciding whether the second requirement has been met. May I advise the hon. Lady that my comments are meant kindly? She has talked a great deal about human rights, which are important. However, we have to achieve a balance of human rights, and respect the human rights of the decent, law-abiding majority whose peaceful existence is threatened when people drink far too much and get out of control, causing the nuisance that happens far too often. Getting that balance right is important, but in this instance she is wrongly seeking to put the rights of the perpetrator above those of decent members of the community.

Amendments Nos. 13 and 14, which were tabled by the Opposition, seek to include a definition of "disorderly" to cover

"conduct which would offend an ordinary person but which falls short of a criminal act."

We had a long discussion about that in Committee. There is no need to define the word "disorderly" in the Bill. It is not defined in relation to the offence of being drunk and disorderly in section 91 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The Select Committee on Home Affairs concluded that it would be a mistake to try to define more closely the current definition of antisocial behaviour. The courts are perfectly aware of behaviour that is disorderly, and of behaviour that results in a criminal act. In Committee, I gave the hon. Member for Woking an example of disorderly behaviour. If a large group of people are marauding through an area, kicking over bins and causing excessive noise, they may not necessarily commit a public order offence, but they are certainly guilty of disorderly behaviour.

The hon. Gentleman talked about high spirits, but in Committee some telling examples were given, particularly by my hon. Friend the Member for Brent, South (Ms Butler), who said that "high spirits" was not an accurate description of the problems in her community.

Amendment No. 5 would require that for orders on conviction the court must be satisfied that the individual was drunk, rather than under the influence of alcohol. That would raise the threshold at which a drinking banning order could be obtained and could lead to a wide range of offenders who were under the influence of alcohol escaping the prohibitions imposed by a DBO. I think that it is for the courts to come to a view based on the evidence before them on whether an offender was under the influence of alcohol when they committed an offence. I ask hon. Members to think about the sort of problem that we are trying to tackle. The courts are well placed to determine whether someone was under the influence of alcohol. I direct the House's attention to the second limb of the offence, which is that for an order to be made, it must be necessary to protect the rest of the community. The courts will examine that closely before making an order.

Amendment No. 6 would ensure that a court must consider only applications by the Crown. That would defeat part of our purpose, which is to encourage the proactive use of DBOs. The court would have to wait for the Crown to make an application; it would not be able to consider the matter of its own volition. That would weaken our proposals.

Liberal Democrat amendment No. 30 would reimpose automatic reporting restrictions in proceedings for an order on conviction involving young people. Several hon. Members have said that they consider it useful not to bind the court to automatic reporting restrictions. That does not mean that restrictions cannot apply in specific, narrow cases if they are necessary for the protection of the individual. I happen to believe that if people have gone out, deliberately got drunk, got involved in violent behaviour under the influence of alcohol, and acted in a such a way that the court finds it necessary to make an order to protect the rest of the public, it is extremely hard to make a case for their name and details being kept a secret from the rest of the community, who have been the victims of that behaviour. Far from being a badge of honour, being banned from one's favourite pubs and clubs is likely to be a good incentive to change one's behaviour. In addition, it is important that local people are able to report it to the police if they see the individuals in question in pubs and clubs from which they are banned, so that action can be taken in relation to the breach.

Government amendment No. 43 gives district councils the same right as county councils to make applications for DBOs, which is entirely right and proper. Government amendment No. 42 is merely a small consequential amendment. The other Government amendments are welcome tidying measures. Clause 23 is to be removed because, on reflection, we realised that the DBO provisions make the Licensed Premises (Exclusion of Certain Persons) Act 1980 superfluous. We can achieve everything that we want to achieve through the DBO route, which is a much better provision. The 1980 legislation is extremely narrow—it depends on a conviction on the licensed premises themselves.

The DBO is—dare I say to the hon. Member for Woking?—a more modern and appropriate way in which to deal with the mischief we encounter in our communities these days. I ask him and his hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who has taken a very legalistic approach to various pieces of our legislation, to think carefully about making sure that legislation is modern, flexible, about changing behaviour and able to cope with the new challenges that we face, rather than cleaving to the traditional interpretation of the law and focusing simply on prosecution. Making available ASBOs and DBOs is about making sure that our criminal justice system is modern, flexible and able to meet the challenges of this day and age.

I confess to being disappointed by the Minister's response. The truth of the matter is that the Government have presided over a massive rise in binge drinking and alcohol-related violence, which they are doing very little to stop. The existing laws are not being enforced, but all the Government want to do is introduce a new flagship policy on the basis that a headline and a new Act will solve all their problems—tell that to the people on the streets who are suffering as a result of alcohol-fuelled violence.

New clause 1 seeks to amend the ASBO legislation to make it more flexible. Why on earth can the Minister not accept that making ASBO legislation more flexible is a good idea? She does not want to accept any arguments from this side of the House, as a result of which I want to put the new clause to the opinion of the House.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.