With permission, Mr. Deputy Speaker, I should like to make a statement about our operations and force levels in Iraq.

First, let me express my sincere condolences to the families of Captain Richard Holmes and Private Lee Ellis of 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment, killed in Iraq on 28 February, and to the family of Trooper Carl Smith, who died on 2 February. I am sure that the whole House wishes to be associated with those condolences.

We express our sympathy, too, for all those families of the forces of other nations and of the many innocent civilians who have died or been injured as a result of terrorist activity in Iraq in recent months.

Hon. Members will have followed the situation carefully, and will, like me, have been concerned about events, especially those following the disgraceful bombing of the al-Askari shrine in Samarra. Some commentators have suggested that that act of terror will lead to a slide into civil war. Those acts of terrorism are cruel and barbaric but they are not mindless. They have a purpose: to undermine the efforts of the vast majority of the Iraqi people who seek peace, stability and democracy in their country, and to try to break the will of the coalition forces supporting them in that quest.

Despite the ferocity of the terrorists, the Iraqi people will not be defeated and our will to see the job done will not be broken. Our analysis is that civil war is neither imminent nor inevitable. However, in some areas of Iraq, including in Baghdad, there has been an increase in sectarian violence. That is abhorrent and plays to the aim of the terrorists.

However, in the face of the cynical targeting of the Samarra attack, the aftermath has been characterised more by calls for restraint by Iraqi politicians and religious leaders, the calm reaction of the vast majority of Iraqis in all the circumstances, despite their natural revulsion and anger, and the mature response of Iraq's new security forces. In the middle of all the problems, those are encouraging signs in a very difficult and delicate situation.

Our respect and admiration for the men and women of our armed forces remains undiminished. The truly magnificent work that they are doing there is having a positive effect and they have played a vital role in helping Iraq come a long way in a short time. Suffice it to say that the Iraqis have clearly shown us what they want, and it is not a return to fear and oppression. They showed us that most impressively in December when, despite the threats of death and destruction, some 12 million of them voted in free and fair elections. That represents a turnout of about 75 per cent. of the electorate.

The present political wrangling over the formation of a new coalition Government is perhaps natural, but it is also contributing to uncertainty and fuelling speculation. As that process moves forward, the Iraqi politicians must not forget the commitment of the Iraqi people who voted in large numbers to bring order and fair government to a unified Iraq. However, there has been a continual and considerable advance in the numbers, capability and morale of the Iraqi security forces, which have developed as democracy has developed. It is in that context that I turn to our United Kingdom troop presence.

When I announced the last changeover in October last year, 190,000 members of the Iraqi security forces were already trained, capable and equipped. Today there are about 235,000—which is 45,000 more than when I announced the last roulement deployment—and others are joining them at the rate of about 5,000 every month. It is against that background that we assess our own force levels. I can therefore tell the House that, as a result of this roulement changeover, there will be a reduction of British forces in Iraq of about 800 personnel. That reflects the completion of our security sector reform tasks to develop the capability of the Iraqi forces, including training the trainers and those involved in guarding their own institutions. The reduction also reflects improvements in the way we configure our own forces. Our force levels reflect the in-theatre assessments in the south-east of Iraq. Today's announcement marks a reduction from the high point of some 10,000 UK personnel in October 2003 to just over 7,000 from May this year.

The lead formation in Iraq, currently 7th Armoured Brigade, will be replaced in early May by 20th Armoured Brigade. The following major units will be deployed to replace those in theatre today: 1st The Queen's Dragoon Guards; The Queen's Royal Hussars; 12th Regiment Royal Artillery; 33 and 35 Engineer Regiments; 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards; 1st Battalion The Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment; 2nd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers (Reserve- Cyprus); 2nd Battalion The Royal Anglian Regiment; 1st Battalion The Devon and Dorset Light Infantry; 1st Battalion The Light Infantry; and 3 Logistic Support Regiment, Royal Logistic Corps.

A number of reserve personnel will accompany this deployment, including soldiers from The Lancastrian and Cumbrian Volunteers, and The King's and Cheshire Regiment. Aviation support will continue to be provided by five Merlin, eight Sea King support helicopters, and four Lynx. In May, there will be a reduction of two Sea King helicopters. Our support to the Iraqi navy and our contribution to the coalition taskforce in the north Arabian gulf will continue unchanged.

Let me stress that the reductions that I have announced today are not part of a handover of security responsibility at operational level. They have not been caused by, nor are they the cause of, changes in troop levels of other coalition allies. In the next few weeks, the joint committee to transfer security responsibility—a body made up of Iraqi ministers, military staff and senior coalition figures—will start the assessment phase to determine whether conditions have been met for some provinces in Iraq to begin the handover process. Today is not that stage of handover. When the committee has reached conclusions, I will of course come back and update the House on the implications of that assessment.

In closing, I would like to reiterate that we continue, amid the struggle in Iraq, to make progress. Of course, much remains to be done there, but let me stress again today that the significant reductions that I have announced are not part of a handover of security responsibility to the Iraqis themselves, although they do reflect the completion of some of the security sector reform tasks that we set ourselves some time ago in developing the capability of the Iraqi forces—in particular, training the trainers and guarding institutions.

Our commitment to the Iraqi people and their Government remains total and steadfast. Our commitment to the coalition is certain. We will stay as long as we are needed, and wanted, and until the job is done. Today marks another significant step in that direction.

I thank the Secretary of State for letting me have advanced sight of his statement, although I note that the BBC had some knowledge of it before noon today.

I am responding on behalf of Her Majesty's Opposition because my hon. Friend the Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox), the shadow Secretary of State for Defence, is, as we speak, en route to Washington to give evidence to the Senate inquiry on the joint strike fighter, where he will be making common cause with Her Majesty's Government on the vital issue of technology transfer.

First, may I associate those on the Conservative Benches with the condolences expressed by the Secretary of State to the families of those servicemen recently killed in Iraq? It is important that the lives of those and the other members of Her Majesty's armed forces are not to be given in vain. To that end, the transformation of Iraq into a functioning democracy must be the goal before us.

Having been in Basra last week, I can readily join the Secretary of State in congratulating the armed forces on the magnificent job they are doing. It is, unfortunately, one of our national scandals that, while the media accord page after page to any failures, real or invented, they give so little coverage to the hard work our troops carry out on our behalf in the process of reconstructing Iraq.

While we welcome any reduction in Britain's military presence in Iraq, if the military conditions so dictate, we take the view that it would be folly to withdraw hastily, before the Iraqi forces can provide adequate security in place of British troops.

Will the Secretary of State confirm that the reductions he now proposes are not dictated by the need to find extra forces for Afghanistan? When does he expect the Iraqi police and army to be sufficiently trained, in number and competence, to enable them to assume control across Multinational Division South-East? What impact will the troop reduction have on the ability of UK forces to deliver essential training to the Iraqis?

Towards the end of the statement, the Secretary of State referred to an assessment process due to get under way shortly "to determine whether conditions have been met for some provinces . . . to begin the handover process." Is it Government policy, if conditions are right, to hand over parts of MND South-East in advance of the Americans so doing in central Iraq? What discussions has he had with Washington about that process?

Finally, the Secretary of State referred to aviation support. He will know that our helicopter and transport aircraft fleets are operating at a frenetic tempo, well beyond what was expected. How on earth can he justify the withdrawal in May of two Sea King helicopters? I was in a Sea King helicopter on Thursday, flying out to HMS Bulwark, and heard from the Royal Navy the difficulties it is having in getting hold of aircraft today. He well knows that helicopters are the preferred means of transport.

What is the Secretary of State doing to address the critical problem of inadequate lift across the board? Does he not accept that the TriStar and VC10 fleets are past their sell-by dates, that some of them cannot be used in theatre because they lack the requisite defensive aids and that the C-130 Hercules fleet is so overworked that it has no capacity to train paratroopers? As a result of all that, the Secretary of State must rely on chartering holiday airliners which are simply not designed to transport troops.

Is the Secretary of State aware that it is utterly demoralising for our troops to have their leave cut thanks to delays in the availability of the transport fleet for which the Royal Air Force is unjustly blamed? In the early hours of Friday morning, I was with 300 soldiers who were delayed by three and a half hours following an engine malfunction on a C-130. We then flew for eight hours from Qatar in a chartered airliner with a seat pitch designed to take holidaymakers on a two-hour trip to Ibiza. Soldiers had to endure intolerable cramped conditions because no TriStars were available.

This is an issue that the Secretary of State can and should address now. I hope that he will have some answers to give the House today.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for the condolences that he sent to our troops and I thank the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox), for his support on technology transfer. It seems that those are matters on which we can agree across the party spectrum, and in so far as we can do that in relation to defence, I think it is worth doing.

I also thank the hon. Gentleman for his accolade for the troops, and for his lack of accolade for sections of the media. To be fair, I think that there are exceptions. I think that there are people who are judicious in what they print, and there are newspapers that give consistent support to our troops in Iraq. Nevertheless, the hon. Gentleman is right: there is a tendency in many quarters of our media to illustrate only that which goes wrong, rather than remembering the marvellous work done by our troops in the most difficult conditions imaginable.

Let me now deal with the questions that the hon. Gentleman asked about the reductions in our forces that were announced today. He asked for an assurance that they were based on the merits of the case for an in-theatre assessment, and not on any obligations to find troops for other areas such as Afghanistan. I can give him that guarantee. Indeed, one of the prerequisites that I specified before deciding to deploy troops to Afghanistan was that we would not become dependent on troop reductions in Iraq. We have made it plain all along that our troop deployments there will be based on conditions on the ground, and on the assessments of our commanders in theatre. I can confirm that that applies in this case, and that there is no connection with Afghanistan.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the timing of the operational handover. I have been careful today to insist that this does not mark a decision on operational handover—the handing over to the Iraqis of lead political and operational responsibility for whole swathes or provinces. What it does mark is an indication of the incremental and increasing participation of Iraqi forces in counter-terrorism in our operations, which at this stage has allowed us to reduce the number of our troops. The assessment of when the process will have reached a point at which a province, or more than one province, could be handed over to the Iraqis will be made when the conditions have been met. The conditions have been publicised, and I think that the hon. Gentleman is well aware of them.

The method of assessing the conditions will be specified by the joint committee that is led by the Iraqis themselves, although it includes coalition forces. That too has been made public. The process will start in April. It may or may not start in any areas over which we have control, but there will be a province-by-province assessment throughout Iraq. The decision will be made following the assessments in April of the conditions on the ground, as was today's announcement.

We have been able to implement the reductions because many of the trainers for the Iraqi forces, themselves Iraqis, have now been trained. Some training capacity will be left, however, and if there are gaps, we will fill them.

As for the Sea Kings and air transport, we do whatever we can. The reductions that have been announced here, and the configuration, are a result of the in-theatre assessment. I note the hon. Gentleman's statement that the Sea Kings are very hard pressed and short of flying hours. I also note that they were flying him around during his visit, but I will examine the position as he requests.

The hon. Gentleman rightly observed that it was prejudicial to good morale when, because of engine breakdowns and so on, the rest and recreation or short periods out of theatre enjoyed by troops, in particular, were reduced. I agree with him entirely, and that is one reason why we tried to ensure that where necessary, we purchased, leased or in some way hired aircraft from outside. It is not possible to guarantee that such things will never happen—as the Prime Minister found only three weeks ago, engines can go wrong in even the best hired planes—but we do what we can. Finally, the hon. Gentleman mentioned demoralisation but the morale of troops in theatre is very high.

I echo the condolences expressed by the Secretary of State and the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) to the families and friends who have lost loved ones in Iraq. I also endorse the tributes paid to the bravery and professionalism of our armed forces, who continue to operate in Iraq in very difficult circumstances indeed.

Today's statement has mixed elements. On the one hand, the Secretary of State acknowledges the danger of civil war, although he says that it is not imminent or inevitable; on the other, the planned reduction in personnel is due to the completion of some security sector reform tasks. Nearly three years on from the invasion and with things so finely balanced, is he saying that there is now to be a reduced British focus on training Iraqi forces? Is he confident about full co-operation from the Iraqis, particularly in the Basra and Maysan provinces? How many troops from other countries are currently assigned to Multinational Division South-East under British command, and does he expect that number to fall over the coming weeks and months? Finally, given his clear frustration with Iraq's politicians, how confident is he that the joint committee will be able to make proper plans that will allow the coalition to form a clear exit strategy from Iraq?

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his remarks about our troops. I should make it clear that my frustration with Iraqi politicians is no greater and no less than my frustration with British politicians. It is the nature of democracy that we do not always agree, but in the midst of the coalition negotiations, all of us should remember the risks that the Iraqi people themselves have taken in coming out to vote in these elections. Ultimately, the salvation of the Iraqi people and their democracy, stability and peace will lie in the hands of Iraqis themselves. It has never been our intention to stay there indefinitely through some imperialist presence. We have said that we will stay until the job is done, that the job will be done when the Iraqis themselves are capable of defending their own democracy and of defending themselves against terrorist activity, and that that will be a process.

Today, I have announced another part of that process—not the end of it by any means. In a sense, this is not even the beginning of the end, but, to quote our most famous politician, it is perhaps the "end of the beginning." This is a significant reduction based largely on the ability of the Iraqis themselves to participate, and to defend themselves against counter-terrorism. There is a very long way to go, and I have been absolutely clear that we are not yet at the stage where the Iraqi security forces can take responsibility for whole provinces. We will continue to assess the situation and when the conditions are met, I will make another announcement to the House.

As far as other coalition troops are concerned, nothing that I have said today about the British disposition of troops—as part of the normal six-monthly announcement of roulement deployment—causes, or is caused by, troop dispositions, reductions or increases among any of our allies in the coalition. So the announcement stands on its own, but we have of course informed our Japanese, Italian and Australian partners in Multinational Division South-East—I spoke to the Australian Minister this morning—and we have informed our other allies, including the Americans.

Is my right hon. Friend aware that the Brookings Institution estimates that between 12,000 and 21,000 Iraqi civilians have died in the violence since the start of the war, in addition to the deaths of more than 1,800 coalition troops and more than 4,000 Iraqi police and military personnel? Does he agree that our most important objective in Iraq should be bringing about an end to the killings, whether of civilians or of service personnel?

When discussing deaths in Iraq, we should recall that in history the price of establishing, fighting for, maintaining and struggling for democracy has sometimes involved sacrifice. It is nothing compared to the hundreds of thousands of deaths under the tyrant Saddam Hussein. I agree entirely that a benchmark of our progress is in the treatment of civilians. I regret whenever civilians suffer as a result of actions that fall beneath civilised standards, whether performed by our troops, anyone else's troops or the Iraqis themselves. But I would point out the watershed of difference between what happens now and what happened 10 years ago in Iraq. Now, if there is maltreatment of civilians, it is exposed, whereas under Saddam it was covered up. It is exceptional now, and under Saddam it was institutionalised. The perpetrators are penalised, prosecuted and—I hope—incarcerated, but under Saddam they were honoured and promoted. That is not an insignificant difference.

What the Secretary of State has told us about the training of an extra 45,000 security forces in Iraq is very good news. The achievements of our British forces there have been very significant indeed. Was the reduction of 800 troops that he has announced discussed with the Iraqi authorities, and what is the general state of discussions between them and British troop commanders, especially in Basra?

In answer to the first question, it was discussed with the Iraqi authorities insofar as it could be, given that there is no national Government formed at present. We keep in touch with our Iraqi colleagues inside the security forces and so on. As regards the second question, the short answer is that they are better than they were a few weeks ago. As the hon. Gentleman knows, several events—not just the video, which was wrongly portrayed as the main reason for the breakdown in communications in several areas—including in the Basra area, our arrest of certain policemen whom we regarded as being involved in nefarious activities, led to a breakdown in communication in that area, but in all of the areas where there was non-co-operation we have either re-established co-operation or are moving towards doing so.

Would not the best way to pay tribute to the 103 bereaved families and to those still serving so splendidly in Iraq be to have a proper inquiry into the reasons why we involved ourselves in the war in the first place? We have had four inquiries, all based on out-of-date information, two of them conducted by committees that were well disposed towards the war anyway, and two that considered only partial aspects of the war. Is it not now time for an inquiry that would be comprehensive, rigorous and genuinely independent?

Well, the facts of the matter are that there have already been four inquiries. Notwithstanding what I thought was a rather misleading slur—I hope that my hon. Friend was not referring to Members of Parliament when he referred to two of the committees as being prejudiced—

I did not say that.

I did not say that he said that: I said that I hoped he was not saying that. However, two of the committees that conducted inquiries were Committees of this House and I accept their opinion and that they were not prejudiced in their approach. I do not know whether the other two, one of which took place under Lord Hutton, can be regarded as prejudiced, but if I were my hon. Friend, I would be careful about what I said. All of the committees approached their specific task with a commendable degree of open-mindedness and scrutiny. The fact that we have had four inquiries and they have not reached the conclusion that my hon. Friend wanted them to reach may be unfortunate, but perhaps it is statistically relevant. I can only suggest that what he is actually asking for is an inquiry that agrees with him, rather than one that discovers the truth.

I declare an interest in a company that works in Iraq. The House will have noticed the Secretary of State's very careful words that the slide towards civil war is neither imminent nor inevitable. However, he did not say that it was unlikely. Does the Secretary of State agree that Donald Rumsfeld's remark that if there is a slide into civil war it must be dealt with by Iraqi security forces conceals a fundamental problem in the whole of coalition policy, because a very high proportion of those security forces is drawn from the Shi'a and Kurdish communities, and it has been elements of the security forces, particularly the police, that have been responsible for many of the killings and atrocities that have been committed against Iraqi civilians? Can the Secretary of State say what Her Majesty's Government are doing to impress upon the Iraqi Government that not only must the armed forces be drawn substantially from the Sunni as well as other communities, but much more must be done than is being done to prevent atrocities by rogue elements within the security forces themselves?

I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that, without necessarily agreeing with all his premises, I entirely agree with both his conclusions. First, not only must there be a competent Government in Iraq but it must be non-sectarian in character and must reach out to the Sunni section of the population as well as to the majority Shi'a or the Kurd section. That means that the analysis of the violence must be more sophisticated than it sometimes is in some quarters. It is not the case that everyone who is opposed to the Government or to our troops is on the other side of the international war on terrorism. Many young Sunnis are dispossessed, unemployed and alienated—there are 200,000 of them in the Euphrates valley—and may drift in and out of violence for reasons unconnected with fanaticism or extremist ideology. I agree that if they are to be brought into ownership of Iraq, the Government have to reach out to them. Secondly, where there is evidence of bias, ranging from a natural bias towards one's own community through to the intentional infiltration of the security forces by militias, it has to be rooted out in practice, ideology and theory as well as in operational terms. Both of those things are essential if Iraq is to build national unity.

If commentators are right that the Milosevic regime should have been dealt with earlier, is there not a strong argument for what happened over Saddam Hussein's tyranny, because he was a far worse tyrant in every way? While deploring the horrifying killings that are committed daily, is there not a responsibility on everyone, including those who opposed the war, to condemn the gangsters and criminals who are responsible for such actions and who have no concern to bring about democracy in that country? The sooner such condemnation comes from the critics, the better.

That is the second consecutive question that I can answer by saying that I entirely agree with the conclusions and with many of the premises on which those conclusions were based. I hope that everyone in the House, even those who disagreed with the original decision to intervene, now understand that we are operating in Iraq with the full support of the Iraqi democratic majority, the sanction of the United Nations and under United Nations Security Council resolutions. That is the status of what we are doing in Iraq at present. It ill behoves those who normally demand that we adhere to every aspect of United Nations resolutions to say that on this occasion in Iraq, because they did not agree with the position several years ago, they will depart from the United Nations at present. Whatever views we took in the beginning, it is now our job to help the Iraqi people build their democratic Government through their own democratic processes, build their economy, build their security forces and ultimately rule their own lives.

I declare an interest—[Interruption.]

While entirely endorsing the Secretary of State's tribute to the work of British forces of all three services in Iraq—[Interruption.]

Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman but the remarks being made from a sedentary position by the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Harry Cohen) are offensive. I suggest that he withdraw them.

They are true, but I withdraw them, Mr. Deputy Speaker.

Given the astonishing skill and triumph of British troops on the ground in Iraq, and in welcoming back the 7th Armoured Brigade when it returns and noting the powerful deployment of the 20th Armoured Brigade, will the Secretary of State nevertheless consider the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth) about the increased efforts that need to be made so that people understand the breadth and scale of the work of British troops on the ground in Iraq, and what a tremendous contribution they have made in the most difficult circumstances in a harsh and unforgiving environment? Will the Secretary of State consider what more can be done to ensure that greater opportunities are made available for the press to see the great scale of what is being done and not just to report on the inevitable disasters in a deployment of that type?

Yes, but first the hon. Gentleman should have given us the full truth about his interests. I do not know what he declared, but he should also declare that he served this country both as a Defence Minister and as a member of Her Majesty's armed forces, so he truly has an interest in the conduct and safety of our armed forces that we should respect.

Secondly, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely correct in saying that sometimes there is a complete lack of understanding of the difficulties under which our troops now operate. It is almost as though they are fighting a 21st-century war in which people expect them to apply 20th-century regulations, international laws and conventions. We may not have all the answers on those matters, but we should certainly face the fact that they create huge problems. Our enemy is less constrained by international conventions, legality, morality or anything else than ever, yet the scrutiny that we constantly place on our soldiers and the international conventions and laws that we expect them to maintain mean that they are more constrained than ever. I do not complain about that, but I ask the public to be a little slower to condemn, a little quicker to support and not to believe everything as represented by the commentariat, because at the end of the day published opinion is not always public opinion.

I do not think that the Secretary of State fully answered the point raised by the hon. Member for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (Mr. Moore) about provincial governments in Iraq who are refusing to have any contact whatever with British occupying forces. Will the Secretary of State tell us what the current situation is in relation to those provincial governments? Is he aware that a large number of Iraqi people, including those who voted in the election, actually want British and American troops withdrawn, and that this weekend the Basra oil workers union will be organising a demonstration in Basra calling for the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Iraq the better to bring about peace there?

I think they probably also wanted Saddam removed as well. I do not remember my hon. Friend expressing his fraternal solidarity—

Yes I did.

—when the troops went in to achieve that objective.

On the position of local government, to be serious, it is not true, as my hon. Friend inadvertently seemed to suggest, that local government in areas of the Multinational Division South-East wanted a complete and total boycott of relations with the British authorities there. At various times recently, two of them wanted a temporary boycott—on one occasion in one province when the governor was out of the province—for a period of between a week and two weeks. That is not to diminish the seriousness of the situation, but nor should we exaggerate such things as some of the anti-war press do.

My hon. Friend said that there were people who wanted the coalition forces out of Iraq. I want the coalition forces out of Iraq, and as soon as the conditions are met they will come out. We have no long-term imperialist ambitions in Iraq, but when people have given their lives for democracy in Iraq it would be an absolute tragedy if we were to leave before people were ready. If British troops are helping Iraqi democrats establish democratic control over their own lives we should be proud to stay in Iraq until the Iraqi people decide in their democratic opinion that it is time for us to go. When they say that, we will go.

I join the Secretary of State in expressing condolences to the members of the 2nd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment who lost their lives a fortnight ago. Colchester is their home base.

I endorse the comments made by the hon. Member for Aldershot (Mr. Howarth). Like him, I was in Iraq last week as a member of the Armed Forces Bill Committee and found that the flights returning our brave men and women home to the UK were not of the quality to which they are entitled. I ask the Secretary of State to give that serious consideration.

Will the right hon. Gentleman also clarify the reduction of 800 troops? Will that bring the total down to 7,000, or will the 800 come from the 7,000, bringing the figure down to 6,200?

On the first point, I will look into the specific case. I know that there have been general problems, and it is perfectly legitimate to raise them because that is in the interests of everyone in the House. I think that everyone here wants our troops to be given the conditions that they ought to have.

On the second point, the figure of 800 is approximately a 10 per cent. reduction on 8,000, which will reduce our total presence to 7,200. I hope that the 7,200 who are there will continue to do the job that they are doing, and in due course we will assess whether Iraqi security forces have the numbers and capability for a handover, in operational terms, of any of the provinces. At that stage, the official handover would begin.

The Defence Secretary still has not explained why the elected authorities of Basra and al-Amara do not support the British forces. Of course, the British presence has the support of the Americans—an SAS man this weekend described some of their forces as viewing the Iraqis as sub-human—of the Iranians, who have benefited from the mess that we have got into, and of the Ministry of the Interior, which has been running death squads and sees the British as too toothless to deal with that. If huge mortgages can be raised and paid off quickly, surely we can get out of Iraq quickly too.

I quite like my hon. Friend so I will try to take him through the illogicality of what he is saying. On the one hand, he is saying that we must maintain a position in which the governor and authorities in Basra never fall out with the British, and on the other hand he is saying that the British have to take action against some in the police force in Basra who are corrupt, even if that means that the governor or the local authorities may break off relations with the British. The relationship between ourselves and the local authorities in Basra broke down, we suspect, precisely because we acted against and arrested several members of the local constabulary, exactly as my hon. Friend would have wanted us to do. That has implications because of course local politicians then say, "We're going to break off relations with you." However, I think that arresting those people was the right thing to do. We believe that they were involved in activities that resulted in people being attacked and killed.

rose—

Order. There has been a tendency to stray outside the strict terms of this statement. If I am to try to call as many as I can of the other right hon. and hon. Members standing, bearing in mind that there is important business to follow, may I ask for brevity, both in question and in answer?

Much of the remarkable reconstruction work in Iraq, of which we have heard so little for one reason or another, is carried out by the civilian contractors and non-governmental organisations who rely on British forces for protection to do their work. Has the Secretary of State made an assessment of the impact on such reconstruction work of the downsizing of the British commitment?

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that in general terms we have taken into account the very points that he raises. Perhaps I can write to him in detailed terms, but I reassure him that the reduction in the forces that I have announced today does not mean a withdrawal and handover to the Iraqis in this or that province. That may or may not come, depending on the assessment of their capability, on their willingness and on their decision to take on the overall control of various provinces, at which stage we would withdraw from them. Today's announcement is not of that nature. Today's announcement reflects the increasing participation of the Iraqi security forces across the board and the completion of a number of our tasks across the board, which means an across-the-board reduction, but not a withdrawal for this or that area.

I associate myself and my colleagues with the condolences that the Secretary of State for Defence has passed to the families of those who laid down their lives in Iraq. I and my colleagues agree with the praise that has been rightly passed on the gallantry and bravery of the members of the British Army, in which the Royal Irish Regiment has a part. The right hon. Gentleman is aware of what they did when they served there, and I just ask him one question: how will they be affected by some of the announcements about south Iraq that he has made today?

To the best of my knowledge, there is no direct effect on the Royal Irish Regiment. If that position is incorrect, I will, of course, write to the right hon. Gentleman, but I think that the regiment is not affected by the statement. Of course, he, among others, has recently discussed with us the future of the Royal Irish Regiment and so on. I understand that, by and large, the announcement about redundancy terms that we made last week has been found acceptable to a cross-section of the Royal Irish Regiment and the people of Northern Ireland, and I am very glad about that because, given all their sacrifices and hardships, they are entitled to be treated with fairness, dignity and honour.

The right hon. Gentleman has spoken about a reduction in personnel of 800 individuals. Would he be kind enough to tell the House more about the nature of those reductions? It is clear that there will be a reduction in the number of personnel associated with the training of Iraqi forces, but it is not clear from the right hon. Gentleman's statement where else the reductions will fall. Will he please tell us?

Let me give an example that will have quite a big impact on the numbers that we need to send to Iraq. As the right hon. and learned Gentleman suggests, not only do we have a diminished number of and need for trainers, but in the guarding of installations, which is quite an onerous task that takes up quite a number of infantry right across all the battalions that we have sent there, the Iraqis are now able in terms of training, capability, weaponry and morale to defend their own barracks, installations, arsenals or police stations, for instance. That has quite a significant effect on the numbers that we are able to draw down.

The Secretary of State may recall the evidence that the Chief of the General Staff gave to the Defence Committee at an earlier stage of our deployment in Iraq, when he said that, although we may operate with the Americans, we do not operate as the Americans. The potential full import of those words seemed to bear out the account of former SAS trooper, Ben Griffin, in The Sunday Telegraph yesterday, which I am sure that the Secretary of State will have read. That would imply that the mistreatment of civilians and operations towards the civil population in the American areas appear to be somewhat institutionalised to a degree. Has he seen any evidence of a change in the manner of American operations in his time as Secretary of State?

The remarks made by General Jackson took into account the fact that the Americans were dealing with different conditions and circumstances in different parts of Iraq, and with different ethnic groups, from those circumstances, environments and groups with which the British had to deal. It was therefore not just a matter of a will on the part of the British to act differently from our United States colleagues, but circumstances permitted that to be the case. Nothing that he said would suggest, nor have I heard anything to suggest, that wrongful behaviour on the part of the Americans is institutionalised. Certainly, whenever any wrongful behaviour is identified, to the best of my knowledge it is dealt with in a pretty quick and robust fashion.

I associate myself and my hon. Friends with the condolences that have been expressed and with the praise for the service personnel serving in Iraq.

On behalf of the Scottish National party and Plaid Cymru, I welcome the troop reductions and hope that they are the first step in complete withdrawal from Iraq. Has the Secretary of State had a look yet at the online discussion board used by service personnel to see their comments on today's announcement? The first reaction is:

"Great, get them all home."

When will that happen?

I have not been able to have a look at that discussion board this morning, although I look at it from time to time. If the hon. Gentleman is in correspondence with those who run it, will he thank them for the many plaudits they gave me for the speech that I made a couple of weeks ago defending our troops? I have not seen such a defence made by or plaudits given to his own party, but I am sure that they will come. I have not seen the piece of correspondence that he quotes, but perhaps if he sends it to me in the form of a letter, I shall reply to it.

May I ask the Secretary of State to convey to the commanders of all our troops in Iraq how proud we are of them? They should never be described as toothless, because the last person who described a Grenadier as toothless lost his teeth. I am proud that the 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, in which I served, is going to Iraq. Can we make sure that we look after the returning troops as much as possible, so that they do not come back, become disillusioned and leave the armed forces, and so that we do not lose the skills that we so desperately need?

The hon. Gentleman speaks with some authority, having served his country with the Guards. We are working on housing—single housing accommodation is a disgrace in many areas and we are trying, through a long-term project, to improve that. There is an above-inflation pay increase—slightly bigger for the lower ranks than for others—and we are working to improve the welfare package. I hope that all of that will encourage people to stay in the British armed forces, which offer a fantastic career to young men and women and in which we have vacancies every single year.

Given that there is no connection to the deployment in Afghanistan, presumably the Secretary of State will be able to assure the House that the 800 troops who are coming back will be allowed to have their 24 months back at home, as outlined in the harmony guidelines, before being sent to Afghanistan.

I am probably over-sensitive, but I noticed a hint of cynicism there. All I can tell the hon. Gentleman is that there is no connection between the deployments. [Interruption.] Actually, to jump from the first to the second is a non sequitur, because, as the hon. Gentleman knows, even before Afghanistan, the harmony level was 21.4 months, rather than 24. However, I repeat what I said at the beginning: the drawdown in Iraq is not dependent on the deployment to Afghanistan, or vice versa. In the next few years, as ever, we shall strive to make sure that we approximate as closely as possible the satisfactory harmony levels for all our troops—not just those coming back from deployment in Iraq, but those coming back from deployment anywhere.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. During questions on the statement, two Members—the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) and the right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind)—mentioned that they had interests to declare. I have just been to look at the Register of Members' Interests, and it is extremely unclear what interest the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex has in Iraq, because he claims to be a director of a restaurant company and of an investment company. If hon. Members say that they have an interest in a subject of such importance as the presence of British troops in Iraq, we need to know what it is and how much money they are making from it.

The requirement is that hon. Members make as clear as possible to the House the relevance of their interest to the matter on which they are seeking to address the House. The hon. Gentleman has made that point and I am sure that it will be noted. I suspect that one of the difficulties is that a great many hon. Members have interests that they feel obliged to declare and we could spend a lot of the day on prefaces to questions making such interests known. However, it is helpful to be as specific as possible, so that the House is properly informed.

On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Have you received a request from the Secretary of State for Defence to come to the House to make a further statement in response to the results of the inquest into the death of Private James Collinson at Deepcut barracks? One of Her Majesty's coroners has called for a public inquiry into the unexplained deaths of four young recruits, saying that we must

"restore . . . confidence in the recruitment and training of young soldiers whether at Deepcut or elsewhere."

Surely, therefore, we are entitled to hear the Secretary of State's views.

I have not received such a request from the Secretary of State, although I did receive a request from the hon. Gentleman to accept an urgent question. Under the rules on such questions and given today's business, however, I felt unable to grant his request.

May I respond to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker? At our request, the coroner clarified the fact that he was not calling for a public inquiry, nor was that what he said. We all sympathise with the feelings of the family in this case and the other cases, but we have already set in motion an independent inquiry led by Nicholas Blake QC, which should report in the not-too-distant future. It behoves us all to await the outcome of that inquiry before we start to run across Nicholas Blake's decisions by announcing or seeking another inquiry.

I am grateful to the Secretary of State for amplifying my response.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.

It is in the nature of adversarial politics that the emphasis is on difference and the focus on disagreement and division. Few places have been more adversarial than Northern Ireland since the latter third of the last century, but finding consensus does not mean losing integrity, and moving forward towards accommodation does not mean turning away from principle. It is my firm conviction that we can find that consensus and reach that accommodation—not an impossibly naive hope, given the years of experience since the peace process began in Northern Ireland. There is agreement on the principle of consent. There is agreement that Northern Ireland is served best when governed locally. There is agreement that Northern Ireland is served best when governed on the basis of fair and equitable power-sharing. There is agreement that Northern Ireland is served best when the police service has the whole community behind it because the whole community is in it. There is agreement that Northern Ireland must be free from the fear of paramilitary activity and criminality and that the rule of law must apply. There is agreement that common-sense north-south co-operation is of great mutual benefit. There is agreement that the current political impasse cannot continue.

It is crucial for Northern Ireland that 2006 be the year of progress in which Northern Ireland politicians, locally accountable and operating on an inclusive basis, once more take responsibility for the things that matter in people's daily lives. It is clear, too, that there cannot be elections to an Assembly that does not exist. Members of the Legislative Assembly cannot continue to be paid salaries and allowances while the Assembly stands idle and there is no prospect of its restoration. No one can seriously contest either assertion and, to be fair, no one has done so. As the House will know, both Prime Ministers are focused on the way forward. With the Minister of State, Northern Ireland Office, my hon. Friend the Member for Delyn (Mr. Hanson), and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Irish Government, I have been talking with the parties in a series of meetings. We are all determined that devolution should be restored to the people of Northern Ireland, and I know that that determination is shared by the House.

Before I move on to the detail of the Bill, I wish to inform the House that I have today announced the reconstitution of the Northern Ireland Policing Board with effect from 1 April 2006. The cross-community board is one of the great successes flowing from the Patten recommendations. I pay tribute to all the current members, particularly the hon. Members for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) and for South Down (Mr. McGrady), for their considerable contribution to the Policing Board over the past four and half years. The Bill covers a number of policy objectives which, for the most part, have a single unifying theme—preparing Northern Ireland for the many and various challenges that lie ahead, particularly the fact that there should be no legislative obstacles in the way of devolution. The Bill will chiefly allow maximum flexibility in the arrangements for the future devolution of policing and justice functions to the Assembly, as was envisaged at the time that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was passed.

Ultimately, responsibility for policing and justice in Northern Ireland should lie with Northern Ireland Ministers, accountable to a local Assembly elected by the people of Northern Ireland. That was envisaged in the Belfast agreement and the structure of the devolution settlement set out in the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Our Government have repeated on many occasions their clear commitment to devolve those functions when the time is right. An effective, independent and impartial criminal justice system is fundamental to a properly functioning society. Before the Government can devolve their responsibilities, we must be satisfied that the system will function effectively and that arrangements are in place to ensure, for example, the continued independence of the judiciary and prosecution system and the effective administration of justice.

The independence and impartiality of the prosecution system and the judiciary are fundamental principles of the UK justice system. The existing legislation places a duty on Northern Ireland Ministers to uphold that. In addition, I intend to put forward concordats between our Government and the Northern Ireland Executive, to be agreed before the devolution of policing and justice, setting out the core principles of the independence and impartiality of the Northern Ireland judiciary and the public prosecution service.

The Bill does not devolve policing and justice. Instead, it supports the framework that we need to put in place to devolve policing and justice by order when—not before—the circumstances are right to do so. That was the intention of the 1998 Act. Section 4 of that Act gives me the power to transfer any reserved matter to make it the responsibility of the Assembly, subject to certain important safeguards. Those safeguards remain, and nothing in the Bill undermines them. Most importantly, the Assembly must agree that the time is right for policing and justice to be devolved and must vote for it on a cross-community basis. That is set out clearly in section 4 of the 1998 Act and nothing in the Bill alters that position. The Assembly must also agree what arrangements it wants to put in place to receive the new functions—whether to have one ministerial Department or two, for example. The Government must be convinced that the proposed arrangements are robust, workable and broadly supported by the parties.

Finally, when the time comes, the order that effects the transfer of functions will need to be agreed in Parliament. There is more work to be done before we reach that point. On 16 February, alongside the Bill, I published a discussion paper that set out what the Government believe is a sensible and pragmatic framework for policing and justice in Northern Ireland. As I said then, the document is not a blueprint, but a basis for discussion. We look forward to beginning those discussions, especially with all the Northern Ireland political parties.

In preparing for the devolution of policing and justice, it will be particularly important to ensure that the Assembly and Executive have all the tools that they need to manage the functions transferred to them. One of those tools is an arrangement whereby the Assembly will raise money specifically for policing. The policing precept in England, Scotland and Wales allows money for policing to be raised from council tax. In my constituency of Neath, for example, the precept is £126.42. We believe that it will be useful for the Assembly to have a similar power to raise additional money for policing in Northern Ireland from the regional rate. As that power can be created by an amendment to the Northern Ireland rates legislation, it does not require provision in the Bill. We will legislate for the detail of the precept in planned amendments to the Northern Ireland rates legislation. The power in clause 22 of the Bill will ensure that those changes to rates legislation cannot be amended by a future Assembly, although the level at which the precept is levied, or whether it should be zero-rated, will be matters for the Assembly. I emphasise that that will be additional money to provide enhanced levels of policing to meet Northern Ireland policing priorities and the Assembly will not have to use the power unless it wishes to do so. Equally, if it does not, there may be implications for other spending.

I know that some hon. Members have expressed concern that we will undermine national security by devolving responsibility for policing and justice. Others have suggested that the switch in primacy for national security matters from the Police Service of Northern Ireland to the Security Service represents a sinister plot to undermine policing in Northern Ireland. Both sets of fears are completely without foundation.

Constitutionally, central Government have responsibility for national security, whether relating to international or domestic terrorism. We cannot and will not abdicate that responsibility. Integrating the Security Service's lead and the police's operational response in the way proposed will bring Northern Ireland into line with the rest of the United Kingdom, where the Security Service has had lead responsibility since 1992.

Let us be clear about what this change will mean in practice. The Security Service has no executive policing responsibilities, even in countering threats to national security. Such responsibilities rest now and will remain with the police, under the oversight of the Policing Board and the police ombudsman. In future, although the Security Service will gather intelligence and provide the strategic direction, it will be the police's role to mount related policing operations.

The main reason is that we cannot address national security on a regional basis anywhere in the United Kingdom. Events have demonstrated that it is vital to provide a consistent and co-ordinated response right across the United Kingdom. International terrorists do not confine their activities to the mainland of the United Kingdom. The recent arrest in Belfast and subsequent conviction of Abbas Boutrab for terrorist-related offences of the kind associated mostly with al-Qaeda shows that. We should all be aware that modern terrorism is an international phenomenon from which Northern Ireland needs to be protected. The changes that will take place during 2007 constitute a part of the fight against international terrorism, and they are another vital step in preparing Northern Ireland for the challenges ahead.

I do not know whether I caught the Secretary of State's language. If I mistook what I thought he said, he will tell me. I thought he said that security rested with the police and the police ombudsman. Will he clarify that?

What I said, and it is helpful to clarify it for the right hon. Gentleman, is that security matters will remain with the Security Service, but operational matters that might or might not flow from intelligence, or advice from the Security Service, or a recommendation from the Security Service, will be for the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The Chief Constable has supported these arrangements and the integration of the two—that is, the operational matters carried out by the PSNI and the intelligence and security matters carried out by the Security Service. Those can work very effectively together, and that is indeed planned.

We understand what the Secretary of State is saying in relation to the integration of national security and dealing with the terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the Security Service is already stretched by coping with the threat to national security from international terrorism. How will it manage to take on the additional role in Northern Ireland with its existing resources?

These are matters that have been worked through with the Security Service. It is a fair question, but I notice that the hon. Gentleman is not disputing the principle, which springs from the fact that we are dealing with an international terrorist phenomenon which knows no boundaries. That is demonstrated by the arrest of that individual in Belfast of all places, which was connected not with domestic terrorism, but with the international phenomenon. That is the key point.

Can the Secretary of State clarify who will adjudicate on what is a matter of national security and what is strictly an operational matter for the Chief Constable? I know that the Chief Constable welcomes some of the proposed arrangements, but he is concerned about who makes that final decision? Will it be a tussle in public or in private? Who will adjudicate?

I do not envisage any tussles in public. I think that the situation will bed down quickly, as it has done in Great Britain, where there is a similar division of responsibility between the chief constable, the relevant police force and the Security Service. The change reflects the increasing normalisation of life, security and politics in Northern Ireland.

Does the Secretary of State accept that the relationship between the security services and the police in England will not necessarily be repeated in Northern Ireland, where much of the intelligence gathered will affect criminal investigations due to the close link between terrorists and criminality? How can we ensure that the flow of information about criminal activity from the intelligence services to the police in Northern Ireland is not hindered?

I have made sure that both the Police Service of Northern Ireland and the Security Service are satisfied that the overlap between pure gangsterism and paramilitarism can be tackled. If I use the phrase, "pure crime", I think that the hon. Gentleman knows what I mean, and it will continue to be combated effectively under the new arrangements.

The Secretary of State has confused the issue. Given the complexity of intelligence gathering in Northern Ireland, intelligence gathering should surely be a unitary matter. Intelligence involves both criminal organisations and terrorist organisations, so it would be better to have one intelligence-gathering organisation, which should be the PSNI. The PSNI should communicate its intelligence on international terrorism and retain information on indigenous terrorism for prosecution. In the past, intelligence was not transferred from MI5 to the police, and people literally got away with murder as a result.

Due to the relationship between the PSNI and the Security Service, what might have happened in the past will not happen in the future other than for reasons of ordinary human failing, which could occur in any situation. When the hon. Gentleman examines the detail and discusses the matter with the Chief Constable—given his long experience on the Policing Board, where he played a valuable role, few people can do that better than him—he will be satisfied that that is the only way in which to proceed. As I have said, the measure concerns terrorism in its broadest context. In particular, we are dealing with the modern phenomenon of international terrorism of the kind which occurred in London on 7 July. Indeed, there were fingerprints—albeit isolated fingerprints—in Belfast, where the individual whom I have described was arrested.

I am sure that the Secretary of State agrees that we will return to many of those points in Committee. Returning to today's Second Reading debate, however, can he not see that he is doing exactly what many hon. Members have always warned the Government not to do, which is to categorise terrorism in two leagues—international terrorism, which is a threat to state security, and domestic terrorism, which seems to have a more benign status? Will he assure hon. Members that paramilitary terrorism in Northern Ireland will be treated in exactly the same context as international terrorism?

I do not disagree with that proposition. I know that the hon. Gentleman agrees that it is difficult to say whether one form of terrorism is better or worse than another, because all terrorism is equally bad. All I am saying is that the modern form of terrorism that was identified in the arrest of the individual in Belfast is of an international character, and that it is as vital that the Security Service is able to tackle that if it surfaces in Northern Ireland as it is in the rest of the United Kingdom. I know that the hon. Gentleman will accept that.

A few moments ago, the Secretary of State used the phrase, "pure crime", which is slightly strange, but we all know what he meant. It is clear from the evidence that the Select Committee has received in its continuing inquiry into organised crime that there is very little that can be described as "pure crime" in Northern Ireland. I think that he has to take that on board.

The Select Committee very appropriately made that point. We have recently seen events in the Republic of Ireland which indicate that. All paramilitary groups have criminal tentacles. It is difficult to see that some of the loyalist paramilitary groups have any political objective any more—it seems to be pure gangsterism—although it is not quite the same in the case of the dissident republicans. In answer to the question of whether dealing with day-to-day crime unrelated to paramilitary activity of the kind identified by the Select Committee would be hampered, I do not think that it would be at all. On the contrary, an enhanced capability could help in every respect.

The Secretary of State said that no one had challenged the principle, but perhaps I may challenge the practicality. The strength of the Royal Ulster Constabulary special branch, and then the PSNI, was that it had intelligence-gathering networks and executive powers, and therefore worked in a joined-up way. In giving some of those powers to the security services, how does the Secretary of State hope to clarify the situation whereby very sensitive intelligence may be handed over to a police force when the Justice Minister in a Northern Ireland Assembly is from Sinn Fein? It is at those hand-over points that intelligence can sometimes break down. I urge him to consider whether, by losing executive powers in some of the intelligence network in Northern Ireland, he may be hampering counter-terrorism efforts.

I do not think that that will be the case; otherwise, neither the Chief Constable nor the Security Service would be satisfied, and neither would I. I remind the hon. Gentleman that the Patten report recommended that national security should not be devolved, and we are acting consistently with that. The Patten recommendations have been hugely successful in winning cross-community support for policing, so that in many respects the PSNI is now seen as a model for the rest of the world. The issue here is a switch in primacy, which should reside with the Security Service for the reasons that I have described.

The Secretary of State said that the Patten report did not recommend that national security should be devolved. However, it clearly said that in areas of national security the PSNI would report to the Secretary of State, as opposed to reporting through the devolved mechanisms. It envisaged that issues of national security and intelligence policing at that level would be part of the responsibility of the PSNI. The Government are going against the grain of the Patten report in insisting that there should be ulterior policing and intelligence arrangements outside the PSNI—MI5.

I do not accept that interpretation. Paragraph 6.22 of the Patten report, although it did not go into as much detail as the Bill, made it clear that

"the Chief Constable remains fully accountable for the involvement of police in matters involving national security, even though his or her main accountability in such matters is to the Secretary of State rather than to the Policing Board."

There will therefore continue to be a direct line of accountability by the police for whatever they do, including about matters of national security, ultimately to the Policing Board and through the devolved Ministers.

I understand the concerns of the Social Democratic and Labour party about the matter, given its wider long-term political objectives. However, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will understand that there is no way that the Security Service could continue to do the important job that it has done for a long time, especially now and in the foreseeable future, without the changes being put in place and consistency with the rest of the United Kingdom. I believe that the result will be to strengthen the overall imposition of security and policing in Northern Ireland rather than to undermine it. If there were any danger of undermining it, the Chief Constable would have been the first to warn against that. He most emphatically has not done so—indeed, he supported the changes.

Several provisions deal with the democratic process. There are concerns about taking a power to bring forward the May 2007 election, but I need to be ready to move quickly if the circumstances are such that an early election is needed to cement success on the political front. That is necessary so that we do not face any obstacle.

Will the Secretary of State respond to the concern of Liberal Democrats about the opportunity to change the date of the election quickly? We will set a dangerous precedent if a Secretary of State can alter the date of such a profoundly important event as an election, effectively by decree.

What does the hon. Gentleman think has happened on previous occasions?

Does the Secretary of State accept that if he and the Government are acting reasonably, they will get the support of the lower and the upper Houses, but that both Houses should have the right to approve any such recommendation?

I note the outrage that the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. Robinson) expressed when he said that Secretaries of State had adopted such a practice for some time. Rather than creating the obstacle of having to come back to both Houses of Parliament, it is better to get Parliament to agree now that, in such special circumstances, with the political process proceeding and the negotiations intensifying, we take a power, which may or may not have to be exercised, to bring forward the election date if, by agreement, we need to do that to make the progress that we all desire and that the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik) has long supported.

Will the Secretary of State give an undertaking that he would not arbitrarily determine the date of an election if the democratically elected and participating parties in the House were all against it?

It is not something that I would want to do except with consent. The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point. We are not considering some diktat by the Secretary of State. It is crucial that that does not happen in the timing of elections, of all things. In practical terms, it is sensible to introduce the provision, whether or not it is exercised.

The Liberal Democrats previously supported the changes that were made to election dates. I do not remember any great tussle in the House, with a few Democratic Unionists fighting for their political lives and everybody else saying, "Yes. We mustn't let the Secretary of State change it." If it was changed before, I do not know why the Liberal Democrats have suddenly been converted. I would like to know the road that they travelled.

I shall leave the right hon. Member for North Antrim (Rev. Ian Paisley) to sort out his differences with the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire in his usual peaceful manner.

The assumption of an order-making power as a matter of prudent proportion is one thing, but the manner of its exercise is another. I was mildly perturbed—I put it no more strongly—by the Secretary of State's response to my hon. Friend the Member for South Staffordshire (Sir Patrick Cormack) when he challenged the right hon. Gentleman about circumstances of resolute opposition by Northern Ireland parties to the proposed exercise of the power. The provision does not make it explicit, so will the Secretary of State clarify whether the order-making power would be exercised by the negative procedure or its affirmative counterpart?

I am taking a power to do this because it is important to have that option available. I am not planning to make such a change; this would be unlikely to occur unless it was part of some political negotiation to get a power-sharing Executive up and running. Frankly, there would be no reason for doing it otherwise.

I am sure that the Secretary of State did not mean to glide over the specific point of my question. I am still seeking to ascertain whether, in the event that he decides that going ahead with his order-making power has become unavoidable as the least worst option, would it be debated in a delegated legislation Committee upstairs for an hour and a half or would it not?

I am sorry if the hon. Gentleman felt that I had not answered his question. Of course this would be done by affirmative resolution, but special emergency procedures might also apply, and those procedures are in the Bill in case they are needed. That is the point that I am making.

The provisions on electoral registration and political donations, which form a large part of the Bill, are also key to moving Northern Ireland forward. We want to modernise still further the registration arrangements in Northern Ireland, safeguarding the dramatic improvements in the accuracy of the register while ensuring that as many people as possible are registered to vote. In allowing us to do this, the registration clauses of the Bill go to the heart of increasing trust and engagement in the political and democratic process.

The Bill will remove the requirement for the Northern Ireland electorate to register annually to vote. The Northern Ireland Electoral Office will therefore no longer conduct an annual canvass. Instead, in order to ensure that the register is updated and expanded, the chief electoral officer will be given enhanced powers to access data from other public sector bodies to help him to track when individuals change address or become eligible to vote. These reforms will allow resources to be diverted towards raising the number of people registered and, in particular, to targeting groups that are currently under-represented on the register.

I understand the objective that the Secretary of State seeks to achieve, but I do not understand why a different registration mechanism from that of the rest of the United Kingdom should exist in Northern Ireland. Will he explain why it is not deemed necessary for the residents of Northern Ireland to register annually, as is required elsewhere?

This has arisen partly out of the consultation with the Northern Ireland political parties. It is designed to achieve the much more effective focusing of the electoral officers' resources on getting more people on to the register all through the year, including by accessing other databases, rather than putting all the resources into an annual canvass.

Is it not also the case that we are not comparing like with like? The registration process in Northern Ireland is different from that of the rest of the United Kingdom in that it is much more complex. There are many more questions to be filled in, for example, and applicants must supply their national insurance number. That makes the exercise much more difficult to repeat as part of an annual cycle.