House of Commons
Tuesday 24 March 2009
The House met at half-past Two o’clock
Prayers
[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]
Oral Answers to Questions
Health
The Secretary of State was asked—
Community Children’s Nurses
Developing high-quality community children’s nursing services is crucial to the provision of safe, integrated and comprehensive care in the home or close to home for children with complex or continuing care needs. We are embarking on a wide-ranging programme of action dedicated to transforming community services. Within this programme, we are taking forward a project looking at the benefits and the opportunities arising from investment in community children’s nursing services.
I know that the Minister is aware that a reception was held in the House earlier this month that was sponsored by the Royal College of Nursing, of which the Minister was a member, and the WellChild charity, which was intended to encourage primary care trusts to employ community children’s nurses in order to help not only children with long-term complex health needs, but their families. Will the Minister tell me what steps the Government are taking to ensure that these nurses are employed, as they will help children and their families to co-ordinate packages of not only medical but local care, which might help them to spend more time at home rather than commuting to hospital on a regular basis, as this is often painful to them?
I congratulate the Royal College of Nursing and WellChild on holding that reception, which highlighted some very important issues; as the hon. Gentleman said, we were both present. Government funding of £340 million established through our recent child health strategy will help local areas to support the development of more care packages in the location preferred by the child and family. To provide the safe, comprehensive and sometimes highly complex packages of care that these children need takes time to co-ordinate. There are no quick fixes, as was highlighted at the reception. In many cases, delays are caused by the time taken to resolve issues such as housing and adaptations rather than the lack of community nurses, but we are committed to the work force and to the planning of community children’s services. I believe that this area will be addressed in the Prime Minister’s commission on the future of nursing and midwifery.
Will the funding allocated to primary care trusts for community children’s nurses be ring-fenced? As we often see with PCTs, if the money is not ring-fenced, it can sometimes be diverted to other priorities. How will the nurses work and interact with the local authority, which often provides the child’s basic care needs in terms of getting the child up, ready and dressed?
As I was saying, the complexity of the package is very evident, so we have to co-ordinate not only with local authorities, but with other agencies. Commissioners need to consider how the new funding established through the recent child health strategy can enable the development of children’s community nursing services capable of providing a more all-round care package, including palliative care and, sadly, sometimes end-of-life care in the home or closer to home. It is for the commissioners to decide within the local community how best to manage those funds.
NHS Services (Economic Downturn)
The evidence from Britain and other countries is that demand for health services increases in an economic downturn. However, thanks to funding already agreed for the period to 2011, we believe that the NHS is in a strong position to manage this well.
As more and more families pull out of private health care, what pressure is the Minister seeing on primary care providers, and what assessment has he made of how well they are able to cope?
It is quite difficult to get reliable figures on how many people withdraw from private health care, as it is obviously a matter for the private sector itself. A few months ago, Laing and Buisson said—the hon. Gentleman may have picked it up—that there has been a 10 per cent. reduction in people deciding to pay privately for their operations, but that actually preceded the economic downturn. Laing and Buisson believes that it has more to do with the very short waiting times on the NHS: there is now almost no difference at all between waiting times in the NHS and waiting times in the private sector. We are confident that, given the increase in investment that the NHS will receive over the next two years, even if all the people in this country choose to use NHS care—I hope that they would like to do so, given the short waiting times—the NHS will be able to cope very well.
My hon. Friend will be aware of the problems that Brent primary care trust was facing a couple of years ago with a £25 million deficit, so will he join me in congratulating Brent for turning that deficit into a projected £12 million surplus this year, which means that more services are now being directed to the right people in my local area?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right that two or three years ago, Brent PCT was in a parlous state. In fact, as recently as three years ago, 104 NHS organisations were in deficit, whereas now the figure is just 3 per cent. There has been a remarkable turnaround, so I would like to pay tribute not only to the management of the PCT in my hon. Friend’s area—as he rightly says, the PCT will now be able to deliver sustainable and constantly improving NHS services to his constituents—but to all the managers throughout the country who have turned around their health care organisations in such a way.
Many of my constituents are very worried about the possibility that the proposed redevelopment of Hinckley and Bosworth community hospital will not go ahead because of the economic downturn. Will the Minister please look into the proposed public-private partnership, hold discussions with Leicestershire County and Rutland primary care trust, and then write to me?
I shall be happy to do that. It is worth mentioning that a week or two ago our ministerial colleagues in the Treasury made an important announcement about the PFI which I hope will prevent the outcome at the hospital that the hon. Gentleman fears, but I will happily write to him to confirm that.
My hon. Friend is aware of the effects of the economic downturn and the pressures that it has placed on the NHS, but is he aware that those effects are nowhere more evident than in the mental health service? People really do suffer, and we always feel that the mental health service is underfunded. Will my hon. Friend ensure that more resources will be provided if they are required, given that there will certainly be further pressure on the service in the future?
Yes. Labour Members certainly do not agree with the Conservatives that a recession is good for people’s health. We know from experience both in this country and abroad that when it comes to such issues as mental health, more men consult their GPs if they are unemployed. That can be an advantage, as men are notoriously reluctant to seek health care and advice. However, as my hon. Friend will know, mental health funding has risen by 40 per cent. in real terms in the last seven years. We do not think that the recession should just take its course, we do not think that it is a price worth paying, and we will be there to ensure that the NHS supports people who may be affected by the economic downturn.
If demand for the NHS is increasing during the economic downturn, it is even more vital for hospitals that have lost money in collapsed Icelandic banks to get that money back. Given the Prime Minister’s recent comments in Manchester about Christie hospital’s missing £7.5 million, what is the Department doing to ensure that Christie gets its money back?
We are working closely with both Christie and the other hospital that has money in Icelandic banks. We are also working to ensure that all charities that are eligible claimants under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme receive their money in full.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that it is wrong to suggest that a recession is good for people, particularly an economic downturn of this kind. Can he assure us that he will continue to focus investment on public services such as the NHS, and will not be diverted into cutting taxes such as inheritance tax?
Yes. I think that we will face a clear choice at the next general election, between a Labour Government who are committed to continuing sustained investment in the NHS and a Conservative party which is committed to a tax cut for millionaires.
National Dementia Strategy
The first national dementia strategy was published on 3 February this year, and will be implemented over a five-year period. Improving services for people with dementia is a Government priority, and we have already identified it as a priority for the national health service in the operating framework. That will help to ensure that dementia is prioritised locally where further improvement may be needed.
The London borough of Bromley contains the highest percentage of retired people in London. What can I tell my constituents about the quality of the services that they can expect, and whether those services will be delivered through GP centres?
The national dementia strategy covers a range of services, but it emphasises the importance of early diagnosis. We intend every area in the country—including the hon. Lady’s constituency—to contain memory clinics, to which suitably trained GPs will refer people who show early symptoms of dementia. There they can be given an accurate diagnosis and assessment—as there are different forms of dementia—and then receive the specialist help and intervention that they require. We know that early intervention enables us to help people with dementia and their carers, and to ensure that people live much better with their dementia and stay in their own homes for longer.
The Minister is well aware that objective 13 of the national dementia strategy is to provide
“An informed and effective workforce for people with dementia”.
He also knows that two thirds of the care home population has a form of dementia. Does he agree that it will be important to provide training for the entire work force in the care home and, indeed, the home care setting? When the all-party group, which I chair, has completed its inquiry into work force skills in this area, will he meet me to discuss the inquiry’s conclusions and consider how they might be included in the implementation of the strategy?
The hon. Gentleman, as chair of the all-party parliamentary group, and I have met regularly. He and the all-party group have made their welcome for the new dementia strategy public, and I am grateful for that. I would be happy to meet him once his group has concluded its investigation into trainees. It is right that we need to ensure that people, whether in hospitals—nurses and doctors—or in care homes, have the right skills, knowledge and understanding of the needs of people with dementia and their carers. That is why the dementia strategy states that a senior member of the hospital or care home should be responsible for ensuring that all staff in the hospital or care home know and understand the needs of people with dementia, so that they can ensure that the response that people get is the best response to meet their needs. It is certainly a matter for both the NHS and social care sector that staff be properly trained. We will publish our work force development strategy for the adult social work force in the near future.
May I place on the record the fact that I am a trustee of a local dementia charity in Brighton and Hove supporting those with dementia and their carers? I am sure that the Minister will recognise the vital role of those caring for people with dementia in their own homes and know how welcome has been the additional funding for breaks for carers. What steps will he take to ensure that primary care trusts make use of the money to support breaks for carers, which is not ring-fenced? For example, in Brighton and Hove I think that £800,000 is available over two years.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on the work that he does in his constituency in support of people in need of social care and in support of people with dementia. He is right to draw attention to the fact that the best care we can give to people is in their own homes, where people are with their family, neighbours and loved ones. Interventions that help that to happen for as long as possible are always in the best interests of the patient. What we need to include, of course, is support for the carers. Respite care is critical. He is right to say that more money has been provided for the next two years. It has been put into PCT baseline budgets. We have announced more money for carers through the carers strategy. I hope that not only in his constituency but throughout the country local organisations will ensure that that money is spent and that respite care is provided for those people who support people with dementia in their own homes.
What extra support can the Minister give to general practitioners to ensure that they detect the early signs of dementia, which is vital?
My hon. Friend raises an important point because two thirds of people do not have their diagnosis of dementia undertaken formally. Many people therefore do not get diagnosed until two and a half or three years after they have contracted that destructive disease. Therefore, it is important that front-line staff such as GPs are better trained to spot the early symptoms. If they are not a specialist themselves, and many of them are not, it is important that they refer people to the specialist memory clinics in their areas, which can conduct a proper diagnosis. It is not just about conveying the diagnosis but about the way in which that is communicated to people with dementia and to their family, which can be an important part of coping and living well with dementia. We are ensuring that training for GPs is increased, so that they can spot the signs early, people can be diagnosed earlier, there is earlier intervention to help people to live with dementia better, and that that is the outcome across the country.
There is much to be welcomed in the national dementia strategy and I again ask the Government to find time for Parliament fully to debate that important strategy. But there is one notable gap in the strategy: there is nothing to tackle the grossly inadequate level of research into the various conditions that come under the dementia umbrella. How is the Minister getting on with persuading his colleagues the Chancellor and the Prime Minister to up the research budget for dementia? I know that that is something that the Minister is concerned about, and he knows that he has everyone’s support on that.
If the hon. Gentleman wants to debate the strategy in the House, he can use the usual channels to arrange for such a debate on a Liberal Democrat Opposition day, but I am very happy to debate the strategy because it is an excellent strategy that has been welcomed across the country. The hon. Gentleman is right to highlight the importance of research. The truth is that we do not have a cure for dementia; that is part of the tragedy of this disease. There is research happening not just in this country, but around the world, to examine what more can be done. But this is not only about cure; it is also about research into what helps people who have dementia and how they can be assisted to live with dementia better in their own homes and be treated better in care homes or in the NHS. I will be chairing a summit in July, where we will be bringing together people from different parts of the country and, indeed, from different countries, to look at what the state of research is and to see where the gaps in the evidence base are and what more we can be doing to improve that evidence base, drawing on the best knowledge not only in this country, but from countries around the world.
I welcome my hon. Friend’s reply to the hon. Member for Rugby and Kenilworth (Jeremy Wright), who chairs the all-party group, and I look forward to meeting him to discuss the report. As well as looking at work force development, will he be looking at what the regulators can do in their assessment of care in homes and the community, and also of training, to drive up improvement in skills in dementia care?
I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising the important point that, as well as providing better services, we need to make sure we have inspection systems and regulation systems that drive up the quality of care. She will know that on 1 April the care quality commission comes into being, which will integrate the three current inspection and regulation organisations. That will help to integrate health and social care for patients with dementia, and their loved ones and carers, to ensure we have an integrated system of inspection and regulation to raise standards right across the health and social care system for patients with dementia.
The Minister knows how warmly I welcome the strategy, because he was good enough to meet my constituent, Sir Terry Pratchett, along with the Prime Minister and myself, at No. 10 Downing street to discuss it. I must press the Minister, however; he has just said that he will hold a summit in July, and that is very welcome, but the Government have already announced that there will be no new money for research into dementia. How can he justify that decision?
We had a good meeting with the Prime Minister, who takes a personal interest in these matters and who met Terry Pratchett. I must put on record the huge courage Terry Pratchett is displaying in allowing everyone to see how he is coping with the disease—with the diagnosis and then with living with the early stages. Indeed, many public figures have now been talking about their experiences. That is an important part of the process of raising awareness among the professions and the wider community about this disease and its consequences, and how we can help people live with it. On research, the Wellcome Trust is spending £30 million this year and more money is going into research. We need to ensure that before the summit we have done an analysis of all the research that is going on, and where the evidence base is insufficient or has gaps in it, so that we can plan and direct our resources to those areas where research will be most effective.
NHS Chief Executives
At the current time, I am aware of one NHS trust chief executive and one NHS foundation trust chief executive who are suspended from work. Chief executives and other executive directors are employees of their trusts, and suspension is a matter for the trust, acting in accordance with individual employment contracts and general employment law.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his answer. In Stafford’s case, where a thorough and damning report is already available, why has the chief executive not already been sacked? If the answer to that is that there is still due process to go through, what assurance can my right hon. Friend give me that it will be brought to an end soon, so that we can stop paying taxpayers’ money—that is hospital budget money—for someone who is doing nothing?
I am sure my hon. Friend will accept that there is no point in acting in haste and then finding there is a tribunal decision against the Government. We have to have due process. I want everyone’s case to be considered properly. I am very pleased that the trust has called in Peter Garland, a former senior official and regional director in the health service, to help it with the investigation and to look not just at the chief executive, but at the responsibility of the whole board for the dreadful events that were catalogued in the Healthcare Commission report.
Will the Secretary of State take account of the fact that I am repeating my call for an inquiry into this whole matter under the Inquiries Act 2005? Will he also make it clear that all those in that trust who are culpable, as set out in the Healthcare Commission report—that includes other senior management besides the chairman and the chief executive at the time—must be removed and not merely suspended on full pay?
As I just said, the investigation will involve everyone who has any position of authority within that trust—the whole board and all the executive directors. It will be a proper investigation and it will be fair, and the action taken will result from that inquiry, not from any knee-jerk reaction by me or anyone else.
Will my right hon. Friend assure us that there is no suspension culture in the national health service? Would he like to hazard a guess as to how long the longest-serving suspended employee in the NHS has been suspended for? If not, could he please send me a note on that?
I do not believe that there is a culture of suspension in the NHS. There are 1.3 million staff in the NHS, and I cannot give my hon. Friend an answer on how many people have been suspended or what the longest period of suspension is. However, I shall see whether somebody can answer his quiz question and then drop him a line.
As I was in Northern Ireland on parliamentary business when the Secretary of State made his statement last week, may I make it plain that my constituents are acutely concerned about this report? We want to restore the confidence and trust that this hospital used to enjoy—it was a good hospital and it did have a good reputation. Would not the quickest way to do that be to have an expeditious public inquiry, so that all the facts and the reasons can come out and we can then go forward under a new regime?
I believe the phrase “expeditious public inquiry” is a contradiction in terms, but I accept what the hon. Gentleman said. Indeed, I was very moved by the contribution of the shadow Chief Whip, the right hon. Member for West Derbyshire (Mr. McLoughlin), at last week’s business questions—he pointed out that his mother had died in that hospital, having received excellent care. We have to ensure that the hon. Gentleman’s constituents and those of my hon. Friend the Member for Stafford (Mr. Kidney), and other people who use that hospital are reassured that what the Healthcare Commission has said, in terms, in its report—that there has been drastic improvement, not least because of a huge increase in staff; staffing was at the core of the problems—is indeed the case. That is why I have asked Professor Alberti to make a very swift report and to report back to Parliament in five weeks’ time.
Whenever the chief executive of a failing trust, such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, is suspended it raises questions about where responsibility really lies. Is not the Patients Association right to repeat the demand for an independent inquiry, looking particularly at the regulation and supervision of hospital care? Is that not particularly the case in the light of the letter in The Times today from Dr. Howard Baderman, a retired accident and emergency consultant who wrote two reports for the Department of Health? He talks of a “grave failure” by the Department to act on those reports in respect of other hospitals. Do we not owe it to NHS patients to ensure that all the lessons are learnt from this dreadful scandal?
We do need to learn all the lessons, but I point out to the hon. Gentleman that there was no independent regulator until we introduced one—the important word there is “independent”. The Healthcare Commission report is independent. The letter in The Times this morning is strongly disputed, not just by the strategic health authority, but by people in the Department of Health who worked with the person who wrote that letter. We put patient safety first—we put it at the forefront of everything. I believe that the Patients Association will be reassured, not just with the Healthcare Commission report but with the three other reviews that are going on, and with the clear demonstrable fact that there is a very clear focus on finding out what happened at Stafford and why it happened—there is still an awful mystery to much of that—and on ensuring that we put the problems right, so that local residents can be assured that they have a safe hospital.
How can my right hon. Friend ensure that any sacked chief executives, including the one at Stafford, do not receive financial benefits from their failures through some sort of golden pay-off?
In 2007, we issued instructions through the NHS Chief Executive, reminding trusts that if they plan to give any financial reward, payment or golden goodbye to any departing chief executive or anyone else, it requires approval from the strategic health authority and the Treasury. As far as I know, no one in those two organisations would give anything other than the statutory entitlement to individuals, because the Government—and, I think, the Opposition—do not want to see any reward for failure, which has been so apparent in other sectors of the economy, creeping into the health service.
On 15 October 2007, after the terrible events at Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS Trust, the Secretary of State said that
“we should be spotting these issues much earlier and getting rid of incompetent chief executives or chairpersons who, fortunately, are in the minority, rather than waiting for a report such as this, by which time, frankly, most of the damage has been done.”—[Official Report, 15 October 2007; Vol. 464, c. 571.]
The Secretary of State knew about the failings at Stafford in May 2008, so why did he not intervene then and there?
I ask the hon. Gentleman to look at the Healthcare Commission’s report carefully. The difference between what happened in Stafford and in Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells, and the fact that the Healthcare Commission took into account those words and what others said at the time, is that as soon as commission staff went into Stafford and saw the problems—in May 2008—they immediately called the chief executive to a meeting, put their concerns to him, and started to see the process of improvement. That is the job of the Healthcare Commission while it carries out its inquiry. The staff cannot say at that stage that they have come to any conclusions, and it would be unfair, one day into an inquiry, to reach conclusions and say that heads must roll and recommendations must be made. We made that specific point to the Healthcare Commission at the time of Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells, so in Stafford staff immediately introduced measures to put things right, rather than wait for the end of the process and the report to be published—as I said they should do in that quote.
I put it to the Secretary of State that he should look at the appendix to the Healthcare Commission’s report and the letter of 23 May 2008 that was received by his Department. If he meant anything by saying that incompetent chief executives should be got rid of at the point at which one becomes aware of them, it should have been done then, but the Department failed to do it. The Secretary of State has to understand that there was a failure, not just within the trust, but within the agencies charged with commissioning, performance management and performance assessment, up to and including the Department itself.
The Secretary of State’s proposed reviews—he now has three—do not have the scope, the powers or the independence to investigate those failures fully and, therefore, to restore public confidence. Will he agree today to institute an independent inquiry in the terms in respect of which I have written to him today?
We discussed this last week and there was no mention of an independent inquiry by the Opposition. The hon. Gentleman refers me to the appendix: let me refer him to the powers that the House gave to the Healthcare Commission. The commission could have immediately put that hospital into special measures. Its decision—as an independent regulator—was not to do so. It would have been quite wrong of Ministers to rush immediately to dismiss or discipline a chief executive when we did not even have any evidence from the Healthcare Commission. It had not reached any conclusion because it had spent only one day in the hospital.
Imagine a giant quango, the independent NHS board, trying to tackle these problems. The whole basis of the Opposition’s policy is to try to remove politicians from these issues. That is quite wrong, and we are right to deal with these issues in the way that we have.
Of course our thoughts and hearts are with those who have suffered because of the debacle at Stafford, but campaigners have drawn attention to many difficulties at the hospital over a very long period of time. The problem is that the board is stacked with accountants and solicitors who are not elected or responsible and who take no notice of what is going on. That is why we have ended up with what can only be called a tragedy. Will my right hon. Friend accept that the structures and targets in place for hospitals, such as looking for trust status and so on, distract them from delivering the care that they ought to be offering people?
I do not think that any neutral assessment of the Healthcare Commission report would conclude that the answer to the problem at Stafford would be to get rid of foundation trust status. However, my hon. Friend is right that the manager and the board at Stafford were seeking foundation trust status. To achieve that, incidentally, they had to put the trust into a proper financial position and save £4 million. They decided to save £12 million, and that is why there was one consultant and not four in the accident and emergency department, and why the hospital had three rather than 12 matrons. It is also why in the emergency assessment unit there was one nurse for every 15 patients, whereas most hospitals of that size have one for every six. Given that 85 per cent. of foundation trusts were considered to be excellent in their provision of services, it would be quite wrong to smear them with what happened in a badly managed and under-staffed hospital.
Children (Complex Health Needs)
The Government’s policy is to provide co-ordinated support as close to home as possible for children with complex health needs and their families. “Healthy Lives, Brighter Future: the strategy for children and young people's health”, which was published in February of this year, built on previous commitments.
While I welcome the child health strategy, what plans do the Government have to increase the number of health visitors to assist children with long-term, complex needs? I understand that the numbers of health visitors have been cut over the past four years, so when will they be back to 2005 levels? What plans does the Minister have to provide adequate respite care for parents and other children in the family?
I know that the hon. Lady follows these considerations very closely, and I commend her for that. She will know that the Government have committed extra finance, to a total of some £340 million over this spending cycle, through both the Department for Children, Schools and Families and the Department of Health. We have also made clear the future priorities for both the operating framework and the present structure. First, we need to address the issues of palliative care and short breaks. Secondly, we need to look at the clinical pathways and put in place individual care plans. That addresses precisely the point that the hon. Lady made about health visitors, for instance, and the complex needs of these young people. Finally, we must address the question of managing medicines in schools. Those three sets of priorities have been identified by parents, people in the voluntary sector and the young people themselves. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for South Cambridgeshire (Mr. Lansley) would just stop talking from a sedentary position, I would be able to answer the question. The day that the Conservative party provides answers to anything will truly be a damascene conversion.
I return to the final point made by the hon. Member for Congleton (Ann Winterton) about health visitors. I can confirm that the work being taken forward by the Government in the spring of this year will concentrate on the valuable role that health visitors play in meeting the complex needs of these young people.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that, when we talk about improving the care provided for children with complex care needs, we should focus particularly on respite care and day care, for the parents as well as for the child? The press covers far too many cases of parents whose lives have come to tragic ends because of the enormous stress and strain associated with providing care, over a very long period indeed, for a child with the extensive disabilities that we often see. We need to focus on the parents as well, do we not?
I entirely agree with the points that my hon. Friend makes, which relate particularly to the work being done on end-of-life care, and specifically to the requirements on which primary care trusts have been asked to focus, with regard to short breaks, and palliative and end-of-life care, for very vulnerable young people and children.
One group of children and young people with complex health needs consists of those who require high-tech, expensive communication aids to express their hopes, needs, fears and interests. I welcome the proposed joint commissioning pathfinders, to which the Government have sensibly committed. Will the right hon. Lady confirm that they will be taken forward with all due haste, and that the Government will look at other aspects of joint commissioning, and models for the provision of alternative and augmentative communication for children who are desperately in need of it?
I commend the hon. Gentleman on his excellent report, the recommendations of which the Government accepted. I can confirm that we will act on the specific points relating to the individual, and the very important support and care that individuals may need. We will also look at his recommendations on wider issues to do with speech, language and communication, and so at the collaboration that needs to take place beyond the health service, particularly through local area agreements, to make sure that we deliver on the recommendations that he rightly made.
The Secretary of State pledged in his first speech as Health Secretary to meet the care needs of people with a learning disability, but in the light of today’s shocking findings by the ombudsman on the NHS’s failures in long-term care for young people with learning disabilities, when will the Minister of State and the Secretary of State convert the words of January’s strategy—itself an admission of the failure of the Government’s 2001 “Valuing People” document—into the action that is so urgently needed if we are to avoid a repeat of the shocking discrimination and damage suffered by those with learning disabilities?
I absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman; the report is shocking. The Government are determined to make progress by accepting recommendations previously made to us, by concentrating specifically on care plans, and by working with GPs on identifying issues, early intervention and providing the correct support. The Minister of State, my hon. Friend the Member for Corby (Phil Hope), has today clearly indicated our determination to make sure that the very highest standards are available to all those who access our health services.
Mental Health Services
The level of funding for mental health has never been higher. Since 2001, real-terms investment in adult mental health services has increased by 44 per cent., and the national health service spent £5.53 billion on adult mental health services in 2007. We have 64 per cent. more consultant psychiatrists, 71 per cent. more clinical psychologists and 21 per cent. more mental health nurses than we had in 1997, and are providing better care and support for people with mental illnesses.
I thank the Minister for that answer. I have consulted locally with constituents about the NHS in our area, and in general the feedback has been very good. I visited an excellent, fabulous facility for young people with acute mental health needs that is attached to my local hospital, but constituents have raised with me the issue of community support for young people with mental health needs. What progress is being made to provide community support for those young people in the area, and what I can tell my constituents on the issue?
I had the pleasure of visiting my hon. Friend’s constituency a few weeks ago. Newham was in fact a national demonstrator site for the development of new psychological therapies and a whole range of new services, and I was extremely impressed by what I saw. I congratulate her on the work that she does in her constituency to support the development of those services. In Newham, 16 staff are part of an early intervention team that helps young people between the ages of 14 and 35 with assessment and care. In particular, it tries to prevent those young people from being admitted to hospital at the first onset of psychosis or some other form of mental illness. Those new early intervention teams—a major investment—are matched by other teams that handle crisis resolution in homes, and outreach in the community. I hope that when she goes back to her constituents in Newham, she will congratulate them on the pathfinding work that they are doing, and assure them that the NHS in her area is seeking to work with other providers to meet the needs of young people and others in the community.
The picture around the rest of the country may not be not quite so rosy. Figures show that the number of people admitted to hospital for intentional self-harm has increased by a third in the past five years, from 74,000 to 97,000. More than 4,000 of those admissions were of children under the age of 14. One in eight women admitted to self-harm in 2007, an 80 per cent. increase since 2000. Figures released by the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children yesterday show that the number of suicidal children ringing the helpline ChildLine has tripled in the past five years. Is the Minister not ashamed of these appalling figures and the Government’s failure to turn the tide on the country’s deteriorating mental health?
I understand the hon. Lady’s concerns; it just surprises me sometimes when Opposition Front-Bench spokespersons reel off a list of statistics without asking questions and, more importantly, without acknowledging the substantial extra investment that this Labour Government have put in place and which her party voted against in every Budget since 1997. The issues that she highlights are serious and need to be addressed. I am pleased that the suicide rate in England continues to fall. It is now at its lowest since records began in 1861, and is among the lowest in Europe. I am also pleased that the World Health Organisation said:
“The ambition and pace of change in England has been remarkable over the last 10 years, and mental health services here are increasingly being seen across Europe as a model to follow.”
That is a record that the Labour Government are proud of, but we know that there is more to do and we will continue to press forward to improve services across the country.
In his reply to my hon. Friend the Member for West Ham (Lyn Brown), my hon. Friend the Minister said that there had been a 70 per cent. increase in clinical psychology—I think the figure was 70 per cent.—but he will know, as I do, that that was from a pretty low base. Can he assure me that he will redouble his efforts to ensure increased numbers of clinical psychologists? Too often people who have been prescribed clinical psychology have to wait for it.
My hon. Friend is right to say that we inherited a pretty poor show from the Conservatives after they were in power for 18 years. We are endeavouring to increase the quality of mental health services. This year is the last year of the national service framework for mental health, and it is the year in which we intend to look forward to establishing a new strategy for mental health services. Building on the success that we have had so far, we will be launching our New Horizons project to go out to consultation to enable us to hear throughout the country what more we can do to embed success in our mental health services, and to go further to ensure that we have mentally healthy communities more widely so that the public health system, as well as specialist services, reach the quality of care that we wish every individual to be able to receive across the country.
NHS Dentists
I was assured by NHS South West and Gloucestershire primary care trust this morning that the PCT is in the process of inviting tenders for dental services with a total value of £6 million over the next two years—that is, £3 million in 2009-10 and £3 million in 2010-11. This investment will be used for building purpose-built practices as well as refurbishing community hospital sites to enable them to provide dental services, focusing on areas of most need in Gloucestershire. This investment has the potential to offer access to a dentist to approximately 95,000 people.
It is difficult to calculate how many people are registered with an NHS dentist since the new contract was established. Perhaps the Minister could give us some idea of how many people are registered in Gloucestershire and nationally. Registration is patchy. In my Tewkesbury constituency a relatively small number of people are registered with NHS dentists, even when compared to other constituencies in Gloucestershire and especially when the national figure is taken into account. What can the Minister do to help the local PCT to increase that number?
We have just announced the money, which will give access to an extra 95,000 people. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would like to welcome that and congratulate the strategic health authority and primary care trust on the great leadership that they have shown on dental practice. I have been advised by the South West strategic health authority that Gloucestershire commissioned three new dental practices, all of which became operational in October 2008—in Forest of Dean, Cirencester and Tewksbury. The SHA has advised that in 2009-10 the tender is expected to be let for schemes in the areas of Gloucester city, Cheltenham and Stroud. The plan is for them to be fully operational by 2010-11.
The 90,000 extra places for patients that the Minister has just announced will go part of the way to addressing the issue of the 1.1 million people who would like an NHS dentist. Professor Steele is currently doing his review. Will his report be published in full, and will the Government accept all his recommendations?
The report, of course, will be accepted in full.
“Accepted in full.” Thank you.
No, it will be published in full; all of us on this side of the House are humble enough to say when we have made an error. I only wish that the hon. Gentleman would be as honest when Conservative Members do. Like any sensible Government, we will look at the review when it is published.
Topical Questions
The responsibilities of my Department embrace the whole range of NHS social care, mental health and public health service delivery, all of which are of equal importance.
I suspect that neither the Secretary of State nor the Government will want any surprises in early August. So will the right hon. Gentleman ask all the chief executives of hospital NHS trusts to report to him personally by the end of May on their ability and preparedness fully to implement the European working time directive? I suspect that such reports will demonstrate the need for some more middle-grade doctors if we are to continue with existing services.
We debated that issue during an Opposition day a few weeks ago. Everyone is aware of the need to comply with the European working time directive by 1 August; I trust that Opposition Front Benchers are now aware that every individual has the benefit of the opt-out.
Yes, I can. I saw my hon. Friend’s comments; obviously, I am particularly sensitive to how he, as the local MP, feels this inquiry is going. George Alberti has not only national but international renown on accident and emergency. As the Healthcare Commission report points out, accident and emergency is where the problem is in Stafford hospital. I assure my hon. Friend that there will be no no-go areas for Professor Alberti as he conducts his inquiry.
Order. Topical questions should be snappy, and three supplementaries is just not on.
Unless my memory is fading, I met the hon. Gentleman and the hon. Member for Sutton and Cheam (Mr. Burstow) very recently. But let me say this: services locally in their area have to be determined on the basis of what is best for patient care. I will become involved in the issue only if local politicians on the overview and scrutiny committee refer it to me. That is the right way for those issues to be resolved.
Since my right hon. Friend has been in post, has the Department of Health has ever lobbied the Treasury to put up the price of alcohol for health reasons?
I obviously cannot comment on the representations made in Government prior to each Budget.
There are a number of bits of analysis on this. The one that struck home more than any other was the Foresight report conducted by some of the world’s most eminent scientists and epidemiologists about the effect of obesity, which is a major driving factor in type 2 diabetes, cardiovascular disease and, indeed, cancer. They said that if we do nothing about this, by 2050 not only will there be an enormous burden in terms of disease but enormous costs—they estimate the cost will be around £50 billion to the NHS and to society more generally. That is why we are introducing the abdominal aortic aneurysm ultrasound check from this year, the vascular check for every adult between 40 and 73, call and recall, and many other initiatives to deal with prevention. The hon. Gentleman raises a crucial point about what we have to do now to prevent this disease burden in future.
Last week, I attended a celebration of the Ear Foundation, which is a charity that was set up to fund the first cochlear implant procedure in the city of Nottingham. Now that the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence has decided that it is a good idea for profoundly deaf children to have implants for both ears, can the Secretary of State tell me what he is doing to ensure that primary care trusts listen to that advice?
The recommendations from NICE with regard to implants must be complied with within three months of the guidance being issued, which was 28 January. PCTs are required to do two things. First, they must make available the funds for clinical decisions to be taken on the patients who should receive that treatment. Secondly, where there are patients who have already been treated but would now benefit from the NICE recommendations, they must ensure that a proper assessment is made of whether they should have that treatment provided to them.
I would be very willing to look at the situation in the hon. Gentleman’s own area. The roll-out of the IAPT—improving access to psychological therapies—initiative, described by Professor Layard as the most important reform in mental health since the NHS was created, will affect the hon. Gentleman’s area as well as others. With 3,600 psychological therapists, on the back of a very successful trial in Newham and Doncaster, and the announcement made last Monday for the very reasons that he mentioned—the health problems associated with the global economic recession—we are bringing forward to this year the money, and recruitment, that was to be spent in 2010-11. That will make an enormous difference to the availability of psychiatric services.
In the private sector and in the public sector, those at senior levels who fail are too often allowed to walk away with money, not fired. Can the Minister tell me how many NHS chief executives and trust board members have been fired since 1997?
No, we do not keep those figures centrally. We know how many non-executive directors have been fired—seven since 2001, when the Appointments Commission took over the role and kept statistics. Executive directors are the responsibility of each employer and each trust, and we do not hold those figures centrally.
We are actively recruiting midwives, and working very closely with the Royal College of Midwives. If an expectant mother were turned away from a unit it would be for reasons of safety—for the mother and the birth—because there was not enough capacity. We have an escalating birth rate and an active recruitment programme of midwives. We are also encouraging return to practise. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman would agree that the safety of the mother, and the circumstances of the birth, is paramount and it is better for a mother to travel elsewhere than for her to be admitted and made unsafe. It is unfortunate when a woman has to travel further to give birth, but it is a matter of safe practice.
What can the Secretary of State do to encourage NHS chief executives to listen to and take note of staff whistleblowers so that they do not feel that they are putting their jobs and careers in jeopardy?
The hon. Gentleman raises an important point. Some of the evidence from Stafford—and we do not have it all yet—shows that staff were raising complaints, but they were never reported to the board. Indeed, the board, when it discussed such issues, met in private, and all the indications are that it did not consider individual cases. It dealt with high-level issues.
The hon. Gentleman will accept that the NHS constitution, which has a substantial section on staff responsibilities, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, which was introduced by this Government, ensure that if there are whistles available, someone to blow them and something to be blown about, that should happen, and we should know about it. One of the great abiding mysteries of Stafford is that no such whistle was blown.
Will the Secretary of State look into the situation where Newcastle hospitals have withdrawn from the joint partnership on laundry services with the Queen Elizabeth hospital in Gateshead in my constituency? They are now transporting laundry to Leicester—364 miles there and back. That is a ridiculous thing to do when the cost of the contract is exactly the same.
At face value, that seems rather strange, environmentally as well as financially. If my hon. Friend contacts me about the matter, I would be willing to look into it.
I share the right hon. Gentleman’s view on that. For 150 years, the chief medical officer has been producing such reports—not the same person, of course—that have made a huge contribution to public health in this country, sometimes years after a report has been published. I respect the integrity of the chief medical officer, as I am sure the right hon. Gentleman does, but I just happen to disagree with that solution.
Incidents of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in my three local hospitals have drastically reduced in the last few months, but will the Secretary of State look at the methodology currently used for determining incidents of MRSA in hospitals? In Barnsley, we had an incident where a patient had an infection after his pacemaker had been fitted in an independent treatment centre. Because it took some time to discover how he had been infected in the hospital, the infection was counted as three separate incidents of MRSA for that same patient. That seems a bit unfair to me, so will my right hon. Friend look into that?
My hon. Friend is right to point to the 65 per cent. reduction in MRSA against the baseline of 2003-04, and there has been a 47 per cent. reduction in cases of clostridium difficile compared with the same quarter last year. He raises an important point, and one case of MRSA, clostridium difficile or any hospital-acquired infection is one case too many. We must consider sensible points such as his to see whether we can eradicate another source of health care-acquired infection.
I know about that case, because the hon. Gentleman dropped me a note about it after the debate last week, and I am looking into it. As he did not mention the hospital, neither will I, but the fact that he has now placed the matter on record allows me to respond to him more formally than I would otherwise have done.
I do not understand why clinicians whose primary role is the safety of their patients are somehow concerned about whistleblowing. Indeed, knowing the number of people in various occupations who are not slow to make people aware of such difficulties, it amazes me that that did not happen at Stafford. The hon. Gentleman has taken a great interest in the matter, and I shall make absolutely sure that the issue that he has raised with me is thoroughly examined. Incidentally, I would also like to talk to the consultant concerned to find out why they were so frightened to raise the matter.
We are waiting for the latest statistics, but we want no children under the age of 16 with mental health problems to be treated on adult wards. There is a discussion about what is in the best clinical interests of adolescents aged 17 and 18 to meet their needs, but until those statistics are published I am unable to comment on the specifics. I am happy to examine the details that the hon. Gentleman mentions.
International Terrorism
I have today published the revised version of the Government’s strategy for countering international terrorism. Protecting the safety of everybody in Britain is the primary duty, and the abiding obligation, of Government. Recent events in Northern Ireland were a chilling reminder that the threat of terrorism has not left our shores, and they demonstrated the need to continue to adapt our approach so that we can deal with that threat wherever it emerges.
As we set out in our Contest strategy today, the greatest security threat that we face comes from al-Qaeda and related groups and individuals. Our aim is to reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. We know that the threat is severe and that an attack is highly likely and could happen without warning at any time. We know that this new form of terrorism is different in scale and nature from the terrorist threats that we have had to deal with in recent decades. This new form of terrorism is rooted in conflicts overseas and the fragility of some states and grounded in an extremist ideology that uses violence to further its ends. It exploits the opportunities created by modern technologies and seeks to radicalise young people into violent extremism.
The threat now comes from the al-Qaeda leadership and its immediate associates, located mainly on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, as well as from its affiliates and from others, including rogue individuals, who espouse similar views. As hon. Members throughout the House will know, not least my predecessors as Home Secretary, on whose important work this strategy builds, those groups have planned a succession of attacks against the UK with the aim of causing mass casualties.
Thanks to the hard work and dedication of thousands of people, to whom I pay tribute, we have had considerable success in stopping terrorists in their tracks and bringing those responsible to justice. We have disrupted more than a dozen attempted terrorist plots in the UK and, since 2001, almost 200 people have been convicted of terrorist-related offences.
However, the threat remains and is always evolving. The strategy takes that into account, draws on what we have learned about how to counter it, and reflects the increased resources that we have rightly made available to keep Britain safe. In recent years, the number of police dedicated to counter-terrorism work has grown from 1,700 to 3,000. The Security Service has doubled in size.
We have trained tens of thousands of people throughout the country to prepare for and protect against a terrorist attack, and we are working with communities to prevent the spread of violent extremism. We currently spend £2.5 billion on countering terrorism. By 2011, that will rise to £3.5 billion—the majority will be spent on the main focus of work: pursuing terrorists wherever they are and stopping their attacks.
The Contest strategy remains centred on four key areas—Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. We have updated each of them. Pursue will make use of the new resources and new legislation available to the intelligence agencies and police to investigate and disrupt terrorist networks here and overseas, and to prosecute those responsible.
Prevent will reach more people than ever, as we step up our efforts to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism. That reflects our better understanding of the causes of radicalisation and includes new programmes and new partnerships with communities here and overseas.
Protect aims to strengthen our defences against an attack through a strong border, improved resilience in our critical national infrastructure and greater protection for the crowded places where we all live, work, shop and play.
Prepare will limit the impact of any attacks that occur, with tens of thousands of emergency services workers, security guards, store managers and others trained and equipped to deal with an incident. Every region of the country now has plans to deal with an attack, improve our ability to recover and ensure a return to normal as soon as possible.
There is also dedicated cross-Government work on the specific threat posed by terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons and explosives.
The vital work to counter terrorism cannot be done by central Government, the police and agencies working alone. That is why the revised strategy is based on work right across central and devolved Government and local government, and with our international partners and local communities.
In addressing both the immediate threats and their longer-term causes—and how we will deliver action locally, nationally and internationally—our aim has been to publish as full and open an account of our work as possible. The strategy also draws close links with other Government policies that are essential to its delivery, including conflict reduction, our international aid programme, counter-proliferation, our work in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and our support to communities here, building cohesion, empowerment and equality in this country. The strategy is also closely co-ordinated with the national security strategy, which was published for the first time last year.
The challenge that all of us in the House face is striking the right balance between measures to protect security and the right to life, and the impact on the other rights that we hold dear.
Contest is based on clear and unambiguous principles. My approach to protecting Britain’s security in the face of the terrorist threat will always be underpinned by our core shared values, including the protection of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic and accountable government.
The Government have sought that balance at all times, but we remain uncompromising on several issues. We oppose the use of torture in all its forms. We have always condemned the practice of extraordinary rendition, and will continue to do so.
The strategy is comprehensive and wide ranging. In publishing it, our primary aim is to reassure the British public that we are doing all in our power to protect this country through our relentless pursuit of terrorists and our determination to prevent violent extremism.
I commend the statement to the House.
May I thank the Home Secretary for providing an advance copy of her statement? Once again, however, may I express my annoyance on behalf of the House at the fact that the documents, which are published today, were released and distributed through the media long before they were released to MPs? That is completely unacceptable and goes against numerous rulings by you, Mr. Speaker. The Home Secretary should be ashamed of herself.
I join the Home Secretary in paying tribute to the police and all the security services, both overseas and at home, for their work in protecting us against the terrorist threat, but we should do more than recognise that hard work—we should also recognise their personal courage in looking after us. We all share the same goal in respect of the issues we are discussing today. We want to do everything we can to combat terror, and we will be constructive critics of what the Government do as a result.
Furthermore, we face new kinds of threat. The events in Mumbai in November were truly shocking. Innocent people were gunned down in their hotel rooms or shot at random on a busy railway station. Armed men roaming the streets of cities looking for people to shoot indiscriminately is a new experience in the battle against terror. That is why we back the Government’s aim of broadening knowledge of the terrorist threat to thousands of people who work in public places.
However, the Government have to do the job properly. It is depressing to discover that the programme described in last weekend’s newspapers by the Prime Minister does not appear to be what we were promised. He described the programme as follows:
“Tens of thousands of men and women…from security guards to store managers…have now been trained and equipped to deal with an incident and know what to watch for as people go about their daily business”.
Will the Home Secretary confirm that the training programme described by the Prime Minister amounts to no more than a voluntary three-hour seminar, and that includes the coffee break? I do not see how we can train people properly to deal with terrorism in less than half the time allocated to a cycling proficiency course.
Will the Home Secretary tell us how widely the training has been spread? When we contacted the management of two major shopping centres this morning, we were told that all that they knew about the plans was from newspaper reports this week. Why?
When it comes to new kinds of threat, the Home Secretary is right to highlight the need to be aware of the danger of an attack with chemical, biological or radiological weapons, but will she tell the House why police in London will not all have access to protective equipment ahead of the G20 summit?
The other big caveat is how we deal with the groups that foster both hatred and violence in our society and the extremism that underpins many aspects of the threat that we face. The meeting held in a school in London last week at which one of the most controversial of all the so-called preachers of hate, Omar Bakri, was able to preach over a phone line to a group of followers and call for attacks on British soldiers and civilians was a disgrace. Why was that allowed to happen?
We have to deal with extremism in all its guises. People have the right to campaign for radical change in our society. We should not seek to ban them from doing so, but the state has the right to protect its people and its institutions, and the principles of a democratic society. We should not be providing support to those who wish to undermine that society, so will the Home Secretary now stop funding groups that propagate extremism, and instead concentrate on funding projects that break down the community divide?
We will support the Government when they do the right thing to combat terrorism. There is much in the document that we welcome, but the Government’s strategy is not perfect and we will continue to push for change where we believe that it is flawed. We will do so out of a desire that I believe is shared right across this House: to do everything we can to keep the terrorist threat at bay.
In relation to the hon. Gentleman’s first point, the Contest strategy has been available to hon. Members in the Vote Office since 10 o’clock this morning.
The media had it last night.
No, the media did not have it last night. It was available to hon. Members at 10 o’clock this morning and, as the hon. Gentleman knows, I personally sent him a copy today as well.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman paid tribute to those involved in helping to keep this country safe. I welcome that tribute. I accept his point that we need to learn from terrible events such as those in Mumbai and Lahore—and we will—and to feed that into our ongoing work to protect from and to prepare for terrorist attacks.
The hon. Gentleman talks about the work we are taking forward through Project Argus. I am sorry that he was so dismissive of a wide-ranging programme that is placed on top of the work of police officers, police community support officers, the security and intelligence agencies and others who work to keep us safe, and that aims to provide training and preparation and to protect us where we shop, where we work and where we live. About 700 programmes have been implemented under Project Argus and more than 30,000 people have received training—and plans are in place for even more people to receive it. On top of that, separate training programmes for security guards are being conducted throughout the country to help ensure that they are vigilant. I hope that hon. Members will welcome and support that work in their local communities.
The hon. Gentleman welcomes our focus on the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat. We are ensuring, once again, that all police officers receive basic information training in CBRN threats, with 8,000 police officers receiving specific training, and they all have access to protective equipment.
The hon. Gentleman rightly emphasises, as do we, the challenge to counteract violent extremism and those who want to support terrorism. In providing funding for groups and other elements of the work, we have ensured that we can measure the outcomes of what those groups do. We commissioned a review from Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and the Audit Commission, which has already been published. I agree that our work to counter violent extremism and to support shared values needs to go even further, which is why we are clear in this document about the values that we share—the same values, incidentally, that are under attack by terrorists— and we will as a Government and more widely across the community challenge those who do not share those values. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will recognise that our emphasis on working—not just in communities, but more widely in prisons, schools, universities and internationally—to prevent people from turning to violent extremism is an important part of, and the correct long-term approach to, what I hope is our joint work to help keep this country safer.
I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement and her commitment to continue to engage with communities. As events in Luton showed, it is extremely important to continue that process of engagement. She mentioned Mumbai, but security in major hotels and tourist places in such cities does not bear comparison with what is happening in London. Although I of course welcome everything the Government have done in training staff, it is vital that we continue to work with the private sector to ensure that it puts in place the necessary security arrangements in our major hotels and major tourist destinations, which will be targeted by terrorists, and we must prepare for that.
I think my right hon. Friend is right to draw attention, as I did, to the need to learn from events such as those in Mumbai. I am glad that he welcomes the fact that, through the security advisers we fund, we have ensured that hotel operators are trained. In addition, of course, we provide advice, and we are developing the way in which we provide it—for example, ensuring that buildings are designed and built to be as safe as possible from potential terrorist attack. We will continue to do that and build on that work. I am sure my right hon. Friend shares my view that terrorists want us to garner obvious, difficult and cumbersome forms of security that prevent us from going about our daily lives. Our task is to make sure that everybody is able to live their daily lives as freely, but as securely, as possible.
I thank the Home Secretary for giving me advance sight of the statement, although I should have liked more opportunity to look at the substantial purple document that accompanies it. Perhaps on the next occasion the Home Secretary could arrange to inform Members that it is available, as that certainly was not obvious to me.
Terrorism remains a grave threat to our society—on that, we are agreed. I too pay tribute to the work of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and, indeed, the police forces involved in counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism, who are so involved in this fight. We have faced it before in the form of republican Irish terrorism and have survived it, and I have no doubt that we shall do so again. Does the Home Secretary agree, however, that although the threat is severe, our response must always be measured and proportionate? We must never become what we are fighting, for therein lies a loss of the moral high ground and the esteem of the very people whom we need to provide intelligence and witnesses.
There is much to welcome in this document, but what further ongoing training, and indeed communication with those involved in counter-intelligence, will these 60,000 people have? What powers will they have, and what does she expect of them? Does she recognise that many innocent people going about their lawful business, from train-spotters to tourists and, in the latest incident, night fishermen, have been arrested by over-zealous police officers? What will she do to prevent that from happening again?
Our concern about the strategy is that it continues to sacrifice hard-won liberties in the name of security, and to trespass at the edge of what is acceptable to many British people. Ministers have repeatedly returned with proposals for longer periods of detention without charge, as if the whole fight against terrorism could be reduced to a number: 90 days, 42 days and, still, 28 days—more than double the next longest period in an English-speaking country.
Would it not be better if the Home Secretary made more hasty progress with the introduction of intercept evidence in courts? What progress is she making with that? Given the substantial success of criminal convictions for terrorist offences—at 92 per cent., the figure is far higher than those for other serious crimes, which is cause for real congratulation of the Home Secretary—will she now review the need for some of the more extreme measures that she introduced in relation to the very long period of detention without charge? Will she come back to the House with a reform of the regime for control orders?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for paying tribute to those involved in countering terrorism and keeping us safe. I agree that our response should be measured and proportionate, but I disagree with his assessment that it is not. I have made it completely clear in the strategy that our approach to countering terrorism must be grounded in basic human rights: that is at the heart of our approach.
The hon. Gentleman described the training that we provide through Project Argus, and other training, as being about giving powers to those involved, but it is not about giving them specific powers. It is about, for example, enabling security guards to be vigilant and aware of what is happening outside, perhaps outside the night club that they are guarding, and training people in shopping centres to be aware of what would happen in the event of a terrorist attack. Those people must learn how to lead others to safety, and where the safe places are. Pretty practical and, I think, sensible guidance and advice will be given to people who can play a role—although it will not be their primary role—in keeping others safe.
The hon. Gentleman returned once again—which I did not, in my statement—to detention periods, and to the fallacy that detention periods in this country are somehow out of step with those in other countries. We have presented our arguments time after time. I remind the hon. Gentleman of the arguments that we have presented about European countries—never mind other countries—where people are detained for longer periods, effectively pre-charge, than is the case in this country, and I remind him that in this country any detention for longer than 24 hours is subject to judicial oversight and review.
The hon. Gentleman asks about our progress with intercept evidence. As we have made clear, we are working through the proposition made in the Chilcot review that it is possible to design a legal system in which we could use intercept evidence, while fulfilling the Privy Council review’s nine tests. As we spelt out in a recent written ministerial statement, we are now, having reviewed and designed a system, trying to test it with real cases.
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s statement. It is important that these reviews are ongoing, as terrorist movements across the world and in this country do not stand still in trying to ensure that on one occasion—it only takes one occasion—they get through, kill people and cause the destruction of life and property. For those who are maimed, life will never be the same again.
I welcome the statement but I would like my right hon. Friend to go back to her colleagues in Government on one part of it. In the past 10 years, 200 of our fellow citizens have been killed abroad in terrorist attacks, and 150 have been maimed for life, yet we still do not have a comprehensive compensation scheme for British citizens abroad. These are not combatants or volunteers; they are simply men, women and children who were in the wrong place at the wrong time, and because it was not in the United Kingdom they are treated differently. That is indefensible. We are dealing with worldwide terrorism. Every British citizen is entitled to be treated the same and to be protected. Where something goes wrong, they and their families are entitled to be looked after by this country. I ask her to take that back to her colleagues and to give a clear indication, possibly as early as the Budget, about what we should do about it.
My right hon. Friend is right to be impassioned about the safety of people both in this country and overseas. A specific part of the strategy is to protect our interests here and overseas, but I understand that he is making a specific point about compensation. We already provide considerable assistance, but I will reflect on his points about a compensation system for those harmed in terrorist attacks overseas, and discuss them with colleagues.
Is there any particular reason why the Pursue strand in the document is being moved up ahead of the Prevent strand, which is normally the first named? Has the right hon. Lady made any progress in her dealings with university staff in reminding them that, while the preservation of academic freedom is absolutely vital, they also have duties as citizens of this country to report to the appropriate authorities any incipient criminal activities that they detect on campus?
I think that the order has always been Pursue and then Prevent. Of course the short-term task is to pursue those who are plotting terrorist attacks and to bring them to justice, and the long-term aim is to prevent people from turning to terrorism or violent extremism in the first place. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will not read too much into the placing of those elements in the list. It is a wide-ranging and comprehensive strategy that requires all four Ps to be successful.
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point about higher education institutions. We have made considerable progress, not least through the work of my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, in providing more guidance on what happens in higher education institutions. It is now recognised that while academic freedom and the right of discussion is absolutely fundamentally part of university life, so is the protection of young people from potential radicalisation, which may lead them to tragic consequences, and the right of everyone to have freedom to live on university campuses without being subject to some of the radicalising influences and violent extremism that there is a risk of being perpetrated in some of our higher education institutions.
I thank my right hon. Friend and all those who have worked with her on updating the Contest strategy, which we first put together in 2003. While it is understandable that she will be concentrating on the immediate physical risk to life and limb, demonstrated so tragically on 7 July 2005, and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat that exists, will she consider adding a further letter to CBRN—E for electronic or cyber attack?
There is a brief mention of it in the updated document, but as we saw from Estonia and can see what is happening across the world, there is a real danger that terrorists could launch such an attack in a devastating fashion that would not only undermine our already fragile economy, but put people at substantial risk.
My right hon. Friend makes those comments from a position of considerable experience in terms of his contribution to the whole issue of how we counter the terrorist threat. He is right that cyber-security generally cuts across almost all the challenges highlighted last year in the national security strategy, including not only terrorism but matters such as organised crime and business crime. That is why a piece of work currently being undertaken by the Cabinet Office is extremely important; it is leading a cross-departmental project on cyber-security, and I hope my right hon. Friend is reassured to know that that work is going on in Government. He will also know, not least because he and I were in Washington at the same time, just over a week ago, that the way in which we can work with our international partners is also very important. During that trip, I was able to meet Janet Napolitano at the Department of Homeland Security, who is currently reviewing the role that that Department should play in cyber-security in the US, and we agreed to share experience, to work together, to tackle many of the problems posed in the area of cyber-security and to ensure we can be safe in the virtual world in the same way as we are in the real world.
The Home Secretary will be aware that one of the so-called preachers of hate is currently in a high-security prison awaiting deportation as a danger to the state. When he was on Special Immigration Appeals Commission bail, he was forbidden to use the internet, yet as we speak, he is broadcasting on the internet his litany of hate, trying to suborn young minds across the country and the world. That is happening from inside a high-security prison. How can that happen?
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Justice was present in the Chamber until recently. I am sure he will be concerned to hear what the hon. Gentleman has said, and I will take that up with my right hon. Friend.
As you may know, Mr. Speaker, I have an interest in these matters, as declared in the register. First, may I congratulate the Home Secretary on what I consider the most important element of this strategy: its unparalleled openness? Does she agree that if we are truly to be able to face, respond to and—God forbid that we ever have the need—recover from a terrorist attack, the resilience that is needed will ultimately lie not in the agencies of the state, but in the resolve, spirit and understanding, and support for our aims, of the ordinary people of this country? Therefore, may I commend her training programmes, and ask whether she agrees that the litmus test of this strategy is how far it will embed that resilience not just in the political leadership here or the formal security agencies of the British state, but in the ordinary people of Britain, because it is ultimately through them and in the communities that we will defeat the terrorists?
I thank my right hon. Friend for those words, and also for his extremely important work in the Home Office, not least in setting up and reorganising the structure of government to ensure that, in the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, we have a strong strategic lead for taking this work forward across government, and his work in highlighting the evolving nature of the threat and the requirement for us to evolve how we dealt with it. I agree with him that while we depend on those in the police, the security and intelligence agencies and the armed forces to tackle terrorism, it is not enough to expect that they will enable us to mitigate that threat. Each of us has a role, and it is in recognition of that that we have—unprecedentedly, I think—made all these 170-plus pages unclassified and available to the public. It is why we have also ensured that we have a more digestible version that the public can read too. He rightly says that it is when everybody understands not that there is a lot to fear, but that there is a lot to be gained by being vigilant and by having a role to play in helping to counter terror, that we will truly be safer and more confident in this country about our security.
May I say to the Home Secretary that a tragic reminder of the less than competent implementation of the strategy is the fact that she was unable to answer the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer)?
To come back to the strategic issue, one of the most fundamental aspects of Contest is the Prevent strand—preventing a large number of young Muslims from becoming radicalised. Her own heads of MI5 successively have told us that there has been a massive 25 per cent. year-on-year increase in the number of those young Muslims. That demonstrates a failure of the Prevent strand, and it is made worse by the fact that her Government attempt, time and again, to implement excessively authoritarian measures such as 42 days, 90 days and so on. What is she going to do to make this strand work?
I have to say that I do not recognise the right hon. Gentleman’s comment that there has been a 25 per cent. year-on-year increase. In fact, it is this Government who, over the past few years, have put a particular focus on the action, resources and partnerships that we have built up in order to prevent violent extremism not just in the communities, but more widely. He does not choose to listen, so I shall end my reply there.
Many of us remember the Omagh bombing and some of us in this place remember Airey Neave. Surely the whole House must agree with my right hon. Friend that there are major differences between the past challenge of the Provisional IRA and the situation we face now. Not only is it international—that makes a crucial difference—but we know the scale of the threat following the attacks on the twin towers and the London underground transport system. Does she agree that one of the important things to recognise in her whole approach is the distinction between the short term, when we have to both disrupt these groups, many of which follow the leadership of al-Qaeda, and convict the people who are found guilty, and the medium to long term, when we have to win the hearts and minds for a society where we have freedom and justice for all?
My right hon. Friend is exactly right; that is the reason why all four Ps that I have outlined today are fundamentally important and why, in the short term, we do need to take action to disrupt terrorist plots and to bring terrorists to justice. It is also why we have focused considerable effort and funding on the second P—Prevent—and why the way in which we prevent people from becoming violent extremists and from supporting terrorism, both in this country and abroad, will be the defining factor in whether we can help to reduce the risk in the longer term.
In the Home Secretary’s Prevent strategy, on page 84 of the document, she rightly says:
“Building community cohesion is about creating strong and positive relationships between people of different backgrounds, including those...from different faith communities.”
Given that statement, does she recognise the potential for inconsistency in allowing schools, through religious discrimination, to segregate communities further, meaning that white-only schools can stay white-only by refusing admission to Muslims and Asian schools can remain Asian-only by excluding applications from non-Muslims? Will she pause to reconsider the policy of allowing that sort of segregation to get worse?
I have had experience in my previous jobs of the admissions criteria for schools, and I absolutely do not recognise the ability of schools to operate the sorts of admission criteria that the hon. Gentleman has just outlined.
I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement, but can she assure me that it will prevent a repetition of the situation where Daud Abdullah, the deputy president of the Muslim Council of Britain, was able to advise Ministers on social cohesion while he was, as he remains, a promoter of violent jihad?
Certainly, we condemn not only the comments, but the statements supported by Daud Abdullah. That is why my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government is in ongoing dialogue with the MCB about his role and the response to those particular circumstances.
I welcome the Home Secretary’s statement, but while her responsibilities are inevitably focused primarily on her own Department, may I commend the cross-governmental approach that the document adopts? Does she share my concern that the pages on Pakistan and Afghanistan suggest that it is hardly possible to say that the Prevent strategy is working in those countries? In fact, what we have done in Afghanistan seems to have fed the forces of radicalisation rather than defeated them. What discussions is she having with her counterparts in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence on revisiting the Afghan strategy to ensure that we start to provide a more stabilising influence in that part of the world and to devote a fairer proportion of our resources to Pakistan rather than just to military effort in Afghanistan?
Of course, military effort is part of the approach that we need to take to making the world safer and ensuring that those states that have in the past undoubtedly been the basis of a terrorist threat are tackled, but so are diplomatic effort and international aid effort. In all those areas, we are working closely with the Government of Pakistan and other international partners—for example, the US—on setting clear objectives, especially with respect to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and on how we can carry those out with the widest range of international partners.
I have not been approached by my constituents saying that too many powers have been given to the police and security services. My constituents are interested in the fact that Islamic fundamentalists are appearing to get away with saying some extreme things about terrorism and the murder of British service personnel. That is what my real concern is, and will my right hon. Friend take some strong action on that? Clearly, the hearts and minds campaign is very important, but work on it should be based on some fundamental truths, including that the biggest killer of Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan is al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That is why the vast majority of Muslims in this country condemn completely the actions of terrorists and want to join others in the community to promote the shared values that we spell out in this document and to work against those who want to promote violent extremism.
It has been confirmed in the past week that the Department for Communities and Local Government is only now compiling a central list of exactly where the £12 million of preventing violent extremism money has gone this year. That makes it very hard to see what due diligence has been exercised. Can the Home Secretary give the House an unequivocal guarantee that none of that money has gone astray, and that none of the £386 million spent overseas on preventing extremism projects has gone astray either?
I really do not think that that money has gone astray. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government has already said that she will provide a report on that money at the end of this financial year. The domestic funding is going to groups from which we will expect evidence of the impact of the projects they are running. We have asked Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary and the Audit Commission to evaluate the work, and their report has been published. As for the overseas work, my colleagues in the Foreign Office and the Department for International Development track such work carefully to ensure that its impact is felt and seen, and that, internationally and domestically, it means we are safer.
I welcome this new strategy and I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend’s staff and others across Whitehall who put so much effort into delivering this important document. Will she comment on the importance of capacity building in failed and weak states, especially in the policing and judicial processes? What plans do the Government have to build a truly comprehensive programme to deliver in those areas?
My right hon. Friend is right. We have identified that failed states and countries where there is unresolved conflict provide strategic sources of support for the terrorist threat. That means that we need to take a broader approach to our support for those states, which would include providing support for law enforcement and law and order. Our wide-ranging support programme is provided through the Department for International Development and directly by police forces in this country, and it goes to places such as Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is an important element of ensuring that that strategic problem is tackled in the overall attempt to reduce the risk from terrorism.
The Home Secretary will be aware that, every so often, protests and marches are held at which people use language, both orally and on placards, that many would regard as inflammatory. The police do not seem to take any action, despite the popular belief that various laws have been broken. Not surprisingly, there is a perception that some people can get away with breaking the law, whereas the majority of the public would be prosecuted for committing the same breaches. Will the right hon. Lady kindly assure the House that no one is above the law and that, when it comes to this issue, anyone who breaches the law will be prosecuted?
Yes, I can give the hon. Gentleman that commitment. That was why we changed the law to ensure that the glorification of terrorism was a criminal offence. People have been prosecuted for precisely the sort of activity that he outlined. Our argument is that we should use the law for people who overstep it, but that even when they do not overstep that line, the Government, Parliament and the community more widely should nevertheless provide a strong challenge. That is something that I hope and expect to see.
Will the Home Secretary give the House an assurance that all measures to combat international terrorism will treat every British citizen in the UK in the same way? That is especially important for people in Northern Ireland. Will she assure the House that she will not require Northern Ireland citizens to have a passport to come over to mainland Britain, just because there is an open border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland?
My hon. Friend knows that the work that we are taking forward on the common travel area is the subject of discussion as part of the Borders, Citizens and Immigration Bill. The matter has been the subject of in-depth discussion in the House of Lords, where some of the assurances that she seeks have been given already. This is an important matter: we need to safeguard the rights of UK citizens in the way that she outlined, but we must also put in place sensible provisions to mitigate the risks arising from the open borders and the forms of travel within the common travel area. We will do that in a way that I hope balances both requirements, and that is the subject of discussion at the moment as the legislation proceeds through the House.
Why does section 9 of the document propagate the fiction that the Government are tackling internet-based extremism, when an answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Patrick Mercer) of 24 February confirmed that the Government have not closed down a single internet site under section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2006? Is that incompetence or complacency, or a combination of both?
The answer is that sometimes, as police officers have outlined, the ability to threaten the use of section 3 has been sufficient to achieve those objectives. That has been what has happened.
I should like to add my thanks to another group of people who have helped to keep us safe—the moderate voices in the Muslim community who stand up to those who would preach violent extremism. I had the opportunity this summer to meet a visiting imam from South Africa, who seemed to be exactly one of those moderate voices. He recently applied to be a permanent imam in a mosque in Slough but has been refused, for reasons that I think are spurious. Will my right hon. Friend make sure that the policy adopted by her Department works in practice as well as on paper?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. There are many brave and important voices in the Muslim community speaking up for precisely the values that she outlined. I was not sure whether she was referring to an immigration decision that had been made—
indicated assent.
I will certainly undertake to review that particular case, given the circumstances that my hon. Friend outlined.
It is almost six years to the day since the invasion of Iraq. I am sorry that the Home Secretary does not feel that the report should be accurate enough to recognise the mistakes that have been made because of that intervention. I quote from page 23, which says that
“in 2003, radical Islamist groups emerged in and travelled to Iraq to take part in what they regarded as a new jihad”.
Further down the page, it says:
“After 2003 Iraq was used as a base for terrorist attacks”.
Does she not recognise that our going there with a military campaign left a power vacuum, which allowed al-Qaeda—the very terrorist group that she spoke about—into Iraq, and allowed it to operate from that country? Will she not put her hand up and say, “Mistakes have been made, and lessons must be learned”? If there is any reason why there should be an inquiry into the war in Iraq, this is it, because exactly the same mistakes are now being made in Afghanistan.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman is looking in detail at the nature of the developing threat that we have spelled out in the Contest strategy. I do not wholly agree with his analysis—
Al-Qaeda was never there before the invasion.
Well, of course the threat from al-Qaeda pre-dated the military action taken in Iraq. The hon. Gentleman shakes his head; it is a fact that the threat from al-Qaeda in the world pre-dated the action taken in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I would be very surprised if he did not understand that.
May I welcome my right hon. Friend’s commitment to operating within the framework of human rights, which of course imposes positive obligations on the state to protect us from the consequences of terrorism? May I also particularly welcome her commitment to complete opposition to the use of torture? Does she agree that we have to make sure that our agents overseas, who are operating in one or two dubious countries, such as Pakistan, are properly trained, and are under proper instruction to make sure that they do nothing that could in any way, shape or form be seen as making them complicit in the use of torture?
I agree with my hon. Friend, which is precisely why my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister last week made it clear that we will publish, after a review by the Intelligence and Security Committee, the guidelines of the codes under which intelligence officers and armed forces question and deal with detainees overseas, to make it clear that the sort of provisions that my hon. Friend is talking about are in place. Furthermore, we will ask for that to be reviewed annually by Sir Peter Gibson, the intelligence services commissioner, and reported to the Prime Minister.
On Saturday, along with my hon. Friend the Member for Kingswood (Roger Berry), I took part in a discussion with members of the Youth Parliament about the Government’s Prevent agenda. The young people expressed real concern, not so much about the powers that the police have been given to tackle terrorism, but about the somewhat arbitrary and over-zealous way in which some police officers use the powers. What reassurance can she give me that sufficient guidance has been given to the police to ensure that they use the powers only when they are engaged in serious investigation of terrorist offences, and not more widely?
Guidance is given. There is both a legal basis for the power, and guidance is given to police officers about how the powers are to be used. My hon. Friend’s point identifies the need for the police to engage with communities, as happens effectively in many areas, to make sure that everybody can understand the nature of the powers, the nature of the threat, and what is, and is not, appropriate. That discussion should be had with the sort of young people with whom, I am pleased to hear, my hon. Friend and colleagues were engaging last week.
Points of Order
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. You will have heard the point that my hon. the Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling) made about the handling of the “Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare” document at the beginning of his questions to the Home Secretary, and the points made by the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Chris Huhne). I want to commend a young researcher of mine, Ruth Davis, who examined the larger version of the Order Paper and noted, in the Votes and Proceedings, that the paper had been laid before the House yesterday.
I attempted to get a copy from the Vote Office after 10 o’clock. The Clerk in the Vote Office informed my research assistant that a copy would not be available until the statement was made at 3.30 pm today, as the Vote Office had been told to release on instruction. An hour later, I returned to the Vote Office in Portcullis House, and copies were then available. I understood from later inquiries that the fact that the document had appeared in the Order Paper meant that it had been laid in the Journal Office yesterday, but only one copy was available there for Members, in the unlikely event that they were aware that it was there. There was no mechanism to make Members aware that the document was available in the House yesterday. The whole exercise is plainly unsatisfactory. Can it be improved?
I always want to make sure that hon. Members—Front-Bench and, of course, Back-Benchers—get information as soon as that information is published. I ask the hon. Gentleman to allow me to look into the matter and get back to him. That is the best thing I can do.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I have tabled a number of named day questions to the Secretary of State for Health, which were supposed to be replied to today. They are highly relevant to the tragedy of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust, in particular on the question of a public inquiry and on protecting whistleblowers, which the Secretary of State said should be done. In the circumstances, may I please ask you to insist that my named day questions are answered today?
This is a matter for the appropriate Minister, who will have heard what the hon. Gentleman said. I have no doubt that the hon. Gentleman, like his colleagues in the Staffordshire area, will pursue the matter in every way possible, and I will seek to help where I can. He has put the problem on the record.
On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Can you give the House guidance? Is it in order for the Secretary of State to deny the existence of information on the growth of the terrorist threat, when that information is published by her subordinate, the head of MI5?
This is a debating point. It is a matter that would be best put to the Home Secretary.
Pension Credit and Personal Expense Allowance (Duty of Consultation and Review)
Motion for leave to introduce a Bill (Standing Order No. 23)
I beg to move,
That leave be given to bring in a Bill to make provision for the periodic review of the capital limits and tariff income rules and the personal expense allowance; to make provision for consultations on the level of those allowances and rules; and for connected purposes.
The Bill I wish to introduce seeks to tackle two injustices. The first concerns the penalty that over 500,000 thrifty pensioners face as a result of benefit rules which, in effect, assume that they are earning 8 per cent. interest on their savings. The second concerns 250,000 frail pensioners in care homes who are reliant on state support and are left with just £21.15 a week to cover their personal living costs.
Under existing benefit rules—the so-called tariff income rules—pensioners with savings over £6,000 who qualify for pension credit are assumed to be earning anything up to 8 per cent. interest on their savings. Whenever I talk about this matter with pensioner and other groups in my constituency, there is one of two reactions—derisive laughter or disbelief turning to outrage, often followed by the question, “Which bank gives that much interest on savings? I want to move my savings there straight away.”
A rate of 8 per cent. is significantly higher than any savings or investment account currently available, and it has not changed, up or down, since 2003. Benefit entitlement is calculated on an assumed rate of return that pensioners receive from their savings. Any savings below £6,000 are disregarded, but for every £500 above that, a saver is assumed to earn £1 per week from their investment.
My Bill would place a duty on the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions to review the tariff income rules and the level of capital. By placing a duty on the Secretary of State to consult widely about the rules and limits, I hope the Bill will force the Government to address the growing anomaly which discriminates against thrifty pensioners. I would go further, but that is as far as the rules of the House allow me in a ten-minute Bill.
The Government argue that the tariff income rules do not represent a rate of return for investing capital, but are there to
“provide a simple method of calculating the weekly contribution that people with capital in excess of £6,000 (or £10,000 if in a care home) are expected to make from those resources”.
However, the rules imply that pensioners with savings over £6,000 are receiving up to 8 per cent. interest. Back in the real world, where, for example, an individual savings account provided by the Government-backed National Savings and Investments currently offers only 1.62 to 2.16 per cent., that notion bears no scrutiny whatever. More than 500,000 pensioners are having their income overestimated, and are missing out on pension credit and other benefits to which they should be entitled.
The Government calculate, for example, that a pensioner with savings of £16,000 earns £1,080 per annum in interest. In the real world of, for example, National Savings and Investments ISAs, such savings would generate £259 to £345 a year. The Government’s assumption that such an interest rate is unrealistic is costing such pensioners at least £734 per year. As real interest rates fall, hard-pressed pensioners are being forced to run their savings down at ever faster rates. That is unfair and needs to be changed.
As for the second injustice, the personal expenses allowance is the only source of income for care home residents whose care is funded by the local authority. At the moment, 250,000 residents receive that support. Means-testing rules require those entering care homes with savings of less than £22,250 to surrender to the state their income, including their state pension and assets to cover the cost of their care. The personal expenses allowance is the amount that residents are allowed to keep for personal expenditure each week, and it currently stands at £21.15—about £3 a day. That amount is the only source of income for local authority-funded care home residents and is intended to pay for toiletries, clothes, gifts for family and friends, travel, hobbies, hairdressing and other leisure activities. Some have had to use that money to pay for health services such as chiropody and physiotherapy. In some cases, the personal expenses allowance is being called on to top up the fees that people pay in care homes. The personal expenses allowance is due to rise this April by 75p a week.
The case for reform and an increase is compelling. It has the support of many older people’s charities, as it is vital to ensure the dignity and self-respect of residents and to give them a certain amount of independence. Age Concern, Help the Aged and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have all published reports demonstrating that the personal expenses allowance is crucial to the dignity of older people and must therefore be raised, as many elderly people live in poverty or their relatives supplement their allowances from their own incomes.
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation conducted research among pensioners and concluded that the minimum such amount needed by a single pensioner to maintain an acceptable standard of living is £42 per week. The Royal British Legion, in its Return to Rationing campaign, also calls for a higher personal expenses allowance. In 2005, the Work and Pensions Committee stated:
“The Committee remains concerned at the low level of the Personal Expenses Allowance and repeats the recommendation of the Social Security Committee that the Government should ‘conduct research to establish the amount necessary to enable pensioners in institutional care to live their lives with dignity.’”
Three years later, the then care services Minister, the hon. Member for Bury, South (Mr. Lewis), twice gave an undertaking to Parliament that a public consultation would be carried out that included the rate of the personal expenses allowance.
However, the current care services Minister, the hon. Member for Corby (Phil Hope), who is sitting on the Front Bench, issued a written statement in January 2009 in which he refused to initiate a consultation on the level of the personal expenses allowance. How does that square with the Department of Health’s Dignity in Care campaign launched in November 2006, the stated aim of which is to ensure that older people are shown dignity and respect at all stages of their care? In that campaign, one of the Department’s dignity tests is
“to enable people to maintain the maximum possible level of independence, choice and control.”
The low level of the personal expenses allowance compromises the quality of life and dignity of older people by restricting their ability to meet their essential physical and social well-being needs. An amount of £21.15 is simply not enough.
My Bill would place a duty on the Secretary of State for Health to undertake an annual review of the level of the personal expenses allowance, including public consultation, so that it can be increased to a level that guarantees a decent, minimum standard of living. Thrifty and frail pensioners in this country deserve a better deal than they are getting on such matters from this Government. I commend the Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Ordered,
That Mr. Paul Burstow, Steve Webb, Sandra Gidley, Tom Brake, Susan Kramer and Greg Mulholland present the Bill.
Mr. Paul Burstow accordingly presented the Bill.
Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time on Friday 12 June, and to be printed (Bill 80).
Coroners and Justice Bill
[2nd Allocated Day]
[Relevant Documents: The Second Report from the Justice Committee, Session 2008-09, The Coroners and Justice Bill, HC 185, and the Government’s response, HC 322, and the Eighth Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Session 2008-09, Legislative Scrutiny: Coroners and Justice Bill, HC 362.]
Further consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee.
New Clause 11
Guidance on offences that involve hatred on grounds of sexual orientation
‘(1) The Director of Public Prosecutions, in consultation with the Attorney General, must issue guidance to prosecutors explaining the operation of the offences under Part 3A of the Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64) that involve hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.
(2) Chief constables must ensure that the contents of the guidance to prosecutors issued under subsection (1) are made known, in an appropriate form, to officers in their force.
(3) When considering whether to consent to a prosecution for an offence falling within subsection (1), the Attorney General must have particular regard to—
(a) guidance issued under subsection (1), and
(b) the importance of the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, respect for private and family life and freedom of assembly and association provided by the European Convention on Human Rights.’.—(David Howarth.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 37—Incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation: association with child sex offences
‘(1) The Public Order Act 1986 is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection 29B (1) insert—
“(1A) “Threatening” in subsection (1) extends to words, behaviour or written material which asserts or implies an association between sexual orientation and a propensity to commit child sex offences under Part 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42).”’.
Amendment 1, in page 34, line 5, leave out Clause 58.
We now come to a short debate about the aspects of the Bill involving homophobic hatred. The offence of using threatening words or behaviour with intent to stir up hatred on grounds of sexual orientation was created by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. Anyone who knows anything about the lives of gay people in this country knows why the provision was necessary and important.
Homophobic bullying and intimidation are distressingly common occurrences. Recent research shows that one in eight lesbian or gay people have experienced hate crime in the past three years. The problem is not only distressingly common but can have lasting deleterious effects on the lives and well-being of the victims. I hope that no one in this debate will question the need for the provision; if they do, I hope that they will be honest enough to say so openly.
This debate focuses on a particular aspect of the 2008 Act. Some religious groups have said they are afraid that the new law will catch them because their religion strongly disapproves of homosexuality, and their representatives or preachers want to continue to say so publicly. It is important, however, to stress what the 2008 Act says and what the new crime is. The Act says:
“A person who uses threatening words or behaviour, or displays written material which is threatening, is guilty of an offence if he intends thereby to stir up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation.”
That means that the words have to be both threatening and intended to stir up hatred. It is not enough for the words to be insulting or offensive; they have to threaten. Nor is it enough that the words may have the effect of stirring up hatred; they have to be specifically intended to do so.
The crime is difficult to prove at the best of times. If a charge was brought against a saintly religious leader whose intention was to save souls, I cannot see how anyone might think that that offence had been committed.
Will the hon. Gentleman give way?
This is a very short debate. Usually I give way freely but, if hon. Members will forgive me, I will not be able to do so with the same freedom in this debate.
The problem is not what the law says, but the fact that some rather odd investigations have been started—not under the provisions that I have mentioned, which are not yet in force, but under different ones. That has given rise to a great deal of anxiety and I am sure that we will hear about the cases in the course of the debate. However, it is important to realise that those cases are brought under entirely different provisions. It is right to say that people should not have to suffer unreasonable and unfounded investigation.
Cases in which people have been exposed to this sort of intrusive investigation, even though no prosecutions have been brought, have been those where the existing laws have been stretched even further to warrant the police coming and knocking on their doors. Should not the hon. Gentleman bear that in mind when considering whether this legislation, which is very specific, may be a mistaken encouragement to others in authority to do likewise?
That is why it is very important that we have specific legislation to give guidance to the authorities about how they implement the new laws. The offence that is usually referred to, as in the cases of Miguel Hayworth and Stephen Green, concerns section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, whereby it is a crime to use threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress thereby. In my view, that provision is in itself a violation of freedom of speech. It seems to allow prosecution merely for insults, and for insults that are merely likely to cause distress but have not necessarily done so.
And were not intentional.
And without intention, as my hon. Friend says. That is why yesterday I would have supported his amendment, which we never reached, to remove the word “insulting” from that provision. That answers the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve).
The provisions regarding hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation are not the same—insult is not enough; likelihood of distress is not enough—but some people are anxious about the possibility that the police and the Crown Prosecution Service will not recognise the difference. I accept that that anxiety exists and that we should do something about it—the question is what. There are two proposals on the table.
The first is to do what the 1986 Act already says following the so-called Waddington amendment, which went through after extensive ping-pong between this House and the other place last year, when the Government eventually gave way. I thought they were wrong to do so, and divided the House right at the end of that process. They did it because they were up against a deadline on another provision in the Bill about industrial action in prisons. However, they made it clear that they were with me in spirit, if not in the Lobby.
The Waddington amendment is sometimes called the free speech amendment, but it completely fails to mention freedom of expression. It says:
“For the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.”
There are many problems with the Waddington amendment. First, it is not aimed at the problem that it is supposed to solve. The problem lies not in the content of the law—a point that it seems to admit itself by using the phrase,
“For the avoidance of doubt”—
but in a possible mistaken interpretation of the law by the police and the CPS. If the police pay no attention to the wording of the offence itself, why should we believe that they will pay attention to the wording of the Waddington amendment? Secondly—this is the most important criticism—it either achieves nothing at all or is attempting to do something that we should oppose. If it really is
“For the avoidance of doubt”,
it adds nothing to the law at all, but if it is read in a different way, as a “deeming” provision, it is entirely unacceptable.
A “deeming” provision is a statutory section that tells courts to ignore reality but to treat one thing as another. Last year, we passed about 85 “deeming” provisions. In the Energy Act 2008, for example, we deemed a place where uranium was enriched to be premises owned or used for the purposes of the Crown, so that the Official Secrets Act would apply even when the place was owned by someone else. It is very common for us to do this. The difficulty with the Waddington amendment is that it can be read as deeming discussion of sexual conduct and so on not to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred even when the words actually were threatening and were intended to stir up hatred. That is particularly worrying in the case of urging persons to modify such conduct, which is what the amendment refers to. Such urging could certainly be done in a threatening way and with the necessary intent. There is a danger that the Waddington amendment could be read in a deeming manner so that a person doing such urging in a threatening way, with intent, would not count as having done so.
Proponents of the Waddington amendment put a lot of weight on the phrase “of itself”, but that phrase has at least two possible meanings. It could mean—this is the hopeful interpretation—something like, “But if the way this was done indicates threats or intentions, the provision does not apply.” “Taken of itself” might mean that, but it could mean something rather different, such as, “Ask only whether the acts complained of are within this provision, and ignore the context.” That would mean that “of itself” was an excluding phrase, rather than an including one. The latter interpretation would fit closely with the interpretation of the Waddington amendment as a deeming provision, which is a grave danger. That is why the Government are absolutely right to propose removing the Waddington amendment from the legislation. It is either useless or dangerous. I do not, however, think that the Government are right to offer nothing in its place, which is where new clause 11 comes in.
New clause 11 would meet head-on the problem of mistaken interpretations that lead to fruitless and distressing investigations. It would do so by requiring the Director of Public Prosecutions to issue guidance to prosecutors on the meaning of the offence, and crucially, it would require chief constables to make the content—or for those Members who were here yesterday, the gist—of that guidance known to police officers. New clause 11 would also introduce a real free speech element by requiring the Attorney-General, whose consent is necessary for any prosecutions to go ahead, to have regard to all the relevant rights and freedoms in the Human Rights Act before giving that permission.
The hon. Gentleman is placing enormous reliance on guidance to be issued by the authorities—the Crown Prosecution Service or the police. I have an extract from the guidance on prosecuting cases of homophobic and transphobic crime, issued by the Crown Prosecution Service in November 2007. It describes homophobia and transphobia as
“terms used to describe a dislike of LGBT people or aspects of their perceived lifestyle. In other words, homophobia and transphobia are not restricted to a dislike of individuals; the dislike can be based on any sexual act or characteristic that the person associates with an LGBT person, whether or not any specific LGBT person does that act or has that characteristic. That dislike does not have to be as severe as hatred. It is enough that people do something or abstain from doing something because they do not like LGBT people.”
Surely that is hugely wide-ranging. Parliament has no say in this matter, and we could be faced with a situation where such an interpretation means that anyone who expresses a dislike of this kind of behaviour would be caught by the CPS under its interpretation of the law.
But that guidance has nothing to do with this aspect of the Bill because it has not yet been brought into force. I am proposing guidance specifically about that aspect; the word “homophobia” does not exist in the provisions we are talking about. Furthermore, the guidance would have to be issued after consultation with the Attorney-General. That means that there will be accountability to this House over what that guidance says, through the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-General.
The effect of the second part of the new clause would be that the Attorney-General would also have to have regard to all rights of freedom of expression before a prosecution was brought. That would feed back through the system and create at least some hope of a judicial review of a decision to go ahead with a prosecution, which there would not normally be. New clause 11 is far more focused on the real problem than the Government’s provisions and would help in a much less dangerous way, but it is capable of meeting genuine anxieties that have arisen in religious communities. It is necessary to do something of this nature rather than, as the Government suggest, do nothing at all.
May I bring my hon. Friend back to the fact that there are complaints, which I recognise as genuine, about misguided police investigations and the questioning of individuals who express an honest view? Although I disagree with that view, I absolutely accept their right to express it. Would not a combination of the production of guidance and reform of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 to remove the word “insulting” not only deal with worries about clause 58 but solve those problems?
I am very glad that my hon. Friend has brought me back to his proposal to remove the word “insulting” from section 5 of the 1986 Act, because that would be a very important reform and I hope that the Government will take it up at some point.
Finally, I wish to speak to new clause 37, which is in my name and that of my hon. Friend. It is an attempt to ensure that a particularly despicable form of homophobic intimidation comes within the meaning of “threatening” in the Act. That is the disgusting technique employed by certain political groups including the British National party, alleging that gay people have a propensity to be paedophiles and commit offences against children. That particular form of intimidation is not just unpleasant but literally life-threatening. I therefore hope that the Government will accept new clause 37 as well as new clause 11.
I hope later formally to press amendment 1 and to have the opportunity to vote on it. It has been signed by 14 other hon. Members of all parties.
We have heard from the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) about new clause 11, and it is gratifying that Liberal Democrat Front Benchers recognise that there is a need for some reassurance about free speech on the statute book. Sadly, I do not feel that the new clause would work, and I shall say why later if I have time. Having heard the hon. Gentleman’s explanation, I still do not understand why they oppose so vehemently the inclusion of a simple free speech clause, which is much more likely to be read and followed by police and prosecutors than page after page of guidance. Either the Liberal Democrats are serious about protecting free speech or they are not, and I cannot understand why they played such an important role in securing a free speech clause in the case of the religious hatred offence, but oppose a much narrower free speech clause in the case of the homophobic offence.
The so-called Waddington free speech clause has now been law for 10 months, although by a quirk of how this place works the incitement law itself has not yet come into effect. If the offence had been in operation, and there was evidence that the free speech clause was being abused in the unacceptable way that the Government and the Liberal Democrats claim it could be, their case would be significantly stronger. However, I do not think that anybody really believes that such abuses are possible.
The wording of the free speech clause simply does not lend itself to the drastic and repugnant misuse that is alleged. Even Stonewall, which the Liberal Democrats often cite in evidence, does not appear to think that it does. Its briefing note, which came to all of us, stated that clause 58
“could mean that a very small number of people of extreme views attempt to avoid prosecution”.
I am sure that a very small number of people could do that using all sorts of methods, including the Human Rights Act 1998, evidence laws and other provisions that we consider essential to protect civil liberties and that we would never dream of repealing. Stonewall does not say that the freedom of speech provision would prevent convictions, thereby contradicting the Justice Secretary. It does not say that it will prevent prosecutions, but only that a small number of extremists will attempt to use it to get out of a prosecution. I do not think that they would succeed and I suspect that Stonewall does not think that, either. Stonewall has been candid. Its members know that a free speech clause does not seriously undermine their intention for the new offence.
Whenever the House legislates, we engage in a balancing act. In the case that we are considering, on one side of the scales, we have freedom of speech, freedom of religion and the pressing need for reassurance about the prevention of potentially widespread abuses of civil liberties. On the other side, according to Stonewall, we have a tiny number of extremists who might point to the free speech clause when they are charged, but almost certainly without success. The organisation does not, therefore, make a strong argument against a free speech clause.
Indeed, Stonewall’s director, Ben Summerskill, said in evidence to the Public Bill Committee that considered the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008:
“We would have no difficulties if the provisions as drafted indicated the mindfulness of those who created them for the importance of free speech.”––[Official Report, Criminal Justice and Immigration Public Bill Committee, 16 October 2007; c. 80, Q179.]
A free speech clause simply indicates Parliament’s mindfulness of the importance of free speech.
What does the free speech new clause say? Let us have it again—it is worth hearing. It says that
“for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself”—
whether that has two meanings may emerge in debate—
to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.”
It simply makes it clear that discussion or criticism of sexual conduct is not caught by the homophobia law.
The religious hatred free speech clause, for which the House voted in January 2006, goes much further. It protects
“expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse”
against religion. I do not understand how anyone could support a clause, which allows expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse against religion, but oppose a provision, which allows mere discussion or criticism of sexual conduct. That defeats logic. I do not understand why the Government would insist on repealing only the weaker of the two provisions, when they claim to oppose both.
Let me try to explain why there is a difference. The religious saver specifies that abuse and ridicule are not covered by the offence. It is tautological but they are not. The Waddington amendment does not exclude ridicule or abuse, because they are already excluded, but purports, according to one interpretation, to allow the exclusion of intentional threatening incitement as long as it refers only to practice. That is the difference, and the hon. Gentleman must explain whether he understood the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) when he outlined the potential effect of new clause 11.
I shall deal with that at the end of my remarks.
The religious free speech clause deliberately narrows the definition of the offence whereas the homophobic free speech provision does not. It simply clarifies what is already outside the scope of the offence. It is not a defence but a signpost, so that those involved at the early stages of the criminal justice system—police and prosecutors— have it drawn to their attention clearly and simply that certain legitimate activities are outside the definition of the offence. That way, if vexatious complaints are made, the police and prosecutors can simply point to the free speech provision and dismiss the complaint, instead of spending time and taxpayers’ money pursuing pointless complaints and trampling on the civil liberties of innocent people in the process.
It is also worth emphasising that the Waddington amendment refers to criticising not sexual orientation, but sexual conduct. I repeat: it does not create a defence. I welcome the support of Liberty—often paid-up members of the Liberal Democrat tendency—for amendment 1. It speculates that clause 58 might possibly remove a defence, but the explanatory notes have got it right. The Ministry of Justice officials who drafted the notes state in paragraph 372:
“The removal of the section will not affect the threshold required for the offence to be made out.”
Clearly, if removal of the free speech clause will not affect the threshold of the offence, its inclusion will not affect the threshold, either. We are tinkering. If it is not necessary to change, it is necessary not to change—a favourite phrase of the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow). The explanatory notes are more accurate and fairer than the Justice Secretary was to those who tabled the free speech clause. On Second Reading, the Justice Secretary alleged that those tabling it intended to make a conviction difficult.
When Lord Waddington moved the amendment, he said that he wanted to make it plain
“that I did not in Committee, and do not now, seek to weaken the protection that the Government’s proposal is designed to give gay people. I have never set out to narrow the scope of the provision. My intention has been absolutely clear: to make clear what both the Government and I agree is outside the scope of the provision.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 April 2008; Vol. 700, c. 1365.]
I hope that the Secretary of State will accept that it is not our intention to provide help to those who use threatening language intentionally to stir up hatred against anyone. “For the avoidance of doubt” means just that. It does not change anything; it just makes clear what is already there. The Office of Public Sector Information’s online statute law database lists 588 legislative uses of the phrase “for the avoidance of doubt”—from the Children Act 1975 to the Crossrail Act 2008—so there is hardly anything unusual about it.
We need free speech about sexual conduct to be put beyond doubt. Joe and Helen Roberts, the Bishop of Chester, Iqbal Sacranie, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Glasgow, and Lynette Burrows—I could go on—are all names synonymous with vexatious complaints to the police and with heavy-handed police intervention against people whose actions were not inciting hatred against anyone.
Now that the free speech provision is on the statute book, I wonder whether we should not look at things the other way round. Will removing it send the signal that discussion or criticism of sexual conduct is caught by the new offence? The Church of England—my own Church—seems to fear that it might. Its briefing says:
“If it is argued that it is necessary for the effective operation of the law that the amendment should be removed, the implication would be that such discussion or criticism could in itself constitute an offence, and to this we would be strongly opposed.”
Surely the retention of clause 58 would also indicate to the courts that this House does not believe that there is a need to protect freedom of expression in the way that the hon. Gentleman has articulated.
I am sure that that is right, and I strongly endorse what the hon. Gentleman says.
Someone else who has spoken out is the actor Rowan Atkinson, who just a few days ago addressed a Committee Room packed with Members of the House of Lords about the chilling effect of the law. He said that he did not think that he would be prosecuted because of jokes or drama about sexual orientation, but he also said:
“I dread something almost as bad—a culture of censoriousness, a questioning, negative and leaden attitude that is encouraged by legislation of this nature but is considerably and meaningfully alleviated by the free speech clause.”
He said that it
“would provide succour and reassurance to those of us in the creative world.”
My union, Unison, has sent out a briefing that says that the free speech clause is a “Tory wrecking amendment”. Unison is entitled to that view, but I do not think that it is being fair. The majority of the sponsors of my amendment are not Tories—although I welcome support from everyone—and even Stonewall does not believe that it is a wrecking amendment.
Let me turn to new clause 11, because I said that I would explain why it is not up to the job of meaningfully protecting free speech. For a start, it focuses mainly on the decision to prosecute, but we are not concerned about prosecutions at this point. None of the cases that I listed earlier resulted in a prosecution. The liberties of those people were breached not by the Attorney-General authorising a prosecution, but by decisions earlier in the criminal justice process.
I notice that the hon. Gentleman used the qualifying word “mainly”. Does he concede that new clause 11 also refers to the guidance going to the police?
There is some merit in that, but it is not a particularly strong point.
New clause 11 reminds the Attorney-General about human rights law, but human rights law applies to the police, prosecutors and the Attorney-General anyway and, to judge from the list of cases that I gave earlier, precious use it has been. New clause 11 also proposes guidance, but that will be issued anyway, without the need for a new clause. New clause 11 does not even say that guidance must deal with free speech; it just says that guidance must deal with
“the operation of the offence”.
Presumably that will include pointing out that the religious hatred offences have a free speech clause, whereas the homophobic offence does not.
Experience has shown that guidance is the problem, not the solution. When two six-foot police officers in body armour interrogated pensioners Joe and Helen Roberts for 80 minutes after they had phoned the council to complain about its gay rights policies, the officers were almost certainly acting in accordance with the guidance issued in March 2005 by the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Home Office. The guidance is called “Hate Crime: Delivering a Quality Service” and in paragraph 2.2.6 it tells officers:
“The perception of the victim or any other person is the defining factor in determining a hate incident. The apparent lack of motivation as the cause of an incident is not relevant as it is the perception of the victim or any other person that counts.”
So a hate crime is to be treated as a hate crime even if it is not a hate crime—I need to think through that one. Paragraph 2.5.1 says:
“If, as victims of hate crimes or incidents, individuals experience indifference or rejection from the police this in effect victimises them a second time.”
I would hate to be a police officer trying to navigate my way through that lot. Some obviously believe that the answer is to come down like a ton of bricks on people about whom complaints of homophobia have been made, regardless of whether they have broken any laws.
I do not believe that we can leave it up to guidance to protect the precious civil liberty of freedom of speech. The existing wording asserted by Parliament less than a year ago provides clarity and reassurance; we must keep it. We must remove clause 58 from the Bill. I hope that we will have the opportunity to vote in a few minutes’ time, as I shall press the amendment.
As this is a short debate, I shall try to keep my remarks as short as possible. The hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) has raised an important issue, and I think that there is common ground between us that the right to freedom of speech and expression must be protected. It must be protected in terms of how a statute would be interpreted in court, but it also has to be interpreted, to use an expression often used in the past by the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris), against the chilling effect that a statute can have if it is mistakenly applied by those in authority. As the hon. Member for North-West Leicestershire (David Taylor) rightly highlighted, there are, unfortunately, quite a number of examples in which laws—not this law, but others that in many ways stretch even further—have been applied in an oppressive way against perfectly respectable people. We have to keep that in mind when we come to legislate.
The hon. Member for Cambridge says that he considers that the law drafted last year—without Lord Waddington’s saving clause—would be sufficient and all right if we simply had guidelines. I have to say to him that I have some anxiety about using guidelines in that way. I accept that guidelines may be of some utility, but the fact of the matter is that if guidelines are disregarded and a legal process against an individual starts to get ratcheted up, there is nothing to stop it until the matter gets into the courts; and by then, as we know, a great deal of damage has been done in many cases to the individuals concerned in terms of stress, their reputation and the anxiety they are placed under—all quite needlessly. It thus seems to me that it would be sensible for the House to consider whether having a saving clause would help.
Now, Lord Waddington, as well as having been a past Home Secretary, and, I believe, a man of moderate views—[Interruption.] Yes, a man of moderate views, I suggest to my hon. Friend the Member for Buckingham (John Bercow). Lord Waddington has also been a lawyer. When I listened to the comments of the hon. Member for Cambridge, it prompted me to look again at the saving clause to see whether it contained the mischief of being a deeming provision along the lines that he identified. He has clearly raised a serious issue for the House to consider. I have to say, however, that having looked at the provision and read it over and over again, I do not see that it can have the possible effect that he has suggested. The reason for that is the appearance of the two words “of itself” in its penultimate line which refers to something that
“shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred”.
It seems to me that those words make it absolutely plain that if a person carries out a discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices that is accompanied by threatening language, those words “of itself” would immediately take that person outside the scope of the saving clause. I have to say that I just do not agree with the hon. Gentleman’s analysis that the saving clause could be used to justify people coming forward and using hateful terminology, language and threats.
The more I listen to that argument, the more I take the view that a saving clause is required, so let me explain briefly to the House why I think this is so important. First, it will provide comfort and reassurance to people that they can continue to express their views. One of the things we are experiencing at the moment in this country is that people of moderate views on any side of an argument are increasingly deterred from expressing their views at all, but those who are full of extreme opinion, whether they be at one end of the spectrum or the other, are not deterred in any way by the law and, in fact, have a free field for themselves. That is not good for the health of our democracy or our civic life. We also need to consider that when Parliament enacts legislation in this way, groups and individuals will undoubtedly attribute to it meanings that Parliament may not have intended.
I thought it worth looking at Stonewall’s briefing, because I have a high regard for Stonewall and its campaign for gay rights. To support its analysis of why the new offence was needed and why it opposed the saving clause, it presented a number of examples. One involved rap lyrics expressing great hatred, such as “Hang lesbians with a long piece of rope”. Quite apart from the fact that I would expect that to be caught by existing law, I feel completely comfortable with the idea of enacting legislation of the kind that we passed last summer, which will criminalise it.
Stonewall says that another example of the sort of thing that it would like halted is a website which describes, in referring to homosexuality generally,
“young people who are being drawn into a lifestyle characterised by disease, degradation, death and denial.”
When I was talking recently to my hon. Friend the Member for Rutland and Melton (Alan Duncan), who is a very old friend of mine—we have known each other since university—I said to him that I did not think that his life had been characterised by any of those phenomena. Most people reading the website would consider it to be utterly wacky. I have to say, however, that if it is Stonewall’s opinion that such material should be criminalised, the House needs to approach the matter with some caution.
I am afraid that, just as with incitement to religious hatred, messages are sent out from this place that are latched on to by pressure groups wishing to prevent other people from expressing legitimate views, even if those legitimate views are in fact nonsensical. We cannot have a working democracy without the underpinning of freedom of speech, which also requires tolerance of opinions that we may consider to be bonkers or which we may dislike. As long as hatred is not stirred up, which is the mischief that we have been trying to address—as long as the civil order of society is not being undermined—we must tolerate such opinions. Indeed, as politicians, we tolerate them all the time.
For those reasons, let me simply say that I am unpersuaded that Lord Waddington’s amendment is in any way mischievous. I believe that it is sensible. As we need some saving clause in an extremely difficult piece of legislation in which the balance that we strike will always pose a problem, I can think of no good reason for us to get rid of it on the basis of the arguments that I have heard this afternoon. I therefore intend to support the retention of Lord Waddington’s amendment, and encourage my hon. Friends to do so as well.
I respect the hon. and learned Gentleman’s position on matters of free speech. He is right to criticise Stonewall’s view that that material would be caught. That is not our view, and I do not believe that it is the Government’s view. I hope that they will make that clear in due course.
Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that if we are to solve these problems, we must make it clear, in statute and in the minds of the police, that there is no right not to be offended? We need to get rid of the idea of insult, especially unintentional insult—as in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986—from our statute book, and also to ensure that guidance throughout makes it clear to the police that they cannot take seriously complaints of insult which is not direct abuse. Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree with that?
Yes. I apologise to the hon. Gentleman for the fact that, in the time allowed, I have not dealt with that point.
The question of insulting behaviour raises an important issue. I am not sure that I can do full justice to it in this short debate, but if the hon. Gentleman wishes to revisit it, I shall be happy to discuss it carefully with him. I can see that there may well be merit in getting rid of an expression that, I think, carries a number of connotations in wider legislation and that may be undesirable. There is, however, an issue that I think we cannot completely avoid. In some cases, insult, particularly if it takes place in a public arena, can reach a point at which it becomes incitement to a breach of the peace. We must guard against that possibility, but subject to that, I am sympathetic to what the hon. Gentleman has said.
For the present, we have quite a simple issue to deal with. We have a piece of legislation, passed on to the statute book last summer, that has not yet been brought into operation and that has not yet been given the chance to see whether it works. I do not see anything in Lord Waddington’s amendment to justify its deletion at present. Its support goes much wider than people with a religious viewpoint. It extends across a wide spectrum of those who have deep anxieties about the erosion of freedom of speech, including within the theatrical world, as has been shown by Rowan Atkinson.
For those reasons, although I am mindful of the mischief that we are trying to address and I want the incitement of hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation to be prohibited, I believe the amendment does nothing to prevent that from happening that and does a great deal to ensure that the legislation that we pass is balanced. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) are right: Stonewall’s example in the briefing is wrong about what would be caught by this part of the law.
Amendment 1 deals with freedom of speech, but it is important that we remember that we are also talking about the freedom of gay people to live their lives free from hatred and bigotry. When we debated the offence of stirring up hatred on the basis of sexual orientation last year, we had a long discussion about freedom of expression and were rightly concerned about getting the balance right.
We need to protect groups that are the target of threatening behaviour intended to stir up hatred. We must also ensure that those who have concerns about some types of sexual behaviour are free to express their arguments and concerns in a reasonable way. They do not need to fear that they will be caught by the criminal law. Last year, we had a very lively debate and the Government took the view that no additional provision was needed to ensure freedom of expression. The offence that we are talking about has a very high threshold and a number of safeguards are built into the system to ensure that the offence cannot be used in any way that disrupts the balance between those two concerns.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in its report published last week, reaffirmed its view that we have the balance right, as did the Equality and Human Rights Commission at about the same time. Last May, this House agreed, by a very large majority, that we had got the balance right. However, as the hon. Member for Oxford—the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) rather; I must get my university towns in the right order—pointed out, the other place inserted a measure for the avoidance of doubt. We all agreed with the principle that the offence should not be misused. As I say, those safeguards have already been built into the offence. The additional provision was and still is unnecessary. It serves only to make the offence less clear; it muddies the waters. This House rejected the amendment and I ask it to do so again today.
In last year’s debates, the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), said that we would return to the issue, so it should come as no surprise to any hon. Member, including those who have put their names to amendment 1, that we are now seeking to repeal the so-called freedom of speech saving provision.
Does the Minister recall the comment made by the distinguished lawyer, Lord Thomas of Gresford:
“Freedom of speech is not derived by clauses inserted into every statute for the avoidance of doubt.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 April 2008; Vol. 700, c. 1373.]
There may be doubt in Lord Waddington’s mind, but I do not think that there is doubt more widely. The measure was carried, on a pathetic turnout, by 81 votes to 57, and it is time we got rid of it.
The hon. Gentleman, as always, puts the argument so eloquently that I simply endorse what he says.
It was again evident from the debate that there are strong and divided views about where the correct balance lies. I remind the House, however, that the offence covers only behaviour that is threatening and is intended to stir up hatred. I think all Members will agree that that type of behaviour cannot be acceptable under any circumstances. It should not be protected by freedom of speech, and any provision that implies otherwise should not be on the statute book. That is why I invite the House to reject amendment 1.
Does my hon. Friend agree—I assume she does, as she will have signed off the information given by the Government at the time of this debate—that if the removal of the free speech clause will not affect the threshold of the offence, logically its retention cannot affect the threshold of the offence either, and that the clause is being used not as a defence but as a signpost to help police and prosecutors deal with allegations more speedily and effectively?
I will come on to the guidance in a moment, but let me just point out a key difference to my hon. Friend. Last May, this House voted on and rejected by a majority of 202 a Lords amendment inserting a saving into the sexual orientation offence. By contrast, in January 2006 we accepted, by only one vote, a Lords amendment inserting a freedom of speech saving into the Racial and Religious Hatred Bill. The saving for the religious hatred offence is the settled will of the House, whereas the saving for the sexual orientation offence is not the will of the House, which is what I ask Members to endorse today.
It seems to be very curious logic to say that because the House voted one way at some point in the past, that somehow binds the House today to vote in exactly the same way. Could not Members change their mind at some point?
Of course the House can change its mind, and we will discover in the Lobby in 20 minutes or so whether the House has changed its mind, but I think that the fact that this was introduced last year for an offence that has not yet been put on the statute book is a pretty persuasive argument for believing that that was the House’s view at that time.
We had long debates about the guidance and about what guidance should be issued. There is a clear need for guidance, as there always is when any new offence is introduced. The Ministry of Justice will provide short explanatory guidance about the offence. The Crown Prosecution Service will issue guidance for prosecutors, and the Association of Chief Police Officers will revise its hate crime manual to include guidance on all incitement to hatred offences. All the guidance will be available before the offence comes into force. However, I am quite persuaded by the argument put by the hon. Member for Cambridge, and I would like to reflect on it. Therefore, although I ask him to withdraw new clause 11, I invite him to take up the opportunity of meeting the Director of Public Prosecutions to consider whether it would be appropriate to make the guidance statutory.
I fully understand the motivation behind new clause 37, but I believe that it is unnecessary. Allegations about offences, and specifically about child sex offences, are a very easy and damaging way of stirring up hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation. Such allegations are damaging and distasteful and should be challenged, but we believe that it is not necessary to mention them specifically in the offence. In many instances, allegations linking sexual orientation with child sex offences will be threatening as well as distasteful, and will be caught by the offence. However, when the circumstances mean an allegation is not threatening, it will not be caught, and we think that is right.
I believe the Minister said in response to the Liberals that she will consult the Attorney-General on prosecuting guidelines. May I invite her to extend her consultation to those of us who feel extremely concerned about these issues, because we fear that the guidance will be as misleading as the CPS guidance to which I referred?
I have invited the hon. Member for Cambridge, who moved the new clause, to discuss that with the DPP, and I think that that is the appropriate thing for him to do. I do not think that it is necessarily appropriate to extend that to the whole House, but hon. Members can make their views known to the Attorney-General and the DPP as they think fit.
On new clause 37, does the Minister agree with us that whenever any linkage of homosexuality with paedophilia is intended to stir up hate it should, by definition, be considered threatening? Is she saying that even if such a linkage is made in the context of a deliberate attempt to incite hatred, rather than, for example, academic discourse, it would not be, in some circumstances, considered threatening and therefore would not be an offence? That is a matter of concern to us, so will she agree to reflect on it a little further?
I have to reject the hon. Gentleman’s argument, because the word “threatening”, in this context, has to have its normal English meaning. We do not think that it is right to stretch that to include words or behaviour that it would not naturally cover, because it would muddy the waters. I am concerned that if we were to go down the road he suggests in new clause 37, those who make such allegations could shift their grounds to similar but equally damaging allegations—for example, saying that gay people are responsible for HIV/AIDS. Although I understand the concerns that he is trying to address, I do not think that the new clause is the way to address them. I therefore hope that he will not press it to a Division, but will join us in the Lobby to reject amendment 1.
I support amendment 1, but irrespective of which side of the argument one stands on today, it is regrettable, given the widespread concern about free speech in this country, that we are restricted to one hour in which to discuss the issues. If the Government had respect for the public’s worries about free speech, they would have allowed rather longer.
We have heard a great deal, especially from those on the Liberal Democrat Benches, about how arrests, persecutions and inquiries were somehow nothing to do with the law, but were all to do with a misguided application, as though some PC Plod somewhere had decided to knock on the door—
I remind the hon. Gentleman of his reply to me.
In the Lancashire case, a couple were questioned by the police for an hour and 20 minutes. They had asked the local council whether they could distribute Christian literature alongside the council’s literature on civil partnerships. There was an outcry, and Lancashire police stood their ground and said it was a proper intervention. The local council also stood its ground and said that it was a proper intervention under the law—not under this Bill—that it was then invoking. It was only when the couple sued—or commenced suing; there was a settlement—that the police and local council decided that they had got it wrong. When that is the attitude of senior police and authorities, who are responsible for implementing the law that this place passes, we sometimes need very simple, straightforward clarifications that almost hit them on the nose, so that they actually understand what Parliament intends.
I agree with the hon. Lady and I would point out that taking the word “insulting” out of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which covers causing harassment, distress and alarm through words or behaviour that are threatening, abusive or insulting, will achieve exactly what she wants. That is the change in the law that she rightly requests, because that is the provision under which the couple were wrongly pursued. It is not a surprise that the police would not give way, because the statute includes the word “insulting”. Does she agree that that is the way forward?
I do not agree that that is the only way forward, because that addresses one law. Today, we have to address this law. The chief constable of North Wales, who can be a little zealous sometimes—that is why I am pleased that he is now in charge of hunting—defended six police officers arresting a man who had used a rather vulgar term for a lesbian to a third party. That is the state that we live in. We do not live in a moderate state that is restrained in its application of the law.
Out there in the country, in case Ministers are completely oblivious to it, there is a swelling unease about freedom of speech. Certain sections of the community believe that they would have to overcome a higher threshold before they would be protected from the sorts of allegations that are frequently made. The religious hatred and sexual orientation laws, and myriad other laws that seek to bring equality, have an oppressive heart. The face may be liberalism, but the heart is oppression. We need amendment 1 to ensure that the Bill contains the clearest possible explanation—hammered home and spelled out—so that there can be no doubt in the mind of anyone responsible for interpreting and implementing the law that the ordinary exercise of free speech is not caught by it.
We have free speech in this House that is not commonly enjoyed by many of the people on whom we pass laws. We enjoy a protected position, but people out there—teachers in faith schools, priests in pulpits, ordinary people expressing a particular opinion—now feel afraid to speak freely. There can be no possible objection to Parliament stressing that free speech is not at risk from this Bill. That is all that amendment 1 seeks to do and I commend it to the House.
I am delighted that so many colleagues have taken their places to listen to my short contribution. I am in a very unusual position. I am speaking against the Government for the first time since I became a Member in 2001 and face the prospect of voting against the Government on a three-line Whip, which I have never done before.
In a sermon in 2006, the Roman Catholic archbishop, Mario Conti, restated the Church’s long-held policy that homosexual relationships should not be given the same value as married, heterosexual relationships. As it happens, I do not agree with the archbishop. I am glad that my hon. Friend the Deputy Leader of the House of Commons is in his place. He will remember a conversation that we had a couple of years ago, in which he said, “Tom, the only remotely left-wing thing about you is that you quite like poofs.”
I have a long history of support for gay rights in this House. It is a matter of some regret that I have to speak against what the Government are trying to do tonight by removing the so-called Waddington amendment. If one speaks to almost any constituent one will realise that there is clearly public concern that a person who voices an opinion that is not considered to be politically correct could end up being questioned by police.
If they are not avidly tuned into the BBC Parliament channel right now, police officers throughout the country will take a keen interest in this debate, the outcome of which will have a major impact on their already massive work loads. If the Government get their way, officers will have every right to roll their eyes heavenward as they resign themselves to having to deal with an increased volume of correspondence from people who interpret every harsh word uttered as a broken bottle thrown.
When Archbishop Conti delivered his speech, a formal complaint was made against him by Patrick Harvie, a Green Member of the Scottish Parliament, who said that the archbishop’s restatement of Church policy was an incitement to homophobic hatred. I assume that Glasgow’s chief constable, being a sensible chap, can put that complaint into the bin, but we are making sure that police officers will have to deal with more vexatious actions simply because we are eliminating a provision that any member of the public would consider to be eminent common sense.
Given the Government’s generous offer, I beg to ask leave to withdraw new clause 11.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
One hour having elapsed since the commencement of proceedings on consideration, the proceedings were interrupted (Programme Order, 23 March).
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).
Amendment proposed: 1, in page 34, line 5, leave out Clause 58.—(David Taylor.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The House proceeded to a Division.
I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.
New Clause 19
Removing immunity of government departments from prosecution
‘(1) Section 63 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (application to Crown) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (5) for “a government department” substitute “the Crown Estate Commissioners”.’.—(Mr. Bellingham.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 38—Failure by a government department or public authority to comply with an assessment notice
‘(1) If a government department or public authority has failed to comply with an assessment notice the Commissioner may certify in writing to the court that the public authority has failed to comply with that notice.
(2) Where failure to comply is certified under subsection (1), the court may inquire into the matter and, after hearing any witness who may be produced against or on behalf of the government department or the public authority, and after hearing any statement that may be offered in defence, deal with the failure to comply as if it were a contempt of court.’.
Amendment 23, clause 153, page 98, line 20, leave out ‘within subsection (2)’.
Amendment 78, page 98, line 24, at end insert—
‘(1A) If a data controller has failed to comply with an assessment notice as requires steps to be taken, the Information Commissioner may certify in writing to the court that the government department or public authority has failed to comply with that notice.
(1B) For the purposes of this section, a data controller which, in purported compliance with an information notice—
(a) makes a statement which it knows to be false in a material respect, or
(b) recklessly makes a statement which is false in a material respect,
is to be taken to have failed to comply with the notice.
(1C) Where a failure to comply is certified under subsection (1A), the court may inquire into the matter and, after hearing any witness who may be produced against or on behalf of the public authority, and after hearing any statement that may be offered in defence, deal with the authority as if it had committed a contempt of court.
(1D) In subsections (1A) to (1C), “the court” means the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session.’.
Amendment 24, page 98, leave out lines 25 to 29.
Amendment 133, page 98, line 25, leave out from second ‘is’ to end of line 29 and insert ‘not an excluded body’.
Amendment 79, page 99, line 19, at end insert—
‘(6A) Non-compliance with any assessment notice will be treated as a contempt of court.’.
Amendment 80, page 101, line 6, leave out ‘without the approval of the Secretary of State’ and insert
‘until the code has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament’.
Government amendment 25
Amendment 81, clause 155, page 109, leave out lines 7 and 8 and insert—
‘(4) The code must not be issued by the Commissioner until a statutory instrument containing the draft code has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.’.
Amendment 82, page 109, line 10, after ‘must’, insert ‘not’.
Amendment 83, page 109, line 13, after ‘is’, insert ‘not’.
Amendment 84, page 109, leave out lines 21 to 27.
Amendment 85, page 109, line 30, after ‘under’, insert ‘annual’.
Government amendments 152 and 153
Amendment 86, schedule 18, page 183, line 1, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
‘(2) In subsection (1) for “he may serve” to the end substitute “he may serve the data controller, or a data processor, with a notice (in this Act referred to as an ‘information notice’) requiring the data controller, or data processor, to furnish the Commissioner with specified information relating to the request or to compliance with the principles.”’.
Amendment 87, page 183, line 5, after ‘(1)’, insert
‘“data processor” refers to a third party handling data on behalf of—
(a) a government department, or
(b) a public authority designated for the purpose of this section by an order made by the Secretary of State, other than an excluded body, as set out in section 41A(12);’.
Amendment 88, page 185, leave out line 21.
In addition to new clause 19, which stands in my name and those of my hon. and learned Friends the Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and my hon. Friends the Members for Enfield, Southgate (Mr. Burrowes), for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) and for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson), I plan to discuss our amendments 78 to 88. I also want to comment on Government amendment 25.
Our new clause 19 would remove the immunity of Government Departments from prosecution, because the Government’s record on handling, storing and transporting confidential data is appalling. I am afraid that the Ministry of Justice is one of the worst offenders. A computer hard drive containing the details of up to 5,000 employees of the National Offender Management Service in England and Wales was lost by the private firm, EDS. Despite the loss having occurred in July 2007, the Justice Secretary was not told until September 2008. In August last year, the names and addresses, details of convictions and even jail release dates of almost 130,000 people were lost when a computer memory stick went missing. It was being used by an employee of a private contractor working for the MOJ. The Information Commissioner said at the time that the data were a “toxic liability”, and described the loss as “deeply worrying”.
The Ministry of Defence is another serial offender. Some time ago, the Defence Secretary of the time was forced to revise upwards the estimate of the number of laptops stolen from his Department in the previous four years from 347 to 658. Furthermore, in January last year, the then Defence Secretary revealed that an MOD laptop, which contained the details of 600,000 people, had been stolen from the boot of a naval officer’s car in Birmingham. The computer contained unencrypted lists of names, addresses, bank and driving licence details, national insurance and national health service numbers and so on—an appalling security lapse.
In 2007, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs had the so-called discgate scandal, in which 25 million records were lost. In November that year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer admitted that two CDs containing child benefit data had been lost in transit to the National Audit Office. Also in November that year, HMRC lost the personal details of 15,000 Standard Life pension holders, after a CD was lost in transit by an external courier.
Many other Departments have lost data, including the Department of Health, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Communities and Local Government. Many of the subsequent inquiries revealed lax security procedures, confused chains of command and, above all, no proper accountability. Many Departments have a serious cultural problem, which is simply not being addressed.
Last year, the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, who was then the Minister for the Cabinet Office, amid great fanfare launched new guidelines called “Data Handling Procedures”. He promised
“a culture that properly values, protects and uses information”.—[Official Report, 25 June 2008; Vol. 478, c. 26WS.]
He also announced stronger accountability mechanisms within all Departments, but unfortunately those changes have delivered no substantial improvements. In fact, they have delivered little. Proper sanctions are needed. The Bill contains no sanctions, and we feel strongly that immunity of Departments from prosecution should be removed. Only by applying such sanctions will permanent secretaries and civil servants make the prevention of loss of data a key priority. We need to send a strong signal to all Departments and agencies that cavalier and unprofessional attitudes to our personal data and privacy will not be tolerated. I hope that the Minister will accept our new clause.
I turn to our amendments 78 and 79. Amendment 78 is almost identical to new clause 38, which was tabled by the hon. Members for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris). The official Opposition, and particularly my hon. Friend the Member for Epping Forest, have said for some time that it is essential that the Information Commissioner be given more power to control and monitor holders of data. That is why we support the principles behind clause 153. However, the clause has one glaring gap, as it does not provide any enforcement powers. If the assessment notice is made, and its subject refuses to comply, the Bill does not allow for any immediate sanction.
Under our amendments 78 and 79, the Information Commissioner will be able to go to the county court, which must decide whether the assessment notice was properly issued, and whether there was a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. If the court decides for the commissioner, it will order the data controller to comply with the assessment notice. Failure to do so will result in the data controller being in contempt of court. We feel strongly that there is no point having an assessment notice regime without proper sanctions for non-compliance. As Sir Mark Walport and the Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, said in their submission to the Committee:
“There are also no meaningful sanctions for failure to comply with the requirements of an Assessment Notice: this needs strengthening in order for it to be taken seriously.”
I hope that the Minister will accept amendments 78 and 79.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments about new clause 38. As he says, the Information Commissioner recommends such a proposal. The sanction comes at the end of a long chain of warnings and efforts to ensure compliance. If we get to the end of that long chain, something has obviously gone seriously wrong. Some effort is required to make compliance happen, and a contempt of court order can be absolved by compliance.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for making that point, on which he can expand when he makes his speech.
Amendments 80 to 85 relate to clause 155, which sets up the data-sharing code of practice. They would ensure that there is an affirmative resolution of both Houses before the commissioner issues the data-sharing code. Given that the Secretary of State is removing the key data-sharing provision, clause 154, from the Bill, why is it necessary to have a data-sharing code? Is that not a little suspicious and illogical? Surely the Secretary of Sate’s credibility in the matter would be reinforced if he also withdrew clause 155; otherwise, people will conclude that if the power to set up a data-sharing code is left in the Bill, the Government will return at some stage with their totally unacceptable data-sharing proposals. However, if the Secretary of State does decide that the data-sharing code proposals must stay in the Bill, surely it makes sense to accept our amendments 80 to 85.
I turn to our amendments 86 to 88. In Committee, we discussed at length the apparent anomaly that the assessment notice regime applied to the public sector only. May I refer again to the submission to the Committee by Sir Mark Walport and Richard Thomas, the Information Commissioner? The submission pointed out:
“As we stated in the report, distinguishing between public, private and voluntary sectors makes little sense, especially as more information is shared across sectors whose boundary lines are forever shifting.”
The Information Commissioner went on to say:
“Private and third sector bodies frequently carry out work for public sector ones. It is common for charities, for example, to carry out functions on behalf of local government. As it stands, we could inspect the local council but not the charity.”
I argued in Committee that as a consequence of the private sector’s ever greater involvement with Government Departments, agencies and local government, there was an increased blurring of the barriers between the public and private sectors. I gave a couple of examples. The Crown Prosecution Service and the Solicitor-General have a large contract with what was LogicaCMG that covers the provision, support and maintenance of hardware and software applications used by the CPS, including the management of a number of large databases such as the witness management system and the graduated fee scheme for counsel.
Another example relates to the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, which manages a large number of public sector databases but also has a number of private sector contractors. In fact, of its 166 databases, 75 are maintained by the Department but 90 are run by private sector contractors. Obviously, there is substantial blurring between the two sectors. Amendments 23 and 24 would bring the private sector into the assessment notice regime. The Minister has argued that such an extension to the private sector would place extra burdens on business and conflict with the Hampton principles. My party believes passionately in reducing the burdens on business, so it is hard to ignore the Minister’s concerns; she also raised various points about powers of entry. She feels that a more co-operative approach between business and the Information Commissioner would be desirable.
However, I submit that there is a compromise solution. Amendments 86 to 88 would extend the less severe and substantially less burdensome information notice regime to the private sector. Crucially, the information notices in schedule 18 do not confer powers of entry, so why does the Minister not accept the amendments as a way to extend the Information Commissioner’s powers to the private sector in a much less onerous manner? I urge the Minister to accept that argument. She has said clearly that she does not want the assessment notice regime to be extended to the private sector, and she has given her reasons for that, but surely our compromise solution would make a great deal of sense.
I turn to Government amendment 25. We argued in Committee as powerfully as we could that clause 154—it was clause 152 at the time—should be deleted. In response, the Minister gave numerous reasons why the clause was needed. We had a vote and lost it. Then we heard that the Government were in the process of climbing down—unfortunately, that was announced in the Sunday press, rather than in Committee or on the Floor of the House. The Secretary of State then tabled his amendment.
For the record, and as the hon. Gentleman will know, I said clearly in response to the Committee debate that the clause was too wide and that we would reflect on the debate and look at it again.
I am grateful to the Minister, and I do not want to be churlish. We had a vote and the clause stood part of the Bill when we came out of Committee, and we felt that we had to vote against it at the time. We are delighted that we helped win the argument and feel vindicated, and we should not be churlish. However, our relief and joy is coloured and tinged by our ongoing and grave concerns about the Government’s record and policy on data.
I mentioned earlier the Government’s appalling record on storing and handling data. We are concerned not only by the Government’s incompetence; of far greater concern are the fundamental flaws in their entire data policy. Only today we heard reports that ContactPoint, the Government’s child protection database, is in disarray. It was designed to help protect Britain’s 11 million children, but its launch has been delayed again after local authorities discovered loopholes in the system that was to hide the details of the most vulnerable young people in this country. ContactPoint has been described as almost entirely illegal by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, and a spokesman for the Department for Children, Schools and Families said that it was working to resolve the problem.
You couldn’t write the script, and it gets worse. A recent report by Ross Anderson, professor of security engineering at Cambridge, concluded that at least 11 of the Government’s databases could be illegal. He went on to point out that the Government are spending a staggering £16 billion a year on data gathering and plan to spend another £105 billion on it in the next five years. Furthermore, almost every one of those database projects has signally failed to remain on budget.
In 2002, the then Prime Minister Tony Blair launched Connecting for Health, a massive £6.2 billion database for medical records; since then, the costs have more than doubled to £12.7 billion, two of the four contractors have pulled out and the launch has been put back to 2015. At the time, the then PM said:
“If I live in Bradford and fall ill in Birmingham, I want the NHS to be able to treat me”.
However, as Ross Clark, author of “The Road to Southend Pier: One man’s struggle against the surveillance society” said, thank goodness Mr. Blair did not fall ill in Stafford. As the Healthcare Commission made clear in its report, it was the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust’s obsession with targets and data that critically undermined clinical judgment and the treatment of patients. The problem is that time and again the Government’s default position when faced with a crisis is to announce yet more databases and more infringements on our civil liberties.
There is no doubt that there is a serious terrorist threat in this country, but the Government’s response to the 7 July bombings was to announce that they would bring in an ID register—never mind that none of the bombers had ever tried to hide their identities. We obviously have serious problems with crime being out of control, and the Government have to do their best to combat it, but they are going to expand the national DNA database even though the overwhelming majority of crimes are committed by a small proportion of the population who are already on the DNA database.
Only yesterday morning, the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, the right hon. Member for North Swindon (Mr. Wills), was opining in an extraordinary manner on the Sean Hodgson case. He pointed out that Mr. Hodgson would never have been released or won his freedom if it were not for DNA testing and databases. Of course Mr. Hodgson was released only because of DNA testing, but that had absolutely nothing to do with DNA databases; all that was needed was one DNA sample from him that did not match any of the key exhibits. The right hon. Gentleman was getting completely carried away. The problem is that when it comes to a crisis, the Government’s default position is to react in the only way they know: to announce yet further extensions of databases.
I should like to quote from the former Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald, who was referring to the proposed communication database when he said:
“We need to take very great care not to fall into a way of life in which freedom’s back is broken by the relentless pressure of a security state.”
Of course we welcome the Government’s withdrawal of clause 154. However, as I mentioned, our joy is tempered and coloured by that appalling catalogue of failings. We need not only a cultural change, but a fundamental change of Government. We welcome what the Government have done, but there is still a long way to go.
As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) intimated, the most important amendment in this group is amendment 25. The hon. Gentleman gloated a little, so perhaps I will be allowed to: I was glad that one of my amendments—the one to remove clause 154—had been signed not only by the representatives of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, but by the Government. I am glad that they have promoted my modest amendment into Government amendment 25.
The Government are entirely right to withdraw the data-sharing proposals, which were far too broad for the problem that they were meant to solve. As Ministers repeatedly said, some data sharing can be beneficial. No one denied that; the question was about the power that had been created to deal with that particular point. The Bill proposed—and continues to propose until amendment 25 goes through—to allow orders from the Secretary of State to permit data sharing between any people anywhere in the world, for the purposes of furthering any Government policy. The orders were capable of overriding the Data Protection Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998 and any other relevant legislation. That final point, especially the possibility that the data-sharing orders would override the Data Protection Act, was the key problem and the point at which the Government rightly decided to give way. Clause 154—or clause 152, as it was—was never proportionate and never had adequate safeguards.
The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk is right to point to the context—one in which Governments collect vast amounts of data and then use them badly, incompetently or in many cases, as Ross Anderson from the university of Cambridge observed, illegally. The Government need to be aware of that context when they return to the data-sharing proposal. As I understand it, they intend to do that not in this Bill but at a later point. I urge them to consult properly, not only with the usual suspects but with all the organisations that felt deeply that clause 152—now clause 154—was the wrong way to go, including the British Medical Association and all the Opposition parties. Otherwise, their next attempt to write a clause to do with data sharing may well turn into a colossal waste of time, as this one has proved to be.
With that small amount of gloating over, let me turn to the amendments.
The hon. and learned Gentleman requests more, but I am sure that that is enough for the time being.
I want to speak briefly to amendments 23 and 24, which are similar to amendment 133, tabled by members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk said, they seek to extend to the private sector the Information Commissioner’s new inspection powers under the new assessment notice procedure. As things stand, assessment notices have two problems, the first of which—it was mentioned by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore)—is that there is no enforcement mechanism for the new assessment notices. The obvious way to solve that is the application to court route, because that is more challengeable and more open than a warrant route. I therefore support amendments, such as new clause 38, which attempt to change that situation.
The other problem addressed by the amendments is the coverage of the assessment notice system. For reasons that remain obscure, but which might have had something to do with the lobbying by the CBI and business interests that broke out when my hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, Central (Jenny Willott) and I moved amendments in Committee, the assessment notice procedure is confined to the public sector, and even within that it is confined to directly controlled organisations and does not cover even private organisations carrying out public functions under contract. That is unacceptable. Private organisations control vast amounts of data, and there is constant concern about how they use them. The Information Commissioner is clear that there are more complaints about the use of data by private sector organisations than use of data by the public sector. Sometimes the Government’s defence in response to examples of their incompetence in dealing with data such as those cited by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk is to say, “Well, the Government are no worse than the private sector at this sort of activity.” That is a somewhat feeble defence, but it illustrates the point that these problems are not confined to the public sector.
As I understood it in Committee, the Government’s case for leaving out the private sector is that it collects data voluntarily, which makes it different from the public sector in that regard. I cannot accept that, for three reasons. First, there are the reasons given by the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk, which are dealt with in amendments 87 and 88. There are many examples of private organisations working under contract to the Government and which have collected information from the Government that the Government got on a non-voluntary basis.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the number of people who are getting caught out by that is increasing? For example, people who are facing unemployment in the current economic crisis have had their information passed to private sector companies for assistance with getting back into work. Given that they number 2 million and rising, every day there are more and more people whose data, not voluntarily given, has been passed to the private sector.
Yes, that is the case. One has to take into account the interaction of different Government policies. The more the Government want to use the private sector and the voluntary sector to a greater extent in the delivery of services, the worse the problem will get.
The second reason I do not accept the Government’s point is illustrated by the recent controversy about Google Street View, where Google supplements its maps with photographs of every house and building in many towns and cities. That demonstrates that private organisations, even when acting purely as such and not working for the Government, do not confine themselves to data they acquire voluntarily. My house is on Street View; Google did not ask me about it, and I am sure that it did not ask anybody else.
Thirdly, what worries people about data is what can be done with them, especially data they gave voluntarily at some point in the past without realising how they could be used at some future point—for example, data about which websites someone has visited or which products they have bought from a shop. Bringing all those forms of data together using sophisticated data-mining techniques and analysis can reveal vast amounts about people that they did not intend to reveal, even though technically they voluntarily allowed the data to be handed over to private organisations.
Liberal Democrat Members think that there is an overwhelming case to extend the scope of the assessment notice system beyond the public sector, as narrowly defined. That view is also taken by the Information Commissioner. After all, the assessment notice system introduced by the Bill is a very gentle form of preventive intervention, not the full panoply of the law. Given that, and given the other options that the Information Commissioner has, there is a strong case for the broader extension of these powers. I urge the Government to resist the lobbying that has been going on and to look at the point of principle from the position of ordinary members of the public who are worried about what is being done with the data they handed over.
I rise briefly to speak to the two amendments tabled in my name and those of the hon. Members for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and for Ealing, Southall (Mr. Sharma), as members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As we have heard, amendment 133 is analogous to amendments 23 and 24.
The CBI told the Public Bill Committee that there were not sufficient safeguards to protect the privacy of individual data controllers in the private sector, but we concluded, after examination, that the safeguards already in the Bill are significant; indeed, they provide greater protection than other compulsory powers of entry, search and seizure in the Bill. For instance, an assessment notice must specify the time at which a search or other inspection will take place and the time within which an individual data controller must comply. Rights to appeal against the term of any notice are provided, and there is express protection for legally privileged material. Those are all safeguards that we had called for in respect of other Bills when the Government had said that they would put them only in secondary legislation. In this case, they are in the Bill and yet the CBI is still concerned.
We thought that the CBI’s objections were insufficient, and possibly even invalid, and reinforced the point, which has just been made, that there is a significant amount of contracting out of public functions to private data controllers. There should therefore be no exemption or lower degree of protection in respect of the powers of the Information Commissioner in those cases, at the very least. I would be grateful if the Minister addressed those arguments.
Our other point relates to new clause 38. The Information Commissioner has called for the power of sanction, and we consider the additional powers for the commissioner to be a human rights-enhancing measure. We noted the Government’s view that it would be unusual for a Department or other public body to ignore an assessment notice or fail to comply with its terms, but there is no reassurance in the Bill that that will not be the case, which is why we tabled the new clause. I hope that the Minister will respond to that point.
I am speaking a little sooner than I expected, but there we are. I begin with Government amendment 25, which is at the heart of this grouping on data sharing and data protection, and the associated consequential amendment 153. They will remove from the Bill the power to establish new information-sharing gateways by secondary legislation. The proposal in clause 154 for information-sharing orders stemmed from a recommendation of the independent data-sharing review, conducted by the commissioner, Richard Thomas, and Sir Mark Walport, the director of the Wellcome Trust. They recommended changes to the legal framework for data sharing, in part to support better public service provision. To counterbalance that power, the review recommended that there should be a transparent and consistent mechanism ensuring greater scrutiny while reducing the scope for confusion.
Following the spirit of those recommendations, clause 154 included a raft of safeguards to ensure an appropriate level of public and parliamentary scrutiny. However, in Committee and elsewhere, we heard and understood the concerns that hon. Members and others expressed about the information-sharing gateway proposal, including that the power was open to misuse. It is important to make it clear that it was never the Government’s intention to allow indiscriminate information sharing, regardless of any protections set up by the Data Protection Act.
After a thorough consideration of the views expressed by Members of this House and by such outside organisations as the British Medical Association, which I met to discuss this very point, we have concluded that a more in-depth analysis of the features of an information-sharing power was needed. It is therefore right that we withdraw clause 154 from the Bill while we undertake that further work. That is a good example of how scrutiny in this place works, and although those who spoke for the Opposition parties had a small go at gloating, they did not go overboard. I appreciate that and I am grateful to them. We accept the humble pie that they proffered to us.
The Government are clear that there are many benefits to sharing data, as I said in Committee. To deliver high-quality public services, Departments need to share personal information in a secure and appropriate fashion. Through such data sharing we can improve opportunities for the most disadvantaged, provide customer-focused public services, reduce the burden on businesses, implement policies effectively and detect fraud. We do not underestimate the risks attached to information sharing, nor will we let them blind us to the potential benefits. I assure the House that in taking the matter forward we will consider carefully the views expressed by all interested parties.
The other Government amendment in this group, amendment 152, requires a brief explanation. New section 41A of the Data Protection Act 1998, inserted by clause 153 of the Bill, provides the Secretary of State with the power to designate, by order, those public authorities subject to the assessment notice regime. As our published delegated powers memorandum makes clear, we intended that that order-making power be subject to the negative resolution procedure. However, owing to an oversight we omitted to amend section 67 of the Data Protection Act, which determines the level of parliamentary scrutiny for all delegated powers in that Act. The amendment makes good that omission.
Let me now move on to the other amendments that relate to assessment notices. They deal with three issues: the scope of the assessment notice regime, the sanctions for non-compliance and their relationship with civil penalties under section 55A of the Data Protection Act. Amendments 23 and 24, in the name of the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), and amendment 133, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), deal with scope. Assessment notices constitute an important step towards improving public trust and confidence in the handling of personal information by public sector data controllers. They will create a formal system based upon the current arrangement of spot checks undertaken on Government Departments by the Information Commissioner, which aim to raise the awareness and compliance of public bodies with data protection principles.
Clause 153 represents the statutory base for the commitment made by the Prime Minister in November 2007, after the loss of the data from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs to which the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) referred, to provide the Information Commissioner with the power to spot check Departments. That power is therefore a specific answer to a specific issue. As the clause stands, it is already possible to include certain private or third sector data controllers within the scope of assessment notices. That would be in cases where those data controllers appear to the Secretary of State to exercise functions of a public nature, or are providing, under a contract made with a public authority, any service whose provision is a function of that authority.
There are sound arguments for applying a higher level of scrutiny to public sector bodies. Data controllers in the public sector handle a variety of sensitive personal information that is necessary to fulfil their responsibilities, such as providing health and social services, fighting crime, and detecting fraud. Most of the information handled by public sector data controllers, or those working on their behalf, is vital to determine entitlements, responsibilities, and obligations. That citizens must provide their personal information to access essential services is, in this context, a defining feature of the relationship between the citizen and the public authority.
For the private sector, the ability of the public to choose to go somewhere else is a powerful driver, encouraging businesses to look after personal information. Extending assessment notices to the private sector could, as a result, act as a significant additional regulatory burden. While I remain to be persuaded of the case for applying the assessment notice regime to all data controllers, we will continue to consider the points made by the Information Commissioner and by some Members of this House in support of those amendments. However, any move to include all data controllers within the scope of assessment notices would need to be carefully considered. We consider that clause 153 strikes a fair balance between the need to enhance the Information Commissioner’s powers and the potential impact of those changes in view of the wider regulatory framework.
Amendments 78 and 79 and new clause 38 deal with the issue of non-compliance. Specifically they seek to deal with non-compliance with an assessment notice as if it were a contempt of court. Again, I remain to be persuaded that a bespoke sanction for non-compliance with an assessment notice is needed. In practice, it is difficult to envisage a public sector body refusing to comply with an assessment notice, considering the bad publicity that would ensue from such a notice. That said, the Information Commissioner made it clear that he would like some kind of penalty or sanction for refusal to comply.
Of course, the Information Commissioner already has a range of enforcement powers available to him for a failure to comply with the Data Protection Act. Information notices can be used alongside assessment notices if he reasonably requires information to assess compliance with data protection principles. If he discovers a breach of those principles during an assessment, he can issue an enforcement notice to compel the data controller to comply with data protection obligations. He also has powers to apply for a search warrant under schedule 9 to that Act. Arguably, any greater powers would be disproportionate and inconsistent with broader Government policy about the investigatory powers of regulators. Again, however, I am prepared to reflect carefully on the arguments that have been made as the Bill makes further progress.
Amendment 88 would remove the proposed exemption from liability for a civil monetary penalty for serious breaches of the data protection principles in cases where information about such a breach comes to light following the issue of an assessment notice. Those monetary penalties, which are provided for in section 55A of the Data Protection Act, will apply in cases of deliberate breach and when a data controller is aware that there is a risk of serious breach but fails to take reasonable steps to prevent it.
By contrast, as I have indicated, assessment notices are a valuable tool to raise compliance levels and to educate public bodies that are being assessed. That is why they do not require the existence of suspicion of non-compliance, or actual non-compliance, with the data protection principles. They are random spot checks. Given the nature of the assessment notice regime, we do not consider it appropriate for information gathered through that process to render a data controller liable to a civil monetary penalty. In any case, the commissioner can still employ his other enforcement tools as and when required throughout an assessment. For example, if he discovered a breach of the Data Protection Act during an assessment, he could still take enforcement action. As I have said, he could issue an enforcement notice under section 40 of that Act.
New clause 19 would limit the existing Crown immunity under the Data Protection Act so that Government Departments would be open to prosecution under it. As the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk will know, Crown immunity means that emanations from the Crown are not ordinarily liable to prosecution for offences created either in statute or in common law. That includes Government Departments, and the limitation on the prosecution of Departments includes the offences in that Act.
That is not to say, however, that Departments are not subject to adequate sanctions for breaches of data protection principles. They can still be subject to enforcement notices, claims for damages in a civil court or civil monetary penalties. That last point is particularly important because it means that financial penalties can be imposed on Government Departments. That range of other sanctions and penalties is sufficient for me to remain unconvinced that disapplying the normal rules on Crown immunity would make any material difference.
Amendments 80 to 84 would make the Information Commissioner’s codes of practice on assessment notices and data sharing subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. The assessment notice code of practice is not subject to any parliamentary procedure, whereas the data-sharing code is subject to the negative resolution procedure. Given the scope of those codes, I believe that we have probably got the level of parliamentary scrutiny right. They are not on a par with, for example, the codes of practice issued under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, if we have misjudged the level of scrutiny for those two codes of practice, I am pretty confident that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in the other place will be quick to tell us that. We will, of course, consider carefully any recommendations that it makes.
Amendment 85 would require the Information Commissioner to conduct an annual review of the data sharing code of practice. The Bill already obliges the commissioner to keep the code under review, and he is required to update it if he becomes aware that its content could result in the UK being in breach of any of its community or international obligations. My concern is that the amendment could prevent the code from being revised quickly once a breach has been identified. It might be a little too rigid in calling specifically for an annual review. The Bill will give the Information Commissioner scope to reconsider and review the code as and when he sees fit. We believe that that is right, given that his role as the independent data protection regulator is to provide the most up-to-date guidance to facilitate data controllers’ compliance with the Data Protection Act.
Finally, amendments 86 and 87 deal with information notices. Section 43 of the Data Protection Act provides the Information Commissioner with the power to issue a data controller with an information notice. That can require a data controller to provide the commissioner with specified information in a specified form, to assess compliance with the data protection principles. The commissioner can issue a notice to any data controller as long as he reasonably requires information to determine their compliance. Failure to comply with an information notice is a criminal offence. The amendments would extend the commissioner’s power to issue an information notice to data processors as well as data controllers. The meaning of a data processor is limited to those handling data on behalf of Government Departments and designated public authorities.
The structure of the Data Protection Act places the responsibility for personal information on the data controller, not the data processor. Introducing a power to serve a notice on a data processor could shift the regulatory balance of the Act. All data being processed by or on behalf of an organisation must be covered by the data controller’s registration. It is the responsibility of the data controller to obtain the information that the commissioner requires. I fear that the amendments would represent a significant change to the data protection regime, so the matter might be better suited to consideration in the review of the European directive that is under way. I therefore hope that the Opposition will not press those amendments.
The hon. Member for Cambridge expressed concern about the Information Commissioner and Google Street View. I have to say that I could not find my street on it, but that might be because I am sometimes technologically illiterate when it comes to such things. I understand that the commissioner is keeping the situation under review, and of course anyone can request to have their image removed. I understand that Google is quite surprised by how few people have so far asked to have their image removed, but that is another matter.
Has the Minister asked the Information Commissioner to consider the implications for public services of some of the issues that have arisen from Google Street View? I know that it has been online for only a couple of days, and I have to confess that it is quite intriguing to play with, but I understand that in one case, a woman fleeing domestic violence was photographed outside her new house. There are therefore implications for the police, councils and so on. Has she asked the commissioner to look into that?
The hon. Lady makes a good point, and she is quite right. Although it may be fun playing about with these things on computers, there are potentially sensitive issues attached to them. I shall certainly ensure that the Information Commissioner takes up that point when he reviews the situation.
I wish to respond to some of the points that the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk made. He asked why we needed a data-sharing code of practice if we are dropping the data sharing order-making power. Of course, the code will be wider than the order-making power and contain practical guidance on the sharing of personal data and other guidance that promotes good practice in data-sharing. It will ensure that the availability of practical and up-to-date guidance about how to share personal data is in accordance with the requirements of the Data Protection Act.
The hon. Gentleman also asked about extending information notices to the private sector and suggested that his amendments might be seen as a compromise. Information notices already extend to private sector data controllers because they can be served on any data controller. I hope that that answers those points.
Although I cannot commend any of the amendments that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon, and the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk and for Cambridge have tabled, I want to offer an assurance. We will continue to listen carefully to the arguments for extending the scope of assessment notices and providing some form of sanction for non-compliance. I do not want to raise expectations, but I also do not want to give the impression that clause 153, as drafted, represents the last word on the matter. I hope that, if and when we make further changes to that provision, the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk will remember that I said it here first.
We are sorry to learn that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle) is not well. She has an inner ear infection—anyone who has had one knows how incredibly painful and horrible it is. We therefore wish her a speedy recovery and speedy return to her place in the Department.
The Minister has given her usual courteous and effective explanation of the Government’s position. I accept her comments about Government amendment 25 and we are grateful for her remarks. Furthermore, her response to the new clause and amendments that we tabled was reasonably encouraging. There will be ample opportunity to revert to those matters in another place. We have a top Tory legal team in the Lords and they will revert to the issues. I am sure that they will be encouraged by her comments, and I therefore beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 154
Information Sharing
Amendment made: 25, page 101, line 12, leave out clause 154.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Schedule 18
Amendments of the Data Protection Act 1998 (c. 29)
Amendments made: 152, page 182, line 26, at end insert—
‘4A In section 67 of that Act (general provision about orders etc under the Act) in subsection (5)(a) insert at the appropriate place— “section 41A(2)(b),”.’.
Amendment 153, page 182, line 29, leave out ‘(except in Part 5A)’.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Clause 103
Sentencing guidelines
I beg to move amendment 20, page 61, line 37, at end insert—
‘(za) the relative effectiveness of sentences in preventing re-offending;’.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 21, page 61, leave out lines 41 and 42 and insert—
‘(d) the relative cost-effectiveness of different sentences in relation to preventing re-offending;’.
Government amendment 143.
Amendment 22, clause 104, page 62, line 4, leave out subsections (2) and (3) and insert—
‘( ) The guidelines must state the appropriateness of imposing different types of sentence for the offence with reference to characteristics of the offender and to characteristics of the offence, including the seriousness of the offence in terms of its effects on victims and the impact different sentences would have on victims.’.
Government amendments 144 to 146.
Amendment 43, clause 108, page 65, line 12, leave out ‘follow’ and insert ‘have regard to’.
Amendment 74, page 65, line 12, leave out ‘follow’ and insert ‘take account of’.
Amendment 75, page 65, line 15, leave out ‘follow’ and insert ‘take account of’.
Amendment 73, page 65, line 17, leave out from ‘court’ to end of line 18 and insert
‘is of the opinion that it would be unfair to the offender to do so.’.
Government amendments 147 and 148.
Amendment 76, clause 110, page 67, line 14, leave out ‘must’ and insert ‘may’.
Amendment 77, page 67, line 17, at end insert—
‘(aa) the number of places available and unfilled in the prison system at the date of the assessment,’.
Amendment 44, page 67, line 28, at end insert—
‘(6) Whilst the courts may have regard to the availability of correctional resources, for the avoidance of doubt the courts must not pass a sentence that is wholly determined by resource assessments which are expressly intended for the guidance of the Secretary of State in planning for and providing such custodial or community sentences as he advises Parliament, and it considers, necessary in the light of such assessments.’.
Amendment 161, page 67, line 28, at end insert—
‘(6) The Secretary of State must monitor any resource assessment published under this section and must ensure that, so far as reasonably practicable, adequate resources as determined by the resource assessment are made available for the implementation of the guidelines.’.
Government amendments 149 and 150.
We now deal with the provisions on sentencing, especially on the Sentencing Council and sentencing guidelines. I support the basic idea in the Bill. It has been a long time coming and various methods and versions were proposed, but the underlying idea was always the same: we should provide for strengthened national powers for a body that includes judges and non-judges and lays down guidelines for sentencing. The underlying idea all along has been more consistency in sentencing and more understanding of the sentences that are passed. So far, so good. I believe that hon. Members of all parties accept that.
The difficulty has always arisen with going beyond the simple aim of extra consistency with extra understanding. The Government have got into trouble by trying to make one of the leading goals of the Sentencing Council and sentencing guidelines simply to save money by various means, including the fairly laudable one of making the criminal justice system more predictable. The problem is that that creates an incentive to make the guidelines far too rigid, to the extent that one could end up with the position in some United States jurisdictions, where the guidelines are so rigid that there is no judicial discretion. The Government have rightly moved from the rigid model, but also have to admit that the benefits that it would have brought in financial predictability have been somewhat compromised.
I am not against going beyond aiming for consistency in the sentencing guidelines. My overriding concern is not the total amount that the Government spend on sentencing, but the direction of the criminal justice system. I especially want the guidelines to help further the aim of turning the criminal justice system around so that its main purpose is to reduce reoffending by imposing sentences that work, as opposed to those that simply sound tough.
I am fortified in my view by not only members of my party, but members of other parties in the House and members of the Justice Committee. Reducing reoffending should become a central aim of sentencing. Other matters cannot be ignored, but when reducing reoffending is ignored, the result is inevitably that crime is higher. There are more victims. The Government are right that victims and concern for them should be at the heart of the criminal justice system, but that must include potential victims. Only by reducing reoffending—most offending is committed by those who have done things in the past—do we genuinely put victims, especially potential victims, at the heart of the system.
I endorse the hon. Gentleman’s comments. I signed amendments 20 and 21 because it is a weakness not to specify the purpose of the Sentencing Council. I agree that, if it is about anything, it must be about reducing reoffending. Does the hon. Gentleman recall that, when we took evidence about what victims want, we were told that, other than wanting the offence that victimised them not to have happened, they wanted it not to happen again? Not only potential victims, but those who are already victims would therefore endorse the view that the priority should be reducing reoffending.
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that important point. Sometimes, we in politics misunderstand what the public tell us about crime. We often think that they are telling us to be tougher and harder for the sake of it, but I do not believe that they are. When the public demand tougher sentencing, they want it to produce the result that the right hon. Gentleman outlined: to reduce reoffending. We must ask ourselves whether tougher sentences would achieve that. If the evidence shows that they would not, our duty is to ensure the imposition of sentences that do. We are perfectly capable of making those decisions, but bound to take into account what the public want from sentencing. As the right hon. Gentleman said, they want to reduce the risk of becoming a victim of crime in future. That is the point of amendments 20 and 21.
We know more about what works and what does not in sentencing than might be supposed from reading the newspapers. Sentencers should therefore be encouraged to use the knowledge that has been accumulated and is accumulating about what works. The best way of achieving that is not through individual sentencers learning more about the evidence, but through the guidelines.
For example, we know that short prison sentences do not work in reducing reoffending. On the other hand, restorative justice works—it is approximately a quarter more effective than other sentences. We know that from randomised controlled trials—the best evidence that one can collect. We know that short, sharp shocks and scaring-people-straight programmes—taking youngsters to jail and saying, “Look, here’s a prisoner, this will happen to you”—do not work. Indeed, in the “Scared Straight!” case, such a programme made things worse. The evidence shows that they increase crime.
Surely the hon. Gentleman’s point is rather less absolute and is, in fact, a relative one. The point is not that short sentences never work nor that effective community sentences always work. There is no doubt—the reoffending data are made public—that offenders are less likely to reoffend if they have received an effective community punishment than they are if they have served a short sentence. However, offenders are also less likely to reoffend if they have served a very long sentence—not that I am recommending that. My last point, which is about the dilemma facing the courts and policy makers, is that in almost every case where a short sentence is given out by the courts, it is given because the offender is one of those who has been given a community sentence and has failed to stop his reoffending. That is the dilemma for the courts and that is why they are bound to resort to short sentences.
I agree with the Secretary of State that the debate is not about absolutes; it is about tendencies and risks. However, the rational approach to sentencing must always be to use all the information that we have. All I am saying is that that information should be built into the sentencing guidelines.
The Secretary of State is right in his analysis of the effect of some short sentences and the effect of longer sentences, but we also need to bear in mind something that might be missed if one takes what he said at face value. Those who get longer sentences tend not to be the chaotic characters who get short sentences; rather, they tend to be armed robbers or professional criminals. They are therefore altogether better able to look after themselves in prison and outside it, subject to being caught, whereas short-term repeat offenders are, by and large, chaotic characters who commit crimes to fuel a drug habit. By their very nature, they are less susceptible to the injunctions of the criminal justice system. The Secretary of State’s facts were correct, but the inferences that we draw from them need to be carefully studied.
That is an important point. In cases of domestic murder, for example, the chances of reoffending are usually very low, which will skew the statistics that the Secretary of State used.
We know that for the type of offender that the Secretary of State was talking about—those with chaotic lives who sometimes find that they are sent to prison because the courts lose patience and cannot think of anything else to do with them—drug and alcohol treatment programmes are more effective, although not always effective, when delivered in the community than they are when delivered in prison. The reasons are obvious. Alcohol treatment, for example, is clearly the best way of dealing with violent offenders, even though some would say that all violent offenders must always be sent to prison. Alcohol and drug treatment programmes are far cheaper when delivered in the community than they are when delivered in prison. We could run more of them, and therefore prevent more crime, if we allocated our resources properly.
We know that what works best for those whom we have to put in prison—the Justice Secretary is right: there are some people whom we have to put in prison—in reducing reoffending are training, education and work programmes. In fact, it turns out that those programmes are cheaper and more effective in prison than they are outside it, for various reasons. That tells us the direction in which prison policy should go, not just the direction in which sentencing should go.
All I am saying is that we need a dynamic system in which whatever we know from the results of research is built into the process of drawing up the sentencing guidelines. That is all that amendment 20 aims to achieve.
One issue in this debate is costs and the extent to which they should be a relevant consideration in criminal justice policy. Let me make it plain that I have absolutely no objection to considering the relative costs of sentences in deciding what should be in the guidelines. It seems obvious that if two sentences are equally effective in reducing reoffending, we should use the cheaper one, because we can do more of it and prevent more crime in the long term. However, I hope that the Government will make it clear that that is the not the same as making sentences in individual cases respond solely to cost, because not only individual cases would be affected. In fact, given the disparate nature of sentencing, doing that would probably not be cost-effective, either.
It is also important to distinguish between the total resources available to the criminal justice system and the relative costs of different sentences. Sentencing guidelines should take into account relative costs, but that does not mean that they should take into account the total resources available to the system. That is the Government’s business. It is for the Government to ensure that the resources are available to make sentencing in the criminal justice system work. As I understand it, that is the spirit of amendment 44, which has been tabled by Government Back Benchers.
Amendment 44 is mine.
I am sorry. There are a number of amendments to a similar effect.
Overall, there has always been a tension between the courts on the one side, asserting their independence to pass sentences that they think are just, and the Government on the other side, trying to have a criminal justice policy. The methods that we have used so far to try to bring the two together have inherent problems of their own. Sentencing guidelines cause the problem, which I am sure the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) will highlight, of reducing the discretion available to judges. Judges will plainly resent that. On the other hand, if we have only unguided judicial discretion, people in the Secretary of State’s position will have to make resource provision for a vast number of sentences that are never used. That would massively increase the cost in the system and mean that resources were not being put to their best use for reducing crime.
There might be an even better way forward than the Bill, which is for the evidence that I suggest should be built into the sentencing guidelines process to be built into the Department’s policy-making process, too. If the Sentencing Council and the Department were working from the same evidence about what worked and if they had the same goal of putting what works to reduce reoffending at the heart of the system, the co-ordination of what sentencers do with what the Government do would be more automatic than it is in a system in which one side tries to tell the other what to do.
However, perhaps that is a counsel of perfection. I concede that the Bill is, on the whole, a step forward, but I ask the Government to reconsider in detail how what works to reduce reoffending can be built into the system.
I want the Sentencing Council to be a success and I want it to be effective, and I know that my right hon. Friend the Lord Chancellor wants that, too. My concern is that the Bill as drafted does not offer any certainty that the Sentencing Council will be effective. There is no certainty that it will address in sentencing guidelines the need to reduce reoffending or to change the attitudes of courts by ensuring that that is at the front of their minds.
I am not so concerned about the courts’ ability to deal with the very serious cases of murder or with criminal gangs and so forth—those matters can be left for judges to decide—but I do not think that judges have demonstrated an ability to understand the need to intervene on prolific low-level offenders or the need to nip offenders in the bud. There is considerable amount of evidence, in work funded by the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation, that taking judges out to see the work of community sentences can be very effective in improving the standard of sentencing.
In the Public Bill Committee I offered three propositions and I very much hope that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will take them seriously. If he does not accept the two amendments proposed by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), I hope that he will think further and perhaps introduce amending provisions in the other place.
The first of my three propositions is that people should be appointed to the Sentencing Council on the basis of their capacity to evaluate evidence on the effectiveness of sentences. I suggested amendments in Committee to put that directly into the Bill. At the moment, the council looks too much like a comfortable judges’ club. The question of effectiveness that the hon. Member for Cambridge underlined in moving the amendments is absolutely critical to whether the Sentencing Council is going to be a valuable addition or not.
Secondly, I believe that the Sentencing Council should be given a clear purpose, which is absent from the Bill. We discussed that in a very good debate in Committee and I hope that my right hon. Friend will take it on board and set out what the Sentencing Council is for in a new clause in the other place.
My final point is the need to clarify clause 103, which specifies five principles to which the council must have regard. The reference to
“their relative effectiveness in preventing re-offending”
appears only in the second half of the fourth of those items. That would be made more explicit if we lifted it up the agenda by accepting amendments 20 and 21. If my right hon. Friend will not accept those propositions today, I urge him to make it absolutely clear in the Bill that this place expects the Sentencing Council to add value to the work of the courts and to attach great priority to advising the courts on what works in reducing reoffending.
I want briefly, if I may, to discuss some of the amendments tabled by the Government and by the Liberal Democrats, but also to concentrate on my own amendments 43 and 44, which, to my mind at least, describe the difference between us and the Government in a fairly effective way. Amendment 43 deals with whether the sentencer should “follow” or “have regard to”—or as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) would prefer, “take account of”—the directions of the Sentencing Council.
There is no difference.
As my right hon. and learned Friend says truthfully and entirely sensibly, there is absolutely no difference between what lies behind his amendments and mine. Amendment 44 deals with the resource implications of resource assessments and how they should affect the discretion of sentencers—a point brought out by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth).
Let me deal briefly with the other amendments and then come back to my own. Just before doing so, however, I declare an interest in that as a recorder, I will have to be guided by the Sentencing Council, just as I am already guided by the Sentencing Guidelines Council at the moment. I have some understanding in a practical sense of the effect of these types of arrangements—[Interruption.] It looks like the hon. Member for Cambridge is laughing at one of his own jokes.
I do not think that there is much difference between us about the importance of the need to reduce reoffending. Both in Committee and this evening, we have all suggested that reduction of reoffending is a highly important aim of the criminal justice system, and it has to be a priority. In our paper published last March—it was written by my hon. Friend the Member for Arundel and South Downs (Nick Herbert) and me and was entitled “Prisons with a Purpose”—we outlined our plans for the reform of the prison system and of the non-custodial sentencing system. At the heart of our paper was a section dealing with what we called “the rehabilitation revolution”. We wanted to see far greater emphasis placed in the prison and non-custodial sentencing system on the rehabilitation of offenders—so that they do not reoffend. This is now largely uncontroversial—[Interruption.] The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr. Hanson), says that it was before; it is just a question of getting on and doing it. He and his hon. Friends have had 10 years to do their best; we look forward to having an opportunity, if the electorate so decides.
I gave evidence to the investigation called by the Centre for Social Justice, which is chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Mr. Duncan Smith), who asked Jonathan Aitken to produce a report on the current state of our prisons and what needs to be done to improve them. That report was published, Mr. Deputy Speaker, as you may know, earlier this week or over the weekend. I am happy to say that a good deal of what is in the document coincides with or is drawn from my own evidence to the investigation and from our document “Prisons with a Purpose”.
The document produced by the Centre for Social Justice is a very big document, but it is worth reading. I am sure that both the Secretary of State and the Ministers of State have it on their reading list. [Interruption.] I am grateful to the Secretary of State. Irrespective of our party differences, there is a mine of information in it. Some of the conclusions arrived at will not surprise Ministers, but I hope that some of them perhaps will. The Conservative party’s attitude to the criminal justice system has, if I may say so, taken—
A turn for the better.
That is the expression used by my hon. Friend, and I would say that the truth that was always there has simply been revealed—but perhaps this is a distinction without a difference.
On judicial discretion, I am not asking for a judicial free-for-all. I have a proper understanding, I hope, of the sentencing exercise. I said it before in Committee and I will say it again now: sentencing is probably the most difficult thing that a judge has to do in the criminal justice system. Yes, judges—and magistrates, such as the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael)—have to consider issues of fact and of law, but I would suggest that the sentencing is the most difficult and complicated aspect of the work of the criminal courts. Yes, guidance from the Court of Appeal criminal division and from the Sentencing Guidelines Council, or the Sentencing Council, and indeed from Parliament is always helpful—indeed, more than helpful; it is very useful.
We accept that judges have to sentence within a range of sentences laid down by statute or by the guidance of the higher courts and by the Sentencing Guidelines Council. Where I think we—that is to say, the Government and the Conservative party—differ is on the tightness of the link between the sentencing guidelines and the independence of the judge or the magistrate to apply the sentence that is just in the case before him.
The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth said today and in Committee that he was not so much worried by the sentencing of serious criminals who get the longer sentences; he was more concerned about the way in which low-level persistent offenders are dealt with. I think that he is right to have that worry, because unless we stop such people reoffending, they constitute a continual public nuisance. They are an expense, and they cause untold misery to the householders, owners of businesses, shopkeepers and so forth who are predominantly the victims of acquisitive crime committed with the aim of feeding a drug habit.
It seems to me—and I do not think that this is a novel opinion—that drug addicts commit crimes rather than criminals’ becoming drug addicts, although my view is changing somewhat following the report on Wellingborough prison which was published this morning. Unfortunately, the findings in that report are not peculiar to Wellingborough. What Dame Anne Owers, the chief inspector of prisons, discovered about the incidence of drug taking, drug dealing and drug use in prisons is not restricted to that particular prison. There is not a single prison in England and Wales that does not have a drug problem to a greater or lesser extent.
Let us all agree that we want to reduce the incidence of reoffending. Let us all agree that Parliament has a perfect right, and indeed a duty, to set out the ranges of sentences for particular offences. Let us all agree that the Court of Appeal criminal division has a role to play, and that magistrates and judges should be given sufficient independence and discretion to enable them to do justice in the cases before them.
Although I understand what amendments 20 and 21 are about, I suggest that it is already covered by clause 103(11), and in particular by paragraph (d), which deals with
“the cost of different sentences and their relative effectiveness in preventing re-offending”.
Although I listened with interest to what the hon. Member for Cambridge had to say, I am not sure that his concerns need to be translated into the Bill. However, Government amendments 143, 144, 146 and 148 move us into more interesting territory. Of itself, amendment 143 does not strike me as objectionable. It seems to say, while using slightly different words, what is currently said in subsections (1) to (4) of clause 104, which the Government intend to delete. Amendment 146, of itself, is not objectionable; on the face of it, the provisions that would replace clause 104(8) appear to be common sense. Amendment 148 simply refers to the offence range rather than the category of case, and is not of itself objectionable. Government amendments 149 and 150 follow on from the earlier amendments, and they, too, are not of themselves objectionable.
Nevertheless, I ask the Government to accept that without amendment 44—tabled by, among others, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and me—there is at least the possibility of an improper connection between money and justice. The amendment states
“Whilst the courts may have regard to the availability of correctional resources”
—that is the jargon—
“for the avoidance of doubt the courts must not pass a sentence that is wholly determined by resource assessments which are expressly intended for the guidance of the Secretary of State in planning for and providing such custodial or community sentences as he advises Parliament, and it”
—Parliament, that is—
“considers, necessary in the light of such assessments.”
When deciding what should be the maximum sentence for robbery, burglary, murder, rape or any other criminal offence, Parliament will need to understand that increasing the maximum sentence or providing a minimum sentence will cost a certain amount of money, and will require additional prison places, probation officers or other facilities to deal with the offenders concerned. Having understood that, however, and having decided on the basis of that information and advice what the appropriate maximum sentence, minimum sentence or range of sentences should be, Parliament should not descend into the courtroom, either directly or via the Sentencing Council, to tell judges precisely what to do. I believe that without amendment 44 or a similar provision, we shall be in danger of moving Parliament and the Executive into the courtroom in an improper constitutional fashion.
Amendment 43 is also connected with my fear that we are in danger of intruding in the courtroom in a way that I find wholly objectionable. It deals with what I call the “follow” or “have regard to” argument. As the law stands, sentencers are obliged to “have regard to” guidance from the Sentencing Guidelines Council, but are not obliged to follow it slavishly. That works well. While I accept that sentencers, be they magistrates or Crown court judges, must explain their reasons for acting outside a particular guideline in a particular case, I do not think that anyone has been surprised by, or unjustly dealt with by, judges having regard to or taking account of the guidance as opposed to following it. The Government, however, require judges and magistrates to follow the sentence advice in the guidelines—indeed, almost to cut and paste it into their sentences.
As I have said before, only the judge or magistrate has the facts of the case before him—the facts relating to the victim, and the facts or the local knowledge in relation to the effect of the crime on the local community; that is particularly true of magistrates—along with some understanding of the antecedents and the earlier life of the defendant or defendants before him or her. That, I suggest, renders the judge or magistrate best placed to deal with the sentence.
Are not the local circumstances one of the most important considerations for a sentencing judge to take into account? A particular class of crime often becomes prevalent locally. In such circumstances, a sentencing judge may well consider it necessary to propose a sentence that is different from, and perhaps more severe than, the general category or bracket specified in the sentencing guidelines.
My right hon. and learned Friend is entirely right. What he has said is doubtless based on his experience both as a Home Office Minister and as a practising member of the criminal Bar.
We all know from what happens in our constituencies, be they urban or rural, that certain crimes become fashionable from time to time. There may be an epidemic of house burglaries, of car crime or of drug retailing on the streets. The courts need to be able to deal with that in the way that is most appropriate to the locality concerned. The advantage of the administration of local justice through magistrates courts and Crown courts is that those courts can respond directly and immediately to local circumstances. It seems to me that, while the Sentencing Guidelines Council—and the Sentencing Council, as it will become following the Bill’s enactment—have a role to play, they should not be allowed to overplay it, and to inhibit the sort of activities that my right hon. and learned Friend has described.
There is a danger in the approach implied in both the question and the answer. It is a twofold danger. First, in order to demonstrate that society will not put up with whatever may be happening in a locality, excessive reliance may be placed on the theory of deterrence and a sentence may be passed that does not have the deterrent effect that it was assumed it would have. Secondly, the process of signalling to society that the courts are not going to put up with the offence may draw them into prison sentences that are themselves ineffective. We should look for ways of making that sort of declaration that do not involve us in impractical sentences.
I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for his intervention, but it is not a question of either/or—it is both/and. Local judges and magistrates should be able to take account of local conditions and from time to time deal with criminal campaigns through exemplary or extended sentences, but of course they want to be effective. Judges are not in the business of passing sentences that either are not obeyed, if they are community sentences, or that do not help to reduce reoffending. Unfortunately, some defendants are beyond education and understanding the effect of their offences. I say in parenthesis that I happen to be a great supporter of restorative justice, which the hon. Member for Cambridge mentioned, but it is vital that judges and magistrates should be allowed within a wide remit to conduct this most difficult exercise, which is to do justice to the defendant, society as a whole, the victim and the victim's family, and to play their part in the reduction of reoffending.
While I dare say the Government see themselves as entirely well motivated, they are being too dirigiste, statist and centralist in this aspect of criminal justice policy. Therefore, I urge them, even if they do not accept my amendments 43 and 44 today, to think rather more carefully. In any event, I will ask at the appropriate time, if I catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to test the opinion of the House on amendment 43.
I shall address my remarks to amendment 161. They follow on to some extent from some of the remarks made by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier). He said that the measure includes the requirement that the guidance of the Sentencing Council be followed. On amendment 44, he talked about not wishing to allow resources to determine the sentence, but resources are key to what is happening.
Amendment 161 would amend clause 110. That clause requires the Sentencing Council to publish resource assessments in respect of its guidelines. In those resource assessments, the council will be expected to say what it thinks the guidelines will do in respect of the demand for prison places, the resources that are required for probation provision and for the provision of youth justice services. The question is: once the Sentencing Council has produced those reports about resource assessments, what happens to them? There is nothing whatever in the Bill to indicate that the Government will have to pay any particular attention to them, yet they are key if the recommendations of the Sentencing Council on sentences are to be put into effect. Amendment 161 therefore says that the Secretary of State must monitor those resource assessments and, as far as he practically can, ensure that there are adequate resources to ensure that the guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council can be put into practice.
The concept of the Sentencing Council has been widely welcomed. I do not have any difficulties with it. Many people outside this place have welcomed it, but what will happen if the recommendations from the Sentencing Council go in a particular direction that the council itself says will impact on prison places and probation services? As the Minister knows, some of us have already told him we have concerns about the resources that are available now and will be available in the next two or three years to, for example, the probation service. Probation representatives are telling us that they are concerned about the effects of their current budgets on front-line services.
I give just one example. The special domestic violence courts were introduced in 2005-06. A domestic violence programme is focused on changing attitudes and the behaviour of participants in that programme. It teaches people non-controlling behaviour. Courses run for a few months and involve individual sessions, group sessions and relapse-prevention meetings. They seem to be the sort of courses that we want to support, but we hear that there are considerable waiting lists for people to get on them: the waiting times vary from 13 to 42 weeks, depending on the area. The maximum wait for getting on a course varies from 33 to 208 weeks. If we are saying that we expect a course to be effective, but there is a waiting time of four years for someone to get on it, that hardly suggests that we are matching the resources to the programme we believe would be effective. Those are the issues that need to be considered in bringing the new regime into effect.
I am not suggesting for one moment that it will be a simplistic exercise; it obviously is not going to be easy always to do this, but if we do not look at what the Sentencing Council has to say about the resource requirements, and we do not consider what can be done to provide those resources, we will end up with more examples like the one I have just cited. There will be recommendations to the courts about what they should do in respect of sentencing, and the court will follow those recommendations, but then we will find gaps in, say, the probation provision to make those sentences work. I hope that when he replies to the debate the Minister will address that point and look at what might be done to make that link between the recommendations and the resources that are needed to put them into effect.
I rise merely to express my anxiety about this House creating a regime that is unduly prescriptive. I agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) that sentencing is one of the most difficult functions of the judiciary and it has been enormously complicated by the volume of legislation that we have passed over the past 10 years and, if one is honest, many years before that. For example, indeterminate sentences of imprisonment for public protection and extended sentences of various kinds are extraordinarily difficult for the judges to determine. My own feeling is that they are also largely unjust in their implication and I dislike them very much. I also feel that Parliament needs to be—
I do not think there has been sufficient time for a full evaluation of the effectiveness of IPPs, but I can say that, when I go around prisons, which I do regularly, I am struck by the difference in attitude between those prisoners who are on determinate sentences and those on IPP sentences. Those on IPP sentences have now got the message that they will not come out and they will be on a long licence unless they stop their propensity to offend. That must be a good thing for the public and a good thing for them.
That is a fair point, but there is another way of looking at this. When there is an indeterminate sentence and the release date is ultimately dependent not on the trial judge but on those who are assessing whether the person constitutes a risk, the natural attitude of those who make that decision is to guard their own back, and the result can be that many people are held in prison much longer than the index for offences justifies and much longer than a proper assessment of the risk would also justify.
I do not know how many prisons the Justice Secretary has been to since he took up this new post, but it is my experience from having been to about 50 prisons in the last three years that IPP prisoners are the most difficult for the Prison Service to manage. They remember the tariff, but they find it difficult to comprehend that they have an unending or an indefinite sentence. That is why they become fractious and that is why prison governors tell me—whether they tell the Secretary of State this, I do not know—that they are very concerned about the management of such prisoners. I appreciate that the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 adjusted the IPP minimum tariff, but it is a very troublesome sentence.
I agree with that. Many years ago, when I was an Under-Secretary at the Home Office, I was responsible for trying to determine when it was proper to release people from the special hospitals. We used to get advice from doctors and others on the safety—or otherwise—of the particular prisoner or patient, and no doubt that is still the norm. It was extraordinarily difficult to make that judgment, and I am sure that many officials—and, I suspect, clinicians—were guarding their back, thinking of the criticism that would come in the national press were they to recommend the release of somebody who went on to commit a crime. I think this is true of IPPs and extended sentences, and I fear that lots of characters are being held in our prisons now because people are unwilling to take that chance. I think we have to take that chance, unless we are going to detain people for unconscionably long periods of time.
There is a further reason why some IPP prisoners are in prison for longer than they ought to be, which is that they cannot get on the necessary course to satisfy the conditions that would enable them to be released. That problem too tends to make them fractious, because they nurse a sense of grievance that the prison is preventing them from fulfilling those conditions.
I think that that, too, is an important point, and I entirely agree with it. However, I shall move on from what is a somewhat narrow point—it might not even be within the scope of the amendment, but thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, for permitting that brief digression—and say that of course I accept that this House has to establish the appropriate brackets of the sentence. That is right; we have always done that, and we should continue to do so. However, my own view is that the imposition of sentences is very much a matter for the trial judge, guided by the appellate court. I think it is difficult to do justice unless we accept that the trial judge or trial magistrate is the person best placed to determine a sentence within the brackets established by Parliament. I therefore agree with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough that we should not put in statute the requirement that a judge should follow the guidelines set out by the council, hence my amendments. I believe the requirement should be that the judge take account of, but not feel obliged to follow, the prescriptive guidelines.
I accept that the council guidelines can bring about greater consistency. That is important, and to that extent I welcome the Bill’s proposals. It is true that the council’s guidelines—this is one of the points made by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth)—can bring to the notice of the judiciary sentences and alternatives that work, because not all judges go to all courses as assiduously as they should, and I have no doubt that the guidelines, the annual reports and the other material published by the council can inform the courts of what is available and what works.
I think, too, that it would be appropriate for the council’s guidelines and other published material to set out the cost implications of various sentence options; that seems to me to be entirely right. I also think that the council guidelines should stress the importance of non-custodial sentences. Whenever I have been to prisons—like my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough, I have been to a large number of them in my life, both as a barrister representing defendants and as Prisons Minister—I have been conscious of the very many people who are in prison largely because of their own inadequacy or an addiction, and who could probably be dealt with other than by being kept in custody.
Confidence in the penal system is important. Confidence should be not just national but local, hence the intervention of my hon. and learned Friend, who said that areas often suffer an epidemic of certain classes of crime, and a local judge may well form the view that a particular approach to sentencing is right given the particular local circumstances. I shall be very sorry indeed if the guidelines regime precludes a judge taking that local approach.
May I make one further point, which will be deeply unpopular, especially to the hon. Member for Cambridge, and which will probably nowadays be regarded as deeply politically incorrect? I do not believe that the criminal justice system should be primarily focused on the victim. I get very concerned when I hear people say that the victim’s interests are paramount. I do not believe that. I think that the purpose of the criminal law is to do justice, and that does not necessarily mean following either the wishes or the interests of the victim. The interests, or at least the plight, of the victim must be taken into account; the victim is very often a witness and needs to be treated with great courtesy, be kept fully informed and be made aware of all relevant decisions. But actually the criminal law is seeking to create a system of punishment, deterrence, retribution and ways and methods of avoiding the repetition of crime. That is not about the victim, and the anxieties and distress of the victim can often cause judges to do things that are not right. When there are victim statements and so forth in court, I personally regard that as an irrelevance. That is not a popular view, and it is probably not shared by many Members. However, I strongly feel that we need to distinguish between the courtesies and respect that one owes to the victim and the fundamental purpose of the criminal law, which is to administer the interests of the state, and not necessarily to reflect the interests of the victim.
I rise to support amendment 161, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) and which I have also signed. Let me explain the background to this amendment, because I know that some Members have argued it may be irrelevant.
Amendment 161 arises out of discussions with the trade union group that brings together the various trade unions representing workers in the justice field. The issue that arose time and again is that when Government wields the end, they should also wield the means. The amendment is in some respects intended to assist the Secretary of State in arguments with other Departments, and possibly the Treasury itself, because there has been a consistent pattern in the justice sector in this House: many Members have welcomed various approaches by the Government, particularly the development of sentencing policy—and innovative sentencing policy—but we have had difficulty extracting additional resources. Although there has been a significant increase in resources in this field, it has not matched the level of demand. That was demonstrated in the report by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies published in December, which showed an increase in resources, but also a massive increase in demand and work loads. This legislation will develop the Sentencing Council and enable it to set out various guidelines, but unless the resources are made available we will pass legislation that will have limited effect—in fact, it could cause more frustrations within the justice system and therefore be less beneficial.
I shall give one example, which has become crucial in recent months. We have met the Secretary of State, and the National Association of Probation Officers, the trade union representing probation officers, has undertaken a survey. It demonstrates that as a result of a reductions exercise—a savings exercise—that is going on, a large number of staff are losing their jobs. We were hoping that this would not involve front-line staff, but it looks as though it will. The situation means that probation officers are having to ponder a quandary when they go before a court and recommend, as a part of their report, a particular approach on sentencing, be it a community sentence, a prison sentence or a particular innovative sentence—I am thinking particularly of sentences associated with restorative justice. They are having to consider whether they should be advising the court, in their professional capacity, that although a given approach might be the best course of action, the resources are not available, particularly within their locality, to implement the sentence. That puts an onus on the probation officer that causes them a considerable dilemma.
Amendment 161 seeks to remind the rest of government, as much as this Secretary of State, that if we are to develop the Sentencing Council and it is to be effective, we must ensure, as the amendment says, that as “far as reasonably practicable” the resources “are made available”. If we do not do that, we will undermine the credibility of this part of this Bill, which we, across the House, have supported. Even if we do not press the amendment to a vote, I urge the Government at least to take the spirit of the amendment back in their discussions with other Departments, in particular the Treasury. If we will the ends, we must will the means, and if we do not do so in this instance, we will undermine the credibility of this legislation.
This debate has been very interesting and well informed, and I shall try to conclude it in that spirit. It might be helpful if I were first to give some background to the proposals in the Bill for a Sentencing Council—I claim some authorship for those. In the mid-1990s, there was, as those of us who were in the House at the time will recall—a number are present on the Labour Benches—concern about the unrelenting rise in crime that had taken place under the Conservatives. Hon. Members may recall that recorded crime doubled between 1980 and 1995. The Conservative campaign guide of 1994 sought to point out that although recorded crime had risen, crime as calculated by the chosen measure of the Conservative Government—the British crime survey, which they had established—had risen by “only 50 per cent.” Both sets of data were true, but even a 50 per cent. rise was alarming.
Thus, following the appointment of the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) as Home Secretary in 1993, there was a big shift in the penal policy of the Conservative Government against what he regarded as the liberal and wet approach conducted by all his Conservative predecessors with, probably, the single exception of Lord Waddington; there was great concern about increasing the number of prison places and much else besides.
One of the things that I examined at the time was the question of consistency in sentencing. With great assistance from the statisticians in the House of Commons Library, I published a paper in 1996 called “Honesty, Consistency and Progression in Sentencing”, and its conclusions found their way into the Labour manifesto and then into the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which was piloted through this House by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael). I proposed a modest change: that a sentencing advisory panel should be established. He will recall how tentative we were about moving into territory that previously had been within the exclusive ambit of the judiciary.
What the data that the House of Commons Library statisticians had produced and that I had published showed was that there was no necessary connection between crime levels—or the rates of growth or decline in crime—and local sentencing rates, be they the custody levels, the proportion of offenders sentenced to custody, or average sentence lengths. Of course I accept what both the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) said about the fact that the court has to have discretion for all sorts of reasons, not the least of which is that there may be what the hon. and learned Gentleman has described as a local “epidemic” of crime and the court may wish to set out imperatives as to why that is not acceptable locally—no one argues about that. The argument is about areas where there are apparently random differences in sentencing that bear no direct relationship either to local crime levels or to reoffending rates.
What I was seeking to do was better to inform the sentencing process, without encroaching on the necessary independence and discretion of sentencers, so we established the Sentencing Advisory Panel. As a result of a major study into sentencing, which I got going towards the end of my period as Home Secretary, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Brightside (Mr. Blunkett) continued and which reported in 2001-02, we then had the Criminal Justice Act 2003—it established the Sentencing Guidelines Council. More recently, in the light, not least, of the pressure on prison places, the Carter inquiry was established and it reported in early December 2007.
Alongside Lord Carter’s report was published further statistical evidence called “Local Variation in Sentencing in England and Wales”. It was produced by my Department, but it never got quite the attention that it deserved—I say that because it contains extremely interesting data. It looks at the variations in custody rates, average sentence lengths and the use of determinate and indeterminate sentences. It showed that all those things varied “significantly” across the 42 criminal justice areas in England and Wales. It also suggested:
“The range in custody rates in magistrates’ courts and ACSLs”—
average custodial sentence lengths—
“in the Crown Court narrowed between 2003 and 2006, suggesting that sentencing practice became more consistent across the CJAs over this period.”
I suggest that that was partly as a result of the work of the Sentencing Guidelines Council.
The document also suggested that there was little in the way of linkage, stating:
“Variation in sentencing amongst the CJAs was not well explained by local crime rates, although there was a weak relationship between recorded crime rates and magistrates’ court custody rates for theft and handling stolen goods offences.”
It continued:
“No statistically significant relationships existed between changes over time of recorded crime and sentencing in magistrates’ courts and Crown Court centres by CJA.”
Against the background of the relative partial success of the Sentencing Advisory Panel and the Sentencing Guidelines Council, Lord Carter recommended that I should establish a judicially led working group to look more closely at whether we could have better machinery for advising and guiding the judiciary on sentencing. Lord Justice Gage kindly accepted the invitation to chair this sentencing commission working group, and his report was produced late last year.
What I sought to do is to replicate, of course in more detail, the key recommendations of his report. I note what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough said about the need for proper judicial independence, but he also said that we had to avoid a judicial free-for-all. I have said very much the same thing and I made it clear in my statement on 5 December 2007 on Carter. I assume that the hon. and learned Gentleman knows Lord Gage and many of the other distinguished members of the working group, so he will know that they would not have made the recommendations if they thought that they would fetter the proper discretion and independence of the judiciary.
We have tabled amendments 143 to 146 to clause 104 and amendment 148 to clause 108 because those provisions were criticised in Committee—[Interruption.] I welcome the hon. Member for Mid-Sussex (Mr. Soames) to the Opposition Front Bench. It is good to have him here to listen to this important debate. We have responded to the criticism that was made on both sides in Committee that the original provisions were too dirigiste. Therefore, clause 104 will no longer make it a requirement on the Sentencing Council to subdivide all offences into categories of offence, but it will have the discretion to do so. If it does, we invite it to subdivide the offence categories in much the same way as they are currently subdivided. We also make it clear that aggravating and mitigating factors can be related to the offender as well as to the offence, and that is the important effect of amendment 144.
Clause 108 sets out the duties of the court in respect of the sentencing guidelines to be found in clauses 103 and 104. Here, too, we have sought to add greater flexibility to the system. Generic offences such as burglary, robbery and theft cover a range of behaviours and, therefore, the Sentencing Guidelines Council has subdivided them into categories. Where they are divided and there are aggravating or mitigating factors, they can be within the overall range of the guidance for the offence and not just in that particular category of offence. I suggest to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough that that will give sentences a considerable degree of flexibility.
The hon. and learned Gentleman suggested that he would divide the House on amendment 43. Currently, the council will be asked to follow sentencing guidance and he suggests that instead it should “have regard” to it. Those words are in the 2003 Act. I was abroad at the time, so I claim no authorship and I cannot remember whether the Opposition thought that it was wonderful. In any event, especially in the area of the law, we have to learn from experience. The hon. and learned Gentleman would not suggest that the criminal justice process or law is fixed in the concrete in which it was embedded back in 1997—at least I hope not.
Of course not. Lord Justice Gage very kindly invited me and the right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East (Mr. Howarth)—who was also a member of the working party—to a briefing by him last summer, just before publication of his report. He made it clear that he was not producing a grid, or Minneapolis, system, and it was clear that he intended there to be a fair degree of discretion. However, what he told us then is not exactly replicated in the word “follow”.
It is common ground that none of us wants a Minneapolis system or any other kind of American grid system, and that is not proposed. The Gage report said:
“A majority of the Working Group”—
the chairman was part of that majority—
“recommends that the test for departures from the guidelines be made more robust by providing that the court may only pass a sentence outwith the guidelines if it is of the opinion that it is in the interests of justice to do so. A minority of the Working Group recommends that there should be no amendment to the statutory tests contained in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.”
Earlier in the report, the working group considered the responsibilities that should be imposed on the Sentencing Council, but—critically—the reader is referred to annexe C where the working group proposes a change to sections 172 and 174 of the 2003 Act. The working group suggests the wording:
“Every court must…in sentencing an offender, apply any guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case unless it is of the opinion that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.
The draftsman of the Bill has, as faithfully as possible, replicated that recommendation, so clause 108(1)(a) states:
“Every court must…in sentencing an offender, follow any sentencing guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case unless…the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do so”.
There are better lawyers than me here, but I defy anybody to explain what is the difference between “must apply” and “must follow”.
What the courts have been doing since the 2003 Act is apply the guidelines by taking account or having regard to them. If the Secretary of State is reducing this debate to a semantic discussion about the meaning of the word “follow”, we have been wasting our time. I have a suspicion that “follow” means something more directional than “take account of”.
It is the hon. and learned Gentleman who has made it a semantic debate, because he tabled amendment 43, which proposes that “follow” be replaced by “have regard to”. There is a difference, and although I am not in favour of casuistry, I am in favour of semantics, because words are all we have, and they have meaning. There is a difference between “have regard to” and “follow” or “apply”. My point is that in clause 108(1)(a) we are seeking to apply or to follow—not have regard to—what Lord Justice Gage and his colleagues explicitly recommended.
They wanted a closer connection between the guidelines and what the courts were doing.
I remind the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham of two things. First, the changes proposed in the other Government amendments that I moved offer considerably more flexibility than the arrangements in the original Bill, as the hon. and learned Gentleman correctly suggested in Committee. Secondly, there is a very clear exception for the courts. Judges in court have great flexibility to refer to the whole of the sentencing guidelines when they judge that aggravating and mitigating factors make that appropriate. If they think that a sentence is outwith those guidelines, they are entitled to pass it if they believe that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to stay within the guidelines.
Does the Secretary of State accept that, when he advocates the use of the word “follow”, he is giving judges less discretion than they would have if the amendments tabled by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) and me were accepted?
I accept that to a degree, although there is not much difference. I am seeking to implement what Lord Justice Gage recommended when he pointed out that most of the working group had said that the test for departing from the guidelines should be made “more robust”. The people making that recommendation are not inexperienced in these matters.
That is something different, not “follow”.
The hon. Member for Cambridge says that that is not “follow”, but something different. I say to him that it is “follow”, but the suggested alteration to the current section 172 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 uses the verb “apply” rather than “follow”. I am perfectly happy to trade “follow” for “apply” because I do not know what the difference between those words is. I believe that they amount to the same thing.
First, and above all, the Government are trying to ensure respect and proper protection for the independence and autonomy of sentencers when they pass their sentences. That is critical: we need to provide considerable discretion, but we must also ensure that that discretion is exercised in a structured way that the public and other sentencers can understand. We are not fettering the judiciary, but we are saying that there should be a carefully moderated body of guidance. That guidance will be moderated by the process of drafting by the Sentencing Council and by the consideration that it will be given—not in the partisan bear pit of the House of Commons but in the more bipartisan Justice Committee.
When the guidance is finally endorsed by the Sentencing Council, perhaps following amendment, it will become the framework that sentencing judges and magistrates will be expected to follow. It will give them a great deal of flexibility, although they will have to make judgments about the starting point. For example, the existing robbery matrix offers considerable flexibility. Judges and magistrates have to make judgments about additional aggravating and mitigating factors—they can decide that those factors cover the whole of the range laid down for a sentence and not just one category of case within an offence range—and they can depart from the whole thing, if they consider that to be necessary and in the interests of justice. My hope is that we shall end up with greater consistency, which would be in the interests of justice, and of the public.
The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham made an interesting point about whether victims—and, by implication and to a degree, the public— had a role in the criminal justice system. I have great respect for the right hon. and learned Gentleman, who paid me the honour yesterday of supporting—
I was his only friend!
He was not quite my only friend, but they were few and far between. I was very grateful for his support, not least for where it came from and the level of information that lay behind it.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman’s view that victims do not have a proper role in the criminal justice system is, however, one that I respect but disagree with profoundly. One reason for our success in raising the confidence of those who experience the criminal justice system very considerably over the past dozen or so years—and it is also a factor in ensuring that, far from rising by 50 per cent., the level of crime as measured by the British crime survey actually went down by 39 per cent.—is the fact that we have sought to place the victim at the heart of the system. I am unapologetic about that.
My hon. Friends the Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) mentioned resources. If I may, I invite them not to press their amendment to a vote, but I accept the burden of the argument—that on a number of occasions Parliament has been invited to endorse new approaches to sentencing, only to find that the resources have not been made immediately available.
As a response, the Government have inserted proposals in the Bill that amount to virtually the same thing as amendment 161. Clauses 110 to 115—but, in this respect, clause 115 is the most important—contain duties placed on the Sentencing Council to assess the
“impact of policy and legislative proposals”
I accept that when enthusiastic Ministers—and I can claim to have been one on a number of occasions—have bright ideas about new sentences, those bright ideas need to be checked for their effectiveness and for their cost. When we seek to translate those ideas into legislative form, we must also be able to tell Parliament where the money will come from.
This is an admission of past mistakes.
My hon. Friend the Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) is muttering, but I am afraid that I cannot hear what he is saying as I am deaf in that ear. However, I shall give way, if that is what he wants.
Since the Minister invites me to join in, I can tell him that I was just wondering whether what he was saying was an admission of some past mistake about which more should be told.
I am full of past mistakes—
We are suffering from them.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough says that we are suffering from them, but I was about to say that my mistakes pale into insignificance when compared with the triumphs of this Administration, of whom I have been an adornment.
Name the triumphs!
Another hon. Gentleman on the Opposition Front Bench asks me to name the triumphs. I could name a number of them, but I shall name just one. According to the Conservative campaign guide of 1994, crime rose by 50 per cent. between 1979 and 1994. Under this Labour Government, crime has fallen by 39 per cent., which makes this the first Government since the war to achieve a fall in crime.
Will my right hon. Friend bear it in mind that part of that success was due to giving the youth justice system a clear purpose to reduce offending and reoffending? Will he deal with the amendments suggesting that the Sentencing Council should be given similar clarity of purpose?
I am glad that my right hon. Friend intervened with that remark, because it brings me to my last point. This is a parliamentary debate, and it is a good process. When I looked at the provisions on the Sentencing Council, I was a little surprised—even though I claim authorship of them—to find that although the purpose of the Sentencing Council was embedded in the clauses, it was not explicitly stated. Its purpose is to issue sentencing guidelines. I am happy to consider what my right hon. Friend has suggested, and to consider whether it would not be appropriate specifically to mention the importance of victims in clause 103(11), where we set out the matters to which the council must have regard. At the moment, we mention in subsection (11)(c)
“the need to promote public confidence in the criminal justice system”;
by implication, that includes victims, but they are not mentioned explicitly. I promise my right hon. Friend that I will examine both those matters before, and during, the Bill’s passage through the other place.
Does my right hon. Friend accept that the interests of victims are specifically linked to the reduction of offending and reoffending?
I absolutely do. I hope that I have satisfied the hon. and learned Member for Harborough in respect of amendment 43. If he reads Gage, he will see that what we are doing is entirely consistent with that report.
I will be brief, but perhaps I should first gently point out to the Secretary of State that crime has fallen in every western European country since 1995, except Belgium, so his claims for the unique success of his policy are a little odd.
I draw the Secretary of State’s attention to what the hon. Members for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and for Walthamstow (Mr. Gerrard) said about the problems in the probation service, which mean that no matter what is said in this place, certain sentences will not be available to the courts. Probation officers will have to tell the courts that some sentences are not available in the area. The ideal is what is proposed by the Conservatives in amendment 44, which deals with the relationship between total resources and sentences. However, in reality, if the resources are not provided, we end up with the position that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington talked about.
I am in a bit of a dilemma on amendment 43, although the discussion between Labour and Conservative Front Benchers about the meaning of “apply”, as opposed to “follow”, helped me to conclude that there is not much difference between what they said. However, to the extent that the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) is correct, and that what the Government propose is meant to be slightly more restrictive than what the Conservatives propose, I come down, in the end, on the Government’s side. That is not because I agree with what they are doing in the Bill, which is to say that we should follow guidelines that are mainly still about punition and the seriousness of the offence.
In an ideal world, the guidelines would say more about reducing reoffending and would be properly designed to draw the courts’ attention to sentences that they would otherwise probably not impose. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham is absolutely right: judges are not fantastically well informed about criminology, although perhaps they ought to be. In that ideal world, the guidelines should be followed, because it would mean that judges had to think about other sentences, and would have to give reasons before moving from them towards a more traditional, comfort-zone sentence.
On the amendments that I tabled, I was glad to hear what the Secretary of State said right at the end of his remarks; I take what he said to the right hon. Member for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael) to have been said to me, too, because we signed the same amendments. On the basis that the Secretary of State will consider what we said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 104
Sentencing ranges
Amendments made: 143, page 62, line 2, leave out subsections (1) to (4) and insert—
‘(1) This section applies to sentencing guidelines relating to a particular offence.
(2) The guidelines must, if the Council considers it appropriate given the nature of the offence, describe, by reference to one or both of the factors mentioned in subsection (3), different categories of case involving the commission of the offence which illustrate (in so far as it is possible to do so by reference to those factors only) the varying degrees of seriousness with which the offence may be committed.
(3) Those factors are—
(a) the offender’s culpability in committing the offence;
(b) the harm caused, or intended to be caused or which might foreseeably have been caused, by the offence.
(4) The guidelines must—
(a) specify the range of sentences (“the offence range”) which, in the opinion of the Council, it may be appropriate for a court to impose on an offender convicted of that offence, and
(b) if the guidelines describe different categories of case under subsection (2), specify for each category the range of sentences within the offence range which, in the opinion of the Council, it may be appropriate for a court to impose on an offender in a case which falls within the category.
(4A) The guidelines must also—
(a) specify the sentencing starting point in the offence range, or
(b) if the guidelines describe different categories of case under subsection (2), specify the sentencing starting point in the offence range for each of those categories.’.
144, page 62, line 29, at end insert ‘or the offender’.
145, page 62, line 42, leave out from first ‘the’ to end of line 43 and insert ‘offence range.’.
146, page 62, line 44, leave out subsection (8) and insert—
‘(8) The sentencing starting point in the offence range—
(a) for a category of case described in the guidelines under subsection (2), is the sentence within that range which the Council considers to be the appropriate sentence for cases within that category—
(i) before taking account of the factors listed in the guidelines under subsection (5), and
(ii) assuming the offender has pleaded not guilty, and
(b) where the guidelines do not describe categories of case under subsection (2), is the sentence within that range which the Council considers to be the appropriate sentence for the offence—
(i) before taking account of the factors listed in the guidelines under subsection (5), and
(ii) assuming the offender has pleaded not guilty.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Clause 108
Sentencing guidelines: duty of court
Amendment proposed: 43, page 65, line 12, leave out ‘follow’ and insert ‘have regard to’.—(Mr. Garnier.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Amendments made: 147, page 65, line 19, leave out ‘Subsection (3) applies’ and insert ‘Subsections (3) and (3A) apply’.
148, page 65, line 27, leave out paragraphs (a) and (b) and insert—
‘(a) where the offence-specific guidelines describe categories of case under section 104(2), to decide which of the categories most resembles P’s case in order to identify the sentencing starting point in the offence range, and
(b) in all cases, to impose on P in accordance with the offence-specific guidelines a sentence which is within the offence range.
‘(3A) In a case where a decision is made under subsection (3)(a), the range of sentences specified in the guidelines under section 104(4)(b) for the category concerned is to be disregarded when determining whether the court has discharged the duty imposed by subsection (1).’.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Clause 119
Interpretation of this Chapter
Amendments made: 149, page 70, line 40, at end insert—
‘“the offence range” has the meaning given by section 104(4)(a);’.
150, page 71, line 11, at end insert—
‘“the sentencing starting point”, in relation to the offence range, has the meaning given by section 104(8);’.—(Bridget Prentice.)
New Clause 12
Special counsel in proceedings concerning witness anonymity orders
‘(1) On any application for a witness anonymity order, the court must consider whether the appointment of special counsel to assist the court in deciding whether to grant the order would contribute significantly to the fairness of the proceedings, and must apply to the Attorney General for the appointment of such counsel if it decides that such an appointment would so contribute.
(2) No witness anonymity order may be granted where the court has applied to the Attorney General for the appointment of special counsel under subsection (1) until the Attorney General makes such an appointment, and if the Attorney General refuses to appoint special counsel on such an application by the court, the application for the witness anonymity order shall be refused forthwith.’.—(David Howarth.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 13—Effect of order on disclosure obligations—
‘A witness anonymity order takes precedence over any obligation of a prosecutor to disclose material to the defence, and, accordingly, no such obligation shall require a prosecutor to reveal the identity of the witness or information that might enable the witness to be identified.’.
Government amendment 142.
Amendment 155, clause 63, page 37, line 16, leave out ‘(8)’ and insert ‘(8A)’.
Amendment 141, page 37, line 40, at end insert—
‘(8A) The condition in this subsection is that the Director of Public Prosecutions has given his consent to the application.’.
Amendment 58, clause 71, page 41, line 20, at end insert
‘and must be made as early as is reasonably possible.’.
Amendment 140, page 42, line 5, at end insert—
‘(7A) The court has the power to appoint special counsel to represent the interests of the defendant in his or her absence, if it appears to the court to be appropriate to do so in circumstances of the case.’.
Amendment 59, page 42, line 7, at end insert—
‘(9) For the purpose of considering an application for a witness anonymity order the court may appoint an independent counsel to assist the court and, without limiting the directions that the court may make, the court direct the independent counsel—
(a) to enquire into the matters that are set out in sections 72 and 73 and any other matter that the court may deem relevant, and
(b) to report his findings to the court.
(10) Where an independent counsel has been appointed, the party who applied for a witness anonymity order shall make available to the independent counsel all the information that is relevant to the proceedings that is in the possession of that party.
(11) Where an independent counsel has been appointed, provision shall be made by order for the fees for the professional services of the independent counsel together with reasonable expenses to be determined and paid from money appropriated by Parliament for that purpose.’.
Amendment 60, clause 72, page 42, line 11, leave out ‘satisfied’ and insert ‘sure’.
Amendment 61, page 42, line 11, leave out ‘C’ and insert ‘D’.
Amendment 160, page 42, line 15, leave out ‘serious damage to property’ and insert
‘damage to property serious enough, either in itself or cumulatively (taken with other threats to property or to the welfare of persons), for a reasonable person with the resources of the witness to be intimidated into refusing to give evidence’.
Amendment 62, page 42, line 19, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
‘(4) Condition B is that the making of a witness anonymity order would not deprive the defendant or (where there is more than one defendant) any defendant of a fair trial.’.
Amendment 63, page 42, line 23, after first ‘not’, insert
‘and could not reasonably be expected to’.
Amendment 64, page 42, line 25, at end insert—
‘(5A) Condition D is that there is no reason to believe that the witness has a motive or a tendency to be dishonest, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and (where applicable) to the witness’s previous convictions or the witness’s relationship with the defendant or if more than one with any defendant, of any associates of the defendant or if more than one, any defendant or with any witness to be called in the proceedings and to any other consideration that may be relevant to the issue as the court may think appropriate.’.
Amendment 19, page 42, leave out line 30 and insert—
‘(b) that there would be damage to property serious enough, either in itself or cumulatively (taken with other threats to property or to the welfare of persons), for a reasonable person with the resources of the witness to be intimidated into refusing to give evidence,’.
Amendment 65, clause 73, page 42, line 33, leave out ‘C’ and insert ‘D’.
Amendment 66, page 42, line 39, at end insert—
‘(aa) the principle that witness anonymity orders are justified only in exceptional cases;’.
Amendment 67, page 42, line 39, at end insert—
‘(aa) the gravity of the offence;’.
Amendment 68, page 42, line 42, at end insert
‘and whether there is other evidence that corroborates the witness’s evidence’.
Amendment 69, page 43, line 6, leave out paragraph (e).
Amendment 70, clause 75, page 43, line 44, at end insert—
‘(6) For the purposes of considering whether to discharge, vary or further vary the order the courts may appoint an independent counsel to assist the court and, without limiting the directions that the court may make, the court may direct the independent counsel—
(a) to enquire into any matter that may be relevant to any issue set out in subsections (1) and (2), and
(b) to report his findings to the court.
(7) Where an independent counsel has been appointed, the party who applied for the order to discharge or to vary or further vary the existing order must make available to the independent counsel all the information in relation to the proceedings that is in the party’s possession, and where the court is acting on its own initiative the independent counsel shall be provided with all such information as the court may think appropriate.
(8) Where an independent counsel has been appointed, provisions shall be made by order for the fees for the professional services of the independent counsel together with reasonable expenses to be determined and paid from money appropriated by Parliament for that purpose.’.
Amendment 71, clause 77, page 45, line 9, at end insert—
‘(4A) For the purposes of considering whether to discharge or vary the order the appeal court may appoint an independent counsel to assist the appeal court and, without limiting the directions that the appeal court may give, the appeal court may direct the independent counsel—
(a) to enquire into any matter that may be relevant to any issue as is set out in subsection (2), and
(b) to report his findings to the appeal court.
(4B) Where an independent counsel has been appointed, the appeal court may direct that the independent counsel shall be provided with such information as the appeal court shall deem appropriate.
(4C) Where an independent counsel has been appointed, provisions shall be made for the fees of the independent counsel together with reasonable expenses to be determined and paid from money appropriated by Parliament for that purpose.’.
Government amendment 131.
We come to the anonymous witnesses part of the Bill. Members will recall that the anonymous witness provisions in the existing law passed through the House in one day last year, and through the other place in two days. At that point, we were promised proper consideration of the provisions in a full debate, in a full Bill. We are now left with a Report stage, effectively on that Bill, of 21 minutes, which is entirely unsatisfactory.
Let me go through three of the main problems that subsist in the provisions. The first is dealt with by new clause 12; it is that the Government have resisted putting in the Bill the mechanism under which independent or special counsel are brought in to advise or help the court as it decides whether to make a witness anonymity order. One of the problems is that an anonymous witness might be prejudiced against the defendant in a way that would become clear only if the defence were able to cross examine them with the benefit of knowing who they were. The person might seem to be only a witness to some external fact in the world at the time of the crime—to something that they saw or heard, rather than to what they thought the defendant did or said. The issue of possible prejudice against the defendant might not be obvious at the time, but that person—even if apparently only a witness to an external event—might turn out to be associated with an enemy or rival of the defendant.
In such circumstances, making a witness anonymity order might well be the wrong thing to do, but that point would not come out unless someone other than the prosecution had access to all the papers and could ask pertinent questions. Given the circumstances, that job clearly could not be done by the defence; that raises the possibility and in many cases the necessity of appointing special counsel to assist the court to do it.
In addition, there might well be cases in which the judge was uncertain whether to grant an order, because the status and credibility of the witness were unclear. In such a case the judge might be tempted to deny a witness anonymity order when further inquiries by independent counsel would have revealed that there was nothing to worry about. In such a case, independent counsel would strengthen the case for such an order.
I am not claiming that special counsel should be appointed in all cases. In the Mayers case, the Lord Chief Justice said that there were cases in which special counsel would help and cases in which they would not. The test that I suggest in new clause 12 for the appointment of special counsel is based on the words of the Lord Chief Justice in that case:
“whether the appointment of special counsel…would contribute significantly to the fairness of the proceedings”.
All I suggest is that the appointment of special counsel should be thought about—no more than that—in every case.
New clause 12 also deals with a possible problem with how the system works now. Special counsel are not appointed by the court, but by the Attorney-General after an application from the judge. So far, special counsel have always been appointed when requested, but what happens if the Attorney-General refuses? There is no provision for that situation, but new clause 12 settles the matter by saying that if the judge asks for special counsel and the Attorney-General delays or refuses, there cannot be a witness anonymity order at that time.
The second problem is more technical and is dealt with by new clause 13. It is the problem of what happens in multiple-defendant cases when a defendant, rather than the prosecution, asks for a witness anonymity order. The Bill says that the other defendants should not discover the identity of the witness, but adds that the defendant has to tell the prosecution the identity of the witness. The problem is that the prosecution have duties of disclosure to the other defendants and it is possible that the identity of the witness, who was supposed to be anonymous, would be revealed indirectly to the other defendants via the prosecution’s duties to disclose. Nothing in the relevant legislation—the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996—definitively rules out that possibility. In Committee, the Minister said that there was no problem because the witness anonymity order took precedence over any duties to disclose, but nothing in the Bill says that and new clause 13 simply puts into it what the Minister said in Committee.
The third problem identified in Committee has resulted in amendments 160 and 19. It is the problem of what to do about cases in which the witness is not threatened with personal injury—there is no threat to life or limb—but there is a threat to property not linked to such injury, such as a threat to burn down a lock-up shop or to damage a parked car.
The debate in Committee was initially about whether property damage should be included at all. There are doubts about whether property threats that are entirely separate from threats of personal injury meet human rights standards. As the debate developed, however, it became clear that there were plausible circumstances on particular estates where such threats, in combination with a general atmosphere of threat and intimidation, would be all too effective in intimidating potential witnesses. The issue then became how the Bill dealt with that problem and whether it properly captured the real-life situation. The Bill as it stands simply talks about serious damage to property, but the question is what that means. Does it mean merely expensive property? If the test relates merely to how valuable the property is, it would tend to favour rich witnesses over poor ones. In any case, that test is not related to the main issue, which is intimidation, not the seriousness of the damage in terms of the value of the property.
Amendments 160 and 19 are tabled in a spirit of compromise to try to clarify the situation. They suggest that the threat to property counts as serious enough if it means that a reasonable person in the position of the witness is intimidated into not giving evidence. The seriousness of the damage to the witness’s property would be judged in terms of their resources, so that damage to the modest property of an impoverished witness would be taken more seriously than damage to the valuable property of a very rich witness.
I want to let my hon. Friend know that in our report, the Joint Committee on Human Rights is wholly with him on what he has said on having, if not statutory clarification, at least guidance on the threshold of what serious damage to property is on human rights grounds, and on the need for special counsel.
I thank my hon. Friend for that news. I do not wish to take up more than half the time on Report for this very important matter, so I will now sit down.
I will be brief, because we are really up against the knives. I fully endorse what the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) said about the restricted timetable. I would repeat what I said yesterday, when we had an even more egregious example of ridiculous timetabling, with the result that seven and a half separate subject areas were denied debate.
This group of amendments is divided into two parts, the first of which relates to the need for special advocates. The hon. Gentleman and I advanced that in Committee. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) has tabled amendments that reflect not only what we discussed in Committee but what was discussed last July during the passage of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008. When we debated these provisions under the emergency legislation last summer, the Government promised that they would much more closely examine the process and procedure for the appointment of special advocates or counsel in cases of this type. There have now been several cases that have gone to the Crown court and, to a lesser extent, to the magistrates court, in which applications for witness anonymity orders have been sought. Of that number, many have been granted, while some have not. However, if I remember correctly our deliberations in Committee, the Government were unable to tell us in how many cases the courts, using their own inherent powers, granted leave for a special advocate to appear on behalf of the court itself or to assist one or other of the parties.
That is an important omission, and the last few minutes of debate on Report are inadequate to deal with the matter. If the hon. Member for Cambridge or my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham are inclined to press their amendments to a Division, we will support them.
I shall deal briefly with the two technical Government amendments in this group. Amendment 142 refines the anonymity provisions to take into account those rare situations where the duty of non-disclosure imposed by an investigation anonymity order may come into conflict with a duty to disclose an anonymous informant’s identity that happens to arise by virtue of some other legislation or the common law. Indeed, the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) alluded to that. The new provision is intended to clarify in what circumstances disclosure of information in pursuance of a conflicting duty to disclose would amount to an offence. Government amendment 131 simply extends the provisions of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008, which are to be repealed following the commencement of the replacement provisions in this Bill.
I shall now deal, at least in part, with the amendments and new clauses tabled by the hon. Member for Cambridge, and if I can in the time remaining, I shall at least refer to some of the amendments tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg). On new clause 12, as the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), explained in Committee, there is no evidence that the current non-statutory arrangements are not working well. The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) asked how many cases there had been. There have been two since the enactment of the emergency legislation where the court asked the Attorney-General to appoint special counsel, and the request was granted in both cases. As the House will be well aware, special counsel is already available in anonymity applications under the common law. We do not see any reason to change that.
New clause 13 follows a similar new clause tabled in Committee and it relates to the effect of trial anonymity orders in relation to disclosure obligations under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. As the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston, made clear in Committee, a trial anonymity order overrides prosecution obligations to disclose material to the defence to the extent the trial court thinks fit in any particular case. We therefore consider the new clause unnecessary.
Clauses 62 and 63 make it clear who can apply for an investigation anonymity order. It would not be appropriate for the Director of Public Prosecutions to have to consent to every investigation anonymity order application, first because the orders are an investigative tool that should be available to the police, and secondly because the police and any prosecuting authority specified in the Bill are capable of deciding whether to exercise the powers or not without reference to the DPP. The orders are not linked to trial anonymity orders; they are an independent tool. It might not be appropriate for the prosecuting authority, in the form of the DPP, to be party to an investigative order that would be pursued by the police. There will, however, be close co-operation between the police and the Crown Prosecution Service in any case, under the guidelines.
The hon. Member for Cambridge also tabled amendments 160 and 19, which would alter the nature of the test that in clause 72 the court applies when assessing whether an anonymity order is necessary to prevent any serious damage to property. My concern is that such a change would make the value of the property relative to the total wealth of the witness relevant in considering whether the witness’s fear is reasonable.
I would think it odd to suggest that someone’s personal wealth should somehow affect how intimidated they might reasonably feel if their house were deliberately burned down. I believe that the amendment is unnecessary because the clause will require the court to have regard to any reasonable fear on the part of the witness that there would be serious damage to property if they were identified. The intimidating effect of damage to property is therefore already captured.
On the series of amendments tabled by the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, we are not far apart on the principles behind some of the things that he wants, but the sort of detail that he requests in his amendments is not appropriate in primary legislation. We believe that the criminal procedure rules are the right venue for dealing with such detail. As an intermediate measure pending the making of those rules, the judiciary issued a practice direction on 28 July last year. The relevant passage stated:
“An application for a witness anonymity order should be made as early as possible and within any period directed by the court.”
The criminal procedure rule committee is currently working on detailed provision for the procedures governing applications for witness anonymity orders. In the meantime, we are content for the courts to operate in accordance with the practice direction.
I assume that the intention behind amendment 60 is to require the court to be satisfied to the criminal standard—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—that the conditions for making a witness anonymity order have been met. We debated that in detail during the passage of the emergency legislation. There are many contexts in criminal legislation in which a court is required to be “satisfied” that applicable conditions are met. It is the function of the court to exercise its judicial judgment about that. It will either be satisfied or it will not, and I believe that that is the right term to use. It is commonly applied by the courts in this country.
Amendment 62 would redraft condition B to replace the reference to anonymity being consistent with a fair trial with a reference to anonymity not depriving the defendant of a fair trial. I agree with the right hon. and learned Gentleman that it is of paramount concern that defendants receive a fair trial, but we believe that the current wording guarantees that they will. The amendment would also replace the reference to “the defendant” with a reference that explicitly covers multi-handed cases. I am happy to confirm that the Bill already covers such cases. When the court considers granting an anonymity order, it must have regard to the impact on all the defendants, and the term “the defendant” in clause 72(4) is to be construed accordingly.
Amendment 63 would mean that in deciding whether condition C is met, the court must believe not only that a witness would not be prepared to testify without an order but that he could not reasonably be expected to do so. In other words, it would add a new objective criterion for condition C to be satisfied. My starting point is that clause 72(5)(a) essentially reproduces section 4(5)(b) of the emergency legislation, which is working well in practice. I would therefore need to be persuaded that such detail is needed in an amendment. In applying the consideration in clause 73(2)(f) of whether it is reasonably practicable to protect the witness by measures other than the anonymity order, the court is likely to consider whether it is reasonable to expect the witness to testify. It will also be able to take into consideration such other matters as it considers relevant, including the reasonableness of the witness’s fear. We therefore do not consider it necessary to change the current framework.
Amendment 64 would make the witness’s honesty, which is currently set out in clause 73(2)(e) as a consideration that the court must have regard to, a fourth condition for making a witness anonymity order. Again, we debated that subject during the passage of the emergency legislation. The amendment is unnecessary because it goes to the question of whether the defendant will have a fair trial. That, of course, is already catered for in condition B.
On that basis I cannot accept the amendments, but I hope that I have clarified to some extent the Government’s position on them. I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments and that they will support the Government amendments.
I am not satisfied with the Government’s responses. On property, the Under-Secretary gave an example of a house in a personal injury case, whereas I referred to property unrelated to personal injury. In those circumstances, the wealth of the witness is immensely important.
I am afraid that the current guidelines maintain that independent counsel is exceptional, but that is not enough. They are also confused about the role of independent counsel, who are there to work for the court, not—
Debate interrupted (Programme Order, 23 March).
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83E), That the clause be read a Second time.
The Deputy Speaker then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).
Clause 61
Investigation anonymity orders
Amendment made: 142, page 36, line 4, at end insert—
‘( ) A person who discloses such information as regards another person as is described in subsection (1) may not rely on subsection (8) in a case where—
(a) it might have been determined that the person was required or permitted to withhold the information (whether on grounds of public interest immunity or on other grounds), but
(b) the person disclosed the information without there having been a determination as to whether the person was required or permitted to withhold the information.
Disclosure for the purposes of seeking such a determination is not a contravention of an investigation anonymity order.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Clause 88
Examination of accused through intermediary
Amendment made: 129, page 51, leave out lines 27 to 38 and insert—
‘(7) Any examination of the accused in pursuance of a direction under subsection (3) must take place in the presence of such persons as Criminal Procedure Rules or the direction may provide and in circumstances in which—
(a) the judge or justices (or both) and legal representatives acting in the proceedings are able to see and hear the examination of the accused and to communicate with the intermediary,
(b) the jury (if there is one) are able to see and hear the examination of the accused, and
(c) where there are two or more accused in the proceedings, each of the other accused is able to see and hear the examination of the accused.’.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Schedule 21
Repeals
Amendment made: 131, page 228, line 34, at end insert—
‘Section 10(1) to (7).’. —(Bridget Prentice.)
Third Reading
Queen’s and Prince of Wales’s consent signified.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
This is an important Bill, which has been much improved by the process of scrutiny in the House. Let me record my thanks, and those of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), to all the Opposition Members for their constructive approach. The hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier), the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham), and the hon. Members for Cambridge (David Howarth) and for Cardiff, Central (Jenny Willott) have been ready to engage in debate in a helpful and positive way.
I commend the valuable and thoughtful contributions from my right hon. Friends the Members for Cardiff, South and Penarth (Alun Michael) and for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East (Mr. Howarth) and my hon. Friends the Members for Bridgend (Mrs. Moon), for Stafford (Mr. Kidney) and for Hendon (Mr. Dismore). Let me also thank the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk for the kind words and good wishes that he sent to my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston. She was very disappointed not to be here to participate in debates on matters that are her policy responsibility. However, I am sure she will be pleased that we have seen the Bill through this evening.
I thank all the officials who have been involved in the many different parts of the Bill. I thank the Public Bill officials, the Chairs of the Public Bill Committee, Hansard and the Public Bill Office—and, of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas) and his counterparts, who, through the usual channels, ensured that the Bill had a smooth passage both in Committee and on the Floor of the House.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I said, on Second Reading and subsequently, that we would listen to those expressing legitimate concerns about a number of provisions in the Bill, and that we were open to constructive suggestions for improving those provisions. We have listened, and we have responded.
There were fears that the provisions in respect of certified coroners’ investigations were drawn too widely and did not provide for sufficient judicial oversight. We have narrowed the criteria for certification of an investigation, and have removed from the Secretary of State the decision whether a certified inquest should proceed without a jury. As the Bar Council and the Criminal Bar Association have acknowledged, those and other changes to clause 11 have
“fundamentally recast the proposals for certified investigations”.
There was concern about the scope of the power to make information-sharing orders. We have now withdrawn clause 154, and will consider carefully the views expressed by all interested parties. There was also concern about the possibility that the Sentencing Council would be required to operate within too rigid a structure for the formulation of sentencing guidelines, and that the requirement for sentencers to follow the guidelines was too inflexible. We have recast those provisions so that both the council and the sentencers will have greater flexibility.
Another worry was that the provisions in part 1 did not go far enough in monitoring the actions that coroners recommended to prevent future deaths, and that senior coroners were being unfairly denied the opportunity to apply for the post of deputy chief coroner. Again, we have listened and responded. As the Bill approaches the end of its Commons stages, we will continue to listen, to reflect and, when we are convinced by the arguments, to respond.
Although it is understandable that much of our deliberation has been focused on the provisions that divide us, we should not lose sight of the many other provisions that have attracted cross-party support. Too little has been said about the reforms of the coroner and justice systems, and the beneficial impact that they will have on bereaved families, victims and witnesses.
One of the matters about which nothing was said—because my amendments were not reached—was the question of complaints against coroners. Will the Minister assure me that the Bill, if enacted, will allow individuals to complain not necessarily about the decisions of coroners, but about the behaviour of coroners who have left families, as in the Marchioness case, or a family—as in the Jeremiah Duggan case—with no confidence in their work?
I will come to the charter for the bereaved in a moment. For me personally, it is one of the most important parts of the Bill. It puts the bereaved families at the heart of the coronial system. I have met the Marchioness victims and talked with many other bereaved family organisations. There will be an opportunity for families to appeal to the chief coroner if they feel that a coroner has been wrong in a decision. In addition, the charter will for the first time give bereaved families the opportunity to know what standard of service they should expect from coroners. I am glad that the hon. Gentleman intervened because I wanted to ensure that that was on the record. In modernising this ancient office, which has not been touched for the best part of over 100 years, we are putting the needs of bereaved families at the forefront of coroners’ investigations.
One of the other issues that was discussed at great length in Committee but that unfortunately we did not have an opportunity to debate on the Floor of the House was that of the disparities between funding in different coroner areas. There are concerns that the Bill does not tackle that strongly enough. Will the Minister give more thought to the possibility of allowing the chief coroner extra powers and some more teeth to be able to tackle problems arising when not enough funding is provided in a local coronial area?
The chief coroner will have a number of powers in setting the national standards and making sure that there is consistency across England and Wales. I spoke to the Local Government Association conference this morning. We will work closely with local authorities to ensure that resources are in place for coroners to be able to carry out their duties properly. As a result of the reforms, there may be fewer inquests for coroners to deal with: because of the introduction of medical examiners, who will look at the death certificates, many cases that presently go to a coroner may not need to do so. Resources may thus be freed up in that way.
The proposed charter will ensure that the next of kin is notified quickly when a death is reported to the coroner and it will be explained to them why a post-mortem is necessary. It will ensure that family members are given regular updates on the progress of a coroner’s investigation, and enable inquests to be held closer to the home of the deceased’s family. It will also ensure that family members have, on request and wherever possible, access to all documents relevant to the inquest and that they will be able to participate fully in the inquest proceedings. It will also confer new and accessible rights of appeal against coroners’ decisions. I hope that that answers the proper questions that were asked by the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) on that matter.
Sitting above the locally delivered coroner service will be the new chief coroner providing strategic leadership, setting and monitoring national minimum standards, managing the operational response to unusual circumstances which crop up from time to time, and ensuring excellent training arrangements.
The death of a loved one is traumatic at any time. Where that death is violent or unnatural, it is all the harder to come to terms with. At such times, bereaved families want answers to the inevitable questions surrounding the death of their loved one and want to be treated with understanding and compassion. Coroners and their staff have a difficult task to perform, and many provide an excellent service to the bereaved. These reforms will help to ensure that all bereaved families have the high standards of service that they are entitled to expect.
This morning when I spoke to the Local Government Association, I said that the Bill was putting bereaved families at the heart of the coroner service and that that was the most important thing it could do. André Rebello, secretary of the Coroners’ Society of England and Wales, who spoke after me, said that it does something else: it gives those families fairness and justice. He is absolutely right.
Victims and witnesses who come into contact with the criminal justice system are equally entitled to receive a high standard of service. The prevention and detection of crime and bringing offenders to justice is not the job just of the police or the prosecutors or the courts. They need the co-operation and support of the wider public. If a member of the public has a poor experience as a witness, who can blame them for not wanting to stick their neck out on a second occasion? So we must put the needs of victims and witnesses at the heart of the justice system. The provisions in the Bill are directed to that end.
The law should only allow a murder charge to be reduced to manslaughter in appropriate and clearly defined circumstances. Those who intentionally incite hatred against gay people by using threatening words or behaviour should not be able to excuse their actions on freedom of speech grounds. Those witnesses who bravely come forward to give information about a gang-related homicide should be able to do so in the knowledge that their identity will be protected. Vulnerable and intimidated witnesses should be given all necessary assistance to help them to give their best evidence in court. Victims and the wider public should have confidence that there is consistency in sentencing across the country.
The Minister is a neighbouring MP and she knows that in this context one issue that often comes our way is the need for the protection of witnesses, even to the extent of having to provide a safe place for them or their business to move to. Will she give an assurance that those systems that involve the police, sometimes the Court Service and often local government, are now robust enough to deliver as quickly as is necessary that safety and protection that our constituents periodically need?
Of course I agree with the hon. Gentleman about how important that is, and I think the witness protection programme is sufficiently robust to deal with exactly that.
I visited one of my local schools earlier this week. It has been doing some work on knife and gun crime, which the hon. Gentleman knows is very important in our constituencies. The people at the school referred me to the Children’s Commissioner survey published last week, which showed that 37 per cent. of young people are afraid to come forward as witnesses in gun or knife crime-related situations. They conducted a survey in their own school, which revealed that 88 per cent. of them felt they would be fearful of being witnesses. This Bill changes that for such young people, and that is hugely important for them. Victims should not have to suffer a second time when they see the person who inflicted pain and suffering on them, perhaps by killing a loved one, being able to cash in on their notoriety. That, too, is dealt with in the Bill, and will be part of helping victims feel they are at the centre of the justice system.
It is through these measures that the Bill will help to deliver justice: justice for victims; justice for witnesses; justice for bereaved families; and justice for the communities we represent. It is for that reason that I hope Members will wholeheartedly give the Bill a Third Reading, and I commend it to the House.
May I begin by thanking the Minister for her kind words about the way in which the Opposition have engaged with this Bill, and by joining my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Norfolk (Mr. Bellingham) in sending good wishes for a speedy recovery to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle), who cannot be here with us this evening?
As with every plum duff, this Bill has some good points that persuade us—just—to allow it to pass through to the other place, where its more hopeless, useless and egregious provisions can be removed or amended. I want to remind the House of a passage from a Government Green Paper published yesterday, as it tells us a lot about how this Government think, and what motivates them in coming to this House with legislation. The passage is from paragraph 4.2 of “Rights and responsibilities: developing our constitutional framework”, published yesterday by the Secretary of State. It reads as follows:
“The possible range of approaches to a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities represents a continuum. At one end, it might take the form of a declaratory and symbolic statement. At the other lies a set of rights and responsibilities directly enforceable by the individual in the courts. Along the continuum there are options including some form of statement of principles which, endorsed by Parliament, might inform legislation—as well as public authority and court decisions—while not necessarily giving rise to enforceable individual rights. Ultimately, different categories of principles, rights and responsibilities could have different legal effects, so that a Bill of Rights and Responsibilities could encompass a range of legal effects and mechanisms for enforcement.”
That is pretty vacuous, but if one were to substitute “Bill of Rights and Responsibilities” with “Coroners and Justice Bill”, one would have an equally apt description of the vacuity behind much of the thinking that has created this Bill.
We welcome the reform of the coronial system in part 1 of the Bill, subject to our deep concerns about the fact that clause 11 remains; we have no doubt that the other place will give that a thorough investigation. We also welcome other aspects of the Bill, outside part 1, that deal with anonymity in investigations. As I said in Committee, we take on board and fully understand the need for anonymity in the stages of investigation into many of the gangland attacks and offences that take place on the estates in our inner cities.
We also welcomed the revival, if that is the correct expression, of the Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008 in respect of witness anonymity orders, which chapter 2—clause 70 and those following—provides for, subject to a number of matters of detail. We welcomed the measures on vulnerable and intimidated witnesses and the extension of live video links for the giving of evidence by vulnerable or frightened people. We have had discussions and disagreement this evening about the way in which the Sentencing Council will be required to arrive at conclusions and recommendations, and whether they should be followed or taken account of. However, as a matter of general principle, we do not object to the existence of a sentencing council; indeed, we have understood its positive features since 2003. We were prepared to welcome other matters, including those relating to the exploitation of criminal memoirs.
We are not only disappointed with the content of some of the provisions on important subjects such as murder—the Government’s refusal to accepts amendments to do with developmental maturity in cases involving diminished responsibility, and in respect of youngsters as well as adult killers—but we are deeply concerned about the way in which the Government have refused to remove the issue of sexual infidelity from the loss of control provisions in clauses 41 to 43. They deal with what used to be called provocation.
The Bill has contained some good things, some less good things and some plainly dreadful things, one of which the Government did recognise through the withdrawal of what was clause 152 and what became clause 154. That was an appalling clause, but it was all of a piece with their attitude to individual rights and the relationship between the state and the citizen. Each time they come forward with a provision to increase the power of the state, to diminish the rights of the individual or to create some new criminal offence, they say that it is only a small reduction of liberty or a small new offence, but that it is strictly necessary in this particular case. When these things are looked at individually, they may not look too bad, but this is—
Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?
If I may finish the sentence, the Secretary of State may have as much time as he wishes—[Interruption.] Well, he is very good at asking long questions. He is also very good at giving long answers—[Interruption.] I forget the name of the Whip’s constituency, but I do hope that his constituents realise what a valuable contribution he makes to our deliberations.
This is a salami-slicing approach to our rights and liberties. Consider the catalogue of infringements engineered by this Government—when one reconstructs the salami, one is left with bad meat.
On the issue of rights, is the Conservative party committed to keeping the Human Rights Act on the statute book?
The Secretary of State knows precisely what the answer to that question is because he had a discussion recently with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve). Our Bill of rights will replace it.
Yes or no?
I know that the Secretary of State is deaf in one ear, but he heard the answer clearly yesterday. I repeat that we intend to remove it from the statute book and replace it with our better version—
So that’s a no, then?
It is a no; that is right. Well done! I am delighted. It is almost a no that this Bill will get a Third Reading. The other place will not suffer the same time constraints and will not be bullied by Government business managers, and I am sure that it will produce a far better Bill.
Yesterday, the Government’s timetable motion allowed only the clause 11 discussion to take place. All the other stuff on homicide, assisted suicide and other aspects of the coronial system had to fall by the wayside, and that is not a good way to construct legislation. Today, we were not able to complete all the timetabled business. Is that because the Government did not want those issues discussed? Did they not have the self-confidence to allow that discussion? Either way, we are left with a duff bit of plum duff, a curate’s egg. I hope that the other place will not feel in the least bit inhibited by the Government’s attitude to civil rights or the proper way to deal with legislation, and I trust that when the Bill comes back to this place in a few months, it will be greatly improved.
May I also send my best wishes to the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle)? I hope that she recovers quickly from her illness.
The Minister was right to say that several parts of the Bill have received all-party support. She was also right to say that it is a better Bill than when it was introduced, especially after the removal of the information-sharing provisions. As I said yesterday, the jurors’ inquest provisions are slightly better than they were when we started. However, as we made clear yesterday, they have not improved enough. They still permit the exclusion of juries in cases in which it is essential that they are involved, and they still far too easily exclude the families involved.
The rest of the Bill has scarcely been scrutinised at all and it is scandalous that we should pass the Bill in its present form. Several of the matters that we have discussed tonight are still not right. The data commissioner, for example, still has insufficient powers, especially over the private sector. The Sentencing Council provisions are still biased in favour of an old-fashioned, backward-looking view of the criminal justice system. The anonymous witness provisions are still seriously flawed. They fail to recognise the importance of special counsel and the Government have not responded to the penetrating debate in Committee about threats to property and how they should be handled in this legislation. We have not even reached the provisions for criminal memoirs and, although they are fine in principle, many of the details are confused and will cause serious difficulty if they reach the statute book in their present form. Above all, however, what happened yesterday means that the Bill cannot be passed in its present form. The motion before us says that “the Bill be now read a Third time”, and it is the word “now” to which I object. Virtually none of the provisions on coroners were reached. Amendments to do with the duties of coroners, the make-up of inquest juries and how the medical examiner system would work and be governed were simply not discussed. There are serious problems in all those elements of the Bill.
Even more important—and for me this is crucial—is the issue of the law on murder. The Bill reforms the whole law on murder, and the defences against it, but discussion in Committee revealed important weaknesses in the Government’s approach to what is the most serious of crimes. We put forward an entirely different approach that took into account the Law Commission’s original recommendations—which the Government ignored—and what was said in Committee. Those proposals have not been discussed at all.
In many respects, the law on murder—what counts as murder—remains too narrow for some cases and too broad for others. What counts as murder does not respond fully to what the public would understand by the word “murder”. Many deaths that the law would see as murder would be counted as accidental by most people, yet many other deaths are counted by the law as only manslaughter when most people would regard them as murder. That aspect of the law, which the Law Commission attempted to reform, has not been reformed at all by the Bill.
The Government’s diminished responsibility reforms are retrograde. They introduce far too much detail and specificity into a defence whose main function is to allow the jury to do justice. The introduction of an over medicalised form of defence—as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) said, it does not include any consideration of developmental immaturity in young people—is only part of the problem. Other difficulties include the fact that the Bill uses far too strict a notion of causation, with the result that the Government are restricting a defence that should not be restricted.
The Bill proposes that the notion of provocation to murder should be replaced by a defence of loss of control, but that is entirely unsatisfactory. In Committee, it became clear that the Government were jamming together two different types of situation. In one, a person can claim to have been justifiably angry at the victim of the homicide, with the result that the charge can be reduced to manslaughter. It is right in such cases that the defence—it is a sort of “blame the victim” defence—should be as narrow as possible. The test of loss of control remains perfectly proper in those cases, but the Bill confuses them with cases in which the defendant’s fear of what might happen, rather than his anger, is at issue.
Cases in the latter category include those that involve abused wives, but the Government have insisted, in the way that the Bill has been drafted, on maintaining a requirement for loss of control in those cases. I do not think that justice can be done if loss of control is included in such cases. Many of us came to the conclusion that cases based on anger and on fear should be entirely separate, yet the Government have not allowed any debate on that. I think that we are on the edge of a historic mistake in the law on murder, and it has all come about thanks to the procedural foul-ups in the way that the Government set up the debate.
The Bill is still seriously defective. In one regard—the proposed secret, juryless inquests—it is objectionable, but it has not been scrutinised enough. I cannot vote for, and must vote against, a motion that includes that word “now”.
I should like to speak briefly in support of the aspects of the Bill, as amended, that have an impact on Scotland. Of course, some of the matters raised in the debate, and some amendments—some pursued, some dropped—were contentious, but they affect only England and Wales, although there are minor provisions affecting Northern Ireland. I want to speak about the amendments, tabled for the first time yesterday, on fatal accident inquiries into overseas military deaths.
For the past 41 years, the bodies of service personnel stationed in Scotland who suffered a military death overseas have been repatriated, but there have never been legal proceedings in Scotland. All bodies returned to the UK were returned to England, where coroners’ courts undertook their duty of helping families to understand the circumstances of the death of loved ones. I have attended coroners’ inquests in Oxfordshire, and I pay tribute to coroners who have spent time trying to get to the bottom of tragic circumstances.
The Ministers involved, both here and in Edinburgh, have recognised that the current situation is no longer tenable. It is not fair that the English and Welsh legal system should carry all responsibility for inquiring into the background of overseas military deaths, while the Scots legal system—an excellent legal system—plays no part. I am pleased that there has been a confluence of interest in getting the situation resolved. It has been a technical process, and there are issues between the legal systems. However, a mechanism has been agreed for the repatriation of bodies and the transferral of cases, should that be necessary. In truth, we do not know how the mechanism will operate, although it was agreed in good faith. I hope that the proceedings will never be needed. Of course, we hope that nobody dies overseas in military service, but at a time when the UK military has a very fast tempo of military operations, sadly there are too-frequent deaths. Unfortunately, it is to be expected that the amendments, now part of the Bill, will move into operation.
People have listened in recent months and years to the families of service personnel, whether it be to those involved in the recent tragic case of Nimrod XV230, to Rose Gentle or to many other service families in Scotland, who have said that the burden and stress put on their families by having to travel far to coroners’ inquests down south was very difficult. The changes will remedy all that. We will look closely at how the system operates in practice.
Those are the only measures in the Bill that relate to Scotland; all the other matters of contention—data sharing, murder and assisted suicide—relate entirely to England and Wales. There are also some provisions that pertain to Northern Ireland. The only measures in the Bill that apply to Scotland relate to fatal accident inquiries into overseas military deaths, and that is why the Scottish National party will support the Government tonight.
There are elements of the Bill with which I profoundly disagree, and I shall have no hesitation in following the advice of my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) this evening. I want to touch on the matters that were not debated yesterday on Report—the changes to the coroner system. I have no doubt that the system could be improved further, but I respect the Government’s intentions in changing the architecture of the coroner system, and in making significant improvements to its operation.
My interest in the subject was sparked largely by the experiences of a constituent of mine, Mr. Alick Moore, who sadly lost his son on 15 October 2004 in a diving accident. Mr. Moore and his family had to wait four and a half years for an inquest to be held, with very little information on the protracted investigations of the Health and Safety Executive and the police into the circumstances of his son’s death. There was little apparent co-ordination, and a very unsatisfactory conclusion at the end. That, and the treatment that Mr. Moore received at the inquest, persuaded me that serious questions need to be asked. I have been in a long correspondence on the subject with various authorities, including the Attorney-General and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, the hon. Member for Lewisham, East (Bridget Prentice). I should like to say how grateful I am for the way in which she addressed the concerns raised by Mr. Moore in her most recent letter to him. I know that he very much appreciates the care she took in responding to the points that he put.
I hope that the outstanding questions—work-related deaths—will be resolved in the further stages of the Bill, if it passes to another place. The work-related death protocol has been ineffective in ensuring proper co-operation between the investigating authorities, particularly the HSE and the Crown Prosecution Service. I am dismayed that the wait that Mr. Moore had to experience is so often seen as the norm. My question to Ministers is whether they believe the Bill will cure that chronic problem of delay in investigation and delay in inquests being held.
It is essential that the investigative period is substantially reduced in order to provide comfort to the bereaved family at an early stage, and so that at the time of the inquest they have clear and conclusive reasons for a prosecution being pursued or not. The key point that Mr. Moore would want to raise with the Minister is how we reduce that very long and entirely unacceptable period between the death and the results of any investigation.
Other issues include the degree to which bereaved families are represented in court. In work-related deaths, corporate respondents to the inquest are often well and expensively represented. The family do not have that opportunity. We should look at whether, within the guidance and the funding of the inquest system, we can provide for families to be properly represented where there are questions that need to be put on behalf of the family about the circumstances of death.
One of the things that my constituent found most difficult about the circumstances that he faced was the point-blank refusal of the coroner to communicate effectively with him until the inquest was completed, and even after that time, when he was not prepared to give any reasons for reaching his conclusions, having set aside what had already been accepted as a partial liability on the part of the company involved. That is unsatisfactory.
I hope the charter for the bereaved that the Under-Secretary mentioned will deal with some of those issues. Clear guidance must be given to coroners on the extent that they can communicate with and have a dialogue with bereaved families without prejudicing the conduct of the inquest. That seems to me to be a crucial point if we are to provide a proper service to bereaved families.
Despite my deep reservations about other parts of the Bill, I think the Government are moving in the right direction in the reform of the coronial system. I wish we had had a separate coroners Bill that dealt with that, rather than with all the other excrescences that have been added. Although I shall join my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge in the Lobby this evening against the Bill, I very much hope that reform of the coronial system will survive parliamentary scrutiny and will be improved in another place, and that we shall see a real improvement in the services offered to families in future.
I share the views expressed by my hon. Friend the Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), and the views that my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) expressed about the Bill. I share the frustration of colleagues who found that they were unable to debate so much of what they wanted to debate yesterday.
I return to the subject on which I intervened on the Minister. One of the things that will be a tribute both to the Minister and to the Government and that I hope will survive in the other place is a better system of protection of witnesses. When Tony Blair was Prime Minister, he made it clear that he was committed to changing the justice system so that victims and witnesses were better protected, and the Secretary of State for Justice and his team have said the same.
One of the tests of whether the Bill becomes decent legislation after scrutiny by the House of Lords is whether all those who would like to give evidence but are frightened feel that they can do so. The Minister replied positively to me about that. But whatever the shape of the Bill when it finishes its passage through both Houses, information about the protection given needs to be clearly, simply and urgently disseminated—in particular that the witness protection service works, and works well. I am still dealing with a family who have not yet had a satisfactory resolution, because of the witness protection service’s difficulty in achieving it, following a domestic violence case of great seriousness several years ago. Clearly, that is not a satisfactory state of affairs.
The coroner’s court in my constituency has a good reputation, but that has not always been true of other coroners’ courts around the country. The Minister shared with me her knowledge of the frustration of those such as the recently deceased and much lamented Eileen Dallaglio, who fought for so long to get what they regarded as justice for their children or relatives who died in the Marchioness disaster. As a result of their complaints, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, East (Mr. Prescott) was eventually extremely helpful in providing a public inquiry. One of the reasons that a public inquiry was needed was that the coroner system, through delay, insensitivity and not allowing the families to take part in the process and get answers to the questions that they rightly wanted to ask—not just about the causes of death following that sinking in the Thames more than a decade ago, but about personal matters such as what happened when hands were chopped off bodies, which was unacceptable—had failed those families.
The Minister and her colleagues are well aware of the concern, expressed in cases that we are still dealing with, about what happens when a British citizen dies abroad and the investigation by the domestic authorities of a foreign country is thought to be inadequate. Sometimes the matter comes back to be considered by coroners’ courts in this country—I am not talking about service deaths, which have been long debated. That issue is rightly a cause for concern among Members of Parliament, and by the time the Bill becomes law I hope that we will be able to say with confidence to our constituents that wherever a British person died, we will have a system that, at home or abroad, ensures the best possible investigation, answers to questions and a sense of closure, with justice. The Minister and her colleagues desperately want that, as do I and my colleagues.
In the three minutes remaining for scrutiny of the Bill—[Interruption.] It is unbecoming for Government Whips who have conspired—I choose the word carefully—to ensure inadequate scrutiny, to protest from a sedentary position when a Member wants to discuss the Bill. They should recognise what has happened.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights spent a lot of time scrutinising the Bill. We were pleased by the speed with which the Minister replied to our letters. It must also be noted that the Government were willing to provide extra days in Committee, and that they provided two days on Report, when the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill got only one day—[Interruption.] The Government Whip, the hon. Member for Wrexham (Ian Lucas), says that it was him—congratulations. However, is it not a pity to spoil it all with the programme motion, whereby important chunks of the Bill were not scrutinised? Ministers have done an excellent job—
We have responded to the Joint Committee’s report because many of the changes in the Bill reflect its recommendations.
So much was done well by the Government, it is a pity that they failed on the fundamental question of Members being able to amend and debate important parts of the criminal law such as murder. To fail at that hurdle is unfortunate. In a spirit of compromise, I ask whether the Government will reflect on whether programme motions can better be used, in consultation with the Opposition parties, to ensure that if there is failure, we all fail, rather than us having sometimes unseemly rows about the failure to scrutinise. That does not look good, particularly given what the Prime Minister has said about the importance of the House being able to scrutinise. The Bill involves important matters, and those who have not been in Committee feel that this is their only chance to get stuck in. We have had good debates about some of the other issues. I urge the Secretary of State, who is listening, to think about what I have said and talk to his colleagues about it.
Debate interrupted (Programme Order, 23 March).
The Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No.83E), That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Bill read the Third time and passed.
Business without Debate
Delegated Legislation
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),
Immigration
That the draft Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 12 February, be approved.—(Mr. Austin.)
Question agreed to.
With the leave of the House, we shall take motions 4 and 5 together.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),
Banks and Banking
That the draft Northern Rock plc Compensation Scheme (Amendment) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 25 February, be approved.
That the draft Bradford & Bingley plc Compensation Scheme (Amendment) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 25 February, be approved.—(Mr. Austin.)
Question agreed to.
European Union Documents
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order 119(11)),
Pre-accession Assistance
That this House takes note of European Union Documents No. 15620/08, Commission Communication: Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA): Multi-annual Indicative Financial Framework for 2010–2012 and No. 17210/08 and Addendum, Commission Report: The 2007 Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance Annual Report; notes the current progress towards further EU enlargement; and urges the Commission to learn lessons from previous experience and ensure that its resources are effectively managed and delivered.—(Mr. Austin.)
Question agreed to.
Regulatory Reform
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 18(2)),
That the draft Legislative Reform (Insolvency) (Advertising Requirements) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 4 December 2008, be approved.—(Mr. Austin.)
Question agreed to.
Petition
Planning and Development (Essex)
I rise to present a petition on what may seem a relatively trivial matter but is of great significance and importance to my community in Castle Point, and particularly to the community of Hadleigh. We are an urban borough, but we have lovely areas and views and a charming, green, tree-lined verge on the A13 entrance to Hadleigh from Southend. We cherish it and want to keep it. Residents are angry that a politically correct band of councillors has dreamed up a scheme to put a bus lane in, which will destroy the verge and the trees. That bus lane will clearly achieve almost nothing for residents but will cost a fortune and destroy our beautiful street scene in that area. Yet again, councillors have totally failed the people. By refusing to consult them, they have shown contempt for residents. I warmly congratulate each and every person who has showed that they care about their community by signing the petition.
The petition states:
The Petition of Gwen Hall, residents of Hadleigh, and others,
Declares that the local council’s plans to destroy part of the grassed tree lined verge between Tattersall Gardens and Hadleigh on the A13 to provide a bus lane is not reasonable, would not improve traffic flows significantly, would destroy the open and green entrance to Hadleigh village and would therefore, on balance, be a waste of public resources; further notes that councillors should consult residents properly on all such issues and listen to them more seriously.
The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to make it clear to Essex County Council and Castle Point Council that they should put this development on hold until they have properly consulted the public, and that they should listen to public opinion.
And the Petitioners remain, etc.
[P000338]
MSC Napoli
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Ian Lucas.)
It is now just over two years since the MSC Napoli, en route from Antwerp to Portugal, was beached off the east Devon section of the world heritage coast, between Sidmouth and Branscombe, following a storm off Cornwall. What followed was four days of what can only be described as chaos, triggered by the substantial influx into Branscombe of people intent on removing items of cargo washed ashore.
The incident triggered a major inter-agency operation led by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency and presented significant challenges both at sea and on land, including public order and traffic management issues. Although those involved in the handling of the clear-up, particularly the work at sea, performed exceptionally well, what will be remembered for years to come will instead be the scenes of looting that took place.
The purpose this evening’s debate is not to apportion blame but to learn lessons and suggest changes. What happened in Branscombe was nothing short of a disaster, and although the impact was felt locally, the issues that it raised are certainly of national, if not international, importance. Frankly, it is a disgrace that the events in Branscombe were not given the examination that they deserved in a public inquiry. The Secretary of State refused to hold any type of public inquiry, simply deciding that the marine accident investigation branch report would suffice and that the events both on Branscombe beach and in Branscombe parish were not his concern or, it seems, of national significance.
Instead, Devon county council was forced to take responsibility and had to resort to spending £22,000 of local taxpayers’ money on its own inquiry, a fact that is all the more shocking when we consider that it spent £25,000 of local taxpayers’ money on an inquiry into foot and mouth in 2001, again due to the Government’s refusal to hold one. Although it is fundamentally and irrevocably wrong that it was left to the taxpayers of Devon to foot the bill, if the inquiry report, which is intended to help authorities cope better with such an incident in future, is given the full attention that it deserves, and if recommendations are taken forward and legislative changes implemented, that money will have been well spent.
I trust that by now the Minister has read the inquiry report thoroughly. I congratulate and thank all those involved, particularly Professor Ian Mercer, who also handled Devon’s inquiry into foot and mouth. Will the Minister concede that it was wrong for Devon to have to foot the bill for an inquiry into an event that had repercussions far beyond the county borders?
It has generally been recognised that the biggest stumbling block to an effective operation on land was the many centres, groups and units that were involved in the emergency. Although we have a successful system in place for disasters at sea, we simply have no clear understanding of who is in overall control of land operations when a ship comes ashore. That was the central focus of the inquiry.
If someone—perhaps, as the inquiry report suggests, the chief constable of the region where the ship or cargo first comes ashore or off which it grounds—were appointed the Secretary of State’s Representative or SOSREP on land, there would be a clear command chain, and the initial confusion need never happen again. If there had been a leader on land from the outset—and I can think of no better person in Devon than our own Chief Constable Stephen Otter—who had been able to direct operations as soon as they were aware of what was about to occur, the scenes of looting and ransacking could have been, if not completely averted, at least controlled and contained.
That brings me to my next point: the urgent need to address the laws of salvage. The looting that took place in the days that followed the beaching of the Napoli caused an astonishing 800 per cent. more damage than the accident caused. The police, who were unsure about the law of salvage, refused to close access to the beach until legal advice had been obtained. Order was restored only when the police were sure that they had the power to cordon off the beach. The uncertainty surrounding the implementation of the current legislation led to delays in the police taking appropriate action. The legislation must now be clarified to prevent similar situations from occurring in future.
The relevant merchant shipping legislation dates from only 1995, yet provisions in part IX of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, which deal with wreck, are an only slightly altered version of the Maritime Act 1854. We are working with a 19th century statutory framework, devised in the days of considerably smaller trading vessels, that cannot now cope with such an incident. Indeed, the Napoli, which was built in 1991 and carried just over 2,000 containers, is dwarfed by the newer generation of far larger container ships, which have a capacity of more than 11,000 containers.
Both the police and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency have freely acknowledged that the legislation cannot adequately cope with current conditions. Indeed, the multi-agency debrief report states that
“the agencies involved in the Napoli incident have now recommended a review of the adequacy of Part IX of the 1995 Act to determine whether it is ‘fit for purpose’ in dealing with large scale incidents where property is washed ashore.”
Does the Minister agree that, in the light of events, it is time to reconsider the applicable legislation and make changes? If so, what time scale can we expect? Perhaps it is true that salvage, especially in my part of the world, was once part of local coastal behaviour, but theft and criminal damage is simply not appropriate or acceptable conduct in the 21st century.
Although the Napoli incident has done much to highlight weaknesses in our maritime legislation, it has also drawn attention to fundamental flaws in the global shipping industry. The marine accident investigation branch report showed that many containers were considerably above the weight shown in their papers. Indeed, the Napoli had arrived or departed from berths or other ports on several occasions at up to 122 per cent. of her maximum stress levels. That, along with the speed and loading, caused the ship to “break its back”.
The discrepancy in weight of many of the containers is not unique to the Napoli; it is a dangerous feature of the industry that shippers deliberately under-declare containers’ weights to minimise import taxes calculated on cargo weight. That dangerous practice was a large contributory factor in the actual break-up and demise of the ship and must be stamped out. That clearly demonstrates that it is essential to weigh containers on the dockside before embarkation, and that the practice should now be mandatory. Will the Minister make that a legal requirement? If so, when?
Considering that a previous marine accident investigation branch report, published in September 2007, on the collapse of cargo containers on the Annabella, concluded that
“the safety of ships, crews and the environment is being compromised by the overriding desire to maintain established schedules or optimise port turn-round times”,
what guarantees can the Minister give that he will ensure that recommendations made to the International Association of Classification Societies and the International Chamber of Shipping will be monitored, followed up and acted upon?
A further recommendation made by the inquiry is that the Government should make a general and permanent commitment to reimburse the extraordinary costs of handling the aftermath of an incident such as that involving the Napoli to the whole range of land-based bodies involved. Insurers have estimated the total bill for the wreck at £120 million, a sum that is second only to the $2.1 billion incurred in the Exxon Valdez case. With claims being met out of a £14.7 million limitation fund, claimants will be lucky to recover more than 20p to 30p in the pound. Instead, it is the taxpayers of East Devon and other affected areas who are being forced to make up the difference for costs such as policing and the use of the fire service, simply because they had the misfortune of having the event happen where they live.
Devon county council spent £44,000 on the clean-up, while Devon and Cornwall police estimate that they spent more than £320,000 on the operation. Those costs cannot even be claimed back from the insurers. For the many others who have put in claims, such as the fishermen and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, the sum that they can expect to receive is minimal. That is undoubtedly a case of penalising coastal areas for any unforeseen shipping incidents that may occur.
In an Adjournment debate that I secured two years ago, I raised the issue of insurance. In fact, I specifically asked for a reassurance that the pot would not run dry. I was reassured somewhat that on 29 March 2007 a spokesman for the Maritime and Coastguard Agency stated:
“The Government’s mantra is that the polluter pays, and in this instance, a very large metal ship needs to be removed. That won’t cost the public purse.”
In fact, the cost to the public purse has been estimated at more than £10 million. Indeed, the then Transport Minister, the hon. Member for South Thanet (Dr. Ladyman), who is in his place this evening, stated in a parliamentary answer in January 2007 that the Department of Transport would not provide money for councils that incur costs as a result of pollution from ships. That contradiction is strikingly unfair to the taxpayers of the south-west, whose council tax bills are already among the highest in Britain, so will the current Minister now consider establishing a central fund along the lines of the Bellwin fund or, indeed, modifying that fund accordingly to meet such disasters?
Since the Napoli incident in January 2007, the adoption by the International Maritime Organisation of the Nairobi international convention for the removal of wrecks has demonstrated a positive and encouraging step forward on compulsory insurance and improving the prospects of cost recovery. The fact that the Government have not yet seen fit to implement that important legislation and that the various provisions of the draft Marine Navigation Bill, which would include the ratification of the ICRW, have not yet found their way into the legislative timetable demonstrates a woeful lack of commitment on the part of the Government. Can the Minister explain that?
The decision to beach the Napoli in Lyme bay—I am particularly pleased that my neighbour, the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin), whose constituency looks over most of Lyme bay, is here this evening—was based on the area’s sheltered waters. However, that brings me to the question why Lyme bay was viewed as a suitable place of refuge.
As my hon. Friend knows, it was only by the grace of God that the ship ended up in his patch rather than mine, for which we are duly grateful. I am sure that he is as concerned as I am to discover that elements of the wreckage remain, entrapping fishermen’s gear in Lyme bay. That points to the sensitivity of the area and to the questionability of having such a wreck end up anywhere in the bay.
My right hon. Friend is entirely right. I have been out with some fishermen and one only has to look at their radar and sonar scanners to see the large amounts of plastic and other debris in Lyme bay. It would be interesting to know whether the Minister thinks that they should be compensated, because a lot of that stuff has still not been recovered. However, my right hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I will come to why I think it questionable that a boat in that condition should have been anywhere near either of our coastal areas.
The Lyme bay area is part of a world heritage site and part of the Jurassic coast—I should declare that I am a trustee of the Jurassic coast trust—but it is also the subject of a fisheries exclusion zone, in recognition of its status as
“one of the UK’s richest marine wildlife sites”.
I would like to quote from a DEFRA document, “A summary of responses to the consultation on measures to protect marine biodiversity interests in Lyme Bay from the impact of fishing with dredges and other towed gear”—I do not know what the acronym for that is, but it would help if there was one—which was published in March 2008. The document states:
“The Bay hosts some of the UK’s most important reef habitat and is considered to be both nationally and internationally important in conservation terms.”
The Devon coast is an area that depends heavily on tourism and our coastline is very important to the economic and social well-being of our community. A new study, conducted by the non-profit regeneration consultancy Era Ltd, on the Jurassic coast suggests that it has exceeded expectations in bringing economic, social and cultural benefits to the region since it was awarded UNESCO world heritage site status in 2001. Its status has given a boost to the area of Dorset and East Devon in terms of learning and education, business opportunities, facilities and services, especially benefiting the local tourism industry—and we in East Devon are rightly very proud and also very protective of maintaining this special coastline. Does the Minister consider that Lyme bay, given its recognised importance as a marine habitat and its UNESCO world heritage status, is an appropriate site to be used for a shipping emergency?
Lyme bay is also an important wintering site for many bird species and within two days of the beaching more than 900 birds were reported oiled. It is estimated that for every bird found oiled on the shore, between three and 10 times as many will have been oiled at sea. The wreck of the Napoli may also have threatened as many as 28 sites of special scientific interest, including the Exe estuary, Chesil beach and the Fleet SSSIs. Will the Minister therefore ensure that provisions specifically to keep ships away from environmentally sensitive areas, as my right hon. Friend the Member for West Dorset has just suggested, and legislation covering navigation are built into the Marine and Coastal Access Bill, particularly in the light of the Napoli incident?
The beaching of the Napoli was an event that highlighted serious deficiencies in many aspects of dealing with such an occurrence, which is why action must be taken now. This report must be heeded, the national contingency plan must be strengthened, maritime legislation must be adapted and a single person to take charge on land must be appointed. Only two months ago, police admitted that they were powerless to stop members of the public helping themselves to sawn timber that had washed up on the Kent coast, which had been lost by a Russian ship, the Sinegorsk.
For an island nation with a proud maritime heritage, it is now high time that the Government demonstrated some form of real commitment to the shipping industry and seaside communities and ensured that costly situations such as this are avoided in the future. The channel is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world and although economic times are more constrained at present, with container ships less frequent along our coast than they once were, that is not to say that things will not pick up again.
Figures from Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay show that as the world fleet has grown, so has the propensity for accidents to happen. In fact, the number of serious navigational accidents rose from around 30 in 2000 to more than 120 in 2006, and statistics now show that a ship is twice as likely to be involved in a serious grounding, collision or contact accident today compared with only five years ago. The grounding of the Napoli demonstrated the costly dangers to a marine nation such as ours, and while mistakes were made, this need not happen again. Instead, it is time to grasp this opportunity to learn lessons and implement real changes that can prevent these disasters in future. When will the Minister finally listen to what he is being told from all sides and implement effective change? If the Government are not simply paying lip service to marine conservation and planning, they will adopt the recommendations set out in the report.
Finally, I would like to add that without the professionalism and efforts of all those who worked tirelessly on the operation, including Robin Middleton, the SOSREP at the time, the situation could have been far worse. What I and those affected by this and similar incidents would like to see is these actions replicated on future operations on land. The Napoli incident has exposed many problems that must be taken seriously and addressed by the Government as soon as possible. This event could and should be used as a template for future containership casualties and provides an opportunity to frame legislation accordingly.
I begin by congratulating the hon. Member for East Devon (Mr. Swire) on securing this important debate. I am very pleased to see in their places the right hon. Member for West Dorset (Mr. Letwin) and my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet (Dr. Ladyman), the distinguished former Shipping Minister, who is continuing to take an interest in these important matters.
With respect to the hon. Member for East Devon, I would suggest that the successful way in which the MSC Napoli was dealt with demonstrates the effectiveness of the UK’s arrangements for handling incidents at sea and the professionalism of all those involved. Mr. Robin Middleton, whom the hon. Gentleman has just mentioned, was then the Secretary of State’s Representative for Maritime Salvage and Intervention—commonly known as SOSREP. He came in for a good deal of praise, and rightly so.
Let me make it clear, as I did at the time, that I have the greatest respect for the way in which the then Minister handled the situation—he kept us fully informed—and indeed the way in which the SOSREP handled it. The question is whether the ship should have been anywhere near there in the first place, which is a wider issue.
I hope, if I have time, to explain in a few moments the Government’s position on where ships go if they run into difficulty.
The United Kingdom’s handling of the MSC Napoli incident received widespread approbation domestically and internationally. Ever since establishing the SOSREP function, and whenever the subject of command and control of maritime incidents has come up for discussion in any forum, we have consistently expressed the view that the UK’s system for dealing with them is exceptionally good. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from shipping incidents even when they have been handled in an exemplary way, and the MSC Napoli incident is no exception. The Government identified a number of lessons, which were set out in the document entitled “MSC Napoli Incident: The Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s Response”. As the hon. Gentleman said, that document was issued in November 2008.
One of the most prominent lessons learned is about the communication of the role of SOSREP and the MCA to other bodies involved in incidents of this type. The emphasis in the MCA’s counter-pollution and response branch has been on training courses for local authorities. We now realise that the MCA needs to inform other category 1 and 2 responders about the role of SOSREP in salvage and the role of other MCA units in counter-pollution activities, including the command and control procedures that are implemented at the scene of a maritime incident. We believe that briefing local resilience forums and strategic co-ordination groups, and conducting suitable exercises with other responders, may be a more effective way of explaining the procedures that are in place to deal with shipping incidents of this nature.
Communication is at the heart of another of the lessons that we have learned. Communication of the potential level of risk between the salvage control unit, where the most up-to-date information is available, and any land co-ordinated response organisation needs to be improved.
The document entitled “National Contingency Plan for Marine Pollution from Shipping and Offshore Installations” sets out the Government’s response procedures. The plan is reviewed periodically to take account of lessons learned from the incidents that have occurred during that period. We consider that the next review of the national contingency plan should consider the scope for dealing with medium-sized incidents through the use of combined response centres. In such a scenario, the marine response centre and the salvage control unit could merge to form a single unit. During the review process, the MCA could also expand on mechanisms for dealing with beached material other than oil and chemicals.
In the next review of the plan, consideration needs to be given to the interface between the at-sea, shore and near-shore protection activities. The review also needs to address the issue of which bodies are best suited to carry out shoreline protection and clean-up, and consideration should be given to the interrelationships between the civil contingency representatives and the MCA.
There are still more lessons to be learned. The co-location of response units should be used whenever possible. A number of MCA officers should be trained specifically for the role of Acting Receiver of Wreck and for liaison with police gold commanders, and suitable procedures should be added to the operational manuals. The use of dispersant on more viscous oils should continue to be considered as a useful tool in future responses to oil spills of this type. That was demonstrated during the MSC Napoli incident with the use of dispersant on IFO 380, a quite viscous oil.
The MCA needs to explore with the other agencies involved how the process of preparing multiple environmental impact assessments for a range of options, and achieving agreement from all the authorities involved, could be expedited in future.
Action is being taken to follow up the marine accident investigation branch’s finding that discrepancies in the declared weights of the containers on MSC Napoli were a contributory cause of the accident, a very important point raised by the hon. Gentleman. The International Chamber of Shipping and the World Shipping Council have published “Safe Transport of Containers by Sea, Guidelines on Industry Best Practice”. When it met in December 2008, the International Maritime Organisation’s maritime safety committee referred those guidelines, and the associated concerns about misdeclared cargo and the false or incomplete declaration of contents, to an IMO sub-committee for detailed consideration.
Let me turn to some other points raised by the hon. Gentleman. I am, of course, aware of the report of the local public inquiry which was conducted by Devon county council. The Government do not necessarily agree with all the conclusions and recommendations of the inquiry, but some of its recommendations are very close to the conclusions that we ourselves reached. We are currently considering the recommendations, and will respond in due course. The most prominent recommendation is, of course, the creation of a new post ashore, with powers of command and control on land which are equivalent to those that SOSREP exercises at sea.
The Government's position is that the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 provides the legislative framework for civil protection in the United Kingdom. That includes a well established generic national framework for managing emergency response, irrespective of the size, nature or cause of the incident. That framework is adapted to the particular needs of the emergency. By using an adaptable, but generic framework, rather than an incident-specific approach, it allows for the integration of emergency plans across agencies and boundaries, and ensures that all involved understand their roles and responsibilities, in a combined response.
Within that framework, the local management of an emergency is undertaken at three ascending levels—bronze, silver and gold commands—responsible, respectively, for operational, tactical and strategic command. I recognise, however, that in the case of the MSC Napoli a local gold command was not established, as the hon. Gentleman has outlined, until it became apparent that events on the beach were descending into disorder. It appears that local commanders, given the unprecedented nature of events, did not anticipate the effect that the beaching of that container ship would have, specifically with regard to the looting of property. I understand, however, that once gold command was established and SOSREP joined that group, control over the scene improved and co-ordination between the land-based and sea-based operations improved dramatically.
All that is not to say, however, that we are complacent. When the Civil Contingencies Act was enacted, there was an explicit intention to review it within three years. That will include recommendations contained in the recent report into the events following the beaching of the MSC Napoli.
The hon. Gentleman went on to recommend that the legislation that relates to salvage and wreck be clarified and updated. However, it would not be true to say that the existing merchant shipping legislation prevented the police from taking the necessary action after the beaching of the MSC Napoli. The law states that anyone finding or taking possession of wreck material, regardless of size or value, must report it to the receiver of wreck. Failure to report recovered wreck is a criminal offence. That was the initial information given, after the beaching of the MSC Napoli, to the media and to finders on the beach.
It was the actions of many of the people who came to Branscombe after the beaching of the MSC Napoli which clearly showed that what they were doing could not be categorised as “salvage”. That compelled the Receiver of Wreck, MCA colleagues and the Devon and Cornwall constabulary to reassess the situation and to invoke the receiver’s power under section 237 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 to use force if necessary against anyone who refuses to hand over recovered wreck material or attempts to conceal it or to keep possession of it. Accordingly, we do not envisage that the Government will be seeking to change the legislation on salvage and wreck on this account.
The hon. Gentleman referred to the local public inquiry’s recommendation that the Government make a general and permanent commitment to reimburse the extraordinary costs of handling the aftermath of an incident from a central fund along the lines of the Bellwin fund. That is an issue on which further discussion needs to take place within government but, on the face of it, it appears problematic. The Government cannot make a generic commitment because every emergency is different, and incidents are considered on their individual merits.
The hon. Gentleman suggested that coastal areas that have national and international conservation significance should not be used as places of refuge in the event of a maritime incident. However, as the right hon. Member for West Dorset mentioned, this proposal is at variance with the UK’s tried and tested policy for protecting our seas and coasts, which is that anywhere around the UK’s coastline could be a place of refuge. When a ship in need of assistance requires a place of refuge, SOSREP inevitably takes account of all the factors that relate to that specific incident, such as the weather, the location, the type of threat posed by the vessel and its cargo. This established process allows SOSREP to determine the most appropriate place of refuge, minimising adverse consequences for any incident. It is important to stress that ships are not brought into a place of refuge in order to cause pollution. On the contrary, ships are brought into places of refuge to avert or minimise pollution.
Let me conclude by thanking the hon. Member for East Devon for his continued interest in the issues surrounding the handling of the MSC Napoli. I have tried to answer his concerns, although perhaps I have not done so to his complete satisfaction. We accept that this matter is of great importance, and it is to his credit that he maintains his interest and has secured the opportunity to raise this debate tonight. I assure him that we will follow up the issues he has raised.
Question put and agreed to.
House adjourned.