House of Commons
Monday 9 November 2009
The House met at half-past Two o’clock
Prayers
[Mr. Speaker in the Chair]
Oral Answers to Questions
Culture, Media and Sport
The Secretary of State was asked—
Stonehenge Galleries
The specific £10 million that we announced last month does not, but English Heritage has agreed funding for the Salisbury and Devizes museums as part of a separate partnership agreement, and the two museums together have received over £500,000 since 1999 as part of the Government’s support for regional museums.
That is very good news, for which I thank the Secretary of State.
The Salisbury and South Wiltshire museum is making a tremendous effort to co-ordinate its fundraising for new galleries with the visitor centre operation. It has signed a memorandum of understanding with English Heritage on marketing and the display of objects. Please will the Secretary of State urge English Heritage to go the extra mile, and help both the museums and local people, to encourage this wonderful new project?
I shall be very happy to do that. I know that English Heritage is engaged in active discussions, and, as the hon. Gentleman said, has already signed a memorandum of understanding. I believe that discussion is still taking place about the amount of support that will become available, but I am confident that both museums will be pleased with the outcome.
Those of us who represent the other side of Salisbury plain are immensely proud of the fact that our area contains the Wiltshire historical records centre in Chippenham. Does the Secretary of State agree that now is the right time for it to be balanced by a suitable museum and visitor centre south of the plain, covering the heritage of which we on the northern side are so proud?
I shall be happy to look into the matter, and either my right hon. Friend the Minister of State or I will write to the hon. Gentleman.
Spoliation
I congratulate my hon. Friend on his achievement in piloting the Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Bill through the Commons. I also congratulate Lord Janner on leading the support for it in the other place. I am delighted that the Bill, which the Government were pleased to support and which received all-party support throughout, will receive Royal Assent shortly.
The 17 institutions named in the Bill will be allowed to return objects lost during the Nazi era, in response to a claim and when the return of the object is recommended by the Spoliation Advisory Panel and agreed by Ministers.
Will my right hon. Friend say what she can do to try to encourage people with potential claims to come forward, and what attitude she will take when the Spoliation Advisory Panel recommends restitution?
I hope that, in co-operation with my hon. Friend—because of his efforts in steering the Bill through Parliament—we shall be able to provide the maximum publicity when the Bill finally receives Royal Assent. I can tell him that Ministers have never turned down any advice from the Spoliation Advisory Committee in the past, and I do not expect that to change in the future.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) on steering the Bill through the House. I also congratulate the Government on their efforts to bring it to fruition as soon as possible.
Can the Minister assure me that, when people would rather receive compensation than have their belongings returned to them, the Government will examine individual cases carefully to ensure that the wishes of the families, who are, no doubt, those most affected by the holocaust, are listened to and acted on as swiftly as possible?
I agree that we should act as swiftly as possible. The ability to receive financial compensation rather than the return of artefacts already exists; indeed, the problem was that financial compensation was the only form of compensation that people could receive. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and I felt that that was grossly unfair. The issue was brought to our attention by a case in which the Fitzwilliam museum was able to return a particular object, whereas the British Museum was not able to return another that belonged to the same family. That was one of the reasons for our seeking this change in the legislation.
Davies Committee
We look forward to receiving the David Davies report, which will be published in due course.
Will my hon. Friend view favourably the rumoured recommendations of the Davies committee that Ashes cricket, the entire Wimbledon tennis tournament, the football qualifying matches of the home nations and Welsh international rugby should be returned to the A list, thus putting the opinions of ordinary viewers and sports fans above, say, those of the Murdoch family?
I congratulate my hon. Friend, who I believe has written to David Davies expressing his views.
I am sure that my hon. Friend would want me to read the report before embarking on any deliberations.
As a result of the de-listing of cricket, we now have a women’s cricket team that leads the world. We have also poured an awful lot of money into disability cricket and grass-roots schemes such as the Chance to Shine scheme, which is active in almost every Member’s constituency. What assessment has the Department made of the amount that it has been possible to invest in such schemes as a result of the de-listing of cricket?
I acknowledge all that the hon. Gentleman has said. It was this Government who introduced the system, which was last examined in 1998. Controversial issues are clearly involved, but we want to ensure that we protect sport in the way that he has described while also meeting the needs of the public. We will read the report with great interest, and we look forward to our deliberations on it.
Product Placement
I have had a number of discussions on product placement, and we have today issued a consultation document on the matter.
I welcome the Secretary of State’s announcement today, but, as he said in his press statement, other European Union countries have already introduced a new regime and he does not want our commercial programme makers to be put at a disadvantage. Can he therefore tell us when he expects a new regime to be in place?
I do not think the hon. Gentleman is quite right in saying that all other EU countries have already introduced it. Certainly, however, the vast majority of EU countries have indicated that, like us, they intend to move in that direction, and we would hope that, with the consultation launched today, we would be able to make a decision in January and a new regime would be introduced early in the new year.
With your permission, Mr. Speaker, may I congratulate my right hon. Friend on winning—this is long overdue—the Stonewall politician of the year award?
Knowing this question was coming up, over the weekend I started counting how often products were placed on the television programmes I was watching, which were mainly imported from the United States, and I gave up after counting well over 20 occasions. I am not remotely corrupted by this. We should stop being so prissy, get on with it, and give some money to ITV to make up for the huge drop in advertising revenue it has experienced.
It was for those very reasons that I took a different view from my predecessor, although I think the arguments were finely balanced. However, the reason why we are having a consultation is because there are at the same time important safeguard issues, and important health issues around the protection of children and so forth. We want to make sure that we get this right so that we maximise income for producers and for commercial television, which is going through a very hard time at present, while at the same time ensuring that we have the correct safeguards in place.
I welcome the consultation paper, and all of this does, of course, represent a complete reversal of the position of the Secretary of State’s predecessor. Does the Secretary of State accept, however, that product placement will do only a small amount to assist commercial broadcasters, who are facing huge economic difficulty, and that we will need to go further and look at other deregulatory measures that will assist all the commercial public service broadcasters to survive?
Yes, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to highlight that this will not be a panacea for commercial broadcasting. There are a number of things we can do to help ease the plight of commercial broadcasting further, and we are looking into them. Ofcom has in the last year relaxed the rules on the responsibilities of commercial broadcasting, such as in respect of news in the regions. As the hon. Gentleman will know, we have imaginative, sensible and practicable solutions to the problems and pressures facing regional news and other important areas of commercial broadcasting.
Product placement is the way forward. Who knows? We may have something above the Speaker’s Chair. This is a welcome move and goes a small way to ensuring that there is programme making within the great Granada region. However, will the Secretary of State do even more—he has touched on this—to make sure that regional news and current affairs programmes will continue to be made within “Granadaland”?
Given the conservatism of this place, I suspect, Mr. Speaker, that your Chair is the last place where we will see a product placed. As far as I am aware, under the EU directive, products would not be allowed to be placed in news and current affairs programmes anyway. My hon. Friend’s point about regional television news is very important. Many of us have seen our news regions amalgamated and journalists lose their jobs, and the quality and localness of news provision suffer as a result. That has happened in my own region of the south-west. The Government have come up with a sensible and imaginative way of securing the future of regional news, and it would be nice if we felt we had support from hon. Members on both sides of the House for that proposal.
Berry’s in the Ribble valley make good chairs, Mr. Speaker, if you are thinking of going down the route just mentioned.
Clearly, we might see the end of Newton and Ridley beer being served at the Rover’s Return on “Coronation Street”, but we have some very good brews around my constituency—Bowland, Thwaites, Moorhouse’s and the like—which could be served there. Does the Secretary of State agree that product placement should not be allowed in news programming, as people want to ensure the neutrality of programmes in that area?
Yes, I do agree with that, but I do not agree that the hon. Gentleman’s area has better beers than mine, Mr. Speaker, as you cannot beat a pint of Otter ale.
Illegal File Sharing
We intend to introduce legislation to address this serious problem in the next parliamentary Session. Our proposals include a system of notifications to those infringing copyright online and action against the most serious infringers.
I thank the Minister for that answer. There is genuine public concern about the Government’s proposals, and in particular the prospect that people who have done nothing wrong could have their internet disconnected. An appeal system has been announced by the Government, but will the Minister give an assurance that people will have a chance to defend their innocence before any decision is taken to disconnect their internet connection?
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for that question. People who have done nothing wrong should not be in any danger of having their internet interfered with at all. Hardly anybody, other than the most serious and egregious recidivistic offenders, should ever be in danger of having any of their internet affected, and nobody will have their bandwidth squeezed or their account suspended until they have had repeated letters, been given a healthy notice period and then had a right of appeal—indeed, two rights of appeal—as she requests.
I welcome, as anyone does, the warm words spoken by my hon. Friend, but he must realise that when we set these organisations up they grow like Topsy; they start impinging and pushing the rules. Will he ensure that it is implicit in the Bill that that will not happen and that we will not create a large sledgehammer to crack a small nut?
I can assure my hon. Friend of that. We are not creating a sledgehammer; we are creating a light-touch regime to enforce the existing law.
Everyone understands the need for safeguards, but will the Minister confirm that, assuming the successful passage of the digital economy Bill, the earliest an illegal file sharer could have their internet connection temporarily cut off is February 2012? That is hardly an example of the Government at their most decisive.
First, no I cannot confirm that; how long it will take to reach that point will depend on how things go. In any case, how long it takes to get to a tiny number of very serious infringers having their internet interfered with is not the measure of success. If everything goes well, nobody will reach that point because earlier measures will do the job. I would be grateful if the hon. Gentleman could confirm to the House that he supports the proposals as they stand.
I am happy to confirm that the Conservatives support the proposals. We just do not think that they, on their own, will do the job. Does the Minister accept that if we are to tackle this problem, we also have to look at reforming the outdated intellectual property laws on digital content? If we do not do that, we will not, in the end, deal with the nub of the problem. Will the Secretary of State be addressing intellectual property laws or will that issue be put in the file marked “Post-election: someone else’s problem”?
That issue is very firmly in the file marked “Announced by my right hon. Friends at the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills last week.” As the hon. Gentleman says, we need reform of licensing and copyright legislation to bring the system into line with the new technology. That goes hand in hand with the measures to enforce copyright online, as does the message sent out clearly from the Government that the content industries, which will profit from these measures, need to step up to the plate and put some work in to develop new business models and new technology to give people what they need, at a price they can afford.
Football Association
I wrote to the Football Association, as well as the premier league and the Football League, on 23 September, outlining the Government’s views on their responses to the seven governance and regulation questions put to them by a former Secretary of State. In that letter, I asked those bodies to work more closely together on key issues in football and to support the full implementation of Lord Burns’ recommendations in his 2005 report. I will be meeting all three organisations in the very near future to discuss these issues.
The FA is not implementing the 2005 Burns report and still has a management board that fails to respect and reflect the diversity of those involved in our national game. What more can the Minister do, given the FA’s attitudes, to protect the interests of supporters, players and clubs by dragging this antediluvian, dysfunctional clique out of the 1950s?
My hon. Friend should say what he means. Clearly, there are issues to address, and the whole purpose of this correspondence and these meetings, and the Burns recommendations in particular, is to do that. Progress has been made—there is now an independent chairman of the FA, which is a step in the right direction, and we have seen support for women’s football—but I believe that more can be done. I am looking forward to raising these issues with these organisations in the very near future.
Listed Buildings
Ministers and officials regularly receive representations on listing issues, including funding, from a wide range of partners. More than £26.5 million was made available via English Heritage grant schemes in 2008-09 for the repair of listed buildings and other heritage assets.
I thank my right hon. Friend for that answer. The current system of listing buildings can hold up development and lead to additional costs. In the case of Stockport college, in my constituency, that meant that a capital grant from the Learning and Skills Council for phase 2 development was almost entirely spent on improving two listed buildings with no educational benefit to any young person. That cannot be right. Will my right hon. Friend meet me to discuss my concerns about the current system of listing buildings?
I am very happy to meet my hon. Friend in the near future to discuss the issues and I know that she has written to me about them. She raised two issues of substance. The first is the delay in considering the listing of buildings. We try to get the decisions out within six months, but that does not always happen and we should strive continuously to improve that. The second issue is the balance that has to be struck between ensuring that we protect our heritage, particularly buildings of historic and architectural value, and that buildings are fit for purpose and can be used, particularly by public bodies.
Bearing in mind that Canterbury, Lincoln and Lichfield cathedrals alone—to name but three—are looking for more than £26.5 million, will the right hon. Lady accept that that is not an enormous sum in the face of the problem? Will she encourage her Treasury colleagues to reconsider allowing private owners to offset the cost of maintenance against tax, freeing more money for public buildings?
I hope that the hon. Gentleman, with his great interest in these issues, will accept that the investment that we have made in churches and cathedrals over the past decade or so has been successful in dealing with some of the worst dilapidations that have occurred in those wonderful heritage assets. I assure him that I make constant representations to my right hon. and hon. Friends in the Treasury to see whether we can get some leeway to ensure that more resources are given to conserve our heritage assets.
Will my right hon. Friend resist any temptation to list Preston bus station, which has little or no architectural merit and has had an application rejected in the past? The current application is being used purely as a tactic to stop the redevelopment of Preston city centre.
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. That particular building has not been drawn to my attention so far, so I am grateful to him for doing so. I shall look in detail at all the representations I receive in coming to my decision.
Listed buildings are part of our national heritage—a national heritage that the Secretary of State described last week in disparaging terms as “the past, old buildings” and “monuments”. Does that explain why the Minister’s Department has cut funding to English Heritage by £100 million, more than halved lottery funding for heritage and withdrawn the draft Heritage Protection Bill?
Let me talk first about heritage funding. I would have thought that Opposition Members would support the Government as we try to ensure that investment in our heritage goes to supporting the assets rather than the bureaucracy of particular organisations. Although it might be true that English Heritage’s funding has kept level over the past few years, the investment in our buildings has increased. We now invest some £600 million per annum in heritage across the piece. I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s assertion that there has been a decline in the funding of heritage. Indeed, I look forward to what he will say in his manifesto about the investment that we will have in heritage rather than the cuts that we will have in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport and its bodies.
On the Bill that failed to get time in Parliament, I regret that that happened but I am taking forward a lot of the propositions in it. Earlier, we discussed the Bill on spoliation that my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) has successfully piloted through both Houses. We are managing to put other elements of the Bill into effect without the legislation, but we will continue to look for an early legislative opportunity both in this Parliament—
Order. I think that we have the gist of the right hon. Lady’s reply.
Byron Review
Professor Byron’s wide-ranging recommendations require cross-Whitehall co-operation. My Department is working as part of the UK Council for Child Internet Safety, as well as providing the new legislative framework we announced in “Digital Britain” to enable implementation of her recommendations.
The Minister will be aware that at midnight a new and violent video game, “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare”, is to be released. It contains scenes of such brutality that even the manufacturers have put warnings in the game telling people how they can skip particular scenes. Given the recommendations of the Byron review, specifically paragraphs 32 and 33, what steps do the Government propose to take to ensure that such violent games do not fall into the hands of children and young people? This is not about censorship—it is about protecting our children.
The clearest recommendation of the Byron review is that content suitable for adults should be labelled and sold as such, and that it should be an offence to sell such content to children. That is the case under current law and it will be the case when the law changes under the digital economy Bill. The game to which my right hon. Friend refers is certificate 18 and should not be sold to children. The Government’s job is to ensure that what adults should be able to get is clearly labelled, and that children are not in danger of being subjected to adult content.
I have seen the content of the video game. It is unpleasant, although no worse than in many films and books. The game carries a content warning. It is an 18-plus game, and carries the British Board of Film Classification 18-plus rating as well. Does the Minister agree that it would be better for Members of the House to support the many thousands of game designers and coders, and the many millions of game users, rather than collaborating with the Daily Mail to create moral panic over the use of video games?
I was in Dundee last week visiting the video games industry, and I certainly agree that it is a large and important industry in which we have a national competitive advantage. It is important that all Members of the House and the Government continue to support it.
Lottery Grants
I meet lottery distributors regularly. The Big Lottery Fund and its predecessors alone have made grants totalling £450 million to community buildings across the UK.
During this week of remembrance, does the Minister agree that a group we should not forget is the one looking after the interests of many veterans, both young and old—namely, the Royal British Legion? Can he tell the House why numerous British Legion bids to the national lottery for new premises or repairs to existing premises have been turned down?
As the hon. Gentleman knows, I cannot comment in detail about individual bids. I can tell him that the money currently used to support veterans, partly in the way he describes and partly, for instance, in enabling them to take trips back to their battlegrounds with their comrades in their declining years, would unfortunately all be cut under the rather ill-thought-out plans of members of his Front Bench.
Competitive Sport (Schools)
Under this Government, there has been record investment in school sport—more than £2 billion since 2003. From an estimated one in four young people doing two hours a week of sport in school in 2002, 90 per cent. are now doing two hours, and more than half are doing three hours. We have raised admission to offer every young person five hours per week, with three hours for 16 to 19-year-olds; 32 per cent. already do that amount, and we are making access to regular competitive sport a key part of our proposed new pupil guarantee.
How can we give support to competitive sport in schools when national lottery funding has gone down by more than 50 per cent. since 1997?
We fund school sport in a variety of ways, including direct funding from Government. The hon. Gentleman will congratulate the Government on the £100 million we are spending on school sport, although he may be embarrassed by the performance of the previous Conservative Government on school sport. I hope he will support all the initiatives that we are taking forward.
Regarding the Minister’s target for 16 to 19-year-olds, will he confirm that currently 63 per cent. of 16-year-olds and 81 per cent. of 19-year-olds are not meeting the target? With fewer than 1,000 days to go before the target is meant to be achieved, what new policies does he have? Will he at least look at young offender institutions, where the target is already being exceeded?
I was previously the Minister with responsibility for prisoners and young offenders, so I am pleased that sport is taking place in young offender institutions. I am able now, in the role of Minister for Sport, to make sure that a growing number of children participate in school sport. The 16 to 19 age group is difficult but we are making sure, through investment in whole sport plans, that governing bodies tackle those areas where there are difficulties in recruiting people into sport. The good news is that we are offering a diversity of sport. Gone is the stereotyping whereby boys played cricket, football and rugby, and girls played netball and hockey. We are offering many more sports so that young people have alternatives and can have a go at different sports, rather than only the traditional ones, because there are many other things that young people can do.
Sport (Young People)
In the run-up to the 2012 Olympics and Paralympics, as part of our legacy promises, we want to create a world-class system of PE and sport for young people in England. We have raised our ambitions to offer every child five hours of high quality PE and sport per week, with three hours for 16 to 19-year-olds. Between 2008 and 2011 we are investing over £780 million through the PE and sport strategy for young people, bringing total Government investment to more than £2.4 billion since 2003.
I wonder whether the Minister shares my concern that some of the money that could be spent on building good sports facilities for young people is being spent on paying very large salaries and expenses for people running the Olympic games, and some of the money finding its way into schools is being spent on computer games consoles. Does he think that that is a good use of public money?
Investment in the Olympics is superb and the whole country will benefit from the Olympic games being held in London. The people contributing to the success of the building of the stadiums and the people involved in organising and running the games are doing a fantastic job. The inspiration from the Olympic games as well as the decade of sport that we are undertaking will mean that young people from all over the UK benefit from sport and have the opportunity to lead healthier lives.
I welcome the Minister’s statement in response to the question. Does he agree that it is particularly important to give support to sport for young people with special needs? Will he join me in welcoming the work of the Special Olympics movement in the UK and the very successful Special Olympics that were held in my constituency in Leicester this year?
I am happy to praise the Special Olympic movement and Leicester, the people of Leicester and my hon. Friend for the work that they carried out in order to hold successful games in July. My right hon. Friend the Minister for the Olympics was at the opening ceremony and I was heavily involved in the organisation of the games. It shows that sport should be available to everybody. The Special Olympics is a movement that I want to support to make sure that sport can reach all parts.
May I stress to the Minister the importance of team sport, especially for young men? Those who play team sport in our young offender institutions are less likely to reoffend when they come out. Given the importance of team sport, what can he tell us about promoting team sport, especially among young men?
It is important that we promote sport in all its forms because sport can raise individual self-esteem, teach people about team work and help us with other life skills that we need. We have made it the responsibility of sports governing bodies to develop and grow their sports. They know their sports best. We are looking to them and we will measure how successful they are in making sure that team and individual sports grow, so that everybody has the opportunity to reach our ambitious target of 2 million more people being involved in sport and physical activity by 2012.
Racism in sport is one thing that can put off young people and others. The Commission for Equality and Human Rights seems completely uninterested in doing anything whatever about that under the useless Trevor Phillips. Can the Minister do anything to encourage the CEHR to take the issue seriously?
I congratulate my hon. Friend on being a marvellous advocate for sport free of racism. I am concerned about his feelings and will write to him in due course and make sure that we raise the issue in the appropriate places.
Overseas Tourists
The number of overseas tourists who visited England in each of the past three years is as follows: in 2006, 27,586,288; in 2007, 27,794,425; in 2008, 27,291,584. Figures for 2009 show a downward trend in numbers, reflecting the global recession and particularly a downturn in business tourism. However, spend by those tourists is up by 2 per cent. compared to last year. In the month of July, domestic tourism increased by 20 per cent. compared with July 2008, which is the best figure we have had for quite a long time.
I am glad to say that many of those tourists from overseas are coming to this country, not least on account of the euro, and coming to the south-west, where we have a huge amount of furnished holiday lettings. The Minister will be aware that the Government have said that the furnished holiday lettings tax regime needs to change. Why does she think that it needs to change, with the European view having been taken on so quickly? Has she heard from her European counterparts about whether they wish to implement those tax changes?
I have not heard from my European counterparts, but I reassure the hon. Gentleman that I am in close discussion with Treasury colleagues on that issue.
Public Houses (Closures)
We understand that in June this year, CGA Strategy, the pub and drinks market analyst that tracks the pub closure rate on behalf of the British Beer and Pub Association, estimated that 2,377 pubs had closed over the previous 12 months.
Does the Minister accept that that is a tragedy? In many urban areas outside towns and in many rural areas, the pub is the only social community facility. Will the Government introduce some policies to try to preserve pubs in this country, even if that goes against their inclination to increase tax on beer? Beer is a popular British tradition. I like it, people like it, let us keep it.
Of course, tax is a matter for the Chancellor and the Treasury, and I am sure that the Chancellor will have heard the hon. Gentleman’s comments. However, I agree that pubs play a major role in our communities, whether in urban or rural areas. We have been happy to support the community pubs initiative; we are supporting the sector where we can; and I was happy to respond to and, indeed, accept most of the recommendations concerning pub closures from the all-party beer group, chaired by my hon. Friend the Member for Selby (Mr. Grogan). We have to accept that there has been a change in drinking culture, with people having different drinks, but we certainly want to support community pubs, and we will do our best to make sure that we do so.
Football Stadiums
The Government currently do not provide any financial support to improve or develop professional football club stadiums. However, the football stadia improvement fund, which is funded equally by the premier league and the Football Association and administered by the Football Foundation, has to date invested more than £100 million in 1,099 projects. My Department also sponsors the work of the Football Licensing Authority, which, by working with clubs, local authorities and the emergency services, will help to ensure that our football stadiums are some of the safest in the world.
Would the Minister for Sport accept an invitation from me to visit Kettering Town football club for its FA cup second round clash with Leeds United, when he might be able to discuss with the club and its fans potential Government support, through planning guidelines or finance, for the redevelopment of the stadium?
I might take the hon. Gentleman up on his offer, as the next game is against Leeds United, and Kettering beat Hartlepool 1-0 on Saturday. That shows that the Sport Minister is well informed. The serious point is that clubs such as Kettering Town act as a strong community focus, and if there are issues about planning or any other areas where we can offer support, we will do that.
Topical Questions
My Department has a broad range of responsibilities. Today I had the privilege to open with the German ambassador an art installation by a young Welsh artist and a young German artist to commemorate the happy events in Berlin 20 years ago. It is an ice wall in the middle of the street outside the German embassy in Belgrave square, not far from here; and, if hon. Members get the chance, it is well worth seeing before it melts.
Will Ministers urge Ofcom to press ahead with remedies for excessive concentration in the pay TV market—BSkyB accounts for 85 per cent. of all subscriptions—and so increase choice, value and competition for TV viewers across the range of cable, satellite and broadband platforms?
I am sure that Ofcom will have heard the words of my hon. Friend, who has submitted his own representations to its review. It is not up to me to tell Ofcom how to conduct its reviews—it is an independent regulator—but so far it has conducted them well and speedily, and I expect this one to be no different.
No. The hon. Gentleman is assuming that that will be the only source of funding, but it will be pump-priming. We have come up with the idea of a modest levy which represents a smaller amount than that which people have saved from their fixed lines because of the reductions in bills over recent years, yet his party has come up with absolutely no solutions for funding. It is amazing to me that Conservative Members, who represent rural areas in particular—it is the rural areas that will lose out, because the market will not deliver broadband to them—have so far offered no solution. We have a solution; I hope that he will support it.
The service is already statutory under the Public Libraries and Museums Act 1964. Local authorities have a duty to provide a comprehensive and efficient library service. I hope shortly to publish a consultation paper so that we can discuss how libraries can be fit for purpose in the 21st century.
It has not.
I am well aware of, and gratified by, the strong interest in the north-west—as in most of the English regions and in Scotland and Wales—in the Government’s proposals to help to save the very important service of regional news. We hope to proceed with this as soon as possible. We will be going out to tender shortly, and we hope to announce by March the preferred bidders for the English region chosen and for Wales and Scotland.
The hon. Gentleman will be aware that that issue was discussed in great detail at the time of the last licence fee review. As he will be aware, this Government introduced concessions for TV licences for the elderly, but there was no consensus, in this House or among several different organisations representing different interest groups, on who else should be added to the list—so none was added. The time to make those representations is during the next licence review; given what he says, I am sure that he will do that.
Have my right hon. and hon. Friends had a discussion with STV about the reconfiguration of its news programmes? People are very concerned about that in the north-east of Scotland, particularly in my constituency, where broadcasts are made under what used to be the Grampian licence—the studios are in my constituency. I am concerned that that area of news will be sucked into Glasgow and have a central-belt bias.
I was in Glasgow last week discussing that very matter with the director of STV, who assured me that its plans for the future would safeguard and build on the local and sub-regional provision to which STV is committed. In order to do that, however, it needs to have a sustainable funding model. That is why it is important that Members in all parts of the House get behind and support our proposals for these regional—or, in the case of Scotland, independently funded—news consortiums to put regional news on a long-term sustainable footing. Without some level of intervention, the market will not sustain it for the long term.
Does the Secretary of State agree that, if we are serious about growing our creative economy and determined that artists and creators are properly rewarded for their work, we must effectively challenge illegal file sharing and end the something-for-nothing culture that exists online? Will he assure me that when he brings forward the digital economy Bill he will consider all necessary measures to protect the 2 million jobs in the creative industries and ensure that creators are properly rewarded for the work that they produce?
I am delighted to have that level of support from the hon. Gentleman, which is perhaps not surprising given his previous career. Yes, I will do that, and he is right to highlight the importance of the creative industries to the UK economy. Not many people realise this, but the United Kingdom is No. 1 in the world in the proportion of gross domestic product in the creative industries. This Government want to ensure that we stay that way.
On his visit to Glasgow, the Secretary of State heard the good news from BBC Scotland about the increase in programmes made in Scotland that are shown throughout the network. Does he agree that the timetable for meeting its target by 2016 is a bit generous, and that it could do it more quickly?
I have some sympathy with that, and in my conversations with the senior BBC management in Scotland they seemed to acknowledge that they could do it a bit quicker than that.
I would be delighted to meet the hon. Gentleman, and of course there are other opportunities for funding to turn some of our churches into facilities that are open to the community.
In considering regional news pilots, will my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State take into account the experience of the consolidation of ITV news programmes, and also the quality of media such as we find in the south-west?
Yes. My hon. Friend and her constituents in Plymouth have suffered in the same way as mine in Exeter from the deterioration in both the quality and localness of regional news provided by ITV in the past 12 months. That is exactly why the Government have brought forward our proposals. Not only do I think that we can avert any further decline, but I think that we can return to much higher-quality and more local news provision on ITV with those proposals.
Of course I would love to do that—congratulations to Kettering. The world-class facilities that we now have up and down the country show that the investment that we have put into sport is coming to fruition. There are world-class facilities not only for elite sport but for community and school sport.
Following on from the question asked by the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart), can the Secretary of State guarantee that if the additional income generated by his measures to cut off illegal file sharers does not exceed the cost of the regulatory burden, he will shelve his plans?
I would think that that is highly unlikely in practice. As my hon. Friend knows, the film industry alone estimates that it is currently losing £200 million a year because of theft from illegal file sharing. I suggest that the regulatory costs of introducing the legislation will not get anywhere near that amount.
During business questions last week I called for a debate on the legacy of the London Olympics and was told to bring up the subject today, so I am. Given that there is genuine concern about the promise of increased grass-roots participation in sport not being delivered upon, and the fact that there are 1,000 days between now and the Olympics, will the Secretary of State join my call for a debate on this very important subject as soon as possible?
The hon. Gentleman is wrong. Both our targets—1 million extra people becoming physically active and 1 million extra people becoming involved in sport—are on target, and we will deliver them.
There are huge discrepancies in Arts Council revenue and grant funding in Birmingham and the black country boroughs. For example, Birmingham receives 15 times per capita the amount that Wolverhampton does. Will the Minister please look into that?
Indeed I will. It is really important that there is a proper regional spread of Arts Council funding, and more important that funding is not concentrated in the regional cities but goes out to all the surrounding areas.
I congratulate the Secretary of State on being voted Stonewall politician of the year, but I am somewhat disappointed to find that in the annual review for ministerial responsibilities, he has been demoted to the bottom of the Cabinet. Does the Prime Minister not share the other organisation’s view of him?
I do not know to what list the hon. Gentleman is referring, but I suspect that it is the list that is regularly published. I suspect the reason why I am 14th or last or whatever it is in the list is that I am the most recently appointed.
Olympics
The Minister for the Olympics was asked—
Budget
The budget of £9.325 billion that I announced in March 2007 remains unchanged. I publish regular quarterly economic updates, the next being due at the end of November, and I provide regular financial briefings, which are sometimes commercially sensitive, to Opposition spokesmen.
I thank the Minister for her response on an issue that is of considerable concern to my constituents, who will be paying quite an amount and footing a lot of the bill for the Olympics, which we strongly support. However, will she give details about which operations will be scaled back if there is a shortfall in sponsorship or private sector investment?
First, I am quite sure that the hon. Gentleman’s constituents will celebrate with the rest of London when the games are held. It is important to remember that 89 per cent. of the budget is being borne by sources other than London. Every host city makes a contribution.
On the hon. Gentleman’s point about scaling back, the London Organising Committee, which is a private company, is on target, even during a recession, with its sponsorship income budget. Of course, we keep these things under regular review, but the committee should be congratulated on its success.
According to the memorandum of understanding signed between the Minister and the previous Mayor in June 2007, the national lottery is due to be repaid once the London Development Agency has recovered its land acquisition and disturbance costs. In that memorandum of understanding, it was explicitly stated that those costs were not expected to exceed £650 million. Is that estimate still accurate?
The figure that was used in the memorandum of understanding, as the hon. Gentleman will remember, was the most conservative figure at the time, which represented the lowest point in performance of land sales for a 20-year period. Obviously, given the impact of the global downturn on land prices, decisions about the sale of the Olympic lands will be taken in the best possible market conditions, but the formula for distribution and reimbursement of the lottery remains the same.
Site Landscaping
I know that the hon. Lady has a great interest in the matter of landscaping in the Olympic park, which is progressing well. Land is being prepared for planting, including the installation of drainage and extensive irrigation systems. Last week Her Majesty the Queen planted the first of what will be 2,012 trees in the park—a mature willow tree grown in Milton Keynes. In fact, the plants for the park have been sourced from Hampshire, Thetford and Wales. I will shortly announce the result of the great British garden competition run in collaboration with the Royal Horticultural Society.
I am delighted that some nurseries and horticultural companies from the United Kingdom will benefit, but can the Minister say for what reason companies such as Johnsons of Whixley in the north of England, which can source excellent plants for a showcase for the landscaping of the games, have not been chosen? Will she assure me that such companies are just as eligible for the competition as others in the UK?
Obviously, I cannot specifically comment on that business, which I believe is local to the hon. Lady’s constituency, but all such contracts will be advertised on the CompeteFor website. We are very fortunate with the very wide range of horticultural suppliers, and I urge all horticulturalists in her constituency to bid again.
What assessment has the Minister made of the role that volunteers could play in the landscaping of the site? She will be aware that 250,000 people have already volunteered. Will she ensure that they are brought into use as soon as possible—indeed, given those volunteering opportunities immediately?
I agree with the hon. Gentleman that there is a tremendous enthusiasm for people giving their time as part of the Olympics, not only in London but around the country. We want to ensure that that energy and that will to give time, motivated by the Olympics, is fully utilised in a variety of ways, and we will make announcements about that at the beginning of next year. On his point about involving volunteers in the park, some 20 primary schools—the construction crew—take part in such activities. I know that the organising committee and the delivery authority will want to maximise that.
Educational Materials
The opportunities for children in schools are enormous. We have already announced the Get Set programme, which is in 12,000 schools. It involves young people in Olympic-related projects, which are a reflection of Olympic and Paralympic values. I encourage hon. Members to encourage their local schools to become involved in the programme if they have not already done so.
Does the Minister agree that, in addition to the economic benefits that can come to Wales and other parts of the UK through hosting Olympic teams, we should do everything that we can to encourage community groups and schools to take advantage of all the possible cultural exchange and understanding that can take place?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and I know that she regularly raises this point on behalf of her constituents. There are benefits to be gained for the whole country. She rightly refers to the cultural Olympiad and I am sure that her constituents will have noticed that the steel for the aquatic centre was rolled in Neath. The whole country is supplying materials for the Olympic park, and that can be an inspiration for communities and constituencies such as hers.
Budget
I meet the chairman and chief executive of the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games on a regular basis. We discuss a range of issues, including its budget for staging the games, and the Government’s budget for construction, security and wider delivery.
Can the Minister confirm that the LOCOG budget will be met 100 per cent. by the private sector, and that there will be no recourse to funding from taxpayers’ funds?
The organising committee is confident that its budget is secure. There are obviously aspects of staging the games that rightly fall to the public sector and some are shared responsibilities, including some aspects of security and other areas that we are working through with the organising committee at the moment. There is general confidence in the excellent success that it has had in raising money.
Sex Industry
My hon. Friend has a great record in championing tough action against the exploitation—[Interruption.]
Order. I apologise for interrupting the Minister. I do not know how detectable it is elsewhere, but within the Chamber there are far too many private conversations taking place—[Interruption.] Order. I need no help from the hon. Member for Wantage (Mr. Vaizey). To put it bluntly, it is straightforward bad manners for people to witter away from a sedentary position when a question is being asked or answered.
Major sporting events in the past have seen increases in sex trafficking and the exploitation of young men and women. We are absolutely determined to take every pre-emptive action that we can, with the Metropolitan police and with established voluntary organisations, to ensure that the London 2012 Olympics do not become a target for that vile trade and are not tainted as a result.
The Minister will be aware that last week the House of Lords concurred with this House that if a man seeks to pay for sex with a woman who is trafficked or bullied into prostituting herself, he is thereby committing an offence. Will my right hon. Friend convene a meeting with the Mayor of London and others involved in the Olympics to consider how they can publicise that new offence in advance of the Olympics, so that people are not inadvertently caught because there is sex trafficking associated with it?
I am very happy to accept my hon. Friend’s suggestion of convening a meeting of all interested parties, to ensure both that we take effective action to deal with that potential problem and that men and women—young men may be open to exploitation as well as young women—are aware of their rights. The other important thing is to ensure that a clear message goes out to the traffickers that there is no point in coming to London.
If it is to be brief.
As always, Mr. Speaker.
The Minister says that she will work with the Met, yet the Met is planning to disband the Human Trafficking Centre in London. Bearing in mind that the traffickers see the Olympics as a honeypot, how can she tolerate that?
The hon. Gentleman has a strong record in this area, and I would be happy to talk with him further about the issue. There is already a dedicated group in the Met working with the five boroughs, but I want the House to be under no misapprehension about how seriously the threat is taken. It is planning, well in advance of the games, that will ensure that it does not materialise.
FOI Request (Immigration)
(Urgent Question): To ask the Minister for Borders and Immigration if he will make a statement on the Freedom of Information Act investigation into the withholding of immigration documents.
This relates to a policy to clear a backlog of general immigration cases between 2002 and 2004. The incidents in question happened more than five years ago and were the subject of a full inquiry by Ken Sutton at the time, in 2004. The Home Office accepted that report in full and implemented all the recommendations made. The report can be read on the website and has been there since 2004.
A request for information from a Mr. Steve Moxon was received in January 2005. We have followed the processes as set out in the Freedom of Information Act. Some information was released when first requested. As the Act allows, some information was initially withheld on the basis of an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. The exemptions used were sections 36(2)(b)(i) and (ii), which relate to prejudice to the free and frank provision of advice and exchange of views. Those are qualified exemptions, subject to a public interest test, which means that they can be applied only where the public interest in disclosure is outweighed by that against. The decision was appealed by the individual under the process laid out in the Act. After consideration of that appeal, we upheld our decision.
In line with the procedures set out in legislation, the appellant exercised his right to appeal to the Information Commissioner. In March 2009, the Information Commissioner ruled that further information should be disclosed. We then released that information in April 2009.
This morning the Home Secretary used the front page of a national newspaper to say that he wanted to start a national debate about immigration. It is a shame that he is not here to start that debate this afternoon.
More and more evidence is now emerging to suggest that the Government broke freedom of information laws and tried to cover up a deliberate change of policy designed to encourage much higher immigration, very probably for party political purposes.
Two weeks ago, a former Home Office adviser, Andrew Neather, was widely reported as saying that Ministers had covered up a secret plan to allow in more immigrants and to make Britain more multicultural. When I put those allegations to the Minister, he said, quite extraordinarily, that he had not and that he did
“not know to whom or to which reports the hon. Gentleman refers.”
—[Official Report, House of Commons, 26 October 2009; Vol. 498, c. 7.]
Let us hope that he can do better today.
First, there was what was originally a secret plan. Will the Minister confirm that what he was talking about back in 2002 was a relaxation of the rules for clearing immigration applicants so that those who had been waiting more than 12 months would be granted clearance to stay without any further investigation into their cases? Will he also confirm that the head of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate said in an e-mail to the then Minister that that involved
“pragmatic grants, i.e. not pursing every angle which could conceivably justify a refusal”,
and that the policy meant that
“some risks would have to be taken”?
Will he also confirm that Ministers were aware of that policy change and that they accepted that it involved taking risks with immigration applications?
Then there was the cover-up. Will the Minister confirm that the Home Office tried to withhold documents outlining that policy change from the Information Commissioner? I have copies of those documents, and they are clearly marked “withhold” at the top. Will he also confirm that the Information Commissioner found the Home Office guilty of breaking the law, and ordered the documents marked “withhold” to be released? Will he tell the House why Ministers broke the laws that this Government had passed?
The Home Secretary says that he wants a rational debate on immigration, but why on earth does he think anyone will take him seriously in that debate when it is now clear that this Government have set out deliberately to deceive the British people, and have proved utterly incapable of telling them the truth about their policies on immigration.
Mr. Speaker, I seek your guidance on the hon. Gentleman’s accusation that Ministers deliberately deceived the British public.
My understanding is that no personal charge against an individual Minister has been levelled—[Interruption.] Order. Secondly, the hon. Gentleman is absolutely entitled to seek a ruling on the matter. The infraction occurs if a Member accuses another Member of misleading the House or of dishonesty to the House. I was listening intently, and I have quite big ears, but I did not hear that.
I am very grateful, Mr. Speaker, for your confirmation that that was not the accusation by the Opposition spokesman, who has just, in this House, accused Ministers of breaking the law.
Perhaps I could address what is clearly the hon. Gentleman’s latest political gimmick. He seems to ascribe to Ministers a motive that he had when he made his rather embarrassing gaffe at the Conservative party conference. He has brought before the House this afternoon—[Interruption.] These are serious accusations.
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Member for Croydon, South (Richard Ottaway) has relatively recently toddled into the Chamber—[Interruption.]
Order. If the hon. Gentleman came in earlier, so be it—I am happy to concede the point—but I am concerned with the issue of substance. I do not want sedentary chuntering of the kind in which he regularly indulges. I do not want to hear that.
Let me explain the background to the House. As I said in my answer to the urgent question, the policy issues were dealt with thoroughly and comprehensively by the Sutton inquiry, and are not the subject of the question tabled today. That rather reveals the motive for asking the question. The hon. Gentleman referred to Mr. Neather, the Evening Standard correspondent, who wrote in that paper on 26 October:
“My views have been twisted out of all recognition.”
That is what Mr. Neather, whom the hon. Gentleman prays in aid, said.
On the freedom of information request, the serious allegation was that we broke the law. In fact, the instruction from the Information Commissioner was issued on 5 March 2009, and on 9 April, in line with that ruling, we disclosed the information—to little or no comment at the time, if I may say so. That again calls into question the hon. Gentleman’s motive in asking this question.
The plain fact about the policy issue in 2004, which was the subject of debate at the time, is that the then Minister acted entirely honourably. I do not know whether she is in her place now, but hon. Members will recall that my right hon. Friend the Member for Stretford and Urmston (Beverley Hughes) acted entirely honourably and took full responsibility for what happened at the time. The backlog legacy programme that was put in place was designed to deal with a backlog that had accumulated not only under this Government; as I said in the House last week, it went back to Willie Whitelaw’s time. Once again, we are having to clear this matter up.
We will sustain public consensus behind the value of legal immigration only if controls are effective and illegal immigration is firmly countered. That has clearly not been the case. First, there is clear evidence that immigration policy was to grant applications rather than to refuse them, and to give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant—a policy that was never made public or debated in the House. Secondly, throughout this period, the Government did nothing to reinstate the exit checks that the Conservative Administration had begun to abolish. As a result, we have not been able to check whether nearly 2 million people a year who have been issued with short-term visas have left again. That is just as large a relaxation of policy as the decision to lean towards approvals. Given that just 60 per cent. of those leaving this country this year can be identified, will the Minister make an urgent commitment to introducing manual exit checks until the e-borders scheme is complete? Will he also estimate how many short-term visa holders have definitely left the country, and how many have overstayed? Will he commit to managing immigration properly, so that public confidence can be restored?
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his support for the border control measures that we are putting in place. Indeed, he and I agree on the need for those border controls. I wonder whether he will join me in asking the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell (Chris Grayling), who has tabled the question today, whether he has dropped his opposition to border controls. The fact is that there are those on the Conservative Benches who talk about civil liberties, and others who talk about the need for databases to control migration. The Conservatives have to make their minds up. At least the hon. Member for Eastleigh (Chris Huhne) is consistent.
The Minister and the head of the UK Border Agency gave evidence to the Select Committee last Tuesday, and the Minister gave us a number of important facts and figures. Will he confirm that none of the issues that are before the House today will have any effect on the veracity of the information that he gave last Tuesday, and that he stands by the figures that he gave us? There are also some outstanding points from that meeting. Will he ensure that a reply to those points reaches the Committee by Friday of this week?
I am grateful to the Chairman of the Select Committee. The answer to his first question is yes. Nothing in the question and answer today in any way affects the veracity of the evidence given to the Select Committee last week. Indeed, the question today is about the allegation that we have broken the law in applying the Freedom of Information Act, and that is something that I absolutely reject. It is a very serious accusation. The policy that I have been asked about today relates to incidents between 2002 and 2004. Regarding the specific answers that my right hon. Friend requested by his deadline of Friday, or a week Friday, I hope that he will forgive me if—he is not nodding; he will not forgive me. I will do my very best to comply with the request of the Chairman of the Select Committee, as I always do.
In a spirit of forgiveness, I say this to the Minister: at the time leading up to the resignation of the right hon. Member for Stretford and Urmston (Beverley Hughes), there were a large number of different failures in the immigration and related systems. If it is true, as has been asserted in the newspapers, that decisions were taken for political reasons, one of the most important aspects of the matter will have been the reduction or relaxation of the citizenship process, which we know took place. Did Mr. Ken Sutton investigate that?
There is a conflation of two points there—I congratulate the right hon. Gentleman on his political imagination, but he is talking about different things. The issue of controversy was over the then A2 applications and how they were dealt with—
I was there.
The right hon. Gentleman says from a sedentary position that he was there; I remember it very well. He extrapolates from that the accusation that there was a political plot. There is no evidence of such a plot; indeed, the Government’s Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 was criticised for being too authoritarian on the issue of immigration—[Interruption.] Some right hon. and hon. Members in their places today criticised it from that point of view. A good effort is going on to raise a straw man, if I may say so, but as ever with the Opposition party, there is no substance to the policy because there is no policy.
Would the Minister agree with me that one of the real sources of poor administration in the immigration system are these delays that the policy which was the subject of the freedom of information request was designed to address? I have a pile of letters with me that my researchers expected me to sign, three of which inform my constituents that they should not expect a decision before 2010 in one case and before 2011 in the other two, so what is the Minister doing to speed up this process right now?
Again, that question is about current policy, not about freedom of information. With your agreement, Mr. Speaker, may I say that if Members are concerned as to why we are here five years after the events, the timetable of compliance with the FOI shows the Home Office in very good light indeed? Indeed, I was surprised that I was able to comply so quickly; the delays were not down to the Home Office. On the substance of the question, as I hope my hon. Friend knows, the measures put in place to clear the backlog are substantial and, indeed, as I was able to tell the Select Committee, a further 350 extra members of staff are now being deployed. The date to which she refers is the end-date, the date by which we will have cleared all the backlogs. Again, we recognised the problem and took action to address it. The MPs correspondence tracker system, which I will take this opportunity to advertise, is a superb service to Members who currently send 60,000 letters a year to me and my colleagues.
Order. May I just say to the Minister of State that the dividing line between comprehensiveness and prolixity is thin, but I fear that he has just crossed it?
Does not this information reveal a culture of risk-taking and laxity in government? Is there not a danger of this culture continuing when, as the Home Affairs Select Committee learned last week, the points-based system overrides the discretion of individual immigration officers even when they entertain the gravest of doubts about people seeking to enter the United Kingdom. May we have an immediate review rather than have to wait for another sorry performance like the Minister’s today?
The hon. Gentleman has reported back from the Select Committee in a way that does not reflect what I told that Committee. The allegation that immigration officers and entry clearance officers do not have those powers is simply not the case. If the hon. Gentleman is suggesting that an immigration officer should be able to refuse entry into this country—without any reason, when that is the point in guidance and indeed in law—then let him say so. I would bet that those on my side of the House for one would not wish to see that.
May I welcome the Minister’s statement? At a time when visa and entry clearance officers are under criticism, often unfairly, may I ask him to convey to his staff my deep gratitude for their compassionate handling of the case of Kenny Chan in my constituency, whose funeral I am attending tomorrow? His Chinese girlfriend, and main carer, Bo Ji, has been allowed through discretion to come into the country, and we are deeply grateful to those staff.
I hope that the whole House agrees that immigration and customs officials in the UK Border Agency do an important job professionally and well, often in very dangerous circumstances, and have to take some very difficult decisions. I remind the House that 285 million people were transited in and out of the United Kingdom last year, which represents a significant challenge in immigration and customs control.
The information that was suppressed, and to which we are now privy, contained a warning that the policy was not without risk. Has the Minister made any evaluation of those persons who were let in, and of whether any of that risk has come to light?
I thank the hon. Lady for that question, and I take it that she has read the information that has been disclosed—
indicated assent.
She indicates that she has, in which case she will be able to confirm that the information was checked for all people, as is always the case, against the watch lists. That was said at the time. The Brace—backlog reduction accelerated clearance exercise—operation, as it was known in 2002-04, replicated guidelines that had been used in the past by Governments of all persuasions. However, I can reassure the hon. Lady on the point that she raises.
Does my hon. Friend agree that the major issue is not the alleged cover-up of an alleged immigration policy, but the problem of the overt immigration policy of unrestricted free movement of labour in the European Union?
At the time, the A2 countries were not members. My hon. Friend follows such issues carefully, and he will have noted the statement that I laid before the House last week on extending the restrictions to A2. I note that he welcomes that. I am grateful to him for giving me the opportunity to bring that to your attention, Mr. Speaker—[Interruption.] No, I am grateful, because it is a good policy, and I suspect that no one was aware of it before now.
Why did the Government change policy in a way that led to such a huge increase in inward migration?
One of the pieces of propaganda being put around is that, somehow or other, there was a deliberate Act of Parliament, or policy decision, to expand immigration. As I said a moment ago, the legal framework under which the Government operated in 1997 was the British Nationality Act 1981 brought in by the Conservative party. We introduced the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which strengthened our immigration controls, and some years later reintroduced the very border controls that allow us to control and manage migration and that the Conservative party got rid of in 1994. Will the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell therefore drop his opposition to our electronic border system—the very system that protects our borders?
Order. I do not think that we will go into that today.
There are no more Conservatives who would be able to answer such a question. Will the Minister accept, however, that the shadow Home Secretary put the question in the context of the Home Secretary’s desire to have a much more open, tolerant debate about the issue of migration, which is healthy in terms of trying to ensure that people do not vote for extremist parties at the next election? In doing so, is it right to recognise that immigration policy was too liberal, with too many mistakes, which puts stresses and strains on the provision of services to others, especially in Croydon where the immigration service is based?
We are very grateful to the good people of Croydon, which, as the hon. Gentleman says, is our major base. The fact is that the major pieces of legislation—the 1961 Bill that led to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962, the Immigration Act 1971 and the British Nationality Act 1981—are the framework for immigration in this country, and since 1997 the Government have introduced a number of Bills—[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Epson and Ewell is keen on chunnering—I think that was your phrase, Mr. Speaker. [Interruption.] Chuntering. I must be careful—that is not chumpering, is it? In the debate on the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill, he criticised the Government for introducing too many immigration Bills. Which is it? Is it that we did not have enough immigration Bills, or too many? He must make his mind up.
It would be entirely wrong to cast aspersions on the Minister’s integrity, which is beyond reproach in respect of this and other matters. I am ashamed that Opposition Members should seek to do that. However, will the Minister consider the uncontrolled immigration from the European Union countries, which may not be totally in the British interest, and seek to find a way of reining it in?
I am grateful for what the hon. Gentleman has said.
The debate on European Union immigration is a debate in which I am more than happy to engage. I am more than happy to justify the benefits gained by the United Kingdom. I am thinking of, for example, the 500,000 British people who live in Spain, the work and study opportunities that we have in the European Union, and the story of migration from European Union countries: migration that has benefited mutually, for instance, Ireland and the United Kingdom, Spain and the United Kingdom, and east Europe and the United Kingdom in the current year, and will no doubt do so in future years. That, however, is a debate from which the hon. Member for Epsom and Ewell will run a million miles, because it will open up the question of Europe.
Energy National Policy Statements
With permission, I shall make a statement about the energy national policy statements and our proposals on clean coal.
In the summer we published the low carbon transition plan, which explained how we would meet our commitments to carbon reduction for 2020 and beyond. New infrastructure is being provided for the coming years, with 20 GW under construction or consented to—more than the amount that will close by 2018—but in order to meet our low-carbon energy challenge, and owing to the intermittency of wind, we shall need significantly more generating capacity in the longer term. As our documents explain, over the next 15 years to 2025, one third of that larger future generating capacity must be consented to and built. Given that challenge, the imperative of reform in the planning system is clear.
The current system is characterised by duplication, with several bodies responsible for different aspects of consent, overlapping responsibilities for politicians and independent decision makers, and delay. Today, to guide the decision making of the new Infrastructure Planning Commission, we are setting out for consultation six draft policy statements on energy, the most important being those on the trinity of fuels of our low-carbon future: renewables, nuclear power and clean fossil fuels. We need all of them in the long term, because the challenge of the low-carbon transition is so significant. We need renewables, which are a home-grown and plentiful source of supply and are already powering 2 million homes in the UK; we need nuclear power, which is a proven, reliable source of low-carbon energy and an important base load in the system; and we need fossil fuels—with carbon capture and storage—which make possible a flexible peak-load response.
Last year, offshore wind generation increased by two thirds and onshore wind generation by one quarter. However, we need to increase the rate of progress significantly in order to meet our objective of 30 per cent. of our electricity coming from renewables by 2020. The national policy statement on renewables covers onshore renewables over 50 MW and offshore wind over 100 MW. Other onshore decisions remain with local authorities. The policy statement seeks to strike the right balance between achieving national objectives and avoiding adverse impacts on the local environment and biodiversity. While Government set out the framework in the policy statements, each application will be decided upon by the independent Infrastructure Planning Commission. The IPC will have to take account of regional and local plans drawn up by local authorities, and developers will have to ensure that they have consulted locally before any application is made, with local authorities submitting local impact reports.
The Infrastructure Planning Commission will make its decisions on the basis of a clear timetable of a year from the acceptance of an application to a decision. That is a crucial change from the system that operated in the past. This system is right for energy security. By meeting our commitments on renewables we can limit the need for gas imports, holding them at 2010 levels for the rest of the decade. It is also the right thing to do for the environment, because there is no bigger threat to our countryside than climate change. But, according to the estimates that we are publishing today, even given our ambitious targets for renewables there will be a need for additional new non-renewable power. We need to use all available low-carbon sources, which is why we were right to end the moratorium on new nuclear power stations in this country last year. In response, energy companies have announced intentions to build 16 GW of new nuclear power. In the spring, we invited comments on the 11 sites that had been nominated for new nuclear, all of which are on or near existing nuclear sites. I can tell the House that 10 of the 11 sites have been judged potentially suitable and have been included in the draft policy statement. The next step will be consultation in the 10 selected sites, as well as nationally. The consultation proposes that the 11th site, Dungeness, not be included in this national policy statement. That is because, following advice from Natural England and others, the Government do not believe that a new nuclear power station can be built there without causing an adverse effect on the integrity of the internationally unique ecosystem.
Under the habitats directive, we are obliged to consider alternative nuclear sites. An independent study has suggested that three—Kingsnorth, Druridge Bay and Owston Ferry—are “worthy of further consideration”. We have concluded, however, that all of them have serious impediments and none of them is credible for deployment by the end of 2025, the period of the policy statement; nor do we believe they are necessary for our plans for new nuclear. Therefore, we have excluded all of them from being potential sites in the draft policy statement.
On waste management, the Government are satisfied that, on the basis of the science and international experience, effective arrangements to manage and dispose of the waste from new nuclear power stations can be put in place. In addition, today we are opening consultation on the proposed regulatory justification for two different reactor designs.
New nuclear is right for energy security and climate change, and it will be good for jobs too, creating up to 9,000 jobs to build and operate power stations at each site and helping leading companies to access the international market.
As well as renewables and nuclear, the third part of our low-carbon future is clean fossil fuels. There is no solution to the problem of climate change either at home or abroad without a solution to the problem of coal—cheap and reliable, but the most polluting fuel. Already, €180 million has provisionally been offered from the European budget to assist Hatfield power station to fit carbon capture and storage, and I can confirm that we have received bids from E.ON and Scottish Power for the next stage of the current CCS competition for a post-combustion power station. Early next year, we will allocate the up to £90 million that has been set aside for the bid or bids that will go forward to the detailed design and engineering stage. Our aim is clear: for carbon capture and storage to be ready to be deployed 100 per cent. on all new coal-fired power stations by 2020. We are determined to ensure that, with the right combination of regulation and incentives, we make this happen, so I can confirm that, under our new framework, there will be no new coal-fired power stations without CCS. With immediate effect, in order to gain development consent all new coal plant will have to show that it will demonstrate CCS from the outset on around 400 MW of total output.
Our plans are based on up to four projects between now and 2020, including up to two post-combustion projects and up to two pre-combustion projects. The pre-combustion demonstration projects are expected to have 100 per cent. CCS on their coal capacity from day one. The post-combustion projects will be expected to retrofit CCS to 100 per cent. of their capacity within five years of 2020. That will be enforced by the Environment Agency, and there will be a review to confirm it by 2018. If we conclude at that time that CCS will not be proven, we believe further regulatory measures will be required to restrict emissions from these plants, such as through an emissions performance standard.
Even with the right regulation, however, if we leave the funding of CCS simply to private companies, it will not happen in time. To make CCS financially viable, our proposed energy Bill contains powers to introduce the levy to support demonstration that the Chancellor announced in the Budget; and, in response to points made in the consultation, the levy will also be available to support the move to 100 per cent. retrofit of CCS. Taken together, these policies are the most environmentally ambitious set of coal conditions of any country in the world, and they provide the opportunity for Britain to create thousands of jobs in carbon capture and storage throughout our country.
On coal, nuclear and renewables, the aim of our national policy statements is clear: consistent with the advice of the Committee on Climate Change, we need to be on course for the long-term goal of near-zero carbon emissions from power. In the spring, we will publish further work on the pathway from 2020 to 2050 consistent with this trajectory.
Alongside the overall policy statement and those for nuclear, renewables, fossil fuels and gas storage, we are also publishing the policy statement for electricity networks. Together, these documents represent a framework for the future of our energy supplies.
In every area—onshore and offshore wind, and other renewables; nuclear; and clean fossil fuels—there will be people who wish to oppose specific planning applications. Their voice must be heard in the process, and we believe that it will be. The planning process must ensure that we give consent to the right projects in the right sites. Although of course we need a process that can turn down specific applications, saying no everywhere would not be in the national interest. As a country, we need nuclear, renewables and clean coal for our energy future. They are necessary for security of supply, tackling climate change and the future of our economy. That is why we are reforming the planning system and publishing our statements today. I urge all those in all parts of the House to unite behind these proposals, and I commend this statement to the House.
What we have heard softly spoken is a declaration of a national emergency for our energy security. The question that the Secretary of State must answer is why did the Government leave it so late? The statement is made necessary by the Government’s admission in July that they expect power cuts in 2017—that was the first time since the 1970s that a British Government have had to make such a disclosure. The cause of this national emergency has been obvious for many years. Over 12 years, 15 successive Energy Ministers—a new one every nine months—have behaved like the ostrich and stuck their head in the sand rather than face up to the action that was needed to address our energy black hole.
Will the Secretary of State say whether the Government knew that most of our nuclear power stations would reach the end of their planned life before 2017? Will he tell us whether anyone in his Administration was informed that North sea oil and gas production would peak and fall away? Did anyone tell them that our most polluting coal-fired power stations were about to close? Every one of the measures contained in this statement should have been brought forward 10 years ago, when the Government had the chance to secure the investments that are so desperately needed to keep the lights on, to keep prices down and to cut carbon emissions. So will he answer the question: why did they leave it so late?
On the planning statements themselves, we support the Government, but does the Secretary of State accept that to give the certainty that investors require they should be endorsed by a full vote of this House, so that they have the democratic legitimacy that will entrench them against future judicial review? We agree with him that it is absolutely right to create a fast-track planning process for large infrastructure projects, with a dedicated secretariat and time-limited decisions, but does he agree that the final decision should be taken not by an unelected, unaccountable official, but by a Secretary of State responsible to this House?
Nuclear power must be part of a diverse energy mix, provided it is commercially viable, but does the Secretary of State accept that it is now too late for nuclear to come on stream fast enough to replace our current capacity before it shuts down, and that this will increase our dependence on gas imports before 2020? The moratorium was this Government’s and they are responsible for that. Why did they leave things so late?
On coal, will the Secretary of State confirm that the large combustion plant directive will close a third of our coal capacity, and that since it was agreed by the Government in 2001 not a single carbon capture and storage plant has been authorised to replace that capacity? Will he say which countries, in addition to China, Australia, Canada, Germany, Norway and Belgium, have used this delay to overtake Britain in CCS? Will he say whether 2014 is still the date by which any entry into his chaotic CCS competition must be up and running, or will he confirm what the industry tells me, which is that it has been put back yet again? I note that his statement was silent on this. Why did the Government leave it so late on CCS?
Will the Secretary of State confirm that Germany keeps 100 days’ worth of gas in storage and France keeps 120 days’ worth, but that Britain has just 15 days’ worth of gas storage? Was his colleague Lord Hunt of Kings Heath right when he said that the current measures would increase that by just five hours? Why did the Government leave it so late?
On renewables, will the Secretary of State confirm that Britain has the lowest proportion of energy coming from renewable sources of any EU country, apart from Malta and Luxembourg? If he intends, once again, to entertain us by blaming the gaping hole in our energy supply on rural district councils, rather than on the void in energy policy, will he say why his statement proposes no reforms to allow communities to benefit from wind farms? A decade on from the renewables target, will he tell us why he left it so late?
Britain’s consumers and businesses will pay through the nose for the last-minute scramble that the Secretary of State has announced today to cope with the black-outs that he predicted in July. Will he explain, clearly and simply, why the Government have allowed us to get into this state and will he accompany his response with an apology to the British people for 12 years of negligence, for which we are now paying the price?
It is hard to know where to start with the hon. Gentleman, and not for the right reasons. In the course of the day, he has managed to show a unique combination of alarmism and complacency. I say that he has shown alarmism because, if he had listened to my statement, he would have heard me say that if we look ahead to 2018 we will replace the 18 GW of infrastructure that is closing with 20 GW of infrastructure. I know that he is interested in the issue of energy unserved, so I direct him to the Redpoint analysis that we are publishing today, which will show him the updated figures as a result of the more recent data we have. I think that will put him right.
The hon. Gentleman showed both alarmism and complacency because what he did not say was that he wants to abolish the Infrastructure Planning Commission. We have gone through this process of years of reform, and the business community likes the system and says that it is the right thing to do. We know that it is necessary, as I said in my statement, to make the low-carbon transition, but now the hon. Gentleman comes along and says that he wants to abolish the IPC.
What do we have from the Conservative party? The Conservatives say that the Secretary of State would set the national policy statements and also decide on the specific applications. What kind of separation of powers is that? It would not only be wrong because it would disrupt a system that is coming into place, and rightly so in my view—it will hasten the low-carbon transition that we need—but wrong in principle, too.
The hon. Gentleman asked a series of other questions. On carbon capture and storage, we still do not know whether the Conservative party supports the levy that the Chancellor announced in April. My right hon. Friend announced a levy in the Budget in April and the Opposition say that they will fund CCS from the proceeds of the EU emissions trading scheme. For six months, I have told the hon. Gentleman—as the Treasury has told his hon. Friend the Member for Wealden (Charles Hendry)—that those funds are already accounted for in the national accounts, so it is funny money that the Conservative party wants to use and we still do not know whether it supports our carbon capture and storage levy.
The truth is that what we heard from the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Greg Clark) is a clear example of why the Conservative party is not fit for government.
I thank the Secretary of State for his statement, but can he tell us why the press were clearly briefed on Friday, contrary to Mr. Speaker’s ruling, and why the statements were supplied to our Whips Office only about 18 minutes before the statement was given in the House?
Although the Liberal Democrats have, as the Secretary of State would expect, consistently supported, and continue to support, a future with clean fossil fuels and renewable energy, nothing that he has said today about nuclear power persuades us that the arguments that it is safe and secure have been made in any way that is different from how they have been made in the past.
Will the Secretary of State make it clear that what he has announced today are draft policies, and will he tell us what the timetable is for consultation? Will all the evidence supplied in response be published, and do the Government still have an open mind on arguments that might persuade them that they are going down the wrong road? Does today’s draft hide within itself the necessary justification of the nuclear policy for European Union requirements, because he did not mention that in his statement at all?
How can the Energy Secretary say that the next generation of nuclear power stations are any more likely to be built without taxpayer subsidy than the last generation when he has not decided which sort of power station design to choose or where the sites will be, and when there is no scientifically justified and secure way of disposing of the waste? How can he tell us that he will go ahead with the plan when the Health and Safety Commission has expressed serious concerns about the proposed designs that are on the table?
How can the Secretary of State tell us that this is the right mix when nuclear power would make so small a contribution to our energy future, and so late in terms of the timetable that he has set out? If he were far more ambitious about renewables and willing to invest in them in the way that he has invested in the nuclear industry in the past, could we not have a safe, reliable and publicly much more acceptable future? Why did he talk about jobs in the nuclear industry but not say a word about the much greater potential for jobs in the renewables sector, which is evidently known and supported around the country?
On CCS, can I be clear that the Secretary of State is saying to the House as before that there will be a new generation of coal-fired power stations but they will not all have to be CCS-compliant from the beginning of their operation? Some of the next generation will, therefore, be dirty power stations from the beginning rather than the necessary clean stations.
Was there a commitment in the statement to a UK grid supported and funded by the Government? Was there a commitment to the European supergrid, which we need if we are to have energy security across the continent?
Finally, as a Labour Minister with all his good democratic credentials, the Secretary of State must find it difficult to come to the House and argue that in future the major energy decisions in this country will be taken by an independent body, not even answerable to Ministers of the Crown, let alone to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Is it not the truth that the one thing that has been disposed of is not nuclear waste, because the Secretary of State has no solution for that, but the democratic process in coming to all those difficult decisions?
Order. Before the Secretary of State replies, may I gently say to the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes) that he did somewhat exceed his time? This is not an example that should be imitated by other colleagues.
I will try to be brief in reply, Mr. Speaker. Obviously, it pains me to disagree with the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes), but let me deal with the three specific points he made. He has an anti-nuclear position. I disagree with it and I shall briefly explain why.
We have very ambitious targets for renewables in this country. We all know the targets are ambitious, so to ask—as the hon. Gentleman did—why we are not more ambitious is, frankly, not realistic. We know that we have tough commitments, but looking at our needs in terms of low-carbon energy in the future, it is wrong to rule out nuclear power, because I think it can make a real difference. As for the hon. Gentleman’s point about nuclear not making a contribution, companies have already put forward plans—as I said in my statement—for 16 GW of new power, which is significant.
The hon. Gentleman made some specific points about nuclear. He said that we had not decided about the stations. Actually, we are saying that there is a choice of two stations—the Westinghouse station or the AREVA station. We shall benefit from the fact that the stations are being built elsewhere, because many of the issues that could be faced will have already been gone through.
On coal, let me be absolutely clear: we have said that there will be no new coal without CCS. That is absolutely clear. We are absolutely clear about that—[Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman says, “Expected.” No, CCS will have to be demonstrated from the outset in any new coal-fired power station. That is very clear from my statement, and he will see it from the documentation as well.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned democratic oversight, which comes in the national policy statements, but when those statements are put forward by Ministers it is right to leave specific questions about specific applications and developments to an independent body. I think that will give more assurance in the process, and I wish the hon. Gentleman had supported our proposals today.
May I congratulate the Secretary of State on his statement? It arises from the planning delay over important national energy requirements. I should like to ask him specifically about wind turbine power. As he is aware, we are doing well on offshore investment, but not so well in onshore investment, where a great deal more will have to be done. It appears that recently 75 per cent. of applications have been rejected, often against the advice of planning officers, by the elected officials who appear to feel that they will be overruled anyway. Will my right hon. Friend comment on that? We welcome his investment in Yorkshire in the Hatfield plant.
My right hon. Friend played an important role in Kyoto and his advice has been very helpful in the run-up to Copenhagen. He is absolutely right. He has been very brave, and has stood up for the issue of onshore wind and said that we need to go ahead with it. He is absolutely right about that. Part of the argument we need to advance in the House and in the country is not just for planning reform but for going ahead with onshore wind, which is why I wish the shadow Business Secretary had not said that he was against all onshore wind. I think it is right that all of us stand up and say that we need onshore and offshore wind. We cannot say no to any of the low-carbon alternatives.
rose—
Order. Thirty hon. and right hon. Members are seeking to catch my eye, so brevity is of the essence. I know that a good example will now be set by the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard).
Is the Secretary of State aware that his decision to exclude Dungeness from his list of preferred sites will be greeted with consternation by many of my constituents, who will be bemused by the objection of Natural England, having regard to the fact that there are already two nuclear power stations at Dungeness? Will he assure me that he will continue to consult on the possibility of restoring Dungeness to the list, and will he confirm that Natural England will not have a veto on that possibility?
I know from our conversations that the right hon. and learned Gentleman feels strongly about these questions. I can confirm that this is a consultation. No, Natural England does not have a veto. We act on its advice and the advice of others. The specific issue with respect to the proposal for Dungeness was that the site was adjacent to the existing power station, which causes a lot more difficulties in relation to habitats than the existing power station. It is a question not simply of new habitats rules coming into place since the original station at Dungeness was built, but of the specific siting of any new station at Dungeness. As I say, there is a consultation and we look forward to hearing the views of the right hon. and learned Gentleman and others.
I warmly congratulate my right hon. Friend on his statement and the plans that he announced for accelerating our plans for new nuclear power stations, which will be warmly welcomed in the country as a whole. His statement updates us on the planning reform changes that the Government have introduced, which will de-risk a lot of the investment that is necessary. Does he have an open mind about whether it might be necessary to go one step further at some point in the future, either in the form of a minimum floor price for carbon or in the form of a new low-carbon obligation on the power generators?
Let me pay tribute to my right hon. Friend because he took the very brave decision on nuclear power, which has not quite a universal consensus, although perhaps a growing consensus, in this House. As for the carbon price, we do want a more robust carbon price than we have at present. The best way of achieving that, in my view, is plan A, which is Copenhagen, and getting an ambitious deal at Copenhagen. He was also right, in my view, to rule out a specific public subsidy for new nuclear, but our focus is on getting that deal at Copenhagen so that we can ensure a more robust carbon price.
The Secretary of State said that he foresaw 150 MW of wind power capacity being installed. Can he confirm that on average 27 per cent. is the typical usage, so that typically 100 MW of that 150 MW will not be in use at any one moment?
I think the right hon. Gentleman has got his megawatts and gigawatts a little confused, if I may say so. The point I was making in my statement was the scale of application that would be below or above the threshold. He is right in that wind power is what we call de-rated in terms of its impact on the electricity system, and the calculations that we put forward take account of that.
What is there in place to ensure that there will be full environmental impact assessments in order that there can be a level playing field for deciding whether to invest in nuclear or renewables? I have concerns about investment in nuclear.
I know that my hon. Friend feels strongly about these issues. Local environmental impacts are built into the assessments. Whether on renewables or on nuclear, those decisions are for the IPC. It is important to say that the advance of the planning reforms is so that the question of need is settled in consultation at this stage in the national policy statements. The question of specific applications and their impact on biodiversity and other matters is then a decision for the IPC, so I can reassure my hon. Friend that the IPC will have to make judgments on those questions.
May I welcome the Secretary of State’s well justified refusal to put Druridge Bay in Northumberland back on the list of potential nuclear sites, and, as someone who has campaigned for 20 years ago to get it off that list, assure him that any future Secretary of State who sought to put a nuclear station on such a magnificent and environmentally diverse site would face a similarly intense and successful campaign?
Again, I know from speaking to the right hon. Gentleman that he feels strongly about these matters. We made a judgment about Druridge Bay and, indeed, the other two sites identified as worthy of further consideration—both that there were serious impediments to their being placed on the list, and that they were not necessary for our plans for new nuclear. Hence, they have been excluded from the national policy statements. I hope that that acts as reassurance to the right hon. Gentleman and his constituents.
As French, Finnish and UK regulators have all recently agreed that the current control systems for the evolutionary EPR reactor are to be subject to architectural change—in other words, the reactor is still being designed— how can the Government possibly sanction the justification of nuclear plant before reactor design is finally decided? Is that not a classic case of putting the cart before the horse?
No, it is not. I said earlier that we were benefiting from the fact that other countries are constructing and using power plants—in the case of both Westinghouse and AREVA—before they are constructed here. That and the generic design assessment represent precisely the advantage that we in this country have of being able to get the design right, so that we can stick to the timetable and avoid the cost overruns that would otherwise result.
Instead of being a world beater regarding civil nuclear power, we are now a client state because of 10 years of drift and neglect. Will the right hon. Gentleman atone for that, at least in part, by working with the further education colleges of Somerset to make our county a centre of British nuclear engineering, particularly as Somerset is likely to be the site of the first of the new generation of nuclear power stations?
I have to say that the right hon. Gentleman has a funny way of advancing his constituents’ interests, but I am not going to engage in the question of atonement. I welcome the work that local organisations in Somerset and elsewhere are doing as part of the nuclear renaissance and to push nuclear skills. As I said in my statement, I think that there are big opportunities in this country in terms of new nuclear and employment and skills.
Will my right hon. Friend make sure that the reduction in the time taken up by the planning process is not portrayed by the nuclear industry as guaranteeing that nuclear power stations will be completed shortly? The fact is that apart from at Sizewell B, the principal cause of delay in getting electricity out of nuclear power stations was the vast delay in construction. For instance, Dungeness B was actually a decade late before it started producing any electricity, and it has never produced the amount for which it was designed.
My right hon. Friend speaks with great authority on this matter. Indeed, I believe that he was shadow energy spokesman when some of those questions were being debated. I take his point, but I have to say this about the specific planning process at Sizewell: my understanding is that there were 300 and something days of inquiry at Sizewell; that only 30 were taken up with the specific issue of the Sizewell proposal; and that the rest were taken up with the debate about need. The virtue of our proposals is precisely that they try to make some progress on need, so that people’s points about specific, local applications can be considered.
I noticed that the Energy Secretary did not answer the question from the Conservative Front Bencher about the 2014 deadline for the carbon capture and storage pilot. I also noticed that the number of bidders has dropped to two. I hope that that, together with the delay in construction at Kingsnorth, does not mean that the 2014 deadline will be put back.
The hon. Gentleman has an understandable interest in a particular competitor in the competition, and he will understand that we have to go through a due process before making decisions. I said that early in the new year we will announce the next stage, including the allocation of £90 million, so he will have to wait until then. To be clear about the matter, however, let me say that we are absolutely not downgrading our ambitions on CCS; indeed, we are upgrading them. I have said today that we will have up to four demonstration projects: up to two of them will be post-combustion, and two of them will be pre-combustion.
I very much welcome the statement, but, given the inevitably long time scales for the development of new nuclear and carbon capture and storage, and getting to where we need to be in relation to our renewables needs, is there not a danger that up to 2020 we could see a new dash for gas? Will that not inevitably increase import dependency, at a time when the world will be thirsty for energy; and will the Secretary of State comment on the national security implications of that scenario?
The Wicks report makes very good reading; I am glad to have the chance to plug it, as my right hon. Friend rather modestly did not do so. We showed in the low carbon transition plan that if we make the progress on renewables that we have set out—that is an “if” because it relies on planning reform, public consent, finance and grid connection, all of which we are acting on—then we will stabilise gas imports at 2010 levels. However, that requires a Government who support the drive to renewables, who do not have qualms about it, and who do not start saying that onshore wind is not part of the energy mix. That is why, in my view, we have to drive ahead with renewables and nuclear.
I welcome the introduction of the first national policy statements, but may I press the Secretary of State on the timetable for ending consultation, both in the wider world and within Parliament? How does that fit in with Sir Michael Pitt’s timetable inviting the energy producers to come forward with their plans?
It is worth saying that the IPC will be up and running and fully operational from next spring. Pre-designation of the NPSs, it will be making recommendations to Ministers, and post-designation it will be making the decisions itself. As the hon. Lady will see from the documentation, we have allowed extra time for consultation. We thought long and hard about this. We thought that it was the right thing to do, not least because of the big interest in nuclear, for example. The 15-week consultation period takes us to about February, and then the Select Committee has to deliberate. We want to move as far and as fast as we can by next spring.
I thank my right hon. Friend for his courtesy in letting me know that Owston Ferry in my constituency was to be mentioned in his statement, and for his swift decision not to include it as part of the list put forward by the independent consultants, who said that it was a site worthy of serious consideration. My constituents will very much welcome the swift decision announced today. However, can he assure the House that his Department has not spent a large amount of money on those independent consultants, who came up with recommendations that he, I and everyone else can see are just plain daft?
I am sure that my hon. Friend’s constituents and the independent consultants will have heard his views on the report. In all seriousness, I can assure him that we see serious impediments regarding all three sites, which is why they have not been included in the national policy statement. We want to offer reassurance to his constituents on that point. Also, as I said earlier, we do not need see the need for them as part of our nuclear plans.
May I say that Hinkley Point is delighted with the Minister’s announcement? One of the integral aspects of this is the infrastructure needed to get to the plant: we need a new bridge and a new road. Can he confirm or deny that that will be part of the planning application? If it is, will it come under the new planning rules?
The hon. Gentleman gives me a good opportunity to plug the benefits of the new system. He is right. At the moment, multiple consents have to be applied for from different organisations, but now a single set of applications will made to one body. That is a necessary part of proceeding on the basis of the timetable we have set out.
I compliment my right hon. Friend on so clear-sighted and realistic a statement, but is he aware that the targets he sets for all three areas of energy supply are very ambitious, not least in respect of carbon capture and storage? I accept entirely what he says about the private sector, left to itself, not doing this on time, but could he set up a small team of capable officers in the Department to drive matters forward?
My hon. Friend speaks with great knowledge about these issues. We have set up the office of carbon capture and storage precisely to do what the Office for Nuclear Development has done in our Department, which is to drive this forward on a proper timetable. He is right that we need to make progress. The next stage has been reached today with the bids for the competition, and the so-called feed studies—the engineering demonstration projects—will be awarded early next year.
rose—
Order. May I appeal to the House for very brief questions and brief answers, so that we get as many people in as we possibly can?
Can the Secretary of State say why the contents of his statement were leaked to the press over the weekend before it was made to Parliament?
It was not leaked to the press, and I take our responsibilities in the House very seriously. It was right that Parliament was the first to hear about the details of the statement.
I am sure that my right hon. Friend will agree that the investment in and strengthening of the grid and the emergence of new connection points is an essential part of delivering a renewable energy strategy, and of renewing other forms of energy in future. What plans are there in the documents he has published today to ensure that linear planning applications and associated applications can receive the attention of the IPC, for example, in the same way that it is intended larger, single-site applications will?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right about the importance of that matter as part of the IPC’s work. That is why networks are part of the IPC’s consideration and remit. He is also right on his more general point about grid connection.
The proposed Oldbury B power station, unlike the existing one next to it in my constituency, would have a very high cooling tower. If my constituents objected to that because of the visual impact and other factors, would they actually be listened to—not just heard—or would their views be overridden? The document states that the national need for stations is the most important factor.
The distinction I have tried to draw is between the national need, which is important to establish, and specific developments, on which it is important that the IPC can take a view. To reassure the hon. Gentleman, the IPC will absolutely take a view on whether that specific development is appropriate.
Climate change is accelerating and sea levels are rising. Of the 10 potentially suitable sites for new nuclear power stations, how many are less than 20 metres above sea level?
My hon. Friend asks a characteristically important question. Let me put it to him this way: flooding and coastal erosion issues are taken account of, as he will see from the documents, in all specific site representations. The question for us is whether to rule out any of those applications on the grounds that he mentions, which we have not done. Although we raised the issue of flooding and coastal erosion in relation to Dungeness, we did not feel that it was enough to rule it out. It is a matter to consider, and he will see that we commented specifically on it in relation to a number of the applications that the IPC will have to take a view on.
In South-West Norfolk there is a growing number of wind turbines, without any tangible local benefit. Will the Secretary of State allow communities that host wind farms to keep all the business rates, to ensure that there is true local benefit from the local energy supplied?
We are always on the look-out for ways to encourage local authorities to support wind turbines.
I am not going to make up policy on the hoof, tempting as it is. The hon. Gentleman’s general point about local people having an interest in wind turbines and in having them in their area is absolutely right.
Should the Copenhagen summit not produce a robust price of carbon—the Secretary of State’s plan A—will he look closely at other, domestic measures that will secure the price of carbon and secure new investment in new technology in this country?
My hon. Friend tempts me towards plan B, and I shall try to resist the temptation. We need to focus on plan A, which is getting a more robust price for carbon. We have recommendations from the Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change, as he knows, and we will obviously consider them as part of the 2020 to 2050 road map that we will produce in the spring.
What has been the involvement and input of the devolved nations in drawing up the national policy statements? They are likely to be required to provide a disproportionate amount of the UK energy need.
As the hon. Gentleman will know, many of these matters are devolved, including specific planning issues. I wish that we had more of a consensus in some parts of our nations and regions, for example on nuclear power, but he will be pleased to hear that we have been in contact with the devolved nations to consult them on the specific proposals.
Can my right hon. Friend give an assurance that the NPSs before us today have been fully assessed for their carbon impact, so that they transmit a clear message to the IPC about the need to meet national climate change targets and priorities?
My hon. Friend makes a very important point. In drawing up the national policy statements, we are very clear about the need to decarbonise our power supply and take the carbon out of our energy. That is why I emphasised in my statement the importance of the new generating capacity we need by 2025. The truth is that we could carry on producing more gas-fired power stations—that is a high-carbon lock-in way of proceeding. The real challenge for us is, in my view, not above all a security of supply challenge, because we are making progress in building new infrastructure, but low-carbon security of supply—meaning nuclear, renewables and other low-carbon sources of fuel.
What specifically will the Government do, however, at Copenhagen on emissions trading to ensure that carbon pricing is fixed at a sufficiently high level to ensure that the base supplies of clean coal and nuclear are made viable?
The hon. Gentleman asks an important question. The most important thing we can do at Copenhagen is to get an ambitious deal that enables Europe to go from a 20 per cent. reduction in its emissions by 2020 to 30 per cent. If we do that, it will most likely lead to a more robust carbon price. That is the most effective thing we can do.
Will my right hon. Friend join me in congratulating employees at British Energy in my constituency? More than 1,000 will benefit from this announcement. Will he also join me in congratulating E.ON and RWE, which want to create more than 200 jobs in the nuclear industry at Gloucester business park? Will he resist any attempt from the Opposition to do away with the IPC, because ultimately, that will result in greater instability in the nuclear jobs market?
I agree with my hon. Friend. He is right to say that nuclear can create big job opportunities in this country and that we should capitalise on them. I pay tribute to the employees in his constituency for the work they are doing. I hope that, even at this late stage, the Opposition will, having pondered the issues, think again about abolishing the IPC, which I think is the wrong thing to do.
The Secretary of State claimed that his statement was consistent with the Committee on Climate Change’s projections, but actually, it said last month that unabated coal should not form any part of our energy generation plans after 2020, whereas the statement only compels clean carbon capture and storage on 400 MW for each power station, and only expects the rest to be retro-fitted later. Does that not leave exactly the same dirty great loophole in his policy as existed before?
I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The Committee on Climate Change is very clear that there is a limited role for unabated coal in the 2020s, and we agree.
I welcome my right hon. Friend’s commitment to 16 GW of new nuclear energy. He knows, as I do, that nuclear is now clean, green and safe. May I also welcome the thousands of jobs that will be brought into the industry, including high-tech jobs, and in particular the hundreds of jobs that will be created at the nuclear fuels plant at Springfields near my constituency?
In a sense, we see from the contributions of hon. Members the jobs impact that new nuclear can have in this country, as well as on energy security and our climate change targets. My hon. Friend spoke very eloquently about what it will do in his constituency.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that a lot of people want to know not only that the lights will stay on, but that they can also afford the bills? What assurances can he provide to people that the energy mix he set out will provide secure and affordable energy supply?
My hon. Friend raises a very important issue. That is why, in the energy Bill, which was in the draft legislative programme, we want to propose social tariffs on a mandatory basis—precisely to help the hardest-pressed consumers. At a time of rising prices and when pressures on prices are upwards, we need tough regulation, and help for the most vulnerable.
Will my right hon. Friend guarantee that the nuclear industry will not be given an insurance indemnity subsidy from the taxpayers?
We have made clear that on the question of public subsidy for nuclear—it was clear in the White Paper produced by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barrow and Furness (Mr. Hutton)—we are not going to provide public subsidy for the construction, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power stations.
My right hon. Friend will be aware that during the two-week cold spell in Scotland last year, renewables contributed only 0.01 per cent. of Scottish needs. What guarantee can he give me that the base load that keeps this country running will be maintained when the wind does not blow?
My hon. Friend is a passionate advocate for the new nuclear industry and the role that it can play in this country, and he is right. I have tried to set out in my statement the combination of low-carbon fuels that we need, with nuclear providing the base load, renewables as a plentiful source of supply, but intermittent, and flexible peak load response.
My right hon. Friend has made a big call today and I commend him. On his proposals for the management of radioactive waste, can he comment on proposals for the deep waste repository, and what date does he think that it might be constructed, as it is important to building a public consensus around nuclear rebuild?
My hon. Friend asks an important question, and there is more information in the documentation we have provided. The truth is that deep geological storage is a long way off, because—as I said to the hon. Member for North Southwark and Bermondsey (Simon Hughes)—waste will stay on the site for many years to come after decommissioning and will then go into deep geological storage. It is also worth saying that several councils in west Cumbria have expressed an interest in being the site for the deep geological storage.
With the single caveat that my right hon. Friend should revisit the decision about Dungeness, I warmly welcome his statement today. Can he assure me that he will talk to those colleagues responsible for higher education to ensure that we create the training places to produce British graduates in physics and engineering to man this industry in the future?
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. We need to ensure, both for reasons of national prosperity and, frankly, energy security and climate change, that we have a supply chain that can accommodate the increase in nuclear power we are talking about. My hon. Friend the Under-Secretary is working on this with the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.
Much as I have concerns about the IPC process, I welcome what my right hon. Friend has said about nuclear. Following on from what my hon. Friend the Member for South Thanet (Dr. Ladyman) said, will my right hon. Friend put into the final national policy statement a clear requirement for an investment in British jobs if we are to have new nuclear power stations?
It is tempting on these occasions to load the IPC with a huge number of responsibilities. Part of what I have tried to set out is a balance of powers, so that it is the role of Government to set out need, get the skills strategy right and obtain the investment. The job of the IPC is to make a specific judgment about specific developments. That said, I am sympathetic to the point my hon. Friend makes about ensuring that we get the jobs in this country.
Bill Presented
Installation of letter box guards (Protection from dogs) Bill
Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57)
Ann Coffey, supported by Ms Karen Buck and Janet Anderson, presented a Bill to require householders to fit a letter box guard if they are in possession of a dog; and for connected purposes.
Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 161).
Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme) (No.4)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Coroners and Justice Bill for the purpose of supplementing the Orders of 26 January and 4 and 23 March 2009 (Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme), Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme) (No. 2) and Coroners and Justice Bill (Programme) (No. 3)):
Consideration of Lords Amendments
1. Proceedings on consideration on Lords Amendments shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption at this day’s sitting.
2. The proceedings shall be taken in the order shown in the first column of the following Table.
3. The proceedings shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the times specified in the second column of the Table.
Lords Amendments Time for conclusion of proceedings Nos. 1, 2 and 216 One and a half hours after the commencement of proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments. No. 55 Three hours after the commencement of those proceedings or the moment of interruption, whichever is earlier. No. 59, 119, 121, 236 and 239 Five hours after the commencement of those proceedings or the moment of interruption, whichever is earlier. Nos. 66, 3 to 54, 56 to 58, 60 to 65, 67 to 118, 120, 122 to 215, 217 to 235, 237, 238, 240 to 244 The moment of interruption.
Subsequent stages
4. Any further Message from the Lords may be considered forthwith without any Question being put.
5. The proceedings on any further Message from the Lords shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement.—(Mr. Heppell.)
Coroners and Justice Bill
Consideration of Lords amendments
I draw the attention of the House to the fact that financial privilege is involved in amendments 12, 14, 28, 54, 66, 131, 145, 149, 150 and 185. If the House agrees to any of these amendments, I shall ensure that the appropriate entry is made in the Journal.
After Clause 5
Information for Requests
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Lords amendment 2, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 216, and Government motion to disagree, and amendments (a) and (b) in lieu.
Lords amendments 112 and 127.
Lords amendment 128, and amendment (a).
Lords amendment 129, and amendment (a).
This group of amendments concerns an extremely important issue. It relates to the question of whether an investigation into the cause of death can take place within the coroners system, and in compliance with article 2 of the European convention on human rights, in circumstances involving highly sensitive information, such as intercept material, which cannot be made public. It is only in a very small number of inquests—fewer than 2 per cent. of all inquests—that the coroner has to sit with a jury. Those are often the most controversial cases, where someone has died potentially at the hands of the state. Of that 2 per cent., there are only a tiny number where article 2 is engaged and there is sensitive material that should not be publicly disclosed.
I should say right at the beginning that every effort is made by this Government—and will be by any Government and by law enforcement agencies—to push for the standard coronial system with a jury in this kind of case to ensure that, if humanly possible, it is a normal coroner’s inquest with a jury that holds the investigation. There was some suggestion with the de Menezes case that it would not be possible, because of the sensitive material, to hold such an inquest, but in the event it was, as ways round the problems were found. That was to the general approbation of everybody—not least and above all to the families and the community concerned. There is no intention whatever—by the agencies, by the police, by the Government, by the Law Officers—that any provisions in this Bill should ever be used as an alternative to a normal inquest where such a normal inquest can, by stretching the envelope as far as possible, be used. Where intercepted evidence is available, every effort is made to gist that material and if the coroner is satisfied that the gist provides a fair summary of the evidence, that is regarded as satisfactory.
For those of us who are not distinguished lawyers and who come to the debate as lay people, will the Secretary of State please tell us what arrangements exist so that highly sensitive information can be discussed or divulged in camera? Is there not already provision that would cover most of the cases that he refers to?
In a sense, my hon. Friend makes my point. There is potential for any tribunal—with a small “t”—to go into camera. In many cases, that provides the answer. For sure, there are long-established rules so that in cases where human intelligence is involved evidence can be given by the staff of the security and intelligence agencies from behind screens—or otherwise their identities can be withheld. In most cases, that is satisfactory. There is, however, a tiny number of cases—there is one we know of at the moment; only one—for which the central evidence arises from intercept. There is a grave anxiety—this is a central issue in the whole question of the disclosure of intercept—that if that evidence were made available as intercept transcriptions in closed court, it would have to be made available to those present, including many who had not been cleared for these purposes.
This issue was examined in great detail by the Chilcot inquiry. As I will explain, it came forward with nine conditions in which intercept material in our environment —not in other people’s environments—could be made available to the court. I am glad to see in their places today the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) and the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), both of whom sat on the Chilcot inquiry and the subsequent advisory panel, so they know a huge amount about this issue.
This assessment must have been made so will the Secretary of State please tell us how many inquests—shall we say in the last five years—he estimates would have been affected by this Executive intervention?
As far as I know—if I am wrong, I will try to correct the record before the debate is concluded—there is one outstanding case, the Azelle Rodney case, which goes back four years. We are dealing with a tiny number of cases, but the problem is that unless we find a way through this problem, there will be no satisfactory investigation into the cause of death in an equivalent case —I make no prejudicial remarks about that particular case.
The original proposals for so-called secret inquests came from my right hon. Friend the Member for Airdrie and Shotts (John Reid), when he was Home Secretary. They did not find favour and were withdrawn, as it was the Secretary of State deciding on whether an inquest should be held without a coroner. It was thought inappropriate—I understand the arguments and agree with them—for the decision in such a sensitive matter to be made by a Home Secretary alone. After much consideration and discussion, I proposed a different scheme that found its way into clause 12 of the Bill as it left the House: a Home Secretary would form a view that a non-jury inquest was required, and the Lord Chief Justice would nominate a senior judge to hear it, but a prior hearing by that judge would determine, on application by the Secretary of State and on hearing the other parties, whether to accede to that application on clear criteria.
Will the Secretary of State also confirm that clause 13, as originally drafted, allowed the use of intercept evidence?
Section 18 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 also allows the use of intercept evidence in certain cases, but the difference is that in neither scheme was intercept evidence to be made available to a wide variety of parties in the courts, or to a jury. We are not digging in—we never have—and saying that in no circumstances should intercept evidence be available to a court, prior to the Chilcot recommendations being implemented. I was the Home Secretary who introduced, in 1999-2000, the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. The central issue is how to ensure that such sensitive material, and all the techniques behind it, are protected.
Everybody who has been in the position—as have I, the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe, and the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed as a member of the Chilcot committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee—of operating or supervising the system is alive to the dangers and invites others to take on trust the nature of the dangers. I hope that colleagues will accept, from a wide variety of sources, and from right hon. Members who do not necessarily agree on everything, that a serious issue needs to be addressed. If I felt otherwise, I would say so, as would the other right hon. Gentlemen involved.
There is another complication to the problem, which is not just awareness of the dangers, but certainty that a particular step will not necessarily lead to others that expose the dangers. Although it might prove entirely reasonable to use intercept in particular circumstances, the rules to make that possible do not have to create a situation in which intercept is used in circumstances in which that would be dangerous to national security.
I accept that, and in our debates about intercept some people have taken the view that we should just make it available. The Chilcot committee looked in some detail at the systems in other countries, but our system is much more adversarial, and the rules relating to the disclosure of unused material, and the police techniques behind it, are much tougher in most cases than those in other jurisdictions. That is fundamental to the problem that Chilcot was trying to deal with.
We have to find some way of achieving a solution when there has been a death at the hands of the state and article 2 is involved, as are the requirements that, in every other circumstance, a jury inquest would take place. There can be a satisfactory finding of fact about the cause of death. There is a fundamental difference between such an investigation into a death, and any investigation leading to a criminal trial. In extremis—this has happened—the prosecution have the discretion to withdraw a prosecution, as they can balance the public interest if they think that they are being required to disclose material that would damage national security. In the context of an inquest or an investigation of a death under article 2, that is not an option, because it is the death that triggers investigation in the circumstances. There is no discretion. The investigation must be held. The only issue before the House—and it is an important one—is what the environment of that investigation should be.
When clause 12 failed to find favour, I announced, along with my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, that as an alternative he would use the provisions in the Inquiries Act 2005 to establish an inquiry. That had been suggested to us informally as an alternative. Provisions introduced in the other place make it clear that the matters before any such inquiry must be those matters which would have been before any inquest, as an irreducible minimum. There is also provision, in schedule 1, for the inquest itself to be formally adjourned while an inquiry takes place, and general provision for it to be resumed. In some cases it may be decided that there is no need for it, while in other cases it will be resumed.
In earlier debates, I put to the Secretary of State the possibility of introducing public interest immunity certificates into the whole scenario, thereby excluding the detail of intercept evidence. To this day I am not sure what the explanation is, whether it holds good, and whether it could apply. Will the Secretary of State please address that point?
Public interest immunity certificates are used to withhold from a jury information that would otherwise be disclosable, but not in a case in which it could lead to an injustice. The right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe signed plenty of PIIs, and I signed plenty of them both as Home Secretary and as Foreign Secretary. The difficulty in this instance is that if we leave it to a jury to consider the matter—as even those who support the idea, such as Lady Miller and certain interest groups outside, will accept—the finder of fact, the jury in this case, will be expected to find the facts when some of the key facts are being withheld. Surely that is far less just than allowing a senior judge of High Court status or above to examine the issue.
Schedule 1(3)(2) to the Inquiries Act states:
“The coroner need not suspend the investigation if there appears to be an exceptional reason for not doing so.”
Will my right hon. Friend confirm that an exceptional reason might be that the inquiry did not comply with article 2 of the European convention on human rights? If a coroner took the view that it did not, would he be within his rights if he refused to suspend the investigation, and would my right hon. Friend support him in that decision?
With great respect to my hon. Friend, I think that the idea of inquiries is that they should comply with article 2. There would be scarcely any reason for proceeding if they did not. I shall say more about this when I sum up the debate, but if that were the case, the matter would fall to be resolved in the normal way, and it might well be for the court to decide whether the inquiry was compliant with article 2.
As I shall make clear in a moment, I am conscious that the Secretary of State has a real problem, and that it is for us in the House to try to help rather than hinder him. Will he confirm, however, that there may already be all sorts of trials—inquests and, indeed, criminal trials— that might be helped by the admissibility of intercept evidence?
Let us be clear about this. The category of case to which the Secretary of State is referring is not a category of case in which intercept evidence might be available that would help but, I assume, a category of case in which intercept evidence goes to the very heart of the decision of an inquest or inquiry. That already narrows it down considerably.
Yes, it does. Typically, the intelligence agencies or the police have available to them intercept evidence which is highly incriminatory. That is, indeed, the argument in its favour, and the reason for its use in cases abroad. It has been judged to be in the wider public interest not to make it available up to now. Chilcot has come forward with his nine conditions, but on the whole we manage to find other means of ensuring that evidence is found.
I should just point out to the House—this is not remotely a theological issue—that it has long been accepted that evidence obtained through recordings, such as hidden microphones, is adducible in court, and that is often used. The point here is that the compromise of techniques is far less. The balance in respect of public interest lies in favour of disclosure. We therefore put forward these proposals, and we sought to strengthen them in the interests of the parties not least by ensuring that a senior judge should be appointed to hold such inquiries.
A series of amendments were put forward in the other place, which I am inviting the House to reject today. They propose that this evidence should be made available to a normal inquest court, save in certain very limited circumstances where the court has a power to withhold it from the inquest jury. The difficulty here is that under the amendments the coroner could disclose the material to the interested parties even if that could cause very considerable damage to other parties. I say with respect that this is where I identify the central flaw in the argument of Baroness Miller and her supporters, such as Inquest, Liberty and Justice, with whom I have talked and for whom I have great respect—and my clause 12 is an attempt to square this circle. Those three supporters have said that
“it will remain possible for a judge conducting an investigation to ban or restrict the jury’s or public’s access to material that would be contrary to the interests of national security.”
If that is so, we return to the central problem here: in these cases, where the evidence from the intercept is key to the cause of death—because if it were not, it would be possible to offer other information—we are expecting juries to come to a decision based on facts that have not been disclosed to them. Baroness Miller inadvertently made the same admission herself. On Report, she said of the Chilcot inquiry conditions that
“it must be possible for the Government and all their advisers to work out a way to put those nine conditions into the Bill in such a way…that they can stay within the inquest system and the conditions can be fulfilled.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 21 October 2009; Vol. 713, c. 733.]
I have two things to say about that. First, some very assiduous and imaginative individuals—including two in this House—are sitting on the advisory panel on the implementation of Chilcot, and achieving this end is very difficult. Secondly, I say, with respect to Baroness Miller, that I do not believe that she had read Chilcot’s nine conditions. The second of them, for example, says:
“Intercepted material originating from the intelligence agencies shall not be disclosed beyond cleared judges, prosecutors, or special (defence) advocates, except in a form agreed by the originator.”
There are various other restrictions on disclosure, too, so we are back in the same box. In a criminal trial, even where there are PIIs, it is fundamental that the trial judge ensures that there is a fair trial in every circumstance, and if he thinks there will not be a fair trial, including in respect of taking account of material he has seen under the PII, he can abort the trial. I say again that that is not a possibility in an inquest, which is an investigation into a death that has taken place.
Is the Secretary of State saying the following? On the one side, there is some risk—although presumably a very remote one—that a coronial judge might reveal information to the parties the revelation of which would be damaging to a party, or that a jury that contains people who are not secure might receive certain information. On the other side, there is a risk that sometimes information will not be disclosed to the jury which it would need to make a perfect decision on the facts. Surely the problem is that that is making the best the enemy of the good. There is no perfect solution to this, but surely a system that allows, in general, the disclosure of intercept evidence will, in general, produce the best results.
The issue of whether and, if so, how intercept evidence can be used in our trial system has exercised senior politicians and senior members of the judiciary for a long time. It is not for the want of trying that we have yet, finally, to pin down a solution. That is the purpose of Chilcot’s report and we have got closer to a solution through it than we have ever got before. I am extremely grateful to those who have been burning their brains out on how to ensure that we arrive at the correct solution.
However, we cannot suddenly say, in a rather blasé way, that we are just going to adopt Chilcot’s approach for coroners’ inquests, without having a proper scheme for every other circumstance. Precisely because of the fact that there is no discretion about whether or not to proceed with an investigation into a death whereas there is that long-stop protection of discontinuing a prosecution in a criminal trial, we have to ensure that the inquests system is more robust than any other—that is so by definition, because it has to be used in every case where there is a relevant case; there is no alternative but to hold an investigation. That is the point I make. I should say, as I was about to say in a moment, that what I have done, and so my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has to have done, is ask the advisory panel on intercept evidence, which includes hon. Members here, whether they will particularly examine the issue of evidence in coronial matters, because we need to find a specific way forward.
I wish to illustrate the point some more for the benefit of the House. Amendment 2, which I am proposing to delete, includes a subsection that states:
“A coronial judge shall not order a disclosure…except where the judge is satisfied that the circumstances of the case make the disclosure necessary to enable the matters required to be ascertained by the investigation to be ascertained.”
It does not say, “Save where they believe that national security considerations apply.” That simply makes my point; if this material is necessary for the finders of fact—the jury—it will go to the finders of fact. The amendment provides absolutely no protection for national security, notwithstanding the fact that the outside pressure groups have accepted that there should be, as has Baroness Miller, in this kind of throwaway line.
I hope that I am not intervening at the wrong moment, but the Secretary of State may have noticed from the amendments that have been tabled that there appears to be an acceptance by those who have tabled amendments in lieu that the principle of the problem that he identifies about the use of intercept evidence may well be widely accepted across the House. The question then arises: what safeguards can the Government offer that the inquiry process will not be used in a way that would undermine the coronial process and be seen to be unfair? On that, may I simply remind him that in Committee, Lord Kingsland—before he died—provided a good steer as to the sort of protections that ought to be in the inquiry process to ensure that it would command confidence? The Government have not adopted all of those. The Secretary of State may comment about this in a moment, but I should say that they might go to the heart of being able to resolve this issue. At the moment, the problem we face is that the situation remains unsatisfactory and that confidence in the inquiry process as it appears in the Bill is not sufficient.
I have been up hill and down dale on this, as I know others have. I thought that clause 12 was a way of resolving this, because it would have placed in the hands of the senior judge the decision as to whether or not to proceed with a certain investigation, they would then have run the investigation and it would have been within the coronial system. That was parodied as a secret inquest, and we have now gone down the route of an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005. We have sought to ensure that only a senior judge can sit on this—other clear criteria are set down.
This matter has gone round and round for two years now and I am certainly ready to promise the House—Members will have to take it on trust, but there is no reason not to trust me—that the inquiry will be used only in exceptional circumstances. The facts speak for themselves—there is only one extant case in which it is likely to be used, and that is a very rare case. Secondly, I will ensure that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I bring forward a protocol to set out the circumstances in which such an inquiry would take place. They would be very limited, too.
It might be useful to deal with amendment (a), tabled by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), to Lords amendment 128. It suggests that any appointment by the Lord Chancellor of a senior judge should be made with that judge’s consent. First, there could and would be no appointment without the consent of the Lord Chief Justice. It is important that I should say that, and it goes without saying that I have to ask the Lord Chief Justice from time to time to nominate a judge; if he or she were to decide that no judge were to be nominated that would be the end of the matter. That power is quite important. The Lord Chief Justice can speak for himself, but I suggest that he would wish to be satisfied about the conditions under which any inquiry were to take place and about what the level of judicial discretion would be for such an inquiry before he made an appointment.
I shall just finish my comments on Lords amendment 128, if I may. I shall then give way to my hon. and learned Friend and, afterwards, I shall finish my speech, as time is limited.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield suggests that the judge should consent to the Lord Chancellor’s request, and I understand exactly why. If it is about agreeing to the appointment qua appointment, I can say that, with respect, that ought to be done by the Lord Chief Justice. Perhaps we should have put that in the Bill. We have not, but I give an absolute undertaking on that understanding and anyway, in practice, the Lord Chief Justice has a veto, quite properly, over whether somebody is or is not appointed. Of course he does. He might just say, “I’m sorry, there isn’t anybody available,” or, “I’m sorry, I will not appoint anybody because this is not an appropriate article 2-compliant tribunal and the learned judge will be compromised.”
As the hon. and learned Gentleman would expect, I have looked carefully into whether I could accept his amendment. At first blush, it appears rather similar to the scheme that was in clause 11 of blessed memory, on page 7 of the Bill as it left the Commons, which spelled out that the judge would have to make a decision, based on certain criteria, about whether the application from the Secretary of State was to be accepted.
To some extent, my objection is technical but I promise the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is serious. We are at a late stage in the proceedings on the Bill, and although I had a lovely scheme in mind, there were no takers for it, so if the only proviso in the Bill is that the consent of the judge is required, he or she must work out how to exercise that consent. He or she cannot just say, “Yes, I’m available. I’ll do it,” but will have to say, “I will have to hold a hearing.”
Another matter to consider is which criteria should be used. Clear criteria were set down in my proposals, but now there is only the hon. and learned Gentleman’s amendment to consider. He could simply have pulled out the old clause 11(6) and plonked those criteria in. It is a bit late to do so, although I am not trying to make a point about that. Just so the hon. and learned Gentleman knows, the alternative I considered was whether there was any provision for the court to make rules, but we are not talking about a criminal case, so the criminal rules committee cannot make such rules. There does not appear to be any appropriate rule-making power.
I hope the hon. and learned Gentleman will accept that the point about consent will be dealt with by the clear undertakings I have given in respect of the Lord Chief Justice, but that for practical reasons it is not really appropriate to accept the amendment.
Does my right hon. Friend not understand that it is a question of scale? In any jury system there are always problems with public interest immunity—there always have been—and we get round them by a mixture of evidential routes that has served us extremely well. We now have a problem in one case—just one case in five years—and to rectify that evidential problem the Government propose to hand a massive new power to the Executive. The disproportionate remedy in the circumstances is obvious to everybody. I know there is judicial oversight, but my right hon. Friend will forgive me for saying that he adulates the higher judiciary only when they are being used as a mechanism to withdraw jury trial. Otherwise, he is rather more critical of them and on occasion has described them both as unelected and unregulated and in various other ways. To say that there is a higher judicial role is not an adequate response. Does my right hon. Friend not understand that that is what concerns most of us in the House?
My hon. and learned Friend is an infinitely more experienced criminal practitioner than ever I was—I say that seriously, without condescension. However, there is a very big difference. In a criminal case, the trial judge can say, “I am not going to proceed, because it would be unjust”, or the prosecution can say, “We are about to have crucial evidence that is sensitive and compromised. We will withdraw the prosecution”, and sometimes does so, because there is no option. But with great respect, there will not be a massive new power in the hands of the state; it would be used extremely sparingly.
I feel extremely frustrated, because my scheme was to give the decision to a senior High Court judge, but that did not find favour. We tried plan A. That did not work. We tried plan B and that did not work, so now we have plan C. To those who say they do not like the idea of non-jury inquests, I say that I do not like the idea either, but I am trying to square an extraordinarily difficult circle, and I have not yet found a way of doing so except by a route similar to the proposal.
The Lord Chancellor has told us that he is trying to square an extraordinarily difficult circle. He has indicated that he has a problem and the Opposition spokesperson has indicated that he acknowledges that the Lord Chancellor has a problem, and we have heard about the problems of the intelligence services. Does the Lord Chancellor accept that it is important that the House focuses on the real people who may have a problem, who could be a grieving, and potentially aggrieved, family in the future? It could be a perturbed public, who are concerned and suspicious about the circumstances of a death. Is he not at least a little bit uncomfortable that on a day when the Prime Minister is off in Berlin, celebrating the end of the Berlin wall, and the end of control and secrecy and all it represented, the Government are trying to put such measures through the House?
None of us is comfortable about departing in any case from jury inquests. I hope my hon. Friend will concede that none of us would be going down that route unless we felt that it was absolutely necessary, but as I said, Inquest, Justice and other groups accept that there is material that should be kept from an inquest jury. It may be absolutely central to the case, and the investigation still has to proceed. Baroness Miller accepts that material should be kept back. She referred to the Chilcot criteria, although the withholding would be rather more extensive than she anticipated. In any event, we cannot do it within the scope of the Bill.
The issue is whether we do or do not come up with a scheme that allows an article 2-compliant investigation to take place, where the finder of fact has access to all the relevant facts. The alternative that has been put to the House is a jury inquest from which material would be withheld, but, I suggest, on unsatisfactory grounds. That is not a way of reaching at the truth for the benefit of the parties—above all the aggrieved relatives. That is our overwhelming concern.
In conclusion, I sense from the sombre atmosphere in the House that everybody is addressing themselves to the issue. Even at this late stage, I invite the House to acknowledge that the issues that I have tried to deal with are extremely difficult. They will, I repeat, arise only in rare exceptions. It is in the interest of all of us that those exceptions are kept to a minimum, but occasionally they will arise. The scheme that we propose is a way of achieving justice, not least for the aggrieved parties.
I shall be brief. I repeat what I said: I acknowledge that the Government have a problem. In the other place, amendments were tabled by Baroness Miller. As the Secretary of State knows from my earlier remarks, and as is implicit in the amendments tabled in lieu, there is an acknowledgement that to allow intercept evidence would be very difficult at this stage.
My party is on the record on countless occasions as wishing to see intercept evidence available in criminal trials and at inquests. That is desirable and it is a shift that needs to take place. I regret that the movement on this is so slow. We subscribed to the Chilcot process so that it could be reviewed, and the Chilcot process is not yet complete. Therefore I acknowledge that to ride a coach and horses through that would be unsatisfactory, even though it is an end that I would wish to see, properly arrived at.
The question then is how we solve the conundrum. The Secretary of State is right that the Bill has been up hill and down dale. He wanted to have a provision for secret inquests that could hear evidence secretly. He received universal opprobrium for that, partly because it debased the entire coronial system. As he will recollect, when the matter came to be discussed on Report, I suggested to him that it would be better if we called a spade a spade, and if we could not have an inquest in proper form, it would be better to look at the inquiry route, which already existed, as an alternative. At least the Secretary of State or some other Minister would have to explain to the House why an inquest was impossible, answer the hostile questioning of the House and enable Members to express a view, and then and only then, with probably a great deal of public debate surrounding the matter, would an inquiry go ahead.
It is also true, as I hope I made clear on Report, that when the matter went to the Lords in Committee, Lord Kingsland argued that if an inquiry route were to be pursued where normally an inquest would take place, there were a great many flaws in the inquiry procedure. He tried to rectify that. It was virtually the last speech he ever made. The Government accepted some of what he suggested, including the need for a High Court judge, and some other safeguards concerning the scope of the inquiry. What the Government did not do was to listen to Lord Kingsland’s calls that that had to be a judicial process, not an administrative process.
The Secretary of State highlighted my amendment (a) to amendment 128, and I am the first to accept that it is probably desperately inadequate. The procedures that we have in the House are now so barmy—there is no other way to describe them—that I had to draft the amendment even before the Bill had come back from the Lords. All I could do, with the help of the Clerk in charge of the legislation, and with the anxiety that as an amendment in lieu, anything more would probably not be accepted, was to find some way of bringing back to the House the issue of judicial control. Imperfect though the amendment may be, its purpose was simply to give the House the opportunity to say, “Perhaps if we have to have an inquiry, there should be a judicial lock on it.” Interestingly, that is exactly what the Secretary of State hinted he was minded to grant in the original draft of clause 11(6). I am a little mystified about why he did not pursue the road that Lord Kingsland identified for him, because, if the Secretary of State had, we would not have ended up with the situation that we had in the House of Lords on Report, when everything went in all directions. I hope that I am not being unfair, but the anxiety that their lordships clearly manifested finally expressed itself in allowing intercept evidence.
I did not intend any criticism of the hon. and learned Gentleman’s drafting of his amendment in lieu. As he knows, I spent 18 years in opposition, 17 of them as an Opposition spokesman for one thing or another, and I used to have to draft such amendments. I hope, however, that I have given him a lot of comfort—albeit not in the Bill—about the practice, which will be inevitable, in circumstances where there is an appointment. Of course I accept that the noble and much lamented Lord Kingsland was searching constructively for a solution, and we were trying to find one, but it is also fair to say that some who have objected at each stage to what we have tried to do, not including the hon. and learned Gentleman at all, will object in any circumstances to there not being an inquest jury in full possession of the facts. That is the central difficulty with which we are trying to grapple.
I appreciate the Secretary of State’s comments, but I shall bring my remarks to a close.
It seems to me that the amendment in lieu tabled by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), which the Secretary of State has not signed, but which would leave out paragraphs (3) and (8) from schedule 1, has this great merit: it would ensure that the Bill went back to the other place, where the issues that I have just raised could be addressed. If we go along the route that the Secretary of State has advocated, and we do not support the amendment, the Bill will effectively go on to the statute book in its present form. That would be unsatisfactory, so with that in mind I intend to support the amendment in the name of that hon. Gentleman and those who have signed it.
We may be at a late stage, but just because we happen to be discussing it on the Monday before Parliament is due to prorogue on the Thursday, we should not suddenly suspend our critical faculties. We are considering Lords amendments, and, if we do not wish the issue to be dropped completely, the proper course of action will be to ensure that it stays in play, so that when the Bill goes back to the other place the Government can take on board what has been said here and, I dare say, what will be said there and come up with a constructive solution that respects its concerns as well as those of Members from all parts of this House.
I shall speak to the amendments in lieu that are in my name and those of other Members who have signed them on a cross-party basis. I, like the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), accept that there is a problem with intercept evidence, and it needs a comprehensive solution. In trying to table sensible amendments in lieu, I was handicapped by the procedures of the House, which meant that the only possibility was to propose the removal of paragraphs (3) and (8) from schedule 1.
On 30 April 2005, Azelle Rodney was in the rear seat of a car in Hale lane, Edgware, in my constituency. A police officer fired eight shots at the car, six of which hit Rodney, killing him. There is no evidence that Rodney was holding a gun when he was shot, although the other occupants were successfully prosecuted, firearms having been found in the vehicle. The suggestion was that it was part of a drugs operation, not, I have to say, a national security issue, and that covert surveillance was used.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission report has not been published, but it recommended no action. Four-and-a-half years on, there has been no inquest and no explanation, and Azelle Rodney’s mother, Susan Alexander, wants, needs and has a right to know what happened to her son. So do constituents, because they were made fearful by the incident having taken place in broad daylight at a busy junction. They, too, would like to know what was going on.
I was pleased when my right hon. Friend the Justice Secretary announced that the secret inquest proposals in the Bill were to be dropped, but I am disappointed that they have been replaced by secret inquiries. This debate seems to be something of a “Groundhog Day” in terms of the issues that we may have to cover. Schedule 1(3), which my amendment would remove, provides for the suspension of inquests
“on the ground that the cause of death is likely to be adequately investigated by an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005”.
However, there are no criteria or grounds for superseding an inquest specified in the Bill. On that basis, the proposals before us are worse than those that were withdrawn for secret inquests.
Article 2 of the European convention on human rights provides a positive obligation to provide an adequate and effective investigation when individuals are killed as a result of the use of force, particularly where the death is a result of the use of force by state agents. The person conducting the investigation must be independent of those implicated in the events, there has to be a sufficient element of public scrutiny to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory, and the investigation must involve the next of kin to the extent necessary to protect their legitimate interests.
According to the schedule, the coroner may not suspend the inquest if there is an exceptional reason for not doing so. In an intervention, I asked my right hon. Friend whether, if the investigation was not going to be article 2 compliant, that would justify the coroner’s refusal and whether he would uphold the coroner in making that decision. I was given a rather ambivalent answer. If the procedure was going to be article 2 compliant in the first place, one would not need to use the provision—it is only the implication that something would be missing from the inquest that puts matters in the article 2 questionability arena. If the coroner considers that it is an exceptional circumstance, then presumably he should be able to refuse the request. I canvassed this issue in correspondence on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights with my right hon. and learned Friend the Leader of the House, who was then Minister of State at the Department for Constitutional Affairs. She replied on 22 January 2007:
“the Government does consider that a reasonable belief that the inquiry proposed by the Lord Chancellor would not meet Article 2 requirements because of its scope, would be an exceptional reason which would justify a coroner’s refusal to suspend an investigation.”
I am listening to my hon. Friend with care. Aside from the inadvertent impact that the amendments would have, although I understand the problems about drafting, how would he propose to address the central question at issue, which is how one would deal with highly sensitive intercept material where some of the facts of the intercept—the techniques behind it, as the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) put it—should not, for very good reasons, be disclosed to the inquest jury?
We run the risk of rehearsing debates that we had before on secret inquests. The starting point is that an inquest is not intended to prove something beyond all reasonable doubt. Public interest immunity applies to inquests, subject to judicial review by either side, and the Government can persuade the coroner to withhold sensitive material, as happened and was upheld in the Jordan and McCann cases, for example. My right hon. Friend has already mentioned gisting. Such restrictions are compatible, in principle, with an article 2 compliant inquiry. My concern is that what is being proposed is a secret inquiry at the behest of the Executive.
I cannot allow my hon. Friend to gloss over this issue. There is no question of these proceedings being secret. Most of it would be entirely public, although of course part would be secret. What he says is all true. However, what if we are in a situation, which appears to be so in the case of Azelle Rodney, where these devices are not possible? They were, happily, possible in the case of Charles de Menezes, but what if they are not? What do we do then?
As I have indicated, there are other options. We simply do not know enough about the Rodney case to answer that question; that is part of the problem.
I am sorry, but I must press my hon. Friend. He is coming to some clear conclusions about one option, on the basis of the Rodney case, but the moment I put to him the heart of the issue, he says that we do not know enough about it, although we have to make a decision about it in the next week. I suggest that he is moving away from the central issue. Whenever I put it to him, “This is the heart of the issue—what would you do?”, he says that it would not arise very often. It does indeed not arise very often—it is very rare—but when it does, what would he do?
I think my right hon. Friend is putting a false prospectus before the House in this respect. My main concern is to ensure that there is an article 2 compliant investigation. I have given indications of how that can be achieved in these circumstances; it may well be that there are other ways round it. The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield has given my right hon. Friend a way forward by saying that if the amendments in lieu are accepted, the Bill could go back to the Lords with some reassurances to try to deal with some of these problems.
This system has operated before, in Northern Ireland. British Irish Rights Watch has written to Members to say:
“We have monitored the use of the Inquiries Act in Northern Ireland and have found it lacking in its ability to deliver truth and justice to the bereaved, build confidence in the rule of law and to comply with the UK’s human rights obligations.”
So this may not just be a one-off, because it has happened before in Northern Ireland on several occasions, and it has been shown not to have worked in terms of providing article 2 compliance and building confidence in the rule of law.
In relation to the experience of inquiries under the Inquiries Act 2005 in Northern Ireland, were not some of the most critical spokespersons in relation to how those inquiries worked Government Ministers themselves?
My hon. Friend knows far more about Northern Ireland than I do, and I would certainly pray in aid his intervention in my argument.
So far there has been only one case to which this relates—the one that the hon. Gentleman mentioned involving his constituent—and people have had to find their way through the system to be able to hold inquests in all the other cases. Does he share my concern that if there were an opt-out, we might find that under these proposals a larger number of cases were being held in secret?
That is a real fear. My right hon. Friend rightly said that the de Menezes case was dealt with under the inquest procedure. That is because there was no other way of dealing with it. If these arrangements had been available, perhaps the de Menezes case might not have seen the light of day in the same way— similarly with the Dyson case, which dealt with depleted uranium victims from the first Gulf war, or the Mubarak case, where the Government resisted tooth and nail proper inquiries into the death of that young man in Feltham young offenders institution.
My hon. Friend is a lawyer and understands these things rather better than I do. Does he share the concern and puzzlement of quite a few people that in the de Menezes case, where some of the evidence was clearly related to national security, the existing law worked, whereas in the Azelle Rodney case, where we are told that national security is not at stake, we are also told that there is something so deadly secret that it cannot be disclosed? We should bear it in mind that we were told, not on the Floor of the House but by Ministers, that there was no chance of an inquest in the de Menezes case unless we changed the law—but we did not change the law, there was an inquest, and it was carried out quite satisfactorily.
My right hon. Friend makes his point. The Rodney case was a police operation to try to bust a drug gang. It was a very dangerous gang by the sound of it—firearms were involved—but it was not an issue of national security in terms of intercept evidence.
Given the way that the Bill is currently phrased, there will be secret inquiries at the behest of the Executive. The Executive will set the terms of reference, the Minister will choose the judge, the Minister or the judge can restrict attendance at the inquest, the Minister or the judge can restrict the disclosure or publication of evidence or documents, the Minister can redact reports and recommendations at the end of the inquiry, and the Minister can suspend the inquiry merely on the grounds that it is in the public interest to do so. That is far more broad and generous to the Secretary of State and to Ministers than the original super-inquest proposals were. That is why I am worried that there are no safeguards in the Bill that deal with this issue.
Similarly, if the inquest is resumed after the inquiry, the findings of the inquest are not allowed to be inconsistent with the outcome of the public inquiry, even if the jury comes to that conclusion. So if a judge is conducting a public inquiry and the inquest is later resumed at the behest of the coroner, the jury is not allowed to make a certain finding even if that is where the facts take it. Secret inquests are being replaced by the prospect of secret inquiries, which will not be adequate and effective investigations. They will not be independent or provide public scrutiny, and they will not involve the next of kin in the way that they should.
In the 16th report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, we particularly considered the use of the 2005 Act and came to the conclusion that
“any Inquiries Act 2005 inquiry specifically designed to circumvent an inquest, in order to meet the Government’s concerns about disclosure of sensitive information would raise the same or similar issues as Clauses 11-12”—
the inquest provisions—
“about the independence and effectiveness of that inquiry for the purposes of Article 2”.
The current proposals will not give closure to relatives or create public confidence that lessons have been learned.
Are families expected to take seriously a secret inquiry chair’s findings as to what happened to their loved one? It is sometimes difficult enough under the existing open arrangement to convince them that justice has been done. Are the public expected to accept the findings of a secret inquiry? We have seen the reaction that there has been to recent inquiries—the public have simply said that they have been whitewashes. That would happen particularly if reports were redacted and the family and pubic excluded from hearings or from seeing documentary or other evidence. The secret inquiries will cover exactly the sort of cases that should be held in the open—those in which the state is potentially implicated and independence is essential.
Amendment (a) in lieu is a consequential amendment to allow for the suspension of a normal inquiry, for example into a big rail accident, in which there will be none of the implications that I have mentioned. The proposals in the Bill cannot be allowed to become part of our law. We have to provide a proper, article 2 compliant process for relatives and the public.
I shall deal first with the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), which I support, and then with the Government motion to disagree to the Lords amendment introduced by my noble Friend Baroness Miller.
I have tried to emphasise throughout the debates on this part of the Bill that the question is not whether there are circumstances in which certain things have to be heard out of the public gaze—for example, when important matters of national security arise in the course of a coronial investigation—but whether there should be a jury in important cases of deaths at the hands of state officials. That is the central question, and it is why the hon. Gentleman has to be right that it is no solution at all to move from a proposal to have inquests without a jury to one to have inquiries without a jury. That is just as bad, and as he pointed out, it is worse in many respects.
The key is public confidence. How can the public be confident when someone has died at the hands of a state official—a police officer, a prison officer or an officer of one of the security services—if the investigation into their death is carried out by someone chosen by the Government, with terms of reference chosen by the Government, and in circumstances in which, as the hon. Gentleman said, the process can be suspended by the Government? The Government could also determine the terms of the final report to some extent. The independence of such an inquiry would be suspect from the start, and the public would have no confidence in it.
Would the hon. Gentleman also say that deaths at the hands of state officials sometimes do not take place in public gunfights in broad daylight? They may take place in a cell out of the public eye, or when rendition or a severe form of interrogation such as waterboarding is taking place. Those cases are much harder to bring to public attention, so the safeguards need to be even tougher.
I fully take the hon. Gentleman’s point. The whole purpose of investigations is to make state officials accountable in a way that they would otherwise avoid. To the extent that we do not go along the route that the hon. Member for Hendon suggests, we will allow unaccountable state action of that sort to take place.
The Government talk about national security, but as we have argued all along, there is no reason why an ordinary coroner’s court could not carry out the task of protecting national security. It has the power to exclude the press and public or to issue public interest immunity certificates, and there is no reason why coroners or even juries should not be security vetted, as juries already are in espionage and treason trials. The question is, what is the size of the risk, which the Secretary of State keeps coming back to, that there will be errors by judges or in the security vetting of juries? I believe that he exaggerates it. There must be a risk, but to exaggerate it to justify the removal of a jury from the process is the wrong way to go.
The Government keep coming back to the difference between criminal trials and coroners’ proceedings, and they make the point that there is always the option of stopping a trial, whereas there is no such possibility in a coroner’s inquest. That has never struck me as a particularly strong argument, because if there were a very important treason or espionage trial, how would it be in the public interest for prosecutors to believe that the right thing to do was to let someone they believed to be a spy, or worse, go free? In reality, stopping the trial is an option only in cases in which Government embarrassment is at stake, rather than real problems of spying, or worse. So that option does not really exist in criminal trials, either.
I have the utmost respect for my hon. Friend and his judgment, but I actually think he is wrong about this. A number of cases have arisen over the years in which prosecuting authorities, security and intelligence services and in some cases the police have had to make a judgment that proceeding would cause so much harm to the chance of collecting intelligence in future that it was not the right course of action.
I believe that my right hon. Friend is talking about cases that never start, but I am talking about trials that are halfway through. Perhaps we should study those cases in detail, but the cases in which that has happened have struck me as being more of a political nature than those he describes.
I am reminded of a former Foreign Secretary in the ABC case of the late ’70s, who felt that he had been assured that witnesses would not be exposed. The judge took a contrary view and the Government dropped the prosecution, having maintained that it was essential for national security reasons.
That is the type of case I had in mind. If right hon. and hon. Members have different examples in mind, perhaps they should mention them.
I believe that for the most part, the Government are taking comfort in an illusion. The comfort that they believe they feel does not really exist, because coronial cases and criminal trial cases are much closer than they imagine. In the end, it comes down to their distrust of the jury as an institution. They keep asking themselves, “Who are these people? Where do they come from? We don’t know who they are. We didn’t choose them. We don’t control them.” Yes, but that is the whole point of a jury and it is where the public confidence in using a jury comes from—it is not made up of people under the control of the authorities. The amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Hendon are important because they would re-establish that principle.
The question is one of balancing risks and what the reality is of the risks that the Government keep putting forward. They keep giving worst-case scenarios and presenting them as though they were inevitable and would happen on many occasions. Of course, they also say, “These things very rarely happen”, so it does not strike me as an enormous risk. However, on the other side there is a risk that provisions such as those in the Bill will be used in other cases in which a jury has been used in the past. That is precisely what the debate about the Menezes case is about—the availability of such provisions and their use much more broadly than the single case to which the Government have pointed throughout the debate.
I am trying to follow the hon. Gentleman’s argument, but I am not at all clear whether his strictures are based on the Secretary of State’s reluctance to accept the amendments put forward by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), or whether they relate to the admissibility of intercept evidence. If he is addressing the latter, I must say that the risk may be small and may arise out of the occasional, rare case, but very significant damage could none the less be done to our national intelligence capability. I am not clear whether the hon. Gentleman has that in mind in the strictures he is making, or whether he is limiting himself to the proposal of the hon. Member for Hendon.
In what I have said so far, I have spoken solely about the proposal of the hon. Member for Hendon, without considering the wiretap point, to which I will come separately. Both situations involve the same sort of judgment, although different levels of risk might be involved, as the right hon. and learned Gentleman says.
I can understand the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) about waiting for Chilcot, and the Secretary of State’s argument that we cannot just insert the Chilcot criteria into the Bill; in fact, that probably would not produce the result that my noble Friend was looking for. However, some of the things I have been hearing about the legal objections to which Chilcot referred elliptically in his last report do not make any sense to me. If there are human rights objections or any sort of objections to schemes of partial disclosure, how much more do they apply to schemes of no disclosure at all? That is the argument I have been unable to follow throughout the entire debate.
I also cannot understand why anyone on the Government side, as the Secretary of State has rightly acknowledged, says that we must wait for Chilcot, because the original version of clause 13 included a scheme that would allow an inquest—admittedly a juryless inquest—to hear wiretap evidence. There are other examples of wiretap evidence being used by various tribunals—for example, in control order and financial restriction proceedings—so the Government have not waited for Chilcot and have done those things already.
This issue comes down to not trusting jurors—and, by the way, not trusting coroners. The idea is that there is some security risk specifically in the coroner’s court and in the jury. The problems one hears about, such as fishing expeditions and certain information coming out if some forms of wiretap were admissible, already apply in the cases where wiretap evidence is already admissible, and would also apply under the original clause 13. It comes down to whether the Government are right to distrust the jury in the coroner’s court so much, and whether the risks arising simply from the jury are worth taking. The Government have not yet proved their case on that. How do we know that juries are so unreliable?
My view is that the House should support the amendments put forward by the hon. Member for Hendon. I do not want to take up the House’s time with a Division on the Government motion to disagree, because we have already heard that the official Opposition will not be opposing it, so there is no chance of defeating the Government. However, there is a serious chance of defeating them on the hon. Gentleman’s amendments, and I urge all my right hon. and hon. Friends to support those amendments in a few moments.
I will be very brief—briefer than I would otherwise be—one reason being that like many Members of the House, I would like to hear the views of the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard), if, indeed, Mr. Deputy Speaker, you were minded to call him at any stage. In that hope, I will be as brief as I can be.
I am grateful to be able to make a contribution in order to deal with what is a grotesquely overstated problem on the part of the Government. My good and right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has always been a master at creating theoretical, if not to say theological, problems with which he is able to torment Labour Back Benchers—he has had a good go at my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore)—and at trying to get them to sort out such problems. The plain fact is that by the Secretary of State’s own admission, the problem that this draconian measure seeks to remedy either does not exist or is so infinitesimally small that it would be a grotesque misuse of the House’s power to hand the Executive such a very large extension of their powers.
May I explain why? Juries know all about covert, intercept, intelligence-based evidence. Let us take for the moment the example of juries in criminal trials. If a jury sits down and hears that a massive police operation nipped a huge bank robbery in the bud, they know perfectly well that covert information and intelligence was behind it, unless they are barking mad and come to the conclusion that the entire flying squad happened to be assembled at that particular point. Of course, if that arrangement is successful, there is no problem. The problem does not arise, and we do not have to worry about public interest immunity in a criminal court if there is a successful operation and people are caught red-handed.
It is exactly the same with a coroner’s inquest. If somebody has been shot by agents of the state because they were believed to be a terrorist, there is no problem if it turns out that the person is a terrorist who was carrying bombs or was in the process of plotting. Such problems do not exist. Coroners will not be asked to investigate that kind of evidence. The problem happens when something goes terribly and demonstrably wrong, which is why it is so rare.
However, when something goes that wrong, and when something goes as wrong as it did the Jean Charles de Menezes case, there must be a public inquiry. Having a private, secret inquiry in those circumstances would be a devastating indictment of our system and of the use of Executive power. Despite the engaging way in which my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State talks about judicial oversight and superior judges—as I said in an intervention, it is always nice to hear him adulating superior judges on the occasion that he wishes to enlist their assistance in taking over jury trial—the measure is no counterweight or counterbalance to a jury sitting in an open inquiry, listening to how something has gone terribly and demonstrably wrong at the behest of the Executive.
My right hon. Friend says that the power will be exercised only rarely, but we have heard that before on many occasions—I am going to stop in a moment to give the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe a decent rein—such as when the House debated giving up jury trial in tampering cases. It was said in this House and in the other place that it would only happen in the rarest of cases, and only when the defence had been heard in full on the basis of all the evidence. That has simply not happened. There are two cases now in which the defence has simply not been informed of the reason why jury trial has been denied.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State may believe that it will happen rarely or will never be used, but the power that we would be giving to the Executive should never be given by this House, unless we were told in the clearest possible terms that to do so was a grave and immediate necessity. No one has made that case today, and in those circumstances I will take great pleasure in supporting the ingenious amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore). I could not get it past the Vote Office, but it is a brilliant idea.
I must first correct the Secretary of State. He said that I was a member of the Chilcot committee, but I was not a member of the original committee. The Conservative representative on that committee was Lord Hurd of Westwell, and I took his place when the committee changed its responsibility and began to supervise the work of the officials in the Home Office who have sought a way to meet the nine tests set out by the original committee. Although we have not yet achieved the objective of finding a scheme that meets those tests, those officials have been carrying out their work thoroughly and conscientiously in their attempt to meet that objective.
I decided that I should contribute to this debate because of my membership of the committee and I am therefore primarily concerned with the question of the admissibility of intercept evidence. Until the contribution by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth), it looked as if I need not trouble the House with my contribution, because—in sharp contrast to what happened in the other place—there seemed to be a splendid degree of consensus this evening on this subject. Indeed, until this happy consensus descended on the House, I thought at one point that I would be in the very unfamiliar position of voting with the Government against my own party. Happily, that will not be necessary.
It is worth setting out the history of the matter, partly to excuse the fact that my contribution lacks all novelty. I am here to repeat the arguments that I put before the House on the Second Reading of the Counter-Terrorism Bill on 10 June 2008 and the Second Reading of this Bill on 23 March this year. After I made my intervention on the former, the provisions that would have made intercept evidence admissible at coroners’ inquests were removed from the Bill. I do not lay claim to a causal connection between my intervention and the removal of the provisions: I merely set out the facts. I was therefore somewhat surprised when this Bill appeared and those provisions reappeared. Once again, I voiced my opposition on Second Reading, and once again—this time at Committee stage in the other place—the Government removed them from the Bill, and I was happy to see that. It is noteworthy that on that occasion they were removed from the Bill without a Division.
It therefore came as an even greater surprise that, on Report in the other place, those amendments designed to provide for the admissibility of intercept evidence were put back into the Bill, this time against the wishes of the Government but at the behest of both the principal Opposition parties in the other place. I am especially grateful to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) for accepting the Government’s view that to put those provisions in this Bill would have damaging and profound consequences for our intercept regime, which makes it unnecessary for me to take the very unfamiliar position of supporting the Government in the Lobby this evening.
It is important that the House understands that I do not take this position because I object in principle to the admissibility of intercept evidence. On the contrary, I have made it clear on numerous occasions, both in the House and outside, that I would very much like to see provision made for intercept material to be admitted in evidence, especially in cases of those accused of terrorism and other serious criminal offences. But things are not as simple as that. They are certainly not as simple as was suggested by the hon. Member for Cambridge.
The work that has been carried out by the officials in the Home Office, and which has been supervised by the Chilcot committee in its present form, has been exhaustive, and it continues. The nine tests that were set out by the original Chilcot committee were necessary if we were to protect a capability of the greatest importance in keeping the people of our country safe. It is one of the frustrating things about the argument that one cannot go very far into the details of justifying the need for those tests without getting perilously close to putting the capability at risk. I am sure that the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith), who sits on the committee with me, would agree, although I must point out that I do not speak for the committee. It would be foolhardy to retain in the Bill the provisions that were inserted on Report in the other place. They do not meet the tests of the original Chilcot committee and, if they were to remain in the Bill, they would be a risk to this country’s strategic intelligence capability that no responsible Government should take.
I hope that the right hon. and learned Gentleman would agree that neither of us wishes to exclude the possibility of finding a way to bring such evidence to bear in cases in which the object is to establish a cause of death. What we have at the moment does not achieve that.
I agree, and as the right hon. Gentleman will know, we have today been invited by the Home Secretary to extend the remit of the advisory committee to look at the possibility of admitting intercept evidence in coroners’ inquests. I cannot speak for the right hon. Gentleman, but I would happily agree to the remit of the committee being widened in that way.
I have listened with great care and interest to the arguments on the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore). The Secretary of State put a reasonable question to the hon. Gentleman, which he was not entirely capable of answering, but on balance I shall support the hon. Gentleman and my hon. Friends in the Lobby, if only because it will provide another week for the Secretary of State to take the opportunity to answer the question that he posed to the hon. Gentleman and to come forward with a satisfactory regime that would deal with some of the mischiefs that were identified so eloquently by many of the contributors to this debate, not least the hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews).
With the leave of the House, I wish to reply to the debate.
I thank the right hon. and learned Member for Folkestone and Hythe (Mr. Howard) for his remarks. I wondered how he would conclude, because I understand his discomfort in abstaining or not supporting those on his Front Bench. He went in for some wonderful casuistry to move from the position that he had adopted to the position that he now supports.
I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore) and others who spoke that I am glad that there is a profound difference between the view of this House and that of the other place. The view from all parts of this House—my hon. Friend added his name to my amendment to delete the additional provisions put forward by Baroness Miller in the other place—is that everybody accepts that there have to be circumstances where intercept evidence is kept from a jury hearing an inquest, so that at least is progress.
Then we hear suggestions that there are ways round that. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) say, “Well, we can do it through the existing measures.” We have been through that. There are some cases—I assure my hon. Friend that they are indeed few and far between—where having a jury trial will result in an injustice, because there will be key evidence that cannot go before the jury as a finder of fact. With respect, where he is wrong is in suggesting that an inquiry headed by a senior judge would not be article 2 compliant. What would not be article 2 compliant in those circumstances would be the inquest jury, which would not be able to conduct a proper examination.
There is another important point that I would make to the House, as the Opposition, as well as my hon. Friends, need to apply themselves to that which they seek to vote on in a moment, although I would advise my hon. Friends not to do so. My hon. Friend the Member for Hendon proposes that we delete paragraphs 3 and 8 of schedule 1. Paragraph 3 allows for a suspension of an inquest where there is an inquiry appointed under the Inquiries Act 2005 and where a judge has been appointed to hear that inquiry. I have already made it clear that in practice—I am happy to put this on the record again, and everybody who knows the practice knows this to be true—there could be no such appointment without the consent of the Lord Chief Justice, and his consent would be forthcoming only where he was satisfied about the circumstances and the discretion available to the learned judge. Those undertakings are absolutely clear.
I should also make it clear that if we were to pass the proposed amendments, that would not result in there being no inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005. Rather, it would simply result in an inquest, which could not hear the evidence, running in parallel with an investigation that could hear the evidence. I suggest that that is the worst of all possible worlds—[Interruption.] I am being told to keep speaking. I am always happy to keep speaking. Although I appreciate his motives, I would ask my hon. Friend to appreciate what exactly he is proposing. He would end up with a muddle, where there would still be a requirement—
One and a half hours having elapsed since the commencement of proceedings on consideration of Lords amendments, the debate was interrupted (Programme Order, this day).
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair (Standing Order No. 83F), That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 1.
Question agreed to.
Lords amendment 1 accordingly disagreed to.
The Deputy Speaker then put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83F).
Lords amendment 2 disagreed to.
Lords amendment 216 disagreed to.
With the leave of the House, I would like to move amendment (a) in lieu.
I have to inform the House that it is not possible under the terms of the programme order for the hon. Gentleman’s amendment to be put to the House. That is quite clearly laid down in the programme order and is backed by the appropriate Standing Order, so we have to move on.
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I have to express some amazement that this has happened. If that is indeed the case, it is contrary to my earlier understanding that it would be possible to vote on amendment (a) in lieu. Indeed, the whole reason for that, as you will have appreciated from the tenor of the House, was that we should be able to vote on that precise amendment.
I was all too aware that that was the consequence, but once the Justice Secretary spoke until 6.33 pm, that left the Chair with no option on this matter.
Further to that point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I had no intention of doing that. I think that there ought to be a vote on amendment (a) in lieu, and if it requires me to move it, I will move it.
The right hon. Gentleman anticipates me. The only way in which amendment (a) in lieu can be put to the vote is if he is prepared to move it.
Provided that the House understands that I shall vote against it.
Amendment (a) proposed in lieu of Lords amendments 1, 2 and 216.—(Mr. Straw.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
Clause 45
Meaning of “qualifying trigger”
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Claire Ward): I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 55.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: amendment (a) in lieu of Lords amendment 55.
On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. We had an unsatisfactory end to the previous debate due to the terms of the programme motion. The amendment in lieu, on which the whole House had expected to vote, could be properly considered only if the Lord Chancellor was prepared to move it from the Dispatch Box. Is it not the case that the same will apply with the forthcoming group of amendments, and that the amendment in lieu cannot be taken if the Minister is still speaking when the knife falls? Would it not be in the interest of proper debate if the Minister sat down before that point, or adopted the same principle of moving the amendment in lieu, so that the House may have a voice on the matter?
The hon. Gentleman’s assumption is correct. On the previous occasion we got into a difficulty by accident, but we were rescued in a way that satisfied the House, and enabled the vote to take place. That is the position.
The Government cannot accept the amendment passed in the other place to remove the sexual infidelity exclusion in the new partial defence of loss of control. The history of the partial defence of provocation has led to a commonly held belief that this defence can be abused by men who kill their wives out of sexual jealousy—[Interruption.]
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. We have moved on to other business, and I must ask hon. Members who do not intend to stay for this debate to leave as quickly and quietly as possible. The noise is quite unfair to the Minister and those who are trying to listen to her.
Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
The history of the partial defence of provocation has led to a commonly held belief that this defence can be abused by men who kill their wives out of sexual jealousy or revenge for infidelity. This erodes the confidence of the public in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Even accepting that a great deal has been done in recent years to address this problem, and that pleas of provocation generally do not succeed on the basis of sexual infidelity, it is still true that under current law that defence can be raised and could succeed.
The hon. Lady will be aware that, only two weeks ago, there was a case in which a jury came to precisely that conclusion under the existing rules and reduced the offence of murder to manslaughter on the ground of sexual infidelity as part of the provocation. Will she identify from where the outcry came, as a result of that difficult decision for the jury, to suggest that it has undermined confidence in the criminal justice system? Why is she suggesting that we should not leave to members of the public sitting on juries the difficult task of making a judgment in these matters? What is the basis on which the Government wish to withdraw that right from the jury?
The hon. and learned Gentleman is right to raise that recent case, but the reality is that there is still an opportunity under existing law for that defence to succeed. The jury in that case decided that it was not appropriate, but it remains possible that a different jury, in different circumstances, might decide that it could succeed.
The hon. Lady will know that, in 2004, the Law Commission published its report “Partial Defences to Murder” and, prior to that, a consultation paper. I am not aware that either document suggested that sexual infidelity should be removed from the classes of conduct capable of amounting to the defence of provocation, should the jury so decide.
The general issue around provocation, and the change of defence, has been accepted by both Houses. The issue here is in respect of sexual infidelity. In respect of the particular case that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) mentioned a moment ago, the jury came to a considered view on the attempted use of the defence of sexual infidelity, but that case also specifically referred to diminished responsibility.
The Minister is slightly misunderstanding my point, and that might be my responsibility. The point that I am making is that the Law Commission did not—either in its final report or in its consultation document—suggest that sexual infidelity should be excluded from the classes of case that were capable of amounting to provocation.
However, there is now a commonly held belief that cases exist in which that defence has been used successfully. We want to put the matter beyond any doubt.
I still do not understand why the defence should not be used successfully. Why does the Minister wish to deny to a jury the right to make an assessment as to whether the offence should be reduced from murder to manslaughter on the basis of provocation? In virtually every other area, it will be allowed to make that decision, but apparently not in the case of sexual infidelity. What has the Minister got into her head that is making her want to withdraw that historic right from a jury?
Frankly, we do not think that it is appropriate, in this day and age, for a man to be able to say that he killed his wife as a result of sexual infidelity. That is essentially the reason. If other factors come into play, the court will of course have an opportunity to consider them, but it will not be able to make the decision exclusively on the ground of sexual infidelity. The sexual infidelity exclusion applies in relation to the words and conduct limb of the new partial defence to murder of loss of control.
Let us just take a quick example. A woman is abused by her husband over a long period, at the end of which they are reconciled. He says that he will moderate his behaviour and promises to be faithful to her in future. She comes home the following weekend to find him in flagrante with his lover. He tells her that the marriage is now at end, and she kills him. How is the jury going to be invited to disentangle the elements that went into causing that act? How is it supposed to disentangle the abuse, which it will be entitled to take into account, from the sexual infidelity, which the Minister now tells us that the Government, in their wisdom, have decided to deny it the opportunity to consider?
The court may of course take into account whether there has been abuse, as well as other factors, but it will not be able to take into account a set of circumstances in which the defendant kills someone in an attempt to punish them or carry out some form of revenge purely as a result of sexual infidelity. I am really quite surprised that the hon. and learned Gentleman thinks that it is acceptable, in this day and age, for someone to use the partial defence that sexual infidelity is an acceptable reason for killing.
This is not just my view. Perhaps the Minister would like to be candid with the House about what the Law Commission was advising the Government, even up to a few weeks ago, on the coherence of their proposals. My understanding is that the Government have received the clearest, most unequivocal advice from the Law Commission that this particular proposal—which was never in the commission’s proposals—is nonsense.
The Law Commission has said that such cases should not be left to the jury. Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman would like to refer to page 65, paragraph 3.143. Now perhaps I can move on—
Page 65 of what?
Of the Law Commission report. Now perhaps I can move on—
I have the Law Commission’s report here.
It is on page 65, paragraph 3.143. I am happy to take further interventions as I proceed through my speech, which will perhaps give the right hon. and learned Gentleman an opportunity to consider the report.
The Minister knows that the Law Commission’s original proposals were cherry-picked by the Government. They decided not to adopt the commission’s proposals for the categories of murder 1 and murder 2. I say again to the Minister that my understanding is that, at a meeting that took place—certainly not under Chatham House rules—between the Government, their advisers and the Opposition in the Lords, the representative of the Law Commission publicly urged the Government to desist from this course of action.
Perhaps I can refer to page 65 of the Law Commission report. It states:
“In Smith (Morgan), Lord Hoffmann, agreeing with the decision, said:
Male possessiveness and jealousy should not today be an acceptable reason for loss of self-control leading to homicide, whether inflicted upon the woman herself or her new lover.”
That, I think, provides some support across a number of areas.
rose—
I will take some more interventions in a few moments, but I want to proceed a little further.
The sexual infidelity exclusion applies in relation to the words and conduct limb of the new partial defence to murder of loss of control. For that limb of the partial defence to succeed, the defendant must persuade the jury of the following: that he or she killed, or was a party to killing another as a result of losing their self-control; that this loss of self-control was triggered by a thing or things done or said—or perhaps both—that, first, constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character and, secondly, caused them to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. Finally, the defendant must show that a person of their sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in their circumstances might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to the defendant.
This is a purposely high threshold designed to narrow the circumstances in which a partial defence to murder can be made out based on anger. However, in order to put the matter beyond any doubt, the Bill as introduced in this House also made specific provision that in assessing whether the things said or done constituted a trigger for loss of self-control, the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded by the jury.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady who has given way very generously. I am not a lawyer, so perhaps we can put this into terms that a layman can understand. The difference between murder and manslaughter is essentially the difference between premeditation and instantaneous reaction. If a man or woman comes home and finds her spouse in flagrante and loses control on the spot—not having premeditated finding such a thing—and hits the spouse over the head with a saucepan, which, instead of merely silencing, kills that spouse, most rational people would say that that was manslaughter, not murder. If we are completely to disregard the sexual infidelity in that situation, it removes a defence that would be reasonable in all other circumstances.
I think that a very important principle is at stake here: whether or not this House believes—it has already put its views on this matter on the record—that when a person commits sexual infidelity they in some sense bring upon their own death at the hands of their partner, husband or wife. That surely cannot be the way in which we should proceed. The reality is that in many court cases, it was decided that that was not an appropriate partial defence, so we wish to make it absolutely clear in the Bill that it cannot be a partial defence in those circumstances.
May I tell the Minister about a case I was involved in not so long ago? A person was bragging about having had relations with a man’s wife. The man who was offended went out, bought a knife and stabbed the other person to death. Would the person using the knife have a defence or not? The man killed had said that he had been with the man’s wife and various rude things, so would the new defence be open to the individual who killed the man immediately with the knife?
I do not think it is a matter for me to set out the circumstances; it would depend on the context, which is what the court would have to consider. We are simply saying that sexual infidelity in itself cannot and should not be an acceptable reason for a defence for murder.
Does not the Minister accept that the sexual bond between two people gives them a greater closeness and involvement than with any other people in their lives, which is why people would use this as a plea—because the betrayal is so much greater and the anger may be so much more than in any other situation?
I do not for a moment deny that passions will be incredibly high when such personal relationships are under pressure in the circumstances that many Members are describing, but surely the hon. Lady would agree that this House and our legislation should not say that dealing with such matters in such a violent way is acceptable. It is not and cannot be acceptable—and we want to make it perfectly clear in the legislation that it is unacceptable.
At a time when we are very concerned about so-called “honour killings”, which in no way involve honour, is it not very important that this House should send out a perfectly clear message, as my hon. Friend has said, that sexual infidelity can never be an excuse—no matter what the links in a marriage or partnership, as described by the hon. Member for St. Albans (Anne Main)—for what is, after all, murder?
I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. Of course we do not believe that fidelity, however desirable, is appropriately or effectively championed by treating the victims of infidelity, who go on to kill their unfaithful partner, more leniently. That is essentially the issue.
I shall give way for the very last time, as I need to make some progress.
I am grateful. May I bring the Minister back to the wording of the Bill? Surely the difficulty here is not that we are asking for new law that would make sexual infidelity of itself and solely a qualifying trigger in this context; rather, the problem is that the Bill provides that a thing done or said that constitutes sexual infidelity is to be disregarded. The Minister would be right if the Bill set this out as solely sufficient for a qualifying trigger, but it does not; surely what is unrealistic is, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said, that the jury is being invited to take no notice at all of something that must count as relevant circumstances.
We need to look at the reality and at what we believe is acceptable. I have to say again that it cannot be acceptable for a man, for example, who finds his wife in a state with her lover and decides to kill her to use the fact of her sexual infidelity as a partial defence. That is not an acceptable way for our legislation to proceed.
rose—
I want to make some progress and deal with a couple of other issues that have been raised in the debate.
The core argument against this provision, as put forward in the other place, centred on the notion that the Government were not prepared to trust the common sense of the jury. I believe that that is essentially the argument put by the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield. That argument is simply misplaced. The provision does not reflect a lack of trust in the jury; what it does reflect is the Government’s determination to ensure that the law in this matter keeps pace with the times. In this day and age, it should not be possible for any person, regardless of gender or sexuality, to stand up in court and blame their partner—let us not forget that it is the partner that they themselves have killed—for having brought on their own death by having had an affair.
Will the hon. Lady give way?
I am going to make some progress; I will come back to the hon. and learned Gentleman.
In modernising the law in this matter, we have purposely set a very high threshold for the circumstances in which killing in anger could ever be treated as manslaughter rather than murder. The words and conduct limb of the partial defence is the main plank for achieving this, but we also believe that in relation to sexual infidelity, it is important to set out the position precisely and uncompromisingly—namely that sexual infidelity is not the kind of thing done that is ever sufficient on its own to found a successful plea of loss of control so as to reduce the verdict from murder to manslaughter.
I want to express one or two concerns about the amendment in lieu proposed by the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth). There may not be sufficient time at the end of the debate—I hope there will be—so I will say a few words about it now. I think I should be grateful to the hon. Gentleman for an amendment in which I believe he is trying to find an alternative form of words to achieve the Government’s purposes in clause 45. However, the way in which the amendment is drafted is unacceptable, for two reasons. First, the amendment restricts the possible motives to three: punishment, sexual jealousy, or sexual envy. Therefore, in cases where sexual infidelity is involved, if the defendant argued that the action he or she took was due not to one of those motives, but to betrayal, breach of honour, or outrage to morality or decency, they could rely on the partial defence. Therefore, if the intention behind the hon. Gentleman’s amendment is what I would hope it to be, it has a loophole.
Secondly, the terms of the amendment are drafted too widely: punishing a person for any act perceived as sexual infidelity would not qualify for the partial defence. The Government’s amendment would ensure that a partial defence could be used, for example, in the extremely grave circumstances in which a woman killed her husband after she came home and found him raping her child. However, under the hon. Gentleman’s amendment, if the act was perceived as sexual infidelity, even though that might not have been the main consideration in the loss of control, its existence would exclude reliance on the partial defence.
Under my amendment, all such issues would be for the jury to decide. I find it difficult to believe that the jury would find in the direction that the Minister suggests.
The hon. Gentleman would therefore leave in some doubt whether there were circumstances in which sexual infidelity would be acceptable as a defence for murder.
The Minister cannot have it both ways. First she says that my amendment catches more cases of sexual infidelity, and now she claims that it catches too few. I wish the Government would make up their mind.
That is not what I am saying. There are circumstances—the prime example is of a wife seeing her husband having sex with their child or a stepchild—in which sexual infidelity has taken place, but that would not be the primary issue on which the defence would, or could, rely under our legislation. They would rely on the extremely grave set of circumstances of the abuse of that child.
But that is the whole point of the words,
“where D acted principally out of”.
The Minister’s example does not work.
The example does work, because the hon. Gentleman’s amendment would still allow sexual infidelity to be used as a partial defence. [Interruption.] Having looked at the matter carefully, I am afraid that that is the case. Under the amendment as drafted, the moment that a person perceived that sexual infidelity had taken place—as they would if they saw their husband have sex with their child—they would rely on that defence. That would not be an acceptable defence, but there would be an acceptable defence on the grounds of those extremely grave circumstances of sex with a child.
I thank the hon. Lady for generously giving way to me a second time.
I doubt that I am the only Member who is getting very confused. The hon. Lady appears to be saying that sexual infidelity can never be a reason for pleading provocation to murder. We all accept that, but that is also the case with all the other reasons why people might plead provocation. The fact that somebody comes home drunk seven days a week is not a good enough reason to kill them, but we know that sometimes that can happen. What is unique about sexual infidelity that it must be removed from the almost endless list of circumstances in which somebody might be provoked?
The circumstances are quite different. Perhaps the right hon. Lady is suggesting that when somebody sees their husband or wife having an affair, that would be a partial defence for committing extreme violence—killing somebody. The right hon. Lady is clearly not in a position to be convinced, but the Government are clear that that cannot be an acceptable partial defence. Although many juries might disagree, there have been examples in the past in which a court has considered that sexual infidelity was a sufficient provocation to allow murder to be reduced to manslaughter. That is unacceptable.
I have been on my feet for nearly half an hour, and I want to ensure that hon. Members have an opportunity to speak in the debate. If the right hon. Lady has more to say, she will be able to do so if I finish my speech quickly. I hope that the hon. Member for Cambridge will see the flaws in his amendment, in relation to restricting and disregarding sexual infidelity as a partial defence. However, I look forward to listening to his argument for his amendment.
Order. The hon. Lady will have to wait a little longer, because I call Mr. Dominic Grieve.
Thank you, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
The first problem is that this is the first opportunity that we have had to consider the matter on the Floor of the House. It is a scandal that our procedures are so rotten, hopeless and archaic that, despite the Government’s so-called modernisation, we were deprived of giving the matter any scrutiny before it went to the other place. From that, in my judgment, stems a great deal of the difficulty that we are experiencing.
The second problem is that the Minister’s arguments this evening are utterly incoherent. Having practised in the courts, I am the first to accept that the vast majority of the partial defences advanced to the wicked act of killing another human being are largely untenable. Every day of the week in our courts, those arguments are trotted out and correctly rejected by juries. I have never been left in any doubt that juries are able to make up their own minds as to what reasonably constitutes the partial defence that may reduce murder to manslaughter on the grounds of provocation, and they have to do it all the time.
For reasons that I find most peculiar, the Government have decided that thousands of years of human history and experience should be jettisoned for a piece of political correctness and proclamation: a declaratory statement that sexual infidelity can never justify violent behaviour. The Minister decided to pick some examples, but in doing so she started to undermine her case very quickly. Most reasonable people might have no difficulty concluding that the fact that one’s partner is sexually unfaithful would not in itself constitute a ground on which anybody should raise a finger against them. However, human nature, and the nature of sexual relationships, shows that, unfortunately, that happens very frequently. Juries have to apply their mind to that, and in my experience they will tend very quickly to put things in different categories. They will take account of the circumstances in order to establish the extent to which a person has been deceived, the extent to which a person has been treated badly, or the extent to which general tenets relating to the reasonable humane behaviour that we owe each other have been violated.
The Minister said that if someone came home and found his or her partner was being sexually unfaithful with a child, that would not matter. What about the circumstances in which someone came home and found that his or her partner was being sexually unfaithful with a sibling, or a parent? Those things could happen, but they would not constitute a breach of the criminal law, unlike the Minister’s example involving a child. I suggest to the Minister that all those examples are of a kind that might lead a jury, particularly if there are other circumstances that merit consideration, to —[Interruption.] The Minister says that that would be incest, but if a sibling were involved and both parties were adults, there would be no breach of the criminal law.
I have no idea whether the Minister has brothers or sisters, but it seems to me that if the Minister turned up and found that the person with whom she was currently having a sexual relationship—her partner—was having a sexual relationship with a close relative, a court would be entitled to take that factor into account. In such circumstances, it would be an aggravating feature because of the breach of trust. [Interruption.] I am sorry if the Minister does not understand what I am saying, but I think that I have made myself fairly clear. [Interruption.] Incest would be a different issue altogether. [Interruption.] The trouble is that the Minister did not listen to what I said. I was referring to circumstances in which someone is not only sexually unfaithful to his or her partner but sexually unfaithful within the context of that partner’s wider family, including close relatives. That can happen without any breach of the criminal law. [Interruption.] I fear that if the Minister has not understood that by now, even an attempt by me to explain it behind the Speaker’s Chair will probably be unsuccessful.
Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. and learned Gentleman, but I feel that I ought to intervene on behalf of the Official Reporters. The introduction of matters by Members from a sedentary position may make it much more difficult for them to produce a reliable account of our proceedings.
The Minister said, from a sedentary position, that I was not referring to the defendant. Of course I was referring to the defendant. The defendant is the person who has put the defence forward, and if the Minister has not understood that, it is beyond my comprehension.
Let me move on. The point at issue is this: why should the jury be deprived of the opportunity to take that factor into account? All I can say to the Minister is that it seems to me that the Government’s argument is entirely incoherent. They wish to issue a statement, but I think that in doing so they risk grave injustice in a very small minority of cases.
The second issue that the Minister has not been able to address properly is how a judge will direct a jury in cases in which sexual infidelity is one component of the story, but other components are also involved. How, logically, will juries be able to disregard the sexual infidelity component? It beggars belief that the Minister thinks that that will be easy.
When I intervened on the Minister, I gave an example which I think is worth repeating. One of the good things that the Government have done in the Bill is to enable people who have been battered and abused for many years to advance the partial defence, even in circumstances in which currently they have been prevented from doing so because they did not act in the immediacy of the violence meted out to them. I welcome that—I think it is an important development—but, as I said to the Minister, there will be cases in which the final trigger is the discovery of sexual infidelity in that context. It is beyond my understanding how a jury will be properly directed to put that issue out of their minds, but will be allowed to consider the other issues.
What my hon. and learned Friend has said is, in fact, the considered view of the Law Commission, which eventually decided not to impose the formulae advocated by the Minister, but to leave it to the good sense of the judge to determine what could properly be left to the jury.
I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend. Listening to the Minister, I began to think that I must have completely misread the Law Commission’s report—yet that is what she told us, and I must tell her that that does not raise my level of confidence that she actually knows what she is talking about.
Perhaps I can enlighten the hon. and learned Gentleman. Section 3.144 of the Law Commission’s report, on page 65, states:
“Under our approach provocation should not be left to the jury in such a case because we do not see how any reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude there had been gross provocation or that a person of ordinary tolerance and self-restraint might have acted in the same way as the defendant.”
Perhaps the hon. and learned Gentleman would like to look at the report in a little more detail.
It is the Minister who is being selective. If she turns the page, she will see the precise exceptions—in sections 3.146 to 3.150—which appear to me to undermine everything that she has said. Section 3.150 states:
“Our approach has been to seek to set out broad principles, to rely on the judge to exercise a judgement whether a reasonable jury could regard the case as falling within those principles and then to rely on the jury to exercise its good sense and fairness in applying them.”
Further up the page, the report provides the precise examples that I cited to the Minister.
Let me return to a point that I made earlier. These are the Law Commission’s original proposals. Since then, the Government have cherry-picked those proposals. I understand why they have done so, but, as the Law Commission has made plain, the coherence of its proposals has been entirely undermined by their action. That constitutes a major problem in the way in which the Government have approached the legislation. I think I am correct in saying that for those reasons the Law Commission has indicated to the Government—and the Minister has not answered my questions since then during the passage of the Bill—that it believes that the decision should be left to the jury.
Even if the hon. and learned Gentleman does not accept the Government’s view, there are pretty good arguments on both sides, but given the violence that is perpetrated against women and given that far more women than men are murdered as a result of affairs and sexual infidelity, would it not be right—I speak as a layman, not a lawyer—for the House to convey the message that sexual infidelity must not lead to a manslaughter charge, because it constitutes outright murder? After all, we convey messages on all kinds of issues. That would strengthen the opinion held by so many of us that women should be protected against violence and, obviously, should be protected first and foremost against being murdered.
Order. I realise that the hon. Gentleman has some knowledge of these matters to contribute to the debate, but that was a very long intervention and we have a limited amount of time left.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick), but I wish to bring my speech to a close.
I certainly do not wish to see circumstances in which the House provides an excuse for men to kill women simply because they perceive that the women have been unfaithful to them—or, for that matter, vice versa: I do not want to see women killing men. On that I am sure we can all agree. That, however, does not justify the remarkable step that the Government will take if they decide that this is one of the components that can be entirely disregarded by a jury when it comes to consider the plea of provocation and the partial defence. I simply do not understand the logic.
History suggests—certainly, the cases that I have seen suggest—that although on occasion the defence may be advanced as a mere cover for the violence of one party to another, sexual infidelity is sometimes an important and relevant component of the cocktail of events that combine to make a reasonable person snap. For those reasons, I think it is very dangerous for this House to deprive juries of the opportunity to use their good sense to evaluate that evidence, but I am afraid that that is what the Government have chosen to try to do, and I do not understand the rationale behind that. I am very wary of legislating in a symbolic fashion. Juries are entitled to consider these points and, in my experience, if we allow them to do so, they will come up with the right answers. For those reasons, the Lords amendment deserves to be supported.
First, I agree with what the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) said about this being the first time that the Bill’s murder provisions have been considered on the Floor of the House. It is extraordinary that the business was arranged in such a way that we could not discuss these and many other important issues about the law of murder.
I also associate myself with the hon. and learned Gentleman’s remarks on what has happened in respect of the Law Commission. It was given a very narrow remit in the first place, in that it was not allowed to consider the question of a mandatory life sentence for murder; it then produced the best possible report it could in the circumstances—even though it might not have been what it wanted to do had it been left to its own devices—and then the Government cherry-picked even that. I must say that it is hardly convincing for Members on either side of the debate to cite what the Law Commission said in its reports, as I do not think they reflect in any way what it thinks.
There are three different kinds of reason on offer in this House and the other place in favour of dropping the sexual infidelity provision the Government originally proposed—clause 45(6)(c). I want to make it clear from the start that I do not agree with the major reason given today, which was implicit in what the Lords said, which is that somehow it is all right for men to use sexual infidelity as an excuse for murder. That is unacceptable. However, two other reasons were on offer, and I shall need to talk about them as well.
Some Members have rightly said that it is a matter of fact that there are cases when men especially—although this can happen the other way around—kill in a rage about sexual infidelity. The issue is not whether that is a fact, but whether it is an excuse; it is a question of value, not of fact. On the question of value, I am entirely with the Government. I do not agree that that is a proper reason to offer in defence against a charge of murder, especially given that a charge of murder is one where there is a requisite intention to kill. The defendant is therefore saying, “Yes, I did have that intent. I had all the requisite intention to murder, so it was not that I did not know what I was doing. I did know what I was doing, but the action arose out of these circumstances.” That is an unacceptable excuse.
I have slightly more sympathy with the second reason raised both here and in the other place, which has to do with the jury. I think the jury does have a place in these cases. I do not think the Government have excluded the jury in the current version of the clause in question either, because they do not say that the judge shall tell the jury how to decide any case where there is sexual infidelity. They simply say that the sexual infidelity is to be disregarded. To whom is that clause addressed? The Government are not entirely clear about that.
Are the Government not saying that the judge must direct the jury that it must disregard questions of sexual infidelity?
Precisely, but there is still the judge saying those words to the jury, and it is for the jury to decide what they mean in a particular case. Therefore, even the Government have not succeeded in taking the case entirely away from the jury. What does “disregard” mean? It is for the jury to make that assessment.
There is a point that I should perhaps have made. Ironically, I actually think the impact of these proposals on juries will probably be minimal. I think it will be very easy for a jury to disregard a judge’s direction in this regard if that jury happens to disagree with it, because that direction will usually be merged with other issues that fall to be considered, and it will therefore be impossible to disentangle how the jury arrived at its decision.
One of the most important aspects of the jury system is that the jury gives no reasons, so we never know the answer to such questions.
I agree with the Government that there is no reason in principle why the legislature should not set the criminal law. It is for Parliament to say what the law should be, and Parliament is perfectly entitled to say that certain excuses should not count. That in itself is not an argument against the Government’s position.
Members seem to have missed the point that this part of the Bill already includes another substantive restriction on what can count as a justifiable lack of control. It is contained in clause 44(4), which says that the loss of control defence does not apply where the defendant
“acted in a considered desire for revenge.”
Revenge is therefore also excluded in the same way. Perhaps a jury will think otherwise, and consider that there should have been such a defence in the circumstances before it. No one has yet complained that that provision should be removed simply because it interferes with the rights of the jury. I am not entirely convinced by the jury point, therefore. The Government are entitled to propose changes in the substantive law, as long as they admit that in the end these questions of fact will, even in their own version, be decided by a jury.
The third reason was more persuasive. It has been alluded to here, but it was discussed at great length in the other place. It takes us back to the evidence the Law Commission gave to the Public Bill Committee. It is the argument that the drafting of clause 45(6)(c) was defective—or, to borrow a word used by one commissioner, “bizarre”. That clause said:
“In determining whether a loss of self control had a qualifying trigger…the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.”
There is an enormous number of things wrong with that formulation. We do not have time to go through them all, but the first thing that is not at all clear is whether it does the job the Government want it to. What is to be disregarded? Is it sexual infidelity? No, the clause does not actually say that. It is merely the fact that something
“done or said constituted sexual infidelity”.
In other words, the infidelity itself is not to be disregarded, but merely the mental process going through the head of somebody else, who comes to the conclusion that something constitutes sexual infidelity—that is what is to be disregarded. It is not clear that that is what the Government wanted. Secondly, how can a thing that is said constitute sexual infidelity? What words constitute sexual infidelity? I cannot see how that works.
Thirdly, what counts as sexual infidelity anyway? The Minister’s examples show the problem is a difficult one to resolve. She put forward lots of examples of what she claimed was sexual infidelity, although it is not clear whether a jury would agree. What about unmarried couples? What about situations in which the couple disagree about the degree of fidelity that is expected in their relationship? This takes us back to the point the law commissioners made, which is that presumably what the Government meant was something like sexual jealousy or envy, rather than infidelity as such. There are other ways of drafting the clause that get out of at least some of these problems. I do not say that the amendment we offer solves all the problems, but I think it solves at least some of them.
On Report, had we been allowed to debate it, we would have offered an even more comprehensive solution that would have separated out the various problems in this entirely unsatisfactory area of the law. One area in which the Bill fails is that it does not distinguish between loss of control through anger and cases of long-term violence where people—especially women—fear repetition of the violence. Those are entirely different cases. The second sort of case is not really about loss of control at all, and should be subject to a separate defence. None of our proposals were discussed, and it is not possible at this stage to rewrite the whole of the murder provisions—although if that were possible, it should have been done.
It is possible, however, to offer a cut down version of what we offered on Report, by way of amendment (a). That amendment deliberately ties the issue of sexual infidelity to a specific part of the trigger provisions, namely that the circumstances should be
“of an extremely grave character”.
It ties it down to how the Bill works, rather than being at large which is how the current drafting works. It avoids the “constitute” problem by concentrating not on the thought processes of the court, but on the actions and intentions, or reasons for action, of the defendant. We hope that it adds more comprehensibility to the sexual infidelity language by referring to “sexual jealousy”, which is slightly clearer.
The Minister said that what was wrong with our amendment was that there were circumstances in which the defendant might “perceive”—she used the language of the amendment—that what was going on was sexual infidelity whereas, in reality, it was not, or someone else might think that it was not. That ignores, first, that this is a jury question in the end—that cannot be got away from; this is criminal law, so the jury decides this kind of issue. It also ignores the fact that the amendment starts with the words
“where D acted principally out of a desire”.
The key phrase is “acted principally”. The jury decides whether someone acted principally out of the various matters referred to in the amendment. The Minister’s problem with the subjective nature of “perceived” does not arise unless the jury thinks that that is the principal reason. No reasonable jury could possible believe that in the circumstances she put forward the principal reason for the action of the killer was sexual infidelity—even the perception of it.
The objections that the Minister raised do not work. I simply add that whatever the problems with our drafting, they are as nothing compared with the problems in the Government’s drafting. Faced with a choice between something slightly imperfect and something plainly bizarre, we should choose the slightly imperfect. Thus, if circumstances arise in which it is possible to vote on amendment (a), I request that we do so.
I think that my right hon. and hon. Friends wish to contribute to the debate, as perhaps do some Labour Members, so I shall be brief and compress my remarks to something shorter than I originally had in mind.
The law of provocation has always been one of the most difficult aspects of the law of homicide, and over the years it has given rise to a great deal of judicial comment and controversy. Broadly speaking, the recommendations of the Law Commission, which are encompassed in this Bill, are to be welcomed, but there is one exception: the proposal to exclude from the triggering event the conduct entitled “sexual infidelity”. I am very much with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve), who speaks from the Front Bench, in believing that this is essentially a matter for a jury.
Perhaps the House will forgive me if I recount a case that I dealt with some three or four years ago—I was acting for the defendant, who was charged with murder. He was impotent, and he often tried to have sexual relations with his wife and failed because of his impotence. The wife then developed a long-standing sexual relationship with a lover, and that was known to my client. There was then an occasion when my client tried to have sexual intercourse with his wife, but because he was impotent he could not achieve that, at which point the wife began to abuse him, laugh at him and say that he was not a patch on the lover. My client lost self-control and strangled his wife.
Within that cocktail of events, the sexual infidelity of the wife played a prominent part, but if we are to accept the Government’s position, that sexual infidelity would have to be disregarded. I see absolutely no justice in providing in statute law that what was clearly, on the face of it, a relevant fact should be disregarded. My client was convicted of murder—that is to say, the jury in that case determined that the conduct did not amount to provocation within the meaning of the law, and he was convicted of murder. I was very unhappy about that verdict, but that is a wholly different matter. What the case shows is that a jury is perfectly capable of addressing this issue and taking a broad view of what is just.
The Minister has said that her views were in accord with those of the Law Commission, but that is not so. What is correct is that the Law Commission said in its report that male possessiveness and jealousy should not, of themselves, constitute good cause. It relied, perfectly understandably, on the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in the very important case of Smith (Morgan), when he commented on the Australian case of Stingel. If the Minister were to read further on in the report, to the following page—this is the point to which my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield was drawing attention—she would see that it makes it clear that where additional material comes into play—for example, taunting somebody about their impotence—it is right that consideration of that combination of events should be left to the jury.
That is why the Law Commission, in its considered view, held against the Minister’s position of excluding a particular category of event from the triggering events. If she would be good enough—I am sure she will—to examine paragraph 3.168 on page 70, where its detailed recommendations for inclusion in statute law are set out, she will not find a recommendation that sexual infidelity should be excluded from the triggering categories. She will not find it, because that was not the Law Commission’s view. Its view—it happens to be my view, too—is that these are matters best left to the jury. Very often, the jury will decide that the conduct does not amount to provocation, as in the case I told this House about, but sometimes it will decide that it does. If we exclude that fact from the jury’s ability to take account of the matter, we bring about a profound injustice. I believe that the views expressed in the other place are wholly right and that this provision has been added—probably at the suggestion of the Solicitor-General, who is no longer in her place—out of a desire to be politically right. I do not think it just and this House should not go along with it.
What I have been totally unconvinced about tonight is why this particular motivation and provocation should uniquely be removed from a jury’s discretion in deciding whether or not it was, in the circumstances rehearsed, an understandable ground for somebody losing control. The Minister has said that sexual infidelity cannot be, on its own, a cause for killing, and we would all agree with that. However, the whole point about loss of control is that the person does not make a rational assessment at the time of what he is doing and does not necessarily intend to kill, but is provoked into making an attack. On that basis, just about every single reason for losing control would have to be taken away from a jury’s discretion. The Minister has not shown that there is some factor in this one cause of loss of control that justifies its uniquely being taken away from a jury’s discretion.
It is no reason to kill somebody if they get drunk, but let us consider a situation where a man comes home night after night as drunk as an owl. If his wife says to him “Don’t do it again” and then moves towards him, pushes him in her fury at his being drunk as an owl and he falls over, hits his head and dies, she will say, “Of course it was not a good enough reason, but I lost control.” Why somebody—it could be a man or a woman; it does not have only to be a man—coming home and finding his spouse of x years in bed with somebody else shall not trigger a similar loss of control is beyond me.
The fact is that one cannot specify what is and is not a reasonable ground for loss of control for the simple reason that nothing ever seems reasonable when one looks at it from the point of view of somebody who is totally in control and rational. It is for a jury to decide the following question: was the provocation in this incident—whatever that incident may be—sufficient to cause that person, on the spur of that moment, to kill in that way? That is entirely a matter for the jury to decide. The hon. Lady has not made any case tonight for the argument that, quite uniquely, the one circumstance in which the jury cannot make that assessment should be sexual infidelity.
I was racking my brains on this, and got a bit of approval from those on the Liberal Democrat Benches who are better versed on this than I am. I think that the right hon. Lady would find that in such circumstances—if, in her delightful phrase, a man was as drunk as an owl and the woman involved just pushed him and he fell, hit his head and died—since we can infer from what she said that there was no intention to commit either murder or grievous bodily harm, no charge of murder would lie, still less be followed by conviction.
That is the whole point and I am sorry that the Lord Chancellor somehow cannot understand it. The whole point is that an intention to kill is not formed.
Leaving aside the example of drunkenness that has been given, as we are talking about sexual infidelity, is it not true that we are not talking about somebody who intended to kill or who was out for revenge? We are talking about someone who snapped and lost control, and a jury should therefore have all the facts.
The hon. Gentleman sums it up exactly. Somebody snaps and loses control, and whether or not a circumstance is sufficient to cause that snap will be decided by the jury in every circumstance, no matter how trivial, other than sexual infidelity. I do not hear the case made for an exception for that single category of provocation.
I understand the right hon. Lady’s concerns and this is an inherently difficult issue, but let me say that it is nothing to do with political correctness. To say that is to trivialise this difficult issue. She chose the example—I did not—and in that case no charge of murder would lie and, if there were a charge and that was the totality of the evidence, it would not go to the jury.
So, if a woman taunts her husband about her sexual activity with a third party and he, in his fury, moves towards her and shoves her hard and she falls over, hits her head and dies, that is not a provocation because, uniquely, the jury will be told that it cannot take sexual infidelity into account. It is nonsense. I shall not go on repeating the same point, because it has repeatedly failed to be answered and I am aware that we would quite like to vote on the amendment.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) has suggested that this is essentially about the Government trying to remove a responsibility from juries simply because juries would find it too difficult to deal with and because it is too difficult for judges to direct juries. I disagree that judges will not be able to direct juries. Judges are perfectly used to directing juries about what they can and cannot consider—they do it every day in court. It is not beyond the ability of judges to tell juries that sexual infidelity cannot be a qualifying trigger for a loss of self-control. If something else is relied on as the qualifying trigger, any sexual infidelity that forms part of the background can be considered but it cannot be the trigger. That is essentially what the legislation seeks to do—to stop the act of sexual infidelity being the trigger that enables people to say that these are extremely serious and grave circumstances.
My reading of clause 45(6)(c) does not match the comment that the Minister has just made about being able to consider it in the background as long as there are other factors. There is a clear contradiction between the wording of subsection (6)(c) and her intention. That is why I urge her to be so cautious about the clause, which I think has been very poorly thought through.
The partial defence for loss of control exists on the basis that there will be certain sets of triggers—things that take place that cause the loss of control. Sexual infidelity is being disregarded as an acceptable trigger that can play into the loss of self-control. We believe that it is acceptable to do that precisely because we do not think that sexual infidelity, in itself, should be considered an acceptable reason for somebody to have killed their partner, husband, wife or whomever the circumstances might involve. The background information might well form part of the case, but sexual infidelity will not be the trigger for allowing the defence of that partial loss of control.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. At the risk of taking up more of her time, I point out that she knows that clause 44(1) already does not apply if
“in doing or being a party to the killing”
somebody
“acted in a considered desire for revenge.”
That is a very important clause that I entirely agree with, but the fact that it is there means that the examples she has been giving about killing on the ground of sexual infidelity based on a feeling of vengeance could not come into the picture anyway. That is why it is such nonsense to include this provision, and why it will be impossible for a judge and jury to disentangle the facts when they are all mixed up together.
I completely disagree with the hon. and learned Gentleman. The judge and indeed juries are quite capable of considering the information that is available to them as background information. We are saying that it is completely unacceptable that sexual infidelity in itself should be used as the trigger to allow the defence of loss of self-control to come into play. That is essentially what this is about, and I am quite surprised that the right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) feels that it is appropriate—indeed, this featured in the case he discussed—for somebody who has committed sexual infidelity to be told by their killer, or for it to be determined in a court case by their killer, that that is essentially just cause. “You have committed sexual infidelity and that is just cause for me to commit murder,” is not an acceptable claim.
That is not what I was saying. I was saying that when there is a cocktail of events—in the case I cited, they included the sexual infidelity that formed the background, together with abuse and taunting of the defendant—the combination is capable of amounting to an appropriate trigger. Incidentally, that is also the view of the Law Commission, and when it took that question out to sample—I think the Minister will find it on page 66 of the report, but I could be wrong—that was also the view of the focus groups to which the question was addressed.
The right hon. and learned Gentleman and I are clearly not going to agree on the issue, and unfortunately the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) and I are not going to agree either—whether it is on sets of circumstances, sexual infidelity or drunken owls.
In the remaining time, I want to deal with some of the other points. The hon. Member for Cambridge referred to the issue of whether sexual infidelity is a thing done, a thing said or both. We have used the words “done” or “said” in the provision, to the effect that the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded. By doing so, we are making it clear that the subsection relates back to the earlier subsection, which refers to
“things done or said…which…constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and caused”—
the defendant—
“to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.”
Although it might be difficult to understand how “things said” would of themselves amount to sexual infidelity—I understand the point that the hon. Member for Cambridge is making—if we were to remove that term we could leave a loophole that might be exploited in the future. For clarity, and to ensure that the provision is seamless, the provision refers to the words in the original subsection—“things said or done.”
That is precisely why it is important that if there is to be a subsection 6(c), it refers to 4(a), as my amendment does, or to 4(b) rather than to the first words in subsection (4) because those words cannot possibly apply in terms to sexual infidelity.
That is why we are ensuring that there is seamlessness between the subsections with the words “things said or done”. That will ensure that sexual infidelity cannot be relied on in those circumstances.
The hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield seemed to suggest that there is no support for the amendment, beyond some form of political correctness. I have to tell him that is quite contrary to the reality of the situation. We have received more than 40 representations, from individuals and groups, asking the Government to seek to overturn the vote taken in the other place. Those organisations are significant and varied. They include the Women’s National Commission, Amnesty International, the Eaves group, Justice for Women, violence intervention programmes and a range of other rape crisis organisations and other groups that support women who have been raped.
All the representations we have received have stated clearly that in the killing of a wife or girlfriend by a partner, actual or suspected infidelity has often been used in the past to reduce murder to manslaughter. The law should be clear that that is no longer acceptable. The penalty for infidelity should not be death, and partners who believe it is their right to kill should always go on trial for murder. In this instance, our concern is that men who kill women should not be able to plead the traditional argument that she was unfaithful.
claimed to move the closure (Standing Order No. 36).
Question put forthwith, That the Question be now put.
Question agreed to.
Question put accordingly, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 55.
Lords amendment 55 disagreed to.
Clause 61
Hatred against persons on grounds of sexual orientation
I beg to move, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 59.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Lords amendment 119, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 121, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 236, and Government motion to disagree.
Lords amendment 239, and Government motion to disagree.
In inviting the House to reject the Lords amendments, we are seeking to complete unfinished business from the last Session. The House will recall that we introduced offences of inciting hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill. During its passage, the other place passed an amendment that inserted what is now section 29JA into the Public Order Act 1986. That section contains a so-called freedom of speech saving
“for the avoidance of doubt”.
Regrettably, for want of time, we were unable to overturn the Lords amendment, but the Minister of State, Ministry of Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool, Garston (Maria Eagle) made it clear that when the opportunity arose, we would return to the issue. To this end, a clause in this Bill sought to repeal section 29JA of the 1986 Act. The House approved that clause by a majority of 152 on Report in March. That was the third occasion on which the House has made it clear, by a substantial margin—202 on 6 May 2008—that there was no need for the freedom of speech saving provision.
The other place has seen fit to strike out the clause, thereby seeking to retain the unnecessary, unwanted and potentially harmful saving provision. We should send a clear message back to the other place that it is ill conceived, ill judged and ill advised. Furthermore, that has been the settled will of the elected House on three occasions to date.
Let there be no mistake: people who stir up violence and hatred against homosexuals are completely wrong. But there is nothing in the Waddington amendment that does that. All the Waddington amendment allows is a
“discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct”.
Lord Waddington is not trying to stir up hatred. He just wants free speech. If people want to say that Roman Catholicism is wrong, let them. That is free speech, and the House should be very careful when it attacks free speech.
The House is not attacking free speech. It is clear that people retain their right to freedom of speech. The clause is unnecessary because the threshold of the offence is already set incredibly high. We introduced these new offences in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to protect a group in our society who are at times the victims of bigotry and hatred. We considered carefully how to formulate the offences, recognising the particular sensitivities about offences that impact on freedom of speech. We believe that we have got the balance right without the so-called freedom of expression saving provision. In introducing those new offences to protect victims of that bigotry and hatred, we looked very carefully before we proceeded.
I have listened carefully to the Minister, and the argument that everything is all right is one to which the House must pay considerable attention. She will be aware that only two weeks ago, under existing law, a case in Norwich gave substantial cause for concern. The right of freedom of expression—the right of people to express views that might appear unpalatable and with which one might disagree—is being visited not with the reply, “I disagree with you,” but with a visit from the police. That must be a subject of concern for the Minister, and the fact that it has happened only recently, following the case in Lancashire some years ago, suggests that there is still a real problem. Individuals are finding that they cannot express themselves with views that are certainly not about hatred, but about freedom of expression and conscience.
There is nothing to prevent freedom of expression, and many of the incidents to which the hon. and learned Gentleman refers, as he well knows, fall under the Public Order Act 1986, in which there is a much lower threshold. Therefore, it is not the basis of the offence under discussion, which involves a high threshold and is exactly the reason why the so-called freedom of speech section is not necessary. It is simply unnecessary and has the potential to remove the impact of the offence itself, and we do not wish to see that. If he accepts that bigotry and hatred on the ground of sexual orientation is completely unacceptable, he should see that we will do nothing to water down that offence. The offence already has an incredibly high threshold.
I am grateful for what the Minister says, and I hope that she will join me in continuing to point to those who raise valid concerns about the Norfolk and Lancashire cases that the problem is the police’s treatment of section 5 of the 1986 Act, which contains an “insulting” provision. Will she say anything more about her Department’s undertaking to review whether she would accept, in some later legislation now, the amendment that I and my colleagues proposed to remove “insulting” from the offence and raise the threshold in that legislation? It would deal with all the mischief in the examples that other hon. Members have given—rightly in that context, although not in this one.
I wish to ensure that we deal with the legislation before us. What is before us is an opportunity to make sure that the will of this elected House, which has had an opportunity on three occasions to state that it does not believe that this so-called freedom of expression section is a necessary or wise addition to our legislation. We have got the balance right already.
We looked at existing models in legislation to decide which way we wished to proceed. The first model is used for race hate offences. In the case of racial hatred, the 1986 Act criminalises threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour that are intended or likely to stir up racial hatred—a low threshold. In contrast, the second model, provided by the religious hatred offences, sets a much higher threshold. In that case, an offence is committed only when threatening words or behaviour are used with the intention of stirring up hatred. It is not enough that the words or behaviour are abusive, insulting or merely likely to stir up hatred. We have adopted that model for the offences of stirring up hatred on the ground of sexual orientation.
The Minister refers to the religious hatred provision, but she will be aware that it contained a further protection, which she has not mentioned. That is what we seek in the legislation before us—the same protection as that which is in the religious hatred provision.
And the hon. Gentleman will recall that the Government did not approve the extent of the Lords amendment on that occasion, either.
We have set a very high threshold for the offences, which can be prosecuted only with the consent of the Attorney-General. The reason why the so-called freedom of expression section is not required is that the Attorney-General already has a duty under the Human Rights Act 1998 to consider rights in the European convention on human rights. The provision does not need to be in the Bill, and therefore we must question why those Lords who supported the amendment wanted it made to the Bill. Such freedom of expression already exists.
It is for the avoidance of doubt.
The right hon. Lady says that it is for the avoidance of doubt, but I am quite sure that in other circumstances, perhaps she, and certainly many of her right hon. and hon. Friends, would say that provisions should not be added to Bills—creating more legislation—simply for the avoidance of doubt. Indeed, I am well aware that they have criticised it when they have believed that it has happened in the past; yet, on this occasion, they think it acceptable to make an amendment that is simply not needed. Even more than that, it has the potential to do harm. It may well result in the offence not being prosecuted, because somebody believes that they can rely on the provision. I hope that that is not the case.
It is true that the section would not change the threshold of the offence, but that is not at all the same as saying that it either has no effect or would not be useful. Would it not at the very least provide a signpost to police and prosecutors, saying that they should lay off innocent people who merely discuss or criticise sexual conduct? That is what we see in case after case. That is the purpose of the section and why we should retain it, and later on I shall certainly seek to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to make those points in more detail.
The legislation before us is not the appropriate place in which to put the police guidance to which my hon. Friend refers. Indeed, legislation is not necessarily the place for it. Guidance may well be the place to put it, and we will seek in due course to look at the guidance. The right hon. Lady said earlier from a sedentary position that the section purports to be for the avoidance of doubt, but in effect it creates doubt where there should be none. In that way, we believe that it is not simply unnecessary, but potentially damaging to the effectiveness of the offence itself.
People with strongly held religious or moral beliefs must of course be free to express their views. [Interruption.] The right hon. Lady says that she does not have the right to express her strongly held religious or moral beliefs. I contend that she certainly does, but not where it breaches the level of the offence, which has an incredibly high threshold.
I probably do have the right, and I regularly use this place to exercise it. But those who do not enjoy parliamentary privilege, and, instead, express the same views on the radio, in letters to their council and in the literature that they give out, find that they do not have that right.
I am afraid that I do not agree with the right hon. Lady. One does not need parliamentary privilege to express one’s views. Freedom of expression is permitted, allowed and encouraged, the difference being when it is intended to incite hatred. There will be people who hold a religious or moral belief and have objections to homosexuality or to certain sexual practices. They are perfectly entitled to hold those opinions, and nothing in the Bill changes that; rather, it ensures that at the point where their words are threatening and their behaviour is intended to stir up hatred, the offence will bite.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her customary grace in giving way. I have said in this House that I do not believe that homosexual couples should adopt children. No police appeared on my doorstep. When a children’s author gave exactly the same opinion on a radio programme—under questioning; they did not just volunteer it—the police got involved.
The right hon. Lady is not entitled to express her views on matters only because she is a Member of this House and entitled to parliamentary privilege. Many of the incidents to which she refers come under the Public Order Act 1986, and therefore the threshold is considerably lower than in the Bill. The high threshold in the Bill relates only to threatening words and behaviour intended to stir up hatred. People are perfectly entitled to express their views about homosexuality. Some will find those views distasteful, offensive or even insulting, but there is nothing in these offences that prevents that expression of opinion. Those uttering such threatening words or exhibiting such behaviour intended to stir up hatred should not have the cloak of a so-called freedom of expression clause to protect them. Frankly, I am surprised that so many hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Benches—and indeed the right hon. Lady, who is sitting there on her own—think that people should be entitled to protection where they have used threatening words that are intended to stir up hatred.
The public record speaks for itself on my position on protecting and standing up for the rights of homosexuals. What does the Minister think would lead to a vicar, for example, or perhaps an imam in the constituency of the Lord Chancellor, falling foul of the legislation that she has put before the House?
In order to fall foul of the Bill, the person’s words would have to be threatening and their behaviour intended to stir up hatred. If they did intend to stir up hatred, I believe, and the Government believe, that they should be guilty of the offence—that the threshold should have been reached. If the hon. Gentleman does not believe that, he is saying that it is acceptable for people to stir up hatred on the ground of sexual orientation and that that is freedom of speech.
I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; she is being very gracious. In order to have clarity, does she think that the Old Testament or the New Testament, the Koran or the Hadith, or the Torah, for example, would fall foul of this legislation?
I think that the hon. Gentleman is trying to find out whether I wish to have a religious and philosophical debate on the holy books. As a Roman Catholic, I can make reference to only one book. The reality is that if somebody uses the words that may be contained in a religious book with a clear intention to stir up hatred, they will fall foul of this offence. Someone may simply express a view that they do not agree with homosexuality or with certain sexual practices—they can have freedom of speech and expression—but that is entirely different from taking it to a level where they intend to be threatening and to stir up hatred on the ground of that sexual orientation.
Does the Minister realise that, if the Bill is passed, it will become more and more difficult in this United Kingdom for a preacher to express biblical standards? Someone could be perceived to be stirring up hatred if they were simply quoting the Scriptures and preaching from God’s precious word. That is a disgraceful situation.
I am afraid the hon. Gentleman is not correct. A person would have to intend their words to be threatening and stir up hatred. That would have to be their intention, not the perception. Nothing in the Bill will prevent a preacher or follower of any religion from expressing their views, provided that they are not intending to stir up hatred. That is quite different.
I want to make it absolutely clear that those who hold views different from mine or those of other Members, and who do not believe that homosexuality is acceptable and have objections to certain sexual practices, are entitled to continue to hold and express them. They may not use threatening words and intend to stir up hatred on the ground of sexual orientation, but that is quite different from the reality of what goes on in churches, mosques and other religious places up and down the country. The hon. Gentleman, and indeed many Opposition Members, may well be doing a disservice to many people of strong religious and moral views on such matters who hold different views but do not intend to stir up hatred. It is a really high-level offence.
Will the Minister give way?
I am going to proceed, and then the hon. Gentleman will have a better opportunity to express his views.
If we had set the bar for the offence too low or had not afforded sufficient protection for freedom of speech, I am quite sure that the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Equality and Human Rights Commission would have been the first to say so. Both bodies have carefully examined the offence and separately concluded that there is sufficient protection for freedom of speech without the need for section 29JA of the 1986 Act.
We should send a clear and unequivocal message to the other place. It made a wrong call in the last Session in passing the so-called freedom of expression saving provision. It has made the wrong call again this Session in seeking to block its repeal. On three occasions, this elected House has rejected the need for it, and I invite it to do so again by rejecting the Lords amendment.
We are certainly revisiting an old topic. I rather disagree with the Minister in her view about the behaviour in the other place the last time this matter came up for consideration. On the face of it, whatever the Government may have felt about the matter, they were prepared to accept the Lords amendment on that occasion. One can only conclude that, in their willingness to do so, they made the evaluation that Lord Waddington’s amendment was innocuous. In my judgment, that is exactly what it was.
The Minister has studiously avoided debating why the offence in question cannot be successfully prosecuted under Lord Waddington’s amendment, because she has no case to make about that. If there were a problem, the Government could at least have allowed the offence to be tested. If it had then turned out that it was causing problems when it got to court, they would have had a greater justification for asking the House to reconsider the matter.
Is it not interesting that the Minister never actually discussed Lord Waddington’s amendment? We all agree that it is wrong to threaten or stir up hatred, but Lord Waddington’s amendment said simply:
“For the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.”
That is all that we are saying—simply discussing the matter is not threatening behaviour or worse—[Interruption.]
I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. I heard from a sedentary position the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) saying, “Not if it is threatening,” but the words “of itself” make it quite plain that if it were threatening language in that context, the freedom of speech defence would not be open to the individual concerned. Therefore, his anxiety is misplaced.
I say this to the hon. Gentleman, seeing as he is participating in this debate: we have in the past worked together on similar issues regarding religious hatred. One comment that he often made then—indeed, I even remember him conceding in the context of this offence—was that such offences, which the House creates, can have a chilling effect on freedom of speech. He may have been the first person to use the words “chilling effect” in the House. I certainly remember them coming first from him.
The fact of the matter is that there is plenty of evidence, unfortunately, in the context of the Public Order Act 1986, that the offence is having a chilling effect. Its interpretation, based upon a form of political correctness handed down by what is perceived to be the line taken by those in authority, is leading to abuse in a number of circumstances by the police who threaten individuals with prosecution unless they desist from expressing perfectly legitimate views. That causes me great concern, but I am glad to say that that has in no case led to prosecution and that in one case it led to the police subsequently providing an apology for their conduct. Nevertheless, we must bear that point in mind, because the Government intend—I do not think the Minister disagrees with this—the offence to be far more serious, although I accept that the test for it may be different, as she said.
If I catch Mr. Deputy Speaker’s eye, I will respond and show how much the hon. and learned Gentleman and I agree on various points. There has, in fact, been a prosecution along the lines that he hoped there would not be. However, how can the words
“discussion or criticism of sexual conduct”—
and so on—
“shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred”
avoid doubt if what is said in that context is threatening and intends to stir up hatred? It may not be a problem to his forensic mind, but most people out there would see it as totally inconsistent. It is a get-out: as long as a person is threatening and intentionally threatening while discussing sexual conduct, they are okay, but when they discuss other things, they are not.
The way I read the saving clause that Lord Waddington drafted—
Only the way you read it.
I must say, it is not only the way I read it, but any sensible person who gives the words their plain English meaning must come to the same conclusion. Clearly, if I make an expression which “of itself” amounts to no more than a reasoned criticism, it cannot be threatening, but it is perfectly plain from Lord Waddington’s amendment—indeed, I have not heard the Government challenge this or suggest otherwise—that if the words constituted threats, anyone standing up in court and saying, “Well, I was justified in making the threat because it was just part of a criticism of somebody else’s way of life or habits,” would not get off the hook. I entirely concur that it would be grossly improper if they did. For those reasons, Lord Waddington’s amendment provides considerable comfort to those who happen to have strong views about how people should conduct themselves, and it does nothing to diminish the ability to prosecute this offence.
On the contrary, this provision gives comfort to those who wish to incite hatred or to be threatening. They will believe that they can do those things if they are given this freedom of expression clause. It is completely unnecessary if they are not threatening or intending to stir up hatred. The hon. and learned Gentleman refers to a range of circumstances that have occurred in the past, but that was not under this legislation. It was under the public order legislation, which is quite different.
I would be more reassured if the Government were taking the public order legislation problems that have arisen more seriously, but there is no sign that they have tabled amendments to try to deal with that problem. As we know from a recent case, the problem is continuing. Indeed, if I understood the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon correctly, he knows of an instance in which a prosecution was brought, although it was not completed. For that reason, we should be very wary of legislation that fetters freedom of speech.
The Minister cannot have it both ways. On the one hand, she says, “The legislation’s fine; you shouldn’t worry about it.” Then she suddenly starts saying, “Actually, the saving clause will encourage people to commit this offence, not deter them from doing so.” If that is the case, she will have to provide a much better argument than she has done this evening. From what she had to say, it was not apparent how this saving clause would operate to do what she claimed it would. The saving clause, given its plain English meaning, cannot achieve the mischief that the Minister claims. It is noteworthy that when this matter was considered in the other place, it was supported by a large number of lawyers, who would therefore have some understanding of how this clause would be interpreted in the courts.
In the absence of this protection that my hon. and learned Friend and I both support, is it not the case that various examples have been cited by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) and, I might add, Sir Iqbal Sacranie and the Bishop of Chester, both of whose collars were felt by the police? The public feel intimidated, and there is nothing in the Government’s line that would remove that sense of intimidation. The Government are resisting the one, modest amendment that would reassure the public. We do not need that reassurance because we are Members of Parliament and we can fight for ourselves, but many of my constituents feel very threatened that if they put a foot out of line, they will lose their jobs.
I agree with my hon. Friend. The other factor that is worth bearing in mind is that as this debate has gone on—the Minister cannot escape this—more people have come forward to express their concerns about this proposal. They include, in many cases, people who may have different sexual orientations from the majority, but think that the provision is entirely unnecessary to provide them with protection. They have also expressed the view that the saving clause introduced by Lord Waddington is a modest and moderate way to provide reassurance that freedom of expression will be maintained. The Government do not help the cause of reducing bigotry and improper or violent behaviour against people of a different orientation by fettering freedom of expression. That is why this House should be so careful before it embarks on such a course of action, and that is why Lord Waddington has been sensible in trying to find a formula that would provide reasonable reassurance that this provision would not be misused—not just in terms of who eventually gets convicted in court, but above all in terms of who is oppressed by those in authority arguing that they have transgressed by expressing legitimate opinions. The Minister cannot get away from the fact that that is a current problem and has not been concocted out of thin air.
My hon. and learned Friend touches on the important point of precedent, and we have already seen that with the public order legislation. I do not wish to put him on the spot, but—given his concern about the public order legislation and the crossover with this Bill—perhaps I shall invite him on to the spot to say what he would do as Justice Secretary should we form the next Government in May.
It is quite plain that the way in which public order legislation has been applied needs to be reviewed. That is something that many hon. Members across the House would agree on, including, I suspect, the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon. That does not necessarily mean that the legislation needs to be altered, but the guidelines certainly need to be reviewed, because there is a continuing failure to understand what the offences that it is intended to deal with are.
However, I hope that my hon. Friend will forgive me if I bring us back to Lords amendment 59. I wish to bring my remarks to a close, as other Members wish to participate in this debate. We on the Opposition Front Bench will vote to support Lord Waddington’s amendment. We believe that it is innocuous, that it provides much-needed reassurance in a difficult area and above all—I emphasise this to the Minister—that it will not prevent the successful prosecution of somebody who intends to incite hatred through threats.
There is indeed a strong sense of déjà vu about this debate, given that it is the fourth time that we have discussed the free speech clause. We have also discussed a previous attempted free speech clause, as proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Heywood and Middleton (Jim Dobbin) in January 2008. I do not want to add to the sense of déjà vu by repeating all the arguments that have been made before, but I want to explain why I think the Government are still wrong on the matter and why I wish they would let the free speech clause remain on the statute book, where it has been for the past 18 months.
The other place has voted for the clause three times, most recently in July, by 186 votes to 133, giving a majority of 53. I unsuccessfully moved an amendment in this place on 24 March to retain the free speech clause, so I was obviously pleased with the vote in July. I was especially pleased that more and more Back Benchers in the Lords from my party seemed to see the sense in a free speech clause. They either voted for it in greater numbers or abstained. I had hoped that the Government would start to see the sense in the free speech clause too.
I find it hard to accept that we are again being asked to vote against the free speech clause. I thought that free speech, civil liberties and human rights were exactly the sorts of things that we were supposed to be in favour of. I am sure that they brought my hon. Friend the Minister into the Labour party, among other things, and they certainly did me in North-West Leicestershire. We should say that we support civil liberties. We all quote Voltaire and proclaim our tolerance, but here we have an opportunity to uphold tolerance for people whose views we may not agree with, but who have a right to those views and a right to express them in a reasonable way.
Before anybody intervenes with a dreadful example of incitement to violence against gay and lesbian people that they claim would be protected by the free speech clause, let me remind hon. Members—for the third time, and briefly—what it says:
“for the avoidance of doubt, the discussion or criticism of sexual conduct or practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.”
The clause does not remove any mention of the context of the remarks. We are not talking about protecting foul rap lyrics or violent rants; we are talking about protecting discussion, criticism or the urging of people to modify their conduct. If someone uses threatening words and intends to stir up hatred, that is of course not mere discussion, but discussion with threats and intent to stir up hatred, which falls squarely within the offence, and so it should.
The free speech clause is irrelevant in one sense. As paragraph 392 of the explanatory notes makes clear, it would not affect
“the threshold required for the offence to be made out.”
The clause would not provide a defence, which is what the Minister implied at one point. It would not narrow or alter the scope of the offence, which is what she tried to say earlier. However, if threats and an intention to stir up hatred are not present, the discussion falls outside the new offence, and the free speech clause simply makes that plain. It is, as it says, for “the avoidance of doubt”, and would help to protect innocent people from unnecessary and intimidating police investigations.
We need that protection, because there seems to be quite a lot of doubt, and as a result quite a lot of unnecessary investigations. In fact, people seem to make complaints to the police as a tactic to silence opinions that they do not like. I am sure that hon. Members from all parts of the House would agree that we should deprecate that. That is not what the criminal law is there for, nor is it what the police are there for. We should make that clear when there is doubt.
Who wants the criminal law to be used to silence discussion or criticism of sexual conduct? Who wants the new homophobia offence to be used against those who merely urge people to modify their conduct or, in religious language, to repent of their sins? There have been countless cases, and several more since we last discussed the matter in the House seven or eight months ago, of exactly that happening.
Andy Robertson is a street preacher. There is a video of him on YouTube, which hon. Members may watch in their offices before the vote. He comes across as an eminently calm and sensible man, and he has preached in the streets of Gainsborough, Lincolnshire for 10 years with no complaints whatever to the police or civil authorities. Yet police officers were sent in by a council employee to move him on, and told him that describing homosexuality as a sin falls foul of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986. I shall return to that. The preacher had not even mentioned homosexuality, but the police, having failed to move him on by citing irrelevant council byelaws, seemed to seize on unfounded and unsubstantiated allegations of homophobia as a device for shutting him up. If they can do that with section 5 of that Act, which is a general offence covering harassment caused by threats, abuse or insult, who can doubt that they would use the new offence, which specifically covers homosexuality?
I look forward to hearing the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) if he catches your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker. He believes that we should remove the word “insulting” from the section 5 offence. I think he probably has a point, and I hope that the Government will listen to it, but that will not solve the problem of how to stop the new homophobia offence being abused in similar ways. Recent cases have shown that a dangerous attitude to gay rights is prevalent among the police and that makes it important to include the free speech clause.
Another example with a little more detail is that of Pauline Howe, which is the most recent case to hit the headlines. She is a 67-year-old grandmother who wrote to her council complaining about a gay pride march at which she says she was verbally abused. She used old-fashioned, politically incorrect words and several biblical references, and I doubt whether many of us in the House would have written a letter in those terms. I hope that the Minister is listening to my comments, and not just to Front Bench conversations. Pauline Howe’s letter certainly did not merit two officers interrogating her in her living room, and apparently frightening the living daylights out of her, but that is what happened.
Will the hon. Gentleman tell me whether he has any comprehension of how merely writing a letter to an official body could constitute an offence against public order?
I am not a lawyer, but merely a humble accountant, if that is not an oxymoron. I cannot explain that, but we have an eminent lawyer on the Front Bench—the Secretary of State—who may be able to explain that in an intervention or in some other way.
Does the hon. Gentleman share my concern that without protection the Bill could be enforced in areas such as home schooling, when some people bring their children up in a particular faith, whether Jewish, Muslim, Christian or another faith?[Interruption.] The Minister may think that that is nonsense, but I am reflecting some of my constituents’ concerns, and I am entitled to do so. If she has something to say, she should say it from the Dispatch Box or from the Back Benches and not from a sedentary position. The point is serious. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is concern that the provision could be extended to home schooling, and that people in their own homes could be restrained from teaching their children in a particular faith course?
There is a risk of that—I am not sure that there is any evidence that it is happening yet—depending on the atmosphere within which the police interpret the new legislation, and the pressures to which they will no doubt be subjected.
Pauline Howe has been the subject of a considerable public outcry, and her freedom of speech has been defended by people across the political and philosophical spectrum. I am sure that Ministers have heard or know of Ben Summerskill of Stonewall, who said that the police response in her case was “disproportionate”, although I do not know where he stands on free speech. One minute he is giving evidence to Parliament that he does not mind having a free speech clause in the homophobia offence, but the next minute he is campaigning against it. However, he said that the police response to Pauline Howe was “disproportionate”, and I agree, but in 2007 he said that he was shocked that the police allowed Christians to demonstrate outside Parliament against the sexual orientation regulations. We rightly allow all sorts of demonstrations, some of them pretty unpleasant, outside this place, and I do not think that a few hundred hymn-singing Christians should be deprived of the democratic rights that the rest of the population enjoy. Mr. Summerskill might not be the most reliable guide on the subject of free speech.
We were told in the debate in the other place—and, by inference, this evening—that the Waddington clause says nothing about free speech and that we should therefore not retain it. That is a silly, specious argument. Just because something does not contain the term “free speech” does not mean that it does not protect free speech. We legislate in all kinds of ways to protect free speech without putting the actual term into the text. The Waddington clause protects free speech by defining a range of moderate expressions—discussion, criticism and urging—that already fall outside the offence, and by drawing them to the attention of the police and prosecutors. It is therefore signposted.
My hon. Friend has given a number of examples—albeit from different legislation—to support his concerns. Has he heard any examples from the Minister, or from anyone else in the Government, of how the existing provision on free speech has either confounded or frustrated the basic intent of the current legislation?
No, I have not. We have not heard any convincing arguments at all. We have seen some smoke and mirrors, and some hand-waving, but we have heard no evidence.
The Minister said tonight—I paraphrase slightly—that the clause has no effect and that we can therefore dispense with it. It is true that it does not change the threshold of the offence, but that is not the same as saying that it has no effect. It provides a signpost to police and prosecutors that they must leave innocent people alone if all they have done is discuss or criticise sexual conduct. There is plenty of evidence that there is a real problem with the police’s handling of these cases, and the effect of the clause will be to tackle that problem.
The Minister also said a moment ago that bad people would try to hide their actions behind the clause. I can say, even as a non-lawyer, that they would not have much luck. The explanatory notes make it clear that the clause does not affect the threshold of the offence. If someone breaches the threshold of the offence, the free speech provision will do them no good whatever. I believe that the Minister is demonstrating what psychologists call cognitive dissonance, in that she is holding two mutually conflicting opinions at the same time. She is struggling with the tussle that they are causing in her brain. The free speech clause either achieves nothing or it allows bad people to get away with things that they would otherwise not get away with—she cannot have it both ways. It is either one or the other. It is a binary, black or white, zero or one, yes or no. There is no middle way that the Minister, as part of the new Labour intake into this place, would like to see.
Nasty people who are facing prosecution will always cast about looking for a way to get off. They often falsely cite the Human Rights Act 1998, but I do not think that any hon. Members believe that that is a reason to repeal that Act. Similarly, the fact that people will falsely, and unsuccessfully, cite the free speech clause is not a reason to repeal it. We are told that use of the phrase “of itself” might mean that people can ignore the context of the remarks. That argument did not make any sense to me when the Lib Dems last raised it, and it still does not. I recall that the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) dealt with it fairly deftly at that time, although he did not get the chance to do so again tonight. I do not believe that it strips the context from the remarks that have been made.
We are also told that we can deal with the cases that we are worried about by amending section 5 of the Public Order Act. The Government are apparently consulting on section 5; perhaps the Minister will confirm where we are on that. Perhaps changes will be recommended, but that is not the offence we are dealing with here. We are dealing with the homophobic hatred offence. If a general offence, such as section 5, can be used against people for expressing views on homosexuality, it is inevitable that an offence that specifically deals with homosexuality will be used even more often. So we must pay special attention to the need to protect free speech in this area.
There is a lot of public sympathy for these victims of police heavy-handedness in the area of gay rights, and I think that people would like to see us make provision to try to stop this sort of trampling on people’s civil liberties. The free speech clause does nothing whatever to reduce the level of protection that the Government—quite rightly, and with widespread support—aim to give to gay people.
The Government admit that the clause does not affect the threshold of the offence; it cannot therefore be used to defend actions that fall within the ambit of the offence. It does not remotely affect any of the other criminal offences that can be used to target those who perpetrate or encourage acts of violence towards any members of our society or to target words that cause “harassment, alarm or distress”. We should find the guilty and prosecute them—who would not endorse that sentiment?—but we should not catch the innocent in the crossfire of that approach.
The free speech clause does no harm whatever; it does only good. If we remove this free speech clause, we send out the message that we are quite happy to take a risk with the freedom of people like Andy Robertson and Pauline Howe. I, for one, am not prepared to take that risk: I will vote against the Government and I urge other hon. Members to do exactly the same.
It is good to be back on this subject. I always predicate my remarks on these issues with the words of the late and greatly missed Linda Smith, who said, “I’m not religious; I get on with everyone.” I doubt whether that could apply to me, but it is fair to say that I have a record of protecting free speech. That is true in respect of religious hatred—as the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) will remember, we worked together on curtailing what would have been an overly broad offence. I have also worked on proposing the repeal of blasphemy, on opposing the criminalisation of the so-called “glorification” of terrorism, on calling for libel law reform and, indeed, on proposing an amendment to get rid of the “insulting” provisions in section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which we were not able to debate during the passage of this Bill through the House because of the use, yet again, of a preposterous undemocratic programme motion, which denied us the opportunity to provide due scrutiny to Government legislation. I should add that owing to yet another programme motion that has not been consulted on—at least not with Liberal Democrat Members—the provision passed in the other place to repeal seditious libel and criminal libel is one that once again we cannot debate. I hope the House will therefore accept that I have a record of supporting free speech.
I want to make it very clear that I support free speech for homophobes. I believe that people who are homophobic—that will include some religious people who may not necessarily intend any offence, but they are perceived as homophobic by some people—should have the right to free speech without great restriction, albeit within certain limits. It is a good thing that we are discussing homosexuality in the context of free speech rather than the rights and wrongs of homosexuality. I think that that is a sign of how things have progressed during my time in the House.
I have to say to supporters of the Waddington amendment, however, that they are promoting the wrong amendment. If they want to tackle the existing mischief and the future mischief of over-policing of comments that might be taken to be homophobic, they have to ensure that our law does not criminalise insulting speech, whether intentional or not, that is short of threatening—or, in the case of directly causing harassment, distress and alarm to someone, something that is short of abusive. While “insulting” exists in the Public Order Act, inserting this provision into it will, with or without the Waddington amendment, still make people feel that they cannot insult people on the basis of sexual orientation and will still make the police believe—perhaps the police should think much more carefully about this, but the “insulting” provision is on the statute book—that they have to investigate complaints, particularly given the fact that people feel that the police should take seriously complaints about incitement to hatred or insulting behaviour on the grounds of race, sexual orientation or religion. I thus urge the House to recognise that in a sense we are debating the wrong amendment. I will come on in a few moments to the right amendment to remove the insulting provisions from the statute book, but it has been put to this House—although not debated—and is supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
The hon. Gentleman may have heard that I anticipated his bringing up this point. I think that his point should be supported and that the word “insulting” should be removed. Is he firmly of the opinion, however, that that is all that is necessary to improve this particular legislation and that the chance of further over-the-top and heavy-booted action by the police and other authorities would be much less if that one word were removed?
It would be much less, because the police clearly would not investigate in the outrageous cases about which we have heard. The treatment of Pauline Howe, whom the hon. Gentleman mentioned earlier, was not disproportionate but absurd. It was disgraceful that the police wasted their time on such a matter. If the “insulting” provision was not there, I am certain that the problem would be less. We cannot legislate for every over-officious police officer, but we can make a clear statutory change to get rid of that provision. Although we are not debating that provision now, it is relevant.
What the hon. Gentleman says may be true, and the menace may be section 5 of the Public Order Act, but it is not before us tonight, it is not for amendment, and there is no immediate proposal by the Government to amend it. We must therefore use what is at our disposal to try to guarantee free speech. Given the circumstances that we are in—rather than those he wishes us to be in—he should support this amendment.
I am an eternal optimist, and I believe that we should aim for the right legislation, not create the wrong legislation on the way to getting the right legislation. My hon. Friends and I will support the Government in the Lobby tonight, and I suspect that there will be another large majority in favour of deleting the provision, so the matter will go back to the House of Lords. However, their lordships should apply themselves to the specific legislation where the problem lies.
Let me set out the reasons for the position taken by the Liberal Democrats. As the Minister said, the incitement to racial hatred provision currently has a low threshold. However, the religious hatred provision rightly has a much higher threshold—it was important that that was restricted to threatening language, and that “intentional” was a requisite part of the offence. Given the importance of being able to proselytise freely, or to criticise religion, there should be a broad free speech saving that was not about religious conduct or practice but about the arenas in which speech would take place, such as those of political discourse, comedy, performance or broadcast. Clearly, that would not be in the nature of language that was threatening and intended to incite hatred such as when talking to a bunch of skinheads in a pub. The measure that we agreed for religious hatred is therefore the right one.
In relation to hatred on the grounds of sexual orientation, the Government have done what is essential: they have ensured that the measure deals with threatening only, and intentional language only. I can think of no pastor or street preacher who is so extreme that they would seek to incite hatred and use threatening language. They might do one or the other, but it is hard to imagine a preacher who would do both. I do not necessarily have good views of religious extremists, but I cannot think of one who is likely to do that. Some religious extremists incite violence directly, and that is already an offence, but they do not go the roundabout way of intending to stir up hatred using threatening language; they usually talk about measures that incite violence directly. No example has been given of the sort of religious speech that would be covered, without the so-called saving. The saving is unnecessary to protect religious speech.
However, there is a real danger out there of extremist political parties using threatening language about sexual orientation that is intended to stir up hatred, without otherwise breaching another part of the statute. Again, let us imagine the British National party saying something homophobic in the context of paedophilia, which is, of course, a myth about homosexuality. However, if it is inciting, and if it uses the words, “And they’ve got it coming to them,” that adds the threat, and that is the real mischief. We know how child abuse is sometimes dealt with in the popular press, and how that can create the sort of mob mentality that is the execution of the incitement of hatred. That would rightly be caught by the offence.
The hon. Gentleman has touched on an attempt to answer the basic question that I was going to ask him. Does he know of any case in which the existing free speech saving clause has prevented investigation or a prosecution when it might have been suggested that one should have taken place in the broad public interest?
This offence has not existed for long while the free speech saving clause has been in place, so I do not think that there has been an issue in that regard. What we must deal with is the existing mischief, rather than hypothetical situations. There is a real threat of incitement to homophobic hatred by extremist political parties, as opposed to the religious. The example that I gave would not currently constitute an offence because it does not directly incite violence, but incites hatred and involves the use of threatening language. Until we have this law, there was no provision to deal with incitement to hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.
Let me turn to the so-called Waddington amendment. I do not doubt the sincerity of Members who support it, but I note that its sponsors in the Lords were not very keen on free speech when it came to the repeal of the blasphemy laws, and generally have not been defenders of free speech when it comes to terrorism law. There is clearly a lobby in favour of extra provisions for free speech in one area, the area of sexual orientation, but we must take that on its merits. What concerns me about that amendment is that its wording creates confusion.
Let me give the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield an example, because he invited me to do so. The amendment states that the
“criticism of sexual… practices or the urging of persons to refrain from or modify such conduct or practices shall not be taken of itself to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred.”
Does that mean that if some extremist group, probably political rather than religious, says, “These gays should keep their dirty practices away from our children or they will get what is coming to them,” that would be covered by the clause? They might think, rightly or wrongly, that because they were restricting their language to criticism of practices—and it is clearly critical of a sexual practice—and urging people to refrain from such practices, albeit in an outrageous and distorted way, they would benefit from the protection of the clause. They might say that their language should not of itself be taken to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred, although it clearly is threatening and does stir up hatred.
I think it is a bit too late for the hon. and learned Gentleman to get out his law books after the damage has been done, and to say, “No, actually they do not benefit from the saving clause”, but I should be grateful if he could address the issue.
I do not think they would benefit from the saving clause, because their language would be threatening. That is clear from the expression, “They will get what is coming to them.” I do not think that, given those circumstances, that is a valid criticism of the operation of the saving clause. It is, of course, right to say—we have debated this in the past—that incitement to hatred should not be construed as the same as expressing a dislike of something, including quite an intense dislike. There is a dividing line between the two, and in my experience courts, and indeed police officers, ought to have no difficulty in telling the one from the other.
What if I say to the hon. and learned Gentleman that the wording was, “These gays had better keep their dirty practices away from our children”? There is a threat in that wording, but is the hon. and learned Gentleman saying that that of itself should not be taken to be threatening or intended to stir up hatred? This is the difficulty, and I note that the hon. and learned Gentleman is not rising to deal with it. There is not a direct threat in the words “had better”, but there is an implicit threat. I could also have used the words “or else”. In the context of a mob or crowd of skinheads, for example, in a pub back room, that is a problem.
I do try to listen to an argument before I intervene, and I think that those words would be caught in exactly the same fashion.
That is the opinion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, but it is not apparent in the wording of the saving clause. It could be taken to lead people to believe that as long as they talked only about sexual conduct or practices and not about homosexuality itself, nor about people themselves, that was a get-out. It is no good saying, “Well, when the first case is prosecuted, this will filter out to the mobs,” because that is not the way these things work. I therefore think this is unnecessary and, as the Minister said, it could cause confusion. I disagree about whether it would be covered, but we do not have to agree on that; rather, we have to recognise that it is not clear law.
Will the hon. Gentleman not agree that the example he has given is of people not talking about the actual sexual practices of homosexuals, but alleging criminal behaviour and the threat of criminal activity—which he has rightly said they are not involved in, because he said that paedophilia is a completely misdirected accusation that comes from people of prejudice against people of homosexuality? Therefore, by the hon. Gentleman’s own explanation, this is not of itself a discussion of their sexual practices.
What matters is whether the mob stirred up thinks it is, because that is what causes the damage. It is not for the court to decide whether it is a reasonable statement. The court has to decide whether it stirs up hatred, whether it was intended to stir up hatred and whether the language was threatening; and after the damage has been done it is too late for Members to come back and say, “Well, the saving clause wasn’t really intended to cover this, and on a narrow argument.” It looks as though it does give a let-out; and it is not an offence to accuse other persons unnamed of criminal offences—we do that all the time—so there is no alternative prosecution.
The hon. Gentleman has just acknowledged that in the example he has given, hatred had been stirred up. Although the mob would not understand this, if the mob had been stirred up, even with the saving clause, an offence would clearly have been committed.
I do not accept that that is clear, but I also feel strongly that whether or not that is the case, it is not apparent to people reading the statute what the saving clause does and does not allow; that is simply not clear. To put the words
“for the avoidance of doubt”
in front of the provision does not make it any clearer. In fact, it makes it seem that it should be obvious, and when it is not obvious, one is puzzled.
Finally, I want to move on to the alternative way of dealing with this. There have been occasions—including all the examples that have been given, such as the Lancashire and Norfolk cases, Iqbal Sacranie and Lynette Burrows—when the people concerned have been questioned by the police. That must stop. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has made it very clear in its considerations of this matter that it is time for the “insulting” provision to be removed from the Public Order Act. It said that in the policing and protest inquiry, which was in the seventh report of 2007-08, and it said it in its eighth report, on this Bill.
It is welcome that the Government are looking at this. However, I hope the Minister will be able to say in winding up that they have stopped looking and are now going to start doing, because I do not think there is opposition to this anywhere in the House. The police may object, because they want the ability to start questioning anyone who insults anyone else short of being threatening or abusive, but that is not good enough.
If the Government are serious about protecting free speech, they have to deal with this, because there has been a prosecution. The case of Hammond v. DPP involved
“an elderly street preacher who preached in the centre of Bournemouth on a Saturday afternoon while holding a large sign with the words: ‘Stop Immorality’, ‘Stop Homosexuality’, ‘Stop Lesbianism’ and ‘Jesus is Lord’. A hostile crowd of some 30 to 40 people had formed, some of whom reacted violently by assaulting Mr. Hammond. After his refusal to desist from preaching, and following substantial debate among themselves…the police decided to arrest Hammond rather than his opponents and he was duly convicted of displaying an ‘insulting’ sign causing ‘alarm or distress’…contrary to section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.”
The divisional court upheld the conviction, despite a human rights claim. That means we cannot rely even on article 10 of the convention. We need to get rid of this statute. I understand that, unfortunately, the gentleman died before he was able to take his appeal further. I think that even if just one person is treated like this, it is unacceptable.
But surely the hon. Gentleman understands that this is the dilemma that preachers face. Here was a person simply standing with a placard, and yet there was no protection for him. The Government know about this. They say they are looking at it, but they are certainly acting in some circumstances where action is not needed. Why are they not doing something that is needed to protect people exercising their lawful right to preach?
I do not think that any of these people would be prosecuted under the law before us, but they clearly remain at risk of being investigated, and potentially prosecuted and convicted, under section 5 of the Public Order Act. The Minister could do us all a favour by helping those of us who want to help the Government by saying something substantive on that point. I think that she and her right hon. Friend the Secretary of State will accept that it has been raised by me on several occasions. It is the real problem. Her doing so would unite The Guardian and Daily Mail, the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) and me—nothing else that I can think of does that—as well as solving her problem in the other place. I urge her to say something on that, so that we get the right law and the right amendment passed. Otherwise, I urge the House to support the Government in this matter.
First, may I say to the Minister that neither she nor her right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, or any Minister involved in this law, has the smallest appreciation of how threatened people out there feel when it comes to the exercise of free speech? One of the most common phrases that we hear now, on a wide range of topics, not just this one, is “Of course, you can’t say that these days.” Normally, it is said to indicate that the person has a view but is afraid, under current state orthodoxy, to express it.
Interestingly, when we last debated this particular amendment from the other place—I hope that the other place insists on it, as it has done in the past—many of the same examples were cited, although the most recent Norfolk one was obviously not available then. The Minister at the time—not this one, I hasten to add—stood at that Dispatch Box and told us categorically, “Of course, this was unreasonable. None of that police action should have taken place.” Let us forget for a moment which particular law it took place under. She said that it was all due to misplaced interpretation and all that would be cleared up by guidance.
Several incidents have taken place in which police action has resulted in very severe criticism, including from Ministers. Despite that, despite the publicity given to it and despite the Government apparently distancing themselves from that sort of action, recently there was an exact repeat of the problem in the case of the 67-year-old pensioner from Norfolk. In other words, not all the guidance that is being issued is stopping this particular menace. It may be that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) is right when he says that the most satisfactory way of addressing this problem would be through section 5 of the Public Order Act, but that Act is not before us tonight. It is not promised to be before us in the near future or even in the distant future, long after this Government have ceased to exist—it is not promised to be before us at all. Thus we must act with the tools that we have got.
The amendment offers some very necessary reassurance to people who seriously believe at the moment that their freedom of expression is restricted and that it is now possible—we have seen from those examples that indeed it is—that the police will arrive on their doorstep not because of something that they have done, but for an opinion that they have expressed. That properly belongs to totalitarian states; it should not belong to free countries. It should never be a feature of a free country that if one writes to a council to express a view on something—anything at all—it should result in the police arriving on the doorstep.
The amendment seeks to reinstate a clause that simply, for the avoidance of doubt, endeavours to put on the face of the legislation freedom of conscience and freedom of the expression of religious and other views. When such a provision was last opposed by the Government, the entire argument—it is all there in Hansard—was based on its being unnecessary. If it was merely unnecessary, there would not be such movement tonight to remove it, and so now the Minister has changed the position. Now, it is not so much that it is unnecessary, but that it might produce the sort of behaviour that we are trying to curtail.
The ground has shifted, but there needs to be protection for ordinary Britons from having the police on their doorsteps, as happened to the Lancashire couple, to the children’s author Lynette Burrows, to Iqbal Sacranie himself—no preacher, said the hon. Lady, is in any danger, but what is Iqbal Sacranie if he is not a religious leader and preacher?—and lately of course in the Norfolk case. There has to be a signal from us that enough is enough; that guidance will not suffice, because it has not sufficed; and that condemnation from this House and from those on the Government Front Bench does not suffice, because it has not sufficed. We must make it explicit that there is freedom of opinion, freedom of conscience, freedom of religious belief and, above all, freedom of the ability to express any of them.
This has been an interesting debate. However hard I try to make it absolutely clear to the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald (Miss Widdecombe) and the hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and, indeed, to my hon. Friend the Member for North-West Leicestershire (David Taylor), who has shifted his place—
Yes, he is always like that.
Indeed, he is capable of doing so.
It is easily possible to outline both the existing provisions and the reasons that make the measure unnecessary. It is not necessary to put on the face of the Bill that freedom of expression should be protected. We do not legislate for that in a range of other areas where we believe that we all have a right to express our views, and in this instance we need not do it because the Attorney-General, who would have to consider any prosecution, has a duty to take into account the convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998—
Will the hon. Lady give way?
I will in a moment.
There is therefore no need for this saving provision on freedom of expression.
The provision might be harmful because it might well give some comfort to those people who wish to stir up hatred and who wish intentionally to use threatening words to stir up hatred. They might well be able to argue that it is simply a use of their freedom of expression to do so, and that cannot be acceptable when we have already set the threshold of the offence so high. For that reason, I believe that it is perfectly possible, perfectly logical and perfectly legitimate to argue not only that it is unreasonable and unnecessary to have this clause but that it could be harmful to do so.
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way, but the point has almost passed. She was referring to the unlikelihood of a prosecution. We are seeking to avoid the likelihood of even the earliest stages of an investigation for a mere expression of opinion—in other words, the police on the doorstep.
I perfectly appreciate what the right hon. Lady is saying, but we heard misconceptions about how the offence might be used.
It has been said that without a freedom of expression provision, the offence will have a chilling effect and may prevent people from proselytising against homosexuality or from expressing their distaste for certain sexual practices. It has been alleged that the offence would prevent people from preaching religious doctrine. It has even been suggested—by the hon. Member for The Wrekin (Mark Pritchard)—that somehow it will fetter the ability of people who want to home-school or to bring up their children in a particular faith.
The offence does not do that. If parents or home educators wish to teach their children, for example, that homosexuality is wrong or that certain sexual practices are wrong or unacceptable, or if they wish to be insulting about such practices or about homosexuality, it would not be covered by the offence, which is simply about threatening words that are intended to stir up hatred. The right hon. Lady and the hon. Gentleman have simply not understood or accepted the high threshold level in the clause. Let me repeat that the offence can bite only when the words or behaviour are threatening and intended to stir up hatred against a group of people on the grounds of sexual orientation.
Evangelical preaching against homosexuality or portraying gay characters in comedy sketches could only be caught up if it was done in a threatening way, intended to stir up hatred. Any words or behaviour that fall into that category should rightly be caught by the law. If the hon. Gentleman or the right hon. Lady are suggesting that they should not be, clearly they are suggesting that it is acceptable to incite hatred against homosexuals. I do not believe that is what the right hon. Lady is saying, but if that is not what she is saying, she needs to give credit to the assurances from the Dispatch Box that the offence is not about criminalising people who simply preach or proselytise their religious or moral values if they do not intend to stir up hatred by doing so.
Quite apart from the fact that the Minister’s remarks are rather offensive in terms of the views of Members on the Opposition Benches, I have absolutely no doubt that section 5 of the Public Order Act was not intended to be applied in the way it has been applied. I have no doubt that if the provision had been debated in the House exactly the same assurances would have been given. The fact of the matter is that the legislation that is being enacted has the capacity to be misused—I do not have the slightest doubt about that—which is the very reason why we thought it was sensible of Lord Waddington to include a saving clause that ensured that did not happen. What can possibly be wrong with that?
I have already explained that it is completely unnecessary to provide such a clause. We do not provide saving clauses or freedom of expression clauses on a range of other forms of offence, where it is not necessary. It is not something that we would advocate. It is simply wrong to imply that the offence could cover anything else, as some Members have suggested this evening.
Freedom of expression or saving clauses imply that there is room for doubt and make the position less clear. The police and prosecutors, and indeed the public, need clarity and certainty about the scope of the criminal law, and the offence as it stands, without the saving provision in section 29JA of the Public Order Act, creates uncertainty. It clouds the issue and it should be removed.
Many Members have made reference this evening to the concerns that have been expressed about purported incidents of over-zealous policing—
Will my hon. Friend give way?
I shall make a little more progress.
Those incidents of purported over-zealous policing have probably taken place under section 5 of the Public Order Act. Without seeing the details, it is not for me to say whether the police acted appropriately in those cases. There are opportunities for people to object and express grievances against the police, should they wish to do so. The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon (Dr. Harris) is right to make it clear that the Government have said that they intend to examine the issue. In his letter to my hon. Friend the Member for Hendon (Mr. Dismore), the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, my right hon. Friend the Minister for Policing, Crime and Counter-Terrorism stated:
“In our reply to your report and in oral evidence to the Committee, the Home Office also gave undertakings to consult on amendments to section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986 . . . We have sought views from a range of stakeholders on section 5 and are currently collating the responses”.
So we are looking seriously at those issues.
rose—
I want to deal with a few other issues. I shall give way to the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon, then I intend to make progress so that there is an opportunity to discuss other points that were raised.
I am grateful to the Minister for re-affirming what the Government said in response to the Joint Committee on the matter. I welcome that, as far as it goes, but can she give any indication of a time scale for any legislation that might flow from that review? In other words, if there is a criminal justice Bill in the next Queen’s Speech—as sure as night follows day, there will be—would such a measure be in time to be included in that Bill?
As I stated, we are considering the responses from stakeholders. We will consider that issue, and the hon. Gentleman will have to wait and see.
Let me deal with the other issues that were raised. The hon. Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan) referred to the situation in Northern Ireland. It is an offence in Northern Ireland to incite hatred on the grounds of race, religion, disability or sexual orientation. There is no such offence in Scotland, although the Administration are considering introducing aggravating factors there similar to those that already exist in England and Wales. The law in Northern Ireland does not have a freedom of expression provision of the kind under discussion.
It is important that we make it clear to the public and to those who have strong religious and moral views that we are in no way fettering their freedom of speech. However, we are making it equally clear that those views cannot be used to justify threats or words intended to stir up hatred. The section currently in the legislation is unnecessary. It is appropriate to send a clear message, for the fourth time, back to the other place that this House does not agree with the amendment. This House is making it clear that we do not require a freedom of expression clause, and that the threshold for the offence is already high.
Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 59.
The House proceeded to a Division.
I ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate the delay in the Aye Lobby.
Lords amendment 59 disagreed to.
Proceedings interrupted (Programme Order; this day)
The Speaker put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83F).
Lords amendments 119, 121, 236 and 239 disagreed to.
After Clause 103
Independent Commissioner for Terrorist Suspects
Motion made, and Question put, That this House disagrees with Lords amendment 66.—(Bridget Prentice.)
Lords amendment 66 disagreed to.
Government amendment (a) made in lieu of Lords amendment 66.
Lords amendments 3 to 54, 56 to 58, 60 to 65, 67 to 118, 120, 122 to 215, 217 to 235, 237, 238 and 240 to 244 agreed to, with Commons privileges waived in respect of Lords amendments 12, 14, 28, 54, 131, 145, 149, 150 and 185.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83H), That a Committee be appointed to draw up Reasons to be assigned to the Lords for disagreeing to their amendments 1, 2, 55, 59, 119, 121, 216, 236 and 239;
That Mr. Bellingham, Mr. Mike Hall, David Howarth, Helen Jones and Bridget Prentice be members of the Committee;
That Bridget Prentice be the Chairman of the Committee;
That three be the quorum of the Committee.
That the Committee do withdraw immediately.—(Mary Creagh.)
Question agreed to.
Committee to withdraw immediately; reasons to be reported and communicated to the Lords.
Business without Debate
Sittings of the House
Ordered,
That—
(1) at the sittings on Wednesday 11 and Thursday 12 November, the Speaker shall not adjourn the House until any Message from the Lords has been received and any Committee to draw up Reasons which has been appointed at that sitting has reported; and
(2) at the sitting on Thursday 12 November, the Speaker shall not adjourn the House, if a Message from the Lords Commissioners is expected, until that Message has been received.—(Mary Creagh.)
Delegated Legislation
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118 (6)),
Security Industry
That the draft Private Security Industry Act 2001 (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 21 July, be approved.—( Mary Creagh.)
Question agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118 (6)),
Security Industry
That the draft Private Security Industry Act 2001 (Amendments to Schedule 2) Order 2009, which was laid before this House on 12 October, be approved.—( Mary Creagh.)
Question agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118 (6)),
Banks and Banking
That the draft Scottish and Northern Ireland Banknote Regulations 2009, which were laid before this House on 13 October, be approved.—( Mary Creagh.)
Question agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118 (6)),
Financial Assistance for Industry
That this House authorises the Secretary of State to undertake to pay, and to pay by way of financial assistance under section 8 of the Industrial Development Act 1982, in respect of the UK Innovation Fund, sums exceeding £10 million and up to a cumulative total of £150 million.—( Mary Creagh.)
Question agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118 (6)),
Financial Assistance for Industry
That this House authorises the Secretary of State to undertake to pay, and to pay by way of financial assistance under section 8 of the Industrial Development Act 1982, in respect of the Car Scrappage Scheme, an additional sum of up to £100 million.—(Mary Creagh.)
Question agreed to.
Regional Select Committee (West Midlands)
Resumption of adjourned debate on Question (2 November),
That Mr David Kidney be discharged from the West Midlands Regional Select Committee and Mrs Janet Dean be added.
Object.
Debate to be resumed tomorrow.
Regional Select Committee (South West)
Resumption of adjourned debate on Question (29 October),
That Linda Gilroy be discharged from the South West Regional Select Committee and Roger Berry be added.
Object.
Debate to be resumed tomorrow.
Tax Law Rewrite Bills (Joint Committee)
Ordered,
That Mr Kenneth Clarke be discharged from the Joint Committee on Tax Law Rewrite Bills and Mr David Gauke be added.—(Rosemary McKenna, on behalf of the Committee of Selection.)
Transport
Ordered,
That Sammy Wilson be discharged from the Transport Committee and Mr Jeffrey M. Donaldson be added.—(Rosemary McKenna, on behalf of the Committee of Selection.)
Statutory Instruments (Joint Committee)
Ordered,
That David Simpson be discharged from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments and Mr Nigel Dodds be added.—(Rosemary McKenna, on behalf of the Committee of Selection.)
Petition
Equitable Life (Northavon)
This petition relates to the Government’s response to the parliamentary ombudsman’s report on Equitable Life. The petitioners are policyholders, their survivors and their supporters. The policyholders have suffered maladministration leading to injustice, as found by the parliamentary ombudsman in her July 2008 report. Furthermore, they and those whom they represent have suffered regulatory failure on the part of the public bodies responsible from 1992 onwards, but have not received compensation for the resulting losses and outrage.
The petition states:
The Petition of residents of the constituency of Northavon in South Gloucestershire,
Declares that the petitioners either are or they represent or support members, former members or personal representatives of deceased members of the Equitable Life Assurance Society who have suffered maladministration leading to injustice, as found by the Parliamentary Ombudsman in her report upon Equitable Life, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 16 July 2008 and bearing reference number HC 815; and further declares that the petitioners or those whom they represent or support have suffered regulatory failure on the part of the public bodies responsible from the year 1992 onwards, but have not received compensation for the resulting losses and outrage.
The Petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to uphold the constitutional standing of the Parliamentary Ombudsman by complying with the findings and recommendations of her Report upon Equitable Life.
And the Petitioners remain, etc.
[P000409]
Mental Health Services
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Mary Creagh.)
Thank you for calling me this evening for the Adjournment debate, Mr. Speaker. It is a great honour for me to speak tonight on mental health.
Earlier today, I visited a unit delivering mental health services to my constituents in Hertfordshire. It was a fantastic and enlightening visit. I met a wonderful lady called Sally Pegrum, a nurse who has been in the NHS for 34 years delivering services to mental health sufferers. She trained at 17 and became a mental health nurse at 18. She is still only in her early 50s, so I hope that we will have another eight years of her excellent service.
I asked Sally what changes she had seen in her 34 years of service, and she said that the delivery of mental health services to the most ill in our society has changed out of all recognition. That is a credit to previous Governments and to this Government. When she started 34 years ago, she worked in an institution—and in those days, they were institutions—where she discovered a woman in her 70s who had been there for 60 years for committing the crime of having a child out of wedlock in her early teens. This is recent history—it was not the turn of the century but 34 years ago. Let me start by saying, then, that things have moved a long way in the past 34 years.
I fully support the idea behind keeping ill people in the community and in intermediate care wherever possible. We have crisis resolution teams working towards that aim. The truth is, however, that the reality of crisis resolution teams does not always match the ambition we have set for them. Such teams are often overworked. They have very large case loads, which makes it difficult for the professionals comprising them to give mental health patients the attention they deserve.
There is often a shortage of intermediate and crisis housing, so even if we want to keep mental health patients in the community or near their homes, there are not the facilities to do so. I fully appreciate that efforts are being made to bring this up to speed, but at the moment, those facilities do not exist in many places.
More worryingly or as worryingly, emergency telephone numbers that are meant to operate 24 hours a day are often not manned in the evenings and at the weekend. If someone is having a mental health crisis, it does not always happen in business hours or during weekdays. We need these telephone lines to be staffed 24 hours a day to meet the cries for help. It is also the case that before being admitted to an acute unit with beds, mental health patients are expected to get assessed by these crisis teams, but in 50 per cent. of cases that is not happening. Again, we need to address this flaw in the system.
My final plea is on behalf of carers of people who are mentally ill. I have met many carers who look after people who are extremely ill, and without their help the full burden would fall on the NHS and the taxpayer. We, as a civilised society, need to look after the mental and physical health of these carers, and we need to ensure that they get excellent respite care, so that they can continue their excellent work on behalf of those whom they love.
I also accept that we are closing beds for the best of reasons, but the truth is that for every three beds that close in hospital wards that do not deal with mental health, six close in mental health wards. I am not going to stand here tonight and argue that mental health wards are particularly nice places to be. In truth, many are not and in fact I have never met anyone who looks forward to going into hospital. Mental health wards are important, however, and they do fulfil a need.
There are problems with existing mental health wards, as I have touched on. About 20 per cent. of patients feel physically threatened in them, while a further 50 per cent. feel threatened at times. A mental health ward is three times more likely to be assessed as being unsatisfactory than a ward treating people with heart disease or cancer, for example. Unfortunately, as my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) knows, such wards are too often located a long way from people’s homes.
I know a cue when I hear one. Not for the first time, my hon. Friend makes a remarkably eloquent case on the plight of the mentally ill. I was delighted that the brand-new Woodhaven hospital was built and opened in the past few years in my constituency. One reason why its acute ward is not a threatening place to be is that it has alongside it a psychiatric intensive care unit, so that if people get into a threatening state, they can be looked after there—except for the fact that that unit has been temporarily closed and might never reopen. Does my hon. Friend agree that to lose a psychiatric intensive care unit, which functions as a complement to an acute ward, is to make things worse not only for the people in need of the intensive care beds, but for those who need to go from the acute ward, at short notice, into intensive care, and who will now be sent, as he says, a long way away?
My hon. Friend makes a valuable point. It is no coincidence that today I visited a PICU—as they are called—an outstanding facility that aids the recovery of some of the illest in our society. I wish my hon. Friend the best of luck in his campaign, and I hope that the primary care trust reconsiders its position. Hertfordshire has an excellent, brand-new facility, which aids recovery.
I am not in favour of keeping acute wards open for the sake of it. However, we must accept that there is a danger of closing wards before the facilities are available in the community to pick up the slack and the patient load. The truth is that in most acute wards, occupancy rarely stands at 85 per cent. In most cases, it is far nearer 100 per cent., averaging 98 to 99 per cent., and can go as high as 125 per cent. when one counts people on leave who are trying to rehabilitate themselves into the community at an intermediate stage, but with the option of a bed remaining open if they have a crisis during that process.
As I am sure the Minister is aware, the pressure on such beds creates problems. When a higher threshold for admittance applies, such acute beds have a higher concentration of seriously ill patients. Staff numbers do not always reflect that situation. The overall number of patients might be the same, but their health needs are far greater because the admittance threshold is raised. Therefore, more staff need to be in place, because too often they feel that they are managing patients, as opposed to treating and making them better, which is what mental health staff want to do.
I mentioned the issue of leave: many patients leave acute mental hospitals to have a couple of days in an intermediate setting to help them to integrate back into their community. However, many patients are frightened to go on leave because they fear that if they have a crisis they will never get back into hospital, as the demand for their bed becomes so pressing while they are on leave that it is given up. Psychiatrists report anecdotally a greater pressure to discharge patients early, which results in far higher rates of readmission. Also—I hope the Minister does not think that I am arguing against myself—bed blocking can occur, because the patient is at a stage at which they can be moved on, but the intermediate services between them and the community are not in place to take them on board. I notice my hon. Friend the Member for New Forest, East getting restless, and I will allow him to intervene again.
I promise that this will be my last intervention. I had not intended to make it, but as my hon. Friend has referred to rehabilitation in intermediate stages, I must draw attention to the fact that Crowlin house—a state-of-the-art rehabilitation centre in Totton, in my constituency—is threatened with closure. It has been reprieved for the moment because no places have been found for residents to be sent in the meantime, but once again, exactly the scenario that my hon. Friend is describing in theory is developing in practice in my Hampshire constituency.
As the Minister knows, such intermediate services are critical. The closure of wards works only when there are good intermediate services that ease patients’ return to the community.
One of my concerns about the additional pressure being placed on acute wards relates to staff turnover. If staff no longer feel that they are in control of the situation—if they feel under intolerable pressure—they are tempted to move on, and many staff who are experienced in hospital settings are now moving to crisis management teams. That is no bad thing, because they bring their experience with them, but we need equality of service. We need excellent people in the community, but we need excellent people in our hospitals as well.
I never thought that in my parliamentary career, I would talk about a balanced score card—it sounds very exciting and new—but I think we need one in this instance. When we are, rightly, closing hospital beds and reducing a hospital ward’s capacity from 22 to 16, as is suggested by best practice, we should have that balanced score card. We should ensure, before the closures happen, that there are community facilities to take the increased load that will be moved back into the community. We should ensure that we have the intermediate beds, the safe houses and the respite care for carers that will make the transition work. We in this place want to be confident that the system works. We want to be confident that our constituents are being given the very best care, and that applies across the House this evening.
I have been speaking for 13 minutes, so I will start to wind up my speech. Being mentally ill is not a punishment. If someone has cancer or heart disease, that is not a punishment, but too often being mentally ill becomes a punishment, and it should not. We should show the same warmth and compassion to people with mental illness as we show to people with any other disease.
It is not going to happen, but if I were Prime Minister this would be my manifesto. We want appropriate, well-resourced community services: the very best services possible, which meet the needs of our constituents, help them to get well, and give them the reassurance they need that the community is ready to embrace them. We need acute beds in modern buildings that promote wellness and recovery. My local trust, Hertfordshire mental health trust, makes no bones about the fact that its acute wards need to be made a lot better. I visited the PICU today, and it is fantastically modern. It aids recovery, and we must ensure that our hospital beds aid recovery.
We need wards that are safe and clean. The mentally ill do not deserve second best. There should be the same focus on cleanliness in mental health wards as there is in any other ward. We also need wards that are age and sex-appropriate. I know that the Minister has personally made enormous strides during his tenure in ensuring that children do not end up on adult mental health wards. Nevertheless, about 400 children a year do end up on adult mental health wards, and as we all know, that number is too high and must be reduced. We also need to ensure that we do not have mixed-sex mental health wards. Again, we need to ensure that patients feel safe and secure.
Finally, we need to ensure that mental health staff are properly rewarded and motivated. I want an NHS that is full of Sally Pegrums. I want an NHS full of people who have given 30-plus years to something that they love. Working with the mentally ill means working in a hugely difficult environment, and it is hugely demanding. Sally has been assaulted verbally and physically on a number of occasions, but she still cares passionately about her patients because she knows that they are ill. We need to reward such people, not just with gratitude but by ensuring that the job allows them to earn a living.
This is not a party political issue. Regardless of which party wins the next general election, mental health must be at the top of the list. It has been at the back of the queue for far too long. Successive Governments have brought it forward, and this Government have done very good things—I do not deny that—but we need to make sure that it remains at the top of the list and pushes to the head of the queue. We face difficult financial times in the years ahead. NHS budgets will come under pressure, but too often the first budget to come under pressure is the mental health budget. In future, it must be the last to come under pressure.
I would like to thank the Royal College of Psychiatrists. I would also like to thank Rethink and Mind for briefing me this evening, and Hertfordshire Viewpoint and the Hertfordshire mental health trust. I thank the Minister, too, with whom I have had a great relationship during his time as Minister with responsibility for mental health. I may not face him across this Chamber again, and in case he does not return to this place after the next election, I would like to say that he has made a fantastic contribution to the cause of mental health, and I hope that if he leaves this place he will continue to give that area the benefit of his expertise. I thank him for everything he has done.
I congratulate the hon. Member for Broxbourne (Mr. Walker) on securing the debate. I know that he has a very keen interest in this issue, stretching back to the work he did on the Mental Health Bill Committee two years ago. I also thank him very much for his extraordinarily generous remarks. If he were to sit on my side of the House, I would have no doubt he could be an excellent candidate for the highest ministerial office in the land, but we will see how things progress in the years to come; I shall watch his career with interest.
Mental health was once a forgotten service, which was poorly funded, highly reactive and focused on institutionalised care to support only those with the most severe illnesses. There were welcome, if rather flawed, attempts to transfer more mental health services into the community throughout the 1980s and 1990s, but it was the national service framework, established by the Government 10 years ago, that really moved mental health into a different place. It did this by expanding community services and developing a more proactive, preventive and personalised approach to treating people with severe mental illness.
As a result of the framework, and the £2 billion real-terms increase in mental health spending since 2002—there have been nine consecutive years of increased spending—we now have 67 per cent. more consultant psychiatrists, 79 per cent. more clinical psychologists and at least 23 per cent. more mental health nurses than in 1997. Crisis resolution and home treatment teams, and assertive outreach workers and early intervention teams are now helping more people with serious mental illness to manage their condition in the community.
I would also like to place on record my thanks to the carers, whom the hon. Gentleman mentioned in his remarks. The carers strategy, which we published last year, placed extra resources in primary care trust baseline budgets. I have recently met carers’ organisations, which are keen to make sure that that money is spent in the community on services such as respite care for those people who are doing such an important and invaluable job in helping to deliver support and care in the community.
The improving access to psychological therapies programme has increased access to talking therapies to more people with lower level mental health needs, again helping to address problems before they escalate. I agree with the hon. Gentleman, and the nurse to whom he referred, that mental health services have changed beyond all recognition. That verdict of improvement has also been reached by the World Health Organisation. It has said that England now has some of the best mental health services in Europe. We want to maintain those high standards and keep mental health services at the forefront of a preventive NHS.
Even with stronger prevention, about one in 10 of those who receive specialist mental health care each year are admitted as in-patients, so the hon. Gentleman is right to say that in-patient facilities remain an important part of the jigsaw of services. He gave an excellent description of the unit that he visited, and I join him in his comments. The hon. Member for New Forest, East (Dr. Lewis) also described excellent work by staff in these units, which are a key part of the mental health landscape. I am committed to continuing to raise standards and to improving the facilities available for in-patients into the future.
The hon. Member for Broxbourne will know that since 2006 the Government have put £130 million into improving those psychiatric in-patient facilities—these PICUs—and acute in-patient wards. He may be interested to learn—he made a specific reference to this—that about £30 million of that money is being used specifically to improve safety for women in-patients. That sits alongside our broader efforts to eliminate mixed-sex accommodation in these facilities and to ensure that every patient’s dignity is fully respected.
I am pleased to say that we know that patients think highly of the care that they receive in these units. Earlier this year, a Care Quality Commission survey of more than 7,000 recent in-patients found that nearly three quarters rated their care as good or better. That is a strong vote of confidence in the quality of acute services, but the question that the hon. Gentleman has really raised before the House tonight has been that of capacity: are there are enough in-patient beds to meet demand? I shall now address that key question.
The essential point is that not everyone needs care in a psychiatric bed, even in an emergency. Admitting someone to hospital when they are in crisis is a decision that nobody takes lightly. As the hon. Gentleman knows, a judgment has to be made on whether hospital admission is the only way to get a person the treatment they need at that moment to avoid the risk of harm to themselves or others. I have indicated, as he has done, that there are now strong alternatives to in-patient care, including community mental health teams, new models of practice, more robust care pathways, and supported accommodation or respite care in ordinary settings. I am pleased, as I am sure he is, that we are reducing demand for in-patient psychiatric care. For example, there were some 118,000 episodes of treatment last year for people who would otherwise have been admitted to hospital.
So although the national picture is one of falling mental health bed numbers, occupancy rates—I heard what the hon. Gentleman had to say about those and I understand the point he is making—have remained steady over several years, which indicates provision against demand is on an even keel. I understand, of course, that in a particular locality these decisions, which are a matter for the local primary care trust and health trust providers, are a matter for local balance and local decision making. The balance between in-patient services, intermediate settings and community services is a matter for local determination. That has to be based on those local health organisations’ determinations, on the basis of their consideration of what is needed locally and what units are available locally. We have had a debate in Westminster Hall on the particular issues that the hon. Member for New Forest, East mentioned. I know that he has met his local trust representatives, and that the hon. Member for Broxbourne has done the same, to examine in detail the local situation.
I am happy to give way, but I do not have that much time available.
I just say to the Minister that Hampshire county council’s health overview and scrutiny committee chairman is as alarmed as I am at the proposal to close the PICU and the intermediate beds in the rehabilitation centre. What can the Minister do if that committee, the local Member and the experts all say that the foundation trust is getting it wrong?
I do not want to repeat the debate that we had in another Adjournment debate on another occasion. The truth is that these PICU beds are assessed on the local needs by the trust and the clinical leaders of that trust. It must be for local determination to achieve the balance between acute beds, community services and intermediate services. The important thing is that there needs to be spare capacity to cater for acute admissions, as and when they arise—that point was made by the hon. Member for Broxbourne.
The truth is that we are simply getting better at treating people effectively in the community. That is what people say they prefer, and what experts say provides better long-term outcomes for them. This is something to celebrate, not criticise—not that I believe that the hon. Gentleman was doing so.
There will always be people who need to be admitted, so we have to arrive at the right blend of community and in-patient services. I want to counter any impression that might be left that the decline in bed numbers, which we welcome, has meant that some patients were being forced out of in-patient units before they were ready. Let me say this straight off: just as admitting someone is subject to very careful scrutiny, so is discharging them back into the community.
Decisions about discharge are always made on clinical grounds, after full discussion with the patient and taking into account any community support that can be offered. So, decisions are not driven by bed numbers or targets; the safety of the patient is the only concern. However, as the hon. Gentleman has said, the debate is a little more complex than in-patient care versus community-based care. There is not such a clear divide. Community services frequently work hand-in-hand with in-patient units to give patients intensive support after their discharge. The introduction of supervised community treatment in the Mental Health Act 2007 gives clinicians added reassurance that if someone disengages from their treatment or from services, or if their condition deteriorates, they can immediately be recalled and treated as an in-patient.
I believe that the hon. Gentleman has not changed his view from what he said two years ago when we discussed the Mental Health Bill. He said that we needed to care about the welfare of people who are mentally ill—he has repeated that this evening— and about alleviating their troubles and ensuring that they are treated in ways that best meet their needs as ill people and as patients. That was an enlightened view two years ago; he has repeated it this evening and I know that he stands by it.
As community services improve and we can offer more support outside the hospital, then the need for in-patient provision will change. It is only right then to review the size and location of that provision and achieve the right balance between in-patient and community services to meet local needs. That is what is happening in many parts of the country. As we have heard, discussions are under way on what may seem on the surface to be difficult, perhaps controversial, decisions. We need to have a sensible debate, as we have had tonight. We do not want to go backwards or to scare people, but we need to talk openly about the issues.
On the question of mental health services in Hertfordshire, we know that the Hertfordshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust has over the past six months reduced its average bed occupancy by improving its crisis resolution services. I listened carefully to what the hon. Gentleman said about staffing and the demand for such services, and the trust is now working with commissioners to look at other alternatives to in-patient care, including an acute day treatment unit, crisis beds and host family arrangements. It has assured the strategic health authority that pilots will take place before it reduces any bed numbers—in effect, it will “double run” community and in-patient services until it is confident that no patients will lose out from a reduction in bed numbers.
In conclusion, mental health services must continue to evolve and continue to improve if we want to give more people the best chance of recovery. The sun is setting on the national service framework but we can look forward to an even brighter future for mental health services through a new programme of work called “New Horizons”. We are considering more than 1,000 consultation responses on our new mental health strategy, which will deepen our commitment to preventing mental illness and to treating people in the home and in the community as much as possible.
Question put and agreed to.
House adjourned.