I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Energy Prices Act 2022 (Amendment) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2026.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Alec. The draft regulations were laid before the House on 16 March.

This Government are fully committed to fighting people’s corner to tackle the cost of living crisis across the United Kingdom. We are taking action on the matter as a priority and we are supporting devolved Governments to act when that is within their purview. I work closely with Ministers in the devolved Governments, including the Northern Ireland Executive. That covers work on the Budget commitments we are discussing, and more widely on the situation for energy consumers across the UK.

At last year’s Budget, alongside several positive changes to help working people across the country with the cost of living, the Chancellor announced significant changes to the cost of energy for households. Let me first set out the implications of those changes for consumers in Northern Ireland, before I turn specifically to the draft regulations.

The Budget set out that we would remove certain costs from energy bills in Great Britain, which led to energy bills in GB falling by 7% from 1 April this year. That reduced costs on bills related to the renewables obligation and the energy company obligation. Northern Ireland is in a different position as part of the single electricity market across the island of Ireland. Energy affordability is largely a transferred matter for the Northern Ireland Executive. From the outset of the Budget, however, we were clear that we would support the Executive to develop a comparable offer and that, subject to a business case, the Treasury would make such funds available.

The Northern Ireland Department for the Economy has since developed a proposal to remove costs—about £30 a year—from electricity bills, totalling £81 million of support over three years. That figure arises because in Northern Ireland, the starting point of policy costs on those bills is different from in Great Britain. In official-level discussions in the wake of the Budget, my Department and the Northern Ireland Department for the Economy worked closely to share learning about the policy design and its legislative basis. That joint working has supported the Northern Ireland Department’s development of its parallel policy.

On 2 March, the Minister for the Economy in Northern Ireland, Dr Caoimhe Archibald, wrote to me to ask that we take forward regulations to support delivery. We laid the draft regulations before Parliament a fortnight after receipt of that letter, and we are discussing them today. Although we are making the regulations to ensure that the Northern Ireland Department for the Economy has the powers it needs, I should be clear that it is entirely for the Northern Ireland Department to exercise those powers, and for the Executive to announce further details on the policy that they are taking forward.

Let me briefly set out precisely what the draft regulations do. They do not give the Northern Ireland Department any new powers that it did not already have in March; they amend the period in which various Energy Prices Act 2022 powers are available to the Northern Ireland Department. Those include a spending power and a direction-making power analogous to those we have used to deliver reduced costs on bills in GB. The effect of the amended time periods is that those powers will now be due to expire in February 2030. They should therefore be available to the NI Department for the duration of the transfer of the renewables obligation cost to the Exchequer.

Apart from the fact that, because we are in effect under the EU-controlled single electricity market, our prices are so much higher than those in GB, I am particularly intrigued to understand the thinking behind a point made in the explanatory notes. It indicates that the extensions apply only so long as the First Minister and Deputy First Minister are in office. What is the correlation and why is that correlation there?

That was part of the Energy Prices Act, as passed into primary legislation in 2022. It was intended to ensure that the powers were functioning at the time when the Executive were formed. I will go into more detail later.

As I was saying, the EPA powers available to the Northern Ireland Department include a spending power and a direction-making power analogous to those that we have used to deliver reduced costs of bills in GB. Those powers will now be due to expire in February 2030. I do not expect my Department to need to take further legislative steps in relation to policy in Northern Ireland, with the Executive now taking on its implementation.

Before I close, I repeat what I said when discussing the parallel regulations on the Secretary of State’s power: this is being taken forward in an international environment that is different from the one in which last year’s Budget took place. That difference reinforces the importance of what we are doing, but we also recognise that further steps may be needed. We have set out what we are doing in relation to heating oil, and contingency planning is under way in case further responsive and responsible action is required.

Ultimately, the draft regulations amend the period in which powers will be available to the Northern Ireland Department for the Economy, following a request from that Department to ensure that it can act as it needs to in order to reduce energy bills. I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

It is an absolute pleasure to serve under your chairmanship this morning, Sir Alec. The regulations, as already mentioned, extend the period for the Northern Ireland Department for the Economy to exercise existing powers under the Energy Prices Act 2022 from 26 months to six years. In itself, that is not controversial; no new powers are created through this instrument and we do not intend to obstruct its passing today. The Minister has explained the reasoning for the extension: to empower the Northern Ireland Executive to parallel the British Government’s autumn Budget commitments.

The Minister referred to the transfer of 75% of the renewables obligation scheme costs attributable to domestic energy supply, which will instead be funded through general taxation. As a result of that transfer, from April, only 25% of the renewables obligation cost is being recovered from consumers—but moving costs from energy bills to tax bills is a sleight of hand.

Let us also not forget the recipients of this taxpayer money: those extraordinary subsidies now flowing from households are giving wind farm owners three times the market price for their electrons. The Secretary of State’s auction process has locked this country, including Northern Ireland, into paying extortionate prices for wind power for the next 20 years—an extraordinary cost—and it is taxpayers who are now footing that bill.

The Minister espouses a commitment to lowering household energy bills, as per the Government’s manifesto pledge to reduce bills by £300, yet we have seen bills go up since they took office. A month ago, the Government adopted our policy to remove one of the carbon taxes on electricity generation—the carbon price support. While the Labour Government transfer renewables subsidies on to taxation, the Conservative party has set out our cheap power plan to reduce the cost of energy and bring down bills by £200.

Before moving to my questions on that point, I want to follow up on the question asked by the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim. Why is it that, as laid out in the explanatory notes:

“Schedule 5 to the EPA sets out the time periods in which certain powers under that Act are exercisable”

and that these powers will

“cease to be exercisable after a period of 26 months during which both the First Minister and deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland held office (currently 3 April 2026)”?

I have never seen such a measure in an amendment or a Bill before the House in the nine years that I have been here. It seems a remarkable paragraph. It is very strange to time limit the measures to the time in office of those two individuals. If the Minister could explain why that is the case, I would be very grateful—it is a genuine question on my part.

If the Minister is keen to see households relieved of the burden imposed by the renewables obligation, will the Government adopt our cheap power plan and scrap the subsidy altogether? And might I ask the Minister when we will see the elusive £300 off all our bills?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir Alec. It was a positive step by the Government to remove the renewable obligations and ECO policies from consumer energy bills in the autumn Budget. Consumers in Northern Ireland should also be able to benefit, as consumers in Great Britain did, from the Government using the powers available to make energy bills cheaper. That is especially important as energy prices are expected to continue to increase for the rest of the year, and as households and businesses face the Trump tax on their bills after his reckless and illegal war with Iran, leading to the closure of the strait of Hormuz and soaring oil prices.

The Minister mentioned oil prices. We know that Northern Ireland has been particularly hard hit by rocketing heating oil prices, because almost two thirds of households there use heating oil. The Government need to take urgent action to set a price cap that shields off-grid households, but if this legislation enables anything that the Government do to then be taken forward by the Northern Ireland Assembly, can the Minister elaborate on how that will work?

I certainly am not going to object to consumers—my constituents—having a £30 bill reduction per annum, though I recognise that that is within the context of Northern Ireland electricity consumers paying excessively more than is paid in Great Britain, because we are held within the single electricity market governed by the EU, not by UK provisions.

I do not think the question that I asked in my intervention has been answered, although it was reiterated by the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine: why is there a nexus in the original Act, carried forward in these regulations, between the availability of the power and the holding of office by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister? Surely we are not saying that if there is not a First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the people of Northern Ireland should be punished by virtue of the absence of this power, so are we saying that, in the absence of a First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the powers would be exercised here by this Department? Is that what this means? What exactly does it mean? On the face of it, it looks pretty incongruous and unexplained to me, and I would like to understand it, as I am sure my constituents would.

Let me first turn to the point that has been raised by the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim and the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine. As I understand it—we were obviously not in government in this period; the party of the hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine was—during the passage of the 2022 Act, that section was formulated in such a way in order for the powers to be implemented once the Executive were formed. It does not mean that if there were not to be a First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the powers would cease.

If I am incorrect about that, I will come back in writing to Committee members, but it is my understanding that the section is like that purely because, at the time that the 2022 Act was being discussed, there was not an Executive formed. The previous Government therefore took powers to take action directly, but the section was written in the way that it is to make sure that the Northern Ireland Executive were able to take action once they were formed. If I have said anything this morning that needs to be clarified, however, I will happily write to Committee members.

The hon. Member for West Aberdeenshire and Kincardine asked when we will see the £300 off bills. We stand by the commitment to have £300 off bills by the end of this Parliament. We have been very clear about that—I have been very clear about it and the Secretary of State has been very clear about it. Bills were on a downward trajectory before 27 February, when the situation in the Middle East started. We did not expect to be where we are today four months ago, and we do not know what the situation is going to look like four months from now. We hope that the strait of Hormuz reopens as soon as possible, so we have a free flow of goods through there and oil prices can reduce.

The hon. Member for Thornbury and Yate asked how this will work. I apologise if I did not pick up all the details of her request, but I think she was alluding to heating oil regulation as well. This legislation does not affect the work that the Government are doing on heating oil, which is with the Competition and Markets Authority at the moment. The CMA is working to an expedited timeline to return to Ministers by June with an assessment of how that market is operating. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State have been very clear that they do not believe the heating oil market is operating in the way that it should, so after the CMA returns that assessment to us, we will study its conclusions to understand exactly what we need to do in terms of regulating that market.

People in Northern Ireland are struggling: our bills are higher and, as has been alluded to and as the Minister has addressed, a number of folks use home heating oil. The £81 million has been allocated to a Northern Ireland Department—a Sinn Féin Department—that is sitting on spend. Will these regulations allow that £81 million to be released to those who are hard pressed and hard pushed with regard to their energy? Will we be able to benefit exactly as folks in GB have over the last number of months?

As I said in my opening speech, these provisions allow the Northern Ireland Executive now to take forward their own scheme and for that money to be released, pending the agreement of the final business case with the Treasury. As I also said in my opening speech, I have discussed this with the Northern Ireland Minister for the Economy, and we are taking forward these regulations at the Executive’s request to make sure that that funding can be released. Over the three years, it will amount to a £30 bill reduction, because of the removal of 75% of the renewables obligation, which will now be paid by the Treasury. Pending the Northern Ireland Executive coming forward with the business case—it is obviously for them to decide how it is disbursed—that £81 million will be disbursed to people across Northern Ireland.

The Minister is being very generous with his time. I hope he will forgive me for making the point that I have limited trust in the ability of the Sinn Féin Minister in Northern Ireland to get this £81 million out the door to folks. What oversight will the Minister have of that money actually getting to the people who need it? It is sitting there and it needs to be distributed.

Oversight will be done in the ordinary way that all oversight of spending is done. As I said, however, the final business case will be approved by the Treasury before that funding is released to the Northern Ireland Executive. Oversight will proceed as it normally would in such circumstances.

To conclude, these regulations are an example of good, practical intergovernmental working. They support our colleagues in the Northern Ireland Executive to deliver reduced energy bills. To be clear, these regulations are enabling in nature. Policy decisions on the use of the powers are ultimately for the Executive, as I said, with the funds available to them.

Until February 2030, these regulations give the Northern Ireland Department for the Economy similar spending and direction-making powers to those we have used to deliver reduced costs on bills here in Great Britain. These powers will apply for the duration of the transfer of renewables obligation costs to the Exchequer. As previously stated, I therefore do not expect my Department to need to take further legislative steps in relation to the policy in Northern Ireland, with the Executive now taking on the implementation. I commend these draft regulations to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

I beg to move,

That the Cttee has considered the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (S.I., 2026, No. 436).

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairpersonship, Mrs Harris. The regulations amend the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, the UK has engaged with and supported the new Syrian Government to help build a secure, prosperous future for all Syrians. The UK has long stood by the people of Syria and will continue to do so as they rebuild their country, clear in the knowledge that a stable Syria is firmly in the interests of the region and the UK. That is why the Prime Minister welcomed Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa on his first visit to the UK on 31 March.

On 21 April, the Government laid a statutory instrument to amend the Syria sanctions regulations. The instrument revoked specific UK sanctions measures on some sectors of the Syrian economy—namely, gold, diamonds, precious metals and luxury goods, including cars. That action allows British companies to trade with and invest in those sectors in Syria. Sustained investment in those and other sectors supports British industry and Syria’s economic recovery. This is the latest step in a series of actions designed to change our approach to Syria, supporting its economy and allowing UK businesses to contribute to and benefit from the country’s economic recovery.

In February 2025, shortly after the fall of the Assad regime, the Treasury’s Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation issued a general licence, allowing payments to support humanitarian delivery. That provided essential sanctions relief to Syria at a time when the country faced staggering humanitarian needs and a broken economy. We followed that in April 2025 by revoking a number of sanctions on energy, transport, financial transactions and trade.

We also delisted Syrian organisations that had been used by the Assad regime to fund the oppression of the Syrian people. That included the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines, several energy companies and, indeed, media companies. We were at the forefront of western countries lifting sanctions on Syria, recognising that enabling the flow of investment into Syria was essential for the country’s recovery and reconstruction.

In parallel, we have actively engaged with British companies to understand their barriers to market entry and to support their re-entrance into the Syrian market. During his visit to London in March, President al-Sharaa joined my colleague the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa at a UK-Syria business reception, where he heard investment proposals from a range of UK firms, as well as the Government’s support for British companies wanting to invest in Syria.

The amendments we made to our sanctions regime last year have allowed us to continue to use sanctions as a tool to promote peace, stability and security in Syria, while encouraging respect for the rule of law and protection of human rights. That is why sanctions remain in place on those who committed gross human rights violations with or on behalf of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

The amendments the Government have made to the Syria sanctions regime, both this year and last year, reflect the momentous changes that have taken place since the fall of the Assad regime. They will support the Syrian people in rebuilding their country and economy and ensure that our regime is up to date. We keep all our sanctions regimes under close review to ensure they are used as a responsive tool and target those who bear responsibility for oppression and human rights abuses.

Members may rightly raise concerns about violence we have seen in Syria since the fall of Assad, whether in the coastal areas, Suwayda or the north-east. The UK remains committed to holding those responsible for violence against civilians in Syria to account. In December of last year, we sanctioned individuals and organisations involved in coastal violence and Assad-era atrocities to hold to account perpetrators of human rights abuses. Additionally, two individuals who financially supported the Assad regime were sanctioned.

In our engagements with the new Syrian Government, we consistently emphasise the importance of protecting the rights of all Syrians and an inclusive political transition. Meaningful representation of Syria’s diverse communities is crucial to strengthening Syria’s social fabric and underpinning a better future for the country.

The past year has seen significant strides forward in Syria. We welcome the progress made by the Syrian Government to open Syria to the world, attract investment and reduce the threat from terrorism and insecurity. President al-Sharaa’s visit to the UK in March was his first, and his meetings with the Prime Minister and indeed His Majesty the King cemented a new era for the UK-Syria relationship.

I would like, if I may, Mrs Harris—particularly as we are coming up to a significant anniversary—to recognise our dearly loved and lost colleague, Jo Cox, who worked with me and many other Members on many occasions during her time in this place to raise the issues affecting the Syrian people. I am sure she would be looking on today with some hope and optimism, although not without some concerns. She would have held us all to account, but with hope and optimism for the future of the Syrian people after what were truly dreadful times.

A stable Syria is firmly in the UK’s interests, and we will continue to stand with the Syrian people. We will work with the new Government to support Syria’s stability, promote regional security and protect UK national interests, including by reducing the risks of irregular migration, terrorism and other threats to our national security. This package, however, reflects the changed environment, and it is another important step in finding a new way forward for Syria. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Harris. Before I start, I add my thoughts on Jo Cox. She was a dear friend right across the House, and had that often unique ability to bring the whole House together on certain topics of mutual interest. Some aspects of international development in Syria were certainly among those.

I thank the Minister for his explanation of the Syria (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026. I do not intend to keep the Committee long, but I have a number of questions because further clarity would be helpful to the Committee and the House. I will come to those shortly, but I want to make it clear that His Majesty’s official Opposition recognise the suffering that has been endured by the Syrian people after years and years of conflict, repression and instability under the Assad regime. We all want to see a more peaceful and stable future for Syria.

Sanctions relief in a fragile and uncertain environment inevitably carries risks, and Parliament is entitled to proper scrutiny of how those risks will be managed. The regulations revoke restrictions on the trade of gold, precious metals, diamonds and luxury goods, including automobiles, or cars. Given the obvious concerns about illicit finance, corruption and malign networks in post-conflict environments, I have to say that I was a little surprised that no formal impact assessment appears to accompany this statutory instrument. I listened to the Minister’s remarks, but will he explain why no impact assessment was considered necessary?

What assessment have the Government made of the likely financial and economic effects of the changes in the regulations, both within Syria and internationally? Related to that, I would like to understand what mechanisms the Government will use to monitor the consequences of the sanctions revocations. In particular, how will Ministers assess where any resulting financial flows ultimately go? Who will benefit from them, and is there a risk that funds or assets could be diverted towards destabilising activity?

Will the Minister say a little more about whom the Government expect the principal beneficiaries of the changes to be? The Government must surely have undertaken some assessment of which sectors or groups inside Syria are likely to gain most from the reopening of trade in high-value goods. They have suggested that sanctions easing may create opportunities for British businesses seeking to engage with the Syrian market, which is good, but if that is the case, what guidance will be issued to UK businesses to help them navigate what remains a highly fragile operating environment? Many firms will understandably be concerned about sanctions compliance and the risk of assets or investments ending up in the wrong hands.

I also want to ask specifically about the provisions relating to petroleum products and kerosene-type jet fuel. Will the Minister clarify precisely what the Government seek to achieve through the amendments in the regulations? Are the measures intended primarily as technical corrections to civilian aviation measures, or do they carry wider security implications?

Finally, while there have been some positive developments in Syria, serious concerns remain about sectarian violence and the protection of minority communities. We all want to see a stable Syrian state that is capable of countering ISIS and reducing wider regional instability, but progress must be accompanied by proper safeguards and oversight.

I look forward to hearing the Minister’s responses. The Conservatives do not intend to oppose the regulations, but I hope he can provide the Committee with greater reassurance on how these measures will operate in practice.

May I associate myself with the Minister’s comments on the anniversary of Jo Cox’s murder and her friendship to the people of Syria? Once again, her spirit is very much alive, in that we have more in common than that which divides us.

The Liberal Democrats recognise the power that lifting sanctions can have to enable the rebuilding of Syria following a decade of civil war and the collapse of the brutal Assad regime. However, it is vital that the new transitional Syrian Government under President al-Sharaa affirms their commitment to political inclusion and religious and sectarian tolerance. They must take concrete steps to promote and protect the rights of minority groups and to ensure that they are represented in the new Administration. The Liberal Democrats therefore call on the UK Government to outline an explicit strategy supporting the promotion of political inclusion and the protection of minorities in Syria and how that will be linked to any future lifting of sanctions.

I thank the Opposition and Lib Dem spokespeople for their remarks and questions, and for their broad support of the regulations. They both reflected on some of the things that are still leading to instability and risk in Syria, which I referred to in my opening remarks. They can be assured that we are keeping these measures under close monitoring.

On the risks the shadow Minister raised, we keep those under review at all times. She knows that I do not comment on future designations, but sanctions can always be reimposed where we see anything we are uncomfortable with or that puts security and stability at risk. We have been clear that the violence and other issues we have seen are unacceptable. We want an inclusive, stable future for Syria, and we took action in December by introducing new sanctions on those responsible for those issues. I emphasise to the Committee that 344 designations remain in place relating to human rights violations committed under the Assad regime. They include certain trade measures, including prohibiting the export of goods that can be used for internal repression, chemical or biological weapons, and other matériel.

That is the approach that the United States and our partners in the EU have taken. The EU adopted legal acts in May last year to lift all economic restrictions, with the exception of those based on security grounds. In June last year, the US repealed the Caesar Act, which led to the eventual removal of many of the remaining US and secondary sanctions on Syria. In the measures we are setting in place today, our action very much aligns with what the US and the EU are doing. The regulations are aimed at not only normalising economic trade and engagement with Syria but creating opportunities for increasing trade and commercial links between the UK and Syria; automobiles are a huge opportunity.

Our latest trade statistics show that the total trade in goods and services between the UK and Syria was £10 million in the four quarters to the end of quarter three of 2025—an increase of 400% since the same time the previous year. That is in the context of the Syrian economy remaining in need of significant support. The humanitarian situation obviously remains acute, there are reconstruction needs and the economy has contracted by 83% since 2010 as a result of the horrors under the Assad regime. The costs of that have been estimated by the World Bank at $216 billion, which is 10 times Syria’s current GDP.

These regulations are part of a series of measures. We focused on some of the most important sectors first, but this is a series of phased normalisations of our trading and commercial relations with Syria. Those are aimed at stabilising the economy, providing opportunities and creating a more stable economic footing domestically in Syria, as well as providing opportunities for the UK and Syria to trade and work together in many different areas. But there is the caveat that sanctions remain in place, and they can be reimposed and more actions can be taken if we see illicit finance or other groups seeking to subvert this for their own purposes.

The shadow Minister asked about kerosene. I will write to her on that point to give her the most accurate information. I hope that that satisfies the Committee that the regulations are a natural next step. We all want to see a stable, prosperous and secure Syria, not just for the Syrian people and the wider region, but for the security and prosperity of the UK.

Question put and agreed to.