I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026.

These regulations amend the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Before I begin, I want to place on the record—I am sure this is shared by all colleagues—our utter horror at the attacks meted out by Russia in Ukraine yet again, in the past 24 hours. The attack on the monastery in Kyiv was particularly despicable, as were the deaths of civilians across Ukraine. Those appallingly barbarous actions show the whole House and the whole world again what Russia continues to be capable of. This morning, I was able to convey that horror and our solidarity and support to the Chairman of the Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, who was here as a guest of Mr Speaker and has been meeting right hon. and hon. Members across the House. We all stand united with Ukraine in this Committee, and our thoughts are with all those affected by those terrible actions.

This statutory instrument was laid on 19 May under the powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018; its measures, subject to the affirmative parliamentary procedure, entered into force on 20 May.

Since coming to power, the Government have been clear that Russia must not be allowed to succeed in its illegal war, and we have been steadfast in our support of Ukraine. Russia represents a threat not just to Ukraine, but to the whole of Europe, including the United Kingdom and our allies. As part of our response to Russia’s illegal and barbarous war in Ukraine, the United Kingdom has sanctioned more than 3,300 individuals and entities under the Russian sanctions regime, with more than 1,300 of those delivered under this Government.

Only last month, we introduced a new package that sanctioned 18 individuals and entities under the UK’s Russia sanctions regulations, including cryptocurrency exchanges active in Russia, and entities and individuals that we suspect are linked to the UK-sanctioned A7 network, which has embedded itself in the Kyrgyz financial sector. This instrument marks a further step in the UK’s sustained effort to erode Russia’s ability to fund its illegal, full-scale invasion, ramping up pressure on Putin’s war chest. It is yet another set of measures from this Government, who continue the work of the previous Government; when I sat on the Opposition Benches, I welcomed and supported such measures, while also providing robust scrutiny.

The sanctions are having a real impact. Last month, Russia slashed its economic growth forecast for 2026 from 1.3% to just 0.4%; Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister ascribed the downgrade to the impact of sanctions, among other factors. Indeed, Putin himself admitted that Russian GDP contracted by 1.8% in January and February, with a decline in areas critical to Russia’s war efforts, including industrial production. It is clear that our sanctions are having an impact and that they have bite, which is why we will not cease them. I will not comment on further measures, but we will not cease to explore all opportunities to raise the pressure and degrade Russia’s war machine for its actions in Ukraine, and to look at all the methods it uses to evade such regimes.

To phase in the implementation of the measures, we have issued two targeted licences, intended as a temporary measure—I make that very clear, as we have done in response to the many questions and debates we have had about this issue. The licences are subject to ongoing review, with fortnightly checkpoints. They may be amended, suspended or revoked, as appropriate.

The first licence is for the new liquefied natural gas maritime services ban. It temporarily authorises spot-market trade from Russian LNG projects Sakhalin II and Yamal until 1 January 2027. The second licence applies to the refined oil import ban and to authorised imports of diesel and jet fuel refined in third countries from Russian crude oil.

As with the LNG licence—I must reiterate this to the Committee—the licences have always been intended as a temporary measure. They are designed to mitigate and protect consumers and market stability here, and they are subject to fortnightly review. The process of review involves continually assessing the impact of licences on energy supplies, market conditions and other relevant considerations against our overarching objective, which is, I am sure, shared by all members of this Committee: of ramping up pressure on Russia through our sanctions regime and, in light of this assessment, determining what steps are appropriate at each review point.

There was some misleading reporting and commentary around the time of these measures. We were not watering down existing measures—these are new measures that many across the House have called for, including me when I sat on the Opposition side, which toughen and tighten the pressure on Russia. As often happens with sanctions regimes, it is only appropriate that they be phased to allow for appropriate market stability; at the earliest possible opportunity, the bans will be introduced in full.

As part of the review process that has been ongoing since the measures came into place, the Government have now set a clear end date for the refined oil licence of 1 January 2027, in line with the liquefied natural gas maritime services ban spot licence. That sets the timetable now for fully phasing in the ban and shutting down the remaining route for Russian oil. Regular reviews will continue to ensure that the licence is lifted at the earliest possible date, which of course could be before that date.

I will turn to the details in a moment, but I want to say thank you for genuine and constructive scrutiny, particularly from Liberal Democrat counterparts and others, and for conversations with Members across the House to ensure that the measures are phased in correctly. On the basis of the review, the Government have been able to communicate how that is going to operate going forward; I hope these measures will enjoy the wholehearted support of the Committee today. They include a range of different measures, and it is important that all of those are able to go forward. The LNG and refined oil provisions were just part of the overall package.

The regulations are a strong enhancement of our Russian sanctions regime. To reiterate what the Prime Minister and my colleague the Minister for Trade said on 20 May, we have not lifted or eased sanctions: our sanctions are now stronger than they were a month ago. I really underline that point to the Committee. The legislation is sanctioning previously unsanctioned goods and services, and that includes multiple measures targeting Russia’s energy sector and other key supplies.

We have imposed further export restrictions that fall into the following four categories: first, items sanctioned by the EU already, including certain types of industrial chemicals, metals and machinery that have potential battlefield use; and goods recommended for sanctions by the Government of Ukraine, including additional forms of metals and articles of carbon fibre, which are frequently used in the manufacture of the drones that we have seen causing such devastating impact. I witnessed for myself where those drones had hit Lviv a few months ago, including again on a religious site in the city centre—absolutely appalling crimes. We need to choke off the supplies and matériel used for those drones.

Restrictions also include a more expansive list of individual chemicals and chemical precursors that might be used in, for example, riot control agents found on the battlefield or goods for internal repression. Lastly, restrictions include goods related to emerging technologies, including quantum, semiconductor and engineering biology technologies, including new goods and those not already clearly subject to existing sanctions, to reduce the risk of circumvention.

As I said, there are measures on refined oil. The legislation bans the import into the UK of oil products refined in third countries that have been made from Russian crude oil. There is a new maritime services ban on LNG that restricts Russia’s access to the UK’s world leading-maritime services, which has been rightly raised on numerous occasions by colleagues across the House. Certain existing long-term contracts are exempt from the provisions until the end of the year, in line with the EU’s LNG measure. We always attempt to work alongside our EU and other counterparts for appropriate effect.

There is also a ban on the import of uranium consigned from Russia and uranium that originates in Russia, and UK involvement in the global trade of Russian uranium is restricted. Exceptions are in place to mitigate risks to energy security in third countries, including the supply of uranium to operational nuclear installations.

Construction services is another area where this package takes action. The legislation introduces a prohibition on providing construction services to persons connected with Russia. That will complement the other restrictions in place on architecture and engineering, ensuring that UK construction businesses cannot support infrastructure and building projects that benefit Russia.

We have also expanded the criteria for specifying ships. Members will have seen the robust and brave action that our armed forces and law enforcement personnel took over the weekend. We will not hesitate to enforce international law and take action when Russia is attempting to use a vessel or another means to circumvent restrictions that we are putting in place. I pay tribute to all those involved in that crucial operation but, as Members will understand, I will not go into further operational details today. I know that questions have been raised on the Floor of the House.

In the new, expanded criteria, we have specified ships to include ships carrying liquefied natural gas that originated in Russia and ships carrying coal and coal products that originated in Russia. The aim of that is to make it easier to sanction ships for a wider range of activity. We have also strengthened the trade and shipping sanctions that can be applied to specified ships by introducing additional prohibitions. The new trade sanctions enable the Government to prohibit persons from providing and procuring certain maritime and financial services in relation to specified ships. Indeed, additional shipping sanctions in this package prohibit persons from operating or chartering specified ships, and require the UK ship registrar, who maintains the UK Ship Register, which is part of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, to refuse to register specified ships.

Lastly, the legislation will close a gap by prohibiting the acquisition and purported acquisition of a detained transport asset from or for the benefit of a designated person or person connected with Russia. That instrument amends the enforcement provisions of the 2019 regulations, as well as the Trade, Aircraft and Shipping Sanctions (Civil Enforcement) Regulations 2024, to provide for the enforcement of the new prohibitions introduced by these regulations.

To conclude, this wide-ranging, impactful package shows that the Government take incredibly seriously our commitment to supporting Ukraine, to targeting Russia for its actions in prosecuting its illegal and barbarous war in Ukraine, and to combating Putin’s attempts to prolong the war and cause further damage, death and destruction, which we have seen him mete out so tragically in just the past 24 hours. Our sanctions have hit Putin hard. We will not let up, and we will continue to go further.

I am grateful for the constructive and ongoing engagement with Parliament on the issue of licensing, including with those I have mentioned, as well as for the strong, unified support for sanctions on Russia and the steadfast backing of Ukraine from the vast majority of the House—although you will know, Sir Desmond, that in the past I have criticised some who have parroted Kremlin lines and have serious questions to answer on these matters.

The Government welcome the shared determination of the Committee to maximise pressure on Putin’s war machine, and we recognise the concerns and genuine scrutiny that have been raised. I commend the regulations to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Desmond. As the Minister has highlighted, the barbaric attacks by Russia over the weekend have added more significance to what we are discussing today. We should also pay tribute to the extraordinary professionalism and courage of our Royal Marines, the Navy, the RAF and the National Crime Agency in successfully intercepting and boarding a vessel from Russia’s shadow fleet in the English channel.

We commend all those involved in that landmark operation, but it reinforces the point that these powers must be used decisively and consistently. We hope that this is not a one-off success but the beginning of a sustained effort. Can the Minister confirm whether we should expect to see further such operations going forward? Russia relies on this shadow fleet to evade international sanctions and bankroll its illegal war in Ukraine. Operations such as this strike directly at Putin’s ability to fund his aggression. Protecting the UK means standing firmly with our allies in Ukraine. Putin believed that he could seize Ukraine in a matter of days, but the determination of the Ukrainian people proved him wrong. We have a responsibility to do everything possible to limit Russia’s ability to continue its aggression against a peaceful, democratic nation.

Russia remains the most pressing threat to European security. We of course support measures that help constrain Russia’s ability to prosecute its illegal invasion and its attempts to destabilise the west. However, as Conservative Front Benchers have already put on the record in the House, we regret that the Government originally left open a loophole for Russian oil that had been refined into diesel and jet fuel in other countries. We understand that that position changed over the weekend, and that there will now be a ban on imports of diesel and jet fuel made from Russian oil by 1 January 2027. As we said, the decision last month to leave the loophole open should not have been necessary, because Britain should be issuing UK oil and gas licences.

This is not the time to be running down our domestic fuel production. Rather than relying on imports from countries that wish us harm, we should get drilling in the North sea: that will boost our energy security and bring down household bills. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Witham (Priti Patel), the shadow Foreign Secretary, has argued, approving licences for Rosebank and Jackdaw North sea fields would help the UK make greater use of its resources. Instead, the Government’s opposition to further domestic production risks leaving us dependent on energy supplies linked to hostile states. We do not believe that is the right approach.

We welcome the ban on Russian uranium and the clarity that the regulations provide by prohibiting imports, whether they come directly from Russia or via third countries. However, can the Minister explain what steps the Government are taking to expand domestic nuclear capability and strengthen long-term energy resilience in response to that?

The ban on British companies shipping Russian liquefied natural gas is another welcome measure. Restricting the transportation of Russian LNG will reduce opportunities for third countries to trade in these products. We also welcome the extension of restrictions on construction services. What assurance can the Minister provide that the exemptions in the regulations will be applied narrowly and not become a loophole?

The provisions targeting the shadow fleet are particularly important because they move beyond banning goods and focus on the methods used to evade sanctions. Although those powers appear robust, the Committee would benefit from greater clarity on how they will operate in practice. How many vessels do the Government expect to have to designate? What evidential threshold will be required? Given the use of opaque ownership structures and frequent reflagging of ships, how confident are Ministers that these powers can keep pace with evolving tactics? Although we welcome the early signs of success, how will the Government assess whether those measures are delivering meaningful results in the long term?

I look forward to the Minister’s response and to receiving reassurance that these measures will be effective in strengthening both our national security and the wider sanctions regime against Russia.

It is a pleasure to speak with you in the Chair, Sir Desmond. I welcome this legislation; if we needed any further explanation of the need for it, the terrible events and attacks over the weekend, which the Minister has already referred to, provide us with that. Allow me to add my party’s admiration for the personnel involved in the first interdiction of a shadow fleet tanker over the weekend.

This legislation is long awaited: I am reliably informed by my noble Friend Lord Purvis that since March 2022 he has called no fewer than eight times in the other place for the loophole on refined products paid for in third currencies to be closed. I am glad that we finally have this legislation before us.

I note that the licence on these refined products was initially not time-limited; as the Minister has said, it has now been rendered so. I understand that the Minister and his colleagues in the other place met Lord Purvis, and that Lord Purvis wrote to the Minister seeking a firm end date. I ask the Minister three things. Will he kindly deposit that correspondence in the Commons Library, to make clear the constructive exchange that took place? Will he confirm that the licence will end no later than 1 January 2027? Will he also confirm that the licence remains under review and could be suspended prior to that date?

I also understand that businesses now operating under the LNG and refined products licences have to notify the Government that they are operating under that licence. Can the Minister state whether notifications have been made since the entry into force of the regime? If not, will he agree to let us know in writing and commit to a monthly update on the notifications made for as long as the licences remain in place?

We must continue to isolate Russia as the rogue state that it is. That means taking robust action to ensure that sanctions are not sidestepped. Since the illegal invasion of Ukraine, it has been necessary and appropriate to implement a wide range of sanctions against both individuals and companies. Liberal Democrats want to put a stop to oligarchs from corrupt regimes channelling their money through the UK by beginning the seizure of frozen Russian assets in the UK, with proceeds being repurposed to finance support for Ukraine, so that we can stand with Ukraine even if US support wavers. We also want action on releasing the proceeds of the sale of Chelsea football club for the benefit of Ukrainian civilians; the proper resourcing of the National Crime Agency; and the closure of loopholes on economic crime legislation that allow Putin’s cronies and other kleptocrats to continue funnelling dirty cash into our country.

Liberal Democrats are also calling for a complete prohibition on UK companies providing maritime services, such as insurance, for Russia’s export of fossil fuels. The scandal of UK plc helping to facilitate profits for Putin’s war machine must end.

To conclude, will the Minister confirm that the Government will keep all sanctions on oil and gas products, and on professional, maritime and banking services, under review, and bring forward further packages that choke off Russia’s revenue streams?

I certainly welcome any strengthening of sanctions against Russia or, indeed, any other aggressor, but there is one point on which I seek clarification. It is rooted in paragraph 4.4 of the explanatory memorandum. That says, as one would expect,

“The instrument extends to the whole of the United Kingdom”.

But it goes on:

“It is subject to any obligation arising in respect of the Windsor Framework…in respect of Northern Ireland.”

That means that the instrument is conditional to the supremacy of any overriding imposition under the Windsor framework.

What possible provision of the Windsor framework could leave Northern Ireland less impacted—as it ought not to be—by these requirements with respect to sanctions? Why does paragraph 4.4 say that? In short, what is it in the Windsor framework that can impede UK sovereignty on this matter? Foreign policy, above all, must exclusively be an integral UK matter, and yet we are bringing forward regulations with an explanatory memorandum that says they are for the whole United Kingdom but subject to the Windsor framework.

That is not acceptable: my constituents want to be as fully a part of the sanctions against Russia as anyone else. I urge the Minister to explain to us what lies behind paragraph 4.4. If there is some exemption or imposition in the Windsor framework, let us spell it out so that we can see what it is. It would be intolerable if what should be a UK-wide imposition were tempered, weakened or undermined by something that the EU required under the Windsor framework. Could we have that clarification?

I genuinely appreciate the scrutiny in the questions raised by hon. Members. I appreciate the wholehearted support for the package as a whole from the shadow Minister. He asked me about further operations, but he will understand that I will not get into those here. But let us be clear that we sent a strong signal with the action over the weekend—the Prime Minister has been absolutely clear about the intent. We will act lawfully to take measures in relation to the shadow fleet, so that is a very clear signal. This is not the first time we have been involved in such operations; we have supported partners and allies on a range of vessels operating outwith international law in relation to sanctions evasion. But this was the first time when we were in the lead and took action in the channel.

I gently caution the shadow Minister on his question about loopholes. There is not a loophole. There was a loophole, prior to our bringing in this legislation—that is why we have sought to introduce it. I have called for this for a very long time, as have many Members. The Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock, was right to point out his noble Friend Lord Purvis’s assiduous advocacy on the issue over many years. The situation did allow these products before and but they will not be allowed now. It is only right that this is phased in appropriately, and we have set out clearly how we intend to do that.

The shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Fylde, raised a point about wider energy supplies and went back to arguments used on the Floor of the House a few times about the North sea. The Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero and others have been very clear: expanding drilling in the North sea will not lower bills or improve energy security. That short-sighted approach would leave the UK exposed to volatile global gas prices. Gas prices are set internationally, so having new North sea licences would not take a penny off of bills and would potentially make people more vulnerable.

We are looking at making better use of existing North sea infrastructure, such as the range of measures we are taking around what are known as “tie-backs”. We will always act in the interests of British consumers, in relation to both the challenges of climate change and making sure that we have security of supply. The regulations are not one policy on their own, but sit within a range of different measures.

The shadow Minister rightly pointed out the importance of investing in nuclear. That is exactly what the Government are doing, including, I am pleased to say, in Wales—my part of the United Kingdom. Announcements were made recently. We can also see the investment in the Hinkley plant, which will bring huge benefits. We are clear that investing in nuclear, renewables and a robust, resilient energy system that does not rely on the likes of Putin—or anybody else—is the way forward, and we work with partners on that.

The hon. Gentleman asked about the other exemptions, saying that they are narrowly construed. I am happy to write to him with some more technical detail, but I assure him in general terms that we aim to make sure that none of those matters can be circumvented in an unreasonable way. He also asked about the shadow fleet. We intend to take further measures in this place, but we have had a steady drumbeat of designations and actions, each of which has to be evidenced and based on clear legal parameters. I absolutely assure him that we are closely across the practice of false flagging and re-flagging vessels, which is one of the tactics that Russia, as well as other countries, has used to avoid scrutiny.

The hon. Member for Bicester and Woodstock raised some important points. He asked whether I would deposit certain letters and correspondence in the Library. My understanding is that those were private, but I will certainly look at whether I can do that, given that the Government have now publicly announced the measures that I set out. On the end date, as I set out to his colleague, Lord Purvis, that will remain under constant review; if there is an earlier opportunity, we will seek to take it, subject to the four-month notification period provision set out in the original licence.

The hon. Gentleman also asked whether notifications of people using the existing licence have been made. Some notifications have been made but the numbers are extremely low, which was one of the factors we took into consideration when looking at how the licence was operating. As he will understand, it would not be right for me to comment on individual companies, as there may be commercial confidentiality provisions. I assure him that we constantly look at and keep under review any UK nexuses, or any other way in which services are used, and that we work closely with other partners to do so. Alongside Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office teams, I met EU officials today to establish where we can unify efforts to have the maximum impact. Although the United Kingdom can have a huge impact, it is important to act with others as that will have the biggest hit to Putin’s war chest.

On the topic of the EU, the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim asked about the Windsor framework. I am happy to write to him on the technicalities, but I do not want to mislead him. All the sanctions regulations came in as a result of us leaving the EU sanctions regime as part of Brexit and our having wider obligations, so I suspect that the language in that paragraph is standard. I cannot think of specific obligations, but I will certainly write to him with the technical detail. I assure him that we aim for the sanctions to have the biggest impact, and that there are not loopholes or ways for anyone in any part of the United Kingdom to get around them. That is also true for our overseas territories and Crown dependencies, with which I work closely to ensure that their sanctions legislation is fit for purpose.

We have strong working between different teams to make sure not only that we understand what we need to put in place legally but, crucially, that enforcement takes place. Having visited the port in my constituency, I know the work that goes on to check and make sure that vessels do not appear on lists of sanctioned vessels. I am sure that that is also the case in Northern Ireland, and across other EU partners.

The Minister will be grateful that I did not intervene earlier on the topic of oil and gas in the North sea—we have had that argument many times, so I will leave it be. On his current point, could the Minister copy me into his correspondence with the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim on this topic? As the Minister touched on, there is particular concern around not just the regulations themselves but the ways in which Russia could use deviation to get around their enforcement. I am keen to see that the language in the regulations is just generic wording rather than there being any specific concern.

Of course. As I said, I do not want to mislead the Committee: if there is something more technical in that language, but I will happily copy the hon. Gentleman into my correspondence. I assure him that we work closely with EU partners, including the Republic of Ireland, to establish whether anybody can use any routes around the measures. We co-operate closely with those authorities generally, including on the security of the waters around our islands, which is crucial.

When we see Russian ships and other vessels attempting to transit, we need to ensure that that is being done lawfully. As colleagues will be aware, ships have the right to innocent passage under international maritime law, but where that is not adhered to we need to look for any possible loophole.

The regulations are an important step forward and I hope the Committee will support them. I commend them to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026.