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General Committees

Debated on Wednesday 17 June 2026

Delegated Legislation Committee

Draft Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit and Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 2026

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Carolyn Harris

† Costa, Alberto (South Leicestershire) (Con)

† Crichton, Torcuil (Na h-Eileanan an Iar) (Lab)

† Davies-Jones, Alex (Pontypridd) (Lab)

† De Cordova, Marsha (Battersea) (Lab)

† Ellis, Maya (Ribble Valley) (Lab)

† Gelderd, Anna (South East Cornwall) (Lab)

Heylings, Pippa (South Cambridgeshire) (LD)

† Hughes, Claire (Bangor Aberconwy) (Lab)

† Khan, Afzal (Manchester Rusholme) (Lab)

† Opher, Dr Simon (Stroud) (Lab)

† Smith, Greg (Mid Buckinghamshire) (Con)

† Snowden, Mr Andrew (Fylde) (Con)

† Stone, Jamie (Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross) (LD)

† Thomas, Bradley (Bromsgrove) (Con)

† Whitby, John (Derbyshire Dales) (Lab)

† White, Katie (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero)

† Zeichner, Daniel (Cambridge) (Lab)

Guy Mathers, Committee Clerk

† attended the Committee

Fifth Delegated Legislation Committee

Wednesday 17 June 2026

[Carolyn Harris in the Chair]

Draft Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit and Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 2026

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit and Fees) (Amendment) Regulations 2026.

The regulations were laid before the House on 23 April. I will set out the purpose of nuclear safeguards and explain the proposed amendments to the Nuclear Safeguards (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. The amendments are about improving how the UK safeguard regime works, making it clearer, more practical to operate and more effective, as well as making our expectations and requirements of nuclear operators clear. They are also about aligning more closely with our international allies, including the United States, on this critical industry.

Nuclear safeguards are vital for non-proliferation. They help to show the International Atomic Energy Agency and the international community that civil nuclear material is being used as intended, and not being diverted into military or weapons programmes. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s international safeguards system has a strong track record of preventing nuclear proliferation. Safeguards are a vital part of the global nuclear energy system, alongside safety and security, and have helped to build confidence in international nuclear trade and co-operation.

For almost 50 years, the UK has been committed to meeting our international obligations and supporting international nuclear safeguards. Having a robust domestic safeguards regime matters not just for the UK, but for the whole international community. It sends a clear message to the world that the UK takes its responsibilities as a nuclear state seriously. It shows that we are acting in line with the implementation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear safeguards are vital for a successful civil nuclear industry.

Our domestic safeguards regime, which has been in place since the UK left the European Atomic Energy Community—Euratom—in 2020, has an important role in both operations and trade, helping to deliver growth, jobs and clean energy. Following Brexit, the 2019 regulations set out the legal framework and obligations for us to continue to meet our commitments. They were designed to be equivalent in effectiveness to the previous regime. The regulations set out requirements for operators of nuclear facilities and spell out the role of the Office for Nuclear Regulation as the regulator. The Nuclear Safeguards (Fees) Regulations 2021 enable the ONR to recover safeguard costs from nuclear operators. Since the regime was introduced five years ago, the UK has been steadfast in meeting its international safeguards obligations.

The amendments will strengthen the UK’s ability to uphold its commitments and support the wider international safeguards system, as well as contributing to the nuclear industry’s ability to participate in nuclear trade. The proposed amendments are drawn from a review carried out by the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero in 2023. We sought views on the amendments through a public consultation in 2025, and feedback from the industry and the ONR helped to shape our proposals. We wanted to balance operator responsibilities while allowing regulators enough time to do their work. We aim to minimise unnecessary impacts on the UK’s nuclear sector while ensuring that the UK can still meet its commitments.

I will briefly cover the three broad categories of amendments. Amendments in the first category remove provisions that are no longer fit for purpose for the UK. Some of these were transitional measures to manage the move from the previous Euratom system to the new ONR regime. In other cases, the provisions no longer apply in the UK’s nuclear safeguards context. These changes simplify the regulations and make them clearer.

The second and largest set of changes is about improving operability and clarifying requirements. The main change involves using IAEA design information questionnaires rather than Euratom’s basic technical characteristics format for reporting design information. The transition was agreed during the UK’s departure from Euratom. This change will align the UK internationally and support our civil nuclear partnerships, including with the United States.

Another important change involves making a stronger and more direct link between particular safeguards provisions and the UK’s international obligations. We are enabling the ONR to amend or remove these provisions when needed, which will ensure that the system stays up to date and works in practice. We are changing some timelines for submitting information to the ONR, with some being shortened to allow the ONR enough time to carry out checks and engage with operators before information is submitted to the IAEA. However, the changes are being limited, so that operators still have sufficient time to prepare the necessary information. We are also updating certain definitions to align them more closely with the language used by the IAEA.

The final set of changes is important in making sure the regulations are fit for purpose. These rules mean certain actions can be treated as criminal offences as a final point of escalation where needed. The 2021 fees regulations will also be updated due to the NSR19 changes so that the ONR can recover costs where applicable. However, we expect these new costs to be rare and minimal.

The amendments will strengthen nuclear safeguards regulation. The changes will enable us to deliver the civil nuclear safeguards regime in the UK more efficiently and effectively. The proposed amendments will help us to continue to meet international obligations as part of the wider responsible nuclear community and help support our nuclear industry in its trade and operational activities, which are vital to our country’s economic growth and energy security. I look forward to hearing what hon. Members have to say on the detail.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris. The Opposition do not intend to oppose this statutory instrument.

There is no doubt about the importance of a strong nuclear safeguards regime for the success of our nuclear industry. It must demonstrate to the world that civil nuclear material is not being used for malign purposes in the United Kingdom. That is precisely why the last Government legislated to create Britain’s current nuclear safeguards regime, so that the UK would remain an independent and responsible nuclear state after leaving the European Atomic Energy Community. It is also why the last Government recognised the importance of working closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency to design a safeguards regime that reflects the sophistication of our nuclear industry.

I welcome the fact that the post-implementation review for those regulations found that the United Kingdom’s new domestic nuclear safeguards had been successful in equalling the level of the safeguards that Britain had as part of Euratom and that we retained industry and international trust in our safeguards regime. The review also recommended certain parts that could either be improved and clarified or that had served their purpose and could now be removed. As I understand, the Government are seeking to implement several of these recommendations in these regulations.

I have a few questions. It is clear from the responses to the consultation for these regulations that the nuclear site operators and other industry parties have concerns about the practicalities of many of the Government’s proposed changes.

Nuclear energy is one of the largest employers in Fylde at the Springfields site in Westinghouse. It is a huge site that is licensed and has capacity to do an awful lot more for the nuclear fuel market in the UK. Does the shadow Minister share my concern that we have to make the site as internationally competitive as possible to get inward investment?

I am grateful to my hon. Friend for that. His point speaks to the practicalities of these regulations, and I join him in his ambition for his constituency and the wider nuclear industry in the UK to be the absolute global gold standard. We must be competitive to ensure our energy, security and economic growth in the United Kingdom.

Although a strong nuclear safeguards regime is necessary for our civil nuclear industry to function—nobody questions that—the Government must ensure that they are not placing unworkable burdens on the nuclear industry. Will the Minister confirm whether nuclear site operators have now agreed to the amended proposals on notification timings for design information changes and the import and export of nuclear material, given that most respondents in the consultation initially opposed those changes?

Secondly, will the Minister clarify what support will be made available to nuclear site operators during the proposed transition period to adopt the IAEA’s design information questionnaires, given the concerns raised by operators about the extra burdens that updating their processes and training their staff would entail?

Thirdly, will the Minister clarify whether the Government intend to provide further guidance on the number of qualified staff required by operators to meet their accountancy and control obligations given the concerns raised by operators over what would be considered an adequate number of staff?

His Majesty’s loyal Opposition have been clear in our support for building new nuclear power, the only form of energy that can provide fully clean and reliable power. A strong nuclear safeguards regime is inseparable from that aim, and the Government must ensure they are giving operators the support they need to meet their safeguarding obligations.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Harris.

My party supports this statutory instrument updating our nuclear safeguards regime. Removing outdated Euratom transitional provisions and aligning our reporting framework with the International Atomic Energy Agency is diligent housekeeping that a serious nuclear nation must undertake and I believe that we are a serious nuclear nation. We have real nuclear ambitions. Sites at Hinkley, Sizewell, and, dare I pronounce it, Wylfa—my apologies to all Welsh present—demonstrate that the next generation of clean, reliable, low-carbon energy can be generated for many decades to come. It is a hugely important part of how we are going to do things in the future and a robust safeguards regime is the foundation on which that future must be built.

I apologise to my neighbour across the Minch, the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar, because this is something I have already said at an all-party parliamentary group today. It is a terrible thing, in line with what was said by the hon. Member for Fylde, that we have a licensed site at Dounreay in my constituency with a highly skilled workforce and a local population that would welcome the next generation of small modular reactors—Rolls-Royce has told me that it would go there like a shot—but we have a Scottish Government that stands absolutely in its way. That is despite the fact that the most recent opinion polls demonstrate that a majority of the Scottish public support nuclear and accept it as part of our energy mix for the future.

I put that on the record and I make no apologies—except for a partial apology to my neighbour across the Minch, the hon. Member for Na h-Eileanan an Iar, because he may be getting a little bored of me. That is why I strongly support this statutory instrument.

I thank hon. Members for their valuable contributions. As many of us have come from the Jo Cox event, I would like to start with what is “more in common”. I think that we are agreed on the global gold standard towards nuclear, both on safeguarding and the opportunity for our international competitiveness, and that is a shared vision. The other shared vision is on nuclear in Scotland; that is a vision that the Government entirely share and will try and deliver.

Would the Minister be kind enough to use what influence she can on the Scottish Government to make them see the error of their ways?

I have two excellent colleagues who serve in Scotland and who do a lot of work on that, but I will endeavour to take it back and make sure we do everything we can to try and influence those decisions.

As I set out in my opening remarks, these amendments to the nuclear safeguards regulations will strengthen the UK’s ability to continue to meet our international obligations. At the same time, they will support the operations and trade that are central to the nuclear sector’s contribution in the UK’s growth and clean energy space.

In terms of the specific questions raised, I hope that the hon. Member for Mid Buckinghamshire noticed that we gave credit to the previous Government for launching the 2023 review and have built on the changes that they instigated. We have extended further timelines of proposals since and have been in consultation with the industry in terms of transitions. We are also in further consultation with the operators, but they have given us clear feedback. We want to make sure that this is practical, but we have been talking for quite a long time and we feel that we are in a good position to move forward. There is a number of qualified staff to be determined by the operators to meet their obligations, and while we have given an indication, it is up to them to deliver that.

I hope that I have provided the necessary assurances for the Committee to approve the regulations, but I am very happy to continue the conversation at another point. I commend the draft regulations to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Committee rose.

Draft Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2026

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Christine Jardine

† Amos, Gideon (Taunton and Wellington) (LD)

† Bacon, Gareth (Orpington) (Con)

† Baker, Alex (Aldershot) (Lab)

† Brickell, Phil (Bolton West) (Lab)

† Forster, Mr Will (Woking) (LD)

† Griffith, Dame Nia (Llanelli) (Lab)

† Griffiths, Alison (Bognor Regis and Littlehampton) (Con)

† Jenkin, Sir Bernard (Harwich and North Essex) (Con)

† Kirkham, Jayne (Truro and Falmouth) (Lab/Co-op)

† Onn, Melanie (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)

† Pennycook, Matthew (Minister for Housing and Planning)

† Poynton, Gregor (Livingston) (Lab)

† Reader, Mike (Northampton South) (Lab)

† Rhodes, Martin (Glasgow North) (Lab)

† Simmonds, David (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)

† Turner, Laurence (Birmingham Northfield) (Lab)

† Vince, Chris (Harlow) (Lab/Co-op)

Jack Edwards, Committee Clerk

† attended the Committee

Sixth Delegated Legislation Committee

Wednesday 17 June 2026

[Christine Jardine in the Chair]

Draft Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2026

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the draft Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025 (Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2026.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Jardine. The draft regulations were laid before the House on 27 April. The Government were clear in their manifesto that housing need in England cannot be met without planning for growth on a larger-than-local scale. That is why we committed to introducing effective new mechanisms for cross-boundary strategic planning.

To honour that commitment, we legislated for an England-wide system of strategic plan making in the Planning and Infrastructure Act 2025, which received Royal Assent in December last year. The Act inserted a new part 1A into the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, placing a requirement on strategic planning authorities—be they mayoral or non-mayoral strategic authorities, or upper-tier county councils and unitary authorities—most of which, but not necessarily all, will be grouped together to prepare a document called a spatial development strategy, or SDS.

An SDS will form part of the development plan that local planning authorities must determine planning applications in accordance with, unless material considerations indicate otherwise. Local plans produced by local planning authorities will be required to be in general conformity with the relevant spatial development strategy. SDSs, as we discussed throughout the progress of the Bill in Committee, are not big local plans; instead, they will be high-level spatial frameworks for housing growth and infrastructure investment across sub-regional areas. They will be able to identify broad locations for development and establish the infrastructure required to support it, and they will be able to redistribute housing and other development needs between local planning authorities.

The draft regulations make two minor, consequential amendments to support the implementation of the new strategic plan-making system, which we intend to commence later this year through a package of regulations. The first amendment concerns the procedure to be followed during the examination of a spatial development strategy. Unless the Secretary of State directs otherwise, a draft SDS must be examined by a person appointed by them. The matters to be examined are for the examiner to determine, and the examination does not have to cover every aspect of the proposed strategy.

The draft national planning policy framework sets out that the purpose of the examination should be to assess that relevant procedural requirements have been met and that the strategy is sound, alongside any other matters that the examiner considers appropriate. Draft regulation 2 will amend section 114 of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act to allow the Lord Chancellor to make rules under section 9 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992, governing the procedures for examinations. Any such regulations will support the effective examination of a strategy.

The second amendment concerns marine plans. Draft regulation 3 amends paragraph 1 of schedule 6 to the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 to require a marine plan authority to notify a strategic planning authority whose area adjoins, or is adjacent to, marine plan areas, of its intention to prepare a marine plan. That requirement already applies to local planning authorities, and extending it will enable strategic planning authorities to consider how they wish to participate in the marine planning process and to put in place appropriate arrangements for that participation.

I trust that the Committee agrees that these minor, consequential regulations are necessary and that it will support the effective implementation of the new system of spatial development strategies.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Jardine, for the first time. I welcome the opportunity to sit opposite the Minister—I appreciate the remarks that he has made—and to address this draft statutory instrument on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition.

The Planning and Infrastructure Act was a mammoth undertaking and has in many ways transformed how our planning system operates. In this House and in the other place, one of the key areas of concern for the Opposition when the Bill was being debated was local consent, democracy and control. The Opposition keenly recognise the importance of getting Britain building—we share that desire with the Government—be it more homes, more transport links or more new infrastructure. However, we acknowledge that that requires change in how the issues are addressed. For too long it has been too expensive, too cumbersome and too controversial to see major housing and infrastructure projects through to complete realisation. That is why the overarching ambition to streamline the planning process is welcome and is something that we in the Opposition are sympathetic to.

Although the regulations are, according to the civil servants who wrote the accompanying explanatory notes,

“consequential and/or minor and technical in nature”,

they continue a worrying trend of centralisation that I hope the Minister will comment on in a moment. Through the regulations, the Government will make England-wide the system of spatial development strategies: a form of sub-regional mandatory strategic planning. The spatial development strategies are plans that look ahead a minimum of two decades and set the framework for local plans. For democratically elected local authorities, that means 20 years of subordinating the democratically accountable local plan to the “high-level documents”. However, it is not hard to see how that inevitably leads to institutional conflict.

I take London as the example. In London, the spatial development plan is known as the London plan and is produced by the Mayor of London. Far from being a high-level strategic document, it is a 526-page tome containing more than 100 separate policies—often of a very granular and sometimes conflicting nature, which makes navigating the system excessively complex. In an area as huge and varied as Greater London, the “one size fits all” approach to the London plan is often in conflict with boroughs’ local plans. Given that spatial development strategies produce a mandatory framework, what recourse of action is available to local councils and local people who find it hard to reconcile the local plan of their local area with the determination of the overriding strategy? How will their voices continue to be heard?

Secondly, and most importantly, I must press the Minister again to adopt a genuinely brownfield approach. This is not the first time we have conversed, debated and potentially sparred over this issue; there is widespread concern. Will the Minister make it clear how he intends to ensure that any long-term strategies encourage a “brownfield first” approach? How will he ensure that the spatial development strategies do not give a new and undemocratic weight to greenbelt developments by overriding any elements of local plans that currently prioritise brownfield development? The Government have spoken before about their reluctance to enshrine a genuine brownfield approach into law, but the Opposition believe it is far better that we deal with the issues now, rather than sandwich them in at a later and perhaps overdue date.

Finally, we were told that a primary aim of the Planning and Infrastructure Act was to streamline and speed up the planning process. What assessment has the Minister made of the potential for the statutory inquiries that he has just referred to, authorised under regulation 2, to increase the amount of time necessary to get the planning system moving, rather than enlivening and quickening the process? Those important questions drive into the heart of the purpose of the very Act that the regulations seek to enforce. I hope that when the Minister sums up, he will address those points and provide the assurances necessary to make the system workable.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Jardine. I have some quick questions that I probably ought to have raised in an intervention. They relate to regulation 3, which will impact the Marine Management Organisation.

What additional burdens will the regulation put on the MMO? Have discussions been had with the MMO about adding the new strategic planning authority to the list? It does not sound as though there will be many new burdens, but has that definitely been checked? Might additional costs be incurred by the MMO as a result? Also, what would the relationship be between the MMO and the strategic planning authority? Would either have a veto over plans that are put forward?

I just want to get a sense of what the Minister anticipates the relationship between the strategic planning authority and the MMO will look like.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Jardine. It is not the first time I have done so as part of a Committee to discuss planning regulations—I am sure, Ms Jardine, that you look forward to debating these as much as I do.

The Liberal Democrats are sympathetic to the need for strategic planning and welcome its being rolled out for strategic authorities; we made that point during the passage of the Bill. However, we also made the point that we should not load this requirement on to hard-pressed unitary authorities. For example, my local authority in Somerset is struggling to begin an enormous and expensive local plan exercise, under which it would be required to find a 46% increase in the number of housing plots in Somerset, which is 75,000 plots all together. It is not reasonable to, at the same time, expect county councils or unitary authorities, acting on their own, to begin work on a spatial development strategy.

I understand that in the regulations there is a provision for authorities to combine to achieve that—indeed, Somerset council is trying to combine. It is part of the Wessex partnership, but the partnership’s bid for mayoral status was pushed back by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, so it is unable to form a mayoral strategic authority. Therefore, Somerset council, like many other county councils and unitary authorities around the country, will be expected to undertake the work. Although we support the spirit of there being spatial development strategies for strategic authorities, we are unable to support the regulations, given the huge extra burden on county councils and unitary authorities, as we raised during the passage of the Bill.

In addition, we do not feel that the regulations have a sufficiently “brownfield first” approach. During the passage of the Bill, we also highlighted the lack of any statutory right to be heard in the plan-making process. The SDS gives us further cause for concern about the implementation of that aspect of the Planning and Infrastructure Act.

I am grateful for the opportunity to say a few words. Can we first admit that the Government’s policy of building all these houses is not going terribly well, and that it is not a great success strategically? Nobody in the house building industry or in local government believes that the Government will achieve their target.

I do not hold the Minister himself responsible for this confusion, but the question at the centre of my remarks is: what do we mean by the word “strategy”? I have worked on this subject during my time as a Member of Parliament. I chaired the Public Administration Committee—and then, the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee—for nearly 10 years, during which we produced a stream of reports about strategic thinking and strategy in Government.

At the end of the last Parliament, the Liaison Committee, which I chaired at the time, produced a report about how Select Committees could help and enable Government to have more strategic thinking behind their policy and implementation, and we recommended a definition for strategy. In this Government’s response to the report, they said that they would adopt that definition, but I do not see any evidence that they have.

These spatial strategies are, in truth, plans, not strategies. A strategy is an active process—a doing word. When someone creates a strategy, they do lots of planning, and lots of plans will go into it, but a strategy constantly evolves in the light of events and changes in circumstances. One of the reasons why so many things go wrong in Government is that people think that they are being strategic, but actually they are just writing down a plan and forgetting about it, rather than thinking rationally.

The Government response to the Liaison Committee’s report said:

“Strategy in government is the coherent mobilisation of capabilities, levers, resources and partnerships towards successfully achieving public policy outcomes.”

Where is the evidence of that in, for example, the Government’s policy on house building? In my constituency, there is an ambitious project to build 7,500 new homes. I am grateful to the Minister for receiving delegations making representations about that.

Order. Sorry to interrupt, but we need to stay within the scope of the regulations; talking about individual strategies and individual constituencies goes beyond that. Could we stay within the scope of the regulations, please?

I think I am within the scope of the regulations, Ms Jardine, because the amendments relate to the use of the term “strategy” in the primary legislation. I do not think I am out of order, but I will not dwell on the matter or test your patience. I have made the point.

I am making a speech, which I am entitled to do.

In the case I mentioned, where there is supposedly a strategy, we seem to be planning to build a garden community without the crucial link road being in place before the house building starts. That is a big problem. Will the Minister take back to the Department the question of whether the Government agree about what “strategy” means? Are they integrating the much more agile definition of strategy into the way they operate, so that we get better public policy outcomes? That is what the whole process was intended to achieve.

Incidentally, the Minister might draw on the national strategy playbook drawn up by the Cabinet Office in the first 12 months of this Government, which is apparently being implemented across Government. I do not feel that this type of reform is reaching into the entrails of his Department, which is responsible for so much that requires strategic thinking.

I thank right hon. and hon. Members for their considered contributions and questions, which I will try to address in turn.

It is first worth making clear that the two minor and consequential amendments before us do not implement the new strategic plan-making system. We will bring forward a package of statutory instruments in the autumn to switch on the main provisions of that system. As I made clear in my speech, the two minor and consequential amendments do two very simple things. One provides for the Lord Chancellor to make examination rules. The final content will be clear when we lay those rules, which we intend to do in the autumn; they will be largely technical and procedural in nature. The other simply requires marine plan authorities to notify strategic planning authorities as well as local planning authorities that they intend to make a marine plan. I hope that that clarifies what the two amendments are about.

On the points made by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Orpington, I do not want to relitigate all the debates we had in Bill Committee; I well understand the concerns expressed by Opposition Members about local input. It is important to reiterate a couple of things. Spatial development strategies will not allocate individual sites. As I said, they are high-level frameworks for housing growth and investment—they are not big local plans. Local plans will have to conform with them, but local planning authorities still have to develop local development plans. That is where decisions about which sites are appropriate come within the context of national planning policy—a “brownfield first” national planning policy.

As the shadow Minister knows, we strengthened the policy requirements on previously developed land in our December 2024 update to the national planning policy framework. We have gone even further in the new NPPF, on which we have just consulted, and we will respond in due course to that.

These are very high-level spatial development strategies. We do not want them all to be London plans; if they were, that would not represent success. London has very particular development needs. The legislative basis for SDSs is the London framework, but as I have said these plans are much more high-level. We are not aiming to replicate the London plan across the country.

The Opposition are grateful to the Minister for the Government’s shift on prioritising brownfield.

I seek clarification. The Minister touched on the preparation of marine plans. How do those engage the role of the Crown Estate, which owns the seabed and foreshore around the coastline of the UK? Let me pick up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex. If, for example, an infrastructure project required the extraction of gravel, the construction of a new port, access to ferries or the construction of a bridge, all those could engage the Crown Estate. Have the Government considered that?

We have, to the extent that marine plans impact on spatial development strategies; I will outline the relationship when I respond to the questions asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes. To be clear, the regulation power that we are talking about is a simple notification requirement on SDSs to ensure joined-up plan making. The Crown Estate is involved with marine plans, obviously, and I will set out how many there are across the country and how that relates, but this is a simple change in scope.

I touched on brownfield land. I want to make clear where the democratic input comes from and who has to produce spatial development strategies: combined authorities, both mayoral and non-mayoral; combined county authorities, both mayoral and non-mayoral; upper-tier county councils; and unitary authorities. All will have a duty to produce a spatial development strategy. Those authorities, as I said, are known as strategic planning authorities.

The Government, however, will be able to group any of those authorities together to jointly produce a spatial development strategy, through a committee known as a strategic planning board. In those areas where, for example, a mayor is not in place and there is not an obvious geography to take forward an SDS, a combination of authorities will be put together to come up with an SDS through a strategic planning board. Each authority will have a voice on the planning board.

I should touch on the geography of an SDS. As hon. Members will know, in February and March the Government undertook a national consultation seeking views on proposed geographies for which spatial development strategies should be produced. That included proposals about which authorities will be grouped together under a strategic planning board. We intend to publish a response to that consultation in the summer.

Regulations will be needed to establish each strategic planning board. Before the regulations are laid, the affected authorities must be formally consulted. We intend to begin laying regulations to establish those boards after the summer recess, as I said; at that point, we will confirm the geographies. Local people will have a chance to input into the strategies, whether they come through the individual authorities involved or the mayoral link.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes knows, marine planning is the process for managing the use of marine resources in a sustainable and co-ordinated manner. It ensures that the right activities happen in the right place, at the right time and in the right way. To encourage sustainable development, marine plans guide those who use and regulate the marine area, while considering the environment, economy and society.

Marine plans operate alongside land-use planning systems to ensure a holistic approach to managing the coastal and marine environments. The six marine plans in England cover 11 marine plan areas. I come back to the specific change we are making through this amendment: it is just a notification—no veto is involved on the part of the strategic planning authority. It is being made so that we can ensure that, in areas where a marine plan abuts a spatial development strategy area, there is co-ordination and that the marine plan can be taken account of in decision making by the strategic planning authority producing the SDS.

I consider these to be simple, straightforward, minor and consequential amendments. We will have a chance to debate more fully the more substantive amendments that come when we establish the new strategic plan-making system.

The right hon. Gentleman will forgive me if I do not take a sideline into a philosophical discourse on the meaning of a strategy or of a report that I do not think he named and I do not think pertains to my Department. We are introducing a system of strategic planning, on which I think there is widespread consensus across the House.

The removal of any effective mechanism for cross-boundary co-operation has caused a variety of issues. The duty to co-operate does not work effectively and we have to put it back in place. The draft regulations allow us to do that. On that basis, we will have a series of SDSs that provide a high-level housing growth and infrastructure framework.

If the right hon. Gentleman’s intervention is about the actual regulations that we are debating, I will give way.

It is about the draft regulations, because they include the word “strategy”. The Minister cannot escape the consequences of that. The report to which I referred was a Liaison Committee report—

Order. The strategy was debated during the progress of the Bill through Parliament. It is not consequential to the draft regulations.

If the right hon. Gentleman wants to write to me about the whole of Government report that he cites—I do not think that he has mentioned the title—I will happily consider some of the lessons learned from it and how they might apply to my Department. On that basis, I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Committee rose.

Customs (Tariff and Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2026

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chair: Paula Barker

† Barros-Curtis, Mr Alex (Cardiff West) (Lab)

† Baxter, Johanna (Paisley and Renfrewshire South) (Lab)

Cooper, Daisy (St Albans) (LD)

† Glindon, Mary (Newcastle upon Tyne East and Wallsend) (Lab)

† Greenwood, Lilian (Lord Commissioner of His Majestys Treasury)

† Juss, Warinder (Wolverhampton West) (Lab)

† Mak, Alan (Havant) (Con)

† Reynolds, Mr Joshua (Maidenhead) (LD)

† Rushworth, Sam (Bishop Auckland) (Lab)

Sewards, Mark (Leeds South West and Morley) (Lab)

† Simmonds, David (Ruislip, Northwood and Pinner) (Con)

† Slinger, John (Rugby) (Lab)

† Stephenson, Blake (Mid Bedfordshire) (Con)

† Strathern, Alistair (Hitchin) (Lab)

† Thomas, Gareth (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)

† Tomlinson, Dan (Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury)

† Wild, James (North West Norfolk) (Con)

Sara Elkhawad, Jennifer McCormick, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

The following also attended, pursuant to Standing Order No. 118(2):

Allister, Jim (North Antrim) (TUV)

Baldwin, Dame Harriett (West Worcestershire) (Con)

Lockhart, Carla (Upper Bann) (DUP)

Moore, Robbie (Keighley and Ilkley) (Con)

Race, Steve (Exeter) (Lab)

Seventh Delegated Legislation Committee

Wednesday 17 June 2026

[Paula Barker in the Chair]

Customs (Tariff and Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2026

I beg to move,

That the Committee has considered the Customs (Tariff and Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2026 (S.I., 2026, No. 572).

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mrs Barker. This is not my home turf; the Minister for Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda and Ogmore (Chris Bryant), has been leading on this legislation, but he is engaged on trade business in Turkey today, so—somewhat like a turkey voting for Christmas—I am here with this Committee, which is good. I am glad that the shadow Exchequer Secretary is joining us today.

The instrument updates the UK’s tariff schedule to implement certain elements of the Government’s steel strategy, as set out by the Secretary of State for Business and Trade in March 2026. Specifically, the instrument will increase to 50% the standard rate of import duty on certain steel products, and it includes provision to ensure that the standard 50% rate will apply in place of any preferential tariffs agreed in trade agreements with partner countries or applied unilaterally by the UK. However, as part of the UK’s commitment to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia’s illegal invasion, the preferential rates agreed with Ukraine will continue to apply. The instrument also includes provisions for goods that were already under contract when the new steel tariffs were made public, so that the new, increased rate will not be paid on those that are imported between 1 July and 30 September.

A strong steel sector is critical for our national security interests, but, as in many other countries, steel overcapacity is distorting markets, driving down prices and threatening the viability of our vital domestic steelmaking sector. That is a key reason why UK crude steel production has fallen by more than half in the past 10 years. Global steel overcapacity is rising; the OECD expects it to reach more than 700 million tonnes next year.

Without action, overcapacity will continue to endanger our ability to produce steel when we depend on it for secure and resilient domestic supply chains. That is why the Government believe that the instrument is necessary. It introduces part of a robust new steel trade measure so that the UK steel production industry has the long-term conditions it needs to continue to play its vital role in robust and secure domestic supply chains, including in relation to our growth-driving industrial strategy sectors, defence and other critical national infrastructure sectors.

The instrument will come into effect on 1 July, alongside an accompanying instrument made under the negative procedure. Together, the two instruments will legislate for the steel trade measure set out in the strategy. Taking account of the importance of steel production for the UK’s overall national security, we must ensure that the UK steel industry can survive and continue to produce the steel needed for national priorities, including defence and critical national infrastructure. I hope that colleagues will join me in supporting this instrument, which I commend to the Committee.

Let us be in no doubt that these regulations, if approved, would cause serious damage to our manufacturing sector and be likely to result in the loss of thousands of skilled jobs. They replace the expiring UK steel safeguard measure. Two weeks from today, manufacturing and engineering businesses will be hit with a 50% tariff on steel imports across 20 product categories. Bright bar, wire and stainless steel are captured for the first time. As the Minister says, preferential rates—aside from those for Ukraine—are also being taken away.

In justifying the policy, the Government have said that higher tariffs will apply only to steel that is, or could be, made in the UK, but the industry has said repeatedly to Ministers and to Opposition Members that that is not the case. Those firms are clear that UK mills cannot produce the grades and type of steel that their businesses require. I raised that issue with another of the Minister’s colleagues, the Industry Minister, during an urgent question at which a number of Labour Members spoke against the regulations; I look forward to contributions from members of this Committee along the same lines. When I raised the issue, the Minister said that there were three mills in the country that could, with investment and additional capacity, provide that—but let’s get real. If approved, these regulations come into effect in just two weeks. That is not enough time to stand up the investment and the production for the grades of steel, the specification and the volume that so many manufacturing businesses need.

I have met representatives of companies in my constituency and beyond, and their message is stark: the Government are jeopardising jobs in crucial sectors, in a flawed attempt to protect UK steelmaking. That approach fails to understand how supply chains in defence, aerospace and other sectors work and why these regulations will undermine our national security.

As the Minister says, the newly broadened commodity codes are set out in the tariff of the United Kingdom—the 18,053 pages of it—and the quotas that will accompany that rate will be in separate regulations. That means that the industry currently has no certainty. The regulations are a risk to manufacturing jobs. They have been rushed without an adequate evidence base. The codes are drawn so broadly that they catch manufacturers for whom no domestic alternative exists. The instrument simply will not achieve the Government’s aims, so the Opposition will not be supporting it today.

I acknowledge the Minister’s point about the global overcapacity of steel. The US, Canada and the EU have introduced similar tariffs, and domestic production is important to our national security. However, agreeing with the importance of steel production in the UK is not the same as agreeing with the approach that the Government are taking in the regulations. The downstream steel-using sector employs 300,000 workers; primary steelmaking employs 30,000. Any credible strategy must account for both sides of that equation. Let us be clear on what the regulations are: they are a 50% tax on steel that British manufacturers cannot always source domestically because it simply is not made here or is not produced in the necessary volumes. That is why industry is sounding the alarm at the scope.

The stated policy is to protect all steel products that could be made in the UK, covering 100% of domestic production, but the commodity codes are drawn so broadly that they are catching manufacturers for whom there is no viable domestic alternative. That will be felt by British manufacturers who rely on specialist steel to produce high-value components for aerospace, defence, Formula 1 motorsport, energy and precision engineering. Those impacted are the manufacturers, the fabricators, the engineers and the specialist processors who depend on steel inputs that are simply not available in the UK. Materials used in house building, rail, logistics centres, food warehouses, pharmaceutical facilities, roofing, cladding and other specialist building capability will be hit.

Another point that colleagues across the House raised in the urgent question is that the fabrication sector has warned that 30,000 jobs could be at risk from these regulations and the tariff they introduce, as overseas competitors simply ship in fabricated products tariff-free. Canada amended its tariffs to include fabricated steelworks. I look forward to the Minister explaining why the Government have chosen not to do the same.

Our defence sector was represented at a roundtable that I was at earlier this week with colleagues from the Liberal Democrats and other parties. Many of the specialist steels used by UK manufacturers are currently not produced, approved or supplied at scale in the UK in the required grades. That is particularly acute in categories 14 and 27, which are currently due to face 50% tariffs once significantly reduced quotas are exhausted. This is not simply a matter of flicking a switch and changing supplier: in many cases, the steels that are required, for example in aerospace, are subject to very strict technical approvals and to very lengthy certification requirements and customer specifications, with supplier approval often taking years.

As for the supply chain, these partnerships are decades in the making and UK producers are unable to say if they will be able to produce what is needed. Companies cannot work on the basis that something “could be produced in the UK”. They need the product now.

These regulations will come into effect, if approved by Members, in two weeks, so I have a clear ask to put to the Minister: will he at least remove categories 14 and 27 from the incoming tariff regime, where there is insufficient domestic production capability, ensuring that tariffs are not applied to specialist steels that the UK does not currently produce? If UK firms cannot access the material that they need at competitive prices because of the tariffs that these regulations introduce, its customers may cut UK production. They may well move sourcing overseas or relocate parts of the supply chain to avoid avoidable cost increases.

That is certainly something that Airbus was talking about in relation to the next generation of civil aerospace. Airbus is unlikely to come to the UK if the tariffs make us far less competitive than its three EU partners. The Confederation of British Metalforming reports that manufacturers are already reviewing offshoring options and moving abroad. The British Chambers of Commerce has warned that firms may need to halt production altogether or are considering relocating. Once manufacturing capability leaves the UK, it is very difficult to draw it back, particularly given the energy policy that this Government are following and the prices that flow as a result. As the CBM’s president has put it,

“you cannot protect upstream production at the expense of downstream survival.”

The Minister will doubtless be aware that Canada offers steel tariff relief through a remission framework, allowing Canadian businesses to request relief if they are unable to source specific steel imports domestically. What assessment have the Government made of such an approach? If companies can demonstrate that they cannot source the steel in the UK, the Government’s policy intent is that they should not be penalised. Such a relief scheme would achieve that aim.

If companies are effectively required to buy from UK producers, pricing will reflect the tariffs. Industry is already reporting that quotes for products are priced just below where the 50% tariff would fall. Who’d have thunk it? Vital inputs are made only by UK Steel, which is behind its planned levels of production and would of course then be a monopoly supplier. Firms have to risk either unpredictable supply or expensive imports.

Given the long-term fixed-price contracts that are common across the defence supply chain, involving tens of thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, a 50% tariff imposed through these regulations cannot easily be passed on, to say it lightly. One SME at the roundtable told me that it would mean an extra £1.2 million on a turnover of around £30 million, which it would simply be unable to fund.

Companies will be incentivised to move production overseas. Ministers should be listening to these sirens and acting before it is too late and jobs are offshored. Even at this late stage, what engagement is the Minister having—perhaps with his ministerial colleagues who are leading on much of the policy, and with industry—to ensure that costs are contained and downstream manufacturing is protected?

If the tariffs are approved, they will come into force and quota rates will apply, but the Government have already said that those rates will be substantially lower than under the steel safeguard. Cutting quota volumes by an estimated 60% overall and by up to 97% in some categories will be achieved through the negative procedure. In discussions with hon. Members, including Labour Members, the Business Minister said that the Government were still negotiating those changes and where the tariffs would sit. I understand that, and I understand that discussions are going on with the EU, but that means that companies still lack certainty before these measures come into force in two weeks.

I implore the Minister to ensure that tariff quota levels are set at a sufficient volume to avoid the huge damage to our industrial base that companies have made very clear is likely if things proceed on this basis. Will the Minister commit to keeping the regulations under review? At the moment, it is proposed that they be reviewed only every 12 months. That is utterly inadequate, given the risk we are all being told about by companies in our constituencies, so I hope he will commit to reviewing them more regularly.

Lastly, I turn to a topic that I raise regularly when the Treasury brings measures forward: the absence of a substantive and costed impact assessment. It is frankly astonishing, with a change of this magnitude, that the downstream effects have not been properly looked at by the Treasury or the Department for Business and Trade. The explanatory memorandum, such as it is, admits that these measures will “raise steel prices”,

“increase…costs for user industries”,

harm downstream businesses and

“impact Small or Micro Businesses”.

I wonder why the Government have not done a fully costed assessment of what that will mean for our aerospace, defence, construction and other sectors that rely on steel. Perhaps the Minister can explain that.

National steel capacity matters for defence, for national security and for supply chain resilience, but these regulations simply fail to achieve the Government’s objective. Instead, they pose a threat to 300,000 jobs in downstream manufacturing. Ministers say that they are listening, but they have not put forward any changes or any solutions to the problems raised by companies. There is still time—just—for them to do so and avoid the enormous damage that we are being warned about.

If Ministers are determined to press ahead, we have two further requests: first, that they delay the implementation of these tariffs for at least six months, to give manufacturers as much time as possible to adjust, and secondly that they develop more forensic definitions and exclude grade sizes and specifications of specialist steel that is not produced in the UK.

The Opposition will vote against this measure. We ask the Government urgently to reconsider their plans, and instead to protect jobs and promote economic growth.

Steel matters for our national security, for our defence and for our critical infrastructure, and it sustains jobs in every single part of the United Kingdom. British Steel supports thousands of jobs and more than £1 billion-worth of economic activity through its own operation and supply chain, as well as underpinning hundreds of thousands of jobs and several more billion pounds-worth of activity across the industries that depend on it.

This is an industry that is worth defending. It has been battered by President Trump’s trade war and by years of unfair practices from China. But supporting the goal is not the same as supporting the method, and the method before us today—a flat 50% tariff, sweeping away the preferential rates across 20 categories of steel—gets the balance badly wrong. It risks protecting one part of British industry by punishing another.

Two of those categories make the point very sharply: category 14, which covers stainless bars and light sections, and category 27, which covers cold-finished bars. Those are not commodity steel products bought by the tonne; they are long precision products on which aerospace, defence and motorsport rely, machined to fine tolerances and certified to exacting grades. Those are also categories in which Britain has little or no production at the volume that we need. A 50% tariff here will not redirect demand to British mills, because there are no British mills to redirect that demand to; it simply lands a 50% tax on those British businesses that need those products.

Hewland Engineering in my constituency is a fine example. It employs more than 120 people and turns over £15 million. It sells precision drivetrains for aerospace, defence and motorsport across the UK, Europe and Japan. The Government’s answer to Hewland and many other businesses is to buy British, but Hewland has looked at the list of approved domestic suppliers, and not a single one meets the grades or certifications that its customers require. This is not a company that is choosing to buy foreign steel over British steel. There is no domestic option, and yet from 1 July, Hewland faces a 50% tariff on the specialist steel that it needs.

That is the central flaw in the Government’s proposals: non-domestic availability. The specialist steel that is required for aerospace, defence and other sectors is not made here at the volumes that we need. It therefore should not have this 50% tariff applied to it.

Who bears the cost of the 50% tariff that the Government are proposing? All the downstream industries that put steel into engines and aircraft parts. They employ around 300,000 people across the country, but this blanket tariff, which is meant to protect, risks weakening that workforce and making it smaller.

The Government know that there is a problem here—that is why Ministers have been meeting industries about this issue for a long time—but it feels as if they are just ignoring these sectors entirely. In an urgent question today, I asked the Industry Minister about this. He said that if I wrote to him, he would help with the quotas and set out the proposals. If we are suggesting that this will happen on 1 July, writing to a Minister on 17 June to ask for some thoughts when we know it will take several weeks to get a response—probably beyond 1 July—will not be of any benefit.

This is not a steel strategy; it is a steel tax on domestic business. We will not support the regulations today, but if the Government intend to press ahead with them, I have some questions for the Minister. Will he consider delaying or tapering start dates to agree some mitigations with industry, removing categories with no realistic domestic capability, particularly in categories 14 and 27, and committing to exemptions for specialist steel that cannot be made at scale in the United Kingdom? Those businesses are crying out and sounding the horn to say that they are at risk of going under. I am worried that, if the Government do not listen to them, swathes of organisations and businesses in my constituency and others will just fold overnight.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mrs Barker. My Keighley and Ilkley constituency is home to several businesses that have major concerns about the impact of this statutory instrument on them and their employees. Airedale Springs, Olicana Products and GESIPA have all been in contact with me about the proposed new tariffs, by which they have been completely blindsided. One of the team at GESIPA described the impact of the tariffs as “devastating”. The managing director of Olicana Products has warned that if this heavy-handed legislation passes unchanged, it will trigger a catastrophic chain reaction across every single UK industry that is reliant on these metals.

Those businesses and business leaders have contacted me and many of my Conservative colleagues as they are deeply concerned about the steel industry. In their correspondence with me, they have been crystal clear that these measures, should they go ahead, will increase costs, reduce supply, weaken competitiveness and directly threaten thousands of manufacturing jobs, while doing little to increase domestic steel production. They are also concerned that the legislation is being rushed. They have had no time to adjust to the mechanisms that have been brought through, which will have severe cash-flow implications for their businesses.

Let me read out directly some of the emails that have been sent to me. Olicana Products said:

“We all want a thriving, strong UK steel sector. However, this poorly planned law will achieve the exact opposite. By choking off essential products”—

and imports that are coming in to their business—

“it will decimate our business and furthermore cause domestic steel consumption to plummet.

We need to act immediately to force a government U-turn before irreplaceable damage is done to our business, our livelihoods and our economy.”

Those are not my words. They are the words of a managing director who employs many of my Keighley and Ilkley constituents.

Diana Scholefield, the managing director of GESIPA—a business that has been running in my constituency for 52 years—contacted me because she is deeply worried about cash-flow challenges. The company tells me that, despite the increase in employer national insurance and minimum wage having a direct impact on its cash flow, this is the biggest challenge that it has faced in the 52 years it has been running. That will potentially have a direct impact on employment levels across my constituency.

In another email, Sean Parkinson, the managing partner of Airedale Springs, reiterated to me that:

“Our steel material suppliers consider that UK steel production capacity does not exist to replace many of the products being restricted”,

and that

“these measures will increase costs, reduce supply, weaken competitiveness and directly threaten thousands of UK manufacturing jobs”.

I say to the Minister—and all the Labour MPs sat opposite who seem to be more interested in looking at their mobile phones than at the detail of this legislation—that the explanatory memorandum states specifically that this delegated legislation is expected to have

“negative impacts on downstream businesses that use steel.”

It also states that

“the amendments in this instrument are likely to result in higher prices for steel products and an increase in costs for user industries”

and that:

“Outside of the steel and fabricated metals industries, there are likely to be impacts on the machinery and electrical equipment, aerospace, and automotive sectors. The largest user of steel, the construction industry, could also face an increase in costs.”

The memorandum also states that the instrument is most likely to impact “small and micro businesses”.

As we prepare to vote on this key piece of delegated legislation, which is due to come into force on 1 July, let me ask the Minister and Labour MPs a question. If they have read the impact assessment, as I assume they have—there is no costed impact assessment associated with the regulations, which is, I suspect, because the Government do not know what the consequences will be and do not want to put that into the public domain—why on earth are they comfortable voting for this legislation when they know its negative implications for many constituents employed in the manufacturing sector and for UK jobs? I certainly will not be supporting it.

I strongly support the points made by the Opposition. This is a rushed and ill-conceived piece of delegated legislation, and I have major concerns about its impact on Northern Ireland and the specialised steel in our defence sector, which is quite significant to the whole nation. There is real concerns about what will happen to that.

Northern Ireland is in a very difficult and different position. This regulation purports to apply to the whole of the United Kingdom, but I must question whether it really does or will. Northern Ireland is, because of the absurdity of being subject to EU law, already subject to EU quotas and tariffs on steel. In the main Chamber, the Minister for Industry talked earlier today about ongoing negotiations with the EU on this matter. However, legally, as things stand, the EU sadly has the status and sovereignty to decree the tariff regime in a part of this United Kingdom. It is absurd beyond measure, but that is the situation.

The rest of the world’s steel is already coming into Northern Ireland, and if we exceed the quota, it attracts a 25% tariff. Under EU rules, that is due to rise to 50%. Incredibly, GB steel coming into Northern Ireland has to pass through a full international customs border—the red lane—because no one can properly say that its ultimate manufacture would not be at risk of going into the EU. It therefore passes through the red lane and is subject to customs declarations and, in certain circumstances—if we exceed the quota—to tariffs.

It is not this Government or Parliament shaping and dictating the tariff rules in respect of steel in Northern Ireland. It seems that the Government are trying to align themselves with the EU provisions to diminish that situation as much as they can, but what if they do not succeed in their negotiation with the EU?

I would like the Minister to tell us what the Government are trying to achieve for Northern Ireland in this negotiation with the EU. Whatever they achieve, will steel entering Northern Ireland from the rest of the world continue to be subject not to UK laws, tariffs and quotas, but to EU laws, tariffs and quotas? What does that situation do not just for the coherence of our United Kingdom economy, but for the constitutional position of a part of this United Kingdom?

Could the Minister tell me what the consequences of proceeding with these regulations will be for GB steel entering Northern Ireland and not deemed a risk, although there will not be very much of that? What are the consequences for GB steel coming into Northern Ireland that is deemed at risk of moving into the EU in its finished form? It seems that it is the EU—not this Minister or Government—that is dictating and setting that framework.

Employers in my constituency are dependent on steel. We do not produce any steel in Northern Ireland, so we depend totally on exports. My employers are already subject to the 25% tariff for rest of the world, which is now going up to 50%. What is their future under these regulations? I do not see many answers. I do not even see that question addressed in the explanatory memorandum. We are a United Kingdom. If we are bringing in United Kingdom legislation, we should at least explain what the effect will be in each part of the United Kingdom. I want to hear from the Minister a clear explanation of what the impact of these regulations will be and how that sits with the supremacy that has been surrendered to the EU.

I thank Members for their contributions and questions in this debate on an important statutory instrument. It is right and proper that the Opposition have the chance to question and interrogate the Government’s decision making on the significant change that we are bringing forward.

It is worth understanding that the Government have been engaging in detail with industry on this since the announcement in March. My understanding is that a number of codes—nine, I think—have been changed since that announcement. That is as a result of engagement and meetings with industry—with those downstream sectors—by the Minister for Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Rhondda and Ogmore (Chris Bryant), and others on whether or not it is possible for them to access UK-produced steel.

The shadow Exchequer Secretary, the hon. Member for North West Norfolk, asked me about codes 14 and 27, which are of particular relevance to the aerospace and defence industries. The Under-Secretary of State for Business and Trade, my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North (Chris McDonald), was asked about that earlier today. He has been meeting with that sector today, I believe, to talk about the impact on them and to consider what the Government can do.

The shadow Exchequer Secretary also asked about a review. It is the Government’s intention to keep this under review, with a formal review point after 12 months, as he noted. On the quota levels, I take the point that there is uncertainty at the moment, given that we are approaching 1 July. I hope that, in line with good policymaking principles, we will be able to set out that detail as soon as possible for the businesses affected.

The hon. Member for Keighley and Ilkley is always good at representing the businesses in his constituency and making his points clearly and forcefully. I commend him for his remarks today.

Could the Minister explain, not only to me but to the businesses in my constituency of Keighley and Ilkley, why, if the explanatory memorandum accompanying the legislation clearly states that these regulations are

“expected to have negative impacts on downstream businesses that use steel”,

he and his Labour party are comfortable introducing it?

I was just coming to that point. As the hon. Gentleman and the shadow Exchequer Secretary have pointed out, the Government are not hiding from the impacts of the measures on some downstream sectors and businesses. He has just read out the explanatory memorandum that the Government themselves produced. The Government have taken a strategic view: in the end, we need a tariff and quota system that protects domestic steel so that, if the worst happens and we need to ensure that we have domestic supply in times of crisis for vital production here in the UK, we have it. Hon. Members know that we have seen a significant reduction in steel production in the UK—I believe a reduction of 50% over the past 10 years—and the representations that the hon. Member for Keighley and Ilkley, and individual businesses and business groups have made to Ministers over recent months have of course been taken into account and considered, but on balance the Government’s view on this strategic assessment is that, in the end, strong production and a strong downstream sector go hand in hand.

This is the kernel of the issue. The Minister is talking about protecting UK steel production, but as I and other colleagues have outlined, and as industry is furiously telling all MPs across the House, at the moment no UK production meets the demand that industry has, whether that is in the precision, the grading or the volume necessary. In two weeks’ time, however, a 50% tax is going to be slapped on businesses buying such steel, which they cannot get in the UK and for which they are forced to go overseas. How can that possibly be the right approach? Does he not recognise that that will lead to job losses and to businesses failing?

As I said, the Government have set out in the explanatory memorandum the fact that there will be an impact from the tariffs, from the 50% rate, but the Government’s view overall is that it is important to ensure that we have a strong and thriving domestic steel sector, which can help businesses here in the UK to weather, and to minimise their exposure to, global shocks, so that we can have a reliable and secure domestic supply. That is very important, and if we had continued on the path that we were on for the long term, we would have seen a continued decline in our domestic supply and in our ability to ensure resilience and security at times when we as a country might need them most.

The reality on the ground is very different. The demand required is 9.1 million tonnes per year, with 5.6 million tonnes being produced in the United Kingdom. We all want to see domestic production increase, but until we see that and allow it to happen, we cannot slap a 50% tariff on what we need to import to keep our manufacturing, our construction and our infrastructure sectors functioning, and to avoid supply chain complications, potential shortages and increased building costs. To my mind, this is a farming inheritance tax moment for the Government. If they do not pull back from it, they will see industry crippled across this United Kingdom—industries such as our manufacturing, our construction and our infrastructure. I encourage every Member in Committee to think long and hard before destroying our home-grown industries.

The existing framework falls away at the end of June. Opposition Members have suggested that where the Government wish to proceed, we should instead delay, but our concern is that that would leave the steel sector as a whole totally undefended and exposed to the significant oversupply of steel production across the world. We do not want to see continued degradation and reduction in our domestic steel production. In the end, that would be bad for our whole country—for businesses large and small, and not only those involved in steel production and manufacturing, but other businesses and our broader economy. That is the strategic assessment that the Government have made.

The Minister is being very generous with accepting interventions. I understand the point he is making about global oversupply; for example, in the housing sector there is an abundance of rebar, which is essentially very cheap, low-grade steel, as it is used in the construction industry, and demand is falling because of a general slowdown in construction. However, that product is completely different from the high-grade 409L steel used in specialist watch-making and medical instruments.

Harefield hospital in my constituency relies on that steel for highly specialised medical instruments that are made in the UK, including small parts such as stents, which keep people’s hearts pumping. Simply saying that there is a generalised global oversupply does not remotely help the individual businesses in the UK that depend on the supply of highly specialised products. Given that the Minister said that the Government have a strategy and want to take a strategic approach, how will they ensure that supplies are present in the United Kingdom before adding 50% to the cost of British manufacturers, upon which our NHS, as well as the other sectors we have heard about, depends?

I thank the hon. Member for his question; he makes an important and valid point. Of course, if the different types of steel, products and manufacturing are not and cannot be produced in the UK, the 50% tariff that we are debating will not apply. Also, this House has not yet passed the quota levels, and Ministers are continuing to engage with businesses and industry. In preparation for today’s debate, I spoke to the Ministers who have led the work on this legislation, so I know that engagement has taken place in great depth over recent months to make sure that the Government account for concerns and get this difficult but important decision right.

On the complexities and challenges around the operation of the Windsor framework in Northern Ireland, and goods being “at risk” or “not at risk”, it is, of course, a difficult and sensitive issue. Broadly, the Government’s approach is to continue to find ways to reduce friction and to deepen our relationship with the European Union. Just yesterday, the Prime Minister confirmed that on 22 July, there will be a summit, during which we can hopefully make progress on a sanitary and phytosanitary agreement and other areas. I am afraid I will have to disappoint the hon. and learned Member for North Antrim, as I cannot give more detail than was given in the House this morning by the Ministers leading on the policy, but the EU and the UK are committed to working together on seeking a solution, and are engaging constructively.

Of course, this issue is important for businesses and communities in Northern Ireland. As a Minister for His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, I have responsibility, in part, for the operation of the Windsor framework, and I have been looking with my officials at what more we can do to help.

I sense that the Minister is either giving way or looking for a note with the answer to a couple more of my questions; I thought I would give him the opportunity to find a note.

I referred to the Canadian example. Canada provides relief to companies that are unable to source steel in Canada that is part of the tariff regime. The Minister keeps saying that if it cannot be produced in the UK, it will not be covered by tariffs, so that should be a simple thing to do. These codes will inevitably include products that are not able to be manufactured in the UK, so why can companies not get relief if that proves to be the case?

Of course the Government will continue to engage with industry and we will listen to any representations made. I am interested in the example from Canada, and I will personally make sure that it is passed on to the Minister with lead responsibility.

Even if Members are not fully satisfied with my responses, I hope they feel that I have endeavoured to take a range of interventions and respond as well as I can to the points raised. I hope Members can see that the goal of the instrument is to implement policy in line with the steel strategy to support the UK steel sector as a whole. For those reasons, I commend the legislation to the Committee.

Question put.

Resolved,

That the Committee has considered the Customs (Tariff and Miscellaneous Amendments) (No. 4) Regulations 2026 (S.I., 2026, No. 572).

Committee rose.