Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Electronic devices switched off, please, and no teas or coffee in the Committee Room. Members may remove their jackets if they wish to do so and, exceptionally, if any Members wish to remove ties, because of the weather I am prepared to permit that as well.

Clause 58

NICE recommendations: decisions about time for compliance

I beg to move amendment 78, in clause 58, page 43, line 40, at end insert—

“1. (8B) Regulations under subsection (8A) must include provision about the period within which NICE guideline NG206 on myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME) must be complied with.

2. (8D) The Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NICE guideline NG206, including the extent to which integrated care boards and relevant NHS bodies have implemented recommendations relating to ME specialist services and severe or very severe ME.”

The amendment would require that a period must be set within which the NICE guideline NG206 on ME must be complied with by ICBs and other health bodies. Furthermore, the Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NICE guideline NG206 across the NHS in England.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

The amendment was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells and Mendip Hills (Tessa Munt) on behalf of the approximately 1.2 million people in England who live with myalgic encephalomyelitis, because five years after the introduction of National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guideline NG206, little has changed. Service provision according to NG206 remains patchy and poor, with many patients having traumatic experiences. The amendment would require a period to be set in which integrated care boards and other health bodies must comply with the guideline, and the Secretary of State must publish an annual statement on compliance with NG206 across the NHS in England.

The introduction of the guideline after sustained campaigning represented a major reform after years in which ME was treated as a psychiatric condition and patients were pushed to follow graduated exercise therapy. Often, GET had disastrous consequences, precipitating serious deteriorations that patients never recovered from. Credit is due to the hon. Member for Washington and Gateshead South (Mrs Hodgson), the current Minister for Public Health and Prevention, for her determination when in opposition to bring about the change.

In a written answer published last week, the Minister for Public Health and Prevention confirmed that all ICBs have a statutory obligation to ensure sufficient care provision for their population, but the experience of those with ME is that that obligation is far from being fulfilled. In some ICBs, no services for ME are commissioned; in others, the provider has a history of providing services that reflect not NG206, but the old and condemned approach of GET. Some services are provided out of psychiatry departments, which is a huge red flag for those with ME, and information on the quality of services is patchy. Results from a big survey of more than 5,000 people with ME or long covid in late 2025 painted a bleak picture: more than half said that they had been disbelieved by an NHS healthcare official, one in three had been made to feel that their ME was their own fault, and almost two in five had had an encounter with a clinician that was traumatic or traumatising.

Five years after its introduction, NG206 is far from being complied with, and so members of the ME community—approximately 1.2 million people, as I said—are desperately asking that something be done to address the situation. The amendment represents a route that offers hope for many long-neglected and mistreated people. I do not intend to press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure us about improving the consistency of provision for people with ME.

Moving to the clause generally, we broadly support the intention, but think that more safeguards need to be built into the principle, given the powers that are being handed to the Secretary of State. The clause makes provision for the period for compliance with a NICE recommendation, but gives no detail of how that will work in practice or how often the Secretary of State will change the standard three-month rule that NICE requires. No ceiling is put on the compliance period, no criteria govern when the period may be extended, and there is no duty to consult or set out reasoning.

What will the process be when the Secretary of State intervenes in the period of time for compliance with a NICE recommendation? We thought that there would be some mix of evidence requirements, consultation, statement of reasons, impact assessment and some kind of parliamentary scrutiny. The Secretary of State should at least have to set out their reasoning why the new power has been used. The value of the current requirement is almost entirely due to the compliance period being short and fixed. The three-month rule gives a positive NICE recommendation practical force. A power to lengthen or vary that period without constraint weakens the requirement in substance while leaving it formally intact. The right is not removed but its timing is made discretionary. For a patient awaiting treatment, that does not amount to the same thing.

A variation power is not new. Since the introduction of the budget impact test in 2017, NHS England has been able to apply to NICE to extend the funding period for medicines with a budget impact above a defined threshold, but, importantly, that period is criteria-based, triggered by a defined financial threshold, subject to a defined process and time-limited in effect. We are not overtly opposed to the power in principle, but more safeguards should be built into the criteria for its application. I would be grateful for some guidance from the Minister on that.

I have sympathy with the principle behind amendment 58, in the name of the hon. Member for Wells and Mendip Hills. The hon. Member for North Shropshire is right to say that individuals with ME have not always received the best quality care. In many cases, ME is a debilitating and incredibly frustrating condition, and around 10% to 25% of sufferers have severe ME, meaning that they are housebound or bedbound. We know that some patients are sadly not believed by medical professionals.

In 2021, NICE said that most medical students have little or no training on the condition. The Government have previously committed to increasing the uptake of ME modules among NHS professionals. What progress has been made on that in the last couple of years? The Government also committed in the ME/CFS action plan to develop and run a public awareness initiative, with implementation expected by May this year. Has the Department developed that initiative yet? If not, what is responsible for the delay? It is not marked as complete on the Government website.

The amendment would put guidance for medical professionals into legislation, though, and my concerns about that are twofold. First, it may slow down improvements in the future. If individuals have to legally follow that guidance, how can they innovate and improve treatment without having to come back to Parliament for more primary legislation? That will take time and may mean that people with ME get worse rather than better care in the short term.

The requirement would also limit clinical judgment. A patient may have a particular set of symptoms or conditions or be on a particular set of medications that mean that the doctor or clinician looking after them needs to vary from the guidance. NICE intends the guidance to be just that, guidance, not law, but if guidance becomes law, the doctor or clinician will not be able to vary from it. My concern is that the amendment would be overly restrictive. Although it is well-intentioned, and it is a good idea to ensure that guidance is followed where possible, it would be too rigid. I therefore do not support the amendment, while continuing to support the aim of better treatment.

Clause 58 amends the Health and Social Care Act 2012 by inserting a new section 237(8A), which states:

“Provision made under subsection (8)(b) may include provision about the period within which a recommendation is to be complied with (including provision for the period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State).”

At the moment, NICE technology appraisals check the value of a product, whether a drug or a technology, then NICE makes a recommendation. It is then supposed to be the case that within 90 days or three months, ICBs ensure that those technologies are available, but we know that in the real world it can take longer—sometimes 12 to 24 months—for some things to become available. That could be because technology needs to be bought or training needs to take place.

I understand why there could be variation and why the Government may want to consider varying the period, but it is not clear why they need to do so in legislation, because it is possible now to vary the period on an individual basis. For example, the Government imposed a five-year limit rather than a 90-day limit for the introduction of hybrid closed loop systems for diabetes, because that is a technology that requires proper training and they were never going to be rolled out in such a short period. The other product that notably has a longer time is tirzepatide, which is more commonly known as Mounjaro. I suspect that that is down to cost, but I am not certain.

Why do the Government want to change the 90 days? The patient’s right to treatment with a NICE-approved product within 90 days will become a right to getting the product when the Secretary of State says so. That is not really a right at all, because it does not give patients any comfort and may mean that products are received later. The Government have put this power into the Bill, so they clearly intend to use it. Given that they have the power to vary on an individual basis, why do they need the power to vary on a blanket basis? Do they intend to extend the 90-day limit across the board? If so, by how much? There is no ceiling. The Committee received written evidence from Henry Burkitt from Oxygen Strategy, who made the point that there is no ceiling, no maximum time, no duty to consult and no necessity for the Secretary of State or NICE to give reasons why a delay has occurred.

The life sciences industry talks about how it wants products to be rolled out. When it is investing and doing research in this country, it wants to see new products rolled out as quickly as possible once they have been approved, and the clause is a sign that roll-out might be delayed. I understand that the Government might want to be able to vary on certain products, but they already can; why do they want to vary on a more general basis? It is presumably to slow down roll-outs, but by how much?

On a point of order, Sir Roger. I am a parliamentary patron and champion of Action on ME. I feel I ought to put that on the record, as we have an amendment on ME.

Thank you. That is a matter of record. Any other takers? No.

Clause 58 is about the time period for compliance with NICE recommendations on health and social care provision. As we have heard, it will enable that period to be determined by NICE or the Secretary of State.

NICE’s technology appraisals and highly specialised technology guidance play a vital role in ensuring that patients in England can access treatments that are clinically effective and a good use of NHS resources. When NICE recommends a new treatment, the NHS is usually required to make funding available within three months. That means that patients can consistently benefit from innovative treatment.

That said, there are cases where the three-month timeframe is just not realistic. That might be because of affordability pressures or practical challenges such as a stretched workforce. In those situations, a longer implementation period is needed to ensure that complex new treatments can be introduced in a safe way that does not disrupt services for other patients. For example, the period for NICE’s guidance on the drug Paxlovid for the treatment of covid was extended to 12 months to allow time for the NHS to put the necessary routine testing systems in place and train healthcare professionals.

I do not think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raised this issue, but the opposite is sometimes true, and the NHS issues guidance that provides swifter access to medicines and medical treatments. For example, cancer medicines can be funded from the point of a positive draft recommendation. At present, NHS England decides whether a NICE treatment is funded more quickly or in a shorter timeframe, while NICE determines whether the funding period should be extended, typically following a proposal from NHS England. The abolition of NHS England means that those roles and responsibilities will need to be reconsidered. The clause provides flexibility for the final decision on funding timelines to sit with either NICE or the Secretary of State, but it will not mandate which.

To the point raised by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, the Government intend to set out further details of these arrangements in regulations using the enabling power granted by this Bill. Importantly, the clause will not reduce NICE’s independent role in assessing the clinical and cost effectiveness of new treatments, nor will it weaken the NHS’s obligation to provide timely treatment. Instead, it will ensure that decisions on funding timelines remain flexible and sustainable, and that the system is equipped to respond effectively to future pressures.

I will now speak to amendment 78, which was moved by the hon. Member for North Shropshire. I recognise the vital role that NICE guidelines play in improving quality and consistency of care across the NHS. NICE’s guidance is developed by experts on the basis of rigorous assessment of the available evidence and provides an important benchmark for best practice, including for patients with myalgic encephalomyelitis. I know that the hon. Member intends to withdraw the amendment, but if she were to press it, the Government would not accept it.

To be clear—again, partly to the point of the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham—it is a long-standing and deliberate position that NICE guidance is not mandatory, which reflects the role it plays in supporting patient care. Crucially, guidelines do not override the professional judgment of clinicians, and it is essential that clinicians retain the flexibility to determine the most appropriate course of treatment for individual patients based on their specific circumstances. It is also important to recognise that NICE guidelines are often complex frameworks for care that must be adapted to local service configurations and patient need. Requiring full compliance with the NICE guideline would remove the ability of local service providers to ensure that ME services are appropriate to the needs of their local populations.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire made some important points about treatment of ME over the years, and many of us have encountered constituents with similar stories. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon for his work supporting constituents with the condition. To be clear, the Department fully recognises the need for more consistent implementation of the NICE guidelines on ME. That is why we are already taking forward practical measures. In particular, the Department and NHS England are developing a service template specification, aligned to NICE’s guidelines, to support commissioners and providers in delivering appropriate services for people with ME. We will continue to work with stakeholders, the industry and the NHS in doing that.

Those steps will help to drive improvement in care without undermining clinical judgment or imposing inflexible statutory requirements. With that, I commend clause 58 to the Committee.

I thank the Minister for her words, particularly on amendment 78. As I said, I will not press the amendment to a vote, but I hope that the Minister will continue to bear in mind that provision for people with ME is extremely patchy and that a number of our constituents are suffering in the long term. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59

Transfer of HSSIB’s functions to CQC

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Amendment 55, in schedule 8, page 110, line 23, at end insert—

“(10) If the Secretary of State certifies that it is in the interests of national security that the powers conferred by subsection (1)—

(a) should not be exercisable in relation to certain premises in which there is a Crown interest, or

(b) should not be exercisable in relation to certain specified premises for other purposes,

those powers are not exercisable in relation to those specified premises.

(7) In this section, ‘Crown interest’ means—

(a) an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department;

(b) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Crown;

(c) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster;

(d) an interest belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall.”

This amendment makes provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers under subsection 51J(1) to the Health and Social Care Act 2008, inserted by Schedule 8 of this Bill.

Amendment 56, in schedule 8, page 116, line 8, leave out subsection (9).

This amendment would allow the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.

Amendment 5, in schedule 8, page 120, line 16, at end insert—

“(2A) After paragraph 6(8) insert—

‘(9) A committee of the Commission is to be appointed in accordance with regulations.

(10) The purpose of the committee is to oversee the health services safety investigation functions formerly conducted by HSSIB, transferred to the Care Quality Commission under the Health Act 2026.

(11) The committee is to be operationally independent from the Care Quality Commission.

(12) The committee is to consist of a chair appointed by the Secretary of State, and not less than six and not more than twelve other members appointed by the chair.

(13) A majority of the members of the committee must not be members of the Care Quality Commission.

(14) So far as is reasonably practicable, the persons appointed to the committee must include persons with knowledge or experience relevant to the discharge of functions under this paragraph.’”

This amendment would ensure that oversight of HSSIB’s functions would remain operationally independent of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) following the transfer of its functions to the CQC.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 60 and 61 stand part.

New clause 42—Funding for Care Quality Commission (CQC) investigations—

“The Secretary of State has a duty to make provision for adequate funding and resources for patient safety investigations conducted by the CQC, including some initiated by the CQC themselves.”

Clause 59 provides for the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission.

Under the new arrangements, the Care Quality Commission will assume responsibility for carrying out investigations into incidents that have or may have implications for patient safety. It is really important to stress that the core purpose of that function remains unchanged: to identify systemic risks, support learning and drive improvements in the safety of health services, rather than determine blame or liability. It is a central measure in strengthening the framework for patient safety investigations and ensuring a more coherent and effective system for learning from incidents across health services.

With more than 70 types of channels or organisations through which patients or users can share feedback, the current landscape has led to fragmentation between investigation, regulation and improvement activity, thereby diluting the impact that insights from investigations might otherwise achieve. HSSIB has been isolated, undermining its efficacy. We will bring HSSIB into the mainstream as a core but distinct part of the CQC. That will enable HSSIB to use its functions more strategically, working in partnership with the national quality board. Clause 59 achieves that by conferring responsibility for those investigatory functions on to the Care Quality Commission through the provisions set out in schedule 8. In doing so, it embeds a comprehensive investigatory framework with an established statutory regulator.

The CQC will be one organisation with separate functions—a regulatory function and an investigative function—to preserve the integrity of each. Within the CQC, HSSIB will continue to operate as a discrete unit and retain its independence from providers, allowing it to identify learnings and take a no-blame approach.

The Minister will recall that in evidence, Dr Rosie Benneyworth, interim chief executive officer of HSSIB, spoke about the vital work of the organisation, especially with regard to investigations where vulnerable staff and workers do not feel confident about coming forward for fear of reprisal. HSSIB did great work in that area, and I am wondering whether the CQC will carry it on and take on board that learning.

I thank my hon. Friend for that point. I have met HSSIB and others on this issue, and it is a concern that staff are fearful of speaking up. That is obviously unacceptable, but we understand that it happens. That is absolutely the culture that we need to drive out, and we need to ensure that HSSIB’s learning about making sure there is a safe space to speak out, which I will come on to, is a core part of future work.

What we are talking about is not so much the safety of staff when they come forward, but the safety of patients, and whether we genuinely believe that the proposed modification to the arrangement will improve patient safety. That is the underlying point. Although the safety of staff is important, it is the safety of patients that we must bear in mind.

Of course, patient safety is what we need to get right. I will come on to that point, but there is a lot to get through with this clause. We can see its importance from the number of organisations and channels that exist. I have said that before, and I am sure we have all struggled as constituency MPs to support our constituents—either patients or staff—through the system and to understand the best route forward on patient safety. We all have the same aim, and we should be clear that the issue is how best to achieve that aim. My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The test is about impact, learning and making the system and the culture change.

My hon. Friend the Member for Lewisham East asked me about confidence, and the fear that staff sometimes have about speaking up, which is obviously an important part of that landscape. We want to make sure that we take forward the learning on both those points into the new body.

The new framework ensures that the essential characteristics of safety investigations are preserved. The commission will have a flexible power to investigate qualifying incidents that have or may have implications for patient safety, with a clear statutory purpose of identifying risks and improving systems and practices. We are maintaining the principle of safe space and introducing strong safeguards in the process, so that staff and the public can trust that they can speak of their experiences openly, without fear or favour, to provide learnings for the system.

We have included protections for safe space materials and restrictions on disclosure, including within the regulatory functions of the CQC, and limits on the use of reports in legal proceedings. That is designed to support openness and candour, and to provide confidence in the impartiality and independence of patient safety investigations. There are clear mechanisms for transparency and accountability, including the publication of reports, requirements to respond to recommendations, and oversight through a statutory review of the commission’s investigatory functions.

Clause 59 also provides the commission with the necessary powers to carry out investigations effectively, including powers to require information, enter premises and co-ordinate with other bodies while maintaining appropriate protections such as legal privilege and safeguards against self-incrimination. Although the commission will decide which incidents to investigate, the clause preserves a power for the Secretary of State to direct it to investigate a specific qualifying incident or category of incidents. That ensures that where issues of significant public concern arise, or where urgent scrutiny is needed or there is particular risk, there is a clear mechanism to ensure that issues are investigated.

The struggles of the Care Quality Commission have been well documented. We will only commence these provisions when we are satisfied that the CQC has improved. The CQC has been supported and held to account to recover its effectiveness, and we will continue to support it and work closely with the newly appointed chair on its journey to rebuild. We will work closely with the CQC to ensure its readiness to receive the investigations functions from the Health Services Safety Investigations Body. Maintaining a centre of excellence for investigations will be integral to the CQC’s culture. Without the clause, the opportunity to deliver the ambitions of the 10-year health plan would not be realised, nor would the broader patient safety landscape, as set out in the Dash review, be fully addressed. It is therefore a necessary and integral reform.

Clause 60 makes provision for the transfer of property rights and liabilities from the Health Services Safety Investigations Body to the Care Quality Commission in connection with the abolition of the former and the assumption of its functions by the latter. It is a key technical provision to ensure an orderly and legally complete transition between the two bodies. Where functions are transferred between public bodies, it is essential that all associated assets, obligations and legal arrangements are also transferred in a way that ensures continuity and legal certainty. The clause provides the statutory mechanism to achieve that.

The clause provides a flexible framework to enable the continuation of HSSIB’s actions and ongoing matters, including legal proceedings, and ensures that references to HSSIB in existing documents are treated as references to the Care Quality Commission to avoid legal uncertainty. The clause provides for staff protections equivalent to TUPE and allows for shared ownership or use of property where needed, supporting a smooth and effective transition.

The overall effect of the clause is to enable a smooth, comprehensive and legally robust transfer of HSSIB’s property rights and liabilities to the Care Quality Commission, ensuring continuity of function and avoiding disruption to ongoing operations. Without the provision, there would be risk of legal uncertainty and operational disruption during the transfer process.

Clause 61 is a necessary and practical provision. At its core, it provides a power through regulations for His Majesty’s Treasury to ensure that transfers made from HSSIB to the CQC are delivered smoothly and on a tax-neutral basis. Like the equivalent provision for the NHS England transfer in clause 3, it allows the Treasury, by regulations, to vary the way in which relevant tax legislation applies in relation to anything transferred under a transfer scheme or anything done in connection with such a transfer. That will ensure that the tax consequences of the transfer can be properly aligned with the policy intention of a smooth and orderly transition.

Importantly, the scope of the clause is limited to specified “relevant taxes”, including income tax, corporation tax, capital gains tax, VAT, stamp duty and stamp duty reserve tax. As with clause 3, without this power there is a risk that the transfers could trigger unintended tax liabilities that would divert public money away from frontline services and undermine the policy intent of the legislation. Clause 61 therefore protects value for money and ensures that organisational change does not come with avoidable fiscal cost.

Clauses 59 to 61 and schedule 8 are necessary to strengthen the framework for patient safety investigations and ensure a more coherent and, crucially, effective system for learning from incidents across health services to make all our constituents and patients safer. I therefore commend them to the Committee.

These clauses are about patient safety. As has been pointed out this morning, patient safety is the absolute key here: that is well recognised across the House, among the public and across the national health service. Before going any further, I declare an interest as a patient of the NHS, a member of the British Medical Association, a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and a consultant paediatrician.

When I was interviewed in 2012 for my current consultant role, I was asked to deliver a presentation about how I could demonstrate to the trust board that the paediatric services in the hospital were safe. The first question I posed—Members will be pleased to know that I will not go through the whole presentation—was: “What is safe?” Are football stadiums safe? Is the London underground safe? Are aeroplanes safe? Broadly, yes, I think we would say they are safe, but they have not been without incident or safety issues.

Healthcare is similar. It involves millions of people, clinical judgment, human decision making and huge variability in the way that patients can present with different symptoms for different problems at different times. Is healthcare safe? Yes, it is safe. Again, however, we know from the many reports we have read that there is a long way to go to make it better and we need to prepare for that. We need to make sure that we design out room for error—that we design processes that limit the opportunities for error—use technology to limit the risk of error, and train people in a way that reduces the risk of error.

One of the key factors in that work is accepting that where there is human decision making, mistakes can happen, and that we need to identify and learn from those mistakes. One of the main ways of doing that is striking a balance between accountability and blame. If there is insufficient accountability, there can be an unclear escalation process, such that people do not know who to go to when they identify a problem. There can be a careless culture, which can develop in places where there is not enough accountability. However, if there is too much focus on fault and determining whose fault something is, we can get a blame culture. That can lead to a failure for people to come forward and therefore to a failure to learn from mistakes. It can lead to a culture of cover-up, whereby people try to avoid getting either themselves or their colleagues into trouble.

That is where HSSIB comes in because, like the air accidents investigation branch and the similar bodies for rail and shipping, it provides a safe space. That safe space is important in ensuring that people can speak up freely without fear, and know that we can get to the bottom of a problem and understand why and how something went wrong, because that is how we fix it.

At the time that HSSIB was established, there was consensus about it. The General Medical Council said:

“We support the creation of a ‘safe space’ approach to investigation. This is consistent with our guidance to doctors about their responsibilities to learn from mistakes and reflect on their practice, and their duty to take part in systems of quality assurance and quality improvement to promote patient safety.”

The British Medical Association told Parliament:

“We welcome the establishment of the HSSIB…Doctors must feel able to report errors and reflect on their own mistakes openly, without the fear of these reflections being used against them at a later stage. Only then can true improvements to patient safety be made.”

Similarly, NHS Providers told Parliament:

“NHS Providers welcomes the creation of the HSSIB as an opportunity to develop a just culture in the NHS and a focus on learning…For the HSSIB to succeed in contributing to improved patient safety, any investigations associated with it must be carried out independently and without conflict of interest, and be perceived as such.”

Indeed, the Minister for Secondary Care herself is on the record as having said:

“HSSIB is a really important new body…It must absolutely be built on the highest standards of trust when it comes to the wider system and the general public.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 564-565.]

I think that I have demonstrated that the creation of HSSIB was a matter of consensus and it was confirmed that it was the right thing to do.

In order to work, HSSIB needed to be independent and without conflict of interest. NHS staff backed it, the providers backed it, the patients backed it and even the Minister backed it. That is what makes the Government’s plans for HSSIB so perplexing. I am not aware of a single royal college or union that supports folding it into the CQC.

Essentially, Ministers have said that this is being done because of the Dash review. “The Dash review says so,” they argue, “so that’s what we’re going to do.” I have huge respect for people who say, “I’ve asked for some experts’ advice, and they have given it, and therefore I should follow it.” However, Ministers also commissioned the report by Lord Darzi, which said that

“a top-down reorganisation of NHS England and integrated care boards is neither necessary nor desirable”,

and yet here we are, doing exactly that. It is perfectly possible for Ministers to take one report as gospel and another as guidance. I would be grateful if the Minister could explain that.

The other reason given for this measure is that it will declutter the landscape, yet few people outside Government seem to think that HSSIB is responsible for cluttering the landscape. For example, the Health Foundation wrote in its submission that

“the government needs to do more to explain how the abolition of HSSIB and transfer of its functions to CQC will meet its aim of reducing complexity and, most importantly, maintain the essential focus on improving patient safety.”

This subject is of particular interest to me. For quite a few years I was a trustee of a charity that supported evidence-based medicine and quality improvement. The hon. Lady talked about a no-blame culture. We now tend to use the term “just culture” but it is the same kind of thing: we must have a safe space for people to come forward, like in the airline industry. We want to encourage reporting not only of mistakes but of near misses so that improvements can be delivered without tragic incidents having to take place. If we are to create a culture in which people will come forward to admit even potential mistakes and near misses, they cannot in any way fear punitive punishment under regulations. Does the hon. Lady agree that folding HSSIB into the CQC will make it difficult to create a culture in which people feel confident enough to want to come forward with and overtly discuss mistakes and errors?

The hon. Gentleman is right. When someone comes forward, they need to have trust in the system. If they think that coming forward will harm their job or career, or perhaps their colleagues’, they may be more reluctant to do so. There is a difference between a mistake and a reckless act. If people behave recklessly and badly, that needs to be dealt with for the sake of accountability, but if an individual is aware of a mistake, or aware of a loophole through which a mistake could have been made if only something else had not happened at that moment, they need to come forward and say so. It would be much more difficult for them to do so if there was a culture of fear.

Dr Benneyworth made it clear to the Committee that

“we are still working in a culture of fear”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 24, Q40.]

and that makes it difficult for people to come forward. People come forward now because they know that HSSIB is independent, but they will be less likely to come forward when HSSIB is an office in the CQC that is independent in name only. The Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), said that

“people cannot sit at desks near other people who are making decisions and at the same time be perceived as entirely independent. The perception of independence cannot be legislated for—the perception is everything”.—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 915.]

As my hon. Friend said earlier, the problem comes when this new body within the CQC has to investigate the CQC. In the oral evidence session, I asked Dr Dash what would happen if the problem was CQC, and she gave what is probably the most extraordinary answer out of the many extraordinary answers she gave. It is worth repeating:

“Well, we then have to deal with that as a problem. That is the same as saying, ‘What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?’…What if the GMC is a problem? What if the Nursing and Midwifery Council is a problem?”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 8, Q9.]

She did not answer my question at all. In fact, she entirely sidestepped it. How can we have confidence in the Government’s proposal if the architect of the procedure cannot answer the most basic questions about the investigatory framework?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. That answer was quite shocking, really. The pause before it and the reaction was remarkable. The purpose of HSSIB is to investigate without fear or favour, and to enable people to come forward in a safe way, but if it was folded into the CQC, as the regulator, and the problem was the regulator, how would it investigate itself? How would it make recommendations to itself? What if it thinks the board that it works for is incompetent? Is it going to tell its boss that it is incompetent? How does that work? No one seemed to know the answer.

It also seems that Ministers have not thought about how the HSSIB unit will be vulnerable to political pressure. Under the Bill as drafted, the Government are planning to direct the “vast majority”—according to the impact assessment—of the investigations, and the quality board is going to have some influence over the recommendations, again under the direction of the Secretary of State.

The Liberal Democrats have tabled amendment 5, which would require the appointment of a committee. That idea is well intentioned, and we recognise the same problems and the same flaws in the Government’s approach, but I do not think it is enough to solve the problem. Even if the law says that the oversight of the investigative units will remain operationally independent, I just do not see how that is possible. I can see that the hon. Member for North Shropshire is trying to help by creating something better than what the Government have produced, but I do not think it is enough.

We have also tabled some amendments, including new clause 42, which would ensure that there is some operational independence in the choice of investigation by requiring the Secretary of State to adequately fund and resource patient safety investigations, including some of those initiated by this unit within the CQC.

Amendment 55 is a probing amendment. We noticed that much of the legislation has been lifted and shifted from the previous Act, but some things are missing, including national security grounds. We want to understand why that ground has not been included in the Bill. Very occasionally, health events have national security connotations—the Salisbury chemical weapons attack, for example. In such circumstances, restrictions on investigatory capabilities could be necessary. I do not know—I was just interested in why the Government have chosen deliberately to remove that particular clause.

Amendment 56 would allow

“the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.”

The HSSIB programme is world-leading. People look at it from across the globe, and some have asked for training or information on it, for which we have been able not just to recoup costs but actually charge. I do not understand why the Government have removed that provision, because it is an opportunity for them to get extra money without taking it off people in taxes. Do the Government want HSSIB to lose its international standing, or do they want British taxpayers to subsidise training for foreign health services? It is not clear. I would be grateful if the Minister explained that.

We need to come back to what the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said at the beginning: what is the purpose? The purpose is patient safety.

The point about patient safety is absolutely important, as every Bill Committee member would agree. The number of patient safety incidents has been going up for the last 10 years. Between 2015 and 2022, there was a 62% increase in patient safety incidents in this country, and since the creation of HSSIB, the number of incidents has again gone up. Does the hon. Member agree that the CQC, which has access to all patient records and all documentation in any healthcare settings in real time, would be able to monitor the improvement and progress that each provider is making following the learning from each incident? That would be important and helpful, as the HSSIB has limited ability to look into documentation and clinical notes.

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but I think this comes to part of the problem. When producing a list of faults—of things that are wrong with the service—and saying, “We need to improve the culture; it needs to be better”, we need to ask, “Okay, but how? What will be the deliverable, measurable way of doing that? How will we go about improving things?” For example, let us say that there is a problem with patients with aortic dissection, so how will we prevent that? The benefit of HSSIB is that it produces a plan, the plan is implemented and patients are safer. Part of this is about the delivery plan.

As for the other part, the hon. Member talked about monitoring progress, but that is not the job of HSSIB. If a mistake or an event happens, it is investigated by HSSIB—HSSIB produces a set of investigations based on understanding how and why it happened, because of the safe space—and then those recommendations are put forward to the Government. The Government then, ideally, implement those changes. The Minister is there to ensure that those are implemented. It will be her job to ensure, having decided which recommendations are to be implemented, that that is done fully and properly. It is a separate function. The CQC is a regulator, HSSIB is an investigator, and the Minister is there to ensure that things are delivered properly.

Going back to patient safety, at the end of my interview, I essentially told the panel, “I cannot tell you that anything is 100% safe”. The assurances that can be provided are that the staff and equipment are available, that training is available for people to do the job, and that processes are in place to identify shortcomings and learn from them, so that they are not repeated. That is key: to find the learning and spread it more widely. As the hon. Gentleman said, implementation is a challenge. It is possible to implement this on an individual basis or to implement a lesson in a unit that has had an error or mistake. Spreading it more widely, so that this is heard in every unit across the country, is more challenging. Fundamentally, I do not think I have heard anything from any of the Ministers, and I do not think it is in the Dash report either, to explain why the Government believe that rolling HSSIB into the CQC with all the problems that it might cause—the risk of it suing itself over whether the safe space is available or not—makes patients any safer.

I declare an interest as a member of the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, which is opposed to the changes to HSSIB proposed in the Bill. Over the last couple of weeks, we have been reminded why we need an appropriate safety landscape when things go wrong. We have had the Donna Ockenden review into Nottingham maternity services. We have had Baroness Amos’s national review into the picture following a range of maternity scandals across the country. Yesterday evening, I attended the debate on the regulations to compensate victims of the infected blood scandal. Safety is at the top of all our minds at the moment, as it should always be.

Something that has come across very strongly from Members of all parties, on both sides of the House, is that culture is critical to ensuring that those types of issues—the huge scandals—never happen again. Indeed, smaller scandals must never happen again, because people need to be free. Staff in particular need to have the confidence that, if they report concerns about the way they operate, they will be safe to do so without jeopardising the rest of their career, and that those concerns will be acted on and the lessons learned. Everybody here wants to achieve that. I do not think anybody is arguing about the fundamental principle that, when there are concerns, they need to be raised in a safe place and that the lessons from those concerns need to be learned.

That is why I share the lack of understanding of the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, about why rolling HSSIB into the CQC will change that culture, because the CQC is a regulatory body and HSSIB is an investigatory one. Their missions are fundamentally different. Putting them together compromises the independent investigation element in a way that is very difficult to overcome. We were told in the evidence to the Bill Committee by HSSIB’s chief executive that it is often told, “We tell you this; we wouldn’t tell a regulatory body.” It is clear that this perception of safety is critical to the way in which people interact with HSSIB.

We also heard in evidence to the Committee that the CQC warned that, as it stands, the Bill could leave it fighting against itself in the High Court. We could get a scenario where the regulatory arm of the CQC sought access to HSSIB’s confidential investigation reports, while HSSIB, the investigative branch, tried to keep them secret to protect its independence. That is not a situation anyone wants to end up in, and I am sure that is not the intention of this clause.

I think the shadow Minister has already made this point, so I will not labour it, but it is also important that the investigatory body must be able to examine the regulatory frameworks, commissioning decisions and oversight arrangements without institutional conflict. When I look back, for example, at the scandal that unfolded at Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS Trust over the maternity failings, I see that the CQC had given that trust a good rating during the course of all those terrible things going wrong. The CQC’s process clearly failed in that situation. It is difficult to imagine an arm of the CQC turning around in that scenario and saying that the CQC got its own assessment wrong. If it had tried to do that, it is difficult to imagine how that might have played out and that people might have had confidence in raising that problem.

I am also concerned about this because, as the Minister has alluded to, the CQC has faced significant criticism and publicly admitted that it has failed to carry out its functions to the best of its abilities over recent years. Although I welcome the Minister’s assurance that the transfer would happen only once the CQC was in a better place, the CQC might—again—be part of the problem in some instances, and HSSIB must be able to point to that where appropriate.

Lib Dem amendment 5 attempts to introduce the principle that, if this must happen, there needs to be a firewall in the CQC to keep HSSIB operationally independent. To achieve that, the amendment proposes to insert into the process a committee that is operationally independent of—with a majority of people who are not on—the CQC. Opposition new clause 42 seeks to do the same thing. I would be open to any suggestions that the Minister might make to reassure us that HSSIB will continue to be operationally independent, for all the good reasons that hon. Members have outlined.

Before I address the clauses, I say for the record that 21 years ago this morning, 52 people were murdered and 784 injured by Islamist terrorists in London. I pay tribute to all the medical professionals who treated those people in such difficult circumstances.

I will speak to clauses 59 to 63 together because they all concern one of the most significant structural changes proposed in the Bill: the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body as an independent statutory organisation, and the transfer of its functions to the Care Quality Commission. At first glance, that may appear a relatively modest machinery-of-government change. The Minister argues that HSSIB’s functions will continue, its statutory safe-space protections will remain and operational independence will somehow be preserved. However, when one examines the evidence presented to the Committee, and that given to the Health and Social Care Committee, of which I am a member, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify the problem that this merger is intended to solve. Instead, what emerges is a remarkable degree of consensus among those with the greatest expertise in patient safety that this proposal carries significant risks while offering little measurable benefit.

The question before us is therefore not whether HSSIB’s statutory functions can be transferred to another organisation, but whether Parliament should abolish an institution that it deliberately created to be independent. That distinction matters. Across public life, we recognise that effective scrutiny depends on institutional independence. Government expenditure is examined independently by the National Audit Office, citizens complain to independent ombudsmen rather than to the organisations about which they are complaining, air accidents are investigated independently by the Civil Aviation Authority, and rail accidents are investigated independently of the regulator. In each case, Parliament has recognised that organisations charged with investigating failures should not also be responsible for regulating, inspecting or enforcing against those they investigate. Healthcare should be no different.

Indeed, if anything, healthcare should demand an even greater degree of independence. Learning from failure depends on the confidence of patients, clinicians and families that they can speak openly and without fear that the information that they provide will later be used for regulatory or enforcement purposes. That is precisely why HSSIB was created. Its purpose was never to attribute blame but to understand why systems fail, identify the underlying causes of patient harm and ensure that lessons are learned before similar tragedies occur again. That philosophy represented a deliberate shift away from a culture of blame and towards one of learning. It was modelled consciously on the air accidents investigation branch, whose success over many decades has demonstrated that independent, no-blame investigations produce better safety outcomes than investigations driven primarily by enforcement.

It is therefore difficult to understand why the Government now seek to move away from the model that other safety-critical industries continue to regard as fundamental. Clause 59 would abolish that independent body and transfer its functions to the Care Quality Commission. In doing so, it would bring together two organisations with fundamentally different statutory purposes, different powers and, perhaps most importantly, different cultures. HSSIB investigates and the CQC regulates. One exists to ask why the system failed; the other exists to ask whether the organisation complied with required standards—those are not the same questions. Nor do HSSIB and CQC require the same relationship with those from whom evidence is obtained. An investigation depends on trust; a regulator depends on compliance. An investigator encourages candour; a regulator necessarily retains enforcement powers. The different roles are not a weakness of the system; they are precisely why Parliament chose to establish separate organisations.

I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could explain what assessment has been made of the impact on public confidence of the investigator and the regulator becoming part of the same statutory organisation. More specifically, what assessment has been made of the likely effect on clinicians’ willingness to speak openly if the organisation receiving confidential evidence also contains the regulator responsible for inspecting and enforcing standards? That concern has been expressed not only by the Opposition, but repeatedly by independent experts—and indeed, we just heard the hon. Member for Lewisham East asking similar questions.

Even the Care Quality Commission has expressed reservations. Evidence that it submitted to the Health and Social Care Committee earlier this year acknowledged that a lack of clarity remains regarding the respective roles of HSSIB and the CQC. Rather than resolving that uncertainty, the proposed merger risks deepening it. The CQC warned that preserving an effective separation between its investigatory and regulatory functions would be essential if confidence in HSSIB’s safe space were to be maintained, and it recognised the genuine risk of perceived conflicts of interest if those functions become blurred.

I think that should give the Committee pause for thought. When the organisation receiving the additional responsibilities is itself warning about the difficulty of maintaining the boundaries, we should listen very carefully. If the CQC believes that the risks exist before the merger has even taken place, what confidence can Ministers offer that those risks will somehow disappear afterwards? Similarly, the all-party parliamentary group on patient safety, of which I am a member, has expressed concern that HSSIB should remain institutionally independent so that its evidence-based recommendations can continue to command confidence across the health system.

Such concerns, as I said, are not confined to Parliament, nor are they confined to one political party. They are shared by patient safety organisations, healthcare professionals and those directly involved in investigating serious incidents. During our oral evidence sessions, I put a straightforward question to Dr Penny Dash. I observed that I could find almost no one apart from her and the Department who believed that moving HSSIB into the CQC was the right course of action. That was not intended as some sort of rhetorical flourish; it reflected the evidence before us. Former Secretaries of State, patient safety experts, independent investigators and numerous professional organisations have all questioned the proposal.

Despite the breadth of concern, the Government have not produced compelling evidence that HSSIB, as presently constituted, is failing. Nor have they demonstrated that the separation between investigation and regulation is itself creating harm. Instead, Ministers have repeatedly assured us that HSSIB’s operational independence will remain, that safe space protections will remain and that independent investigations will remain. If that is indeed the Government’s position, an obvious question follows: if HSSIB will continue to operate independently, if its investigations will continue to be conducted independently and if its statutory protections will remain intact, why is it necessary to abolish the independent organisation at all?

That question goes to the heart of clauses 59 to 63, and throughout the evidence presented to the Committee, I have heard no convincing answer. The Government ask Parliament to believe that everything that makes HSSIB valuable will continue unchanged, but at the same time, they ask Parliament to dismantle the very institutional structure deliberately designed to protect those characteristics. That is not merely an administrative contradiction, but a constitutional one. If institutional independence genuinely matters, it should be preserved. If institutional independence does not matter, Ministers should explain why Parliament was wrong to establish it in the first place.

That question of necessity leads directly to the Government’s principal justifications for clauses 59 to 63, the Dash review. The Government have repeatedly relied on that review as the intellectual basis for abolishing HSSIB as the independent body, yet when one examines the report and the evidence given by its author to this Committee, the case becomes increasingly difficult to sustain.

Without doubt, the review identifies a genuine problem: it concludes that the patient safety landscape has become crowded and in places confusing. Dr Dash told the Committee that she had identified more than 150 organisations operating across the wider patient safety landscape, and that clinicians were spending considerable time responding to different organisations, requesting information, completing forms and participating in overlapping reviews. She said that the system had become “busy and confusing”, and that that was distracting clinicians from improving the quality of care.

My hon. Friend is making a comprehensive speech and getting to the nub of all the relevant points. He talks about the system failing; to me, that is the absolute nub. The CQC is absolutely part of the system and of the establishment. If anyone is put off from making a complaint to the CQC when they think the CQC may be to blame, how on earth can the functions currently exercised by HSSIB continue in any effective way?

My hon. Friend makes several key points, and he is absolutely right: what problem are the Government trying to solve here? If we believe in independence, believe in an investigatory body and believe it is working well—and it demonstrably is working well—why on earth would we change it? That goes to a further point: these clauses not only potentially provide for a transfer of HSSIB into CQC but add risk and failure in that procedure.

My hon. Friend asks how we can be confident that the system is going to work if a patient or a clinician does not want to put their head above the parapet because they are frightened that there will be regulatory consequence. That is a fundamental problem with the Government’s proposal. As I have said several times in this speech, we have not had the answer to that and no answer seems to be forthcoming. I may touch on that in a bit more detail in a moment.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash was clear on this topic when he gave evidence to the Committee:

“My concern was that the NHS and actually health systems across the world are not very good at learning lessons when there are tragedies.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 29, Q52.]

That is the problem that HSSIB was created to address and why I struggle with the Government’s argument. If the problem is that the NHS does not learn lessons effectively, the answer should be to strengthen the organisation designed specifically to help it to learn, not to weaken the independence of that organisation. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash identified the precise part of the system that remains broken. He said:

“the Bill does not do anything to address the bit that is not working well, and that bit is that the NHS is still very poor on acting on recommendations that are made”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q52.]

That is the crucial point. The Government’s justification for the merger appears to be based on a concern that there are too many recommendations, too many reviews and too much duplication, but the evidence of my right hon. Friend highlights a different problem. The issue is not that we do not know what needs to change but that we too often fail to act on what we already know. The answer to that problem is not fewer independent investigations but stronger accountability for implementing recommendations. Indeed, my right hon. Friend made that point powerfully in his evidence. He explained that

“What there needs to be is a formal system with a legal obligation on the Government.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q53.]

He warned that too often recommendations disappear into what he described as “agree in principle”, which allows organisations to acknowledge a problem without committing to a timetable for fixing it.

The Government are proposing structural change because recommendations are not always acted on, but the problem is not the existence of HSSIB; it is the absence of sufficient accountability when recommendations are made. The Government appear to be addressing the wrong failure. There is another important point from my right hon. Friend’s evidence. He explained that one of the long-term purposes of HSSIB was to reduce the need for expensive public inquiries. He told the Committee that

“Ideally, when something goes wrong, what you want is for there to be an investigation and for lessons to be learned, so that grieving families can say, ‘Well, at least we are confident that this wouldn’t happen again.’”

However, because families often lack confidence that lessons will actually be learned, they understandably seek public inquiries. My right hon. Friend explained:

“families still think the only way they can get real change is through a public inquiry”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 32, Q56.]

That is an important warning. If confidence in HSSIB is reduced, the unintended consequence may be more public inquiries, not fewer—more cost, more delay and, most importantly, more time before lessons are learned and acted on. That is the opposite of what the Government say they want to achieve.

The Government’s second argument is that safe space can be protected through legislation. I accept that Ministers intend to preserve those protections; however, the evidence we have heard demonstrates that the issue is not simply one of statutory wording but of culture and confidence. My right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash gave a particularly important example: he explained that the CQC plays a vital role because it rates healthcare organisations. Hospitals and GP practices care deeply about whether they are rated “outstanding”, “good”, “requires improvement” or “inadequate”. His concern was this:

“If a staff member is talking openly to HSSIB about a failure of governance in their organisation, and that is the same organisation that could decide whether they get stripped of their ‘outstanding’ rating and downgraded to ‘good’ or ‘requires improvement’, my concern is that some people may worry and say, ‘Maybe I shouldn’t be open, because this could affect my hospital’s rating.’”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 33-34, Q59.]

That is the practical problem: the Government’s argument relies on the assumption that staff will distinguish perfectly between different parts of the same organisation, but the concern is that a frontline clinician may not see those internal distinctions. They may simply see that the investigator and the regulator now sit under the same roof. When people are deciding whether to disclose something that may have consequences for themselves, their colleagues or their organisation, perception matters. As my right hon. Friend said,

“we have to be really careful that people still have confidence in the safe space function if this merger goes ahead.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 34, Q59.]

A similar point was made by Professor Carl Macrae from the University of Nottingham. While giving evidence to the Health and Social Care Committee, he said that it is difficult to conceive how legislation alone could overcome the fundamental conflict created by merging an independent safety investigation body with a regulator, given that the two organisations perform inherently different functions.

The Government’s case depends on trust surviving that merger, but the evidence tells us that trust is precisely what is at risk. Dr Benneyworth made a similar point from HSSIB’s perspective. She told this Committee:

“There needs to be much more clarity about governance and how that will work in the legislation to protect independence.”

She went further and suggested that if the Government proceed, there would need to be much stronger safeguards, including

“a legal duty on the CQC to protect the safe space.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 26, Q44.]

That evidence is significant because it is not a witness arguing that change is impossible; it is the organisation at the centre of this proposal telling this Committee that the legislation, as drafted, does not provide sufficient reassurance.

The Government’s response cannot simply be that they intend to be careful. The former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), said that the integration would be approached with “enormous care”, but we have to ask what that actually means in legal terms. Where are the enforceable safeguards? What prevents a gradual erosion of independence once HSSIB is part of the regulator? History tells us that institutional safeguards matter precisely because they protect against future changes in culture, leadership or priorities. A body can begin with the best of intentions, but still drift over time—that is why Parliament creates independent institutions in the first place. It is not because Ministers are untrustworthy; it is because good governance recognises that structures matter. In this case, the structure matters enormously.

Those concerns become even more significant when we consider the legal framework around protected information and the practical operation of safe space. The Government’s argument appears to rest on the belief that if the right protections are written into legislation, the independence of HSSIB can be preserved, but the evidence we have heard suggests that the challenge is much more fundamental. The question is not simply whether information is legally protected but whether staff, patients and families will continue to believe that it is protected. That distinction matters.

During our evidence session, Dr Benneyworth highlighted a very specific concern about the drafting of the legislation. She explained that, at present, the clauses related to connected individuals could create uncertainty about who in the CQC might have access to protected material. She said:

“The legislation needs to be much clearer around the protection of protected disclosure materials, to give the system confidence in our ability to hold and not share confidential information.”—[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 25, Q41.]

That is the crucial point: the success of HSSIB depends on confidence that information provided in confidence will remain within the investigation process. If there is uncertainty about whether information could move elsewhere in the organisation, the very existence of that uncertainty risks undermining safe space.

Dr Benneyworth went further. She explained:

“There needs to be a legal duty on the CQC to protect the safe space.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 25, Q41.]

That is a remarkable admission. The organisation whose functions are being transferred to the CQC is telling Parliament that the Bill, as drafted, does not provide that sufficient certainty. The Government’s response cannot simply be that everyone involved will act in good faith. Good governance requires more than good intentions; it requires a structure that protects independence, regardless of who happens to lead an organisation in future, who is Secretary of State or who is in government. That is why Parliament creates these independent bodies in the first place.

There is also a practical issue that cannot be dismissed. Dr Benneyworth explained that HSSIB is unique because it can investigate every part of the healthcare system, including national bodies. She told the Committee:

“At the moment, we have the ability, being an independent organisation, to investigate any part of the system where there is a concern.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 23, Q38.]

That includes looking at how national systems operate, how regulators function and how different parts of the health service interact. That independence is important, because sometimes the problem is not the provider delivering care; sometimes the problem is the system around it.

A regulator may look at whether an organisation has complied with standards; an independent investigator may ask a different question: why did the system make it possible for failure to happen? The questions are complementary, but not interchangeable. Dr Benneyworth made precisely that point when discussing national failures. She explained that some problems cannot be solved by regulating an individual organisation, because the underlying issue sits elsewhere in the system. She said that is not something that can be changed by a regulator—a fundamental distinction. Regulation can identify whether standards have been met and independent investigation can identify whether the system itself needs to change. Both functions are necessary, but combining them risks weakening both.

Those concerns sit within a wider challenge on candour in healthcare. The statutory duty of candour was introduced following the Francis inquiry into the failures of the Mid Staffordshire health trust. The duty’s purpose was straightforward: when something goes wrong, patients and families should receive an honest explanation. Despite that legal duty, however, evidence remains of a defensive culture within parts of healthcare. Legal advice can sometimes encourage organisations to think first about liability, rather than about learning. Administrators can understandably become concerned about litigation risk—and where fear dominates, openness suffers. That is precisely why the safe space matters.

HSSIB was created to provide an environment where the priority is not defending an organisation, but understanding what happened. If we weaken confidence in that environment, we risk making the wider culture of candour even harder to achieve. The irony, of course, is that the Government argue that the merger will strengthen patient safety, and yet the evidence suggests that it could weaken one of the most important ingredients of patient safety: openness.

I also want to express concerns shared with me directly by people working within HSSIB. During a meeting with some of my constituents who work in the organisation, individuals involved in patient safety investigations raised significant concerns about the proposed move. They believe that bringing HSSIB into the CQC represents a backward step for patient safety. They also expressed concern that the rationale for the merger has shifted. Initially, the argument appeared to focus on streamlining and reducing duplication; increasingly, however, it appears to be about reducing the number of safety recommendations being made. That misunderstands the problem.

As I have pointed out before, the challenge is not the existence of recommendations but ensuring that those recommendations lead to action. Indeed, I was informed that HSSIB has already been developing a recommendations monitoring system, specifically designed to improve implementation and oversight. In other words, the organisation is already working to address the very issue now being used as justification for restructuring it. That brings me back to the evidence given by my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash. He identified what I believe to be the central weakness in the Government’s argument:

“the Bill does not do anything to address the bit that is not working well, and that bit is that the NHS is still very poor on acting on recommendations that are made”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 30, Q52.]

That is the point that Ministers need to answer. If recommendations are not being implemented, strengthen implementation; if accountability is weak, strengthen accountability; and if learning is not embedded, create mechanisms to ensure that learning happens—but do not weaken the independence of a body responsible for identifying those lessons. The risk is that the Government solve the wrong problem. They will remove the independence of the investigator, while leaving untouched the failure to act on what investigators discover.

After considering the evidence presented to this Committee, the evidence that we heard in the Select Committee and my conversations with my constituents and others, I remain unable to support clauses 59 to 63. That is not because I oppose reform or believe that the patient safety landscape cannot improve—of course it can. The NHS must continue to learn, adapt and improve, but improvement requires honesty about what is working and what is not. The evidence suggests that HSSIB’s independent investigative model is one of the things that is working and that failure lies elsewhere. It lies in whether recommendations are being implemented, whether organisations learn quickly enough and whether staff feel safe enough to speak up. The answer to those problems is not to remove independence, but to strengthen it.

The creation of HSSIB represented a recognition by Parliament that healthcare needed the same principles of independent safety investigation that serve aviation, rail and other high-risk industry so well. Those principles exist for a reason: when something goes wrong, society needs an organisation that people trust to ask what happened, why it happened and what must change to prevent it from happening again. That organisation must be separate from those responsible for regulating the system. It must be able to investigate without fear or favour. It must command the confidence of patients, families and healthcare professionals.

The Government say that the protections will remain, but the evidence we have heard overwhelmingly demonstrates that confidence in those protections is precisely what is at risk. Once institutional independence is removed, it simply cannot be recreated through internal guidance or assurances. The structure matters, the culture matters and the trust matters.

For those reasons, I urge the Minister to reconsider clauses 59 to 63. If the Government believe that improvements can be made to co-ordination, accountability or implementation, discussions on that should absolutely continue and the Opposition would welcome them. However, the clauses go much further. They remove the independent status, which is so important. Given the enormous human and financial cost of avoidable harm in healthcare, Parliament should be extremely cautious before weakening one of the few mechanisms specifically designed to prevent it.

I am particularly keen to speak on clauses 59 to 63, because HSSIB was a key part of the Health and Care Act 2022, which I took through as a Minister. At that time, I was grateful for not only the fearless and tough questioning from the now Minister, who was on the Opposition Benches, but for her support. She said:

“HSSIB is a really important new body”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 564.]

She also said that it is a

“new and important body, which we are all desperate to ensure works well.”––[Official Report, Health and Care Public Bill Committee, 19 October 2021; c. 566.]

It is fair to say that it does work well, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon set out clearly in his detailed remarks. The thread running through his remarks, which is particularly important in this context, was trust. People who have had something go wrong and have reported a problem need to trust that it will be looked at independently and dispassionately.

I fear that what is proposed here results from a deeply misguided decision, which has at the heart of its logic a fundamental flaw. As the hon. Member for North Shropshire set out, the decision fails to recognise that HSSIB’s role is fundamentally different from the role of CQC. It is an independent investigator; it is not a regulator or an enforcer, yet that somehow seems to be conflated in what the Government are trying to do here. They have simply failed to make a logical case for the change.

The hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, who I always listen to with great interest on these matters, highlighted that patient safety should be at the heart of this legislation. That is absolutely right, but patient safety goes hand in hand with the confidence of those working in the system to speak out and put forward evidence that will improve patient safety. It is not an either/or; one is complementary to the other. It is important that this safe space remains, because that provides the conditions in which patient safety can be improved.

In her evidence during the first session of this Committee, Dr Dash stated that she found more than 150 organisations operating in this space when she undertook her review. However, in Hansard, she went on to say:

“I was asked by the Department of Health and Social Care to look at that landscape. I was asked to focus on six organisations”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 5, Q2.]

Only six out of 150? That does not ring true. That is not a tidying-up of the landscape but a very narrow focus. When the Minister comes to her concluding remarks, can she answer who specifically determined those six organisations for Dr Dash and told her to look only at those, ignoring the other 144-plus organisations? We all know that what a review comes up with is, to a large degree, determined by the scope set for it. By picking a mere six out of 150-plus organisations, I fear there is a risk that the scope has effectively, to a degree, stacked the outcome of what would be looked at and what would be concluded.

Before addressing specific concerns about the approach being adopted with the abolition of HSSIB, I want to highlight a real challenge with—even if one accepted the premise, which I do not—where it is proposed the functions are transferred to, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon set out.

Dr Dash said in her evidence that the CQC

“still has a way to go, and we all need to acknowledge that.”

She went on to say:

“I would have hoped that, by now, many of those challenges had been addressed. Some of them have been, but some of them have struggled.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 4, Q2.]

We are talking about moving an effective organisation into another organisation which, quite apart from whether the merger is appropriate given their different remits, is—by the review author’s own admission in evidence—basically not in a fit state to receive those new functions. I think that has been tacitly acknowledged by the Minister in saying it will only be done at an appropriate time, when the CQC is ready. Therefore, why make those changes at all? At the moment, it does not look like the CQC will be ready, at least in the near future, based on the evidence we have heard.

My right hon. Friend will be aware that it is not the only thing that the CQC is being asked to take on. It is also being asked to take on the regulation of event healthcare, which is another new function for the CQC, all at a time when, as he says, it has its own difficulties to manage.

My hon. Friend the shadow Minister is right to highlight, for want of a better way of putting it, the cumulative challenges that will potentially be piled on the CQC, on top of the pre-existing challenges with how that organisation is functioning.

I read with great care the Adjournment debate that took place last night in the Chamber, which has been referred to by a number of hon. Members, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex, and I pay tribute to him for his work in this space. I worked closely with him in the context of the passage of the Health and Care Act 2022, and I know that the issue of patient safety is fundamental to what he seeks to improve and achieve in this House. I agree with him: I fear the Dash review simply fails to make the case for those changes. Also, as hon. Members have set out, it sadly appears to contain a number of errors and assumptions that are inaccurate, which I will turn to in a moment.

The fundamental challenge is to establish a way for people to feel confident and trusting in challenging a culture of denial and blame. We have seen this most recently in the context of maternity failings and scandals. The need for that safe space, and for an organisation able to challenge the institutions, is very clear, and I fear that this change actually weakens the ability to do that. Dr Dash’s review, I fear, fails to fully recognise just how important the safe space concept is—not just in how it is drafted and framed legally but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon said, in how it is perceived by those who need to use it. The CQC, of course, has a legal duty to act on information it receives, but that risks being conflated here.

I saw this illustrated last night, for example, in the Adjournment debate, in a comment made by the Minister’s colleague, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, the hon. Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), when she was responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex. She was talking about the criteria for disclosing protected information outside the investigative function. She said:

“Those criteria set a high bar for any disclosure—as high as it is currently with HSSIB—and the CQC will publish further guidance setting out much more detail.”

This is the key point. She went on to say:

“As the Bill sets out, the CQC will appoint a responsible person who will decide whether the case matches the criteria and whether it warrants information sharing outside the safe space.”

And this is the crux of it:

“That person is likely to be the CQC’s chief executive officer.”—[Official Report, 6 July 2026; Vol. 789, c. 147.]

That is an inherent conflict. If the person who is the head of the regulatory body is making the decision on whether information should be disclosed by HSSIB in its folded-in form, that will do nothing to inspire confidence in disclosure and the safe space provisions. I fear that drives a coach and horses through some of the arguments being made that there are sufficient safeguards within this merger to ensure HSSIB can continue as it has done thus far.

The crux of some of Dr Dash’s arguments appears to be that there are, as the Minister also alluded to, too many recommendations being made and that it is a complex landscape. Yet HSSIB, as my hon. Friend the Member for Harwich and North Essex set out yesterday, has made 56. He went on to say that the 30 or so public inquiries and other investigations have delivered 1,400, so it simply does not follow that HSSIB is the problem in that complex landscape.

What was made very clear by, again, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon is that, of course, the concern is not the recommendations. It is not the organisation making the recommendations that is responsible for the fact that they are not implemented. It is the NHS itself, its inertia, its unwillingness and the Department’s unwillingness to take them forward in a coherent fashion—to drive the recommendations through and monitor whether they have been delivered on by the NHS.

On pages 8 and 9 of the Dash review, Dr Dash talks about this. She states:

“Recommendations are…focused on inputs, rather than outputs or outcomes, and fail to…balance…risks within organisations and across systems…the existence of so many recommendations causes considerable confusion for staff. They result in more clinical staff moving into supervisory roles to check that other…staff are adhering to the recommendations. The overwhelming majority of recommendations lack data as to the cost of implementation or the expected impact.”

She recognised, did she not, that there was a problem with people being asked to check up on one another’s work and check up on their work? But the recommendations do not deal with that, perhaps because the scope, as my right hon. Friend has described, is so narrow.

I do think that the scope of the review, who determined the six organisations and how that was looked at is important, and I am sure that the Minister will be able to clarify that when she makes her concluding remarks. However, there are a couple of other issues that concern me in terms of some of what was in the review, which seems to be the basis on which this is being done. Finding 6 suggests that HSSIB has expanded its

“scope of work beyond the original remit.”

It goes on to say:

“HSSIB was originally established, along the lines of safety investigatory bodies in other industries, to look at specific cases or incidents of severe harm, but it has since broadened its work into making more systemic recommendations.”

I have to say, as the Minister who took the Health and Care Act 2022 through, that is simply not the case. That Act does not limit HSSIB investigations to individual incidents. If I recall correctly, in some of the debates on the HSSIB clauses in the Bill, we alluded as a Committee to the need for it to be able to look beyond individual incidents and try to draw out common themes. What has been said simply does not accord with my recollection of the purposes of the legislation.

Again, my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon highlighted this. Recommendation 3 states:

“Most investigations into safety incidents should continue to be managed within provider organisations”.

That is the real challenge here. HSSIB’s independence is what allows it to range across the piece—to have issues raised with it and look at individual organisations. The challenge so often is that the provider organisations are marking their own homework and are simply not getting to the truth, or being as candid with those who have made the complaint as they have a right to expect.

I wonder whether the right hon. Gentleman has had the experience that I have had as a constituency MP of very senior clinicians who work in the NHS attending my surgery and explaining that if they have raised concerns within their organisation, they have been encouraged either to leave or to retire. They feel frightened to raise concerns about safety that they have experienced in carrying out their duties, so it is really important that this safe space exists. Does he agree with that?

The hon. Lady makes her point extremely clearly, and I do agree with exactly the point she makes, because in any organisation it is a big step for an individual employed by or working in the organisation to make a complaint about their organisation or to whistleblow on something that has gone on or that they feel has not been got right. Key to getting people to do that is that they feel safe and empowered to do it in the public interest, and that is exactly what is at the heart of the air accidents investigation branch and the rail accident investigation branch model, so that the information is brought forward and learnings can be driven by it to improve safety for everyone. As the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket said, that safety is patient safety and that has to remain the golden thread that runs through everything we are debating. Whatever difference of perspective we have on this set of clauses, that must remain at the heart of what we are looking for.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. The issues relating to clause 59, principally the abolition of HSSIB, have been well articulated, not least by my colleagues on this side. I wish to add some of my own views too.

The debate has been framed as a transfer of the functions of HSSIB to the CQC, and indeed that is the title of the clause. The Minister has certainly articulated her arguments in that way. Effectively, it is the abolition of HSSIB. In fact, clause 59(1) plainly says:

“The Health Services Safety Investigations Body is abolished.”

Its functions may be transferred, but that is quite a significant change, and I do not want that to be lost within the context of this debate. At the heart of it is this idea around investigatory and regulatory functions. While the argument remains technical—and it is of course easier for the Government and indeed Dr Dash to make the arguments to abolish HSSIB in the abstract—when we talk about the real-life implications and how real people react to different circumstances, it is plainly very significant and negative.

That is particularly true when it comes to investigating where things went wrong and when the system is at least in question and could be at fault. When there are things that need airing that people are afraid to air, confidence in the new framework is essential. Regardless of the systems, processes or protocols that the Government may wish to put in place to ensure that the safe space concept continues to exist, who on earth, if they are worried about making disclosures, will be satisfied and confident that those in the CQC, who may themselves be at fault, will not learn about a disclosure to the arm of the CQC that is empowered and entrusted with investigating the problem? An independent organisation, which HSSIB currently is, provides not just technical confidence but genuine confidence that people can speak freely on matters that may well be extremely unhelpful to their employer or the CQC—the national regulator itself.

As the hon. Member for North Shropshire noted about the Shrewsbury and Telford situation, it developed while the CQC gave a good rating. It may be that the CQC was fair in doing that, but it does not look good in the eyes of the public, and it will be a consideration for individuals seeking to make disclosures to an investigation. What will the public think?

As I said throughout my speech, I am against this proposal whatever the nature of the CQC. However, does it strike my hon. Friend, as it strikes me, that the problems of moving the functions of HSSIB into the CQC are compounded given that the CQC, as he alluded to, is not functioning well and does not have the confidence of patients and clinicians?

My hon. Friend leads me to a point I was going to make later, but I will make it now. He is absolutely right: the CQC has not had a lot of good press and does not instil a high degree of confidence in professionals and the public. That is a very real issue. The Minister and, I think, Dr Dash have said that the transfer of powers from HSSIB to the CQC will not happen until it is in a better place, and that is all very well, but these changes are intended to last for a long time—indefinitely, presumably. To merely wait until an organisation is in a better place to transfer those powers, and to expect that organisation to remain in a better place in perpetuity, is wishful thinking.

The CQC has had leadership issues. We all hope and I am sure that the leadership will be in a better place in the near future, but if an organisation can be in such a bad place because of a failure of leadership, those circumstances can return in the future. Of course, it might be leadership failings within the regulator that HSSIB is asked to investigate. Again, if its functions are delivered by a regulatory organisation with leadership failings, there will be no confidence whatever that a truly independent and meaningful investigation can take place.

Let us not forget that the public are somewhat jaded by investigations, inquiries and reports—justifiably so. They clearly have a valuable function, but their function is far more valuable if there is confidence in them. If a powerful organisation such as the CQC—the regulator—can effectively mark its own homework, that does nothing to help the reputation of investigations and inquiries with the public. I suspect that the problem with them in the public’s mind is that it always looks a little bit like the establishment is looking at itself and coming up with an argument it can then justify. There is a perception that that does not lead to meaningful change. With this Bill, we will create an environment where that perception is even stronger.

My hon. Friend is rightly highlighting the importance of independence, and trust in the independence, of the organisations investigating failures and making recommendations. Does he agree that that is only half of it? Those organisations are not at fault when recommendations are not implemented, so the other half of this is that the NHS and the system need to act on those recommendations when they are made.

It is, of course. I have been focusing on public perception, and my right hon. Friend is absolutely correct that that is only one part of it—an important part of it. Probably, the most important part is what actually happens, and that requires the NHS to learn and improve, which is very unlikely to be improved by this proposal.

My hon. Friend is making a very important case about the importance of the perception of independence and the safe space actually being safe. There is a risk that people feel that they will be hounded or—

Order.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following:

Amendment 55, in schedule 8, page 110, line 23, at end insert —

“(10) If the Secretary of State certifies that it is in the interests of national security that the powers conferred by subsection (1)—

(a) should not be exercisable in relation to certain premises in which there is a Crown interest, or

(b) should not be exercisable in relation to certain specified premises for other purposes,

those powers are not exercisable in relation to those specified premises.

(7) In this section, “Crown interest” means—

(a) an interest belonging to a government department or held in trust for His Majesty for the purposes of a government department;

(b) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Crown;

(c) an interest belonging to His Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster;

(d) an interest belonging to the Duchy of Cornwall.”.

This amendment makes provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers under subsection 51J(1) to the Health and Social Care Act 2008, inserted by Schedule 8 of this Bill.

Amendment 56, in schedule 8, page 116, line 8, leave out subsection (9).

This amendment would allow the Commission to recoup charges in excess of the costs incurred in providing assistance.

Amendment 5, in schedule 8, page 120, line 16, at end insert—

“(2A) After paragraph 6(8) insert—

“(9) A committee of the Commission is to be appointed in accordance with regulations.

(10) The purpose of the committee is to oversee the health services safety investigation functions formerly conducted by HSSIB, transferred to the Care Quality Commission under the Health Act 2026.

(11) The committee is to be operationally independent from the Care Quality Commission.

(12) The committee is to consist of a chair appointed by the Secretary of State, and not less than six and not more than twelve other members appointed by the chair.

(13) A majority of the members of the committee must not be members of the Care Quality Commission.

(14) So far as is reasonably practicable, the persons appointed to the committee must include persons with knowledge or experience relevant to the discharge of functions under this paragraph.””.

This amendment would ensure that oversight of HSSIB’s functions would remain operationally independent of the Care Quality Commission (CQC) following the transfer of its functions to the CQC.

Schedule 8.

Clauses 60 and 61 stand part.

New clause 42—Funding for Care Quality Commission (CQC) investigations—

“The Secretary of State has a duty to make provision for adequate funding and resources for patient safety investigations conducted by the CQC, including some initiated by the CQC themselves.”.

I believe Dr Caroline Johnson was mid-intervention.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was talking about the importance of the perception of the safe space, in relation to people being able to come forward, and the fears of whistleblowers. Does he agree with me that it is not just this perception that causes potential whistleblowers to worry? If they read the newspapers on a regular basis, or are on social media, they will see examples of people who have suffered mistreatment as the result of having been whistleblowers.

The shadow Minister is absolutely right. Perception is a problem, but the reality on the ground is perhaps an even greater problem. Both are issues here with what the Government plan.

There could be a reason why this merger, or the abolition of the Health Services Safety Investigations Body, needs to happen, but we have not seen that compelling argument. We have seen some attempts at justification, but they seem to be incredibly thin—and that is being generous.

The principal argument seems to be that there is a busy and confusing landscape when it comes to investigatory and regulatory bodies. The figure Dr Dash put forward was something like 150 different organisations; she was asked to review just six of those. Even if she were to have abolished all six, it clearly does nothing to reduce the busy and confusing landscape. My hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon made that point well.

A busy and confusing regulatory landscape should not be a justification for getting rid of an essential investigatory body and disincentivising the investigation process and whistleblowing and disclosures, by tying it up with the regulator, which itself may be at fault. Streamlining and dealing with a busy and confusing landscape are objectively good reasons to do something, but not this. That is the central point.

As my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon referred to, the question was put to Dr Dash, the author of the recommendations, when she gave evidence: what happens if there is a problem with the Care Quality Commission once HSSIB has become part of it? I think we rightly expected a fairly clear answer on that. The answer was a rhetorical response:

“‘What happens if the problem is this organisation or that one?’”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 8, Q9.]

That was the response from Dr Dash. But we are not talking about whether there is a problem with this organisation or that one; we are talking about the CQC, the organisation that HSSIB will become.

If there is a problem with another organisation, HSSIB can investigate it; if there is a problem with the CQC now, HSSIB can investigate it; but when HSSIB becomes the CQC, there will plainly be a problem with investigating the CQC. When that question was put to the author of the report on whom the Government are relying, no answer was provided. The reply to my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon was a rhetorical question.

I urge the Minister to reflect. There is a major issue here that has not been addressed. Until she, or those on whom she relies, can articulate the answer, I urge her to delay these proposals.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell.

The question is what will make patients more safe. Does incorporating the department that looks at safety into the organisation that inspects the services help? It might. Safety is not an add-on; safety must be at the heart of absolutely everything that we do. Safety is not a separate matter; it depends on those who work in our NHS and all of us all the time. That must be the culture. Let us not rely so much on inspections and litigations. At a time when we are unable to find jobs for newly qualified midwives, we spend more on obstetric litigation and compensation than we spend on obstetrics. I applaud what our Government are trying to do and their intention to improve things.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. This morning, we had really good and detailed exchanges about patient safety and learning the role of HSSIB.

Often politics is confrontational and divisive, but I want to be clear that I take at face value that every single Member who has spoken and who I have met with, including people who do not want to see this change, have the best of intentions. They want to understand patient safety—in the long term we can talk about safety and quality of service, but let us focus on the safety aspects here—and they are trying to navigate something. They are seeing a change, which is always difficult, and we need to ensure we get that right. It is absolutely right that we do that in Committee, on Report and in the House of Lords. We will continue to take note of all the points made and seek to address them. I fortunately had the lunch break to reflect and do that a bit more carefully.

For people here and those reading our deliberations, what is difficult about the Bill—we understand this as legislators—is that we are abolishing an organisation and moving functions. That stands within a wider framework of changes to the safety and quality landscape that the Government are seeking. When one focuses on things that are being abolished, it is very binary. I will try and locate some of that without veering too far from the matter in front of us.

Among all the discussions, there are a couple of key questions that I want to address, including why I do this. Through the passage of the Bill, many people in the wider landscape have said to me, “Why are you bothering having a row about this?” I find that quite shocking as a riposte, because the answer is simple in the context. It is too important to not attempt to get this right and make changes to something that clearly is not working. I do not think I have heard anybody say that the current system is working.

As the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston noted, I said during the passage of the Health and Care Act 2022 that the functions of HSSIB are really important and must be built to the highest standard. I absolutely stand by that. It is not working; that is why we are changing it, but also why we are preserving the function within a new system, which we will seek to improve.

Will the Minister give way?

I am going to try to go through these points because I have listened carefully to everybody’s contributions. If there is something outstanding, I will be happy to come back to it.

To answer some of the direct questions that were put to me about the Dash review, I do not recall anybody particularly disagreeing with its findings when it was published or when we put it forward in our 10-year plan last year. I do not expect everyone to agree with every single recommendation or point made in that review. To an earlier point that was made by the Opposition, it was informed by a broad range of evidence and perspectives from across the health and social care system, including engagement with commissioners, providers, patients, families, and people harmed by poor-quality care, as well as charities, academics and national organisations. It looked really closely at what has not worked and why. I encourage hon. Members to go back to the work that Penny Dash was asked to do and the wider report.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon and the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston asked why the review covered only six organisations. The then Secretary of State authorised the Dash review to look at six organisations in this space that were directly overseen by the Department. Many other organisations in this space are not directly overseen by the Department, so they were not in scope of that review as they had their own regulatory landscape ecologies and so on. That is why those six organisations, which we oversee, were looked at.

Last night at the Dispatch Box, the Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill), made it clear that the rationale for this change is not based on cost. It is not based on the recommendations being too expensive. Rather, as I am sure colleagues will agree, we have seen far too many recommendations regarding patient safety but too little action. Inaction is not helping to improve the patient landscape.

Opposition Members referenced the view from the longest-serving Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), that the NHS will not change or adopt the recommendations. That is a profoundly depressing prospect. We cannot predicate our laws and the health landscape on the basis that the culture in the NHS cannot and will not change. This is not a party-political point, but because of what has happened in the last decade, we must move from a defensive culture into a culture of learning while keeping a safe space in which people can speak up. We have heard a lot about “perception” today. I accept that there is a perception of negativity that is damaging to patient safety and people speaking up, but that is what our wider reforms are seeking to address.

I listened carefully to what the Minister said about a change of culture. A change of culture can certainly happen. In the surgical world, we used to bring patients into the operating theatre, check that the patient was on the operating table and do the operation. Sometimes, we operated on the wrong patient and on the wrong part of the body. We then introduced the World Health Organisation checklist, which checked absolutely everything before we started. It was a complete change of culture in the operating department. We made sure that we had the right prosthesis, the right patient and that we were operating on the right part of the patient. Now, the WHO checklist is a universally adopted process. I am absolutely sure that the culture in the health service can change.

I thank my hon. Friend for that. He and others on both sides of the House with clinical experience, including the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, have shared live examples that can shock the layperson. It is important that those practices are changed clinically, and it is up to Government to make sure that the overarching legislative framework enables that.

Will the Minister give way?

I want to make some points first. I will pick up any outstanding points I do not cover.

The abolition of HSSIB and the transfer of its functions to CQC is being done to strengthen the link between patient safety investigations and the action being taken on the frontline to simplify the patient safety landscape. We want to align the recommendations with action.

Hon. Members quoted evidence that Dr Dash gave to the Committee. Let me remind the Committee of something else she told us, about how HSSIB’s functions can be better aligned as part of the CQC. She said:

“by bringing HSSIB into the CQC, you can align the work of the two.

For example, if the CQC is going round the country and spotting a particular problem with the way in which anaesthesia is being given or with managing patients post-surgery, the CQC could then say to HSSIB—that team of people with specific expertise—‘Can you go in and take a look at this? Can you do a detailed focus review of this particular area of care that we are spotting through our visits and which seem to be a particular challenge?’ It is that bit about enabling the CQC to identify a problem and then asking HSSIB to review it in detail, and HSSIB bringing its expertise in investigations into the CQC to enable the CQC to go deeper and then come back to the NHS”.––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 7, Q8.]

to enable best action. These organisations can learn better from each other.

Transferring investigation powers to the Care Quality Commission is an opportunity to strengthen the CQC. We have to move away from a defensive culture to a culture of shared learning if we are to improve patient care. The CQC can learn and improve from HSSIB best practice and take a more holistic approach to patient safety. Those executing the regulatory and investigatory functions can learn from each other and exchange skills, which would strengthen the links between learning, oversight and improvement, leading to real and sustained change across the system, driven by the CQC.

On that point, will the Minister briefly give way?

No.

There will be no barrier to investigating whether CQC inspections are causing unintended harm. If they are, and the investigator feels that a recommendation for change should be made, they will make it. The insight gained from investigations will continue to inform recommendations concerning the CQC’s regulatory functions, and the Bill allows for the investigation function to make recommendations to the CQC in its report. The CQC would be legally required to respond to such recommendations. There will be no need for litigation through the courts. That is an important point. Again, I am addressing the points made by Opposition Members. We will continue to set this out more clearly for Members. I am happy to find different ways to do that.

I now turn to the wider point about whether both an investigatory and a regulatory function can reside in the same body. Many organisations have different functions and responsibilities that they have to discharge simultaneously; we have also heard a lot about the safety body, which of course is part of the Department for Transport. It happens across a lot of bodies. I totally accept that it would be helpful for the debate if we were clearer on what some of those bodies are, and we will come forward with more information on that.

Will the Minister give way?

I am going to persist on some of these arguments. I think I have addressed all the points made by the Opposition. It is the job of effective leadership to manage those interests and responsibilities, and that is what we expect of the CQC’s leadership.

I will now turn to the amendments on this topic, which I thank the hon. Members for Sleaford and North Hykeham and for North Shropshire for tabling. Amendment 55 would make provision for the Secretary of State to disapply investigation powers in certain circumstances. I recognise the importance of ensuring that investigatory powers are not exercised in relation to sensitive Crown or Government premises where there is a national security interest. I want to be clear: the Bill already provides for that.

The Bill already amends section 96 of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 so that it applies to the new CQC investigatory function. Section 96 makes provision for the application of CQC legislation to the Crown, which means that the mechanism that the amendment is seeking to introduce is already in place within the existing legislative framework. Additionally, the Bill already provides for a power which enables the Secretary of State to disapply these investigatory powers in relation to Crown premises when it is in the interest of national security. The amendment would therefore duplicate an existing provision and would add unnecessary complexity to the legislation without delivering any additional benefit.

Amendment 56 would allow the Care Quality Commission to recover charges that are higher than the actual costs it incurs when providing assistance to anyone other than an NHS body or the Secretary of State. I understand the intention behind the amendment—to give the commission greater financial flexibility—but the Government do not think that it is necessary. The charging framework in the Bill is based on the clear principle of cost recovery. Removing subsection (9) of proposed new section 51R of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 would mean that the commission could charge more than it actually costs to provide a service, shifting away from recovering costs and towards allowing the commission to make a surplus through its charging powers.

My understanding is that, in the past, HSSIB has provided services to not only British health services but overseas health services, which were, in some cases, charged for that service, as it is a world-leading organisation. Why would the Minister not want that to continue?

I am happy to get back to the hon. Lady on that specific point, if that is the case. The charging framework is about recovering costs, not making a surplus, which is what the amendment would result in. If that is not the case, I will make sure that she receives a proper correction.

The Government do not think that there is a good case for the amendment, because, as I have said, the aim of the provision is to provide for fair and transparent cost recovery, not to raise extra income beyond cost. I am not sure whether the hon. Lady is suggesting that it might be good for the commission to create additional funding, but if that is not clear, I am happy to get back to her on it. The provision makes the recovery of costs more predictable and consistent for those who have to pay them. That is usual for public bodies.

New clause 42 relates to funding provisions for the CQC’s new investigation function. The Department already provides grant in aid to the CQC to provide adequate funding for investigations and special reviews; similarly, HSSIB’s budget is provided through grant in aid and is set each year. When the CQC takes on HSSIB’s functions, the funding streams will remain distinct, and the CQC will have to assure the Department that the amount allocated to the new investigation function is being used for that purpose.

Funding decisions for the investigation function will continue to be captured in wider departmental budget-planning processes and considered centrally. That provides assurance that business and strategic priorities for the investigation functions can be met. Robust financial oversight will require the CQC to demonstrate that grant in aid is used appropriately, and solely to support the investigation function, without the need to prescribe funding arrangements in legislation.

As there is already an operational mechanism for the Secretary of State to provide adequate funding and resources for investigations, the new clause is not needed. It would also be inappropriate to prescribe the form or level of funding in legislation. The new clause would reduce the Department’s ability to manage funding through the established spending review and estimates process; introduce unnecessary rigidity as the merged function evolves; and risk creating binding funding expectations that may not align with future fiscal constraints. A non-legislative approach ensures flexibility, scale and adaptive function while maintaining robust oversight.

I agree with the intention behind amendment 5, tabled by the hon. Member for North Shropshire, which is, as I understand it, to ensure that the Health Services Safety Investigations Body functions that are transferred to the CQC retain a high level of operational independence and continue to command the confidence—the Committee heard that word a lot this morning; I completely agree on its importance—of patients and their families, healthcare professionals and the wider public. Similarly, I understand that the objective of the amendment is to maximise the perception—again, that is a word I am coming back to; I tried to address the issue earlier—of independence in the CQC.

The Government have protected safe spaces in legislation, and we agree that operational independence of the investigation function is required, but our plans support and enable that. For that reason, we cannot support the amendment, which would impose a highly prescriptive governance structure on the CQC by requiring the creation of a separate statutory committee and setting out in primary legislation detailed requirements for its purpose, membership appointments and operational arrangements. While the Government fully agree that effective safety investigations must be conducted independently and objectively, we do not consider it necessary to put such detailed organisational arrangements in the Bill.

The Bill already provides a clear legislative framework for the transfer of those functions and enables the CQC to discharge them appropriately, within its broader statutory responsibilities. Furthermore, the CQC already operates within a robust statutory framework and is capable of establishing governance arrangements that support the effective delivery of its functions, including appropriate safeguards to protect investigative independence and the handling of safe-space material.

The amendment would reduce organisational flexibility by mandating a specific committee structure, and would constrain the CQC’s ability to adapt its governance arrangements over time in response to operational experience, changes in circumstances or future improvements in best practice. Under the amendment, governance arrangements would be fixed in statute, rather than having the capability to evolve as the organisation learns and develops.

Those additional administrative and governance requirements would increase bureaucracy and complexity, which the Government are looking to reduce. I re-emphasise that, in addition, a statutory committee would weaken the important links between learning and the action that the transfer of this organisation is intended to support. One of the key benefits of bringing these functions into the CQC is the opportunity to strengthen strategic oversight and ensure that learning from investigations can more readily inform improvement activity across the system.

The Minister seems to be saying that her reasoning for moving HSSIB into the CQC is to ensure that actions take place in response to the recommendations. But if HSSIB outwith the CQC makes recommendations that are delivered by the provider organisations, commissioned by the ICBs and overseen by Ministers, and then the CQC checks that as part of the regulation, why does HSSIB need to be within the CQC for that to happen?

We are probably not going to agree on this point. I have made the point several times—and we made it in the Dash review—about bringing these organisations together. As I said again in my opening comments, it is about the opportunity to get this right and share that learning and experience. It is not about the cost but about aligning the recommendations and the actions that follow through from them. That learning, and the opportunity to push that through, is something we should grasp.

Coming back to amendment 5, creating a separate statutory committee risks introducing additional layers of separation that could slow the flow of intelligence and impede timely action in response to emerging patient safety concerns. We believe the integration of investigatory functions can be secured through clear statutory functions and appropriate safeguards, rather than through organisational structures set out in primary legislation that are too rigid. Establishing detailed governance requirements in statute may also make future improvements more difficult to implement without legislative change.

I understand and respect the concerns that underpin the amendment, but the Government believe that the Bill already provides the necessary framework for the safe and effective delivery of health services’ safety investigations following their transfer to the CQC. We will of course work closely with both the CQC and HSSIB on their transition arrangements through a transition board, whether on the issues of ensuring operation independence of the investigation function and the ways in which that learning is shared, or, further to the Opposition spokesperson’s point, how we make sure that learning is shared and creates an impact, and where that is felt most clearly. For those reasons, I ask hon. Members not to press their amendments, and I commend clauses 59, 60 and 61 to the Committee.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Does any Member wish to press amendment 55 to a Division?

The Minister has reassured us that, although it has not been lifted and shifted from the original, the amendment is a duplication of another clause. Therefore, we believe the Committee—

Order. The Member just needs to say whether she is pressing it to a Division.

No, I am not.

Schedule 8

Transfer of HSSIB’s Functions to CQC

Clause 62 underscores the importance that we place on special reviews and investigations, and it will maintain the Care Quality Commission’s ability to conduct them by ensuring that the CQC’s investigatory role remains properly aligned with its original statutory purpose. The CQC is the independent regulator of health and care providers, and in the case of commissioners, it has the powers to undertake a special review or investigation when requested to by the Secretary of State.

On 30 January 2024, the then Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins), commissioned a section 48 review into mental health services in Nottinghamshire following the tragic events of June 2023. As we know, that revealed serious and systemic failings and led to strengthened oversight and a clear improvement plan. With NHS England being abolished and its functions being transferred to the Department and across the wider system, this clause will remove NHSE from the scope of section 48 and allow Ministers to set out, through regulations, the future scope of section 48.

NHS England’s commissioning functions will mostly transfer to the integrated care boards but, as we discussed previously, NHSE’s most specialised commissioning functions will transfer to the Secretary of State. In future, regulations will set out the specific commissioning functions that the Secretary of State will be responsible for and that the CQC may review or investigate. The scope of the special reviews and investigations will continue to apply only to commissioning functions under the National Health Service Act 2006 or section 117 of the Mental Health Act 1983, which is the CQC’s existing remit.

This approach will ensure that the CQC’s investigatory powers will not be automatically extended to departmental functions, which would fundamentally change the relationship between an arm’s length body and a Government Department and would not align with the original intention of section 48 reviews. For that reason, the Bill will provide for scrutiny through secondary legislation. That will set out a transparent and accountable way to specify which commissioning functions are in scope, enabling parliamentary scrutiny and CQC oversight where it is genuinely relevant to patient safety and care quality.

This approach will also provide important flexibility: as commissioning arrangements change, the right function can be brought into scope without unnecessary delays. Taken together, this clause will protect the CQC’s independence, maintain accountability and provide a sensible framework for scrutiny where it adds real value for patient safety and care quality. I commend the clause to the Committee.

I have just a couple of questions. Clause 62 will update the CQC’s power to conduct special reviews of NHS commissioning to cover ICBs and the Secretary of State’s commissioning functions, and the requirement for ministerial approval before the CQC can investigate will be retained. How will that apply when HSSIB is moved into the CQC? Is it the Minister’s intention that HSSIB will need the Secretary of State’s approval to complete investigations?

My understanding is that the clause will not change that particular power, but I will get back to the hon. Lady if I am wrong.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 62 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 63

Time limit for bringing proceedings

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The 10-year health plan reaffirms the Government’s commitment to families affected by bereavement or serious harm, ensuring that lessons are learned from their experience and that more cases are fully reviewed and acted on. Families seek closure following serious harm to or the death of a loved one by wanting to understand what went wrong and what could be done to stop other families experiencing similar trauma, and by wanting to hold someone to account. Families often turn to the Care Quality Commission for help.

Clause 63 will extend the CQC’s power to bring proceedings against a health and social care provider for a serious breach of regulations from the existing limitation of three years from the date of the offence to five years. Let me be clear: extending the three-year limitation from the time of the offence will not alter the first requirement that the CQC should act within 12 months of sufficient evidence of a serious breach of regulations becoming available. That 12-month window for action once the regulator is aware of the offence will remain unchanged. Extending the limitation period to five years from the date of the offence will mean that fewer events that should be considered by the regulator will effectively time out and go beyond the reach of the regulator’s action.

The CQC is not the only body with an interest in investigating serious breaches of regulations that result in unnatural death; there are other investigatory bodies, such as the police, with equal interest and powers to investigate deaths for the purpose of pursuing criminal prosecution. The coronial process serves a different purpose. A coroner’s role is to establish facts surrounding an unnatural death rather than to find fault. In a complex case, a police investigation or a coroner’s inquest—sometimes both—can take time to conclude. Those independent processes are a useful source of information for the CQC to form a full picture of a breach of regulation.

A culture of learning from investigations, inquiries, errors and poor care should be the norm in the NHS. It is therefore expected that a service provider may also commission its own internal investigation to learn from an unnatural death. Furthermore, there are cases where the CQC is approached late with information after an offence may have been committed. For example, the CQC may only receive information about an offence two and half years after it was committed, leaving little time in the remaining six-month period to investigate. Extending the period to five years would help mitigate such circumstances, and that is why we are extending the statutory limitation period. This will ensure that the CQC has the ability in far more cases to address the serious regulatory failings that it should and must address, without risking falling foul of a time limitation. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

As the Minister said, clause 63 amends section 90(2) of the Health and Social Care Act 2008 to extend the limit on proceedings relating to the registration of offences under part 1 from three to five years. The impact assessment talks a little about the time it takes to investigate these cases, but as the Minister said, the time to investigate is 12 months from the CQC being given enough evidence to consider whether the case is prosecutable. Why has she chosen not to change that too? Does she think people will have enough time to investigate? She is looking puzzled.

Apologies—I missed the exact question as to what needed to be changed. Could the hon. Lady repeat that?

The Minister talked about changing the time period in which proceedings can be effected from three to five years, but once the CQC is aware that an investigation could be brought and there is evidence that needs to be looked at, it will still get only 12 months. That has not been changed. I wonder what the rationale is for that. I am not criticising it; I am just asking the question.

The other issue is that clause 63 is prospective, so if an offence were committed immediately after the Act was passed, for the first three years things would effectively be as they are now; the change from three years to five would be relevant only after three years. Clause 71(2) on commencement provides that clause 63 will not come into force until two months after the Act is passed. I just wonder in practical terms why, given that it will take three years to come into effect in any case, it will not come into force on the day the Act receives Royal Assent.

The impact assessment talks about the CQC prosecuting two or three additional cases a year, and a cost of £4.3 million over 10 years with fines of £2.7 million over 10 years. Will the regulator keep the fines, or will they go back into the Treasury? Can the Minister guarantee that the additional funds that are estimated to be required for the additional cases under this new regulation will be provided so that the CQC can do the investigations that she is giving it the opportunity to do?

Put simply, the answer to the hon. Lady’s questions is that we are not seeking to change other aspects. The CQC wants to get to points as soon as possible, so the 12-month period has not been changed. The function of clause 63 is merely to recognise the issues around the three years and to change that to five years. We are not seeking to alter anything else in that regard. On her point about the commencement date, that is merely recognising what is considered to be parliamentary convention.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 63 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 64

Abolition of Healthwatch England

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Schedule 9.

New Clause 74—Report on the abolition of Healthwatch England—

“(1) Within 12 months of the passage of this Act, the Secretary of State must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament on the impact of the abolition of Healthwatch England and transfer of Healthwatch England's functions to ICBs.

(2) The report must consider—

(a) the effectiveness of escalation routes for complaints,

(b) the ability to receive responses to complaints from the relevant ICB officer,

(c) accountability of ICB CEOs for delivering new functions arising from the abolition of Healthwatch;

(d) independence in the delivery of patient surveys, and

(e) ability to investigate organisations from which the ICB commissions services.

(3) The report must make recommendations about how any issues identified under subsection (2) may be mitigated.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a report within 12 months of the passage of this Act on the impact of the abolition of Healthwatch England and transfer of Healthwatch England's functions to ICBs.

New clause 78—Healthwatch funding—

“(1) The Secretary of State, must within 12 months of the passing of this act, enact a scheme to fund Healthwatch England and local Healthwatch organisations for the 2027/2028 financial year to the level estimated by the Department for Health and Social Care in 2013/14.

(2) The Secretary of State must consider uprating this funding with inflation for 2026/2027.”

This new clause would ensure that Healthwatch England and local Healthwatch organisations are funded to the level estimated by the Department for Health and Social Care in 2013/14.

I call the Minister.

This is a popular clause, Ms Lewell—and rightly so. I recognise that this provision has elicited a lot of interest among our constituents and the wider public. I look forward to hearing Members’ contributions.

Clause 64 abolishes Healthwatch England, which I believe is a mistake, and introduces schedule 9 to facilitate that. The impact assessment talks about the roles of local healthwatch and Healthwatch England, with local healthwatch obtaining views, making reports and recommendations, promoting and supporting public institutions, signposting to advice, and giving views to Healthwatch England nationally; and Healthwatch England then providing leadership, guidance and support to local healthwatch, escalation to the CQC, which we have heard a lot about already, and advice to the Secretary of State or NHS England.

Members may be familiar with the term “nothing about us without us”—the idea that policies should not be decided and services should not be shaped without the participation of those who will use those services or be affected by the decisions that are made. As a medical practitioner, I believe that is an important principle. Patients must have a voice, because it is they who have the lived experience of their conditions and know their needs better than any civil servant in Whitehall. They know what is working and what needs to change.

Let us look at the history of patient voice. In the two decades after the NHS’s inception, the provision of care was really quite paternalistic. Patients did not really have any role in shaping the services that they received. That changed in 1974 with the establishment of community health councils, made up of volunteers. They carried out research, conducted visits to inspect standards and represented communities when changes were proposed. They also helped the public with information about local services, including how to make complaints—very similar processes.

The Labour Government abolished community health councils in 2003, although a cursory trip to Hansard reveals that the Government repeatedly stated before the publication of the NHS plan that at that point they envisaged no immediate changes to community health councils, but they did go on to do that. That is reminiscent of what we are discussing today, because abolishing Healthwatch was not in the Labour party manifesto.

In 2003, the community health councils became patient and public involvement forums, and five years later they became local involvement networks. The names and structures have changed, but the principle of patients having an independent voice remained. Healthwatch is the latest iteration. To be precise, Healthwatch England was established initially as a committee of the Care Quality Commission in 2013. It operates a hub-and-spoke model with more than 150 local healthwatches spread across local authority areas.

Healthwatches play a vital role in exposing problems in the health service. Indeed, even the King’s Speech contained a reference to Healthwatch England. According to Healthwatch England’s May 2025 report,

“nearly one in four…adults have noticed inaccuracies or missing details in their medical records”,

such as inaccurate personal details and inaccurate records of medicines, diagnoses, treatments and conditions.

I note that the Minister herself has relied on Healthwatch when bringing problems facing her constituents to the House. She said:

“In a recent Adjournment debate about Bristol and the south-west, I raised the issue of a pregnant constituent who was unable to access care at that critical time. This is the No. 1 issue raised by Healthwatch. Patients are struggling.”—[Official Report, 10 February 2022; Vol. 708, c. 484WH.]

So Healthwatch is valuable.

I invite Members to look at the impact that Healthwatch had in 2023-24. More than 925,000 people used their local healthwatch to get advice and information about their health and care. More than 329,000 people shared their experiences to help improve services. Healthwatch England helped to secure changes to Royal Mail so that NHS letters are delivered to patients on time. It also led new NHS guidance so that patients commencing cancer treatment have priority access to NHS dentists. A piece of Healthwatch research indicated that millions of eligible adults may be missing out on social care.

Recently, my local branch, Healthwatch Lincolnshire, produced a report on the challenges facing carers nationally. Healthwatch has influenced the future of attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder care, encouraged the uptake of cervical cancer screening and so much more. That is why the public and health experts are alarmed by the Government’s plans.

As for HSSIB, the success of Healthwatch is due to its independence, but the Government want to do away with that. Their policy paper commits to replacing Healthwatch with a new patient experience directorate, which will sit inside the Minister’s Department. Instead of having organisations embedded in communities sitting on local health and wellbeing boards, the public will need to interface with the Minister’s Department. How can she guarantee the independence, and the perception of independence, of the new directorate? How can she be sure the public will trust it?

I remind Members of what Councillor Dr Wendy Taylor of the Local Government Association said:

“The current proposals to disband Healthwatch and allow health and social care services to gather and respond to feedback, rather than being challenged by an independent voice, risks organisations being seen to mark their own homework.”

When Healthwatch conducts surveys, it often solicits information that proves problematic for the Government of the day. How can the public have confidence that the new directorate’s process will do the same? What will stop the Secretary of State deciding what questions get asked and what data gets published? From my reading of the Bill, the answer is nothing.

The Government have made it clear that, alongside the new directorate, ICBs will take over several patient voice functions. I appreciate that this strays slightly into the subject of the next group of provisions, Ms Lewell, but it is difficult to separate Healthwatch from local healthwatches. The Patients Association has warned:

“Splitting local Healthwatch between ICBs and local authorities risks creating a patchwork of accountability with no single body responsible for ensuring patients are heard”.

If responsibility to deliver those functions is shared between different parts of the health system, who becomes accountable if it is not funded? Who is accountable if people fall through the cracks? If accountability is divided, it often means that accountability is somewhat diminished.

Members also need to ask whether it is financially feasible for ICBs to deliver patient voice. In its evidence, the Health Foundation wrote:

“Moving the NHS functions of local HealthWatch organisations into newly enlarged ICB footprints could also result in the loss of a more nuanced local understanding of the public’s priorities and needs, with particular implications for seldom heard or more vulnerable communities.”

We know that ICBs are under financial pressure because of decisions by the Labour Government; they have had to slash operating costs by 50%, and many are pencilling in cuts to frontline services. Against that backdrop, how can they afford to deliver patient voice functions? Ms Lewell, your guess is as good as mine.

We have not heard about any additional funding from the Government for the purpose of patient voice. Healthwatch England was provided £3.3 million in 2025-26, and local healthwatch £14.1 million. How much of that money will be redirected to the patient experience directorate and the ICBs?

I tabled a written question about the benefits to the public purse of abolishing Healthwatch. The Minister’s response was as follows:

“The potential savings from abolishing Healthwatch England and Local Healthwatch are dependent future policy decisions regarding the approach taken to collecting user experiences post-abolition.”

She set out an intention for “future policy decisions”, but there was, and still is, an absence of a plan. That is something we have heard again and again in relation to health, in Committee and throughout the two years that this Government have been in power: the absence of a plan for how things will be achieved. They have lofty aims, and understandable and sometimes really good goals, but no understanding of how they are going to get there.

It is not just the Opposition who are concerned; I will give some examples of Government Members who are, too. The hon. Member for Birmingham Erdington (Paulette Hamilton) said:

“One of my biggest concerns about the Bill is the reduction in independent patient representation, including the abolition of Healthwatch structures.”—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 921.]

The hon. Member for York Central (Rachael Maskell) said:

“Replacing Healthwatch will mean that, ultimately, patients will not have confidence in the commissioners.”—[Official Report, 9 June 2026; Vol. 787, c. 136.]

The hon. Member for Blaydon and Consett said:

“I understand that the Government’s real intention, through the Bill, is to strengthen the patient voice and the ability to raise issues, but there is real concern that an organisation inside the Department of Health and Social Care will not provide that independence. Will the Minister commit to looking again at how that independence can be built in and…with the ability to pull the levers”?—[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 944.]

We have also heard concerns from the Health and Social Care Committee.

But the Member that the Minister may be most interested in is the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham). He wrote to the former Secretary of State last year saying:

“People speak to Healthwatch because they are outside the system—they are impartial, trusted, and provide a safe space for concerns to be shared.”

Does the Minister agree? If so, why does she want to remove the independence of patient voice? The right hon. Member for Makerfield also said:

“The independence of resident and patient voice is a necessity. Without it, we risk losing the trust of the public, the richness of lived experience, and the ability to challenge and improve the system from within, particularly during this time of significant system reform”.

My plea to the Minister is this: think again about the importance of the independence of patient voice. People will give their views when they think they can do so independently and safely—a principle that was echoed in the debate this morning. Removing the independence does not seem necessary, and I do not understand why the Minister thinks that it will improve patient care and thereby patient safety. It is clear that Members not only on the Opposition Benches, but right across the Government Benches—in fact, potentially the new Prime Minister from next week or the week after—may think the same. I encourage the Minister to reconsider this step.

For over 50 years, there has been a statutory independent patient voice in the health and care system. The creation of Healthwatch was, in part, a direct response to the issues raised by the Francis inquiry into Mid Staffs. In a 2024 Healthwatch poll, almost a quarter of NHS patients said that they had experienced poor care in the past year, but 56% of them—more than half—took no action. Of that 56%, 20% said that that was because they were scared that giving negative feedback directly to NHS services would affect their ongoing treatment. Women, people living in areas of greater deprivation, disabled people and unpaid carers were significantly more likely to give the fear of retribution as a reason for not speaking up.

The Government are stripping patients of their voice in our NHS. Rather than being able to go to an independent body and express how the NHS can work better for them, patients will now be able only to give feedback to the same organisation that might have failed them. I have had experience of that in the past few weeks. My partner Emma has endometriosis, which has been an ongoing condition. She was worried that speaking to the local hospital trust specifically about the treatment she received might affect her treatment going forward.

The Government have argued that the changes will bring patient insight closer to decision making, making it much more effective at securing change. The former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), stated that patients do not need “ventriloquists”. That blatantly disregards the vital role played by Healthwatch in advocating not only for vulnerable patients who, understandably, do not feel confident navigating health services with often complex or combative systems, but for whole communities with a pre-existing distrust of the system.

We believe that removing Healthwatch leaves the health service to mark its own homework, which creates a conflict of interest. It will significantly undermine public trust, as independence is removed. Will vulnerable people who have suffered harm or poor experiences in the health and care system really have faith in a system headed by a director in the Department of Health and Social Care, which is the very organisation running the system that caused them harm in the first place? On a local level, will they have faith going to the same ICB that oversees the providers that have failed them? One need only look at the long list of maternity failings in Mid Staffs to see that internal functions can fail catastrophically. We know all too well that the NHS default is sometimes to cover up. The public knows that, too, so independence is everything.

Healthwatch has been keen in spotting and exposing challenges in the health service, such as widespread failures in the NHS referral process, yet there will be no incentive for the new system to investigate such issues, which are invisible in the main NHS performance metrics. The system does not always know what questions it needs to ask, so an independent route for unsolicited feedback is important. We also think that the provisions disadvantage hard-to-reach communities and those who may have a distrust towards the NHS and public authorities, making it harder to gain the feedback and concerns of those communities. That risks inadvertently further baking in inequalities.

More widely, clarity has not yet been provided on how those functions will be funded. The reform is coming alongside major reductions in ICB running costs. Healthwatch currently receives almost £26 million a year; that is already 60% less in real terms than the original DHSC estimate to fund the network. There is a risk that the money will be absorbed into wider budgets and never spent on the patient experience infrastructure. If people want to see the value of Healthwatch, they need look no further than the Cabinet Office briefing notes on the King’s Speech, which reference a May 2025 Healthwatch report on missing medical records to make the case for the single patient record.

Fundamentally, the Government are conflating patient voice with patient involvement in decision making. While greater patient voice in commissioning and decision making is needed, it is not a replacement for the advocacy and other functions of Healthwatch, which helps vulnerable people to navigate a complex health and care system and performs signposting functions. Splitting local healthwatch functions across ICBs and local authorities once again separates health and care and reinforces existing gaps between them. As we know, many issues span both areas and need a joined-up investigative approach. How will the new model ensure a joined-up view of people’s experiences across the NHS and social care? We urge the Minister to reconsider this decision. We have seen overwhelming support for Healthwatch across the sector, and it is becoming increasingly clear that many people in the NHS and the medical profession think that this is a huge mistake.

Healthwatch England has played a central role in escalating the findings of local healthwatch organisations and in advocating nationally. We have three examples. The first is the call to publish research highlighting inequalities in waiting times for disadvantaged groups, and for a demographic breakdown of waiting lists, which the NHS obliged with last summer. The second example arose after Healthwatch Sunderland supported a patient with a learning disability who had received accessible screening information but risked missing care because of inaccessible follow-up letters. Healthwatch England raised that gap with national bodies and highlighted inconsistencies in communication, and, as a result, the national easy-read templates were introduced across the cancer pathway, which improved accessibility and reduced risk. The third example is that Healthwatch feeds back patients’ horrific stories of corridor care—including that of a pensioner who was left in a corridor—to NHS leaders, and lobbies for increased transparency and oversight when it comes to corridor care.

I have several questions in three forms. Is the Minister genuinely sure that a director of patient experience in DHSC will be eager to advocate for patients and flag issues at a national level given that they will essentially be flagging to their bosses where work is not up to scratch? Is she sure that the level of persistence that has so often been needed to advocate for change at a national level would be forthcoming from a director employed by DHSC? What will be the mechanism for escalating local concerns that indicate national or systemic issues?

Will the Minister explain where the Government envision the new director sitting in the DHSC structure, and what the reporting lines will be? How will the Government ensure that they have the resources and sense of operational independence to investigate and raise concerns nationally? Healthwatch England has often flagged issues to MPs and to the Health and Social Care Committee as a way of applying pressure on NHS leaders and Ministers to enact change.

I am a member of the Health and Social Care Committee, and the hon. Member is absolutely right to say that Healthwatch England raises issues with us. When the Department assumes those roles and functions, I very much doubt that it will be as keen to disclose such issues to the Committee.

The hon. Gentleman must have read the next line of my speech. We are concerned that a DHSC employee appearing before that Committee will not clearly and openly state whether DHSC is failing.

New clause 78

“would ensure that Healthwatch England and local Healthwatch organisations are funded to the level estimated by the Department for Health and Social Care”

in 2013-14. We do not just want to protect Healthwatch; we want to strengthen it. As I mentioned, it receives almost £26 million a year, which is spread over 153 organisations. In real terms, that is about 60% less than the £43.5 million that DHSC originally estimated would be needed to fund the network. The Healthwatch network does such amazing work—I will not go through it all again—despite being underfunded compared with those original estimates. Imagine the work it could do if it was adequately funded.

Even more worryingly, there is still no clarity on how Healthwatch’s functions will be funded once they have been transferred to the new system. Given the ongoing constraints and cuts to ICB running costs, there is a real risk that the funding for Healthwatch will simply end up being incorporated into wider ICB budgets, and money for the patient experience infrastructure could end up being cut entirely. The new clause aims to ensure that the Healthwatch network is properly funded, but it also raises the point that, if this change is to go through, funding for patient experience infrastructure must be protected. Otherwise, the Bill risks not just weakening patient experience, but removing it altogether as the funding gets swallowed by wider NHS operational demands.

It is, as ever, a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Ms Lewell.

Healthwatch was established, at least in part, as a response to the Mid Staffs scandal. Mid Staffs came up three times in our evidence sessions, and the hon. Member for Winchester mentioned it just now. That scandal matters to everyone, but it has a particular resonance for my role in Parliament. Many of my constituents were harmed by the failing at Mid Staffs. I was born in that hospital, and I speak as a Staffordshire MP. None of us should ever forget what happened or allow it to be swept aside without examining it. There were a great many failings at Mid Staffs over a long period. Oversight was just not in the room when decisions were being made.

Staffordshire county council’s health and care overview and scrutiny committee clearly did not do that job. The Francis report stated:

“The arrangements for public and patient involvement, and for local government scrutiny in Stafford, were a conspicuous failure.”

The report recommended some changes to ensure that Healthwatch, which was in the process of being set up at the time, was funded properly. In that light, the framing of this debate is important and timely. Healthwatch has been going for well over a decade. It is right that we now examine its impact, as it is a significant part of patient voice within the NHS.

Despite the very best efforts of a great many hard-working staff and an army of committed volunteers across the country, the quality of local healthwatch organisations is pretty changeable. Over the past few weeks, I have spoken with right hon. and hon. Members from across the House. The feedback that I have received has ranged from, “My local healthwatch team is brilliant— I work with them really closely and they have really helped out with a huge amount; they deliver great things in my constituency” all the way to, “I have some pretty significant concerns about their impact.” In a couple of cases I heard, “What is Healthwatch? I have never heard of it.”

We heard in evidence that the reason for that variability was a lack of funding. Would the hon. Gentleman support our new clause 78, which tries to deal with the lack of funding and ensure a consistent service from Healthwatch across the country?

Funding Healthwatch is really important, but to address the issue properly, we must make sure that Healthwatch is in the rooms it needs to be in. Funding needs to be part of the process that ICBs follow. I will touch on that later, so the hon. Member will hear further thoughts on the matter.

Local healthwatch organisations across all our constituencies have an important role. At the local level, they are geographically bound to counties. In constituencies like mine and that of the hon. Member for North Shropshire, those geographical areas are huge. The health disparities within my constituency, with two towns that are 4 miles apart, one with a significant mining—

I hesitate to intervene on the hon. Gentleman, because he seems to be straying into the next grouping and I do not want to encourage him down that route, but now that he has raised it, I share his concern. I do not know what it is like in his area, but the ICB areas that local branches of healthwatch will be absorbed into are even larger than counties. In my area, Surrey and Sussex make up three administrative counties. That is an even larger area. The provisions are clearly not the solution to the problem that the hon. Gentleman is outlining.

In isolation, that criticism would be legitimate, but, alongside other changes being introduced, there are ways to mitigate that problem.

I am concerned that local healthwatch branches are not truly local. The healthwatch in Staffordshire has not held an event in my constituency for a number of years. I think its last three events were just volunteer fairs to get more volunteers involved. That is not to say that there are not significant numbers of people there who work very hard to support people in their engagement with the health service, but geographic changeability is real. On a national scale, Healthwatch England has a huge role to play.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

I will make some progress. There are concerns that if we roll some responsibilities into ICBs or councils, the Department needs to make sure that the issue does not get pushed to the side and that the funding does genuinely remain for patient voice. I am reassured that there will be a patient experience directorate within the Department. That will bring decision making and the patient voice into the Department while also keeping an eye on what is happening with those ICBs and ensuring that they have standards to hit.

The Department needs to ensure that it is sharing good practice and keeping oversight of local authority commissioning of social care. The CQC is starting to do that, and there are some positive indicators. There is obviously more work to do, and we need to stay on top of it because, as I said earlier, there are risks whenever there are changes to healthcare. I am reassured that bringing the patient voice into the room with decision makers is the right way to enact change.

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

I am just about to conclude, so I will allow the hon. Lady to come back when she makes her speech shortly.

The final point I want to make is about local government. I hope the Secretary of State will issue guidance on how local government will commission adult social care services. I also hope we will get annual reporting from ICBs and local councils on how they are using the patient voice. I know that the Secretary of State will have the ability to intervene, and I would expect him to do so should those reports show that the patient voice is not being used, is not finding its way into the room or is not leading to the meaningful change that the Amos report suggests.

I will confine my remarks to group 47, conscious that the next group will give us an opportunity to discuss local arrangements, so I will stick to the national ones.

We are all aware of the significant role that Healthwatch England plays, as well as its popularity and the trust that many people place in it. As a former Minister in the Department, I was on the receiving end, on occasion, of some sharp—or firm—suggestions from Healthwatch England, but that is what it was there for. It was there to be the grit in the oyster. It often made useful suggestions, and its independence meant that it could put reports not only to me but to the public—it published them. It could give them, for example, to my hon. Friends who served on the Health and Social Care Committee and, if it wished, go to the media to make sure that that voice was heard.

That is where, for me, the challenge with what is proposed comes in, because a new directorate in the Department, staffed by civil servants, will simply not be able to do that. We all know that those who work in a Department, however excellent they are, report upwards ultimately to the permanent secretary and to Ministers. They are answerable to the political leadership of the Department. Would they be able to decide that something was coming through regularly from patient feedback and publish it independently, without ministerial approval or that of the permanent secretary, or hand it to the media? Would that director be able to champion the patient voice by going on television, irrespective of any ministerial approval?

The reality is, of course, that they could not. It would all be kept in-house in the Department, part of a closed process that would not alter decision making in reality, because that is already happening in the Department. The Department should already be looking at reports from Healthwatch England as part of decision making by Ministers and senior officials. What this simply does is remove the independence. It weakens that voice by making it something that happens within the Department rather than in the public sphere because, quite rightly, those officials will not be able to have their own independent voice out there, irrespective of the leadership of the NHS or the Minister.

I genuinely worry that what we see here is the continuation of a theme that has run throughout other aspects of this legislation—a theme of centralisation, of removing independent external challenge and bringing it inside the system, be it the Department or the NHS. When that happens, my fear is that the people who will lose out will be the patients, whose voice will no longer carry as loudly.

I rise to speak to new clause 74 on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby (John Slinger), who is in the Gallery, and also to some extent on behalf of my predecessor, Jo Churchill, who was the Member of Parliament for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket before me, and was also a Health Minister. This is about Healthwatch and the patient voice. The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Rugby suggests that the Secretary of State create an impact report within 12 months of the Bill passing through Parliament to assess what the impact of the amalgamation or integration of the functions of Healthwatch into the ICB would in fact be, and in particular look at the effectiveness of the complaints procedure and the way in which complaints were responded to.

The theme is also that which we spoke about this morning on whether an organisation can successfully interrogate itself. I believe that with the appropriate safeguards it probably could, but I do think that the suggestion that there ought to be a formal report on the impact within 12 months is something worth considering.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship again, Ms Lewell. I think right hon. and hon. Members will be disappointed to know I am not going to speak too long on this, but they need not worry: in the next grouping, usual service will resume.

I want to pick up a few points on the abolition of national Healthwatch. When we took evidence from Sarah Woolnough of the King’s Fund, I asked her a fairly open-ended question about when she gave evidence at the Health and Social Care Select Committee. I put it to her that she

“seemed to suggest that the Government could achieve what they needed to in the 10-year plan without this reorganisation.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 15, Q23.]

She gave me an answer that essentially said it could all be done without the need for the reorganisation that is in the current NHS Bill. I then asked Mr Jacob Lant, a representative from National Voices, whether he would agree with that and, unprompted, because I did not mention Healthwatch in my question, he replied:

“Yes. I kind of think, as the debate goes on, that—with the changes to Healthwatch in particular—you could achieve so much without legislation. You could beef up the internal functions for listening to a patient and engaging with them without legislation—there is no requirement for that. You could invest more resource in that, and you could do the same with Healthwatch.”––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 16, Q24.]

We already know from the evidence that we received, unprompted, from National Voices and the King’s Fund that the abolition of NHS England will not solve the problems that the Minister, the Government and the Department think are there, and indeed it could be done in a different way.

I listened closely to the hon. Member for Lichfield. He seemed to be presenting a number of problems, but the solution that the Government have come up with does not hold water. As right hon. and hon. Friends have said, the removal of Healthwatch England and the introduction of a director for patient experience simply does not work because the independence—which is so fundamental to the HSSIB that we talked about— of local healthwatches, which we will talk about, and of Healthwatch England is fundamental to the ability of that organisation to do its job.

In a previous career I worked for the Getting It Right First Time programme in the NHS. When that programme first started, it sat outside the structures of what was then NHS Improvement, latterly NHS England. At that point we could make recommendations to the NHS— I do not mean this flippantly —in a way that was unrestricted. As soon as we were brought into NHS England, into a governmental structure, the recommendations that we put forward were looked at and scrutinised and we were told often, “We do not have the money to afford that”, or, “That is not in our plan.” And that is precisely what will happen if recommendations are put through the director of patient experience. As others have said, when this director of patient experience arrives at a Select Committee, he or she will be there to represent and defend the Department and Ministers, understandably, because that is who he or she will work for. They will not be able to stand up, go on television or the radio, do the broadcast interviews or make representations, because they will be a creature of the system rather than a scrutineer of the system and an advocate for patients. That is a fundamental problem, and while I accept that there may be ways to improve Healthwatch England, as Members have outlined, this simply will not do it.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Ms Lewell. This is another example of the Government seeking to abolish an independent voice and merge its functions into an organisation that, frankly, will probably benefit to some extent from not having that independent scrutiny, but it is not for the betterment of patients or indeed the system. Healthwatch England is effective specifically because it is an independent voice for patients. We have not heard any compelling arguments for why, just because the system is not perfect, this change is better than leaving it alone.

The argument has been advanced that this brings patient voice closer to decision making, but I would hope that the directly elected Ministers who represent people are what bring the voice of the people closer to decision making in the Department of Health. They should be the ones bringing patient voice to the heart of decision making—I am sure that they do, of course—and there are other means by which the Department formulates policies and decisions; it does not need to remove an independent patient voice through Healthwatch England, which serves a different purpose, to enhance that.

That different purpose is this: some of the things that Healthwatch England advocates for and shines a light on are uncomfortable truths for decision makers and the Department of Health. It looks far too cosy to now bring that function into the decision-making process. Some of these issues need the light shedding on them that comes with an independent organisation providing patient voice. We have heard how the Select Committee and MPs, in their free-ranging Back-Bench function, benefit from hearing that voice through an independent organisation such as Healthwatch England, because it allows them to fulfil their scrutiny function. This is not just about decision making; it is also about scrutiny of decisions once they have been made. What will the Select Committee, MPs and journalists do when they no longer have the light shed by that independent voice?

As my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon has pointed out, representatives who are employees in the Department of Health and Social Care rightly have other overriding primary duties to the employer—the Department itself. Let us ensure that patient voice is articulated by those who do not have a primary obligation to their employer, but have an obligation to an independent organisation with functions that serve solely to amplify and project the voice of patients.

There are a number of issues with the abolition of local healthwatches, but I will save that for the next discussion. I want to make the wider point that there is a centralisation issue here too. Whether the Government like it or not, this measure will centralise powers into the Department; it will take outside powers from Healthwatch England and bring them in-house. That is nothing short of a centralising measure. The Minister needs to address the justification for that, because the more negatives there are to this decision, the more we need to understand the positives. So far, they are light indeed, or she has failed to articulate them. I think that there is a reason she has failed to articulate the positives: they simply do not exist.

I look forward to the Minister’s response. I urge her to take some more interventions, because the arguments she has given to the Committee in her speeches at the end of each discussion have tended to raise more questions than they have answered. We can only deal with that by intervening on what she says.

I think that the record will show that I have taken several interventions in recent days, and I will continue to do so. I have been very clear that we have some fundamental disagreements on philosophy and approach. I will desperately try not to veer into the next groups, but it may be tricky. I am sure that you will steer me through, Ms Lewell.

I want to pick up on some good, helpful points that have been made. I pay particular tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield for the comments he made. I appreciate that certain areas, particularly Mid Staffs, have elicited a lot of debate and concern. I commend him for following that through on behalf of his constituency. I know that other Members in Staffordshire want to understand how the Government’s future plans will address their very real concerns. That is also true of other areas that have experienced shocking scandals, as we call them. I take that very seriously.

I will pick up on the question of independence that we veered into before, which was mentioned by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham. She highlighted her concerns and the issues raised by my right hon. Friend the Member for Makerfield, and I heard what she said. Independence was also raised by the hon. Member for Winchester and my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield. We therefore return to that point about independence and, as my hon. Friend said, about being in the room, making those decisions and changing the entire culture of the organisation to do something different.

The question is then whether bringing the functions of Healthwatch to the national level is the right method. Again, I commend work on that and the individuals involved in it. Hon. Members mentioned Jacob Lant of National Voices and the King’s Fund, which have worked with us very well to challenge us and try to make this legislation better. I really appreciate their work, and we will continue to talk with them.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon mentioned GIRFT. I cannot help but respond to his point, because he suggested that being inside NHS England has somehow made it less effective, and I could not disagree with him more. It is not because he has left and is here; his presence is obviously missed at GIRFT and welcomed here. To be serious, every meeting I have with NHS England and everything we are attempting to do in reforming outcomes for patients on the ground involves GIRFT. It is now at the very heart of what NHS England does. By coming inside the organisation, it has done exactly some of the things we want to do: drive cultural difference and change inside the organisation, rather than being outside of it. As I said before, this is a slightly philosophical argument and political argument. I appreciate that there are views on either side, but that is absolutely our intention.

On the patient experience directorate, we recognise that public trust will be crucial. We need to ensure that there is system learning across the piece. The patient experience directorate has to earn the trust of the public and parliamentarians, so we will design it to operate transparently and sit at the centre of decision making rather than at its margins. Ministers will be accountable for and answerable to Parliament on the work of the patient experience directorate. It has to focus on the voices that are too often overlooked. The central priority of the directorate will be to reach under-represented and seldom heard groups and to ensure that engagement is accessible, inclusive and proactive, so that the experiences of vulnerable people help inform and shape the decisions that affect their lives.

I was flattered to hear my comments on Second Reading quoted by the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, but I think she has misunderstood me. My question to the Minister was and still is about how we maintain within the new arrangements the ability to speak up on behalf of others. Could the Minister comment on that?

I thank my hon. Friend for making the intention of her comments clear to the Committee. It is right that we need to build trust in patient voice and experience. We will pick up on that in our debate on local healthwatch branches, because that is perhaps where Members of Parliament are particularly important.

At a national level, there are many voices and organisations continuing to review the issue and challenge the Government, including through reports, meetings with Ministers and in Parliament, highlighting the good work that they do and numerous Committees. Health Ministers appear before the Public Accounts Committee, the Health and Social Care Committee and Lords Committees; I have appeared before the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee. That is an important way of ensuring that the Department and the new experience directorate will be accountable.

I recognise the important contribution that Healthwatch has made in capturing patient insight and informing the design and delivery of services, but we do not believe that new clause 78 is necessary. It is inconsistent with the purpose of the Bill. I am aware of the views of the hon. Member for North Shropshire, but the Government’s policy is to abolish Healthwatch and ensure that patient and public voice is more directly connected to decision making. It would therefore not be appropriate or consistent to legislate for a specific funding level for organisations that would no longer exist, or to constrain how funding is deployed to support the new arrangements.

For the record, I tabled amendments to delete those clauses, so there was consistency of intention.

I am just computing that in my brain. Can I seek clarification on that?

I tabled amendments to delete the clauses that will remove Healthwatch, but they have not been chosen for debate, because we can just vote against those clauses standing part. New clause 78, which would ensure that Healthwatch is funded properly, was tabled alongside amendments to ensure that Healthwatch is retained.

I understand. I am grateful to the hon. Member for that clarification, but her new clause represents an incomplete picture of Government funding for Healthwatch. A £14.15 million grant has been provided to local authorities for local healthwatches, and that is only part of the overall funding; a larger proportion is rolled into the wider local government financial settlement, and because that is not visible as a distinct line, headline figures often understate the total funding available. All of this funding is not ringfenced.

With this it will be convenient to discuss schedule 10.

Clause 65 and schedule 10 will abolish the current local healthwatch arrangements and place responsibility for gathering the views of local people firmly with the bodies with the clearest levers to act: integrated care boards and local authorities.

At present, many organisations are gathering views, running engagement exercises and raising issues, often with the best of intentions, but the result can be duplication, variable coverage and uncertainty about who is accountable for responding. We can end up with lots of feedback but too little clarity on the action that follows. By placing those duties on integrated care boards and local authorities, we are ensuring that insight from patients, service users and communities feeds directly into where commissioning and service planning decisions are made for both health and care. As my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield said, the people are in the room. It makes it easier to connect lived experience to priorities, quality improvement and the tackling of inequalities, rather than leaving intelligence at arm’s length from decision makers.

This is about strengthening impact, not silencing criticism. Integrated care boards and local authorities will have a statutory duty to demonstrate how they have engaged with all people in their area, including seldom heard groups, and will be expected to have clear routes for people to raise concerns. We expect transparency about what people have told the system, what the system has done in response and how learning is shared across partners.

As I said in my evidence, many constituents in my Bristol South constituency are said to be hard to reach. They are not hard to reach, in my view. We know exactly where they live, who they are, how old they are and what sex they are. We know largely what diseases they have. We know their level of income. We know their levels of education and attainment, and how they impact their health outcomes. They are not hard to reach; the system is not set up to listen to them. That is what we are determined to change.

Dr Penny Dash’s review of patient safety described a cluttered landscape, with overlaps in how user experience and advocacy are organised. It described the burden that that can place on the frontline, producing multiple, poorly co-ordinated asks with limited impact. Bringing the patient and community voice closer to the organisations responsible for improvement—it is actually their job as commissioners—will help to make feedback more actionable, reduce confusion and support better services. I commend the clause to the Committee.

As I understand it, the objectives of the Bill are to replace the local healthwatch with a less independent, internalised gatherer of patient experience feedback. The objectives appear to be featuring feedback more centrally in strategic decision making, getting people into the room and simplifying the patient landscape.

There are things that I do not understand about that. If the problem is that those who commission or deliver the services are not listening adequately to the people who gather the patient experience information, why not invite the independent individual who has gathered that information into the room? Why ask someone in the room to gather the information and risk the independence? Why not compel more listening?

The Minister talked about who is accountable for action. My understanding is that it is the healthwatches’ job to gather the patient experience and present it to Healthwatch England and the decision makers. It is not their job, as I understand it, to make decisions on how care is delivered or to deliver that care differently. Does the Minister intend that to change?

The Minister also talked about strengthening the impact of Healthwatch, but I do not understand how this change will do that. We have heard how its independence allows Healthwatch to go on telly, talk to Members of Parliament, Select Committees, radio stations and others, and publicise its findings. If it is within the Department, will it be able to do so as freely? I suggest that it will not.

The other thing that I do not really understand—perhaps the Minister can help us with this—is the organisation. At the moment, it is done in local authority areas. It will now become the job of the local authority and the ICB to commission feedback, but we have already heard how the 50% cuts to ICB budgets have led to ICBs merging into larger conglomerates. Those do not necessarily overlap with the strategic mayoral authorities in the way the Minister eventually wants. What geography does the Minister want the feedback to be gathered over? How does she see that working? Will it require further restructuring? The hon. Member for Lichfield talked about the importance of localism and how different areas of his constituency have different health needs. How does the Minister think that that will work under her new plans?

The Minister said that one benefit of the new process is reaching vulnerable individuals, but what is to stop Healthwatch doing that? Ultimately, if we have Healthwatch doing things now that are independent and respected across the House—I am sure your local healthwatch is also excellent, Ms Lewell; Lincolnshire’s certainly is—why not strengthen that voice? Why not say to those who are providing that service, “We’re going to give you more resources,” or “We’re going to ask you to deliver it in a slightly different way,” or “We’re going to ask you to focus on particular populations,” or even, “We’re going to invite you into the room with the ICBs so that they can hear you and listen carefully”?

Why not compel those making the decisions and delivering the services to listen to Healthwatch, rather than replacing it? It was not Healthwatch’s job to listen to them, but to gather the information and present it, and that is what it has done. Can the Minister explain how removing its independence is going to help? I simply do not understand it.

I am very grateful to serve under your chairship, Ms Lewell. My hon. Friend the Member for Winchester has made some general points about Healthwatch and the importance of an independent patient voice; I will not reiterate them, because he made them very well, but I want to speak specifically about local healthwatches and the benefits that they bring.

I find it quite difficult to hear in this room, so I hope the hon. Member for Lichfield will correct me if I have misunderstood the gist of his speech, but I was frankly astonished by the suggestion that if local managers had heard about the problems at Mid Staffs or at Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS trust, the concerns raised in those extremely serious scandals would have been addressed. The reality is that the management of both providers knew exactly about the concerns in those trusts, and they did not address them. That is why we have Healthwatch.

The hon. Member for Lichfield may be aware that my parents live in Stone, which was in the Mid Staffordshire constituency at the time. My mum was a clerk to Staffordshire county council, and I recollect very strongly that the health scrutiny committee at that council questioned the trust about its appalling mortality rate and was constantly reassured that there was nothing to see here. It absolutely failed to mark its own homework. The suggestion that my constituents Kayleigh and Colin Griffiths, who fought for the Ockenden report on Shrewsbury and Telford, did not first try the local services is, I think, missing the point.

With the Ockenden report on Nottinghamshire a couple of weeks ago, we also saw that the hospital trust commissioned several reports into its own maternity services, which found that it was failing. Instead of acting on them, it brushed them under the carpet and commissioned another. The suggestion that providers are capable in the current culture of dealing with those issues does not, I am afraid, hold true in the way it should across every trust.

Is it the hon. Member’s belief that that is something that Healthwatch would have been able to deal with, support and prevent?

The hon. Member will know that Healthwatch was introduced almost as a direct consequence of the Francis review of Mid Staffordshire, so that was certainly the intention. I have discussed the variability of healthwatch organisations across the country and the fact that they are not as well funded as was originally intended. Although I take the point that they have not effectively delivered that alarm-raising service in every case, if they were properly funded and used in the way that they were envisaged to operate, they would be able to spot such issues.

rose—

I am going to go on and give some examples. Central to the value and success of the Healthwatch network is its local focus and the fact it is centred in communities. Where it has worked well, that has allowed Healthwatch to earn trust and build relationships, especially with harder-to-reach communities, as we have discussed. I take the Minister’s point that we know about those harder-to-reach communities, but the reality is that we are not engaging with them, and that is important.

Is there not a third issue: that the local authority and the ICB will no longer have congruent areas and will therefore look at different populations?

The hon. Lady raises a good point. I do not want to revisit an earlier part of the debate, but it is certainly relevant that where there is not a local authority representative on the ICB and there is not a mayor in place, and the ICB’s area is not coterminous with the local authority boundary, that adds another element to the issue of the separation out of Healthwatch. Does the Minister agree that the independent and locally rooted Healthwatch cannot be replaced by processes that sit within the NHS system? Will she please reconsider the change? There is concern on all sides of the House, given the value that Healthwatch brings to the service.

Clause 65 and schedule 10 focus on local healthwatch arrangements. As I said when speaking to the previous group of amendments, Healthwatch is respected and trusted at a national level, and that is even more the case at a local level. I fear that the Government seek to remove something that works, that is effective and that ensures a strong patient voice in the system.

It simply does not work to have integrated care boards take on those responsibilities, as they will be marking their own homework rather than being the independent patient voice. It is a little like the discussion the Committee had during the previous grouping on HSSIB, in which it turned out that the CQC will be able to investigate itself, but the chief executive of the CQC would decide whether any protected disclosures could be published during that investigation. That measure brings things entirely within the system and removes the independent voice, which is exactly what this clause also does.

The ICB is the voice of the NHS system, not the voice of the patient. We need the grit in the oyster that is provided by an independent voice talking to the ICB. Being in the room with an ICB will not mean that the patient voice is heard more loudly or clearly, or that it will be acted on—it is probably more likely to mean that it is not. As an example from my constituency, the ICB did conduct a consultation exercise on the proposed closure of St Mary’s birth centre in Melton Mowbray, the response to which was overwhelming: the patient voice said that they did not want that to happen. That response was fed into the ICB, but the ICB did what I fear it planned to do all along and closed the centre. Given that that voice in the room came from a consultation exercise led by the ICB, it seemingly did not make a jot of difference to the outcome or decision, or to whether the patient was heard.

On the impact of local authority scrutiny panels, the NHS ICB in Melton previously recognised the need for increased GP provision in the town due to the increasing size of the town and the long waiting times, but just recently decided to reverse that position and say that it did not see the need for that. Members of the scrutiny committee, across all parties, were absolutely clear that they disagreed with that decision, but did that get listened to or make a jot of difference to the ICB? No—the ICB did what it was going to do anyway and changed its mind.

My concern is that we will see less grit in the oyster and patient voice, and more managerialism in the NHS ICB system. We heard from the hon. Member for North Shropshire and the shadow Minister about the challenges there would be, even were that patient voice to happen. Given the Government’s 50% cuts to ICB budgets, which are already impacting frontline services, ICBs will not be able to take on additional responsibilities without the funding that they need. That is quite apart from the principle that they should not be marking their own homework. I fear that “system knows best” will become the default.

We have also heard about the geographical challenges. Given that mergers and acquisitions are getting even bigger, ICBs are moving further and further away from what was conceived: for them to have the same geographical footprint as the upper-tier local authority providing social care, to ensure that the two organisations spoke to each other and were better integrated. Removing the representative from the local authority that provides that healthcare from the board, even if they are replaced with a mayor, does not bring about the reconnection with social care provision that is so central. Removing the voice of general practice or primary care from the ICBs again moves that independent challenge away from the system.

I fear that this is a fragmentation of those links at a local level and the weakening, if not silencing, of a patient voice that can challenge publicly and ensure that what patients need to have said is genuinely said. Being in the room does not mean that that voice is heard or acted on, as shown from the examples I have spoken about: there is a consultation exercise, the view is reflected on, and the ICB does what it was going to do anyway and does not change its position. I have genuine concerns about the loss of an independent patient voice in a local context.

The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but I think she made the point in her opening remarks that we have lacked not recommendations and suggestions for changes but action to fix the issue. But it is not for Healthwatch to take action to fix the issue; it is for the ICBs and the NHS to act on those recommendations. We are proposing to give the bits of the system that have failed to take action and fix the issue not just the responsibility that they already have but the responsibility for reflecting patient voice. The one bit that is working—where patients’ voices are heard—is the bit that we are getting rid of. We are not seeking to fix the bits that have real pressure and genuine levers to compel an ICB to act on those recommendations when they are made independently, rather than simply marking its own homework.

As with my reflections on clause 64, I genuinely fear that in this weakening of patient voice, particularly at a local level, the patient will be the loser because the system will continue to do what it wishes to do. It will do its consultations, and it may have a director of patient experience at an ICB level, but they will be working for the ICB; they will not be there as an independent voice to challenge the ICB—including publicly—on what it is doing.

I hope that the Minister reflects further on the real diminution, if not the neutering, of patient voice that comes with some of these arrangements. As always, I look forward to her reflections when she winds up.

I want to address this clause because I believe that the Government are making a significant mistake by abolishing Healthwatch England, as they have just done with the group of amendments, and local healthwatch organisations. The Government have sought to reassure the Committee that the functions currently carried out by Healthwatch will continue; however, that is not the question before us. The question is whether those functions can continue with the same degree of independence, credibility and public confidence once they are absorbed into the organisations that they currently scrutinise.

Having listened carefully to the witnesses who appeared before the Committee, and having reflected on the debate on Second Reading, I do not believe that the Government have demonstrated that they care. Once again, the Government’s case rests largely on the recommendations of Dr Penny Dash. Dr Dash argued that patient engagement should sit much closer to those responsible for planning and delivering services, that providers and commissioners gather and respond to patient experience themselves, that integrated care boards already possess engagement functions capable of undertaking that work, and that the variation between local healthwatch organisations means that the current statutory model is no longer justified.

Those are interesting arguments, but they were examined by this Committee and, in my view, were not sustained by the evidence that we subsequently heard. Indeed, what struck me throughout the oral evidence sessions was not simply that witnesses disagreed with Dr Dash’s conclusions but that they challenged the central assumptions on which they depend. Dr Dash’s recommendations assume that independence is desirable but not essential. The overwhelming weight of evidence presented to this Committee suggests precisely the opposite.

That distinction matters, because this debate is not fundamentally about patient experience. No member of this Committee disputes that patients should influence the design and delivery of services; Healthwatch already exists to help to achieve precisely that. The issue before us is different: it is whether those speaking on behalf of patients should remain institutionally independent of the organisations whose decisions they are expected to scrutinise. Throughout our proceedings, I have become increasingly convinced that that is the question that Ministers have not answered adequately.

The Government’s proposal to abolish the independent voice of patients is a mistake. It is a backward step, and I have seen no compelling reason why it should happen. Apparently, the voice of patients is going to be realised through integrated care boards and local authorities themselves, but that is not an independent patient voice. The very point of independence is that that voice is represented through an organisation that has no other function—no other skin in the game other than to represent that voice. It is remarkable that the Government are taking this step.

I suspect the Minister will say—she has already given a number of reasons—that this is happening in order to bring the voice of patients closer to those who make decisions, but that is not the function of Healthwatch. If she wants to achieve those things, she can achieve them while maintaining Healthwatch as an independent patient voice.

That independent voice ensures not only better decision making, but more effective scrutiny of decisions that have been made, and it does it by ensuring there is no blending or conflict of interest within a certain organisation—the decision maker. It does it by ensuring that light is cast on the critique, the scrutiny and the voice of patients, and that that process takes place outside the closed doors of, in this case, the integrated care board, not behind them.

I suspect that the Minister will say that the system is not working, because there are too many good reports by Healthwatch that sit on a shelf and have not been implemented. I would far prefer for us all to be able to see reports that have not been implemented sitting on a shelf and try to do something about them than for the patient voice to be heard behind closed doors and not acted upon. That is the inevitable conclusion from this merger—this abolition of the independent patient voice.

I want to talk about my experience on the Isle of Wight of the important work that our local healthwatch does. It assists me in my role as a parliamentarian and representative of the people, which is to scrutinise the decision-making of my local integrated care board and others, by providing the objective and unfiltered voice of patients through data, statistics and records, all of which will be lost within the ICB when this abolition takes place.

Guess who is often on the sharp end, or who is often critiqued by the evidence provided by Healthwatch? It is the ICB itself. Therefore, it is no wonder that Professor Croisdale-Appleby, the chair of Healthwatch England, agreed with the characterisation that this looks like the ICBs or other bodies marking their own homework. They will get to decide which part of the patient voice is acted upon, and which part is ignored, without the public gaze or scrutiny that is provided by an independent report that decision makers, parliamentarians, local councillors and the independent media can also use.

I will give a particular example from the Isle of Wight. Not so long ago, the integrated care board for Hampshire and the Isle of Wight proposed to reduce funding for Mountbatten hospice on the island and to redistribute that money to the mainland—it was, in my view, outrageous. The integrated care board had all the information available at its fingertips to realise that that was a bad proposal, and it had all the patient voices and views that it could possibly come across to realise that it was a mistake. It did not first consult representatives, such as me, my neighbour the hon. Member for Isle of Wight West (Richard Quigley) or local councillors, before making its proposal.

It was then Healthwatch’s data on the views and voices of patients, which had already been gathered, that helped the hon. Member, local councillors and me to make an argument against the proposal, directly to the ICB, in the media and to councillors at county hall. Without the tools that Healthwatch provided, it would have been so much harder to make that case. The ICB backed down on that proposal, but, if all that infrastructure, and all the information that Healthwatch independently provided, had sat behind closed doors within the ICB, we would not have had the opportunity to make our case and reverse the decision. That is one of the many thousands of real-life examples across the country where the affected patient voice was aired and properly used to reverse a bad decision, and it is an ability that will be lost.

Another issue is the fact that the centralisation of powers will inevitably water down the patient voice. There are over 150 local healthwatch branches, but there are not 150 integrated care boards. In the case of the Isle of Wight—I use that as an example because it is my own patch, but it will be the same situation up and down the country—we have our own Healthwatch Isle of Wight, which represents the unique insight and views of patients on the island. If those powers go to the integrated care board, that will cover Hampshire and the Isle of Wight, a population nearly 10 times as big. Our unique patient voice will be watered down into the patient voice of Hampshire; while the Hampshire patient voice is equally valid, that will nevertheless reduce the unique insights of smaller populations all over the country by including them in something bigger.

Particularly unique to my constituency and Isle of Wight West is health travel—that is, the reality of having to cross the Solent on a ferry to access so many health services. That is something that Healthwatch Isle of Wight uniquely understands through its direct consultation and work with island patients. Indeed, the people who work for our local healthwatch and its trustees are islanders. They do not just get it because they hear it; they get it because they live it. If that entire function is taken up to the Hampshire and Isle of Wight level, that unique insight will be lost. The ICB may give some regard to the cost of ferry travel and the implications of the disruption caused by having to travel on a ferry in order to access a hospital service that is not available on the Island, but its decision making will be much devalued in weight if it does not have the unique, independent patient voice coming from the Isle of Wight via our Healthwatch.

Again, we have had an important discussion, particularly around the issue of independence; I accept that it is difficult and that there are arguments on both sides. We have heard a lot about Professor Croisdale-Appleby’s evidence on behalf of Healthwatch. I made this argument on Second Reading: we have had this arrangement for 52 years, and I think we can all agree that the situation is not good. It has not worked. As I said earlier, 20,000 reports add a lot of work. There is a lot of work in this landscape—well-intentioned work by good people. We can argue about whether Healthwatch was set up appropriately to do the job it has been asked to do.

I was pleased to hear the three examples from the Lib Dems and other individual examples of where light has been shone upon a closure, for example. It is good that that has been valued by local Members of Parliament. I would argue that nobody should be closing services without fully engaging with the local population and setting out clearly why that is being done. That is a failure of those local organisations, and we need to address the cause of that failure.

I am struck by the oral evidence to the Committee on those 20,000 reports in 52 years. It was suggested that it takes six months, as I think the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said when quoting the evidence, for somebody to “go out”—that is the phrase that is used: “Let’s go out and talk to people in these far-flung communities. What do they think? What is their experience? Who are they?” It constantly surprises me, as it did when I worked inside the system. These are not remote people. We know who they are and what is wrong with them. We know how remote they are from the system. That goes to the heart of why the taxpayer is so alienated in this country from public services and their poor functioning. That is what the Government want to change.

It is not a matter of ICBs adding a new function; the Opposition have fundamentally misunderstood that. It is about rewiring these organisations to do something very different. Their function as strategic commissioners is to understand and to use all the data and evidence, including direct voice. We can argue about how that direct voice is taken in, but that is fundamentally what a commissioner is—I say that, having been a commissioner. It is not being done well, and that is why we are changing the legislation. Under previous legislation, ICBs had multiple functions. We are changing that to force them to be commissioners, but it is not an add-on; it is fundamental to the commissioning process. It is a complete rewiring of the organisation to listen to patient voice, patient experience and the reality of health inequalities.

In my constituency, I am afraid have not seen examples of the independent voice really speaking on behalf of the people I serve—some of whom have the worst health inequalities in the country, largely as a result of the tobacco industry and its legacy—whereas their experiences and their health outcomes are very well known and should drive the necessary changes. That is why we are driving all the changes in the 10-year health plan: to meet the needs of communities. We will continue to have this debate, but I wanted to make that absolutely clear.

We assume that the independent voice is always clear, but it is not. We have heard that it is variable and fragmented. That is not the fault of anyone trying to provide it, but that is where it is. The system is supposed to listen and improve services, and it does not. Things need to be changed in order to achieve that, and that is what we intend to do. The changes will be supported by scrutiny, transparency and oversight arrangements. The alternative, which is maintaining a separate structure with limited levers to drive change, has not delivered, and it cannot continue to try.

We are not removing patient and user voice; we are embedding it at the heart of the new system. ICBs will be expected to carry out proactive, inclusive engagement, particularly with so-called seldom-heard groups, including carers, those who do not have access to digital platforms, those less proficient with technology and people for whom English is a second language. Crucially, ICBs will be accountable for demonstrating reach and impact, not simply how many reports or engagement exercises they have done. Impact is what we will be looking at.

As I have said, this is about moving from a model where voices can be collected but overlooked to one where they must be heard and acted upon. The new patient experience director in the Department will work closely with local systems to identify national themes and significant concerns, ensuring that patient experience informs policy and improvement at the national level. To answer a previous question, the Secretary of State will have the power to issue directions to ICBs and local authorities if they are failing to exercise that function.

As I have said in debates on previous groups, I understand that it is difficult when we are debating the abolition of something outwith the wider framework of the 10-year health plan, the Dash review, the patient experience directorate in the Department and changes to the national quality board. It is incumbent on the Government to make that architecture clear and to build confidence and trust. That is what we intend to do, and that is how this body will be taken forward.

All comments have been noted. There is a fundamental difference of approach. We are making those bodies fundamentally different and rewiring them to do something different. I understand the bumpy road—I have been part of that, with community health councils and links to Healthwatch, and it has been a long one. I think we will keep returning to this theme. Those organisations have not been changed to do what they are supposed to do, and that is the ambition of this Government.

Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

As the UK resilience action plan sets out, we are living through a period of profound change. Ensuring that our institutions are clear in what they must do to prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies is essential. With that mind, the clause is necessary. It clarifies the existing duties on NHS trusts under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004—the legislation that sets out how the UK prepares for, co-ordinates and responds to serious emergencies. Since the Civil Contingencies Act came into force, NHS trusts have been included as category 1 responders. That means that they have had specific legal duties to assess risks, plan for emergencies, maintain business continuity, warn and inform the public, and work together to co-ordinate an effective local response.

Due to changing policies by the previous Government, references to NHS trusts were removed from the Civil Contingencies Act, yet under transitionary powers in other legislation, they remain category 1 responders. This has meant that their role has seemed unclear for some other responders and the public. I want to be clear that the clause does not change the position of NHS trusts, nor their duties or functions under the Civil Contingencies Act; instead, it simply clarifies the legislation, making their place and role clear. That is vital so that NHS trusts and other responders know exactly what is required of them during and after an emergency. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 66 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 67

Minor and consequential amendments

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government amendments 20 to 24 and 83.

Schedule 11.

These are minor and technical amendments. Government amendments 20 to 22 make changes to the Armed Forces Act 2006 to remove references to NHS England, reflecting that NHS England will be abolished. Those amendments are consequential to the Armed Forces Bill 2026. Government amendment 83 makes changes to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026 to remove reference to NHS England and update a reference to NHS trusts to take account of the new conversion procedure created by clause 35 of the Bill. Government amendments 23 and 24 both amend the NHS Act 2006 by removing unnecessary consequential amendments to that Act.

Clause 67 inserts schedule 11, which makes minor and consequential amendments that are required as a consequence of the provision made in other clauses of the Bill. They mostly result from the abolition of NHS England, the conferral of NHS England’s functions on others—primarily the Secretary of State and integrated care boards—and the changes made to the NHS provider landscape. Those minor and consequential changes are made to a large number of enactments, but notably a significant number of such consequential changes are made to: the Mental Health Act 1983, the NHS Act 2006, the Health and Social Care Act 2008, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 and the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021. The changes are necessary to ensure the proper operation of the statute book and reflect the substantive changes being made elsewhere in the Bill. I commend clause 67 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 67 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 11

Minor and consequential amendments

Amendments made: 20, in schedule 11, page 140, line 16, at end insert—

“91A The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.”

This amendment and amendments 21 and 22 remove a reference to NHS England from section 343AZB of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (to be inserted by the Armed Forces Bill).

Amendment 21, in schedule 11, page 140, line 17, leave out

“of the Armed Forces Act 2006”.

See explanatory statement for amendment 20.

Amendment 22, in schedule 11, page 140, line 18, at end insert—

“92A In section 343AZB (inserted by the Armed Forces Act 2026), in subsection (5)(a) omit sub-paragraph (i).”

See explanatory statement for amendment 20.

Amendment 23, in schedule 11, page 144, line 5, leave out paragraph 118.

This removes an unnecessary consequential amendment to section 12E of the NHS Act 2006 (that section is replaced in its entirety by clause 10 of the Bill).

Amendment 24, in schedule 11, page 148, line 9, leave out paragraph 139.

This removes an unnecessary consequential amendment to a heading that is replaced by clause 11.

Amendment 83, in schedule 11, page 191, line 35, at end insert—

“Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026

400 In Schedule 1 to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026 (relevant authorities)—

(a) omit paragraph 9;

(b) in paragraph 12, omit ‘section 25 of’.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This is a consequential amendment to Schedule 1 to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Act 2026, which would remove a reference to NHS England and update a reference to NHS trusts to take account of the new conversion procedure created by clause 35 of the Bill.

Schedule 11, as amended, agreed to.

New Clause 20

Arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities

“(1) Section 75 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (arrangements between NHS bodies and local authorities) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (6), for the words from ‘consultation’ to the end substitute ‘the making of arrangements by virtue of this section’.

(3) Omit subsections (7A) to (7L).

(4) In subsection (8), at the appropriate place insert—

‘“local authority” includes—

(a) a combined authority,

(b) a combined county authority, and

(c) the Greater London Authority;’.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This enables combined authorities, combined county authorities and the Greater London Authority to enter into arrangements with NHS bodies under section 75 of the NHS Act 2006 in relation to any of their functions, replacing the current different and more limited provision about combined authorities and combined county authorities.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Dispensing medical practitioners etc

“(1) The National Health Service Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 132 (persons authorised to provide pharmaceutical services)—

(a) for subsection (1) substitute—

‘(1) Except as may be provided for by or under regulations, no arrangements may be made by an integrated care board with a person providing primary medical services under Part 4 to provide pharmaceutical services.’;

(b) in subsection (3), for ‘medical practitioners’ substitute ‘persons providing primary medical services under Part 4’;

(c) in subsection (4)—

(i) for paragraph (a) substitute—

‘(a) as to grounds on which an integrated care board may, or must, refuse to grant an application for inclusion in a list referred to in subsection (3),’;

(ii) in paragraph (aa) omit ‘of medical practitioners’;

(iii) in paragraph (b), for ‘NHS England by a medical practitioner’ substitute ‘an integrated care board by a person’;

(iv) omit paragraph (c).

(3) In section 134 (pilot schemes), in subsection (8) omit ‘by a medical practitioner or dental practitioner to a patient of his’.

(4) In Schedule 12 (LPS schemes), in paragraph 1(8) omit ‘by a medical practitioner or dental practitioner to a patient of his’.”—(Karin Smyth.)

This updates the legislation about the provision of pharmaceutical services by medical practitioners to conform with current law and practice whereby commissioning arrangements are generally made with the practice rather than individual doctors. It also removes a reference to dental practitioners that is not needed.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services

“(1) Section 133 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services) is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

‘(1) Subsection (2) applies if the Secretary of State is satisfied that a situation or event has caused or is likely to cause a disruption resulting in the inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services in England or in an area within England.’

(3) In subsection (2)—

(a) after ‘Secretary of State’ insert ‘may by direction’;

(b) for paragraph (a) (but not the ‘and’ at the end) substitute—

‘(a) require an integrated care board to make other arrangements,’;

(c) in paragraph (b) omit ‘may’.

(4) After subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) A direction under subsection (2) must specify the period for which it has effect.

(4) The period must not be more than 6 months.

(5) But the Secretary of State may by further direction extend the period for which a direction under subsection (2) has effect by up to 6 months at a time.

(6) The Secretary of State must publish any directions under this section.’”—(Karin Smyth.)

The amendments made by this clause (among other things) relax the legal test for making alternative provision to address the inadequate provision of pharmaceutical services owing to a disruption of services.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 23

Pharmaceutical services: appeals etc

“Schedule (Pharmaceutical services: appeals etc) makes provision about the destination of appeals, and jurisdiction to determine certain matters, currently governed by Part 7 of the National Health Service Act 2006 (pharmaceutical services and local pharmaceutical services).”—(Karin Smyth.)

The clause introduces a Schedule which amends provisions about certain appeals etc to the First-tier Tribunal. Those appeals will be transferred to an NHS body determined by regulations. It is expected that initially this will be NHS Resolution.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 91

Regulations: reference to agreements and standards

“(1) The Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 2 (power to make regulations about human medicines), after subsection (4) insert—

‘(4A) Regulations under subsection (1) making provision in reliance on section 3, 4, 5 or 7 may refer to international agreements or standards relating to human medicines, including agreements or standards as they have effect from time to time.’

(3) In section 16 (manufacture, marketing and supply), after subsection (2) insert—

‘(3) Provision made in reliance on subsection (1)(a) may refer to United Kingdom standards that—

(a) relate to the marketing, putting into service or other supply of medical devices, and

(b) are specified in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time.

(4) Regulations made under section 15(1) that contain provision made in reliance on subsection (1)(a) about relevant requirements (or exceptions from them) may include provision in relation to a medical device where—

(a) the device complies with regulatory requirements applicable somewhere outside the United Kingdom which is specified in regulations, and

(b) a description of the device and the regulatory requirements applicable to it are contained in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time.

(5) In this section “United Kingdom standard” means a standard that is—

(a) set by the British Standards Institution, or

(b) primarily developed for use in the United Kingdom, or part of the United Kingdom.’”—(Karin Smyth.)

This new clause would amend the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 to (a) enable regulations to refer to both international agreements and standards and standards developed in the United Kingdom and (b) enable the Secretary of State to dispense with requirements placed on devices which meet regulatory requirements applicable outside the United Kingdom.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

Government new clause 92—Medical Devices Regulations 2002: mutual recognition agreements.

Government new clause 93—Consultation about medicines and medical devices regulations.

Government new clause 94—Medicines and medical devices regulations: parliamentary procedure.

Government new clause 95—Medical devices etc: parliamentary procedure for certain fees regulations.

Government amendments 80 to 82.

New clause 67—Secretary of State directions relating to early access to medicines—

“(1) The Secretary of State may give directions to any of the bodies mentioned in subsection (2) about the implementation of a scheme providing early access to medicines to people with life-threatening or seriously debilitating conditions.

(2) The bodies are—

(a) integrated care board,

(b) NHS Trusts,

(c) NHS Foundation Trusts,

(d) NHS Advanced Foundation Trusts, and

(e) other health and social care bodies.”

This new clause would give the Secretary of State power to direct integrated care boards, NHS Trusts, NHS Foundation Trusts, and NHS Advanced Foundation Trusts to implement a scheme to provide early access to medicines to people with life-threatening or seriously debilitating conditions.

New clause 68—Review of the Early Access to Medicines Scheme—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, commission a review of the regime for early and accelerated access to medicines in England and Wales.

(2) The review conducted under subsection (1) must consider—

(a) the effectiveness of the Early Access to Medicines Scheme (EAMS) and Innovative Licensing and Access Pathway (ILAP),

(b) the effectiveness of the early access outside of the Early Access to Medicines Scheme (EAMS) and Innovative Licensing and Access Pathway (ILAP), and

(c) equality of access across England and Wales, with the aim of reducing geographical inequalities between different NHS trusts.

(3) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the report and recommendations of the review before both House of Parliament.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to commission a review of regime for early and accelerated access to medicines.

I will begin with Government new clauses 91 to 95. Many hon. Members will know that the current regulatory framework for medicines and medical devices is seen as overly complicated and difficult to navigate. It is also slow and burdensome to amend, limiting our ability to ensure that it keeps pace with developments. Maintaining the safeguards to public health is central to every decision we make. However, the regulatory framework currently slows down innovation and delays patient access to healthcare products. From a market growth perspective, it also places barriers to the UK market, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises.

These new clauses will deliver a more streamlined regime for making and updating secondary legislation. The ability to make faster and more responsive updates to secondary legislation will enable the Department and the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency to address the current barriers that I have highlighted in the regulation more quickly.

New clauses 91 and 92 provide for changes with regard to powers to make “ambulatory references”, which are references in legislation to external documents such as technical standards and lists, which can be updated from time to time. These changes will ensure that the legislation continues to capture updated versions of those documents without the need for further regulations. International and domestic standards are crucial in the highly technical areas targeted by the change. It is important that the regulatory regime remains aligned with the technical, scientific and international framework that is designed to evolve over time.

Currently, there are limited powers for medical devices regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that change over time, and there are no such powers at all for medicines. Without the ability to make ambulatory references to those documents, legislation is needed each time the standards are updated. That is disproportionate and risks unintentional regulatory divergence that creates uncertainty for industry.

The new clauses introduce a power for human medicines regulations to refer to external international agreements or standards that are updated over time. For medical devices, the provisions also extend the current ambulatory reference power to make reference to lists of countries subject to mutual recognition agreements, lists of devices or categories of device that are eligible for an international reliance pathway, and lists of British technical standards. Amendment 80 sets out that the extent of new clause 92 will cover England, Scotland and Wales.

The provisions of new clause 93 enable a more flexible approach to consultations on regulatory changes related to medicines and medical devices, rather than the current one-size-fits-all requirement. Under the amended powers, the MHRA and the Department will still retain a legal duty to consult relevant stakeholders, and significant regulatory changes will continue to be subject to public consultation. The measure is designed to enable consultations that are proportionate to the scale of the change in hand. That will ensure that regulations can be updated more efficiently and in line with the needs of the health service.

New clause 94 will enable certain technical updates to medicines and medical devices regulations to be made using the negative rather than the affirmative procedure. Specifically, it relates to changes that routinely arise as clinical practice evolves—for example, updating detailed lists of medicines or making limited adjustments to the professional groups who may prescribe, supply, sell or administer particular medicines. At present, even minor or time-sensitive changes of this sort can require a debate under the affirmative procedure, which is not always the best use of parliamentary time.

New clause 95 is the final measure in the regulatory framework package for the MHRA. It is designed to streamline the process for routine fee updates made using powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 by allowing the use of the negative parliamentary procedure for routine fee uplifts. That will bring the powers in line with those relating to fees in the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021, where uplifts to existing fees can be made with the negative procedure. That will also reduce delays in making and communicating such adjustments, while maintaining appropriate safeguards, including the requirement to set out the cost basis for any new uplifts with any legislation—whether it is made under the negative or affirmative procedure. The draft affirmative procedure will be retained for any substantive changes, such as the introduction of a new chargeable function.

Finally, there are a number of consequential provisions related to those I have just discussed. Government amendments 80 to 82 primarily relate to the commencement period in which they come into force.

In conclusion, the amendments will enable a faster and more responsible reform of the existing legislative framework, while preserving proportionate safeguards and necessary scrutiny. I commend the new clauses to the Committee.

New clause 91 would amend the Medicines and Medical Devices Act to enable regulations

“to refer to both international agreements and standards and standards developed in the United Kingdom”

and enable the Secretary of State

“to dispense with requirements placed on devices which meet regulatory requirements applicable outside the United Kingdom.”

New clause 92 would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” so that

“agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations.”

New clause 93

“amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices.”

That means that instead of a public consultation, it

“gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate”.

I would be grateful if the Minister clarified whether that could be nobody, or whether it has to at least be somebody.

New clause 94

“changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure.”

That relates to regulations about medicines and medical devices. I want to ask about scrutiny, because we have had a number of statutory instruments over the last few years that, under the new regulations, would now be put under the negative procedure. When we have looked at them, there have been questions and potential changes.

Why does the Minister want a lower level of scrutiny? In general, scrutiny is a good thing. I understand that this could smooth out procedure and make it a bit quicker in some cases, but we had an example where a Minister brought forward fee increases. I then raised the issue of national insurance and that Minister was not aware of whether it was paid at that time. The civil service pay estimate was significantly lower than expected and lower than what was given. Therefore, six months later we were back in Committee with a different Minister asking for more money. There is a scrutiny issue with new clause 94. That also relates to the fees and terms in new clause 95, which was one of the examples I gave.

I thank the hon. Lady for her comments. The purpose of the new clauses is to support our life sciences and medicine sector, in order to make that more streamlined. She will be aware of the proposals about the negative and affirmative procedure. If there were particular issues of scrutiny, normal parliamentary rules and processes would apply if Members wanted to raise any particular issue.

Question put and agreed to.

New clause 91 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 92

Medical Devices Regulations 2002: mutual recognition agreements

“(1) The Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (S.I. 2002/618) are amended as follows.

(2) For regulation 1A (Schedules) substitute—

‘1A Schedule

Schedule 2A has effect.’

(3) In regulation 2 (interpretation), in paragraph (1)—

(a) in the definition of ‘mutual recognition agreement’, in paragraph (a), for ‘country listed in Schedule 2’ substitute ‘country specified in a list published by the Secretary of State from time to time’;

(b) in the definition of ‘third country conformity assessment body’, for ‘established in a country which is listed in Schedule 2 and designated in accordance with a relevant’ substitute ‘designated in accordance with a’.

(4) Omit Schedule 2 (mutual recognition agreements).”—(Karin Smyth.)

This new clause would amend the definition of “mutual recognition agreement” in the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (as it has effect in England and Wales, and Scotland) so that agreements are defined by a list published by the Secretary of State, rather than a Schedule to the regulations.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 93

Consultation about medicines and medical devices regulations

‘(1) Section 45 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (consultation) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1), for “a provision of Part 1, 2, 3 or 4” substitute “Part 1 or 3”.

(3) After subsection (1) insert—

“(1ZA) Before making regulations under Part 2 or 4 the relevant authority must—

(a) carry out a public consultation, or

(b) consult such persons as it considers appropriate.”

(4) In subsection (3), at the beginning insert “Where a public consultation is carried out”.

(5) In subsection (4), in the words before paragraph (a), for “subsection (1)” substitute “subsection (1ZA)”.’—(Karin Smyth.)

This amends the duty to consult in relation to regulations about human medicines and medical devices. It gives the option of consulting such persons as the relevant authority considers appropriate instead of a public consultation.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 94

Medicines and medical devices regulations: parliamentary procedure

‘In section 47 of the Medicines and Medical Devices Act 2021 (regulations: procedure), for subsection (3) substitute—

“(3) Regulations under Part 1 are subject to the draft affirmative procedure.

(3A) Regulations under Part 2—

(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions—

(i) provision made in reliance on section 6(1)(a) (fees);

(ii) provision amending the meaning of ‘appropriate practitioner’ or ‘approved country health professional’ for the purposes of Part 12 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (see regulation 214 of those regulations);

(iii) provision amending any of the following provisions of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012—

• regulations 217C(3) or 217CA(3) (original pack dispensing for products containing relevant substances: definition of ‘relevant substance’),

• Schedule 13 (prescription only medicines for which community practitioner nurse prescribers are appropriate practitioners),

• Schedule 15 (requirements for specific products subject to general sale),

• Schedule 16 (patient group directions and vaccine group directions),

• Schedule 17 (exemption for sale, supply or administration by certain persons),

• Schedule 18 (substances that may not be sold or supplied by a pharmacist without a prescription in reliance on emergency provisions),

• Schedule 19 (medicinal products for parenteral administration in an emergency), or

• Schedule 21 (medicinal products at high dilutions);

(iv) provision amending regulation 250 of the Human Medicines Regulations 2012 (restrictions on persons to be supplied with medicinal products: exceptions) for the purpose of changing the products to which any exception from time to time provided for by that regulation applies;

(v) provision that is consequential on provision of a description mentioned in any of sub-paragraphs (ii) to (iv);

(b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they—

(i) contain only provision that is made in reliance on section 7 (emergencies),

(ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health, and

(iii) are not within paragraph (a);

(c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within sub-paragraphs (a) or (b).

(3B) Regulations under Part 3—

(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision made in reliance on section 12(1)(a) (fees), and

(b) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a).

(3C) Regulations under Part 4—

(a) are subject to the negative procedure if they contain only provision of one or more of the following descriptions—

(i) provision made in reliance on—

• section 17(1)(a) (fees), or

• paragraph 9 of Schedule 2 (supplementary provision about civil sanctions);

(ii) provision amending or revoking regulation 1ZA of the Medical Devices Regulations 2002 (expiry of certain provisions) or consequential on such provision;

(b) are subject to the made affirmative procedure if they—

(i) contain only provision made in reliance on section 18 (emergencies), and

(ii) contain a declaration that the person making them considers that they need to be made urgently to protect the public from an imminent risk of serious harm to health;

(c) are subject to the draft affirmative procedure if they are not within paragraph (a) or (b).”’—(Karin Smyth.)

This changes the parliamentary procedure for certain regulations from the draft affirmative procedure to the negative procedure. The changes all relate to regulations about medicines and medical devices (although the procedural provisions relating to certain other matters are restated in the amendment).

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 95

Medical devices etc: parliamentary procedure for certain fees regulations

‘In Schedule 7 to the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (regulations), in paragraph 12—

(a) in sub-paragraph (1) for “relate to altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money” substitute “fall within sub-paragraph (1A)”.

(b) after sub-paragraph (1) insert—

“(1A) Provision falls within this sub-paragraph if it relates to—

(a) altering the amount of a fee or charge to reflect changes in the value of money,

(b) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged in connection with the exercise of a function which a public authority has by virtue of provision made under section 8C in connection with the EU medical devices Regulations, or

(c) altering the amount of a fee or charge to be charged under the Blood Safety and Quality Regulations 2005 (S.I. 2005/50).

(1B) In sub-paragraph (1A)(b) ‘the EU medical devices Regulations’ means—

(a) Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC, or

(b) Regulation (EU) 2017/746 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on in vitro diagnostic medical devices and repealing Directive 98/79/EC and Commission Decision 2010/227/EU,

as they have effect from time to time by virtue of Article 5(4) of the Windsor Framework.”’—(Karin Smyth.)

This allows regulations altering certain fees in relation to medical devices etc to be made subject to the negative resolution procedure. At the moment those regulations are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 1

National Maternity Commissioner

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, appoint a National Maternity Commissioner, situated within the Department of Health and Social Care.

(2) The functions of the National Maternity Commissioner are to—

(a) oversee NHS maternity services;

(b) act as an independent voice for women and families;

(c) ensure lessons are learned from identified failures and that the recommendations of maternity reviews are acted upon;

(d) promote consistency, safety and accountability across NHS maternity services; and

(e) advise the Secretary of State on matters relating to the safety, quality and provision of maternity services in England.

(3) The person appointed as Commissioner must—

(a) be a person with knowledge, expertise and experience relevant to the discharge of functions of the role;

(b) have first-hand experience of working in maternity services, so far as reasonably possible; and

(c) not be a sitting Member of Parliament.”—(Helen Morgan.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to appoint a maternity commissioner within the Department of Health and Social Care to oversee national maternity services. This person should be someone with experience and expertise of maternity services, and not a political appointment.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 13—Maternity Safety—

“(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that every NHS maternity unit is rated ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ by the CQC.

(2) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the passage of this Act, establish a scheme to support NHS trusts to deliver the requirement under subsection (1), which includes—

(a) 24/7 consultant obstetrician cover on every labour ward,

(b) one-to-one midwifery care,

(c) a Director of Midwifery in every maternity service,

(d) ringfenced maternity service development funding, and

(e) a dedicated neonatal workforce plan.

(3) Within 12 months of the commencement of the scheme under subsection (2), and every 12 months thereafter, an annual report should be laid before both Houses of Parliament on the effectiveness of the scheme.”

This new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to create a scheme to ensure that every maternity unit in the country achieves a “good” or “outstanding” rating by the CQC.

New clause 1, which I tabled, would require the Secretary of State to appoint a maternity commissioner within the Department of Health and Social Care to oversee national maternity services. This person should be someone with experience and expertise in maternity services, and not a political appointment.

It is important to start by saying that I tabled the new clause before we had the report from Donna Ockenden on the Nottingham review, and last week’s report from Baroness Amos on her national review, both of which recommended the appointment of a maternity commissioner. Obviously, since then, the Secretary of State has announced that he will appoint a maternity commissioner. None the less, I will state the arguments for having one, and if the Minister can give us some assurances today, I will not press the new clause to a vote.

Just to set the scene, which I think we all know too well, maternity services in England have suffered a series of high-profile scandals. The cost of political neglect has been paid by families in terms of trauma, injury and lost lives. We have known for a long time that maternity services in this country have been failing. Numerous recommendations have been made over that period, but they have not been effectively acted on in a consistent way, and Baroness Amos’s inquiry finally confirms that.

It is important to say that the vast majority of births take place safely, successfully and happily. However, where things go wrong, having a baby safely has become a postcode lottery. Women are being routinely silenced, and staff who raise the alarm on unsafe care or systemic discrimination have been put off or crushed by a culture of fear. We therefore need to make England the safest country in the world to have a baby.

The Liberal Democrats have been campaigning on that for a long time, and following the Ockenden and Amos reviews it genuinely feels that there is now the will and focus to deal with the problem once and for all. This issue has been going on for far too long. We thank the Secretary of State for hearing our campaign and Baroness Amos’s calls for a national maternity commissioner to oversee national standards and drive change. We also pay tribute to campaigners such as Louise Thompson and the former MP for Stafford, Theo Clarke; without their advocacy, and without so many women sharing their stories, we would not be moving forward.

It is important to say that one individual—one maternity commissioner—will not solve all the issues in maternity by themselves, but they can help drive change and address recurrent issues, whether those are cultural or about safe staffing. They can hold Ministers to account, help restore public confidence in NHS maternity service and ensure that accountability exists. But I want to be clear that the buck should always stop with the Secretary of State; they hold the power and the purse strings, and this role cannot be used by Ministers as a way to shirk that responsibility.

I hope the Minister will clarify a few key points. First, can she reassure us that the commissioner will be independent and not a political appointee? It is essential that this individual feels confident to hold the Government to account and have those difficult conversations. That is far less likely if they are a political appointee.

Secondly, women have made it clear that for them to be reassured that this change will happen and happen meaningfully, they need a clear timetable for when the maternity commissioner will be in place and operating. Understandably, the Secretary of State has not been able to provide that yet, given the need for this Bill to pass through Parliament and for the statutory role to be on the books, and given the time it will take his maternity taskforce to define what it wants the role to look like and for the appropriate legislation to be written and put in place. However, we hope we can get a firm commitment to a timetable from the Minister today or, if not today, then on Report.

We think the commissioner should be involved in the establishment of the taskforce, because it is important that it does not develop a plan that they are required to implement, despite it being something they personally would not have approved. I therefore hope the commissioner will be in place very quickly, even if only on a temporary basis, so that they are working to get the taskforce plan into place.

We heard from the Secretary of State that the commissioner will co-chair the taskforce alongside him. That seems to be the right move, and I welcome it, but, as I said, it is important that they have some role in shaping its action plan, so that they can feel responsibility for it and be fully behind its implementation. Will the Minister commit to introducing a temporary maternity commissioner so that that can happen?

Finally, we have heard reports that the taskforce is not meeting very regularly. I hope the Minister can reassure me that it is now meeting much more regularly and getting that plan into place as quickly as possible, and that the Secretary of State is fully on board in driving forward the commissioner’s role as soon as possible.

New clause 13, which is also in my name, is about putting a duty on the Secretary of State to create a scheme to ensure that every maternity unit in the country achieves a good or outstanding rating from the CQC. I will not repeat some of the points I have just outlined about failing maternity services, but the first quarter of 2026 saw the worst ever recorded rate for maternity injuries. Four years ago, the Ockenden review into the Shrewsbury and Telford hospital NHS trust, which is in my area, found that over 200 babies had died unnecessarily in Shropshire. Yet, despite several immediate and essential actions being put in place, a subsequent CQC review found that the majority of maternity units in this country did not achieve a good rating for safety—they were inadequate in some way. That is just not acceptable.

Our package of measures includes the maternity commissioner, which the Government are obviously progressing with, and we are very pleased about that. However, we also need investment in the service to ensure that that maternity commissioner has the resources they need to make the changes required. We therefore call for one-to-one midwifery care for every woman in labour; a consultant on every labour ward 24 hours a day, seven days a week; a director of midwifery—a senior, experienced midwife—in every maternity service to ensure that more junior midwives on that ward are suitably supervised; the restoration of ringfenced service development funding; and a dedicated neonatal workforce plan.

New clause 13 also requires an annual report to be laid before the House on the “effectiveness of the scheme”. That would allow Parliament to track progress and hold the Government’s feet to the fire on it. Baroness Amos has also called for regular reporting to Parliament to maintain accountability, albeit through the maternity commissioner.

There seems to be consensus, here and across the NHS, on the need for meaningful and decisive action on maternity. There is a great deal of overlap between our plan and the recommendations Baroness Amos has made, and I hope the Minister will be able to take some of these points on board and incorporate them into the Bill.

As the hon. Lady said, new clause 1 seems somewhat redundant, because the Government appear to have decided to appoint a maternity commissioner.

New clause 13 asks for a report. Before I go any further, I should say that I am a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health and have attended the delivery of many babies as a paediatrician at different levels of seniority. I should also say that I am a member of the British Medical Association, that I continue to work as an NHS consultant paediatrician and that I worked at Nottingham University hospitals NHS trust in late 2012, early 2013.

I have great sympathy with the reasoning behind what the hon. Member for North Shropshire is proposing. We have all been shocked by the many reports we have read, the circumstances we have heard about, the tragedies that have occurred over many years and the challenges that are faced by maternity care. I am not sure that writing more reports is going to help; I think we need more action rather than words.

The hon. Lady mentioned the taskforce. I was disappointed that it took the Government so many months to establish it, that it took so long for it to meet and that it has met only a few times. As we have talked about things such as Healthwatch and the HSSIB, the Minister has shown her enthusiasm to get on with things and ensure that the recommendations made in the varying reports are implemented. I would therefore be interested to understand how that will occur in maternity.

My understanding is that the Government are going to produce a plan on how to deliver the recommendations in the recent report, and that is going to be available by Christmas. However, that means that we will then be in a situation where the Government came into power in mid-2024 and then spent a year writing a plan—the 10-year “Fit for the Future” plan. Around the time that they published that, they decided that they needed an urgent maternity report; that was going to take a few months, but it ended up taking another year in of itself. Now we are going to take another six or seven months writing another plan on how to implement the plan we have written, based on the plan we wrote before, based on the plan we did not have at the general election.

I am interested to understand how the Government are going to convert the good intentions I am sure they have into action. In particular, their manifesto promised that thousands more additional midwives would be trained. I would be interested to know what progress they have made on that.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for North Shropshire for bringing this discussion before the Committee. I put on record our thanks for the work she has done in this area and for her engagement with me, and indeed with officials at the Department, to help us understand it more clearly, particularly in the light of the new clause.

Hon. Members across the Committee are committed, as are the Government, to ensuring that women, families and babies receive the care and support they need. We know that the vast majority of births are safe and that there are outstanding examples of care in the NHS. However, where things do go wrong, it can have a devastating impact on women and their families.

That is why the Government launched the national investigation into NHS maternity and neonatal care, chaired by the noble Lady Baroness Amos. Baroness Amos brought the findings from past reviews, local rapid reviews and new evidence from families and staff together into one clear national set of recommendations, which as we heard was published last week. The Government also launched the maternity and neonatal taskforce, chaired personally by the Secretary of State, which will translate Baroness Amos’s recommendations into action.

As we heard, Baroness Amos recommended the appointment of a statutory maternity and neonatal commissioner. We have accepted that recommendation, and I know there is support for it across the House. To be clear, the Secretary of State stated last week that we are committed to putting the role on a “statutory basis” as soon as possible.

I am afraid I cannot give the hon. Member for North Shropshire a more detailed timetable at the moment, because we are currently looking at options to legislate at pace, including potentially through this Bill, subject to discussions through the usual channels, while also—this is crucial—giving the taskforce the opportunity to shape the scope of the role. That was one of Baroness Amos’s urgent actions, and we accept it as a crucial first step in overseeing systemic improvements to care and outcomes and earning back the trust of women and families.

The maternity and neonatal commissioner will champion the voices of families and drive forward that necessary change. The Secretary of State will remain accountable to Parliament for maternity services. The role will be discussed urgently with the taskforce and will have a relentless focus on driving those improvements, which will include co-chairing the taskforce.

As the Committee knows, these are complex matters. The Government, having accepted the Baroness Amos’s recommendation, intend to legislate as soon as practicable. Our immediate priority is to work quickly through the taskforce to define the scope and responsibilities of the role. I know that the hon. Member for North Shropshire will not press the new clause, but I commit to keeping in touch with her and other hon. Members as this work progresses.

We talked about clause 1—on the abolition of NHS England—at the beginning of the Bill. The Minister was keen at that time to take unelected individuals out of the picture and create accountability by returning things to democratic control through the abolition of NHS England and putting them back in the Secretary of State’s hands. However, this proposal essentially does the reverse with maternity care, taking it out of the hands of Ministers and the Secretary of State and putting it into the hands of a commissioner. Could the Minister explain that?

I am sorry, but I did not get the end of that sentence. However, I think the hon. Lady was saying that the Bill essentially abolishes NHS England. Again, as I have said repeatedly, nobody is opposing that. As is well known, the recommendations on the maternity commissioner have come through a separate process. Given the need for public assurance and to earn back the trust of women and families, as well as—I think the hon. Lady said this herself—the shocking revelations that have come through some of this work, Baroness Amos recommended a maternity and neonatal commissioner to drive through these changes and give confidence to the system. That is why we are going to accept her recommendation. Accountability for maternity services obviously remains with the Secretary of State, who will be co-chairing the taskforce. I hope that addresses the comments the hon. Lady made.

On new clause 13, we know that the vast majority of births are safe, but the devastating trauma experienced by many through failures in care must be brought to an end. The CQC has an important role in assessing whether patients are receiving safe, effective and high-quality care, and it is essential that it can do that objectively and independent of Government. It is therefore not appropriate to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure particular ratings.

I thank the Minister for her response. Given the commitments that she has made, I do not intend to press the new clauses, but I hope she will be able to come back to us on Report with some more concrete progress. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 3

Assessment of risks posed by contracts with non-UK based suppliers

“(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must conduct and lay before Parliament a risk assessment of all contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside of the UK.

(2) In conducting an assessment under this section the Secretary of State must—

(a) pay particular regard to contracts which provide technology companies with access to confidential patient data;

(b) consult national security experts on the risks posed to UK sovereignty by such contracts;

(c) consider risks associated with the sharing of confidential patient data with organisations based outside of the UK;

(d) assess public and NHS staff attitudes to relevant suppliers and any implications such attitudes may have on the use and effectiveness of products or services provided under the contract; and

(e) consider the background of relevant suppliers, known contracts with other states and organisations, and any relevant ethical considerations.

(3) Where any significant risk is identified, the Secretary of State must set out the Government’s intentions to manage and mitigate such risks, including its intention to use or develop domestic technologies, systems or products in place of those provided under the relevant contract.”—(Dr Chambers.)

This new clause would require the Government to publish a risk assessment of contracts between NHS organisations and suppliers based outside of the UK.

Brought up, and read the First time.

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 4—Duty on the Secretary of State to prioritise domestic suppliers—

“In the National Health Service Act 2006, after section 1CC (inserted by section 6 of this Act) insert—

‘1CD Duty to prioritise domestic suppliers

(1) In exercising functions in relation to the health and care service, the Secretary of State must prioritise the awarding of any contract that will involve the handling of NHS patient data to suppliers based in the United Kingdom.

(2) The Secretary of State may only seek to procure technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data from suppliers based outside of the United Kingdom where a viable domestic alternative does not exist.

(3) Before signing any contract for the procurement of technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data with a supplier based outside of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must consult with—

(a) patient groups,

(b) national security experts, and

(c) staff unions,

on the proposed contract and lay a report on such a consultation before Parliament.

(4) Where it is proposed to sign a contract for the procurement of technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data with a supplier based outside of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must arrange for a motion agreeing to the signing of such a contract to be tabled in each House of Parliament, and no such contract may be signed where a motion for its agreement is negatived by either House of Parliament.

(5) If a contract is awarded for the procurement of technology and information systems which will handle NHS patient data with a supplier based outside of the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State must place a statement before both Houses of Parliament setting out whether the Government is taking, or is planning to take, steps to develop or support long-term domestic alternatives to the systems provided by the contract.’”

This new clause would place a duty on the Secretary of State to prioritise domestic, UK-based, suppliers for technology systems and contracts handling NHS patient data, and places restrictions on the signing of contracts for such systems with non-UK based suppliers.

New clause 5—NHS Digital Sovereignty Strategy—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy (‘an NHS Digital Sovereignty Strategy’) which sets out the Government's approach to maintaining the security and resilience of relevant NHS information systems by—

(a) assessing, managing and mitigating risks—

(i) associated with foreign interference,

(ii) arising from reliance on foreign-supplied technologies, and

(b) preventing over-reliance on foreign providers by building domestic capacity.

(2) For the purposes of this section, a ‘relevant information system’ is an information system with access to NHS patient data.

(3) An NHS Digital Sovereignty Strategy published under this section must—

(a) include risks associated with—

(i) hardware,

(ii) software,

(iii) supply chains, and

(iv) procurement processes;

(b) include a specific focus on security and resilience in digital procurement processes, detailing how the Government intends to reduce strategic dependencies on foreign-owned service providers to mitigate the risk of systemic disruption;

(c) include a commitment to prioritise the use of technologies developed in the UK by UK organisations in relevant information systems to reduce reliance on foreign technologies;

(d) recommend steps to support and develop sufficient domestic capability where it does not currently exist;

(e) where risks are identified, state how the Government intends to address these risks by supporting the use or development of domestic technologies or systems.”

This new clause would require the Government to publish an NHS Digital Sovereignty Strategy setting out how it intends to address risks to relevant information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies.

New clause 9—Retendering of contract for the NHS Federated Data Platform—

“The Secretary of State must, before February 2027, commence a competitive retendering for the contract to provide the NHS Federated Data Platform.”

New clause 10—NHS contracting for IT or data services—

“(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, by regulations establish a governance framework for the contracting of any IT or data services by the Department of Health and Social Care or any NHS organisation.

(2) The framework established under subsection (1) must include the following provisions—

(a) a party may not bid for any contract for services where such services have previously been provided by the party on a free trial basis;

(b) the automatic extension of contracts should be subject to audit by the National Audit Office;

(c) contract terms must include provision for the department or NHS organisation to take ownership of any bespoke system built or developed by the contractor during the delivery of the contract;

(d) the department or NHS organisation must, at the end of the contract period (or following any extensions) conduct a competitive retendering process; and

(e) where a retendering process takes place under subsection (2)(d), the contractor may not assist in the preparation of the contract specification.

(3) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure.”

New clause 43—Data obligations—

“A contract given in relation to the provision of NHS services must include an obligation to provide data under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in relation to that contract and to the patients served.”

This new clause would oblige those receiving contracts to provide NHS services to make available FOI data in relation to the patients covered by the contract and the contract itself.