Tuesday, 3rd March, 1925.

The House met at a quarter-past four of the clock, THE LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 1^a .—( The Marquess of Salisbury.)

On Question, Bill read 1^a ; and to be printed.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 1^a .—( The Marquess of Salisbury.)

On Question, Bill read 1^a ; and to be printed.

Brought from the Commons, read 1^a , and to be printed.

Read 2^a (according to Order).

Order of the Day for the House to be put into Committee read.

Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—( Viscount Peel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly:

[The EARL OF DONOUGHMORE in the Chair.]

Clause 1 agreed to.

Clause 2 ( Employment of young persons as trimmers or stokers):

The noble and learned Lord said: I gave notice to my noble friend on the Second Reading of the Bill that I would ask him to consider whether it was proper to bring a Bill of this character into operation as an Act of Parliament before the conditions which were intended to bring it into operation are fulfilled. The Bill provides for changes in labour conditions on board merchant ships which have been recommended by International Conventions. As to the first of them, which is embodied in the clause added to the Bill by the last decision of the House, I have not thought it necessary to raise any question. It provides for the case of shipwrecked seamen and regularises a mode of dealing with their claims for wages, which I suppose all people of any experience on the subject think is very reasonable and proper, and to which I know there has been no sort of objection among persons interested in shipping.

The clause to which I move an Amendment is a penal clause, which deals with the employment of young men and lads under eighteen in certain departments on board a merchant ship, in particular in the engine rooms and in the stokehold. That, of course, is a matter of importance with regard to conditions of service on board merchant ships. But the thing comes to be proposed in this way. The League of Nations, by its International Convention, brings together representatives of States which are ship-owning States, mercantile States and representatives of other States, and at Conventions conclusions are arrived at as to the proper, or perhaps the best, conditions of carrying on the merchant service. There are three Conventions embodied in this Bill. I pointed out to my noble friend last week that of sixteen Conventions which have been put forward under the same conditions an exceedingly small proportion—I think I might say an almost infinitesimal proportion—have been ratified so as to bring them into general operation at sea. So far as I know, the Conventions here under consideration have not been ratified so as to give them any general operation.

Now what is proposed by this Bill, with its penal clauses with regard to new conditions of employment, is that British shipowners shall be subjected to those new conditions without any security for that general amelioration of conditions at sea, or that equality of conditions of service in. the mercantile marine at large, which is intended to be procured by measures of this kind. I am told, and I believe, that British shipowners are perfectly ready to come into line with any reasonable proposal which may be resolved upon by Convention for the amelioration of conditions at sea; but I know a great many shipowners are anxious lest Conventions should be agreed upon and brought into operation with respect to British shipowners, and should remain mere idle words with regard to shipowners at large. I ask my noble friend whether the best mode of dealing with this matter is not to add to the Bill some provision whereby, when ship-owning nations generally, or to a reasonable extent, have concurred in the proposals which are embodied in the Bill His Majesty by Order in Council may bring them into operation to affect British shipowners.

Amendment moved—

Page 3, line 27, at end insert the said new subsection.—(Lord Merrivale.)

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 2 agreed to.

Clauses 3 and 4 agreed to.

Clause 5:

Interpretation.

5. In this Act—

The expression "young person" means a person who is under the age of eighteen years:

The expression "ship" means any sea-going ship or boat of any description which is registered in the United Kingdom as a British ship, and includes any British fishing-boat entered in the fishing-boat register.

The limits of the ports are fixed by Statute. So long as these craft keep within those limits they do not come within the purview of the Bill. But from time to time these craft pass over the imaginary line in the Port of London which constitutes the seaward limits of our jurisdiction, and unless this Amendment is accepted those particular craft, as I said just now, will be deemed to be sea-going craft and will be liable to the pains and penalties laid down in the Bill. A precisely similar Bill to this was before your Lordships' House last year and an Amendment in precisely similar terms to this was moved on that occasion by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillimore. It was accepted without demur by Lord Parmoor who was in charge of the Bill. But ho went further and expressed his pleasure that the Amendment had been moved. He thought, I presume, that it was necessary that such a matter should be cleared away out of the Bill. The noble and learned Lord said this:—

"I appreciate the point that there is no necessity so far as the Protocol is concerned, or as regards the real purpose of this Bill, that such ships shall be included as will be in terms excluded if the Amendment of the noble and learned Lord is adopted. If he desires to press the Amendment, I shall not raise any further objection."

I do not know what attitude the noble Viscount will take to this Amendment, but I have heard it suggested that he is not going to accept it.

That, of course, is mere rumour. I have not had an opportunity of testing his mind by personally interrogating him, but it will be a very great disappointment if he refuses to accept it. So far as we are able to judge there can be no justification for refusing to accept it, especially in face of the fact that Lord Parmoor, who is not only a distinguished lawyer but who knows all about these Conventions and has had some considerable experience in relation to them, accepted it. I hope that the noble Viscount will see his way to accept this Amendment.

Amendment moved—

Page 5, line 1, after ("ship") insert the said words.—(Viscount Devonport.)

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 5 agreed to.

Clause 6 agreed to.

Clause 7:

Short title and construction.

7. This Act may he cited as the Merchant Shipping (International Labour Conventions) Act, 1925 and shall be construed as one with the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894 to 1923. and those Acts and this Act may be cited together as the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1894 to 1925.

The noble Lord said: The Amendment of which I have given notice is almost identical with that which has been proposed by my noble and learned friend Lord Merrivale, and in view of the undertaking given by the Government I do not propose to proceed with it. Although the Chamber of Shipping feels that it is a bad precedent to propose that something should apply to British shipping which does not apply to other shipping in the world this is such a small matter that I am quite satisfied with the undertaking the Government have given. I do not propose to move the Amendment.

Clause 7 agreed to.

Schedules 1 and 2 agreed to.

Bill reported without amendment.

Read 3^a (according to Order): privilege Amendment made; Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

Moved, That the Bill be now read 2^a .—( Viscount Peel.)

I venture to say that this is an extremely bad precedent which we ought not to follow and which we ought not to allow. In fact, last year your Lordships rejected this Bill on the Second Beading. My noble friend Lord Peel said that it was by a small majority, but small majorities are very often right, and the effect was exactly the same whether the majority was small or large. It has been said that unless this Bill is passed it will involve the country in a very large expenditure. I think that the Labour Government at one time actually talked about £17,000,000 or £18,000,000. This was afterwards reduced to a very much smaller sum, something like £500,000, and I believe that in the House of Commons this year the sum mentioned by the critics—for there were critics of the Bill; it is quite true that the House did not divide, but some of the most eminent constitutionally-minded members of the House of Commons opposed the Bill—was reduced, I think, to something like £200,000. But I do not care what the amount is. It is the principle that matters, that you must not do, in these days, that which Parliament refused Charles I permission to do—namely, to levy taxation without the consent of Parliament.

There is another, and I do not know that it is not a still more important constitutional change that arises from these Bills. I am glad to see the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith, present, because, unless my memory plays me false, ho has or had some knowledge of the Parliament Act, and the procedure which I am now venturing to criticise is the procedure which has been used under that Act. My noble friend Lord Peel, as I understood him, said that there was some difference between the Bill of last year and this Bill. I have the two Bills in my hand, and I will begin, first of all, at the wrong end and take the Schedules. The Schedule of this Bill and the Schedule of the last Bill are absolutely the same. There is no change in them whatever. When, however, we come to part of Clause I in the old Bill, we find that the milk charges have been exempted. There was no necessity to insert those words in the old Bill because the charges were imposed only upon those articles which were mentioned in the Schedule, and milk was not mentioned in the Schedule. The reason why milk was mentioned in the last Bill was that when the Bill was introduced the charges on milk were included, but in the House of Commons last year an Amendment was moved and accepted by the Government leaving out those charges, and consequently there was a little confusion in the drafting which makes no difference whatever to the Bill, because in neither Schedule was milk included.

Turning again to Clause I, I find three paragraphs with ( a), ( b) and ( c) against them. Paragraphs ( a) and ( b) have been merged into one sentence, and ( c) has been left out. Now paragraph ( c) in the old Bill was for services rendered, and accordingly, whatever charges were made for services rendered in the old Bill, which was not certified as a Money Bill, are left out of this Bill. Last year's Bill, therefore, was more of a Money Bill than this year's Bill, and yet, notwithstanding that fact, we now find that this year's Bill is certified as a Money Bill. I venture

to say that this raises a very important question. Under the Parliament Act, as your Lordships all know, if a Bill is certified as a Monty Bill you can reject it hero and it then goes back to the House of Commons, and, if they do not otherwise determine within a month, it goes to His Majesty the King for Royal Assent. Now I suggest to your Lordships that you should reject this Bill and rend it back to the House of Commons, in order to give them an opportunity of considering how it is that a Bill which last year was not a Money Bill and which this year imposes a smaller charge than the Bill of last year, now becomes a Money Bill.

Your Lordships must remember that this may create a precedent, and that if in the future a Bill comes up to your Lordships' House which you reject on Second Reading, and there is another Speaker, perhaps less scrupulous than this Speaker, in the Chair, he may say: "The Lords rejected this Bill; I will see that they do not reject the next, because I will certify it as a Money Bill." There is no appeal from Mr. Speaker's decision. The only possible appeal is to send back the Bill to the House of Commons in the hope that the good sense of the House of Commons will prevail, and that a Bill which last year was not a Money Bill shall not this year become a Money Bill. The question, I believe, has been raised whether there ought not to be some reform in your Lordships' House. I think this shows that some reform, at any rate in this direction, is absolutely necessary, and that it should not be left in the power of one man to say one year one thing and another year another. I beg to move.

Amendment moved—

Leave out ("now") and at the end of the Motion insert ("this day six months").—(Lord Banbury of Southam.)

On Question, Amendment negatived: Bill read 2a; Committee negatived.

Let me at once disclaim any intention to make it the starting point for anything in the nature of a roving expedition over the wide and scattered field of foreign policy. Still less do I desire that it should be regarded as calculated in any way to cause embarrassment to His Majesty's Government, or to appear to force them to a premature disclosure of matters which, in their view of the general interest ought, for the time being at any rate, to be kept in reserve or even in silence. It is very difficult, indeed I think it is impossible, in the times in which we live to isolate the various problems which disturb the serenity of statesmen and cloud the horizon, not only of Europe but of the whole world, by endeavouring to put them into distinct and independent compartments. Even if you take by way of illustration two such questions as those of Allied Indebtedness and European Security, logically quite separable, you will find at once that they have reactions and inter-actions which would make it an unprofitable task to attempt to solve or even to discuss the one without reference to the other.

I have purposely confined myself, in the inquiry which I propose to address to His Majesty's Government, to a matter which it seems to me can be and ought to be discussed as standing upon a footing of its own. It arises under Articles 42-i and 429 of the Treaty of Versailles which are to be found in Part XIV of that Treaty under the general heading of "Guarantees." They provide, as your Lordships are aware, for the temporary occupation of German territory lying "to the west of the Rhine together with the bridgeheads." As is clear from the terms of these Articles, the occupation was not intended to last for more than fifteen years unless at that date—that is to say, after the expiration of that term—in the language of one of the subsections, the guarantees against unprovoked aggression by Germany were not then considered sufficient by the Allied and Associated Governments. In the meantime, during these fifteen years of provisional occupation, what was contemplated was a progressive evacuation of specified areas at the end of each term, subject to the general proviso that "the conditions of the present Treaty are faithfully carried out by Germany." The first term of five years came to an end, at any rate as we in this country hold, on January 10 last. Thereupon the bridgehead of Cologne and the adjacent territory, which has been held I think during the whole of those five years under the Treaty by British troops, were due to be evacuated subject to the proviso which I have just quoted. And it is in consequence of alleged defaults on the part of Germany which amount in the language of the clause to failure faithfully to carry out the conditions of the Treaty, that evacuation has been, at any rate for the moment, postponed.

Before I proceed to say a few words about the actual facts, I should like to make a general observation. Though the provisions of Articles 428 and 429 come under the heading of what are called "Guarantees" they are, on the face of them, temporary measures. They form no part of, and they have no organic connection with, the provisions which were contemplated by the negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles for the permanent security of France. The permanent security of France was considered to be provided for in another way, in a twofold fashion: first of all, to some extent and by very material and stringent provisions, in the Treaty itself. I mean by those Articles of the Treaty, Article 42 and Article 43, which deal with the left bank of the Rhine and, indeed, with more than the left bank of the Rhine. Article 42 provides, as your Lordships will no doubt remember, that—

"Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the East of the Rhine."

And Article 43 provides that—

"In the area defined above the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation, are in the same way forbidden"—

a very stringent and, as was then regarded and I think ought to be regarded now, an effective safeguard, so far as it goes, against German invasion.

But quite apart from those provsions of the Treaty, and outside the Treaty altogether, there can be no doubt that France counted upon, and may, indeed, to some considerable extent have been induced to modify the position which her Government originally set up in this matter by the tripartite pact between France herself, ourselves, and the United States of America which, at that time, there was reason to believe-might be, and indeed would be, ratified, but which, as we know now, for reasons it is not necessary to go into on this occasion, never came into effective existence, or, indeed, into existence at all.

I have always thought that the feeling not only of soreness but of insecurity which the lapse of that arrangement has undoubtedly left in the minds of the French people, was a perfectly natural and legitimate consequence; and I know my friend Lord Grey has on more than one occasion, both in this House and outside, given expression to the same view; and I believe it is very widely shared in all parts of this country. But legitimate. natural, genuine, deeply seated as that feeling is, it has no real relevance to the present question. It may well afford, and I think it does afford ground, and ample ground, for devising—as I hope the statesmanship of Europe and the world will soon prove its capacity to devise in the interests not only of French but of European and of worldwide security—a substitute and a more comprehensive pact. That, in my judgment, is at this moment the primary and the most urgent need of the international world.

But the fact that that need has not yet been met can afford no reason whatever for attempting to re-write these Articles

of the Treaty and to convert the strictly limited and temporary measures for which they provide into an indefinite occupation by the Allies of the left bank of the Rhine. If that were so, if that contention were really well founded, there would be no point or object in going into the question of German default. The real question, therefore, as it appears to me is this, and it is a question of fact: Has there been such unfaithfulness (I use the language of Article 429 of the Treaty) on the part of Germany in fulfilling the conditions of the Treaty as to justify the Allies in the non-performance of their prima facie obligation to evacuate the Cologne area at the specified date in January last?

This is not the first time, let me remind you, that the question of the failure of Germany to carry out the very important, and, I will add, the very necessary, disarmament provisions of the Treaty, has arisen. As far back as March, 1921, an allegation of such default was one of the heads of the ultimatum which was then presented to Germany by the Allied Powers. Two years later—I am not sure that everyone remembers this—in the early part of 1923, curiously enough immediately after the French occupation of the Ruhr, the question was again raised; and interrogatories were addressed to the Government of that day (Mr. Bonar Law, I think, was then Prime Minister) in the House of Commons, with regard to the whole matter of German disarmament. The War Office was questioned upon the matter, and the Under-Secretary of State for War, Colonel Guinness—the exact date is March 22, 1923—said in the House of Commons:—

"The British representative is satisfied that the reductions in the German Army contemplated by the Treaty, both in respect of men and material, have been so carried out as to constitute effective disarmament."

Some six weeks or two months later, a further Question was addressed to the Government upon the subject. The date is May 7, 1923.

The Question was addressed with particular reference to the German police, and the Under-Secretary of State for War, replying again, said:—

"Our military advisers are satisfied that the provisions of the Treaty with regard to the surrender of arms and munitions have been carried out to such an extent as to ensure that at the present time Germany is effectively disarmed."

And he added:—

"It is known that, just prior to the French occupation of the Ruhr, the authorised Army was considerably under establishment."

That is less than two years ago. There was, I believe, some interruption- some people say some obstruction—of the effective supervision by the Inter-Allied Commission on German armaments in the months that followed; but we now understand that in September of last year they resumed active inquiries. The result is, first of all, a preliminary Report, and now, as we understand, a final Report, upon which the Allied Governments are asked to take action.

I should like to make perfectly clear, what indeed it ought not to be necessary to have to make clear, that no one, I will not say in this House but anywhere in this country, so far as I am aware, has any motive or desire to screen or to minimise German default. If the provisions of the Treaty as to disarmament can be shown to have been so infringed as to amount, to use the words of the Treaty itself, to unfaithfulness in carrying out its provisions, the contingency upon which the Allies agreed to evacuate has not arisen. As I said a moment ago, that is a question of fact; it is a question of the weight of evidence,. and I confess that it is much to be regretted, very much to be regretted, that the Treaty did not provide some adequate and trustworthy machinery, an instrument of inquiry, for deciding such matters as this. It has done so in some cases; it, has not done so in this.

There are two considerations—I will only mention two—among many which are obvious and which ought, I think, to be kept in view, and which I have no doubt are being kept in view, by His Majesty's Government. In the first place, the kind of default which would justify a postponement of the prima facie obligation to evacuate must, as everyone-will agree, be a default not trivial or casual but substantial and deliberate. Another consideration is this: that you must make a distinction—I am not suggesting for a moment that that distinction will not be made, for it is a vital one—between measures which may be legitimately taken in a country subject to the existing economic and political conditions which prevail in Germany, to strengthen the

safeguards against internal and domestic disorder, and measures which can only be legitimately and adequately interpreted as preparing the way and providing the means for external aggression. No fair-minded man will deny that this is a consideration which ought always to be kept in view.

That being so, I want to submit to your Lordships, and in particular to the noble Marquess who represents the Government, that it is of the utmost importance that the evidence, upon which for the moment only a provisional decision has been taken—as I understand the case the full and final Report of the Commission had not then been produced or considered—should be produced, and that if need be Germany, the German Government and those who speak for it, should have an opportunity of stating, if they have one, their counter-case. I ask this, not in the interests of Germany but in order that our fair dealing in the matter, our desire and determination to act in such a case, when we are alleging that we are, excused from an obligation which, prima facie, we have undertaken, should be free from all question and even free of suspicion.

We have no want of respect, any of us, for the Inter-Allied Commission, no want of respect for the military and expert judgment of such a great authority as Marshal Foch, no want of respect, let me add, for that distinguished body which has recently apparently become part of the international polity of Europe, with a mysterious attribution of curiously sporadic vitality, the Ambassadors' Conference. I shall be glad to learn from the noble Marquess what are the precise functions and the exact authority of that Conference; whether it is merely an international clearing-house, whether it is a factory for provisional decisions, whether it has any independent authority of its own, or whether, as would seem to be the case and ought to be the case, it is both in initiation and determination subject to the great States of whom its constituent members are the representatives and the delegates. If that is the case, as I think and believe it is. I am not at all sure that it may not in the long run turn out to be an instrument not for accelerating but for procrastinating decision.

Be that as it may, it appears to many of us, and to most people in this country, unless His Majesty's Government have overwhelming reasons to the contrary, that in the general interest—it is a matter of almost imperious necessity—the evidence, I do not say necessarily in complete detail, but the substance of the evidence, which the International Commission has collected and which has been submitted to these various authorities, and which must ultimately be weighed and decided upon by the Governments concerned, should be evidence of value and weight which the whole world can judge. Let me add, if it is necessary to add, that in making such an appeal we are not showing, certainly none of us have any desire to show, any lack of regard for the opinions or the susceptibilities of our friends and Allies. I may claim, speaking perhaps without presumption as an old friend of France, at any rate as one who during many responsible years did everything in his power to cultivate and develop the Entente so providently brought into being by my noble friend whom I see opposite, by the wisdom and statesmanship of Lord Lansdowne—that Entente which, when the testing moments came, was one of the main agents, I would go so far as to say the main agent, for saving Europe and the world from irretrievable calamity—that the request which I make to the Government, which they will, of course, answer or not, fully or with such materials as they think proper, is made, as my noble friend, I am sure, well knows, in a spirit of loyalty to that which I conceive, and I believe most people in this country conceive, to be the best interests of honour and peace. The country will be glad to know, and I think your Lordships' House will be glad to know, in this matter, where exactly at this moment we are, and whither, so far as the noble Marquess can foresee, we are going.

I want to direct my Question to two points. When this matter was discussed some time ago in this House the noble Marquess said that the Government were not prepared to give an answer, on two grounds. I think I cover the matters touched on in his answer, but if in any

way I have limited them I will at once accept the correction. The first thing was that there had not been time to consider the provisions contained in the Protocol itself. Since that date there have been three months for consideration. It never occurred to me that the Protocol as a document was difficult to interpret or to understand, but since that time there has been ample discussion, and no doubt the noble Marquess is aware of the accurate and careful analysis made by that great international lawyer and jurist, Sir Frederick Pollock. I do not think that he approached the Protocol originally in any specially friendly spirit, but he makes a masterly and accurate analysis, showing what the Protocol does and what little basis there is for many of the suggestions made as to what it is supposed that the Protocol might do. If I might refer to one passage from his analysis it will show what I mean. He says—

"The risk of a British Fleet or a French Army, not to speak of contingents from the Dominions, being ordered about under some foreign command is fabulous, and not less so because the fable has been accepted by some persons who ought to have known better. We shall see that the Protocol is careful to observe this fundamental denial of any quasi-federal executive power in the Council."

I merely quote that because I do not desire to go into matters of that sort in any wide terms on the present occasion.

The other matter which, I admit, does raise considerable difficulty, is the attitude of the Dominions and Dependencies. It seems to be forgotten when this matter is discussed that at every stage in formulating the Protocol the representatives of the Dominions and of India at Geneva were fully consulted, and in many respects their advice was adopted. I do not want to press the matter too far, and also I am cognisant of the fact that, not only as regards the Protocol but as regards the general Imperial relationship between the Mother Country and her Dominions and Dependencies, there are questions pending at the present time which, in the interests of everybody, should, if possible, be finally dealt with on a satisfactory basis.

I should like to say one or two words on some information which has come to me. I have lately been in the East. Eastern opinion appeared to be all in one direction—in favour of the Protocol.

I should like to say a word about Australia's attitude, and I will quote from a statement made by Mr. Duncan Hall, who is said to have written the best book which has yet appeared on the constitutional position between a Colony and the Mother Country. What does he state?

"The outstanding fact is that there is no decisive opinion in Australia on the Protocol. Sensational headlines in a section of the Press, and alarmist statements by an eminent politician with an axe to grind created considerable uneasiness in the early stages of the discussion. But the arrival of full information from Geneva, including the final text of the Protocol, and reassuring statements by responsible persons based on a study of these data, have done much to check apprehension."

He ends with these words:—

"Already one can say with some confidence that the current is setting towards ratification."

I do not desire to place too much weight on any one opinion, however well founded, but I think it is a great mistake to approach the Protocol with the idea that there is anything contained in it which either created alarm in our Dominions or which, on the other hand, is other than favourable to them in the security which it gives for the normal conditions of peace.

There are two other extracts to which I should like to refer. The former Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, Sir Robert Borden—I am sure he is an authority whom we should recognise in this country—declared at a meeting of the Canadian League of Nations that he gave his support to the Protocol. That is a very important matter. I admit that it is very difficult to speak with certainty on questions of this kind. In the same way it was argued by Sir Francis Ball at a meeting in New Zealand, over which he presided, that the Protocol should be subjected to some amendment before ratification. No one objects to that; I have often said that the question of amendment should be left open. That meeting carried unanimously a resolution urging that the Protocol be ratified. So that whatever the balance of ultimate opinion in those places may be, and it is as difficult to gauge as the final opinion in our own country, there is a large body of responsible opinion in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, to which I have referred, undoubtedly in favour of the ratification of the principle of the Protocol; and one would expect it to be so. The Protocol is a document which appears to me to be favourable in an extraordinary degree to our Colonial possessions.

There is one more word that I should like to say about Australia. The Chairman of the First Commission which had to deal with very important matters in framing the actual terms of the Protocol, was Sir Littleton Groom. Sir Littleton Groom, who is Attorney-General of the Federal Government of Australia, after full consideration and communication with his Government, assented to the terms of the Protocol and said that he thought they were favourable in regard to the position in Australia. I have not heard that he has said anything since which is out of accord with the opinion he then expressed. I was in intimate association with him for a series of weeks on this point, I saw him every day and every evening, and I feel certain that his mature consideration, on behalf of the Federal Government of Australia, was in favour of the terms of the Protocol, to which he finally gave his assent.

I cannot help recalling another fact in reference to New Zealand. I have quoted the opinion of Sir Francis Bell, but the representative of New Zealand in Geneva was Sir James Allen. When we were discussing the Protocol in its earlier stages—it was necessarily altered and revised many times—there were points in it to which objection was taken on behalf of the Government of New Zealand. Telegraphic communications took place between Sir James Allen and his Government, and Sir James told us in very frank terms that as the Protocol then stood he thought he could not give his assent to it on behalf of New Zealand. Those matters were dealt with. The objections raised by Sir James Allen were met, and after they had been met, he told us in terms, after communicating with his Government, that they were prepared to accept the terms of the Protocol as then arranged; and when the time came he gave his vote, of course, in favour of the acceptance of those terms as they were brought before the Assembly at Geneva.

It seems to be forgotten how much intercommunication there was between the Mother Country and the Dominions and India upon this point. India was specially represented by Lord Hardinge of Penshurst us well as by a very well-known military expert in India, Major-General the Maharajah of Bikaner. I do not think you could have had two more representative members of the delegation or two gentlemen more conversant with conditions in India, and both of them gave their assent to the terms of the Protocol. I do not want to go so far back at the moment, but your Lordships may recollect that when Lord Hardinge returned to this country he sent to the newspapers a warning against the misapprehensions as to some matters which had been sent home, and gave his adhesion to the terms of the Protocol as it existed at that time.

May I turn now to another point, because it will be the shortest way of dealing with this question, and will show how matters stand. I hold in my hand the Report by the right hon. Austen Chamberlain on the Thirty-second Session of the Council of the League of Nations, as to which, I think, a very important point arises, and I hope that the noble Marquess will be able to give me an answer in regard to it. Mr. Chamberlain made it clear that he was merely asking for an adjournment of the last Council meeting as a matter of procedure, and that he was giving no opinion whatever as to the merits of the Protocol either one way or the other. That is entirely in accord with what the noble Marquess said in answer to me. These are the actual words of the Report—

"In asking for a delay, he wished it to be clear that ho made no declaration and gave no indication of what the ultimate decision of the British Government would be."

Therefore, so far as the last Council meeting is concerned, the matter was left at large.

But M. Briand is reported as having made a statement. I admit that I give great weight to M. Briand's statement not only because of his personal knowledge and ripe experience, but because I have the same feeling as that expressed by the noble Earl, that every possible attention, within the limits, of course, of what is right and just to others, on the question of security should be given to the French representatives. The remarkable fact is that at the Assembly itself M. Briand accepted the Protocol as satisfying the French desire for security (which is the main point that we ought to fix in their favour) and there and then said that he would accept the Protocol—I do not think there is ratification in France—on behalf of the French Government as a great document and a great proposal which, in his view, would give the security which all France desired and which would erect an almost insuperable barrier to warfare in future.

What did M. Briand say at the Council meeting? I take this from the Report which has been issued—

"The French delegate said that it was easily understandable that the British Government should ask for the adjournment of this question, purely for reasons of procedure."

There we are all on common ground.

"The question before the Council at that moment was, therefore, only one of procedure, and concerned the mere adjournment of the question on the agenda of that Session."

Then he said something which, to my mind, is very important—

"The work, however, which had been undertaken had not been discontinued …"

The Council had undertaken that work on a mandate from the Assembly and not on its own initiative. It had to do it because it had been ordered by the Council to do it, and I want to know what the work was which had been undertaken and had not been discontinued. I ask that question for this reason in particular. When I came back from Geneva I was asked, through the ordinary sources, to nominate a member of the Drafting Committee which, under Article 3 of the Protocol, was to indicate clearly how far the Protocol would introduce amendments in the provisions of the original Covenant.

I nominated a person—of course, I do not give his name—with special knowledge in international matters, a special jurist and draftsman; there can be no question whatever of his capacity for nomination. But before that nomination was made effective the change of Government was brought about, and I want to know whether, in accordance with the request then made, an English representative, a draftsman and international lawyer, has been carrying out this work. It is extremely important. I am afraid that I have read the Protocol so often that it seems to me to be a very easy document to interpret, but it is also, apparently, an easy document to misinterpret. But if you can once have the amendments introduced, by a proper drafting committee, into the Covenant itself—that was the desire of the Council—then it would be clear to everyone whether, and in what respect, there was any difference between the two documents, and the era of speculation—unfortunate speculation, I think—would be closed.

Then M. Briand goes on to say this:

"And it was contemplated that in March next "—

I think the Council meet next Monday. but I am not sure; the noble Viscount would know that—

"the Council would be able to take up, with a certainty of achieving positive and practical results, the discussion which it thought might be held in the present Session."

Is our representative, who I understand will be the Foreign Minister, going to stand aloof, or is he going to take the part and the influence which Great Britain ought to exercise in the work which has "a certainty of achieving positive and practical results"? That is a very concrete question. Are we going to stand aloof? I think there can be no greater misfortune than that Great Britain should stand aloof from a great project of this kind.

It is not that the project itself is so important in one sense, but it is the step, and the only step, which has been at present devised in order to bring about a great world Conference on Disarmament. Are we going to help towards a world Conference on Disarmament, or not? It does not seem to me that the details of the Protocol are of importance for this purpose. If there is a world Conference I have no doubt it will have to be adjusted and reconsidered; because, unless at the world Conference a project of disarmament is generally accepted, the whole matter becomes null and void. Is there any other way of carrying out the obligations of Article 8 of the Covenant except through the process of a world Conference? And if there is to be a world Conference ought it not to be carried out through the agency of the League of Nations? If this opportunity is lost—it has been a very difficult matter to bring about—when is an opportunity likely to recur in which the Prime Ministers of France and England were jointly concerned, to which they gave their joint consent, and which was afterwards adopted in principle by the forty-nine nations at the Assembly of Geneva?

The opinions of other countries, again, may be a question of difference in different cases; but I should like to quote one because I think it very much concerns that which was said by the noble Earl this evening. The opinion I am going to quote is that of the Foreign Minister of Poland, Remarks have been made at different times as regards the attitude of Poland towards the League of Nations. I want to bear my testimony that its attitude has always been a loyal one, and the very great difficulties which have arisen on every Council I have attended at the League—the noble Viscount, no doubt, met with the same difficulties—on the questions of nationality and minority between Poland and Germany have been met on both sides in a spirit of compromise and good feeling, and a very difficult matter has been practically finally settled.

The Foreign Minister of Poland declared that though the form of the Geneva Protocol might undergo many modifications, it was quite impossible that its spirit of general solidarity and its desire to see difficulties settled by arbitration should cease to exert an influence. Why should it cease to exert an influence? If the League of Nations means anything it means that countries, instead of determining their own rights in an isolated spirit, should be prepared to submit them to a common tribunal and, therefore, a common settlement. He goes on to say that Poland held, on the contrary, that the Treaty policy was universal solidarity to safeguard the Treaties, and he believed that if all the States pledged themselves to combined intervention against a nation infringing the peace, there would be no more war. Then he said, with reference to the guarantee of peace to which reference was made by the noble Lord, that to guarantee peace on the English Channel—that was, a guarantee, or pact, between England and France—while leaving the whole of the rest of the world at the mercy of events would mean, he thought, not peace but war. He could hardly believe that any nation could be brought to sign such a document.

That is only one illustration. I do not suppose it would be right to refer to matters of private information, but I am bound to admit that I think I am entitled to say that I find on every side, as regards communications made to me, with comparatively very few exceptions indeed, a unanimous feeling in support of that which was done and sanctioned at the last meeting of the Assembly in Geneva. I do not, of course, suggest for one moment that a scheme of this kind is perfect; nor do I suggest that there may not be ample grounds—I believe I see by the newspapers that it has been raised by the Committee of Imperial Defence—on matters of that kind where amendments should be allowed and accepted. Those are really infinitely small points in comparison with the general scheme that there shall be no more war as far as human prevision can foresee.

Perhaps I may be allowed, as one does not know what information has been obtained—at any rate, no information has been asked especially from those who were at Geneva—to give a short illustration from the Navy. Unfortunately, as I think, we were not given much assistance, during our discussion of the Protocol, by the Service Departments of this country. But late in the day a very eminent representative of the Navy was sent specially from the Admiralty and he came to see me at Geneva. I have not the slightest doubt that he was sent as a man of the highest authority. He raised three points. Two of them are met by special provisions in the Protocol as it stands, and the third point was not met because it was too late; the Committee had already adjourned. The first of the points was to make it quite clear that in the adoption of the Supreme Court provision was made that there should be no interference with the principles of naval warfare adopted by British Prize Courts. If you look at Article 3 you will see that this is provided for in terms. Whether it was necessary to provide for it in terms is another matter. I thought it was not; but it was possible to do it and we put it in. Another point is met by Article 10. It was feared by the Navy that if they were called upon to co-operate under a League of Nations action they might not have belligerent rights. I think the supposition was superfine, but if you look at Article 10 you will find we were enabled to put in words to satisfy them that belligerent rights can be exercised under these conditions.

The only other matter has to do with Article 7, and I want to say a word or two about it. I think Article 7 is somewhat unfortunately drafted. It was intended to do nothing more than this—to maintain the status quo during the hearing of an arbitration before the Courts. Just the same sort of provision was inserted for this purpose in the Treaty of Lausanne. There has been some difficulty as regards Iraq in seeing that such a provision is properly maintained; but it is quite clear if you are to have a procedure by arbitration, or court of conciliation, that while that procedure is going on you must have a provision that the status quo shall be maintained. When the matter came before the Assembly I made a statement in public, as I had promised the naval representative I would, and said that in my opinion this was nothing more than a status quo clause; and if it is a status quo clause it is what no one would dissent from. If it can be construed, as I understand it is said to be construed, as a general interference with mobilisation, then, of course, it ought to be altered. No one suggested that, no one thought of it, and the only reason why a matter of that kind was not made quite clear was because it was not until the Sunday that this eminent naval authority raised it, not until after the Committee which dealt with this matter had dissipated. It was therefore not from any want of desire to make the matter clear but because it was impossible to deal with it. That was fully explained at the time.

Those were the only three points raised. I do not suggest that further consideration may not have raised other points of difficulty, but these were the only three points raised. Two of them are dealt with specifically, and as regards the third it was stated that we believed the fear of the Navy was not well founded. It was certainly not the desire of any man, not the desire of any of my colleagues or myself, that these wide powers should be inferred from the words we had used. But how is one to deal with these, suggestions which come, from the various Services? I want to deal with them; we want to deal with them; and we have tried to deal with them. The noble Marquess opposite knows that if any one wants to bring about a constructive scheme of this kind he naturally desires that difficulties of this kind should be met; they should be brought into the open. Let us understand what they are and then those who are responsible for the Protocol will be prepared to give their assistance within all reasonable limits; but you must have limits.

There is the question whether the Protocol is to apply to countries outside the League of Nations. The answer to that, of course, is quite clear. You cannot determine that finally until you have had a world Conference. The Protocol is not a final thing for conditions as they exist now. It is only a step towards a world Conference, and at that Conference every country, whether in the League of Nations or not, will have a full opportunity to see what arrangements can be come to. If they are generally accepted then of course the Protocol falls through; you cannot have greater safeguards than that. But if before the time comes for seeing how far security and disarmament can be connected you create difficulties, I might almost say invent difficulties, I do not see how any scheme of this kind can be fairly considered. If the security is to be less the measure of disarmament will be less. That is the simple proposition which we had in our minds. We desire that the measure of security should be as wide as possible. That is the right principle.

The obligation we have already under taken as signatories to the Treaty of Versailles, in which the original Covenant is contained, is that we will bring about these conditions of mutual disarmament. One can hardly think that Germany will take any other attitude than that of saying: "We will carry out our obligations but all the other countries should carry out theirs." When I was at Geneva on the last occasion we appointed a Commission with the assent of all the other bodies, and particularly of France and Italy, to take over the question of disarmament at the right moment in Germany, Bulgaria, Austria and Hungary. It was a Commission appointed for that very purpose. I do not know whether the right moment has come or not, but when it comes you will have the question of disarmament settled so far as the defeatist countries are concerned, and if you allow the Protocol to go forward there is a great chance that you will have a system of disarmament all round. I am not going to prophesy as to the measure of success, but let us try it. Suppose it fails; we shall have taken our part. And if it succeeds it will be the greatest triumph in the cause of peace that can possibly be imagined, having regard to conditions in Europe at the present time. I do not want to detain your Lordships longer now and I will ask the Question which stands in my name.

House adjourned at ten minutes past seven o'clock.