Wednesday, 1st July, 1925.

The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Debate resumed (according to Order) on the Amendment, moved yesterday by Lord Balfour of Burleigh, to leave out Paragraph 10 of the Schedule:—

Purchase of tramways by local authorities.

16. The provisions of Section 43 of the Tramways Act, 1870, shall apply to the intended tramways. Provided that in the application of those. provisions the period of forty-two years shall be substituted for the period of twenty-one years therein mentioned.

On Question, Amendment agreed to.

Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

With a view of eliciting information—and that really is my principal object—I have submitted a list of five questions in writing to His Majesty's Government, and with these I will deal first. I will amplify those questions and try, so far as possible, to explain their purport and w hat was in my mind when I put them. In the King's Speech of last November the reference to the Singapore base concludes with the following words:

"to proceed with plans already made for enlarging the naval base at Singapore."

My first question is: Do these plans include a graving dock?—because, in March last, the late Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, replying to this same question, put to him by the noble Viscount, Lord Wimbourne, stated that the question had not yet been settled. As it is a very important point, further information on it is requested.

My second question is: Is it proposed to have both a graving dock and a floating dock, or are these alternative proposals? On the provision of the floating dock a good deal depends. The late Marquess Curzon, dealing with this point in the same debate, said: "We"—that is, the Committee of Imperial Defence—

"came to the conclusion that at any rate for the purpose of the floating dock there can be no doubt about it that the site on the old Strait is the only possible site."

The Old Strait is some distance from what is commonly associated with the town of Singapore, Keppel Harbour. It is, as you know, situated on that stretch of water which lies between tae Island of Singapore and the mainland of Johore, and if this Old Strait site is going to be utilised then not only, so far as I can see, will the expenditure on the base be greatly increased, but also the area to be defended will be greatly extended. This point is somewhat important and it is for that reason that I have put this question.

My third question is: has His Majesty's Government considered the possibility of enlarging one or more of the existing commercial docks at Singapore so as to render possible the docking in them of capital ships of the largest size There are various reasons for my putting this question, and one of the most important of them is the question of economy. Next in order of importance

comes my desire to find a sort of middle way between the attitude of the Government and that of the different Parties. In the last debate on this subject the late Marquess Curzon gave as one of the objects of the base, that it was to enable our Fleet to do at less cost what it might otherwise have to return to Europe to effect, and presumably repairs were in his mind. Then again, the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, in the debate of last July, said this:—

"all we ask for in pressing the urgency of the completion of this base is something at Singapore which can do for modern capital ships that which Hong Kong could do for capital ships at the time of which the noble Viscount was speaking. There is nothing new asked for."

That was when the Labour Government was in office, and we were being urged to reconsider our decision. I would point out that up to 1910 our battleships were berthed in a commercial dock in Hong Kong. It seems to me that by enlarging the commercial docks at Singapore we shall not only meet the requirements of the Marquess Curzon, which I have already quoted, but we shall also meet those of the noble Marquess, Lord Linlithgow, by providing an effective substitute for Hong Kong in pre-war days. There are other advantages, I imagine, also. I can hardly conceive that the initial outlay involved would not be considerably less, and in time of peace, if this dock were a commercial dock, some revenue would be coming in to meet current expenditure.

Another most important point, in my opinion, is that the area to be defended would not be extended. I will deal with this point later, but I wish to make it now while I am on the particular question of the commercial dock. Admittedly a large naval establishment, reserved exclusively for naval uses, is preferred by the Navy, and offers conditions far more ideal. But a large establishment of that kind would be reserved exclusively for the emergency of a future war, and I think, by general admission, that contingency is remote. The base that I suggest, though it would undoubtedly supply what is wanted at Singapore at present—namely, facilities for the repair of our largest ships—could not be regarded, even by the most captious of our critics abroad or at home, as an unreasonable provision

My fourth question deals with cost, and it is this: Has any comprehensive estimate yet been made of the cost of this new base? By "comprehensive" I mean one which includes the cost of barracks, hospitals, new coast defences and arrangements to meet air attack. The sum of £10,000,000 has frequently been quoted as the sum approximately correct, and I submit that the nation has a right to know the full amount to which it will be committed. In some matters it is necessary to go ahead at any cost. In others it is inure prudent, as the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith, reminded us on Monday, to cut ones coat according to one's cloth. There is, in addition, the question of current expenditure to be considered. This, in any case, will be considerable; but it will vary with the form of defence employed. It is probable that the first attack on this base at Singapore will be from the air. I admit that for the moment such an attack is not feasible, but aviation is making astounding strides. Aerial aircraft carriers—that is to say, airships capable of carrying aeroplanes, and thereby conferring on the aeroplane a far larger radius of action—are developments, if not of the immediate, at any rate of the near future. And I understand that this base will not be completed before the year 1937.

When I was talking about the commercial dock I referred to the size of the target and the necessity for avoiding any increase in the size of that target, simply because of its exposure to air attack. The target is large enough already. Not only have the docks, the camps and the forts to be defended, but there are the town and its suburbs also. And during the weeks that must elapse before the arrival of our Fleet at its Far Eastern base Singapore will require the same sort of defence as London required during the World War. After all, no security from air attack will exist until the enemy air fleet has been annihilated. If we are going to rely for the defence of Singapore on the presence of a large body of troops in that locality, hundreds of acres of cantonments will be needed for their accommodation. Thousands of soldiers will be exposed to the effects of an unhealthy climate in time of peace, and a large target will be offered to the enemy bombing aeroplanes in time of war. As for expense, as an old soldier who has had something to do with estimates in his time, if my experience is any guide for the future, more than twice ten millions sterling will be spent in the process.

My fifth question refers to a rather minor point. The late Marquess Curzon, in his speech last March, informed your Lordships that Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements had offered, respectively, gifts of £250,000 in cash and a piece of land worth £146,000 to His Majesty's Government for the prosecution of the enlargement of the base at Singapore. He added that these generous gifts had been gratefully accepted. He had previously announced that the total expenditure on the base for the current year would be £204,000 and implied that that would be more than covered by the gift of money from Hong Kong. What I want to know is whether these gifts are unconditional, or whether any future Government which suspends or modifies this scheme will be obliged to give them back. It would, indeed, be the irony of fate if a future Labour or Liberal Government had to vote money for, so to speak, the redemption of this scheme, in view of the emphatic protests which both Opposition Parties have launched against its initiation.

There is just one other point. The late Marquess Curzon laid great stress on the small expenditure which would be incurred during the first three years. Nothing can alter the total sum to be expended, except a radical modification of this scheme. The less money that is spent in the early stages the more that will have to be spent in the last seven or eight years. It is obvious that even et the lowest estimate the annual charge, during that latter period, for Singapore will be at least £1,000,000 per annum. There will be, in addition, the cost of maintenance. I mention this because, presumably, from the moment work is started at the Old Strait some measures will have to be taken for defending that locality.

Those are my questions, and I will now turn to the more general aspect of the matter. So far as the change of policy is concerned, and its effects in other lands, there is little left to say. I think it is indisputable that much anxious comment has been aroused in Japan, not only in peace societies or in the Japanese branch of the League of Nations, but among perfectly sober-minded people with no particular axe to grind. Most reasonable newspapers have commented in very anxious language on this situation. I do not think any well-informed person questions our right to build this base and certainly no one questions our good faith at Washington—no one who is well informed and knows the facts. I think am not exaggerating when I say that there has been considerable bewilderment in Japan at the revival of this plan—an old plan, on the admission of the late Marquess Curzon, who said that it had been for long in the minds of His Majesty's advisers. How long? From before 1902 or since 1922, because in the intervening period the Japanese were our Allies during a time of dreadful stress and anxiety and, indeed, Japanese sailors and marines assisted us to repress a mutiny at Singapore itself.

I am putting myself for the moment in the position of a Japanese naval officer, and I think he might say this to himself: "What are these British at? They are hard up and yet they are spending all this money. This battleship base in the Far East can have no meaning unless it means that the British are aiming at naval supremacy in the Pacific. This base requires subsidiary bases. Where are they? At Hong Kong or the Phillipines? Is an alliance against us contemplated, because a base so far distant from home waters and the Mediterranean is surely incompatible with the one-Power standard?" That may seem unimportant. It may seem merely a revelation of the military mind. Mens militaris res mirabilis; but that mind exists in all countries and it creates an atmosphere in which doubts and suspicions flourish and in which only one industry prospers—that of armaments. That is the very sort of atmosphere which the late Government endeavoured to dispel by its policy in this matter. I do not think I am exaggerating when I say that there is not a Japanese war game played to-day, nor yet a Japanese naval mess, where these questions are not being put and answered in the way that I suggest. And these are grave dangers in the situation. We have also, I think, by our conduct in this matter, caused considerable discouragement throughout the world on the part of well-wishers of the League of

Nations. We are, after all, a leading Member of that League and yet it would appear that we take for granted that another war, or a war of sorts, will take place in the Far East in 1937 or soon after. We seem to these people to be preparing, in a spirit of cool foresightedness, for that contingency.

As regards the Washington Pact we have, of course, observed the letter of the Pact, but I wonder if we have not departed a little from the spirit that it was hoped would inspire the Washington Conference, whose main object was to limit armaments. Given the will, to arm and the belief that security depends on, force, there is nothing so easy as the evasion of the limitation of armaments. Any country with a. highly developed industrial system can equip itself with modern and more formidable weapons of offence and defence and, without infringing a single clause of any Treaty, the race of armaments can be commenced. There is the danger.

I have been at considerable pains to study what are the purposes of this base in the mind of His Majesty's Government. Various definitions have been given by different members of that Government. The right hon. Gentleman who is now Secretary of State for the Colonies and was at one time First Lord of the Admiralty, is reported to have said that the Singapore base was a piece of pure strategy unconnected with policy. Students at the Staff College are taught that strategy should be in harmony with policy. Experience often teaches that this is seldom the case, but it should be. Strategy and policy are, as a rule, an ill-assorted couple. During the War sometimes our policy was, shall I say, mercurial and our strategy somewhat stolid. Anyhow, there was a sort of union between them and not the complete divorce which the right hon. gentleman I have quoted seems to contemplate. Policy is the expression of a purpose, I presume. Strategy s the way of putting that purpose into effect. Very often the purpose is an unattainable ideal.

More often, again, strategy imposes severe restraints on policy, but they have got to work together. It is impossible for Chiefs of Staff to formulate a plan unless they have a policy to work on. Pure strategy, as I understand the expression, would mean that free licence

was given to the strategist. In so doing any country embarks on a perilous and expensive course. Your Lordships will forgive a reminiscence. I remember once, in the Balkans, seeing pure strategy at work. The armies of the Balkan bloc outpaced the plans of statesmen. They conquered the Turks far more quickly and thoroughly than their statesmen ever thought they would, and the Balkan Premiers found, at the end of 1912, a thing that they had dreaded and hated for decades broken in their hands. They did not know what to do with it, and in spite of the frantic efforts of the noble Viscount, Lord Grey, here in London, the victors fell out over the division of the spoil, and a peace ensued eventually which, if it was not one of the causes of the World War, was at least a powerful factor in making that war unpreventible. It is almost unthinkable that there should be such a thing as pure strategy in a country under a democratic form of Government. Yet here is this statement on record on the part of one of His Majesty's present Government.

The noble Earl, Lord Balfour, in the first speech he made on this subject in my hearing, said this, in reference to the expenditure on the Singapore base:—

"this money, though spent on armaments, though spent on a naval base, is not only not spent for aggressive purposes, cannot be used for an aggressive purpose, and is incapable of being an instrument of oppression and aggression."

There is no one who is not ready to admit the sincerity of those remarks, but I question seriously whether they represent the views of the Admiralty in regard to the uses of a naval base. Admittedy this is a repairing base. The site has been selected expressly because it is far distant from the expected theatre of operations, but it is none the less a strategical focus—and has been so described by a writer on this subject—for a number of operational bases in the Far East, and it is difficult to describe a place of this kind as wholly non-aggressive when it exists to render possible, and to facilitate, offensive action. Strategy, policy and tactics in times of tension all inhabit a vague borderland; it is difficult to say where one begins and the other ends, and one never knows what will happen. But I think the definition I have given of this base must be admitted as a reasonable one.

Later, the noble Earl spoke of the British Empire as one of the great securities of world peace. Personally I entirely agree with him. I will go further. I will say that I, as a Britisher, knowing the intentions of most leading British statesmen of any Party to-day, am quite prepared to admit that if we built this base at Singapore we should use it honestly and fairly to maintain the balance in the Far East and, in fact, to act as peace preservers. But while I think that, I think it is only reasonable to expect that other nations may take a different point of view. There is a new conception as to how peace shall be maintained to-day. We have entered into that conception as a Member of the League of Nations, and if we arrogate, to ourselves the right of being policemen there are mischief-making people in all other countries who may do exactly what they would do in this country, urge their Governments to follow our example and themselves start building bases. I should like to think that a base of this kind would act as a deterrent, but I greatly fear that it will not. Warlike preparations incite more often than they deter. That is not only the lesson of history just before the last War, it is the lesson of every war. War like preparations do not deter. Armaments are procreators of other armaments. Their evolution is prodigious in the number and variety of types produced.

The late Marquess Curzon of Kedleston justified the new base on the ground that it was necessary for our Fleet to possess sufficient mobility to keep open trade routes, protect our Dominions and vindicate the honour of our Flag. I will, with your permission, take these points seriatim. First, as to trade routes. I suppose it is indisputable that in the event of war in the Far East, with the only possible enemy in that quarter, our trade north of Hong Kong would cease automatically on the day war broke out, just as automatically and completely as our trade in the Baltic ceased during the last War. What the value of that trade is it is difficult to estimate. Our trade south of Hong Kong would, or could, I am told, be maintained precariously, but still maintained. Again it is difficult to estimate the value of that trade. Our Colonial trade, that is to say

the trade from Australia and New Zealand, does not for the most part pass through the Straits of Singapore, and what little of it that does could easily be diverted to a more southerly route round the Cape of Good Hope.

Before, our Fleet could reach this base eight weeks would have to elapse, and before it could take the open sea and fight an engagement against the only possible enemy, another four weeks would have to elapse. During that period of at least three months it is difficult to see how a base at Singapore could either mitigate the loss or increase the proportion of protected trade, and when our Fleet had won the war, when the fleet action had been fought after the first three months, if trade is the only consideration then there is at least one certain result, and that is that our best customer would have been ruined. Many figures have been given as to the value of this trade. For example, in another place an honourable and gallant Member stated that its value was £1,000,000,000 sterling annually, and that the £10,000,000 to be spent on the base at Singapore was only one-tenth of one per cent. of that amount, which was a cheap rate of insurance. I neither follow the arithmetic nor do I accept the. figures given as even approximately accurate. In the first place, £10,000,000 is not one-tenth of one per cent. of £1,000,000,000 but one per cent.; and in the second place, these figures are all misleading because what one really has to calculate is the amount of trade that would be jeopardised as the result of a war in the Far East. That is to say one has to deduct from the total amount of trade that part which could be diverted and that which could be maintained precariously.

I will now pass to the question of the defence of our Dominions, and I should like to put a question which is not among the original questions, but I am sure the noble Earl who is going to reply will forgive me for that. How can Japan or any country out there invade Australia? I am taking Japan because it is the nearest. When noble Lords opposite are claiming an innocuous and wholly non-aggressive character for this base they quote the distance from Singapore to Japan—about 3,000 miles. The distance from Yokohama to Thursday Island, the nearest point in Australia, is more than 3,000 miles and to Sydney it is 5,000 miles. How could, let us say, the Japanese undertake the invasion of Australia? The nearest Dominion has been selected and the nearest possible enemy in those waters. To do so they would first have to have an advance base either in the neighbourhood of the Dutch East Indies or of the Philippines. I am told that Jaluit, their place in the Marshall Islands, is only a coral atoll, and that immense preparations would have to be made before it could become a large base. Moreover, Japan, before it could possibly think of invading Australia, would have to possess, either by previous conquest or by an alliance, far greater resources in fuel oil and other necessities of naval warfare than it has at the present time. This is an international problem, and, I hope, one of the dim and distant future, but I really fail to see how the construction of this base can facilitate the solution of this distant problem, and I do see how it can import into it a new cause of suspicion and irritation.

As for the vindication of the honour of our flag, I am entirely in favour of that, but I ask myself whether to defend it by force is the only way, because, carried to its logical conclusion, that would mean that we must possess a naval strength superior to that of any other combination that could be brought against us in all seas. Not only is the expense prohibitive, but it is against all our commitments both to the League of Nations and to the Washington Conference.

My last point is an old point which has been frequently debated here, and has been replied to The noble Viscount, Lord Wimborne, raised it in the debate on his Motion. He asked whether the base could indeed be utilised, in the event of the circumstances which would render it necessary to us. At the time the noble Marquess, Lord Curzon, said that the Admiralty were satisfied that we should be able to utilise the base at Singapore. With all respect and with the utmost diffidence I still entertain some doubt. After all, the Admiralty is not the only party to be considered. There is such a thing as public opinion, and I wonder whether, in the event of a war in the Far East—a remote contingency we all agree, but a remote contingency which would bring with it a strong pro- bability that the war would extend and become another world war—I wonder whether, at a time like that, any Government or any Board of Admiralty would like to see three-quarters of our Fleet going to a far-distant base several thousand miles away. I have a theory that defence, like charity, begins at home, that the British taxpayer pays £55,000,000 annually for the Fleet to defend the heart of the British Empire and that, if he were told that that defence, or three-quarters of it, was going as far away as Singapore, either he would demand a one and three-quarter power standard at any cost or else a lot of people in this country would point out that we could economise, since it would appear that one-quarter of our present Fleet was sufficient for home defence. I have tried to examine this matter fairly and squarely. I did not want to bring this point into my speech at all, and it is only because I have a profound conviction on the subject that I have referred to it. That conviction is that Singapore either requires an increase in our naval forces or will not be utilised when the crisis comes.

In conclusion I want to indicate a policy. I venture to do so for this reason. Surely a matter like Singapore should not be one for constant change of policy, Governments succeeding each other and reversing the decisions of their predecessors. That is a most undesirable state of affairs for various reasons, in addition to that small reason that I gave regarding the Estimates. I believe that there could be reached a very general measure of agreement over a policy which, stated in its broadest terms would be this: that we were determined to insist on the protection of our vital interests in the Far East, and notably of our food supplies. That is a policy which will find approval in every political Party. We have to do this, and that policy, as I see the matter, has to be reconciled with three considerations. The first is our membership of the League of Nations; the second, our commitments at Washington; and the third, the situation at home.

As regards the first, as I said just now the problem is an international one. It affects other countries—France, Holland, as well as Japan and America. Of those four countries three are, like ourselves, Members of the League of Nations. Surely, in approaching this matter, we should consult with them, because people look to us for an example. As regards our commitments under the Washington Conference, I repeat that we have acted in perfect conformity with the letter of the Pact. The spirit of that Conference also, I repeat, was the limitation and reduction of armaments. If we approach the Singapore base in conformity with that spirit, I think we shall see more clearly the manifold dangers we run of making other people arm.

Lastly, there is the situation at home and we have got to think of that. Today we are in the presence of a very serious situation. The pinch of poverty is cruel among large sections of the working classes. Is this a time to embark upon what, at the lowest estimate, is a vast expenditure abroad, and for entirely unproductive purposes? It is a vast expenditure. Later on it will fall with a heavy weight upon the people of this country, not only in the annual charge for building but in those tremendous charges which grow in connection with so vast an establishment as appears to be contemplated. Unless there are overwhelming reasons for the construction of this base, surely economy should be the first consideration.

Supposing there were an agreed policy, what would be the method of putting it into effect? I should like to say what my noble friend, Lord Haldane, suggested some years ago in this House in regard to matters generally—defence, and so on. He said that he invited this House to see that requisite study should be devoted to certain contingencies lest they should possibly mature and we should find ourselves unprepared in the face of what we had not thought out. That to me, as an old General Staff Officer, is the gospel. I would like to see personally a thorough investigation of this matter. I would like to see it studied from all points of view and that the people in this country should know what they are defending by this expenditure, against whom they are defending, and why, and how. I will be the first to admit that while expert naval opinion consider mammoth warships as essential to defence it is a most unsatisfactory state of affairs that we should not be able to dock our capital ships in the Far East, but for that surely an easier remedy can be found than this great base.

It is planned, as I understand it, on a gigantic scale. It is an old plan, dating before 1902 perhaps. It is an old plan in a new world with new conceptions. It is a case of putting old wine into new bottles, or new wine into old bottles. I do not know which applies best, but in any case the result is bound to be unfortunate. This base will not be completed for eleven years. When one looks back over that period, when one reflects on the number of warships that have been scrapped and the ruthless suppression of old types, on the advances made in the design of submarines and more especially in aviation, and when one reflects that His Majesty's Government propose, in accordance with the Resolution of the last Imperial Conference, to proceed. with plans already made for enlarging the naval base at Singapore, I submit that there is some ground for anxiety. Frankly, what I fear is this: That we are embarking upon a programme which will be at once costly, and far more costly than most of us realise to some extent futile—to what extent I am unable to say, but I have a feeling that it is to a large extent so out-of-date as to be liable to be futile—and a programme which, if not provocative, not consciously provocative, is at any rate disturbing. No public-minded man, reading the Press to-day of Japan or any other country, can deny that this programme is disturbing, and disturbing at such a time in our history.

I suggest, on the other hand, that by modification of this scheme, such as the enlargement of one or more of the commercial docks at Singapore—by means of a subsidy, if you will, as is being done at present, I understand, in the case of a dock at Auckland, New Zealand—a plan could be worked out by the three Chiefs of Staff which would satisfy all that our Imperial and national security requires with a minimum of irritation and at a far lower cost. That is a suggestion which I put forward with great diffidence, as I have said before. I have not put these questions in the spirit of Party politics, but in order to elicit information on a question of vital import- to the nation, to the Empire and, I think l may say without exaggeration, to the. world. I beg to move.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

When the Bill was in Committee before your Lordships' House, I pointed out that the origin of this Bill was the great strike which occurred between the employees on the omnibuses and the tramways and the great syndicate which controlled the tubes, some of the underground railways, certain sections of the tramways and practically the whole of the omnibus traffic. At that time the number of omnibuses on the streets of London was 5,000 and the General Omnibus Company owned no fewer than 4,500, the other 500 being in the hands of some 200 private owners. I contended that the public would, in all probability, be placed at the mercy either of the syndicate on the one hand or of the strikers on the other.

It seems to me that under the Bill we are practically in the same position, inasmuch as too much power has been given on the Advisory Committee to trade interests. No fewer than three members are appointed to represent and watch over the interests of those who work on these great lines and no fewer than four members are allocated to those who control those lines. If a strike occurs we must be in the hands of a monopoly. I contend that since this monopoly has been given to a great body we ought, at least, to have for what we have given some financial value in return for this concession, as is the case in Paris and in New York, because your Lordships must admit that competition is now eliminated, seeing that the number of omnibuses on certain streets has been stabilised. I do not say whether that is right or wrong. Probably in the interests of traffic it is quite right, but it gives control to the monopoly and shuts out competition.

What is the cause of the congestion? The cause of the congestion is the development of motor traffic. Latterly motor traffic in this country has been increasing at the rate of 20 per cent. per annum; consequently, in five years we shall have that motor traffic doubled. But the probabilities are that it will be much more than doubled, for we know that it is computed that in the United States of America there is one car to every seven or eight of the population, whereas in this country at present it is only one car to from 35 to 45 of the population. Therefore, in view of the tremendous development of motor cars, the probability is that motor traffic will be doubled in two or three years. I contend that the surface of the ground, if I may so put it, has been allocated and if we are to do anything for the reduction of traffic we must seek a remedy by going underground.

I should like to say a word about the tramways. I have heard it said that tramways ought to be swept away. I concur that the tramways are very troublesome, to the omnibus and the omnibuses on the tramway routes ought to be stabilised. They are a great inconvenience to omnibuses and a positive nuisance to private motor cars. Again, it is said that tramways do not pay. It is true that during the past few years the tramways have not paid, but there are many reasons for that, into which I will not enter. Owing to physical considerations, however, the large proportion of men and women who work in the Metropolis are obliged to live in the outskirts, and they must be, conveyed to their work every morning and returned to their homes every night, and at the "peak" hours of the morning and the evening these tramways are an absolute necessity to the community at large. I naturally take a great interest in what are known as the "daily breaders" because I had the honour to represent a constituency for a quarter of a century in another place. The majority of my constituents were "daily breaders," and it is in a great measure owing to their confidence in me that I have the honour of speaking in your Lordships' House. But even if the tramways were swept away and replaced by motor omnibuses, these alone would not cure the present congestion of traffic. There are at the present time two or three points in the West End of London alone where the current of cross traffic is so great that it cannot be dealt with over-ground, and I suggest that tunnels should be made for the purpose of relieving that traffic.

I now come to the question of the breaking up of the streets. At the present time there are some half a dozen authorities who have what I may call access to the streets. There are the road contractor and the authorities for water, gas, electric light, telephones, and telegraphs, all of whom have power to break up the streets. I suggest to the Government that if it were possible to get these various authorities to co-operate in a friendly spirit—I am not speaking now of accidental breaking up of the streets, which must often occur, but I am speaking of their programmes—there is no reason why their programmes should not be forecast, not for weeks or months, but possibly for a year. If that were done the breaking up of the streets would be reduced by 50 percent. I hope the time is not far distant when three or four great underground thoroughfares, in the shape of tubes, will reach out from London into the furthest suburbs, and that will tend to diminish the difficulty of traffic. I was much struck by a remark made by a noble Earl opposite in our last debate, when he pointed out that it is not sufficient to deal with the traffic at the centre alone, but you must deal win it at its probable sources. It was for that reason that my noble friend Lord Buxton contended, more especially as this was acknowledged to be an experimental measure, that we should deal with the smaller or more confined areas. Of course, that is no longer possible owing to the Bill having become law.

I note with satisfaction that the noble Lord, Lord Lamington, is about to deal with one aspect of this question, which hitherto has been ignored in your Lordships' House, but which nevertheless is of supreme importance. The year before list there were some 600 fatal traffic accidents in London. Your Lordships will realise that London is worse in this respect than any town in the United Kingdom. Last year the number was 800, or an increase in one year of 200 fatal traffic accidents in the area of the County of London; and, whereas other accidents the year before last were 31,000, they reached 36,000 last year, or an increase of 5,000. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Lamington, will develop this point because it is a terrible thing to think of the sorrow, the suffering and the loss of labour that is due to these nearly 40,000 accidents which happen every year in the area of the County of London.

There is one other point I should like to place. before your Lordships and that is what I call the physical point—the fact that in certain parts of London there are currents of traffic which converge and impinge upon one another. I shall probably be told from the Front Bench opposite that such a question cannot be dealt with, that it is a matter of town planning and that to deal with it would mean an exorbitant expenditure. But I should like to direct attention to the fact that many years ago when civilisation had not advanced to the point it has now reached, and when the difficulties were correspondingly greater, under the rule of Napoleon III, in Paris Baron Hausmann carried out such a scheme and as a boy in Paris I saw the continuation of his policy. I was told recently by members of the Paris Municipality that, enormous as the expenditure was, they were glad to-day that it had been made because, directly nod indirectly, they had actually benefited by it.

I hope it will not be thought that my desire in raising this question is to embarrass the Government. It is the reverse. I am eager to do everything and anything in my humble capacity to assist them. I recognise that the time at the disposal of the Traffic Minister has been very short and that the difficulties have been tremendous. I would like to give him credit for what has already been done in the direction of parking motor cars and the institution of one-way streets. I suggest that it would be to the advantage of the Government if they could see their way to bringing those officials who are responsible for that great duty in this country into conference with those who are responsible for it in the City of New York, where they have had much greater difficulties to contend with and have managed it with signal success. I recognise all the difficulties which confront the Government and that if they could appoint an angel from Heaven as Traffic Minister, that angel would have all his work cut out for him. I beg to move.

Three main points emerged from that discussion, possibly the most important of them being the announcement of the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, who replied for the Government, that the London Traffic Advisory Committee was to be appointed and that when that Committee had got to work it was hoped there would be a considerable reduction in the number of street accidents. The figures given by the noble Lord, Lord Rathcreeden, show what has occurred during the last twelve months in comparison with what happened in 1923. In the latter year there were 668 fatal accidents in the Metropolitan area and 16 in the City. In the period ending December, 1924, those 668 fatal accidents in the Metropolitan area had gone up to 884 and the 16 in the City had increased to 22; an increase of about 33 per cent. In drawing a comparison last, year between 1922 and 1923 my noble friend pointed out that there had been an increase of something like 20 per cent. As there is now an increase of approximately 33 per cent. it is very desirable to know what has been done by this new Traffic Committee and whether they have any views about what they may be able to do in future to reduce this appalling daily slaughter that takes place in London.

That is the main point of my Question; but I should like to refer to two others which arose in the course of the debate last year. I asked the noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, whether he could say in what part of the Metropolis these accidents chiefly occurred, whether it was in the congested parts of the West End, or in the more outlying and less busy thoroughfares. He rather declined to offer any definite opinion and said that it would cost a great deal of labour on the part of the police authorities to obtain any information on the point. But it came out in the course of discussion that the majority of these accidents occurred in the less busy streets. That is borne out by the fact that there were only sixteen fatal accidents in the City in 1923 as compared with 668 in the rest of the Metropolis in 1923, and twenty-two as compared with 884 in 1924. One deduction might therefore be made—that for the most part. these accidents occur owing to the extreme speed at which vehicles are driven in the Metropolis.

I understand that a speed limit of twenty miles an hour is supposed to be in force and it ought to be enforced more strictly. I should have thought it would have been possible, without any very great expenditure of money or labour, to prepare a chart showing where fatal accidents occurred in the different parts of the Metropolis, just as the Board of Trade produces a chart of the wrecks which take place at sea. It ought not, at any rate, to be a very expensive task. It is generally said, in regard to the matter of speed: "Do not let us have any speed limit throughout the country generally." On the other hand, there is no doubt, from what was said in the debate in your Lordships' House on the last occasion, that motor cars travel at a considerable speed. My noble friend Lord Banbury said that one can often see motor cars going not at thirty or forty miles an hour but at fifty miles an hour, when the drivers think the streets are not very crowded.

Another point which arose in the course of the debate was that the police have power now to stop anybody driving a motor car without regard to the exact number of miles per hour he may be travelling if they are of opinion that the driving is dangerous to the public, and that a policeman can exercise his own judgment in the matter. I asked the noble Earl who replied on that occasion, whether that fact could be stated publicly and a warning issued throughout the Metropolis to drivers, that if they knowingly or unwittingly drove to the public danger they were likely to be stopped by the police. I think that would have a great effect. The noble Earl declined to have this action taken. I do not know why it should not be taken, because I am certain it would he a deterrent to those who drive to the danger of the public. A rather new point was brought out when it was stated that the police have this power of acting on their own judgment.

I trust the noble Viscount who is to reply will be able to give us some information to show that it may be possible in the future to prevent this frightful amount of slaughtering that goes On day by day. It is a psychological curiosity that if a railway accident occurs and three or four people are killed the papers are filled with columns of detail, an inquiry is held and a report is issued, but if four or five persons are killed in an omnibus accident there is a paragraph in the papers and practically no notice is taken. We have got into a state of things in which an average of two and a half persons are killed daily in our streets.

I have not put down a question on the matter, but I hope the noble Viscount in reply will be able to give us the number of pedestrians included in the total number of killed. In the year 1923, out of 668 fatal accidents 455 were to pedestrians. The noble Earl, Lord De La Warr referred unsympathetically to that fact. He said that many of these fatal accidents to pedestrians were caused by the pedestrians' own negligence. The late lamented Marquess Curzon of Kedleston criticised that statement as rather unfeeling. After all, pedestrians have to cross the streets at times. These accidents do not take place chiefly in the congested areas where policemen supervise the traffic, but in the outer districts. It is all very fine to say that it is the pedestrians' fault, but if you are crossing a street which is about fifteen yards wide and there is nothing in sight you are surely entitled to do so, although while you are crossing a car may come down upon you travelling at ten or twelve times the speed at which you are walking. The statement that people are careless I deny altogether. It is quite legitimate for you to cross the street and to think that you can do so safely when you can see nothing coming from either side. Some of these very fast cars undoubtedly do cause terrible accidents. I should like to know how many of the unfortunate people who have to go on foot are sufferers from this state of affairs. I beg to ask my Question.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Order of the Day read for the consideration of Commons Amendment.

Moved, That the Commons Amendment be now considered.—( Viscount Peel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

[ The reference is to Bill ( No. 58).]

Clause 5, page 5, line 7, leave out ("or pilotage").

Moved, That this House doth agree with the Commons in the said Amendment.—( Viscount Peel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Moved to resolve, That in accordance with the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919, this House do direct that the Bishopric of Leicester Measure, 1925, be presented to His Majesty for the Royal Assent.—( The Lord Bishop of Southwark.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House adjourned at twenty-five minutes past seven o'clock.