Wednesday, 8th July, 1925.

The House met at a quarter before four of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Field-Marshal Sir Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., having been created VISCOUNT ALLENBY of Megiddo, and of Felixstowe in the County of Suffolk—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

William, LORD BISHOP OF MANCHESTER—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

Dudley Massey BARON DORCHESTER of Dorchester, in the County of Oxford, having succeeded to the title on the death of his mother, Henrietta Anne, Baroness Dorchester, by virtue of a special limitation in the Patent, dated the 2nd August, 1899, in the 63rd year of the reign of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria—Was (in the usual manner) introduced.

Read 3^a (according to Order) and passed, and sent to the Commons.

Moved:—

That the Bill be divided into two parts, viz.:

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (No. 8) Bill [H.L.]; and

Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (Bournemouth and Lyme Regis Orders) Bill [H.L.],

—( The Marquess of Salisbury.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bill divided accordingly.

Moved, That the Report of the Examiners on the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (No.8) Bill [H.L.] be held to apply also to the Ministry of Health Provisional Orders Confirmation (Bournemouth and Lyme Regis Orders) Bill [H.L.].—( The Marquess of Salisbury.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

The case presented to the world by this officer, Major Adam, formerly of the 5th Lancers and at one time a, Member of Parliament for Woolwich, is that he had a promising military and political career ruined by the action of the Army Council, and his final appeal, one of many appeals, to that body for a revision of his case was summarily rejected last autumn. It is to be hoped that the War Office can satisfactorily explain to this House the principles which have guided them in the conduct of this case. If they cannot it seems desirable in the public interest that they should undertake an inquiry into all the circumstances.

I should like to make it clear that I am not making any charges against the Army Council or against anybody else, because I am not in a position to do so, having only heard one side of the case. All I am going to do this afternoon is to give the ease which Major Adam has presented to the world, which has been accepted by a considerable section of the Press, and which is believed in by a great many people in this country. If the War Office can show that the facts which I am going to give are untrue, and if they can explain satisfactorily the principles which have guided them in the conduct of this case, I shall have no more to say, because I have no desire to press this Motion. It seems clearly desirable that such charges as those made by Major Adam should not remain without reply. If his statements are true, they disclose a most serious situation, and suggest that he has suffered a very great injustice. If they are untrue, their falsity ought to be exposed, and Major Adam himself ought to be exposed.

The following is a very brief summary of the main facts of the case. I will try to be as concise as possible. In 1906 Major Adam was serving in the 5th Lancers at Aldershot. He had at that time a distinguished career behind him, and an equally distinguished career in prospect. He was a graduate of the Staff College, had seen considerable war service, was proficient in foreign languages, and had received uniformly favourable reports from his commanding officers. His General Officer commanding at Aldershot informed him in writing that he would not be recommended for promotion in consequence of an unfavourable report. The report referred to had, he declares, never been shown to him, and this involved a breach of the King's Regulations, for, according to the King's Regulations, if there is in a report anything unfavourable to an officer, reflecting in any way upon his conduct, either professional or otherwise, that report is bound to be shown to him. He declares that this report was not shown to him. He at once applied to see it, and after some delay, it was shown to him. It was a report of the Brigade Commander, which stated that his com- manding officer had given him chance after chance, and found him quite impossible. His commanding officer was unable or unwilling to explain this report. Major Adam appealed to the War Office officially. What happened to this appeal is unknown, and he has never been able to find out. A few days later a War Office letter was forwarded to him by the General Officer commanding at Aldershot, intimating that the Army Council, after full consideration of his case, had decided to call upon him to resign his Commission. The words used were to the effect that the King had no further use for his services. That expression is employed only in cases where an officer has done something of a discreditable nature.

There are two points which seem to be worth noting in this connection. This decision of the Army Council was not apparently based upon the report which Major Adam had seen, although it had not been shown to him when it should have been shown to him, but upon another report which he had never seen at all. The report which he had seen had at that time not reached the War Office, so that they could not possibly have acted upon it. They acted upon a report of the General Officer commanding at Aldershot, which had never been shown to him, and has not since been shown to him. Accordingly, this letter was sent in direct violation of the King's Regulations, which require that such a report should be shown to the officer concerned. In the second place, the King's Regulations require that before an officer is asked to resign his Commission unfavourable reports should have been rendered in two successive years. That was not carried out in this case, for there is only a single report against him.

Upon his receiving this communication Major Adam at once interviewed the Brigadier who was responsible for the report. The latter expressed unbounded astonishment and dismay, and the very next morning went up to the War Office himself, and not only succeeded in inducing the Army Council to withdraw their threat, but actually persuaded them to give Major Adam a post on the General Staff at Whitehall. He was further assured by the Brigadier that his report should have no deleterious effect upon his career. This procedure seems a most remarkable one. An officer holding a high command reports that one of the officers under his command is quite impossible, and the War Office declare that he is unfit to hold a Commission, but the very day after having come to that decision, they give him an appointment on the General Staff, which is generally regarded as the goal of every ambitious officer.

One year after this surprising and inexplicable occurrence—that is, in October, 1909—another hardly less mysterious incident occurred. Major Adam received an official communication informing him that, on account of further unfavourable reports, the Army Council had decided to place five officers of the 5th Lancers on half-pay. One of these officers was Major Adam. As he had not been serving with his regiment for the past year, but had been at the War Office, it is difficult to see how any further report could have been unfavourable to him, but if there were any such report, it should obviously have been shown to him. He declares that it was not shown to him, nor were the other reports which reflected upon the remaining four officers shown to them. Beside, he had been distinctly led to believe that the only unfavourable report which he had ever seen had been cancelled. Accordingly, he applied officially to see these reports on his conduct.

At this point the mystery which surrounds this very mysterious case deepens perceptibly. He was sent for by the Chief of the General Staff, whose private secretary informed him that his request to see these reports was quite reasonable and justifiable, but if he insisted on seeing them he would be deprived of his Staff appointment. In these circumstances, of course, he had no choice but to acquiesce under protest, and to withdraw his application to see them. Major Adam continued to retain his Staff appointment at the War Office until 1909, when he stood for Parliament as Unionist candidate for Woolwich and was returned at the General Election in January, 1910. He was therefore seconded from the Service, in order to fulfil his Parliamentary duties. All applications to the War Office for reconsideration of his case having failed, he decided to raise the question in Parliament of the unfair treatment of himself and his brother officers, by being placed on half-pay without being shown the evidence against them.

To cut a long story short, he accused the Brigadier who had reported on these officers of wilful and deliberate misstatements of facts, and, before doing so, he informed that officer and the Secretary of State of the action that he was going to take. The Secretary of State promised Parliament that the case would be investigated. As a matter of fact, it appears never to have been investigated at all. All that happened was that Major Adam was invited to submit in writing the evidence upon which he had based his accusation. He not unnaturally replied that the subject could not be adequately dealt with by correspondence, and he requested a full inquiry and a personal examination of everybody concerned. Upon this the War Office published in the Press a letter which they had written to the Brigadier, whom Major Adam had accused, and who had himself asked for a Court of Inquiry, as, indeed, he was bound to do, since his character had been very severely reflected upon in public. In this letter they informed the Brigadier that they had investigated the case, and were satisfied that his conduct had been in all respects correct and fair, and—this is an important point—at the end of their letter they drew special attention to the fact that Major Adam had been called upon to retire from the Service some years before, and had been given another chance only owing to the Brigadier's intervention.

I confess that this action seems to be both unjust and futile. It seriously injured Major Adam, and it injured the Army Council hardly less. It will be noted that if Major Adam's account is true the letter gives a most misleading interpretation of the events of 1906, and, while it casts the gravest reflection upon him, it fails to explain what train of reasoning had led the War Office to discover that an officer who was unfit to wear His Majesty's uniform on Monday was eminently qualified for an important Staff appointment on Tuesday. It seems most unfortunate that the War Office failed to hold this inquiry, which they had promised both to Major Adam and to the Brigadier whom he had accused, and who had asked for it. But, instead of carrying out their promise, they seem to have endeavoured to defend the accused by casting reflections upon the character of the accuser.

After this Major Adam was unable to obtain further consideration of the case in Parliament, as he lost his seat at the next General Election, which occurred about a year later; and he lost his seat largely owing to the capital that his political opponents were able to make out of the War Office letter, which, they naturally concluded, involved something discreditable against his character. Having lost his seat, he tried to secure employment on the Staff, but was informed that the Army Council had decided that an officer who had behaved as he had in Parliament could not be re-employed. He was also informed by the War Office that they knew the whole story, and therefore they were not prepared to employ him again. This was a somewhat cryptic remark, which evidently had a sinister meaning.

It will be observed that he had thus not only been deprived of his political career by the Army Council's public attack upon him, but he was now to be deprived of his military career too because in his capacity as a Member of Parliament he had ventured to question the procedure of the military authorities in regard to the system of confidential reports. All attempts to elicit from the War Office the reasons why he had been placed on half-pay continued to meet with evasive answers, and therefore, in order to clear his character, he at last asked whether he could issue a public statement himself in the Press in the same way as the War Office had issued theirs. This request, which seems to have been only a fair one, was refused.

After further attempts to obtain satisfaction Major Adam at last abandoned all efforts to obtain satisfaction by these methods, and in 1914 decided to bring an action for libel against the Army Council. That action resulted in a verdict for £2,000 damages, and the disclosures at the trial of the manner in which the confidential reports were rendered and the conduct of the Army Council in publishing the nature of those reports, without investigating the case, or allowing Major Adam to be hoard in his defence, created a public sensation, and called for scathing comments by the Judge who heard the case. The War Office did not deny the libel, but pleaded privilege, and on that ground took the case to the Court of Appeal, where the verdict was reversed, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld in the House of Lords. Thus Major Adam again failed to obtain satisfaction from the Army Council, who evaded responsibility on the narrow legal ground of privilege. The rest of the story may be very briefly told. When the War broke out, in spite of his qualifications as a Staff College graduate and his knowledge of foreign languages and Staff experience, he was only given a few unimportant jobs at home. He continued to appeal for a revision of his case, with the same lack of success, and finally, in 1917, his health having broken down, he was required to retire from the Service. He continued to press the War Office for a revision of his case, the last appeal being made in October last, and met with the same refusal. During the whole period since 1910 the reflection cast by the War Office on his character has not ceased to prejudice his chance of standing for Parliament.

Such are the facts of the case, as given by Major Adam and not by me. He asserts positively that there is a great deal behind all this, and there would seem to be some reason for his assertion. It is rather difficult, for instance, to suppose that in 1906 the Army Council would have ordered an officer who seems to have had such an unimpeachable professional record to resign his Commission on the strength of a single unfavourable report which, as a matter of fact, had not reached them when they sent in the order. Moreover, the terms of the order would seem to preclude any possibility of that order having been given on account of his military record. The whole attitude of the War Office seems to indicate that they acted upon information which reflected on his character apart from his military capacity. Major Adam asserts that they had such information, that it was false, and that it was deliberately and maliciously given to them, and he is prepared to give evidence proving that they had this information, that they imparted it to others, and that it is false, and I have seen that evidence. Moreover, he has written a book in which he sets out in black and white certain definite charges against a former officer of the 5th Lancers whom he mentions by name, and who was the commanding officer of that regiment, and he declares that this officer, who was commanding the regiment in 1906, deliberately supplied false information to the Brigadier and that the whole of the report of the Brigadier and General Officer at Aldershot is based upon that information. His charge against the Brigadier is that he acted recklessly and ignorantly and without due regard to the consequences of his action, and his accusation against the commanding officer is that he acted maliciously and out of personal enmity. Those were the charges made in 1914. They were never answered. The Brigadier had died by that time, but the commanding officer was and is still alive. If the charges be true that officer has been grossly libelled, yet never in 1914, or since, has he ventured to defend himself against charges so injurious to his character, so far as I know. If all these charges are false then Major Adam should clearly he shown up. Obviously it is desirable in the public interest to prevent an ex-officer publishing defamatory statements about his former superior officers and the Army Council.

The conclusion of the whole matter, as presented by Major Adam, is this. He has seen his military career wrecked, his political career lost to him, and his character as a gentleman impugned. His health is seriously affected, and all this is, he claims, owing to the action of the Army Council, and the question is by what principle has the Army Council been guided. Let us suppose what seems difficult to believe, that their action has been based solely on Major Adam's military record. In that case, if his story is true, he seems to have suffered serious injustice at their hands. In the first place, the King's Regulations, as I have shown, have been violated, because he was originally condemned upon one report, instead of upon two reports received in successive years, and also because the confidential reports upon which he was then and subsequently judged have not been shown to him; secondly, and more important still, because, while ostensibly judging him on his military record, they have gone out of their way to impugn his private character also. On the other hand, supposing the War Office have been in- fluenced, as he claims they have been, and as there seems some reason to suppose they have been, by other alleged facts which have nothing to do with his military capacity, in that case the injustice seems to be graver still, for they have given other reasons than the true ones for the action which they have taken, and have denied him any opportunity of clearing his character from the real charges or from the stigma they have gratuitously placed upon it.

I submit, my Lords, that the time has come when this mystery should be cleared up and the War Office should disclose to Major Adam all the information upon which they have acted, whether in the form of confidential reports or of other communications which reflect in any way upon his character as an officer or as a gentleman, and give him full opportunity of being heard in his own defence. As the matter stands at present the only conclusions which the public can draw are these. On the one side is an officer whose private and public characters have been impugned, and all he asks is that the facts against him should be made known to him, and that he should have art opportunity of defending himself. On the other side is a body which has already been unable to defend itself against a charge of gross unfairness, made in a Court of Justice, but which nevertheless, if his story is true, has wrapped itself in a cloud of mystery, and given him none of the information upon which he has been judged. The conclusion which the public are likely to reach is that a man who only asks that his public and private life should be subjected to full inquiry is not likely to have anything to hide—not so much as a body which refuses to give any explanation of its conduct. This conclusion may be unjust, and if the noble Earl who is going to reply can show that the facts which I have given, and which are not my facts, but those which Major Adam has given—if he can show that those facts are untrue, and can satisfactorily explain the principles which have actuated the War Office throughout the case, I have no more to say, and I shall have no desire to press my Motion. I do submit, however, that, as the facts stand at present, and as far as they are known to the public, some explanation is required. I beg to move.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn

It is, I am afraid, rather more than twenty years since I first became connected with those two countries, and at various intervals, almost in cycles, we have been confronted by this kind of thing in increasing volume, and these crises and congestions are usually due either to Government action or inaction, or inaction after action. They encourage large production, or they encourage an influx of settlers, or make provision to build a branch line. They then fold their hands and go to sleep, and placidly let someone else watch the trend of events. Suddenly their plans come to fruition. Settlers arrive, production increases suddenly, or railway material for building of the line arrives. The administration is caught napping, and chaos results. Sudden demands are made for engines, rolling stock, trains, and provisions of all sorts and kinds. Panic measures, both locally and at home, are resorted to, and much money is wasted. Everyone is discouraged, and trade falls.

I notice in the report of the general manager of the Uganda Railway for the year ending December, 1924, that he says:—

"It appears to be almost forgotten that less than two years ago the production and trade of the two territories did not warrant, and in ally case the financial position did not permit of, commitments to large capital betterments, renewals of lines, rolling stock, etc."

I do not know what profit the railway made in 1922, but in 1923 it made a profit of £400,000, and in 1924 of £700,000. I think they are rather difficult to please. That statement, in my view, gives the whole case away. It is an example of the mentality of officials. They ignore cause and effect altogether. One of the causes of our troubles in East Africa and Uganda after the War was Mr. Chamberlain's Budget in this country, and the terrific taxation at the same time imposed by the local administration, both in Kenya and Uganda. The buying power in this country was killed, and also the buying power of the natives in Kenya and Uganda. I remember calling attention to this in this House some years ago, and I remember telling how, in consequence of the taxation, those who would otherwise have bought Manchester goods had reverted to the wearing of skins. The result of the taxation was that production fell very badly. Then the taxation was reduced and encouragement given to production. Production increased very rapidly and very largely and, as exports increased, so imports increased too. This never seems to have occurred to the official mind, which never thinks ahead. They never seem to have realised what the effect of very high taxation would be nor what the reduction of taxation would bring about.

Following upon the statement of the general manager of the Uganda Railway, let me refer very shortly to what we think will happen in the future. The congestion to-day is apparent, but what that congestion will be if remedies are not quickly applied I would hardly like to say. Let me take four staple products of the country. There are 60,000 acres of coffee planted, but only 20,000 acres in bearing. If no more coffee trees are planted, in three or four years' time the crop ought to be trebled. In 1924 the crop of sisal was 11,000 tons. In four years' time it is expected to be 33,000 tons. Maize in 1924 was 52,000 tons, and in 1925, 75,000 tons. By 1927 it is expected that 100,000 tons will be produced. As to cotton from Uganda, where the congestion is worse than anywhere else, the crop in 1923 was 00,000 bales, in 1924 137,000 bales, in 1925 165,000 bales, valued at nearly £5,000,000, and in 1930, according to official or semiofficial figures, the crop is expected to be 250,000 bales. With regard to these figures the Administration or the Colonial Office have no excuse for saying, "We did not know what to expect." If you take the cotton crop in Uganda, the whole thing is arranged by the Government themselves. They make the arrangements and give out the cotton seed. They know perfectly well how many acres of sisal are planted, and how many acres of coffee, and it is very easy for them to arrive at an intelligent anticipation as to the amount that will be produced, and which they will have to move next year.

May I come now to the various seats of trouble which I have mentioned in my Question? I propose to deal very shortly with the port of Kilindini, because I feel quite confident that the Colonial Office will shelter itself behind a body in London called the Joint East African Board, to whom the question of the working of the port was referred many months ago, and I do not think that the board have yet sent in a report on the subject. The present conditions are very bad. These is no proper control. The wharves belong to the Government and two lighterage companies are allowed to use them and make whatever charges they like, and in fact I have been given a letter this afternoon by a gentleman who has just returned from East Africa and who told me that the lighterage charged for a few hundred yards is as much as 50 per cent. of the entire freight from England.

As regards the congestion al the port of Kilindini probably the most exasper-

ated man who has anything to do with it is the manager of the Uganda Railway who, I gather, is fairly powerless in the matter and is rather between the devil and the deep sea. I believe that, according to his report last year, he has put forward some very sensible proposals himself, and I trust that the Government will quickly come to a very definite conclusion as to how to deal with matters at Kilindini. The general manager says in the report that it is quite impossible to deal adequately with the traffic at this port until the deep sea piers are finished. I think that is perfectly correct. As regards the Uganda main line itself, in this ease the general manager is master of his own house and I do not think that I can comment very much on this part of the line, as things are fairly satisfactory Incidentally, however, the general manager alludes to the shortage of trucks: and to engines and trucks that have to be used for carting materials for branch lines and coal, and are thus diverted from their proper use. He says also:—

"We are very short of marine officers, pier masters, works inspectors, locomotive firemen and other grades, and particularly short of engine drivers."

If the general manager confesses that he is short of all these men one can imagine that there is probably some congestion on the Uganda Railway.

I will leave East Africa now and come to Uganda, where the congestion is worse and probably more felt than anywhere else. You might hardly credit it, but in the old days before the Uganda Railway was built it used to take a caravan of porters, walking with loads on their heads, some four and a-half months to walk from the ocean port of Kilindini to Uganda. The railway has now been built a good many years and steamers are on the lakes, but I can produce instances where goods coming from Kilindini have taken from four to five months to reach their destinations, or a greater time than they did when they were carried on the heads of porters in the days when no railway was ever thought of. The congestion in Uganda is so bad that, unless something is quickly done, the whole future of this country must be jeopardised, and we shall be very lucky if we escape without some disaster.

I find it very difficult to credit a fact, which I believe is a fact, that there is no traffic manager in Uganda at all, and no senior railway official. On Lake Chioga, where most of the extremely valuable cotton crop originates, there is not, I believe, a single European railway official. There are none but Asiatics. There is an Asiatic clerk who is in turn station master, pier master, booking clerk, and general clerk, and, in addition to that, has to superintend all the native labour round the pier, the railway station, and the wharf. Your Lordships can imagine the chaos that exists under those conditions. I dare say this is due to economy. Your Lordships would be the last persons to dispute the need for economy and the first persons to welcome any sigin of economy from this or any other Government, but here is a case where economy has run mad and loss to every section of the community is being piled up through it. The case for the Administration is the alleged shortage of labour, but I am assured from all sides by private individuals and by correspondence from over there that it is not so much shortage of labour as the inefficient way in which the available labour is handled.

I would like to deal now with the question of facilities in Uganda at terminals and lake ports where the cotton crops have to come. The railway, as I have said, is already in a prosperous condition, and in the last two years made over £1,000,000 profit. They provide practically no terminal facilities for these goods and cotton frequently has to lie about, as the general manager admits, in mud or dust, exposed to all weathers, and in some places not even protected by tarpaulins. In addition to that, ports have been suddenly closed to traffic with practically no warning, and cotton which may have come 100 miles by road to be loaded on the steamer has to remain in the mud or to be taken back home. Tororo coffee from the Tororo district has to conic over 200 miles. That is hardly the way for a Government, that in every ministerial speech talks about exploring new markets, to treat those who make markets.

Let me quote two cables received from Uganda recently, from persons I do not know, and with whom I have nothing to do:

"June 15. Booking from Lake Chioga ports, Busoga Railway, Jinga Pier has been suspended indefinitely. Steamer sailing from Kilindini has not been filled owing to congested state of Uganda Railway. Fifty per cent, of labour wasted owing to absence of supervision."

"June 27. Lake Chioga ports again closed. Namasagali port choked, bales cotton in transit unprotected."

This is a letter from the general manager of the same company on May 19:

"Kampala Station is a sight calculated to make one weep, if they had goods lying there. Bales of lint and bags of cotton seed are lying all mixed up, thousands of them all unprotected in the open on grass. At Port Bell there are thousands of bales there in the open but very good dunnage is provided, and I believe an effort is being made to get the stuff moved."

I must apologise for all this detail but it is necessary to give these examples in order to show your Lordships what has happened. I want to give your Lordships one more example of what happens there. It was obviously evident to the general manager of the Uganda Railway in the early part of 1923 that considerably snore steamer facilities would be necessary on Lake Chioga in the present year, 1925. In his report last year I find this:

"On April 6, 1923, the local Administration asked for a new steamer for Lake Chioga. The order was not placed' by the Crown Agents till January 16, 1924,"

after nine months of deep thought and cogitation—

"then the contractors took twelve months to make and ship the hull, and this steamer will not be ready to take the water till two years and three months after the purchase was asked for."

I am sure your Lordships will not require me to make any comment upon that.

I could go on, but I have taken up a sufficient amount of your Lordships' time. I hope I have given your Lordships enough incidents and details to show what the state of congestion is at the moment and what a very serious consideration it is for the future. I hope that the Government will take steps, and take them very quickly, not only to relieve the congestion which exists now, but to provide for the very much more serious congestion which will arise next year and the year after unless they exercise a very great deal more forethought and have a great deal more vision than they have shown for many years. I beg to move.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

It is to be remarked that Mr. Wood, who was then Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, made a tour of the West Indies in 1921–22, accompanied by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, and in his Report he stated that they could not have visited all the different islands—broadly speaking, the Lesser Antilles—had it not been that the Government were good enough to provide a vessel for them, so that they could go to each individual island. That bears out my contention that intercommunication between the islands is very difficult indeed. I do not propose to go into all the many ramifications of this question. That would take far too much of your Lordships' time, and without a large scale map it would be very difficult to elaborate or to define exactly what needs to be done. I will take only the more salient points in connection with this question of communications.

First of all, with regard to communications with the chief island of all, Jamaica, I do not think that there is very serious cause for complaint concerning the lack of transport from this country. There is a fortnightly boat of Elders and Fyffes' Line, and there are occasional boats crossing the southern portion of the Caribbean Sea in the direction of Bermuda. There is also a boat every three weeks, run by the Leyland Line, and communications are possible by Canada, the United States and round the Bahamas to Jamaica—a very roundabout and expensive route, but still a means of arriving at Jamaica. Accordingly, I do not want to lay stress upon lack of communications in this direction, except to say that I think it might be possible to establish an arrangement that was recommended by the West Indian Shipping Committee, which reported in 1919. The Report said, in Paragraph (47), sub-paragraph (9):—

"If direct communication between Jamaica and the United Kingdom could be secured by some service proceeding through the Panama Canal, a small subsidy would be worth paying for the purpose of securing such communication."

I think that this would be a possible undertaking, and not a very costly one.

I have so far referred only to passenger communications, but, as regards cargo going from Jamaica to the United Kingdom, the position is very different indeed. The Elders and Fyffes boats, which carry on the main traffic with a fortnightly service, are all for the pur- pose of carrying bananas, and the banana trade requires such special fittings that other forms of cargo cannot be taken, as, for some reason or other, it does some harm to the fittings that have been established. Consequently practically no cargo at all goes out by those boats to Jamaica, and there is only an occasional cargo boat—I am not sure whether the Leyland Line run one or not—that goes there, with the result, among other things, that, in the first place, the Jamaican people feel themselves entirely in the hands of the great American fruit company that carries on its properties in Jamaica for the purpose of supplying bananas to the United States and to Canada, because the bananas of Jamaica do not for the most part come to this country. Those which do come from Central America. They are taken by boats, which call at Kingston but have filled up before arriving there.

The Jamaican people therefore feel that they wish to have a more independent service for the purpose of marketing their own fruit in this country, and not a service or organisation which may be in any way controlled by the United States. I think that their fears in this regard are vain, but at the same time they do feel that the trade is controlled by American companies. One result is that of the total shipping that cleared in Jamaica in 1923, four million odd tons, 1,760,000 tons alone were British. All the rest was foreign tonnage. This illustrates how the greater proportion of the cargo that goes to Jamaica comes from Canada or the United States, and very little is taken direct from this country to Jamaica. These trade figures are also shown by the imports into Jamaica for 1923. The total imports were 5,200,000 odd tons, and of these only 1,500,000 tons came from the United Kingdom. Of the remainder, no doubt a million came from other Colonies, probably almost entirely from Canada. Therefore about half the trade was of an Imperial character, and the other half was entirely foreign. The export figures are pretty much on the same lines. Out of the total exports of 4,200,000 tons, only 1,240,000 tons were to the United Kingdom, 600,000 tons going to other Colonies. That is not altogether a satisfactory state of things, and certainly you can appreciate that people living in Jamaica would rather have a closer service or services with the United Kingdom.

Leaving Jamaica and going to the southern portion of the Caribbean Sea—Barbados, Trinidad, and British Guiana—communication with this country is really not bad. They have Dutch and French services, and the Harrison Line runs a service every three weeks to Barbados and Trinidad, and there are other fairly reasonable services connecting with British Guina. There is no reason to complain of that, but it is different when the Windward and Leeward Islands come under consideration. Being at Barbados last February, I found a couple who had been waiting there a month to get, I think, to Antigua. There was no communication directly whatever, except by a boat which comes from Canada every three weeks to the Leeward and Windward Isles and on to Barbados.

One suggestion—apart from having a small subsidy for ships going through the Panama Canal—is that there should be some means of linking up services which come direct from Europe to Barbados or Trinidad—some communication established by which people in the Leeward and Windward Islands could have a regular service to Jamaica, etc., without any very long wait. That, I think, might afford a fairly satisfactory solution of the difficulty, at any rate for the present. At the present moment Jamaica is altogether cut off from the other portions of the West Indies. There is no communication, except chance communication, and you would have greater cohesion among the scattered portions of the Empire if the Government were to subsidise or set up some line of steamers connecting Barbados and Jamaica with these other islands. I am no great believer in subsidies in ordinary circumstances, but the circumstances of these Islands are so peculiar, and there is so much hardship inflicted upon the inhabitants of these Islands, that I think the Government might well do something.

In this connection it rather surprised me to read in The Times of yesterday that the Prime Minister, in reply to a Question in another place, stated that he was advised

"that the existing facilities for the conveyance of mails to the West Indies were adequate. He saw no reason, therefore, to make a special contract involving payment of a subsidy."

That may be quite true for such places as Barbados, Trinidad, and Jamaica, but I do not think it is at all applicable to those people who live in the Windward or Leeward Islands. Surely something should be done to bring them into closer touch with the rest of the Empire.

In bringing forward this Question I am animated by a desire, having been out there this last winter, to try to do something to bring these Islands into closer touch with the rest of the West Indian Islands. There is a feeling out there that in the past the Colonial Office have neglected them, and that their aspirations and their wants have not been duly considered. I am sure that that is a wrong idea, and that it is only because of the great difficulties of the situation that more has not been done. As Mr. Wood says in his report, one object of his going out there in 1921 was to bring home to the people there the idea that there was sympathy felt with them, and that it wag most desirable that a better understanding should be obtained of what they wanted done for them. He said:

"The occasion was therefore regarded as a new departure by the Colonial Office, deliberately conceived with the object of pro-mooting a closer touch between those responsible in the United Kingdom for the administration of the Colonies and their inhabitants."

And he goes on to say how his visit was everywhere much appreciated. I think I may say the same thing with regard to the visit undertaken by Lord Burnham and the Imperial Parliamentary Association.

Mr. Wood says:

"It is impossible to begin any report on the West Indian Colonies without reference to what for any visitor must be the outstanding characteristic of them all. Diverse as they are in almost every other respect, there is no difference in the matter of loyalty to the Throne and to the person of His Majesty the King."

Then he adds:

"The effect of it is constantly to direct the gaze of the West Indian communities towards Britain and towards the visible symbol of unity that the person of the Sovereign affords. The worth of such an influence in maintaining imperial solidarity and in counteracting the possible growth of other tendencies can hardly be placed too high, and it is well that citizens of the United Kingdom should appreciate it."

He said that the other tendencies were, of course, that the connection with the United States had become so very strong by way of trade, even all the money transactions being in dollars, that there might be some risk that their feelings might be diverted so as to desire a closer alliance with the United States of America. I do not believe that for a moment. Nothing is so strong as the desire that they should remain a component part of our Empire. I only wish that those who live in this country would realise what wonderful possessions they have in the West Indies which are full of historic and romantic interest, with miles of the finest scenery. If people, instead of going to the Mediterranean or Monte Carlo for the winter, were to go a little further and spend a holiday in the West Indies, they would have an enjoyable time and get a warm welcome from the inhabitants.

Order of the Day for the Second Reading read.

Moved, That the Bill he now read 2^a .—( Viscount Peel.)

On Question, Bill read 2^a ; and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

House adjourned at twenty minutes past seven o'clock.