Wednesday, 5th August, 1925.

The House met at three of the clock, The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Moved, That Standing Order No. 143 be considered in order to its being dispensed with in respect of the said Bills, and that the Bills be now road 3^a .—( The Earl of Donoughmore.)

On Question, Motion agreed to, and Bills read 3^a accordingly, with the Amendments.

Bills passed and returned to the Commons.

Returned from the Commons, agreed to.

Returned from the Commons, with the Amendments, agreed to.

Returned from the Commons, agreed to, with Amendments.

Returned from the Commons with certain of the Amendments made by the Lords agreed to, and one Amendment disagreed to, for which the Commons assign a Reason.

Moved, That the Commons Reason be now considered.—( Lord Emmott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Page 38, line 28, after ("relate"), insert ("Where any parking place is part of a street, regulations may provide for charges to be paid to the local authority in respect of the services of an attendant").

The Commons disagree with this Amendment because they consider it inexpedient to authorise the making of a charge, direct or indirect, for the use of the highway.

Moved, That this House doth not insist on the said Amendment.—( Lord Emmott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

DEVIZES GAS ORDER, 1925.

GREAT DRIFFIELD GAS ORDER, 1925.

LANGLEY MILL AND HEANOR GAS ORDER, 1925.

Moved, That the draft Special Orders, which were presented on the 15th day of July last, be approved.—( Viscount Peel.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

China is going through a period of intense political and intellectual disturbance. Civil war has been incessant for the last few years; and now strikes extending over a wide area, and a boycott of British goods, are paralyzing communications, industry, and trade. The China market, which is the one market in the world which could offer a real and immediate outlet for our harassed industries—if only peace and security could be established—is practically dead. Before we can find a remedy for this state of affairs we must understand the underlying causes of unrest. The seat of the trouble lies in the prolonged insecurity and economic losses of the Chinese people. They are an essentially practical folk, hard-working farmers, shopkeepers, merchants, and bankers. During the last few years there have been incessant interferences with their crops, their trade and transport at the hands of irregular troops, brigands and tax-gatherers. There is no security for life or property, there is no incentive to produce, and the channels of credit are drying up. Those are the underlying causes of unrest.

In such circumstances it is easy to stir up trouble. The ground has been prepared for an outbreak of feeling against foreigners, by deflecting attention from the internal dissensions to the foreigner, his Treaties and his privileges, some of which certainly afford a pretext for legitimate grievance and require reconsideration. A very real spirit of nationalism has been growing up in recent years, and it is fed and inflamed by attributing all the ills of China to foreign privilege and foreign influence. In such an atmosphere the most trifling incident may cause a nation-wide conflagration. That, indeed, is what has just happened. A strike occurred in a Japanese cotton-mill. The strike led to a demonstration, directed primarily against Japan. The shooting of some of the demonstrators by the Municipal Police Force of the International Settlement at Shanghai directed the agitation against the British, because the handful of police immediately concerned happened to be British subjects. This incident at Shanghai on May 30 was the match which started the conflagration.

The fundamental causes of the present trouble do not lie in anti-foreign feeling, or in Bolshevist propaganda, or in labour unrest. All those factors are involved and have appeared conspicuously upon the surface. But the seat of the trouble lies far deeper—in the sufferings of a great people caused by constant unrest, and in a sense of grievance at the attitude of the Treaty Powers since the Washington Conference. If we are going to help China we must at least understand the real cause of her troubles. The disruptive influences in China have become so acute, and China's administrative machinery is so ill-equipped for action covering the whole of that vast country, that, the situation, both as regards the immediate troubles and the deeper causes, has slipped beyond the control of any Chinese Party. They recognise them selves that friendly help and co-operation from the Powers is essential to any real settlement of the present troubles.

A genuine effort to remedy outstanding grievances in China was made at the Washington Conference in 1922, but the Treaties then concluded have not yet been enforced, partly owing to France's delay in their ratification. In the three intervening years matters have gone from bad to worse, and British interests in China are now in desperate straits. The Treaties, on which the smooth working of foreign trade has long depended, have become a dead letter. The railways, in which large British investments are involved, are in a state of disrepair and chaos and are constantly subjected to military interference; it is almost impossible to get a car on any of the lines without heavy bribes to local military authorities. Taxes are levied on every branch of trade by any military adventurer with a small force behind him. The various provincial Armies spend their time in harrying one another, and the brigands are left free to harass the farmers and traders. Six weeks ago it looked as if there was no coherence in China, no hope of unity or agreement on any single issue.

But the unexpected often happens in China, and the incident at Shanghai—the collision between the students and the police has created a sudden unanimity of thought and emotion throughout the country. This incident must be investigated and settled, promptly, publicly and impartially, before we can hope for the restoration of tranquillity, a stoppage of the strikes and boycotts and the rehabilitation of our good name in China. As soon as this incident is closed we must settle down in earnest to the task of dealing with China's outstanding problems. The special Conference promised at Washington in 1922 must be convened without delay, with extended and, indeed, the fullest possible powers to help China and to re-establish foreign prestige.

There is one initial difficulty to negotiation—the refusal of the various factions in China to recognise, to support and to stand by the decisions of the central Government. But that is their own affair. We cannot dictate what body of men in China shall speak with the responsible voice of the, Chinese people. But, if we announce our readiness to negotiate, experience suggests that the real forces in China will find some way of making their voice heard, and of securing representation on the body which will be gathered together to meet our delegates. We are bound to recognise the body which is put forward, by the Chinese themselves as their chosen representatives. Should such a body fail to materialise we must, of course, be guided by events. But it is not safe to assume that no responsible Government will be forthcoming. There is, indeed, every hope that the good sense of the Chinese will prevail and force them to sink their minor differences, when once they are convinced that we are approaching them in good faith and good will.

As soon as we are in touch with a recognised and responsible body we should hold ourselves ready to co-operate with them in any way they may desire. It is greatly to be hoped that they will speedily regain and maintain effective control of the national railways, which are a most important factor in the situation, for, on the one hand, the railways facilitate the constant military operations, and, on the other, they help or hinder vitally the orderly processes of trade. The special Conference will be empowered to arrange an increase in the Customs Tariff in such a way as to justify the abolition of all illegal taxation on trade in the interior. The question of the unsecured Debt, the domestic loans, and all outstanding foreign loans and debts for railway and other Government material, should be dealt with in a spirit of equity. They are a separate issue, entirely distinct from and outside of the question of trade. China can well afford, and will certainly wish, to deal with them in an honourable way, but it would be most impolitic to meet such obligations from the Customs revenue and the taxation of trade.

His Majesty's Government have expended an immense amount of trouble and energy in trying to help British industries and to foster British trade with the Dominions overseas, with Central Europe and with Russia; but it is only too clear that each of these markets is capable of showing only a slow response to their efforts. China stands waiting, the greatest producer of raw material and the greatest potential customer for manufactured articles of any market in the world—rich, productive, enterprising and eager for development.

Your Lordships may ask how the assembling of the Special Conference promised under the Washington Treaties can possibly help to settle the political troubles of China. This is a difficult question, but I will try to answer it. China had existed for thousands of years as a group of practically independent provinces, held together very lightly by a super-imposed Court, a theocracy, speaking with divine authority through the Emperor, the Son of Heaven. Theocracy exists with difficulty under modern conditions of thought and education, and China's theocracy has recently collapsed together with many others. As a result China has been thrown back upon her fundamental form of governing machinery—the family, the village and the province; that machinery, fortunately, remains more or less intact.

But nations cannot exist nowadays without some centralised Government. There are problems of national communications, national revenue and expenditure to be dealt with, and national defence and foreign relations must be cared for. And so, ever since the Revolution of 1911, the Chinese provincial leaders have been struggling among themselves for the supreme power, for the creation of a national government in which each hopes to play a dominant part. But the country is so big that unification is practically impossible. The first object of our policy is to co-operate with the forces of law and order in China, so far as they may desire our co-operation, in re-establishing such conditions as will bring about a peaceable situation in that country. An increased Customs revenue, provided that it is apportioned in such a way as to give a square deal to each Province, will help a good deal. Peace on the railways will help quite as much. Both revenues and railways are a vital concern of all trade, both Chinese and foreign, and therefore fit subjects for a Conference. We promised a Conference three years ago, and we ought to show our good faith by getting to work without further delay.

Will your Lordships bear with me if I say one word about labour in China? A considerable and very natural interest has been shown in this country in regard to the attitude of Chinese labour to the present trouble, and the effect of investing British capital in the development of Chinese industries. It has even been suggested that one of the root causes of the present trouble, lies in the fact that Chinese labour, especially in the Treaty Ports, is subject to such unfair treatment that it was bound to rise in revolt against the inhuman conditions of modern industry in China. And it has been argued that the use of British capital for the development of Chinese industries is contrary to the best interests of our own workers. I believe that these arguments are based on a misconception of the facts and the issues.

It cannot be denied that labour conditions in China are not good and that they call for the most careful consideration at the hands of all employers of labour in that country. A vast and undigested mass of workers has drifted into the great industrial centres, and has thus become divorced from the restraining influences of family and village life, which are the real governing forces in China. The tendency of the Chinese is always directed towards the formation of guilds and societies for mutual protection; and the industrial workers are forming such organizations at every centre of industrial activity. Such organizations have received sympathetic support from British employers when they have concerned themselves with industrial problems. It is regrettable that they have occasionally been used for political purposes and have worked with purely political ends, to the detriment of the workers' interests. Those organizations have established themselves as a power in the land.

We cannot overlook the fact that labour conditions are bad in some factories in China, that children are sometimes unduly exploited, and that conditions of work and pay are sometimes bad. But I can assure you that in the large majority of British factories in China labour is very well cared for. You have only to watch the stream of workers, men, women and children, emerging from their shifts to see that they are happy, well-fed and well-clothed, and that their general condition compares favourably with that of the industrial worker in any country.

But the Chinese are essentially an agricultural people. The Chinese industrial workers miss their traditional village life, and they hanker after the life of the field—with its intense pressure at periods of seed-time and harvest, but with its long rests. Every Chinese has a real sense of the quiet pleasures of life, for which no material, well-being entirely compensates him. But I could name many factories, both under British and Chinese control, in which the welfare of the Chinese is as well cared for as in any English factory, and in which conditions of work and relative conditions of pay are quite as good as they are in England. The real burden on the worker occurs in the small factories in the interior, which are far removed from the limelight and the competition and the public opinion of the larger centres. The burden on the children must be sought in social conditions over which it is often difficult to exercise any control. In many parts of the country the women refuse to be separated from their children, and insist on bringing them to the factories. These problems are receiving the most earnest Attention from British employers in China. But it is not just to attack general industrial conditions in China on humanitarian grounds, or to attribute to them an undue influence in a political struggle in which they have actually taken little part.

Let me now turn to the economic side of the Chinese labour problem. There are indications in the papers that have come under my notice that labour in this country feels a certain resentment at the development of industry in China with British capital. On the face of it there may appear to be something to be said for this argument. But I do not think that it goes to the heart of things. The products of industry in China do not now compete, and in my opinion will never be in any real competition, with the industrial products of this country. It is, on the other hand, of the greatest importance to British industry that China should be encouraged to produce such articles as she can produce with relative economy and efficiency. She must have something to sell if she is going to buy from us. Undue insistence upon the hardships of labour in China will not help the Chinese; it ambarrasses both employer and employee. I can assure your Lordships from experience that, in the majority of recent strikes, the workers have left their work with the greatest reluctance, and that they have generally gone back gladly and without any pressure for material changes. They have admitted in almost every instance that strikes have been caused not by economic but by political pressure.

Labour in this country has a vast interest in the welfare of China. If peace could be restored in China that market would offer the greatest and the quickest conceivable outlet for the products of British industry. It is the one market in the world which could offer an immediate solution for our unemployment problem. China can absorb, she wants and she can pay for, an immense volume of cotton goods, steel work, railway material, bridges, electric plant, and practically every type of article which is produced in bulk in this country. British labour has one real interest in the Chinese problem and should play a leading part in impressing upon our Government the need for the greatest possible effort in restoring peace in China, in opening the channels of trade, and in developing a market such as is unparalleled in the history of the world. If once it were realised how immense an outlook for our industries and our trade would be available if only we could help China to get on to her feet again, it would be clear that the solution of the China problem is one of the greatest problems of British statesmanship of our day. That realisation can only be brought about if the political and industrial and commercial interests in England face the situation with a strong and united front, and insist on decisive action, not in the interests of international finance, but in the interests of China, which are, fortunately, concurrent with the interest of British trade and industry.

Our fellow-countrymen in China are faced with a grave situation. The Chinese have been inflamed by an insidious propaganda and, as so often happens in nervous crises, the brunt of bitterness has been directed against China's best friends. For we are friends of China and I believe that they have the fullest recognition of that fact. Our people have been in the closest relations with them in every sort of business enterprise; we have learned to work with them on a basis of real co operation; and millions of Chinese now enjoy an amazing prosperity and security in those countries adjoining China that are under the British flag.

But, whilst recognising that the Chinese as a people are far from unfriendly to the British, we cannot overlook the fact that, for one reason or another, the present attack is directed primarily against Great Britain. The interests of the British in China are conspicuous, and therefore apt to bear the brunt of any sudden agitation. And British policy will decide the issue. The rights and wrongs of the actual shooting incident at Shanghai can only be decided by impartial investigation; but whatever the results, every Englishman, whether in China or elsewhere, will deeply deplore the loss of life that occurred at a moment of intense nervous pressure on both sides. We must convince the Chinese that we are determined that the actual incident shall be decided on a basis of strict justice. But we must equally convince them that we cannot permit reckless interference with the security of our people. On the quiet sanity of our policy at this moment of crisis depends the health of all our future relations with China.

We have now been forced into a position in which we must declare ourselves openly and firmly on the side of the forces of law and order. It is impossible to ignore the disastrous effects of the propaganda issuing from the headquarters of the Soviet at Peking. But that is, after all, only a side issue, an irritating factor; the main problem is a Chinese problem and must be dealt with as such. China herself must deal with Bolshevism, and she will do so in her own way, as soon as she is on her feet again. We can help her to gain that strength by insisting on the personal responsibility of each and every Chinese authority for the safety of the British lives and property within their zone of influence. We must aid them to fulfil that responsibility by the co-operation of adequate naval patrols. And we must make it clear that those patrols are protective, not aggressive. We are fortunate in having able and experienced representatives, not only in Pekin but in the consulates which are established at every vital point in China. Our consuls speak Chinese, and are in intimate touch with all the Chinese leaders. I doubt indeed whether there is any country in the world where we have such good official representation as we have in China. If our representatives on the spot are assured of solid backing from home, they can exercise considerable moral influence in the interest of order, through co-operation with the Chinese authorities. Every recognised Chinese authority would welcome co-operation and support on such lines. Chaos is just as harrowing to them as to us.

The Chinese authorities, however, have not the strength in the present situation to cope with troubles such as now exist, especially when they are aggravated from outside. It is unthinkable that we should attempt to intervene in Chinese internal affairs, and we have maintained the view, consistently and wisely, that it would be impolitic to back one Chinese leader or one Chinese Party against another; in their Party struggles they must work out their own salvation. But we can and must stand solid behind each responsible authority to the extent of insisting that they protect effectively the lives, the property and the interests of our people. Protection of our interests means incidentally the protection of Chinese interests, and security for all.

This may sound too simple to be true, but I am convinced that the simple policy of open justice and an insistence on security will go a very long way towards settling the immediate trouble in China. And the immediate crisis, this orgy of intimidation and boycott, must be settled before we can deal with the greater problems now outstanding by the normal processes of negotiation; though we can well afford to take the broad and generous line of proclaiming even now our readiness to proceed with preparations for negotiation. Before I leave the story of the crisis I should like to pay my tribute to our countrymen and countrywomen on the spot. In the full ardour of a tropical summer they are standing to their task of maintaining order, and doing their work in their communities with a devotion, self-sacrifice and courage which is beyond all praise and worthy of the best tradition of our race. Their good-natured tolerance has averted worse disaster and won the admiration of all the better thinking classes in China. But they cannot hold out indefinitely. We must come to their support without hesitation and without delay.

It will restore confidence if the Chinese know that we are pushing forward the fulfilment of the promises made at Washington. Our good faith has been brought in question; and our good faith must be unquestioned if we are going to succeed. We should appoint immediately our representatives to a Conference in China, and we should proclaim our readiness to clear up all outstanding difficulties generously, and with a determination to meet legitimate grievances. The Chinese are asking for increased revenue from the Tariff; it is a legitimate demand. They are asking also for a square deal, and discussion on a basis of frankness and equality in regard to all outstanding Treaty problems. They ask for the removal of abuse of privilege—in the method of interpreting our extra-territorial rights, in municipal representation and in the control of the Mixed Court at Shanghai. They are a reasonable people; they know as well as we do that Treaty privilege when not abused acts as much in their interest as in our own. But they know as well as we do that there are abuses. We have promised to remedy them and we should do so without delay. The promised Conference in China offers the best possible machinery for such an effort. It will afford an opportunity to examine and solve outstanding problems, not only with the Chinese, but with our American and Japanese and other friends who have interests in China similar to our own—security and freedom on their lawful occasions.

If I have stressed unduly the material interests of our country in China it is not because I underestimate the deeper interests that link the two great civilisations, the two great political entities of Great Britain and China. If I have underestimated the difficulties of the settlement it is not because I have been sheltered from personal experience of those difficulties. But all my experience impresses me with the need for common sense and sympathy in dealing with the immediate and critical situation. The immediate problem is the stoppage of the strikes and the boycott. That can only be accomplished if we realise that boycotts and strikes are the Chinese method of making a protest against what are, in their view, remediable grievances. The Chinese will stop boycotts and strikes if we can convince them of our good faith and our desire to meet them in a spirit of justice and equity. After that will come the major effort, the readjustment of the conditions under which we live and trade in China. To meet that major situation we need a new attitude of mind in regard to China, a fuller appreciation of their point of view. If once we can convince them that we do appreciate their point of view, that we have a sincere desire to meet them in a spirit of comradeship and fair dealing, we shall find them a reasonable and kindly people, equally alive to our common difficulties and equally desirous of living together on neighbourly terms.

If I may add one last word it is this. It is not possible to over-estimate the value of personality in China. Personality will count above all things at the coming Conference. If I have succeeded in convincing your Lordships that this country and our Empire have a vast interest at stake in China, I trust that the influence of this House will be exercised to ensure that British representation on that Conference is entrusted to a statesman of the very highest standing, ability and reputation, to one who can speak with full authority, and who can bear the full weight of the reputation of our country and our race. Prestige is strength in China, and strength is greater than force. At this moment of crisis, when our problems in Asia are undergoing reconstruction, we owe it to the Chinese, we owe it to ourselves, to convince China that this is no Party question in England, that every Party, every class in England stands united in a determination that justice shall be done in China, and a desire to re-establish our relations on a basis satisfactory to both sides and thus holding some hope of permanence. I beg to move.

Motion for Papers, by leave, withdrawn.

That provision in the Regulations has been altered by what is known as Circular 1297, the object of which, as specifically stated in the circular, was to reduce the cost of these special schools. The circular contains words recognising that in these cases much more individual treatment and highly specialised teaching are necessary than in the ordinary schools—a proposition so obvious that it need hardly have been stated—and then goes on, in subsection (4) of Section 2, to call upon the local education authorities to take every opportunity of reducing the number of teachers employed, by the simple expedient of not appointing another teacher when a vacancy occurs, with the object of fulfilling the third clause of this circular, in which it is stated that the Board will be satisfied if the staffing of special schools conforms to the standard of one full-time teacher for every twenty children in average attendance at a school for the blind. That is to say, they substitute in a sentence the figure twenty as the normal size of a class for blind children for the former number of fifteen.

The point of my Question is to press His Majesty's Government to restore the smaller figure. I would mention that this is a case in which every teacher of the blind, without any exception whatever, is convinced that if this latter figure of twenty in a class is maintained it will be impossible for teachers to do their duty by the children in their charge. Upon that point they are absolutely unanimous, without any exception. Moreover, they have at various times since the issue of that circular made representations in that sense to the Board of Education. The College and Association of Teachers of the Blind, the British Medical Association and the National Union of Teachers have one and all made representations to that effect to the Board of Education, and they have not met with any success. I therefore feel it my duty, as I happen to be chairman of the council of the teaching profession, in which the teachers of the blind take their part with all the other classes of teachers, to bring the matter to your Lordships' attention.

It is further my information that wherever this Regulation has been enforced it has had a very detrimental effect upon the training of blind children. I am informed that in a number of cases where this has been so the head teachers have written to the Board of Education testifying to that fact. Now, the reason why every teacher of the blind in this country gives it as his or her conviction that it is not possible to deal with more than fifteen in a class satisfactorily, is that it is impossible to treat a class of blind children as a whole, except in purely oral instruction which does not play by any means the greatest part in their education. Wherever it is necessary to teach the blind child to use its hands instead of its eyes the child cannot be taught orally but has to be actually shown, and in such subjects as geography, natural history and elementary science the teaching must be individual. Most of all, in the important subject of handcraft one of the primary objects is to teach children to use their hands to take the place of sight so as to enable them to become self-supporting citizens. It must be perfectly obvious that if the result of this provision, originating solely from economy, is to send out children inefficiently trained, as the price of a very little direct economy the nation is going to have to bear a much larger indirect cost, because the children will not be so self-supporting as before.

I am given to understand that the noble Lord who is going to reply on behalf of the Government has been making investigations on the subject from medical authorities, and I have no doubt that if he thinks fit he will detail the result to your Lordships. That is not the point which I make at all. I am not attempting to challenge anything to do with the health of the children, or whether twenty in a properly ventilated and properly sized class room will not be as healthy as a class of fifteen. I am taking the point that this is a small direct economy leading to a much larger indirect expenditure, and that from the point of view, not merely of the most humane and generous treatment of the children who have lost their sight or never had it, but also from the point of view of economy, this provision in Circular 1297 ought to be modified or rescinded altogether.

I have said that it is the unanimous opinion of every single person who is engaged in teaching blind children that it should be done if they are to carry out their work satisfactorily. That is a testimony which it seems to me deserves very serious attention, because if the Regulation of twenty in a class for the blind is preserved it means that you are asking a large number of people to do work under conditions under which they are satisfied they cannot do their work properly. This request is not put forward in the interest of the teachers. I have been among them and talked with them and I am satisfied that they would all be perfectly willing to conduct classes of twenty, even if it meant harder work for themselves, if they felt that they could really give the children the education which they require. It is put forward distinctly in the interests of these blind children. I mentioned the date of the Circular—namely, January, 1923—and that is not unimportant. I think it might have been urged at a time when economic pressure was so great that the experiment might be tried of slightly increasing the size of the classes. It has been tried now for more than two years and I think, in view of the evidence which I have endeavoured to represent to your Lordships, it is perfectly apparent that the experiment has failed. Therefore, I ask the Government whether they cannot see their way to replacing the provision of the circular so far as the teaching of the blind is concerned by the old provision.

1.Whether he can give the House any information in supplement of a Report (headed "Inhuman Punjab Jailors") which appeared in the Morning Post newspaper of July 24, of a judgment given in a defamation case brought by an Indian jailor in Multan jail, in which the Judge is stated to have held that grave allegations of inhuman treatment of prisoners were proved, and to have expressed his opinion that two officers of the Jail Department, in giving evidence, showed a bias in favour of the plaintiff;

2. Whether the recommendations of the Indian Jails Committee, 1919–20, with respect to the appointment of unofficial visitors, have been carried out at Multan Jail and other Indian prisons generally;

3. Whether any complaint of ill-treatment of prisoners had been made to any visitors of Multan Jail and reported by them, and, if so, with what outcome; and

4. Whether he will invite the Government of India to make further investigation into the experiences of prisoners in Indian jails:

and to move for Papers.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, should like to set before you the text of the 'report out of which my Question arises. I will read a quotation from the Morning Post of July 24, which says:

"Considerable interest has been aroused by the judgment given in a defamation case brought by an Indian jailor in Multan jail, one of the largest in India, with accommodation for 1,400 prisoners, against Lala Lajpat Rai's paper Bande Mataram, of Lahore, for publishing an interview with a political prisoner in the jail, alleging that most inhuman treatment was meted out to the prisoners.

"The Judge held that the graver part of the alleged facts was proved. He therefore awarded only nominal damages. The Judge held that it was proved by overwhelming evidence that during the plaintiff's tenure of office prisoners were punished with ear holding' and with shoe beating. It had also been proved that indiscriminate beating with the fists and kicking were practised by the head convicts."

I think the word "convicts" must be a mistake, and I shall give your Lordships my reasons for saying so later.

"Moreover, it had been shown that the jailors extorted money by maltreating the prisoners till they received illegal payments irons the prisoners' relatives.

"The Judge expressed his opinion that Major Trutter"—

whose name should be Truter—

"and Major Wadia, a superintendent in the Jails Department, in giving evidence showed a certain bias in favour of the plaintiff. Lala Lajpat Rai, writing in the Press, declares that the malpractices complained of are not even a fraction of those in vogue in the Punjab jails, and offers his full co-operation to the Government in the task of uprooting such abuses."

I have been able to obtain rather fuller information regarding the actual evidence given by some of the witnesses and I will read to your Lordships a very short extract:—

"Witness C. Ram, ex-prisoner in Multan Jail, deposed that 'Gidar Kut' had been inflicted on him. He explained that 'Gidar Kut' was a punishment in vogue in the jail, in which ten or fifteen convict warders were let loose on a convict and thrashed him indiscriminately. Witness had been thrashed for protesting that the food given was improperly cooked and the bread below weight. Witness had also received another punishment called 'Kan parade,' in which the prisoner was forced to pull his own ears by passing his hands through his legs, and was then thrashed while in this position.

"Another witness corroborated this evidence, and described also how the most unnatural crimes were committed by the warders against the prisoners.

"Another witness said he had 'Gidar Kut' inflicted on him, after which he was kicked and thrown into a refuse tank, where he was forced to remain for half an hour. On his refusing to apologise, the warders again thrashed him. He testified that neither the non-official visitors nor the European officers ever listened to the convicts' grievances."

There have been many other complaints of Indian prison administration, more especially in regard to the treatment of some of the political prisoners who were imprisoned after the Akali disturbances in the Punjab, but I am not going to deal with the whole of these. I am only putting before your Lordships matters which were given in evidence in the Courts and which the Judge held to be completely proved. Those are incidents, I think your Lordships will agree, which prove how extraordinarily inefficient must be the administration and control in the prison in which they occur.

I have felt myself under some personal obligation to bring this matter to the notice of your Lordships and to urge the noble and learned Earl, the Secretary of State, to make some further inquiry into it. Mr. Lajpat Rai, the editor of the paper against which proceedings were taken, was in England last summer and I saw a good deal of him. I was discussing with him and getting from him his views with regard to the Indian Government and Indian public affairs generally. Towards the end of his stay here he asked me if he might put before me certain points upon which he felt very strongly, which were not political questions but matters in which the Government of India was incurring grave criticism from Indian public opinion, and which he thought might be remedied if attention were called to them in a judicious manner. One of the things to which he called my attention was the treatment of prisoners in jails, with regard to which he gave me many particulars, which I will not rehearse to your Lordships because they are matters of hearsay. But there were particulars with regard to the accommodation, the close and fetid confinement to which political prisoners are subject, and so on, matters of physical experience which could be easily proved by an inspection by unofficial persons, even if they might not be admitted or taken cognisance of by the official people responsible for them.

The facts he put before me so impressed me that there was a case for inquiry that I promised him that I would take means, without publicity, after the Recess, to draw the attention of the Viceroy of India to these representations and to ask him to look into the matter. After the

Recess I was not in a position to do this, and Mr. Lala Lajpat Rai apparently has taken the alternative course of according publicity in his newspaper to these complaints, or some of them, with the result that a very damaging judgment has been passed upon the administration of Indian prisons and one which, I think your Lordships will agree, calls for some further inquiry and explanation. I am not bringing any kind of general indictment against the Indian prison administration. Indeed, in many respects for many years it was very much better than the prison administration in our own country. But it is a very surprising thing to me that these abuses should exist even if only in one jail—the Multan jail—such a very short time after the very efficient Report which was drawn up by a very strong Committee on the Indian jail system and which reported in the year 1919, only five or six years ago.

I must say that the defect of that Report, as it appeared to me, was that it still proceeded rather too much from the point of view of the official machine; that is to say, what is the best way of administering a prison, what are the best rules, and so on, and not quite sufficiently from the point of view to which all prison reformers are now devoting their attention—what is the psychological effect on the individual prisoners themselves and what are their own experiences in prison. Speaking generally, however, it was a very enlightened and excellent Report, and from it I wish to quote only one passage. The Report says—

"A sufficient number of official and nonofficial visitors should be appointed for every central and district jail and for such subsidiary jails as the Local Government may direct. All Local Governments should consider the question of bringing the number of non-official visitors in their Province up to the Bengal standard, viz, two for subsidiary jails, three for district jails and six for central jails."

Then they go on to say—

"It should be clearly understood (1) that no visitor can be allowed to go round a jail without an escort, which is necessary for his personal safety and should consist of at least two warders.… No prisoner should be punished for any complaint or statement made to a visitor unless that visitor concurs."

It is most unfortunate that this recommendation that no unofficial visitor should go round a jail unless accompanied by two warders should have been of a

character which inevitably renders the provision of unofficial visitors entirely nugatory.

Even if the unofficial visitor goes round with one warder, he will not get a complaint from any prisoner under normal circumstances in an English jail, and certainly not in an Indian jail, where we are told that the warders are more corrupt than they are in the English jails. He will not get any complaint if there is one warder only and certainly not if there are two, who are in a position to know what the complaint is and will concert together to refute it. I am not surprised to see that the provision for unofficial visitors, so guarded, appears to have been practically, so far as any good effect is concerned, a dead letter. The provision that no prisoner should be punished for any complaint or statement made to a visitor unless that visitor concurs is, again, a provision which is likely to increase the very great suspicion and timidity of prisoners of making any kind of representation on account of which they know that the warders can, and will, get back on them. When I put my Question I asked whether non-official visitors have been appointed. I now see from this further Report that certain nonofficial visitors apparently have been appointed, but it was testified by a witness that neither non-official visitors nor European officers ever listen to the convict's grievances.

So we have two facts. First of all, a very grave and scandalous lack of discipline on the part of the warders in these prisons, and abuse and ill treatment of prisoners are proved. We also have, apparently, proved in evidence that the non-official visitors and the European officers do not pay attention to the representations made by the prisoners to them. The Judge is reported to have expressed his opinion that Major Truter and Major Wadia, a superintendent, in giving evidence, showed a certain bias in favour of the plaintiff. Of course they did. Everybody who has had anything to do with public administration generally in many Departments, and I have had a great deal to do in the way of personal responsibility with prison Departments, knows that, of all public Departments, the Department concerned in the administration of prisons is the most self-righteous and most obscurantist and most confident that no outside person can make any reason- able criticism upon its administration, They are so now; they always have been so. They are more so even than the police because the police, although extremely self-righteous and obscurantist, do come from time to time under the healthy discipline of such inquiries as the one which has been proceeding lately with regard to certain occurrences at Vine Street. I do not want to say that these prison officials were sinners above all other prison officials. I myself, as a result of my own experience and responsibility in various grades during my life of prison administration, learnt very thoroughly to sympathise with any responsible prison officer, who is irritated by and resents criticism of prison administration.

The whole system of our prison administration, the whole method by which we attempt to deal with crime and to suppress it, and the systems which have been in force in our prisons and which are only gradually being reformed are so ridiculous, so stupid, so inhuman and so disheartening to any one who has had any kind of responsibility for them, that that branch of administration, to any sensible and reasonable man, is a source of perpetual distress, I might almost say of despair. He has to do with an inefficient and ill-trained staff, a staff for which he cannot get enough money to pay properly, a staff which is imbued with the old traditions of prison administration which are now entirely superseded in the minds of enlightened persons. Having to combat all these things, any person in responsible control of a prison feels very great sympathy with those of his officers under him who are attempting to deal with the difficulties of the prison system. Consequently, it is only to be expected, and it is almost a venial and pardonable phenomenon, that a prison superintendent should show a bias in favour of exonerating his own subordinates, and it is fortunate that from time to time these questions come before a Judge, who is bound to express, simply from the point of view of justice, equity and public interest, what his opinion is of such proceedings as have been disclosed in this case.

What I want to press upon my noble friend the Secretary of State for India is that he will give me answers to the definite questions I have asked him, and also say whether he will invite the Government of India to make a fresh investigation into the experiences of prisoners in Indian jails. I want those investigations to be made from the point of view of the prisoners themselves. There is at present great conflict between two theories of prison administration. One is the mechanical theory and the other the humanitarian theory, for which we are very largely indebted, as the Indian Prison Commission of 1919 themselves admitted, to the United States of America. The line on which at present reform is now proceeding is to attempt to deal, not so much with the mechanism of the prison and rules for warders, but with the personality of the prisoners or the effect of the prison. It was only when we began to get into our prisons the suffragettes and conscientious objectors that we began to get really reputable testimony as to certain evils which the prison authorities had persistently refused to admit. I must say that the suffragette movement and the conscientious objector movement have done a great deal to fortify public opinion and to promote that tendency to improve our own prison system which, I am glad to say, I now recognise is actuating our Prison Commissioners.

But the same kind of criticism and approach is evidently necessary in India. You ought to approach the question of Indian prison conditions from the point of view of the many political prisoners you have there. Those are people whom you may say are seditious, but they are mostly honourable and humane men and they can give definite and good critical evidence as to the things which go on in the prisons. I want to have the challenge of Lala Lajpat Rai taken up. He declares that the malpractices complained of are not even a fraction of those involved in the Punjab jails and he offers full co-operation to the Government in the task of uprooting such abuses. I want to have that offer taken up. I know him well enough to know that that offer is made in good faith. I know that he and many others are able to give the Government a tale of prison administration which they cannot get from superintendents or from the best meaning prison administrators, who are inclined to look upon the administration of prisons from what I might call the mechanical point of view. It appeared to me when I was in office that there was a case for inquiry into the management of Indian jails, not necessarily with publicity.

The publicity has now come. I suggest that such an incident as this gives cause for thought and that there is reason for urging the Government of India to make further inquiries generally, from such unofficial witnesses as they can get, as to what are the conditions of the prisoners in Indian jails, and, further, to take in hand the amendment of the regulations in regard to unofficial visitors so that they may be withdrawn. It is a ridiculous and quite unnecessary provision that every non-official visitor to the prison must be accompanied by two warders. That is bound to render his visit entirely nugatory. I beg leave to put my Questions and to move.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Read 3^a (according to Order), and passed.

House in Committee (according to Order) on re-commitment of Bill; Amendment proposed by the Committee made.

Bead 3^a , with the Amendments (according to Order), and passed, and returned to the Commons.

Read 3^a (according to Order), and passed.

House adjourned at ten minutes before six o'clock.