rose to move that an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty the Queen, congratulating Her Majesty and His Royal Highness The Duke of Edinburgh on the approaching Marriage of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer; expressing to Her Majesty the great pleasure felt by this House and the Nation at this joyful event; and praying that His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales and the Lady Diana Spencer will be blessed with every happiness in their married life.

My Lords, on behalf of the Opposition I warmly endorse the sentiments expressed by the Lord President to Her Majesty the Queen and His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh on the approaching marriage of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to the Lady Diana Spencer. I think all of us will wish the young couple every happiness in their married life, and I am sure that they, too, in turn will inspire the love, affection and respect of the British people.

My Lords, on behalf of noble Lords on these Benches I wish wholeheartedly to support the Motion now before the House. The engagement of the heir to the Throne has already given great pleasure to millions of people in this country and elsewhere. That pleasure stems largely from the fact that the forthcoming marriage obviously commends itself to Her Majesty the Queen and to Prince Philip, and to the affection which Prince Charles and the Lady Diana Spencer have for one another.

The Monarchy is an institution which, in the view of most of us, is vital to the protection of our freedom and parliamentary democracy. In our present Monarchy we have the sure confidence that they will develop and flourish. In the Prince of Wales, who, too, has earned the nation's respect and affection, and his future bride, I am certain that the principles upon which the Monarchy has been built will be fully upheld.

If I may speak as one who yesterday celebrated 42 years of happy married life, I should like to join in offering our affectionate good wishes that the Royal couple may enjoy throughout their lives all the blessings that a happy home can give.

My Lords, from these Benches I want heartily to endorse all that has been said in support of the Motion. The marriage of a Prince of Wales is in itself a matter for great rejoicing by the citizens of this country, but there are many reason why this particular marriage gives such great pleasure not only here but throughout the Commonwealth, and indeed the world. Walter Bagehot said in his work on the English constitution:

"A princely marriage is a brilliant edition of a universal fact and as such it rivets mankind".

The happiness which is felt on this occasion is an expression, first, of the deep affection in which the Prince's family is held. The example which Her Majesty the Queen and her family provide is a constant reminder in this uncertain world of the values which really matter; and not least of these is the strength of their family life. We rejoice to share their happiness on this great family occasion.

As has been said, our delight is also due to the place which the Prince of Wales has won in all our hearts. The qualities of courage, humanity, concern and zest for life which he has shown are indeed a happy augury for the future of our nation. All that seemed to be needed was that he should find someone of character and sensitivity with whom to share his life. It is clear that the nation approves his choice, for Lady Diana has quickly won a secure place in all our hearts. I have no doubt at all that the high ideals of Christian marriage, in which they believe, will help to sustain them in the great responsibilities to which they are called. We rejoice with them and for them, and their happiness will uplift us all.

My Lords, noble Lords sitting on the Cross-Benches wish to be associated very warmly with the terms of the Motion proposed by the noble Lord the Leader of the House. There is, perhaps, an added pleasure for them in doing so since it was from these Benches that His Royal Highness made his very eloquent maiden speech on sport and leisure. The marriage of the heir to the Throne is, of course, a happy family occasion, but inevitably has wider significance also. It will bring great joy to the nation as a whole, to the Commonwealth and to all those throughout the world to whom His Royal Highness has endeared himself during his many visits and travels. We wish His Royal Highness and Lady Diana Spencer every happiness.

My Lords, it is a pleasure and a great privilege to represent my few colleagues on this one Bench and to associate ourselves with the good wishes that have been expressed by the Leader of the House. July 29th is a memorable day, not only in the lives of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales and Lady Diana Spencer but in the lives of all, or at least the majority, of the people of this country. It is a day which we shall look forward to as much as I think they do. We express the hope that in the future they have very many years of happiness and joy, and years that are spent in a world of peace.

On Question, Motion agreed to, nemine dissentiente: the said Address to be presented to Her Majesty by the Lord Chancellor, the Archbishop of York, the Lord President, the Lord Byers, the Baroness Hylton-Foster and the Lord Peart.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper. After the State occasions, the dust-carts!

My Lords, Her Majesty's Government are not aware that anyone is proposing to do so. Some may have considered it and I imagine the public health, environmental and particularly the expenditure and management implications for the collection area have weighed strongly against it.

My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that very satisfactory reply, can I infer from it that if he were to have his attention drawn to specific examples Her Majesty's Government would take the necessary action?

My Lords, if my noble friend would draw my attention to specific details I would be very glad to have a look at them.

My Lords, would the Minister agree that, where the collection is done by the local authorities direct, anybody who objects has a chance to get some redress, but that where it is contracted out, as it is in some authorities, there is quite a different situation? Further, is it not better to have refuse collected over the weekend than not at all?

My Lords, if there is no collection at all then the authority concerned is not carrying out its statutory duty. I know of no such case.

My Lords, the noble Lord will realise that in this House there is an expert on every conceivable subject, and I was the chief cost accountant for the Birmingham refuse disposal department before I degenerated into journalism. Therefore, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will bear in mind when he comes to consider this question that there are some places from which refuse must be collected at weekends? I am thinking of fish markets and meat markets, and places of that kind, and I remember that we always used to collect from them at weekends.

My Lords, the noble Lord, with his obviously vast experience, is referring, of course, to the collection of trade refuse, and indeed there are situations where that is done at weekends.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, we have made substantial improvements since taking office, despite a 40 per cent. increase in the volume of appeals. Improved productivity in the department has enabled us to contain this increase and still reduce the times taken to determine cases. However, we believe there is scope for much further improvement, and my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State announced on Tuesday of this week in another place a whole new range of fresh initiatives designed yet further to improve the service provided on planning appeals.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that very satisfactory Answer; and it is good news that there are still further plans to improve the productivity of the department in dealing with appeals. Is my noble friend aware that planning authorities are often loath to grant planning permission for the conversion of rural barns for rural industries because of the danger of precedent being used at subsequent appeals to get other rural industries nearby; and is he satisfied that the precedent argument is not being overused to get incorrect planning decisions?

Again, my Lords, as I said in answer to the last Question, one would need to have specific instances brought to one's attention to be able to give a thoroughly satisfactory reply on a specific case. But in general may I refer my noble friend to a recent circular, Development Control—Policy and Practice, which in fact asks local authorities to look favourably on proposals to find new uses for disused agricultural buildings; and, yes, planning permission should be refused only if there are specific and convincing planning objections to an individual proposal. The question of precedent really should not arise, and each case should be decided on its merits.

My Lords, would the Minister agree that the improved performance by local authorities is in fact far greater than that of central Government, for would he not also agree that, while central Government have taken on additional staff for the work, particularly part-time inspectors, local authorities have had to achieve their improvement with fewer staff and reduced financial resources?

No, my Lords, I would not agree. I gladly pay tribute to the fact that local authorities have made a contribution to this improvement—I am very pleased to acknowledge that—but I think I should also say, in view of the point that the noble Baroness makes, that in fact the Government's actions certainly have focussed the attention of local authorities on this issue; and I think I would be entitled to refer to the increasing productivity in the DoE planning inspectorate. In fact, in terms of the number of appeals that they have had to deal with, they have gone up by some 20 per cent. and the time factor has been materially improved.

But, my Lords, is the Minister denying that local authorities have had to speed up this work—and they have a great deal of work to do with regard to planning appeals—with fewer staff and less financial resources?

My Lords, as always, the noble Baroness fails to take into consideration the improved efficiency of local authorities, and it is that, I would suggest, which is a material contribution to the improved performance to which I have gladly paid tribute.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the circular that he mentioned gives local authorities the right to refuse everything in the green belt and conservation areas irrespective of whether or not there are buildings there?

No, my Lords. The Government have said—and I am glad to confirm this yet again—that the circular in question makes it quite clear that there is no departure that is envisaged from current policies restricting development in green belts.

My Lords, would the noble Lord be prepared to take on board the other side of the problem when people wish to make appeals against planning decisions—tenants' associations and such like—but discover that they cannot afford to do it, and therefore the local authority wins hands down? Would he not consider the possibility of aiding such local voluntary organisations which wish to make appeals against planning decisions but cannot afford to do so?

My Lords, I can only assume that the noble Lord is referring to the difference in making appeals other than by written statement, and, if he would care to bring to my notice specific instances, I should be glad to have a look at them.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the statement made by the Leader of the Greater London Council to the effect that no further permissions will be granted by the planning authorities of that council for office development in London? Does he anticipate, therefore, a very considerable increase in the volume of appeals to his department arising from that view, and can he also anticipate its effect on rental values in the City of London?

My Lords, I feel that we are going rather wide of the original Question. I am aware of the statement to which the noble Lord refers, and it may indeed have both effects that he mentioned. In both circumstances, I think that would be a rather unfortunate situation.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

; My Lords, the Government's decision to require the corporation to dispose of their interest in the Wytch Farm licence after very careful consideration of their representations, is entirely consistent with their general policy objectives. These are to reduce the size of the public sector wherever possible by transferring to the private sector activities which could equally well be performed there, and to reduce the size of the public sector borrowing requirement.

My Lords, may I thank the noble Earl for that Answer, which he will not expect me to find very convincing. May I ask the noble Earl two further questions? Would he not agree that the Wytch Farm development was an outstanding example of precisely those qualities of initiative and enterprise for which the Prime Minister has called? Does he not also understand that the decision to sell off that project, so far as British Gas is concerned, is an affront or an insult to the dedicated public servants in British Gas who are responsible for it?

My Lords, I have very high regard for the British Gas Corporation. But my view is that its main responsibility should be to supply gas, which it does very effectively. I see no reason why such a public utility should be a major holder of capital in our economy.

My Lords, would my noble friend not agree that this has the enormous advantage of relieving State capital overburden and replacing it by private capital and also spreading the glories of private capitalism?

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that British private capital is no less British than a British public asset.

My Lords, is this not a case where private money put into this established project will not be available for new enterprises which we so badly need?

My Lords, I find that an extraordinary comment. Up to about £50 billion every year is invested out of the capital markets of the United Kingdom and there is plenty of United Kingdom capital for such assets of which this is one.

My Lords, would the noble Earl not agree that Lord Beswick's remarks about an insult to the people who have developed this very valuable capital asset would only be an insult if this property was not sold off for a proper commercial price? I am sure that the noble Earl will tell the House that it will be sold off for a proper commercial price. Will he do so?

My Lords, it is obviously for the British Gas Corporation itself to conduct the sale; but, in every other respect, I agree with the noble Viscount.

My Lords, have we reached the stage when a public body, if not successful, is damned; but if it is successful, it has to sell out?

My Lords, I do not accept the argument of the noble Lord at all. This is a very successful and very well managed public utility corporation to which I am delighted to pay tribute. But there is no reason in logic or in any theory that I can see that it should simultaneously be a major holder of a capital asset of this kind.

My Lords, may I ask the Minister why, if he has such a high regard for the British Gas Corporation's activities, he has chosen to ignore their advice in the selling of the gas showrooms to private enterprise?

That is another issue. It is a contiguous issue. There is no reason why the fact that a company or corporation is successful at something that it should enjoy a continuous monopoly in that field.

My Lords, would my noble friend not agree that the term "selling out" is quite inappropriate? We should be talking about public participation in national wealth.

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend who has put the point that I was seeking to make rather more graphically.

My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl to consider a further point? Do the Government not realise that instead of creating an atmosphere in which we can consider how to make the role of the public sector more effective, this kind of vendetta is going to make it absolutely inevitable that we shall get an equal and opposite reaction? We shall get an alternative Government sooner rather than later which will nationalise for the sake of nationalising.

My Lords, I would think that that would have been considerably later, and by then it will be too late.

My Lords, could the noble Earl ensure that the same high standard is maintained regarding the environment of Wytch Farm which is an extremely beautiful part of the country?

My Lords, I enjoy the good fortune to have friends with whom I stay at the weekend from time to time overlooking Wytch Farm so I have a personal interest of that kind. It is one of the most beautiful parts of Dorset. It has been well guarded so far and I shall see that that continues.

My Lords, would the noble Earl the Minister, on further consideration and in the light of all the efficiencies of the corporation in developing the project, consider that it is against the short-term, long-term and national interests to carry through this sale?

My Lords, for the reason I gave earlier, I do not think that is so. As the noble Lord, Lord Lever, reminded us in his maiden speech in this House from the Benches opposite, there is no shortage of national capital in this economy. There is something of a shortage of profitable ventures into which that should go, which is one of the reasons why we have very large-scale overseas investment. This is a profitable investment and British capital will flow into it.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, the Government have welcomed the Brandt Commission report. We shall take it into account in our preparations for the Mexico Summit where we hope there will be a full and informal discussion of the many issues involved.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that outside this country—indeed in some parts of this country—there is a firm conviction that this Government are opposed to the recommendations of the Brandt Commission report as shown in the conferences in Venice and New York last year and in the very cold terms of the Foreign Office the official response to the report published just 12 months ago? Is he further aware that at the Ottawa conference the Canadians are taking the lead in trying to stimulate western positive response to the Brandt Commission report in preparation for the Mexico conference? Will he tell the House, on behalf of the Government, whether the Government accept the core of the Brandt Commission report—the core being the interdependence of nations throughout the world with the inevitable consequence that the recovery of the British economy depends upon the kind of measures that have been put forward by the Brandt Commission which, included a former Conservative Prime Minister?

My Lords, the views of the noble Lord on the Brandt Commission report, I would think, were now almost as well known as those of the Government. I have certainly repeated the Government's view on the Brandt Commission report on a number of occasions from this Box. As the noble Lord said, the Government's view has also been published in various documents presented to Committees in the other place and elsewhere. We have welcomed the Brandt Commission report. We share its concern about the problems of the developing world and we shall continue to contribute to a wide range of international action designed to help developing countries.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that it is not to be against the principles of the Brandt Report to remind any Government that it is full of generalities, and to accept it as though it is a blueprint may well alter the approach to the real priorities that face any Government which want to remedy the inequality of conditions throughout the world?

My Lords, the fact is, of course, that, as my noble friend has rightly pointed out, the Brandt Report is a very long and comprehensive document. It is not possible to give a response to that document in one sentence.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the report is full of particularities as distinct from generalities and it is to some of these particular matters that have been raised that some particular response is required?

Yes, indeed, my Lords, and the Government have expressed a view about some of the particular points and have expressed reservations about others.

My Lords, while welcoming the changed attitude of the Government towards the Brandt Report, as indicated by the earlier appalling paper they issued on the subject, may I ask the Minister this: Will our representative at the Ottawa Conference seek to secure a new approach to this problem which has meant North-South dialogue for eight years, with an increasing gulf between them? Will the Government make an effort at the Ottawa Conference to get the heads of the Western nations really to approach this issue in a different way?

My Lords, the change to which the noble Lord referred in the Government's attitude towards the Brandt Report is, I am afraid, confined to the mind of the noble Lord. As for the Ottawa Conference, that is another matter.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that he really cannot get away with that? The Government's response, as he perfectly well knows—does he not?—was originally extremely cold, as my noble friend has said. We do very much welcome the increase in wisdom of the Government at the moment. Is the noble Lord aware that the world outside, though at first shocked by the Government's initial response, is now beginning to see that they can sometimes learn by experience?

My Lords, I am happy to accept the congratulations of the noble Baroness upon our current policy, but the difference that she sees between that and the earlier one is largely confined to people's minds.

My Lords, will the noble Lord recall that a few weeks ago there took place in these buildings one of the most massive lobbies on the Brandt Report that I can recall on any subject, having been either in this Chamber or in the other Chamber for the last quarter of a century? Will he and his colleagues, in approaching the Mexico Conference, realise that if they can take a more positive attitude than has been indicated so far they will have the support of an important section of public opinion led, I am glad to say, by Church representatives?

My Lords, we have always welcomed, and I repeat our welcome now, public expression of opinion on these matters and public discussion on these matters. The lobby to which the noble Lord referred was of course part of that public debate.

My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether a firm date has been fixed for the Mexico Conference, and, if so, who will represent this country? Will the Foreign Secretary himself be there?

My Lords, the firm date, I believe, is 29th September but I shall have to check that and let the noble Lord know if I am wrong. Her Majesty's Government will be represented by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister.

My Lords, is not the noble Lord the Minister aware—and perhaps he will be further aware if he reads Hansard tomorrow—that he has missed the point I was making, as has his noble friend Lord Harmar-Nicholls? I am not talking simply about aid to the underdeveloped countries; I am asking the noble Lord whether the Government have recognised the core of the Brandt Commission Report, which is interdependence? Also, do the Government recognise that the future of this country, as well as the prosperity of underdeveloped countries, depends upon putting into effect the specific proposals—not the generalities—brought out by the Brandt Commission Report?

My Lords, as the noble Lord knows, the Brandt Commission Report contains a very large number of specific proposals. We have welcomed many of them and we have expressed reservations about others.

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available today at the usual time. The Committee stage of the British Nationality Bill will be adjourned at approximately seven o'clock for a short period, and during the adjournment the Report stage of the Armed Forces Bill and the County Courts Jurisdiction Order 1981 and consideration of Commons amendments to the Forgery and Counterfeiting Bill will be taken.

With the leave of the House, I should like also to say a word about future business. Your Lordships will no doubt be concerned to know when the House will rise for the Summer Recess, and indeed it is customary for an announcement to be made at around this time in July. All that I can say at present is that, although every endeavour will be made to ensure that the House rises for the Summer Recess on Friday, 31st July, this will be subject more than usual this year to the progress of business. I will, of course, make a further announcement as soon as possible.

My Lords, the House will wish to thank the noble Lord for making that announcement. May I ask whether he realises I am sure he does—that in all parts of the House there is a very strong feeling that an almost impossible burden of work has been put upon the House at this very difficult part of the Session, and that the Government really should not cram so much complicated and controversial legislation into the back end of the Session? Of course, we know it is not entirely the fault of the noble Lord himself; it is the Government's responsibility for their programme. But I think the House is entitled to ask him whether, if, as he foreshadowed, we have to sit in August, at least we shall not have to sit more than one or two days.

My Lords, I think I shall probably have no opposition from any part of the House for the first thing I want to say, which is to wish the noble Baroness a very happy birthday. The House has certainly had to consider a great deal of business in recent weeks and I cannot deny that it has been a very busy Session indeed. But I would question whether it is correct to say that the Government have asked the House to sit far longer or later in the past few weeks than has been the case in most recent years. I think the noble Baroness asked for a guarantee about August. All I can say is that, as always, I will use my best endeavours.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time. Exceptionally, your Lordships will notice that if the Bill is given a Third Reading I shall in a moment be moving an amendment.

moved the following amendment:

Clause 57, page 28, line 45, leave out from ("force") to end of line 46 and insert ("at the end of the period of three months beginning with the day on which it is passed.").

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.

My Lords, I am sure that your Lordships would want me to congratulate the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on his well executed quadrille in moving these four Bills and to mark their valuable contribution to consolidation.

My Lords, I am deeply grateful to the noble and learned Lord; it is wonderful what eloquence will do.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 49:

Page 3, line 34, leave out ("full-time").

I was disappointed to hear that my noble friend felt that the noble and learned Lord Advocate and I had not given enough heed to amendments which have been moved on the two previous sittings in the Committee stage of this Bill in your Lordships' House. I consider that we listened closely, and we showed that we had done so by accepting an important amendment which was moved by my noble friend Lady Trumpington to Clause 1(4). Then there was almost the last amendment to be moved at our previous Sitting, which was also moved by my noble friend the Lord Geddes. I should have thought my noble friend would have noticed that the very next amendment, which is in my name, is in response to opinions expressed in another place by the honourable Member for Uxbridge, Mr. Michael Shersby. Furthermore, I feel sure that before long this afternoon my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate will also be demonstrating that we have, indeed, taken seriously other amendments in the names of my noble friends Lord Drumalbyn and Lady Elles and, indeed, my noble friend Lord Geddes himself.

But so far as this amendment is concerned, if employment is to be an essential element in defining a connection with the United Kingdom, then the employment concerned must occupy a significant role in the individual's life. The other evening there was an amendment down in the name of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, which my noble friend did not move, to insert the word "genuinely" into the text when it was referring to employment. Although my noble friend did not move the amendment, I could well understand why he felt that it was necessary to know, if there was to be a relevant employment criterion, that it was, at least, a genuine one. For example, I do not think a part-time job, or an occasional consultancy with a British firm, will do, since this cannot be the basis for a link with the United Kingdom which is sufficiently close to justify the conferment of citizenship on the employee's child.

Before I finish these few remarks, may I go just a little wider, because my noble friend went a little wider. May I just remind the Committee that the foundation of the Bill is the need to tie British citizenship with those people who have close and continuing links with the United Kingdom, and thereby to confer automatically the right of abode on all British citizens. In doing this, we are providing in the Bill that all British citizens, whether they are men or women, should have equal rights to transmit citizenship, and all British citizens, whether they are born, naturalised or registered, should also have equal rights to transmit. This will mean enormously increased opportunities to transmit from generation to generation. When, in addition, we are studying the criterion for those who will transmit through their employment, we are, after all, seeking to define the elements of a significant tie with the United Kingdom, and the Government believe that for this purpose the employment concerned should be on a full-time basis.

I wonder whether I may revert to a question which I put to the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, at the previous sitting on 13th July, which appears in col. 1100 of Hansard. I asked him then whether it would be possible, for a person who was contemplating taking up employment, to find out whether it would be accepted as relevant employment by the Home Office, for the purposes of this clause. The noble Lord, Lord Belstead, said in reply that he hoped I would understand when he said,

"that obviously all the practicalities have not been worked out, but … it would be wholly unreasonable if I did not say on behalf of the Government that people will want to clear their lines before they go abroad".

I took that as being a semi-undertaking that, when somebody wished to know whether a job which had been offered would satisfy those criteria, he would be able to get some kind of clearance before he went. It is very important that we should get that on the record, and that something more definite is said by the Minister this afternoon in response to this amendment. When we talk about full-time employment, the phrase can be interpreted in relation to United Kingdom legislation, but we do not know whether exactly the same meaning will be attributed to the phrase if somebody goes to Tanzania or Australia. Perhaps that is obvious to the lawyers; it is not to me and, I suggest, it will not always be to the people who are thinking of taking these jobs abroad.

The other point that I want to make is that the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, has just pointed out that, by the amendment that he is about to move, we are considering not only employment overseas; we are also treating employment in the United Kingdom as being relevant employment for the purposes of this clause. We had several discussions—not just one—on the circumstances that we face in this country, with 3 million people out of work and a vast number of people having to accept whatever jobs are available.

It is probably well-known to your Lordships that there is a growing practice of work sharing, in that two people may do the same job, one going to the place of employment in the morning and the other going in the afternoon. There is a growing practice in some companies of adopting short-time working as an alternative to redundancies. One hopes that that will continue, because it is better to have part of a job than none at all. So I would fully support the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, when he seeks to make this alteration in the Bill, particularly with regard to that part of the relevant employment within the previous two years, which may have been within the boundaries of the United Kingdom.

This would make the Bill more flexible. It would increase the confidence of people when they go abroad to know that the part-time job that they have had—if they have been so lucky—in the period leading up to their departure for overseas, would count as relevant employment. Therefore, I very much hope that the Government will, at least, take this back and give it further consideration before Report stage.

I hope that my noble friend Lord Belstead will not think it offensive if I say that, in his speech, he did not really even attempt to justify the retention in the Bill of the expression "full-time", which my noble friend's amendment seeks to delete. He said that where employment was to be the link with the United Kingdom, it should be significant and I certainly would not want to argue with him about that. I would agree with him about that. But employment can be significant, particularly in the cases of certain individuals, without being full-time.

My noble friend will be aware, if he looks at the lists of public appointments which are published annually in a White Paper, that many chairmen and directors of nationalised industries are described as "main-time" as distinct from "full-time". It would seem to me quite wrong that the advantages of this part of Clause 3 should be denied to someone whose employment was main-time, because it could not be argued to be full-time.

There is also the question of the women. Many married women with young children—and these are precisely the people who may well be going to have another child—work part-time while the child is at school. It would seem a little oppressive to exclude them from the benefits of Clause 3 simply because, in the nature of things, a part-time occupation was all that they could follow. But it may well be—in my noble friend's own phrase—significant. It may well establish a real and significant link with the United Kingdom. Yet on any reading of the clause as it stands, with the words "full-time" in it, it would not qualify. So I ask my noble friend to have another look at this.

He will have heard, in the nicest possible terms, the warning of my noble friend Lord Geddes that during the first two days of this Committee stage, while he and his noble and learned friend have been the height of courtesy and charm, they have been pretty inflexible on anything of any real substance. Some of us, who have a little experience of these matters, may have developed the suspicion that they themselves are operating under fairly tight riding orders from their friends elsewhere. It is not going to help our debate. Could I say with very great respect to my noble friend that a Minister in charge of a controversial Bill at a late stage of the session sometimes finds that he makes rather speedier progress by means of a well-timed and occasional concession.

I should like to support the spirit behind the amendment. Also, I agree entirely with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. If the position remains as it is in the Bill it will cut out a great many women who are doing part-time work. If we look at subsection (2) it is quite clear that a person will fulfil the stated requirements if the Secretary of State is satisfied that those requirements were fulfilled in the case of either his father or his mother. In a case where it is the mother, it is very likely that her work will be part-time.

In his reply the Minister said that if employment is essential it must occupy a significant role in the applicant's life, but he has not given any strong reasons, except that it could not be part-time or consultancy work, to justify that assertion. It is very important that it should not remain in this restricted fashion. In concentrating on women I am not adopting a sexist attitude, because this would also apply to a number of men. If the position is left as it is in the Bill, it will be far too restrictive. I believe that this is how many of us across the Committee feel about it.

I take some interest in this part of the Bill because I would have had to qualify, together with one of my children, under this clause. I think I would have qualified under (3)(b) and (3)(c) but I can think of many people employed in that part of the world where I was employed who would not have qualified but who nevertheless would have regarded themselves as 100 per cent. British citizens and who would have wished to pass their citizenship on to their children. Directly you start to define something in terms of employment, you get into the most awful bog. The safest thing to rely on is (2)(d):

"That the parent in question intends to maintain a close connection with the United Kingdom …".

That is a criterion which it is not too easy to prove but it is very much clearer than trying to define innumerable types of employment which might or might not qualify. In the paper today I happened to notice that some hospital, I think in West Africa, is advertising for a financial controller. If he goes out, stays a number of years and has a family out there, will his children qualify under this Bill? I think they will qualify only if he intends to maintain a close connection with the United Kingdom. I would suggest that my noble friend should rest his case more on that than upon anything else.

Could I begin by saying that for my part I would not expect my noble friend on the Front Bench to be able to accept many amendments at this stage because of the great complication of the Bill and because he will have to go away and think about what we have said and see how it ties in with the rest of the Bill. I have every confidence that he will do that and I hope that we shall see the results at the next stage of the Bill.

Unlike the noble Baroness opposite, I support the principle of the Bill as it stands but I foresee difficulties over its being put into practice. It is desirable that this facility should be given to people who are working full time, but that they should be employed full time by one particular company is a quite different matter. I would suggest that my noble friend should look at that point. I am sure that my noble friend Lord Hawke is quite right in saying that very often a person who goes out from this country to do a particular job then finds himself, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter said, being mainly employed in that job but doing other jobs as well. I remember a man whose main employment was with a shipping firm but who was also the joint correspondent of The Times. Incidentally, he was also chairman of the British School in that place, and often captained the cricket team. This shows his close connections with Great Britain.

I should be grateful if my noble friend could at least say that he will look at this aspect because I do not think that the way in which the Bill is drafted on this point is quite right. It would tie a man to being full-time by one particular company. A man might be refused recognition under this clause if he had two or three other jobs which took up a considerable part of his time.

If it is the intention of my noble friend Lord Geddes to push this amendment to a Division, I would expect my noble friend the Minister to be in the Lobby with us because the words in the Bill do not square with what he said at the Box. He said that he would be satisfied, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter said, if the employment was significant. The words do not allow "significant" to come into it. It is full-time. That has a real meaning. There is no doubt that if "full-time" remains as the definition it will restrict the Bill to a point where I doubt whether it will be workable. All the arguments which have been used regarding women, part-time consultants and the rest are very strong. But now that we have more or less had to accept that employment is going to be the touchstone as to whether or not it passes the test, I believe that from that point on we ought to be as broad and as sensible as we can as to how "employment" will be interpreted. I was very impressed with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Spens, regarding one of his amendments, that employment as we see it today may well not be the type of employment which will be generally accepted as meaning employment 10, 12 or 15 years from now when this Bill, if it becomes an Act, will be operative.

I have argued on the one or two occasions upon which I have intervened that power should be left in the hands of the Secretary of State to decide upon the definitions. I should have thought that here is a case, for all the considerations which have been put forward by my noble friend, where the Secretary of State ought, in the light of the conditions existing at the time, to be the one to decide what is relevant employment. One ought not to tie his hands in advance by saying that he can concede only if it is what we term full employment. I believe it will be a much better Act if, having given the power to the Secretary of State to take into account conditions at the time when the decision will have to be made on this particular point we let him decide whether part-time, or consultancy time, or main time, as my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter said, is that which brings them within the orbit.

I should have thought that this was a time when the amendment of my noble friend Lord Geddes ought to be accepted. And if it is that my noble friend still believes, as he seemed to do when he made his speech a minute or two ago, that "significant" is the word, then he ought to be in the Lobby with us.

May I add one other word in support of this amendment. I have in mind the situation of a foreign correspondent of one of our great newspapers. I speak now from direct personal experience, having travelled the world for The Times and other newspapers in my day. The foreign correspondent of, let us say, The Times who might also serve an American newspaper at the same time and who therefore would not be fully employed by either, though he would be fully employed by both, is in a very exposed position. Very often he is treated in the countries to which he is accredited as the nearest thing to a spy. I can think of one of my assistant correspondents who ended up in Dachau, of another one who only very narrowly escaped and of a third who also very narrowly escaped after great difficulties. The people who work for our media overseas are very exposed indeed. One can think of cases where, if they have not died in concentration camps they have been exposed to years of prison and suffering. With a change of régime, because the country is overrun by the Germans, or the Russians, or whoever it may be, it is very important that they should know that in serving—to take the example of The Times—they stand in some measure of respect and honour in the country from which their employment stems.

Merely because such a correspondent is not full-time in the technical sense, he will be ruled out although he renders great service to the country, simply by being in a very exposed position. Not only is he not on a salary, he may not even be on a retainer. He may simply be on the equivalent of a lineage basis or recompensed according to the amount of time that he gives to the paper or to the network for which he is working, according to the situation. When there is no crisis there is no work, and for him no money, or very little. When there is a crisis he is working flat out, so he is then full-time.

Then what applies to newspaper correspondents should also surely be considered with regard to part time engineering and planning consultants, for example. In countries in the developing world the planning or the architectural consultant has a very important role to play in identifying opportunities for which British firms may tender. He is therefore a very important element in the export drive. He may not be full-time employed; he may be self-employed. Are the self-employed left in or left out by this clause?

I hope that my noble friend will have gathered the sense of what has been said from many different quarters of the Committee and from many different points of view, both professional and political, and that he will take it back and realise that there are people who are not in the technical sense full-time employees of one particular organisation but their contribution to our well-being and our survival is indeed significant.

I would also point out that if the provision says "full time" it also prevents someone from changing jobs because subsection (2)(b) says "throughout the period of two years". Therefore, if a person were to change jobs and have, say, a lapse of a week between jobs the employment would not be throughout the period of two years. A person would immediately forfeit all rights.

Another point is that I should have thought that the purpose of these four categories, paragraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d), was to ensure commitment. The commitment is quite well assured in (c) and (d) and all four must be fulfilled. They are linked by the word "and" and not "or". All four have to be fulfilled and (c) and (d) seem to provide the request for commitment to the United Kingdom.

The Minister knows my views about employment as the only tag on which to hang this close affinity and the fact that in future years employment may just be disappearing, but also when we were discussing the possibility of including self-employment in this clause he said that the Government were unable to think of any way of doing it and he has thrown the ball back at us in order to give us an opportunity to find a solution. If this phrase of "full-time employment" is kept in the clause that will rule out any chance of getting self-employment put into the clause. What is full-time employment for the self-employed? There may be occasions when they are working 24 hours a day and there may be other occasions when they do not work at all, so how do you define "full-time employment" in relation to the self-employed? We must try to get this very great restriction which the words "full-time" mean, deleted, if possible.

I should like to put a question to my noble friend. The fact that this Committee feels so strongly about the term "full-time" is perhaps indicative that many of your Lordships, when they are working abroad, are not working full time. I wonder whether any consideration has been given to those Members of your Lordships' House who do work outside this country and eventually have children abroad. Will they also not be British citizens when they take up their titles and sit in this House?

I will, if I may, confine my remarks to the effect of the amendment, which is to delete the words "full-time" from the text when talking about relevant employment.

If my noble friend would allow me to intervene, he has in fact anticipated my point in regard to deleting the words "full-time" from the text.

Although many of the remarks which have been made in this short debate have been informative, they have gone a little wide of the amendment. My noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter expressed the hope that I would not find him offensive. Of course not. However, I do find my noble friend, uncharacteristically, somewhat inconsistent on this occasion, if he will forgive me for saying so. I say that because my noble friend, with his characteristic ability has, in previous debates on the Bill, expressed some criticism of the need for the Secretary of State to have so much discretion in the Bill, which my noble friend has said is bound, in the circumstances of today, to be in fact the discretion of officials of the Home Office, who of course in certain cases will give advice to the Home Secretary. The inconsistency which I feel is there on this occasion is that if this amendment were to be accepted—and my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter would support him—then I think there would be endless arguments about what constitutes "relevant employment". There would be an increase of discretion and, incidentally, an enormous increase in the amount of time which is taken to decide particular cases.

However, both my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, have made valuable remarks about the particular position of women, although of course they are made in the context of a Bill which is supposed to be putting men and women on exactly the same footing. I cannot resist just reminidng the Committee of that.

Just let me interrupt—I particularly went out of my way to say that I wanted to make it quite clear that my remarks applied to men as well as women.

Very well; the Government will certainly look at the remarks made by my noble friend and the noble Baroness in that light. Indeed, we shall look carefully at what has been said by many of your Lordships, first by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, about the position of people who are doing valuable jobs—often very valuable jobs—but the very nature of their job means that it is not defined as "full-time".

Incidentally, there is one small technical point which I think it is right for me to inject, which is that both my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn and the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, I think were not entirely right in their assumption that Clause 3 only refers, in the requirements for relevant employment, to somebody who sticks in the same job. I think if the noble Earl glances at subsection (4) he will see that specific arrangements are made there for somebody who wants to change his or her job en route.

Certainly the Government will respond to what was said by my noble friend Lord Lauderdale and my noble friend Lord Harmar-Nicholls. The Government will look carefully at what has been said. I hope I have pointed out some of the difficulties in respect of this particular amendment from the Government's point of view, and I hope that with that response my noble friend will consider withdrawing the amendment.

Before my noble friend indicates what he is going to do, I should like to take up one personal reference made by my noble friend Lord Belstead. I welcome his emphasis on consistency and I hope that he will apply it himself. His argument on this occasion was against leaving matters to the discretion of the Secretary of State. When we come to subsequent amendments he will no doubt find that quoted against him.

There was a reason why I used that particular argument, and it was not a reason I had to resort to because I could think of nowhere else to resort. It was because we are talking in Clause 3 about an entitlement, and I genuinely think that there is some difficulty here, when my noble friend Lord Harmar-Nicholls talks about going wholly towards the Secretary of State's discretion. In considering the value of an amendment of this kind, I would ask the Committee to consider that one has to decide, first of all, do we really want to abandon what is meant to be, and indeed is written into the text as, an entitlement, or do we want to foresake that and go wholly to a matter of discretion? It is that which the Government will go on considering in the light of what has been said; but I hope that I have been able to point out some of the problems inherent in this amendment.

Before I sit down may I say that I realise I have not replied to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. It is not from any wish to be cavalier to the noble Lord, but I really do not think I can add very much to what I said at the last sitting of the Committee. The noble Lord asked me specifically whether a certificate would be issued to people before they go abroad. I cannot add to what I said to the noble Lord on that point. Undoubtedly, if people wished to approach the Home Office, if Clause 3 became law unamended, they would be able to thresh out with the Home Office where they stood. I am not in a position to say whether or not a certificate would be issued. But this point, important though it is, goes a little wide of the amendment we are discussing.

I am most encouraged by the support that this amendment has had in your Lordships' Committee, and I think the correct wording would be slightly encouraged by the second remarks by my noble friend on the Front Bench, rather than the remarks he made immediately following my moving of the amendment. I think the feeling in the Committee is that this is an extremely important point. The noble Lord the Minister has said that it would cause—I am paraphrasing his words, with apologies—confusion and anomalies. The reason I moved the amendment originally was that it would cause even more illogicalities and anomalies if the words "full-time" were left in. It is a question of evils, and I personally prefer the evil of deleting "full-time".

There is one point the noble Lord did not take up. I was going to make it and I was delighted that the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, made it from the Cross-Benches. Subsection (2) says very clearly the word "and" after (a) and after (b) and after (c). We have four provisos, of which "relevant employment"—and whether it should be full-time or not is what we are talking about—applies only to (b). So from the security point of view, if that is the right word, there are still paragraphs (a), (c) and (d) involved. I find difficulty here, but I think on balance I am not going to press the amendment. I should be most grateful if the Government would look very seriously at this position. It is, I think, an extremely important one, on which I hope we will see an improvement when the clause gets to Report stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 50:

Page 3, line 35, at end insert ("(whether or not in the United Kingdom)").

This would seem to be an admirable improvement in the provisions of this clause, and we naturally support it.

As one who was not as clear as I might have been about the meaning of the clause without these words, and at that time not having seen this amendment, I welcome this clarification very much indeed.

May I ask the noble Lord the Minister, as he said this refers to the qualification in subsection (2)(b), whether this has any effect on the references to overseas employment in two places in subsection (4)(a) and in two places in subsection (4)(b), or whether that is to be clarified as well?

The answer to the noble Lord is, no.

If I may refer back to the previous debate, on the 13th, when we were talking about the question of unemployment, the noble Lord, Lord Harmar-Nicholls, suggested that if a person was out of work in the United Kingdom and he was drawing unemployment benefit, for the purposes of this Bill he would be treated as if he was employed. I think this was a point which was not picked up by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate in the reply he gave at column 1087. Whatever the truth of the matter may be, whether a person is looked upon as employed if he is drawing unemployment benefit, is it not the fact that a person in that position would have a close tie or connection with the United Kingdom? Has not the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, reiterated again this afternoon, for the nth time in proceedings on this Bill, that the essence of nationality is that a person should have a close and continuing link with the United Kingdom. Therefore, while relevant employment outside the United Kingdom should perhaps have the character which is ascribed to it in the Bill, is it not an inappropriate concept for persons who are within the United Kingdom for a proportion of the two years leading up to the date of birth of the child?

Would not the noble Lord go a little further than he has done? I welcome the clarification which the amendment has brought to the Bill, but would they noble Lord not say on behalf of the Government that as far as a person's time in the United Kingdom is concerned, which is counted towards the two years, it does not make any difference whether he is in full-time or part-time employment or unemployed, because during the time when he is physically here within the country he must by definition have a close tie or connection with the United Kingdom?

For the record, I should like to support this amendment very strongly, if only so that the noble Lord the Minister does not think that I am always against his point of view.

I am grateful to my noble friend. So far as the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is concerned, I endeavoured on the last sitting of the Committee to point out the reasons why the Government felt that it was necessary to have what I called a "cross reference" between relevant employment and having a close connection with the United Kingdom. I think that it would be tedious if I were to go over that ground again.

Concerning the point which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, makes about being unemployed, that is a matter, of course, which the Committee may wish to discuss further later on. But clearly, at any rate my reading of the Bill is that the matter of being unemployed would mean that somebody would not fall within the scope of Clause 3(3), although I repeat what I said to the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, that, of course, provision is made in subsection (4) for somebody to have a period of time out of employment when he is changing jobs.

moved Amendment No. 50A:

Page 3, line 36, after ("company") insert ("firm").

I have no doubt that my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has noticed that in Clause 3(9) we find that the word "firm" is used—and used there, so far as I can see, for the first time. The strange aspect is that subsection (9) refers back to subsection (3) in such a way that one would assume that the word "firm" had been used in subsection (3), whereas it has not been used. Of course it may be that the draftsman, magnificent though he is and using the English language only in its strict meanings, has rather jumped a bit and taken it upon himself to use the word "firm" in its broader and looser meaning as well as in its strict and legal meaning. As I understand it, the word "firm" as a term of art in law, refers only to a partnership; whereas in ordinary common parlance, especially no doubt in the City of London, the word "firm" is used in relation to any company or association, incorporated or otherwise, as well as any kind of professional body. Of course, it may be that one has missed the point.

I hope that my noble friend will forgive me for intervening for a moment. He will observe that this is an amendment to an amendment. I am proposing to leave out the subsection altogether, which will simplify the matter. Will my noble friend also bear in mind that the word "firm" has a slightly different connotation in Scotland?

I had, in fact, noticed and I am sure that noble Lords have noticed the many amendments which are consequential upon the one which my noble friend is now moving. All the same, I think that we are entitled to some explanation, if there is a rational one—which there may not be of course—as to why it is that in subsecton (9), which my noble friend wishes to leave out, the word "firm" is used, but in subsection (3) it is not used. I can hardly believe that the parliamentary counsel really intends that the word "firm" shall be used in its wider and non-technical sense.

I have sought to learn here from the wiser and more experienced, and your Lordships will have heard my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter advising those in the position of my noble friend and myself that it would help us to give well-timed and occasional concessions. I hope that this is a good time for a concession, though. I fear that the concessions in the Committee stage, at least as regards the first part of it, may be rather occasional.

The difficulty so far as subsection (9) is concerned was one which we had appreciated. Having considered the matter as put forward by my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn we are persuaded that it would be possible now to do something to meet his point. I am glad, therefore, to be able to tell your Lordships, and in particular my noble friend, that we are prepared to come forward with amendments on Report to achieve this aim. At that stage also we shall take acount of what my noble friend Lord Renton has said. I think it likely that the intention was that a firm would be covered as an association—that is to say an unincorporated body of persons. We have the feeling that this is a fairly technical area and that therefore it would be preferable for us to come forward with our own amendments to deal with it rather than to accept those of my noble friend, and I hope that my noble friend will feel satisfied with that.

That undertaking will cover also the amendments which are down later in the name of my noble friend Lord Geddes, which I think are Amendments Nos. 79 and 81—and we are glad on that matter to be of the same mind as he is—and also the amendment which is down in the name of my noble friend Lady Elles, which I think is No. 80. I hope that, with that assurance, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Before the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, replies, I should like to say that I am sure that the Benches opposite feel very happy with the noble and learned Lord's reply. I am hoping that later in the proceedings some joy will equally be brought to the Opposition Benches because, as the noble Lord the Minister will know, when he quoted a number of concessions that had been made, he repeatedly referred to amendments moved by his noble friends. I hope that at some stage in these proceedings, he will be equally gracious to other sections of the Committee.

I intervene only to ask a question, I think that this was a very logical amendment to deal with the question of a firm—"an association of persons" was, I believe, the phrase that was used. But is it not equally illogical to have a clause of this kind which does not provide for the single employer who has an employee and who makes an arrangement with that employee to serve an association, or be it a single individual abroad who comes within the purview of this provision? I am at the moment unaware—and it may very well be my foolishness, for which I apologise to the noble and learned Lord—why this has to be an employer consisting of a body of persons or indeed a limited company. If the noble and learned Lord finds that, surprisingly, I have made a sensible point, I wonder whether he will agree to consider this aspect for the Report stage, as well as the aspect that has been covered by the amendment that we are now discussing.

I certainly would not express surprise that the noble Lord should make a sensible point—not at all. I think that these provisions are drafted against the background of what is understood to be the likely circumstances, and the use of the words "company" and "association" arises for that reason. But I certainly undertake to consider, with my colleagues, the problem that the noble Lord has raised, in order to see whether, in fact, there is anything that we ought to do in that connection.

In view of what the noble Lord said about the distribution of the amendments in respect of which we have been able to undertake to make alterations in the Bill, one of the earliest that we said we would consider very carefully came from his noble friend Lord Gifford.

I should like clarification of the situation in which we now find ourselves. I have spoken to a large number of amendments and have also referred to Amendments Nos. 76 and 78. I gather that my noble and learned friend has replied to me on Amendments Nos. 76 and 78 and said that he will look into this with a view to bringing in more appropriate amendments in lieu of them. He has accepted in principle the amendments to include the word "firm", but again he is also going to consider what is the most appropriate form of amendment. Is the situation that he wants me to withdraw my amendment? I see that my noble and learned friend is indicating agreement, so with that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 51:

Page 3, line 37, at end insert ("or").

In this case there is no difference between us about the sense of the matter. The subsection that we are considering lists a number of forms of employment which can be "relevant employment", and then the word "or" between the last two of these is an indication of the nature of the link which exists. I think that it is in accordance with normal drafting style to express it in that way. It would not be wrong to have "or" in at each of the preceding breaks, but it would add nothing except an extra word, and in the interests of economy and of elegance of style, I think that it would be right to leave this subsection as it is. In the light of that explanation, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I am not sure that the elegance of style is not claiming too much for the words of the Bill. However, I agree with the point of the noble and learned Lord.

As someone who programmes computers, may I say that the words "and" and "or" have very definite logical meanings, and many of the problems that arise in legal documents are as a result of using the word "and", when one really means "or". Perhaps one should be aware of these distinctions when drafting. If a little more rigorous logic in the use of these two words was applied in drafting Bills, the Bills might be clearer at the end of the day.

It is the legal precedent that the word "and" can mean "or". Indeed, in the last case in which I had the honour of appearing as counsel in the Appellate Committee, I successfully established that proposition.

I suppose that computers will need to learn to cope with "the noble and learned Lord"!

I am not entirely sure whether I should feel either chastened and/or reprimanded, but in view of the comments made, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 21:

Page 3, line 41, after ("in") insert ("or associated with a company or association established in").

As regards Clause 3(3)(c), to which my noble friend referred, that is a continuing link which remains throughout the time of the employment. Subsection (3)(b), on the other hand, is concerned with a link which is established only at the beginning of the employment. In other words, it is a link that depends upon the way in which the employment itself was begun.

Clause 3(3)(b) was widened, in answer to representations made, in order to include some cases which appeared to be deserving cases. For example one of these was where a company in the United Kingdom grants a licence to the overseas company to manufacture its products and, as part of the agreement, agrees to provide staff who will be employed by the overseas company and who will provide expert assistance to it. That is the kind of case which the definition, as it now appears in Clause 3(3)(b), is intended to cover.

My noble friend's amendment would go considerably further than that. It would bring within the definition of "relevant employment" employment with an overseas company which was linked with the United Kingdom only because it had been arranged by a company, say, an employment agency, established overseas but which was controlled by or which itself controlled an employment agency in this country. I think that it would be impossible to accept that such employment in itself reflected any sort of real or significant link with this country. The difference between Clause 3(3)(b) and Clause 3(3)(c) is quite an important one in this area, and, therefore, I would ask my noble friend to accept that the logic which he was seeking to apply from Clause 3(3)(c) back to Clause 3(3)(b) is not appropriate in this instance. In the light of what I have said, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

I think that I can follow the counter-logic—if I may so call it—of my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate. Having tabled the amendment, obviously, I should still like to see the extension that my amendment would give, but it is a relatively minor point and I beg leave to withdraw it.

moved Amendment No. 60:

Page 4, line 44, leave out from ("fit") to end of line 45.

This series of amendments are at the very least drafting amendments and they may, as my noble friend said, have some effect in substance. It may be helpful if I read the subsection as I think it would be if my noble friend's amendments were given effect to. I think subsection (5) would in that event read:

"If in the special circumstances of any particular case the Secretary of State thinks fit,

(a) subsection (2) may be treated as if the reference to twelve months were a reference to six years; and

(b) subsection (2) (b) may be treated as if the reference to two years were a reference to a shorter period".

I accept that at first sight the wording of subsection (5) as it now is may appear rather cumbersome. It does however, we think, achieve the intention, and we fear that this is not quite so true of the revised wording proposed by my noble friend Lord Geddes. May I just say briefly why we think that? First, in Amendment No. 60 my noble friend is seeking to remove the words,

"he may do either or both of the following things, namely—".

Now I suggest that these words do in fact serve a rather useful purpose in that they make quite clear that each of the two discretionary powers set out in the subsection may be exercised independently. This is an important point that would not be equally clear in the revised version.

Secondly, in Amendments Nos. 61 to 64, my noble friend is seeking to replace the words

"the Secretary of State may treat subsection 2 (or 2 (b))"

by the words,

"subsection (2) (or 2 (b)) may be treated".

Once again, I think this is to lose a little in the rewording. The wording as it stands emphasises the responsibility for exercising these powers by the Secretary of State.

Finally, in Amendment No. 65, my noble friend is seeking to replace the words, "such shorter period as he thinks fit" in subparagraph (b) with the words "a shorter period". Now, it is true that the words "the Secretary of State thinks fit" already appear at the beginning of the subsection. It may therefore be thought that there is no need for them to be repeated here. They are not, however, just repetition. They draw attention to the fact that two separate discretionary powers are involved here: one to decide whether or not a period shorter than two years should be accepted and another to decide of what length this shorter period should appropriately be. These are both quite important powers, distinct powers, and as my noble friend Lord Belstead said earlier, this is a section where we are concerned to confer an entitlement. It is important, therefore, that any discretions which are involved should be fairly clearly defined, so that, if a court had to consider the entitlement, they would have a clear view of the areas in which discretion operated.

This is a passage of the Bill to which reference has been made in exchanges in which my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, took part earlier. I referred then to the fact that (b) could lead to a discretion that would enable one to overcome difficulties that might occur in a particular case over the 90 days. Although it does not expressly cover that, I quite agree, the period that the Secretary of State is bound to consider might be shortened in an appropriate case so as to avoid the necessity of covering a particularly troublesome period that extended over 90 days.

I hope that, in the light of these explanations, my noble friend may feel that the wording we have chosen in this important area is appropriate. I am grateful to him, however, for his help in seeking to simplify the Bill. I am sorry that on this occasion we do not feel that the result is quite as good as he hoped for.

The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate referred again to an issue which arose the other day on the 90-day provision. I should like to be a little clearer in my mind than I am as to what it is he has just said to us. Has he been telling the Committee that, even if this clause goes through as it stands, there will be a statutory 90-day period of limitation? And notwithstanding the fact that there does not appear to be any express power given to the Secretary of State to modify that 90-day rule, is there nonetheless somewhere to be found in the sub-section, or in the Bill, a power in the Secretary of State to override the 90-day statutory figure? I should be grateful if he would clarify that.

May I take one further point which I am sure he will deal with with his habitual kindness? He used the phrase which his noble friend Lord Belstead uses quite regularly to the effect that this clause gives an entitlement. It is of course riddled with provisions like, "If the Secretary of State thinks fit", and the rest of it. Am I to understand from what has been said now and earlier that, notwithstanding that phraseology, it would be possible for an aggrieved person to appeal to the courts? If such an aggrieved person sought to appeal to the courts, would he be put in the extreme position of having to establish that no reasonable Secretary of State could possibly have "seen fit", or would the merits of the matter be open on appeal to the courts? I should be grateful if the noble and learned Lord would deal with both those points with his habitual clarity.

So far as the first point is concerned, the power we are looking at in subsection (5)(b) is a power to shorten the period of two years. The 90 days is an interval which can occur within the period of employment which might be looked upon as trying to meet the two years. The point that my noble friend made on the last occasion—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, also dealt with this—was that there might be a rather peculiar case in which the period happened to be just over 90 days for some special reason.

I agree that there is no power in this clause as presently drafted to cope with that directly. That is to say, there is no power to extend the 90 days. But of course one can see that this power might be made relevant to that by shortening the period under con-sideration so as to leave out of account the awkward period with the more than 90-day interval in it. For example, supposing that, right at the beginning of the two-year period under consideration, the person in question was out of employment for, say, 93 days, and thereafter everything was perfectly all right; he was working fully from then onwards. It would be perfectly open to the Secretary of State under the power in subsection (5)(b) to say not the full two years but the two years minus 93 days, and in that way get over the difficulty, at least in that case. That is what I had in mind.

What would happen if the 93 days came in the middle of a period and not conveniently at the beginning?

Again, subject to the circumstances as a whole—and it is a pure discretion—it would be open to the Secretary of State to consider making the two-year period so short that it would be the period after that awkward 90, 91 or 92 day interval had occurred. So if it was about the middle, the period to which he would actually shorten it might be just under a year.

The noble and learned Lord always delights the Committee with his clarity and simplicity of mind. May I therefore ask him to tell me why, instead of going through the whole mechanics of the two years and the discretion, there is not a simple provision in the Bill wich gives a similar discretion to the Home Secretary to reduce the period of 90 days or, rather, add to the period of 90 days?

Yes, add to it.

That would seem to me, with my simple mind but not as clear a one as the noble and learned Lord's, to be a rather more advantageous way of dealing with the problem.

As I said earlier, it is obvious that this clause has to deal with a great variety of circumstances and if you deal with all the possible circumstances you will certainly sacrifice the clarity which the present clause has, and the more special circumstances you deal with the more difficult the whole thing will become. It is important to remember that there is an overriding and complete discretion to grant citizenship to a minor in Clause 3(1), and in my submission there is a limit to the number of subsidiary discretions that it is right to have, and subsection 5(b) is an appropriate one. I do not for a moment suggest that overcoming 90 days is the only purpose of that subsection; it is, rather, looking at the period and seeing whether in the circumstances it is a period that must be satisfied.

Coming to the second matter raised by my noble friend, it goes back to the first occasion on which the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, raised the issue in connection with the phrase "the Secretary of State thinks fit" where it first occurs, and it was also raised by my noble friend Lord Colville. The intention in Clause 3(2) is to confer an entitlement, and that is what is to be found at the beginning of that provision:

"A person born outside the United Kingdom shall be entitled"

and so on. The phrase "if he thinks fit" does not thereafter occur in the main provisions of that clause; the phrase "if the Secretary of State is satisfied" occurs, but the phrase "if the Secretary of State thinks fit", which is the appropriate phrase for a discretion, does not thereafter occur in the main provisions of Clause 3(2). Therefore, in Clause 3(2) the intention is that the facts, if they are established, should confer on the person in question an entitlement which he could raise with the court, and it not being a matter of discretion, he would not have to satisfy the very heavy burden, to which my noble friend referred, of overcoming a discretion by showing that no reasonable Secretary of State could have exercised his discretion in the manner exhibited in the particular case.

Within that, in order to deal with special cases, there is a subsidiary discretion in subsection (5), and that is why I said it was necessary to make as clear as one could what that discretion was because if there was a question of entitlement under discussion, then a separate test would apply if it was being sought to overcome in some way the exercise of discretion. But the discretions in subsection (5) are discretions in favour of the applicant, and therefore it is most unlikely that the applicant himself would want to challenge them, except possibly to try to say that the only reasonable exercise would be to have a shorter period in the case of paragraph (b) or a longer period in the case of (a), but it is in subsection (5) that that sort of test might be relevant. Once the result of that was established, the entitlement test would apply to the rest of the clause; and as the Committee knows, I have undertaken that we will look at the formulation of this to try to make it as clear as we can in the various contexts in which it occurs. I undertook to do that in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, much earlier.

While taking up a point just made by the noble and learned Lord, I will not go back to the concession he has kindly made about the "satisfied" formula, but he indicated that the "thinks fit" formula, which confers a pure discretion, might be challenged on the unreasonableness ground. That cannot be right if Clause 43 stays intact, and perhaps the noble and learned Lord would confirm that Clause 3(5) is one of the discretions which would be caught by Clause 43(2); that is, the discretion about which, if it were exercised against the applicant, the Secretary of State would not have to give any reasons and would not be subject to any kind of appeal or review.

Yes, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, about that, when one takes account of the effect of the later provision. I was really attempting to distinguish between the kind of burden that ordinarily exists to overcome a discretion and the kind of burden on an applicant to show that he was entitled. To distinguish between those two was what I had in mind and I hope I succeeded in doing so.

I am grateful to my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate for the very full explanation he has given, particularly on the last point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford. I shall read with great interest the exact words my noble and learned friend used in his explanation and meanwhile beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 68A:

I am grateful to my noble friend for his clear explanation of this detailed and interesting amendment. I think that it raises problems and I should like to respond by trying to point out some of the problems as the Government see them. The normal avenue to British citizenship for an adult under the Bill is through naturalisation, unless the person concerned holds citizenship of the British Dependent Territories, or British Overseas Citizenship, or is a British subject under the Bill, or a British protected person, and then there is the entitlement to citizenship under Clause 4, which we shall come to shortly. An adult should be considered in his own right and upon the strength of his own connections with the United Kingdom.

Naturally in considering an application for naturalisation from an adult born overseas to a British citizen by descent, we would take into account the fact that the applicant's parent was a British citizen, but, frankly, once one is an adult, the status of one's parents cannot be decisive. The person would be considered on his or her own merits, and not entirely upon their parents, and this we believe is a fundamental objection to the amendment. Although my noble friend has put in some very interesting lines which would take the person concerned into citizenship, it depends initially on the fact that the person concerned is a child of a citizen by descent.

My noble friend might say that a different approach is justified with a person born overseas to a British citizen by descent, particularly if he has the links with this country specified in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the amendment. My noble friend has said that such a person will have links with this country through his parentage, his education, his employment, which justify conferring upon him an entitlement to our citizenship.

But for a moment I should like to consider the strength of the links that such a person will have with this country under the amendment. It might be said that the parent of the child might have had links with the United Kingdom through employment, but the parent simply failed to apply for the child to be registered under Clause 3(2) within 12 months of the child's birth. But we have specifically provided in Clause 3(5)(a) that there should be a discretion to accept applications made in this way up to six years after the child's birth. Although my noble friend dealt in great detail with practically every part of his amendment, in listening to him I was never quite sure why the application would not have been under made Clause 3, when it could have been.

On the other hand, it might be said that the parent had close connections with the United Kingdom but these did not fall within the ambit of Clause 3(2), and since the family never resided in the United Kingdom together, the child had no claim to registration under Clause 3(6)—the one about coming back to the United Kingdom. But as has been amply demonstrated, the ambit of Clause 3(2) as it now stands is very considerable, and where a family has real connections with the United Kingdom, but for some reason cannot meet the requirements of Clause 3(2), and the child does not qualify under Clause 3(6) (which is the coming home part of the clause), then there is always the avenue of registration under the discretionary power in Clause 3(1)—the power which has always been in the law of the land since the 1948 Act.

May I now turn to consider the ties with this country set out in paragraphs (b) and (c), one of which the applicant has to hold in his own right. First, there is the requirement in paragraph (b) of my noble friend's amendment that the applicant shall have qualified in the United Kingdom to practise in a profession designated by the Secretary of State. Of course, it is quite true that the professions which my noble friend mentioned indicate a significant period of training, which I presume under this amendment would have to be undertaken in the United Kingdom.

But we are dealing here with someone who has been born overseas whose connections with the United Kingdom, or through his family, are, as I have demonstrated, almost certainly very slight; otherwise, there would be the applications under Clause 3. Once that person has completed his or her training, he or she may well leave the country and return to the country of birth, and there is nothing in the amendment to stop the person doing that. I do not deny the formative effect of our institutions of higher education and professional training; and, of course, I do not deny for one moment the absolute right—indeed, very likely the desirability—of somebody, having trained here, to go away again. But it is a very different thing from saying that that is a good thing to do to saying that that should as of right confer citizenship upon the person concerned.

Secondly, there is the alternative requirement in paragraph (c) of the amendment. This, I think, is rather closer, and it is the bit which has two limbs. First, the applicant has to be educated here for at least four years; but if then a child, that person will presumably have been here on his own. Otherwise, if the parents were here, of course, he would have qualified under Clause 3(6). But if we are talking about a student who is coming from overseas, although his parents are citizens by descent, he is presumably a person coming and attending university or polytechnic here and then getting a job, albeit with a United Kingdom-based firm, and then going away again, perhaps for the whole of the rest of his life.

Again, although I do not doubt for one moment that such a person may be an admirable person, I really do not see that that coming back, being educated and going away again is really a basis for the conferment of citizenship. My noble friend raised an extremely important point that such a person might be stateless. I would hope that in an instance where that might be the case Schedule 2(4) would cover such a person.

I hope I have dealt with the aspects of my noble friend's amendment which are important. I will certainly look very carefully at my noble friend's amendment again, because there really is a great deal in this and my noble friend's explanation was detailed and close. I would ask my noble friend, for his part, perhaps, to have a look at the Government's reply before deciding what it is ultimately that he would wish to do about the amendment.

I do not want to hold your Lordships up on this but may I point out where, in the case of one or two things, I think my noble friend has not quite seized what I was after. Really, the whole point of making this effort to extend the avenues to British citizenship is that there are wide areas that are not covered in the earlier part of the clause. My noble friend seems to have a fixation about being employed in British industry, for example; as if it were that you could not maintain your connections with this country unless you were employed by a British firm. Surely that cannot be correct. That is one of the main reasons why I have drafted my amendment in this way.

My noble friend said in terms that the connections with the United Kingdom were very slight. It seems to me that this is by no means so. Here you have parents who have themselves, in all probability, been educated in Britain, and they then go abroad. Mark you, I agree that this is not necessarily so, but this is the sort of case I am taking: the parents have been educated here, they go abroad, they are not employed by a British company but they do maintain their links, possibly by coming home from time to time and having holidays in this country; or, in the second leg of the alternative, they send their child over to have its education in this country. But the point is that, not being in relevant employment, they cannot use the avenue laid down in the first part of this clause.

Another thing I should like to draw to the attention of my noble friend is that he has assumed that the child who comes over and, on passing his minority, either qualifies himself professionally or joins a firm in Britain to get further training and experience, will be going away again immediately. Of course, it is possible he may wish to go abroad, but having got his close connections with Great Britain I see no reason why he should not go abroad as a British citizen. I really can see none whatsoever. But I would guess that at least as many people who have the sort of pattern of life as indicated in my amendment would not be going abroad again. I have noticed that in many families there is a curious alternation, so to speak—one generation goes abroad, the next stays at home and the next goes abroad again.

But what is of great importance is that from this country we should have people with professional or technical training going out in a fairly steady stream so as to maintain the connections of this country with the rest of the world, and the rest of the world with this country. This is the whole point of my amendment; but I would lay great emphasis, at the end, on the enormous importance that people who do this attach to their remaining British and their children remaining British. I do not suppose that by any stretch of the imagination I could have got the conditions exactly right in this amendment, but I do com- mend it to my noble friend for further study. He has said he will look at it, and I am sure he will. I see the noble Lord opposite rising in his place, so I give way to him.

The noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, is courteous, and I assure him that I rose only in order to say that my noble friends and I have much sympathy with this amendment. I would not have jumped up in order to say anything hostile to what he had said. It is right that a lot of consideration should be given to widening the sphere that we are discussing. Perhaps I may add just two points to what the noble Lord said in the hope that the Government, in considering this matter again, will take them into account.

It is obviously perfectly true—and this has been said already—that we need to encourage people from this country to go abroad, spread their skills, and do it for the benefit of this country. That is right. But equally it must be true that if you have people of merit you want them to come to this country, and they are not likely to come here unless they know that they can be part of the British family and can be admitted to British citizenship. Therefore, that obviously is a very good reason for seeing that the clause is widened.

There was one point that I did not understand in the reply of the noble Lord the Minister, and it was this. I thought he was saying that it was open to such a person to apply for naturalisation. I believe I understood him correctly to say that. This is a vicious circle, because I am not sure, unless I am told that I am wrong, that there is an automatic right to enter this country by such an individual, who will have to reside here for a minimum period of time before he can apply for naturalisation, and who furthermore during that time will have to have unconditional permission to reside here. This is a vicious circle because I do not think that any of us can by any means take it for granted that there will be permission to do anything else but visit—and certainly not to stay—for the requisite period. One knows the conditions on entry to this country are usually made clear: that the person concerned is not permitted to take employment here or is limited in his stay here for a certain period of time.

These are two points which the Government, in their kindness, may bear in mind when considering what on the face of it appears to be a very worthwhile amendment. It may be that there are some problems that we have to get over. The spirit of the amendment is obviously one that my noble friends and I appreciate.

When my noble friend felt the Government have a fixation about tying an entitlement to British citizenship by descent to employment in British firms, this is not borne out if one reads Clause 3. The whole point of widening the scope of Clause 3 was that it would give an infinitely wider scope than that particular interpretation which is the impression which my noble friend had.

If somebody in the circumstances that he envisaged comes back to this country, he also asked, why is it that they cannot then go away again but take with them the conferment of British citizenship? My noble friend said that he did not think that such a person would necessarily go away immediately from these shores. So often families work on a basis of one generation away and another generation at home. Humanity happens to work out like that.

We are talking about a situation where we have increased enormously the scope of the people who can transmit their citizenship as of right by birth by bringing within the rights of transmission women who have never been there before and also those who are not only born but who are naturalised and registered as citizens. This is going to mean that the people who can transmit their citizenship to the next generation by birth are going to be increased enormously.

Without going over old ground again, it is basically for that reason that not only the present Government, but the previous Government in their Green Paper reached the conclusion that the right thing to do was to say that citizenship could be transmitted as of right to the first generation and, after that, rules should be made. Coming now to the present Government and the White Paper, the rules should be either through relevant employment or through the other avenues of families who return to the country or through the general discretionary registration power of the Secretary of State under Clause 3(1) which has always been in the law ever since 1948.

Taking into account what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, I shall look at the detailed amendment. It necessitated a lot of research so far as the Government were concerned and my noble friend's remarks were lengthy and detailed. If he is prepared to look at my reply, I shall be prepared to look at his remarks.

So that the Committee are informed of the validity or otherwise of the point could the noble Lord deal with naturalisation? He said that one of the solutions to the problem regarding the amendment was naturalisation. I tried to point out that this was a vicious circle. Could he deal with the point about right of entry and residence of an unconditional nature which is required before there can be a naturalisation application?

I was more downright; I was saying the people that my noble friend wishes to deal with in the amendment who will be adult should become British citizens by naturalisation. That is the way which is favoured under the Bill. I am not trying to avoid replying to the question, but we are going to come to these matters on Clause 5 and Schedule 1. This will arise again and again. To suggest in some way that naturalisation cannot be an avenue to citizenship because of rules about entry is to suggest that nobody can ever become naturalised. That is not the case. The avenue for naturalisation is going to be there for people who are able to enter the country under the immigration rules and fulfil the requirements for character, language and residence. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable for me to suggest that the people who my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has in mind should have—because they will be adults and not minors—the avenue of naturalisation under the Bill.

I am grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for what has been said. I hope that my noble friend will pay great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said. Perhaps my noble friend in the course of studying this amendment will have regard to the ways in which the people, about whom I have been talking, can gain entry into this country. Will they be given sufficient time in getting the right to stay here to be naturalised because their parents were British by descent? This would greatly ease the situation.

My noble friend has not quite seized what the whole of my clause is about because he said that a method is provided in the second part of Clause 3. People who have either their own businesses abroad or are employed in foreign concerns will have to retire from those early in order to come out of those jobs if they are going to avail themselves of the three-year period of residence during the minority of the child. One way of easing this would be to return, for the purposes of this Bill, to a minority of 21. It would give us slightly greater scope. The fact is that this will not happen.

I can envisage that parents may be prepared to come over with the child when he first comes to this country and no doubt he will be allowed in then. But, unless there is some other provision made, he may well be subjected to a time limit for a stay in this country to prevent his being naturalised. I find it very difficult to stomach—I am sure that parents in this position would—the idea that they have to come back to their own country to get their son naturalised. It is an extraordinary position. I hope that we shall find some way round this and I look to my noble friend to do so. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 69:

Page 5, line 23, after ("terminated") insert ("or if his father and mother were living permanently apart,").

I support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, which I think raises a lot of important considerations. Regarding Clause 3, this is the first time we have been able directly to consider Clause 3(6), and it is a very important clause. It is going to be the main avenue by which people who have been born abroad and married abroad and who want to come back and bring their family back to Britain will be able to register their children as full British citizens. It is not, I suggest, in perfect form, and the amendment raises the main defect in it.

There are going to be a lot of cases—are there not?—involving a woman (I speak particularly of a woman) who has been born abroad and who has married abroad a foreign national, whose marriage has failed and who then wants to come back to Britain with her family and take up residence here. She returns and does not get divorced either because divorce is against her religious principles or because divorce is impossible or because the husband will not consent. The years go by and the eldest child begins to approach the age of 18, which is the cut-off point. Beyond that age the application will be no good. In this sort of case the husband will often not wish to consent to the child becoming a citizen of this country. He may be proud of his own citizenship and in any case, because of the breakdown of the marriage, may not be keen to allow a change of citizenship for his children. So the suggestion that the conditions should be widened to allow not only for one party's consent to be dispensed with on a divorce but to allow it to be dispensed with on a permanent separation is absolutely right, and I hope that the Minister will give this favourable consideration.

I hope that the Minister will either define "terminate", which might terminate the debate, or accept the amendment which the noble Baroness has moved. It seems to me utterly reasonable and the only consolation any of us has, sitting in any kind of assembly, whether it be in Synod, in your Lordships' Committee, or a parochial church council, is to take refuge in Dr. Johnson's dictum,

"that which is not formed by reason cannot be destroyed by reason".

As this is utterly reasonable, I cannot see that the Minister can continue to resist it and continue to have sleepful nights. I very much hope that the Government accept this amendment, which covers far more than it says, and which would leave in no doubt many people who find themselves abandoned with no home, no citizenship and not much clear hope for their children.

May I ask my noble friend about the position of the common law wife? After all, the common law wife is now recognised in this country. I do not know whether they would be qualified or considered illegitimate under this clause. I should like to know the position with regard to the common law wife who has been living with a man for many years in this country and has children and what would be the position of the children, because much of this Bill deals with married women.

I should like to ask my noble friend Lady Elles why she has inserted in the amendment the word "permanently". Is she not putting up a considerable obstacle in the way of the applicant? The fact that the parents are living apart is easily demonstrable but who is to know, after they have been living apart for some time, that they may not come together? Therefore, to include the word "permanently" must put a heavy onus on the applicant. I wonder whether the amendment would not be much better without it.

This amendment seeks to enable a child to be registered if he or she is born overseas to a British citizen by descent and later comes to this country with one of the parents to live. Subsection (6) as it stands at present requires the child, before he can acquire an entitlement to be registered, to come to the United Kingdom and live with both parents unless, for reasons which are set out in subsection (7), he is effectively part of a one-parent family.

The provisions of subsections (6) and (7) are designed to accord an entitlement to registration where the future of the children concerned can reasonably be considered to lie in the United Kingdom. This amendment could cover cases where this would not be so. For instance, it would be possible for the family to make arrangements for one parent to reside here for three years solely to enable the child to acquire British citizenship, and the family would then be able to re-unite on a more permanent basis abroad. That would be unsatisfactory and would certainly be counter to the purpose of the Bill, which is to confer British citizenship only on people with real connections with this country.

I do not mean to be flippant in any way, but, arising from the intervention by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter, I may say that there are sometimes difficulties in deciding on the particular position which my noble friend Lady Elles has in mind. When I looked at my noble friend's amendment, my mind went back to a rather different situation. It certainly used to be the law—I do not know whether it is still—that if a voluntary school were to be closed and the school sold, the site had to be offered back to the original donor, unless the donor could no longer be found.

I remember a case, which is probably apocryphal, of such a school, whose site had been donated by the family of my noble friend Lord Salisbury; and the time came when the number of pupils fell away and the decision to close the school was taken. Entirely by an oversight, the existing Marquess, when that happened, was not consulted about the matter. When the people concerned were asked why they had not consulted the then Marquess of Salisbury the answer they gave was that he could not be found!

I believe there is a genuine difficulty in these cases and the Government believe that the solution is that which was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Elles at the end of her remarks. These are precisely the sort of cases which ought to be covered by Clause 3(1), which contains the general powers to register. It is worth saying, in case your Lordships' Committee feel that this answer is one that has suddenly been dreamt up by the Government spokesman on this particular Bill, that this power of the Secretary of State is in fact a very old one; it has been the law since the 1948 Act. It is used in deserving cases and I join with the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Peterborough in saying that these are exactly the sort of cases that ought to come under the general registration powers of Clause 3(1).

What has just been said by the noble Lord the Minister makes me feel very uneasy. This particular subsection is both very wide and very narrow in its scope, and we are back again to what the Secretary of State "thinks fit". I should not have thought that that was good enough and it certainly does not answer the point that was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Elles. I do not believe the noble Baroness got an answer to the question she asked concerning the definition of the word "terminated". It appears to me that "terminated" must mean that the marriage has come to an end, and therefore it means that the couple have been divorced. It follows from that that the point she made about couples being separated because of religious reasons is very relevant to this matter. There are also cases where one of the partners may go off to live with somebody else, and although in some cases there may be quite an amicable separation, in other cases one spouse may not know where the other spouse is and cannot get in touch. Neither can one fail to take into account those cases where the child's entitlement is used as a weapon in a marital quarrel. This is also something which happens between husband and wife and it seems to me to be quite wrong that the child should suffer.

I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, had a point when he raised the question of whether the word "permanently" should appear in this subsection. While the noble Lord was speaking it occurred to me that there could be a case where the parents are still married and where there is no intention of breaking up the marriage. One of the parents might come to this country with a child in order to acquire a home or to arrange for the child's education. Therefore, both the parent and the child might stay here for some time. It is clear that the family's home is in the United Kingdom—establishing the rather mystical "close connection" that covers the case— but the family will still be "separated", even though the separation would not be of a permanent nature. There may also be cases where the wife will return home with the child for some time in order to look after an elderly relative, for example. That does not mean that the marriage has been terminated or that there has been a permanent separation.

We certainly support this amendment because it appears that if the clause is left as it stands, with only what I must call a dubious proviso in subsection (1), then the clause can only work to the disadvantage of a number of children. The number of children so affected might not be very great but that is immaterial; it is an injustice even if it is an injustice affecting only one child. I do believe that this amendment should be supported. The Government should not rely on Clause 3(1) but should write something clear into the Bill, or if the Government reject this amendment and the noble Baroness intends to press it, we will certainly support her.

It does seem to me wrong continually to rely on the discretion of the Secretary of State in Clause 3(1). I appreciate that, as the noble Lord the Minister said, this power or something very similar to it has been in our legislation since as far back as 1948, but surely we should limit as much as possible the number of occasions when one wants to leave it to the Secretary of State to exercise a very wide power of this kind. Even though the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness may not be in the precise form that the Government would like, if the Minister is prepared to stand at the Dispatch Box as he did and say that this is the sort of case where the Secretary of State would exercise his discretion, then he could equally well give instructions to the parliamentary draftsman to produce a form of words which gives effect to the wishes of your Lordships' Committee. I am sure that the noble Lord has heard enough from all sides of the Committee to realise not only that the amendment is welcomed universally but that many people would prefer to see something even wider.

I personally agree with what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, when he pointed out that permanent separation would be very difficult to test and that if the parents were separated for the three-year period provided for in subsection (6), that would be enough of a test to be written into the Bill. But if one parent returned to this country leaving the other parent overseas, and remained here for the qualifying period without being accompanied by the other spouse, then I should have thought that that was a separation that justified conferring citizenship on the child without the presence of the other parent. Whether there was the possibility of reconstructing the marriage at the end of the three-year period seems to me to be quite irrelevant as to whether or not citizenship should be conferred on the child.

I was disappointed that the noble Lord the Minister did not reply to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Vickers. It is quite usual these days for couples to live together without getting married and for them to have several children, although this may be more common in some communities than it is in others. In this day and age I do not believe that we can write into this Bill, which deals with the conferring of privileges which might be vital to the future of people's lives, provisos which make those privileges conditional upon their parents having solemnised their union in a church.

I hope the Minister will take this back. I agree with what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, and maybe this is a question that could be returned to at Report stage if we do not have precisely the right wording now. But unless some undertaking of that kind is given, I hope that the noble Baroness will press her amendment, and if she does we on these Benches will certainly support her.

Since I have been guilty of not replying to two questions, perhaps I may answer now. The definition of "terminated" is, of course, a legal termination and no other definition applies. A legal termination is what is meant by the word "terminated" in this subsection in the context of this Bill. With regard to the question asked by my noble friend Lady Vickers, in a situation involving a common law wife the child would benefit from the mother's citizenship but not from the father's citizenship. I believe the difficulty which the Government see is that each case would probably be different and would have to be the subject of value judgments. In making his remarks the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, made a series of value judgments. The noble Lord is absolutely at liberty to make those judgments, but even if one were to agree with all that was said by the noble Lord—and I do not know that I did—it would be very difficult to write those value judgments into the statute. That is why I personally believe that these are cases which should be dealt with under the general discretion of Clause 3(1). Whether that is also the view held by my noble friend Lady Elles I do not know, but I think the moment has come to find out.

Before my noble friend decides what to do, may I say this? I apologise for not being here earlier, but I was in another committee. When I saw that my noble friend's amendments were being called, with both of which I have a lot of sympathy, I wanted to come in. I would not have added my voice—my vote would have been sufficient, if it were called for—except for the defence which my noble friend Lord Belstead has put up, which I find particularly irritating. In his first reply, he explained why this amendment could not be accepted. In some intricate way, somebody may be able to turn and twist it and one half of the family may be on the Continent, while the other half is here. That kind of defence, putting up this mythical, convoluted and intricate argument to get around something, is disturbing, because it is no answer to the possibly hundreds or thousands who, for quite genuine reasons, need the kind of protection which this amendment would give.

I am reminded of the lady living in a house, who objected because she could see somebody doing something in a window that she found rather unpleasant. She wanted the authorities to have a look at it, so the police came round and said, "But you can't see in the window where you say these awful things are happening." She said "Can't you? You bring up a table, put a chair on top, stand on a box on top of that and then you will be able to see." I hope that that rather convoluted explanation of the kind of thing that may happen—and it needs a lot of imagination to get to the point where my noble friend did on this—is not going to be brought in again on such practical questions as this amendment brings to the fore.

I am extremely grateful for the support which I have had from all sides, including the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, on the Opposition Front Bench and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. The point that I wished to make was that, as the Bill is now worded, it is giving grounds for disagreement on the basis of religion and I wish to stick to that point. That is precisely why I put in the word "permanent". I am thinking of cases where there can be a judicial separation, but in legal terms—and in accordance with the definition of my noble friend, which I accept—it is neither divorce nor annulment of the marriage.

I accept that in a Bill of this kind there will be a lot of difficulties. People either know of, or imagine, all kinds of cases where the provisions of this Bill can be got around and where it can be severely abused. I think that we all accept that. But my noble friend the Minister has been made aware of the kind of case that I am thinking of, and I want assurances from him—not now, but at the next stage of the Bill, or in writing that, particularly, those women who have children abroad, and of whom they are given legal guardianship, can bring them back to this country.

We have all, particularly in this party—and I would remind my noble friend of that—made enormous studies of the rights of one-parent families, and have made all kinds of recommendations for their protection, whether they live in this country or in another country. I think that we as a party—and I speak now from the Conservative Benches—should not be seen to be failing in looking after those who may be in distress in any other part of the world outside the United Kingdom. On those grounds, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 70:

It certainly seems to me that this amendment, too, should be supported, because I think the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, has shown us that if both the parents die the child is not only in great personal and tragic difficulties but also in great citizenship difficulties. The noble Lord explained the amendment so well, that I shall not rehearse these points again. But, in addition, it seems that if the mother of an illegitimate child dies the child will have no right to citizenship without this amendment, because the relationship that is necessary for citizenship of an illegitimate child is through the mother. Therefore, if the mother dies there will be no entitlement. But if there is a reference to his guardian and the mother dies, the illegitimate child will also have a right of citizenship by way of the guardian. I shall be glad to hear what the Minister says in reply to those points.

As has already been pointed out, the purpose of subsection (6) is to provide a basis for deciding that a person born outside the United Kingdom has a sufficient connection with the United Kingdom to be entitled to citizenship. The nature of the connection is three years' residence in the United Kingdom, subject to qualifications, with that person's family—father and mother, if they are both alive. As my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn has so clearly pointed out, the provision in subsection (7) is designed to deal with the situation where the father or mother have died. If both father and mother have died, then this method of demonstrating connection is not open, because, in the nature of things, the family, sadly, is not there to have such a connection.

Certainly, I strongly sympathise with the matter which my noble friend has raised. His solution is to refer to the child's guardian where the child has lost both parents. It is clear that, where the family have come back, there is certainly sufficient connection. I am not sure that it can safely be said that there is sufficient connection in the case of a child who has lost both parents, and who is being cared for by a guardian. The guardian need not himself or herself be a British citizen, nor need the family of which he or she forms a part have established itself in this country. In many cases these requirements will no doubt be fulfilled, but not in all. It does not follow, just from satisfying the test of my noble friend's amendment that they would be satisfied. So far as I know, it is not provided in our nationality law that a child should derive any entitlement to citizenship from a person other than a parent. The introduction of the guardian would certainly be a novelty in this area.

The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, has pointed out that there is also a problem of the same kind in a situation where an illegitimate child has lost his or her mother. As I said earlier, it is next to impossible to cope with every case. It would seem to us that cases of this kind are best dealt with under the general discretion. In some circumstances, it may well be quite unnecessary to think of imposing the necessity to have the guardian there; the guardian may arrange for the child to come back and to be as permanently in this country as if the guardian were there, although the guardian himself or herself is not in this country. So it does not seem to be a particularly relevant consideration regarding the question of the connection between the child and this country.

For these reasons, it would be best, in our view, to leave this sort of special, though sad case to the exercise of the general discretion. There is a point on the form of the amendment to which I should draw attention. The amendment comes after subsection (7)(b) on page 5 of the Bill. Therefore, the reference to which the amendment refers is the reference to subsection 6(c) above: that is, to the question of consent. One can see that in relation to questions of consent the guardian may be important to some extent, although what I have said would apply there. However, I am wondering whether my noble friend intends this reference to extend back to subsection (6)(b) as well. I rather think so from what he said. Although I strongly appreciate the particular case to which my noble friend has referred, in the light of what I have said I hope he may feel that the best answer is to put it under the general discretion.

If there is one phrase which occurs in your Lordships' House more than any other when dealing with a Bill it is this: "What is said in this House is one thing; what is engraved on the statute book is another". Perhaps I may be forgiven for using those words again, which are so often repeated, when one hears the noble and learned Lord, quite understandably, and the noble Lord the Minister, again quite understandably, refer us on each occasion to the benefits of Clause 3(1), which is the discretionary power of the Secretary of State, embedded in our statute book since 1948, to cause to be registered as a citizen any minor.

What worries me and, I believe, may worry other members of the Committee is that we are referred to it when we deal with the various hardship cases. And we are referred to it, I am absolutely sure, with absolute sincerity. I do not doubt that for one moment. However, in order that we may do something affirmative, is it possible that there could be some document, some leaflet, some list of precedents set down in the Home Office which said that the sort of way in which the Secretary of State would be expected to exercise his discretion would be in the following types of cases? And they could be given by way of examples. Obviously they would not be limited to those examples. They could be culled from the discussion in this House, from the discusson in the other place which took place in Committee and, no doubt, from the experience, the precedents which occurred in the past regarding the exercise of this discretion under the 1948 Act and subsequently.

If we could have an assurance from the Government that at least such a pamphlet, such a document could be considered, I believe that many of us, whatever be the hour at which we go to bed tonight, would go to bed that much happier. It would not then be just a question again and again of a reference to Clause 3(1): this is the sort of case which the Secretary of State might well consider. There would be about it something of a more permanent nature. I think that then we should feel that we had done a job, and done it properly.

Again I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for what he has said. The idea which he has put forward is excellent, and I hope that it will receive consideration. My noble and learned friend has dealt with the matter very sympathetically but I have the feeling that he has done it in a case where the Government had, so to speak, three trays: in, out and too difficult, and that this went into the too difficult tray. I still feel that the way in which this would work out in normal circumstances if the parents died when they were abroad and had remained in touch (as will happen in most cases) with their relatives in this country is that a relative would go out from this country, collect the child, bring it back and probably have it adopted by somebody. Probably this would be a very good solution, which would give rise to another circumstance.

As I understand the Bill, the child would take its nationality from the adopter and that would get over the difficulty very nicely. In other cases it seems that, somehow or another, provision should be made for the attention of the consul, the high commissioner or whoever it may be in the various countries to be drawn to these cases and for appropriate action taken. One would hope that in the end the child would be able to get British nationality, if it was appropriate in the circumstances. I agree that this is a very difficult problem. I put down this amendment simply because there was an obvious gap and because in many cases a guardian was the obvious person to be a sort of ad hoc rather than a legal guardian. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

In view of the fact that it appears that my suggestion met with some support, I wonder whether I am in order to ask the noble and learned Lord to give it favourable consideration.

My noble friend said that he thought the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, was excellent. I think that it is the opposite of excellent. The idea that some pamphlet can override what is written into a statute, the idea that a discretion which you are giving to the Secretary of State has got to be confined to some pamphlet which perhaps has been drawn up years before he has to apply it, is deplorable. The strength, as I have argued of Clause 3(1) in giving the discretion to the Secretary of State is that he can take into account the conditions which apply when he gives his decision. A pamphlet which was drawn up at the time we approve this Bill and make it an Act would, very likely, be out-of-date. It is a departure which I would deplore.

Some advocates are called great pleaders. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is a great persuader. I am terrified when he uses his great power of persuasion to suggest this innovation. It is full of danger. Now that he has called for an explanation, I hope that the explanation which my noble friend will give will not repeat the word of my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn, who said that his idea was "excellent".

I am attracted by the proposition of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, but we are dealing with cases which will arise years ahead where I do not think one can foresee the circumstances. I should not like the Secretary of State to be hampered even by some pamphlet which he put out indicating the kind of guidance which he would give. On the whole, therefore, I agree with my noble friend rather than with the noble Lord opposite, though with some reluctance.

Not even the Secretary of State can foresee all possible cases and therefore there is some difficulty, as my noble friend Lord Home of the Hirsel said, in laying down in a pamphlet how he proposes to exercise his discretion. I agree that it might be useful sometimes to know how he had done it, but unless one could have a full record of all the facts one would be in the same kind of difficulty as in trying to compare sentences imposed by different magistrates on different cases from newspaper reports, where not all the facts are set out.

I would remind your Lordships—just in case your Lordships might have forgotten it—that in the White Paper the Secretary of State indicated in very broad terms the way in which his discretion to register minor children is exercised. In paragraph 78 of the White Paper he says:

"In exercising his discretion he takes account of the citizenship of the parents, the place in which the child is living and is likely to live and other relevant matters and in considering an application on behalf of a child who is approaching the age of 18 he also has some regard to whether the child would be likely, on reaching that age, to satisfy the conditions required of an adult applying for naturalisation or registration at discretion".

I respectfully suggest that that is a very succinct but fairly widely embracing statement and I should have thought that it might satisfy at least my noble friend Lord Drumalbyn.

I should never have spoken for a second time, and if I did I should have been ruled out of order immediately, because up to that stage it looked as though I had the support of the Committee but my second intervention seems to have produced another reaction. All I was asking for was examples of cases in which the Secretary of State might exercise his discretion. I will say no more.

I hope the noble and learned Lord will give a little more thought to this. We are getting case after case in which the noble and learned Lord or the noble Lord beside him says, "Oh yes, this is a hard case, it is an obvious case, and therefore I think is probably one for discretion". That is said in good faith, but as has been pointed out it is an assurance which has no legal value whatsoever. It cannot be quoted in any court and it is not binding in any sense. As we are continually being reminded, we are dealing with a clause which gives an entitlement. If an amendment is put in, there is the entitlement and there is something to argue about if a future Secretary of State refuses a request. But in the light of what has happened the alternative, so agreeably offered from the Front Bench, really amounts to very little at all and if we are not to have in some quotable form an assurance that these cases will be covered it may well be a temptation to some noble Lords to press the matter to a Division to try to put the provision into the Bill so that there would be something which gives an entitlement.

That is perhaps something for the next stage of the Bill. There are two separate ways of looking at this. My noble and learned friend spoke about the way in which the Secretary of State proposes to exercise his discretion, whereas others have spoken about the sort of cases in which he might be called upon to exercise his discretion, which I think is more what the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, had in mind.

That is right.

I have no doubt that my noble and learned friend will consider this again and individual Peers also no doubt will consider it, but at the moment it looks as though it is too difficult, and therefore I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 71:

We on these Benches shall be supporting this amendment. Ideally I should like to see the scope widened beyond the European Community, but nevertheless it is a particularly important matter within the EEC for British parents to feel secure in the knowledge that their children will be born British. As the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, pointed out, the freedom of movement provisions in the Treaty of Rome and in Community legislation are intended to ensure that a person who is a national of any member country can move freely between all member countries, enjoying essentially the same security and the same rights as in his own. As we know, the citizenship laws of other Community countries are all, except for Ireland, based on jus sanguinis. Children born in those countries to British parents will not get the local nationality. The noble Earl referred to France, where a child born stateless is entitled to become a French citizen, but it is also true that in all the other countries there is a residence requirement to be met before stateless children can get the nationality of the state in question.

Some thousands of British people are already working in Europe, and probably many more will do so, especially as unemployment in this country gets worse. A child born in Belgium, where many British people work—and I, like many other noble Lords, have had letters from people I know who are working in the Community, and from others whom I do not know—could be born stateless, and, if the parents' work required them to move to another country—for example, Italy—before the required number of years' residence in Belgium has been fulfilled to give the child Belgian nationality, the child would then have no hope of being anything but stateless. Italy would have no obligation to confer Italian nationality on the child. Imagine, further, a couple with several children born abroad, but born in different countries because the parents' work required them to move to another country in the early years after the particular child's birth. They might have several stateless children, none of whom would be able to get the nationality of the state of birth because they would never be able to live a sufficient number of years in any one country.

There is a further point, that not all EEC countries have ratified the UN Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons, as we have done in this country. This is an added burden. The number of children who would benefit from this change would be comparatively small, but the problems these children would otherwise face as stateless persons are so serious, the amount of work involved in dealing with the bureaucracy, trying to sort out their nationalities, the parents trying to do it for them, would be so great that it would outweigh any reservations the Government might have on this amendment. I cannot think of any at the moment. We believe this amendment should be strongly supported, and, hopefully, accepted by the Government.

May I refer once again to the provisions of Schedule 2 for the reduction of statelessness, which the noble Lord the Minister has prayed in aid on other occasions when it has been pointed out that children born overseas may not be entitled to the citizenship of the country where they are born, as in the case cited by the noble Earl, Lord Bessborough, of the British child born in France. The noble Lord the Minister has airily said that we have provisions in Schedule 2 which will take care of this because they reduce statelessness. But, when one looks at Schedule 2, one finds that it does not apply to children born, for instance, in the countries of the European Community, unless at some stage in the child's life he can be brought back to the United Kingdom or to a dependent territory. If I may refer your Lordships to paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, it is headed,

"Persons born outside the United Kingdom and the dependent territories".

It says that such a person shall be entitled to be registered in the circumstances mentioned, and the most important of the circumstances to which I would refer your Lordships appears in subparagraph (c), where it is required that the person be:

"in the United Kingdom or a dependent territory … at the beginning of the period of three years ending with the date of the application".

So, in the circumstances which we are considering, where somebody's parents are working, for instance, in France and they continue to serve overseas—perhaps they move from France to Italy or to Belgium; it does not matter where they go within the European Community—if they do not come back to the United Kingdom, then the provisions for the reduction of statelessness on which the noble Lord the Minister has set such great store will never apply. The child can never qualify unless he comes to the United Kingdom or to one of the dependent territories. Therefore, I think that this amendment is highly desirable, bearing in mind that, on Second Reading and again on the first day of the Committee stage, were we told quite forcefully from the Government Front Bench that all these countries of the European Community have jus sanguinis which is so much better than the jus soli which we have had for 700 years. However, is it better in the case that we are talking about where statelessness is likely to be created by the application of that law in those countries and where there is no remedy provided in the Bill?

I think that the noble Lord the Minister when he comes to reply must either accept this amendment or, at the very least, must undertake, when the time comes, to amend the provisions of Schedule 2 paragraph (4) so that children born outside the United Kingdom in the countries of the European Community may qualify if they remain in those countries for three years as they already do qualify if they are in the British dependent territories or in the United Kingdom for that period.

I should very much like to support the eloquent moving by my noble friend Lord Bessborough of this amendment tabled in our names and in those of noble Lords opposite. I shall try not to overlap the points which he has already made. However, I should like to confirm that I and many of my colleagues from Britain who are Members of the European Parliament, including I would say Labour members, have received many representations both from organisations and from individuals throughout the Community—not only confined to Brussels and not only confined to those who work in the European institutions or for them.

First, of course, it must be said that the British Nationality Bill is a courageous piece of legislation and is very much needed and warmly welcomed. I think that most of us accept that to be so. I think that most of us would also accept the principles on which the Bill is structured—namely, that citizenship and the right of abode are tied together and that at a certain stage for the majority of individuals there is a cut-off point for transmission by descent. But in accepting those principles there must be special cate- gories of people clearly definable who may not fit into narrowly defined limitations, but whose claims to better treatment from Her Majesty's Government than they have so far received under this Bill must be recognised. In another place, for instance, naturalised and registered citizens with little or no previous connection with this country, have been granted certain rights, and I think that nobody in this Committee would object to that. Nevertheless, the rights that have been granted to these naturalised and registered citizens are being denied to the particular category of citizens that we are dealing with in this amendment and who have possibly had for centuries long connections with this country through family, tradition, education and culture.

I wish to make a few brief points. First, my noble friend has pointed to the success of our trading association in the Community. It might be worth recalling the most recent words of the Prime Minister on this subject where she states in a document called, Here to Stay, produced by the European Democratic Group, that membership of the Community is central to Government policy. I hope very much that my noble friend the Minister is listening to that comment.

But, so far as the trading success of our country is concerned, it is almost entirely dependent now on the Community: eight of the 11 largest export markets of the United Kingdom are member states of the Community. The only one that so far is not in that list is Greece and it has only joined the Community this year. However, the eight others are among the 11 largest export markets of this country on which a third of the jobs in this country depend. I repeat, a third of the jobs in the manufacturing industry depend on the exports to these particular countries. It would be foolish to imagine that the success of this trade that has developed in the last eight years since membership has been achieved by British salesmen and businessmen staying at home: it has been achieved because they have gone out into the Community, out into the member states and have been prepared to settle there for a time and to do a job on behalf of this country.

Let us take another aspect—research and development. How would we have built Concorde or the Air Bus if British engineers and citizens had not been prepared to go, albeit for a short period of time, perhaps four or five years, to contribute British expertise and knowledge to the advancement of technology? Of course I mention only those two examples, but there are many examples which particularly my noble friend Lord Bessborough would certainly be able to draw to the attention of your Lordships.

One of the declared objectives during the United Kingdom presidency of the European Economic Community has been to adopt the Draft Directive on Freedom to Provide Service in Insurance. That will only benefit the United Kingdom if insurance firms actually have representatives serving in other parts of the Community in order to get work as a result of the adoption of this directive, and of course not only in British firms but to be allied and associated with foreign firms in the Community.

The very principle of mobility of labour and adaptability to new industries will only help to relieve our unemployment if citizens can move freely in a large, free, single market of the European Community to benefit from the opportunities available. That surely is what the European Community is all about. When we had freedom of movement in the Commonwealth we built up a strong economy. Those trading links do not exist now in the same way and we have to look forward to the future that freedom of movement within the Community is the base upon which our export trade and our economic propserity must grow.

If we want to have individuals within the European Community moving from job to job, as, indeed, is the employment pattern today, then we shall no longer be in jobs from the age of 20 to 60 behind the same desk and pushing the same pen. The whole essence of employment and solving the unemployment problem is being able to move from job to job. Here again is what the Community is about. We cannot expect a citizen from this country to go to a British firm in Paris, for instance, and stay in that firm forever if he is given the opportunity to bring British expertise, British influence and British knowledge to a French firm in order to gain further British exports. He will want to take the French job and his wife will say to him, "No do not do so because our child will be born French or possibly not French. We want our children to be British. We are working for Britain and that is a right that we have and should demand". I believe that your Lordships should support this principle.

The setting up of this market already implies the right of entry to all European Community citizens to this country and the right to social security benefits and the right to jobs. It also implies corresponding rights in the transmission of citizenship to descendants. Why is it that, if French people come to this country they can go on having French citizenship for three or four generations without ever returning to France, but if we send British citizens who are working, or who go of there own accord to live, in France—as my noble friend has pointed out—this is not possible? It is certainly not possible in Belgium and certainly not, for instance, in Denmark. If the right of abode is now a condition of citizenship, it is also true of the large majority of the nationality laws of EEC citizens in other countries.

If a French or Italian can pass on his citizenship to a grandchild, why should not a British citizen have the right to pass on his citizenship to a British grandchild with equal right? If we want to encourage the young, particularly to travel and to get to know their European partners, to learn languages—which, after all, is one of the main conditions and assets which is valuable to a trading nation—to attend other universities, to have teachers exchanging between schools in our member states, then we cannot also deprive them of the right to have their children being granted British citizenship and to be protected.

I am sorry to go on about this, but perhaps we should remember that the Community is based on the friendship which has been nurtured and maintained between France and Germany in particular in order not to create again zones of antagonism. It is only because there have been masses of exchanges between those two countries of individuals, groups and even townships that the Community is based on an area of peace in this western world. I do not want to get too dramatic or exaggerate this point, but I think that it is a fair point to make.

I should like to raise two more points. I apologise for being rather long on this, but it is perhaps worth raising the point—because it was touched upon by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk—that the number of children being born in the Community is difficult to assess. I have tried to obtain figures in order to give the Committee some idea of the numbers of citizens who might be affected if this amendment was to be accepted by the Government and by your Lordships' Committee. It is perhaps interesting to know that in 1979, out of a total population of British citizens of 30,000, 413 British births were registered in Brussels, about 40 in Luxembourg and slightly over 4,000 in Germany. Of course, that number is larger because of the British forces serving in Germany, so many of those would have been British citizens automatically under Clause 2. Therefore, noble Lords will see that the numbers are comparatively few.

However, noble Lords might like to know that when asked how many British citizens had been born in Paris in the last two years the British Embassy in Paris replied, "Oh, but we do not count how many British citizens are born in Paris. After all, we are all European". I must confess that this has only been reported to me because I did not telephone myself; I was given to understand that the person who telephoned the British Embassy in Paris on my behalf was horrified at that reply.

So perhaps that is also a lesson for the Government. I hasten to add that I cannot vouch for the reply because I did not hear it myself, but I have it on good authority that that was the reply given. Finally, of the many hundreds of Britons whom I have met in the European Community since our membership in 1973, having the honour to serve as a member of the European Parliament and representing over half a million electorate in this country, I must say that there is no group of British citizens more loyally attached to this country, more concerned about its future and more willing to remain outside the United Kingdom for part, if not all, of their working lives in order to contribute to a more prosperous Britain. I very much hope therefore that the Government will see fit to accept this amendment. Of course, I agree that it may not be properly worded, but I very much hope that they will take the spirit of this amendment in the way that I believe the majority of this Committee would wish.

The Government, of course, very fully appreciate the importance of our membership of the European Community and of the special ties which exist through our participation in European matters. There will be logic in going from that to some aspects of citizenship. But it remains the fact that the individual members of the Community retain separate citizenships and that there is nothing in the circumstances of our membership to indicate that birth within the Community should confer greater privileges as regards citizenship than birth outside it.

My noble friend Lady Elles made reference to the Commonwealth situation and, of course, the situation is that since 1948 British citizenship cannot be passed down in the Commonwealth beyond the first generation, whereas of course in foreign countries it could be done through the male line at consulates. So far as the Government know, this has not prevented people wanting to go out to the Commonwealth or in any way inhibited the development of British connections with the Commonwealth.

As my noble friend has said on a number of occasions, the present proposals are designed to ensure that our citizenship goes to those who maintain links with this country—close connections with this country. I should like to draw attention to the fact that Clause 3 provides very considerable opportunities for people working in the European Economic Community to have citizenship through the provisions there. The great majority of cases which would arise would, I should have thought, be covered under these provisions.

We must also be cautious about distinguishing between, for example, the countries of the Community on the one hand and countries like Norway or Sweden, which have common travel areas with Denmark, which is in the Community, on the other. Is it right, for example, that someone living in Switzerland or Austria should be put in a different position from this point of view from a person living in West Germany?

It is the removal of anomalies that this Bill seeks to achieve. In 1971 we brought into line, to some extent, the arrangements for acquisition of citizenship by Commonwealth citizens and foreign nationals. This Bill takes that process a stage further. It seeks to remove the anomaly whereby citizenship can be passed on in the male line by consular registration in foreign countries but not in Commonwealth countries. Of course, as I have said, I very much appreciate what has been said by the various noble Lords who have participated in this debate. I think that what has been said does not take sufficient notice of the fact that those who do a job on behalf of this country—to quote the phrase that my noble friend Lady Elles used—would be covered by the provisions that we already have in the Bill.

As regards the schedule dealing with statelessness, of course, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is right in what he says about that, and it would be necessary, in order to get the benefit of that particular provision, to satisfy the provisions of sub-paragraph (c) to which he referred. I think that it is also worth noticing that in practice all member states have provisions which enable a child born in their territory to acquire their citizenship, though not sometimes until fairly late on in that child's minority. There is a problem certainly with those who may move from one country to another. But there surely is also a problem with those who might deliberately decide, for example, to settle in France. Why should generation after generation of people who have left here simply because they descend from British people in France have the right of citizenship, where that would not apply elsewhere?

These are the difficulties that we see in giving effect to this amendment. Nevertheless, we appreciate the very real problems that this amendment seeks to cover, and I should like to assure my noble friend Lord Bessborough and all others who have spoken that the Government will give very serious consideration to all that has been said to see to what extent we can meet the difficulties. I also take note of what he kindly suggested we should do; that is, to give full notice of any proposals that we have for change or improvement in time to enable him and other noble Lords to see these proposals. In the light of those assurances I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

We are reaching the bewitching hour of seven o'clock, so I shall not indulge in all the remarks that I might make in answer to my noble and learned friend. But I must admit that I am not entirely happy with the partial assurances which he has given, and I do not really agree with him about the various difficulties which he has raised. I hope that he will read our remarks carefully and that we may have further consultations before Report stage. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 72:

Page 5, line 33, leave out subsections (8) and (9).

I think that this is probably an appropriate moment to adjourn this Committee stage for the dinner break. It would probably be a good thing if, after the intervening business, we resumed the Committee stage at eight o'clock, if that would be agreeable to your Lordships. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 26th June be approved.

My Lords, I wish at the outset to thank the noble and learned Lord for explaining the order. These orders tend to be introduced every three or four years, so the introduction of this one, as the Lord Chancellor indicated, is in line with the established trend and I hope your Lordships will approve it. I also wish to endorse what the noble and learned Lord said about the immense importance and value of the county courts in this country.

The noble and learned Lord, with his customary foresight and care, has anticipated the main points I proposed to raise and has dealt with, for example, the question whether the proposed increases are in line with inflation. I will not, if he will forgive me, get involved in a comparison between what the noble and learned Lord described as the admirable efforts of his Government and the lower level of inflation during the final period of the last Government; I will leave that perhaps for another occasion. He also dealt with the other principal customary aim of these orders, namely, to maintain a balance of work as between the county courts and the High Court.

The noble and learned Lord has indicated what approximately will happen regarding the volume of judicial work likely to be transferred from the High Court to the county court as a result of the order. He has similarly also referred to the raising of the registrars' jurisdiction and the likely effect that that will have upon their workload and he mentioned the possibility of the appointment of further registrars in the future. I take it that it will be a while before the further appointments are actually made, and I should like to ask him whether he is satisfied that in the meantime the county courts from October onwards will be able to cope with the increased load.

While referring to registrars, I am bound to say that I have often wondered whether in fact we should not be raising their jurisdiction still further as a matter of principle, anyway. There could of course be a further sizeable saving in costs. They are a very able body of people, and I have never been convinced by the argument that increasing their jurisdiction would lead to a significantly higher number of appeals from their decisions.

I also wish to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor about the increases which he has proposed in regard to the equity jurisdiction under the order. As the noble and learned Lord indicated, it is to be raised from £15,000 to £30,000. Last time, in 1977, the increase was from £5,000 to £15,000, and I am wondering whether the noble and learned Lord is satisfied that the proposed increase from £15,000 to £30,000 is sufficient, bearing in mind that the principal jurisdiction in contract and tort in the county courts this time has gone up from £2,000 to £5,000. Last time, in 1977, it went up from £1,000 to £2,000.

There is just one other matter to which I feel I must refer. It is the concern expressed in some quarters about the proposed increase in the so-called costs sanction from £1,200 to £3,000, to which the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has referred. In his references he also acknowledged the concern which has been felt in some quarters, and indeed he explained the background to this as well. My noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones has received a letter from a Mr. Brian Thompson of Brian Thompson and Partners, solicitors, in which Mr. Thompson states he had hoped,

"that there might well be discussions between the TUC and the Lord Chancellor and that some agreement might be arrived at. I regret to say that on this occasion there were no discussions and there is no agreement. The proposed increase of the so-called costs sanction from £1,200 to £3,000 is very substantial and very drastic. It will affect a large number of claims and will impose a heavy financial burden on trade unions at a time when legal costs are already escalating".

I felt it only right to pass on that particular concern which has been expressed and to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor whether he might feel able to comment further upon the fears expressed, and indeed perhaps to take them into account in any further discussions that take place. The noble and learned Lord has already indicated that he has consulted the TUC, and I am not sure whether or not Mr. Thompson's reference to the possibility of discussions is different from that. At any rate I felt it only right to mention that concern. As I say, the Lord Chancellor has already spelt out some of the background to the particular proposals.

So far as the order itself is concerned, and the extensions of jurisdiction contained in it, I would certainly offer the noble and learned Lord full support, and I hope that your Lordships will approve the order.

My Lords, I am very grateful for the gracious way in which the noble Lord, Lord Boston of Faversham, has received this Motion. Yes, I am satisfied that the county courts can cope. I have no doubt about that. That is the advice that I have received, and I believe it is right. The noble Lord asked whether the registrars' jurisdiction could be raised still further. Well, probably, Yes, if one viewed it in isolation, but of course one must balance the trial jurisdiction of registrars against that of the judge. We thought that what is proposed was about right. I am afraid that it is a long time since I practised in the county court, but it must be remembered that nowadays registrars are usually dual-purpose. Very often they are district registrars as well, and they have an enormous matrimonial jurisdiction outside the kind of trial that we are talking about. Without going into specifics I would absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boston, that their quality has risen continuously throughout my legal lifetime, and of course their judicial experience is growing all the time. A very high class of person is attracted to such a post. There is no question that, if it were thought right to alter the balance, registrars probably could take trials involving a slightly larger figure, but I am not anxious to increase it further at the moment, for the reasons that I have given.

I had the letter from Thompsons, for whom I have a very great deal of respect, partly because they sometimes briefed me, and partly because I had the pleasure of appearing against them on a number of occasions. But I did not altogether go along with their arguments on this occasion, for the very reason that I gave in my opening speech. Of course, lawyers naturally want to have a greater flexibility, but I have kept the exact proportions at the top level of the sanction rule and at the bottom level I have been slightly more favourable to plaintiffs, if one views it at as a fraction of the maximum jurisdiction, as it will be if the order is passed. So I think that their case proved either nothing at all, or a great deal too much. The sanctions have always existed, and basically I have preserved the status quo.

The other point raised by the noble Lord was about the consultation with the TUC. The TUC wrote me a long and very interesting letter, which very largely covered the same ground as the Thompson letter. The TUC wrote some time ago—I think in April, but certainly quite a long time ago. In consultation with my officials, I wrote to the TUC an equally long reply. At the end of my reply—this is probably the point to which Messrs. Thompson were referring—I said to the TUC that, if it wanted discussions either with my office or with me, I should be very happy to hold them. But the offer was not in fact taken up, I thought probably because the TUC, if not actually content, had other thoughts on its mind and did not want to pursue the argument any further.

The noble Lord also asked me about the equity jurisdiction. What I have proposed is actually a compromise. I hope that I am not disclosing things that I should not disclose. My original proposal was to raise the figure to £50,000, instead of £30,000, and that, I think, would have been quite a good thing. But the profession came down quite heavily against me, and so £30,000 is a compromise figure. On these occasions one likes to carry people along with one if possible, and I hope that they feel that I have taken account of their point of view.

There is of course an argument for the lower figure—I am not sure whether they actually put it forward—and that is that equity jurisdiction is a matter with which the Chancery Division in particular is very familiar, while most of the circuit judges are common lawyers. I see the noble Lord, Lord Foot, here and I am not sure whether this is true of the solicitors' profession. But at the Bar most county court practitioners, too, are common lawyers. So I think they have got something there. I think I would have preferred to have put it at £50,000, as the noble Lord, Lord Boston, seemed to suggest, but these things are questions of judgment and discussion, and the figure of £30,000 was arrived at by those means. I think I have dealt with the various points that the noble Lord, Lord Boston, very kindly made, and I am very grateful to him for the kindly way in which he has received the Motion and for his interest in the matter generally.

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support the remarks of my noble friend Lord Boston in this matter. There is, of course, ample justification for the order, and, as my noble friend has said, there have been periodic reviews of these limits. I believe that the parent Act, as it were, of county courts in their present form was in 1846, and the jurisdiction then was £20. In 1900 it was £100 for tort and contract jurisdiction, and £500 for equity jurisdiction. Some very bright statistician has calculated that, taking into account changes in the value of money since the halcyon days of 1900, it would give us £2,750 as a common law jurisdiction and £14,000 for equity jurisdiction. So the decision of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor here is well within those limits.

My Lords, may I make two points very briefly, first so far as the remuneration of practitioners is concerned, and particularly barristers—and I can do this with a great measure of dispassion as it is only very seldom that I am involved in civil matters. There is a feeling among members of the Bar that it would be wrong if, in the future, a barrister handling a claim limited to, let us say, something of the order £3,500, which previously would have been in the High Court, but now conducting that trial in the county court, should find himself receiving remuneration at a very much lower level than previously. If that were so I am sure it would be accepted that it would be wrong and invidious. There is the same responsibility and complexity, and the practitioner has to exercise the same care and the same attention in dealing with it. An assurance on that matter would, I am sure, be very welcome by both sides of the legal profession.

The second matter is on a perhaps slightly more, or even more, political note, and it is this. For my sins I was a Member of the Opposition Front Bench even in 1971, when the Courts Bill went through another place, and I remember then voicing the view that it might have been opportune at that time to have included the county courts within the purview of the Beeching survey. I must say that I find that thought returning to me at the present time in considering whether the criterion of financial limit is in fact the proper one to draw as a line of demarcation between the county court's jurisdiction and that of the High Court.

After all, a claim for £4,000 in a personal injuries case or a claim in equity jurisdiction of £27,000 will involve exactly the same issues and will demand exactly the same application, exactly the same skill, exactly the same experience, from a circuit judge or his deputy sitting in the county court as would a claim slightly above the limits in each case on the part of a High Court judge. This undoubtedly is not the proper forum in which to raise that, but I would be grateful if indeed the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chan- cellor were able to give some indication whether there is any propsect in the future of further thought along those lines.

My Lords, at this stage I can speak a second time only by leave of the House. I had not realised that the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, was going to rise, or I would have dealt with the two speakers from the Opposition Benches together. First, as regards counsel's remuneration in the county court, of course in the Provinces the taxing officer is often the same person as in the High Court, and I am assured that the proposed provisions for Scale 2, which is the highest scale, do give registrars full discretion on brief fees and refreshers. That is some reassurance to him, I hope.

The noble Lord made a very interesting point at the end of his speech. When Beeching was going through in 1971—that is to say, when the Courts Bill was going through in 1971—I wanted to do this very thing, as he did. I was assured that it was far more than my rather humble department could take on board. The Courts Act itself put an immense strain upon the department, and therefore it was not then possible. They told me it simply was not possible to try it then. Curiously enough, during my present term of office the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, put the same point to me, and I had put the same point to him when I was in opposition.

I do not think I can offer any immediate prospect of this. What I can say is that I think we are moving slowly towards what I believe to be the ultimate goal. We are approximating the practice of the High Court with that of the county court more and more. We are going to bring out in a relatively short time a completely revised set of county court rules. The existing set (to show how slowly things move in the world) was, I think, introduced in 1936, and was in fact introduced by my father. But we are gradually approximating the practice of the two courts towards one another.

To some extent the registrars, as I say, have jurisdiction as district registrars in the High Court; and, of course, if we look at the people who in fact try the cases in the High Court and the people who in fact try the cases in the county court, you will see that they overlap to a large extent, because sitting as deputy High Court judges you find leading members of the Bar who are also recorders and deputy judges in the county courts. So it is moving in that direction. I cannot promise legislation, and I think myself—and this is the advice I have received—that in order to get it right one would have to have another Commission to square up the nuts and bolts and discuss the implications of it. It is an extremely interesting point, and I am very glad the noble Lord raised it.

My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments be now considered.

My Lords, before I take the voices, perhaps I can say publicly what a great debt is owed by the House and the profession, and indeed the public, to my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross and to Mr. Norman Miscampbell in the other place. This is a useful Bill which would never have seen the light of day if they had not taken the labouring oar and, respectively, piloted it through each House. I think the thanks of the public are due to both of them.

My Lords, perhaps I could add my congratulations to those just expressed by the noble and learned Lord, and from these Benches join him in his tribute to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, and to his honourable friend in another place, Mr. Miscampbell. They have indeed performed a very great service to Parliament, to the profession and to the public generally in steering this very valuable Bill through the two Houses.

My Lords, may I associate my noble friends with what has been said in congratulation to the noble Viscount? He has performed a very valuable service. We endorse everything that has been said on that account.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 1.

First, may I say to my noble and learned friend, and the noble Lords, Lord Boston and Lord Foot, that I had not expected those words and I am immensely grateful to them. I am sure that my honourable and learned friend the Member for Blackpool, North, will be equally grateful because he took a lot of trouble about it. I am a cautious person and I have still to pilot seven amendments that have come from another place before this measure can finally be put upon the statute book. I hope that we shall have no great difficulty before I finally row the boat and moor her to the quay and complete the task and voyage that we set about.

The first amendment is a technical matter but one of some importance. The whole of the first part of the Bill, which deals with forgery, is geared to the proposition in Clause 1 which relates to doing something to the prejudice of some other person or to oneself. Clause 10 set about to define, among other things, the meaning of "prejudice". This Bill was not only very carefully considered in this House but in another place, and the right honourable and learned gentleman, the Member for Dulwich, had a particularly acute look at Clause 10 and the meaning of "prejudice". On the discussion in another place, it became apparent that the definition was not sufficiently wide to cover circumstances in which a person could be prejudiced by being deprived of an opportunity to gain financial advantage or earn remuneration, and also it did not cover circumstances in which a person obtains an opportunity to gain a financial advantage from another thus prejudicing another person; gaining a financial advantage from person A to the prejudice of person B.

It was thought—I am sure rightly—that circumstances of this sort needed to be catered for. The classic example was quoted of a person who resorts to forgery in order to obtain a contract for which he and others had been bidding by forging testimonials or something of that sort, and thereby depriving the genuine tenderer of what would have been his contract if it had not been for the forgery. Although the first amendment looks very complicated, it makes the definition of "prejudice" more comprehensive so that it will deal with the type of case that was being discussed in another place. I hope that in view of the fact that it was accepted there your Lordships will also think it is right that we should agree with that House.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 2 and 3.

These are purely technical. What has happened is that in Clause 12 there are at the moment two subsections dealing purely with verbal amendments to the Road Traffic Act 1960 and the Road Traffic Act 1972. Since then Parliament has passed a measure called the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 which contains the same definition relating back to the Forgery Act. It is much easier to have a comprehensive reference to the three Acts in one subsection. Therefore what this amendment does is to incorporate the measure that we have just passed and cut out subsection (2) which is not necessary any more and amalgamate the three into one.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 4.

This amendment looks very small indeed; but, as a matter of fact, it is a point of substance. It occurs in Part 2 of the Bill where we go on to the matter of counterfeiting. In Clause 14(2) it is said that it is an offence for a person to make a counterfeit of a currency note or a protected coin without lawful authority or excuse. What is intended is to make it an offence to make a counterfeit of a currency note or a counterfeit of a protected coin. If you do not put in the word "of" it will read that it is an offence to make the protected coin. That is not a matter for counterfeiting at all and it should not be thus phrased. If you put in the word "of" it is the making of the counterfeit of a protected coin, that becomes an offence. This little word is very necessary and I beg to move.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 5, 6 and 7.

Your Lordships have always prided themselves on having experts in everything as Members of this House. But I had not appreciated that in the other House there was quite such an expert numismatist as one of my honourable friends there. He raised some recondite points, such as I would not have thought existed at all. These three amendments really relate to something that he raised, and I am sure that we are all very grateful to him for doing so. There are those people who make goods—tankards, coasters and that type of product—upon which they like to print an impression which looks like a coin of the realm—perhaps in the middle of the bottom of the coaster or on the side of the tankard or other such notable relics of one's holiday or possibly more valuable pieces, as the case may be.

It is all very well for those things to be produced because they in themselves could not possibly do any harm to the public since the picture on the side or the impression on the bottom of the article cannot possibly be taken to be a coin. But if you have the tools whereby you can make this impression or picture, they can be of the nature that you would be able to use them also to make a counterfeit coin. Therefore, it was thought that it ought to be clarified that people who wished to do this should be able to do so only with the consent of the Treasury. That is what the effect of these three amendments is: that people shall be allowed to produce goods of this sort. However, if they want to have the necessary equipment to make them and the impression or picture is such that it could be something which could be to the prejudice of the coinage by being used improperly to make something that looks like a counterfeit coin, then the making and use of the tools themselves should be subjected to Treasury consent. In those circumstances, the other place thought that it ought to re-write some of the provisions in Clause 17.

The three amendments concerned have the effect therefore of allowing these goods to be manufactured but retaining a certain control over the necessary equipment to do so. I hope that your Lordships will feel that that is a reasonable balance, one that will allow freedom for our manufacturers and at the same time allow sufficient control over the equipment to prevent any prejudice whatever to the coinage. Those three amendments go together.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House do now adjourn until eight o'clock.

moved Amendment No. 77:

I think this is a very interesting amendment in that it does seek to define words which obviously have no fixed purpose in their actual wording, namely, "close connection". But I remember the noble and learned Lord, I think it was, or the noble Lord the Minister pointing out to us that these words have been used in previous statutes. I know that one of my noble friends asked whether the Government could give any indication as to whether there had been any decisions by way of precedents on the meaning of those words.

I must say that my friends and I sympathise with the wish to have some sort of certainty here, especially when you have the exercise of some sort of discretion with regard to the Home Secretary's interpretation of them. I am a little worried, as was the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, as to whether this list is a sufficiently good one. I hope, as I believe he does, that the Government, if they find this list not acceptable for good reason, will be able to make some suggestions as to how the words "close connection" may be defined.

I hope I shall not be deemed to be facetious in my next remarks, but many of us know that there are people who sever their connection with the United Kingdom for motives not altogether laudable, and it seems to me strange that when we have a definition of "close connection" such as the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, sought to give us, nowhere is there any reference to the fact that a "close connection" could be found by the payment of United Kingdom income tax. It seems to me that if there is to be a definition and somebody is to get the benefit of this, one at least of the ways in which a "close connection" could be found is that United Kingdom income tax is being paid. However, having made that remark, I, like the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, will await with interest to see whether the Government can at least do something to make the words "close connection" have some meaning in this Bill so that people know precisely where they stand.

If I may intervene for one minute, I very much hope that the noble Lord's proposal that payment of tax might be one of the conditions will not be followed, considering that there are at least 8 million people in this country who do not pay tax but who nevertheless would consider themselves very closely connected with this country.

I intervene again only in order to make my position quite clear. I am dealing, of course, with people who have removed themselves abroad, and they do not normally come within that definition.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Geddes for putting down this amendment, because I think it is important that we should have a short discussion about this expression which lies really at the heart of Clause 3, although I think the dangers of trying to be specific have already been demonstrated by the short exchange which has occurred between the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and my noble friend Lady Elles.

I will come immediately to the point, if I may. Those making application under this provision for their children would be asked to give details of the connections they have with this country through their employment and in other ways. As far as employment is concerned, these inquiries will normally be quite straightforward and we do not think it would often be necessary to go beyond the details of the nature of the employment and the links which that employment involves with the United Kingdom which are supplied by the applicant.

As to the parents' connections with the United Kingdom in other ways, which would be needed to assess whether the parent met the test of intentions in Clause 3(2)(d), detailed inquiries about the nature of these again would not be necessary in most cases. If I may give just one example, and one example only, I envisage that it would be sufficient, for instance, for the parent to give details of such matters as contacts with relatives in the United Kingdom; but that is not supposed to be a test which, if somebody said they had no relatives in the United Kingdom, they would fail. Indeed, the list of items which is given in the amendment is only illustrative, as I think has been made clear, and I do not think the noble Lord intends that an applicant who did not have any of those connections in the amendment but who nevertheless had close ties with the United Kingdom in some other way would necessarily fail to meet the "close connection" requirement. Nor indeed need it follow that an applicant who had only one of these connections would thereby automatically be deemed to have a close connection with the United Kingdom.

I have spoken about the individual. May I give one, and one only, illustration from the point of view of the "close connection" so far as relevant employment is concerned? The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, spoke about the payment of tax, though there is not agreement on this matter in the Committee this evening. What would be in the applicant's favour, I think, would be such a factor as evidence that substantial benefits, financial or otherwise, flow from the company for which the person is working to the United Kingdom; but it does not mean that if that particular criterion is not evident the application would fail.

I want to stress that in operating this provision we should like to aim at a simple and soundly-based procedure designed to help applicants who have links with this country to secure citizenship for their children and not to impede them from doing so. We will do our best to keep the administration of this provision as simple and as straightforward as possible. We do not consider that the definition proposed in this amendment would help and, for the reasons I have given, we think it could hinder matters, since it would be only too readily assumed that the list of illustrations was exclusive. As my noble friend himself has said, that would not be the intention.