My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, though I naturally regret the inconvenience caused to the travelling public by the current industrial dispute, I note that the level of disruption has diminished over recent weeks. At no time has air safety been impaired as a result of the dispute. We are not contemplating alternative methods at present.

My Lords, is it not intolerable that such action can hold the public to ransom and put commerce in jeopardy while causing very damaging losses to British airlines, and should not such a jugular vein of the country be better protected in the future by a no-strike agreement?

My Lords, it is unhappily the case that industrial disputes of this kind of course cause damage to commercial enterprises of various kinds. As for the solution that my noble friend points to, that also presents certain difficulties.

My Lords, is it not the case that this dispute has arisen out of ham-fisted industrial relations and the breaking of procedures and agreements, and that something more ought to be done? If it is possible for England to win the Third Test Match, it ought to be possible to solve this crisis.

My Lords, it is not the case that this dispute was caused by the reasons that the noble Lord described. I must confess that I am not immediately aware of the connection with the Third Test Match.

My Lords, will my noble friend confirm—and this arises out of what the noble Lord, Lord Beswick, said—that the air traffic controllers are not in dispute with their own employers, the Civil Aviation Authority, but have been called out by the union as part of their quarrel with the Government? On that basis, can my noble friend indicate whether the trades dispute immunity covers the union in this action?

My Lords, it is the case of course that the civil servants' pay arrangements are normally negotiated to include the affairs of the air traffic controllers and that is an arrangement of long standing, as my noble friend knows. There may well be some advantages in removing the air traffic controllers from the ambit of the Civil Service negotiating machinery, but of course in the long term we still have to find the money for these extra payments.

My Lords, as the Government are meeting with opposition in their effort to reduce air fares in Europe, may I ask the Minister whether they have pursued the suggestion, made in the report of the Select Committee of this House on European air fares, that we might take the initiative in trying to co-ordinate air traffic control in Europe? Does the noble Lord recall that the witness from the trade union side was of the opinion that the TUC would support any such initiative through the International Transport Federation? Finally, may I ask the noble Lord whether, if we could secure such co-ordination, it would not mean that we could cut the excessive flight distances between various points in Europe, cut the cost and therefore cut the air fares?

My Lords, there are a number of difficulties about integrating the air traffic control system of Europe. There already exists of course the Euro-control organisation which goes some way along that line; but the principal difficulty in the way of a total integration of the air traffic control system arises from the very different national considerations of each of the major nations concerned—not least, for example, the necessity to integrate civil air traffic with military air traffic control arrangements. So far it has proved impossible to overcome these major difficulties.

My Lords, can the Minister go so far as to say that he will look at what we said in our report? He tells us nothing new; we set all that down. Surely it is better to try to do something than to accept that it is impossible?

My Lords, the report did set out the major difficulties but did not offer a solution.

My Lords, have Her Majesty's Government ever considered the possibility of appointing the noble Baroness, Lady Burton, as an air ombudsman for Great Britain?

Hear, hear!

My Lords, doubtless if the Social Democrats ever achieve Office, the noble Baroness will occupy the position I now hold.

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord one question? Is he aware that certain operators are trying to get round this difficulty by flying in uncontrolled airspace? Although, as he says, safety is not jeopardised at the moment, it is not a development that he should encourage.

My Lords, I am certainly not in favour of airlines doing anything that would lower the safety standards, but, as I said earlier, I am not aware that there has been any case of that during this present dispute.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

No, my Lords, it has not. A non-departmental public body is only identified for abolition, merger or being made independent of Government when its function no longer needs to be discharged in that way.

My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that reply, may I ask him why nine new quangos have been started since 1979?

My Lords, since the Government took office, out of 205 quangos at that time 22 have been abolished and 14 have been identified for abolition in the future. Ten new bodies have been established. One was the London Advisory Group, which has already completed its work and been disbanded. Two—the Steering Group on Health Service Information and the Working Group on Rickets—have specific short-term remits and will be wound up when they have done their job. Four are replacements of one or more previously existing bodies. An example is the Social Security Advisory Committee, which replaced the National Insurance Advisory Committee and the Supplementary Benefits Commissions for Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that it is about time that we got rid of this stupid expression "Quango"? A lot of well-meaning and excellent voluntary workers are being classified as parasites by the Government by the use of this stupid word. Secondly, is the noble Lord aware that the efficiency of the National Health Service is being undermined by the Government's policy of a ridiculous allocation of money, by its distribution throughout the regions and by blindly going ahead with pampering the private health service at the expense of the National Health Service?

My Lords, the noble Lord is ranging rather widely, but I entirely agree with him that the word "Quango" is not a good one. There is no accepted definition and the words that we use, which are a bit of a mouthful, are "non-departmental public body". These bodies are accountable to Government but with a measure of independence, and carry out special functions at arm's length from the department.

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Minister, if he accepts the figure which his noble friend has given of 36 Quangos, whether he is able to say if they are Quangos operating in the regional health committee areas or in the area health authority areas? Also, will he put in the Official Report the functions and the names of the 36 Quangos involved?

My Lords, area health authorities are not Quangos, nor are they non-departmental public bodies. They are integrated into the National Health Service. I am certainly happy to produce the information for which the noble Lord has asked.

My Lords, I am aware that area health authorities are not Quangos. What I was asking was whether it was necessary to repeat some of the committees set up in regional health authorities, which were considered as Quangos and which made up the 36.

My Lords, I am sorry, but I do not know the answer to that. I shall write to the noble Lord.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the fact that if he abolishes more Quangos, he will have more people unemployed to add to the extra 178,000 who are reported today as having become unemployed during the past month?

My Lords, this gives me an opportunity of saying that most of the people who are employed in Quangos simply get travelling expenses and subsistence. They do a magnificent job and it is not really a question of employment.

My Lords, I suggest that we move on to the next Question now.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, we have been carefully studying the Royal Commission's report and the initial reactions to it. We see a need to invite more specific comment on some of the issues raised by the report, and my right honourable friend is today announcing his intention of sending a consultative memorandum shortly to a wide range of interested bodies. Copies of this memorandum will be placed in the Libraries of both Houses, and will be available from the Home Office on request.

My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord the Minister for his reply and for the valuable information that he has given? Does he not agree that, in the present state of public order in this country and the crisis of confidence in the police in some parts of the inner urban areas, urgent attention should be given to implementing Part II of the Royal Commission's report to introduce a quite separate prosecuting solicitor's department for each police area, and that in Part I the coercive powers of the police, and the treatment of suspects in custody, should as a matter of urgency be placed on a statutory footing?

My Lords, the likely effect of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on relations between the police and the communities whom the police serve will be an important factor in our consideration of the Royal Commission's report. The noble Lord mentioned urgency in his supplementary question. Perhaps it would be helpful if I made it clear that I think I am right in saying that my right honourable friend's Written Answer to a Question today will make it clear that we would be hoping for replies, in the light of the memorandum, by the beginning of October. If my right honourable friend's Written Answer does not make that clear, I am saying it now.

My Lords, as one who has had a No Day Named Motion down on the Order Paper for many a long month about this report, may I ask whether it is the Government's intention to initiate a debate on the very wide-ranging recommendations in the report at an earlier, rather than at a later, stage?

My Lords, the Government would welcome a debate, if time could be found for it through the usual channels.

My Lords, in view of the considerable evidence in recent weeks of the breakdown in relationships between the police and the local populations in some areas being caused by the use which the police make of their existing powers to stop and search people in the street, will the Government reconsider the recommendations which the Royal Commission makes about this sphere of police powers in the light of anything which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, has to say resulting from his current investigations?

My Lords, anything which emerges from the inquiry of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, and which has a bearing on the matters covered in the report, including the matters which the noble Lord mentioned, will of course be given close attention.

My Lords, have the Government thought of even a rough timetable for dealing with this matter? Many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission, like the beginning of the introduction of the tape recording of interviews with suspected persons, can be dealt with by administrative means. Indeed, some of the most important recommendations can be dealt with administratively without awaiting the necessity of legislation. Accordingly, can the Minister at least say that before the end of the year some practical steps should be taken in a situation of urgency, as noble Lords have already indicated?

My Lords, I did make the point to the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Claughton, that the Government would be hoping for responses to the memorandum by the beginning of October. The memorandum will not be just a general document. Its intention is to try to focus the attention of different interested groups who have already expressed their interest in different parts of the Royal Commission's report on what my right honourable friend considers are some of the particularly important and difficult parts of the report. Therefore we are following a timetable. Having said that, the noble and learned Lord mentioned in particular tape-recording. There would be difficulties about considering tape-recording separately from other parts of the report. The implications for the dispatch of court business, for resources generally and for the safeguards afforded to suspects will, however, be factors influencing the Government's consideration of this and of the other proposals contained in the report.

My Lords, on the wider question of criminal procedure generally, would the noble Lord the Minister give us an undertaking on behalf of the Government that no consideration of short-term expediency, or suchlike, would make the Government erode in any way the right for serious offences on the part of a defendant to trial by jury, it being a principle which is so utterly central to the concept of human liberty?

My Lords, ahead of final decisions which have been taken, the noble Lord will not expect me to be specific. But the report is called The Balance of Criminal Justice. Certainly I shall give to the noble Lord an undertaking that the Government are well aware, as were the Royal Commission, of the need to give especially close attenton to the balance between the powers of the police and safeguards for the citizen.

:My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, it is important that the market disciplines which apply in the private sector should, so far as possible, be reproduced in the public sector. We aim to do this as appropriate by privatisation, by a reduction in the monopoly powers of public enterprises and through cash limits and external financing limits. It is, moreover, essential that those responsible for negotiating pay levels, whether in the public or the private sector, should realise the effects of what they do on the levels of output and unemployment.

My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that reply does he realise that he has not really answered the Question? Might it not appear that his planning and research department is suffering from rigor mortis? Does he not think that an injection of formalin might at least prevent the body from decaying any further?

My Lords, I am most interested in the noble Lord's views on matters of medicine, but so far as the substance of his question is concerned, contrary to what he implies there are already favourable indications that market forces are effective in the private sector. The level of pay settlements in the present pay round is running at less than one-half of what it was in the previous pay round and we look forward to further reductions in the coming pay round.

My Lords, I really must come back once more to the noble Lord. If he will read the Question he will see that I do not ask what is happening at the moment. I am asking about the future if this Government are successful and get back into office.

My Lords, I am well aware of the fact that the party to which the noble Viscount now owes his allegiance are advocates of an incomes policy. This is no doubt the issue to which his Question is really directed. However, the noble Viscount needs to ask himself two questions. First, why does he assume that he will be successful in applying an incomes policy when every other party over the last 30 years has failed to do so? Secondly, why does he assume that the trade unions will co-operate with him in such a policy when they have refused to co-operate with other parties and have publicly said so?

My Lords, the Minister has alluded to the public sector. May I ask him whether his attention has been drawn to the most remarkable article by Professor James Meade, a Nobel prizewinner, in the volume dedicated to the memory of Anthony Crosland concerning the instructions, which are novel, which should be given to arbitration tribunals in that sector?

My Lords, I am aware of the article to which the noble Lord refers. I am also aware of the views of Professor James Meade. His proposals, however, suffer from the defect that all incomes policies suffer from; namely, the virtual impossibility of enforcing them.

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord what are the Government's criteria for privatisation?

Yes, my Lords. The Government's criterion is the national interest.

My Lords, would not the Government be prudent in their own interest to make contingency plans for a pay policy that is more flexible than the total freeze which they may otherwise eventually be forced to impose?

My Lords, we do not accept the noble Lord's view that a total freeze is a possibility. We believe that realism is coming back into pay bargaining. We believe that the present policy will permit a degree of flexibility that is not possible under a pay policy. We believe also that our present policy will avoid the kind of trauma that are associated with the break-up of an incomes policy.

My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the present incomes policy, coupled with unemployment, is the means by which wage restraint is being exercised at present? And is it the intention of the Government to continue along those lines?

My Lords, I do not agree with either part of the noble Lord's supplementary question. The Government do not operate an incomes policy. Secondly, as we have made clear on many an occasion, the real cause of the present level of unemployment, which is a tragedy, of course, for the people concerned and a great waste of national resources—something which cannot possibly be denied—is the growing uncompetitiveness of British industry over a long period of time, a situation which has been much exacerbated by the present world recession.

My Lords, would not the noble Lord agree that the Government, who were widely based and widely supported in the country, might have a very good chance of getting the cooperation needed to work an incomes policy?

My Lords, the present Government are widely supported in the country. They secured a large majority in 1979 and they will secure a large majority when the next General Election comes.

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available at the usual time this evening.

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, may I ask whether the Motion means that three or more stages can or cannot be taken on one day?

Yes, my Lords it does.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 38:

Page 39, line 36, leave out paragraph (c).

The intention of the Government in adding representatives of the further education sector, educational advisers and the independent and grant-aided sectors, as was set out in this clause, was to take into account all the interests of the SCE examination board, which has merged since the composition of the board was laid down by the 1963 Education (Scotland) Act and consolidated in the 1980 Act.

In recent years—it may be since the noble Lord, Lord Ross, left office, I know not,—educational advisers have played an increasingly effective and indeed an important part in the development of the school curriculum, and we consider that they merit separate representation on the board. It may be that one should perhaps distinguish the distinction, as it were, between directors of education and the educational advisers who perform a different role as employees of education authorities. Their duties are different to those of directors of education, or indeed teachers, each of whose interests are already separately represented on the board. I am advised that legally they cannot be represented on the board without the Bill saying so—which it does—and therefore we have specifically mentioned them. In those circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord will be content and will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

I should like to ask the Minister of State whether he means psychologists and that sort of expert adviser.

No, I do not. These are employees of the education authority whose role is to examine the functioning of schools within their spheres of responsibility and to advise. They have nothing to do with any outside body, still less do they have special skills, such as those of psychologists. They do not examine the pupils; they examine the working of the schools and make recommendations, very often to headmasters.

Are they on the staff of the directors of education? I always thought that the inspectors in Scotland were central inspectors, came under the Secretary of State for Scotland, had their being within the Scottish Office and were not local authority people. I thought they would have done the kind of job to which the Minister of State was referring—in fact I know that they do that kind of job.

There is no definition, either in this Bill or in the principal Act, of "educational advisers". We have little or no guidance from the Minister of State, but he did say that they were employed by the education authorities. The Act—the original Act—says this:

"appointed by the Secretary of State from amongst persons nominated by, or by bodies appearing to the Secretary of State to represent the interests of, the universities…education authorities".

So they are included within that, and quite frankly I do not see the point of giving them a separate opportunity of representation. It is not an important point, but I hope that the Minister of State will look at this before the next stage of the Bill. In the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 39:

Page 40, line 16, at end insert ("and in the case of education authorities the cost of presentations shall not be passed on to the parents of those pupils who have been presented").

The effect of the noble Lord's amendment would be to introduce a provision into the 1980 Act which expressly prevented education authorities from passing on to the parents of pupils in education authority schools the charges which the authorities pay to the board in respect of the examinations for which pupils are presented.

There may be some misunderstanding about this. I well appreciate the noble Lord's concern, but the amendment is unnecessary for this reason. If he looks at Section 3 of the 1980 Act he will see that, subject to certain minor exceptions, school education is to be provided by authorities without payment of fees. Accordingly the authority has no power under the existing provision to charge fees for examination presentations. I am informed that, from the legal point of view, if this amendment was written into the Bill—in other words, to provide that no such power is to be available to authorities—one might by this amendment be setting up a proposition that such power does in other situations exist. Therefore not only is the amendment unnecessary, it is indeed undesirable.

I should perhaps state that in the independent and grant-aided school sector, where the school authorities are entitled to pass on examination charges to parents, of course they may do so if they wish. But under the provisions of our assisted places scheme relief in appropriate cases is brought so far as pupils attending those schools under the scheme are concerned. I hope, therefore, the noble Lord will agree that his amendment is not necessary.

I think that is very good news. Concern has been expressed by various teaching organisations about this. Far be it from me to take this Government down a dangerous path; they are very fond of treading such paths anyway. I hastily seek to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 40:

Page 41, line 14, leave out subsections (7) and (8).

There is nothing sinister about these two subsections of this particular clause, as I hope to show the noble Lord, Lord Ross. The purpose underlying subsection (7) is, first, to remove any doubt about the power of the Secretary of State under Section 129(6) of the 1980 Act to attach conditions to grants given by him in the past to meet the obligation to the Scottish Certificate of Education Examination Board; secondly, to enable him in the future, with the board's consent, to vary or revoke any such conditions. So far as subsection (7) is concerned, the amendment would delete it from the Bill.

To explain matters I have to go back into the history. The Secretary of State's power to give grants to the board has been used primarily in relation to the provision of premises. When the board set about acquiring its existing premises in Dalkeith the Secretary of State agreed to give a grant towards the cost, subject to certain conditions. One condition was that in the event of sale, which had to be at full market value, the whole proceeds were to be surrendered to the Secretary of State. Since it is the Government's intention that the board will in future finance any property acquisitions by borrowing, it is only just that the board should be empowered to use the proceeds of sale of the Dalkeith premises towards the acquisition of new property. The intention is that the Exchequer will recover only such part of the grant for the Dalkeith premises as will not be used by the board for the acquisition of replacement property.

Subsection (7), therefore, removes any doubt that there may have been about the Secretary of State's power to attach conditions to the grant in respect of the Dalkeith property and gives the Secretary of State power to renegotiate the conditions with the Board to accord with this intention. As I say, there is nothing sinister about the inclusion of subsection (7), and of course the conditions of the grant may be varied only with the Board's consent.

So far as subsection (8) is concerned, the purpose behind that is the ultimate repeal of Section 129(6) and thus the repeal of the Secretary of State's power to give grant to the board. The intention is, as I have said, that if the board needs new premises at any point in the future, it will finance that by borrowing. So that the power to give a grant is now not only unnecessary; in the Government's view it is undesirable. Clause 13 seeks to transfer to local authorities full responsibility for control of the board's expenditure. Just as it is no longer appropriate that the Secretary of State should continue to be responsible for approving the board's estimates on behalf of the local authorities who in fact finance the hoard, so it is no longer appropriate that there should be a power in the background to give central Government grant to the board.

Effective control over the board's income and expenditure cannot be exercised if both the board and local authorities have at the back of their minds the fact that, whenever financial difficulties appear to be looming, the Secretary of State is available to bail them out. The Government want to encourage the board and the local authorities in their financial responsibilities and do not think that providing a convenient cushion of funding is the way to do it. As regards future development work by the board, if the noble Lord, Lord Ross, is concerned that the Secretary of State might be unable in future to grant aid desirable examination development work, I can put his mind at rest because the power to make such grants will continue to be provided under the Educational Development, Research and Service Regulations 1946. For all those reasons, I hope that the noble Lord will see the reasons for drafting the clause in that way and withdraw his amendment.

I am not entirely satisfied. I think the matter was relevant to the provision of the new building at Dalkeith. It might well be equally relevant later on, and I do not think anything is gained by the Government's doing what they are doing here. It may well be that the Treasury insisted upon it and the Secretary of State for Scotland could not resist it, or could not resist the idea of being popular with the Treasury in doing something he knows or hopes will cost him nothing and indeed gain them nothing. I think it is unwise, but I will not press the matter and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 42:

Page 49, leave out lines 39 to 47.

There is much in this Bill which is precisely similar to the 1980 Act. We still keep the two committees, one in respect of primary and secondary education and the other in respect of further education. Under the existing provisions, which are basically Section 94 of the 1980 Act, there are four stages. First, the award is intimated to the Secretary of State. Secondly, the Secretary of State must make an order, which attracts no parliamentary procedure, giving effect to the award so far as it recommends changes, unless either House or an affirmative resolution resolves that effect should not be given to the award, and the resolution of each House must be based on national economic circumstances. Thirdly, if both Houses pass the affirmative resolution, the Secretary of State then has to determine what changes should be made. Fourthly, if both Houses do not pass the affirmative resolution, effect must be given to the award.

New Section 97B makes provision for dealing with arbitration awards in a slightly different way. An award is to be notified to the appropriate negotiating committee which will transmit it to the Secretary of State who must inform the committee that he does or does not accept the award. Under subsection (6), which the noble Lord seeks to delete, he is put—if may quote the lawyers' expression— "on terms" as to what he is to do in relation to the notification and subsequent action so far as the award is concerned. If he does not accept it, he may make an order, subject to negative resolution in either House, to set aside the award. If the order is annulled by resolution, the award must be put into effect.

In empowering the Secretary of State to prevent an arbiter's award having effect, the clause substantially re-enacts Sections 93 and 94 of the 1980 Act. These amendments, whatever their intention, apparently deprive the Secretary of State of any role in relation to arbitration awards. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Ross, does not actually seek to achieve that, because if subsection (6) is deleted from the Bill, the Secretary of State would have no role to play at all. As I have said, the power to overturn an arbiter's award already exists, and in current economic circumstances there is every justification for retaining it. For instance, employers could be faced with an arbitration award which could not be met without increases in rates or financial savings which unacceptably reduce standards of service. In that event we should consider it reasonable for the Secretary of State to set aside a pay award and to substitute one which employers could more readily meet. Any action by the Secretary of State would still be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and I do not suppose that he would be allowed to exercise this power without explaining his reasons to Parliament.

The next matter which the noble Lord seeks to achieve is, in effect, to cut this House out of such scrutiny. I see no justification for confining the power of parliamentary review merely to another place. I suppose it could be said that money will be involved because we are talking about pay. But I maintain that this House has a legitimate interest to scrutinise the Secretary of State's exercise of the power to set aside an arbiter's award. I should have thought that, in fact, teachers would take some comfort in the thought that under these conditions the Secretary of State's order could be brought under review in either of two places. I say that particularly for this reason: that in so far as another place is concerned, where the Government of the day have their majority, if the matter is raised by virtue of a prayer, it is inconceivable—or almost inconceivable—that the Secretary of State will not achieve his way. I should have thought that your Lordships' House, with certain independence of thought and action—which we see demonstrated all too frequently—could bring to bear a much more thorough-going review with a much more uncertain end as regards a vote. As I have said, that could bring some comfort to teachers who were dissatisfied with the Secretary of State's action.

Therefore, for all these reasons, I consider that the Secretary of State should maintain his role, as he does at the moment, as is set out in subsection (6), and that it would not be appropriate to remove, as it were, the jurisdiction of both Houses in respect of a negative resolution, as they have at the moment.

I think that the Minister of State did his best with a bad principle. To attack the correctness or otherwise of my amendments and their effect is fair game, but I did not anticipate that he would rest upon that. I thought that he would give us some great new discovery in respect of the Secretary of State. I do not object to the present position. I had to work under it when I was Secretary of State. It says:

"If in any case where any recommendations of arbiters have been transmitted to the Secretary of State under subsection (1) above"—

that is, the principal Act—

"each House of Parliament resolves that national economic circumstances require that effect should not be given to the recommendation"

and so on. That is his power at the moment to set aside an arbitration award.

Under the present Bill and this particular subsection which I suggest should be changed, the Secretary of State has a very different power indeed. According to the statute, he merely decides to set aside the arbitration award. There is no restriction about national economic circumstances. That was the only argument that the Minister of State used; I took down his phrase— "the present economic circumstances". If that is the case, why not put the same phrase in the subsection as is in the present subsection? That is all I am concerned about at the present time.

Turning to the second point about this decision not to implement an award, I still think that it is quite wrong that it should be done on the basis of a negative resolution. As I understand it, we accept that if they deal with a negative resolution in another place we do not bother with it here at all. In fact, I cannot recollect any negative instrument coming up for consideration here. That is the position of practice rather than the position of law. Therefore, I wanted to strengthen that to ensure that in one House the decision would be taken on the basis of a positive resolution. In other words, it is the Government who must bring it forward. I will gladly change that to both Houses if that is the feeling of the Committee, and shall certainly do so at the next stage of the Bill.

Meantime, I think that what the Government are doing is wrong. If they mean to set aside arbitration on the basis of national economic circumstances, they should do in this Bill what they did in the last Act—put in that phrase absolutely clearly. It was something that resolved a very considerable difficulty in respect of teachers on both sides of the Border before, and I think we should keep it there. If the Minister of State cannot give me a more satisfactory answer on the principle, I feel that I must take this to a Division.

It is difficult to see in what way any Secretary of State could come to either House, if this matter was raised by way of a prayer, and justify the rejection of an arbiter's award unless it was in the context of national economic circumstances. He could not, so far as I can conceive, think of any other reason. Any discussion, any debate which took place either in your Lordships' House or in another place against an order by a Secretary of State would be bound to touch on the question of economic circumstances because, as I have said, the only reason which the Secretary of State could give for refusing to accept the arbiter's decision would be that the national economic circumstances do not justify an award of an increase of salary as recommended by the arbiter. It really seems to me that what the noble Lord is complaining about is that the previously affirmative resolution procedure which, of course, has its place—but I do not think necessarily has its place in this type of situation should be preserved. That is another matter. However, I see no reason why we should keep the words, "national economic circumstances" in the Bill when, if one stops to think about it, they are really—I shall not say "not justfied"—not necessary in these circumstances.

That really is very disappointing. They are in the 1980 Act. They were put there at a time when we decided to set aside both in England and Wales and in Scotland the award or to have the power to set aside the award. It was specifically stated that they would only depart from the award on that basis. If these words are not there, then whether the Minister of State likes it or not—and he is a lawyer—for any reason at all the Secretary of State could set aside the award. He cannot deny that. If he says—and he has repeated it—that the only situation that he can foresee is that it will be set aside only on the basis of the national economic circumstances, then surely the words should be there. That is the case. It would not cost him anything, but he certainly would satisfy or allay the suspicions of many people connected with education who do not like the change that is being made and who wonder why it is being made. Therefore, if he cannot give me any better answer than that, then I am afraid that I had better divide the Committee.

As I have said, this clause itself brings within its orbit 11 clauses. It makes considerable changes in respect of how in future we are going to conduct the negotiations in respect of teachers' salaries. There was one thing in the present situation that is not brought in, and I was really surprised that that should be so. We have not found a name for the new body, and they are to be given the power to christen themselves. I wonder what they will come up with, but I am sure that all suggestions will be considered.

The other point is that hitherto there has always been an independent chairman of the Scottish Salaries Committee. In this case there is no indication at all that there is to be an independent chairman. When we come to questions like salary negotiations, or whether or not we should set up arbitration, I think an independent chairman can be invaluable. I should like therefore to ask the Government in the first instance why they have decided not to have an independent chairman.

The second point is one that I mentioned in passing; that is, the relationship between the local authority representatives and the Secretary of State's representatives on this committee. I said before—and although it is called a secret concordat, there has been very little secret about it—that there was very close contact between the Secretary of State's representatives on the Scottish teachers' salaries committee, and indeed they would not look at any settlement unless the Secretary of State agreed. That was the understanding. I think I have a right to ask the Minister of State as to whether that understanding still exists.

This committee does not at the present time work on the basis of a simple majority. A majority of the teachers' side works independently, while the employers' side act really on the say-so of the Secretary of State. By no manner of means can it be called free negotiations. This is a complicated business. This is why I think there should be an independent chairman and why I think the whole question of arbitration, to which we had to resort on more than one occasion, is so important. That is why I divided the Committee. I shall have another look at that one before we come to the next stage and consider whether I can find more suitable words so that people could vote with me with a freer conscience in an endeavour not to make nonsense of the Bill.

On this point can we be given an indication by the Government as to whether the present basis of the relationship between the local authorities and the Secretary of State will continue? There has been considerable difficulty between local authorities and the Secretary of State. As a matter of fact, at the present time in another place the Secretary of State is moving against one of the more important other local authorities in respect of their burden of rates. It may well be that we will not have the same kind of co-operation between the Secretary of State and the local education authorities that we have had in the past. Perhaps we could have some information about these two particular points: first, the independent chairman, and secondly the relationship between the Secretary of State and the local education authorities in the way they intend to conduct the negotiations under the new committee and the new procedures.

May I deal first with the matter of the chairman, and whether or not he is independent? As I understand the position, the existing negotiating bodies work quite effectively with chairmen who are chosen from among their own members. For example, the Scottish teachers and the Special Service Conditions Committee. Therefore, that seems to the Government at any rate a matter which is working quite well and does not need to have any more elaborate statutory structure.

May I interrupt the Minister of State there? We are now going to have only one committee, and it means that the powers that the Secretary of State has in respect of salaries he will also have in respect of conditions of service. At the present time, on conditions of service, there is no agreement with the local authorities that the Secretary of State has a veto, so we shall have a very different set-up in respect of what is in the Bill. It should not be related to one particular committee working very well which does not have an independent chairman. The important committee has an independent chairman.

I have related it, and gave one example, but I think that the principle is the same. The view that we take is that there is no need to have a more rigid and less flexible machinery. I think I can encapsulate the noble Lord's second question by saying that he questions the relationship of the committee with the local authority. The Secretary of State is, as I understand it, going to publish a memorandum or other piece of paper, and this is going to be discussed with COSLA, if they wish it. No doubt this will be one of the matters which they would wish to go over. I do not think that I can help the noble Lord any further than that. So far as the procedures of the committee are concerned, such matters as voting, and so on, will relate to their own standing orders, and we think it is a matter for them to draw up their standing orders as they think fit.

I hope that the Minister of State will agree with me that the present situation under the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 is that a chairman is appointed by the Secretary of State as an independent person. That has been so for a long time, and I do not see any justification for a departure from that. To suggest that it works quite well in respect of the other committee which deals with conditions of service is a very different matter, and the conduct of that committee is very different indeed from that of the Teachers' Salaries Committee. The Teachers' Salaries Committee is now taking over that responsibility, and it is probably all the more important that the chairman should be an independent person. That is the first point.

When the noble Earl says that a memorandum will be produced and there will be discussions with COSLA (which is the local authority association), will he answer one question for me? Is there, or is there not, an agreement presently existing between the representatives of the local education authorities on the salaries committee and the Secretary of State that no settlement is reached without the say-so of the Secretary of State? That is a very important question and if the Minister's answer is "Yes", then what will be the future position under the new set-up?

I tried to answer the noble Lord. He may not agree that the situation we shall set up is the best one in the circumstances, and if he does not, then it is his privilege to disagree, and if he tables an amendment at the next stage or seeks to divide your Lordships on whether this clause should be part of the Bill, then that too is his privilege. But as a question of policy I must tell him that so far as chairmen are concerned this is the policy which we have adopted. I do not think I can help the noble Lord further.

I set out to be conciliatory and understanding and I told the noble Earl that I agreed with the main changes being effected by the Bill arising from the Houghton Committee. Getting rid of an independent chairman is not a main change, but it could be important, and I hope the Minister will give some thought to the matter between now and the next stage of the Bill. Meantime I shall not hold up the progress of the Bill or seek to get rid of the whole of Clause 9; but I hope that by the next stage we will be given some information as to how salary negotiations have been conducted up to now and how they will be conducted in future.

This is an important matter for ratepayers, local authorities and everybody else. The Secretary of State puts in a figure as to the cash limits in the rate support grant for salary pay increases he is prepared to meet. In the last rate support grant for Scotland he said he was prepared to meet increases in pay up to 6 per cent. However, when it came to a teachers' settlement, the settlement was 7·6 per cent., which meant that the local authorities through their rates had to find the extra 1·6 per cent., which was considerable. However, at present in another place he is telling them they cannot increase their rates.

I want to know what the Secretary of State will do in future negotiations. He has the power of veto now, and while he allowed that 7·6 per cent. settlement to go through, he did not provide the wherewithal to local authorities to meet it. What will the situation be in future? Will he control the settlement from the local authority side? I hope the Minister will find that information for us before the next stage of the Bill, although in the meantime I do not propose to divide the Committee on this important and, on the whole, desirable clause.

I can answer the noble Lord to this extent before we move on. The previous Administration, of which the noble Lord, Lord Ross, was a distinguished member, consulted a number of bodies in 1976 and it was envisaged that the Secretary of State would exercise statutory control over the amount of pay settlements. My right honourable friend has decided not to include provision to that effect because it is considered that the local authorities and other employers concerned are capable of taking, and indeed should take, responsible decisions on what pay offers they can make within the resources available to them, and we feel it should be left to them to make their own decisions. As to whether the existing agreement will continue—which is really what the noble Lord is asking about—these arrangements were negotiated outside the statutory framework and it will be a matter of negotiation as to whether they continue, as I told the noble Lord, and I cannot at the moment anticipate the outcome of those negotiations.

Reverting to the matter of the arbiter's award, which was the subject of my noble friend's amendment, I must admit that I voted less for his Amendment No. 43 than against what the Minister said in rebuttal of it because, frankly, I could not understand the logic, or lack of logic, in what he said on the matter. I think the Minister was correct in saying that if Amendment No. 43 had been carried it would have deprived the Secretary of State of power to reject an award of an arbiter, and the way in which my noble friend spoke to his amendment made it perfectly clear that it was not his intention to deprive the Secretary of State of power, but that it was his intention that the Secretary of State's power to reject an award should be limited in the way it is under the present law, namely limited by the needs of national circumstances.

The Minister's reply I could not understand because he said it was inconceivable that the Secretary of State would put an order forward for any reason other than that. If that is the case, then there does not seem to be merit in removing that from the law when it has worked satisfactorily up to the present because, as far as I can see, it can do nothing other than create suspicion in the minds of teachers that the Secretary of State is contemplating turning an award down for other reasons altogether. If the Minister of State is correctly interpreting the view of his right honourable friend the Secretary of State and there is no other reason for seeking to set aside an arbiter's award, I do not see the logic in taking that expression out of the Bill.

The second reason why I was unhappy about the Minister's reply was that he gave no justification whatever for substituting the negative for the positive procedure. I agreed with him when he said there was little doubt that under an affirmative resolution the Secretary of State, given the majority the Government have in another place, could be practically certain of getting his resolution approved. But he went on to say that that was a good reason for the order also coming before your Lordships' House, which was more independently minded and where the Government could not have that absolute certainty. I have no doubt that the noble Earl had at the back of his mind what happened last year on an education procedure. The Government came a lovely cropper in your Lordships' House on the subject of school transport, about which your Lordships showed an independent attitude.

I agree with the noble Earl that such an order should come before both Houses of Parliament, but I cannot see, in the absence of any explanation from him, why he is substituting the negative for the affirmative procedure, because the affirmative procedure makes it certain that the order will be discussed in both Houses (or in one House if that is the way it is put) whereas under the negative procedure, as we know from the past, something has been allowed to slip through because, perhaps coming at a very busy time, it has not been noticed. People cannot miss an affirmative resolution; they can, regrettably, miss a negative one. I therefore hope that at the next stage my noble friend will table an alternative amendment or amendment the effect of which will be to maintain in the Bill the present position. In those circumstances, given that the Minister appears to accept the basic restriction which would apply for the rejection of an arbiter's award, I hope that he might find it possible to keep the Bill as the present law stands.

moved Amendment No. 45:

Page 53, line 28, leave out ("by more than one.").

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, for raising this question. It seems to me that there is here a weak link in what I understand to be one of the major objects of the Bill; namely, to enable parents to take a greater interest and to play some part in the placing of their children. There are, I think, about 10 or 12 articles in the Bill, all of which come to the bottleneck (if I may so call it) of the appeal committee. This point was raised by my noble friend Lord Balerno on Second Reading, and I believe that my noble friend Lord Mansfield had a shade of sympathy. He said, "Well, of course, there are two things that you must remember. One is the sheriff, and the other is that you might involve the local authority in some expense". I should like to say a word or two about both of those points.

First, in regard to expense, I would say that the only expenditure which could arise here would be insignificant. That is laid down quite clearly in new Section 28A(3)(b). Therefore, if there was any significant expenditure it would be illegal for it to go forward. I do not know what is meant by insignificant expenditure, but I suppose that it means buying a chair or perhaps a table, or adjusting an electric bulb. It is quite clear that there is to be no structural change and certainly no additional teacher is to be employed. So I think that the argument about expense carries no weight whatever.

The other question is: What else can the sheriff do Of course, he has to see that the law is obeyed. He then has what I must say is a rather peculiar power, which I think could possibly be interpreted in different ways. But in the ordinary course of events, if there is an appeal he will confirm the education authority's decision; that is to say, he will go against the appellant. That is laid down in new Section 28A, on, I think, page 10 of the Bill. The first thing he must do is to see that the law is observed. That is fair enough; I agree. Secondly, when it comes to supporting the local authority, the sheriff must ensure,

"that, in all the circumstances, it is appropriate to do so".

That means that any appellant must show that the action of the local authority has been inappropriate. It is not a question of being better or less good, or wiser or less wise, or more convenient. It must positively be shown as having been inappropriate. I do not know what is meant by inappropriate. Perhaps it could mean sending a girl to a boys' school, or sending a child of the wrong age group to a particular school. Perhaps that would be inappropriate. But, with respect, I would say that it must be something very near to being unreasonable or totally undesirable. In other words, I think that the appeal to the sheriff is of very little importance. It will not be used much, it should not be used much, and it will not be much use to parents.

Therefore, the vital importance of having an objective appeal committee is to my mind very strong indeed. If one was having an arbitration with perhaps a big organisation, such as British Leyland, they might say, "Yes, we will have an arbitration, but we will appoint all the arbiters". I do not think that many people would accept that proposition, but that is exactly what is written into the Bill, and I think it a pity because, after all, we all want to gain the confidence of the parents, so that they feel they are getting a fair deal. If they do not get a fair deal, the purpose of the provision will be very largely lost. Here the provision is much more narrowly drawn than is the English provision. We do not necessarily copy the English, but I think that in this respect they are wiser, and I suggest that it would be in the interests of the purpose of the Bill to make the appeal committee more objective than it is at present.

I shall add only a few words to what has been said. I support the amendment because it has been pointed out to me by the Scottish Consumer Council that a great many of the parents and other people concerned with the education of children are worried lest the appeal committee is highly biased and has no really independent chairman. This is not in the least a political point; it is purely a practical one; and we are anxious to ensure that the appeal committee contains a majority of independent representatives and that it is seen to be functioning fairly in the eyes of the parents who are appealing against an education authority decision. At the same time, the chairman of the appeal committee should be an independent person and should not be a member of the education committee or authority. He should be somebody who can be quite independent and can view these discussions from an independent point of view.

The point is perfectly simple, and it does not seem to me to have any political significance at all. It is purely practical. I think this is an amendment which will improve the Bill, will improve the respect which the authorities and parents will have for the Bill, and I hope very much that the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, will accept it.

I rise to support this very practical amendment. I must say that the Government themselves must have a slight feeling of conscience, because they endeavour to excuse the position by saying that the authority members will not outnumber the other members by more than one. If I may a say so, it is rather like the lassie who tried to excuse her illegitimate child to her parents by saying, "After all, it is only a little one". I really cannot see why the outnumbering by more than one should not simply be left out altogether. One is enough to bias the committee and to put the committee into disrepute, and I hope the Minister will be able to accept the amendment.

I am not at all certain why the words appear in the first instance, unless I am totally misreading the schedule. The schedule says that an appeal committee will consist of three, five or seven members. Take a committee of three members. If the authority members are going to outnumber the others by more than one, they might all be authority members—the numbers will be either 2–1 or 3–0. When you get on to five or seven, it does not have exactly the same effect, of course, but I still do not think that this is in fact the right amendment to achieve what the noble Lords are wanting. Because if the education authority is going to be suspected of trying to make certain that the appeal committee backs it up by having a majority on the committee—if that is the way the education authority is going to work—you have got to point out that they also pick the other people who are going on the committee. They are appointing the whole committee.

I thought that part of what the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, said was really against the whole procedure, because the education authority are choosing the whole committee. If they are going to be doing a bad job because they have a majority of one, if they cannot be trusted to consider the matter effectively, then obviously they are going to make certain that the other people will be people who are likely to back them up in any case. So if there is anything wrong in this, it is giving the education authority the power to select all the members of the committee.

I should have thought that a more sensible arrangement would have been to ensure that the representatives of parents or people who have experience in education, or people who are acquainted with the educational needs of the authority, making up the minority of the committee, should not be chosen by the education authority at all, I would have been happier if a means had been devised for an alternative way of appointing these other people.

The noble Lord, Lord Hughes, raises a point of great interest, and there may be something in it which the Minister wishes to consider. But may I point out that, of course, Governments appoint judges and Governments still litigate before judges; and local authorities appoint stipendiary magistrates and still expect them to behave judicially—and by and large they do. The point I am making is that there is all the difference in the world between the situation where members of the tribunal are actually members of the education authority and where they are, albeit appointed by the local authority, not members of the authority or a committee.

On that point, I might say that it is perfectly true, of course, that judges are appointed. But the Secretary of State does not appoint a number of judges exceeding a number of other judges by one to sit alongside them.

These two amendments in fact fall to be considered separately. I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, has run his arguments in together, no doubt with the perfectly laudible intention of saving time, but I think I must address myself to each one separately. If I may first deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Mackie of Benshie, the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has of course shot my fox. If the noble Lord, Lord Mackie, had in fact read Schedule 1, he would have seen that an appeal committee can consist of no more than three persons from among those appointed by the authority under the schedule. Therefore, as the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, said, it would make nonsense of that if the majority from the local authority, so to speak, was more than one.

I think my first general point is that as an ex-county councillor I really resent the insinuation of the noble and learned Lord that in some way all the appeal committees are going to be set up by authorities with intent to defeat appeals, and that the persons who are going to sit on those appeal committees are going to be judges in their own cause, to quote his own phrase, and hell bent on denying satisfaction to the appellant parent. I do not think that they will take such a cynical and misguided view of their role and function.

If one may take an example—and one does not have to go so far as the Court of Appeal—lay magistrates are appointed by my noble and learned friend, and in Crown Courts they sit as an appellate court from decisions of their fellow magistrates in courts of petty session. I have never heard it said that an appellant is denied justice in the Crown Courts, in the old courts of quarter session, because the lay justices inevitably, as it were, rush to the protection of their friends and refuse to believe that they might have erred or in some way misdirected themselves. I see the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, looking at me, and I hope that she would agree with that contention. It is simply not right to say that the people sitting on these appeal committees are going to be judges in their own cause. They will make it their own casue, in the same way as any unjust judge can, if they so wish, but to start one's argument on that basis is, I think, quite wrong.

The Government have in fact given a great deal of thought to this matter of the composition of these appeal committees; and the next point I have to take up is that of my noble friend Lord Selkirk when he said that in fact the expense which flowed from the decision of an appeal committee would of necessity be insignificant—because it might well be very far from insignificant. In fact, the decision of an appeal committee to uphold a parents' placing request could involve the authority in significant additional expenditure. There might well be the engaging of a new teacher, with all that that implies—not only questions of salary, but all the back-up expense to do with that.

The next matter upon which I take issue with my noble friend is this. Although we have to go to new Section 28E, and although it allows the appeal committee to confirm the authority's decision where one of the grounds of refusal set out in new Section 28A(3) obtains, the committee may nevertheless decide not to do so. in other words, it can weigh up the merits of the appeal and it is not bound by any such considerations as appear in the new Section 28A(3). The authority may therefore, whatever the grounds of appeal may have been, have to place the child in accordance with the parents' wishes, even if this can only be achieved by significant expenditure. As I have said, that can embrace the employment of an initial teacher or it may mean the extension or alteration of facilities or accommodation. Clearly where this could occur then considerations of public money and finance come in. That means that the safeguard of the education authority has to be taken into account as well as the interests of the parents. There is a balance to be held here. Both the public interest and the interests of the parents must be adequately protected. I urge upon my noble friend to reflect that the decision of the appeal committee is not one which will of necessity have insignificant consequences.

The next matter which my noble friend touched upon was the appeal to the sheriff. That, I regret to notice, he dismissed in so many words by saying that he did not think that it would really amount to much and would not be used. That is a matter of construction of the statute. I disagree with my noble friend, as it happens; but the point which I want to make is that after the determination of the matter by the appeal committee then, so far as the education authority is concerned, that is the end of the matter. If the appeal committee comes down against the education authority, they have no further right of appeal. They may be put to this expense, whereas the parents have the right of appeal to the sheriff. They have a further stage by which the case can be reviewed again.

This was another matter which engaged us when we came to decide on the way in which these appeal committees should be made up, and because of considerations of public money, among other things, we felt that there should be a majority of one in this particular instance. It was because we felt that parents might feel that an appeal committee was not being objective in turning down their appeal that the further appeal—which I may say the English do not have—to the sheriff was instituted. I regard that as a very real safeguard for the rights of parents.

Then the matter was taken up in relation to the chairman. We are all concerned to see that parents receive a fair and impartial hearing when matters come to be ventilated before the appeal committee. The concern of Members, and their view, is that the object of the exercise that I have set out is more likely to be achieved if the chairman of the appeal committee was not a member of the authority or indeed of the education committee. I believe that one should strike a balance between the interests of parents, the children and the public interest. I say, with deference to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside— remembering as I do his strongly anti-deviationist stance not so many years ago—that I do not see that we have to follow the English down this particular road unless we feel that it is right and proper so to do. I ask why it should be assumed that a chairman of an appeal committee who is a member of the education authority cannot be impartial. I refute that implied allegation which is implicit in these amendments.

What is essential is that the chairman or any other member of the appeal committee should not be too closely involved with the particular case which is being heard. I would draw your Lordships' attention to paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 which excludes from membership any person involved with the original decision to refuse a placing request. Members of the Committee will also see that paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 1 exclude from membership of the committee persons involved with schools related to the placing request. These provisions provide adequate safeguards of impartiality over this matter.

Then where do we get to? For myself, I think that for the reasons which I have given and argued at fairly considerable length I do not believe that it is right to reject the impartiality of local people and local councillors in the way in which this first amendment implies that they should. But I am bound to say that I recognise the force of the arguments so far as Amendment No. 46 is concerned. If one may use the hackneyed but nevertheless entirely important saw, justice must be seen to be done, even on this particular non-litigious plane.

I am very willing to give considerable thought to that amendment between this and the next stage of the Bill. I am willing to give thought to the previous amendment, too. I am bound to say that I think that the Government are on pretty firm ground there. I should be very interested to hear from other Members of the Committee who have had long experience in the field of local government, whether they share the somewhat cynical attitude of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, over this matter.

May I ask a question in clarification? Did I understand the noble Earl to say in reply that because the parents had a right to appeal, it was only right that the authority should have a majority of one on the initial appeal. In other words, the parents had the right of appeal to the sheriff but the authority did not, and therefore it seemed to him logical that the authority on the first appeal should have a majority of one. If so, it surely is hardly fair that he should try to prejudice the first appeal because the parents have a right to the second.

The noble Lord is adept at making thoroughly illogical leaps into the dark. What I said was that in these matters, where there could be significant public expenditure concerned, there has to be full regard paid to public interest as well as the interests of parents and children. I went on to say that in this particular instance the parents have a further right of appeal to the sheriff and that the local education authority (who are, after all, the guardians of the public purse in this connection) do not. They have no further appeal. We thought in those particular circumstances it was right that at the midway point—that is to say, the midway point between refusal of the education authority to give effect to the wishes of the parents and the other end of the spectrum, when the sheriff finally decides—the education authority should be in a majority of one so far as the appeal committee was concerned.

If the noble Earl, as I understood him to say, is prepared to consider both these amendments, then I can proceed accordingly. I am anxious not to delay the House at all, in view of the other important business that is to come on, and to hear what other noble Lords who are experienced in local government affairs have to say on this matter. I am a little concerned that my advocacy is so very had and that I have apparently misled the Minister—and I am sure it is my fault—into thinking that I was making unwarrantable insinuations against people. It was nothing of the kind. I refrained from talking about the importance of justice being seen to be done, because there are plenty of platitudes flying about without my adding to them. What I was thinking of were the parents, who have been told that this is their charter. I can just picture the scene as they come in before the tribunal, because I have seen many court scenes like that, with the mother saying, "Who are these people who have turned down the appeal?" Then the parents hear that the majority of people are members of the education authority. I should have thought that was wrong.

I was not making insinuations. Many of the members might try to be impartial and might manage to be. But it is the impression which is given by this situation that I very much fear. I have been accused of insinuating and of being a deviationist. I was not at all suggesting that a chairman of a local authority could not be impartial. I was saying that in common sense, and out of consideration for the parties who were appearing, it would be better if he were not involved. As for copying the English, I agree entirely with the Minister that we should not always copy the English. But if they are right, there is no harm in doing the same, and I hope that they will do the same for us.

What the noble and learned Lord has said only underlines to me the need for a thoroughly impartial appeal committee. His interpretation of subsection (3) on page 2 seems to bear no relation to the words of the Bill. May I read those words?

"The duty"—

that is, to place children—

"imposed by subsection (1) above does not apply—

(a) if placing the child in the specified school would—

(i) make it necessary for the authority to take an additional teacher into employment;".

He said that it would. I interpreted the Bill as it stands:

(ii) give rise to significant expenditure on extending or otherwise altering the accommodation at or facilities provided in connection with the school".

That is, those things that are ideal, so long as the expenditure is insignificant. If the noble and learned Lord interprets the Bill totally differently, then it seems necessary to have an objective appeal committee.

What the noble and learned Lord has underestimated is this. I have been a member of a local authority, as have many others, and there are good and bad members of local authorities. There are very unreasonable local authorities and very unreasonable parents, but in most cases parents will not appeal. We are dealing here with the unreasonable cases, and in those cases justice should be seen to be done. This is no reflection on local authorities; it is merely a sensible way of doing it.

On the whole, after listening to what has been said, I think that I agree with the Government on this occasion. In many ways the amendments are misdirected. After all, the authority appoints and the members who object to the unobjectivity of the committee have had no objection at all to the fact that it is the authority that does the appointing of all the people. This was pointed out very well by my noble friend Lord Hughes. There is something else that people seem to forget about education authorities, and, indeed, about regional authorities, of which the education authority is but one committee: they are a very mixed lot of people. They are not all of the same mind and, at times, they can be guid thrown even against their own colleagues and their own establishment.

One other thing which my noble and learned friend Lord Wilson forgets is that not all members of the education authority are elected. I am sure I do not need to tell Scots members here that there are teachers co-opted on to education authorities, there are Ministers of the Kirk of Scotland, by statute, co-opted on to education authorities and there are Roman Catholic priests co-opted on to the education authorities. So in talking about an education authority, please do not think that you are talking about clashes of politics or anything else, in connection with the appeal procedure. It is just not so.

I had something to say and I should have welcomed a discussion at the right place when we were dealing with appeal committees and further appeals to the sheriff, but nothing was said about them. I quoted the figures for Strathclyde, and about 96 or 97 per cent. of transfer appeals were allowed. The only objection we heard from the Minister of State to the behaviour of any local education authority was in relation to Lothian, and I pointed out that, a month or two ago, the Secretary of State approved a new scheme for transfer that would probably have put right any weaknesses. So the experience at the present time is that the situation is well under control and is satisfactory.

The point is that once you list instructions (a), (b), (c) and (d), as to why you cannot allow a person to be transferred, you get a more inflexible position, and the weakness in the whole transfer scheme, and in the parents' charter, is that there is less flexibility now than there was. But that is in the clause. When we come to it, we can rely on the good sense of local authorities in selecting. I ask your Lordships to remember that in the case of Strathclyde no one who is on the appeal committee can have been there at the original decision or even have listened to the discussion. It is somebody entirely different and entirely new. It might be somebody from an authority far away. Then you have parents and people who, in the opinion of the education authority, are experienced. We are making a mountain out of a molehill here. We have gone out of our way in being reasonable about providing an appeal, and about the whole transfer scheme. I do not know whether anything I have said has been any help at all to the Government, but the matter has been pretty well discussed and agreed, and the balance is just about right.

It is a most unusual situation to have the noble Earl, Lord Mansfield, on the Government side and the noble Lord, Lord Ross, on the Opposition side in harmony against some of the back-benchers of both parties. Clearly, it is very satisfactory to know that the noble Earl will think again, certainly on the second amendment and perhaps on the first, though I am not sure that I would not have done it exactly the opposite way round and been ready to accept the first amendment and not the second. My reason is that if, when a parent goes to the appeal committee, he knows that there will probably be a majority of one on the education authority, he is very much more likely to go to the sheriff if he loses. If, on the other hand, he knows that the first committee is a balanced committee, then the chance of an appeal to the sheriff is very much less. So you may find that, by the very provision that is suggested in the first amendment, there will be less need of an appeal to the sheriff. I find the second amendment very difficult, If the noble Earl will accept the second, that is fine. But if he does not, I do not think it matters too much.

Having said that—I though it was worth while making the point—I leave it to the noble Earl and everybody else who is directly concerned to decide what is to happen, given that the noble Earl said that he would certainly consider again the second amendment and, I hope, the first.

Having just gone through the trauma of sitting on a committee which dealt with a slightly different question—namely, a teacher who was subsequently dismissed and who has now appealed—I support my noble friend on the Front Bench. The important point about any committee is that it should be properly constituted. We cannot in the end obtain objectivity. It is an illusion. Anybody who has sat as a magistrate knows that one's judgments are subjective. You are only in danger when you cheat yourself by thinking that you are not subjective in your judgments. What balances it out is that two other people sit with you. It is unlikely that everybody will have the same point of view on any given issue.

In the anxiety that everybody should have no concern or interest in the case, it seems that we have ended with a jumble which is not properly arranged. In court cases there is the protection of somebody to represent both parties. Here there is what might virtually be called a "kangaroo court", consisting of people with insufficient experience of handling such cases who have finally to make a judgment. This is the danger into which you fall if you are anxious to get people with complete impartiality but no knowledge of the subject. In the end, there will probably be more of the one and less of the other.

I suggest that members of an education authority will certainly be impartial. It is unlikely that they will know very much about a particular school or about particular parents. If we are searching for this will-o'-the-wisp—in other words, if we are looking for people who know nothing about the circumstances—there is an inherent danger.

As I have sat on an appeal committee, perhaps I may say that I have been rather horrified by some of the things which have been said today. I do not think that appeal committees will be tribunals or courts of law. They have got to be listening bodies. It is most unlikely that a vote would ever be taken. As the education authority, a local authority is ultimately responsible for education in its area. I believe that a local authority should have just a balance on the appeal committee.

The appeal committee upon which I sat was composed entirely of members of the education committee. A co-opted member took the chair. During four years there was only one appeal against us to the Secretary of State, and that appeal was turned down. We have to look at the appeal committee not as a court of trial nor as a tribunal but as a listening and attentive body which will decide how a child should be placed according to a little more information which is drawn out in interview. I, too, support the Government.

Arising from the argument between the Minister and the noble Earl, Lord Selkirk, I want to ask the Minister about the possibility of increased expenditure being forced on a local authority. The noble Earl quoted from the top of page 2 of the Bill and pointed out that the duty imposed by subsection (1) does not apply. He quoted paragraph (a)(i), which would make it necessary for an authority to have an additional teacher. Section 28E says that an appeal committee may, on a reference under Section 28C, confirm the education authority's decision if they are satisfied by (a) and (b), but if they are not satisfied they must refuse to confirm the decision of the education authority.

In the past when the word "may" has appeared in the Bill it has often been moved that it ought to be replaced by the word "shall". The argument has been that "may" sometimes means "shall". What does "may" mean in this connection? Does it make it obligatory, or does it mean that an appeal committee, even though it is satisfied that one or other of the grounds exists, can still refuse to confirm the authority's decision?—in which case the Minister is right in saying that they can be landed with additional expenditure. This is an important point. There have been so many arguments in past debates about legislation as to what the word "may" really means that I hope the Minister is saying that in this case "may" has the meaning which is taken outside legislation and does not in this case mean "shall".

For the second time in this debate the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, has shot my fox. Of the three Members on the Opposition Front Bench who have sprung to the Dispatch Box, two at least are now on my side. I take comfort from this very welcome, though possibly short-lived, agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Marnock.

To return to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, new Clause 28E is permissive. I take the noble Lord, Lord Hughes, one stage further. Over the page it says that an appeal committee may confirm the decision if it is satisfied, first, that one of the grounds of refusal in Section 28A(3) exists. Secondly, it has to be satisfied that it is appropriate to do so. That is the let-out. It gives them what I might call—I am conscious of the noble Baroness, Lady David, and her possible aversion to lawyers—the discretion, notwithstanding that there may be grounds of refusal under Section 28A(3), to refuse to confirm the authority's decision and require the education authority to place the child to whom the reference relates in the specified school.

If my noble friend Lord Selkirk reads it in that way, I hope he will see that this has two consequences. First, it gives to the appeal committee a rather wider role than perhaps he contemplated. Secondly, it has possible financial implications. It could be, for instance, that, in the provision of an extra teacher or in the adaptation of school buildings, there would be financial implications. It is those financial implications which have led to the Government proposing in Schedule 1 to the Bill that the appeal committee should be set up in the way that is proposed and that it should have a majority of not more than one. However, I confirm what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hughes.

In view of what the noble Earl the Minister has said, and with the reservation of any right which I have to raise the matter again on Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 47:

moved Amendment No. 48:

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 92:

Page 7, line 27, leave out ("made within five years after commencement").

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones has referred to this as being an important amendment, and indeed it is. If my reply is perhaps just a little longer than your Lordships would wish, may I say that this will not be a precedent for the other amendments, important though they are, which refer to Clauses 6, 7, 8—which my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate will be dealing with I hope—and Clause 9, all of which refer to transitional arrangements in the Bill. That is to say the preservation of entitlements of people who had entitlements before the Bill and we wish to see that those entitlements are preserved transitionally.

This amendment would mean that certain groups of Commonwealth citizens who immediately before commencement had an entitlement to citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies would have these entitlements preserved indefinitely. In the Bill, of course, the entitlement is for a five-year preservation. We are talking about those who are Commonwealth citizens settled here on 1st January 1973, who have remained settled here since then, and those Commonwealth citizens who hold the right of abode under Section 2(1)(d) of the Immigration Act 1971 by virtue of having a parent who is a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, by birth in the United Kingdom, and their Commonwealth citizen wives, if they have been resident in this country, or in relevant employment or partly the one and partly the other, for five years.

The permanent arrangements for British citizenship envisage that adults who seek to acquire British citizenship should do so by naturalisation—and indeed we debated this in quite a lengthy debate on a previous stage of the Bill—save of course for British passport holders who will, under Clause 4 of the Bill, have an absolute entitlement to British citizenship after five years in this country. I put it to the Committee that it would be incompatible with these arrangements if a significant group of citizens of other countries were to have an entitlement to British citizenship for the rest of their lives, and that is why we are proposing to bring these entitlements to an end.

But we are genuinely anxious that this change should be made without undue dislocation or hardship. Accordingly, we have proposed that those Commonwealth citizens who hold these entitlements by virtue of having been here since 1973 should have the entitlements preserved for five years after commencement. That incidentally is comparable to the arrangements made in Clause 18 for the preservation of the same sort of entitlements for Commonwealth citizens through their ties with dependencies. Incidentally, the Government originally proposed that the entitlement should be for a period of two years, but it was changed to five years in another place and I think it is quite right that it was.

But we think five years is long enough. After all, most of those people who have an entitlement in this way will hold it because they have been settled here, as the noble and learned Lord has explained, before 1973, and they have remained settled. In most cases, they will have held this entitlement since the end of 1977, because the five years has been up at the end of 1977 at the latest, and in many cases for many years before that. These are people who will thus have had a considerable time before now, and certainly before the commencement of the Bill, to decide whether to exercise their entitlement to register as citizens, and will have five further years under Clause 6 of the Bill after the date of commencement.

There are also practical arguments against an indefinite extension. It would greatly extend the transitional period for the new citizenship arrangements. It would thereby cause confusion and uncertainty since an individual's avenue to citizenship could depend on his or her status many years previously, and it could be difficult for individuals to know where they stood.

May I just register what I think are three very important points. The first two are points of agreement with the noble and learned Lord. The noble and learned Lord said that this has nothing to do with immigration, with people coming into the country. I absolutely agree with the noble and learned Lord on that. I think he implied that it also had nothing to do with settlement. It has nothing to do with making people leave the country. Clause 6 has nothing to do with that at all. People who are settled here have nothing to fear in that respect. But then the noble and learned Lord went on to deploy arguments about the importance, so far as being able to move around in Europe is concerned, of being able to get citizenship and the importance of registering by entitlement and the certainty of doing that, as well as the finance of it to the person concerned.

It really seems to me that these are arguments for people looking at Clause 6 and saying to themselves, "Here is a clause which is trying to encourage us into citizenship. Let us avail ourselves of the clause and not leave this entitlement for years and years", as the amendment would have us do. It is part of the policy of this Bill that people who take up British citizenship should be willing to identify with this country's interests. It seems wrong that those people who are qualified and are living here should simply do nothing about it and then protest if, after a lengthy period, the entitlement is ended but they have done nothing at all about taking up their citizenship rights. This is really all that Clause 6 is trying to do; it is saying to people, "Here is your entitlement. Do go on and take it up".

May I finish by replying to just two important points which the noble and learned Lord made. The first is that the noble and learned Lord—if I may say so, absolutely rightly, I think—referred to Commonwealth countries which have become independent recently and what is going to happen to their citizens under these arrangements. The noble Lord referred particularly to St. Lucia and also to Antigua. The extra five years in the Bill are precisely designed to try to help countries which have become independent recently. As to countries which may become independent after the commencement of the Bill, we shall, of course, have carefully to consider those people from those dependencies who have settled here. But it is relevant that in the Belize Bill, which has just been going through both Houses of Parliament, people from Belize who have been settled here for five years will become British citizens. I suggest to the Committee that this may well prove to be an appropriate pattern for the future.

The other point which the noble and learned Lord put to me, and to which I think I must reply is, that in the noble Lord's view it could be argued that, compared with Clause 38, Clause 6 reflects some form of racialist intention. Clause 6, which we are debating, concerns a right to registration by people who are neither our citizens nor do they hold the right of abode in this country as yet. Clause 38 provides, among other things, that Commonwealth citizens who now have the right of abode should not lose it. With respect, I do not think the comparison between the two clauses is really apt. Clause 6 is giving people time in which to claim an entitlement. Clause 38 too is preserving an existing status for people who already hold it.

Finally, the noble and learned Lord referred to children, minors. We come to an amendment, No. 93A, when we have finished with this one, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt. I should like to give an assurance to the Committee that this amendment, which we shall be coming to, on children has been looked at very carefully by the Government. But perhaps we could leave the question of children. I would ask the Committee whether we could leave the question of children out of this particular argument and deal with it on the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt.

Before the noble Lord sits down, I may not have heard him when he was dealing with the point I made about the EEC, perhaps because I was talking on a matter of the Committee's business with my noble friends, and I missed it.

I was venturing to suggest that the argument about the European Community is an argument against the amendment and for the clause. The clause endeavours to encourage people—by giving them another five years none the less—to get on and register as citizens if they have the entitlement. Subject, of course, to our negotiations with the European Community when the Bill has gone through, we can be pretty well sure that it will give such people the entitlement to move around in Europe as they want.

I genuinely do not see how the argument about the European Community can conceivably be an argument in favour of the amendment, which is to put off the right which people have to claim their citizenship for years and years ahead.

First, may I say that the noble Lord need have no anxiety about the length of his reply or that any objection will be a made by the Committee if he explains the Government's policy with equal thoroughness on the amendments which we are still to tackle, some of which are not concerned with transitional provisions, as the noble Lord suggested, but are of almost equal importance to this one.

I thought it was a pity that the Minister did not deal with the question of minors, because it struck me, as I listened to the noble and learned Lord, that this was possibly the most important leg of his amendment. The minors are in a position where they are not able to do anything for themselves within the five-year period which is stipulated by the Bill. Of course, it is a matter for the Committee, but I think it would have been preferable if we could have known what was in the Minister's mind at this stage, because it would certainly make a difference to my thinking if later on the noble and learned Lord was to decide that he was not satisfied with the Minister's explanation and that he wanted to press his amendment to a Division. If the Minister had it in mind to make some more permanent arrangements for the minors, this would certainly condition my thinking on whether or not to support the noble and learned Lord in a Division. Therefore, I attach a great deal of importance to that.

With respect, I think that the noble Lord's argument with regard to the EEC was a very difficult one to follow. Perhaps I may recapitulate. The noble and learned Lord was telling the Committee that if a person fails to exercise this right within the five years he forfeits it altogether and it becomes very much more difficult for him then to assume British citizenship by naturalisation, if he wishes to do so in order to enable him to move freely around the Community; that under the Bill he is not able to do that until he becomes a naturalised British citizen. I would simply remark in passing that the matter was dealt with in the Green Paper published by the former Government in April 1977. Paragraph 30 states:

"The establishment of a British Citizenship would make it necessary to re-examine in consultation with our partners, the present definition of United Kingdom national for European Community purposes. If the transitional arrangements suggested above were to be enacted, there would be some people who would become British Citizens but who have not the right of free movement under the definition now in force".

It goes on to define who those people are. I have searched through the White Paper and I cannot find any corresponding paragraph dealing with the position which may result from the passage of this Bill.

Before we leave this particular amendment we need to know precisely where people will stand. It is an important right, and it may become even more so in the future as unemployment continues to rise and as more and more people find it necessary to seek work elsewhere in Europe. I should like to confirm something which the noble and learned Lord said, which may not be sufficiently within the Committee's knowledge. In doing so I would refer to what the noble Lord has just said about free movement and the argument, as he put it, for people looking at Clause 6 and, in effect, saying to themselves, "Let us avail ourselves of this privilege of being able to register within the five years so that we can go abroad to work in France or Germany".

The noble Lord must be living in another world if he thinks that immediately people in Birmingham, Handsworth hear the noble Lord on "Yesterday in Parliament", they will rush out to HMSO to buy a copy of the Bill, read Clause 6 and then at the earliest possible opportunity avail themselves of this privilege which is being conferred on them. I can tell the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, that there are many people who have been living in this country for upwards of 10 years who have not appreciated the arguments for and against applying for registration, because during that priod they may have been working hard, building up their homes and their families, and it has never been necessary for them to go abroad. They exercise all the privileges of citizenship in that they can vote, they are eligible for jury service, they can stand for public office, and so on. Therefore, the question has not arisen. However, with the passage of this Bill it now becomes very much more important.

I should like to raise another point, to which I should be grateful if the noble Lord the Minister, would address himself, and which it seemed to me he rather glossed over when dealing with the speech made by the noble and learned Lord. It is the question of cost. If someone does not exercise this right immediately, will it be the policy of the Government progressively to increase the fees so that the expenditure on people who are concerned with vetting the applications is fully covered by the income that they receive—the £50 or the £150, as the case may be, depending upon whether it is registration or naturalisation?

As I have pointed out to the noble Lord the Minister on earlier occasions, this is one of the few departments of Government which have been immune from any cuts. In fact, the number of people dealing with nationality applications has increased enormously. Their productivity has gone down. I make no apologies for making this point yet again. The noble Lord's colleague, Mr. Tim Raison, has on several occasions told me of the decisions of the courts in 1977, and particularly in the case of Zambia, which have resulted in enormous increases in the bureaucracy of the Home Office to deal with applications for naturalisation. I am afraid that the same will be true of the provisions of this Bill; that there will be enormous increases in the number of civil servants employed to vet the applications and this will be reflected in the size of the fees. So within a few years it will not even be £150, which is the figure that the noble Lord has just quoted; it might be £300 or £400.

Just how will it be possible for the unemployed person from, say Jamaica, living in Birmingham Handsworth, or Brixton to find the enormous sum of money that he will be required to produce in order to become a British citizen and exercise what the noble Lord the Minister called the privileges of becoming a British citizen? It will be very much more difficult for a Commonwealth citizen to do this in the future. I should have thought that there are few enough distinctions in our law which preserve the position of Commonwealth citizens as opposed to aliens; that when it costs nothing, as the noble and learned Lord has said, and when it contains bureaucracy within certain limits—although it does not abolish it entirely—the Government would have welcomed an amendment. I was very disappointed at the Minister's reply, but I am still prepared to give this matter of a time limit further thought so long as I can be satisfied that at least the Government do not intend to retain it as regards minors.

Before my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter speaks, it might be for the convenience of the Committee if I make it clear that what the Government wish to do on Amendment No. 93A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, is to try to meet that amendment. But before I can meet it I must obviously hear the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt. That is why I felt that as that is a self-contained subject—a most important one on children—it would probably be for the convenience of the Committee if we waited to debate it then. I must be absolutely straight about this: the effect of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, and the effect of this amendment are by no means quite the same. None the less, I leave it to the Committee to deal with it as they think best, but I should like to make clear my intention towards the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, at this stage.

For my part I think that what my noble friend the Minister has suggested by way of procedure is right: we should first deal with and settle this amendment and then proceed to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead. I rise only to ask my noble friend a question, and his answer may well be of help on quite a number of subsequent amendments in which the five-year limitation reappears.

My noble friend knows only too well, serving at the Home Office, that whatever limit—be it a time limit or any other type of limit—one lays down, there are inevitably on occasion hard cases which fall just outside it. In this particular instance it might well be the case of someone who has been very ill for a number of years and under medical treatment or supervision. There are other obvious possibilities. I ask my noble friend the following question: In such a case where there has been no neglect or fault on the part of the person concerned, where it is a genuine hard case, will it be the law, if we enact the clause as it stands, that the Home Secretary will be unable to grant registration? Will the five-year limit be a bar, or will his right honourable friend have a measure of discretion?

May I say ex abundanti cautela that I hope that when my noble friend replies to that question he will not seek to twit me with urging his right honourable friend to take a greater discretion, because in this case such discretion, if it exists under the Bill, will be a discretion which could only be exercised in the favour of some unfortunate case. I should like to know whether, if the Bill stands in its present form, it will be impossible for his right honourable friend in such a hard case to allow citizenship.

Before the noble Lord replies to that question, I should like to say that I much agreed with him when he said that the extension which was made in another place from two years to five years in these circumstances was sensible. I think they were right to do that and I am glad that it is within the Bill. But is it not here an encouragement for persons to register? Does it not provide a great opportunity for those leaders of the Churches who have been taking an interest in this Bill, and who have told us their view about it, to assist any persons in their parishes to effect such registration? May we hope to see from the leaders of the Churches a campaign by their clergy throughout the country to help people to effect this registration? Indeed, this seems to me to be just the task which the Churches are best fitted to do. If it is said that some burden is imposed upon people to effect a registration—and the clergy seem to have been so critical of parts of this Bill—I would suggest that here is a great opportunity for the clergy in this country to be able to assist their parishioners by ensuring that they do become registered.

I listened, as the Committee always does, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson of Ewell, with great respect. We find that he is a very profound supporter of the Government and the Government's view. However, I had to rise to my feet and exercise some imagination as regards a plea made by the Government to ministers of religion throughout the country to preach presumably upon the theme, "Beware the wrath to come; six months only is left!"

Is it really at all practical to look at this amendment save upon the basis that we weave a tangled web for the citizens of this country, many of whom do not understand and cannot possibly understand what is involved? Of course, with the best will in the world, some of us, if the Bill becomes an Act, will do our best to see that it is known among immigrant families, people who have settled here and people who regard authority—and it is such a pity but we know it to be true—as something one avoids because one does not get into trouble if one keeps away from authority. That is the mentality that I have come across in the small amount of race relations work that I have tried to do in a part of the world that I know pretty well and where there is a rather substantial ethnic minority. This is a pertinent point not only because of the parents but because, as has been mentioned previously, we are dealing also with children and their rights.

I can only advance the following short, cryptic reasons for looking at this amendment with some favour. First, do we want to try to get simplicity where we can? There cannot be anything more simple than to say that a right that you had by virtue of your being here before 1973 is a right which will subsist—everybody understands it. Secondly, do we want to increase the burden of work upon civil servants or to decrease it? Is it not a much simpler task for them merely to see whether somebody has the right under this clause or does not have that right?

Thirdly, do we want to walk into cases of hardship? The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, raised that point and I know that he will have realised, as he is so thorough, that if we look at the end of the clause we shall see that there is a right to extend cases under subsection (2) from six years to eight years in any special case. There is no right of extension given in the case of the subsection (1) cases with which we are dealing. That seems a little bit of an absurdity, to say nothing else. Do we want to provide for a longer period, as we must provide if we are to be logical, for the cases of hardship, so that we have another set of civil servants dealing with cases of hardship and then appeals from them, and Members of Parliament obviously being approached in order to try to transform a decision which was a negative one into a positive one?

The next matter that we must think about is surely that there was a promise—and it is understood by people because it was a simple promise—that nobody's right would be made the less by this Bill. In the other place there was a considerable amount of unhappiness when this clause was being dealt with. Indeed, so much was this so that there was a compromise reached and the compromise was that two years was turned into five years. I think that it is for this Committee, with its humanity and with its reviewing ability, to say that there ought not to be a time limit at all.

This is an extremely important amendment and I have not the slightest doubt that a great deal of time ought to be spent upon it. Bearing in mind the protection that we all want to give to those who have bona fide rights but who may suddenly find that those rights have been taken away from them by virtue of an omission—be it because of an illness or of negligence, or be it the fault of a parent who should have taken trouble but who has not done so and whose child will suffer for it—we should also like to consider in regard to those people—and this is the last point that I want to make; it is not an original one, because it has been mentioned before—that nobody ought to be the loser because he cannot afford to exercise a right. We have heard that if you go over this five-year limit you walk into fees at the moment of £150, and goodness knows what they may be hereafter. This is an amendment which ought to commend itself to the Committee.

I think the way in which I can deal with this is to illustrate my own position. I was born in Grenada. Until Grenada became independent in February 1974, I was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies. I came here as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, and I had an English passport. My English passport, the last one before I needed to register, was in 1968. It was a 10-year passport. When Grenada became independent in 1974, it was reckoned that there was no need to do anything about it because I had an English passport and I could travel with it. in 1978 the passport lapsed, and therefore I had to do something. It was not until then that I registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, the point being that I did not have to register before February 1974, because until February 1974 I was a citizen of the United and Colonies by birth. That is the point.

I knew that as soon as Grenada become independent my status was changed. I can assure your Lordships that the vast majority of Grenadians who are living in Shepherds Bush, and so on, did not know that. This is the point about this particular amendment. What you are insisting on—and I was sad to hear the Government insisting on keeping this—is that people who, when these changes take place are not aware that they have taken place, should within a stated period become aware and in fact act on the knowledge. I cannot see why there is such a great need to insist on the five years. In fact, if you must put a time limit, then put 10 years. The reason why I would say 10 years is that it will in fact eliminate any person who could have that right, because you see a person who was born in 1972 will be 18 in 1990, and therefore up to 1990 you will have covered all these people if you put 10 years.

Frankly, I cannot see the need for this stated period. People have a right; in the 1971 Immigration Act the right was preserved. What the Act said in 1971 was that people who in fact had a right to register once they had lived here for five years, and who were living in Britain at the time of the Act coming into force, would retain that right. What the Government are doing in this Bill is taking that right away from them. They have given them a limit of five years, after which they lose it. Had there been a real, strong reason for doing so, one would understand, but there is no real, strong reason for doing so. They can afford to leave them with that right. Why insist on taking that right away from them after five years? The Minister mentions the right of abode. It has nothing to do with a right of abode. In 1974 I had a right of abode here; on the other hand, I needed to register as a United Kingdom citizen if I was going to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies, which in fact I was until 1974 when Grenada became independent.

There are lots of people who are going to be in that position. These islands have been becoming independent one after the other. In November, Antigua will become independent. Any Antiguan living here will have the same problem. If he had taken out a United Kingdom passport in July for 10 years his passport would not lapse until 1991, and really he is not going to think of doing anything about registering until that time because he can go all over the world with the passport that he now has. Therefore, there is no need for him to do anything, and he will not do anything. But in 1991, because of this Bill, he will no longer have the right to register, because the Bill gives him that right for only five years. Assuming that the Bill comes into force at the beginning of 1982, he will have that right only until 1987. After that it will be gone.

I really do not see why the Government are so persistent about this five years. I had a circular from the Caribbean High Commissioners and they pinpointed that as another example of the way in which Britain is proceeding to separate itself from the Commonwealth. The Government must have received that, because it was merely a copy of a memorandum they had sent to the Foreign Office. I read the debates in the other place, and I have listened to the Minister here. None of the arguments I have heard has led me to realise that there is any strong reason for insisting on this. I would beg the Government to think again.

There is no strong reason for insisting that after five years these privileges should lapse. There is no strong reason. Then why insist on it? If there is no strong reason for insisting on a particular line of action, why insist on it? I cannot understand what is behind all this, because there is no need. After all, they have the right. The right was assured when the 1971 Immigration Act was going through Parliament. It is assured here again, but for five years only.

Why five years? What is this big magic about five years? They have it. Once they are living here, and were living here in 1972 and were here for five years, they have a right to register as a United Kingdom citizen. I was chatting with the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, and she asked me whether I had registered. I said, "Yes". Apparently she has not, but she recognised that if she does not do it within five years she cannot. She has to be naturalised. She is a Member of this House! I really hope that the Government will give some thought to this matter and not pursue it. It is not an issue that is worth pursuing.

May I follow up on what some of my noble friends have said and the reply given by the Minister? The Minister said in his reply that five years is long enough. My noble friend Lord Mishcon pointed out that originally it was two years which was written into the Bill, and then it was made five years. What I fail to understand is why the Government should be sticking to something which is obviously not a principle. If the two-year period was increased to five, then the whole time limit is fairly flexible. We still have not had an answer as to why the Government are sticking on five years, when, as my noble and learned friend pointed out when he moved the amendment, all this amendment is asking for is to keep the status quo so that citizens could, if they chose, at any time obtain full British citizenship as distinct from settled status, and do so as a right without risk of refusal, and also, as has been pointed out, at a lower cost than having to wait for naturalisation.

The Minister accepted that there could be a feeling that Clause 6, when compared with Clause 38, appeared to many people to contain some racialist content. I am sure the Minister sincerely believes that not to be the case. But that, with respect, is not the point. The point is that thousands of people in this country, black and white, believe there is a considerable racialist content in the Bill. If the Government are anxious to dispel such fears, the least they could do is to accept those amendments which would not bring more people into the country but would simply allow those concerned to exercise the right about which we are speaking in their own time.

I will not rehearse the examples given by my noble friends, particularly by my noble friend Lord Pitt, of why the time limit of five years could be a tremendous drawback. Indeed, it could in addition mean extra work because if people realise they have only five years—this theme runs through many of the amendments—then, while they may not have wanted to apply anyway, they will do so knowing that at the end of that time there will be no extension. The chances are that they will take up the option instead of leaving it, simply because they feel that at the end of the five-year period they will have no other opportunity.

It is all very well to discuss a matter like this in relation to people who understand the subject, who know exactly what this is all about and know precisely what is going on. I should have thought, however, that the Minister would realise that one need only look at the various provisions in our housing, health and social security legislation to see that many people do not understand and appreciate their rights. Despite the amount of paper and information distributed by the various departments, that lack of knowledge about rights still exists. By making what is a complicated Bill even more complicated—by resisting an amendment which to us seems clear, natural and sensible—the Government are acting very strangely. Indeed, I was surprised to hear the noble and learned Lord, Lord Rawlinson, refer to the great opportunity, as he put it, for church leaders to assist their parishioners in view of the five-year period given in the Bill.

I said that many of the clergy had been telling us about people coming to them expressing anxieties, and I hoped that this would provide an opportunity for them to assist their parishioners by helping those people to register.

That is what I thought I said the noble and learned Lord had said. If there was not a five-year period, they could exercise their right at any time. In any event, I am wondering whether this sort of thing is a task for the Churches. It would be nice to hear one of the right reverend Prelates on the subject. Is it their duty to try to act, as it were, as a go-between in this sort of situation, when I suspect that they would much prefer there not to be a five-year limit? I think they would much prefer people to be able to do this in their own time, whenever they choose to do so. Even so, that would not stop their parishioners coming to them for advice.

We have not heard from the Government a strong argument, one that holds water, against the amendment. The noble Lord has simply argued, with his usual skill and charm, for what only amounts to another piece of legislative red tape, one that will bring a great deal of upset, disturbance and unhappiness to a great many of our fellow citizens.

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, for her kind words to me. I do not seem to have been skilful enough to get over to the Front Bench opposite that the effect of the amendment would be to make the situation of claiming citizenship through the provisions set out in Clause 6(1), which are based broadly on the main provision—namely, that someone shall have been resident here before 1st January 1973 and shall have been ordinarily resident here after that for a period of five years—remain open indefinitely, and that would make matters more, rather than less, complicated.

Why?

Because as the years go by people would continually need to hark back over a long period of years to what their situation was maybe 15, 20, 25 or 30 years beforehand. In addition, I wish to make it crystal clear that what we are talking about is the right to claim an entitlement to which most people finally became entitled on 31st December 1977, because that was the five-year period after 1st January 1973. Therefore, most of the people about whom we are talking under Clause 6 have at the very least been entitled to claim citizenship of this country for getting on for four years, and many of' them for a great deal longer than that.

It is perfectly true that there are the most important additional categories of those who are members of Commonwealth countries which become independent after the commencement of the Bill, and I hope I have settled any concern which noble Lords may have by making the point that the five-year period for them will be most helpful. Those, for instance, like Antigua, to which the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, referred, can be dealt with (and it is the Government's intention so far as, for instance, Antigua is concerned, so to deal) in the same way as the people of Belize have been dealt with, I think wholly to their satisfaction, in the Belize Bill which has just been going through Parliament.

Noble Lords have asked why the Government want Clause 6. We genuinely want people to identify with this country. We want them to take citizenship so that they will have the full rights which, throughout the country, we have heard so much about in connection with the Bill; so that people will take their full rights of citizenship both at home and—if we are talking about the EEC and other parts of the world—abroad; and I am bound to say that in terms of good relations within this country, it is surely right to suppose that people who are settled here and are entitled to have citizenship of this country, should in fact claim it. I find it an extraordinary argument—I must say I have been surprised by this debate—that in some way it should have been said that we are against the claim of citizenship, when in fact the whole intention of Clause 6 is to urge people to take it.

My noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter asked me a direct question about hard cases, worthy cases. There is no power at present to grant cases put in over the time limit, but I would remind my noble friend that, once again, we are talking about people almost all of whom have for four years or more had this entitlement, on to which another five years will be added. Therefore, we are not talking about a door suddenly being closed on people with an entitlement. I would add to that, that of course the people who are covered under Clause 6(2) are the same people who are covered under Clause 6(1)(b), except that they have not yet been here for five years, or have not been in relevant employment, or partly in the one and partly in the other. For them there is the special entitlement in subsection (6), that a period of six years can be extended to eight years.

The only point I would add is that on many occasions during the course of proceedings on the Bill the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has referred to the need to advertise what its effects would be, and while perhaps I have not responded in as forthcoming a fashion as the noble Lord would have wished, I think that this is the moment when I ought to do so. Whenever the noble Lord has mentioned this point I have thought that he has been absolutely right, and I give an assurance to the noble Lord that it is the intention of the Government, if both Houses of Parliament pass the Bill on to the statute book, that every effort will be made to see that the facts of the case in the Bill are brought to the attention of people.

I would, however, support what my noble and learned friend Lord Rawlinson of Ewell has said. If it is true what noble Lords opposite are saying—that there is great concern about this particular clause—I do not think that it should be particularly difficult for those who are leaders of opinion around the country to bring the true facts of the effect of Clause 6 to the notice of people. The effect is that after the commencement of the Bill, if it becomes law, they will have yet another five years to claim an entitlement to citizenship, which the Government very much hope they will take up.

Will my noble friend add to his reply to me by saying that before the Report stage he is prepared to consider introducing in respect of subsection (1) a discretionary relaxation parallel to that which, as he has pointed out, already exists in respect of subsection (2)? I am not asking him to commit himself, but surely there is a certain logic in dealing with both of these limitations on the same basis. While my noble friend is no doubt right in saying that there will be very few hard cases under subsection (1), I think he would hesitate to say that it is impossible for there to be any. Some of us might feel easier in mind if there were a parallel provision in subsection (1) to that which the Government have very sensibly inserted in respect of subsection (2).

It would be dishonest if I did not say this. The difference between Clause 6(1)(a) and Clause 6(1)(b) is that the people covered in paragraph (a) have definitely had their entitlement since, at the very latest, 31st December 1977, whereas the people covered in paragraph (b), who are then dealt with again in subsection (2), could be clocking up their entitlement and had not yet achieved the period of five years of either residence or employment, or partly the one and partly the other. It is for that reason that the special arrangements to make it a 6-year period for them, to be extended, if necessary, to eight years, if the Secretary of State thought right, were included. As my noble friend says, it is perfectly true that there is an extra twist to the story in that the six years can become eight years, and on that ground I would certainly look at the matter, but it would be wholly without commitment. It would be dishonest of me not to warn my noble friend that it would be very difficult to make a move on this point. If my noble friend would be satisfied with that, I shall look at it, but it would have to be without commitment.

I confess that I have been very disappointed by the answers given by the noble Lord the Minister to this important amendment. We are discussing people who have lived in this country for at least eight years and who under our present law have the right to remain here permanently. That is their legal right now. The passage of the amendment would simply mean that those permanently resident Commonwealth citizens, when they wished to take advantage of the possibility of registration, could do so, if they so chose at any future time, including when they became aware of the machinery and of the value of doing so.

When I was appointed Lord Chancellor, the first report that I received from my advisory committee referred to the immense number of people in this country who had no knowledge of what were their rights. Secondly, they had no knowledge of what to do about enforcing their rights, and the third conclusion of my advisory committee was that there was a need for a massive extension of legal aid and advice. That related to our own people who, one might have thought, would have been aware of the benefits of the welfare provisions of recent legislation, whereas there was a massive lack of knowledge of those rights. If that is true of the citizen who is not faced with the transformation that the sudden granting of independence to a country might present him with, then is it surprising that people in that situation, due to ignorance, illness or poverty, might well simply not be able to take advantage of the registration procedure?

I am bound to say that the suggestion that some special duty should fall upon the clergy, as distinct from anyone else, to act in this matter surprised me a little. As the noble Lord the Minister indicated in his reference to the importance of publicity, this is essentially a matter in which at any rate the maximum effort should be made; but it cannot be wholly successful.

As I understand it, it is conceded that the amendment can do no harm. It is conceded that it can have no adverse effect on immigration. It is conceded that it can have no adverse effect on the new British citizenship. There is some faint criticism that it does not have the same pattern and detail as the naturalisation provision. Why should it? The amendment would allay suspicions and fears. It might well be that those suspicions and fears are exaggerated—I know not—but they will certainly not be diminished if tonight your Lordships do not support the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 93A:

Page 7, line 33, leave out ("both at commencement and").

Three of your Lordships have put their names to this amendment in addition to the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, and so I thought that it might be for the convenience of your Lordships' Committee if I indicate that having heard the speech made by the noble Lord I should like to accept the amendment on behalf of the Government.

Clause 6 is the first of several clauses which make transitional provisions for existing citizenship entitlements. It is true that the noble Lord's amendment could arguably be said to extend the scope of Clause 6 somewhat, but I believe that the noble Lord has made a most convincing argument for showing that, if not in the letter of the law, at least in the spirit of the law his amendment is in fact preserving and not extending a right.

I should only like to add that my understanding is that Commonwealth citizens who register here can claim the right to register their children. The difficulty which the noble Lord has put forward is that, although that may be so, there are cases when that does not happen. As I understand the noble Lord's argument, that means that in such cases as those which the noble Lord has explained, when the registration entitlement has not been taken up by the parent or guardian—the only people who can take it up—then in effect the child is placed in an impossible position and can do nothing about it. The effect of the noble Lord's amendment is that when the child concerned reaches the age of majority, he or she could then claim to be registered four or five years after commencement, which the Bill allows. I accept on behalf of the Government that this is a desirable objective and, having heard the noble Lord's speech, the Government have no hesitation in accepting this amendment.

It would be less than gracious if I did not thank the noble Lord the Minister for accepting my noble friend's amendment. I am disappointed that his eloquence and persuasiveness is obviously far more effective than mine was when speaking to the previous amendment—although it was a pretty narrow thing. Nevertheless, we do thank the Government and I hope that it is a harbinger of more good things to come. The night is young and we wait at least full of hope, if not of total confidence, for further favours to be savoured.

I should just like to join my noble and learned friend in thanking the Minister. He has done a good deed today.

moved Amendment No. 93B:

This amendment would mean that for five years after commencement, a person born overseas before commencement to a woman who becomes a British citizen on commencement (or would have done so had she not died), would be entitled to British citizenship on application. The noble Lord has explained the underlying reason, which is that the Bill establishes equality from the point of view of the sexes in nationality matters in the future after commencement. If the noble Lord will forgive me, I shall not go into enormous detail although his amendment raises very real problems. The noble Lord says: "Why is it not right to go into the past?" My answer is two-fold. The first is that I do not think that this amendment, if it is right, actually belongs here at all, since this subsection is concerned to preserve entitlements held under our present nationality law, and those who would benefit from this amendment do not have this entitlement.

The anomalies raised by this amendment are severe. If I may give an example, the amendment would give an entitlement to British citizenship to anyone whose mother becomes a British citizen (or would have done so but for her death). This would include a woman who becomes a British citizen through a tie with this country through a grandparent. Her son or daughter will, under this amendment, be entitled to British citizenship and the right of abode here, though their nearest direct tie with this country is through say, their mother's grandfather or their great-grandfather.

But a person whose father becomes a British citizen through a grandparental tie with the United Kingdom has no such entitlement under the Bill. If born in a foreign country, he may hold citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies by consular registration; but since he himself will have no tie with the United Kingdom closer than that of a great-grandfather, he will not have the right of abode in the United Kingdom before commencement, and will not become a British citizen on commencement. He will probably become a British overseas citizen and be able to seek British citizenship under Clause 4; that is true. It will not by any means be on all fours with the situation which the noble Lord would have set up so far as people descended in the female line are concerned. So, we would have a situation in the third generation born overseas, where a person whose connections with the United Kingdom lay through his or her mother had an unqualified entitlement to British citizenship for five years after commencement, while those who had similar connections with the United Kingdom through their fathers could only acquire British citizenship after meeting various residential requirements and, in many cases, by meeting the various naturalisation requirements.

This really puts into a rather large nutshell the reason why this is a very difficult amendment. We are the prisoners of our past. This illustrates the inherent difficulty of trying to unpick the past. An amendment designed to ensure equal treatment between the sexes with the best will in the world ends up by placing those with links through the United Kingdom through their mothers in a better position than those who have links with the United Kingdom through their fathers. I am in no way criticising the noble Lord. He is attempting a complex task which is bound to lead to the anomalies that I have tried to outline.

I want to say two things. One, the noble Lord the Minister said that the amendment does not belong here because the clause preserves an entitlement whereas what I am trying to create is a new entitlement. Am I correct in saying that the former Home Secretary, Mr. Merlyn Rees, did as a matter of discretion grant citizenship to the children of British women overseas under certain circumstances which may not have been precisely the same as those which are envisaged in this amendment? Am I not therefore preserving an entitlement which was not conferred on these people as of right but as a matter of discretion by the predecessor of the Secretary of State?

If there were people who were capable of benefiting from that provision of Mr. Merlyn Rees, which I think dated from some time after the Green Paper, and who did not exercise their rights, then should we not incorporate some provision into this Bill to enable them to do so in future? I quite accept that there may be criticisms to be levelled at the drafting of the amendment which I have tabled, but I think that the noble Lord the Minister knows perfectly well what I am trying to do.

May I draw him out a little and ask him this straight question: What will happen to children who would have been eligible for the concession announced by Mr. Merlyn Rees, but who have not yet taken advantage of it at the commencement of this Bill? Will we, within the terms of this clause, preserve their entitlement, and will the noble Lord accept that that is the reason why I tabled this amendment in its present place?

The Merlyn Rees concession is no longer necessary after the Bill has become law, because of transmission in the future through the female line. But the answer to the question which the noble Lord has asked me, about what happens to children who are too old to be registered under the concession for minors, is absolutely straightforward. It is that children who are of age and wish to become British citizens, and who have not under the concession been registered already, should do so through naturalisation.

But what about the children who were adults at the time when the former Home Secretary announced his discretion? What is their position then?