My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, work on dismantling the carved woodwork is now in hand and will be completed during the Summer Recess. Known wood consolidation techniques are being reviewed, and wood carving requirements are being assessed. The overall timetable is going as planned.

My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that Answer, may I ask whether he is aware that, accompanied by Black Rod, I was able to inspect both floors above your Lordships' Chamber last week and was horrified to see the amount of damage that has taken place over the years, including the degrading of the wood on both levels? Is he further aware that in this country there are apparently only 15 carvers who are capable of repairing the woodwork that has been damaged?

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her supplementary question. Yes, I was aware that she had indeed been above our heads and I congratulate her on her expertise. We also agree with the figure which she has given; namely, that there are about 15 to 20 carvers in the country available to do this kind of work.

My Lords, I should like to ask the Minister whether we are safe in this House now, or is this part of a plot to abolish this House?

My Lords, I share with the noble Baroness the feeling of safety with this ceiling above me. However, it is, I am sure, nothing to do with a plot to abolish this House.

My Lords, is it not correct that at the time of the original Statement reference was made to the possible necessity of inspecting other ceilings? If that is correct, have such inspections been carried out and what are the results?

Yes, my Lords, that is indeed the case. The ceilings of the Robing Room, the Royal Gallery, the Prince's Chamber and the Peer's Lobby have been examined and been found to be in sound condition. The Peer's Lobby ceiling will be surveyed properly during the Summer Recess.

My Lords, is there no method of replacing carved wood with moulds of some other substance and using that instead of wood and making it look a perfect verisimilitude?

My Lords, there are, indeed, other solutions available. We hope very much that they will not be necessary and, judging by the sounds from the Chamber, the Chamber agrees with me.

My Lords, is the noble Earl not aware—probably he is not—that I have a number of friends who are engaged in the exact occupation of making moulds for plastics to replace some of the woodwork in this House?

My Lords, why not have a couple of gnomes!

My Lords, I was not aware of the noble Viscount's attributes, but I am pleased to hear of them.

My Lords, when does my noble friend expect the work to be completed?

My Lords, at the moment the timetable is for completion in 1984.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, a small number of those performing essential war-time operational duties would be located in protected accommodation. The main groups of operational staff would be: the United Kingdom warning and monitoring system organisation, amounting to 4,600 personnel approximately; the staff of the war-time regional government structure, amounting to 3,500 personnel altogether, and some armed forces personnel.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for the informative nature of that reply. Further, can he say whether any provision is made for the families of people who are provided with bunker accommodation? Can he also say what, in the event of a nuclear war, is to happen to the rest of the population?

My Lords, I do not think that it would be proper for me to anticipate the reply regarding families to the noble Lord's four Questions for Written Answer which are set down in the Minutes of Proceedings. On the other part of the question, I think that the answer will also arise in the replies to those Questions for Written Answer.

My Lords, is not the problem of nuclear war not how to get into a bunker, but how to survive having got out of one?

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Paget, is speculating on a situation and that the House can share with him some similar view.

My Lords, is it not a fact that a great deal of public money is being spent in answering these successive Questions from the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, on a wholly hypothetical event which it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government to avoid? Is not the repetition of these Questions an abuse of the privileges of this House, and can they have any effect but to bring aid and comfort to our prospective enemies?

My Lords, may I say that I believe—

Order, Order!

My Lords, is not the noble Lord aware that such a question is really distasteful?

My Lords, in reply to my noble friend, may I say that it is never the intention of Her Majesty's Government to prevent any of your Lordships from putting down Questions, should your Lordships wish to do so. On the point about repetition, I think that this is a matter of judgment for the noble Lord who is putting down the Question and a matter for consideration by the Table Office.

My Lords, can the Minister clarify present plans for civil defence, which are now in confusion? Has the recommendation that we should all stay at home been withdrawn? Is it now accompanied by three proposals: deep shelters for the administrative staff, less deep shelters under large buildings, and shelters in gardens to protect against fall-out?

No, my Lords; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, should read again the Statement repeated in your Lordships' House on 7th August last year, which was a civil defence Statement. If he reads it carefully I think he will come to another conclusion. As regards the immediate arrangements, I can assure the noble Lord that a very careful study is being undertaken by the Home Office Working Group on Shelters, which deals with the matter on an inter-departmental basis. The examination is being done in conjunction with the Property Services Agency and local authorities. This is an extremely detailed survey of buildings, structures, underground tunnels, underground car parks, et cetera. This is thought to be by far the most cost-effective way of making use of our existing resources—by spending money on planning and carrying out a survey.

My Lords, is it not the fact that the only country that has ever suffered from a nuclear attack is one that had no nuclear arms and no nuclear allies? Must we not hope that this country never gets itself into that position?

My Lords, that is quite correct.

My Lords, will the noble Lord agree that although we might differ in the conclusions that we draw from the information, by the comprehensiveness of his answers he shows that he at least agrees with me that the information should be made available?

My Lords, so far as I know, I do not think that it has ever been the policy of the Home Office to conceal information. In fact, the reply given to a Question in another place was that much of this information is not secret.

My Lords, will the noble Lord agree that a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament would cause far greater risk to the safety of the people of this country than any of the risks which are set out in the Question which has been tabled today?

My Lords, I fully accept what the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, has said. The policy of adopting the nuclear deterrent is one of first importance.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

Yes, my Lords, to the extent that waterways comprise streams, as defined in the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951 and that a polluting offence under Section 2 has been committed. Otherwise, in the exercise of their functions relating to land, any public body—under Section 11 of the Countryside Act 1968—shall have regard to the desirability of conserving the natural beauty and amenity of the countryside.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that at Martham Broad in Norfolk the internal drainage board has released vast quantities of sulphuric acid and ferric oxide into the streams which has killed and blanketed the streams concerned? It is ichthyo-toxic, which means "fish poisoning". If I, as a farmer, had introduced half the quantity of silage effluent, I should have been prosecuted fairly quickly. Can my noble friend please say why the internal drainage board has not been prosecuted for this behaviour?

My Lords, prosecutions under the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts 1951 to 1961 can only be undertaken by a water authority or with the consent of a water authority or the Attorney-General. The Anglian Water Authority does not regard this situation as constituting a pollution offence. Its view is that what is coming out of a pump is natural and is not, in the legal sense, pollution.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply, but is it not also true that a member of the public or of a conservation body could take a view that this was a writ of mandamus situation and could go to the High Court and ask the water authority to prosecute against what has been seen to be a very serious polluting action?

My Lords, of course it would be up to individuals to do what they wish, but they must bear in mind my earlier reply.

My Lords, would the noble Earl agree that it is an extraordinary situation where an internal drainage board, which is responsible to, and indeed part of, the remit of a regional water authority, can only be taken to court—as the noble Earl has told us—under the prevention of pollution Acts by the regional water authority? Would the noble Earl look at that? It seems to be monstrous. Would he agree that it is symptomatic of the total lack of control that is exercised by anybody over the extremely damaging activities of some internal drainage boards?

My Lords, I would not go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Melchett. But he will no doubt recall that there is a Part II of an Act, which has not been implemented since 1974, which in point of fact would amend this situation. Perhaps I could remind the House that at the moment the Wildlife and Countryside Bill—which we are all looking forward to being returned to this Chamber shortly—is being considered in another place, where there is an amendment which will require the IDBs as well as water authorities to consult the Nature Conservancy Council on any works which appear to them likely to be harmful to natural flora and fauna in sites of special scientific interest.

My Lords, is my noble friend the Minister aware that the drainage to which my noble friend Lord Onslow referred has caused pollution, but was totally unknown and unpredicted by those involved? Would he therefore agree that, in order to avoid a similar mistake being made again, it is essential to have a public inquiry before the new scheme affecting the Halvergate marshes?

My Lords, as I understand it, in the case of the Martham Broad it is hoped, as a result of local discussions with conservationists, to finance the extra cost of resiting a proposed pump which will by-pass the broad.

My Lords, has my noble friend given an indication that the Government intend to accept the amendment that he says is on the Marshalled List in another place?

My Lords, it is my understanding that it is a Government amendment, so I think it will be accepted.

My Lords, will the noble Earl agree that it is not very much use putting an obligation on internal drainage boards to consult the Nature Conservancy Council if the boards know that they can only be prosecuted by, in effect, people who are their masters, and who are extremely unlikely to prosecute them? Can the noble Earl also say whether it is possible to challenge the Anglian Water Authority's decision that this pollution was not pollution when clearly to everyone else concerned it was?

My Lords, so far as the amendment to the Wildlife and Countryside Bill is concerned, I look forward to debating it with the noble Lord when he comes back. So far as the remarks about the Anglian Water Authority are concerned, I shall indeed draw that to their attention.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, the Atlantic Salmon Trust and the Salmon and Trout Association have written to officials recommending changes in the law relating to the use of drift nets and monofilament nets, to the sale of salmon, and to rod licences and catch returns. This approach was made at the same time as the Government issued a consultation paper, entitled the Review of Inland and Coastal Fisheries in England and Wales. The Government will be glad to receive the views of the Trust and the Association on the matters covered in the consultation paper, which include most of the matters which were raised by the two bodies. Further consultation will then take place as necessary.

My Lords, I am grateful for that reply. In spite of its friendly nature, is there not a risk that action to curb large-scale illegal netting by professional gangs, to which reference is made in paragraph 17 of the consultation paper—the magnitude of it is referred to there—may be held up for years, as indeed was Government action arising out of the Bledisloe and Hunter reports, while other discussions are going on about the other major matters raised in the consultation paper? Do the Government intend to legislate as soon as they possibly can—which would in fact mean the 1982–1983 Session; it would not be possible before then—to remove the ridiculous anomalies which have arisen where salmon legislation is concerned, before irreparable damage is done to the legitimate interests of professional commercial netsmen and to the interests of rodsmen as well?

My Lords, I accept my noble friend's consternation about poaching. I only hope that the consultations we have will not result in, as he put it, years of delay. The main thing is that we want to get it right, and that is the reason why we propose to have consultations. Secondly, where administrative action can be taken—and sometimes it can be—we wish to take it as soon as possible after those consultations have taken place. The third point is legislation. That is bound to be more lengthy and will have to fit into the legislative timetable.

My Lords, is the Minister aware of the real urgency for comprehensive legislation for the preservation of Atlantic salmon, which are in great danger, not only from the points made by the Atlantic Trust but internationally and nationally? Atlantic salmon may well be extinct in a few years unless the Government take urgent steps in the not distant future.

My Lords, I entirely accept my noble friend's anxiety over this matter. What I would tell him is that the consultation paper was issued, I think, on 8th July. Consultations have been allowed up to 30th October, which is a fairly brief period of time, and thereafter advice will be given to Ministers as to how best and how most appropriately to act.

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of your Lordships if I announce that dinner will be available at the usual time this evening.

At a convenient moment after 3.30 this afternoon my noble friend Lord Bellwin will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement that is to be made in another place on Local Government Audit in England and Wales.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.

My Lords, in rising to move that the Commons amendments be now considered I trust the House will permit me to draw attention to the loss which we have all received in the death yesterday of my noble and learned friend Lord Widgery. Only last week he was with us sitting on the Cross-Benches. Only the day before yesterday he was noticed by a neighbour sitting in his garden quietly enjoying its peace and beauty. I had hoped myself that his retirement last year after a heroic struggle with an incurable and progressive and crippling illness would be the prelude to a long and happy retirement in the company of his much loved wife.

John Widgery was a wise, brave, strong, patriotic, compassionate, and above all a profoundly humble man; an ornament to the law; a model of acquired skill and innate talent in the judicial art; a great public servant; an active member of his church; and above all a gentle and affectionate friend. We shall all miss him very much, and our hearts will be with his wife in the sorrow of her bereavement.

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for the tribute that he has rightly paid to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Widgery. He graced the Bench as Lord Chief Justice, as a Lord Justice of Appeal, and High Court judge with the qualities in high degree of fairness, integrity, courtesy, economy and clarity of expression, and above all of sound common sense. The administration of justice in our country owes a very great deal to him. He was indeed, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has said, a great public servant. I owed much to him myself when I was in office. He was sustained in all he did by his devoted wife Ann, to whom we send our sympathy at this sad time.

My Lords, the two noble and learned Lords who have just spoken knew the noble and learned Lord, Lord Widgery, far better than I did, although on many occasions when I met him I must say that I was deeply indebted to him for the friendship which he showed to me. We on these Benches would like to associate ourselves with the very sincere tributes just paid to a very distinguished Lord Chief Justice, in particular for the part that he played in the reorganisation of the court system after the Beeching Report. We send our condolences and our sympathy to Lady Widgery.

My Lords, I have it in command from Her Majesty the Queen to acquaint the House that Her Majesty, having been informed of the purport of the Commons amendments to the Supreme Court Bill, has consented to place Her Prerogative and interest, so far as they are affected by them, at the disposal of Parliament.

My Lords, in all this long series of amendments I shall be moving the same Motion, but I hope to group them in a convenient form. The Motion which I beg to move on this amendment, which will be the same in every case, is that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 1. In speaking to that amendment, I shall, with permission, speak at the same time to Amendment No. 12, No. 1 being the paving amendment to that one, which will be a new clause to follow Clause 144.

When the Bill was first before your Lordships it was pointed out that under the present law a solicitor could not appeal from an order made against him personally by the Crown Court. The noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, moved an amendment to give jurisdiction to the civil division of the Court of Appeal to hear such an appeal by a solicitor. I accepted, it will be remembered, that there was a gap in the law here which should be filled, and accordingly, following consultations with the Law Society, the Government moved these amendments into the Bill in another place. The new clause confers a right of appeal in respect of any exercise of the court's inherent jurisdiction, not simply its jurisdiction to make an order relating to the payment of costs by a solicitor. This will have the result that the same provisions will operate throughout the Supreme Court. It will also enable the Court of Appeal to regulate any purported exercise of the inherent jurisdiction by the lower court so as to ensure that it is not used in cases in which it would be more appropriate to invoke the disciplinary process of the profession. The change is made by way of a textual amendment to Section 50 of the Solicitors Act 1974, since it is subsection (2) of that section that confers the relevant jurisdiction on the High Court and the Crown Court.

Amendment No. I also deals with a point which came to light while the new clause was being prepared. The words it would add to Clause 18(1)(f) of the Bill can be found in its predecessor, Section 31(1)(h) of the Act of 1925, originally from the Judicature Act of 1873, but they were omitted from Clause 18(1)(f) because it was thought at the time of drafting that they served no useful purpose. It now appears that they might do so. There is authority for the proposition that an order against a solicitor personally to pay costs is not an order

"relating only to costs which are by law left to the discretion of the court"

because it has been held that an order can be made against a solicitor only if he has in fact been guilty of some misconduct or negligence; it cannot, therefore, be said that such an order is entirely within the discretion of the court. Without these words, Clause 18(1)(f) would in future catch such appeals and therefore impose a requirement of leave to appeal. With the words reinstated, such appeals would fall outside that paragraph and there would accordingly continue to be an unfettered right of appeal.

My Lords, the amendments to which the noble and learned Lord has spoken would seem to be helpful and practicable, and what finally fell from the lips of the Lord Chancellor will, I am sure, give satisfaction to solicitors in general.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 2, and I propose to speak at the same time to a large group of amendments as follows: Nos. 2, 5A, 7, 13, 17 to 19 inclusive, 23 to 27, 33A, 36, 39, 40, 43, 45 to 51 inclusive, 55 to 57 inclusive, 60, 63 to 70 inclusive, 73 to 77 inclusive and 79. These amendments are not all actually linked together but they are all minor or drafting amendments relating to county courts, many of which are made with a view to facilitating the forthcoming consolidation of the County Courts Act. The group also contains other amendments of a purely drafting character and since I doubt whether the House will wish to take up much time discussing any of them, I do not propose to speak again to any of them; but if any noble Lord would like a more detailed explanation of any of them, either in the time of the House or privately, I shall be happy, so far as I can, to provide it.

My Lords, I respectfully agree with the course which the noble and learned Lord has proposed. I apprehend that this is a day when much, perhaps not totally necessary, detail expressed over a great length of time would not be entirely welcome to the House. As the amendments are matters without controversy and are largely matters of drafting, as the noble and learned Lord said—and when he says that something is a mere matter of drafting, of course I accept that fully from him; I am sure he would alert us if any point of principle, discord or potential controversy arose—I agree to the course that has been proposed.

My Lords, I propose, with the leave of the House, to group together Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5 and 20, 21 and 22. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 3.

This group of amendments, which I think I should explain in a little more detail, is designed to restore the provisions of the Bill relating to rights of action in rem in admiralty cases to the same position as at present under the Administration of Justice Act 1956, but with a change in relation to ships which are the subject of a charter by demise. On Report in your Lordships' House, my noble and learned friend Lord Diplock expressed some concern at the breadth of the changes which it then made in the rules giving rights to plaintiffs to start actions in rem. I undertook to look again at the question in consultation with the interests concerned. As a result of those, I decided it would be better, with one minor exception, not to proceed with these changes for the time being, and accordingly these amendments were moved by the Government in another place to restore the status quo, with the exception that charterers by demise are placed on the same footing as owners for the purposes of the commencement of actions in rem. Those who have been consulted, I understand, agree that this is a small but useful improvement.

My Lords, those who are dealing with these matters were, with respect, well advised to accept the advice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, who is probably the finest world authority on charter parties and kindred matters, and I would certainly not quarrel with him, or indeed with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor.

I hope none of us will quarrel with each other this afternoon, my Lords.

My Lords, Amendment No. 4 is consequential. I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 4.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 5.

My Lords, this amendment is consequential. I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 5A.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 6, and with this amendment I take Amendments Nos. 11, 42, 53, 71 and 72. I told the House at the Report stage that amendments to enlarge the scope of attachment of debt were in contemplation and that consultations were then entering a final phase. Happily the consultations were concluded in time for these amendments to be moved in another place, and the result is that the net by which a creditor may attach or "garnish" the money owed to his debtor may be more widely cast, so as to include all kinds of savings held by all kinds of deposit-taking institutions. The bigger fish which would be brought within the net by these amendments would include building societies, the Trustee Savings Bank and the National Savings Bank. I understand that no voice has been raised outside against the proposals and many voices have been heard in favour. Rules of court will be needed, but consultations on these have already begun. My Lords, I beg to move.

My Lords, I doubt whether the big fish referred to will be very pleased with these amendments, but it seems equitable that they, too, should be caught in the net.

My Lords, this amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 2. I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 7.

My Lords, your Lordships will remember that in this House we passed an amendment at the suggestion of the Lord Chief Justice, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Roskill, to the effect that the Moonie-type libel and slander cases should be exempt from the rule requiring a compulsory jury if either party demanded it. The amendment was strongly attacked in the House of Commons, and I am bound to say that I remain very much of the same opinion as I previously held in the House. But there are times when one is wise to retreat before the troglodytes, reactionaries and pterodactyls, and the other strange creatures in the undergrowth who oppose law reform, and I now propose to take this cautious approach, hoping perhaps to fight another day.

The effect will be that the length of trials in such cases will be doubled. The juries for trials of this length will no longer be random because almost everybody will be excluded from them owing to the fact that everybody who ought to be a juror is excused; namely, full-time workers, shopkeepers and the others at the heart of the jury system. Of course there will be a very adverse effect on the actual transaction of business in the courts, owing to the increased length of trial and to the fact that there are a number of people in prison who ought to be tried sooner by a red judge than will now be possible, or who are on bail and will have to undergo even longer delays. But as I say, discretion is the better part of valour, and to some extent I have got rid of some of the worst evils through the good offices of the Lord Chief Justice, who has made a practice direction—which he is fully entitled to make—which will do something to remedy the evils that the troglodytes have perpetuated. My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 8.

My Lords, seldom can such a proposal have been moved from the Woolsack with such total lack of conviction and enthusiasm. I have little doubt that had we enough time and the matter was of sufficient significance, we might invite Parliament to have a second look at it. But regardless of whether I come within the category of troglodyte, pterodactyl, or whatever other heraldic or other animal that came into the vivid imagination of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, I think we had better bow before what strength and quality this storm has.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, and I shall kiss the rod on behalf of the House and other progressive characters in it.

My Lords, I ought to take Amendments Nos. 9, 35 and 62 together. I therefore rise to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 9. This amend ment alters Clause 69 so as to make it clear that the discretion to order a jury is exercisable in the subsection (1) "proviso" cases (that is where the prolonged examination of documents is involved), as well as in cases which are outside subsection (1) altogether. Amendments Nos. 35 and 62 do the same for the county courts by inserting a new provision in Section 94 of the County Courts Act 1959, in place of the existing subsections (3) and (4). My Lords, I beg to move.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 10. This is a very esoteric subject, which revolves around a most marvellous invention of a member of the Bar, called the Anton Piller order, which—if I may try to use more explicit language—is designed to save those reputable firms which are engaged in the production of video recordings from criminal and other breaches of their copyright and intellectual property by the use of illicit tape recordings.

I need not go into the details, but under an ordinary Anton Piller order the alleged infringer is made to answer questions. Very often, perhaps in most cases, an ingenious person on the other side of the battlefield discovered that he could be excused from answering these awkward questions by pleading what in America would be called the Fifth Amendment: that he might expose himself to criminal proceedings if he answered the questions in a particular way. That caused a great rumpus because the victims of the practice, which is totally illicit, then complained that the whole protection of the Anton Piller order would be removed from them, and up to a point that was right. To quote Mr. Gladstone:

"The resources of civilisation have not wholly been exhausted '

and the amendment which, as I say, is somewhat esoteric, seeks to remedy the situation in an evenhanded way, by on the one hand requiring defendants in civil proceedings concerned with copyright and the like to answer the questions, whether or not incriminating, and, on the other hand, making any answers so given inadmissible in any criminal proceedings which might be instituted for related offences. This amendment was put together with commendable speed after consulting all the interested parties and I understand that it has general support. It is slightly modelled—after all, plagiarism and excision are the true marks of the great draftsman—on Section 31(1) of the Theft Act 1968, but I think it is unobjectionable and I hope the House will find it so, too. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons on the said amendment.

My Lords, I have no criticism to make of this highly esoteric field where intellectual property, I see, comes to the foreground, and one needs a good deal of that to follow the Anton Piller doctrine.

My Lords, Amendment No. 11 follows on Amendment No. 6. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendment No. 12 follows on Amendment No. 1. I beg to move.

My Lords, with the noble and learned Lord's permission, may I thank him most heartily for the way in which he received this amendment here, with the result that we now have this amendment from another place. If I had been in my place in time I would have again expressed my gratitude to him with regard to a similar amendment dealing with the attachment of debts, so perhaps he will allow me to say "Thank you" twice.

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for those gracious remarks. I try to help the profession when I can, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, performed a useful public service by drawing attention to these two matters.

My Lords, Amendment No. 13 is consequential on Amendment No. 2. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendment No. 14 deals with the commencement of the Act, and I group it, if I may, with Nos. 15 and 16. The second of this group of amendments postpones general commencement of the Act by three months, from 1st October 1981 to 1st January 1982. It had been my hope that the Bill would come into force at the beginning of the legal year, on 1st October, but there are a number of matters in respect of which rules of court, both in the Supreme Court and in the county courts, and in other subordinate legislation, will be required before they can come into operation. Some of these, such as the new provision for appeals from county courts to the Court of Appeal (in paragraph 10 of Schedule 3), were in the Bill from the beginning, but a number of others have been added during the course of the Bill's passage; for example, the provision about attachment of debts, vacation sittings and the transfer of proceedings between the High Court and county courts. Even if the resources of the Lord Chancellor's department were greater, it would have been difficult to carry out the appropriate consultations and then get the necessary rules drafted and approved by the rule committees before 1st October. I have therefore rather reluctantly decided that commencement will have to be postponed for three months, and that is the effect of this amendment.

The other two amendments in this group, Nos. 14 and 16, stem largely from this postponement. They bring forward, so that they come into effect on Royal Assent, instead of having to wait until 1st January 1982, two things: first, the provisions giving a two-judge court of the criminal division of the Court of Appeal power to deal with sentencing appeals; and, secondly, the new clause which we have just been discussing dealing with Anton Piller orders. So I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in Amendment No. 14.

My Lords, with very great daring I would suggest to my noble and learned friend that on occasions such as this in the past the House has permitted blocks of amendments to be taken together. My noble and learned friend has said, I think, that Nos. 14, 15 and 16 go together, and I have known the House to be agreeable to taking three in one, as it were, where it is suitable. I do not know whether this is a suitable occasion, but we have a long list of amendments before us.

My Lords, the answer to that is that my noble friend is of course perfectly right, but the trouble with this procedure, which I would have taken, is that it only really works when the amendments are in sequence. He is quite right in saying that Nos. 14, 15 and 16 could be dealt with in this way, but most of the others are dotted about the Bill. But if it is the will of the House, I will put all three together in one Motion, if I may now propose that.

My Lords, I am not surprised that it has been thought necessary to delay the implementation of the provision on the rules on this very technical matter. After some experience in the Lord Chancellor's Office I know how difficult it is to catch up very often with these major pieces of highly technical legislation, and, of course, it is very important to get the rules right.

My Lords, I think I can do the same with Nos. 17, 18 and 19, all of which are consequential on Amendment No. 2. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 20, 21 and 22 are consequential on Amendment No. 3, and I have already spoken to them. I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 23 to 27 are consequential on Amendment No. 2, and I beg to move.

My Lords, Amendment No. 28, to which I will now speak, is grouped with Nos. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 33, all of which are in sequence, and then Nos. 52, 54, 58, 59, 61 and 78. All these amendments are consequential to the code for the transfer of cases from the High Court to the county court, and vice versa, introduced into the Bill during its Committee stage. The first of these amendments makes it plainer that the power of transfer to county courts may be exercised not only in cases where there is a limitation on the amount—for instance, in contract or tort, £2,000—but also where there is a concurrent jurisdiction not divided between the courts by relation to amount. I believe this to be largely a drafting amendment. Amendment No. 29 restates in more general terms the exception from the new powers of transfer for proceedings relating to the welfare of children.

The new subsection (3A) makes it plain that the High Court may re-transfer to the county courts a case that has come up to it by the exercise of Section 75B or 75C. The third amendment moves the proviso to Section 78(2) of the County Courts Act 1959, which provides that an order for transfer to the county courts of any proceedings by the Crown in the High Court shall not be made without the consent of the Crown, into the new Section 75A. This thereby enables the proviso to Section 78(2) of the 1959 Act to be repealed in Amendment No. 59. Amendment No. 30 also reflects paragraph (a) of the proviso in Section 2 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, thereby enabling the whole of the proviso for that subsection to be repealed in Amendment No. 52.

Amendment No. 31 removes the substance of Section 77 (repealed by Amendment No. 59) of the County Courts Act 1959, which sets out the procedure on the transfer of cases from the High Court to a county court into the new Section 75A. The fifth amendment divides the new Section 75B into two new sections. There are two main purposes. The first is to ensure that the power of the High Court to bring proceedings up to itself is untrammelled by any exception. The second purpose is to ensure that the power of transfer up does not prejudice Clause 29, which relates to prerogative orders. This amendment makes no change to Section 75B, subsections (2), (3) and (4), beyond making them a separate section on their own. The sixth amendment is the obverse of the second amendment, dealing with children's cases and re-transfer. It also imports new words into the power to transfer so as to ensure that Parliament's intentions in conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the county courts (as in the case of sex discrimination, race relations, et cetera) is not got around by exercise of the power of transfer. The seventh amendment, Amendment No. 52, is consequential. Amendment No. 54 is a related repeal about jurisdiction in the Companies Act 1948. Amendment No. 58 is another consequential repeal, as is the tenth amendment. The eleventh and the twelfth amendments are also consequential.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 33A. This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 2.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 34. The purpose of this amendment is to enable the Lord Chancellor (with Treasury concurrence) to provide a scheme for interest to be paid on certain county court judgment debts. The scheme would be made by statutory instrument subject to negative resolution. The background is that interest does not at present run on county court judgments and there have been criticisms of this position from time to time from the judiciary and elsewhere. At Report stage I undertook to put down an amendment in the Commons. In view of the way in which the county court operates and also in view of the need to limit the effect on the manpower in the public service, the scheme will need to be flexible, both as to those judgment debts which are to be included and the machinery by which interest will be payable. I propose to issue a consultative paper to canvass the opinions of interested parties. I beg to move this very highly technical amendment.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 35. This amendment is consequential to Amendment No. 9.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 36. This amendment is consequential on Amendment No. 2.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 37. I believe that this is another technical amendment; I hope that I am not misleading the House in saying so.

My Lords, I remember an occasion in the House of Lords when counsel for one of the parties said that the point being taken against him was a very technical point. The late noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, said, "Ah, yes, in some cases what you may think of as a technical point is a point of principle which has been discovered by the other side!"

My Lords, there is not another side to this particular debate!

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 38. This is another technical amendment and goes together with Amendment No. 41. I do not think that any point of principle arises on this amendment.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 39 and 40. These amendments are consequential on Amendment No. 2.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 41. This amendment is consequential on Amendments No. 37 and 38.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 42. This is consequential on Amendment No. 6.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 43. This is consequential on Amendment No. 2.

My Lords, I am informed on the best authority that this is a highly technical amendment. I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 44.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 45 to 51 inclusive. They are consequential on Amendment No. 2.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 52. This is consequential on Amendment No. 8.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 53. This is consequential on Amendment No. 6.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 54. This is consequential on Amendment No. 28.

My Lords, to save the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor from utter exhaustion, would it not be possible to move those amendments which are merely consequential together under the rubric of "merely consequential amendments"? We would not seek to invite the noble and learned Lord to put each one to us.

My Lords, I willingly and happily accept the suggestion which comes from the noble and learned Lord, since all the remaining amendments are consequential on quite a variety of other amendments that I have already moved.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 55 to 79.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 141ZAC:

If this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call any of the remaining amendments to Clause 43.

I am sure that the Committee will be grateful to my noble friend for the spirit in which he addressed himself to this matter and the atmosphere which he has sought to continue from that which prevailed on the Supreme Court Bill. May I first of all try to answer the two specific questions that he raised at the beginning? Apart from the omission which he himself has noticed, I think that his clause covers all the provisions in the Bill which he would have intended it to cover. So far as the Immigration Act amendment is concerned which is contained in Clause 38 of this Bill, our view is that that has made amendments on provisions of the Immigration Act but the amendments are inserted into the Immigration Act and accordingly the provisions relating to appeals and so on in the Act are not interfered with by that amendment.

If I might now address myself to the main matter which my noble friend has raised, as I have sought to explain earlier the intention of the Government is that, where under the Bill there is an expressed entitlement to registration, that should be a right which is subject to the appeal, subject to adjudication by the court. The phrase which is in that sort of provision about the Secretary of State being satisfied is one which we have undertaken to look at in order to give effect to that view. Accordingly, so far as the substance of the matter is concerned, I think there is no difference between us in that our intention is that there should be a right to go to the court to have the matter determined.

My noble friend has asked what the procedure would be. Of course, the Bill does not attempt to lay down the procedure, that being more a matter for the court itself. I certainly understand that the most likely procedure to be available and suitable for this problem as far as the English courts are concerned is the new Order 53 provision. Of course, as my noble friend knows, the new Order 53 for judicial review provides that in an appropriate case the court may give a declaration of rights as well as effect relief such as would be given under the old prerogative writs or prerogative orders. Accordingly, the procedure that would apply for a declaration in a suitable case would be available in such a situation.

The problem of "close connection" has been referred to more than once, and I agree that the question of application of that test to particular circumstances may not always be easy. I do not regard the difficulty as arising from any doubt about the meaning of the words "close connection", but rather from the application of these to different circumstances. Our view is that in the situation where an entitlement applies, the court will have the responsibility of determining whether that entitlement exists, and that, therefore, is not a situation in which any kind of discretion to the Secretary of State would arise. If the Secretary of State was entitled to reach that view, which does arise in some circumstances, we should doubt whether the formula would apply here. This is a matter which we shall, of course, consider in relation to the amendment which, I think, was originally moved by the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, a considerable time ago. Certainly what my noble friend has said today we will have in mind in considering the appropriate result of that consideration. I hope that, in the light of that assurance, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw this amendment.

We are all indebted to the noble Viscount and to the noble and learned Lord for a very lucid debate, so far, on a vital matter. I imagine that there will be no difference at all on any side of the Committee. once one accepts the fact that there is a need for an appeal; certainly, where the question of entitlement is concerned. Some of us feel that it should also be there in other circumstances where discretion applies, but we are not going to debate that on this amendment. I ask for the Committee's indulgence while I go further into this matter only because, since there will be consideration between now and Report stage, I want—if I may say so, in all humility—the Government at least to know what is the position of my noble friends on this matter, although I believe it is a position which will be held by the majority of the Committee. I would even be optimistic and say that it will be held by everybody in the Committee.

The noble Viscount made a most important point when he said that if there is to be a right of appeal on entitlement, it must be clear beyond peradventure in the Bill that the court or tribunal that hears the appeal can do so de novo. It can open the matter as though the court were, indeed, the Secretary of State, looking at all the evidence. The noble Viscount, very correctly, took as his example Clause 3(2)(d) of the Bill. He mentioned only the first part of it because, out of consideration to the Committee, he wanted to be brief. But there is a second part to it.

He mentioned the first part,

"that the parent in question intends to maintain a close connection with the United Kingdom",

and that can well be held to be a question of fact. The noble and learned Lord may well say, as he has said before, that a close connection is pretty obvious. You look at the facts of each case and decide it. But I ask your Lordships to look at the second part of that paragraph which reads:

"… or, if the parent in question has died since the birth, that he or she had that intention at the time of the birth."

What an area of evidence can be covered by any such situation! I think the Committee is anxious that the appeal procedure, which the Government have been good enough to say they will now, in view of the opinion of the Committee, put into this Bill, shall be abundantly clear as being a procedure which enables the appellate court or tribunal to look at all the evidence and to make a decision of its own.

If I may say so with the greatest of deference, the noble Viscount was absolutely right when he talked about the limitation, so far as lawyers know it to date, of the judical review procedure. Most of us feel that the judicial review procedure will be upon the basis: "Has there been a quite apparent miscarriage of justice? Have the rules, as it were, been observed in coming to a decision so far as the Minister is concerned?" If they have been observed, then it is very likely—I put it no higher—that the judge conducting the judicial review will say: "I need go no further".

So I make an appeal on behalf of my noble friends with the same voice, if not so eloquent a voice, as the noble Viscount, that, whether the Government make it the tribunal which the noble Viscount was talking about on his important amendment on another occasion, whether they make it the tribunal that my noble friends and I advocated in a certain amendment or whether it be the High Court, it must be a procedure that allows the applicant to go with his case to the judge or to the tribunal, on the basis that it should be heard with all the evidence that was before the Home Office, and with the court or tribunal free to make its own decision in the place of the Home Secretary if the court or tribunal feels that the decision is wrong.

There is only one other matter that I wish to raise and I shall then sit down very rapidly. The noble Viscount, in my respectful view, was also correct in saying, when he referred to the provisions that amend the Immigration Act 1971, that he wanted to be abundantly sure that the right of appeal before the tribunals set out in the Immigration Act should, without any question of doubt, still be available. The noble and learned Lord said very clearly: "That is our view". I would plead with him, so that there is no dubiety at all, that at Report stage there should be brought into the Bill a clear statement in a suitable place that nothing else in the Bill affects the rights of appeal in the Immigration Act, as amended by this Bill.

I do not think it is necessary, at this stage, to add anything on appeals in entitlement cases, because my noble and learned friend himself, on a much earlier amendment some days ago, during a debate in which I took part, gave the clearest possible undertaking that the Government would be looking into this between now and Report stage. I am sure that he took on board the view then expressed, which has been re-echoed this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, that the kind of appeal in those cases will not be the kind of appeal in which the onus falls on the appellant of establishing that no reasonable Secretary of State could possibly have come to the view complained of, but that it will rather be a case, as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has said, of the appellate body, whatever it is, having the right to look at the whole facts of the case and to see the case as the Home Secretary originally saw it, in order to see whether they come to the same view. As is it clear that the assurances we have been given cover that, then it would be premature before the Report stage to say anything more on that.

But I am moved by this amendment simply to ask one question on the construction of this clause, about which I am puzzled. This clause deals with discretion cases and subsection (1), on which the amendment does not bite, lays down the impeccable sentiment that the discretion,

"shall be exercised without regard to the race, colour or religion of any person who may be affected by its exercise".

If one then reads subsection (2), one sees that recourse to the courts is excluded in these discretion cases. Subsection (1) deals with a discretion case. Does it, therefore, follow logically that there is no sanction whatever on the Secretary of State to act as laid down in subsection (1)? Alternatively, if we had a Secretary of State—and I hasten to say that no one would suggest it of the present one—who allowed any of these decisions to be affected by any of these considerations, would the person complaining, the person who thought this had happened, have any right of access to the courts at all? If he has not, then really the impeccable sentiments set out in subsection (1) are hardly worth the paper they are written on.

May I first of all make it clear that the undertakings which I gave earlier were to consider the expression that was used in the Bill, "the Secretary of State is satisfied", with a view to seeing whether that expression caused an impediment to the achieving of the result which we said was achieved. I have never said that we agree that it is necessary to bring any kind of appeal procedure into this Bill for that particular matter. What we have said is that we want to consider the words to make sure that a person has access to the court in order to vindicate his rights in the entitlement situation. That seems to me to cover the right in a way more directly than an appeal. The very idea of an appeal procedure may not be the best thought for this. This is a situation in which a person has a right which, in our view, he should be entitled to vindicate. That is the purpose that we have in mind and which I think would entirely match the object that my noble friend Viscount Colville had in mind.

So far as the question that is raised by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, is concerned, the view which I would suggest to the Committee is the correct one is that Section 43(1) is a very plain direction to the Secretary of State, to a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, and I would take the view strongly that that is a very clear statement which we would not anticipate ever being breached. It seems quite inappropriate to go on to provide any formal sanction, but I feel fairly certain that the court would take account of Section 43(1) in considering the scope of Section 43(2). There are authorities, as I am sure my noble friend is aware, which state that however wide an exclusion of the court's powers of review may be in form, in fact it applies only to the area of jurisdiction which Parliament has given to the inferior tribunal or statutory authority. Therefore, in considering the scope of subsection (2) the court would certainly have regard to the existence and effect of subsection (1).

While I agree with my noble and learned friend in what he has just said, he rather foreshadows what we are going to discuss, perhaps in the next amendment to be moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and perhaps my noble and learned friend would consider that there would be much merit in that amendment, merely to make it absolutely clear that subsection (2) is governed by the first few words in subsection (1). Therefore, while I would very much agree with my noble friend in what he just said as to what is the probable actual construction of subsections (1) and (2), nevertheless I hope he will look with considerable favour on what I understand is going to be moved by the noble and learned Lord in the next amendment.

I was tempted to intervene to make the point the noble Lord, Lord Rawlinson, has just made in the light of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, but perhaps, as I see eagerness to deal with the Statement, it would be appropriate for us to deal with that matter when I move my amendment. As to what has been said on the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Viscount Colville, he will no doubt give his decision upon the matter. I confess that we found somewhat disappointing the words of the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Advocate, in his response, and in view of the great importance of this I wondered whether it would be possible before the actual day of the Report stage if we could get some indication from the Government, by correspondence if possible, as to what they have in mind. Because clearly this is going to the root of much of the anxiety that has been created by the Bill, namely, the apparent rightlessness and parlous situation of people whose rights may be very seriously and adversely affected.

I imagine it would be the wish of the Committee just to finish this amendment before we take the Statement, and I will do so very quickly indeed. As one footnote to the point made by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter, I would say that the difficulty about getting the courts to come to the interpretation that he foreshadowed, as did also my noble and learned friend, is that you have a sort of Anisminic type case, where the difficulty is such that it is only in this House that the matter is finally resolved. That is an extremely expensive way of doing it for the sake of two or three words in the Bill which would save all that trouble. On the main point, I understand perfectly well the scope of the undertaking that had been made earlier by the Front Bench about the Secretary of State's being satisfied. What I had hoped to do in this amendment was to deal with some of the mechanics of the way in which judicial review works, and I have welcomed the support of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, on this. I think everybody agrees that there is a real problem here.

I think I must say finally to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay that he referred to the extension under Order 53 of the remedies so that they now include an injunction and a declaration. With the greatest deference, I would invite him to talk to the judicial authorities about that. I think he will find that although those remedies have been put in, they have not extended the fundamental scope of what the order for judicial review covers. They have not enabled declarations to be given except when an abuse of power has been discovered; they have not changed the fundamental tests by which the courts decide in their discretion whether or not to make an order of certiorari. In other words, there is no new additional fact-finding machinery that has been built in by the addition of these two new powers. If that is right, think the force of what he said by say of reply to me very largely falls away and we are back with the quotation from the Lord Chief Justice that I gave him.

I want to withdraw this amendment quickly. I hope my noble and learned friend will respond to the invitation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, to tell us early what is going to be done, because we shall need to know about this. I hope that he will carefully consider what has been said and that we may revert to this matter when we come back again on Report. i thank him very much for what he has said, but I am afraid that unless he comes up with something which is satisfactory we shall have to go back to it. I leave one thought in his mind. Would it be possible to provide in the Bill as an absolute minimum something like "subject to rules of court" or "the ability to make rules of court" to deal with this question as a supernumary to Order 53 if it should turn out that that order is inadequate? I just leave the thought with him that that might be one of the ideas to consider. I thank those who have taken part in this debate, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

I understand that it would now be convenient to take the Statement. I beg to move that the House do now resume.

My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

• Appropriation Act,
• Belize Act,
• Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act,
• Supreme Court Act,
• Armed Forces Act,
• Greater London Council (Money) Act.

My Lords, belatedly, with the permission of the House, I should like to repeat a Statement which is being made in another place on local government audit in England and Wales.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for giving us the Statement this afternoon. The comments I shall make on it will include some of the points in the consultation paper because the two things go together and in this short period of time it has been rather difficult to gather them together.

The newly proposed audit commission is a much more expanded and expensive Quango which is replacing the present system of audit in local government. These proposals certainly appear to be a further and serious erosion of local government independence and accountability. In fact, paragraph 2 of the consultation paper rejects the unanimous advice of the Public Accounts Committee for a new national audit office under the Comptroller and Auditor General. It uses the following phraseology:

"In the Government's view, this would bring local authorities into a relationship with Parliament which was fundamentally inconsistent with their constitutional position, confusing their line of accountability at a time when the Government's aim is to strengthen their accountability in the direction in which it constitutionally lies, to their electors".

This is from a Government which unfortunately again and again—I say this sadly—in recent months have undermined the local accountability of elected local authorities. We have seen this running through every piece of recent legislation—orders, motions—which has come before this House and another place and has connection with local authority affairs.

Paragraph 18 of the consultation document makes it clear that under the new audit system the auditor will have extended powers

"to make an immediate report if he considered that a matter of public concern should be borough urgently to the public attention."

Does this mean public irregularities or the unlawful use of public funds? If so, we would readily support this proposal. Or does it mean that these new auditors will be empowered to make political judgments and to report upon areas of public policy where the responsi bility is from the local authority to its electors? I should be grateful if the Minister could tell me what are the criteria for "a matter of public concern".

In paragraph 20 of the consultation paper, the Secretary of State proposes to take powers to direct an extraordinary audit additional to those which already exist. Again I ask, what does this mean? What are the public interest criteria which the Secretary of State will apply? Again, is it in the area of public policy? If so, then the Secretary of State is not only taking away the powers of local authorities to appoint their own auditors; he is taking powers to direct the audit commission into areas of public political policy and controversy.

In paragraph 2 of the Statement, the Government say that they do not believe it to be right in principle that local authorities should appoint their own auditors. I would ask, whyever not? Most business organisations do so. These include the largest companies in this country. To paraphrase, I hope one can say that what is good enough for business is surely good enough for local government.

Value for money features largely in these proposals. No local authority in today's economic climate can possibly refute the necessity of research for value and economy. Research has gone on for many years and it is not new. Local authorities set up their own central organisation, LAMSAC, to head the search for efficiency, yet in paragraph 16 of the consultation paper the Government say that there is a case for transferring some of LAMSAC's work to the commission. The Government go on to say that they will discuss this question with the local authority associations. I very much hope that they do and that they will take their points of view into very strict account. In addition, when there is talk of an independent chairman of the commission being appointed I hope it will be done in conjunction with the local authority associations and that the local authorities will be represented in the majority on the Commission and not be relegated to a minor role.

I should like to ask the Minister what is the justification for appointing additional district auditors from private firms—paragraph 11 of the Statement. I believe it was done, with agreement, a year or so ago by Barnet and Sutton at a quite considerable extra cost to the ratepayers. Can the Minister tell us whether it was worth while and does it justify the extension financially in the coming year? In conclusion, we should like to know what is the estimated cost of these proposals, which the Secertary of State has said is going to involve some extra cost, and, even more important, what are the estimated savings which may be made.

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friends on these Benches I wish to join with the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, in thanking the noble Lord the Minister for repeating the Statement. The noble Lord may be glad to hear that we do not take quite such a jaundiced view of the Statement as a whole as apparently does the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, although we do agree with her in wishing to oppose any further limitations on the freedom and autonomy of local government. Nevertheless, we believe that the mea sures contained in this statement may well prove in the long-run to be of benefit to local government and to those who depend on it.

However, we have one particular anxiety which the noble Lord the Minister may be able to relieve, and I will put one question to him. As the Statement appears to focus largely on value for money and the cost effectiveness of local government expenditure, we wonder whether the noble Lord the Minister would agree with us that it would be difficult for the commission to decide whether certain local government expenditure is in fact cost effective unless the commission is empowered to look at consequential effects on public expenditure in other areas. For example, if local government spends a lot of money on home helps it undoubtedly cuts down National Health Service expenditure, because it enables people to be discharged home who would otherwise have to remain in costly hospital or other institutional care. So my question to the noble Lord is that: Will the commissioners, in undertaking this very important task of looking at items of local government expenditure, have power to examine the consequential effects—savings or other wise—on Government expenditure in other areas?

My Lords, may I deal first with the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk. When she asks whether the new auditors will be empowered to make political judgments, the answer, of course, is clearly, No, any more than district auditors make political judgments now. The people who will be appointed through the commission will be district auditors: they have not made political judgments, nor will they, and I should not have thought that it was a matter for public concern that such outside expertise should be brought in. It should be a matter of some public relief, in fact, because although I pay great tribute to the work of the district auditor service, which I think does an excellent job (and I have not heard anyone say other than that), the fact is that in the main they have not concentrated on value for money exercises to the extent that we hope will be possible for others who come in and bring with them certain commercial expertise and knowledge. So that is one benefit which I think will be gained.

When the noble Baroness asks why should not local authorities appoint their own auditors, may I remind her that in the larger businesses it is in fact the shareholders who appoint the auditors, not the management as such. Management appoint them, but they have to be confirmed by the shareholders; so I would ask, who in fact is the shareholder in local government? Is it the ratepayer, is it the council staff, is it the councillors? I think really the question does not come off the ground at all.

The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, asked what justification there is for the additional auditors coming from private firms and was it worth while in the case of individual authorities who called in auditors to have a look. In fact they did not call in auditors as such; they called in management consultants to look at that aspect of their work, and only they will be able to say whether they felt that it was worth while in terms of what they received by way of advice. I could give opinions in one or two cases that I know, but I do not think that is something upon which I should embark now.

As to the last major question with regard to cost, it is difficult to say. We estimate that the cost of the administration of the commission will be something between £100,000 and £150,000 in a year. If the noble Baroness was referring to what will be the actual cost in each case to an authority and what would it be in total, clearly I cannot give her that answer, but I hope she will be satisfied to take into account not so much what it might cost but what it will save. Surely if it is thought—and it is—that a great prize is there to be achieved, then it is worth embarking upon.

My Lords, before the Minister leaves that point, may I say that I asked about the estimated cost. Obviously I did not mean to the individual authorities—the Minister is quite right there. And I asked about the projected savings. I should have thought that there must be some even fairly notional figure in the mind of the Secretary of State or the department when they are bringing this forward, because otherwise all we are left with are increased administrative costs.

My Lords, if local government was able to save 0·1 of 1 per cent. it would represent £20 million, so when I said that there was a prize to go for I do not think I was exaggerating.

I took the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Winstanley, with regard to being concerned about the consequential effects, but I do not think he need worry unduly. The basic object of the exercise is, first, to help the district audit, as it is now, to bring in the know-how of private sector people with commercial expertise to add to the pool of thinking—and there can be nothing wrong with that. Basically, that is what it will be doing. It is not to take political judgments, which the noble Baroness was concerned about; it is certainly not to criticise the level of a service being provided, unless that is so excessive in some ways as to be clearly unreasonable, which is very rare indeed. In that sense it will not lead to the kind of concern that the noble Lord, Lord Winstanley, mentioned.

My Lords, just now the Minister said that 1 per cent. of something resulted in whatever it was—I could not follow it. One cannot follow such a statement if one is not an economist. Unless the Minister can spell this out and say what 1 per cent. is, I am unable to understand or believe it. I apologise to the noble Lord for intervening at this stage, having not heard the Statement.

My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Baroness does not believe what I say, but I was only giving an indication; I was not saying that this is the justification for the basic motivation of what we are doing here by appointing an audit commission. I was trying to indicate the opportunity that would exist for there to be general savings. However, I must touch on a point also made by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, when she referred to accountability. That also is a major aspect of what we are looking for. I know nobody in local government—and I know as many people in it as most—who really objects at all to there being the maximum degree of accountability, and they have no concern that it should be a district auditor or anybody else who highlights what they are doing. They are always prepared to justify it and are usually well able to do so.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that, notwithstanding the comments of the noble Baroness opposite, many of us are very glad indeed to hear this announcement of the strengthening both of the quality and of the independence of local government audits. In view of the enormous sums of money to which he referred, and in view of one or two unhappy cases in local government of which noble Lords are well aware, is my noble friend aware that many of us feel that this action is well timed and of very great importance.

Would he, however, reassure me on two points? Will the creation of this new organisation slow up, as centralisation sometimes does, announcements of auditors' decisions, because in local government time is so very important, and, as he knows well, things can go wrong in a matter of additional weeks. Secondly, will the very effective power of the district auditor to surcharge individual councillors who are responsible for irresponsible decisions persist tinder the new arrangements? Finally, will my noble friend join me, as a former chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, in saying how very much some of us admire the really splendid work which that Committee has put in on this extraordinarily difficult, complex and important subject.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his remarks and his encouragement. So far as the Public Accounts Committee is concerned, of course I think everyone is indeed glad that they look so closely as they do at this work. In fact I ought to have said to the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, that what we are embarked upon here with an audit commission in fact is not the recommendation of the Public Accounts Committee. Local Government would have felt—frankly we felt, too—much more concern had we gone the route that they proposed. Nevertheless, we felt that their basic concern and their recommendations for greater accountability and involvement in this way were very valid; hence the point of my noble friend, with which I very much agree.

On the two questions he put to me; first, will it slow up announcement of audtiors' decisions; I see no reason at all why it should; quite the contrary, because it is in fact in many ways supplementing the existing service, which hopefully should enable any decisions to be taken that bit sooner, although I would not like to make any commitment. But there is no reason at all why it should be slower as a result of what we are proposing. Neither should it have any effect at all upon the powers to surcharge councillors, happily a very rare occurrence. They will be exactly district auditors in any case, and they will have neither more nor less powers than the district auditors at the present time.

My Lords, from these Benches we would also like to give a somewhat cautious welcome to the Statement and to the consultative document, which we have seen briefly. The noble Lord, looks surprised. I am sure there is no reflection intended on the integrity of the present district audit unit staff or indeed of LAMSAC, I hope there will be the widest consultation with the local authorities, particularly with regard to the work of LAMSAC and as to how much of that ought to be taken over properly by the new commission. I would ask the noble Lord to have another look at the date by which the reflections of the local authorities have to be in to him. The date given in the Statement this afternoon and in the consultative document is 15th September. Most local authorities, like Parliament, have a recess in August. That only gives them a bare two weeks to make up their decisions and to make their views known to their local authority associations. I hope the noble Lord is not going to be too hard and fast on the 15th September, and that he will, if necessary, lengthen it to get proper consultations with the local authorities. We also welcome the fact that the commission's annual report is going to be laid before Parliament, and if it is necessary there will be an opportunity for either or both Houses to discuss it. We would applaud anything that takes away the powers from the Secretary of State in the Local Government Act 1972, even if it puts them on to a new commission.

My Lords, on the last point the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman, makes, the powers are the same and will be the same as they are now, neither more nor less. They are independent; the district auditor is independent. If anything, the new Commission will be less attached to the tenuous relationship there is at the present time with the Department of the Environment. As to the work of LAMSAC, I do know that this is a matter of concern. We can only decide it together with the local authorities, who, after all, pay half the cost of LAMSAC anyhow.

If the local authority associations feel that the date of 15th September is a difficult one to meet, I am sure they will make that known to us. This is something we want to do together because it is for the betterment of everybody involved. So without making any commitment—I know the noble Baroness does not expect me to—I would feel entitled to say that if the local authority associations feel there is great difficulty for their members we would want to know about it and consider it accordingly.

My Lords, I think that most people concerned with local government will be very welcoming of this Statement made by the noble Lord. Would the noble Lord care to say that a view was taken by the Advisory Committee on Local Government Audit in regard to the Public Accounts Committee's recommendation, that the audit commission should be under the surveillance of the Comptroller and Auditor-General; the fact that he has announced that it is not going to be so will be greatly welcomed by those in local government.

My Lords, I am deeply grateful to my noble friend, who quite properly reminds me that it was in fact the unanimous feeling of the Advisory Committee on Local Government Audit that it should be an audit commission in this way. While it would be fair to say that on some aspects they have reservations, in the main—and there are some very distinguished members on that body, not least my noble friend Lord Marshall—it was their unanimous view that they approved of an audit commission, albeit with reservations on some aspects, and they certainly thought it a more preferable route than the one through the Comptroller and Auditor- General.

moved Amendment No. 141ZB:

In my respectful submission it is not right to speak of subsection (1) of Clause 43 as being in isolation, or even in glorious isolation; it is part of the whole provisions of the Bill. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord who moved the amendment would accept that it is one of the fundamental principles of the construction of any Act of Parliament that it must be read as a whole and that therefore the court in reading subsection (2) of this clause would read it in the light of all the provisions of the Bill, including subsection (1). I think that that is abundantly established on the authorities in this branch of the law.

That having been said, the amendment is seeking to say that subsection (2) is to be subject to subsection(1), There is an inherent difficulty in that particular formulation. These two subsections are concerned with different parts of the process of dealing with applications for citizenship which are at discretion. Clause 43(1)—what might be called the anti-discrimination provision—is concerned with the procedures leading up to the decision whether to grant citizenship. Clause 43(2), on the other hand, is concerned with what happens after the decision is made. It seems very difficult to provide that a provision affecting one part of the process should apply to a separate part of the process. That is, we believe, a fundamental objection to the amendment as it stands and likely to introduce confusion into the Bill rather than clarity.

Clause 43(2) is in two parts, the first part dealing with the question of assigning reasons and the second part dealing with the question of decisions not being subject to appeal to or review in, any court. So far as the second part is concerned, as I said, it seems to us that that exclusion will be read in the light of the whole provisions of the Bill. But so far as the first branch is concerned—the giving of reasons—I must say that I cannot understand how the noble and learned Lord proposes that that part of subsection (2) should be subject to subsection (1) or, indeed, what that means in the circumstances.

Accordingly, in so far as the noble and learned Lord has explained the purpose of his amendment, then the rules about context and so on, to which I referred, would seem to mean that, under the Bill as it stands, what he is looking for is very much already so. So far as the first branch of subsection (2) is concerned, it does not appear to make much sense, if I may say so, with all appropriate respect.

Whatever may be the effect on any other Member of the Committee, my noble and learned friend has thrown me into a certain amount of confusion. I would have tended to suggest to the Committee that it is not so much the glorious ioslation of Clause 43(1) that is the point, but the juxtaposition of it with Clause 43(2). When Parliament put into one and the same clause in a Bill that there should not be any appeal against a discretionary decision and at the same time that where discretion is used it must be done without regard to race, colour or religion, what court would not suppose that the two are to be read together in precisely the way that my noble and learned friend has said, but to precisely the opposite effect? In other words, surely most courts would be inclined to think that the provisions in subsection (1) were not intended to be subject to an appeal because of what comes in subsection (2). I do not think that that is what the Government want.

I do not see any reason why the Government wish to object—if there is the rare and conceivable case where you have actual evidence that a discretionary decision has been taken to the detriment of somebody because of his race, colour or regligion—that that matter should be precluded from being appealed. I do not think that that is what the Government want at all. I should have thought that they would underpin the concession which, in fact, subsection (1) consists of and which was added in another place.

Why will my noble and learned friend not take the point? I quite see that there might be something a little unworkable in the way in which the amendment has been drafted and it is probably not intended to relate to reasons, but the substance of it is something that needs to be made clear. As I said before, why do the Government insist that, instead of inserting a few simple words, they should leave a situation which is bound to lead, if it occurs at all, to massive and expensive litigation? What is the point of it? Why not make a small change and make the matter clear beyond peradventure?

I apparently jumped the gun on this point as regards the earlier amendment of my noble friend Lord Colville of Culross. I am bound to say that I found the reply of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate on that occasion, though adroit and suave as ever, somewhat unconvincing. On this occasion I should simply like to ask him this question. Is it clear beyond peradventure that some person who, rightly or wrongly, has had the Home Secretary's discretion exercised against an application of his and who alleges that there is here an element of discrimination on grounds of colour, race or religion, could take this appeal to the court?

My answer to that is that to some extent it must depend upon the circumstances. But in an applicaton to the court to have the question determined, I should expect it to be argued in court that the protection afforded by the latter part of Clause 43(2) cannot apply to prevent review where it is suggested that the discretion which has been exercised is not a discretion which the Bill contemplates but something completely different. There may be other ways in which a discretion could be vitiated by considerations of that kind, apart from questions about discrimination under Clause 43(1). There may be inferences from other parts of the Bill or from general principle that would have that effect. Certainly—so far at any rate-I would suggest to your Lordships that the juxtaposition of these two clauses requires the court to do justice where there is proof that discrimination has taken place, although, as I said earlier, our view is that the existence of subsection (1) is simply declaratory of the position. We cannot contemplate that the Secretary of State, the governor or lieutenant-governor vested with this discretion would act in breach of subsection (1).

In another place after some debate the Government conceded the general principle contained in subsection (1); that is, that so far as the Secretary of State is concerned there should be no discrimination in regard to race, religion or colour. That was greeted with some satisfaction by those who are anxious to see harmonious race relations in this country and who had regard to the unfortunate feelings—whether or not they are deserved—that there is some sort of prejudicial element in this Bill, because that concession was at least an expression of Parliament saying that in any circumstances before the Secretary of State there must be no question of discrimination.

Some members in another place felt that this was a cosmetic exercise and nothing else. As I understand it, the Government were extremely keen to say that that was not so and that it was meant to be a principle that is very firmly embedded in the Bill. If I may put it respectfully, they did not make a very good job of embedding the principle firmly in the Bill. Certainly they did not make a very good job of it by putting that principle in the same clause—and this has been pointed out by other Members of your Lordships' Committee—as a subsection which said that you cannot ask the Secretary of State for any reasons as to why he granted or refused and you cannot appeal to any court against his discretionary decision.

The noble and learned Lord can speak with that accent of which we are so fond until doomsday, but without any question of doubt he will not convince the Committee otherwise than to say that there must be some doubt about this. When an advocate is appealing on behalf of an applicant, he is trying to say to the court "Would you please look at this case and decide whether or not there was discrimination? "In his opening remarks he has to say "Of course, I could not ask the Secretary of State to give me particulars as to why in the case of Mr. X, who happens to be white, who lives next door to Mr. Y, who was in this country for precisely the same time, and who, indeed, works side by side with his white neighbour in the same factory and upon the same work, Mr. X was granted naturalisation or registration—whatever it was that happens to be discretionary—and Mr. Y was not.

Furthermore, immediately drawn to the court's mind would be the second part of this clause, which would say in very distinct terms that in any event there could be no appeal against the Secretary of State's decision, because it was a discretionary matter. The hearing would end in a nullity or a farce. I know that it would be a long nullity or a long farce if an advocate of the capability of the noble and learned Lord was acting in the matter and was appearing before the court. But a farce or a nullity is no less the case whether it be short or long, and it is the duty of this revising Chamber and—if I may say so with deference—the Government, to make the principle that was supposed to be embedded in the declarations in another place on this clause abundantly clear, and to say that in a case where discretion is alleged, without any question of doubt the applicant has the right of appeal and to deal with that matter before the courts.

All that I ask of the noble and learned Lord is this. We have heard three eminent lawyers upon this matter and one who is endeavouring hard before he leaves this world to deserve that title. If all four lawyers are of the view that this matter could not be debated before a court, or that it is very doubtful whether this discrimination matter could be debated because of the wording of Clause 43(2), then it must be the duty of the Government to say that at least they will take this clause back—unless the mood of the Committee is to be tested—and ensure that it is abundantly clear that on a matter dealt with by Clause 43(1) there is a right to have the matter investigated by the court.

Throughout the discussions in this Committee we on these Benches have been looking for assurances for those about whom we are concerned, who are fearful as to the consequences of this Bill and who, rightly or wrongly, misunderstand its motives and intentions. That is why we shall look forward with particular interest to the response at the Report stage to the amendments in the name of the noble Viscount which we have recently discussed, and why we think in this whole area involving the exercise of discretion it is very important indeed that there should be no doubt whatever as to the Government's intention. In the interests of clarity I would appeal to the Minister to take this back.

Perhaps I could say a few words in addition to the opinions that have already been expressed and with which I warmly agree, although it has been proved in practice that taking individual cases of discrimination before the courts or before any tribunal is not a very satisfactory way of asserting rights, because there can always be a multitude of reasons advanced as to why some decision has been made other than the question of race, religion, or colour. I anticipate that if the Secretary of State's decisions were queried or the governor's—and I agree with those who have said that we are not talking about the present Secretary of State—there would be a multitude of other reasons why he had declined to grant nationality, or to have exercised his discretion in favour of the applicant, under any of the other parts of the Bill where the powers are given to him.

What I want to ask the noble and learned Lord to tell me is this. If the Secretary of State's discretion is not to be questioned, does that also mean that a general investigation as to the way these powers are exercised by the Commission for Racial Equality would be legally impossible? My own opinion is that the general powers of investigation which we gave to this Commission for Racial Equality under the 1976 Act are a far better way of proceeding to examine discrimination over a broad area than the pursuit of individual complaints.

If the arguments that noble Lords have advanced are correct, that these matters are not capable of being tested in a court of law, then the same thing would be true of the general investigations that are conducted by the Commission for Racial Equality. It was not so very long ago that the Home Office sought to prevent the CRE from conducting an investigation of the way that the Secretary of State uses his discretion under the Immigration Acts. Fortunately, that was found not to be possible by the courts, and the investigation was pursued. If we leave this clause as it stands the same arguments could take place all over again, and not only would individuals find it difficult to pursue complaints in the courts but also any general investigation of the use of these powers would be declared outside the powers of the Commission for Racial Equality.

May I briefly support what has been said by referring to the sense of bitterness which arises when somebody believes that he has been discriminated against for reasons of race or colour or religion; reasons over which in the case of race or colour he has no control, and in the case of religion should not be expected to play any part in the decision. When one is faced with a complaint of discrimination in other fields we now have a law which enables advisers to investigate whether there is evidence. I certainly have had experience of investigating allegations of discrimination against Government departments.

It is not a question of the integrity of the Secretary of State; it is a question sometimes of what is alleged against a particular official at a very junior level. Sometimes one finds there is no evidence, but sometimes one takes it to a court or tribunal and, whether or not the complaint is in the end found to be justified, the safety valve, the importance of having a forum in which this can be adjudicated, is of paramount importance.

I am bound to say with other noble Lords and noble and learned Lords that if a case of alleged discrimination came up against the Home Office under this Act I would hesitate indeed to advise someone that, even if there was a prima facie case, it was likely to succeed. The Treasury counsel, who are not slow to take points of jurisdiction and take points of this kind, would I am sure raise as a preliminary point that under this Bill there is no jurisdiction in the courts to review a decision however wrong or however unreasonable it may seem to be.

May I briefly rise to say that it seems to me that there is one thing that ought to be looked at on the religion side. There are certain sects in America who have some rather strange beliefs and who have been known to kill off rather a large number of people, and there may be moments when a Secretary of State has to exercise discretion. If these people have a total right of appeal on the grounds that they have been discriminated against purely because they belong to one of these extremely strange sects, that would not be right. I do not know whether elsewhere in this Bill there is any provision to stop this.

May I just say to my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate, as one lawyer to another, ubi jus, ibi remedium: where there is a right there has to be a remedy.

I think that this might be the moment for us to come to a decision about this matter. I regard it as quite fundamental. What may have happened in the history of the Bill is that subsection (1) came in late in the consideration of the matter. It was accepted by the Government as of fundamental importance, but of course they did not marry it with subsection (2). On the contrary, as the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has said—and he attached most valuable weight to the juxtaposition element here, and the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, sought an answer from the noble and learned Lord about the situation—where an applicant claims to have evidence of discrimination, is he to have no remedy? Is he to have no opportunity of coming before the court? The answer given by the noble and learned Lord was, "Well, it depends on the circumstances". Of course it does. If the circumstances justify the proceedings, he ought to have a right to proceed. Accordingly, I think that this matter ought to be tested.