My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, a package of measures to improve the Orange Badge Scheme and to eliminate abuse was announced by my honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport on 30th July. The introduction of a separate offence for misuse of an orange badge by able-bodied people, became operative earlier this week. The other changes include new regulations for the issue and use of badges, and further guidance for local authorities on the administration of the scheme generally. Interested organisations, including those representing the disabled, have recently been consulted on the draft regulations and we are now considering their responses.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that reply. Is he aware that reform is needed?—because the present schemes are being abused when cars, bearing badges, are parked in restricted zones although they are not at the time being used by disabled people. In new arrangements will the Government ensure, first, that the name of the disabled person is on every badge and, secondly, that all badges are easily removable and are only in place on the windscreen of a car when a disabled person is using that car? The interests of severely disabled people are now being damaged by an erosion of confidence in the parking system.

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend and I can give him a "Yes" answer to both his questions. First, the name is and will be on the badge; secondly, there is an idea for the future that badges are removable in plastic containers.

My Lords, I think that the noble Earl will appreciate that everyone in your Lordships' House welcomes the widest possible use of genuine disablement badges. The noble Earl mentioned that disablement organisations have been consulted about the proposals. Who has been consulted on behalf of those who will have to carry out the duty of preventing abuse?

My Lords, the Minister of Transport has been trying to keep a balanced appreciation of this and, of course, the Ministry of Transport is in contact with local authorities and road users.

My Lords, on that same point, has it yet been decided whether police and traffic wardens can take action when they check and find that the person whose name is on the badge is not using the car?

My Lords, yes, indeed, they can, and they can at the moment. As a result of the new regulations being drafted at the moment, we hope that this will be even easier for the police and wardens to do.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that there is disquiet in the country among the able-bodied people? In fact will the badge also carry an expiry date?—because that would catch a great number of people who are using the badges illegally.

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend. I am fairly certain that that will be the case, but I shall check on it and make sure that her remarks are brought to the attention of the proper authority.

My Lord, I beg leave to ask the first Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

No, my Lords. In any case, the quotation, taken out of context, does not accurately reflect the late Lord Mountbatten's view on nuclear deterrence.

My Lords, is the noble Viscount aware that to my knowledge the speech has not, in fact, been printed in full in any newspaper? In order that noble Lords may check for themselves whether or not the quotation accurately represents the speech, I have placed copies of the full text of the speech in the Library.

My Lords, I am delighted to hear that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins—the chairman of the CND—has indeed reprinted the full speech and has placed copies of it in the Library. I would recommend noble Lords to read it. If the House would bear with me for a moment or so on this very important matter, I should like to point out that Lord Mountbatten, as Chief of Defence Staff, fully supported our policies of nuclear deterrence and of maintaining a nuclear balance.

In his Strasbourg speech in May 1979 he gave his audience all his feelings on the awesome nature of nuclear weapons and, indeed, his repugnance towards war, which I believe we all share in this House. But, having done that, if your Lordships will bear with me—because I believe that this speech has been quoted too often—he then continued:

"But how do we set about achieving practical measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament? To begin with, we are most likely to preserve the peace if there is a military balance of strength between East and West. The real need is for both sides to replace the attempts to maintain a balance through ever-increasing and even more costly nuclear armaments by a balance based on mutual restraint".

That is the Government's objective.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that there is an historic precedent for this suggestion? Does he know that in 1924 the Minister for Works, Fred Jowett, added to the statue of Nurse Cavell, the heroic woman who was shot by the enemy, these words:

"Patriotism is not enough. I must have no hate or bitterness for anyone"?

The Minister said, "dig deep", and that was done, and those words are on Nurse Cavell's statue today.

My Lords, as to the question of any inscription on any public statue, that is a matter not only for the Government but for the family of the statesman concerned and for many others. However, the suggestion as to the terms of the inscription and the request that the Government support them are turned down for the reasons that I have stated.

My Lords, if statues to the recently dead are to be used as instruments of political propaganda, would it not be more appropriate, in view of the late Lord Mountbatten's lifetime of devoted service in the Armed Forces of the Crown, to use the latin quotation:

"Si vis pacem para bellum"?

My Lords, is it not the case that in the speech to which I have referred Lord Mountbatten specifically condemned the exact quotation which the noble Lord has quoted? If noble Lords doubt that, I commend them to the Library where they may see it for themselves.

My Lords, I am afraid that I did not quite understand that, but I have nothing to retract. I hope that noble Lords will read the full speech, which shows all the late Lord Mountbatten's horror of these weapons, but that they will also concentrate on what he says when he gets to his practical propositions.

My Lords, is it not the case that the Government, the CND and all shades of opinion in between, would be united in endorsing the general drift of the late Lord Mountbatten's famous speech?

My Lords, I think that this is undoubtedly true. The noble Lord knows well the date of the speech that Lord Mountbatten made, not so very long before he was tragically assassinated. It is a speech of a lifetime of reflections and a repugnance of war. But the recommendations of what to do about it are entirely in accord with the present Government's policies.

My Lords, would the noble Lord not agree that the business of making selective quotations from public figures of this stature to support causes which they never themselves supported is somewhat distasteful and questionable? If there is to be a recommendation regarding the inscription on Lord Mountbatten's statue would not the other quotation to which the noble Viscount referred:

"We are most likely to preserve the peace if there is a military balance of strength between East and West"

be a more appropriate memorial to Lord Mountbatten?

My Lords, it would be more appropriate. The question of any inscription is covered by one of my previous answers.

My Lords, can the noble Minister give us an undertaking that when statues are erected to the memory of any of us we shall have a voice in deciding what the inscription shall be?

My Lords, I hope that the noble Lord will check with his solicitor what is in his last words on this.

My Lords, is it not a fact that Lord Mountbatten would expect this country to survive and win any battle upon which we are engaged? I take completely out of context what the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, has said.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the second Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, it would not be in the interests of national security for me to comment on matters of this nature, beyond saying that as part of our deterrent policy adequate emergency arrangements do of course exist.

My Lords, would the noble Viscount agree that it is regrettable that apparently arrangements are being made for the continuation of some form of Government in the event of nuclear war but no provision whatsoever appears to be being made for the safety of the governed?

My Lords, I would repeat again that the Government's policy is to prevent war, all war, and to do it through a policy of deterrence, but the credibility of deterrence depends on certain emergency arrangements. But I think it is quite wrong to suggest—and I believe that perhaps this is the purpose of the noble Lord's Question—that, because emergency arrangements are being made, this in any way suggests the Government's belief in the likelihood of a nuclear war. We are determined to prevent all war, and to do that we must have emergency arrangements.

My Lords, would the noble Viscount agree that it would help discussion of the very serious problem of our defence and of multilateral disarmament if a deep shelter complex were provided for the leaders of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and if they were invited, for better safety, to occupy it forthwith?

My Lords, is the noble Viscount aware that the Rand Institute of Strategic Studies in California reported that it would take 11 medium nuclear weapons so to destroy this country that it would be incapable of operating as a political unit? Does the noble Viscount agree with that estimate?

My Lords, without agreeing with any precise estimate, the absolute horror and severity of nuclear war is what makes us so determined to follow our policy of deterrence, and behind that to work for the mutual reduction of arms, about which I spoke in referring to Lord Mountbatten's views in the last Question.

My Lords, has the Minister read the background paper to the inquiry by the British Medical Association into the effects of nuclear war? Has he noted that it says that even in the deepest shelters the occupants would be choked and asphyxiated to death?

My Lords, I am going to give the same answer. The whole point is not to have a war, but the belief of Her Majesty's Government is that if our will to keep the balance were to be weakened by certain movements which are currently advocating a unilateral rather than a multilateral move in relation to disarmament, war is more likely and not less likely.

My Lords, on a point of order, may I ask our noble Leader whether the House is dealing with replies to a Question about an inscription on a monument or whether it has engaged in a debate about nuclear war? If so, are we within Standing Orders?

My Lords, we are on the second Question that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, has asked.

My Lords, is the noble Viscount aware that, as between (according to estimates) 150,000 and a quarter of a million members, or supporters, of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament gathered in London on Sunday, it might be difficult to accommodate them, as the noble Lord, Lord Beloff, suggested, in the available shelter which the Government have provided, let alone the 50 million people who are apparently not to be provided for at all? Is he finally and further aware that the purpose of these questions is to make the public aware of the dangers of nuclear war and of the fact that the Government, while themselves preparing to use nuclear weapons, are making no provision whatsoever for the consequences of such use?

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, has now stated quite clearly that the Government—I think his words were, and I will have to check Hansard— are planning actually to take part in a nuclear war. I suggest that the whole intention of these questions is to try to produce extra fear of these nuclear weapons, and on the back of that to avoid our building up the necessary balance, which must be done as a prelude to disarmament, at the present time. The Government are in sympathy with the vast majority of those who attend CND or any other peace demonstration. They would only say, I think, that perhaps the efforts of the leaders of those movements might be more usefully applied to asking the Russians for permission for a march to Moscow to complain against the 250 modern, three war-headed, reloadable SS20 missiles which are now in position, targeted on Europe, can only be targeted on Europe and cannot reach America, and can reach the whole of Europe whether they are sited in Western Russia or east of the Urals.

My Lords, in view of what the noble Viscount has said, and claiming to be a believer in deterrence, does he believe in being deterred, and has he not described being deterred in pretty formidable terms?

My Lords, balance appears in this world, as it is, to be necessary and a necessary preliminary to making slow progress towards disarmament and arms control.

My Lords, I apologise that in my previous intervention I had not noticed that my noble friend had passed to his second Question, but I think my intervention is equally relevant here. The second Question relates to the safety provision that has been made for the Prime Minister and Cabinet at a particular place near Bath. May I ask whether the debate that is now going on is in order since it appears to be a debate on the merits of various forms of defence and not to relate to this particular Question?

My Lords, I have answered the original Question, and said that we are not prepared to comment on this matter.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, there is as yet no firm evidence that 16-year-olds in England and Wales wishing to continue in full-time education have not been able to do so, though some will not have been able to gain entry to their first choice of course or institution. To help local education authorities cater for the growing demand for full-time education from 16 to 19-year-olds, the Government are providing for an additional £60 million of public expenditure in Great Britain in 1982–83 and for further expenditure in the following two years. For those young people who do not wish to remain in education or do not get a place at school or college, and become unemployed, the Youth Opportunities Programme, which provides courses of work experience and training, has been expanded to 550,000 places in the current year.

My Lords, while thanking the Minister for that Answer, may I ask whether he is aware that my Question refers to this autumn, so that the £60 million for 1982–83 is really not relevant, although of course we are pleased to have it? Is the noble Lord aware that while he may not have evidence of 16-year-olds not getting places, I have such evidence applying all over the country where technical colleges or colleges of further education have had to reject students? I will name a few: Hampshire, 400; Cumbria, 150; Kent, Thanet Technical College, 224; Sheffield, Granville College of Further Education, 437; Liverpool, Collquitt College, 422; Clwyd, 180; and I have details of many more all over the country. Is the Minister aware that these young people have applied for specific courses and that while the YOP programmes may be very good, these young people wish to do some particular thing, and that therefore it seems a great waste that either they should have to wait for YOP programmes or their particular abilities and desires cannot be met, and they are left unemployed?

My Lords, the unknown factor in the details which the noble Baroness gave is how far those students obtain a place elsewhere or on another course in the same institution; at present, from the figures, we do not know. However, it is highly relevant that this very substantial increase in funds is being made available for the future.

My Lords, in supporting my noble friend in her Question, may I ask the Minister whether it would not be true to say that, in view of the sad facts, the Government are not only hardhearted but are a thoroughly philistine Government?

The noble Baroness is habitually fair, my Lords, and when I remind her that earlier this year the Government, together with the local education authorities, sat down and then published a major review entitled Education for 16-19 Year Olds, and then have provided the funds to match those plans for the future, I think the noble Baroness will perhaps take a rather more charitable view of the Government's activities.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of Ruskin's famous axiom that there is no wealth but life? The most important life is our young. Consequently, is the Minister aware that, in the micro-electronic age in which we are now to live, whatever party is in power will have a problem of creating employment in the new kind of electronic society? Is the noble Lord therefore aware that these 16-year-olds should be having a chance to get further training? As 14 per cent. of teachers who qualified last year are still out of work and as 25 per cent. of that 14 per cent. are qualified for higher education and further educational activities, is the Minister aware that the nation would be doing a blessing for itself if it saw to it that those kids and teachers got to work in the type of teaching that is needed for the future?

The noble Lord calls for further training, my Lords. There is nothing between the Government and the noble Lord in that, for substantial additional resources have been added to the training programme. In addition, the new Young Workers' Scheme, as it is called, will certainly stimulate youth employment.

If I may ask a final supplementary question, my Lords, may I ask whether the Minister would agree that senior pupils as defined in Section 114 of the 1944 Act—that is, pupils from 12 to 19—have a right under Sections 8(b) and 41 of that Act to education either at a school or further education establishment?

That is precisely why we are making additional resources available, my Lords.

My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 this afternoon, my noble friend Lord Belstead will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is to be made in another place on police searches in Brixton.

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, this is another in the series of Motions to carry on a Bill through into the next Session. In this case, the Humberside Bill is in another place and your Lordships' consent is required to enable it to proceed in the new Session.

My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments and Reason be now considered.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 en bloc to the Lords Amendment No.1, and with permission I will speak also to the following amendments: Nos. 7, 8, 107 and 108. It will be recalled that your Lordships' amendment was agreed to by this House on Report, but it did not take account of the changes to Clause 6(1)(a) made by your Lordships on Third Reading. Those amendments provide that people who are minors at commencement but otherwise eligible for registration under Clause 6(1)(a) will be entitled to registration once they come of full age and will hold this entitlement for five years thereafter.

Your Lordships' amendment would, however, restrict the discretion of the Secretary of State to accept late applications. It is clearly desirable that those who are minors at commencement, and who cannot apply under Clause 6(1)(a) until they are of full age, should be able to benefit from the discretion in your Lord- ships' amendment on the same terms as applicants who are adults at commencement. There should be discretion to accept late applications from them too, especially where they come of full age near the end of the five-year period. One objective of the amendments we seek to move is to give the Secretary of State such a discretion. The Commons have therefore gone even a little further than the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, did on Third Reading in this House, although I would be the first to recognise that the move in this direction was entirely due to the arguments which Lord Pitt put forward.

My Lords, I thank the Government for accepting our amendment, for keeping to it and in effect for improving it; I think the Commons amendment to my amendment is an improvement and I therefore hope the House will accept it.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 7 to the Lords Amendment No. 6. I spoke to this on the last series of amendments.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 8. I have already spoken to this amendment in my earlier remarks.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 10. The Commons decided not to oppose the principle that people from Gibraltar should have an unqualified entitlement to British citizenship. But I regret that, despite the efforts of my noble friend Lord Bethell, the amendment which left this House, though probably workable, was in the Government's view still deficient from a drafting point of view in various respects. It provided that an unqualified entitlement to British citizenship should be held by a person who is a United Kingdom national for European Community purposes by virtue of the operation of any of the pre-accession treaties listed in Part I of Schedule 1 to the European Communities Act 1972. But in fact no one is a United Kingdom national for European Community purposes by virtue of any of those treaties.

What was I think in my noble friend's mind was that the entitlement should be held by all those who are United Kingdom nationals for the purposes of those treaties. But it is not just people from Gibraltar who are United Kingdom nationals for that purpose. People connected in various ways with this country are nationals for that purpose. In most cases such people will automatically become British citizens on commencement of the Bill and consequently do not need the benefit of the entitlement in this amendment. The other cases are British subjects under the Bill who have the right of abode here, but have no connection with Gibraltar. The amendment thus went wider than I think my noble friend intended.

Accordingly another place have agreed a provision which, while it secures the essential objectives of your Lordships' amendment, will benefit solely those whom that amendment was intended to help. The new provision confers an unqualified entitlement on those British dependent territories' citizens who are United Kingdom nationals for the purposes of the Community treaties. British dependent territories' citizens who derive that status from their links with Gibraltar are the only category of such citizens who fall to be United Kingdom nationals for the purposes of the Community treaties, and therefore they alone will be able to benefit from this provision. My Lords, I beg to move.

My Lords, what happens if the Community treaties are altered, as they might be in the case of Cyprus being admitted to the EEC? I ask this with reference to the special territories under British control in Cyprus.

My Lords, I should like to say how glad I was to hear of the decision of his right honourable friend which my noble friend has just announced and the acceptance by the Government of the special position of the people of Gibraltar and the securing for them of that entitlement to British citizenship which, as your Lordships know, means so much to them. This seems a very wise and sensible decision, and I know that it was a hard one for Her Majesty's Government to make, because to some extent it damages the tidiness and the pattern of the Bill. But tidiness is not the most important thing in legislation. We are dealing here with human beings, and I have already heard from Gibraltar what pleasure has been caused among these loyal people at the announcement that Parliament in its combined wisdom is now securing to them this citizenship.

As your Lordships know, the people of Gibraltar have been, and are still being, subjected to pressure and to hardship by the Spanish Government in pursuit of what many others regard as an insolent claim. Therefore it will be a particular encouragement to them that the Parliament and the Government of this country have decided to accord to them this special treatment, this special acknowledgment of their close links with this country, and I would wish, as I know my noble friend Lord Bethell would very much wish, to thank Her Majesty's Government for this wise and prudent decision, and to thank my noble friend Lord Belstead in particular for the considerable part which I suspect he played in it.

My Lords, I hope that your Lordships will forgive an attire which has been enforced upon me. I think that the House will agree with the sentiments of the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, in realising that the Government, if I may say so, have graciously bowed to the will of this House. It was the will of this House in regard to the brave people of Gibraltar which was secured with the support of the Opposition. I put that on record merely in order that it will be abundantly clear as to those who fought gallantly for a very gallant lot of people in Gibraltar, and on this occasion it was not a question of political division, but rather a matter of goodwill from all parts of the House.

My Lords, I should like to say that I agree entirely with what the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, has said and with what my noble friend has said. What must be taken into consideration is that no one can in any way detract from my admiration for the people of Gibraltar. When in another place I was, with others now in your Lordships' House, constant in my vigilance on behalf of Gibraltarians, as on this particular issue. But the fact of the matter is that I do not believe that at this stage we can ignore the fact that later on, in examining some of these amendments, precisely the same argument of honour and contribution to Great Britain can be advanced in the case of many other millions of people who could be affected unless we change the Bill substantially.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter for his generous words. I should like to welcome back to your Lordships' House the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. Though I I am not sure that I should be entirely happy to see his head if we go through the Division Lobby, I should like to assure him that his presence here is very welcome and that we have missed him. My noble friend Lord Drumalbyn asked me a direct question about the sovereign base areas. At the moment this is most certainly a hypothetical question. If Cyprus joined the European Community, a decision would have to be taken on the sovereign base areas, but before the people involved could benefit from Amendment No. 10 they would have to be declared to be United Kingdom nationals for European Community purposes. I am afraid that at this stage I cannot say whether or not that would happen.

My Lords, I wonder whether it would be convenient to the House if I were now to repeat a Statement being made in another place. If that is your Lordships' wish, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. The Statement is as follows:

"Mr. Speaker, with permission I should like to report to the House on the inquiry ordered by the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis into the conduct of the police operation which took place on 15th July in Railton Road, Brixton.

"The House will recall that the raid took place at a time of serious public disorders in which petrol bombs had been used. Acting on information that petrol bombs had been stored somewhere on the premises, police officers entered a number of houses to execute search warrants. Offences under the Licensing Act were also suspected. Allegations were subsequently made that the police caused unnecessary damage to property and personal effects. The commissioner immediately ordered a full inquiry.

"The inquiry was carried out on the commissioner's behalf by Deputy Assistant Commissioner Dear. I have now received a copy of his report which is both detailed and frank. I have placed in the Library a memorandum summarising his description of what took place and his main conclusions.

"He says that the information about petrol bombs came from a proven source and he concludes that the decision to mount a search operation was justified. He considers it significant that although no petrol bombs were found in the houses, a crate of bottles, with evidence of preparation for use as bombs, was subsequently found on waste ground beside one of the houses.

"Mr. Dear criticises some aspects of the execution of the raid, including the choice of a rendezvous point too close to Railton Road and the slowness of the build-up of the large force of officers involved, which undermined the secrecy of the operation. He also criticises some of the detailed arrangements for briefing the officers who took part.

"Damage was shown to have been caused by the police in gaining entry to and searching the premises. Mr. Dear found that for the most part this damage was unavoidable. In relation to two properties, complaints were made which have been investigated under Section 49 of the Police Act 1964. Reports of these investigations have been referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions.

"During the course of the inquiry there were a number of claims for compensation. A good many of these have already been settled. Some, however, were in Mr. Dear's view grossly exaggerated, and in two cases prosecutions for criminal deception have been started.

"It is important to appreciate the difficulties which the police had to face in Brixton, particularly at the time of this operation. During a period when riots were taking place it would have been wrong not to follow up information about petrol bombs; and we must recognise that if bombs had been found at the time reaction to the raid would have been different. In these circumstances I do not question the judgment of the police that a search should be made. Nevertheless, important lessons have been learned from the execution of the operation and the commissioner has assured me that these will be taken fully into account in the future."

That, my Lords, is the end of the Statement.

My Lords, this House is grateful to the noble Lord for repeating that Statement. The Statement relates to a very grave matter and it will not be possible at this stage to pass definitive opinions on the commissioner's report, until we have actually read through the document. My instructions are that up to 15 minutes ago, at any rate, the report was still not available, and so we shall have to examine it when it is.

We on this side of the House fully appreciate the difficulties which the police had to face in Brixton. I believe we are on common ground on all sides of the House, that far and away the greater part of the police force carry out their very difficult duties with complete legality and well within those rules and customs which prevail in the police forces throughout the United Kingdom.

This Statement, which reflects and is meant to reflect the attitude of the Government towards the report they have received, is, I find, a little alarming. The real allegation was originally that police caused unnecessary damage to property and personal effects. On listening to the Statement, we find that Mr. Dear criticised some aspects of the execution of the raid, including the choice of a rendevous point. He also criticised the detailed arrangements for briefing. But when it comes to the damage, the Government's Statement—and I will put it no higher—is a little odd. Instead of saying that part of the damage was in fact avoidable, the Statement shelters behind the claim that, for the most part, the damage was unavoidable; a rather quaint way of actually failing to be quite straightforward about the fact that some avoidable damage was in fact incurred. Nor does the Government Statement give any indication of the extent to which avoidable damage was incurred. The Statement says that "a good many" of the claims already made have been settled. How many does "a good many" mean? And what amounts in compensation have in fact been paid, that will enable this House to arrive at some conclusion as to the extent of the damage—and in particular, of the avoidable damage?

The Statement continued that, in Mr. Dear's view, some of the claims were "grossly exaggerated". How many claims were "grossly exaggerated", and how many claims were found to be supported by the facts? It is this kind of attitude towards the incident that fills us with a certain amount of unease. The Statement concluded by saying that "important lessons have been learned". My Lords, they can say that again! Would it not have been better, since this Statement reflects the Government's attitude, for some expression of regret to have come from the Government; that avoidable damage was caused, that in some cases (we do not know how many) there was a completely unjustifiable and violent intrusion into the private lives of individuals and families? And would it not have been better to have expressed some regret for that? There is nothing in the Government's Statement which expresses the Government's attitude, which contains any expression of regret.

I believe two lessons are important, aside from the lessons to which I have referred indirectly. The first is, that there is a need for the establishment of an independent complaints procedure. The second lesson to be learned is, that urgent attention ought to be paid by the Government to Part I of the Royal Commission's Report on Criminal Procedures. The whole House will expect that. I suspect that when the full import of the report is taken into account, and when the report of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, is published so that all can see it, public interest will have to be allayed, because public interest will be intense.

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, can answer three questions arising from this report? First, as it is impossible to ask meaningful questions on the conclusions reached by Mr Dear without reading his report, could not the noble Lord arrange for a copy of the full report, rather than a summary, to be placed in the Library? Secondly, can he assure the House that all the evidence considered by Mr Dear was made available to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, when he conducted his inquiry in a wider context? Thirdly, was Mr Dear's report made available to Lord Scarman before he completed his report? Does the noble Lord not appreciate that it is important that this report is available when the Scarman Report is published (and no doubt this House will wish to debate the matter) and that Mr Dear's report should also be available?

My Lords, may I first reply to the two noble Lords who have responded to the Statement. The noble Lord, Lord Bruce of Donington, expressed concern about the matter of damage and asked a series of questions which, I quite openly admit to the noble Lord, are not to be read in the Statement. This is because I think the answers to the noble Lord will be found in the memorandum which is being placed in the Library. Indeed, I think the noble Lord and all your Lordships will there find all the details which one would expect to find about the question of damage, because, firstly, in the memorandum the operation is itemised property by property. All the 11 properties which were searched are itemised in the memorandum, and there is a report there of the damage to each of those properties.

The noble Lord asked me how much damage there was, what was the position about compensation and for more information about the statement that many claims were grossly exaggerated. Contrary to reports that much more extensive damage was done by the police, Mr Dear's inquiry has revealed that the amount claimed for structural damage at all 11 houses was under £8,500, and most of these claims have already been settled for about half the amount claimed. In other cases the police are still trying to reach agreement, and where agreement is not possible claimants have been advised of their right to pursue their claims in court.

The noble Lord, Lord Hooson, asked me questions about the publication of Mr. Dear's report and about its relevance to the forthcoming report by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman. The report from Mr. Dear will not be published in full. It is well established that such reports, containing information that might be prejudicial to individuals, should remain confidential; and I know my right honourable friend hopes that both Houses will take the view that not only the Statement but the very full memorandum being placed in both Libraries will provide a great deal of information to Members of both Houses. Of course, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, visited Railton Road in July of this year. However, the operation as such was not within his terms of reference. As to what evidence he has taken regarding this particular matter, that is for the noble and learned Lord and his own discretion.

My Lords, may I revert to the question of damage and ask the noble Lord whether the full report contains any pictures of this damage about which so much criticism has been made, or, if there are no pictures in the report, whether his right honourable friend has seen any pictures? Will he not agree with me that while some damage is unavoidable when breaking into premises, when speed is the essence of the question and there are cupboards and doors to be broken down in quick time, it is extremely easy for young men with the adrenalin running, and realising that somebody may get hurt in the short time that they have to do the job, to do excessive damage? This, surely, could much best be now judged if photographs had been taken immediately. Perhaps this is one of the lessons that he says the police learned from the operation. Some effort might well be made to have a photographic unit included in a sensitive major operation of this kind in future.

My Lords, I think the simple factual answer to my noble friend is that I am not aware that photographs were included in Mr. Dear's report, but I certainly take on board the importance of what my noble friend says.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that many of us recognise that, with the suggestion that petrol bombs were being manufactured at a time such as that which existed a few months ago in Brixton, it was perfectly understandable that immediate action was called for from the police? But is he also aware that a number of us would prefer to reserve comment on this whole range of issues until the report of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, which will, I think, give us a much better opportunity to pronounce on this whole question? Lastly, we are of course in the difficulty of not having had the opportunity of looking at this memorandum, and we will presumably have that opportunity later this afternoon.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, for his understanding of the need for the raid which, as the Statement of my right honourable friend says, was in Mr. Dear's view justified, and in my right honourable friend's view justified. So far as concerns the forthcoming report from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, of course this still has to be completed and the time for comment will be when the report is published.

My Lords, can the noble Lord say whether any indication has been given anywhere as to the nature of the lessons that have been learned? Further, can he say whether any disciplinary action has followed from the report?

My Lords, there was a slow build-up of a very large number of men close to Railton Road. The slowness was largely the result of other police commitments at this very difficult time from a public order point of view; but it may well have given warning to the occupants of the premises and thus reduced the chances of finding evidence. The size of the task-force also accentuated the public impact when in the event no petrol bombs were found. Mr. Dear also refers to "confusion" over the briefing of officers. The commissioner accepts that there are lessons to be drawn from all these matters, and he has already taken action on them.

My Lords, could the noble Lord please tell the House what was the basis or the origins of the authority that allowed or permitted the police to act in the way they did?

My Lords, as the Statement of my right honourable friend says, the information came from what Mr. Dear considers was a proven source.

My Lords, I think the noble Lord has misunderstood what I meant. Under what authority did they act? For example, were there magistrates' warrants issued which permitted the police to break in; or on what other authority did they act in this way?

My Lords, on the authority of warrants, and the position about warrants is fully described in the memorandum which is in the Library.

My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he will beg his right honourable friend at least to express some regret that people's homes were vandalised in the way we saw in the pictures that appeared in the press? I am amazed, sitting here, that we have had a Statement about this matter but at no stage have we had an apology to the people who had their homes vandalised in this way. Because, my Lords, even if it was in the case of only one property that it was done in that way, unlawfully, that is still something about which the Home Secretary should apologise.

My Lords, both my right honourable friend and I, and indeed the police, of course, would very much regret any unnecessary damage, but I think the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, would like perhaps to read again the Statement, and certainly to read the memorandum, before jumping to conclusions.

My Lords, this is a second amendment related to Gibraltar, and I beg to move that this House agrees with the Commons in their Amendment No. 12. The broad effect of this amendment is the same as that of an amendment which we passed in your Lordships' House seeking to ensure that those registered under what we have come to know as the Gibraltar amendment are British citizens by descent. However, it is intended that the Gibraltar provision, as amended by the Commons, should appear after Clause 4 of the Bill instead of after Clause 9, as originally proposed. This change will, I understand, be made by the Public Bill Office.

This has affected Lords Amendment No. 29 (that is the amendment which we made on Report) in two ways. First, its place in Clause 13 has to be changed, since the subsections of that clause follow the sequence of the clauses in the Bill to which they relate. Secondly, the reference to the Gibraltar amendment in Lords Amendment No. 29 has to be altered so that it refers to that provision as amended in another place. My Lords, this really is an entirely technical matter. It does not in any way change the second Gibraltar amendment which we made in our proceedings. I beg to move.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 14 and their consequential amendments and, if I may speak to them, Amendments Nos. 15 to 105, Nos. 109 to 117, No. 120, No. 121 and No. 122. All these amendments follow from the amendment which was moved by my noble friend Lord Geddes on Third Reading to change one of the references to citizenship of the British dependent territories in the Bill to "British Dependent Territories' citizenship". Once that amendment had been agreed by your Lordships' House— and it was agreed—it was clearly desirable to change all other references to citizens or citizenship of the British dependent territories in the Bill to bring them into line.

Your Lordships will recall that I had my doubts about the feasibility of this course at so late a stage of the Bill. Accordingly, I suggested that it might be necessary to insert a provision which would have ensured that the term "citizen of the British dependent territories" and "British dependent territories' citizen" were interchangeable. I cannot say that I was thanked for that particular suggestion or, perhaps to put it in parliamentary language, many of your Lordships expressed concern about it.

I am very glad to be able to say that on looking at this again, we have found it feasible to change all the references and that is what these amendments do. I think I had better end on that and then, if I may stand up again, there is the question of apostrophes which come in. I should like to collect my thoughts.

My Lords, we on this side of the House warmly welcome what has been done by the Government and the industry which must necessarily have been applied; although I remember the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, saying that he had it already prepared. In any event, it is the case that the proposal that the Act should contain a provision of alternate meanings to the same word throughout reminds me of the writings in 1066 And All That where I think it read "for 'pheasant' read 'peasant' throughout", and it would not have been wholly acceptable. It was a suggestion met with praising with faint damns. I think it is a very useful thing to have been done and we approve of it.

My Lords, before going further on this I must inform the House that there is a series of misprints on the Marshalled List in this series of amendments moved by my noble friend. They are Amendments Nos. 50, 67, 73, 74, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98. Only half of these amendments have been printed and all should read "leave out 'citizenship of the British Dependent Territories' and insert 'British Dependent Territories' citizenship '.". I must apologise for this omission not only from the Marshalled List but from our presentation of the case.

My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend Lord Belstead and the Government for finding their way to bring in the necessary 98 consequential amendments. I know from the reports I have received how well that has been received in the dependent territories and how much they appreciate the effort that the Government have gone to. I should like to point out that Amendment No. 98 on the Marshalled List appears still to be defective.

My Lords, I should like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, on his initiative and persistence and I think everyone agrees that the result achieved is far better than in the original Bill. It was sensible for these amendments to be incorporated in all the places where reference is made to British dependent territories rather than simply leaving it, as was originally suggested by the Government, as a substitution in one place.

If I may ask the noble Lord the Minister to give me his attention, I asked what was intended to be a serious question on the last occasion when we were talking about Lord Geddes' amendment when, although the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, said that he had done the donkey work in going through every clause where this phrase occurs and that he was in a position to hand the Minister a list of them, the noble Lord clearly did not wish to rely entirely on Lord Geddes' industry but had to have it checked himself. I can understand that this was necessary; but I asked the noble Lord whether the Government did not have available to them the services of word processors. This was not meant to be frivolous. If such devices were available, it would be simple to go through the text of the Bill and to find every reference to this particular phrase and to replace it with an alternative phrase such as was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Geddes. As this is not the last occasion when your Lordships will wish to put in an amendment which occurs in several places in a Bill (although perhaps not on quite so large a scale) my question would be of great interest so that we can know in the future whether to accept a Minister's rejection of amendments at a late stage as being impracticable or whether we know that there are modern devices available to them to enable them to do the sort of thing suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Geddes.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, will have noticed from the consultations that were taking place on the Front Bench that we have not brought our word processor with us into this House. I must say although I should like to congratulate my noble friend Lord Geddes on this alteration that he has successfully made to the Bill, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, will not be correct and that there will not be several occasions in the future when we shall make a hundred or so amendments all at one go to a Bill. May I confirm to my noble friend that he is right in the point he put to me and that the point which he put will be correctly included as Amendment No. 98 in the corrections to which my noble friend Lord Skelmersdale referred.

My Lords, I hesitate to add another voice from the Liberal Benches in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, on the amendment that he has had accepted. As I come from a small nation, I should like to support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, said in regard to this matter because I was in Hong Kong in the early summer when these matters were discussed and I was asked to address the Reform Club of Hong Kong with its 25,000 members. When they met on their Annual General Meeting and I was invited to that meeting, I was surprised that there was a dinner party with over 1,000 Cantonese present. I was asked to speak. I followed a number of erudite people; my task was merely to propose a vote of thanks to the chairman and I did not know in what language I should speak. I spoke in Welsh and encouraged a thousand Cantonese to follow me in saying: "Jechid dda"—"Good health" in Welsh—to the chairman. In relation to the association between this area of Hong Kong and our country the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, has made a great contribution.

My Lords, may I also add my congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Geddes, and concur entirely with what has been said because there is no doubt that what I may call his brilliant stroke of genius, his very happy thought, will confirm to all concerned—to all the citizens of these territories—that they are British and bring it far more to their minds and keep it before their minds, which is what we believe they want.

May I also congratulate the Government on not only accepting this but in performing their task—perhaps not without blemish, but very nearly so. I have never seen an Order Paper such as the one we have today. It seems to me that my noble friend Lord Geddes has set the Government 100 lines! It is practically a 100 repetitions of the same correction. The Government have delivered their task on time.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their amendment to your Lordships' Amendment No. 35. This is consequential on my noble friend Lord Geddes' original amendment.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their amendments to your Lordships' Amendment No. 37. These are also consequential on Amendment No. 14. I beg to move.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their amendments to your Lordships' Amendment No. 43. It is consequential on Amendment No. 2, the amendment which dealt with Clause 6 in which the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, put an amendment into the Bill. I have already spoken to them.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their amendments to your Lordships' Amendment No. 47. These are consequential on Amendment No. 114. They are again "British Dependent Territories' citizen" amendments.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their amendments to your Lordships' Amendment No. 49. These are similarly consequential. I beg to move.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their amendment to your Lordships' Amendment No. 53. These are similarly consequential. I beg to move.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth not insist on its Amendment No. 118. The Commons have, as your Lordships will know, disagreed with this amendment for the reasons which are given on the Marshalled List. Of the 90 amendments which your Lordships sent to the Commons, this is the only one with which the Commons have disagreed in principle. I would ask your Lordships to bear in mind the acceptance by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary of all the other amendments, many important, which the House has made during the long stages of this Bill. Your Lordships may therefore wonder why my right honourable friend was not able to recommend acceptance of this amendment, and why another place disagreed with the amendment by a margin of 56 votes.

The reason given by the Commons on the Marshalled List for its disagreement goes to the heart of our objections. This amendment is intended to make the Secretary of State's discretionary decisions under this Bill subject to the courts whenever an unsuccessful applicant alleges that he has been discriminated against on grounds of race, colour or religion. The grounds for the Secretary of State's decision in sensitive naturalisation cases could thus be open to public scrunity whenever an applicant chose to allege discrimination.

In the national interest I really do think that this would be highly undesirable, particularly as there are other ways of taking forward allegations of discrimination. By far the most significant area where the Secretary of State is to exercise discretion under this Bill is naturalisation. The provisions for naturalisation set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill have been agreed by both Houses. They include good character, which needs to be assessed not on objective criteria, because that has not been the habit in this country, but on the basis of all relevant factors known to the Home Secretary. Now, my Lords, if the courts were to review a decision which it had been alleged had been taken on grounds of race, colour or religion, they might well find in certain cases that they were cases involving bad character, or even security.

As many of your Lordships, with your experience, will be very well aware, there would be particular difficulties where the Secretary of State proposed to refuse an applicant on security grounds. He would have to reckon with the possibility that the aggrieved applicant might allege discrimination, take his case to the courts, and try to secure there an investigation in public into the reasons for the decision. Even if such a case was heard in camera, the mere request for such a hearing would make the aggrieved applicant aware of the circumstances surrounding the refusal. Also, even in camera proceedings based on affidavits would be open to criticism unless the other side was aware of the Home Secretary's case. Thus security details would inevitably become known publicly. I am sure that your Lordships will agree that this would not be in the national interest.

For these reasons, my Lords, the Government share the views of the Commons that discretionary decisions under the Bill should not be subject to appeal or review in the court. This amendment, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, moved into the Bill in previous stages of the deliberations which we had, represents an incomplete appeals system which would nevertheless be very damaging indeed in naturalisation cases, although may I say I accept immediately that that was not in any way the intention of the noble and learned Lord.

May I go on to say that the Government understand full well the concern which prompted the noble and learned Lord to move the amendment, and the concern which lies behind the amendment. We accept that an applicant for citizenship at discretion, who believes that he or she has been discriminated against on grounds of race, colour or religion, should have some means of redress. But there are other avenues which we believe will meet the needs of those concerned. Such people will be able to take the matter up with Members of Parliament or with a Member of your Lordships' House. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary is responsible to Parliament in the exercise of his discretion under the Bill. He and his successors and those who work for them would be bound to take most seriously representations made to them by Members of Parliament to the effect that a particular decision had been taken on discriminatory grounds. It also seems inconceivable that an allegation that discretion had been exercised in a discriminatory way would not amount to a complaint of most serious maladministration. It would be alleged in effect that the Secretary of State, in exercising his discretion, had breached the very important principles set out in Clause 43 (1). In such circumstances, Parliament has its Commissioner for Administration (the Ombudsman) to investigate if the case is referred to him: and a very good thing too.

We consider therefore that there are already real remedies which are available to the unsuccessful applicant who considers that he or she has been the victim of discrimination. These remedies do not risk causing the considerable harm which we believe could flow from the power to review the Secretary of State's discretion in naturalisation cases which in our view would very probably result from this amendment.

My Lords, I hope your Lordships will agree that the Government had good reasons for asking the Commons to disagree with this amendment—alone out of the 90 which your Lordships made. We would not have taken so drastic a step at this late stage in the Session unless we really felt that there was very real cause for concern. I have attempted to set out those reasons today. I urge your Lordships in the strongest possible terms not to insist on your amendment.

My Lords, in one sense, as the lawyers would say, this is res adjudicata. It was decided by the House in Committee stage by a majority of 94 votes to 70 that this precise amendment should be introduced into the Bill. It was introduced and carried. The amendment was supported on all sides of the Committee and by distinguished lawyers in different parts of the House on the Conservative and Liberal Benches—I will not mention the Labour Benches lest I be thought guilty of immodesty. It received the approval of the Committee to a substantial degree. All the matters that have been raised by the noble Lord were then canvassed and considered, and considered responsibly. Therefore, I greatly hope that, as we are now dealing with precisely the same amendment, those who supported it previously will be inclined to maintain consistency in their approach.

It does of course raise important considerations. There are two subsections to Clause 43, as the House will know. The first subsection reads:

"Any discretion vested by or under this Act in the Secretary of State, a Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor shall be exercised without regard to the race, colour or religion of any person who may be affected by its exercise.".

That subsection was introduced in another place by the Government and it was introduced—so said the Minister of State, Mr. Raison, and I quote:

"to allay the fears of the minority communities".

There were such fears and I am afraid there are still such fears, and presumably therefore the Government intend and intended the clause to be effective, to have a purpose, to give to a person complaining that his application, say for naturalisation or registration—these discretionary powers run through the Bill—was dealt with with regard to his race and that there were racial factors affecting the determination of his application.

The second subsection provides that—

"The Secretary of State, a Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor … shall not be required to assign any reason for the grant or refusal of any application under this Act the decision on which is at his discretion;"—

so he does not have to give reasons: and then it goes on—

"… and the decision of the Secretary of State or a Governor or Lieutenant-Governor on any such application shall not be subject to appeal to, or review in, any court.".

So you have in the first subsection a solemn pronouncement that these discretionary powers shall be exercised in a certain way—that is to say without regard to race, et cetera—and in the second subsection a complete blockage on any attempt to challenge when in a given case an applicant can bring before the court evidence that there has been a racialist element in the discretion. The occasions on which that would be done would be very few and far between; I cannot imagine it happening under the present Home Secretary. But of course this is legislation for the future as well.

My submission is that as the clause would stand without the amendment in the second subsection inserting there

"subject to subsection (1) herein"—

the famous pronouncement that the power shall be exercised

"without regard to race, colour or religion"

is of merely cosmetic effect. Some of the most oppressive regimes in the world have great declarations of principles and rights, with no remedies and no redress. They are useless—indeed they are a mockery. I would not go so far as to say that this is a mockery, because of course the mere declaration has a certain limited value in itself. But, as they stand, subsections (1) and (2), as I see them and as others saw them in our earlier debates, are in conflict, and the purpose of the amendment is to ensure that subsection (1) should be made to prevail over subsection (2).

There could be a case where facts could be proved that there was an exercise of racial discrimination. On a very exceptional case somebody might be able to say that a future Secretary of State said: "Mr. X—that notorious black man? We could not have him naturalised or have the claim of his son registered." What is to happen there? Is all that is suggested is that he should raise it in the House of Commons? Unfortunately, admirable though Parliament is as an institution and admirable as is the Commons, where most of these complaints would apparently go, the parliamentary remedies are no real substitute for access to a court of law. It is very difficult publicly to give parliamentary answers and have debates about matters relating specifically to the position of individuals. There is no opportunity for cross-examination. Recourse to the Parliamentary Commissioner involves a complication, and again it is no substitute for the right of legal redress in an appropriate case.

Courts have a sense of public responsibility. They have the means in their procedures to protect state secrets. I have appeared in many cases, in the Old Bailey and elsewhere, where matters of enormous importance to the security of this country were involved and had to be ventilated in closed court. I have no record of any leakage or damage having been done to the security of the state, as a result of that procedure and that necessity.

During the debate in Committee, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville—and I hope he does not mind my quoting from him; I am sure he is unlikely to—said at column 696 of Hansard:

"I do not see any reason why the Government wish to object—if there is the rare and conceivable case where you have actual evidence that a discretionary decision has been taken to the detriment of somebody because of his race, colour or religion—that that matter should be precluded from being appealed.—"[28/7/81.]

I entirely agree and I venture to think that it was thinking on those lines that led the Committee to carry the amendment.

If anything, the need for the amendment to remain in the clause is possibly greater now than it was at the Committee stage, because we had not at that stage had the rejection by the Government of the attempt by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, to place modest limits on Clause 44(2), the ouster clause. His amendment did not over-ride the Secretary of State's ultimate discretion. It proposed a modest but useful limitation on unfettered discretion in the Secretary of State, and gave a right of appeal for the benefit of applicants for naturalisation, who were turned down because they failed to meet the requirements of residence, sufficient knowledge of language and a future intention to reside.

It gave a right of appeal to a committee of inquiry under the chairmanship of a judge, similar to that provided for in another part of the Bill and, indeed, similar to that which has functioned in immigration matters since 1948. But it was rejected by the Government. They have taken an absolute position of refusal to limit, even in clearly justiciable matters, the absolute ipse dixit of the Secretary of State. In this day and age when, increasingly, the court has been enabled to intervene in matters of natural justice, in matters of civil liberty, it is indeed dismaying that the Home Office should be taking this total, obstructive position in regard to this matter.

My Lords, the noble Lord the Minister said that there were reasons given by the Commons for disagreeing with the amendment, but in fact there is only one reason, and one reason only, and as he said, it is an important reason of principle. But it is here set out on the Marshalled List, because the Government believe and, as the noble Lord said, another place by a majority, believes, that discretionary decisions under the Act should not be subject to appeal to, or review in, the courts. That is a fundamental matter of principle, which now has to be resolved in the light of the arguments which have been put to us by the Minister.

The Minister has said that applicants can go to the courts at any time, if the words that your Lordships inserted are retained, because they will be able to allege discrimination even if there are no grounds for believing that that is the case. But we have heard two very distinguished legal authorities, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, this afternoon, and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, at Report stage, saying that they believe that these cases would be rare and that evidence would have to be adduced sufficient to enable the courts to take into consideration such an application.

I make the point in passing that, if a person were to seek to go to the courts on legal aid to challenge the Secretary of State's discretion in a matter of this kind, he would presumably have to obtain an opinion of learned counsel that there were sufficient grounds for doing so and this would not be given lightly. So I think that the picture that was given by the Minister, of many people frivolously taking cases to the courts on alleged grounds of discrimination, is a false one and should not be allowed to remain in the minds of your Lordships when we come to make a decision on this matter.

Secondly, I quite agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, that, if we had to consider only the attitude of the present Secretary of State, there would be no grounds for anxiety. But we are not legislating in this Bill only for future Secretaries of State. In this clause, we are also dealing with discretions which are exercised by governors or lieutenant-governors and I suggest that we really need some restriction on an unfettered right of discretion, which may be exercised by dozens of people of varying merit across the world. No doubt, most of the governors or lieutenant-governors who are appointed to these eminent positions are persons of the highest possible character, who would not dream of discriminating against an applicant on these grounds, but the possibility must be entertained that they might do so and the person concerned should have some remedy.

The noble Lord said that people already have a remedy; they can take their case to an MP or to a Peer who will, no doubt, raise it with the Home Office Minister. But do we need subsection (1) to enable the MP or the Peer to do that? Would they not find it part of their duty, whether or not such a clause was in the Bill, and does not the existence of subsection (1) imply something additional to the normal procedures which are adopted by Members of both Houses, in the case of complaints made to them by constituents or by any citizens?

The noble Lord said that the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration would be entitled to take into consideration an allegation of discrimination on grounds of race, colour or religion. Would the Parliamentary Commissioner have information available to him which is not granted to the courts? The noble Lord said that he does not think it would be sensible for the courts to have to look at information regarding character, and certainly not security. But are there not procedures in the courts which would enable sensitive information of this nature to be taken into consideration without its being given in public?

There was the recent case of Williams v. Home Office, where documents were disclosed to the courts and, for reasons of which your Lordships are aware, one of the solicitors acting in that case divulged those documents to a newspaper and was very heavily criticised for having done so. Therefore, do the courts not have sufficient protection, if information of this character is given to them, to prevent it from reaching newspapers or the general public, if the Secretary of State thinks that it is information of a nature which should not be divulged? No, my Lords, these are matters of very great importance and principle, and I think that, if the reassurance which the honourable gentleman, Mr. Timothy Raison said was provided in subsection (1) is to mean anything, it must be qualified in this way. I hope your Lordships will agree to retain the words which your Lordships put in so recently and which we have heard no reasons for taking out this afternoon.

My Lords, I wish to add to the debate only my feeling that the Government in their opposition to the amendment which we passed have lost all touch with reality. If the amendment which we passed can stay in this Bill, there really will not be any kind of embarrassment for Governments by claims being brought which have no merit in them. It is possible at the moment to bring an action against a Minister who has made a discretionary decision and it is possible to bring it if that decision has been made on discriminatory grounds in most areas of the law, but it is very, very difficult indeed to obtain proof or to mount such an action unless there are very solid grounds for the allegations which are being made.

You do not even get over the first hurdle if you simply come to court crying "racial discrimination". If you go for a declaration, you will have to give particulars of the facts which you rely on in support of your allegations. If not, you will be struck out. If you go for a judicial review, you have to put in your affidavit the basis of your claim. If there is no basis, you will not get leave from the court to bring the action. Therefore, the only actions which could be brought against an allegedly discriminatory exercise of a Government's or Minister's discretion are those which can be shown to have a prima facie foundation. Whether it is private money or legal aid money, no such action would be brought unless the advisers had the material upon which to make at least a prima facie case.

So there is no cause for alarm. The cause for alarm is the other way round: that if in the very rare case a prima facie case could be brought, the bitterness that would be felt by the person concerned and the whole of the minority community involved if action to the court were excluded would be intense and would be a mockery of the proud declaration that is in the first subsection of this clause.

My Lords, as one who spoke in support of the noble and learned Lord when he moved this amendment and as five Members of these Benches voted with the majority of this House in passing it. I must express my own regret that the Government are unwilling to sustain the decision of this House or to do what they have done in one or two other instances: to provide alternative amendments to meet the concern which has been expressed here.

We on these Benches supported this amendment because of our continuing concern throughout all the discussions about the anxieties and uncertainties which the Bill has caused among certain groups of our fellow citizens. We believe that this amendment would do much to reassure many of them that there would be a right of appeal on grounds of race, colour and religion. I feel that this amendment is still important. For that reason, I feel bound to join with those who wish to see it retained.

My Lords, I have done much heart-searching over this amendment, partly because it is natural to uphold the rights of people to appeal against a decision affecting them and partly because, as always, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has a magical and eloquent way of advancing his arguments—also because I hate having constantly to stand up and talk against the Lord Bishops. But speak against them I shall.

I have been struck by the seriousness of the remarks of my noble friend the Minister, and in supporting and I fear repeating a few of his words I am merely stating my reason for disagreeing with this amendment, for practical and security reasons. Both of the last speakers referred to the meaning of Clause 1 without Clause 2. Surely Clause 1 concerns the procedures leading up to the reaching of a decision whether to grant citizenship while Clause 2 consists of a challenge to that decision.

If somebody said that the Home Secretary had discriminated against him on grounds of colour, race or religion, the obvious reaction of the court would be to ask why he had been refused. In some cases it might of course he possible to give the reasons. In others it would surely be most inadvisable. I for one am not so naive as to believe that a person of bad character would be deterred by a refusal to grant him British nationality. I would argue that the more devious a person is the more plausible would be the case he would bring before any possible appeals court.

Then again, unless all those persons, be they judges or laymen, who might serve on the courts were required to sign the Official Secrets Act—and even then a slip of the tongue in public is certainly not unknown to me—the work of the Home Office could be greatly hindered, and unless those courts were in possession of classified information they would in certain cases be powerless and useless.

Persons who feel aggrieved by the Home Secretary's decision against their becoming British citizens by naturalisation have, as my noble friend the Minister said, the right to appeal to Members of Parliament. Indeed, they do so now. If there is a question of maladministration, a case can of course be brought for investigation by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration—in other words, the ombudsman. In either case publicity would arise out of people bringing their cases to those persons. So it would not be unknown for a person's case to be argued in private. Therefore, the avenues of appeal are not closed. Furthermore, in immigration matters there are extensive appeal rights and these, too, are often complemented by the large numbers of those who appeal to Ministers and to Members of Parliament.

Finally, if your Lordships did accept this amendment it would not enlarge the grounds of appeal. It will not enable any dissatisfied applicant to appeal against the decision because, unless the statute requires that the Minister states his reasons and goes on to say that those reasons will automatically be the subject of judicial review, there is nothing in the amendment that extends the grounds of appeal. I therefore earnestly hope that your Lordships will support the Government and will, if the House divides, vote against this amendment.

My Lords, may I suggest that the reasons given by the other place make very odd reading when set alongside the argument put forward by the noble Lord the Minister this afternoon? The other place put as their case against the amendment which your Lordships approved that discretionary decisions should not be subject to review in the courts. The argument of the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, this afternoon is that that is of no consequence because a discretionary decision under the Acts can be reviewed by the Parliamentary Commissioner.

Might I ask the noble Lord what it is that the Parliamentary Commissioner has which the courts have not? Why is the Parliamentary Commissioner regarded as a superior tribunal for investigating these matters compared with Her Majesty's judges sitting in camera? I suspect that there is very little answer to that question. The real answer is one which the noble Lord, Lord Belstead, might be a little reluctant to give, and it is this. He knows, I would suspect, perfectly well that under this section if your Lordships' amendment were removed there would, for practical purposes, be no right whatever of appeal to the Parliamentary Commissioner.

The reason for that is very simple. Throughout this Bill there is no obligation upon the Secretary of State, or a governor, or a lieutenant governor to give any reasons for any decision. And if there is no obligation to give such reasons, there is no way in which an aggrieved person could get an application on its feet in front of the Parliamentary Commissioner. He would turn down every application out of hand. I venture to suggest that talk about that alternative remedy is really talk about a subject which one appreciates would be totally ineffective.

The other alternative remedy the noble Lord puts forward is to say, "Well, of course, an aggrieved person can always go to his Member of Parliament". So he can; but it does rather postulate—does it not?—the existence of 650 Members of another place all passionately concerned with the rights of people aggrieved under this Bill. I think that is perhaps a trifle fanciful in the world of reality. I would suggest that without this amendment there is really no alternative and that this amendment is the only way of making enforceable Clause 43(1). Unless we insist on this amendment, Clause 43(1) will be nothing but a pious platitude; it would be totally unenforceable and ought to have no place whatever in any Act of Parliament.

My Lords, I ought to be in Antigua at the moment, but when I discovered what the other place had done, I thought my place should be here. Whatever may have been the Government's intention, the effect of this Bill will be discriminatory. There are three types of citizenship, of which only one carries the right of abode in any territory; that is British citizenship, which carries the right of abode in the United Kingdom. British dependent territory citizenship does not carry the right of abode in any territory; that right will depend on the immigration laws in that territory. British overseas citizenship carries no right of abode anywhere and is hardly what one would rightly call citizenship. The vast majority of the people who become British citizens will be white. Some of them will be people who do not live in this country, have never lived here and have no intention of living here. The vast majority of people with the two other citizenships will be black or brown. The Government claim that they are guided by the question of close connection with this country. It is right that a connection by descent should be regarded as a form of close connection, but it is wrong that an ancestral connection should be regarded as having a stronger claim than other kinds of close connection, which is really what is done in this Bill.

The abolition of jus soli and its replacement by a requirement that the person should have a parent who is a British citizen or settled in the United Kingdom will cause uncertainty among the black community, because they know that when they apply for a passport they will need to show that their parents were settled here when they were born or that they had registered as British citizens. And they also know from experience that they will be subjected to very strict examination before their right is conceded. The Home Secretary has discretion to register minors, reduce the period required for qualification or extend the period allowed for application for registration within certain limits, register women who are widowed or divorced, allow a person to renounce citizenship or to claim it again. He also has the power to deprive them of citizenship. Except for the deprivation, the Home Secretary need give no reason for any of his decisions. His discretion, his decision, shall not be subject to appeal to or review in any court. That is Clause 43(2). Commonwealth citizens who previously had, and some of whom still have, the right to register as British citizens will, after a period, lose that right. We lost that battle. They will need to apply for naturalisation. Naturalisation can be granted or rejected by the Home Secretary, without any right of appeal.

My Lords, I will confess that one of the reasons why I fought so hard to get safeguarded the youngsters' entitlement to registration is that some black youngsters have been convicted of being suspected persons, and there was always the danger of their being regarded as not having a good character when they applied for naturalisation. Your Lordships will appreciate what impact that would have. It was a serious matter, even though, as your Lordships know, people convicted of sus need not have committed any crime and may never have committed any crime. I was thinking not only of youngsters who would have no difficulty in regard to naturalisation: I was also thinking of those for whom there could be this handicap.

This is how the black community saw this Bill. Then we had the declaration in what is now Clause 43(1), which stated that the discretion shall be exercised without regard to the race, colour or religion of persons who may be affected by its exercise. That seemed to indicate that the Government were prepared to reassure the black community of their intentions, and we were all grateful. Then, in this House, we made that declaration meaningful by tying subsection (1) to subsection (2) and making subsection (2) subject to subsection (1). As I saw it, that meant—and my noble friend Lord Gifford has confirmed me in my point of view, because I am not a lawyer—that if someone felt that refusal of naturalisation was due to his race, colour or religion he could appeal to the court. Again, as I see it, he will have to prove the fact or establish a prima facie case before the Home Secretary will be called upon to answer. What he will have is the right to appeal to the court if he has evidence to suggest that he was discriminated against on grounds of race, colour or religion. I have never thought that anyone could sustain an appeal merely by saying "I am black". He would have to show that his race, colour or religion were the main ground or the only ground on which his naturalisation was refused.

I hope your Lordships will insist on retaining this amendment, because whatever good the Government did by inserting subsection (1) into the Bill, they are busily undermining it by their rejection of our amendment, because all they are doing is restoring all the fears that existed. In fact, it is worse than that. If we accept the decision of the Commons, the black community will believe that the Government intend the Home Secretary to be free to discriminate. That is what they will believe. I hope the Government understand what that would mean. Under the Immigration Act 1976 discrimination on grounds of race or colour is illegal already. The Government may well find themselves having to defend themselves before the courts under that Act, and may well discover that they have stirred up a hornet's nest by their refusal to accept this amendment.

I hope the Home Office is not unaware of its present problem with the Commission for Racial Equality over the alleged practice of racial discrimination in the immigration service. I can assure your Lordships that if the Government persist in their attitude there will be lots of challenges of that sort, because in effect the black community will be convinced that the reason why the Government and Parliament will not accept this amendment is because Parliament intends to agree that the Home Secretary should discriminate. They will therefore have to take appropriate action. Our amendment is of great value to the community, but it is also of great value to the Home Secretary, and I hope the Home Secretary and his advisers will understand that. My Lords, I implore you to stand firm.

My Lords, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Pitt, will forgive me if I do not follow him down those somewhat broad paths although I know he speaks with the utmost sincerity and conviction upon this matter. I should like to address the House for a moment because both my voice and my vote have been quoted on the Committee stage and I think I should explain why I am not going to be able to support my noble friends on the Front Bench this evening, although in fact I shall go away.

When I supported the noble and learned Lord and his amendment at the Committee stage the House will remember that, both then and on Report, I had tabled further amendments which were attempting to deal with the whole range of appealability of discretionary decisions by the Home Secretary and by the equivalent authorities in the islands and the dependent territories. I had hoped that the amendment we are now discussing was going to be the first in a series of amendments that would open up for the first time these discretionary decisions to some sort of appropriate type of appeal. It turned out that I was wrong because your Lordships rejected what I still maintain—and I am glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has said so again—was a modest compromise provision which I introduced at the Report stage.

My Lords, I am bitterly sorry that my noble friends on the Front Bench have not taken this opportunity of making appealable one area of government out of a very large number—one area of government which is comparatively isolated in being now still without any remedy in any form of court or tribunal against the whole tendency of legislative practice over the past 20 or 30 years. But I have one very considerable reservation about leaving this amendment in the Bill, and this alone.

I am interested to hear that my noble friend Lord Belstead is so sure that the way in which the courts would interpret Clause 43 (as it is for these purposes, with the amendment in it) is to provide the courts with the ability to look at cases where there was evidence of discrimination, and I am delighted to know that the Government are so sure that they know the way in which the courts are going to interpret this Bill. I believe I am not alone in your Lordships' House in thinking that there is by no means that clarity about the way in which the courts are going to interpret this provision—and indeed the provisions about the entitlement parts of the Home Secretary's jurisdiction.

If my noble friend is right, and that with this amendment the courts are to be able to review cases of discrimination, then I should have thought that it was almost inevitable that they would have to decide that even if the Secretary of State had acted in total excess of his jurisdiction, the ouster clause, as it would then stand, would make it quite impossible for him to look at any of the other reasons for the failure to grant a naturalisation on some grounds, such as residence or one of the factual matters that I raised in my amendment. I think that would be a mistake.

If we are going to leave this without any very evident jurisdiction for the courts to look at discretionary matters, let us leave it at large. Do not let us provide the courts with one method of review on a narrow ground (important though that may be) if, by doing so, we then remove from them any possibility of interpreting the Bill (difficult though it might be) so that they could also review the discretionary decision on other grounds as well. For the purposes of creating a muddle I would rather leave this amendment out so that the courts may look at the Bill without being directed in this direction on discrimination and against any power to look at the other reasons which went into a discretionary decision. Therefore I would prefer not to support directly my noble friends on this. With respect to them, I do not think that they have properly clarified what the courts are going to do, or should do, and what Parliament intended the courts to do.

I leave the subject with this: If subsection (1) is to mean anything at all it would have to be given some effect; if it is to be given some effect then the only effect that it can possibly be given by way of law—and it is part of the law—is to suggest that there may be some remedy in the courts, and if there is a suggestion that there may be some remedy in the courts because of that and upon those grounds, then there may be a broader remedy also. For those reasons I should prefer not to pinpoint the discrimination grounds as being the only ones upon which the court may intervene. I therefore find myself in a position in which I am bound to abstain.

My Lords, the House always has the greatest admiration for the speeches of the noble Viscount who has just sat down, not only because he has such a clear way of expressing his views but also (if I may say this as a humble colleague) of the way in which his expertise in the law is provided for the benefit of this House. Therefore, I find myself in difficulty in saying, in regard to the speech that he has just made, that for this House, with all its responsibility, to be invited to object to the amendment of my noble and learned friend, purely on the grounds presumably that the courts will not know which way to turn when it comes to the courts being asked to consider the provisions of this Bill, leaves me with the feeling that that is a view that will not find favour in this revising Chamber.

There is not the slightest doubt; there is the utmost confusion on the Government Benches as well here as in another place. Perhaps I may remind your Lordships in regard to this very serious matter what happened at the Committee stage in this House. There was a question put with his usual directness by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. In a very brief intervention, he asked this question:

"Is it clear beyond peradventure that some person who, rightly or wrongly, has had the Home Secretary's discretion exercised against an application of his and who alleges that there is here an element of discrimination on grounds of colour, race Or religion, could take this appeal to the court?"—(Official Report, 28/7/81; col. 696.)

There could not be a clearer question and it appears in the report of the Committee stage of this Bill in this House. Answering for the Government the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate answered in this way:

"My answer to that is that to some extent it must depend upon the circumstances. But in an application to the court to have the question determined, I should expect it to be argued in court that the protection afforded by the latter part of Clause 43(2) cannot apply to prevent review where it is suggested that the discretion which has been exercised is not a discretion which the Bill contemplates but something completely different."

In other words, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate was saying that he felt that such a review by the courts was by no means barred in a case where the applicant was saying that, indeed, he had been discriminated against on the ground of race, religion, or colour.

When this matter came before another place—and I am looking now at col. 788 of the House of Commons Official Report of 27th October—the Minister, the right honourable gentleman Mr. Raison, said:

"I am afraid that the amendment would still remain unacceptable to us. As I understand it, the intention, if not the effect, of the amendment is to ensure that an applicant who believes that he has been discriminated against on grounds of race, colour or religion, should not be barred from taking the matter up with the courts by the general bar on access to the courts in discretionary cases set out in Clause 43(2). But such a provision would, in our view, have serious drawbacks. It would mean that everyone whose application is refused would be able to challenge the Secretary of State's decision in the courts merely by alleging that he had been discriminated against on grounds of race, colour or religion ".

The two interpretations of the Bill as unamended by your Lordships' House are completely and absolutely different from the respective Front Benches in this House and in another place. Dare we leave this to the remarks of learned judges that Parliament, in the exercise of its wisdom in two Houses, has left this Bill in a state where one cannot even get help, as those who are advocating certain revisions of the interpretation of our laws have asked for, by looking at the Official Reports of this House and of another place when the Bill in question was being debated? If I may say so, we would leave ourselves in a position of ridicule at the hands of the Judiciary because we, as a legislature, have been lazy, indolent or muddle-minded.

I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, will forgive me if I look at her for one moment with eyes of admiration as always, and say that she really must fall under the spell of my noble and learned friend, because on the last occasion he spoke last in this matter and she thereupon followed him into the Division Lobby and supported him on precisely this amendment.

My Lords, I think that I might be allowed to reply on that point. I did begin by saying that I had thought long and hard about this whole matter. I think that that maybe explains the line that I have taken today. I should like to ask the noble Lord whether I am right in thinking that there is no right of appeal at the moment. Can the noble Lord answer that point before he sits down?

My Lords, I do not want to continue a debate with the noble Baroness. I merely say that I thought she saw the light on the road to Damascus last time; I think that she may have been blinded on another road on this occasion.

I want to end upon the following note. Not only, as I have said, would we be throwing confusion and, if I may say so, indignity into our deliberations if this amendment were not, in fact, supported once again by this House, but—and this is my plea to the House—we would be doing something serious to damage the image that we managed to get on the last occasion by saying to those who have alleged, rightly or wrongly, that this Bill is discriminatory from a racial point of view, that that is not so; that "The Lords in its wisdom put a right of appeal there where anything was being done which in your view was contrary to your interests in regard to nationality and citizenship, where you could properly allege and substantiate a case in the courts on the ground that you had been discriminated against on race, religion or colour". We have an opportunity of restoring confidence. Do not let us lose it by cowardice or mere party allegiance.

My Lords, I did not intend to speak, but I now find myself impelled to do so because there is great feeling among the Roman Catholic community about this matter. I should like to say very simply and with great respect to the noble and learned Lord and also to the noble Lord who spoke for the Liberals, that I see this as quite a simple problem. Subsection (1) says that there shall be no discrimination on grounds of race, colour or religion. That is a fact and it is laid down. The noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, who is my great friend and a fellow Roman Catholic, has said that, if we do not agree to this amendment to Clause 43(2), we are allowing discrimination to take place. We are not. When the Secretary of State or a Governor applies this law he must be bound by subsection (1). All that I am doing if I support the Government—which I shall do—is saying, "I trust the Government, the Secretary of State, to abide by subsection (1) and I do not need to have the additional check that there can be an appeal in the courts about it". The Government do not wish to have endless appeals in the courts because of the general implementation of all these matters. But in no way by going into the Lobby on behalf of the Government (if there is a Division) am I believing that there is any intention on the part of the Government to discriminate because this amendment is not inserted in subsection (2). I hope that my noble friend Lord Belstead will spell this out when he replies. I think that it is quite extraordinary that the noble Lord should be twisting it in this way.

My Lords, did not the noble Duke support the amendment in July when all these matters were canvassed and considered?

That is absolutely true, my Lords, I did, as the noble and learned Lord has said, do that in July. However, now it has been back to the other place and I see from what the Minister said there—and he was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon—that there are reasons that would mean that the whole matter would be opened up over and over again. I am prepared to trust the Secretary of State to administer the law of the land—Clause 43(1)—without having to have an appeal to the courts. If there is any question that the situation could go badly wrong, then we could always look at it again in this free country of ours.

My Lords, I had no intention to speak at all. However, it seems to me that Clause 43(1) states that discretion is vested in the Secretary of State so that he may exercise it against an applicant; but cannot do so on account of applicants' race, colour or religion. Why are those latter words put there? Obviously we all know that the present Secretary of State would never exercise his discretion with prejudice to race, colour or religion. But Parliament, when it passed subsection (1) must have foreseen that, human nature being what it is, it is possible that at some time in the future a Secretary of State may well, unless he is forbidden by the Act to do so, allow himself to exercise his discretion because of the race, colour and religion of the person who is applying for naturalisation.

The last three lines of subsection (2) say:

"… the decision of the Secretary of State … on any such application shall not be subject to appeal, or review in, any court".

This seems to me to be absurd. I cannot understand that in effect to knock out those words can do any harm at all. Nobody can appeal against or ask a court to review the way in which the discretion has been exercised. All that any man or woman could do is to bring substantial evidence before the court that the then Secretary of State, in action that he has taken, relied on his dislike of the race, colour or religion of the applicant. Unless the applicant has strong evidence, he would never have a chance of appealing or of getting a review in court. If he came to the court without strong evidence, the court would tell him to go away in no uncertain manner.

One day we may have a Secretary of State who is prejudiced and who accordingly refuses the applicant because of his colour, race or religion. It seems to me however that if the applicant had no strong evidence of the Home Secretary's prejudice the court would rightly throw out the applicant, without any loss in doing so. When an Act gives power—and this very strong power—to a Minister who abuses it, the court will support the appellant; and this has generally occurred during the last 20 or 30 years. If what I have suggested is correct, can we be doing any harm by eliminating the last three lines in subsection (2)? To my mind it would be a very sound thing to do.

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord would give way for one moment. I do not think that the House now has power to make any further amendments to the Bill. We are confined to discussing the precise question of whether the previous Lords amendment should stay, and, I fear, nothing else.

My Lords, I am perfectly prepared to put it that way, but it is not so easy. It seems to me shocking that a Bill should be passed in this way so that, however unfair a Secretary of State might be and however prejudiced he might be against the applicant, the applicant has to put up with it and the Secretary of State can do what he likes. It seems to me quite monstrous that if the applicant can bring strong evidence to show that the Minister has acted entirely on his dislike of the applicant's race, colour or religion and has therefore refused the application and the Minister has dismissed the applicant's appeal, this would be a shocking and most serious denial of justice.

My Lords, as I sought to make clear at the beginning of this afternoon's debate, the Government would be very concerned if your Lordships insisted on Amendment No. 118. I think that it is fair to claim, at the end of what must have seemed to many of your Lordships immensely long proceedings on this very lengthy Bill, that my right honourable friend has shown an open mind on the many amendments which your Lordships' House has proposed over the last three months or so. Indeed, noble Lords have been most generous—not least the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones in recognising, that constructive attitude of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary.

Therefore, before this afternoon's debate your Lordships must have wondered why it is that the Government have felt unable to accept this amendment. The reasons are straightforward and they are simple. The provision that discretionary decisions in this Bill should be exercised without regard to race, colour or religion was put into the Bill in Committee in another place by the Government, incidentally supported by the votes of the Opposition in that Committee.

Of course, my Lords.

My Lords, on that occasion it was explained quite clearly, so that there was no misunderstanding, that this Bill was meant to be simply a declaration, but a declaration which would have very great advantages.

First and foremost—and I say this particularly to my noble friend the Duke of Norfolk, who I felt wanted the advantages spelt out by the Government—this declaration would give to those people coming to this country a symbol of reassurance, and it would remind all of us of the innate sense of fairness, which I hope that our country will always retain. My honourable friend the Minister of State, Mr. Raison, gave an assurance on that occasion that this statement would be embodied in the instructions which were given to officials handling cases in the Home Office. The declaration would be a signpost which would guide both the Parliamentary Commissioner, when he might inquire into cases, and Members of both Houses when they take up cases; of course, if either the Ombudsman or a Member of either House were to be concerned and it became evident that a decision had been taken contrary to this declaration, the matter would, of course, be pursued on behalf of the applicant.

The noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, asked why the Parliamentary Commissioner was better in these particular circumstances than a court of law. It is because the Parliamentary Commissioner is the servant of Parliament. He would have access—as, indeed, he showed not all that long ago in a naturalisation case—to the Home Secretary's reasons and be able to delve, but in a way which would avoid undesirable public disclosure. This is not, so I understand, to say that our law is so inflexible—which is the impression I rather have this afternoon speaking as a layman—that if a decision is blatantly discriminatory it cannot be reviewed by the court. I understand—

My Lords, may I—

I think I have listened long this afternoon. Let me give way in a moment. This is not to say that if a decision was blatantly discriminatory it could not be reviewed by the court, and I understand there are precedents for this. But this is different from Lord Elwyn-Jones's amendment, which seems to envisage applicants being able to take allegations which could be wholly unsubstantiated to the courts in the hope that in what could be very sensitive security cases, or character cases, all the reasons would be reviewed.

My Lords, the noble Lord again refers to the role of the Parliamentary Commissioner. Does he mean that in spite of the fact that Clause 43(2) says:

"The Secretary of State … shall not be required to assign any reason for the grant or refusal of any application …".

that nevertheless, when the Parliamentary Commissioner looks into a complaint, that the Secretary of State will in fact give him the reasons for any refusal notwithstanding the provisions of Clause 43(2)?

My Lords, I would have thought that the noble Lord, who takes such an interest in these matters, would have noticed the last case in which the Parliamentary Commissioner looked precisely into a naturalisation case. The Parliamentary Commissioner in that particular case made it quite clear that the reasons of the Home Office had been explained to him, and in the light of that report and other evidence available to the Home Office the Parliamentary Commissioner said, "I consider that they were reasons which the Home Office was entitled to take into account". I think that that is an effective remedy, but it is an effective remedy because we have the ombudsman and because he is a servant of Parliament.

I was also interested in the intervention of my noble friend Lord Colville. My noble friend, with characteristic honesty, resiled in no way from the consistent and honourable position which he has taken up throughout this Bill in favour of appeals generally. Indeed, we have gone some way, I like to think, to try to meet the points my noble friend has clearly made. But this afternoon, as I understood my noble friend, he argued that by pinpointing discrimination in this particular way under this amendment the courts would be inhibited possibly from looking at other cases. That may, or may not be. As a mere layman I certainly do not know. All I can do is listen to my noble friend. All I can do is to read the proceedings which went on in another place. There I noticed that the right honourable gentleman, Mr. Peter Archer, a former law officer, delivered himself of the view that the courts would be able to go into the real reasons for refusals in discretionary cases, but it might be necessary to hear them in camera.

Another distinguished lawyer, Mr. Greville Janner, from the Opposition Benches, simply welcomed the prospect of the courts being able to review real reasons for decisions without making any mention at all of them being in camera, if Lord Elwyn-Jones's amendment was to stay. Finally, the honourable gentleman, Mr. Douglas Hogg, delivered himself of the view that Lord Elwyn-Jones's amendment would not have any effect at all. If the noble and learned Lord will forgive me saying so, the effect of this particular amendment is obscure, but we believe on the Government Front Bench that the effect will be that it could be very damaging so far as naturalisation cases are concerned.

If I may, I shall finish by explaining why. The question of whether discretionary decisions in this Bill should be subject to appeal is a matter which was debated and decided in another place, and then was debated twice by your Lordships' House, both times on amendments moved by my noble friend Lord Colville. On the second occasion your Lordships decided that it would not be wise to make discretionary cases appealable. The reason for your Lordships' decision lay in the nature of naturalisation.

Throughout our proceedings on this Bill your Lordships have shown great concern about the rights of people to have their cases heard by the courts, and the Government really have done their best to respond. Through amendments which we have made on report we have made it as clear as we possibly can that where a person claims an entitlement under this Bill that claim should be reviewed by a court. We cut out references to the Secretary of State being satisfied, and we put in subsection (3) of this clause which says:

"Nothing in this section affects the jurisdiction of any court to entertain proceedings of any description concerning the rights of any person under any provision of this Act".

But when we came to naturalisation your Lordships agreed that the traditional practice of the Home Secretary having to be ultimately responsible was the right one in the national interest.

Having listened to your Lordships' debates, I realise that this is not the way that some people would have it. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has consistently made clear his wish to have objective criteria which would be fought out in court: not a thing which has been done in this country for 140 years so far as naturalisation is concerned. In another place the right honourable gentleman, Mr. Hattersley, put it even more starkly.

"The new Nationality Act which must be introduced in the future,"

the right honourable gentleman said, in another place on Tuesday,

"must include an appeals system preceded by an explanation of why an application has been refused".

That expression of view, and this amendment, would lead directly towards that result in naturalisation cases.

My right honourable friend has given an assurance in another place that wherever possible reasons will be given if naturalisation has to be refused, not least to help an applicant who may have a second and a successful opportunity to apply, but to open up all naturalisation cases, including character and security cases, to judicial review I think would be absolutely disastrous. This could well be the consequence of this amendment, for on an allegation that a decision had been taken by discriminating on grounds of race, colour or religion, all the circumstances could have to be argued in open court. Surely that cannot be the intention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, but it could be the effect of this amendment. I ask your Lordships to beware of going down this road, and on this occasion not to insist on this amendment.

My Lords, I beg to move that this House doth agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 121 and 122 to the Lords Amendment No. 120. Amendments Nos. 121 and 122 are consequential on No. 14.

rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 19th October be approved.

My Lords, I have the feeling that the noble Lord the Minister, with whom I have had a number of friendly tussles across the Chamber, is not quite as relaxed and at his usual affable ease tonight as he is usually. The reason for that is quite simple. The poor man is having to argue an absolutely impossible and awful case. It is very unlike him, if he wants a political punch up, and so let us get rid of that idea first before discussing what has really happened and what is happening now.

The noble Lord referred to my honourable friend in another place, Mr. Kaufman, and his threats that the Opposition would repeal shortholds when they came back into power. What was said at that time, through the passage of the Bill which became the Housing Act 1980, was that if the safeguards which were asked for regarding shorthold were given by the Government and kept, then this would certainly be a very strong consideration. It was also pointed out then—and pointed out the other night—that the Government incorporated only a few of the safeguards which were in the original Private Members' Bill which Sir Brandon Rhys Williams and other Conservative MPs supported. The Government went even further and did not put the man who was the father of this infant, which is now being strangled at birth, on the Select Committee which was considering this matter in another place.

It is really quite extraordinary—I say this quite seriously—to base the case for this order and for taking what are really draconian powers, which I agree were inserted in the original Act, on blaming the Labour Party and the Opposition for the failure of landlords to take up shorthold. If it were not so ludicrous it would be quite sad. We are reminded on many occasions that, unfortunately, we have been in a state of internecine warfare for some time. One of the "beefs" which many of us in the party have is that not enough time has been spent on dealing with exactly the policy measures which the Minister is talking about. So let us just get that out of the way.

I am sure that some of my colleagues will feel amazed, and perhaps even a little puffed up with pride, to feel that what the Labour Party says in Opposition can really lead to something like this order being put before us tonight. I should like to take noble Lords back for a moment to what really did happen. They may remember that we had a long struggle over short-holds in this House. Indeed, when I moved that the relevant clause should not stand part of the Bill (at that time it was Clause 51 and now it is Section 2) the voting, I am sure the Minister will remember, was 99 in favour of the clause and 91 against. There was a minute majority of eight in favour of including shortholds in the Bill. The disquiet expressed on all sides of the House was quite tremendous. The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, said that he faced a tremendous dichotomy over this. In the end he abstained on the basis that he thought that the Government would find some way of introducing even further security into shortholds. One of the reasons why shorthold was accepted, even by this very small majority, was that an amendment was introduced earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin. This all took place on 2nd July 1980.

If I may remind the noble Lord, when he introduced the amendment to make fair rents registration compulsory he said, and I quote from the Official Report (col. 351):

"This amendment ensures that the fair rent will apply from the onset of the tenancy".

He went on to say:

"At present the Bill requires that the registration of a fair rent is applied for within 28 days of the tenancy commencing. Although this in itself is a unique protection for the tenant, the point has been made in another place that there will be no fair rent until the rent is registreed by the rent officer—perhaps three months after the tenant moves in. Our amendment bridges this gap".

This enabled the Minister to say on the same day, during the debate over whether the clause should stand part, when referring to the considerable amount of alarmist talk about shorthold, that there were important shortholds safeguards and that:

"A fair rent must be registered for a letting to be a shorthold. Compulsory rent registration has never been a feature of any previous Rent Act legislation, and thus the proposal provides an entirely new safeguard for tenants … the Bill now ensures that the tenant will pay no more than the fair rent right from the start of the shorthold".

In view of what the Minister has said when he pointed to the Rent Acts when this was not introduced, perhaps I may point out that he was referring to the fact that there, security was built in, but here we are dealing with shortholds where there is not complete and entire security for the tenant. Grave anxiety was also expressed in this House about reserve powers given to the Secretary of State to alter this rule. Indeed, because of pressure not only from the Opposition, but also from the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, and the noble Lord, Lord Foot, as well as from my own noble friends the Government came back at Report stage and made the order subject to affirmative rather than negative resolution. Now less than a year after the introduction of shortholds the Government have swept away not only the compulsory fair rent registra- tion but also the requirement that registration of a fair rent is applied for within 28 days of commencement of tenancy—although the Minister had described this as "a unique protection for the tenant". Circumstances have not changed. Why did the Government include compulsion in the first place but discard it now when obviously it was included as a necessary safeguard for the tenant? No reason has been given except that the Labour Party has spoilt it all for the Government.

The Government have an overall majority in the other place. The Government are running local authorities with the most severe draconian powers. The Government pride themselves on being a very tough, inflexible and rigid Government when it comes to the economy and almost everything else. Yet here the Government are so frightened by the Labour Opposition, and goodness knows that we have enough problems of our own, that they say, "This is the end of shorthold. This is what is stopping the landlords coming forward".

There has been no proper research, and no evidence has been brought forward. It really is (I am trying to find a polite word that will not upset the bishop) a disgrace and, in fact, an insult to this House and to Parliament. No reason has been given, apart from those I have mentioned, which were just nonsensical, except that the Government have a hunch that more shortholds will come on the market as the landlords' ante is put up. What a way to legislate; what a disgraceful U-turn; what contemptuous use of the reserve powers, and what a way to treat this House!

The reluctance of the House as expressed in the vote was concern for tenants. How, then, can we be expected to throw that concern out of the parliamentary window when the Government assured us so strongly and so often in both Houses that the tenant was amply protected and was going to remain protected? It is absolutely disgraceful that a Government should break their word so irresponsibly without any viable reason. The phoney explanation that this will not really affect tenants' rights just does not stand up. If the reason is to persuade landlords to let on shorthold, the incentive must therefore be that there will not be a fair rent. If it does not have an effect on tenants' rights, as the Government protest—and they protest much too hard about this—then where is the incentive to the landlords?

This is not to mean that landlords are all bad. Of course they are not; it would be ridiculous to say that. I am merely pre-empting the Minister, so that when he comes to reply he does not say that I am only against the landlords. But what the Government have done is to give landlords power over their tenants. Not all landlords are good, any more than all tenants are good. Also, landlords are human, as other people are, and many landlords, if offered the chance to "make a quick back", will take it, as people will in other spheres or in things with which they are connected.

So what this means in practice is that the landlord has now been given the power of blackmail over the tenant. First of all, if the tenant comes in, as he will have to now, without a rent being registered, he can say this to the tenant. I understand that it can take up to six months, in fact, to get a rent registered, so the landlord will be able to say to the tenant—otherwise, there does not seem to be much purpose in doing this—"We will agree a rent". It may be higher than the tenant wants, but if you are homeless you really have to afford almost anything to get a roof over your head, which is the first necessity for human beings. Then the landlord will be able to say, "If you continue to pay that rent, then at the end of the year", which is the first point at which the landlord can give notice to the tenant, "you can stay on. But if you start going round and getting a fair rent registered, then I do not want to see you again after the end of the year". In addition to having to pay over the odds, perhaps, in many cases, the tenant will also have to pay a deposit, which, of course, would be much higher than the deposit if a fair rent was registered.

The Minister made great play about empty properties, and, of course, it is absolutely true that no one wants to see properties kept empty. It upsets me just as much as it does the Minister when I see houses boarded up, whether they are boarded up and kept empty by local authorities or by private landlords. There is, however, no way of knowing that the properties that are being used are from this source or from other sources. All I would say is that the trends show that wherever it is possible a landlord would prefer to sell his property rather than to let it on shorthold, or use it in any other way. The figure for empty properties that was floated around at one point of about half a million is quite nonsense. It is a very wide margin, I know, but it has been estimated that the number of empty properties ranges between 8,000 and 50,000.

The decline in the private rented sector is historic, as the Minister knows well. It has been declining (even when the controls were lifted at one point) almost since the beginning of this century. Short-holds increase the incentive to sell through more frequent opportunities; and, again, there is no reason why people should not buy their own homes. In fact, I am absolutely in favour of it if they can; but what is needed is a long-term housing strategy. We all know—and it would be stupid to deny this—that the future of rented property, particularly for lower-income groups, must lie with housing associations and with local authorities, with proper security. With local authority "starts" likely to be not even 27,000 this year but around 20,000, and with the construction industry in one of the deepest depressions it has ever been in, with higher unemployment than in any other industry, it does not look a very rosy housing future for those who are in need of a home.

The myth that shortholds would help young, single people has also now been exploded, and, again, that was something which was pressed upon us. I would say immediately that anything that would help the young singles to find somewhere to live, as well as families, is very important. Although they might not have had security beyond a year before this order was laid before us, they would have had a fair rent registered for that time. But now they are in a position, which has been set out by the National Union of Students (I am sure the Minister has seen it as well as I have), where there is not only difficulty in getting accommodation but where, even if they were fortnuate enough to get a shorthold, they would find that the rent was probably far beyond their means and certainly beyond the grant, or even a rent allowance if they were entitled to it.

Then there is the problem of rent allowances. The DHSS allows only up to fair rent levels. There can be exceptions in some cases—assured tenancies and one or two other cases—but the shorthold is not one of these; and one sees a completely non-political body like the Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux desperately worried about this because they see, as all of us do, the delay between the date of application and the date of registration which will result from this order, and the fear of the termination of a tenancy at the end of the minimum period of shorthold. They are very concerned about homelessness among the people who come regularly to see them, and they really have their ears and eyes to the ground and know what is going on in these areas of want.

Increased homelessness will add more to waiting-lists and also to human misery. The organisations most concerned with housing are extremely worried. The Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the AMA, are worried because of the effect on local authorities. They can see that people who may have had a chance to take a shorthold when the fair rent had to be registered, because that was some security or safeguard to them, will now be descending on the local authorities, who are having their money cut anyhow by the Government and whose housing programmes have been cut as well. The Association of District Councils has not yet discussed this; and all the voluntary housing organisations like Shelter, CHAR, SHAC, are horrified by this. So far as I can gather, there has been no consultation or indication of previous intention given to them about it, except that they knew of the Secretary of State's reserved powers in the Bill.

At the moment this does not apply to London. In the debate in another place the Member for Paddington, Mr. John Wheeler, said in his speech that he supported the Government very reluctantly even when the situation being discussed was outside London, but he gave notice that he certainly would not be able to support the Government as a good Tory Member if in fact this happened in London. I should like the Minister to give an assurance that London will not be mopped up in the reserve power; alternatively, to let me know why London was left out; or to tell me what the position is with regard to London. I should like him also to tell me whether this is the start of a complete erosion of fair rents and the introduction of a glorious free-for-all. This is complete decontrol across the board, but it is not glorious for those who cannot afford it. This is so squalid that I find it difficult to find words to describe it.

I must be more naive than I thought, but, quite honestly, in July 1980 when that safeguard was put into the Bill in this House and when the Minister reiterated it in the debate on shorthold I was convinced that the Government meant what they said. The idea did not occur to me that in barely less than a year an order of this kind would be brought forward. I innocently thought—and this is the way in which it was described in another place by Mr. Geoffrey Finsberg—that it might be possible when circumstances change to lift the compulsion; but this was all seen and understood in the context of security for tenants and probably an increase in housing generally. I can only say, finally, that I hope that by 1984, or preferably before, we shall see the end of this Government's shorthold.

My Lords, may I intervene briefly in what for a time, during the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, sounded like a private quarrel between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party about the virtues of private landlords. I should remind the House that we are not debating the wholly academic question of what a future, hypothetical Labour Government would or would not do about the Housing Act and shorthold tenancies.

The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, began his speech by talking about this; but this is not what we are discussing. What we are discussing is an order which puts at nought an amendment to the Housing Act moved by the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, himself, and carried in this House—an amendment which Lord Bellwin commended to us in the most glowing terms, terms which the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, has repeated. He said that this amendment provided another important safeguard for the tenant under the Government's shorthold proposals. The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, quoted more of the noble Lord's words about this amendment. Never have I seen anybody swallow his words with such apparent satisfaction and, as a doctor, I feel that by now the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, ought to be showing some signs of indigestion; because here was an amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, told us provided vital and important new safeguards with regard to shorthold tenancies. This House carried that amendment and now we have an order which virtually puts that amendment at nought.

I am bound to say that I do not wholly take the same view as noble Lords on the Opposition Benches with regard to shorthold tenancies. I do not take the view—and I know that the noble Baroness does not take that view either—that it is better to have places empty than to have them let on shorthold tenancies. My noble friends and I on these Benches believe that if there are ways of facilitating shorthold tenancies, that is undoubtedly to the benefit of many homeless people, provided that there are certain safeguards. The amendment which this House brought in in July 1980 provided one of those important safeguards. The order that we are now asked to approve removes that safeguard, a safeguard whereby, before a shorthold tenancy comences, the tenancy had to be registered and a fair rent fixed.

I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, will tell us that after the passing of this order, if this order is passed, there will be nothing to prevent the tenant from going forward at a later stage to the rent officer and having a fair rent fixed. There is nothing to prevent that and he will be able to do it. But when one considers tenancies in general, the only real protection for a tenant who is in dispute with a landlord about rent is security of tenure; and security of tenure is precisely what the shorthold tenant, by definition, does not have. Therefore, the shorthold tenant will not go along at a later stage to have a fair rent fixed; he will merely leave things.

The noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, asked what possible advantage there could be to the landlord to terminate a tenancy at an earlier stage, say, at the end of 12 months; because the rent would be registered and it would have to be the same rent for a new tenant. That is not the case; because the tenant will not have taken those steps and the rent will not have been registered. The whole business will have been neutralised by the uncertainty which surrounds shorthold tenancies. I feel it regrettable that we are asked to pass an order which virtually negatives a very helpful amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, commended to us when he introduced it previously.

He will also tell us, I know, that we are leaving out London, for necessary and obvious reasons; but the reasons which apply to London surely apply to Merseyside and perhaps to Greater Manchester. I know we are not dealing with many shorthold tenancies, but 92 per cent. of them are outside London and yet London is being excluded. The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, went into detail about the various parties concerned.

Before I sit down, I, personally, would merely say that I am concerned about one category of people who could potentially benefit from shorthold tenancies, if the holding of those shorthold tenancies is facilitated by the Housing Act in the way we had in mind when we passed that amendment. I refer to students. I am concerned about the situation of students, not just in London, but in many universities and many cities. Many are in desperate difficulties with regard to tenancies in multiple occupation for very high rents. I do not believe that students are the people who are going to go forward at a later date to have a fair rent registered. If we had this provision which this House so wisely inserted into the Act, whereby a fair rent would be registered at the commencement of the tenancy, then I think that that would have improved things. Now we are leaving a group of people, perhaps not of the type that are necessarily going to take active steps at an early stage of their tenancy, when they feel very insecure by the nature of their circumstances, to register a fair rent. I think that they will leave things as they were. Therefore, many objections which many noble Lords in the Labour Party have towards shorthold tenancies as a whole become intensified and more real with the passing of this order than they would have done had we left the Act as amended by this House.

It is extremely unusual for the noble Lords here to vote against an order. I think that, in general, we believe it to be inappropriate, when an order is laid, that we should vote against it. But in this case, when the order has the effect of putting at nought an important amendment to the Housing Act which was carried in this House, and carried with various undertakings given by the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, who is now asking us to pass this order, I am bound to say that had the noble Baroness decided that she would ask her cohorts to go into the Lobbies to vote against this order, then I myself would have done my best to persuade my noble friends to follow her.

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, may I say that the reason why I did not ask my noble friends to go into the Lobbies was not because I was convinced by what the Minister had said, but because of the arrangements existing in this House. Reluctantly, I have had to accept the pressure on me. I am sad about that and I detest it.

My Lords, I had intended asking a question of the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, before she sat down. However, unfortunately the noble Lord, Lord Winstanley, is a much fitter parliamentarian than I am and he beat me to the "draw" and was on his feet very much faster. As the noble Baroness is not in a position to reply to my question, I shall address it instead in a slightly different form to my noble friend Lord Bellwin. Would be confirm that a tenant who is aggrieved at the amount of rent on a property is able himself to apply for a fair rent to be registered? Would he also confirm—

My Lords, would my noble friend repeat the question, if he would not mind?

I am sorry, I did not hear the noble Lord.

Would my noble friend repeat the question?

My Lords, my question is: Would my noble friend confirm that where a tenant is not satisfied with the rent that he is paying or has to pay, that the tenant is in a position to apply for a fair rent to be registered? Would he further confirm that from the time of an application for the registration of a fair rent the normal period is about eight weeks and not the six months, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk?

The noble Baroness also mentioned that higher rents would put up the size of deposit that tenants would have to pay. It has always been my understanding that any deposit paid towards rent counts as rent paid in advance and therefore a tenant can take that into account when making future payments. The size of deposit would only be towards any damage or something of this kind to a property. I wonder whether my noble friend could confirm that this is also the case? Otherwise I feel that the position may be slightly misleading.

My Lords, I feel angry tonight, not only at the content of the measure that is before us, but at the means which is being used to put it through. This is an order being put through at the "fag end" of a parliamentary Session in a virtually empty House, with no possibility of our being able to amend it, with very little notice and precious little opportunity for public debate. The content of the measure that we are debating is in practical terms in the nature of its effect nothing less than the effective de-control of rents in the private rented sector outside London.

Let me make that argument good by reference to the kinds of situation which will happen after the passing of this order. The vast majority of people who will answer advertisements and who will take up tenancies in the future will be those who are looking for a long term or an indefinite term residence. There is we know, a desperate shortage of housing, not only in London but in many cities. No landlord in his economic senses from now on will offer anything but a shorthold and he will offer one at the so-called market rent with all the scarcity element included in that, which will be rents which people will find enormous difficulty in affording. Those will be the terms on which one-year shortholds will be agreed.

The person who needs to live in that property for a long term or an indefinite term will of course not apply to a rent officer to register the rent because that person will thereby forfeit any hope of a renewal of the shorthold. Most landlords who let property want to let it for so long as they can get a rent which satisfies their economic demands. In the majority of cases these are not houses which are only being let for a short term; they are being let for so long as an exorbitant rent can be obtained from them. Therefore, the situation will appertain that used to appertain in the furnished rented sector; that is, although there was in theory a provision for the fixing of a rent which would he a reasonable rent—it was not quite the fair rent system but was in practice equivalent—it was hardly ever used because the people who were advised that they could use it were also advised that there could then be a notice to quit served with a six months' extension of security at the most and they would probably be out of their property within about nine months, which is exactly the kind of time scale we are thinking of with a one-year shorthold tenancy.

That is why I say that in practice there will be very few applications for fair rents. In practice, all new lettings, whether to short-term or long-term occupants, will in fact be unprotected shortholds. Some people of course actually only want a one year letting, although they will be very few in number. Even in their case the protection of a fair rent is of very limited value because of course in the Housing Act, against fierce opposition from these and the Liberal Benches, a change was made which meant that the registered rent would only become effective from the date of registration and not as previously happened from the date of application.

I am quite sure that if we had been told last year that the Government was set on a system of shortholds without the protection of a previously registered rent, and there was no way of changing that intention, we would have at least fought tooth and nail to get an amendment which said: if there was an application for a fair rent it would be effective from the date of application. As it will be, the person wanting a year's letting who applies for a fair rent in the first months will then enter a protracted war with his landlord—the landlord seeking by all means to defer the registration of the rent for so long as possible and the tenant seeking to accelerate it. We have been informed I think by the Association of Municipal Authorities that the time spent can be up to six months and then an astute landlord, wanting to have adjournments and take points of law, could extend that for a longer period still.

Whether it is a short term or longer term affair there will be no benefit from the notional theoretical residual protection of the Rent Acts which the noble Lord is relying on. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bellwin, will probably rejoin that there is a housing shortage and that there are disincentives to let properties and there are empty houses unlet. There are all sorts of ways of dealing with properties that remain unlet. We have debated them in the past and we can debate them in the future. The one answer not to provide for the problem of unlet properties is to provide a charter for the exploitation of tenants.

The position of someone at the bottom end of the economic scale, one of the many millions of people who are on supplementary benefit, will be even the most precarious of all. Those on supplementary benefit who are going to be in a shorthold paying a market rent will be told on the one hand in effect by the landlord that if they register the rent they will not get a renewal of their shorthold; on the other hand, they will be told by the supplementary benefits office that if they do not register the rent they will not get the full rent allowance provided by the supplementary benefits scheme. That kind of dilemma will be one which will be bitter and which will be impoverishing and which has not been thought of by the Government when they think of introducing a scheme like this at a time of great unemployment and economic recession.

My Lords, I think that it is time that somebody other than the Minister rose to welcome this order. This I gladly do. However, what a tragedy from the point of view of those who have been looking for accommodation over the past 12 months that the Government did not listen to those with experience in property and those with knowledge of the laws of economics and get things right in the first place! However, better late than never.

As for the Opposition—and by this I mean both the Labour and Liberal Opposition—really, words fail me. How can such intelligent and talented people be so economically illiterate? Do they not understand the laws of supply and demand Do they not realise that there are many, many house and flat-owners who would dearly love to let their property rather than sell it, but that in some parts of the country fair rents are fixed at a level which gives a return of less than one-half of 1 per cent. on the vacant possession value of the property' Do they not realise that by their opposition to the whole concept of shorthold they are acting against the wellbeing of students, of young couples saving up to buy their first house, of people who have lost their jobs and are trying to move to another part of the country to find work and who need rented accommodation? Do they not realise they are acting against the best interests of these people? It seems, my Lords, impossible to get this through. I have tried to make this point to the Opposition on several earlier occasions. All I can do is to conclude by saying that I do welcome this order.

My Lords, I was about to ask the noble Lord whether he would give way so that I could put a question. How is the student who has not got a large sum of money behind him going to be able to pay the rent of a flat or house, or whatever it is, if there is no sort of control at all? What is the evidence the noble Lord can bring forward to show that there are going to come into the rented market all these hundreds of buildings, when we have seen a decline over the years even when there was no control?

My Lords, I would gladly answer that question. If landlords had the assurance that there was no political sword of Damocles hanging over their heads, they would put their properties on the market if they could get a decent return. In many parts of the country the market rent is only 20 per cent. or so above the so-called fair rent; so I do not think it would be impossible for students to afford it—and the more property that comes on to the market, the more quickly rents will settle down at a reasonable level.

My Lords, in addition to the very cogent point put by the noble Lord, Lord Monson, I see this as part of a bigger and wider strategy which the noble Baroness just does not seem to see. For years —

My Lords, with respect, I do not think the noble Lord was here when I spoke.

My Lords, I heard the noble Baroness ask her question. That is what I am referring to, and I have no doubt, knowing, her well, that she puts the whole of her argument into one question when she really tries. But she put a question to my noble friend, asking how certain people would be able to afford it and she is viewing this in the narrow, short term. Looking at it from that point of view there is a certain logic in the point she makes, but I am asking the noble Baroness, and indeed my noble friends, to look upon this as part of the bigger strategy. Those others who have tried to deal with housing matters in both Houses have recognised for years that the private sector has not been making the contribution it could make to provide houses for rent, and the reason is because they have been "clobbered" on every hand and it literally has not been worth their while to think in terms of such an investment. I am hoping—this is the point I should like to put to my noble friend—that this is only a beginning. I hope this is getting the toe in the door and really recognising that a great contribution can be made in regard to the housing shortage, which is the real problem—not the one about students and others. There is a housing shortage which is—

I said that.

which is being kept as part of our problem because we have not given the encouragement that the private houseowner and landlord are entitled to have, and which they did have for years until it was taken away.

My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord whether he will do me and also the rest of the House a favour, and go away and read my speech? Because a lot of the things he said—really, I do take exception to somebody who comes in in the middle of a debate and attacks me, not having even been here to hear my speech. I think it is discourteous, to say the least.

My Lords, if I may say so to the noble Baroness, who is one of my pin-ups, I think I must say to her that she really must not be touchy, because the object of Parliament is to share minds on these matters; and whether one has been in at the beginning of a debate or at the end, if there is a contribution to be made it should be made, and if there is a good point to be made then it should be made. One has not to think of the susceptibilities of the noble Baroness or of anybody else. I hope that we are going to have the beginning of a real housing development, one where the private sector will be able to make a real contribution.