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Lords Chamber

Volume 426: debated on Thursday 21 January 1982

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House Of Lords

Thursday, 21st January, 1982.

The House met at three of the clock:( Prayers having been read earlier at the Judicial Sitting by the Lord Bishop of Derby):The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Retirement Arrangements

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to promote flexible retirement in place of set retirement ages and what consultation they are having with private industry.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security
(Lord Elton)

My Lords, the Government White Paper Growing Older made clear that we regard the introduction of arrangements for more flexible retirement as an attractive long-term aim. It also made it clear that cost and other difficulties rule out any early changes in this direction. A straightforward reduction of the retirement age of men from 65 to 60 would, for instance, cost £2,500 million net under present circumstances. It would cost considerably more, even, than that under conditions of full employment. Less radical schemes could be less expensive, but, for the reasons I have referred to, no specific consultations with private industry are at present in hand.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply. Arising from his Answer, may I ask him whether there would be any possible danger to the employment of young people if veteran citizens who are of good health were encouraged to work as long as possible beyond retiring age with a view to final retirement on improved pension?

My Lords, I am not quite sure what is a veteran and what is a vintage citizen in terms of the question. Of course, it is open to people to work beyond the age of retirement. Retirement from full-time work is, however, one of the conditions for receipt of retirement pension. The National Insurance Act 1946 included provision that a person should automatically be regarded as retired five years after the minimum pension age. This was introduced because some people, for example, farmers and some shop keepers, or indeed anyone who was able to, preferred to work as long as they could, as the noble Lord would like to happen. In that case, they would never receive the pension to which they had contributed if it became payable only when they stopped work. The Government therefore consider that this deeming of retirement at the age of 70 is fair and reasonable and have no proposal to change it.

My Lords, does the noble Lord the Minister accept that front a medical point of view retirement should not be a sudden short sharp shock in the form of a transition from total activity one day to total idleness the next; that it is very much better if retirement is a more gradual and phased process? If the noble Lord accepts that, would he also accept that there are a number of administrative changes which would not be costly which the Government could make to assist firms to introduce work-sharing schemes and other ways of making retirement a more gradual and phrased process?

My Lords, I hear what the noble Lord says with great interest, the more so as I approach the time myself. As regards the possibility of phasing out one's employment, this is very much a matter for individual employers and employees. The present scheme does allow flexibility in the ages of retirement for individuals, and they can choose that time for themselves.

My Lords, would the Minister consider whether it would be helpful if a substantial increase were granted in the amount of the pension, thus encouraging more people to retire instead of continuing to work and keep other people out of jobs after the normal retirement age?

My Lords, there is a limit to what one can do with existing resources. To tempt people to retire by an overall increase in retirement pension would be about the most expensive solution to our problems we could find, and, if that were to be done, it would not be a solution at all.

My Lords, does the noble Lord realise what the nation would lose if we tried to get mathematical formulae for people to retire at certain times? When I look at the serried ranks opposite, with so much talent over the retirement age, it is an asset to the nation.

My Lords, I was trying to distinguish between the tones of the laughter in front and behind. I will not enter into a geriatric contribution. I will only say that the noble Lord's point is well taken.

My Lords, may I ask the Minister whether he is in a position to tell the House how many men and women over the age of 65 are in fact still working?

My Lords, because neither the retirement conditions nor the earnings rule apply to pensioners who are working more than five years after minimum retirement age, information on this is not collected. It is estimated, however that there are about 100,000 people who are currently deferring retirement and are earning entitlement to increments to their pension for their eventual retirement. Most of them are within a year or two of minimum pension age. What they will do when they reach either minimum pension age or a point five years beyond it, it is not possible to predict.

My Lords, could the Government say whether they are satisfied with the working of the present scheme intended to encourage men to retire at 64 rather than 65, and do they think this scheme should be extended to an even earlier age?

My Lords, the Government are never satisfied with anything less than perfection. I would not wish to enter a judgment on what the noble Lord has asked me. I will write to him.

My Lords, could the noble Lord say whether it is still the intention of the Government to abolish the earnings rule, and, if so, can he give any indication of when that might occur?

My Lords, the Government's position on the earnings rule has not changed. It is a desirable thing to do. It cannot be done until the resources are available.

My Lords, in supporting the noble Lord, Lord Gainford, on his Question, is the Minister aware that it was his own party which set up the Anglo-German Foundation, which was looking into the problems of the industrial society, and that there is a vast detailed literature on all the things we can do to meet these problems? Although the Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, is always urging us to look at Germany and what they are doing, we do not follow suit. They go in for everything—shared working, early retirement. It is there on the Embankment—

Several noble Lords: Question!

My Lords, I am not certain what the noble Baroness's question is, but, if she is asking about awareness of the literature, the department is constantly looking at information from all over the world, not only Germany.

Nhs Waiting List

3.9 p.m.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government by how much the number of people waiting for admission to NHS hospitals has increased since 1979.

My Lords, far from having increased, the figure for England and Wales has fallen from 791,949 on 31st March 1979 to 664,675 on 31st March 1981. That is a reduction of over 127,000.

My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend for that excellent, encouraging reply. It is quite a remarkable achievement at a time of such restraint. Could he give some indication of how this has been achieved, and at what cost?

My Lords, the fall since 1979, when figures were affected by industrial unrest, reflects improved performance both by doctors and by other National Health Service staff. Indeed, 286,000 more patients were treated in hospital in 1980 than in 1979—an increase of 5 per cent. The earlier discharge of patients and the increased use of day surgery have probably played some part in this good result.

My Lords, can the Minister say, without giving any party point of view, what part private hospitalisation has played in reducing that number?

My Lords, the possible questions are so numerous that I have not the precise answer at my hand. However, I can tell the noble Lord the principle in outline, which is that this Government regard the private sector as assisting the public sector and do not see it as interfering in any way with the rights of citizens under the National Health Service, for which it provides important ancillary work.

My Lords, is the noble Lord in a position to tell the House whether the situation with regard to waiting lists for out-patient appointments at hospitals is as good and as encouraging as that which he has given us for in-patient treatment?

My Lords, on the question of waiting list cases, the latest figures are for 1978 and they show, based on a 10 per cent. sample, that 38 per cent. of male admissions were waiting list cases. The bulk of the others were emergency admissions. I am afraid that this is not a direct answer to the noble Lord's question and partly reflects the burden placed on the National Health Service by accidents on the roads, at work and in the home. A very high proportion of those come in as emergencies nowadays.

My Lords, while welcoming these figures, may I ask whether my noble friend can say what the situation is as regards the non-teaching hospitals, particularly in the so-called "grey" areas? Is there a reduction in the waiting lists in the non-teaching hospitals that is comparable with the reduction in the teaching hospitals?

My Lords, I regret that my figures are not broken down in that way. I shall write to my noble friend.

The Prison Population And Remission

3.13 p.m.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what immediate reduction in the prison population in England and Wales would result from the adoption of 50 per cent. remission as in Northern Ireland.

My Lords, the initial effect of adopting 50 per cent. remission on the Northern Ireland model would be to reduce the prison population in England and Wales by about 4,000. Provided that there was no change in sentencing practice, the longer-term reduction would be very much smaller and might be fewer than 1,000.

My Lords, am I wrong in my recollection that the noble Lord the Minister gave the figure of 7,000 to my noble friend Lord Wigoder for the immediate reduction in the prison population that would result in applying 50 per cent. remission to all those serving sentences of two years and less? Therefore, is it not curious that the figure which the noble Lord now gives for the reduction for all those serving sentences of whatever length should be smaller than the figure he gave to my noble friend? However, even if it is a figure of 4,000 for the total prison population, would that not represent a very significant reduction of the burden now being felt by the prison service, and is it not, therefore, worth reconsidering the Government's decision to reject that proposal in favour of one which is very doubtful as regards its effect of reducing the prison population at all? Other things being equal, is it not a good idea for the system to he the same in the United Kingdom as a whole, bearing in mind that Northern Ireland is still part of the United Kingdom?

My Lords, the figure which I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, was 3,000. In the longer term, of course, the case which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is making would not result, as my original Answer said, in a very considerable reduction. Moreover, we would lose the benefit of the parole system which we have in this country, which selects those whom it is calculated ought to have a period of release on licence under supervision, and in exchange we would get a system of release which would not be selective; and I do not believe that that would be to our advantage.

My Lords, can the Minister say how many prisoners have been released in Northern Ireland under this arrangement of 50 per cent. remission? Has the experiment been carried out without any damage to law and order in Northern Ireland? If the answer to that is, Yes, then is there not much to be said for the benefit of the immediate advantage of an immediate substantial reduction of the prison population of this country?

My Lords, I am afraid that I cannot give to the noble and learned Lord the figure for which he asks. But in comparing the two systems one would be making, with respect, a value judgment and I would not, I think, want to depart from the answer which I gave to the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. The parole system which we have here, which it was felt in 1976 it was not possible to introduce into Northern Ireland, is a system which I would be loath to desert.

My Lords, is my noble friend the Minister aware that the introduction of a mandatory remission scheme, such as is envisaged by the noble Lord's Question, would make a mockery of due sentencing in serious cases of crime? Would my noble friend the Minister not agree that, in view of certain recent events, implementation of such a policy could give rise to very serious public concern?

My Lords, I think that the question which my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway asks should be taken seriously. As regards the solution, the Government believe that the best prospect for a substantial and sustained reduction in the size of the prison population lies in a reduction in average sentence lengths in suitable cases by the courts. It is for that reason that the Government have introduced into the Criminal Justice Bill some changes in the provisions for partially suspended sentences, and we very much hope that partially suspended sentences will be approved by both Houses and can be brought into effect.

My Lords, does the noble Lord not agree that the consensus of opinion in Northern Ireland is that 50 per cent. remission is excessive from the point of view of deterrence? On the other hand, would he perhaps agree that there might be some merit in a compromise along the lines of 40 per cent. or 37½ per cent. remission for good behaviour, to be applied uniformly throughout the United Kingdom, which would virtually maintain the deterrent effect of a prison sentence, but which would go some way towards alleviating prison overcrowding?

No, my Lords; the Government believe that the road to go down is to introduce Section 47 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 for partly suspended sentences which can be applied at the discretion of the courts, and that is something to which the Government attach great importance.

My Lords, has my noble friend the Minister considered that possibly the best way of reducing the prison population would be to increase the penalties, because then the deterrent would be greater, there would be fewer people coming before our courts, and therefore fewer to go to gaol?

My Lords, the penalties under the law are pretty stiff. I would not advise my noble friend to try it and see.

My Lords, perhaps the Minister could advise his noble friend that the prison population in Saudi Arabia is effectively reduced by means of executions and amputations? Will he also ask the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to take note of the views expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, that the system operated in those countries is a mockery? Returning to what the Minister said about the parole system, would he not agree that, if the parole system were retained for the balance of one-sixth of the sentence—which would make the total amount of remission allowable under both remission and parole the same as it is now, so that a person could obtain 50 per cent. remission by means of the Northern Ireland system and an additional one-sixth under the parole system—then no one would serve a sentence longer than he would have to do under the English and Welsh system as it is at the moment?

My Lords, if we went down that road I believe that the gap between the length of sentence given and the actual sentence served would be too great, and that probably would be reflected in the length of the sentences given by the courts.

He Helsinki Agreement: Madrid Conference

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made at the Madrid Conference on European Security and Co-operation (Helsinki Final Act).

My Lords, western delegations welcomed as a useful step the draft concluding document tabled on 16th December last by certain neutral and non-aligned states. But the recent and continuing repression of human and social rights in Poland, which violates commitments undertaken in the Final Act, inevitably affects the situation in which the conference will resume.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for that Answer. Is not this the third occasion on which the non-aligned nations have saved the conference? Is not their draft proposal accepted as favourable by both West and East, although some amendments arc necessary? Does not this draft statement include the positive results of the conference? Can the noble Lord say what they were? Can he place a copy of that draft in the Library?

My Lords, the concluding draft document highlights the points on which we were agreed and the points on which agreement is still to be reached. From that point of view, I think it is useful, and we must hope that it is possible to reach agreement. But I would be less than candid if I did not say that the events in Poland have made things in Madrid that much more difficult.

With regard to tabling the document, perhaps I could take advice as to whether or not I can do so.

My Lords, in view of the fact that the Helsinki Agreement lays down that signatories will not interfere in the affairs of other countries, would my noble friend consider putting a list in the Library showing the transgressions made by the Soviet Union, perhaps in alphabetical order, starting with Afghanistan, going through Poland and finishing with Zaire? Could this list be made publicly available? Could we not take some credit for drawing the attention of the Soviet Union to the way in which they have disregarded so much that they signed at Helsinki? If progress is not made, would it not be a good idea to withdraw from the Madrid Conference? —because many people believe it is now becoming farcical.

My Lords, I shall look at the first part of that to see whether what my noble friend suggests would be possible. On the last part of my noble friend's question, it seems to me that since the CSCE conference flows from the Final Act at Helsinki, which specifically includes the problem of human rights—which are now at risk in Poland, and for violations of which the Polish Government and, we believe, the Soviet Government are responsible—I think that there will be an admirable opportunity when the conference resumes on 9th February for the West to make known to the Soviet and Polish Governments what they feel about these matters. For these reasons I think that it would be a mistake to call the conference off.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that we on this side of the House, and I suspect the House on the whole, would welcome the resumption of the talks at Madrid, even though they have been going on for very nearly 18 months? Indeed, would not the fact of the conference reconvening on 9th February perhaps be used as a spur to promote the ending of martial law in Poland in the very short term and the restoration of the significant advances that were made in that country before the present crisis arose, both in the field of human rights and in civil liberties? If the noble Lord is to pursue the suggestion of a list of countries that have offended against the rule of non-intervention, will he make that as general, fair and wide-ranging as the circumstances, alas!, require?

My Lords, with regard to the last part of the question, I think that I should like to look at the whole subject to see whether it is worth doing and whether the amount of trouble that would be involved is worth it. I agree with the noble and learned Lord as regards the first part of his question. I think that 9th February would be an excellent opportunity for making plain the West's position.

I would also say to my noble friend that of course one part of the conference which we hope will be successful is an agreement on what was originally the French proposal for a disarmament conference and confidence-building measures, which were to take place as soon as the conference was over. I think that this would be very useful to have, if we could get it. So at the moment I think that it would be a mistake to assume that it would be in our interests to see the conference ended.

My Lords, has any limit been set to the discussions in Madrid or are they expected to go on for ever? If any limit is set and no agreement is reached by that time limit, will we withdraw from the whole operation, or what will be the result?

My Lords, I think that forever would be too long, but a little longer would be right.

My Lords, would the noble Lord reaffirm the Government's commitment to détente? Judging from the tone of some of the questions asked by noble Lords sitting behind him, not all of his noble friends retain that commitment. It would be rather welcome to some of us on this side to know that, in their zeal for human rights, the Government do not want to throw peace out of the window.

My Lords, of course we are all in favour of human rights, and we are in favour of détente if it is made possible by those with whom we seek to get agreement.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware of the deep appreciation which many of us have for the full and frank way in which he replies to our questions?

Several noble Lords: Hear, hear!

But, my Lords, I should like to ask this. Is not the real problem two different views of human rights in the East and the West? Is it not the case that the East concentrates on living conditions, employment and homes, which gives the individual an opportunity, while the West insists on rights of personality and freedom of speech? I am in favour of both. Cannot the Helsinki talks try to find some co-ordination between them?

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his compliment, but it is the "but" that counts in the end. I do not think that I agree with the noble Lord. I think he will find that in the Helsinki Final Act it is fairly clearly written down what is meant by human rights, and everybody subscribed to it. There is no doubt whatever that there has been a violation of human rights in Poland.

Glasgow Rape Case

3.28 p.m.

My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to make a Statement on the case of alleged rape and serious assault in Glasgow which has been the subject of much recent comment.

In Scotland, the Lord Advocate is answerable to Parliament for the conduct of criminal prosecutions. It is, however, the practice not to divulge any details of the evidence in particular cases. This is intended for the protection of all the parties involved, and it is particularly important in the present case, where it is possible that the complainer may at some future date make an application to the High Court of Justiciary to bring a private prosecution; it is particularly important in these circumstances that nothing is said that might affect any such application, the interests of the complainer, or the interests of any person who may be accused by her, and who under our legal system is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Subject to these restraints, I wish, however, to be as frank and open as possible about this matter to the House and to the public on account of the anxiety aroused by the case.

In this case the Procurator Fiscal, on receipt of information from the police, charged four youths with rape and with attempted murder. On reporting the case to Crown counsel in Edinburgh, they, in the exercise of their responsibility as independent prosecutors, indicted three of these youths with one charge of rape and one charge of assault to severe injury, permanent disfigurement and danger to life. The case was put out for a sitting of the High Court in Glasgow in June 1981. When the victim appeared it was apparent that she was not in a fit state to give evidence, and on the instructions of Crown counsel she was examined by a consultant psychiatrist. In the interests of the woman I would not wish to reveal the details of the report save to say that her medical history since the events complained of caused the psychiatrist to conclude that a court appearance at that time would be detrimental to her health and carried a hazard of suicide both before and after the trial, whatever the result. Accordingly, the case was not called.

Thereafter the decision had to be taken whether the trial should be further postponed, or whether the Crown should proceed with the whole, or part, of the indictment in the absence of the complainer's evidence, or whether the case should be dropped altogether. In coming to that decision Crown counsel was principally influenced by the likely effect on her health of the prospect of having to give evidence.

Given that the complainer was not at that stage able to give evidence, the difficult decision arose whether on the remaining evidence available the Crown should proceed with both or one of the charges. The view was taken by Crown counsel that in the light of all the circumstances in the absence of the complainer it would not have been proper to proceed on the whole or any part of the indictment.

With regard to obtaining the evidence of the com-plainer in the situation where she was not able to give her evidence in court, it has been suggested that her evidence could have been taken on commission under Section 32 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. In terms of subsection (2)(b) of the section, the application to take evidence in this way may only be granted if the judge is satisfied that there would be no unfairness to the other party or parties. I am of opinion that an application in this case to take the evidence on commission of the complainer would not have been granted.

In the light of the information available to him Crown counsel considered that the prospect of sufficient improvement in the complainer's health to alter the situation was not sufficient to justify keeping the proceedings alive any further and, accordingly, instructions were given that the case should be dropped. Once that has been clone a prosecution at my instance is no longer possible. Crown counsel exercise their independent professional judgment in coming to decisions on matters such as those I have referred to, but in cases of difficulty they may, and do, refer questions for my decision. I have decided to instruct that no decision to drop proceedings altogether in any case of murder or rape should be taken before the hearing of evidence has begun without the question being referred to me for decision.

3.33 p.m.

My Lords, I think we are grateful to the Lord Advocate for the Statement he has made and the speed with which he has made it, bearing in mind that he was abroad yesterday and the urgency for a Statement may have come as a surprise to him. He will appreciate that this is the third Statement from the Crown Office, and that this last one is much more in line with the first one.

I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord saw the newspapers yesterday. Bear in mind that the whole gravamen of this Statement today is that the reason why the case was dropped was the effect on the health of the woman who was the victim of this brutal, savage, obscene attack. The report says:
"I believe that the decision was a correct one. However, there is no doubt in my mind that the matter of this unfortunate woman's mental stability was irrelevant".
That was the Solicitor-General for Scotland yesterday. So it comes to this: that we are more confused than ever by the Statement that has now been made.

It was said by the Lord Advocate, and rightly, that the Crown Office tends not to give reasons, or give information. But this is an exceptional case. It was not just the debatable question that always arises in respect of rape. There was no doubt about the serious assault on the woman. She required 168 stitches. She is scarred for life, physically and probably mentally as well. So from that point of view, bearing in mind the timescale—November 1980, the charging of the youths; still in November 1980, committal for trial at Glasgow, where I gather they were committed to the High Court; they had pleaded not guilty—you cannot drop proceedings like this and say nothing about it. But the Lord Advocate comes along at this date and suggests that one of the reasons why he can give us no further information is because of the possibility of a private prosecution by a woman who, he tells us, is not fit to give evidence in any court. When was the last private prosecution? Shall I tell him? Over 70 years ago. That is how rare it is.

Therefore, I feel that the noble and learned Lord is scraping the barrel for some reason or other in respect of not giving us information. The fact is that this case cannot be revived, and so anyone is free to say what they like about it. The newspapers who normally would not, if proceedings are continuing, be able to say anything, have disclosed—and I should like information about this; if he is as obdurate as his Statement he is not going to give me the information—that they have in their possession an alleged confession by one of the youths; that another youth is prepared to give an eye-witness account.

There is the whole question that you cannot commit a crime like this without trails of blood all over the place. The woman herself said that she turned up at the first day hearing and was prepared to give evidence. Whatever else happens, would I be right in saying that in this case justice has not been done? It is a serious matter for Scottish law if people in this same position so torture their victims, or alleged victims, that the proceedings against them are dropped.

I hope that the Lord Advocate will go a little further. I appreciate and am grateful for what he said at the end of his Statement, that in future a thing like this would be dealt with by himself or by a Law Officer —I presume that this was not dealt with by a Law Officer—and that there is some hope to have renewed confidence in the fact of the Scottish legal system. But I consider that this Statement is most unsatisfactory, and I really think we ought to have some form of judicial inquiry into the events in this case.

3.37 p.m.

My Lords, I make no apology for not seeking to increase the hysteria with which this whole subject has been surrounded in the course of the last few weeks. One gets the impression from the popular press that rape has become the British national pastime. I do not seek in any way to minimise the gravity of such an offence when it takes place, nor the fact that in a very large number of such cases it may be necessary to send the offender to prison. But to put the matter in general perspective it is right, it it not—the Lord Advocate will no doubt agree—that in Scotland, for the last year for which figures were available, there were some 34 people convicted of this offence? That was about a quarter of the total number of offences alleged as reported to the police, and if one takes account of the experience of the rape crisis centres in England, it looks as though the total number of incidents may perhaps have to be increased by another 20 per cent. or 25 per cent. altogether. Not perhaps sufficient to justify quite the outcry that is at the moment taking place.

So far as this incident is concerned, the particular case which is the subject of the Statement today, is it not perfectly clear from the noble and learned Lord's Statement that the decision as to whether or not to prosecute in Scotland is taken on totally independent grounds by totally independent lawyers? Is it not highly desirable that that situation should continue? Do the lawyers not have to weigh up with some care what the state of the evidence is?—whether the complainant is available to give evidence; whether, if she is available, her evidence is likely to be credible; and, above all, both in Scotland and in England, whether there is independent evidence available which will support the evidence of the complainant and implicate the defendants in the commission of the offence. Is it not absolutely essential to the administration of justice in both countries that these decisions should be left to be taken on an independent basis and not be subject to political pressures?

3.40 p.m.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, will have an opportunity a little later, my Lords; it is the practice, I believe, for me first of all to respond to the speakers from the Front Bench. As for the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Ross, I am grateful to him for what he said at the beginning of them. With regard to his comments about statements by others, I am not in a position to say whether those statements have all been correctly reported. But I am in a position to say that I have personally, since returning from Luxembourg last night, looked at this matter with all the care and concern that I believe your Lordships would expect of me, and it is in response to that that I say that the principal factor which gave rise to this decision was the one to which I referred; namely, the concern of the Crown counsel involved for the health and safety of this woman, who had, as the noble Lord said, suffered a great deal already.

Crown counsel in this situation has a very difficult decision to make, and I am sure the noble and learned Lord sitting opposite me, with his great experience of these matters, will agree that the decisions are extremely delicate. Consider the situation of Crown counsel, in the light of his information, deciding, "This is one woman, but the whole interests of justice are more important. Let us go ahead"; and suppose that the case failed in the High Court and the people indicted were all acquitted, and then the terrible hazard to which the psychiatrist had referred had occurred. What would be the feeling of Crown counsel in that position? He would have done his job as best he could, but the consequences were very serious. I have no doubt at all in my mind—and I hope your Lordships will accept this—that Crown counsel considered this matter and did his best to weigh up all the factors; and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, very fully and well, if I may say so with respect, summarised what those factors are. But that, I am satisfied, was the factor that was strongest in his mind.

The noble Lord suggests that I am leaving it, as it were, to a woman in this condition to carry on. The problem for me is that Scots law says that once intimation is made on behalf of the Lord Advocate to accused persons that the charges against them are not to be proceeded with, I can do nothing further; I cannot indict these people again. Therefore, the question of what can be done is important. If this lady's position is now different and if she, being advised, for herself considers that the risks are not as great as we had thought, or that the situation has changed in such a way that it would be perfectly safe to proceed, then there is an avenue open to her to make an application. It would not be right for me to speculate, of course, on the chance of success. It is, I ask your Lordships to accept, for that reason and that reason only that I do not want to go into the detail of the evidence in this particular case. It is for no other reason. So far as I am concerned, I have nothing whatever to hide, nor I believe has Crown counsel responsible for making the decision. But I have to take account of the interests of this lady and any responsibility that may exist of proceedings for the future.

I am much obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, for the way in which he put the problem in perspective against the general background. I believe it is important that decisions such as these in relation to prosecution are taken on independent grounds by independent people, and the observation which I made at the end of the Statement was intended not to detract from that but to give me a chance, while the opportunity is still there, of reviewing with Crown counsel in cases of this seriousness whether or not the irrevocable step should be taken. So far as I am aware, there is nothing further I can do in relation to this particular case. I wish to make it clear of course that Crown counsel and my colleague the Solicitor-General for Scotland and myself are as determined as anyone in your Lordships' House to do our best to prosecute this type of terrible crime—we try to do that; there are many difficulties, as your Lordships know—and this particular case has certainly caused a great deal of concern.

My Lords, there are several questions I wish to put to the noble and learned Lord, and I preface them by saying that I readily appreciate the difficulty of his position, having been out of the country until yesterday, and I accept without qualification his assurance of the care which he has given to these matters; and I have some sympathy with the views expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder.

First, does the noble and learned Lord agree that the restraints on him in disclosure to this House, having regard to the possibility of a public prosecution, are quite minimal? Secondly, he said, as I understood him, that the view was taken by Crown counsel that in the light of all the circumstances and in the absence of the complainer it would not have been proper to proceed. Can he say whether the evidence remaining, without the evidence of the complainer, was sufficient in law to entitle a jury, had it believed it, to convict the accused of any criminal charge on the indictment? Thirdly, he referred to the possibility of invoking Section 32(2)(b) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980. Does he not think it would have been prudent to give further considerstion to that possibility at the time, since of course one cannot tell at this stage what might have been the approach to this matter? And in the whole circumstances, does he not think it would have been more sensible at least to test that possibility?

Fourthly, he referred to Crown counsel making his decision in the light of the information available to him. What precisely was that information Did he consider further precognition of the complainer to confirm the psychiatrist's impression or otherwise? Did he consider taking a further medical opinion to see whether the situation was really as bad as represented in the first psychiatrist's opinion? Or was it simply accepted that they must proceed on the basis that what the psychiatrist said was right, in spite of the fact that, since, the lady in question has been saying she was always ready, willing and able to give evidence?

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but would he not agree that this is developing into a debate?

With respect, my Lords, I think not, and I certainly hope I do not appear to be doing that. This matter is one of the utmost concern to the administration of criminal justice in Scotland and I am certain—

My Lords, I recognise that noble Lords in all parts of the House agree that this is a serious matter, but I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson, appreciates that if he refers to the Companion to Standing Orders it is there said that Statements should not turn into debates. If he could restrict himself to his last question, I think that would be the wish of the House.

Of course, my Lords, I accept the noble Leader's ruling, and I apologise. This is my final question. Are the reports in the press and on the BBC that the Procurator Fiscal's office in Glasgow was gravely concerned with the Crown Office decision well founded? If so, was anything done to clarify the position at that time, and should not this case have gone to a Law Officer at a very much earlier stage?

My Lords, I do not agree that the restrictions in regard to this matter arising from the possibility of private prosecution are quite minimal. I believe that it would be quite wrong for me in this situation to examine the detail of the evidence or to deal in detail with the matters which have been raised about the particular evidence in this case.

With regard to the question relating to the possibility of having made an application for the evidence to be taken on commission, I have given this matter the best consideration that I can and have reached the conclusion that in this case an application would not succeed. Of course one can always test matters by going to court, but I believe that it is not the function of the prosecutor to make law in that way. I would respectfully suggest that he has to decide whether in all the circumstances it is appropriate to proceed. I would suggest that prosecuting people is not the way to find out and to develop the law, though of course on occasion in relation to prosecutions important new points of law are determined. Therefore I do not think that it would be right for me to continent further on these matters, except to say that Crown counsel involved did, I think, consider fully the questions which have been discussed relating to the evidence.

My Lords, while I thoroughly accept what my noble and learned friend has said with regard to his own position in this matter—namely, that he cannot take any further action—I should like to ask him to inform the House whether it is possible in Scotland, as it is in England, for the prosecution when offering no evidence nevertheless to ask the court that the charges may remain on the record, so that if evidence is forthcoming, or a witness is able to attend at a later date, the case may then be proceeded with?

Yes, my Lords, it would be possible instead of intimating that no proceedings are to be taken, to intimate that the particular case is not to be proceeded with meantime. Of course, in considering what he is going to do in that connection, the prosecutor in Scotland has to have regard to the interests of all parties, and that was a matter that I sought to refer to in the earlier Statement.

My Lords, will the noble and learned Lord agree that, as pointed out by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, a very great danger in these cases is that when something very dreadful such as this case induces a national hysteria, one seeks either to turn that hysteria into legislation or into a twisting of the law? Will the noble and learned Lord make it very clear indeed that in a case of this kind evidence on commission, where the accuser does not appear and is not subject to cross-examination before the court, is quite impossible and would involve a gross breach of civil rights?

With regard to private prosecutions, are they in Scotland, as they are in England, under the control of the Attorney-General? If that be so, will he be very careful indeed to look at the situation of a prosecution brought privately here, which would almost certainly be promoted and financed by the press?—probably a very dangerous thing to happen.

My Lords, in Scotland private prosecution has been extremely limited, and as the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Marnock, pointed out, the cases are extremely rare and very few have been successful in recent times. I think that the last successful case that took place without the consent of the Lord Advocate was in 1909. However, it is the court that has the control in relation to that, and if it is a private prosecution that is in issue, an application has to be made to the court—

My Lords, let us suppose that the unfortunate woman had died from her injuries, which might well have happened. Would the same decision not to prosecute have been taken, or would a prosecution have been initiated on the evidence available?

My Lords, I think that that is a hypothetical question, and I am very glad indeed that it did not arise. From the most recent reports it appears that the woman seems to be in reasonable health.

My Lords, we have had nearly half an hour on this Statement. May I suggest to the House that we hear the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, and then move on to the next business.

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Leader of the House because it was precisely this point that my wife raised with me this morning. She said, "If they had killed her, they would have been prosecuted". I think that my wife was right, and although what noble Lords have said here this afternoon may carry weight in this House, there is a large amount of lay opinion outside the House which will not understand the position. Therefore, I hope that in one way or another some way will be found to put the matter to rights.

My Lords, all I can say is that I have done my best to explain the position as simply as possible without undue technicality, in the hope that not only your Lordships' House, but members of the public who are concerned about and interested in this very important matter, will understand what I have been trying to say.

Procedure Of The House

3.56 p.m.

My Lords, I beg to move that the First Report from the Select Committee on Procedure he agreed to. Over the last few months I have received a number of representations from Members of the House on the subject of Starred Questions, and as a result the whole of this meeting of the Procedure Committee was devoted to this one subject. In general these criticisms fall into two parts: the first is that Question Time very often lasts rather too long, and the second relates to the difficulty that some of your Lordships have experienced on finding a space to put down a Question on the Order Paper because so often the Order Paper is full for the whole month ahead in which it is open to put down Questions.

The Committee devoted a considerable time to the discussion of these matters and considered a number of different suggestions for change. As to the length of time that was taken up by Question Time, their decision was that they saw no need for the introduction of any new rules, but rather they wished to draw attention to the guidance issued in a previous report of the Procedure Committee in 1976, which was still valid; and in the view of the committee if that guidance were to be followed now, it would solve the problem.

The committee wished me to reiterate the guidance in the hope that in the future it would be more closely followed. So I should like briefly to remind your Lordships of the guidance given by the committee in 1976, namely:
" They consider that Question Time should normally be concluded in twenty minutes and draw the attention of the House to the following undesirable features of Question Time which tend to lengthen it:
  • (a) the tendency for small debates to develop;
  • (b) lengthy Ministerial replies which encourage lengthy supplementaries;
  • (c) the practice of advancing a point of view under the guise of a supplementary question; and [finally]
  • (d) the habit of reading out prepared supplementary questions".
  • On the other subject—the difficulty of finding time for putting down a Question—the committee expressed considerable sympathy with those of your Lordships who have found no place for your Question while finding that other Members of the House had a considerable number of Questions on the Order Paper. The problem was particularly acute just before Christmas when we were not sitting on Mondays and therefore there were no Questions on Monday, but even now the present situation is that the list is completely full for the whole of the next month. No one can put down a Question more than a month ahead, and at the present moment there is no space on the list.

    Various solutions were proposed and considerable discussion ensued, but in the end the agreement that was come to was to recommend to your Lordships that for an experimental period of six months no noble Lord should be allowed to have more than three Starred Questions on the Order Paper at any one time. I would emphasise that this is only to be an experiment for six months, but the hope is that it may allow more of your Lordships to find time to put down Questions, and, in particular, might make it possible to put down Questions of more topical interest. If this report is agreed to, then it is proposed that this experiment should start one month from today, and then we should reconsider it in the light of the experience gained. My Lords, I beg to move.

    Moved, That the First Report from The Select Committee be agreed to. —( Lord Aberdare.)

    The Report was as follows:

    STARRED QUESTIONS

    The Committee have considered the length of time spent in the House each day on Starred Questions and the difficulty some Lords find in being able to table Starred Questions within the existing time limit of one month.

    So far as the length of Question Time is concerned, the Committee point out that this matter lies in the hands of the House itself. They reaffirm the guidance which they gave in 1976 (1st Report 1975–76) namely, that," They consider that Question Time should normally he concluded in twenty minutes and draw the attention of the House to the following undesirable features of Question Time which tend to lengthen it:

  • (a) the tendency for small debates to develop;
  • (b) lengthy Ministerial replies which encourage lengthy supplementaries;
  • (c) the practice of advancing a point of view under the guise of a supplementary question; and
  • (d) the habit of reading out prepared supplementary questions".
  • The difficulty which some Lords have found of not being able to table Starred Questions within a reasonable period of time has been particularly acute recently, following the Summer Recess. The problem has been intensified because the House has not generally sat on Mondays since the Opening of the new Session. The Committee believe that the current difficulty will probably not be as severe later in the Session. However, they recognise the concern that exists in all quarters of the House that too many questions are being tabled by the same Lords. The result of this is that topical questions cannot be asked at short notice. The Committee considered whether this problem could be alleviated by increasing the number of Starred Questions allowed each day from four to five. However, they were of the opinion that this would not solve the present difficulty but merely serve to extend Question Time further.

    The Committee recommend instead that, for an experimental period of six months, no Lord should he allowed to have more than three Starred Questions on the Order Paper at any one time, and that this period should begin one month after the agreement of the House to this Report.

    My Lords, the noble Lord the Lord Chairman referred to 1976. At that time I had the honour to be Leader of your Lordships' House, and I know many of the problems. May I ask the Leader of the House whether, perhaps in consultation with the Lord Chairman, she would have a look at the list of Questions for Written Answer that are now set down on the Order Paper. Many Questions are now being put there because it is not possible to get them answered quickly orally. May I ask—and I have to admit that during my period as Leader of the House I was not sure how it could be adopted—whether it is possible that Questions for Written Answer could be disposed of with a greater degree of expedition than at present? I think many Peers are putting down Questions for Written Answer because they cannot get them on the Order Paper for answer orally. If this course could be adopted, then I think there might be some relief of the Questions put down for oral Answer, and I think that would be for the benefit of your Lordships' House.

    My Lords, may I add a word? I am a Member of the Select Committee and, of course, I go along with the recommendation; but I attach perhaps even a little more importance than the noble Lord the Lord Chairman indicated he did to what I think is the very real problem at this moment, and that is the difficulty of getting a Question relating to a topical matter down for answer within a reasonable time. The noble Lord the Lord Chairman told us that in fact the Order Paper is at the moment full for the whole month during which one is permitted to put down Questions; and, as the House will recall, the right honourable gentleman the Member for Huyton said a week is a long time in politics. It is the fact that matters arise about which some of your Lordships in all parts of the House may want to ask a Starred Question, and they simply cannot do it for at least a month; and, with respect, that seems to weaken the value of your Lordships' House as a body entitled to investigate and inquire into the responsibilities and activities of government.

    I very much hope that the rather modest experiment which the Select Committee has recommended will help in regard to this position. I am inclined to doubt whether it will; and I hope that, when the Select Committee reconvenes to again consider the matter after the sixth-month period, consideration may be given to the alternative of allowing perhaps a fifth Question on the Order Paper, perhaps one put down with a shorter time limit—to be answered within, say, 10 or 12 days.

    The Select Committee have reported that they do not think that Question Time should exceed 20 minutes. When you have only four Starred Questions I wholly agree with that. It seems, with respect, that for four Starred Questions 20 minutes is too long. But if the House is to devote 20 minutes, or perhaps even a little more time (as it might think desirable) to Questions, then it is at least arguable that we should allow additional Starred Questions and, in particular, one—perhaps one, perhaps two—which has a shorter time limit, so as to allow topicality. I hope the House will accept this experiment, but if, as is the view of some of us, it does not have much effect, then I hope we may be able to go for a more radical solution.

    My Lords, I would agree with the Select Committee that perhaps some limitation ought to be introduced. I come with fairly fresh experience of another place, and on the whole I find the Question procedure here rather preferable to that in another place; but there are a couple of points I would have made, I think, had I had the opportunity. I would have thought that perhaps four Questions on the Order Paper, rather than three, would have been better. It would have given one the chance of one a week.

    Another point I would have made (though I have benefited by it, and I think I ought not to have done) is that at the moment one can put down two Starred Questions on one day. I think that probably is being rather greedy; and I would have thought that if, in extending the number of Questions that can be put down on the Order Paper, the committee decide to recommend that any one Member of this House can have only one Question on any one day, that would be something that most of us would accept.

    My Lords, may I disagree with my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter as regards the possibility of increasing the number of Questions. I think the remedy lies largely in those who ask Questions and get a long ministerial reply, and who then are tempted, and fall to the temptation, to ask an equally long supplementary in return. That seems to me to be one of the basic weaknesses of our present Question Time.

    I think that the proposal by the committee is entirely good. If one looks at the Order Paper, between 18th January and 18th February there are 19 sittings. One noble Lord—all to his credit, no doubt—has no less than seven Questions down for answer during that period. Any noble Lord having that proportion, which no doubt he is quite justified in putting down, inevitably squeezes out a lot of noble Lords, on either side of the House, who wish to ask what they feel are urgent Questions on some topical matter. I believe that if we have this experimental rule of not more than three Questions under any noble Lord's name it will give a wider scope for Back-Bench Questions and a narrower scope for Questions which deal with major policy issues which really are not very urgent for reply. Therefore, I think that by and large there is every advantage in supporting the proposal of the committee.

    My Lords, is not one of the main causes of this problem, as it is also of the length of many of our major debates, the fact that the membership and the active membership of your Lordships' House is continually growing?

    My Lords, ought we not to give this experiment a chance now, and get on with it? We are not going to alter anything by going on talking. In six months' time we shall have another chance by referring it to the committee.

    My Lords, I thought it might be helpful to the House if I intervened just briefly to answer one or two of the points which have been raised, and to say in general, on the question of the length of time spent on Starred Questions each day, that I agree that the four features set out in the report are certainly undesirable. The maintenance of order in the House is indeed the responsibility of the House as a whole, and therefore of every noble Lord who is present. As the Leader I can only act as the voice of the House in this respect, and that is what I endeavour to do. But I think it important to recognise that this very valuable principle that the House has, of each Peer exercising his responsibility in this matter, is one of which we should be proud and to which I think we should all adhere.

    A number of noble Lords have raised points on the difficulties of tabling Questions, including my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter. The Procedure Com mittee made their recommendation only after very careful consideration, and I believe it is important that the House should agree with the recommendation of this well-established and senior committee. I hope, therefore, that all noble Lords will agree with the recommendation. Of course, it is always possible to table amendments, but, as we are going to have this recommendation for an experimental period of only six months, then the whole question can be looked at again should it be thought to be necessary.

    The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, made the point that under the suggestion of the Procedure Committee it would be possible to table three Questions only at a time and that he would have preferred to have tabled four. In fact, if he looks carefully at the recommendation, he will see that it does not necessarily limit any one Peer to three Questions in any one month. If there are spaces for Questions at later days on any Order Paper a Peer can ask several Questions in one month. That is how it would work. What is important, I think—this was the point made by my noble friends Lord Boyd-Carpenter and Lord Balfour—is that there should be some gaps so that at reasonably short notice some more urgent Questions can be asked of the House. I hope that the House will support the recommendations of the committee for this experimental period. I hope that will be found to be beneficial to all noble Lords in all parts of the House.

    Standing Orders (Public Business)

    4.12 p.m.

    Moved, That the Standing Orders relative to public business be amended as follows:

    Standing Order 3

    Leave out all the words after "ceremony" in line 5.—( Lord Aberdare.)

    My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion in my name on the Order Paper. This results from a previous decision of the Procedure Committee to reduce the size of the Journals of the House. In effect, it avoids the need to reproduce in the Journals the Letters Patent by which an hereditary peerage has been granted when an hereditary Peer takes his seat. I beg to move.

    On Question, Motion agreed to

    Civil Aviation Bill Hl

    My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. It is a pure consolidation Bill. It brings together in one Bill the law relating to the Civil Aviation Authority, aerodromes, the regulation of civil aviation and the law governing aircraft. Unless any noble Lord objects, this Bill in the usual way will be referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.

    Moved, That the Bill be read a second time—( The Lord Chancellor.)

    On Question, Bill read a second time, and referred to the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills.

    Harbours (Scotland) Bill Hl

    My Lords, I understand that no amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript amendment or to speak in Committee. Therefore, unless any noble Lord objects, I beg to move that the order of commitment be discharged.

    Moved, That the order of commitment be discharged. — (The Earl of Mansfield.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Fire Service College Board (Abolition) Bill Hl

    My Lords, I understand that no amendments have been set down to this Bill and that no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript amendment or to speak in Committee. Therefore, unless any noble Lord objects, I beg to move that the order of commitment be discharged.

    Moved, That the order of commitment be discharged.—( Lord Belstead.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Reserve Forces Bill Hl

    4.16 p.m.

    My Lords, I beg to move, that the Bill be now read a second time. This Bill proposes minor amendments to the Reserve Forces Act 1980, which was itself a consolidation of existing legislation on the reserve forces. The Government have many times reaffirmed the importance they attach to the Reserve Forces, and, as my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence announced in June 1981, we expect that they will have an even larger part to play in the collective defence and security of the United Kingdom and NATO in the future. In particular, we plan to increase the strength of the Territorial Army from 70,000 to 86,000 during the 1980s.

    Turning to the Bill, its main provision is to be found in Clause 1, and is to give legal effect to the change of title of the Territorial and Army Volunteer Reserve to the Territorial Army. The designation TAVR dates from the reorganisation of the Army Reserves in 1967. In June 1978, a committee under Major-General Shapland, which had been set up to study wastage in the TAVR, recommended, among other things, that the word "reserve" should be dropped, since this did not reflect its contemporary role, and that the title "Territorial Army" should be readopted. The Government accepted this recommendation on taking office, as was announced by my right honourable friend the present Lord President of the Council on 7th August 1979. This change has been welcomed by the TAVR and its Council, and also, I think, by many noble Lords. I am glad to say that the name "Territorial Army" is now in common usage once more. It does, however, remain necessary to formalise the change by amending the legal title of the Force, established by Section 5 of the Reserve Forces Act 1980. This, Clause 1 of the Bill is designed to do.

    There are a number of other miscellaneous provisions in the Bill which I can explain in more detail if the House so wishes.

    Moved, that the Bill be now read a second time—( The Earl of Avon.)

    On Question, Bill read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure for five minutes.

    Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

    [ The Sitting was suspended from 4.18 to 4.23 p.m.]

    Civil Jurisdiction And Judgments Bill Hl

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

    Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—( Lord Cullen of Ashbourne.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    House in Committee accordingly.

    [The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]

    Clause 1 [ Interpretation of references to the Conventions and Contracting States]:

    moved Amendment No. 1:

    Page 2, line 3, before (" Ireland ') insert ("the Republic of").

    The noble and learned Lord said: In rising to move this amendment, may I apologise to the Committee for the slight procedural hiccup, which was due to the fact that I was informed that there was to be a debate on the Reserve Forces Bill, so I left my outer garments in my office instead of at a convenient place outside the Chamber.

    If I may speak to the first two amendments together and move the first, as I do now, it is purely technical. If the amendment is passed, that will make matters conform with our consistent practice in legislative language, to which I gather importance is attached. The sense remains unaltered. I therefore beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    moved Amendment No. 2:

    Page 2, line 21, before ("Ireland") insert ("the Republic of").

    The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Clause 1, as amended, agreed to.

    Clauses 2 to 14 agreed to.

    Clause 15 [ Interpretation of Part I and consequential amendments]:

    Page 8, line 35, at end insert—

    ("() Save if and in so far as the European Court shall have decided otherwise, where a party seeks relief to prevent the occurrence of any harmful event, that event shall be deemed to have occurred in the place where, but for the grant of such relief, it would have been likely to occur.").

    The noble Viscount said: This amendment concerns a problem which I raised on Second Reading concerning the quia timet injunction and its Scots equivalent. That is an injunction which is designed to prevent somebody who is going to beat somebody up from beating them up; an injunction to restrain somebody from knocking your house down before he knocks it down. This is a type of injunction which the court can now grant against any wrong anticipated to happen in this country. I venture to suggest it is a very beneficial remedy indeed.

    My concern, and the concern dealt with by this amendment, is that if the Bill passes in the form in which it now stands, the courts will no longer be able to give such an injunction if the potential wrong-doer is a person or company domiciled in another contracting state. I understand that the Government agree that the courts of the country should continue to be able to deal with matters of that kind—anticipated wrongs in this country—but is not in so much agreement with me as to how it should happen.

    The problem arises because of the way in which Article 5 (3) of the convention is expressed which gives jurisdiction to the courts of this country over a person domiciled in another EEC country only where this country is the place where the harmful event "occurred"—a word of past significance. My hypothesis is a case where no harmful event has occurred but where a harmful event is anticipated and it is desired to stop that event before it happens.

    For instance, if a lady who has been living with an Italian in Italy, says that the Italian is coming here and is about to beat her up and she wants it stopped, there must be a very substantial risk that the courts of this country will have to say: "I am sorry, no harmful event has occurred here. We cannot do anything until it has happened. Go away. But of course you can go to Italy and sue him there if you like". One difficulty is that in most of these cases the matter is urgent. What one is trying to do is to stop something happening soon.

    We see from the Marshalled List that amendments are to be made to Clause 23 which will improve the situation somewhat in that they will allow the courts of this country to give relief not only where there are existing proceedings abroad hut where the plaintiff in question intends to bring proceedings abroad. So, when those amendments are made, as I hope they will be, the courts in this country will he able to say to the lady I instanced: "We could stop him beating you up, providing you promise to go to Italy and start proceedings as quickly as possible there as well". That may be some improvement, but it will not be much consolidation, and it really seems extraordinary that, if one is saying, "This French company is about to knock down my house", the question of whether it is going to do so or is to be allowed to do so is tried in France rather than here.

    Therefore, while the amendments proposed to Clause 23 and onwards are a good idea, they do not solve the problem of a person having to go to a foreign country and of the courts of that country, rather than of this country, having to decide on a wrong which is threatened over here. I think the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor agrees that there ought to be this jurisdiction, and the question is how to confer it. The Government say, and I agree, that this is ultimately a matter for the European Court. It will have to be decided there one day. If the European Court, contrary to my fear, decides that there is this sort of jurisdiction although no harmful effect has occurred over here, then all will be well. If it decides that there is not, there is nothing at the moment that legislation here can do about it, and one will have to try to renegotiate the convention to confer this jurisdiction. I hope we shall hear that, in those circumstances, the Government would feel minded to push very hard for such a renegotiation.

    The problem arises in the meantime. I say that we must have an amendment which will allow judges in the interim until the matter goes to the European Court to give this relief. I believe that my amendment does give relief. It allows jurisdiction in these matters where the harmful event would be going to a trial in this country but for the injunction sought. I fear that, without this amendment, judges who are asked for an injunction of the kind I have suggested will feel bound to say that they have no jurisdiction and the plaintiff then will be sent away without an injunction.

    In theory, such a plaintiff could go to the European Court, but, in practice, it is inconceivable that he or she will. What they are doing is seeking to stop an immediate wrong happening, and, long before they could get to the European Court, either it will have happened or the fear will have proved unnecessary; but in no circumstances will the plaintiff turned away by the English courts have the interest or reason to go to the European Court and test the matter. Therefore it will never get tested and in effect this jurisdiction will lapse where the defendant, the potential wrongdoer, is a person domiciled in another European country unless the Government say that the first time such a thing occurs they will themselves take the matter to the European Court and find out the answer.

    On my basis, this jurisdiction will continue unless and until the European Court decides otherwise. The Government cannot say it is wrong to have in the Bill any act of provisional interpretation because they already have one. This is not a lawyers' problem, although of course it is a problem in legal language. It is a very real problem. One of the best jurisdictions of the courts is to prevent harm rather than to deal with wrongs when they have happened. In my view, this amendment or something like it is really the only way of dealing with this. I beg to move.

    If I may say so, I think the noble Viscount has raised a very real point of substance in this amendment. I should like, if I may, to support him in his plea for it. The quia timer injunction, as many of us know, is often sought in regard to matrimonial or quasi-matrimonial matters. I say "quasi-matrimonial" to cover cases where one is dealing with a common law wife or husband.

    The situation may well arise where somebody of moderate or indeed very small means has to go to the court in order to try to get this remedy to prevent a very serious tort being committed so far as he or she is concerned. If the requirement were then made that the relief, the injunction, could only be granted subject to an undertaking that proceedings would be taken in a foreign court—and I hope no one will think that we are belittling Italy if we take an Italian court as an example—it would, of course, mean an impossible situation for that applicant to deal with. I stand to be corrected, but I think I am right in saying that it would be quite impossible, for example, to obtain legal aid in support of the proceedings that would have to be brought in Italy. If I am wrong, and legal aid would be available, it would quite obviously mean a most wrong and unfair burden on public funds. I should have thought that, certainly during the interim period that the noble Viscount mentioned, it would be very proper for this amendment to be in the Bill.

    I was very grateful to the noble Viscount—from the location from which he speaks I never know whether I am to call him "the noble Viscount" or "my noble friend" but for the moment I shall call him the noble Viscount—for raising this point on Second Reading. I immediately gave instructions that it should be looked into most carefully. The result is that we have put down later amendments which I am advised will achieve the purpose the noble Viscount has in mind. We all agree that a quia timet procedure is a valuable one—and may I in parenthesis apologise for my pronunciation of Latin? It is the pronunciation I always use in court and it was that which was always used in this country between the 17th century and the time when I first went to school.

    The noble and learned Lord will forgive me, I hope, if I say that from time immemorial at my very saintly and distinguished school, the City of London, the pronunciation was used that I begged liberty to use in this House.

    I was only explaining why 1 called it the quia timer injunction, "and one has to be consistent in these things. One says "bona fide", "prima facie", " quia timet" and things like that, when other and more modern scholars would use a slightly different pronunciation. if I may say so, I am in very good company. I have heard Mr. Harold Macmillan as Chancellor of the University of Oxford use this pronunciation and I know that Warden Sparrow, when he was Warden of All Souls, used it too. I can use all three, but I try to use them consistently.

    The fact of the matter is that this is a very valuable thing and I am advised that my Amendment No. 4 and those that go with it achieve the purpose. I cannot really recommend the actual amendment which the noble Viscount has put forward. It seems to me to have a good deal wrong with it, and I will explain why, in addition explaining why I am advised that it is unnecessary. To begin with, it starts by saying:
    "Save ii and in so far as the European Court shall have decided otherwise".
    That could be contrary, as far as I can see, to the actual terms of the convention, which gives national courts the right to refer any question of interpretation to the European Court. The amendment could well be regarded as preventing United Kingdom courts from themselves referring the question to the European Court but requiring them to exercise the jurisdiction under this amendment until, on a reference from other national courts, the European Court has spoken.

    The amendment then does a very curious thing, from the point of view of draftsmanship. It seems to me to create a kind of stage Irishman's Irish bull, because it says that, where a party seeks to prevent something from happening, the event shall be deemed to have occurred. I think that that is going a bit far, and the consequence from deeming it to have occurred is that an action for damages would then arise, I suppose, for something which had not happened. For example, a non-battered wife, in proceeding for a quia timet injunction, could then proceed for damages for having been beaten when she had not then been beaten. So I do not think that the draftsmanship will quite do.

    The more practical point, which I should like to put for the consideration of the noble Viscount, is that, if he really studies Article 5(3) of the convention itself, he will see that this amendment is not necessary because one of two things must happen. If you can go for quia timet proceedings in, say, the Chancery Division, if that is what is thought, because you think that you are going to have your house knocked down or, if you might be beaten by someone in Italy, either he will obey the injunction or he will not.

    If he obeys the injunction, I suppose that nothing more will happen, because the house will not be knocked down or the wife will not be beaten. But the moment she does get beaten in defiance of the injunction, not only will the person who beats her be liable to be put in prison for contempt of the injunction, but also a tort will have taken place within the jurisdiction here, for which she can bring the substantive action. I can quite well undertake, with a good conscience, that I will look at my own amendments, when they come, in the light of what the noble Viscount has said and see whether they can be improved or whether I have left a gap somewhere. But this particular amendment is one which I hope he will not press to the ultimate of a Division, because I would not be able to support him.

    I shall happily call it a quia timet injunction, or anything else that might persuade the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor to agree with me. I shall also happily stand the ribbing about the wording of my amendment, and will be delighted to discuss with those who advise the noble and learned Lord some better wording; and I see the force of what he has said. Certainly, one could include words so that for the purposes of jurisdiction only, the deeming shall be taking effect, so that you cannot get damages for what has not happened.

    But I venture to doubt that the amendments which are coming, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, answer more than half my problem. As I understand them, all they will do is to allow the court to give interim relief, provided that one is going abroad to have the matter dealt with. What I am saying is that where a French company is about to commit a nuisance by smell which will ruin your property, or to knock down your property, that matter should not only in an interim stage, but in the final stage, be justiciable here and you should not be required to go abroad, having got your interim relief, to have that sorted out abroad.

    Unless I have misunderstood them, none of the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor allow that final decision on the matter to be had here. It is not right, if I may respectfully suggest that to him, to say that either the tort will happen, in which case you will then have a course of action which you can start over here, or the injunction will stop it so that it does not matter. The point is that if the only relief you are seeking is an injunction to restrain a future wrong, you will be able to get interim relief over here only on terms of going abroad.

    It may well be that there is a difference between us not in what we are trying to check, perhaps not even in substance as to how it is best achieved, but as to what the effects of the words are. Therefore, I am happy at this stage to withdraw my amendment. But I remain of the view that this is a matter which needs to be dealt with and, unless the noble and learned Lord convinces me on his subsequent amendments that my criticism of their scope is not justified, I may wish to return to the attack hereafter. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 15 agreed to.

    Clauses 16 to 22 agreed to.

    Clause 23 [ Interim relief in England and Wales and Northern Ireland]:

    4.46 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 4:

    Page 15, line 6, after ("been") insert ("or are to be").

    The noble and learned Lord said: May I speak to Amendments Nos. 4, 5 and 6 together? These are the amendments to which I was referring in my reply to the noble Viscount a moment ago. The first two amendments relate to Clause 23(1). Their purpose is to empower the High Court in England and Wales and Northern Ireland to grant interim relief in cases where substantive jurisdiction lies with the courts of another contracting state and proceedings are to be commenced in that state. At present, the clause gives jurisdiction only where the proceedings have already been commenced there.

    The normal practice, in cases where the High Court has substantive jurisdiction, is that interim relief will not be granted before the issue of the writ. This is reflected in the present wording of the clause. However, provision is made by Order 29, Rule 1(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, whereby in urgent cases the plaintiff may apply for an injunction before the issue of a writ, and in those cases the injunction before the issue of a writ may be granted on terms providing for the issue of the writ and such other terms as the court thinks fit. These amendments will enable a corresponding practice to be followed where the proceedings are to be commenced abroad. This will, for example, enable the High Court to grant an interim injunction quia timet of the kind suggested

    by the noble Viscount on the Second Reading of this Bill; for instance, where a lady in this country wishes, as a matter of urgency, to obtain an injunction against someone domiciled in another contracting state to restrain him from molesting her.

    The amendments will also cover, and this is an additional advantage of them, the issue of, for example, a Mareva injunction—which I am prepared to explain, but I imagine, as I look around me, that those who wish to know what a Mareva injunction is will already do so and that those who do not already do so will not wish to know—to restrain the disposal of a defendant's assets in this country, which could be available to satisfy a judgment of the court in which the proceedings were to be brought, if the High Court considered that there was an imminent danger of their disposal. The amendments cover any case in which proceedings "are to be" commenced in another contracting state. However, it is expected that the power to grant relief will be made subject to Rules of Court on the lines of Order 29, Rule 1(3).

    The third amendment relates to Clause 23(2) which allows the power to grant interim relief to be extended to cases where proceedings are commenced otherwise than in a contracting state. The amendment will secure that (consistent with subsection (1)) the power may be extended also to proceedings which are to be commenced there. Amendments for the same purpose are also being moved to Clauses 24 and 25, but these, happily, relate to Scotland and my noble and learned friend will move them after this. I repeat in this context the assurance which I gave to the noble Viscount in resisting his previous amendment, that I will cause these amendments to be examined afresh to see whether there is or is not the gap which he believes to exist and which at the moment I do not think exists, owing to the terms of Article 5(3) of the Convention. If the gap is found, or if a better method of dealing with the matter is found, I will return happily to the matter at Report. In the meantime, this is the best I can do to meet the point which the noble Viscount very properly raised on Second Reading. I beg to move.

    As these amendments go at least part of the way towards solving the problem which I raised at Second Reading, may I say how grateful I am to the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for giving the matter his attention and for going at least this far to help.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Page 15, line 10, leave out ("the subject-matter of those proceedings") and insert ("they are or will be proceedings whose subject-matter").

    Page 15, line 23, after ("commenced") insert ("or to be commenced").

    On Question, amendments agreed to.

    Clause 23, as amended, agreed to.

    Clause 24 [ Provisional and protective measures in Scotland.]:

    moved Amendment No. 7:

    Page 16, line 17, after ("concluded") insert ("or, in relation to paragraph (c) of that subsection, are to be commenced").

    The noble and learned Lord said: As my noble and learned friend has explained, Amendments Nos. 7, 8 and 9 and also Amendments Nos. 10 and 11 are designed to do for Scotland what is being done for England and Wales by the amendments of Clause 23, and accordingly are designed to meet in part the point which the noble Viscount made at Second Reading. I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Page 16, line 26, leave out ("in relation to") and insert ("in determining whether proceedings have been commenced for the purpose of").

    Page 16, line 28, leave out ("in such proceedings").

    On Question, amendments agreed to.

    Clause 24, as amended, agreed to.

    Clause 25 [ Application of s.1 of Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972]:

    Page 17, line 6, after ("brought") insert ("or are likely to be brought").

    Page 17, line 12, after ("brought") insert ("or were likely to he brought").

    On Question, amendments agreed to.

    Clause 25, as amended, agreed to.

    Clauses 26 to 28 agreed to.

    Clause 29 [ Overseas judgments given against states, etc. ]:

    On Question, Whether Clause 29 shall stand part of the Bill?

    On Clause 29 stand part I am raising a matter of some concern, as I understand it, to the City of London. I am basing my comments on this clause upon a memorandum of a working party of the City of London Solicitors' Company.

    The State Immunity Act 1978, which adopted as part of English law the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity, was much welcomed in the City of London, not least because it brought English law into line with New York law. This meant that New York could no longer have the unfair advantage of submitting that it had a superior system of law for syndicates of banks wishing to enter into a contract to lend money to a sovereign state. May I say, with a depth of professional feeling, that the Act was largely instrumental in stopping a quite serious drift of legal work from London to New York where loans to sovereign states were involved?

    Under the State Immunity Act, once English jurisdiction has been established, a state engaged in a commercial transaction—such a transaction is defined in Section 3 of the Act to include a loan or other transaction for the provision of finance—cannot plead immunity from suit as respects proceedings relating to that transaction. Moreover, under Section 13, once judgment has been obtained against a state, whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, it may be enforced against the assets of the state in the United Kingdom which are in use or intended for use for commercial purposes and, subject to the consent of the state, against the other assets in the United Kingdom.

    So far as central banks who may be engaged in a commercial transaction are concerned, they are similarly not immune from suit. But their assets enjoy a greater immunity from execution than those of the state because a judgment obtained against a central bank, whether in the United Kingdom or abroad, cannot be enforced against any of its assets in the United Kingdom without its consent.

    There is a strong feeling among those whose legal advice is sought by the City's institutions that any legislation which might appear to move backwards from the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity to the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity should be strongly resisted, on the grounds that under the restrictive doctrine, which is that upheld in the majority of developed countries, it is now acknowledged internationally that states which enter into commercial transactions should be liable to suit in the same way as individuals or corporations.

    It is well known that states are more and more involved in commercial transactions. The vast majority of countries borrow foreign currencies in the international market place. Some oil-rich states are lenders to other states as well as being borrowers, while in relation to loans to sovereign borrowers some, but by no means all, lending institutions regard the execution of a judgment as being of less importance than the obtaining of the judgment itself.

    Generally speaking, lenders are not prepared to advance money unless they have a reasonable likelihood of being able to enforce judgment, wherever obtained—and I repeat the words "wherever obtained"—with speed and certainty in the country where the borrower's assets are to he found at the time of default. In a high proportion of international loans nowadays, particularly those where sovereign borrowers or their state organisations arc concerned, the assets of the borrower consist of bank deposits placed in the leading financial centres, and a significant proportion of those deposits is likely to be found in London.

    Whenever a loan agreement governed by English law is made between a syndicate of banks and a sovereign state, the English lawyer is required as a condition precedent to the first borrowing under the agreement to deliver an opinion to the effect that the agreement can he enforced against the state in the manner which I have described. Almost invariably these contracts will contain a submission by the borrower to the jurisdiction of the English courts and a consent by the borrower to the enforcement of any judgment against any of his assets. In such cases, the lenders know that, by virtue of the State Immunity Act, if the sovereign borrower is in breach of contract they will be able to obtain a judgment against it in the English courts and enforce that judgment or any other judgment obtained abroad against any of the borrower's assets in the United Kingdom.

    It is in this respect that many of my professional colleagues are deeply concerned. The provisions of this clause appear to constitute a step backwards towards the absolute doctrine of sovereign immunity. The clause appears to provide, contrary to the provisions of the State Immunity Act, first, that if a judement is obtained against a state in an overseas country it shall not be registered, nor shall a court in the United Kingdom entertain proceedings at common law for the enforcement of that judgment. Secondly, a central bank, which is a separate entity, would only enjoy the immunity to which I have referred in respect of proceedings relating to anything done by it in the exercise of sovereign authority. This presents the English lawyer with the problem that, with Clause 29 in its present form, advice of a qualified nature would have to be given to lenders about enforceability in our courts, and this would normally mean that the transaction would not take place.

    To maintain the legal position created by the State Immunity Act, it would seem necessary to amend Clause 29 to provide that immunity granted under Clause 29 will not apply to judgments obtained overseas against a state relating to proceedings of a kind in respect of which, had the proceedings been started in the United Kingdom, the state could not have obtained immunity from suit under the State Immunity Act. It may also be necessary to add some language to make it clear beyond peradventure that Clause 29(1)(c) does not in any way expressly or by implication derogate from the absolute immunity from execution conferred on central banks by Section 14(4) of the State Immunity Act.

    I should add that there is already considerable protection against the enforcement in the United Kingdom of judgments which have been improperly obtained overseas. To be enforceable in the United Kingdom a judgment obtained overseas must not have been obtained by fraud, must be final and conclusive, must not be contrary to public policy, and must have been obtained in a foreign court competent to entertain the case and to require the defendant to appear before it in the course of proceedings which do not offend against English views of natural justice. It is difficult to see why this degree of protection for defendants should not be just as appropriate for states acting commercially as it has been over many years for private individuals and corporations.

    It could be that from time to time states will complain to the Foreign Office about the enforcement in the United Kingdom of judgments originating overseas from courts which those defendant states believe to have taken jurisdiction in inappropriate circumstances or to have delivered judgment without doing justice in all the circumstances. Surely that is not a good argument for refusing to enforce in those judgments in respect of which jurisdiction was taken entirely properly and in which full justice has been done having regard to the defendant's case.

    I have said enough in regard to this Clause 2(1)(c), and I hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, members of whose office I believe have already had discussions of the most courteous nature with those who are interested in what I have said, will be able to give sufficient assurance as to amendments to be introduced by the Government at a later stage of the Bill to obviate the necessity for others to put down amendments at Report stage.

    Amidst a galaxy of noble and learned Lords, I was privileged to raise my small voice in support of the Bill which subsequently became the State Immunity Act 1978. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, that that Act has been a very important up-dating of British law to bring it to accord with the facts of life insofar as the immunity of sovereign states is concerned, to the great benefit of all in the City. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, would be the first to accept that, important though it has been in preserving the business and the fees of solicitors in the City, it has been even more important in ensuring that the business itself remains in the City, because, when important commercial and financial contracts are concluded, the law by which they are governed tends to determine the place where the business is done. It has certainly been very important indeed to the City that the State Immunity Act should have been passed.

    I want to support very strongly the case which has been made most lucidly by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon for not in the Bill now before us vitiating the improvement of the law made in 1978. It would be very sad if, having done good a few years ago, we should now undo that good to the detriment of many types of business, both financial and commercial, of great size and importance to the City of London. Therefore, I should like to support very strongly the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon.

    I would just like to add my support to the observations which have fallen from the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. There are important commercial interests involved in this clause which were fully discussed when the State Immunity Act 1978 was before this House. At that time the Government showed themselves to be very receptive indeed to the important City and banking interests which were involved, and the Act was substantially amended in order to meet the representations made by those concerned in those interests. I feel sure that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will be no less sympathetic to the same series of points which arise on this Bill.

    I am grateful to all three noble Lords who have raised this point. As they rightly say, my own department has been fully seized with this argument from a fairly early stage. The clause which we are discussing, Clause 29, results from the relaxation in recent years of the rules concerning state immunity. May I at once, wearing for a moment my legal headgear, say that I have always been an enthusiastic "restrictivite" as regards the doctrine of state immunity in relation to commercial transactions. In the law of the United Kingdom as it stands at the moment, these rules are now embodied in the State Immunity Act 1978, but other states have different rules and their courts may assume jurisdiction in proceedings against states in cases in which our courts would have granted immunity. We need to be sure that this country does not have to enforce judgments given against foreign states in cases in which they may feel aggrieved about the foreign proceedings.

    As I have said, representations have recently been made to my department to the effect that this goal can be achieved without going as far as this clause does in preventing enforcement. The question is currently under consideration between my department and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I hope that we shall reach a view about it soon enough to be able to deal with it in this House before we part with the Bill, but I will let both noble Lords who have spoken know what we propose when a view has been formed upon it. I have every sympathy with what they have said, and I hope that by Report stage I shall be in a position to say something about it. At the moment I am not.

    I am sure the House is grateful to the noble and learned Lord, the point. I am sure that in his generosity he will give the information not to just two of the noble Lords who have spoken, but all three.

    Clause 29 agreed to.

    Clauses 30 to 32 agreed to.

    Clause 33 [ Minor amendments relating to overseas Judgments]:

    5.9 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 12:

    Page 20, line 41, leave out ("of law and tribunals").

    The noble and learned Lord said: This is purely a drafting amendment concerning the description of courts whose judgments will be enforceable here under the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, as amended by Schedule 9 to this Bill. At present, Clause 33(1) refers to judgments of,

    "courts of law and tribunals".

    However, Clause 46 provides that in the Act, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression "court" without more includes tribunal, and new Section 11(1) of the 1933 Act as amended by paragraph 5(2) in Schedule 9 makes the same provision. The reference in Clause 33(1) can therefore be safely abbreviated to "courts". In those circumstances, I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Clause 33, as amended, agreed to.

    Clauses 34 to 38 agreed to.

    Clause 39 [ Domicile and seat of corporation or association]:

    moved Amendment No. 13:

    Page 26, line 25, leave out ("is carrying on business") and insert ("has a place of business").

    The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, if I may, I will speak to this and the following amendment in moving this amendment. These amendments make two minor changes to the definition of the domicile of corporations and associations for the purposes of the 1968 Convention and the Act. Clause 39(4) provides that a corporation or association having its seat in the United Kingdom will have its seat in a particular part

    of the United Kingdom in three cases, the three cases being (a) when it has its registered office or some other official address in that part, ( b)when its central management and control is exercised in that part, or ( c)it is carrying on business in that part.

    A corporation or association which is domiciled in a part of the United Kingdom under ( a), ( b) or ( c) may as a general rule be sued in the courts of that part under Article 2 in Schedule 4. Clause 39(5) has a similar effect for the purposes of channelling domicile to a particular place. This is particularly important for Schedule 7 which in Rule 1 provides that in general persons shall in Scotland be sued in the courts for the place where they are domiciled. These amendments replace the references to "carrying on business" where they occur in subsection (4) ( c) and subsection (5) ( c) by the words" has a place of business".

    The use of the expression "carrying on business" is based mainly on the English practice under which process may be served on a foreign corporation if it carries on business within the jurisdiction. However, for this purpose the business must be carried on from a fixed and definite place and the activity must have been carried on for a sufficient time for it to be characterised as a business. Furthermore, the common law has been largely overtaken by the Companies Act 1948, which in Section 412 provides that where an oversea company which carries on business within the jurisdiction fails to register the name and address of a person authorised to accept service of process a writ may be served on the company at any place of business established by it in Great Britain. The emphasis on the company's place of business is echoed in the Scottish practice, under which a corporation is deemed to be resident in Scotland and subject to the jurisdiction of the Scottish courts if it has a place of business and carries on business within Scotland. The essential criterion appears to be the establishment of a place of business rather than the actual carrying on of a business at that place.

    The result is that the existing jurisdiction exercised in each part of the United Kingdom over corporations and associations will be substantially retained if the words "place of business" are substituted for the words "carrying on business" in subsections (4)( c) and 5( c).Furthermore, having a place of business in a country appears more consonant with the notion of a seat than simply carrying on business there. I hope I have made this lucidly plain, and I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    moved Amendment No. 14:

    Page 26, line 34, leave out ("is carrying on business") and insert ("has a place of business").

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Clause 39, as amended, agreed to.

    Clauses 40 to 51 agreed to.

    Schedules 1 to 6 agreed to.

    Schedule 7 [ Rules as to jurisdiction in Scotland]:

    moved Amendment No.15:

    Page 81, line 16, leave out ("other intellectual property") and insert ("other similar rights required to be deposited or registered".

    The noble and learned Lord said: If I may, with the leave of the House, I will explain also Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 at this time. These are drafting amendments which bring the references in Schedule 7 to jurisdiction in matters relating to registration of patents and other similar rights of intellectual property into conformity with those in the convention itself. They make clear that the jurisdiction given by Rule 2(13) of Schedule 7 relates only to those kinds of intellectual property rights which require registration or deposit and not to either copyright or common law rights in industrial property which arise without deposit or registration and in regard to which there seems to be no need for a special rule of jurisdiction. I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    moved Amendment No. 16:

    Page 82, line 38, leave out ("case concerning") and insert ("proceedings concerning the validity of entries in").

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    moved Amendment No. 17:

    Page 82, line 38, leave out ("other intellectual property") and insert ("other similar rights required to be deposited or registered").

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Schedule 7, as amended, agreed to.

    Schedules 8 to 11 agreed to.

    Schedule 12 [ Commencement, transitional provisions and savings]:

    5.17 p.m.

    Page 99, line 6, at end insert—

    ("Provision

    Subject matter

    section 49(1) and Part I of this ScheduleCommencement.
    Section 51Short title.

    Provisions coming into force six weeks after Royal Assent

    2. The following provisions come into force at the end of the period of six weeks beginning with the day on which this Act is passed:").

    The noble and learned Lord said: Perhaps in moving Amendment No. 18, I might speak to Nos. 18, 19 and 21 together. Amendment No. 20 is a slightly different point and I will move that separately.

    The purpose of these amendments is to postpone the commencement of the fixed day provisions listed in Schedule 12, Part I, until six weeks after Royal Assent. The amendments are inspired by a proposal made by Lord Mishcon on Second Reading, in which he will remember, and the Committee will recall, he argued that practitioners and others should have a propor opportunity of seeing what the new law is and what are its implications before it comes into effect. There could also be delays in publication. Some of the provisions listed are purely empowering provisions, for instance, Sections 26, 33 and 37, and it is unlikely that these powers would be exercised for some time after Royal Assent; the others, Sections 29, 30, 31 and 32, are unlikely to affect many cases. But I would agree with the noble Lord that there is really no need to bring them into force immediately. I therefore beg to move.

    I am most grateful for the gracious way in which the noble and learned Lord referred to this amendment and my own humble participation in it by something I said at Second Reading. Will I be forgiven if I express a plea that this is a matter of general application, unless there be special circumstances; namely, that legislation should commence after a reasonable period from Royal Assent, for the very reasons that I tried to give at Second Reading and with which I will not weary your Lordships by repetition?

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    moved Amendment No. 20:

    Page 99, leave out lines 39 to 41 in column 2 and insert ("Repeals consequential on sections 30 and 32.").

    The noble and learned Lord said: As I said, this is a slightly different point. I can describe it, I think, accurately as a purely drafting amendment. Lines 39 to 41 on page 99 in column 2 describe the repeal of Section 4(3) ( b) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 concerning registration of foreign judgments given in breach of an agreement for the settlement of disputes. They should also describe the repeal of the last part of Section 4(2) ( a) ( i) of that Act concerning the effect of appearance abroad to contest the jurisdiction. The former repeal is consequential on Clause 30; the latter is consequential on Clause 32. The amendment substitutes an entry which describes both repeals by reference to these clauses. I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Page 100, line 39, at end insert—

    ("Section 19 and Schedule 7

    Section 19 and Schedule 7 shall not apply to any proceedings begun before the commencement of that section.".)

    The noble and learned Lord said: I beg to move Amendment No. 22. This amendment is designed to make clear that the changes in the rules of jurisdiction of the Scottish courts brought about by Clause 19 and Schedule 7 have effect only in relation to proceedings begun after the clause and schedule are brought into force. The present rules will continue to apply to proceedings commenced before that time. I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Schedule 12, as amended, agreed to.

    Remaining schedule agreed to.

    House resumed: Bill reported with the amendments.

    Unfair Dismissal (Increase Of Compensation Limit) Order 1981

    5.23 p.m.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the draft Unfair Dismissal (Increase of Compensation Limit) Order 1981 be approved. It may be to the convenience of your Lordships if I were to speak at the same time to the draft Employment Protection (Variation of Limits) Order 1981. Both orders were laid before your Lordships on 7th December 1981.

    The Secretary of State for Employment is required to carry out each year a review of the limits relating to certain payments which are made under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, taking account of certain factors laid down in the Act. The limits are the weekly earnings limits which are laid down for the purpose of calculating redundancy payments, the basic and additional unfair dismissal awards and certain debts in relation to the insolvency provisions of the Act; and the daily limit on guarantee payments to workers on short-time and temporary lay-off.

    As part of the autumn 1981 review, the Government consulted a wide range of organisations for their views of what changes, if any, should be made to the limits. In the light of these consultations the Government have decided that all the monetary limits, which are covered by the review, should be increased. They are the limits of payments for redundancy, for basic and additional awards for unfair dismissal, for certain debts payable under the insolvency provisions of the Act, and for guarantee pay. The proposed changes, as set out in the draft order, will come into effect on 1st February 1982.

    The Government have decided that an increase of around 4 per cent. is the maximum increase in the limits which can be justified in present circumstances. The Government therefore propose that the current weekly earnings limit should be increased from £130 to £135. The Government also propose to increase the daily limit on guarantee pay from £8.75 to £9.15. Guarantee pay is payable for five days in a quarter and the Government have decided that this should not be altered. While these increases take some account of the increases in average earnings, they are inevitably strongly influenced by economic and employment considerations.

    The other order for which I seek approval—the draft Unfair Dismissal (Increase of Compensation Limit) Order 1981 revokes the Unfair Dismissal (Increase of Compensation Limit) Order 1979 which set the limit on the compensatory award for unfair dismissal at £6,250. This limit is not subject to annual review, but it may be reviewed from time to time. I should mention that, as in previous years, those who were consulted on the limits covered by the statutory review were also asked for their views on this limit. The Government propose that the upper limit on the compensatory award should be raised from £6,250 to £7,000. It has remained at £6,250 since February 1980, and the Secretary of State considered it appropriate that some account should be taken of the effects of inflation during the past two years. I have deliberately given a fairly brief exposition of these orders which in effect make small adjustments to the existing limits on compensation, and which I think are probably uncontroversial, as I thought that I might be best interpreting the wishes of your Lordships if I were so to do. I beg to move.

    Moved, That the draft Unfair Dismissal (Increase of Compensation Limit) Order 1981 laid before the House on 7th December be approved.—( Earl Ferrers. )

    5.26 p.m.

    My Lords, I am sure that we are grateful to the Minister for his explanation of these two orders which I think he has rightly taken together. As he has reminded us, one is subject to an annual review and the other to a review at various periods, and with the rate of inflation in recent years it might be desirable at some time perhaps in the future to review more frequently than every 12 months. Anyway, I think that he will be relieved to know that we support the orders, but I should like to put one or two questions to the noble Earl.

    As regards the factors which the Minister has to take into account, I understand that they would include the level of earnings and that, of course, would take account of the profitability of firms and employers. So one has to balance the interests of the employers and the employees concerned, especially in cases of unfair dismissal. Secondly, I believe that the general economic situation is a factor; and thirdly, there are other relevant factors.

    In regard to unfair dismissal one must have regard not only to the interests of the employers but the employed as well; and in a time when there are nearly 3 million unemployed the possibility of getting alternative employment is all the more difficult. Those are factors which might be taken into account. The other factor, of course, is to have regard possibly to the levels of redundancy payments. There are two types: the statutory ones which most people receive and there are others running into hundreds of thousands of pounds, as recent publicity has indicated. One might suggest that the level of redundancy payments, unfair dismissal payments and so on should be in relation to those factors.

    As regards the unfair dismissal order which refers to Section 75 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, I notice that the next section, Section 76, refers to compensation payable in respect of sex and racial discrimination. I may presume, I hope, that the levels which the Minister has just indicated to us might also apply to compensation payable in respect of those two forms of discrimination. In the case of sex discrimination there may be some feeling that the lower income levels of many women might justify a lower rate of compensation for unfair dismissal, but I would hope that that is not the case.

    The final question that I should like to put to the Minister concerns consultation. The noble Earl has said that consultations have taken place and I may presume, I hope, that they include consultations with the TUC; the CBI representing the employers; and employees' organisations. With those few comments and one or two questions, I would suggest that we support the order and hope that the factors that I have mentioned might be taken into account in subsequent reviews.

    My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, for the welcome which he has given to these orders. He is, of course, quite correct in his concern about the provisions for dismissal for sex and racial discrimination. The limit, of course, will apply not only to unfair dismissal compensatory awards but to compensation which may be awarded by industrial tribunals in cases where complaints of discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act or the Race Relations Act have been upheld. In both those cases the limits are increased from £130 to £135.

    I certainly take note of the points which the noble Lord made about inflation and the need to review these things more frequently, but, of course, I would give no guarantee as to what would happen in the future. But I understand the point which the noble Lord seeks to make. As regards consultation, of course, the TUC was indeed consulted.

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Employment Protection (Variation Of Limits) Order 1981

    5.32 p.m.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the draft order laid before the House on 7th December be approved.— (Earl Ferrers.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    The Orange Badge Scheme

    5.33 p.m.

    rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what steps are being taken to revise the orange badge scheme for disabled drivers as provided for in the Disabled Persons Act 1981.

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. As we all know, 1981 was the Year of the Disabled, and during that year there was a greatly increased public awareness of the needs of disabled people. The year may be over, but I believe that the genuine public interest and concern for disabled people continues.

    The Government made a very firm commitment in the Disabled Persons Act 1981 to on-going help for disabled people, and in particular it was announced that the orange badge scheme would be revised, and that is the aspect on which I wish to speak tonight; not because I am a disabled person, but because I have been on the other side of this matter for some time in terms of traffic control and the issuing of badges. I think that it is of value at this stage, when the Government are considering the final form that this badge will take, for us to put forward practical points for consideration.

    There is no doubt that the present orange badge has been completely discredited. Everyone ignores an orange badge when they see it because they feel that so few people with them on their cars are actually disabled. I think that this is a great pity and it has been a great disbenefit to the genuinely disabled people who have had such badges. But in some areas the issue of such badges was almost on demand and, of course, this devalued them. It is essential that when it is issued the new badge should have a real value. I, personally, would like to see different colours for disabled drivers or passengers because I think that the situations and needs of positioning a car are somewhat different according to your degree of disability and whether you are driving yourself. Someone else driving you can perhaps go a little further afield. But whatever the arrangements made in that respect, I think it is important, as I have stressed before, that the badge should have a genuine significance.

    I would commend to the Government the type of scheme which is now in operation by Westminster City Council, on which I served for 10 years. They have operated their own white badge scheme since 1958, and it works rather well for the residents of the City of Westminster and for those people who have a need to come regularly into the city. This badge has always been much more selectively issued and only for a limited period of time. The time varies greatly. It can be for as little as two or three weeks, but the maximum is three years. Patients who have needed to attend for some special treatment for just three weeks have been issued with a badge for that period. Another case is that of a young student who wanted to take examinations and he required a special white badge for a disabled person for just two weeks, and he got it.

    Of course, many people need a place where they can park near their work, and unless they could park they would not he able to keep that job. Again, Westminster believes that it is of much greater value for the person with the disabled badge to have the right to park on any meter or in any residents' parking bay rather than in just a disabled persons' bay, because frequently the disabled persons' bays are not where the people wish to be. Surveys have shown that there are certain areas of the city where there is a much greater concentration of white badges than in other areas. A typical case in point is north of Oxford Street, where a great number of people are either attending disabled institutions or are involved in the rag trade there. They have special disabled areas and parking bays in Duke Street, Orchard Street, Marylebone Lane, Vere Street and Leicester Square, but these are fairly limited in number and do not serve the same purpose; they are intended for people wishing to shop in the Oxford Street area.

    However, the assessment before issue of a badge in Westminster is what I think is very important; the criteria are laid down in the Disabled Persons' Motor Vehicles' Regulations 1975. Westminster, to a large extent, follows those criteria. There are some criteria which, if the applicant meets them, do not involve him or her in any questions or examination; the badge is simply issued. Those in particular cover people who already have a special vehicle provided by the DHSS, those who are in receipt of a mobility allowance or the registered blind, although, of course, quite obviously in those cases the permit is for a passenger, not for a disabled driver.

    But other categories may be required to be medically examined. In some cases the evidence is so clear-cut that there is no need for a medical examination and the doctor attached to the council waives the examination. But in other cases the applicant is seen and the badge determined after the patient has been seen. I well remember a patient of my own who suffered a severe virus infection and who was partially paralysed down one side. On paper, in fact, he would not have been granted a badge because it was an unusual virus and the technical terms were not recognised as being a case where there was a need. But when he was examined by the doctor he was immediately given a badge as his disability was great.

    However, the real criterion is not your degree of disability; it is your degree of mobility. You could have lost an arm or have a completely useless arm, and that would not qualify you, in Westminster terms, for a disabled passenger's or driver's badge. The essence of it is whether or not you are well able to walk a considerable distance from your vehicle. The assessment is made on the understanding that anyone who cannot walk 100 yards unaided is considered to be 85 per cent. disabled in terms of mobility, and if that person cannot walk that distance and he or she is either 85 per cent. or even more seriously disabled, then of course he or she gets a badge.

    But there are all sort of cases of people who have had an injury, perhaps a broken leg, who might well need a disabled driver's or passenger's permit for a period of time, but it is not an irreversible condition. After a certain amount of time that person is quite able and mobile, and able to go back to an ordinary driving situation. With the existing orange badge scheme, in other parts of the country, once that orange badge is obtained it just goes on for ever and it remains permanently attached to the rear windscreen of the car, and in fact if the person's children or grandchildren use the car the badge is still there. Sot think the other scheme is a very good one.

    When the review comes up after the three-year maximum, or the shorter period according to the condition of the applicant, then, depending upon the circumstances of the case, it is either an automatic and immediate renewal—such as for someone who had a high degree of irreversible disability—or for someone whose previous medical report had said that it was hoped that within six months, or three years if the permit was given for that time, the person would be fit and well again, there would be a further examination to assess that person's condition at that time.

    Although this seems perhaps a hard and onerous course to adopt, I do not consider that it is. I think that it is a much more fair system than the indiscriminate handing out of badges, which means that those who receive them really can have little use from them and attach little significance to them because of the fact that they are so readily available. If the badge is issued and everyone knows that that person has met certain criteria of disablement, then there is no doubt that it would be much more widely respected.

    But another problem exists. Even if you have your badge and it is the most perfect badge issued under the best possible conditions, what use is it to you if you cannot possibly get anywhere to park? As a member of the Greater London Council, as I presently am, I am very concerned with the complete chaos in London parking at the present time. I do not lay this at the door of the present administration. This has been increasing under all administrations for some time, but it has reached an almost dangerous point at present.

    A survey taken last summer showed that of the cars parked in central London—it was just a one-week survey—over 50 per cent. were illegally parked. Now until the time comes when there is adequate enforcement to stop this illegal parking, it is quite hopeless for anyone to find a proper parking space. In central London, returning briefly to Westminster, 2,600 white badges have been issued to Westminster residents, or people regularly visiting Westminster, and they have always had priorities in parking terms. First, road safety; visibility; dangerous intersections. Road safety has always been first. Secondly, loading and off-loading. It has always been felt necessary to have provision for the business life of the city to continue because that is, after all, what is supporting the whole population. Then, thirdly, the meters, short-term and long-term; and finally, the residents' parking.

    Parking is a major problem throughout the country, and the larger the city the greater the difficulty. There are 10,000 meters in the city of Westminster, and there are over 16,000 resident parking places. If you appreciate that there are 2,600 disablement permits and over 22,000 residents' parking permits, you can see what a fine balance there is already between the number of permits that are issued and the number of places available. So although, when I first started to research this matter, I had hoped to persuade the central London boroughs to accept the use of a national scheme for a disabled badge, I appreciate that the pressure on kerb space in the centre of London makes this particularly difficult. There is of course plenty of off-street parking, but that is of little value to disabled drivers.

    The traffic survey showing that 50 per cent. of people were offending all the time was quite revealing. The GLC estimate that every day in London there are 350,000 vehicles committing an offence in terms of parking. We know that shortage of wardens is one of the factors involved. There is at the moment provision for 1,800 wardens, but actually in post there are only 1,310 wardens. The police estimate that for full enforcement of the present system throughout London 4,000 wardens are needed. But putting aside that 4,000 and coming back to the 1,800 and considering that situation, why are there in terms of traffic wardens 500 good jobs going begging today? There must be something wrong when we read so regularly about the hundreds of thousands of unemployed people only to find out there are 500 immediately available jobs as traffic wardens and no one wants them.

    Of course the chances of getting a parking ticket if you are in London are not great. It is estimated that only 5 per cent. of people now actually pay a penalty. "You might as well risk it" is the word that has got around, "because not many people are likely to catch up with you". Think about the cost if they do catch up with you. Six pounds may seem like a lot of money to someone in a rural area, it might be a deterrent; but £10, as it is going to be in London, does not really mean very much when you realise that the two new leaders of our famous alliance had a recent simple lunch, as it was described, and the cost was nearer £40 than £30. This really means that £10 for your parking facility is not so disproportionate.

    Instead of meeting for lunch, perhaps to do important business, as we hope, let us look at some other people who instead are spending their day in a Mayfair gambling club. Well, if you are going to gamble all day, £10 at risk for your meter is not too great. And you gamble a bit further because you believe that if you can outwit the fixed penalty officer for six months and one day, you have got away with it and you are not paying anything.

    We must ask the Government to introduce rapidly the wheel clamp in central London. I am convinced that that would be effective as a means of enforcement. When I was vice-chairman of planning for part of London in recent years I tried then to have this wheel clamp review. Now I understand, from parliamentary answers that have been given on this matter, that it is reaching a much closer examination. I would urge the Government to introduce an experimental use of wheel clamp in central London as soon as possible. Because as the word has got around that it is a nuisance for you to park but you can do it and get away with it and risk it, so the word will get around that it is a much greater nuisance if you go back to get in your car and you cannot move it because it has been immobilised with a wheel clamp attached to the wheel. I find it interesting that what was originally called the "Denver shoe" because it was American, is now being Anglicised and called a "Bulldog;" but it is the same thing, the wheel clamp that goes on your car.

    Towing away is generally effective. As a magistrate I have seen this clearly very often. But no one is too worried about the fine. They just send in a written plea of guilty and pay it, or just pay it at the cheaper rate earlier. But if someone's car has been towed away it is an extreme inconvenience and nuisance to them and they really think twice about placing their car somewhere where it will happen again. I believe that the same thing would happen with the wheel clamp. It would be effective.

    On the other side of the coin, there are far too many quite unnecessary parking restrictions throughout the whole of London. If I have seen them throughout London, then I am sure other people who know different areas see them just as clearly there. About two years ago the GLC asked all the London boroughs to review the existing parking restrictions and to inform them where they would like to apply for a change in traffic order to remove unnecessary restrictions. Only about six boroughs responded, but in the area in which I live Saturday restrictions have been removed completely. That has been great for the people living there. Whereas in the past everybody had to pop out early in the morning to put money in a meter or move the car to another spot, now anybody who is not working on Saturday can enjoy their weekend time at home, and it has had the great merit of freeing the wardens from that area so that they can work in other areas where they are really needed because of traffic conjestion. It has taken an unnecessary restriction off residents using local streets at weekends and has transferred the wardens' commitment elsewhere.

    In my constituency we have a particular problem because we are at the very end of the Piccadilly line. It means that many commuters coming from outside London leave their cars in the local streets all day as well as in the local shopping centres. Any disabled person living near Cockfosters Tube Station has no way of getting to the local shops because of so many cars being parked there all day. A scheme is gradually evolving—the first part be implemented soon, after which I hope it will be extended to the Cockfosters area—by which, to avoid all-day parking, there will be introduced a one-hour restriction during the day. That restriction will not be a nuisance to local people or those who wish to come and go, but it will prevent indiscriminate, all-day commuter parking. That will be a valuable scheme for people and it will certainly help my disabled constituents.

    To sum up, ask the Government to introduce a disabled badge which will be honoured and supported by the public and will mean something to other drivers; one that will mean something to those who have the badge, in that it will be of real significance because it will be of value and will enable them to park. I ask the Government to encourage the traffic authorities to urge all who can to reduce unnecessary parking restrictions which have grown out of all proportion and to enforce existing necessary parking restrictions. Finally, I urge them to bring in rapidly the experimental use of the wheel clamp.

    5.53 p.m.

    My Lords, I wish at the outset to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, for asking this important Question tonight, and wish briefly to support her in pressing it on the Government. We listened with interest to her description of the Westminster scheme, and we know that she has considerable experience and knowledge in this sphere. The orange badge scheme is valuable but, as the noble Baroness said, there is no doubt that, owing to abuse of it, public confidence in it has declined.

    Those of us who want to see the scheme preserved and the abuses eliminated welcomed the inclusion in the Disabled Persons Act 1981 of the separate offence of misuse of an orange badge by a non-entitled person. We also welcomed the Government's intention to introduce regulations revising the conditions of the scheme. In the consultations which preceded the production of the draft regulations, the Government were ready to go some way to meet the views on a number of points of the All-Party Disablement Group and other organisations representing the disabled. For example, eligibility is not now to be restricted to those receiving mobility allowance, as was thought would be the case originally; the rear badge is to be abolished; and the form of the badge is to be modified so that it can easily be removed when no disabled person is travelling in the car.

    Nevertheless, the All-Party Disablement Group are still concerned about certain aspects of the regulations. The group want slightly broader criteria for eligibility; there is concern that the interpretation of the phrase, "Very considerable difficulty in walking" will be too strictly limited. This will depend, suppose, to a considerable extent on the nature of the advice which is given by the Department of Health and Social Security to local authority social services departments.

    The group also want a standard system of progressive warnings for the misuse of the badge. This, the Government fear, would be too complicated, but the object of the group is to see that persistent offenders are penalised. The group also feel that the two-hour time limit for parking is unreasonable, particularly as in Scotland there is no such time limit and the system seems to work there effectively. The group have called for effective motitoring of the revised scheme, and the Government have promised that it will be monitored in that way, and it will certainly need such monitoring.

    To me, the main omission from the Government's proposals is the question of differentiating between passengers and drivers, a matter to which the noble Baroness referred. It could be done in different ways, but we must bear in mind that often abuse arises because non-disabled drivers benefit from possession of the badge for parking purposes when the are not carrying disabled passengers. The ways in which this distinction might be achieved are, as the noble Baroness suggested, by having different colours for the badge, or possibly it could be done by overstamping badges with "D" for driver or "P" for passenger, or perhaps the addition of a coloured flash on the basic badge might be the way to differentiate. I am convinced that some provision of that kind would tackle directly what is probably the most widespread form of abuse.

    A further suggestion that has been made is that photograph of the badge-holder might be attached to the badge, which would make clear to whom the disability related. This is already common practice with concessionary fares for disabled persons and might therefore be acceptable. It would however be more controversial than the previous suggestion of distinction between driver and passenger, and I think the latter suggestion, that there should be some differentiation in the badges, might make the photograph proposal superfluous.

    We on these Benches are anxious to see the orange badge scheme preserved and widely accepted, and we should like to know from the Government how near they are to the production of the regulations in their final form. I hope that in answering the Question the Minister will be able to tell us that, because the sooner the regulations can be implemented the better.

    5.58 p.m.

    My Lords, we should all be grateful to my noble friend Lady Gardner for having asked this Question of the Government today. It is timely to seek information from Ministers about the progress being made in revising the present schemes. Lady Gardner spoke, as a magistrate and councillor, from her experience. I hope to make a contribution on the Question regarding the effects on disabled people. I think your Lordships know of my interest and involvement, as a Minister over several years, in this subject. My noble friend mentioned the recent international year, and have been the chairman for Scotland of that year and the only chairman of the four in Parliament. I suppose must also declare an interest, being in the category of 80 per cent. war disabled, both legs having been affected by a bullet through my middle.

    I would start by saying that the ability for a severely disabled person to live a normal life can be greatly assisted by motor transport. I speak here of the kind of person who can walk only a short distance or not walk at all. In the last four years there has been great progress in helping such people, and I refer to the introduction of the mobility allowance and the Motability scheme, which have both come into force in the last five years. I shall not go into those matters in any detail but I think that the House would like to know that over 11,000 cars are now on the road in this country as a result of the Motability arrangements in only the last four years. That is excellent news.

    But the benefit to severely disabled people who cannot walk, or who can walk only a few paces, is much reduced if they are unable to park at, or very close to, their destinations. The 1970 Act, the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act, was the legislation which enabled local authorities to introduce the orange badge schemes, and as noble Lords will know, the badge has the wheelchair symbol on it.

    It has been said that there are two acute anxieties which oppress western civilisation. The first is the threat of nuclear war arising from Soviet imperialism, and the second is the parking problem. This afflicts both the able bodied and the disabled. Therefore, it is of concern to the whole community that any scheme which operates for the benefit of severely disabled people should not be open to abuse. As has already been said by my noble friend, unfortunately, through nobody's particular fault, the orange badge schemes have fallen into some disrepute, because they are open to widespread abuse. They must be improved.

    What happened was that local authorities who had the power to issue the badges started by issuing them very generously. They were too kind; and one must remember that the badge is valid not only in the area of the local authority, but all over the country, with the exception of central London, which I shall come to later. Therefore, some local authorities might have felt that they could be kind in their own areas, which perhaps were very rural and did not have parking problems. But this must be tightened up in the future.

    I would remind the House that the intention of the orange badge scheme is to relieve those severely disabled people who qualified for it from the payment of parking charges. That is basically what it is supposed to do, but in practice it also confers considerable privileges. Although, as has been stated, there is no limit in Scotland, the position varies in other areas. Certainly there is a limit of two hours in parts of England. But in practice wardens have allowed cars with orange badges to be parked more or less continuously at a meter or in places reserved for residents, though the orange badge holder probably is not a resident of the area. Wardens have even been known to exercise discretion to allow cars with organge badges to be parked on a continuous yellow line, though that is not part of the privilege for which the scheme was designed.

    The system has fallen into disrepute because it has been too difficult for able-bodied people using a car after a disabled person has used it to bother to take off the badge. I believe that most of the abuse has arisen unintentionally in that way—though there may have been some intentional abuse as well—and this has meant that a car might have been parked in a privileged position with an orgage badge in place when on the day in question it was not in fact assisting the severely disabled person for whom the badge was intended.

    I would suggest that in any new general scheme guidelines should include the following points, which I believe are of great importance. First, a higher degree of disablement should be laid down as the minimum for eligibility for a badge. The main consideration should be that the person is not able to walk more than a short distance. This consideration need not be related to the use of the legs. There can be severely disabled people with respiratory diseases who can walk only a very short distance. I should like to give an example here. There can be severely disabled people who are deaf or deaf and dumb, and they are handicapped in many ways, but they do not need a parking badge. So local authorities should not issue them simply to everybody who is more than 50 per cent. disabled, which has been the case in some areas.

    The second point is that the name of the disabled person must appear on the badge and the defined period of validity of the badge. This has been done by many local authorities and so I should not wish to appear to be criticising them all. Certainly some local authorities in Scotland have done this from the very beginning of the scheme in the early 'seventies. But it has been left to each local authority to do more or less what it wished in this respect.

    Thirdly, the badge must be removable when the disabled person is not using the vehicle. Of course this is made easier if a special holder which adheres to the windscreen is issued at the same time as the badge, and that, too, is being done by a number of local authorities. Then I should also mention the square badge consisting of a sticker which, once put on the vehicle at the back, cannot be removed. I am glad to hear—no doubt my noble friend on the Front Bench can confirm this later this evening—that the Government have already decided that in the guidelines that type of badge will be abolished, since it does not add anything so far as parking is concerned and it has been thoroughly misleading to the general public.

    My fourth point is that once the new system is in operation police and wardens should be encouraged to do more checking as to who is using the car if it is parked in a privileged place with a badge on the windscreen. There should be a better system of checking and taking action if it is found that the badge is being abused. The badge should be in place only when nominated disabled people are using the vehicles in question. It is in the interests of disabled people that the system should be tightened up. It is only when the public as a whole have the greatest confidence in the system that it will be of the most use to disabled people. It will be a real help to the severely disabled if it is accepted by the rest of the public as operating strictly and fairly.

    I should like to add one comment about the square sticker on the back of the car. When this matter was mentioned by me in the House in the Summer, the noble Baroness, Lady Masham of Ilton, pointed out that once, when driving alone on a motorway, she had had to stop, and being unable to get out of her car on her own, she had no way of indicating distress. Her car had broken down. A lorry driver had stopped because he noticed the square sticker on the back. So I would add the point that there might be a case for some kind of separate sticker on a vehicle, indicating that a car is being used by a disabled person who is unable to get in or out of it without assistance. But if there were to be such a sticker, it should be an entirely different colour, since it would have nothing to do with parking. I would add that this might have some additional benefits. If, for instance, more self-service petrol stations are opened where there are no attendants there to help, it can be very difficult for a driver who is normally confined to a wheelchair and unable to get out of a car and serve petrol to herself or himself.

    I now come to the question of central London. As my noble friend Lady Gardner said, at least three authorities in central London do not accept the orange badge scheme. They are the Cities of London and Westminster, the Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, and part of Camden. A number of disabled people have criticised this, and may feel that those councils are being beastly. I would take this opportunity to say that I disagree entirely with that. I recognise that the centre of a capital city, which is a catchment area for many millions of people, cannot, with the orange badges being issued so freely as they have been, allow a situation in which any number can come in and park in the centre. I accept that, and I think this has to be considered as part of changes in the schemes.

    May I give an example? Two or three weeks before Christmas people would drive a hundred miles to London to do their Christmas shopping if they felt they could park somewhere in the middle of London, next door to a shop, with an orange badge. If, then, for that reason or for people coming up to London for other reasons besides shopping, the centre of London's available parking space was more or less all filled by orange badges, that would bring even more disrepute upon the scheme. So I myself recognise that there is a problem where the centre of a city is concerned. The system would become extremely unpopular if it were to give encouragement in that direction.

    These central London councils have their own, stricter schemes. My noble friend Lady Gardner described the Westminster one; the other ones are similar. The Westminster white card system is based on 85 per cent. disability or medical examination, to put it very briefly. I thought my noble friend Lady Gardner was suggesting that those standards should be adopted for the whole country in any new scheme, the guidelines for which the Government are expected to issue. I am not myself sure whether that can in fact be possible. I think that if it were possible to have one set of standards for the whole country that would certainly make life easier for disabled people, and probably for the public. But for the reason have just given it may always be necessary to have some tighter scheme in the centre of big cities, and particularly in the centre of London. Otherwise the standards might be too restrictive for other parts of the country.

    I look forward to the reply from my noble friend at the end of this debate. I hope he will be able to tell us how far the Government have proceeded in the reforms that we are expecting. A comprehensive scheme for the whole country administered by local authorities is of great importance in assisting severely disabled people. The present schemes are causing irritation and frustration, whether the abuse of them is arising intentionally or unintentionally. It is clear that improvements can be made. The Government must give the guidance and directions which are needed; and a new system should be introduced soon.

    6.13 p.m.

    :My Lords, as a disabled driver for 22 years I should like to thank Lady Gardner of Parkes for this opportunity to discuss Her Majesty's Government's plans to revise the orange badge scheme. There are some rumours being circulated which cause alarm among some disabled drivers and other road-users, and this has been confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Banks, tonight. The abuse by able-bodied people of the orange badge has been a reflection of selfishness by some members of our society, but this is the sorry state of the present-day situation. Therefore, as said at the time that the Disabled Persons Bill 1981 passed through your Lordships' House, it was a very necessary move to tighten up on the allocation of the badge and to penalise people for the wrongful use of the badge and for parking in a place reserved for a disabled person.

    My Lords, I am very often a disabled driver, but am also sometimes a disabled passenger. The problems are different. If I stay in an hotel overnight by myself, it is often impossible to park the car in a garage and then cross a dangerous road, to be met by an impossibly high kerb. I have to leave the car near where I am staying. If, however, I am with, perhaps, my noble kinsman, he can drop me and go and park the car. He as a helper needs some indentification. Once he had gone into the hotel where we had been staying to fetch our suitcases in the morning, and I was waiting inside. When he came out there was a policeman ready to pounce.

    Many towns now have streets which are closed to private cars, and only taxis and buses are allowed down them; for example, Oxford Street in London. A disabled person might have to go down such a street. Would the Government look into this situation and see what can be done for a disabled person and their helper, should they have one?

    What really concerns me is the rumour that badges should be displayed only on the front of cars—and this has also been discussed tonight by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy. I would totally agree with him that the disabled driver should have some sign and the disabled passenger should not. As a disabled driver who often drives alone, I think such an idea is ridiculous. On two occasions over the years I have broken down, once on the A1, when a lead came off the inside of my engine, and once when I had a puncture on the M1 motorway. After about half an hour of trying to attract someone's attention on the A1, when I could not get out of the car as there is no hard shoulder on the A1, a lorry driver stopped to help me. He said, "I saw from behind that you were disabled and alone. That is the only reason I stopped to help you". He in fact had to stop another lorry to help him.

    Another reason I feel so strongly about a clear sign which can be seen from behind is because if there is a pile-up, which there so often is on the motorway —in fact, there was a massive one today—and the disabled driver happens to be in one of the cars, someone may come and help more quickly if they can see a disabled sign. In a state of fire this could be a really terrible situation, and the disabled person could be left there to burn to death.

    My Lords, the train strike and the appalling weather conditions have made me even more aware of this need. Without warning there is now to be no train on which to return to Yorkshire tomorrow morning. I have to go home by road. It may be that on Monday I shall have to drive down through floods, ice, fog or snow. If I did not have my car well signed from behind, there would be no way of telling I am disabled should I need help. Another reason why I think cars should be signed from behind is that it may be that those people who drive very close behind the car in front will allow a wider space if they see the badge. Disabled people's hand controls can be very sensitive. Far too many cars drive on each other's tails, causing more accidents. I am not saying that disabled people do not drive as well as anyone else, but they would not be disabled if they did not have something amiss.

    My Lords, my last reason for the need for a clear sign from behind is that when a disabled person has parked the car, if other able-bodied people see the car parked in a convenient place they will go and park there, too. People tend to be like sheep. They will then say, "I did not know that car belonged to a disabled person". Very often people do not look at both ends. If some people do not want to have a sign on the back, then let them choose.

    I have discussed this matter with taxi drivers, people who do the work on the hand controls of cars, police and the general public. They feel the same as I do. Clear identification of the users and the vehicles is, in my view, a necessity; also a humane approach from people in authority to those people who need their help, the severely disabled members of our society. It must not be forgotten that there are some people who sometimes have a short-term disablement and who need help. This could be a fractured femur or the result of a stroke or a respiratory or heart problem. Perhaps the Government could consider a different coloured badge to run for six months and a badge that can identify their cars. I think that people should carry a rail card for the long-term disabled. I carry a rail card, a House of Lords card and a prison card. One more card would make no difference. If the scheme is to work, it should be done properly. I have severely disabled friends from Ireland, France, Italy and Austria. Their needs are the same. Is it not time, now that we have a United Europe, that we should have a European disabled parking badge?

    6.21 p.m.

    My Lords, I congratulate humbly my noble friend Lady Gardner of Parkes for putting down this Unstarred Question. Those of us who hold orange badges have responsibilities. We should be aware of our privileges and not try to obstruct others and to be sensible about it. But I find it bothering for those of us who are holders of that badge that it still can remain on a car without suitable identification of the holder. The badge should be related to the disabled person concerned. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Banks, I feel that a photograph as used in your Lordships' House is the best answer. It may be that any such scheme will cause more trouble for those of us who are entitled to have our badges because we shall have it challenged for proof of eligibility; but in order to retain the credibility of the orange badge scheme, it is so worth while.

    We must get rid of the abuses of the scheme. It not only brings the law into disrepute but it reduces the strength of our case. Everybody appears to be climbing on to our bandwagon. It is said to be possible to remove the orange badge when one is not using the car. I can assure your Lordships that this calls for very agile arms and hands and for strong fingernails and lots of time. The ability to park a car for those of us who are immobile is very important. It is not only important for those of us who are passengers but also for our drivers and helpers who are good enough to hump us about. I can assure your Lordships that I am conscious of the fact that my life course is littered with the slipped discs and hernias of people who are good enough to help me. I consider that the helpers of disabled people deserve all the help that they can get about car parking. To make watertight the rules on eligibility is essential for the protection of this parking law. I humbly suggest that the clearest method of identification should be used and I, personally, cannot think of a clearer method than by photograph.

    6.24 p.m.

    My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Gardner for her persuasive manner in introducing this matter and to the other speakers for their comments on the orange badge scheme. The Government welcome the opportunity to tell the House about the steps that are being taken to improve the operation of the scheme and to eliminate abuse. I do not think there can be any doubt about the value of the scheme in helping severely disabled people to live more active lives and do many things which most of us take for granted. The Government are determined to ensure that these people should continue to benefit to the fullest possible extent.

    As the House knows, the scheme operates under the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970 and under Regulations made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport. The scheme is administered by local authorities, usually the social services departments, who issue badges to people who satisfy the criteria laid down in the regulations. The House may be interested to know that at the last census of badgeholders in 1976, some 220,000 badges had been issued. All the indications are that the present figure is much higher, probably in the region of half a million.

    Unfortunately, as we have heard tonight there have been many complaints in recent years about abuse of the scheme; particularly about the number of able-bodied people taking advantage of the concessions. This abuse stems partly from the fact that issuing authorities in some areas have taken a very liberal view of the eligibility criteria and partly in cases where able-bodied friends and relatives of badge holders use badges for their own purposes. Whatever the origin of the abuse, severely disabled people are understandably annoyed when they see people without apparent disability using badges to occupy the parking spaces they need. This widespread abuse also tends to bring the scheme into disrepute in the eyes of ordinary motorists and puts at risk the sympathetic treatment which disabled people should expect from it.

    In the light of criticism, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State's Department reviewed the scheme and proposed a number of changes designed to ensure that badges are issued only to those who really need them and to eliminate abuse, particularly by people not entitled to the concessions. Following extensive consultation with interested bodies, including organisations representing the disabled, a package of measures to improve the scheme has emerged. The changes were announced in the other place by my right honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport on 30th July. The measures include, first a new offence for misuse of badges by able-bodied people, and this was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Banks, and, secondly, new regulations which will define more clearly the categories of people entitled to badges, strengthen the powers of local authorities to refuse to issue new badges and enable them to recall existing ones where the holder persistently abuses the scheme. Thirdly, local authorities will be provided with further guidance about the issue of badges and about the administration of the scheme generally. They will be asked to discontinue the issue of "non-statutory" rear badges which have been a source of complaint, and will be encouraged to provide transparent adhesive containers to permit badges to be removed more easily from the windscreen when not in use. Finally, applicants for badges will also be issued with a new explanatory leaflet emphasising their obligations as well as their privileges.

    The first step in the implementation of the proposed changes has been the inclusion of a provision in the Disabled Persons Act 1981, which came into force last October, to make misuse of badges by non-entitled people a separate offence with a maximum penalty of £200. The offence is not subject to the fixed-penalty system so people who engage in this selfish practice will appear before magistrates.

    So far as the new regulations are concerned, interested bodies have already been consulted on the draft proposals and their responses are now being considered by my right honourable friend. Under the proposals, entitlement to a badge will in future be confined to recipients of mobility allowance, the blind, those using vehicles supplied by Government departments or receiving grants towards their own vehicles, and to other people with a permanent and substantial disability which causes very considerable difficulty in walking. This should simplify the task of issuing authorities because, apart from the last category, where we would expect medical advice to be sought in the more difficult cases, entitlement would be virtually automatic.

    It is intended that the regulations will also provide for the introduction of a new design of badge with the date of expiry made much more prominent. The new design should make it much easier for disabled people to use the adhesive containers which we are asking local authorities to supply; and for the police and traffic wardens to spot badges that have expired.

    As I said earlier, the regulations will also strengthen the powers of local authorities to refuse to renew a badge and to require the return of an existing badge where the holder has persistently abused the concessions. The vast majority of badge holders recognise that, apart from the privileges involved, the orange badge also carries an obligation to obey the rules, and it is only right that those people who persistently abuse the concessions or allow able-bodied people to use their badges should be penalised. We appreciate, however, that loss of a badge may be a very serious blow to some disabled people. Authorities will therefore be advised to exercise their powers with restraint and in all cases to warn the individual concerned about the likely consequences of his actions.

    In addition to these changes, it is also proposed to increase the discretionary fee which local authorities may charge for issuing a badge from £1 to £2. The present fee, which is intended to recoup some of the cost of administering the scheme, has remained at £1 since 1975 and, given that the badge remains valid for three years, we consider that the proposed increase is not unreasonable. As I have said, responses to the consultation on the draft regulations are being considered by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, and I cannot, of course, anticipate his decision on the details. I can, however, assure the House that all the points made here today will be carefully considered before any final decisions are made.

    Here, I must say how opportune it is that my noble friend should have proposed the debate this evening as it is the intention to make the regulations fairly soon. Even after they are made of course it will take a few months for them to come into operation. This is to give local authorities the opportunity to adjust to the changes and to acquire supplies of new badges and adhesive containers.

    If I may now turn to one or two specific proposals that have been made during the course of the debate, my noble friend Baroness Gardner, the noble Lord, Lord Banks, and my noble friend Lady Masham of Ilton all suggested that there should be separate and distinctive badges for drivers and passengers. This is a suggestion that has been made on previous occasions in response to consultation on the orange badge scheme and it is fair to say it has some measure of support.

    There are arguments either way. In favour of the suggestion it has been said that separate badges would deter able bodied drivers from taking advantage of the concessions when they are not using the car on behalf of a disabled passenger and that it would be easier for the police and traffic wardens to identify offenders.

    Against this, it is not uncommon for some disabled drivers to travel as passengers in other people's cars. They would qualify for both badges thus increasing the number of badges in circulation and perhaps even the scope for abuse. Moreover, there are doubts about whether the proposal would really aid enforcement as in many cases the police would still have to wait by an empty vehicle until the driver returned in order to establish identity. It should then be fairly easy under the present system to check whether the driver is the person named on the badge.

    I understand that the Joint Committee on Mobility for the Disabled have expressed strong opposition to the proposal, partly because they see the introduction of a two-tier system as the first step on the road towards reduced concessions for passengers. On balance, at the moment the department consider that the present arrangements provide a useful flexibility and we have not felt justified in including the proposal for separate badges in our package.

    The noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, mentioned the Westminster white badge scheme. This is a success story and the method has been considered. I was also very interested in her informed remarks on central London parking. However, as we are getting more international—which I shall come to later—I am not at all sure whether central London parking should not be considering to become a little more national itself.

    The gradation of badges with different colours was also mentioned. This was one of the points of the noble Lord, Lord Banks. We doubt whether it is necessary to distinguish between different categories of severely disabled people. Under the present rules, badges should only be issued to the blind and to people with a permanent and substantial disability which causes considerable difficulty in walking. We believe that all those people are in need of the full benefits of the parking concessions provided by the scheme. It is important that all badge holders should be seen as people who need assistance and that their needs should be respected by other road users.

    Some remarks were made about the problems faced by issuing authorities. We appreciate that authorities have a difficult task in identifying those who are entitled to badges, particularly where the disability of applicants is not immediately apparent. We also recognise that the authorities have to cope with traffic problems that may be caused by large numbers of cars displaying orange badges and parking on yellow lines in particular areas. The Department believe that the changes we have in mind should greatly ease these problems.

    The new eligibility criteria should make it easier for authorities to ensure that badges go only to those who really need them and the measures to tackle misuse of badges should deter able-bodied people from taking advantage of the concessions. This should reduced the amount of yellow line parking and thus assist other road users. Additionally, we shall be giving authorities comprehensive advice on how the rules should be administered, and we believe that this will ensure a more uniform approach throughout the country.

    So far as parking is concerned, particularly in central London—and this was again raised by my noble friend Lady Gardner—we recognise that there is far too much illegal parking in London. It hampers access and contributes to congestion. The House has an opportunity to debate this issue next Wednesday, so I do not propose to say very much tonight. I can assure the noble Baroness that considerable efforts are being made by the Metropolitan Police to recruit more wardens, and numbers are gradually increasing. Until full establishment is reached, it is rather academic to discuss the ideal number of wardens, but establishment will be kept under review in the light of operating experience as numbers grow. It is essential to the enforcement process that fixed penalty notices are effectively followed up, and legislation to improve the fixed penalty system will be brought forward this Session which will substantially strengthen the disincentives to illegal and irresponsible parking.

    A word, too, on wheel clamps. As I believe the noble Baroness is aware, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport is at present consulting interested organisations on the possible use of wheel clamps to immobilise illegally parked vehicles. The consultation period ended—again very aptly—yesterday, and responses from representatives of disabled people are among those being considered. I rather presume that if they are going to be rejected they will be called Denver clamps. If they are going to be accepted they will probably be called Bulldog clips, but I do not know.

    So far as temporary badges are concerned, I should say that the orange badge system was from the outset designed to cater only for people with permanent disabilities. The All-Party Disablement Group would, I know, like eligibility to be extended to other groups such as those who have had an arm amputation, those who have difficulty in carrying, or perhaps the mentally-handicapped. The scheme is, however, under considerable pressure and any extension would, I believe, lead to claims from other groups such as epileptics and agoraphobics.

    Any considerable extension of a scheme with about half a million of people already in receipt of badges could well make it less workable. We did consider a system of progressive warnings. But, as I said earlier, we believe that it is better to ask local authorities to have the final say on withdrawal rather than make any system of progressive warning law.

    On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, I should say that the design of a badge and the information to be included is prescribed by regulations and is not linked to the discretion of local councils.

    My Lords, I am afraid I was trying to give a very brief account of what had happened since the Act of 1970. What is happening now is much better than what was happening in the 1970s. The earlier regulations in various parts of the country did not originally require this or the local authorities were not carrying it out.

    My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. I am sure that he will find that, when the new regulations are in force, the system will be even more improved. Before the regulations do come into force, local authorities will be given comprehensive guidelines. I have noted Lord Campbell of Croy's five points. I will ensure that they are taken into consideration. They will be asked to exercise restraint in issuing badges and to ensure that badges go only to people who genuinely come within the prescribed criteria. They will also be asked to discontinue the issue of rear badges which have given rise to a good deal of complaint.

    Here perhaps I could say a word to my noble friend Lady Masham of Ilton. The point is that the rear window badge will mean "invalid" so far as parking attendants are concerned. Having listened to her plea tonight, I cannot really see why there should not still be some sign in a rear window which would not of course have any validity when it comes to parking or in law. I will bring her remarks to the attention of the department.

    As the House will appreciate, there are conflicting interests in this field and we recognise that the proposals may not please everyone. The problem has been to strike a fair balance between the needs of disabled people and other road users. We believe that the measures proposed go a fair way towards doing this and that they will achieve a wide measure of support, particularly among disabled people.

    Finally, it may assist the House to know of the measures recently announced by my right honourable friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport, designed to help orange badge-holders with their parking problems when they take their cars to other European countries. In future, holders of orange badges who visit countries which provide parking concessions for their own disabled citizens will be able to take advantage of the concessions provided by the host country by displaying their orange badge. The concessions vary from one country to another but they usually allow for an extension of the time limit where waiting is restricted and an entitlement to use special parking places reserved for disabled people. This international recognition of the orange badge follows a recommendation of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport that member countries operating national schemes of parking concessions, should make reciprocal arrangements for disabled people. Some 12 countries are taking part in the exercise, which should be of considerable benefit to orange badge-holders who travel abroad on business or pleasure. The arrangements have also been extended to Northern Ireland so that the separate orange badge scheme operating there is now open to badge-holders from Great Britain. Full details of the concessions in the participating countries have been made available to disabled and motoring organisations.

    The international co-operation which has enabled these arrangements to be achieved shows a widespread willingness to cater for the needs of disabled people throughout Europe. The awareness of the problems they face transcends national boundaries and the measures mark the continuing efforts to help the disabled which the International Year of Disabled People fostered. I hope that this international spirit will continue to flourish and that our efforts to improve the orange badge scheme at home will lead to a fair and balanced scheme which other countries will wish to emulate.

    May I reiterate before closing that all the comments and suggestions made in this debate are in time for consideration with regard to the regulations and guidelines, and will indeed be carefully processed. The orange badge scheme represents an ongoing commitment to the disabled and I hope that what I have said tonight will underline the Government's continuing interest.

    My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down—I know he has given a very detailed reply to the various points already—is he able to comment on the point which has been raised regarding the two hours restriction on parking? This would appear to to be most unreasonable and must present problems, particularly when attending places of entertainment.

    My Lords, I have not actually replied to it because, as I said before, I am not quite sure what the regulations do contain; but what has been said tonight will be taken into account and if it is not in and if it could be in, then it will be in.