House Of Lords
Friday, 11th June, 1982.
The House met at eleven of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Peterborough.
Accountancy Bodies: Recognition
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether, in considering any applications from additional accountancy bodies for authority to conduct audits under Section 161(1)(a) of the Companies Act 1948, they propose to abide by the principles set out in the letter from the Department of Trade and Industry dated 12th September 1975 to the then presidents of the existing authorised bodies, and, if not, why those principles are no longer considered necessary for the protection of the public.My Lords, the letter to which the noble Lord refers starts with the statement that,
This is what we propose doing. So far as the other issues raised by the noble Lord are concerned, I am giving the matter careful consideration and will write to the noble Lord in due course." we will, of course, deal with every application on its merits ".
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for that information. May I ask the noble Lord whether it might be helpful to have discussions with the recognised bodies, because I am sure that, if they were to take place, some reasonable agreement could be reached on this difficult problem?
My Lords, I will certainly bear in mind the suggestion that the noble Lord makes. But I think that the best course would be for him to give me the opportunity of going into the matter in detail, and I will let him know what conclusion I come to as to the course that we should follow.
My Lords, is it still the current policy of the Government that no new body will be recognised until a substantial majority of its members match the existing standards of the bodies so far recognised?
My Lords, this is one of the points to which consideration needs to be given.
My Lords, I hope that the existing bodies can take some comfort from the reply of the noble Lord the Minister. But is the noble Lord aware that, if his Answer is what I take it to be, it should be of some help in the United Kingdom profession in, to take just one instance, its negotiations with its sister organisations in the EEC, which have the object of securing practising rights in the EEC countries? Would he accept that a rather fuller and more explicit statement of support by the Government in due course for the standards set by the existing recognised bodies would, by removing any lingering doubts or ambiguities, also be desirable? Would he not agree that objectives such as this one are very much in the public interest?
My Lords, I am aware that strong feelings are held on this matter. This is why I say that I will give it very full and careful consideration.
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the exchanges have shown that there is something of some importance in this Question and Answer? I have not been able to understand what it is all about and, since my noble friend has said that he will write a letter to the noble Lord, could those of us who are not able to interpret the historic exchange that has taken place have a copy of it as well?
My Lords, the matter is of importance, which is why I promised to give it careful consideration. So far as the rest of my noble friend's question is concerned, I will certainly ensure that the views that the Government come to are made widely known.
My Lords, did I hear correctly that the noble Lord accused the noble Lord the Minister of hypocrisy? If so, may I dissociate myself from such an accusation?
My Lords, I am absolutely certain that my noble friend was not accusing me of any such thing, and I would be horrified to believe that the noble Lord himself harboured any such unkind thoughts.
Capital Ownership In The United Kingdom
11.10 a.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made to date in stimulating the wider ownership of capital in the United Kingdom.My Lords, the Government have made significant progress in promoting the wider ownership of capital in a number of different areas. In particular, improvements in the tax incentives for profit sharing and share option schemes in the 1980 Finance Act have been successful in encouraging wider ownership of shares, and the further improvements announced in this year's Budget should help to build on this success. Other examples of Government actions designed to spread the ownership of capital are the arrangements made to give council tenants the right to buy their homes, and improvements in the capital gains tax régime. We have also introduced various measures, such as the Business Start-Up Scheme and Venture Capital Scheme, which are designed to encourage wider investment in new businesses.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. May I ask him to enlarge a little on two of the schemes he has mentioned? First, as regards council houses, has he a figure of the number of tenants who have taken up their rights under the Housing Act 1980 and, secondly, what success has the Business Start-Up Scheme had so far?
My Lords, so far as the first of my noble friend's points is concerned, approximately 250,000 tenants have now bought their houses and a further ⅓ million have had their right to buy acknowledged by their landlords. So far as the Business Start-Up Scheme is concerned, this was introduced in the 1981 Budget. It is still too early to give actual figures of the take-up of relief, but there have been a number of investment funds set up for this purpose, and a great deal of interest has been shown. The present Finance Bill does, in fact, contain further improvements in the scheme.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the very desirable objective which the Government have in mind could be enhanced by a more generous approach to the lower paid sections of the community, such as hospital ancillary workers, nurses et cetera?
My Lords, if I may say so, that raises a quite different issue from the Question on the Order Paper.
My Lords, would my noble friend agree that perhaps the greatest stimulation to the wider ownership of capital is Her Majesty's Government's highly successful fight against inflation, in that that in itself stimulates savings with which capital can be acquired by ordinary members of the public?
My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend. A reduction in the rate of inflation has many beneficial effects.
My Lords, does the noble Lord's memory go back so far as mine, to the day when the Conservative Party came out with the revolutionary slogan, "A Property-owning Democracy"? While the answer which the noble Lord has given this morning indicates some approach to wider ownership of capital, is it not the case that we await the day when we can have a better approach to democracy relating to the democratic decisions concerning the use of that capital? Can the noble Lord give us any hope in that respect?
My Lords, my memory does indeed go back to the days when the Conservative Party invented the slogan, "A Property-owning Democracy", and it extends over the period when they have brought that slogan into real effect. So far as control over the ownership of property is concerned, this country is a democracy and its laws are passed by Parliament, and they make whatever provisions may be thought to be appropriate in that respect.
My Lords, is it not the case that pension funds and life insurance companies now own more than half of the shares on the Stock Exchange and that, on present trends, they will probably own most of them in the 1990s? Is it not important for the Government, politics quite apart, to begin to examine whether such pension funds are fully democratic, fully accountable, since these 11½million people who, quite properly, are spreading ownership in this way by their contributions to these pension funds are at the moment not fully protected democratically and are not totally in control, as they should be, of the decision-makers in those funds? This is an issue which is now causing increasing concern.
My Lords, the noble Lord's question strays far from the one on the Order Paper. I would, however, join him in paying tribute to the very valuable part played by the pension funds and the insurance companies in enabling people to build up modest amounts of capital and to protect themselves against their old age and other contingencies.
My Lords, first may I declare an interest as a member of the Wider Share Ownership Council and then ask the noble Lord whether the Government will give serious consideration to introducing something along the lines of the French loi Monory?
My Lords, the question of the introduction of a scheme on the lines of the loi Monory has been considered on many occasions. We believe that the series of specific measures which we have taken, including the Venture Capital Scheme and the Business Start-Up Scheme, are targeted more directly to the problem and are likely to be more cost effective.
Video-Cassettes: Legislation
11.16 a.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are satisfied that existing or proposed legislation is adequate to deal with the problems caused by the sale or rental of hard porn and horror video-cassettes.My Lords, existing legislation relating to obscene publications and indecent displays applies equally to material contained in video-cassettes as it does to other forms of publication or display. As to proposed legislation, the Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill would apply to the exhibition for private gain of video films, and the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill would enable local authorities to exercise control over the numbers of shops dealing to a signficant degree in pornographic material. That of course would include such material contained in video-cassettes. The Government have at present no plans for further legislation, but we will keep the operation of the law under close review, particularly in relation to material involving horror or violence.
My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for that Answer, may I ask whether he would not agree that there are three particular problems which lead to the view that neither the present nor the proposed legislation is adequate, the first problem being that the material, by its very nature, is not immediately identifiable so that police officers entering premises do not know what it is that is there to be seized; the second problem being that this material can be shown to young people without any control under either the present or the proposed legislation; the third problem being that the depraving effect of this appalling rubbish is enhanced in the home by the facilities that are available there for the particularly nauseating bits to be played and replayed at will?
My Lords, I accept that the medium we are looking at now is different in kind and intensity of effect from the traditional sort of pornographic material which was available in the noble Lord's youth and my own. It poses particular difficulties. The noble Lord will be aware of the lack of agreement that there is in general on the control of this difficult area and may take courage from the voluntary approach now being looked at by a working party which has been set up by the British Board of Film Censors and the British Videogram Association, with the intention of setting up some kind of certification scheme similar to that used in the film industry.
My Lords, would the noble Lord the Minister bear in mind that there is growing and widespread concern about the matter? While the Minister has clearly indicated to the House the current state of legislation, it does not quite go so far as I think the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, had in mind; namely, whether the Minister is satisfied that those measures which he has mentioned to the House this morning are adequate to deal with the very problems which he has indicated. Can he go a stage further so far as the interesting point about classification which he mentioned is concerned and say whether the Government will give very serious consideration to it? Perhaps he would also bear in mind the need to deal with the problem of video-cassette piracy, which is not unconnected with these matters.
My Lords, as to the first part of the noble Lord's question, the system of classification—if it involves a voluntary sense—is a very good answer in part to the problem. Under the provisions of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill as it left your Lordships' House, it will be open to licensing authorities to require shops to indicate the classification given by such a body to the material which they sell. As to the noble Lord's second question, I regret that for the moment it escapes me. Could he remind me what it was?
The second part of my question concerned the question of video cassette piracy and the need to bear that in mind.
My Lords, perhaps it escaped me because it is a little far from what we are discussing at the moment. What we are now looking at is the nature of the stuff on the tapes, or discs as they may later be, when they are sold. Questions of copyright and so on are outside the brief for which I have prepared myself on this occasion, because they do not relate to the original Question.
My Lords, can the Government tell us whether any of the existing obscenity laws affects cable television and, if not, whether the Government have any proposals to legislate on that matter?
My Lords, although that is a related question, I regret that I shall have to write to the noble Lord, Lord Kennet, and give my answer.
My Lords, can the noble Lord the Minister explain to me, in view of my maidenly innocence, what is meant by the expression "hard core" in this Question'?
My Lords, if the noble Lord's innocence is so maidenly at his stage in life, I am afraid that my explanation might shock him.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that children under the age of 16 can obtain X certificate films, and does he think there might be some advantage in amending the Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act in order to include video-cassettes?
My Lords, I think that I have gone as far as I can in saying that I believe we should proceed at present along the voluntary path and see how it works. We shall look at this very closely in the context of two pieces of legislation which are currently going through this Parliament.
Nhs Nurses' Pay Claim
11.23 a.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will acknowledge the justice of the National Health Service nurses' wage claim and thus relieve them of the necessity of contemplating strike action.My Lords, the Government have recognised the dedication and commitment of nurses and midwives by enabling a pay offer to be made which is 2.4 per cent. above the general NHS pay factor. We regret that this offer has now been rejected by the Staff Side of the Nurses and Midwives Whitley Council, but that offer is still on the table.
My Lords, I wish to thank the noble Lord the Minister for the courteous nature of his response to my Question, although I deplore its content. Is the noble Lord aware that, notwithstanding the offer, members of the Royal College of Nursing and of the Confederation of Health Service Employees will still be the lowest paid in public service? Is the noble Lord further aware that, in the view of the Royal College of Nursing and the Confederation of Health Service Employees, it is the Government's intention to destroy their solidarity and to impose humiliation? Would it not be better for the nation and for the organisations involved if the Government were to resort to a policy of conciliation?
My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, that the Government have no intention of trying to humiliate anybody. We have made the very best offer that we can in the circumstances. We have recognised the very special position of nurses and midwives by giving them a rather larger offer than it is possible to give to other workers, and also by declaring our determination to establish permanent machinery for determining nurses' pay in future.
My Lords, will the noble Lord the Minister and the Government have it in mind for the future that, in the view of many, against the background of the nurses' claim, to accord to judges an increase in salary of 18 per cent. is consistent neither with commonsense nor with justice? Will he bear in mind for the future the need for recognition of the fact that this kind of thing encourages militants and discourages moderates?
My Lords, the TSRB covers a very small number of senior staff. Its recommendations are for "catching up" awards from 1980 recommended levels, which could, perhaps, be analogous to the Clegg awards of 1979–80. Even after the recent TSRB award, the pay of those persons affected is at the very most only I42 per cent. above the level recommended for 1st April 1980. Since then, NHS staff have received increases nearer to 20 per cent.
My Lords, in view of the supplementary question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, is my noble friend aware that the pay of judges has never, in real terms, ever matched that set by the judicature Act of 1872?
My Lords, while my noble friend Lord Morris might be right, there have of course been a good many other changes since that time as well.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that, while paying tribute to the work of ACAS, the move to call in the chairman of ACAS to try to resolve this matter by discussion is a pretty hopeless one? Would it not be far better if the Government agreed to arbitration? I am sure that the nurses' claim would be freely admitted. Is the Government's position here the same as when the teachers went to arbitration and secured an increase? Are the Government objecting to arbitration in this instance in case the nurses' justice is admitted?
My Lords, perhaps I should make it clear that Mr. Lowry has not been asked to solve this problem but rather to act as a line of communication in this matter between the Government and the TUC, to see whether he can determine what common ground may exist. The other matter which the noble Lord raised is, of course, an important one too.
My Lords, will the Government bear in mind that, although we all recognise the great devotion and hard work put in by nurses, for which we admire them, there is a further point—which is that they have a long period of training? They train for three, four or even five years and, during that period, they do not receive a training grant as a student would, but only low pay for the hard work they put in. Will the Government bear in mind that most of us in the community feel that we owe a very great debt to the nursing profession and that it is time we recognised that debt by making a substantial award to its members?
My Lords, the Government certainly agree that the nurses occupy a very special place in the National Health Service. That is why we have offered rather more to the nurses on this occasion than we have to other workers in the same service, and why we have agreed to establish the special negotiating machinery to which I referred earlier. We hope that these special considerations will weigh with the other members of the service as well.
My Lords, while accepting that the offer to the nurses within the pay code policy is a reasonably generous one, may I ask whether my noble friend does not accept that the increased rents, increased laundry charges and increases in other charges, too, have largely swallowed up the pay increases? Will he bear that point in mind?
My Lords, only about 10 per cent. of nurses in the health service actually live in accommodation provided within the health service. Quite a wide range of nurses, student nurses, pupils and others enjoy discounts from the accommodation charges, and indeed those who live in substandard accommodation also have discounts. Furthermore, the charges are being introduced on a progressive basis and will not be fully in place until 1984.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that some of us do not like to press the noble Lord the Minister, who we know is a kindly individual? But is he not aware that there is such a disparity between the attention we give to police force increases and the attention we give to the nurses, and I regard the nurses' service to the nation just as well? Is he not aware that now, with our young men in the services being damaged and wounded in the Falklands, we may have more need than ever for a well-trained nursing profession? Consequently, I think this contingency should he taken into account during the discussions.
My Lords, as I have already said, the Government certainly accept that the nurses deserve, and indeed have received, special consideration in this matter; that is why we have made the provision to which I have already referred. But, at the end of the day, the cost of the health service can only be within what we can afford, and that is why arbitration, for example, is not a possibility open to us, because it is for the Government to decide what the nation can afford in the circumstances.
My Lords, does the noble Lord mean by that reply that if arbitration was carried out and the nurses got an increased pay award the money would have to come out of the health service, which is already strained financially too much at the present time?
My Lords, I have to say that arbitration is not a possibility in these circumstances. The Government have, through the Whitley Council, made the best offer that can be made within the limits of the resources available. The noble Lord is quite right that if a larger offer had been made it would have had to come from within existing funds available to the health service.
My Lords, we have now had nine minutes on this Question, and there is other business to take today. I think we have covered this very fully. I do not in any way wish to stop noble Lords asking questions, but I think it really would be the wish of the House that we might now move on to the next business.
My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness the Leader of the House if I can have just one more minute to put a very vital point, not from my own point of view, but from the point of view of the nation and the feeling towards the nurses?
My Lords, I do appreciate that the noble Lord feels very strongly about this matter. Could he ask one very short question—not make a point, but ask one short supplementary question?
My Lords, I will be as short as I can. With regard to the noble Minister's last answer, on refusing arbitration, will he now tell the House what happened to the Conservative Party's election pledge to permit free bargaining?
My Lords, in any situation of free bargaining, the employer, whoever he may be, whether the Government or some private company, has to decide the maximum sum he can afford in terms of wage increases. That is what is going on now. We have decided the maximum sum that is available for this purpose. Arbitration would only threaten that position, and perhaps suggest additional payments, but it would not say where those funds were to come from.
Planning Inquiries (Attendance Of Public) Bill
11.34 a.m.
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Sandford.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD AMPTHILL in the Chair.]
Clause 1 [Planning inquiries to be held in public, subject to certain exceptions]:
On Question, Whether Clause 1 shall be agreed to?
I have a point to raise on Clause 1 of this short Bill. The Bill gives the right to the public to attend planning inquiries and to inspect the documents which are presented in evidence to them. I wholcheatedly support that measure. The point I want to raise arises out of this. The effect of the noble Lord's Bill would, I think, be limited if, after the public were allowed to hear the evidence and inspect the documents, they were not allowed to be acquainted with the decision which is made at the end of the inquiry by the Secretary of State concerned and of the reasons for it.
The whole point of admitting the public to any administrative or judicial proceeding is so that the process can be scrutinised and appraised and criticised by the public and their representatives the press, in order to see whether wise decisions are being reached. At the moment, although the Bill gives the right to the public to hear the evidence and read the evidence, there is not a right to know about the decision and the reasons for it. Although sometimes, I am told, the press and public, if they ask for it, will receive a copy of the Minister's decision and the reasons, that is not always the case; there is no right. Sometimes the request for reasons and for a copy of the decision is refused. I had thought that it might be possible by a short amendment to bring this further matter within the scope of the Bill, but the amendment would have to be quite substantial and there may even be doubt, given the Title of the Bill, whether an amendment to that effect would be in order. Therefore, I hope that perhaps the noble Earl who is acting for the Government on this Bill—I apologise to him for not having given him longer notice than a day of this point—can give some assurance that it is the Government's intention, and the intention of the various departments involved in planning inquiries, that the same principles that apply to this Bill—that is to say, openness to the public subject only to security questions—would be applied when members of the public or the press request to be given information about the final decision which comes out at the end of the inquiry, and the reasons for it.My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, that it is the intention that information about planning decisions and the reasons for them in the form of planning decision letters are always made available, not only to those parties who have a statutory right to receive them but also to the press and anyone else who asks for them. This will continue to be the practice, and we do not feel that there is reason for a statutory provision. In the light of this longstanding departmental practice, and the extreme rarity of any complaints of the kind to which the noble Lord, Lord Gifford, has referred, the Government cannot accept that a need arises to provide a specific right for members of the public and press to receive reasoned decision letters on request. Even if need for such a right were established, arguably it would be more appropriate by amendment of the statutory procedural rules governing many classes of planning inquiry which already deal with details of this kind rather than through primary legislation. I hope that this explanation will allay any fears the noble Lord has.
I am very grateful to the noble Earl, and I am sure his assurance will be of value to all those who wish to follow public inquiries and who have from time to time, although only in rare cases, been thwarted in their desire to know the reasons for the decision.
Clause 1 agreed to.
Remaining clause agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment.
Firearms Bill
11.40 a.m.
My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time. I cannot begin without paying tribute to my honourable friend Mr. Eldon Griffiths who promoted this Bill as a Private Member's Bill in another place. It is a measure of his experience and parliamentary skill, and the respect in which he is held, that the Bill passed so easily through another place and arrived in this House unamended. It also reflects the all-party support which the Bill received and which I venture to hope it may receive also in your Lordships' House.
The existing controls over firearms arc contained in the Firearms Act 1968 which is a somewhat massive consolidation measure. Indeed, it is so thorough that one wonders how there could be any gaps in it. But circumstances being as they are, and as crime increases and the use of firearms in the commission of serious crimes increases, any gap which does arise should be filled. I shall hope to show your Lordships that there is a gap here which should be filled and which will be filled by this Bill. Many noble Lords like my noble friend Lord Swansea are familiar with the law relating to firearms under the Act to which I have referred and, indeed, the rules made under it. These controls require any person wishing to possess, purchase or acquire a firearm, to hold a valid certificate issued by a chief officer of police. It is generally acknowledged, I think, that these controls are reasonably effective in ensuring that firearms do not fall into the wrong hands. I must stress "reasonably effective" because they are not completely so—nobody could maintain that. But because of the difficulty which some criminals experience in obtaining a real firearm, there is a danger that they will turn to the adaptation and misuse of an imitation firearm. The law already recognises the seriousness of the criminal use of imitation firearms by providing that there shall be the same maximum penalties for certain offences in relation to them as for the use of a real firearm. Those offences include carrying a firearm or imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence or to resist arrest. It would, of course, be preferable if we could find a way of ensuring that all imitation firearms were not available to criminals. But the promoter of the Bill, whose concern for these matters is so well known through the advice which he gives and which he now has given to the Police Federation for many years, has looked closely at the problem and he has concluded, rightly in my view, that the introduction of controls over imitation firearms merely on the grounds of appearance would not be feasible. The Home Secretary who recently completed an exhaustive review of this matter has reluctantly arrived at the same conclusion. I think it will probably be generally accepted that it is not feasible. However odious the criminal misuse of an imitation firearm might be, obviously it cannot be used to shoot a victim so long as it remains merely an imitation. That is a glimpse of the obvious which I think I have to make. But real distress can be and is caused to those threatened by a firearm, whether it is real or imitation. Indeed, a toy firearm, completely innocuous and incapable of being fired in any way, is sometimes used by criminals in pursuit of serious crime. With the increased availability of tools used, for example, by do-it-yourself enthusiasts, there is a real risk that criminals may convert some imitation firearms so as to enable them to fire live ammunition. Some of them indeed are so constructed as to require very little work to enable them to to fire live ammunition. Although the act of conversion is, I must tell your Lordships, already an offence under the Firearms Act unless undertaken by a registered firearms dealer, it would be giving criminals an easy opportunity to convert an imitation firearm—an opportunity which should not be presented to the criminal—in circumstances, for example, where the barrel has merely to be bored to be converted from a false barrel into a real one. That is the type of thing which the Bill now before your Lordships seeks to prevent. The substance of the Bill is contained in Clause 1. That provides that any imitation firearm which has the appearance of a firearm to which Section 1 of the Firearms Act 1968 applies, and which can be readily converted into such a firearm, is to be treated as if it were an actual firearm for most of the purposes of the 1968 Act. That means that the possession, purchase or acquisition of a readily convertible imitation fire- arm will become unlawful unless its possession et cetera is covered by a firearms certificate. People dealing in such imitation firearms in future will have to be registered dealers. In practice it seems unlikely that many certificates would have to be issued in respect of readily convertible imitation firearms, because it will be difficult for an applicant to show that he had good reason for having such an imitation rather than one that was incapable of being readily converted into a firearm. The words "readily convertible" are, of course, the operative words. Some noble Lords may wonder why the Bill does not extend to all convertible imitation firearms rather than to those which are merely readily convertible. With the aid of special tools and equipment and with the necessary expertise, virtually any imitation firearm, including many toys, could be converted to fire live ammunition. But I suggest that it would clearly be inappropriate to bring all such imitations under strict control. This view was taken in another place after a good deal of discussion. The Bill, therefore, is confined to those imitations which could be converted without any special skill and using ordinary do-it-yourself tools and equipment. Clause 1(6), to which I should invite your Lordships' attention, embodies that formula and puts it into statutory form. I trust that your Lordships will agree that this is the right approach. It is the essence of the Bill. Of course, it will ultimately be for the courts to decide in any doubtful cases which are brought before them whether a particular imitation firearm is readily convertible. But, in order to help manufacturers, importers and retailers to comply with the law, the Home Office will draw up non-statutory guidelines, and these will describe measures which can be incorporated in an imitation firearm to render it capable of being readily converted. Assurances were given in another place that these guidelines would be drawn up in consultation with representatives of the trade and other interested parties, and would be available to them before the new legislation is brought into force. Indeed, subsection (3) of the commencement clause—Clause 4—is, somewhat to my personal regret, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, will understand, left open. There is no fixed date. There is no time limit after the Bill receives Royal Assent, but it is to be done by an order of the Secretary of State when everybody is ready. I do not find that totally satisfactory, but there are many worse cases, so I am prepared to let this one run if noble Lords will agree that it should be so. There is one other point which is of interest to lawyers, which I think I should just mention. I only hope that I have it right. However, it seems to me that these non-statutory guidelines will not be part of the law and, indeed, there may be doubt as to whether the courts' attention could even be drawn to them. Taking a somewhat strict view of those matters, I would lean against those being available to the courts, but I would be very interested to know what noble Lords think about that. However, they will not be part of the law. It may be that they might have the same sort of status as the Highway Code, but I do not know. I do not think that there is much else in the Bill to which I should refer, but perhaps I should draw attention to the special defence in subsection (5) of Clause 1, because this will help to safeguard the position of a person who might already have an imitation firearm for perfectly innocent purposes without knowing, and having no reason to suspect, that it was readily convertible. Your Lordships will appreciate from what I have said that this Bill is only a modest addition to the existing firearms law. Indeed, it is true that there have been some cases where the courts have considered an easily-convertible imitation firearm to be caught by the present legislation as being parts of a firearm within the meaning of the Act. But in spite of that, which does not remove all uncertainty in this matter, the promoter of the Bill felt and I am sure that he was right—that it would be helpful to all concerned with the application of firearms law to have the status of such devices clearly set out in statutory form, and particularly to know the circumstances in which an imitation firearm could be regarded as readily convertible, whether or not the statement of the circumstances is part of the law. I know that my noble friend Lord Elton, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, intends to say a few words about some of the provisions of the Bill, and no doubt he will endeavour to answer any points that are raised by your Lordships. With the leave of the House, I shall endeavour to deal with them as best I can at the end of the debate. My Lords, I beg to move.Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time. — (Lord Renton.)
11.56 a.m.
My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Renton, for undertaking the carriage of this, I think, useful little Bill through the House. It is reassuring to me that a great expert in this field in the person of the noble Lord, Lord Swansea—who knows more about guns, used lawfully, of course, than any other person so far as I know in the United Kingdom and even including Wales—is to speak.
It is a mournful fact that the carriage of weapons is increasingly being used in crime and, therefore, any gap in the legislation to control and limit it, as far as one can, ought to be filled. There seems to be a gap here which I think that this little Bill probably helps to stop. I am bound to say that I am not sure that I am able to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Renton, on one matter, when he expressed the hopeful opinion that firearms controls are reasonably effective. In the debate in another place there was a startling statement made by one of the Members, that whereas now there are only 50,000 to 60,000 legally-held and licensed hand guns in Britain, there are no fewer than 350,000 illicitly-held pistols. Where that interesting figure emanated from and what the basis of it was, I do not know, but it is a startling figure. The opinion has been expressed that illicit hand guns can now be bought in our major cities more cheaply than it would cost to buy an imitation hand gun. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Elton, will be able to give us any hope, comfort or reassurance in the face of those assertions of fact, because they present a very worrying situation indeed. The gap that, therefore, needs to be filled—if that is right—is a review of the licensing system and the degree of controls that presently exist, and perhaps even the attitude of the courts towards offences in this part of the criminal law. But if it be the case that the criminal can get the real thing pretty easily—and I fear that that may well be the case—we cannot take a great deal of comfort from the little entry that this Bill will effect into the field of limiting the accessibility of weapons to the criminal. As regards the gap that needs to be filled, it seems to me—I must confess on a fairly limited study of the problem—that the attempt in the Bill to cover the situation seems to be as good as any that can be attempted. It is not easy. There is, on the one hand, the desire not to render inaccessible that which has become part of the upbringing of children in this day and age. I am not sure that I have wholly welcomed the fact that television and cowboys, the wild west plethora that invades the television box day in day out, firearms and wielding them, have become part of life that the young become addicted to. It is alarming at times to see the youths and boys in action, hiding, concealing themselves, and making all the relevant noises in a most frightening way at times. I do not suppose there is anything we can do about that. As parents all of us have suffered the hazard of water pistols, and I do not suppose there is a great deal of harm in that. But we are becoming over-conditioned, and I think we are over-conditioning our young people in television to the acceptability of the handling and use of a gun as part of manhood. It is not a happy development. However, the fact that there should be available now, without licence, readily convertible imitation weapons is, of course, a serious matter. If this Bill becomes law, they will need to be licensed. I come back to my question. If they need to he licensed it seems unlikely that the criminal will ever seek to acquire one. What puzzles me is this: what does the applicant for a firearm which is not a real firearm, but is readily convertible to one, want it for? If he wants it for an honest purpose of self-protection and self-defence, he can apply for a licence. In the appropriate case he can get one. What does the man who wants an imitation firearm that can easily be converted say to the police when he applies for the licence? It puzzles me. I do not know what the point really is. In so far as it is said, after much discussion in another place, that this would apparently stop the criminal using these things, I suppose it must be right; but I confess to being mystified at the moment as to what are the grounds on which a person would seek to go to the trouble of acquiring a licence to have possession of these guns. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Renton, with his ability to understand these things so readily, may be able to give us a reassuring explanation. I was delighted to see that he was able to have an opportunity, in introducing what is now his own Bill, to ride his favourite hobbyhorse; namely, the appointed day in question. If it is sought to achieve a satisfactory arrangement with manufacturers, et cetera, and effective guidelines, the sooner the Home Secretary has the power in his hands by this Bill becoming law, the greater will be the pressure he could exercise on those who are going to be putting these things on the market, or distributing them, or whatever it may be. I confess that on this occasion I unreservedly share the views, the concern, of the noble Lord, Lord Renton, about this provision. Perhaps we could get an explanation as to why this should be necessary. Having raised these questions, if the Home Office is assured that there is a practical gap here, and we are not merely cluttering up the statute book with that which (a), is not needed or, (b), is unenforceable, it seems to me that this is a Bill which, within the limits of its sphere of operation, could possibly he useful in the battle against dangerous crime. Any step to promote our success in that struggle is, of course, welcome.12.5 p.m.
My Lords, I shall not detain your Lordships for long. I should like to congratulate my noble friend Lord Renton on the able way in which he has outlined this Bill to the House, and to give the Bill a welcome, as it is a praiseworthy attempt to strengthen the law relating to the criminal use of firearms. I shall not weary your Lordships with too many details of a technical nature.
It is evident that the Firearms Act 1968 needs bringing up to date in this respect. Most of the content of that Act goes back a great deal beyond the time when this question of replica firearms arose and they became available on the market in such large numbers as they are now. Previous attempts to define replica firearms fell down on the question of definition and distinguishing them from the toy firearms which children—and who can blame them?— are so found of using in playing cops and robbers and cowboys and Indians, despite the best endeavours of their parents and other well meaning individuals to discourage them from warlike acts of that sort. Those of your Lordships who have read that short story by Saki entitled The Toys of Peace will know what I mean. These replica firearms have now been freely available for a good many years. They are a legitimate item for collectors and for serious students of firearms design who may wish to study the mechanism, and so on, without all the palaver of acquiring the genuine article and having to go through all the formalities of getting a firearms certificate. The trouble is that the more faithful the replica is to the original in its appearance and mechanism, the more likely it is that these replicas may be used for criminal purposes. No-one knows how many of these articles there are in circulation. It is certain that they have been used in many cases in the commission of crime. When the average layman sees one of these things pointed at him he cannot be blamed for not being able to distinguish the imitation from the genuine article. As your Lordships will remember, there was that well-known case in the Indian High Commission a few years ago. Two men armed with imitation firearms went in there, and they were discovered by one or two plain-clothed policemen who were armed. In the full belief that the arms in the possession of these two men were genuine, they opened fire on them. with the tragic results that we all know. It is highly probable that replica firearms have been used in the assistance of many robberies and other crimes where the criminals have not been apprehended, and of course there is no way of finding out to what extent they have been used, except where the perpetrators are arrested. In such cases, they can be caught under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act as it stands. The present Bill is to cover the case where a replica firearm can be converted into what I shall term as a "shooter". There is a great temptation to do that by the criminal, and in some cases it is not difficult. What is difficult is how to define a replica which can readily be converted. The honourable Member for Bury St. Edmunds, with the assistance of the Parliamentary draftsmen, has made a valiant attempt at achieving such a definition, but even so this part of the Bill can only be described as being a rather grey area. It is open to wide interpretation and so much hangs on what the court may decide is needed in the way of the skill of the individual and the resources and tools available to him. I foresee wide and differing interpretations being placed on that part of the Bill by the courts. Many of us are do-it-yourself enthusiasts—I dabble in it a bit myself—and it is conceivable that some replicas could be converted using ordinary tools available to the householder. "Do-it-yourselfery" has grown more sophisticated, with more elaborate implements and tools becoming available on the market, and some household workshops would do credit to an engineering works. The question, therefore, is how to define that part of the Bill properly. It is conceivable that a particular replica firearm could be held to be not readily convertible with the equipment that is freely available at any one time, and then a couple of years later a new or improved tool might appear on the market rendering that same replica capable of conversion, and then it could be illegal. What would he the position of the owner in those circumstances? Could he take shelter under Clause 1(5), for example? Perhaps my noble friend would address himself to that. The gun trade are willing and anxious to co-operate with the Government in making the Bill workable, and I hope they will be called into consultation to work out guidelines and a code of practice jointly with the Home Office experts to ensure that replicas put on the market in future are of such a nature as not easily to lend themselves to conversion. My noble friend mentioned non-statutory guidelines. He is a lawyer, I am not; it is a question which needs careful consideration in terms of how much force the guidelines will have and whether the courts will take any notice of them. Among the points which occur to me and which could be covered in the guidelines are that the skill and equipment required should be more than that available to the ordinary person; that it should not be possible, with a given replica firearm, to exchange some of its components for the genuine articles so as to turn it into a shooter (that can he done, without greatly affecting the fidelity of the replica to the original, by minor dimensional differences); that the replica should be constructed of materials which, if it could be turned into a shooter, would prevent it from standing up to the shock of firing. That is an important point because, if it were generally known that replicas, if converted to shooters, would not withstand the shock of firing, a potential criminal would be deterred by the knowledge that it might do as much harm to him as to his intended victim, and the problem would be half way to being solved. I shall not detain the House longer on what is a useful measure which deserves an easy passage through your Lordships' House. I wish the Bill well and commend it to your Lordships.12.15
I intervene briefly, my Lords, largely as a result of some remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Swansea. It seems to me—I believe it is more than just a Committee point—that the measure will be seriously weakened by Cluase 1(6), which says the Bill will apply only if the imitation firearm can be converted without any special skill. In other words, if any special skill is needed, no illegal act will have been committed. I should have thought it impossible for anyone to convert an imitation into a real firearm without having any special skill. It might not be necessary for him to have special equipment; if he has enough special skill, he might be able to do it with a screwdriver or some ordinary domestic tool. Surely special skill must always be necessary for such a conversion to be made, and in that case the offence would not be covered.
12.16 p.m.
My Lords, I intervene mainly to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Renton, on introducing the Bill. In the debate on law and order I referred to the violent crime now perpetrated against many workers in the course of their duty. Particularly in my work with shopkeepers, I have discovered that many holdups are carried out with replica firearms. As we have heard, if something is stuck in your ribs or you are threatened with something, unless you are an expert you have no way of knowing whether it is a replica or the genuine article, and it is too late to find out after discovering it was a real gun.
My noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones wondered why people wanted collections of replica guns. I must tell him that a certain shop I pass every day in my locality is known as an aqua store and sells not only all the necessary diving equipment but has a tremendous number of replica guns in stock. I complained about that on one occasion because they were openly displayed in a window which anybody could break. In addition, they sell some fearsome things which I gather are used for dealing with sharks. I am not aware that we need such equipment in our waters. It seems that people collect items, perhaps like a trophy, rather as in the old days people collected the heads of the animals they shot. There is no doubt that it is a flourishing trade. Anything which will make it less possible for people with criminal intent to obtain something which will make the commission of crime easier must be welcome. With other noble Lords, on one occasion I tried to promote much keener laws on firearms generally Nevertheless, we have a very good record in this country I compliment the noble Lord on introducing the Bill. May it have a speedy passage through the House.
12.18 p.m.
My Lords, I apologise to my noble friend Lord Renton for not being here for the opening, but I fully support his Bill. My noble friend Lord Swansea went into the detail of the matter, and indeed the Bill appears to refer to what look like replicas, which I assume means things that could easily be mistaken for real weapons. I had the privilege when in New York of being taken through one of the most difficult precincts. I was present when a gang were pulled in. They were stripped of their weapons and I was permitted to examine them.
I recall jocularly saying, "Nobody would be worried by that", which was a fair-sized gun made of cheap alloy with silver metal painting on it, the sort of thing you would expect a young child to have with a cowboy outfit. The policeman said to me, "Look down the barrel, ma'am. It looks so innocent with that cheap paint on the outside—look down the barrel Down the barrel had been placed copper tubing of a size that was readily available under planning arrangements for city buildings, to enclose electric wiring. The tubing was perfectly easy to obtain, and anybody faced with that trivial looking toy would never have thought that it was capable of firing. Admittedly it would be only one shot, and there is some doubt as to whether it would be totally lethal. But the police assured me that certainly at close range it would have blinded somebody, or caused very serious injury. So such a firearm need not necessarily look like a genuine replica, but can be turned into a lethal weapon.12.21 p.m.
My Lords, at this stage your Lordships may wish me to give an indication of the Government's attitude towards my noble friend's Bill, and I should like to congratulate him on the eloquent way in which he has introduced it to the House. The purpose of the Bill has already been explained by my noble friend, and we do indeed recognise the debt of gratitude that we owe not only to my noble friend, but also to his and my honourable friend Mr. Eldon Griffiths, the promoter of the Bill in another place, for their efforts in steering through Parliament this modest, but important, contribution to firearms legislation.
My noble friend has already pointed out that the Bill extends only to certain imitation firearms which can be readily converted to fire live ammunition. Those are the weapons which it was set out to catch. He made clear that neither he nor Mr. Griffiths felt that the introduction of controls over imitation firearms generally was feasible, and mentioned that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary shared that view. Perhaps I should explain to the House briefly why my right honourable friend reached this conclusion, which was announced shortly before Easter in another place. The Government share fully the concern which has been expressed about the criminal misuse of imitation firearms of all kinds. At this point I must say that I have no idea where the figures quoted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones originally came from. I do not get the impression from the police, with whom my department is fairly closely in touch, that existing controls of real firearms are defective, and if they were defective on the scale mentioned it could not possibly have escaped anybody's notice —My Lords, if the noble Lord will allow me to intervene, I would say that the source of my information is entirely what was said in another place. One cannot always believe what is said in another place, but at any rate that is my sole authority. I hope that I have not spread alarm and despondency, though 1 could give my own personal vouching of the figures: but that is the origin.
My Lords, what I intended to express was ignorance of the original source of the figures, not the words that the noble and learned Lord quoted. I would equally say that we have no evidence that such weapons are available at the kind of knock-down prices to which the noble and learned Lord referred. I hope that I can reassure anybody who is worried about that.
As 1 was saying, we share the anxiety expressed by my noble friend, and it was for that reason that a thorough examination was undertaken of possible ways of tackling the problem. However, there are already millions of toy firearms in circulation and many of them are modelled on real firearms. We concluded that it would be impossible to exclude these in their present form from any controls over "look-alike firearms that might be devised. Measures to achieve conspicuous dissimilarity could easily be circumvented by a determined criminal. In the final analysis, even if the manufacture, sale, and possession of all imitation firearms, including toys, were to be outlawed, it would still be possible for criminals to fashion guns out of wood which, under the conditions of stress in which they might be used, would easily pass for the real thing. Against that background, my right honourable friend concluded that there were no practicable steps which could be taken to bring "lookalike" firearms under further legislative control. I fear that that will not comfort the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips. However, it is clearly right that those imitation firearms which can be readily converted to fire live ammunition —and I dare say that what my noble friend Lady Hornsby-Smith referred to would fall into that category—should be subject to the same controls as actual firearms. The Bill now before the House therefore has the full support of the Government. I do not propose to comment on all the provisions of the Bill, since my noble friend has already highlighted the main points. I should however say a few words about the non-statutory guidelines which have been mentioned—and they are a subject of interest since it will fall to the Home Office itself to draw them up. Perhaps I could first of all reassure your Lordships, especially those of you who might be particularly concerned about the possible effects of the Bill on the trade. by repeating the assurances which have been given in another place. As my noble friend said, the guidelines will consist of measures designed to render an imitation firearm incapable of being readily converted. They will be prepared in consultation with the trade—and that I think answers the question asked by my noble friend Lord Swansea—and other interested parties. The provision in Clause 4(3) to bring the new legislation into force by commencement order, will not be used until the guidelines have been completed and made available, but I can assure your Lordships that that will be done as soon as possible in the light of the consultation that must be gone through. As I am sure my noble friend knows, the admissibility of references to the guidelines in a court will of course be for the courts themselves to decide. Although the guidelines will not have any statutory force, it is difficult to imagine that an imitation firearm which incorporated suggested features designed to render it incapable of being readily converted, would become the subject of a prosecution. The guidelines will be revised from time to time to take account of changes in technology, and those engaged in business transactions involving imitation firearms will be expected to keep abreast of these developments. However, I do not think that any responsible manufacturer, importer, or retailer will be at risk of prosecution. My noble friend has touched on the certification under the 1968 Act of readily convertible imitation firearms. Although the issue of a firearm certificate is a matter for the appropriate chief officer of police, we agree that there are unlikely to be many occasions when the possession of a readily convertible imitation firearm would be authorised. Noble Lords may ask why an absolute prohibition is not therefore being introduced. Perhaps I ought to remind the House that under the Firearms Act 1968 no firearms are subject to an absolute prohibition, and even the most dangerous weapons can be possessed in certain circumstances, provided an authority is held from the Secretary of State. Moreover, there may be instances where a collector's item may fall within the scope of this Bill, but where it would not be appropriate to render the device incapable of being readily converted. It is, I suppose, for my noble friend to reply to the principal question posed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, on the effect of licences and who would require a licensed weapon. I do not doubt that one consideration is that, if there is imposed a licensing system which makes nobody want the item, then the item will not be produced and the menace to society will have been removed. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the earlier, and more infantile, menace—the water pistol—as a kind of precursor of the menace of later years, and said that all parents were subject to it. I cannot help wondering whether in fact the noble and learned Lord's own parents were not subject to this menace at an earlier stage, and he is such a civilised example of the membership of your Lordships' House that I cannot believe that the water pistol is really such a malevolent precursor of violence as he would suggest. I think that I have replied to all the points which it is proper for the Government to reply to at this stage, and I therefore conclude by once again congratulating my noble friend on the task that he has performed today and by commending the Bill to the House.12.29 p.m.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Elton. If I may have the leave of the House to speak again very briefly, I should like to thank him and other noble Lords who have supported the Bill. I am grateful for the Government support. I should like to comment briefly on some points which I found so interesting and so welcome, made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones. He made the very telling point that, thanks to television, in the minds of many young people firearms seem to have become part of the way of life. Of course the reason for that, as I understand it, is that "the Westerns" are made mostly in the United States, and in the United States there is no equivalent firearms control. I think there is possibly an arguable case for the media to point this out, that the mass of films that they show from another country are produced in circumstances which are quite different from those which prevail here. I am not in a position, of course, to comment on the number of firearms illicitly held here. I think there was some confusion in another place, quite frankly, about that matter, and I have nothing to add to what my noble friend Lord Elton said about it.
I welcome the support on this occasion of the noble and learned Lord about the desirability of a fixed date in a commencement order, but I must confess that I have no intention of moving an amendment to that effect in your Lordships' Committee in view of what has been said by my noble friend Lord Elton about the Government's intention to expedite the matter so far as they can. I was very interested in what my noble friend said about the non-statutory guidelines, and I must accept it that it will be for the courts to decide upon their admissibility. May I say how interested I was, as I am sure all your Lordships were, in the speech of my noble friend Lord Swansea, with his great knowledge of these matters. If I may comment upon one or two of the things that he mentioned, reference has been made to the difficulty of defining what is really convertible. I hope that the non-statutory guidelines will resolve that difficulty. I was somewhat reassured by the statement of my noble friend Lord Elton that the guidelines will be revised from time to time. Obviously, this is a matter in which we have got to feel our way forward in the light of experience, and I hope that that prospect will reassure my noble friend Lord Swansea and, indeed, cover a good deal of what he said. As to Clause 1(5), of course, it is unthinkable that there should be a blanket defence in respect of all the perhaps hundreds of thousands of imitation weapons which could conceivably be covered, but I hope that he feels that subsection (5) of Clause 1 gives a reasonable let-out for the innocent people concerned. The noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, and my noble friend Lady Hornsby-Smith each gave direct evidence of matters which they have observed from their own experience, and that evidence is welcome evidence in support of the Bill. With gratitude, I trust that your Lordships will now give this Bill a Second Reading.On Question, Bill read a second time, and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.
Supply Of Goods And Services Bill
12.34 p.m.
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, that The House do now resolve itself into Committee.— (Lord Mishcon.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[THE LORD AMPTHILL in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 to 11 agreed to.
moved Amendment No.1:
After Clause 11, insert the following new clause:
(" Amendment of Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 and Misrepresentation Act 1967.
The noble Lord said: I feel some embarrassment, I am bound to say, in introducing an amendment to this excellent Bill, which has not only received no opposition so far—and it will not get any from me, either—but has been so widely applauded, both in its content and in the manner in which it has been handled. Nevertheless, the Bill offers an opportunity to raise again a matter which was of some difficulty and was only at the last moment resolved when the 1973 Bill was before the House.
The purpose of this new clause is to bring consumer sales at auctions into line with other consumer sales by removing the right of auctioneers to exclude or limit the terms which are implied in contracts of sale under the Sale of Goods Act—terms which (I may say in parenthesis) under this Bill are also to be implied in contracts for the transfer of goods otherwise than by sale. This exceptional right of auctioneers is contained in Section 12 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. Subsection (1) of the new clause would remove it. The rest of the first amendment and also the second new clause are consequential.
The two clauses emanate from the body which represents dealers in antiques and the like, the London and Provincial Antique Dealers' Association (which is known as LAPADA for short) with whom auctioneers are in competition. Indeed, it seems that in recent years auctioneers have been tending more and more to handle the same classes of goods as antique dealers, and have been actively seeking sources of supply for sale by auction. It is not greater competition that LAPADA objects to: it welcomes the stimulus to the market and the benefits to the public that competition evokes. All it asks is that the terms of competition should not be weighted against it, as they are now, in ways I shall try to explain.
The Law Commission said this in paragraph 114 of their report in 1979, at the beginning of the passage dealing with auction sales:
" We deal separately with auction sales because they have certain features which call for special consideration. An auction sale, as such, is of course merely a method of selling either to private purchasers or to business purchasers, or to both. In some cases, for example in certain classes of commodity sales by auction, sales will clearly be to business purchasers. Other types of auction on the other hand, for example, those held in some markets, are obviously a method of selling to consumers. But there are many auctions where the purchaser may or may not be a private purchaser, and this practical consideration must clearly affect the question how, if at all, contracting out in auction sales should be controlled ".
With the greatest respect, I suggest that this practical consideration is one for the auctioneers. If it raises a problem, it is one for the auctioneers themselves to solve, not at the expense of their competitors, the antique dealers, or of the purchasers. Surely any problem that exists should not be invoked to justify enjoyment by one set of traders of the advantage over others of being able to claim exemption from complying fully with rules of fair trading which govern consumer contracts in the form of implied conditions—to the detriment of consumers.
I am not saying that there may not be certain kinds of auction sales which should be treated differently, notably where in practice all the purchasers, or nearly all, are acting in the course of business. I had in mind the commodity or fat-stock markets, in which not to my knowledge are antique dealers interested. This kind of exception can be dealt with along the lines of subsection (4) of the amendment, which would enable the Secretary of State to specify by order certain kinds of auction sale to be treated as other than consumer sales. This would mean that in such auction sales exclusion clauses would be allowed as at present so long as they were adjudged to be reasonable in the circumstances.
The reason why I move this amendment is that it seems to me to be obviously unfair that, where two sets of traders are selling the same goods by two different methods, one set should be given legal privileges in the strict sense of the word which not only place the other set at a disadvantage but also place the private purchaser, the consumer, at a disadvantage. In my submission, that should be put right if at all possible.
May I describe as best I can what the new clauses will do? I am not a lawyer, and I would claim indulgence for any shortcomings in my explanation, but there arc lawyers here who, I am sure, will be glad, however kindly, to correct any of my mistakes. The Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act 1973 introduced for the first time in this country a distinction between what were called consumer sales and those which could not be so described. For the sake of convenience, the latter are usually referred to as "business sales", although that phrase is not to be found in any statute. The Act rendered void and ineffective all clauses which sought to exclude or limit the terms implied by the Sale of Goods Act 1893 (now by the Sale of Goods Act 1979) if they appeared in consumer sales.
If they appeared in business sales, those excluding clauses could be effective if they were proved reasonable. These provisions were carried forward into the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which replaced most of the 1973 Act.
The Unfair Contract Terms Act contains a definition of "consumer sale" in Section 12(1). I give it to your Lordships although you may be very familiar with it:
" A party to a contract deals as a consumer in relation to another party if he neither makes the contract in the course of a business nor holds himself out as doing so and if the other party does make the contract in the course of a business ",
and (and I abbreviate here) if the goods passing under or in pursuance of the contract are of a type ordinarily supplied for private use or consumption. That is in Subsection 12(1). Then comes Section 12(2), which says:
" But on a sale by auction or by competitive tender the buyer is not in any circumstances to be regarded as dealing as a consumer ".
My recollection is that this section was added towards the end of the passage of the Bill before it became an Act. One thing is certain and it is that the Law Commission were more or less equally divided in the matter. They recommended that further study should be given to it, but I do not think that it has. Two things follow. First, that the use of exclusion clauses in a sale by auction has only one constraint at present—that of the reasonableness of the exclusion clauses used—and, secondly, that, even if the buyer is a private buyer, the exclusion or limitation clauses will not automatically be void but will be void only if the court finds them unreasonable.
On the other hand, in vivid contrast, if a dealer attempts to use clauses which seem to exclude or limit the contractual liability imposed by Sections 13 and 14 of the Sale of Goods Act (which is about merchantable quality or fitness for a particular purpose or correspondence with description) not only will such a clause be immediately void, whether or not it could be adjudged reasonable, but also the dealer would be committing a criminal offence punishable by a fine of up to £1,000 if he attempted to make use of such void and ineffective clauses. This last sanction was introduced by order made under the Fair Trading Act 1973. It is called the Consumer Transactions (Restrictions on Statements) Amendment Order 1976.
If this new clause is accepted, the next new clause will be needed to amend the existing order to ensure that all consumer transactions, whether or not they take place at auction sales are covered. A complication arises because, under the Fair Trading Act, an order must be recommended by the Director-General of Fair Trading as needed to deal with a practice detrimental to the interest of consumers. If that recommendation is made, it must be approved by the Consumer Protection Advisory Committee before it is made by the Secretary of State.
I hope I have made it clear the use of exemption clauses at auctions in the case of consumer sales is, or can be, detrimental to the interests of consumers as they are not protected by the implied terms. I hope I have made it clear that that is so. It seems to me so obvious as not even to need clarification. The order made by the Secretary of State would be laid before Parliament in draft to be approved by each House. I hope that the first new clause satisfactorily resolves the complication, but it is a complicated matter and, all the same, if it does not, it cannot be beyond the wit of man to devise other ways to overcome it.
I would not expect the auctioneers to welcome these amendments any more than any persons or group of persons welcome the loss of privileges, but all that these clauses seek to do is to place auction houses and dealers on an equal footing and to allow them to compete on equal terms in areas where they compete. I put it to your Lordships that this is fair and reasonable. I beg to move.
The role of anyone who attempts in Parliament to pilot through a Private Member's Bill is a hazardous and at times an unhappy one. It could not have been put better than it was some two days ago in the Cinematograph Amendment Bill, a Private Member's Bill moved in this House, which had the support of the Government, The Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Elton, put it in this way:
I could not put it better myself and in regard to this present Bill. I preface these remarks to my answer to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Drumalbyn, because nobody could have put his case more clearly, lucidly or courteously than he did; and it may be a very strong case. Unfortunately, it is completely inappropriate for inclusion in this Bill. Here is a Bill which one is hoping will be non-controversial. This amendment seeks to amend two Acts of Parliament already passed and following upon a report of the Law Commission, so far as one part of that legislation is concerned. As I say, the case may be a very powerful one, but I submit not for the amendment of this Bill. I say this not because I feel that the noble Lord's points are not valid and may find a more successful result through another journey. Nobody could be a better guide on that journey than the noble Lord. However, on this journey I must point out to him the arguments against —not that I support them but I merely show that this would be a controversial addition to this Bill and therefore would jeopardise its future to a very great extent. I summarise some of the arguments against. I repeat that I do not necessarily support them. The first is that the Law Commission recommended that sales by auction should, like competitive tenders, be excluded from the definition of consumer sale. This was accordingly incorporated into the 1973 and 1977 Acts. When that was debated at that time, so far as I can trace there was no attempt to make any provisions such as the noble Lord suggested completely void. It was only a question of whether one made them subject to certain defences or whether one did not. Furthermore, it is said that people buying at auctions have different expectations of their legal rights. It is also argued by some that it will not be possible or easy to distinguish between consumer bidders and business bidders at auctions. It is further said by others that the auctioneer may not know whether the seller is a private individual or a dealer. It is claimed by others that auctions provide a convenient method of selling goods, where the seller may not be able to give normal undertakings. I refer to such sales as sales by executors or by order of a liquidator or receiver. I merely say this in order that the Committee will realise that this is unfortunately an addition, not only one which would not be properly embodied in this Bill but also one which would be controversial and therefore may well impede the passage of the Bill if it were incorporated in it. For that reason, and for that reason alone, I am afraid that I shall have to oppose this amendment." This Bill has the Government's support. I hope your Lordships will assist its passage through this House. Private Members' Bills are a little less robust, if I can so put it, than Government legislation, and they need that help. In particular, therefore, I hope that your Lordships will be very sparing indeed of amendments to it. Some for the purposes I have mentioned may be unavoidable. But clearly the more there arc, the riskier will be the future of the Bill when it returns to another place. It deserves a place on the statute book. It can protect many of our fellow citizens from affront, and some of them, I believe, from real harm ".—[Official Report, col. 264; 9/6/82.]
Perhaps it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I indicate the views of the Government on my noble friend's amendment. We enter the fascinating if at times perilous world of sales by auction. Many people who bid at auctions do so in the expectation of acquiring a bargain; many are disappointed. I do not suggest that auction rooms should carry the immortal words of Dante:
But they certainly ought to bear the maxim of the common law: "Caveat emptor". The present law follows the recommendations of the Law Commission. The chief reason for those recommendations is a purely practical one. The very full protection which is given by the 1977 Act applies only where a person buys as a consumer. There are two elements in buying as a consumer. The first is that he himself is a consumer. Secondly, he buys from a trader. There are those two elements in the equation. Where you have a sale by auction, the auctioneer is a mere agent. The contract is between the owner of the goods and the final purchaser. The owner of the goods may be a trader; he may be a private individual. Those of you who have experience of sales at auction will remember the well-known phrase appearing in so many catalogues:"All hope abandon, ye who enter here".
The identity of the vendor therefore is frequently not disclosed. By definition, the identity of the purchaser cannot be disclosed until the sale is completed. It is quite impossible therefore at the outset to know whether or not the full protection of the 1977 Act, which applies only where a person buys as a consumer, would or would not be relevant. It would introduce an element of confusion and doubt which we think would raise serious practical problems. There is the further point that auction sales provide a valuable forum for the disposal—if I may put it in this way—of second-hand goods, personal effects, household effects, and so forth. Very often of course there are properties of deceased estates and the owners of them are in no position to give any warranties or assurances. The people who buy these goods do so well-knowing what the position is. As a practical matter, therefore, I fear that I need to advise the Committee that we would not think that the amendment was a feasible one. There is, however, a further point. My noble friend was good enough to make it quite clear that he was expressing the anxieties felt by the London and Provincial Antique Dealers' Association. In other words, from this point of view what was really involved was not so much consumer protection as protection of the interests of one section of the trade against the interests of an- other. This, if I may say so, does rather go outside the spirit of the Bill. I would not want on this occasion to enter into any debate on the merits of the proposition, but it would seem to me to be straying rather wide. But primarily on the basis that such a new clause as that proposed by my noble friend would create serious practical difficulties in working, the view of the Government would be that the amendment is not one which should commend itself to the Committee. I hope that my noble friend will take this advice into account." The property of a gentleman ".
I am grateful to my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, for the way in which they have dealt with this amendment. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, because I realise that this is an embarrassment to him. I entirely accept what he says, that at this time of the year particularly, whenever a Private Member's Bill has come from another place and is amended here it places in jeopardy the possibility of the Bill becoming an Act. I am fully conscious of that. I do not know whether I need to apologise for taking up the time of the Committee because this is an important matter that deserves to be studied.
I have expressed my opinion that it is primarily a matter for the auctioneers themselves to sort out. It also has to be dealt with at the instance of the Government. And as the Law Commission suggested that it needed further study, I hope it will get the further study that has been suggested. I fully recognise, of course, as indeed did the Law Commission, that there are peculiar difficulties in this, but the fact remains that while the auctioneer is an agent it is the agent who sets up the terms on which the auction is conducted: it is not the seller. It is therefore for the agent to establish conditions, I would have thought, which are compatible with fair and equal competition with the dealers. That is what I have suggested, and I still believe this to be true. It is not that I "have it in" for the auctioneers in any way at all—far from it; I think they are a distinguished body and many of them hold great international reputations. That was also recognised in the Law Commission's report. However, the fact remains that the Law Commission were not quite so definite as was suggested by my noble friend the Minister. In fact the actual words they used were:If my recollection is correct—and I was there at the time when the 1973 Act was going through—this was the amendment which gave the exemptions from the implied terms of the contract and it was introduced at a very late stage and rather took Parliament unawares at the time. I may be wrong, but that is my strong recollection. I quite see that the owners who are sellers are not always in a position to alert the auctioneer to defects in the goods, but I think there is an obligation on them to do so and any action taken by the auctioneers should recognise that obligation. Plainly this amendment at this stage and in this context—because I recognise that it does not fit very easily into the Bill—is not going to make very much progress, especially on a Friday morning when the House is relatively thin. Simply because the House is relatively thin and because the opportunity for discussion of it has been limited although, so far as it goes, it has been pretty comprehensive, it would obviously be wrong for me to test the opinion of the House today. Therefore, I should like simply to acknowledge the way in which this amendment has been received by your Lordships and ask leave to withdraw it." We are divided on the question whether there should be any control on a sale by auction of the seller's freedom to contract out of the conditions and warranties implied by Sections 13 to 15 of the Sale of Goods Act ".
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendment No. 2 not moved.]
Clause 12 [The contracts concerned]:
1.5 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 3:
Page 8, line 7, at end insert (", and" the supply of a service" does not include—(a) the making of a loan or the provision of credit, or (b) the supply of the services of a solicitor in his capacity as an advocate.").
The noble Lord said: This amendment, which covers two matters, is designed to avoid confusion and difficulty arising in the future. The Long Title of the Bill refers to the amendment of the law, although I recognise that on Second Reading both the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, indicated that their purpose was not, in this part of the Act, to amend but rather to codify the law.
There is no doubt at the moment that the grant of credit or the making of a loan imposes no duty of care or skill owed by a banker to consider the prudence of the customer in borrowing. This has been well established and understood, but was contested in a case where the court held strongly that there was no such duty on the bank. The case to which I refer is Williams and Glyn's Bank v. Barnes, which was reported in the Commercial Law Reports of 5th October 1981. The report starts on page 205 and the passage to which I refer occurs on page 208.
The question therefore is whether the making of a loan or the giving of credit may be, within the meaning of this Part of the Act, the supply of a service. That question could be one of crucial importance to potential litigants, and it is with a view to avoiding that difficulty that this amendment is put forward. If it were held or thought to be a supply of a service, then that would be governed by Clause 13 and therefore would import a duty which presently does not exist.
In view of the Long Title referring to amendment of the law, I believe there is real cause for concern that a court might feel that the decision in Williams and Glyn's case no longer stood and that this Act had an effect upon the position, which is clearly not in the minds of the noble Lords, Lord Mishcon and Lord Cockfield. On those grounds I would propose that the amendment set out in paragraph (a)—
" the making of a loan or the provision of credit ",—
should be adopted. As to paragraph (b)—
" the supply of the services of a solicitor in his capacity as an advocate "—
the position is that either a barrister or a solicitor may be an advocate in certain courts. So far as barristers are concerned, no contract exists between a barrister and his instructing solicitor, nor with his client. Therefore, Clause 13 could not be applicable in any
event. The solicitor is in a different position. He has a contract with his client—his retainer—and he has a contract with his client whether his function is in the court as an advocate or not in the court, which is his most common function. This question as to the responsibility of a solicitor when acting as an advocate came before the court in the case of Rondel v. Worsley, and there it was held that barrister and solicitor advocates enjoy the same immunity in respect of negligence while functioning as advocates.
In view of the terms of this Part of the Act, some doubt might be cast upon the decision in Ronde! v. Worsley and it seems very desirable that any possibility of that should be resisted or, in the case of a loan or credit, should be avoided. It may be said that these matters could easily be dealt with, as indeed they could, by an exclusion order made under Clause 12(4) of the Bill. If that were so, if an undertaking to make such an exclusion order were given, that would seem to me entirely satisfactory. However, the response on Second Reading to the possibility of a specific exclusion order of this kind from the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, was far from such an undertaking. For that reason, I thought it right to put before your Lordships this amendment.
May I say one further word? A few moments ago, the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd, mentioned to me that he would like added to the amendment as printed, after the words "the services of a solicitor" in paragraph (b), the words "or chartered patent agent". I would entirely support such an amendment, if the procedural requirements have been complied with, but in that respect I think it would be appropriate that I should leave the matter to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd. I beg to move.
May I briefly support what the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, has said in introducing this amendment. He has mentioned that only this morning I approached him to see whether he would agree to the addition of the words "or chartered patent agent" being inserted after the word "solicitor". In my experience, I have seen, and been involved with, chartered patent agents as advocates in the patent court. I therefore consulted the clerk who is concerned with this Bill, and he suggested that the procedure which we have now adopted would be suitable, rather than that a manuscript amendment should be circulated at this stage. I have also notified the Table on this matter. But, if there is some kind of procedural difficulty that was not disclosed to me earlier, I shall, of course, withdraw this kind of amendment. But I was assured that it was perfectly in order to proceed in this way. May I add that Part II of this Bill may substantially alter the existing law. There is some ambiguity about this, but it seems that this is not merely a codifying Bill. Therefore, I strongly support this amendment.
I have been introduced to a new procedure. One is always anxious to learn and, from these Benches, it may be convenient to throw last minute verbal amendments at the Government, in the hope that they can be embarrassed thereby. I can only say that this is a new procedure to me. But I am taking it as an intimation that someone who is supporting the amendment that has been moved by my noble friend Lord Nathan would also like to see patent agents included in this connection. With his usual courtesy, to which we are so accustomed, the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, has intimated this to those who are responsible for the Bill, in order that they may have warning on another occasion. Having so interpreted his words, I continue to deal with the amendment.
One obviously wants to see that this Bill is as clear as it possibly can be. My own view, and the view of those who are guiding me on this Bill, is that it is quite impossible to construe as a service the granting of a loan or the giving of credit simpliciter. Naturally, if someone who is going to advance money or give credit decides to take on the garb of an adviser on whether or not the transaction, in respect of which the loan is being made or the credit is being given, is an advisable one, or on whether the person concerned ought to be taking the loan or credit, in any event, having regard to his means and his ability to pay, that will be a service, and I would be the last one to think that it was proper to exempt such a person from the duty of acting with reasonable care when he is giving such advice. I cannot conceive—this is my personal view and the view of those who advise me on this Bill—that the service recorded in paragraph (a),is a service that is caught by the Bill. But if there is any doubt about it, and if someone of the stature as a lawyer of my noble friend Lord Nathan regards it as being doubtful, then anyone who has the respect that I have for my noble friend would immediately say that it was a matter that ought to be looked at. If one says that, one then asks: what is the best way of looking at it? —bearing in mind my anxiety, which I have expressed before, that there should not be amendments to this Bill, in order that it may progress and get upon the statute book as quickly as possible. There is, of course, the alternative way of taking advantage of Clause 12(4), which was indicated by my noble friend, but that is very much a matter for the noble Lord the Secretary of State. That subsection reads:"the making of a loan or the provision of credit "
If I may respectfully suggest this to the Secretary of State, who, I believe, will courteously be rising in a moment to guide the Committee, I should have thought that the interval of time between now and Third Reading might usefully be employed by a discussion—unless the noble Lord can give some kind of firm assurance now that this is the sort of case where he would exercise his powers and give an exclusion order—as to whether it is more sensible to deal with the matter by way of an exclusion order or by way of an amendment. And I believe that the noble Lord the Secretary of State is as anxious as I am to see that there are as few amendments as possible to this Bill. Turning to paragraph (b), which reads," The Secretary of State may by order provide that one or more of sections 13 to 15 below shall not apply to services of a description specified in the order, and such an order may make different provision for different circumstances."
that has already been dealt with in another place. I see that the right honourable gentleman the Minister for Consumer Affairs dealt with it at col. 596 of the Official Report of another place on 2nd April 1982. He then said:" the supply of the services of a solicitor in his capacity as an advocate ",
and he was, of course, referring to the very clause that I am talking about—" If in future we discover that there are problems—for example, for people providing a particular type of service which clearly should be exempted from some of the provisions of Part III—the amendment "—
" will enable the Secretary of State to make an exclusion order.
That is, of course, the very case to which my noble friend is referring in paragraph (b) of this amendment. I imagine—though it is not for me to forecast what the noble Lord the Secretary of State will say—that he may wish to refer to this and to say that this is the type of case where one can take it for granted that an exclusion order will be made. The noble Lord the Minister is of such capacity that he needs no assistance from me. Nevertheless, in fairness to him I ought to say that at Second Reading he made it very clear, for the protection of everybody, that he had no intention of Part II of this Bill being operative until he had given the fullest opportunity to those who felt they might be unfairly affected to make representations in order that they could be considered in relation to this power to make an exclusion order. So I turn, with the friendliness which I hope I always exercise, towards him, to the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, who endeavoured to put patent agents into this amendment. I had no notice of it. Nevertheless, may I say to the noble Lord that if there is a strong case for patent agents they will no doubt make it in due course.The only example that I have been able to discover where this might be necessary—and I am still not sure that it will be—is the highly specialised case where there is a contract with a solicitor which includes a provision for him to provide his services as an advocate. As I say, we shall look into this further."
If I may speak briefly on this subject, so far as making of loans is concerned the Government take the same view as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. In the case of the provision of credit there is an arguable case that this is a provision of services, but at this stage I am not at all certain that an adequate case has been made out for their exclusion. The right course, I would suggest, is that which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has suggested; namely, that there should be further consultations on this matter to see what the right way of proceeding is. I shall be only too happy for such consultations to proceed.
In the case of a solicitor acting as an advocate, we recognise that there exists at present a rule of law which gives to a solicitor the same immunity from actions for negligence in relation to those particular activities as is enjoyed by a barrister, and it was not intended that the Bill should alter this position. There is an argument, which I do not want to press at this stage, that the Bill does not in fact affect the defence which would be open to a solicitor if somebody tried to proceed against him. There is a reputable argument there that the Bill does not alter the nature of the defences open to a solicitor. Nevertheless, I realise the anxieties which exist on this score. As the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has said, there is power under Clause 12(4) for me to make an exclusion order. I hesitate to give a categorical assurance today that such an order will be made because I think it is only right that the legal profession should themselves reflect upon the matter and come along to me with their own clear-cut recommendations about what should be done. I promise the noble Lord that I shall then approach the matter with a completely open, if sympathetic mind. I hope he will accept this as the kind of assurance for which he is looking.Of course I accept the offer of an open and sympathetic hearing. As the position of solicitor-advocates was raised, which I did not previously realise, as long ago as October, it is remarkable that the consideration has not been able to be given to this matter until now.
So far as the exclusion orders are concerned, as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, said, they must be effective as at the date of the bringing into operation of Part II, otherwise there would be a complete distortion of the position. So far as the loan and credit situation is concerned, I was interested in the distinction drawn by the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield. As he has suggested, I should certainly like to consider that aspect. In withdrawing the amendment I think I ought to say that I reserve the position for a later stage of the Bill as it proceeds. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 12 agreed to.
Clauses 13 and 14 agreed to.
Clause 15 [Implied term about consideration]:
1.26 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 4:
Page 8, line 34, at end insert (" where the supplier is acting in the course of a business ").
The noble Lord said: This is a very simple point, I believe. The amendment brings Clause 15 into line with Clauses 13 and 14. It introduces the words which appear in those other clauses: "acting in the course of a business". The concern is that there are many informal agreements for the supply of a service—for example, between neighbours—with no intention of any monetary consideration passing: say, in relation to mutual arrangements concerning gardens, mowing and so forth.
It has been suggested to me that the words "in the course of a business" were omitted from the clause by analogy with the sale of goods under Section 8 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. But it is an implied term that consideration for the sale of goods shall be a monetary one. I do not think that applies at all in the case of a supply of services. The introduction of this provision under Clause 15, which has no relation to the person carrying on the supply of a service in the course of business, will I think extend the Act far further than was intended or is desirable. It is for that reason that I move the amendment.
As the noble Lord, Lord Nathan, has just said, this is not one of the major points which he has brought before the Committee this afternoon. It so happens—I wish frankly to say this—that in the draft Bill which accompanied the report of the Consumer Council these words, or similar words, occur. But the advice which was received from the draftsman—and I rather imagine that it was correct advice—was that the words were unnecessary.
The type of transaction to which the noble Lord referred and the chances of it ever reaching even a solicitor's office, let alone the court, must be minimal: neighbour swapping a service with neighbour and finding that he had certain rights (or that one or other of them did) under the Bill. However, everything must be taken into account when one accepts the responsible role of legislator, as this House does. Therefore, may I suggest that between now and Third Reading—in saying that I am assuming that no Report stage is necessary—one should take further advice to see whether these words are necessary. If they are necessary, then I can no doubt bring an amendment before the House at Third Reading in words which will not be quite the same as the words of this amendment, for certain reasons with which I shall not weary the Committee. If one can avoid it, I should like to do so, for the reasons which have already been given. I do not think that an amendment of this kind, if it is necessary to be brought forward, will impede the progress of the Bill in another place, although it would mean a report back, with the Bill amended, to another place. Upon that basis, I hope that my noble friend can see his way clear to withdraw his important amendment.There is very little for me to add to what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. I myself would be remarkably surprised to find, if one entered into a mutual arrangement with a neighbour under which he mowed your lawn while you were on holiday and you mowed his when he was on holiday, that the law regarded that as a contract. Indeed, I think the important thing is that the clause as drafted applies only to contracts and does not apply to friendly arrangements which do not in fact constitute contracts. I believe that this is the real answer to the case for the amendment. But in the light of what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, I do not consider that it is really necessary for me to say anything more.
In the light of the statement made by my noble friend Lord Mishcon, I will withdraw this amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 15 agreed to.
Clause 16 [Exclusion of implied terms, etc.]:
1.31 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 5:
Page 9, line 19, at end insert—
(" (5) Nothing in this part of this Act affects the duties owed to a company by any of its directors in his capacity as such.").
The noble Lord said: Whatever may have been said about the last amendment, this clause really does raise matters of considerable difficulty and importance. It is a vexed question, in practising the law, to know whether a contract is one of service or for the supply of a service. It is precisely that problem that arises in this case. In my view, it is probable that non-executive directors supply a service while executive directors operate under a contract of service. I believe this approach is the one that must be generally applied. There are, of course, some non-executive directors who are non-executive directors of quite a number of companies, and in that context it may be said that they are acting in the course of a business. It is for this business that an anomaly arises. Under this part of the Bill, if non-executive directors are supplying a service, whereas executive directors are not, they are exercising a responsibility towards the same company but their responsibilities are governed by different rules.
Under Clause 13 there is a duty to take reasonable care and skill which is, as I interpret it, to be assessed objectively—that is to say, that the exercise of the reasonable care and skill is to be assessed objectively, whereas in brief it might be said that the duty of directors generally under company law is assessed subjectively, having regard to the qualifications of the person exercising it. Therefore, one could find that if the directors of a company entered into a contract on the company's behalf in perfectly good faith but for some reason or another it did not turn out well, then any possible liability of the executive directors would, it seems to me, be assessed on a different basis to that of the liability of the non-executive directors. I cannot imagine that was ever intended.
The purpose of this amendment is merely to ensure that in relation to the duties of directors to the company of which they are directors, nothing in the Act shall have any effect. I beg to move.
As my noble friend Lord Nathan has said so correctly, there is a difference, very often worrying to lawyers, between a contract of service and a contract for service. There is no doubt at all that a non-executive director comes into the latter category. I can only say for those who are responsible for this Bill that there certainly was no intention to include the non-executive directors in this sense; it would be recognised as extremely untidy from the point of view of the law if outside company legislation there was a provision in an Act somewhere which dealt with, or covered the duties of, some directors of a company who were in fact non-executive directors. This would be a very untidy way of dealing with company law and the duties of directors. If I may say so, that point is recognised. Whether it is necessary to deal with it in this way—and I know that my noble friend will forgive me if I say that the wide term, undefined, of "company" and the wide term, undefined, of "directors" in this amendment would have to be looked at more carefully—or whether it is a question of an exclusion order, or whether the Government with the benefit of their great advice and wisdom take another view of how to deal with this matter, I shall await to hear with interest.
I wonder whether I might express the view that I have some reservations as to whether this case is well-founded in law. As far as I know, there is no legal distinction between an executive director and a non-executive director. They are both directors of a company and their duties and obligations as directors must be identical. It is perfectly true that some directors also have a contract of service as managers or as executives, but that is a separate contract quite distinct from their office as director. Admittedly, it is a matter of convenience to be able to refer to some people as executive directors and to other people as non-executive directors. It is equally a matter of convenience to refer to some people as finance directors, production directors, sales directors, marketing directors or public relations directors—but none of these phrases has any foundation in law.
If this is not the position I would have expected some authority to have been quoted in support of the contrary view. But no such authority has been quoted, either statutory or case law, or even a statement of a leading text book. Therefore, in so far as this argument is based upon a claimed difference in law between executive and non-executive directors, I wonder whether it is soundly based and whether the position may not in fact be that all directors of a company are covered by the decision in City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., and that the problem which the noble Lord sees does not exist. There is another aspect of this—mainly that the provisions of the Bill would apply only if the services were rendered in the course of a business. A directorship is not a business. It is assessed under Schedule E of income tax as an office or appointment. It is not assessed under Schedule D as the profits of a trade, profession or business. That this is so is clearly borne out by the fact that where a director's fees are brought into the computation of the profits of a partnership or of solicitors or accountants, that is done by way of an extra-statutory concession. In fact, the concession is No. 40 in the latest list of statutory concessions published by the Inland Revenue. I would, therefore, suggest to the noble Lord that he should consider the question whether, if it is necessary to make an extra-statutory concession, it does not therefore follow that the strict law is precisely the opposite; namely, that in law even if a director is a member of a firm of solicitors or accountants, and even if as a result of the extra-statutory concession his fees are brought into the computation of their profits, nevertheless in law he remains a holder of an office assessable under Schedule E and he is not carrying on a business. I put it no stronger than that it seems to me, at first sight, that the fears which have been expressed are not well supported on either ground, and had the position been different I would have expected to have seen it more closely argued. I would, therefore, like to make two suggestions. The first one is that the people who entertain these doubts, and I agree they include the Law Society, should give further thought to the matter to see whether the doubts are well founded. Secondly, of course, there is the provision in Clause 12(4) for an exclusion order to be made, and if in fact a case can be established I would be very willing to give consideration to such an order. But I hope the noble Lord will not in any way misunderstand my position if I say that I believe it does need to be established first that there is a problem before we then set out to solve the problem.
I would make only one comment, if I may. The noble Lord the Secretary of State when addressing us from the Dispatch Box does so in a remarkable manner. 1 was full of wonder, as he quoted rules and cases and so on, looking straight at the members of the Committee and without once looking at his notes. My admiration, I hope, is going to be genuine. I found myself in a similar situation when listening to the President of the United States some few days ago: I was full of absolute wonder when after 40 minutes he sat down, having looked at his notes but a couple of times, and having spoken very rapidly and with admirable quotations, not least from Sir Winston Churchill's speeches. I was only told afterwards that it was as a result of a device which I hope is not in your Lordships' Chamber at this moment that he was able to do this. Having been fooled once, I am sure I have not been fooled again.
I am very grateful for the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield. Of course, I will look into the matter further, and, if necessary, contact the noble Lord, Lord Cockfield, with such material as there is on the point. I would only add that I have found it extraordinarily dangerous, particularly in the field of charities, and elsewhere, to ascertain what the law is according to what are the rules of the Inland Revenue in relation to a particular situation, though I was much interested in what the noble Lord had to say on that. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 16 agreed to.
Clauses 17 to 19 agreed to.
Clause 20 [Short title, etc.]:
moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 11, line 38, leave out (" but not to Scotland").
The noble and learned Lord said: I beg leave to move Amendment No. 6 on the Marshalled List. In view of the day and the hour, I shall not pursue those aspects of Private Members' Bills touched on earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, nor shall I pursue the possibilities of the use of laser beams as ready prompts in your Lordships' House.
The purpose of this amendment is simply to seek the application to Scotland of the provisions of the Bill, or at least to elicit from the Government a more satisfactory explanation than has so far been afforded to Parliament for the absence of Scotland from these provisions. One thing, I think, is certain, and that is that if the machinery of government had operated properly and as it ought to have operated, Scotland would indeed have been covered by the provisions of the Bill. In saying that, let me emphasise that I am not directing any generalised criticism, much less attack, on either the Scottish Law Commission or anyone else. All I am saying is that there is a question to answer as to why Scotland was not covered in the Bill.
What in fact happened, as your Lordships know, was that when the Bill was originally published Scotland was not covered, but thereafter in the Standing Committee in the other place an amendment was effected to provide that Scotland should be covered by a new Part II of the Act and should also be covered by Part III of the Act with certain adaptations thereto. That amendment having been effected, on Third Reading the Government successfully moved to delete those provisions applicable to Scotland which had been added in the Standing Committee.
It is important to observe that in so doing the Government did not oppose in principle the need for legislation in this context for Scotland. Indeed they conceded, as I understand what was said—I cannot, of course, quote—that the existing law was scrappy and uncertain and required clarification. The reason for seeking to delete the application of the Bill to Scotland was that it had not been possible to carry out the necessary close consideration. I find this—and I must confine myself to the understatement, beloved of your Lordships' House—very difficult to accept, because of course the report on implied terms in contracts for the sale of goods, on which this Bill is largely based so far as the supply of goods is concerned, was the third in a sequence of three. The first two, presented if my memory is correct in 1969 and 1975, on exemption clauses in contracts, were joint reports carried out by the Law Commission jointly with the Scottish Law Commission.
The third report quite properly did not proceed as a joint report. The development of the law in the two countries had been slightly different, and for that reason the Law Commission proceeded in this matter on its own. But the point I seek to make is that at that point the Government and the Scottish Law Commission were, of course, alerted to this situation, and indeed it is a provision of the Law Commissions Act that the commissioners shall act in consultation with one another in exercise of their functions.
In that situation, I find it, as I have already said, very difficult to accept that it was not possible to give the matter of the law in this particular context full consideration and to be ready to proceed on the basis of a statute applicable not only to England, Wales and, I think, Northern Ireland, but also to Scotland. In those circumstances, if the Government are unable to accept that the Bill should be amended to cover Scotland here and now, then at least I hope that we would have an assurance that the necessary examination of the law in relation to the supply of goods and services will take place and that that examination will be given a reasonably high priority—certainly a significantly higher priority than I gather, from reading the reports of the debates in the other place, the Government were then prepared to give.
There is grave concern in many circles in Scotland that the matter, so far as that country is concerned, has been overlooked. Accordingly, I suggest that the matter should now be given, as a matter of urgency, the necessary consideration in order that we may be assured of the desirability, as regards the law in this matter, that the two parts of the country should be on the same footing. It is not a question of slavishly following the English, but in the context of the consumer interests involved here it is clearly desirable that the law should not be out of step further than necessary.
In another place we always felt that it was a bold English Member who intervened in Scottish affairs. But I was glad that my noble friend Lord Wilson of Langside had tabled this amendment for today. During Second Reading in our own House on 5th May each of us supporting the amendment today, mentioned the exclusion of Scotland. I should like to point out that my noble friend Lady Seear has just sent an apology to me. She has been trying to be in two places today and unfortunately at 1.30 she had to succumb only to be in one. Therefore, she has left her support for the amendment and regrets that she cannot be here to add to it. Additionally, in this respect, my noble friend Lady Elliot of Harwood also had to be in Scotland and she herself is not here. Therefore, your Lordships are left with a Scottish speaker and an English speaker in support of the amendment.
The noble Lord, Lord Young of Dartington, made the point on Second Reading that the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, has made today; namely, that he felt there was an advantage in having a uniform body of commercial law in the two countries unless there was strong reason to the contrary. In the few remarks that I wish to make today, I think it obviously would be better if I confine myself to the Scottish support for the amendment rather than to my own thoughts. When we were discussing the Second Reading of the Bill great tribute was paid, and I think deservedly paid, to the work of the National Consumer Council in so far as the Bill was concerned. I am hoping very much that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate, whom I assume will be speaking, will feel able to pay an equal tribute to the Scottish Consumer Council for the part that they played in the clauses relating to Scotland. On 29th March the Scottish Consumer Council wrote to the Solicitor General for Scotland saying how disappointed the council were at the proposed exclusion of Scotland from the Bill. They asked a question and 1 should like to quote it. They asked:Matters did not go very well for the Scottish Consumer Council. So a month later on 29th April they wrote again saying how disappointed they were at the decision taken and furthermore that, although they had given very careful consideration to the points raised in the debate on Second Reading, the council remained convinced that Scotland should have been included. We move on to the third letter—it seems to be my fate to deal with letters—dated 17th May when the Scottish Consumer Council tried again. First, they made the point that the Scottish Consumer Council were largely responsible for the inclusion of clauses applicable to Scotland in the Bill. They then went on to express the hope that it would still be possible to persuade the Government to offer some commitment that the law in Scotland in relation to the supply of services be the object of consideration by the Scottish Law Commission in the near future. Of course, as he will know, this last appeal was made to the noble and learned Lord, the Lord Advocate. I have just received a letter from the Scottish Consumer Council dated 9th June. They informed me that they had not yet had a reply from the Lord Advocate to their last letter which the Chairman of the Scottish Consumer Council wrote to him. It may be, of course, that since 9th June the noble and learned Lord may have already replied, but if not, let me point out that they did ask me if I would mention today a matter which I have already mentioned—namely, that in particular their concern is that the Lord Advocate refers the matter of supply of services to the Scottish Law Commission. Therefore, in paying tribute to the Scottish Consumer Council I hope—as indeed did the mover of the amendment my noble friend Lord Wilson—that if the Government cannot include Scotland at this present stage, then the Lord Advocate, as the very minimum, will offer the statement that has been asked for by the Scottish Consumer Council." how, without Scotland's inclusion in the Bill, the Government hopes to achieve clarity in this area of law, so that judges, traders and consumers alike can quote it authoritatively? "
I should like briefly to support what has been said by both of the speakers so far. What is left in doubt in the Bill as it stands is the date upon which Part II will be brought into operation. I understood my noble friend the Secretary of State to have indicated at an earlier stage that in the interval he was going to make inquiries as to how far it will be possible to exempt certain forms of activities before the Bill was brought into operation in Scotland. Could not this time be used for the Scottish Law Commission to inquire into the matter and even for legislation to be carried through? Is it too tight a programme? We just do not know how long it will be before the England and Wales Bill will be brought into operation in respect of Part II. However, I emphasise and strongly support the proposition that the same kind of provisions should be provided for Scotland and at the same time, if at all possible, as for England. Perhaps my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate could deal with that point.
I do not assist the popularity of this Bill in Committee by speaking at any length at two o'clock and by repeating points that have already been made by those who support the amendment. Briefly, so far as I and those who are involved with the promotion of the Bill are concerned, it would indeed be ideal if the law could be the same throughout the United Kingdom on a matter of this kind. But one realises the difficulty again in regard to the passage of this Bill if one attempted to amend it in the way that is sought, for that would be contrary to the already expressed wish—even if it be the second expressed wish and not the first expressed wish—of another place.
So in view of that desire, which I should have thought would be a common desire, one can only hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate can give us some assurance that he will use the influence that he has in regard to the Scottish Law Commission or, to put it another way, will ensure that recommendations are made to the Scottish Law Commission on what has been said this afternoon, and that he will add his own authority to any representations that may be made that this is deemed by this House to be an urgent measure and something that is urgently required to be examined in order that Scotland may have the same advantages as other parts of the United Kingdom by benefiting from this legislation.
2.2 p.m.
I think there are three matters with which I would wish to deal in seeking to state the Government's position in relation to this amendment. First, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson, in introducing his amendment, pointed out that on two earlier occasions the two Law Commissions had worked together. When it came to the stage which gave rise to the report on which Part I of this Bill is founded, the Law Commission made it perfectly plain that in their view the development of the law in the two countries in this particular area had been different, and therefore it was not appropriate to engage in a joint examination of the law at that stage.
I do not know whether that is being challenged as being incorrect, but I would certainly strongly take the view that the advice given by the Law Commissions in the exercise of their role is sound advice and we ought to accept it. When the two commissions are not working together in relation to a particular project they, of course, keep very closely in touch with one another as to what they are doing. The Scottish Law Commission has a working party whose responsibility it is to receive the working papers of the Law Commission and study them and their probable implications for Scotland, and to make comments to the Law Commission at an early stage. In my experience, that has been a satisfactory way of proceeding. As regards this particular Bill—and I refer specially to Part I—the results of the English Law Commission's efforts are embodied in it. The Scottish Law Commission proposes to examine this area of the law in conjunction with an examination of a closely related and very important area of the law; that is to say the implied terms and buyers' remedies in relation to the sale of goods. In other words, they take the view very strongly that it is right that buyers' remedies in relation to the sale of goods should be somewhat the same as the remedies in relation to the supply of goods. Therefore, before one reaches a conclusion on what is the correct formulation in relation to contracts for the supply of goods, this particular related area should be examined. The Law Commissions have the responsibility to develop the law in an orderly fashion and not in a piecemeal fashion. In fact, it is a keynote of the Law Commissions' Act—which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Gardiner, introduced with such skill into this House, laying the foundations for these institutions in such a very remarkable way—that they should operate in that way. In this part of the project, the two commissions are again able to work together because the buyers' remedies and the related matters of implied terms in relation to the sale of goods are matters which the Law Commissions consider that they can examine together, and they are in the process of doing so. It will be seen from the nature of the Law Commission's own report, on which this Bill is founded, that difficulties are involved, which I need not go into, in legislating on these two matters separately. There are advantages in doing it together and it is that advantage that we seek. When that work by the Scottish Law Commission is completed, I am unable to give a commitment that we shall be able there and then to legislate on the report. But I claim—T think very easily and fully in the light of the record—that the Scottish Law Commission's reports are usually implemented by Parliament very fully and pretty quickly. I see no reason to anticipate any difference in this particular part of the operation. As regards the supply of services, that is an immensely large area. There is much to be said for the view that good law reform proceeds after a proper examination of the law in that area has taken place. We have seen that there are certain difficulties which can arise if that is not the order of events. On the Scottish Law Commission, this particular subject matter is part of its first programme of law reform —the law of obligations. I think that your Lordships can take it that the Scottish Law Commission will give it the appropriate priority in the light of the other claims on the attention of that commission. There are many matters in the law of Scotland that urgently require reform and the Scottish Law Commission is in a very good position to judge the urgency and the priorities that exist in that field. It has a number of fields to cover that, as it happens, are not covered by the Law Commission at the present time: it is not working in these areas at the present time. Perhaps the one that occurs most frequently in reference is the study on the law of diligence. Certainly for my part—and the Scottish Law Commission agree with this—it is of the highest priority that we should get our court enforcement procedures right. What I can say to your Lordships is that I have discussed this matter from time to time with the chairman of the Scottish Law Commission. He is well aware of the situation and he will take full account of what has been said in your Lordships' House in reviewing the priorities of the commission with his colleagues on the commission, as they do from time to time. The Law Commission is in fact undertaking work in the supply of services area, and the Scottish Law Commission will keep closely in touch with that work and will certainly consider fully the implications for Scotland as the work proceeds. I do not think that it would be right for me to go further than that. I would only say that it does not necessarily follow that the introduction of legislation is necessary in order to secure rights for the people of Scotland. The Scottish Law Commission, as well as myself, are anxious to secure that the rights which exist in this area in Scotland are appropriate. Finally, may I say that I should like to accept the invitation that the noble Baroness, Lady Burton, gave me to say something about the Scottish Consumer Council? I most gladly pay tribute to their work. They have done excellent work. I think I can also say that I keep in pretty close touch with them in a number of areas as well as this. I believe that we shall be able to work satisfactorily for the future as we have done in the past, but we have to recognise that their interests are not the only interests that the Scottish Law Commission have to serve, and the Law Commission does its best to balance these interests. I hope that in the light of that explanation your Lordships will not feel that the machinery of Government, so far as Scotland is concerned, did not operate properly in this connection.We must all be most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for all that he has said. It was, of course, like everything he says, most impressive. Of course I did not challenge—I thought I had made it clear, but I am sure that I did not—the decision of the two Law Commissions to carry out the report on which this Bill is based not as a joint exercise. That was perfectly understandable and perfectly appropriate. I mentioned the matter merely to focus on the point that all concerned must have been alerted to the needs of the situation about at least five years ago. That was the sole point that I made today. I found the noble and learned Lord's reply to the amendment much more impressive than I did that which was made in the other place. In the whole circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 20 agreed to.
The Schedule agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment: Report received.
Food And Drugs (Amendment) Bill
2.13 p.m.
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.
Moved, that the House do now resolve itself into Committee.— (Lord Darling of Hillsborough.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
House in Committee accordingly.
[The LORD HAYTER in the Chair.]
Clauses 1 to 5 agreed to.
moved Amendment No.1:
After Clause 5, insert the following new clause:
(" Seizure by inspectors
. Section 102 of the principal Act (Powers of inspectors of weights and measures) shall be renumbered as subsection (1) and the following new subsection shall be added at the end—
"(2) Subject to the production if so requested of his credentials, an inspector may at any time within the premises seize and detain—
The noble Lord said: I am advised by the Food and Drink Industries Council and the Retail Consortium on these amendments. Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 will be familiar as being copies of amendments moved in another place by the Government and later withdrawn. No. 1 has been added because it is understood that in updating the Food and Drugs Act 1955 in relation to Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 and defences, it would be appropriate to update it also in relation to the seizure of documents where it is in line, for example, with the Weights and Measures Act 1979, it being another factor which has arisen over the last 25 years and in which the Food and Drugs Act requires updating. I have tabled these amendments as promised on Second Reading because the Government have not seen their way to tabling them themselves, and I hope my noble friend Lord Sandys will tell us a little about the results of the quick inquiry that was initiated to see how interested parties reacted to the amendments.
The point at issue is that, whatever your Lordships decide to do with the amendments and whatever happens to the Bill, the potential injustices in not bringing the food legislation up to date in respect of defences on the same lines as other consumer protection legislation will remain. I hope, therefore, that my noble friend will be able to show us that the Government understand fully that it is a potential injustice and that they will do something without delay. There will obviously have to be some delay, but I hope he will show us that it is not something that will just be shelved because it is too difficult, but that something will happen. I think that is as far as I need go at this stage. I beg to move.
I understand from my reading of the first amendment that it is defective because the provision to which it refers was repealed from the Food and Drugs Act 1955 by the Weights and Measures Act 1963. That places us in some confusion and therefore it might be helpful if the Minister would give us the benefit of his advice on how we should proceed.
It would probably be suitable for our deliberations if at this stage I were to respond to the comments of my noble friend Lord Mottistone and the noble Lord, Lord Darling. My noble friend referred to the fact that when the Bill was being considered in another place, the Government moved two amendments which would have altered the statutory defences available under the Food and Drugs Act 1955. Section 113 of that Act makes the seller of a defective article liable in law unless he can prove that the contravention was due to the default of another person and has that other person brought before the court. That degree of liability on the seller goes considerably further than in other major legislation designed to protect the consumer, such as the Weights and Measures Acts 1963 to 1979, the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 or the Consumer Safety Act 1978, whose provisions operate satisfactorily. The Government therefore thought it right to take the opportunity presented by the Bill to move those amendments to the Food and Drugs Act which would have made it a defence to prove that due diligence had been exercised to prevent the contravention.
The Government hoped that that proposal would be acceptable to all interests concerned in the proper administration and enforcement of the food and drugs legislation. However, representation was made in another place that a major change of principle in the legislation ought not to be made until all interests had been consulted and their views had been considered. The Government accepted that, and therefore withdrew their amendments, and immediately sought the views of interested organisations. These have been received, and unfortunately there is no consensus of opinion. It is clear that this is a case where the Government ought to follow the normal procedure of allowing ample time for consultation. In the light of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, it is especially important that there should be proper consultation and exchange of views before Parliament is asked to take a final decision. However, if that is to be done, there will not be time to incorporate new clauses in the present Bill. In any case, the first amendment is deficient in its drafting, not least because it refers to Section 102 of the principal Act, which has been repealed by the Weights and Measures Act 1963. Clearly we need more time for thought. Industry, trade and advertising interests are generally in favour of the principle of a defence of due diligence, while representatives of enforcement authorities and consumer groups have serious misgivings. However, even some of those in favour recognised that the defence provisions cannot stand alone. It is now clear that powers of enforcement officers, sampling procedures, and related matters, need to be studied in depth, and there has been insufficient time for that to be done. Indeed, on reflection we might well argue that a Private Member's Bill was inappropriate to tackle such a complex issue. I realise that this is a disappointment to my noble friend and the interests on whose behalf he has spoken. But I know also that he and they fully recognise the importance of allowing full prior consultation in cases of this type, and that they would indeed expect it. The Government remain of the view that it would have been preferable to provide for a due diligence defence. They therefore intend to re-open consultation on this issue when the next opportunity arises for a review of the food and drugs legislation. I regret that 1 cannot say when that will be, and the Government have already said that they do not believe that a review would be justified at present, but they will give serious consideration to arranging one when resources allow. Finally, my noble friend has suggested that the Bill would seriously alter the balance between prosecution and defence, because the penalties would be considerably more severe while the defence would remain subject to the existing provisions of the Food and Drugs Act. Much higher financial penalties would indeed be possible but, on the other hand, the power of magistrates to imprison would be removed—that is under Clause 5 of the Bill. Noble Lords will also recognise that the penalties laid down in the 1955 Act have become nugatory as a result of the fall in the value of money since then. Above all, everyone recognises—not least the reputable majority of the food industry—that the appropriate penalties must be available to the courts in order to deter the illegal and highly lucrative trade that has been detected in unfit meat. In view of what I have said, 1 very much hope that my noble friend Lord Mottistone will not press his amendments to the Bill.2.24 p.m.
In view of the undertakings that we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, I think that it would be inappropriate to continue any discussion on the Bill; rather we should hope that the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, will withdraw the amendments and thus allow us to speed the Bill on its way to the statute book unamended. Since I am not going to say much more, I want it to be clearly understood that I do not agree with any of the views expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, on behalf of the interests for which he was speaking.
I would add only two other comments. The noble Lord, Lord Sandys, has given us an undertaking that the defence will be considered in relation to a review of the Food and Drugs Act. I think it deplorable that the Government ended the review that had already started, and on which a great deal of progress had been made, and I would hope that that review can be resurrected, as it were, as speedily as possible. The other comment I should like to make is that in light of the views that have been expressed that is, that there ought to be a great deal more uniformity in the defences in this very wide field of consumer protection legislation—the question of the defences should be referred to full examination by the Law Commission. I think that this is a matter that is most suitable for an inquiry of that kind. In fact, I do not think that a review of what is major legislation should be conducted by any body but the Law Commission. With those very few remarks, I must again thank the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, for helping us out of a difficulty and for helping us to get the Bill on its way to the statute book.I was approached by my borough health officer for Ashford in Kent, and also by the Institution of Environmental Health Officers, to oppose Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 to this Bill. They do not consider that they are good amendments; they do not consider that they have been given enough time for adequate consultation since the amendments were first introduced in another place: and they consider that if they were to be accepted the Bill would be seriously weakened. So I hope that the noble 'Lord. Lord Mottistone, will see his way clear to not pressing his amendments.
This is a Private Member's Bill, of course, and from this Bench I should merely like to say that I think the Committee should accept the detailed explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Sandys, and that under the circumstances the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, should withdraw his amendment; and I would echo the words of my noble friend Lord Darling, that the Committee should allow the Bill to proceed with the greatest dispatch, and then the Government can carry on with the detailed work that they have announced.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Spens, I came here this morning with a whole sheaf of letters from various health and environmental authorities deploring the fact that the Government were proposing to have any sympathy towards the amendments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone. The basic principle of law in relation to the sale of bad food (I had come along this morning to argue) should be quite simply that it is an absolute offence. Any person marketing bad food should be strictly liable for such an act. Food is totally different from other commodities. Mistakes should not be tolerated, in the public interest, as the consequences of one mistake can be disastrous and can cause considerable suffering.
Therefore, the matters referred to in the amendments should not be allowed to provide a defence to a prosecution. Of course, they would be important as factors in mitigation of the penalties that a court might impose. Naturally, the question of due diligence would be a factor which might influence the court in the amount of penalty it imposed, but it should not be a defence. On the question of due diligence, from the letters I have had—and I agree with them, in view of the fact that I have had some experience of these matters as a county magistrate in Surrey for a number of years—I would say that the fact that due diligence should afford a defence would make a farce of prosecution proceedings, particularly in a magistrates' court.I am no lawyer, and I always listen with great attention to what lawyers have to say, but from the point of view of a retailer of some long experience, as your Lordships know, I think it would be wrong, in the ultimate, to do away with the defence of due diligence. Although the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, may have withdrawn his amendments for reasons that have already been stated, I still think it is a very important thing that should be embodied in the legislation.
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken, even those against me, and so briefly. It is obvious that the bulk of noble Lords who spoke are against me. I would ask them and, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, to observe that we are all very distressed at the meat traders who have given rise to this legislation in the first place. Meat falls into a special category in this area, as is widely recognised within the food processing industry. Immense trouble is taken by food processors to avoid this sort of situation, not least because if they did not they would not sell their goods. It is not fair that, because there are a few people who have been guilty of a malpractice, all the rest should be swept together by the same argument and assumed to be as potentially guilty.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. He has misunderstood the position. It is not a question of suggesting that other firms are guilty in the same way as those dreadful cases in relation to meat distribution. Once you put into a statute that there is a defence of due diligence there are almost endless opportunities for lawyers to find, sincerely and properly, circumstances in which it would be of assistance. It seems to me as a matter of principle a mistake that there can be a defence of due diligence against a prosecution for the sale of bad food.
In saying that there should be an absolute offence, I would take the analogy of the Belisha beacon crossing. I know that all analogies raise problems; but, there, it is no good a motorist who interferes with the passage of a person on a Belisha beacon crossing saying that he looked around and was very diligent in approaching it. It is an absolute offence to interfere with the passage of a person on a Belisha beacon crossing. So far as bad food is concerned, that should be an absolute offence also, if there is any marketing of such a product.
I do not think that it is as simple as that, but this is not the time or place to pursue the argument. I should like to ask my noble friend Lord Sandys before making my decision on what to do whether I got the impression correctly that there would be a deeper review of this issue immediately, notwithstanding the fact that it may be some time, as he explained to us, before the overall review, as one may call it, of the 1955 Act takes place. Is the inquiry which was started three or four weeks ago to be further studied, so that, when it comes to a chance to fit something into legislation, this subject will have been dealt with in a clearer way?
In response to my noble friend, I think that if he reads my reply in Hansard he will see that what has taken place (that is, the review which was set in motion early in May by a letter which went out from the department on the 5th of that month) has produced a number of replies. I think it would be informative to him to realise the scale on which it has been done. He will be interested to know that letters were sent to 269 representative bodies. It would be tedious to inform the House which they were but I have a list in front of me. On this particular matter of the due diligence consultations, 269 letters went out and, to date, 220 replies have been received. Those in favour of a due diligence defence amounted to 42. Those against it amount to 178—an overwhelming refusal of the position proposed by the present amendments before your Lordships' Committee. These replies are being studied. Naturally, we still hope that all those letters sent out will eventually be responded to by the representative bodies concerned; but of course it is only a matter of weeks and legal advice has had to be obtained at some speed on a very complicated matter. I can only reassure the noble Lord to the extent that I have in my reply, and, also, my noble friend Lord Ferrers gave certain assurances on Second Reading.
I am sorry to intervene again, but I have been shocked by the last statement that was made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandys. I think it utterly inappropriate to base a constructive review of Section 113 of the Food and Drugs Act on replies to the kind of letter sent out inviting comments. I invite the noble Lord to look at that letter again. It is a positive invitation to many of the organisations who received it to reply favourably to the Government's propositions. Apart from that, to try to measure arithmetically the 260 letters that were sent to trade associations and some nine to the local government authorities, the professional associations of environmental health officers and trading standards officers, seems to be altogether inappropriate.
I accepted when the noble Lord made his first intervention that there would be a proper review of the defence procedure and the prosecution procedure on the Food and Drugs Act. I hope that that proper review will take place. I sincerely hope that it will not take place on the basis of the letter that was sent out on 5th May to the various organisations. The noble Lord should bear in mind that that letter was posted, second-class post, on Friday, 7th May. I do not need to tell the Committee what happens to second-class post which is posted on a Friday. There is not an organisation in the country that received that letter before 10th May. They were asked to reply by 21st May. Organisations had to consult their members in eight or nine days, because time has to be allowed for the information to be posted in order to arrive at the Ministry by 21st May. Therefore, the time they had for proper consultation and consideration was at the most nine days. To try to build up a constructive case on that flimsy basis is something we should not accept.I must rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Darling, in the last point that he made. I have been watching this issue with some concern on behalf of the London Boroughs Association, 32 authorities that administer this legislation, and the 333 district councils. I very much hope that my noble friend has no intention whatever of taking into account this exercise, which amounts to little more than a straw vote, in the reviews and reconsiderations to which he referred in the earlier part of his speech. The exercise needed in this must be much more thorough.
I think at this stage it would be appropriate to say that of course I recognise what the noble Lord, Lord Darling of Hillsborough, has said with regard to the arithmetical aspect. His arguments are quite strong in that regard. While I was attempting to show that a review has taken place to the extent that I have described, it was merely to demonstrate that an effort was made between the consideration in another place and the consideration of this matter in your Lordships' House. Naturally the Government recognise that this is not a full review, but it did constitute a real effort, carried out with some speed and with the co-operation of those concerned, to furnish the Ministry with some material on which to base their preliminary examinations. I hope that to some extent what I have said will reassure the noble Lord, Lord Darling, on that point and also my noble friend Lord Sandford.
I am grateful to all noble Lords for those supplementary remarks. There is a serious concern on the part of food processors that they may be unfairly treated. I fully accept the points that have been made by all sides. I, too, thought that the arithmetical proportions could be criticised the other way round, just as much as from the angle put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Darling. 1 trust the Government will really take note that this is not something which should be allowed to die but needs to be tackled seriously. However, I am very much aware of the fact that none of us wishes to destroy this Bill, notwithstanding the arguments put forward, because of itself it is good even though it does not go far enough in every respect. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
[Amendments Nos. 2 and 3 not moved.]
Remaining clauses agreed to.
House resumed: Bill reported without amendment: Report received.