My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, I am having inquiries made and will write to the noble and learned Lord when they are complete.

My Lords, I am much obliged.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, no amendment to the statutes of the Victoria Cross is required. It could be awarded for actions in the South Atlantic if a suitable recommendation were made.

My Lords, does my noble friend realise that the whole country will be pleased to know that that is so and that many people—in fact, almost everybody—hope that this glorious feat of British arms may be signalised by an award such as that of the Victoria Cross, for the George Cross, although secundus inter pares with the Victoria Cross, is not quite the same thing? I hope that something will be done to help that cause along the way, because I am sure it will be well received not only by the country but also by the armed forces and especially by the people concerned.

My Lords, I note what my noble friend has said, as I am sure will my right honourable friend. I cannot comment on any particular recommendations which may or may not have been made.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in another place on 2nd March 1981, we support the concept of a United States rapid deployment force. Since the force is not intended for use without the agreement of those in the region concerned, we believe that the rapid deployment force will preserve security by deterring the Soviet Union from encroaching on Western interests in areas of the world outside NATO responsibilities.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that, in a letter to President Reagan, the Labour Party said:

" We regard it as vital that nations should be able to resolve local differences without fear of great power involvement and consider the existence of an American rapid deployment force may increase fears that the United States will decide to intervene in local conflicts "

?

My Lords, that may be the view of the Labour Party. It is the view of the Government that if we really are concerned to protect the freedom of the West, it is necessary to protect that freedom wherever it may be challenged.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the vast majority of people who recognise that the main threat to peace comes from the possibility of Russian aggression are delighted to see our American allies taking steps to equip themselves for that quick action in an emergency which can prevent trouble from spreading?

My Lords, I agree entirely with my noble friend.

My Lords, can the noble Lord tell the House how the rapid deployment force could have been able to prevent Ethiopian aggression against Eritrea or the present happenings in the Lebanon?

My Lords, that is a hypothetical question to which the noble Lord must await an answer.

My Lords, is not one of the countries in which the rapid deployment force will be stationed Morocco, which is far from being a free country, but one of the most reactionary kingdoms in the world? Does that make sense of the Minister's reply that this is there to defend freedom?

My Lords, the noble Lord's supplementary question does not make sense in the context in which the rapid deployment force was set. If the noble Lord casts his mind back he will remember that the rapid deployment force was set up by the US Government (or, at least, the concept was explained by the US Government) in the general context of the Soviet threat to the area of the East—Iran, Pakistan, and the oil interests in that particular area.

My Lords, will not the Minister agree that unilateral actions of this kind are likely to prejudice the beginning of negotiations between the USA and the USSR at START today?

My Lords, no.

My Lords, does the noble Lord regard Iran and Pakistan as models of that freedom which the West seeks to defend?

My Lords, no, but the United States Government was concerned about the threat of the Soviet Union, in military terms, operating on comparatively short lines of communication against the Western alliance who had been operating on long lines of communication in an area of the world where the oil interests were very great indeed. It was in that context that the United States Government took a decision which the Government of the United Kingdom believe to be prudent and which the United Kingdom Government support.

My Lords, was that not a reasonable decision to take, considering that Afghanistan was invaded, and though, admittedly, Afghanistan was not a model of democratic Western, liberal democracy, at least the Afghans would rather make their own mistakes and slit each other's throats without having the Russians helping them to do so?

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that supplementary question. It was in the context of the unwarrantable aggression against Afghanistan that this particular strategic concept was originally announced.

My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 this afternoon my noble friend Lord Trefgarne will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement that is to be made in another place on Assisted Areas Map Review. This will be followed by my noble friend Lord Bellwin who, again with the leave of the House, will repeat a Statement on Industrial Action, British Rail and London Transport.

It may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available at the usual time this evening. The Committee stage of the Criminal Justice Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7 p.m. for a short period.

My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

• Deer (Amendment) (Scotland) Act,
• Children's Homes Act,
• Planning Inquiries (Attendance of Public) Act,
• Gaming (Amendment) Act,
• Oil and Gas (Enterprise) Act,
• Social Security and Housing Benefits Act,
• Thomas Brown and Sons, Limited Act,
• Hong Kong and China Gas Company plc Act.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 39:

Page 21, leave out lines 18 to 23.

I should like to support this amendment, but briefly, because the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, said pretty well all that there is to be said about it. It is absurd to encourage conditions which the people who have to ensure that they are carried out believe to he impossible. This is what the National Association of Probation Officers say about these negative conditions, and they are supported by the Association of Directors of Social Services, who are the other side of the picture here.

The National Association of Probation Officers quote cases where offenders have been ordered not to associate with members of their own family, not to go to within a certain distance of central London when the area is outside, and not to go into a public house or an off-licence. Their feeling is that there is no way of enforcing these conditions, and the Association of Directors of Social Services say that to enforce them would involve supervision 24 hours a day. I do not think that further argument would strengthen the case, so I support the amendment.

I wish to add only one experience of how negative orders seem a little curious. It was a case in the Old Bailey, where the circuit judge was trying a lorry driver on a charge of having consumed too much alcohol. He said, "I want you to make me a promise that you will never drink alcohol at lunch-time again—not even a glass of dry sherry", and that was thought to be something that it would be very difficult to enforce!But, seriously, I support what my predecessors have said.

I should like to support this amendment and I hope that the Minister will make clear by what, if any, means the Government will enforce this provision if it remains in the Bill.

I want to start by explaining that the purpose of enabling the courts to include negative requirements is to strengthen the supervision order. Our intention is to restore the confidence of the courts in the use of this non-custodial measure, particularly in cases where the offender might otherwise be given a custodial sentence. A negative requirement can be included in an order, under the provision which this amendment would delete, only after the court has gone through several steps.

These have been strengthened since the provision was debated in another place. The Government have tabled an amendment to Clause 20 which would provide that, before including any requirement in a supervision order, the court must consult the supervisor about the offender's circumstances and about the feasibility of securing compliance with the requirements; and I shall be moving that amendment shortly. The court must satisfy itself that it is feasible to secure compliance. I must also consider the requirements necessary to secure the good conduct of the offender and prevent the repetition of offending by him. Finally —this is important in the context of what has been said this afternoon—the court must secure the offender's consent to the requirements. This battery of measures should quite adequately guard against the imposition of unenforceable or oppressive requirements.

A court might think it right, when making a supervision order, to require that the offender should not attend a football match for the remainder of the season. Of course, the supervisor cannot necessarily personally ensure that the juvenile never does so. It is not the supervisor's job to police the offender's every movement. His role is rather to make sure that the offender understands his obligations under the order and the consequences of breach, and generally to advise and assist the offender. If, on the other hand, it is discovered that the offender has in fact attended a football match, there is no question that he in breach of the requirements of his order and can be brought to court and punished for it.

This measure builds on an existing provision in Section 12(3B) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. That provision, which was modelled on the probation order, was inserted in 1977 and does in fact allow a court to impose negative requirements on a juvenile offender, though without any of the safe-guards which we propose in the Bill. We have no evidence that that, even without those safeguards, has caused any difficulty.

The Government are fully aware that this provision has been greeted without enthusiasm in some quarters.

But there may well be some courts which will find it useful, and if they use it instead of custodial sentences the Government's aims will have been fulfilled. I ask your Lordships to recognise that the Government regard it as very important indeed to restore the courts' confidence in the supervision order. The use of the order has declined so dramatically in the last 10 years and the use of custody has risen so dramatically that something has obviously gone wrong. The provision which this amendment would delete may not command universal support. But if it is of some use to some courts, surely it is worth retaining. On those grounds, I hope that your Lordships will reject this amendment.

It is curious to hear that the views of the people who will have to operate this provision have been completely ignored in this way. Let there be no misunderstanding. The people who have to deal with this are the probation service, and the National Association of Probation Officers—both the noble Baroness and I have informed the Government of this—think that it is unworkable. What is the point of instructing people to do something which they who have to operate it think is unworkable? It seems very lacking in understanding not, at least, to look at this again and to talk to somebody about it. It is so very difficult to make any progress in anything if, when the only people who know what is going on express a strong view, the government entirely ignore it. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to say rather more than he has said.

On the contrary, we have taken into account the views of those who would be concerned, as the noble Lord describes. That is why my noble friend Lord Elton tabled Amendment No. 40, which we shall come to in a moment and which I shall move, with your Lordships' permission, on behalf of my noble friend, which specifically requires that the views of these people be taken into account at the moment when they are most valuable.

I wonder if the noble Lord could help by telling the Committee whether or not NAPO were aware, at the time when they made representations concerning this clause, that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, was going to put down the amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has mentioned, because it seems to me to go some way towards meeting the case which the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, has underlined yet again. If the probation officers were anxious in case the courts imposed conditions which could not be monitored, then the amendment which we shall be coining to shortly would largely take care of that. As the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has said, the courts do not have to use this provision. It is there for them if, having consulted the supervisor, they are satisfied that it is feasible to secure compliance with those conditions. Having regard to that, I should have thought that the use of these provisions by the courts would tend to expand, and to do so with the full approval of the probation officers.

Without looking at all the correspondence, which I cannot do in a second, I am not quite certain when it was that this amendment was tabled and when it was that the probation officers made their last representations on this matter. But this amendment was certainly tabled by my noble friend in response to what he knew was a widely held view, and one which had been aired in the other place.

May I ask the Minister why, under this proposed clause, the court is given not only the same powers as the supervisor—I understand that was really the purpose of the clause—but, in being given these negative powers, is not limited, as is the supervisor, by the limitation of 90 days? It would appear that for some reason the court is being given not only the same powers as the supervisor but is being given the added negative powers, of which complaint is made, without any limitation. On the face of it, therefore, a court, unlike a supervisor, can impose a negative limitation of unlimited amount.

It may be of assistance to your Lordships if I say that my noble friend Lord Elton will have something more to say on that matter when we come to Clause 20 stand apart.

From what the Minister has said so far, I do not think that he has answered the points which have been raised both by myself and by my noble friends and other noble Lords. Whether, when we come to Amendment No. 40, this will light up the whole question very much better than it is at the moment, I do not know, but I am doubtful. Amendment No. 40 still leaves it to the court to impose these negative requirements, and it is the basis of these which the probation officers and the directors of social services, among others, as well as many magistrates, are against. I should have thought that the Association of Directors of Social Services were aware of Amendment No. 40 when, within the last day or so, they sent out their views.

The Minister's answer does not get past two important factors. Negative requirements are extremely difficult, almost impossible, to monitor. If the attention of the police is drawn to them, they can take no action if the youngster is covered by a supervision order. Secondly, it still does not answer the very fundamental fact which has been put in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge: that this is something for which probation officers in particular have to take responsibility and which is their close concern. If it is their view, first, that it is unworkable and, secondly, that it is highly likely that it could destroy the relationship which they are trying to build up with the person who is subject to the supervision order, then it seems to me that it is very dangerous and unhelpful ground upon which the legislation will then be treading.

For the time being, and reluctantly, I shall withdraw the amendment in order that we can hear the noble Lord, Lord Elton. We have just had a "trailer" that he will say a little more than we had anticipated that he would say. I hope he will get round the core of our argument on this amendment. It has nothing to do with the intentions behind it. We are concerned about what the Bill says without the amendment: how it will work out and how it will not work out, and the very strongly expressed views of those people who will be responsible for implementing it.

moved Amendment No. 40:

As the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, has said, the Government have indeed sought to give legal form to an undertaking which was given at Report stage in another place. Most certainly the view which we on these Benches take is that the Government have come a very long way towards fulfilling that undertaking, and I have no doubt at all that they genuinely intended to carry out the very letter of the undertaking given in the other place. The question which arises, however, is whether the wording of the new provision in fact executes what clearly was the intention of the Government all along.

I wonder whether I may be allowed to quote very briefly from the amendment which was proposed by Mr. Kilroy-Silk at the Report stage in another place. It is worth bearing in mind the exact wording of that amendment which gave rise to the undertaking in the first place. The wording was:

"(d) it is satisfied, after considering a report by a probation officer or by a social worker of a local authority social services department about the offender and his circumstances and, if the court thinks it necessary, hearing a probation officer or a social worker of a local authority social services department, that provision can be made for the offender to participate in any activities specified in the requirements."

It is obvious that the purpose of the amendment was to make it clear beyond peradventure that the facilities for the carrying out of that particular order were already in existence. The amendment had nothing at all to do with the question whether the juvenile offender or his parent or guardian agreed to it. That is another provision in the Bill, and already incorporated in it.

In his reply, the Minister of State, Mr Mayhew, said at col. 895 of the Committee stage report on 12th May of this year:

" I appreciate that the purpose of the amendment is to make quite sure that a supervision order will not be made which will, for example, require the offender to do something for which provision does not exist in the area in which he will live or work so that it would either be a nullity or a great difficulty, thereby detracting from the quality of the supervision he receives and the effect of the supervision order generally. Therefore, I am happy to accept the principle of the amendment".

Then the Minister resorted to the time-honoured riposte from which all of us have suffered from time to time when drafting amendments in this way: that the wording of the amendment was incomplete and imperfect and that it was necessary for it to be reconsidered, purely so far as drafting was concerned.

If, however, we look at the amendment, we come to the conclusion that the wording of the amendment may very well not be such as to carry out the undertaking. The mendment refers to the consideration to be given, first, to the offender's circumstances, and, secondly, to the feasibility of securing compliance with the requirements; and then there follow the words,

" and is satisfied, having regard to the supervisor's report, that it is feasible to secure compliance with them".

It may be argued that the formula employed by the Government is wide enough to include both the physical capabilities in so far as the authority is concerned as well as a number of other factors. However, it might be the case that the words employed in the provision are such as to refer basically to the attitude of the offender towards what has been offered to him. That is already covered in Clause 20, extra Clause (3E) subsection (c), which reads:

" the supervised person, or if he is a child, his parent or guardian, consents to their inclusion".

It is therefore out of an abundance of caution that we on these Benches ask the Minister very humbly to look at this matter again to see whether some form of words cannot be devised which would more clearly carry out the purport of the undertaking that was given in another place.

Speaking personally, although I am speaking from this Bench, I am bound to say that the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Elton, goes a long way towards removing my own concern that I had when I read the Bill originally about the imposition of negative conditions:in supervising orders. It may be that the court, after consulting the supervisor, will find in most cases that the supervisor will satisfy the court that it is not feasible, and it is to be hoped that the court will abide by that advice. I myself do not find that objectionable.

Although it is not an exact analogy, my noble friend Lord Harris of Greenwich knows only too well that there have been occasions, not very frequently, when in devising the conditions for prisoners who are to be released on parole we as members of the Parole Board have thought it necessary to impose negative conditions. We have always taken great trouble to ensure that those conditions were practicable. It may well be that members of the probation service would prefer not to enforce negative conditions, but provided such conditions are carefully thought out—and in this case they are imposed only with the agreement of the supervisor and of the offender himself or herself—then I personally would support this amendment.

I was merely going to say that the Government have got this about right. Having listened to what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Elystan-Morgan and Lord Hunt, I would not have thought that this amendment needed any variation.

This amendment deals with the same points covered by Amendments Nos. 41 and 42 tabled by my noble friend Lord Ridley—who apologises to your Lordships for his absence abroad but who has asked me to speak to these amendments on behalf of the Association of County Councils.

We have been very concerned about the resource implications of the requirements in these supervision orders. I would like to thank my noble friend for this attempt to allay our fears by consultation on feasibility. I think this will work and I hope it will work. It is very important that unrealistic supervision requirements should not be imposed. I believe it is fair to say that our worries are allayed if not entirely removed. However, I thank my noble friend, I welcome this amendment, and if Amendment No. 40 is passed, I do not propose to move Amendments Nos. 41 and 42.

I should like to support my noble friend Lord Elton. I think he has done rather well, if I may say so without sounding patronising. What I hope will he the result of this is that there might be a switch of resources from secure accommodation to supervision orders. If that happens it means, with luck, that fewer people will have to go inside and that more people can be secured under supervision orders. Everybody will benefit; the taxpayer will benefit because it is cheaper to keep people outside and looked after than it is to keep them inside, and there will be fewer people inside anyway. That seems to me to be a perfect example of what should happen, hut whether it will or not is of course open to doubt.

It would be very ungracious for me not to say that I am very happy to support this amendment.

I should not wish to delay your Lordships any longer. I think the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, will have appreciated that this amendment seems to command a good deal of support. May I just say that in the old days I suppose it was occasionally possible for the courts to impose conditions on supervision orders which were difficult in respect of compliance. I believe we have gone a long way towards eliminating that. I am sure no court has deliberately done that but it may have happened inadvertently from time to time. I believe we have gone a long way seeing that that does not happen in the future.

moved Amendment No. 43:

I can see the logic of this amendment, but I am slightly concerned because I believe it is important that the custodial sentence should not be seen as an alternative to supervision or as a second stage in a procedure following a supervision order. Supervision orders must stand on their own feet, but this amendment implies the threat of a custodial sentence which is merely suspended in the forlorn hope that a supervision order may succeed. I am not sure that this is entirely satisfactory and therefore I do not feel that I can support this amendment.

I also have doubts about this amendment. I do see the point put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. But, in the first place, do we really want to be as tough with the juveniles and youngsters as we do with adults? Then I question whether it would in practice serve any useful purpose. The situation today is that, if the child is brought back to the court under the terms of the supervision order, the options open are either to make an order under Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act, and/or—one can do one or other or both—to impose a fine up to £50 or make an attendance centre order. Incidentally, there are more opportunities for attendance centre orders than there are orders made. In addition to this, the child may have to take part in intermediate treatment activities or comply with other conditions as part of the order. In this way, the order is not the same as a probation order. Therefore, it would seem to me that it could happen that the child could be punished twice for the offence in addition to being penalised for being in breach of the supervision order.

There is a further point about the wording and the drafting of the amendment which I do not very much like. It is putting in a statute the words,

"if the application is brought within nine months of the date of the original order".

It does seem to me that one is tying something down in a way which should not be done in a statute. There may be all sorts of exceptions. But that is perhaps a more minor point. So, although I appreciate the motives behind the amendment, I do not think I like it very much.

I certainly accept that this is a serious and thoughtful amendment which deserves our proper consideration. Its purpose, which is to strengthen the confidence of the courts in the supervision order as an alternative to custody, is entirely in accord with the Government's policy. Indeed I am aware that the amendment commands influential support outside your Lordships' House. I am afraid I feel, therefore, something of a killjoy in asking your Lordships to consider some of the difficulties involved in this amendment, although I am reinforced in the view that some of those will have occurred already to the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, and indeed to my noble friend Lord Digby.

In effect, what the amendment does is to open up the possibility that the court can re-sentence a juvenile offender for the original offence and substitute a custodial sentence in place of the supervision order made in the first place. If the juvenile under supervision commits a further offence he can of course be sentenced for it. What we are talking about here is behaviour which is not criminal but which constitutes a breach of a supervision order and is therefore punishable. The amendment could thus be a double edged weapon. It could have the effect we all hope for, which is to get the courts to use supervision instead of custody. On the other hand, it allows the court to impose a custodial sentence which is not an immediate consequence of a criminal offence, and indeed one that it did not see fit to impose originally.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris, has of course been a distinguished chairman of the Parole Board, but matters concerning parole, as I am sure he will readily admit, mainly affect adults and touch upon juvenile offenders only in exceptional cases. I should perhaps point out that conditional and suspended sentences are not, on the whole, an advisable way of dealing with young people. Adolescence is a period of change and development, sometimes very rapidly, with the passage of time. It is in recognition of this that there are important differences between the probation order that can be made on adult offenders and the supervision order that can be made on juveniles. The probation order is a system for withholding a sentence on an offender with his consent during his good behaviour under supervision. The supervision order, on the other hand, is a full sentence in itself and is made without the youngster's consent. There is no question of a potentially harsher sentence being withheld during his good behaviour.

More particular difficulties could arise from the lapse of time. Juveniles become eligible for different penalties at different ages. A supervision order can be made on a child aged 10 and over, but boys become eligible for custodial sentence only at the age of 14 and girls at the age of 15. If a boy is given a supervision order when he is 13 and commits a breach of the order when he is 14, is it right that he should then receive a custodial sentence when he could not have been given one at the time when he was convicted?

The proposed power would, of course, apply to supervision orders made under the strengthened powers contained in Clause 20 of the Bill. It is right to encourage the courts to use these for difficult offenders. I accept that the terms of the amendment go some way towards recognising the difficulties by restricting the re-sentencing power to the first nine months of the order. But a more careful restriction would be needed if it were not to work unfairly.

If the noble Lord is content not to press this amendment, I can undertake that the Government will reconsider carefully whether it is possible to strengthen the breach provisions along these lines.

May I just ask the noble Lord one question? If a 14 year-old boy can be given a custodial sentence, what sort of institution would he go to?

I think that varies. I am speaking from memory here, but I think he could go either to a borstal of some sort or to a detention centre.

My Lords, the noble Lord has, if I may say so, given a most reasonable reply, and, on the basis of what he has just said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

I should like to speak for one moment about resources. We are all very worried over the whole question of resources for non-custodial care. The figures are quite alarming. In 1980–81, £85 million was spent on community schools for education, observation and assessment centres, and only £7 million on non-custodial care. We believe that we should develop non-custodial care. in the voluntary sector, as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, will know, we have got the Rayner Foundation Fund, to which the voluntary organisations can apply, and have clone, and have done some extremely good work. When it comes to local authorities it is extraordinarily difficult. The local authorities have not enough money. Secondly, from a procedure point of view, if they have to take money from the block grant which they receive for their services, many local authorities do not allocate that money to non-custodial care.

I know that this is an extraordinarily difficult problem. it does mean that there should be a way of dealing with local authorities in the same way as voluntary organisations are dealt with—that is, by means of money earmarked for a specific purpose. If we are going to swing away from custodial to non-custodial care, the local authorities must have the resources, the earmarked resources, to do this.

The proposals in this clause, to give the courts new powers to impose supervised activity requirements on juvenile offenders, are an important step forward in giving the courts greater confidence in using intermediate treatment schemes as a genuine alternative to custody or residential care for young offenders, at what might be described as the heavy end of the delinquency spectrum. There is, however, as the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, has said, the gravest danger that these provisions, to borrow the words of St. Paul, could be but the "tinkling of a cymbal" if the financial resources arc not deliberately and specifically channelled to this purpose.

Let me quote the words of the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department of Health and Social Services, Sir George Young MP, in an address to the Leicester Action for Youth Trust on 12th February last year. He said:

" At present, the development of intermediate treatment is too patchy. Some areas can boast a wide range of activities provided from a variety of sources; in others, almost no facilities are available. Everywhere intermediate treatment at the heavier end—that is, for youngsters convicted of more than just petty crimes and beyond the reach of many of the programmes—is very sparsely available".

As the noble Baroness has pointed out, the total expenditure in 1980–81 on intermediate treatment by local authorities in England and Wales was approximately £7 million. That is only a fraction of the £85 million spent in the same financial year on running local authority community homes with education, observation and assessment centres. One could go into very great detail about the wide disparity of investment on the part of local authorities in intermediate treatment schemes. Indeed, 10 per cent. of authorities in England and Wales spend annually less than £5,000 on such activities—that is, less than the annual cost of keeping one juvenile in a custodial or residential establishment.

We have gone this way before. It is exactly the tragedy which occurred, in my submission, in relation to the Children and Young Persons Act 1969—a bold Act, and an Act which undoubtedly brought into force provisions for which there had been a crying need for a long time; but an Act that never, up to now, has properly fulfilled its purpose, because it was never given the essential resources that were necessary for its implementation. I therefore join the noble Baroness in an urgent plea that the necessary financial requirements should be planned at this stage, otherwise a great deal of the force of Clause 20 of the Bill will be lost.

I have no desire to delay the Committee, but I join the other speakers very briefly at this stage, if only to emphasise the point that, in my opinion, Clause 20 is arguably the most important part of Part I of the Bill, as it now stands. I cannot stress its importance too much.

The noble Baroness has mentioned one of the crucial questions that arises; namely, will the Government make adequate resources available and specifically for the purpose of intermediate treatment? The other question which arises and which is equally obvious is: will the courts make use of this provision if the resources are provided? The record is not very encouraging. In the last decade the courts have increased sentences to borstal training from 6 per cent. to 12 per cent., and there has been a decline in supervision orders, in probation orders.

One can say that here is a provision which is really cost-effective. It may cost as little as £100 per young person per annum; it can cost as much as perhaps £2,000 for very intensive intermediate treatment. Moreover, the results in terms of deterrence are not discouraging compared with the very discouraging results of putting people away in community homes, in borstals and in detention centres. Under 40 per cent. re-offend, so far on current statistics, within two years. We must compare that with the cost of putting a young person away in a community home to the tune of £10,000 per head per annum; £9,000 for borstal and £8,000 for detention centre, with failure rates up in the range of 80 per cent. Therefore, I think we must hope that both these crucial questions will be satisfactorily answered.

It might perhaps be helpful if I put my oar in at this stage and your Lordships could perhaps occasionally pick up a few points that I propose to make and for which my noble friend trailed his coat earlier on.

We are looking at a clause the main function of which is to increase the efficiency of non-custodial sentences, and that is something about which I think we are all agreed. We all realise that it is necessary to get the support and confidence of the courts if this is to work. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has just said that it is all very well having a provision and even having resources, but if the courts do not use the provision, then the resources go to waste. I shall address myself to that point in a moment.

Let me pick up a few points that were left on the table, as it were, after earlier amendments. As regards the probation officers knowing about our proposals in Amendment No. 40, let me say that we gave clear indication at Third Reading in another place; that debate was closely followed and our intentions were known. As your Lordships will know, the magistrates are strongly in favour of what we propose. In fact, they asked for negative requirements to be built in. My noble friend was asked about the 90-day limitation applying only to the supervisor and not to the courts. What in fact has been done is this: it applies to positive requirements because positive requirements can involve residence away from home and there should, therefore, be a limit on them. This is distinct from negative requirements. The 90-day limit will apply to the requirements which can in future be added to the supervision order under the provisions of Clause 20. I think that that is what the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, wished to know.

I should like to mention the question of resources. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for the Department of Health and Social Services has said that the provisions will not be implemented without the resources being available. Your Lordships will have seen that the figure in the Explanatory and Financial Memorandum is worth a little more than the "tinkling of a cymbal", although whether it will reach the braying of a sackbut, shawm or psaltery, I could not tell your Lordships.

Let me return to a matter that has been of considerable interest in another place as well as among your Lordships. I say "let me return to", but the question is whether I can find it in the first place!As I have said, the purpose of the clause is to keep people out of prison and to strengthen the confidence of the courts in a non-custodial sentence. Your Lordships have certain anxieties about negative orders which I think may be less than justified in the event when it is seen how they are used, particularly as there is restraint as regards the participation of the supervisor in the decision to place a negative order, but also it is—is it not?—the sort of thing that as a good parent one does oneself. One tells a child that there arc certain things that he must not do, and of course sometimes he goes and does them and is found out, and other times he does them and is not found out, but in the end he gets caught.

We are not suggesting having a sort of Tom Tiddler's ground in which somebody has to watch the child every minute of the day. That is relevant to the question of what I think has, rather unfortunately, become known as the "curfew order", which was debated for a long time in another place during both Committee and Report. The issue was not raised by amendments on the Marshalled List and that is why I thought that I ought to intervene on the point now. My honourable and learned friend the Minister of State made it clear in another place that the Government had come to the conclusion that a free-standing curfew order raised too many problems. In particular, it was clear from the comments made on the proposal that the enforcement of the order would be problematical and would risk damaging relations between the police and the young people concerned. The Government regretted this since the curfew proposals seemed an imaginative addition to the powers available. As the Minister of State indicated, comment on the curfew proposal led the Government to conclude that a more promising approach might be to incorporate the curfew proposal in the supervision order powers in the Bill. He indicated that we would be examining urgently the possibility of extending the provision for the strengthened supervision order for which Clause 20 of the Bill makes provision.

Accordingly, we have been consulting the bodies concerned—the Magistrates' Association, the local authority associations, and the representative bodies for the probation service and social services—on the possibility of amending Clause 20 to introduce a curfew requirement. The general reaction has been that, although there are reservations and some opposition, a curfew requirement in a strengthened supervision order would be more constructive and viable than a free-standing curfew power.

I ought, therefore, to give notice to your Lordships that the Government intend to bring forward amendments to Clause 20 at the Report stage of the Bill to enable a court to include in a supervision order a requirement that the young offender on whom the supervision order is imposed should remain in the place where he normally lives during specified hours on specified days. The requirement will be carefully drawn in order to enable it to be added to the supervision order as part of a constructive package of conditions and requirements.

I should emphasise that in the proposal there will be provision for the consent of both the young offender and the parent to this requirement before it can be imposed, and there will also be provision to ensure that the requirement is added only after consultation with the supervisor. We believe that this will be a useful addition to the powers which Clause 20 contains. Comment both on the original curfew proposal and on this new proposal has emphasised the delicacy of family relationships, particularly where young offenders are concerned. We acknowledge that cases will have to be selected with very great care, but in the context of the strengthened supervision order powers, with the co-operation between the supervisor and the court which they imply, and the need for the consent of both the supervised young person or, if he is under the age of 14, the parent, we believe that this will be a useful addition to the powers available to deal with young offenders.

It occurs to me as I close my brief that what I have just said may appear to read differently in print from what it sounded like to your Lordships. The requirement for parental consent exists for young offenders generally. It is if the child is under 14 that the parent's consent overrides that of the child.

I want to raise one matter and ask the Minister what he thinks about it. It concerns the title of "intermediate treatment", because many people become confused. I wonder whether it might be changed to "supervised activities", and then people might understand it more clearly. I should also like to support what the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and others have said about the need for resources. Many of us know that people respond much better outside than inside an institution, with longer lasting results as long as the leadership is there. But there cannot be leadership without resources. Some of the intermediate schemes are operated on a shoestring. I should like to tell your Lordships that the other day we had a party of young people come to our home and they were swimming. One of these children was aged five. Crime is being committed at a very low age and, with armies of young people doing it, it is a worry. Unless resources are given to the community, what will happen? Will there be residential care for five-year olds? It is very worrying when crime is being committed at such a low age.

I should also like to clear up the point about 14 year-olds who have a custodial sentence. I hesitate to correct a Minister, but he mentioned that they might go to borstal. I know that they will not go to borstal because they have to be between 15 and 21 years of age to go to borstal. I just wonder to what institutions they go.

We were discussing Clause 20 and care orders; I never so much as mentioned borstals.

But the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, did.

Perhaps we could revert to that in a moment. The noble Baroness raised the question of intermediate treatment. The term "intermediate treatment" is not a statutory term; nor indeed is the term "supervised activities". I suppose that one could sound as if it takes place in the dentist's chair and the other at school. So, to that extent, both are misleading. I think that intermediate treatment—which is what it is, generally speaking, known as now —shows very promising signs of being a useful alternative to custodial treatment, and one which is relatively less expensive.

The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, spoke somewhat disparagingly of shoestrings. Of course, I wish that the shoestring was longer, but a great deal of very good work indeed is done for small amounts, particularly through the involvement of voluntary agencies, and I saw some of them at work in the field before I was replaced by my noble friend at the Department of Health and Social Security. In that context, that department has increased its grant to the IT fund, to which reference has already been made. In 1981 the increase was from £273,000 to £340,000. It has also increased the number of grants made to voluntary organisations from £404,000 to £512,000. It is a fairly thick shoestring, but, if the movement continues to grow and improve as at present, then I hope that we can—I would not commit anyone other than yself—expect it also to grow in its resources.

I should like to thank the noble Lord for giving us notice that the Government intend to introduce a curfew order. If I may have the noble Lord's attention for a moment, perhaps I may ask that we be given proper notice of this, because whether the curfew order is good or bad depends entirely on the conditions. We all know the objections and the fears that have been expressed about destroying family life and everything else. We shall want to consider this very carefully, and I hope that we shall be given proper notice of it.

I should like to underline what was said about resources and what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said about the efficacy of supervision orders. If the crime recommittal rate within a period of two years is 4 per cent. among people with supervision orders and 90 per cent. among people who have gone to borstal—and I believe that the number of people who continue to commit crime having gone to borstal is very high—surely this points almost to a switch of resources from borstal training and detention centre training to supervision orders. If we can have a system whereby more people are supervised outside and fewer people are supervised inside, it becomes infinitely cheaper for the taxpayer, infinitely more effective in stopping crime and we also become a more civilised society. Unfortunately, it appears that the borstals and detention centres are paid for by central Government and supervision orders are paid for by local government. That is an excuse for rather idiotic accounting. In other words, it goes against local government spending on one side and not against central Government spending on the other.

Can the Minister give us some information about the relative costs? Speaking from memory, it costs over £7,000 a year to keep a person in gaol. What are the relative costs for these different approaches? The Minister may not be able to be exact, but, following on what the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, said, I should have thought that we could be fairly lavish on supervision compared to the amount it costs to keep someone in gaol.

I should like to make two points: first, on the point that has been raised by many noble Lords and particularly by my noble friend Lord Elystan-Morgan, that it is absolutely essential that local authorities should be given more resources. The noble Lerd, Lord Digby, did not move the amendment in the name of his noble friend Lord Ridley. If he had moved it, I should have found myself unable to agree with the local authorities about taking over what I would partly call the decision of the courts. Nevertheless, I would have used the occasion to emphasise the need for resources to be made available to the local authorities so that they can use noncustodial treatment and penalties, which are so important.

On a further point, I should like to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, said about the curfew orders. We had this trailer that the Minister would be saying something on Clause 20 stand part. Having heard it—and we shall certainly look at it with great care—at this moment I am not very happy about it. It seems to me to be very much the same sort of thing as we discussed on the earlier amendment on negative conditions, only rather wider, and at the moment it seems to me that the same objections still apply. So I feel it only fair to warn the noble Lord that we shall look at this with great care and that at this stage he cannot rely on our support for this.

I want to raise one point about the curfew orders and the nomenclature involved. In this respect I think that "curfew" has an unfortunate connotation. We are really saying that we want to increase parental responsibility and parental control. Perhaps my noble friend could consider whether some other name which is not so emotive could be used for these orders.

I wonder whether I could briefly say something supporting my noble kinswoman and the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, on the intermediate treatment centres. I would disagree with my noble kinswoman when she says that they are often funded on a shoestring. They seem to me to be funded on thin air. I was recently appointed by my local bench as a member of the support group of the centre from which the children she mentioned came. They had managed somehow to get hold of an old rectory from the Roman Catholic Church who kindly let them have it. They managed to get it done up and painted by young people on community service orders, and this is a good thing and just the sort of thing that they should be doing.

They have somehow managed to collect some ancient beds and furniture which they had scrounged and which had been thrown out from old people's homes, and so forth. I went over there the other day and was talking to the social worker in charge. He said, "This is fine, now you are seeing it on a summer's day, but we are never going to keep it going through the winter because we cannot afford anything to heat it with I said," Do you think logs would help? I am willing to send you some logs". His eyes lit up, and with a great smile he said, "That will be absolutely marvellous. It might just keep us going". I am not saying that because I want to appear on your Lordships as a sort of modern day Lord Bountiful, but when my noble friend the Minister speaks about voluntary effort, that is fine, but not everybody has a landlord in the area who is going to send up lorry loads of logs to keep it going through the winter. It is not a shoestring; there is absolutely nothing there at all.

May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Elton, one question on his announcement concerning the curfew. It is an important announcement he has made today and a number of us would want to consider it before coming to a conclusion as to our views on this particular proposition. It would be helpful before the Report stage of the Bill to have some indication of what the balance of force has been in terms of the advice given to the Government in this matter. As I understood the noble Lord, he indicated that a large number of organisations had been consulted, and properly so. What a number of us would be interested to know is the position of those organisations, and not at the Report stage but before the Report stage. I n order to assist the noble Lord in this respect I will put down a Question, and I hope he will be able to answer it before the Report stage of the Bill so that the House can be informed on this particular question.

Whatever one calls it, a curfew condition would be most useful, and particularly valuable in rural areas where there is a shortage of attendance centres. May I ask my noble friend the Minister whether it would be possible to make a curfew condition as part of a probation order, or only in the case of a supervision order?

The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, asked about a point raised by my noble friend. I can tell her that the disposal to which she refers is to a detention centre. A number of your Lordships have asked for notice of the curfew provision to be as long as possible. Of course we shall do our best. Your Lordships will realise that this was being argued to and fro all the way through in another place and the amendment is now in drafting. I shall do my best to table it at the earliest convenient moment, hassled no doubt with the hounds of Lord Harris' supporters snapping at my heels with his Question. I am obliged to him for providing me with this means of acceding to his request; otherwise, it would have been difficult.

The Government are well seized of the fact that supervision costs a great deal less than does any custodial form of detention. It is also more productive. It is more optimistic. It is likely to lead to less re-offending. Of course if it grows then let us hope that we can get the resources to go with it, but you do not empty one particular institution overnight by increasing the numbers throughout the country of people in intermediate treatment. Therefore, there is this awful lag when school rolls go down, for instance, and you have two-thirds empty schools but the savings are not immediately commensurate with any reduction of numbers. We should not forget either that we are only holding our own with numbers. We wish to reduce the numbers. We are fighting against a rising tide of which the members, the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, has said are sometimes as young as five years old.

I was delighted with the noble Earl, Lord Swinton, for a splendid—I think from the mutters which greeted the first half of his intervention, to the surprise of your Lordships—demonstration of uxorial co-operation with the noble Baroness, Lady Masham. He also illustrated an admirable example of the interface; the co-operation between intermediate treatment and community service orders. I think I have done as much as I should to tell your Lordships what is in the mind of the Government. We shall put our amendment down as early as may be. I beg to move that the clause stand part of the Bill.

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I shall now repeat a Statement being made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Industry in the other place. The Statement is as follows:

"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a Statement on regional industrial policy. Copies of the Statement are available in the Vote Office.

"When my right honourable friend the then Secretary of State made his statement on 17th July 1979 announcing the results of the Government's review of regional industrial policy, he undertook that those former special development areas and development areas which were due to become non-assisted from 1st August 1982 would be subject to a special review before the changes finally took place.

"Since then, there has been a very substantial increase in unemployment nationwide. This increase has formed the basis of a large number of representations which the Government have received in respect of many areas from honourable members, local authorities and others, seeking improvements in those areas' Assisted Area status. Therefore, as well as conducting the special review, which was confined to the areas which are due to lose assisted area status by two or more stages, we have looked carefully at a number of other areas whose circumstances seem to have deteriorated relative to the country as a whole.

"The changes announced by my right honourable friend three years ago had the effect of reducing the proportion of the population covered by assisted areas from over 40 per cent. to about 26 per cent. We believe that changes on the scale proposed then are broadly right so that the fact that unemployment has increased substantially in a particular area does not of itself qualify that area for upgrading. Any further adjustments should be concentrated on those areas whose position has deteriorated markedly relative to the rest of the country. This is necessary both to contain the cost of regional aid within acceptable limits and to provide industry with reasonable stability for their investment decisions.

"The further adjustments therefore which we now propose as the outcome of our review are relatively few. Nevertheless, I am very grateful to all those who supplied us with much valuable information and advice in support of their representations and I can assure the House that they have all been considered with great care.

"We have concluded that four of the Scottish travel-to-work-areas which would have lost assisted area status by two or more stages since 1979 should retain their assisted status. These areas are Lerwick, Kirkwall, Forres and Nairn, which will now retain the intermediate area status which they received on 1st August 1980. All have particular problems arising largely from their remoteness from economic centres and thus warrant the retention of some of the incentives to industrial investment which go with assisted area status. We are however satisfied that assisted area status for the remaining areas subject to the special review is no longer justified and the Government intend, as we announced in 1979, to withdraw that status from them after 31st July.

"After careful consideration, there are a few other changes which we think it right to propose. The travel-to-work-areas concerned are Teesside, which will become a special development area; Rochdale and Rossendale, which will be designated development areas; Llanelli and Pontypool, which are currently part development area and part intermediate area and which will become uniformly development areas; and Bolton, Leigh and North-wich, which will retain intermediate area status.

"Apart from these changes the Government intend that the decisions regarding the assisted areas announced by my right honourable friend the then Secretary of State in July 1979 will be implemented without further change. Thus, from 1st August this year, the coverage of the assisted areas will be around 27 per cent. of the working population in the areas with the most persistent problems of high unemployment. We are notifying the European Commission of these changes in accordance with our Community obligations.

"My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales will be announcing separate proposals covering the remote and sparsely populated area of mid-Wales.

"The House will recall that, in 1980, following a review of derelict land clearance areas, the Goverment announced that a number of employment office areas which are due to become non-assisted areas from 1st August 1982, would be designated as derelict land clearance areas. As a result of the decision regarding the assisted areas which I have announced this afternoon, some of those areas will not now become non-assisted areas and thus will not need to be designated as derelict land clearance areas. The Government have however decided to designate additionally the Nuneaton and Bedworth employment office areas as derelict land clearance areas.

"The necessary orders to give effect to these decisions will be laid before the House shortly.

"Mr. Speaker, when my right honourable friend the then Secretary of State made his announcement three years ago, he committed the Government to a policy of reducing the unacceptable differences in economic performance between different parts of the country. In carrying this out, we must aim at getting value for money by concentrating help where the need is greatest. It made no sense then—and it would make no sense now—for regional aid to be spread thinly across nearly half the population. Nevertheless, it is right to take account of changed circumstances and, where there has been a marked relative deterioration in particular parts of the country, it is right to adjust the boundaries of the assisted areas to reflect this. I therefore commend my proposals to the House".

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating that Statement, entitled Assisted Areas Map Review. We can give one very small cheer to the Statement; the changes announced today go a very little way towards increasing the proportion of the population covered by assisted area status from 26 to 27 per cent. However, it goes only a very little way towards restoring the cuts announced in July 1979, when the proportion of the population covered was cut from 40 to 26 per cent. and £233 million was saved.

There are a number of specific questions I would put to the Minister. Can he say how much new money is involved in the Statement, or is it that the existing money is just to be spread more thinly? How many new jobs is it hoped to create by the changes? Which areas have unemployment levels higher than that which would have won them assisted area status but are now denied assisted area status because of the generally higher unemployment levels?

I was intrigued by the way in which the Minister was able to announce certain changes to Wales, while certain other changes for Wales had to be left for the Secretary of State for Wales to announce at a later date. One wondered whether he was being reduced to a Secretary of State for mid-Wales only. In general terms, we are not satisfied with the Government's measures to reduce unemployment, but we do not believe that this afternoon is the time to debate that particular issue.

My Lords, we on these Benches would also like to thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. We agree of course with the policy of concentrating resources where the need is greatest. That must be right. Is the noble Lord really satisfied that the present approach to identifying the areas where need is greatest is satisfactory in the light of the present pattern that has emerged with the growth in unemployment? I refer to the emergence of black spots which are scattered in all the regions. It is perfectly possible today to identify black spots in areas which are not in regions which attract support, and in other parts where unemployment is by no means so serious, although they are seen as being areas of high unemployment.

To give an illustration of that which is highly relevant to the fact that the noble Lord has referred the changes to the EEC: it is possible to get EEC assistance from the social fund for certain activities in Toxteth, because it is in a special area, but not for Brixton, because it is not, although the relative levels of unemployment in Toxteth and Brixton are equally acute. That is because of the way in which we identify areas of special need. That is perhaps a larger question arising out of the Statement today, but it is one of considerable importance.

While supporting the idea of giving aid where there is the greatest need, may I ask whether the Minister would agree that the greatest need now concerns the long-term unemployed, wherever they are and whatever the area or region in which they happen to find them selves? I am questioning in fact the basis on which the aid is now being given to areas.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for the solitary cheer he was able to give to the Statement, which was broadly reflected in the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, for which I also thank her. As for the rationale behind the proposals, which I think was at the heart of what Lord Ponsonby was saying, as I made clear in the Statement, the assisted areas are really too large presently to be effective. Moreover, there are places outside the areas which reasonably feel they are being treated unfairly by the present arrangements, which they consider to be anomalous, which was also the point made by Lady Seear.

As for the precise criteria by which we determine these particular areas, I have included in my brief a number of percentages which might unduly detain your Lordships, but I should be happy to write to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, with them. He asked me what would be the cost of the proposals. We estimate that as they stand, the cost would be in the region of £8 million to £10 million per annum, but I am not in a position to give an estimate of the number of jobs that would be created by them.

The noble Baroness, Lady Seear, also referred to the European social fund. It seems likely that in 1983, these proposals will affect our ability to benefit under the areas of intervention of the European social fund which, as she will know, has a slightly different concept from the travel to work areas we employ in these matters. Nevertheless, we hope to increase the total amount of money that the United Kingdom receives from the fund overall in 1983.

My Lords, to pursue the point made by my noble friend Lord Ponsonby about mid-Wales, we are aware that the Secretary of State for Wales has recently been indisposed, and I am sure we all wish him a speedy recovery, but as the Minister was able to talk about Llanelli and Pontypool, may I ask him to explain when we may be enlightened as to the fate of mid-Wales?

My Lords, I understand that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales intends to reply to a Question for Written Answer in this connection. I think that it is to be today, but it is certainly to be in the very near future.

My Lords, it would seem that the Statement that my noble friend has repeated applies only to England and Wales. Are we to assume that the somewhat similar, and sometimes better, arrange-ments for Scotland and Northern Ireland are to remain unchanged?

My Lords, what I have announced today has some relevance to Scotland. To some extent there are separate arrangements for Wales, to which I have already referred, and certainly the arrangements for Northern Ireland are entirely different.

My Lords, may I press the Minister a little following the question of the noble Baroness, Lady White? May I put it to him that it was an extraordinary reply to say that a Written Answer may be given in another place? Is the noble Lord not prepared to give us the information in the House today? I do not begin to understand how it is right to be entirely dependent on a Written Answer in another place before we can have the information which has been asked for in this House.

My Lords, there is no secret on the matter—or there would not be if I could find the relevant piece of paper!However, as I say, it is a fact that my right honourable friend intends to reply to a Question for Written Answer, and I can tell the noble Lord and the House that he will be describing the arrangements that are to be made for mid-Wales, which are actually made under different legislative provisions.

My Lords, will my noble friend come a little cleaner? Like the noble Baroness, Lady White, who has an interest in mid-Wales, I find his answer a little tantalising. Would it not be possible to tell the House at least the tenor of what the Secretary of State is about to announce in another place?

My Lords, I have in front of me what I think is a draft on the Written Answer that my right honourable friend intends to provide. If my noble friend would care to table a suitable Question for Written Answer, I should be happy to answer it today, if possible.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that in Wales there is considerable expectation that the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State is about to make a reasonably favourable statement on mid-Wales, which was in fact demoted by the present Government in 1979? Is the noble Lord aware that £10 million to £12 million distributed throughout the United Kingdom will be spread very thinly indeed, to the extent that it cannot be described as very much more than a cosmetic exercise? Can he say how the money is to be allocated? Will it be channelled through the respective Scottish and Welsh development areas, and the National Enterprise Board, and how much money will each of them have additionally following the Statement by the noble Lord's right honourable friend? Is the noble Lord aware that the problems of Wales in general, and mid-Wales in particular, are at present acute, and will he tell his right honourable friend that much more money will be required before there will be any increased confidence in the Government?

My Lords, I am of course aware of the anxieties about mid-Wales which the noble Lord has expressed. The announcement that my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Wales will be making will, I think, go a very long way towards allaying the anxiety.

My Lords, may I ask a question about England—Wales seems to have had a good time —and press the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear? Is it not the case that the asistance to industry is given under Section 7 of the 1972 Act, and that discretionary grants to industry are available under Section 8? Is it the case that we are to have another Statement to meet the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, to indicate that Section 8 will be used more liberally and more decisively to assist the areas outside the assisted areas which are black spots of unemployment and which need help as much as, and in many cases considerably more than, some of the places within the assisted areas? Is there a further Statement due on that?—because it is of great importance to many areas suffering from very high levels of unemployment.

My Lords, I certainly agree that the spread of unemployment is not even throughout the areas. The Statement that I have repeated this afternoon related to the assisted areas in general, and not to specific areas and specific black spots. In fact, it is the case that specific black spots, to which the noble Lord referred, are very often caused by the decline of a specific industry in the area concerned. There are powers available to my right honourable friend in connection with specific industries, and indeed there are various European initiatives which have the same effect. So far as I know, no further specific Statement is foreshadowed about specific black spots or specific industries, but I shall certainly bear in mind what the noble Lord has said.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I should like to repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport. The Statement reads as follows:

"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a Statement about industrial action on British Rail and London Transport.

"As the House knows, the NUR are now on strike both on British Rail and the London Transport Underground. Nine London bus garages have also joined in.

"The NUR strikes have not been total. Limited services have been running in a number of areas, including some into London. But with rail or Underground services the major routes into London have been heavily overloaded with very substantial delays, particularly in east and south-east London. Hundreds of thousands of people suffered enormous inconvenience this morning. I congratulate all of them for the initiative and effort they have shown in getting to work. The help being given by the police, the motoring organisations and the radio stations is particularly appreciated.

"The Government's view is that these strikes constitute a wholly pointless and unwarranted assault on the travelling public. They should be called off without further delay before irretrievable damage is done, not least to the railway system. I under-stand that the General Secretary of the NUR has called ACAS in to help, at 12 hours' notice. But plainly the first requirement is that the NUR and ASLEF should deliver on the productivity arrangements for which they have already been paid and which emerged from the intervention of ACAS last summer. All who want to see a modern and efficient railway should support the British Rail Board in getting these promises on productivity delivered.

"On London Transport the pretext for the strike was flimsy in the extreme. London Transport had already called a cooling-off period for further discussions on their proposals for timetable changes. And negotiations on pay were still in their early stages. There are no grounds whatsoever for throwing over the normal negotiating procedures, as the NUR has done.

"In full co-operation with the Metropolitan Police steps have already been taken to help ease the traffic situation in London. In addition to 8,000 extra car parking spaces being provided in central London, arrangements by the Ministry of Defence are now in hand to provide a further 3,000 places in Hyde Park and Regent's Park. Parking restrictions and parking meters have been suspended in all side streets. Special efforts are being made to keep the radial routes free of obstruction. Road works are being suspended wherever possible within 60 miles of central London. Businesses will be asked to minimise heavy goods movements during the rush hours.

"In addition it is essential that people stagger their working hours and above all see that cars are full and that journeys are shared.

"We stand ready to introduce all further measures necessary to help the flow of traffic and to ensure that Britain keeps moving. I will keep the House fully informed".

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for repeating the Statement, and from this side of the House I should like to express, and share, concern about the effect of the industrial action on the travelling public and on industry. We also appreciate only too well the possible effects of the action on our railway system. Bearing that point in mind, does the Minister appreciate that men do not lightly take action such as this? Is that not sufficient reason why the Minister should act and should not content himself with issuing strictures and homilies?

The Statement said that the unions should deliver on productivity arrangements. Do the Government give sufficient credit to the unions for the fact that over the past two years they have agreed to the loss of some 14,000 jobs in British Rail, and should not the Government do their part and deliver on the invi stment programme? For example, does the Minister recognise that the investment expenditure for 1981, when compared with the investment ceiling for that year, is £135 million down; and that in 1982 the difference will be £156 million? Does the Minister also recognise the serious concern that exists among the London Transport staff and the travelling public over the cuts in services caused by the House of Lords judgment, and that the Government have declined to act to remedy that situation?

Will the Minister explain the point in the Statement about arrangements being made by the Ministry of Defence to provide 3,500 further parking places in Hyde Park and Regent's Park? Perhaps he will explain that, because I had no idea that the Ministry of Defence was responsible for those two parks. Is there not also a clear indication that the General Secretary of the NUR has tried to get negotiations moving; and as Mr. Weighell has tried during the past week to deal with ACAS, is not the reference in the Statement to the effect that he called in ACAS at 12 hours' notice either careless wording or unjust to Mr. Weighell? Will the noble Lord clarify that reference or withdraw it?

In view of the seriousness of the situation, may I ask what steps the Government will be taking, or propose to take, to deal with the dispute itself? Will the Government endeavour to arrange tripartite talks? Is it not important that the understanding that existed between British Rail and the unions, as evidenced in the joint policy declarations which were presented in 1980 and 1981, should be restored; and would the Minister not agree that that can only be done by the Government taking the initiative to deal with tripartite negotiations?

My Lords, we on these Benches would like to thank the Minister for repeating the Statement, and say that, of course, we agree it is deplorable that so much disruption has been caused and that there has been so much trouble to the travelling public. We take the line that there can be no compromise on the productivity agreement; that the productivity improvements must be implemented, and that there can be no exception to that. We also agree that the negotiation procedures for London Transport should not have been abandoned. Once procedures agreed to are not allowed to operate, then a state of anarchy in industrial relations results.

In so far as the strike on London Transport is in fact a strike against the Law Lords' decision not to allow London ratepayers to subsidise London Transport, the desire of the NUR to obtain grants to enable the cuts not to be made is understandable, but it means that it is to some extent a political strike rather than an industrial strike. On the other hand—and I speak as a ratepayer of London and, therefore, as an interested party—it is true, is it not, that pretty well every other Government subsidise the Underground service of their own capital city? I think I am right in saying this. While it is, in the view of many of us, entirely unreasonable that the London ratepayers should subsidise the Underground service, is it really unreasonable that the Government should make some subsidy towards what is a national service in view of the fact that so many non-Londonders in fact use that service—commuters, visitors to London and tourists? There is a case, surely, for the Government doing something to ease the burden of cost on London Transport, rather than the London ratepayers doing it.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, and I shall try to answer the points that they have raised. First of all, the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, talked about the investment programme. I feel that when we talk about the investment programme of British Rail we should bear in mind a few of the facts. Those who travel on the St. Pancras/ Bedford route will see a classic example of £150 million of investment lying idle because the workforce simply will not put it to use. We often hear that if investment was made first then there would be a response, but here is a classical example of a very substantial investment having been made, and we sec the response. I think that is a cause for much concern when we are talking about investment.

I think that one could talk a great deal, as indeed the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, and I have in the past, about investment in British Rail, and indeed about subsidies for British Rail. I think it should be stated yet again that the taxpayer is paying some £900 million a year to British Rail. Some may consider that it should be more, and it may be that it should or it may be that it should not; but if productivity deals are made and not adhered to, then what kind of incentive is that to increase the £900 million and more?

As to the point with regard to the Ministry of Defence, I think that is a fairly clear one which does need explaining. The answer is simply that the MOD will provide tracking to enable access to be gained to the additional parking which will be made available to ensure that people have a place to park. That is the significance of that—and I understand why the question was asked.

On the point of Government intervention, I think I should say at once that it is for the Railways Board to negotiate with its workforce on matters of pay and productivity, and for them alone to resolve the dispute which threatens such devastating damage to the railway industry. One has to be very careful, in discussing matters of this kind on Statements, not to say anything to exacerbate the situation. We are in fact all concerned to see an end to the dispute, and all that goes with it. It would be very easy for me to make a lot of statements which I think are justified, but at this moment of time I think I should not make them unless I am pressed further. So I shall not do so at the moment.

I think I should say to the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, so far as a Government subsidy to the Underground is concerned, yes, she is quite right; clearly there has to be a subsidy. But I would remind her that the Government already subsidise London Transport to the tune of £250 million a year. Again, one has to say: is that enough? Some would say that it is too much. It is a judgment you take; but the fact is that we did not have all these traumas and dramas that we are having at the present time in London when the previous GLC administration was there. We had problems, certainly. Indeed, I think the very first time I ever spoke in your Lordships' House was to make a Statement on an impending London Underground strike, and that is now over three years ago. So it is not a new thing with this administration.

Nevertheless, it has to be said that there is much cynicism and much politicking going on in this whole matter of what is happening to London and its Underground. There is much reason to think that the workforce is being led along by people whose motives are not those which I think most Members of this House would support. I think that is the best answer I can give to the points raised so far. I will pick up others as they may come.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that many of us take the view that this is very a sad day for the railway industry and a very sad day for the National Union of Railwaymen, which has now embarked on an industrial dispute which it stands no prospect whatever of winning and will only inflict great hardship on many members of the travelling public, especially in London? Is the Minister aware (as I am sure he is) that in the last few days great hardship has been caused to many people in London as a result of the industrial action taken on the London Undergound, and that this is undoubtedly causing a great deterioration of relations, which in the past have been excellent, between members of the travelling public and railway and Underground employees in London?

May I ask whether it would not be admirable if, at this very late stage, when it is obvious that a large number of members of the NUR do not want to take industrial action, the union now meeting in its annual conference took the initiative itself to order a ballot of its own membership? I think that that would reassure many of us and give the opportunity to those members of the NUR who do not want to take industrial action to have their voices heard. May I ask the Minister this? At the end of his Statement, he said that it was essential that people should stagger their working hours. That is manifestly right. May I ask what action the Government themselves have taken as employers to ensure that that is being done?

My Lords, on the latter point, the noble Lord makes a good point. I cannot give an immediate answer, but I would assure him that the Government would expect that we practise what we preach, and I will take away and discuss it and make sure that it is happening. As to a ballot, this is a decision for the union people at the conference. I should have thought that it probably was a good thing to do. I should welcome it, but it is their decision. Otherwise, I would agree with and accept the other points that the noble Lord made about the great burden imposed on everyone in the short term. Some of us are very concerned about the longer term effects that it will have on jobs and those who read Sir Peter Parker's letter—and some may feel that it came at the last moment—may feel that it is a moving one and I hope that no one thinks that this is playing around for negotiating advantage.

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that it has been commented in the press that the actual machinery of the railway negotiations between the unions and the Railways Board is extremely cumbersome and takes a long time to get its way through and work itself out. It appears that this machinery is enshrined in the 1962 Transport Act. If that is the case and if the machinery is as inefficient as it is said to be, can my noble friend look into the possibility of reforming the Act to make sure that it is an encumbrance no longer?

My Lords, I am not able to comment on the extent to which that Act is or is not defective and is contributing to the particular situation at the moment. I hope that one would always be looking at ways to improve legislation. I should not have thought, when we are now in the third Transport Bill of this Government's term, that there was much need to complain that we are not prepared to make changes. If the point that my noble friend makes has some specific aspect he would like to discuss with me. I should be glad to hear of it from him. I am reminded by my noble friend Lord Avon that my particular office has started staggering. They were there at six o'clock this morning.

My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that political parties which receive large sums of money from trade unions should be particularly careful about appearing to defend union actions that are plainly contrary to the national interest?

My Lords, I should prefer not to make a comment on that point. Precisely because of what I have said at the moment, I am anxious not to exacerbate the situation by giving a view. Everyone has his own view. I do not think it would help if I commented on this.

My Lords, while taking on board what the Minister has said about not exacerbating and speaking for myself so as not to embarrass my noble friends on this Bench, is the Minister aware that something should be said on behalf of the passengers? Is the Minister aware that I have nothing to put in Hyde Park, however many places they make available, being entirely dependent on London Transport?

I should like to ask the Minister a specific question. Am I correct in understanding that last week ASLEF accepted the proposition which was put forward by London Transport for "settling" the London Transport dispute, involving a trial period of one month; and then the NUR called out their members on an entirely separate issue?

May I ask this question, which I think is a very serious one for the ordinary travellers on London Transport? When I am told that the unions say that they care very much about the travellers and the ordinary consumers, I do not believe it—having heard that tale too often. I am not afraid to cause exacerbation on this point, because somebody must speak up. I should like to ask the Minister whether we are not now approaching the stage—and if he does not want to answer it now, I will accept that—when it seems to many of us in this House and outside that we are governed not by the Government of the day (irrespective of party) but by a sectional interest?

My Lords, I am sure that there would be much sympathy with that point that the noble Baroness makes. I ought properly to answer the one specific question that she put. It was whether an offer was made and whether it was agreed to and later rejected. I shall spell out my words carefully. The dispute between London Transpot and its unions arose in the first place with the introduction of a new timetable on the London Underground. The unions were not prepared to accept the new timetables and the Underground has been more or less at a complete halt all last week. After extensive talks, London Transport offered a full week's cooling-off period and ASLEF, representing 50 per cent. of the drivers, and TSSA, representing clerical and managerial staff, were prepared to accept the offer. It is understood that the NUR's London Transport representatives were also prepared to accept. The offer had to go to the NUR national executive for a final decision. They rejected it out of hand and called an all-out strike of their members from midnight of last night. NUR members run the signal boxes, and the system cannot work without them.

It is very tempting for me to go into a lot more detail, but I am not going to do that. Maybe there will have to be other Statements. I hope not. It may be that one would go into more detail then, but not at this stage. On the general point that the noble Baroness makes, the philosophical one, who could not wholeheartedly agree with the depths of the feelings that she expresses? I should have thought that when she refers to the effect on the poor, long-suffering travelling public, her view must be shared by everyone. It seems that they are always at the receiving end.

My Lords, I shall merely say this. Is the Minister aware that I and the travelling public are grateful to the Minister, if to nobody else?

moved Amendment No. 44:

After Clause 21, insert the following new clause:

The Parliamentary All-Party Group on Penal Affairs did go rather further than this amendment and made a recommendation that care orders should no longer be an available option in criminal proceedings at all. We are not moving an amendment to that effect, but that is what most of us in the group would hope to have. We take the view that a care order is something which should be put on a child who needs help and not one who needs punishment. We have fallen back on a number of amendments to safeguard the use of the criminal form of the care order.

There is very little to add to what the noble Baroness said. But I will refer to what Mr. Brian Harris, President of the Justices' Clerks Society, pointed out. He said that, if a child is brought before the court in care proceedings, social workers, teachers and other witnesses will be called to give evidence on oath and what they have to say will be fully disclosed to the child and his parents, who will have the opportunity to cross-examine the applicant's witnesses and call witnesses of their own. By contrast, the determination of sentence in criminal proceedings is a very cursory affair. A child who is made the subject of a criminal charge can be taken away from his home on a care order for his own good without any of the safeguards that Parliament has seen fit to lay down for care proceedings where the child's welfare is the sole consideration.

The noble Baroness quoted the statistics from Lancaster which showed that something like 70 per cent. and 80 per cent. of children who received care orders did not conform to any of the three conditions which the university thought was necessary before the court should make a care order. I think that the situation is very unsatisfactory and I think therefore that we have to be very careful to add safeguards, of which this is the first and perhaps the most important. I beg to support the noble Baroness in her amendment.

I apologise to my noble friend Lady Faithfull, but pressing private business prevented me from hearing the beginning of her speech. I hope that I shall not repeat what she said. In the discussions on Clause 20 the Minister mentioned with approval that he had sought the approval of the Magistrates' Association. I hope that the Government will take the point that not only the Magistrates' Association but the Justices' Clerks Society and New Approaches to Juvenile Crime have all supported these particular amendments. I hope that the Government will deal with them favourably. Those bodies are about the most professional group from whom one could seek advice. It is anomalous that as the Bill stands it will not be possible to send an unrepresented young offender to a detention centre for a three-week term which, with remission, will be two weeks in practice, whereas a juvenile can be removed from home and sent to an institution under a care order for a year or even longer without being offered legal representation. This new clause would rectify the anomaly and provide an important safeguard for the potential recipients of care orders—

I hesitate to interrupt the noble Baroness. I know that she wants to assist the Committee; she always does. I believe that she will find that she is speaking to the next amendment and not to this one. This amendment does not deal with the question of representation.

I beg the Committee's pardon. I asked the noble Baroness whether she had been speaking to the two amendments and that is why I was speaking as I did. I am sorry.

I should like to add my support for this amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, made an admirable case and the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, made further points. The DHSS research has shown that many care orders are made in criminal proceedings on young people convicted of petty property offences with few, if any, previous convictions. Some 40 per cent. of the care orders made in criminal proceedings were imposed on first offenders, and 60 per cent. were imposed on first- or second-time offenders. I do not think that this is a very satisfactory state of affairs. If these criteria were used, I think that it would help uniformity, as the noble Baroness said. If it helps uniformity, helps the courts and helps the social workers and parents, it would be excellent if the Government were to accept this amendment.

I also should like to apologise to the noble Baroness because, owing to the sumptuousness of your Lordships' carpets, I cannot always move as quickly as I should like. I apologise for not hearing most of her speech. I should like to ask a question the answer to which she may already have given the Committee. When a care order is made —I am not a magistrate so I do not know about this—is it open-ended? For how long is it made? How often is it reviewed? If a child is unfortunate enough to need special attention, as in this amendment, for how long may it have to stay in a community home?

The Government are of course aware of the concern expressed by the Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group and others which underlies this amendment. We are firmly of the view that the care order should remain available to courts dealing with juveniles in criminal proceedings. It is necessary in order to help the courts to deal with difficult offenders without having to resort to custody. The courts are already criticised for imposing custodial sentences on young offenders too readily. The care order must be retained as a substantial alternative. That there may well be room for better practice is one thing. It is another to conclude that there should be legislative restraint. And one must not exaggerate. In 1980, the latest year for which we have statistics, fewer than 5,000 juvenile offenders were made subject to a care order—4,700 to be precise. That is really a very small proportion of the total number of juveniles found guilty in the courts in 1980, which was 116,500. Its use has, moreover, declined in recent years while the use of custody has increased. We must beware of further discouraging its use in proper cases.

The care order is a substantial intervention in the life of a young person. It should not be imposed lightly. The Government recognise that there is some evidence that care orders may, in practice, be imposed for offences which are relatively minor. The question which this amendment raises is whether statutory guidelines have a contribution to make. As my noble friend indicated on an earlier amendment, which pro posed statutory guidelines for custodial sentences, the Government are not persuaded that statutory guidelines are an effective way of assisting the courts. We have no doubt that useful, comprehensive and effective guidelines can be devised. But I recognise that the Committee has expressed its view on that question, at least so far as guidelines on the use of custody are concerned.

As to this amendment, the first general point is that it is framed in terms of the offender being removed from the charge or control of his parent. In 1978, the local authority associations and the Magistrates' Association agreed that the making of a care order in criminal proceedings should presuppose that it is necessary for the child to he removed from home for a period. But the local authority retains the discretion to place him at home at the appropriate time. This flexibility to exercise professional discretion remains an essential ingredient in the care order. On the face of it, the terms of the amendment would conflict with the responsibilities of the local authority into whose care the young offender was committed.

I now turn to the criteria set out in the two parts of the amendment. The first restricts the imposition of a care order in criminal proceedings to juveniles who have educational, vocational, medical, emotional or personal needs which can be met only by removing them from the charge or control of the parent or guardian. These are care criteria. It is arguable that cases producing these problems should be dealt with in care proceedings on one of the specific grounds set out in Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. But the criteria proposed in the amendment are much more specific and limited than those set out in that section; for instance, that the juvenile is in need of care or control which he is unlikely to receive unless the court makes a care order.

I accept that there may be a case for requiring a court which is dealing with a young offender in criminal proceedings to satisfy itself that the criteria of Section 1 are satisfied, before it makes a care order on welfare grounds. But is there a case for being more restrictive? If the court is prevented from making a care order just because criminal proceedings are involved, there may be a risk that it will feel obliged to impose a custodial sentence.

This leads me to the second limb of the amendment. If a care order is being made for the young offender's own protection, it is his welfare and not wider considerations which are the justification. As an instrument for protecting the public, the care order is of dubious value. The degree of security afforded by care as such is relatively limited, unless the local authority holds the offender in secure accommodation, and this is quite unnecessary for most young offenders who are subject to care orders. I would suggest that, as a criterion for the care order, protecting the public is too restrictive and makes the care order too much like a custodial sentence. Indeed, it is narrower than the criteria which have now been incorporated into Clause 1 of the Bill for custodial sentences, and, as I have already suggested, we do not want restrictions on care orders to lead the courts to impose custodial sentences where they otherwise need not do so.

I therefore suggest that the criteria advanced in this amendment are unsatisfactory. It seems to the Government that the substantial nature of a care order as an intervention is properly reflected in the context of criminal proceedings by restricting it to offences which are sufficiently serious. Section 7(7) already restricts the imposition of a care order in criminal proceedings to offences for which an adult can be imprisoned. Of course, many instances of offence categories which carry imprisonment are minor—even trivial. Theft is an example of an offence which ranges from the most serious to the trivial. The guidelines now incorporated into Clause 1 adopt the notion of seriousness. If that approach is appropriate for custodial sentences, it would seem appropriate for care orders in criminal proceedings.

The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, asked me about the time for which a care order can run. I understand that care orders are generally of an indeterminate time period, but must be reviewed by the local authority at least every six months. I hope that what I have said has persuaded noble Lords and my noble friend of the shortcomings of these proposals and that the amendment will not be pressed.

Before my noble friend speaks, may I clear up a question of words?" Custody "does not in the English language, or in law, so far as I know, mean secure custody. Somebody who goes to an open prison is in custody, and somebody who is in residential care is, I should have thought, in custody in the ordinary sense of the word.

I wonder whether the noble Lord the Minister can answer two questions which he may have overlooked in the course of his reply. The noble Baroness, Lady Masham, put to him a question about how long these care orders normally lasted. Would the noble Lord care to confirm that they continue until the child reaches the age of 18 unless they are previously discharged by a court, and that the average length of time for which care orders have lasted in recent times is about three years? Secondly, would the noble Lord care to deal with the question of what happens in the case of a care order when a local authority decides to return a young person to his own home? The question was: what is the relative responsibility of the local authority and the parents in such a case for any conditions that are imposed?

May I say that my noble friends and I find the Minister's answer, although, as always, courteous, extremely unsatisfying and I want to give the following reasons. The noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, gave some very good and cogent summarised reasons for this amendment. She talked about uniformity and hinted, in the most tactful language, at the miscarriages of justice that very often have occurred in various areas concerning this very serious matter of the care order. If, instead of criticising, as it was quite open to him to do, the language of the grounds and the matters which one though the court ought to consider, the noble Lord the Minister had said that the Government would like to use alternative language, that would have been a very helpful intervention. Indeed, if the noble Lord had gone as far as his right honourable friend in another place when this very matter was being discussed, and had said that he appreciated the importance of considerations like these being known to the court, and had added that, since that date, the Government had considered guidelines and would be giving them to all courts which would be concerned with the making of care orders, the Committee would have been more satisfied.

I make only one other observation so as to bring the weight of this amendment properly before the Committee. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, assumed that the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, had given the figures which had been procured by way of research at Lancaster University by the Centre of Youth Crime in the Community. The noble Baroness will correct me if I am wrong, but I believe that it was a mere reference to it which the noble Baroness made and that she did not give the figures to the Committee. Only so that the Committee knows the result of that research and the weight of the amendment which is now being considered, may I now give those figures?

What they tried to do was to apply the very criteria, in somewhat different language, embodied in this amendment: is the child a danger to himself or the community? Does he have any special needs—educational, medical, or otherwise—which can be met only in a residential setting? Is he without a home and family in the community which can, with appropriate support, provide an adequate degree of care and control? In Oldham, the researchers found that 90 per cent. of the young offenders in residential care did not satisfy even one of those criteria. In Basildon, the figure was 70 per cent. In Wakefield it was 80 per cent. And the figures from a range of other areas were all similar. Therefore, the Com- mittee is dealing with a vital, urgent and important matter upon which action needs to be taken. If only the noble Lord the Minister would tell the Committee what action he or his right honourable friend is going to take, it might help those who want to know what they ought to do about this very important amendment.

May I add one point to those which my noble friend has just made. When the Minister replied to the amendment he said that the seriousness of the offence should be the criterion. I read out research which had been conducted by his own department which showed that the majority of care orders made in criminal proceedings are made on young people convicted of petty property offences, with few, if any, previous convictions. Therefore, the research carried out in the Minister's own department shows that something needs to be done.

May I join briefly in the appeal made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. As the Minister recognised in the speech which he made, the point about criteria was discussed at some length at an earlier stage of the Committee proceedings on the Bill, and by a decisive majority it rejected the view of the Government and decided to proceed in the way that it did. It seems to me to follow that the Minister should consider again rather more carefully the argument which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, and others have put to him. I do not think that any of us would wish necessarily to defend the precise language of, let us say, paragraph (b) of this amendment. It seems to me, with great respect, that this is just the kind of occasion upon which it is perfectly reasonable for the Minister, without making any final commitment, to indicate that he will consider the matter before the Report stage.

As always, I come to these occasions with an open mind and a flexible approach. I am impressed by the weight of opinion which I have heard this afternoon in connection with the amendment. There could perhaps be a case for introducing into the Bill some indication of the nature of the circumstances in which orders of this kind should be made. Therefore, I am willing to give an undertaking that both I and my right honourable friends will consider the matter with a view to bringing forward an amendment for that purpose at the next stage of the Bill. In the light of that undertaking, I hope my noble friend will see fit to withdraw her amendment.

I am most grateful to my noble friend the Minister for saying that he will look again at the matter. We shall await with interest what occurs next. Until the Report stage, therefore, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 45:

After Clause 21, insert the following new clause:

It is sufficiently daunting to be told by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, that one is speaking to the wrong amendment. Imagine how much more daunting it is to do that in front of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor. However, I wish to repeat what I said before because, as Hansard will show it in the wrong place, I think it had better go into the right place as well. It is clearly anomalous that, as the Bill stands, it will not be possible to send an unrepresented young offender to a detention centre for a three-week term—which, with remission, will in practice be two weeks—whereas a juvenile could be removed from home and sent to an institution under a care order for a year or even longer without being offered legal representation. This new clause would rectify that anomaly and provide a very important safeguard for potential recipients of care orders in criminal proceedings.

The noble Baronesses from the All-party Penal Affairs Group have put the case so well that I need not delay the Committee at all beyond saying that the kind of child who has to try to represent himself is either inarticulate or too articulate and has no idea at all of how to make his case. If one regarded a care order as something done for the benefit of the child at his home, then that is one thing; but I maintain that a residential care order of a criminal kind is a form of custody and, in my opinion, no child should be sent into any form of custody without legal representation. I believe this is absolutely basic. I hope very much that the noble Baroness will insist upon this amendment, if she has to do so. The presence of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor on the Front Bench makes me think that he almost certainly agrees with what I am saying. If I am wrong, I still hope that the noble Baroness will insist.

I should like to support this amendment, adding to that support which has already been shown. The fact that this amendment has the support of the Magistrates' Association and of the Justices' Clerks' Society indicates that those concerned with the day to day handling of this sad problem see the essential importance of the inequality suffered by the unrepresented child in proceedings which may result in that child's loss of liberty for many months, and that it is very important that an offer of legal representation should be made mandatory before a care order can be made in criminal proceedings.

The noble Baronesses, both of whom have spoken rather movingly, indicated the plight of the unrepresented child in these conditions. As the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington has said, the Bill rightly makes an offer, in Clause 2, of mandatory legal representation before a custodial sentence can be imposed on a young offender. I agree that one sees the gross inequality between that provision and the failure to provide for the child who is going to be sent away from home to be in custody for about a year. I hope therefore that the presence of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor should not be a matter for foreboding and anxiety, but is a welcome indication that he has come to support this amendment.

I cannot imagine the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, being daunted by anyone—not even the Lord Chancellor. She certainly made a powerful case for this amendment, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull. I want only to reinforce what has been said in one respect—the disparity between the length of time that a young person should be sent to a detention centre, prior to which he would be legally represented, and the length of time during which a care order may persist, prior to which he would not be legally represented. The noble Baroness rightly said that the maximum amount of time for which a young person could be sent to a detention centre is three weeks, which could be reduced to two weeks with remission, and she added that a care order might be effective for upwards of a year. I pointed out—and the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, did not correct me—that the average length of care orders, in recent experience, has been three years, up to the time when the young person reaches the age of 18. So the effect of a care order in the future is going to be very much more serious in respect of a young person's life than the imposition of a sentence to a detention centre. I believe that for all the reasons given, and for this reason in particular, the provision of legal aid before such a sentence is imposed is absolutely essential.

I wish to support this amendment, for the reason that one knows that not only children cannot express themselves, but that sometimes parents are almost illiterate, and this is an important factor. I should like to inquire into one other point. The noble Lord seems to think—perhaps rightly, and maybe I am wrong—that because a child is subject to a care order and is therefore removed from home, it will be automatic that the child will go into some custodial setting. What I have in mind, and I should like the noble Lord to tell me if I am wrong, is that foster parents should be included in this. I personally feel this is far more important than any other kind of non-custodial treatment for a child.

Before the noble Lord the Minister replies, may I too ask a question? Does this mean that where a family had all done something wrong, an adult member of that family would be legally represented, but that a child of that family, just because he is a child, would not be legally represented? It seems very strange that legal representation should be given to adults but not to children; how much more the children need it than do the adults, because most adults can express themselves.

If I may first answer my noble friend Lady Macleod of Borve, I understand that foster parents would indeed be covered by the proposal in the amendment. In answer to my noble friend Lady Masham of Ilton, the present position is as she described it; that is, of course, the concern of my noble friend Lady Faithful. But the concern which underlines the amendment is one that the Government share. A care order made in criminal proceedings is undoubtedly a very serious sentence and one that should not be made when any less substantial form of intervention in a juvenile's life would suffice.

Perhaps I should first make the point that legal aid is available to juveniles in both care and criminal proceedings. Under the ordinary provisions the courts can grant criminal legal aid in any case in which it is in the interests of justice to do so. We do not have exact figures to show how many juveniles made subject to care orders in criminal proceedings were legally represented. Some 4,700 care orders were made in 1980, as I said earlier this afternoon, and only 30 per cent. of those who came before the juvenile courts in 1980 applied for legal aid. But we do know that 91 per cent. of the applications for legal aid in the juvenile courts were granted. I realise that that does not meet the purpose of this amendment, but it is worth pointing out that juveniles are not totally bereft of all prospects of legal help.

This amendment would override the general rule that the interests of justice should govern the granting legal aid and make a grant mandatory in all such cases before a care order was made in criminal proceedings. There are two things to be made clear. Firstly the Government recognise that there are categories of cases in which it is right to overrule the general rule in this way. Secondly, the Government themselves have a "shopping list" of categories for which they would like to provide mandatory legal aid. But as I have said already, the hard reality of scarce resources means that we can only proceed rather slowly. The Government have made considerable provision in this Bill. Mandatory legal aid before a custodial sentence on a young offender is provided for in Clause, 2, and before a residential care order in Clause 22. We have also undertaken to make legal aid available for appeals to the Crown Court against the refusal of bail.

Those provisions will make a considerable demand on the legal aid fund, which is under some strain at the present time. These measures also need to be set beside others which, as the Committee will be aware, the Government are making; the most important being, perhaps, legal aid for certain proceedings before a mental health review tribunal. It is not in dispute that the care order is a serious disposal. We are providing for legal aid for custodial sentences and for residential care orders, and the care order itself is undoubtedly now the most serious sentence for which legal aid is not automatically available. Unless my noble and learned friend wishes to intervene at this point to make any further observation on this amendment, I should like to say that, while I recognise the importance of this matter and the strength of the view put to the Committee, if my noble friend will withdraw her amendment on this occasion I will undertake that the matter will be further considered before the next stage of the Bill.

It possibly was with warm-hearted anticipation that I looked at the noble and learned Lord and hoped that he would help us, as he usually does, with his guidance and with his sense of justice which is so pronounced. But I have no doubt it is only because he wishes to consider all the remarks made today and weigh them carefully, as he always does, that he has not risen.

I venture to make one small contribution which I hope the noble and learned Lord will consider when he is looking at these matters. The point has already been made that it is rather extraordinary that before there can be any question of a custodial sentence, any question of a detention order, then quite obviously legal aid is mandatory. I must say if I were weighing, as the noble Lord the Minister did a moment ago, the order of priority for legal aid, I would put the question of a child just about to enter upon life, possibly the last opportunity of correct treatment saving that child for the future, as one of the highest priorities. If I had to adjudicate, if I may say this humbly, between some of the things for which legal aid is available, I think I would put them below the one that your Lordships are considering now.

I make the point, if I may, in this way. In the days of my youth, which is now unfortunately some time ago, I used to be an advocate in the place of my birth in the juvenile court as well as other courts. I can still well remember that the only time when I really thought I was being of use was when I was dealing with parents who were completely non-vocal and from whom I had to extract, in the fairly warm atmosphere of my office as I tried to make it, the salient points about the child's upbringing, what had gone wrong, what could go right if only the child was enabled to return and the parents were able to reprimand him in their own way and then exert some discipline and care and love and affection to see that no trouble ever arose again.

When I was able to be that advocate—and I say this in all humility; and so far as I remember 95 per cent. of my juvenile court work was in an honorary capacity, as it had to be and it was very right that it should be; there was no legal aid in those days—I used to regard myself as having salved my professional conscience when I walked out of the court having made a plea about the child not being detained, not sent to an institution, not sent to foster parents, whatever the situation was. I said to myself, "Yes, your professional career is worthwhile because you have been able to do this today".

It is completely wrong, if I may say so, that the opportunity should not be given as is proposed in this amendment. May I lastly say to my noble friend the Minister that if it is a question of leaving it for the court to decide on an application instead of its being mandatory, I will tell him those parents who will apply. There will he the aggressive parents—not all of them but a substantial percentage. It will be the child who says, "I have heard I have a right to apply. Apply". It will not be the child that we are trying to think of today or the parents that we are trying to think of today; they will not even make the application.

May I ask my noble friend this one question. I do not think anybody could be more moving than the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, on the subject of a deprived 10-year-old from an inner city background, from an inarticulate one-parent family, who is being deprived or not having proper legal representation. The noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, said that it was a question of money. He said quite openly and honestly that he did not quite know how many people had applied for legal aid in this context. I just wonder how much would be involved. I do not think it could involve all that much compared to the legal aid budget. Surely, as the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, has said, there are people who could happily be deprived of legal aid rather than those of whom we are all thinking in this case.

I am very greatful to my noble friend the Minister for what he has said. May I ask him this, to get this quite clear. Do I understand that legal aid is available in the cases we are talking about but that it is not mandatory?

May I perhaps clear up this point. I am only here because I was alerted this morning to the fact that this amendment was on the Marshalled List and I thought I would want to listen to what was being said without preconceptions either way. There have, I think, been one or two misunderstandings as to the position concerning the availability of legal aid. I hope I have got it right myself. I see the noble and learned Lord opposite and I am sure he will keep me right. As I understand the position it is that in all criminal proceedings—and we are talking only about criminal proceedings—legal aid is available whether for adults or juveniles. That covers this case in two possible ways to which I will come.

Adults are not ordinarily automatically entitled to legal aid. I think my noble friend Lady Masham was under some misapprehension about that. The general rule—and it is a general rule which on the whole I would prefer to stick to—is that the court has discretion in criminal cases whether to give legal aid or not. It is enjoined to do so by the statutes governing legal aid where the interests of justice so require. In deciding whether the interests of justice so require the court applies what are known compendiously as the "Widgery criteria named after our late friend the then Lord Chief Justice. One of the criteria, in fact the most important criterion which is normally applied, is the question whether liberty or reputation are seriously in jeopardy in the proceedings. I attach a good deal of importance to the courts having a free discretion in applying that criterion and the other Widgery criteria.

There have been implanted, one might say, upon the discretion of the court, a few cases—and we are concerned only with juveniles—where the court is enjoined willy-nilly to give legal aid. I am anxious to keep those exceptions, because they are exceptions to a general rule, as few as possible. In this particular field of cases, before a residential care order can be made by the court legal aid is mandatory and not discretionary. I forget where that comes from, but I am tolerably sure that that is the correct position. This particular amendment will deal with the situation after conviction and not before conviction. It is limited, as I understand it, to that. It follows, therefore, that if the child is charged with an offence which could carry a custodial sentence the court can give legal aid, when the charge is made or before the charge is made, on application.

This, I imagine, would be so in a case where there is a danger, for instance, of a residential care order—which is by far the commonest case—so that the question of guilt or innocence, or the question of a plea of guilty or not guilty, would already be covered by legal aid and by the presence of a solicitor or counsel—I should hope, in most cases, a solicitor. Therefore, legal aid would in that sense automatically be available in such a case before a care order was made, because the child would already be represented in the earlier phase of the case, before conviction, by a solicitor and the legal aid order would cover the disposal order after conviction.

Therefore, the amendment deals with the situation only where legal aid has not, in fact, been given before conviction, before a care order is made. It deals only with the period between conviction and disposal. The amendment would in effect, therefore, require a second consideration of the question of legal aid after conviction and before disposal. I think that it is important to realise this. If I may say so, as I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon—to whom I listened, as always, with great attention because his experience in this field of work is very much more extensive than mine—I was rather struck by what may be a false criticism, but I shall still make it to see whether I am right or wrong. I think that when a child does not ask for legal aid or it is not applied for on his behalf, subsection (1)(b) of the amendment would not protect him because, as I understand the amendment—which I have only had a short time to consider—if he is informed of his right to have legal aid and then does not apply, he is not protected under the amendment.

The noble and learned Lord is always courteous and I am most grateful to him for allowing me to intervene. The point that I was trying to make was that a child of the kind that we are thinking of when asked—or even if the parent is asked—" Do you wish to apply for legal aid?" will really not be in a position, in many, many cases, to answer in his own interests. I was, therefore, putting the point that it is the aggressive child or the aggressive parent who will say, yes. If, on the other hand, it is mandatory, that question will not arise.

As I understand it, this indicates to me that we may have to think about the matter a little more. Subsection (1)(b) of the amendment says:

" having been informed of his right to apply for legal aid and had the opportunity to do so, he refused or failed to apply".

Therefore, the very child whom the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, is seeking to protect is expressly excluded from protection by the terms of the amendment which is put forward. I still think that that is possibly a valid criticism of what the noble Lord was saying.

There is another matter which I think the Committee should bear in mind. If a care order, other than a residential care order, is made—which is the situation we are considering, because legal aid is mandatory in any event if a residential care order is to be made and before it can be made—as I understand it the position is that the local authority then decides what is to happen in regard to the actual physical location where the child is to be disposed. It may be that he is left at his home. It may be that he is put in foster care. But he can be sent—and of course I do not wish to cover up or conceal the situation—by the local authority (although he has not been sent by the court) to a residential establishment in just the same way as he would have been if the court had made a residential care order. That may be the commonest case.

What occured to me when I read the amendment was that in that set of circumstances, which is possibly the set of circumstances which noble Lords in support of the amendment are trying to get at, legal aid and legal representation in the court will be of least value, because in the end the loss of liberty will not be due to the order of the court itself, but to the discretion of the local authority imposing it upon the child, not as a punishment but as a way of disposing of the child in his own interests. Therefore, I have a certain scepticism about the effectiveness of this amendment which has not, I think, been fully reflected in the discussion. However, having heard my noble friend Lord Trefgarne, I am wondering whether perhaps we ought not to think about this a little more and try and get it straight on Report.

I would not oppose this amendment on the grounds of expense. I do not know how much the expense would be. I am very anxious not to add to the expense of criminal legal aid for reasons I have explained in other contexts, but I do not think that it will cost a very great deal because to begin with in a great number of cases where the child's liberty is in jeopardy, legal aid will already have been granted. If there is the possibility of a residential care order, it becomes mandatory. We are, therefore, dealing only with a very small minority of cases where the residential care order is not in contemplation, a custodial sentence is not in contemplation, and where the court may nonetheless be contemplating imposing a care order without its being a residential care order. I do not think that we need be unduly impressed by the resources point. However, I should like to think the matter over again because this is not a field in which I claim very great expertise. I have taken very careful note of what everybody has said and not least the importance which is attached to it by the various bodies which have been mentioned. I should like, if I may, to think on the matter a little more deeply.

I can hardly rise to my feet when the noble and learned Lord said that we are not really concerned with the resources aspect in this matter. I think that we are in some state of confusion here, and the noble and learned Lord has put the confusion very clearly. The most vulnerable are the least likely to ask for help—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon. It was for that reason that the All-Party Parliamentary Group considered this to be such an important amendment to safeguard those who, quite frankly, could not help themselves. I find it very strange when one considers that we do not have the numbers of those who have asked for legal aid. From my experience in the juvenile court, I only once remember a young person and a family asking for legal aid. Indeed, they did so because I recommended and took them along to a solicitor to get legal aid against myself, then the director of social services.

Therefore, it is not generally known and it is not generally understood that legal aid is available. However, I do see the points that the noble and learned Lord has made as regards the very real difficulties. As he has given an undertaking that he will, with his Ministers, look at the matter again, I shall at this stage beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 46:

After Clause 21, insert the following new clause:

Having had a very helpful discussion with the noble and learned Lord, I shall say only that I support the amendment and l am quite certain that some review should exist. I should have thought that a review by the juvenile courts was as good a way as any other.

I should also like to support this amendment. I see that the amendment which follows it is for a review by a body, by a committee. I very much prefer the amendment now before us to the fallback position, which I consider the following amendment to be. As the noble Baroness has pointed out, this amendment would make an annual review mandatory. It means that a young child who commits a minor offence and who could be taken away from his parents for, say, the next eight years if he is 10, without any subsequent independent review of his situation, is in a very unfair position, although we are aware that local authorities can have an internal review every six months.

It is also strange that this child is put in a very anomalous position compared, for example, with a psychiatric patient who is detained against his will, where a periodic appeal is possible to the Mental Health Review Board. So a child who does not have any psychiatric problems is in a worse position as regards having an annual review than a child who has some form of mental sickness.

In Scotland the position is very much better from the child's point of view, because a supervision order with a residential requirement—which is about the nearest eqivalent to the care order—lapses after a year unless it is renewed by a children's panel. What is suggested in this amendment is that the panel should, in fact, be the juvenile bench, which seems to make the most sense and the most consistency. This was embodied in the proposals of the report of the Parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group on young offenders. It is something which, in a Bill of this sort, where a great deal of concentration is being put on the position of the young offender, should have the support certainly of the Committee, and I hope of the Government.

Children change so much between the ages of 10 and 18, which is the span of time about which vie are talking, that it would seem to me to be only natural justice that this review should be mandatory. For the sake of argument let us assume that people say they always no it—there is nothing that concentrates the mind more than being told you have to do it once a year rather than saying, "Yes, we ought to do it, but we do not have the time". I know that one is talking of the extreme case, but the thought of a child of 10 being sent away under a care order for some minor criminal offence and not coming out until he is 18 is a very much longer time in custody than is normally handed out to anyone but the most serious adult criminals.

I would hope that my noble friend will look at this proposal very sympathetically. I do not think that it will cost very much; I am sure that that argument will have been considered. I know that many of us are always asking for care to be taken in Government expenditure and for it to be cut back as much as possible. But I do not think that this would cost very much and I think it is natural justice, and natural justice only.

I should like to add that so often when we have been discussing children's legislation in this House it has been quoted that time is so much longer to a child than it is to an adult.

I want to say right away, of course, that I understand the anxiety which underlies this amendment. I think that it is part of the wider debate which is developing about the philosophy of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 and its approach to children in trouble. The amendment goes to the heart of the framework of that Act. That is something which the Government have sought to avoid doing. As recently as 1978 the Magistrates' Associa- tion and the local authority associations agreed that the 1969 Act provided an appropriate framework for dealing with the majority of children who offend. We should therefore be anxious not to weaken its structure until we are confident that we have something better to put in its place.

The 1969 Act makes the care order generally available to the courts as a way of dealing with juveniles who are in trouble, which includes juveniles who have committed a criminal offence. A care order, whether it is made in care proceedings or in criminal proceedings, usually lasts until the juvenile reaches the age of 18. That enables the care authority, in the most serious cases, to plan for the juvenile's long-term care, and it enables them in all cases to keep an eye on the juvenile's welfare and to help him with his changing needs.

In parenthesis, at this point perhaps I could respond to a matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, earlier in connection with another amendment. I think that the average duration of a care order tends to approach three years for a boy, as I think the noble Lord said, but it is, in general, rather less for a girl. At any point during the currency of the care order the local authority, the juvenile himself or his parent or guardian can apply to the court to have the order discharged. That is in addition, of course, to the right of appeal against the order when it is first made. This amendment seeks to provide that a care order made in criminal proceedings should automatically lapse after a year. That would introduce a very major distinction between orders made in care pro-ceedings and orders made in criminal proceedings. We would still have offenders and non-offenders dealt with within the same system, but they would be there under radically different terms. I hope that that observation, and indeed what I had to say before, will persuade my noble friend of the shortcomings of what she proposes and that she will see fit not to press her amendment.

I understand the position of my noble friend the Minister over this. I cannot understand why it can be done in Scotland and not here, but we have not got quite the same legal system here. At this point I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment in order to give one an opportunity to discuss Amendment No. 47, with the understanding that it will be possible to bring it back at Report stage.

moved Amendment No. 47:

After Clause 21, insert the following new clause:

Like the noble Baroness, I prefer Amendment No. 46. I want to refer to something that the noble Lord said in defence against Amendment No. 46. He said that if you review the custody under a residential care order of a criminal sentence, and you do not do the same under a civil arrangement, you are putting the two people in different categories. This is the argument against the criminal care order. It is clear that it is wrong that this should happen. But it is still clearer that somebody who is under a sentence should not fail to have his sentence reviewed because somebody who is put in a similar position for his own good and convenience, because there is nowhere else to send him, has no arrangements of this kind. The reply is absolutely unsatisfactory, and I hope that at the end of these two amendments we can get a better reply out of the noble Lord because that is not an answer that one could accept for one moment. If somebody is sentenced to however simple a custodial sentence, which a residential care order is, there must be some system of reviewing how long he stays there which does not apply to somebody who is under a civil care order, which is entirely different. Perhaps we can hear some more about this later.

Speaking personally, I prefer Amendment No. 47 to 46. I hope that the Government will feel that they can look at this again. I have always felt that the more co-operation that could take place between education authorities, the probation service, the social service and the Bench, the better. This seems an excellent way of bringing them all in. Maybe it does not apply quite so much to Greater London, but outside London it would he valuable if people who knew the background of the child involved were enabled to look into the case on a yearly basis.

I have listened carefully to the arguments on this amendment and the previous one They establish beyond any doubt the principle that there should be a review at fairly frequent intervals by a body composed of people other than statutory social workers. I hope that the Government will pay great attention to the point made previously by the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, comparing a situation with that which will exist, or already exists, with the mental health tribunals. It is wrong that juveniles should be in a worse position than psychiatric patients.

I find myself happily in sympathy with the intention behind this amendment. Indeed, we would go further. The Government consider that the cases of all children in care, not only those in care as a result of criminal proceedings under Section 7(7) of the 1969 Act, should be subject to review—and, indeed, Section 90(3) of the Child Care Act 1980 already requires local authorities to review the case of each child in their care at intervals of not more than six months. This clause is concerned with imposing a duty on the Secretary of State to make regulations. Section 20(2) of the 1980 Act already enables the Secretary of State to make regulations regarding the procedure of reviews. This clause would therefore, to a large extent, duplicate existing provision.

As your Lordships may be aware, the power to make review regulations, in common with a number of the provisions originally enacted in the Children Act 1975, awaits implementation. The introduction of review regulations, like other unimplemented provisions, would I fear have significant resource implications. The cost has been estimated at some £7·2 millions a year. It will regrettably not be possible to introduce regulations until resources become available. Membership of the reviewcommittee—a mattercovered in the terms of the proposed new clause—will be considered at that time. The making of regulations would of course be preceded by consultation with all interested bodies. In the meantime, as I have already said, there is a clear statutory requirement on local authorities to carry out reviews of children in their care at least every six months. I hope that this will allay the fears of my noble friend and indeed of other noble Lords who have spoken, and that my noble friend will not wish to press this amendment.

While welcoming what the noble Lord the Minister says about his sympathy for the underlying principle for this amendment, may I say on behalf of those of us on these Benches that we consider that this amendment is in any event a very poor substitute for what is enshrined in Amendment No. 46. I hope I am not out of order in encouraging the Minister to consider very, very carefully whether or not a judicial review hearing should not after all be the answer in these cases. The matter has been put very clearly by the Magistrates' Association in their publication of 1980:Observations on the Children and Young Persons Act 1969. They say:

" In the case of, for example, psychiatric patients detained against their will, periodic appeal is possible to the Mental Health Review Tribunal, but the sane child enjoys no such privilege".

That point was made by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. They go on to say:

" Reviews are admittedly undertaken by the local authority every six months but they appear to be of a very cursory nature. We do not know of any local authority which holds a formal review where a child is legally represented or where his views are expressed".

In my submission, the review body clearly should be the juvenile court, a body that has the independence and the benefit of all the reports prepared by social workers. Clearly it is a body which has the status to arrive at an independent judgment that would be accepted both by society and, one hopes, by the child himself.

The situation in Scotland has been referred to where orders lapse after 12 months. Indeed, I had hoped very much that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, would be here to explain how it is that the superior wisdom of Scotland has managed to achieve something denied to those of us who live south of the Tweed.

I feel that the case is an extremely strong one, when we remind ourselves of just how long a care order can last. A care order can be made for a child aged, let us say, 10 years and one month. It may be made for something very trivial, indeed for something for which normally one would not consider a custodial sentence as being within the pale of possibility at all. It is made not on account of the gravity of his offence but on account of the poverty of his home. That child could remain in a custodial setting until he achieves the age of 18—I appreciate this would be an extreme case, but it is a possibility and certainly I could produce statistics to show that some people do go through this experience. That is a very long period and a huge slice of his life for a trivial offence, and in circumstances that cry out for a judicial review.

I am sorry I have spoken so much in relation to Amendment No. 46, which has now been withdrawn, but it is only by holding up Amendment No. 47 to the light of Amendment No. 46 that we can really consider the issue. Therefore, I end by repeating the plea that in relation to Amendment No. 46 (disposed of though it has been) and Amendment No. 47, the Government should urgently reconsider the situation.

May I intervene? I should like to put this to your Lordships, in spite of the glances of the Chief Whip. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that some money could actually be saved by a judicial review: in other words, children would be released from care orders. Has that sort of sum been done against the resource argument? Of course, I agree that we have got to be very careful with resources, but the point is that if a child of 10 can stay inside for eight years for nicking an apple, that is an indictment of a civilised country. Of course, that is something which will not happen very frequently, but it has only to happen once and we should then all hang our heads in shame.

May I make just one observation which I hope will assist my noble friend Lord Onslow? A care order is not a custodial sentence. A child who is in care and who happens to be placed in a residential home, for example, or who is in foster care or even in his own home, is not under a legal constraint. Of course, if a child of a later age is sent to a borstal home that is something different. He is then in some form of legal custody—

I wonder whether the noble Lord would he good enough to allow me to ask a question. I am trying to understand the distinction he is drawing—and, of course, there is a distinction—between a care order where a young person finds himself in some form of residential accommodation and a normal custodial sentence. I recognise that there is a distinction, but what happens when the young person absconds from that establishment? What then happens to him?

Of course, that would be a breach of the terms of the care order and suitable disciplinary procedures would then no doubt be applied. But a care order is different from a custodial sentence. A care order can be terminated at any time more or less during its course by application to the court which originally made the order. Indeed, care orders are reviewed, as I have said, on a regular basis. Your Lordships were saying in the context of Amendment No. 46 that you thought the review should be carried out by the juvenile court. That was something that I thought it necessary to resist, but I am much less resistant to the proposals in this amendment, which in principle we have accepted. Indeed, in practice the concerns expressed in connection with the amendment are already met by what happens in the reviews by local authorities to which I have referred already. The sort of anxieties expressed by my noble friend Lord Onslow went very wide of what happens in practice. If my noble friend was right in saying that children were being locked up from the age of 10 to the age of 18 without any review, that would be a different matter; but that is far from being the position in practice.

Would not the Minister agree that whether or not it is called "custody"—and I would suggest there is no profit whatsoever in dissecting legal hairs of that sort—whatever it is called, it is a constraint upon physical liberty? It is the order of an authoritative body backed by sanctions that that person shall live in a certain place. In that respect it has everything in common with a custodial order.

No, with respect, I do not think I would agree with that. The order is for the child to live under the care of the local authority, and that is a very different matter. The local authorities have wide discretion as to where that child should live—whether in a residential home, with foster parents or indeed in the child's own home. I think that is a very different thing from a custodial sentence. A care order is most certainly not a custodial sentence and I hope your Lordships will not be misled into thinking that it is.

I am sorry to prolong this discussion, but it worries me that the Minister will keep on putting together the terms "community home", "residential care", "foster parents", and then "the child's own home". It is very important to differentiate between these things. With great respect, I think it is quite absurd to pretend that if there is a care order for the child who is residing in its own home with its own family, this is on all fours with a child being away in residential accommodation. If this is not grasped, I do not think we are going to get very far with this.

I wanted to indicate the wide range of possibilities that are available to the local authority in respect of their responsibilities under a care order, which we are considering. Indeed, I imagine it is the case that a particular child for whom a care order is made might spend time in all three of the various situations that I have referred to. I believe that we are considering something very different from a custodial sentence and I also think that the judicial review, which is effectively what is proposed by the earlier amendment, is not appropriate. I agree that some less formal review is desirable. That is why we have accepted the principle of this amendment and why indeed, in practice, as I have said, reviews of one sort or another take place on a regular basis.

The Government are aware that criticism has been made of the review practice of some local authorities. Indeed, the Department of Health has discussed this matter with social service directors—I was myself present at an important meeting of that kind— recently whose attention has been drawn to the need to improve their review practice where shortcomings exist. The Government are not unmindful of the need for keeping the matter under careful scrutiny, and I hope I have been able to allay most of the fears of the Committee.

I thank the Minister for his reply. We are in difficulty because a care order is very wide and has several arms. If a care order is made, it is open to the local authority social services department to place the child in a children's home—a small one with only 10 children, if you like—or to place the child in a foster home, or (I do not agree with this, as I have let the Committee know) to place the child back at home. We must therefore realise, as the Minister said, how flexible a care order is. Having said that, it is true that, under the children's homes regulations, there is provision for the child to be reviewed. But difficulty comes when, for instance, a child is moved into a community home for education which is not in the area of the local authority, and often those children do not get reviewed because they are, as it were, at a distance. It is essential that every child in care—be it in a community home for education, in a children's home or at home on trial—should be reviewed.

In the light of what the Minister said, I hope that my noble friends on the All-Party Penal Affairs Group will agree that, inasmuch as there is confused thinking over this issue, we should consider it afresh. In the light of what the Minister said, I suggest that we withdraw the amendment and raise the matter again on report. Accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

I can paraphrase the clause by saying that it enables courts to require a local authority to remove from home for up to six months any young person convicted or found guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment in the case of a person over 21 who commits that offence while already subject to a care order. If I were the only person pleading on behalf of my noble friends for removal of the clause from the Bill, your Lordships might not have been considerably affected, so I hope the Committee will forgive me if I read the list of those so much concerned with all aspects of juvenile offenders that they regard Clause 22 as objectionable.

The list includes: the Conference of Chief Probation Officers, the National Association of Probation Officers, the Association of Directors of Social Services, the Association of County Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities, the British Association of Social Workers, NACRO, New Approaches to Juvenile Crime, the Association of Community Homes, the Residential Care Association, the National Intermediate Treatment Federation, the National Council of Voluntary Child Care Organisations, the National Council of Voluntary Organisations and the National Youth Bureau. The Committee may think that, if the Minister rises to support the clause, he will stand in lonely isolation, certainly in relation to those who are knowledgeable about juvenile offenders, as I know the Minister is, in spite of the very short acquaintance he has had with the responsibilities he now so elegantly bears. One knows—this was brought home to us clearly by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor—that before any child can have a residential care order made against him, he has the opportunity of legal representation. That I realise. I equally realise, as was borne in on us in the discussion of the previous amendment, that a care order has many facets and—the phrase was used—many arms; foster parents or possibly sending the youngster back home—as the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, said, a completely wrong use of a care order.

I am talking about the child who, under this provision, could and would be sent to a residential establishment. That is wrong because, first of all, the Government estimate that between 500 and 900 young offenders may come within this provision and that the cost may be about £6 million. What an extraordinary contrast that is with the cost to the Government of £2 million under Clause 20, which deals with intermediate care, and, the Committee may think, what a wrong order of preference in regard to the handing out of money which is so scarce in the Government's resources.

What happens to youngsters who are sent to residential care? Is there any question of there being a real hope that, as a result of their having committed another offence, their stay in the residential establishment will turn a rather unhealthy young citizen into a very healthy one? Up-to-date statistics are not available, but we remember the statistices we were given previously about borstal and similar institutions. The number of those returning to crime is unfortunately all too high. One therefore pleads again for all the resources available in intermediate care and not for a power of this kind.

But the real evil of the clause is the effect it has on residential homes themselves. The Association of Community Homes, commenting on the White Paper, Young Offenders, published in October 1980, said that the treatment of children subject both to determinate and to indeterminate sentences in the one home.

" cannot be viable in the same establishment without each treatment plan seriously undermining the other".

When you have in that home subject to a care order children who have committed no offence at all staying there for an indeterminate period, what is their idea of justice when they see that offenders—presumably offenders on the second occasion—go there for a determinate sentence and come out before they have they have a chance of coming out? Judging from what is said by those who run the homes, those who are knowlegeable about youthful offenders, and those who want every penny that we possess to be spent on the one hope that we have in regard to the young people—intermediate care—it appears that this would be £6 million or more absolutely wasted. The proposal stands the chance of greatly spoiling the residential homes and institutions that we have. This is a bad clause; it should not be in the Bill.

As chairman of the Committee on New Approaches to Juvenile Crime, I support the proposal that the clause be left out. I shall not make a speech, since the case has been so well put by the noble Lord, Lord Mischon. I rise to say merely that I support it.

When my noble friend Lord Mishcon read out the formidable list of bodies totally preoccupied with the problems that are raised by the consideration of the clause, one wondered what consultations the Home Office had had. With whom did they discuss the matter? Was it only the Tory Party conference? No, I must not suggest anything so party political as that. But I seriously ask, were there consultations with interested bodies? We have heard of the whole range of interested bodies. On the probation side there is both the Conference of Chief Probation Officers, and the national association thereof. Then there are all those concerned with social service work, so far as I can see, as well as the National Council for Voluntary Organisations. It is a most formidable array.

I confess that I myself cannot speak with any expertise in this field, but I am connected not remotely with someone in my family who can. I draw attention to the contrast that is involved. What is now proposed, in provisions which are almost universally resisted by all concerned who work in the field, is now to be preferred to the undoubted success of intermediate treatment, and there is also the fact that intermediate treatment costs £2 million as against the £6 million that is proposed. The possibility of financial saving appeals to any Government, but in particular to a Government who are faced with problems of making both ends meet, as of course, all Governments are, though perhaps not to quite the same extent as the present Government, for reasons which I should not be so party political as to enter into it. I draw attention to the analysis of what the bodies concerned have said and to the notable point made by my noble friend Lord Mishcon in his powerful speech—that what is proposed would be gravely damaging to residential establishments, for the reasons that he has stated.

So I hope that there will be a fundamental rethink on the matter, and I shall be very curious to know the answer to my primary question: Whom did the Government consult? From where did the Home Office get the inspiration?—if it can properly and reasonably be described as inspiration. I notice that the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, is eager to intervene, and I willingly give way to her.

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I should like to ask him whether he agrees that the difficulty was that the magistrates wanted the clause, for a very good reason. They wanted it because there was bad practice in respect of the care order—and we come back to the same question again and again. I would suggest that my noble friend consulted an enormous number of people. I think that the consultations were very full and that much time was given to them. However, I think I am right in saying—perhaps this will be agreed—that it was the Magistrates' Association that was involved. I wonder whether it is agreed that one should have sympathy with the Magistrates' Association because there was bad practice on the part of the social services, perhaps understandably, bearing in mind difficulties over time and one thing and another.

The noble Baroness has rightly drawn my attention to the discussions with the Magistrates' Association. The joint working party reported in 1978 and at that time agreed on guidelines designed to ensure that local authorities met the expectation of the courts that in certain circumstances a juvenile offender would be removed from home. As I understand it, for the past three or four years the guidelines have been operating successfully throughout the country. Even if the Government have evidence of any areas where the guidelines are not operating successfully—and the organisations that have been communicating with us indicate that they have no such evidence—that would be an argument for improving the operation of the guidelines in any such exceptional area and not for the introduction of this retrograde proposal. I think that that is the answer to the query that the noble Baroness has raised.

I should like to ask the noble Lord the Minister, why on this occasion he does not like the idea of guidelines? Whenever we have tried to insert proposals in the Bill in the form of a statutory provision, it has been said by he or his colleagues that guidelines are far better. Now we have some guidelines, and no doubt the Minister can tell us in what respect they are not working satisfactorily, if that is the case. Then, as the noble and learned Lord suggests, we can consider whether it would not be better to try to improve them, rather than to write into the statute a provision that has been so universally condemned.

I think that the question that the noble and learned Lord has put should be extended, so that when the Minister replies he should say not only who has been consulted, but which of the organisations have given a favourable answer to the suggestion that the clause should be incorporated, and which of them have spoken against it. If the overwhelming weight of expert opinion is that the clause should not be inserted, one must then ask, what is the reason for its insertion? Is it because a rather similar proposal was included in the Tory Party manifesto, and that although the proposed clause does not go quite as far as that, the Government feel that there is an obligation to the party to insert a provision which they know to be fundamentally wrong and bad?

While I am on my feet I should like to ask just one question; namely, why the Home Office has never followed up the Research Study No. 32—Residential Treatment and its Effects on Delinquency? It was published in 1975, and it showed conclusively that in the majority of cases residential treatment is followed by reconviction within a very short period. If residential treatment is still as ineffective as it was shown to be in the Home Office research study of 1975, ought we not to have some more up-to-date figures which would enable us to evaluate the advantages of Clause 22?

I should like to follow the example of the noble Baroness and say simply that I support the Opposition Front Bench and the admirable speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon.

I, too, should like to support what my noble friend and other noble Lords have said, and emphasise the point made just now by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury: that the reconviction rate in these cases is so high that that alone should make one wonder about the situation. Even as recently as 1979, two researchers at Lancaster University found that two-thirds of the total number of young offenders from Rochdale who were placed in custodial homes re-offended. That is the latest information that we seem to have had since 1975.

The views of the many organisations that are involved in providing residential care should also be borne in mind. In the strongest possible terms they have warned that the proposal contained in Clause 22 would have a highly damaging effect on residential care itself, because residential establishments would be expected to house in the same establishment young people who are subject to ordinary care orders, whose length of stay is indefinite and depends upon their assessed need for residential care, and also those who are subject to the new, determinate residential care orders. In its comments on the White Paper Young Offenders of October 1980, which put forward this proposal, the Association of Community Homes emphasised that the treatment of children subject to both determinate and indeterminate sentences—

" cannot be viable in the same establishment without each treatment plan seriously undermining the other".

So I would only say that on three very important counts—the whole question of resources, the question of the reconviction rate and also the point about the harm that will be done to those establishments dealing with residential care at the moment—we have the strongest evidence, in the views of the organisations concerned with them, against what has been proposed and what is still in the Bill in the form of Clause 22. There would appear to he, as yet, no argument put up that would overturn the very strong views put forward by my noble friend and other noble Lords (and, I venture to say, the one or two points that I myself have put forward) which would give any support for Clause 22 remaining in the Bill.

That was a formidable deployment, was it not, of combined opinions? I wonder whether the phalanx of opposition to this measure which noble Lords have quoted—including, I noticed, the Association of County Councils, which I think is a newish recruit and which I was not aware of—does not repose to some extent upon a misconception. I am advised that in fact the Association of County Councils at best regards it as a curate's egg, so I withdraw that point. I was saying that I was withdrawing one of the facts I was deploying against the noble Lord. He need not trouble himself with which; he can just be content that my case is fractionally weakened by what I have said.

I just wonder, among the snowstorm of extra information I have been given, whether in fact we should not look at the central matter and ask ourselves whether we are looking at this aright. There is support —significant support—for this proposal from the people who are between the upper and the nether millstones, and they are the magistrates in their courts. If there was no support I do not think this measure would have manifested itself in the manifesto on which this Government were elected.

Noble Lords opposite, and some on this side of the Committee, seem to regard what we propose as some sort of brutal, blunt instrument for the courts to use to snatch innocent children from caring parents. A court which at present puts a child in care leaves itself no stronger measure in reserve, at present, short of a custodial sentence. The children we are speaking of are already in the care of the local authority, and my noble friend Lady Faithfull would say that some of them should not therefore be with their parents. However, the breakdown shows that of the offenders in care on 1st March 1979, about 37 per cent. were placed at home and about 40 per cent. in local authority residential establishments; but, of course, these proportions will vary from time to time.

We are therefore looking at some 40 per cent. of the children in this group. Those children will already have offended; they will already have shown that that combination of care is insufficient or ineffective in preventing re-offending; and, as things now stand, the intervention of the court on the child's reappearance must at present be either draconian or derisory, either custody or simply further care; and the only effective impact the court can secure is by custody.

What is now proposed is to leave the child in the care of the local authority but to take from that authority the power they so far have had to place the child with any parent, guardian, relative or friend. Even as it stands, that limited removal of discretion need not be wholly exercised. Under the new Section 20A(1)(b), the court can use this power to say to the local authority, "You cannot leave this child with just any relative you choose; he or she can stay only with his mother, or with a particular uncle or aunt". The exclusion of all relatives is the final step. It means that the child must be put in a home, but it does not mean custody. In other words, the effect of this clause is simply to prevent the child being sent back home with a flea in his ear or, as the only alternative being sent to custody, destitute of his liberty.

The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, noted the link between this clause and the proposals in the parliamentary All-Party Penal Affairs Group guideline amendment, No. 44, I think it was; and those criteria are in fact in line with each other. Both the criteria in the amendment presuppose explicitly that a care order should be imposed on a juvenile offender only if it is necessary to remove him from the charge or control of his parent or guardian. Of course, this is precisely what Clause 22 enables the court to do, with the added safeguard that it is only after re-offending that it can do it.

Your Lordships raised a large number of other matters, most of which I think were peripheral to my main theme; but I cannot I think accept the idea that the differential effects of different forms of residential treatment make invalid altogether the care order system. As to the re-conviction rates—and as the noble Lord has asked about research—we shall be examining the working of this clause when it comes into effect, but there is a considerable division of opinion as to what are in fact the predisposing criteria for re-offending. In a recent piece of research by Cawson there is a firm conclusion that the most significant predictor of re-offending is the extent of the juvenile's previous offending. Compared with that, other characteristics of the offender, or of his placement, are unimportant.

So we are not looking at a picture in which all is black or all is white. I believe that what we propose is to be recommended because it is better than custody. As I said at Second Reading, this is not a way of snatching children into residential care and out of their homes as a first resort: it stands between the child and imprisonment when the only means by which the court could at present give notice to the child and those responsible for him of the seriousness of what he has done is to put him into custody. I think that this is better than custody. Noble Lords who seek to take this power from the courts and from this Bill will in fact be condemning more children to custody, and I think that would be a retrograde and a heartless step.

Not quite as heartless, if I may say so, as going against the whole experience as recorded, and as I ventured to summarise before the Committee, of all those who have to do with residential homes, the ameliorating effect that those homes can have, the order, discipline and fairness within them—a point which I noticed the noble Lord the Minister, while covering most of the rest of the debate, ignored. His one justification was that the magistrates would like to have this power and that one was saving the child from (dare I say it?) drifting between the Scylla and Charybdis of a residential home or imprisonment, detention.

In order not to be stranded on either Scylla or Charybdis it is necessary to have a positive course to steer. That is what Clause 22 provides. If you drift, you finish up on Scylla or Charybdis, wrecked.

The quickness of mind of the noble Lord the Minister is something that many of us have noticed and admired before. If he wishes me to carry on with a naval metaphor, then I shall do so and say that sometimes it is very sensible, having sailed a straight course between Scylla and Charybdis, if you want to make another journey between them to adopt the same straight course. It may well be that the magistrates will decide, after a reprimand, to send the child back under the self-same care order; but give the magistrates the opportunity under this section, contrary to the advice of probation officers and everyone else, and they will not. They will avail themselves of this power thinking that Parliament decided that it wanted the magistrates to do so. What they will do is to take the child away from the parents or from wherever it may be and put it in one of the residential establishments which those who run them —and the magistrates do not—do not want.

It is in those circumstances, with a degree of confidence, supported as I have said by all those so experienced in administering the difficult task of rescuing juvenile offenders, and in the hope that £6 million or more will not be wasted on this provision, that I ask your Lordships to decide that the clause should not form part of the Bill. As the Minister has not answered, as I think, the most telling points in the debate, I have no alternative but to ask the Committee to divide on this matter.

moved Amendment No. 48:

After Clause 22, insert the following new clause:

I rise to support the noble Baroness in moving this amendment. In a Written Answer to the noble Baroness, as I understand it, the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne—and I am glad to see that he is in his place —told her, regarding the provision of secure accommodation appropriate for holding 15 to 16 year olds, juveniles, on remand that locally there is and will be for some time some under-provision of the appropriate secure accommodation. I am not quoting him but that I think was the gist of what he said.

Arising out of that, I should like to put to the Minister three pertinent questions. First of all, how long will that situation endure? How many is the shortfall of places? How local does a boy on remand have to be when remanded in custody? We know how temporary remands tend to be. In a number of cases they go on for a matter of months. It is not too strong an expression to say that it is a scandal that this situation should be continuing and that its effects should be prolonged. It is a choice between undesirables: between the inconvenience of travelling for the purpose of visits and so on to and from an appropriate secure place where a young person is on remand, and the totally unacceptable retention of juveniles in a local prison, strictly locally. Is it not a choice in that case of expediency or putting expediency before human rights?

When the all-party penal affairs group wrote the report on the young offender and strategy for the future we made this specific recommendation which the noble Baroness mentioned, and that was that there should be a specific time-table to be announced for the ending of the remand for 15 to 16 year olds to prison department establishments, and rapid progress should be made towards this objective.

In the Committee stage of this Bill in another place on 18th March Mr. Sam Silkin suggested that an amendment on these lines should be put into the Bill at this stage and it could be made operative as soon as the secure accommodation, where the juveniles ought to be kept, is available. Clause 60 of this Bill makes provision for the commencement date of all provisions in the Bill. That at least would ensure that the minimum time would elapse before the amendment because operative. I do not have a great deal of confidence that without the insertion of this amend- ment there will be any sense of urgency, any more than I am satisfied that there has been a proper sense of urgency hitherto.

In the Committee stage last week I had the privilege of moving the first amendment which was to stop young offenders from being put into adult prisons on remand in custody. I also had the chastening experience of when unfortunately the replies that we received from the Government were so unsatisfactory that, although we had not intended to divide the Committee, we did so and therefore at the moment this is still left in the Bill. I am referring to Clause 1.

We are now talking about an amendment that was moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, which is trying to do something which one would have thought would really be accepted almost without a word, and that is to prevent juveniles, much younger people, from being remanded in adult prisons. In 1980, 3,372 juveniles were remanded or committed to prison department custody. Of those, over 830 were subsequently acquitted or received non-custodial sentences. I am not arguing that those who received custodial sentences afterwards should ever have been sent to adult prisons; but to think that over 830 youngsters spent some time remanded in an adult prison with all the influences that there are in places like that, and in places totally unsuitable for young prople—to be in even for a day—and then when they came out they did not receive any form of custodial sentence at all. It makes one wonder how, in 1982, in a society which we like to consider civilised, we can still perpetuate this horrendous and repulsive system.

In 1975, the House of Commons Expenditure Committee, in its report on the Children and Young Persons Act, said:

" We condemn in the strongest possible terms the use of certificates of unruliness as a means of achieving secure accommodation. We recommend that the practice of remanding young persons to adult prisons should cease forthwith. Alternative arrangements must be made."

That was seven years ago and not only has that not yet happened—and I accept that it is not the responsibility of only one Government—but the practice will still remain in a new Criminal Justice Bill, which we were all hoping would bring more radical light and more libertarian views into our criminal justice system.

When the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, spoke to this amendment, he quoted the reply which the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, had given to a Question put down by the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull. He said that, when the secure places now under construction became available, the total number of secure places in community homes would be about adequate for the number of juveniles in need of security. If the number of secure places is very nearly sufficient to enable us to end this iniquitous practice, then we want to know. The Government must by now have a very clear idea of when the presumably, few secure places will become available. The noble Lord will know, because, in his answer, he referred to places that are now under construction.

Therefore, we want to know from the Government exactly what their timetable is. We want to know that this is a priority, and if the timetable is one which we consider reasonable in the circumstances, then the Government will, at least, have produced an answer and we shall know that there is a specific programme. We are all concerned with penal reform and it would be quite wrong for us to let a situation continue where young juveniles—not just young offenders—can still be remanded in custody in adult prisons. As the House of Commons Expenditure Committee said, this practice should be ended forthwith.

I am attached to an open borstal, and very many of the boys whom I have seen have been remanded in large local prisons, such as Durham, Armley, Liverpool and so on. After that, they go on to another large prison, which is Strangeways in Manchester. Every single boy from the North goes there for allocation and sometimes stays there for two or three weeks and may be locked up for 23 hours a day. I have been to some of these prisons, and I know the feeling that one gets. The first time I went to one I heard a large door clang behind me and then I went through yet another door. But, after one has been there at least twice, the feeling is never quite the same. Is it right that we are shutting up our boys and giving them this experience, which we might keep until later when they have done something worse?

I suggest to the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, that these youngsters should not be placed in old mental hospitals which are horrible and depressive places. I would place them in some of the teacher training colleges, which the noble Lord, Lord Elton, knows only too well have been closed down. If the Government wanted to do so, they could easily put a fence around these places; and the more attractive they are the better will be the behaviour of young people. Therefore, I should like to support this amendment.

I understand that the Minister may not look too favourably on the idea of using these former teacher training colleges as secure accommodation, because of the cost of modifying them as compared with erecting new, special purpose-built accommodation. But there is no dispute in principle on this, as I understand it, because the Government have said that they intend to phase out these remands as soon as resources allow. The question before the Committee is whether or not the Government have a definite plan, and will come forward now and tell us precisely on what date the resources will allow for secure accommodation to be provided in every region, instead of there being certain shortages only in particular areas of the country, as there are now.

I may say, in reply to the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Masham, about Liverpool, that that is one of the prisons in which there is already severe overcrowding. Her remarks highlight the fact that these young people are to be sent to local prisons, where the degree of overcrowding is almost horrendous and where, as one governor has expressed it, "We are dealing with penal dustbins". These are the places to which young people are sent, where the staff and the governors themselves are already telling us that they cannot cope with the adults, let alone the juveniles.

So I hope that the Government will pay serious attention to this amendment, because I believe that, unless we have something like this on the statute book in this Bill, we shall be fobbed off with pious hopes on the part of the Government that, "We shall provide secure accommodation as soon as resources allow, but the economic situation is very difficult", and so on. I should like to see the Government undertaking research on the reconviction rates of young people who are sent to these establishments, because I agree wholeheartedly with what is said about the enormous risk which is run by sending a young person, at a very impressionable stage of his life, to an establishment where hardened criminals are found. I cannot envisage anything more foolish, nor anything more likely to impose serious burdens on the resources of future generations when they have to look after these young people who have become hardened criminals themselves, as a result of the influences on them at the age of 15 and 16.

This new clause seeks to do something which the Government are already committed to trying to achieve. We are therefore wholly in sympathy with the intention behind it, which is to bring to an end the remand to prison of juveniles who are certified as being so unruly that they cannot safely be committed to the care of a local authority. This is a somewhat emotive subject. It was given a full debate on an identical amendment in another place, and your Lordships here have spoken eloquently about it this evening. But I am afraid that the Government cannot accept this new clause. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary already has power, under Section 34 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, to make orders amending the remand provisions. The power was last exercised last March, when 14-year-old boys were excluded from this provision. It now applies only to boys aged 15 and 16. We are already looking to see what can be done about that age group. This new clause would make an abrupt change in an area where we need to move very carefully, and to try to carry with us the confidence both of the courts and of the local authorities. I should therefore like to try, briefly, to explain the difficulties.

Juveniles have the same general right to bail as do adults. The 15- and 16-year-old boys upon whom this debate focuses have been refused bail because the courts have substantial grounds for believing that they will fail to surrender to custody, or will commit an offence while on bail or interfere with witnesses. In such cases, the provision in Section 23 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 is that they should he remanded to the care of the local authority. But the boys we are talking about have been through yet another filter. The courts have certified that they are of so unruly a character that they cannot safely be committed to the care of a local authority.

Since 1977, the issue of certificates of unruliness has been the subject of very strict conditions. The boy must be charged with an offence punishable, in the case of an adult, with imprisonment for 14 years or more, or with an offence of violence, or have a history of offences of violence. In addition, the court must be satisfied on the basis of a written report from the local authority that no suitable accommodation is available for him in a community home where he could be accommodated without substantial risk to himself or others. These are, therefore, boys charged with very serious offences for whom both the court and the local authority agree that a remand in care is not suitable. I say that to make it clear that the Government have a duty to proceed realistically in this matter. We have given it a great deal of thought, and we are on the point of opening consultations with the local authorities, the magistracy and others involved. The purpose of these consultations will be to establish exactly what degree of progress is or is not practicable in present circumstances.

It has been said that there is now enough secure accommodation to cope with all juveniles who are now remanded in custody. If that were the whole of the answer, we should be only too delighted, but I am afraid it is not. The number of secure places in community homes for accommodating remanded juveniles has increased over the last few months as new units have been opened and it now seems that the total stock is just about sufficient. However, there is still under-provision in one or two parts of the country and there may also be some difficulties in securing that a proper staffing complement is recruited and trained.

During our consultations we shall need to satisfy ourselves that the community home system will be able to accommodate satisfactorily all those boys who are now remanded to prison department establishments. We cannot solve the problem of dealing with these juveniles by simply depriving the courts of their powers to remand in custody, which is what this amendment would do. They and the local authorities each have a duty to ensure that the public is, where necessary, given some degree of protection and that the juvenile attends court for trial or sentence. We must work towards a solution which makes allowance for these duties.

The Government have made clear their view that there will always be a minority of juveniles for whom a custodial sentence is inevitable. In spite of that, we remain committed to a policy of trying to make sure that unconvicted or unsentenced juveniles are not held in custody. That commitment brings with it a responsibility to proceed realistically, and that is what we shall do. We took one cautious step last March and ended the remand in custody of 14-year-old boys. We are now going to consult with a view to taking a further step. The Government would be wrong, I think, to act hastily, and I hope that the new clause will not be pressed.

May I end by saying that it has been argued that remands in custody cannot be justified because many juveniles are eventually found not guilty or receive non-custodial sentences. That is easy enough to say after the event. The simple point is that the court can only make bail or remand decisions on the basis of the facts that it has before it. In the case of a juvenile, these facts must be pretty serious and persuasive. It is also worth pointing out that a decision on bail is different in kind from a decision on guilt or sentencing. It is essentially a predictive decision about whether the offender will turn up for trial or sentence or will get up to further mischief while on bail. The courts must base their decisions on substantial grounds, but they are not clairvoyant. They must do the best they can on the facts available to them at the time. It is of no help to that process to point out that in the event things sometimes turn out otherwise. I hope I have been able to point to some of the real difficulties with which we are faced in this amendment and that it will not be pressed.

Before the noble Lord sits down, am I to understand that it is the Government's policy in the long run to have enough accommodation, so that juveniles on remand for criminal offences are not sent to prison?

Yes, most certainly.

May I instance one type of case with which we are dealing; namely, juvenile arsonists. For juvenile arsonists you simply must have secure accommodation. If you do not have it in the region you must have it in a local prison. These might well have, and in many cases they do have, a boys' section It is very important that magistrates should be able to remand in custody cases of that kind.

In answer to the noble Baroness's question—"in the long run?"—the Minister said, "Yes, in the long run Could he be a little more specific, particularly in view of the answer he gave to the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull? It was a point which I also raised when I spoke. There should be something more specific than this. "In the long run" sounds to me rather more depressing than we had expected from the answer to the question.

The words "in the long run "were the words of my noble friend. They were not my words.

I know.

I should have been willing to go further if my noble friend had asked me.

Is it impossible for the noble Lord to give us any dates? If this can be done for 14-yearolds, why is it impossible to do it for 15-year-olds? The noble Lord intimated for some time in correspondence with the noble Baroness, Lady Faithfull, and others that the day was approaching when accommodation would be available. Now he gives no date at all. He sets no limit to it. We have to remember what the conditions in our prisons, with their overpopulation, are like for remand prisoners. It is possible to take the view that preferably no remand prisoners should be made to endure the conditions which exist in our prisons, but we could at least start with those aged 15 and 16.

I cannot, I am afraid, give a specific date as to when this happy state of affairs will arrive. Certainly I agree that it is a most desirable objective. In recent months we have made significant progress. Indeed, since the Written Answer which I provided to my noble friend Lady Faithfull, we have been able to open some new accomodation, and the position is slighty better now than it was on the occasion when I answered my noble friend. I cannot give your Lordships a precise date on which we shall be able to accept this as a formal commitment, but it cannot be far off. It is now only 15-and 16-year-olds who are subject to the possibility of the unhappy situation where they would be remanded to prison. When they are committed to prison for this purpose they are, in any event, kept carefully separated from the other prisoners, which was a point made by one noble Lord. However, I agree that we want to move as fast as we can. We are going to have consultations with the magistrates and others to see whether we can move forward, perhaps one step further, in the very near future. I cannot give a precise date to your Lordships, but I can say that as a matter of principle we shall do that just as quickly as we can.

I thank the Minister for his reply. It is quite obvious that it would be extremely embarrassing and very difficult for the Government, at the drop of a hat, to provide secure accommodation for these young people. Having said that, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, that to send them to prison is quite monstrous. But the Government are facing in the right direction, they are aware that this is a very great problem, and to my certain knowledge more secure places outside have been provided.

May I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod of Borve, that I have dealt with many arson cases. Those involved have not been sent to prison. I do not believe that arsonists necessarily need treatment and necessarily have to go to prison; they can be dealt with in secure accommodation outside the prison setting. My noble friend the Minister has said that consultations are taking place about this, that he is aware of the problem and that it is the policy of his department to move in the right direction. We hope that they will move fast. No good purpose would be served by pressing the amendment. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw it.

This is probably an appropriate moment for the dinner adjournment. May I also say to your Lordships that although I realise that this is a very important part of the Bill and that feelings quite rightly run very highly upon it, a little faster progress after the dinner adjournment would mean not asking your Lordships to sit too late, or later than I would otherwise have wished to ask your Lordships to sit; and it would probably be better for the Committee as a whole if we could make a little more progress. I beg to move that the Committee stage should be adjourned until five minutes past eight o'clock.

moved Amendment No. 49:

Page 27, line 8, after ("accommodation") insert ("and for different periods of time").