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Lords Chamber

Volume 433: debated on Monday 12 July 1982

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House Of Lords

Monday, 12th July, 1982.

The House met at half-past two of the clock: THE CHAIRMAN of COMMITTEES on the Woolsack.

Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Rochester.

The Lebanon: International Relief

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to organise an international effort to alleviate the suffering of the Lebanese people.

My Lords, the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator is the focal point for international disaster relief co-ordination. In addition to our direct humanitarian help, the Government are working closely with this organisation, as are many other Governments, the European Community and the relief agencies, to relieve the suffering of the Lebanese people.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that encouraging reply, which will give some hope to many in that part of the world, where the carnage is now terrible and which I feel will be condemned by nearly every civilised human being. I am proud to hear that our Government are playing their part in endeavouring to get relief quickly to the Lebanese people.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that supplementary, my Lords. Nearly £¼million in unilateral aid has been given in the Lebanese situation and we are contributing about £1 million to the proposed European Community contribution. The noble Lord mentioned the Lebanese people, but I would point out that the aid is for people, not for nationalities; the aid goes directly to suffering people, no matter what ethnic origin they may have.

My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether the aid is being given in financial terms or in actual goods which they can use?

Both, my Lords. The initial response by the Government was for £10,000, which was a cash grant to the Lebanon Red Cross, which was telegraphed on 12th June—only six days after the incident—to our embassy there. The rest has been paying for such things as blankets and tents and air freight for other people's blankets.

My Lords, while the alleviation of the immediate needs of the 600,000 displaced people is obviously very urgent indeed, may I ask the Minister if he is aware that what the Lebanon needs more than anything else is secure and respected frontiers? May I therefore ask him what steps the Government are taking to ensure that any peace-keeping forces are given adequate international authority?

Although that is rather a different question, my Lords, I would say that until the situation becomes clearer and the constant military action de-escalates, it will be impossible for the Government to come to a decision on the matter.

Arising out of that, my Lords, may I ask if it is not possible for the Government to use their influence to increase the United Nations peacekeeping force to prevent a deterioration of the situation? Did not Greece yesterday offer to send a contingent, and could the Minister give any report on what happened at the UN Security Council yesterday when they discussed this subject?

Not in answer to this Question, my Lords. If the noble Lord would like to put down a Question on the subject, I should of course be delighted to answer it.

My Lords, is the Minister able to say whether there is now any difficulty in getting aid in, or has that problem been resolved? Is the aid therefore now getting to those who need it?

Indeed I am able to say, my Lords. There has previously been some reference in the House to the problems of the access of the International Red Cross to the area. I am glad to say that those have now been resolved and that there are now teams on the ground in the Lebanon.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that I fully take his point, and accept immediately, that the aid being provided will not be limited merely to the Lebanese people, although they no doubt are the greatest sufferers, but that it is for other people who are suffering as well? Would he be prepared to give me an assurance that, if there is any interference by the aggressors and invaders in the area with humanitarian aid being taken to people who are suffering so drastically, this Government will give a world lead in condemning such action?

Guyana Frontier Projects: World Bank Assistance

2.42 p.m.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government what support they have given recently to Guyana's application for World Bank assistance towards the financing of development projects in the frontier region that is being claimed by Venezuela; and where the matter now stands.

My Lords, the United Kingdom representatives at the World Bank supported an 8 million dollar loan in 1980 for a study of possible hydro-electric schemes in the region. This is currently taking place and is expected to be completed by the end of October this year. No other proposals have come before the bank's board. Any proposals arising from the study will be carefully considered.

My Lords, I am much obliged for that reply. Since the Venezulan Government are in this case denouncing frontier treaties which we have signed, are claiming over half the territory of Guyana and are being bellicose in order to whip up support for themselves at home, may I ask whether the noble Lord agrees that potentially at least we have something like a Falklands crisis situation brewing here unless every- body is very firm about it? Moreover, since the attempt by Venezuela at vetoing the development in the disputed areas is part of the war of nerves against Guyana, which we do not want to see escalated into something worse, do we not have to be very resolute in supporting Guyana in getting help for the area if the World Bank study shows that the project is feasible?

My Lords, I can see absolutely no parallel between the Falklands situation and the Venezuelan-Guyanan situation. The Venezuelan Government have made it clear, both in public statements and to British Ministers, that they intend to follow the provisions of the 1966 Geneva Agreement in order to reach a peaceful settlement of the controversy. Since the Argentine invasion of the Falklands there has been no evidence that the Venezuelan Government have changed their resolve to settle the dispute by peaceful negotiation. With regard to the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, to a war of nerves, I should like to say that the Venezuelan Government and the Venezuelan representative at the World Bank have absolutely no power to veto. The decision is taken by a majority of the bank's directors.

My Lords, while I partially accept the noble Lord's remarks about the Falklands situation, may I ask whether he is aware that this country feels a real debt of gratitude to Guyana for being, with Trinidad, almost the only country in central America to support us over the Falklands issue? Will not the noble Lord assure the House that we shall give every possible assistance to Guyana if there is a dispute over the World Bank loan?

My Lords, with regard to the first part of the noble Baroness's supplementary question, yes, I would agree most certainly that the Guyanan Government, and of course the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, Mr. Ramphal, who is Guyanan, were among the first to give their support to us in our endeavour over the Falklands. Regarding the second part of the supplementary question, we shall of course have to await the results of the study. So may I say to the noble Baroness that her question is, first, hypothetical, and, secondly, a little premature.

My Lords, can my noble friend indicate whether or not the United Kingdom have guaranteed the territorial integrity of Guyana?

My Lords, I am not precisely sure as to that, but I can say that there is no garrison in Guyana.

My Lords, granted that the Venezuelans have no right to veto the application to the World Bank, do the Government regard it as significant that they should have attempted to defeat the proposal?

No, my Lords. I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Northfield, when he talks about a war of nerves. This was a political act, and it has failed to come off.

My Lords, will the Government make it plain to Guyana that it would be easier for us to support applications for international financing of this kind if the Government in Guyana ceased to violate human rights?—as, for example, exemplified by the murder of the distinguished scholar, Dr. Walter Rodney, and the continued persecution of his brother, Mr. Donald Rodney.

My Lords, will the Government note that Venezuela also claims that Trinidad is draining off Venezuelan oil under the seas?

My Lords, I rather think that that is another question. I am not prepared at this time to get into arguments about the state of oil fields in that part of the world.

Manufacturing Production

2.47 p.m.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

The Question was as follows:

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether there has been an increase in manufacturing production during recent months.

My Lords, in recent months the index of manufacturing production has recovered the ground lost as a result of bad weather at the turn of the year. The underlying level of output has been broadly flat since last autumn, at a level about 2 per cent. above its low point in the spring of last year, but all the leading forecasters expect growth to be resumed in the second half of this year.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for the good news that in a period of world recession our manufacturing output has increased by 2 per cent. Can he perhaps tell the House how productivity compares with that, as measured by output per man-year in manufacturing industry?

Yes, my Lords; indeed that is perhaps one of the most encouraging pieces of news. In the first quarter of 1982 output per head in manufacturing was 12 per cent. higher than at the end of 1980, and a record for all time, by quite some considerable margin.

My Lords, is the noble Viscount aware that the Question posed by his noble friend related to recent months, and that, excluding of course oil production, there has in fact been no increase in manufacturing production? Is he further aware that most reputable forecasts do not predict any increase at all, however insignificant, until next year? Is he also aware that during the past year promises of increased production and forecasts have always been predicated in relation to a period some three months forward, so far without result?

Furthermore, is the noble Viscount aware that this disastrous performance has at the same time been accompanied by a massive increase in unemployment? When will he and his noble friends face the fact that their economic and financial policies are completely disastrous and have devastated British industry, and does he realise that that is reflected by a further increase in bankruptcies?

My Lords, within both my Answer and the definition of manufacturing production, only oil refining is included. That does not alter the trends of the figures that I gave in my Answer, which no doubt the noble Lord will look at in the official record. So I have nothing to change in respect of that. We have had a flat period after a 2 per cent. growth. As far as most forecasts are concerned, I have seen and will continue to see, I believe, variable forecasts; but with the kind of return to competitiveness that we have started to see with these productivity figures there is little doubt in the minds of most forecasters that the upturn which started last year will be resumed. The question is timing.

The noble Lord gives me a feeling sometimes that he is overjoyed if there is any slight lull in recovery and rather distressed if recovery is taking place. Far from disastrous results, this Government have, for the first time, tackled the root causes of inflation, our industry is becoming steadily more competitive and it can only be a matter of time before the results are realised.

My Lords, the noble Viscount, in displaying the lull to which he refers, stretched "recent months" back to January and made that his datum. Would it not be a bit odd if in midsummer there was not some increase in performance on one of the worst winters this century has seen? We do not want to be depressed about a lull in the depression; we want to see one.

My Lords, I made clear that by the autumn of last year we had seen a 2 per cent. increase from the low point at the beginning of the year. I also made clear that since that period the output has been flat. Certainly the flat since that period includes a particularly low December result and a recovery from it in month-by-month figures since that time. The noble Lord will of course also recollect that we have had two rail strikes, which did not improve the figures in March (I think it was) and will not be improving them at the current time.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that, while everyone will welcome the slow improvement that he has been able to announce, people in industry are conscious of the fact that they are still burdened with the restrictions arising from the various Employment Acts which remain in existence and the high rate of interest? Is there any way in which the Government are able to influence an improvement in both those spheres?

My Lords, I think those supplementaries, though I understand my noble friend's feelings on this subject, are wide of the Question. The employment legislation—the Act that we have enacted and the Bill that we intend to enact—will help to improve our competitive position.

My Lords, is the noble Viscount aware that British manufacturers can make some efforts to overcome inclement weather? Their great difficulty, and their almost impossible task, is to overcome the policy of the present Government, where we have seen a rise in unemployment to 3 million people and the highest rate of bankruptcies that this country has seen since the war. Does the noble Viscount not think that he is exhibiting only a degree of petulance, while we on this side are just as much concerned about those who have lost their jobs as we are about those who, under this Government, have lost their businesses as well?

My Lords, I would not agree with any of that. The share of world markets held by British manufacturing goods was, as I have so often said, halved between 1960 and 1975, and it was still in a very had shape when we came to power. The results of this were hidden from the British people because world growth during the 'sixties and 'seventies was unique, and we shall probably never have a period like it again. We are now beginning to recover the competitiveness which was lost over all those years, one has to say under all Governments.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that in the private sector, in real terms, there has been considerable investment in improved machinery, improved lay-outs and improved productivity schemes, and that this has been a healthy reaction and has resulted in high productivity? Is it not sad that in the public sector, in such places as the railways, where there has been massive investment in electrification of the line between Bedford and St. Pancras and where the rolling stock sits in the sidings, all that investment comes to no avail because ASLEF refuse to drive the trains?

My Lords, there is evidence that the productivity increases which I mentioned stem from the better use of existing investment, which is the really important thing. Investment is continuing, and there is indeed a slight upturn in investment intentions. As far as the public sector is concerned, yes, there has been a great deal of investment in that area, also. While there is some evidence of much better use of that investment in some of our nationalised industries, there is certainly not enough evidence of that investment being properly used.

My Lords, will the noble Viscount take steps to ensure that his noble friend Lord Cockfield receives a copy of the reply he has given this afternoon, since it is in complete contradiction to the predictions which were given by his noble friend some three months ago? Will the noble Viscount accept as a matter of principle that we on this side of the House shall be truly pleased, and indeed delighted, when output in this country achieves one half of the rate of increase it achieved under Labour Governments?

My Lords, I should like to point out, as I said very clearly in my first Answer, that output per man has reached an all-time high, well above any of the levels that were reached under the previous Government.

I am sorry; that is correct. Output per man in manufacturing industry is well above any previous year. I would ask the noble Lord to look up the position—and perhaps he will let me know if he can find any other facts, because they do not exist.

My Lords, is this not the position; that any small improvement that the Government achieve in productivity will be offset by the eager support given by the Opposition to damaging national strikes?

My Lords, I would rather not be drawn on to that one, but, yes, I very much agree that current industrial disputes are never helped by public statements.

My Lords, is it not the case that if, by their policies, the Government were to achieve an increase in the number of unemployed to 10 million, the productivity of those remaining in employment would be quite phenomenal but total production would continue to fall?

My Lords, until British industry is fully competitive and starts to regain the share of world markets which we lost under previous Administrations, the future levels of employment will never be secure. Once that competitiveness has been regained, and once we start to regain that share of world markets, employment will follow.

Business

My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 this afternoon my noble friend Lord Elton will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is to be made in another place on the Buckingham Palace incident.

It may be to the convenience of the House if I aslo announce that dinner will be available this evening at the usual time. The Committee stage of the Employment Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7 p.m. for a short period. During this adjournment the Excise Duties (Deferred Payment) Regulations 1982 and the Building Societies (Special Advances) Order 1982 will be taken.

Feltham Station Area Redevelopment (Longford River) Bill

Read a third time, and passed.

Employment Bill

2.59 p.m.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—[ Earl Ferrers.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The EARL OF LISTOWEL in the Chair.]

[ Amendment No. 47 A not moved.]

Clause 3 [ Basic award]:

I should point out that if Amendment No. 48 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 49.

moved Amendment No. 48:

Page 5, line 37, leave out ("by virtue of section 58 or 59(a)").

The noble Lord said: I should like to take Amendment No. 48 in association with Amendment No. 52 which is in Clause 4 but which, in effect, is making the same point. The purpose of the Bill at this stage is to create a new special and basic award, the minimum of which is a £2,000 sum and the maximum is a £4,000 sum. The Committee will remember that we are here dealing with dismissal on grounds of union membership, which was the subject of Clause 2 which we considered when we last debated this measure. Having made the distinction between people who are unfairly dismissed on grounds of union membership, on the one hand, and all other forms of dismissal on the other hand, the Bill proceeds to give special compensation provisions for all those involved in unfair dismissal on grounds of union membership. That is done in this clause which is about the basic award, and in the following clause, which is about the special award; so that we have here a new form of basic award.

The first point to make in relation to the amendment is that it was this Government which in their 1980 legislation in effect abolished the old basic award in the sense of an irreducible two weeks' pay. So the situation which this Bill proceeds to change, and which our amendment proceeds to change in a slightly different way, is that we now have a compensatory award standing at a maximum of £7,000, which has not been fully indexed for inflation for the last three years, and a very small additional award which, at the moment, is paid to about 3 per cent. of complainants where reinstatement is awarded and refused.

Under the provisions of the unfair dismissal legislation, as it now stands, as we shall undoubtedly be told by the Government in opposing this amendment, there is a distinction already as far as the additional award is concerned between unfair dismissal in general and unfair dismissal for an inadmissible reason. It is true that for unfair dismissal in general there is a slightly lower minimum and a slightly lower maximum, a 13-week minimum and a 26-week maximum, whereas for those dismissed on inadmissible reasons (that is to say, for trade union membership, race and sex) there is a slightly increased additional award of a 26-weeks minimum and a 52-weeks maximum.

We no not argue, and would not accept, that this small additional award which is paid to the three categories of inadmissible reasons and which is paid at the moment, as I have said, on average to about 3 per cent. of complainants, represents a justifiable precedent for what the Government are doing in this clause; because what the Government are doing in this clause and, even more, what the Government are doing in the next clause, is creating a completely different set of conditions with a much more substantial minimum and maximum level of payment simply for those who can say that they have been dismissed for trade union reasons, either because they refused to join a union or because they were dismissed because they were members of a union.

We do not maintain or accept that what happened in the past as far as the inadmissible reasons are concerned, in any way justifies what is being done now. I, myself, would say that the only real way in which one can justify compensation for dismissal and the degree of compensation for any particular dismissal, is the degree of loss suffered by the individual who has been unfairly dismissed. It will be said (and has been said) by the Government that there is a sense in which those dismissed for refusing to belong to a trade union can suffer more loss than those dismissed on other grounds. I will accept that there are certain circumstances where, in individual cases, that may be the case. It is possible that if someone is expelled from a union and therefore excluded from a job, it will then be more difficult to get another job in that particular trade and in that particular industry, because exclusion from the union is more important than exclusion from any particular job.

Nevertheless, there are many other forms of dismissal in particular cases where the same circumstances could apply. It is perfectly possible to think of situations for dismissal on grounds of ill health, and especially dismissal on grounds of ill health in relation, for example, to a heart condition or mental instability; and irrespective of whatever the tribunal may say—if it says that it was unfair and gives compensation because the dismissal was thought to be unfair—the fact that one has had this kind of thing as a reason for dismissal, fairly or unfairly, follows people about from job to job. References have to be given and information of this kind, even if it is dismissed and set aside by the industrial tribunal as unfair, undoubtedly affects in general terms the capacity of the individual to get another job. Therefore, someone in that situation might find that he was suffering more loss, and needed far more compensation, than someone who was dismissed because of exclusion from a particular craft union.

Again, one of the weaknesses of the present unfair dismissal provisions is the size of the maximum, the £7,000 maximum. It is possible for a middle manager or a senior manager who may not be unionised at all to get maximum compensation for unfair dismissal and, given the present level of the maximum, for that maximum compensation to compensate for less than 12 months' salary; because there are people with significant salaries on the managerial side who, because of the present level of the maximum compensation, cannot obtain any reasonable redress in an unfair dismissal situation.

Therefore, we say that if you want to inject into this Bill something which increases the size of compensation, we are not against that; but do not limit it to those who are dismissed on a very narrow section of grounds; for example, in this case, those who are dismissed on grounds of trade union membership. Raise the maximum! Raise it in general! It will be an extremely cheap thing to do because the tribunal will still be deciding whether individuals have mitigated their loss, whether individuals are likely to suffer an anticipated loss in future, what is the level of their present salaries and, therefore, what kind of degree of suffering or loss they are likely to have—and they can decide that on the basis of the individual and not in some crude, rather biased way by reference to a particular kind of dismissal. We take the view, I believe, that a dismissal is a dismissal is a dismissal; and an unfair dismissal is unfair whatever the reason. If Parliament legislates and says that some reasons are fair and some reasons are unfair, the only fact which should govern the substantive degree of compensation should be the decision of the industrial tribunal of the anticipated loss of the individual concerned. That is the point of the amendment.

Finally, let me say that there is no evidence known to me—and I should like to hear from the Government if they have any—that those individuals we talked about in the past (and I do not intend to mention them) when we were discussing Clause 2 of the Bill, in fact were dismissed and compensated in ways which were unnecessarily and unfairly limited because the maximum of the present compensation did not enable them to get adequate redress.

One looks, if one may mention the name, for example, at the Walsall dinner ladies' case. The existing provisions seem perfectly adequate to deal with their case. Then again, if the Government wish to put into the Bill an improvement in the maximum, and if they wish to do it in terms of the basic award, we have no objection to that; but we see no reason why that maximum should not be for all categories of dismissal rather than this narrow category. That is the purpose of this amendment. I beg to move.

May I ask what would now be the maximum rate for unfair dismissal if the figure that was paid in the Conservative Government's 1971 Act, which first introduced the unfair dismissal award, had been indexed to keep up with inflation? What would now be being paid?

I have asked for information to be given to me on the question raised by the noble Baroness. It may be too much for our pocket calculators this afternoon, but we shall try and get her a satisfactory answer on that matter as soon as we can. We are now squarely in the territory of compensation, as the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, pointed out to us. The purpose of Clause 3 is to provide a minimum basic award of £2,000 to employees unfairly dismissed for reasons relating to trade union membership, including non-membership in a closed shop. This together with a special award introduced by Clause 4 is intended to provide employees dismissed in such circumstances with a total award of compensation that will not only adequately compensate them, but also deter employers from carrying out such dismissals in the future.

At a previous stage of this Committee I said that I made no apology whatsoever for the desire of the Government to try to create an effective deterrent in this field. It is our view that unfair dismissals, because of non-membership of a union in a closed shop or because of trade union membership or activities, call for substantially greater compensation than is the case in regard to the generality of unfair dismissals. This is the difference, the differential, to which objection is made by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, and which he seeks to correct in his amendment.

The major impetus for increases in closed shop compensation has in fact arisen out of deep public concern that unfair closed shop dismissals have continued to occur in spite of and in defiance of the protection against such unfair dismissals in the 1980 Employment Act. It is clear that further such dismissals are only likely to be deterred by substantial increases in the sums of compensation payable in such cases. The circumstances of the dismissed employees in the Walsall and Sandwell cases illustrate the point well. In the Walsall case, the four dinner ladies who were sacked were part-timers, some of whom had been employed in their jobs for only a few years. Their employer obviously thought that they would receive only small awards of compensation—particularly if their reinstatement was not ordered. Fortunately, the fact that reinstatement was ordered meant that compensation was higher than it would otherwise have been. In the Sandwell case, Miss Harris chose not to take her case to a tribunal as was of course absolutely her right. Even if she had or if an employee finding his or herself in comparable circumstances had, such an employee might have received no more that a derisory few hundred pounds.

In these cases, therefore, the councils concerned—the employers concerned—were risking only relatively small sums of money in dismissing unfairly while those dismissed were unlikely to be adequately compensated. That is why the Bill provides for substantial increases in compensation, including the minimum basic award of £2,000. The justification for placing a minimum on the basic award, as well as introducing special awards, is of course that if the dismissed employee does not ask for reinstatement, he will only be entitled to the basic compensatory award. It is right in these circumstances that the total award should still be at a deterrent level and should not normally fall below a minimum level, which the Government judges should be at least £2,000.

Reference has been made to the fact—the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, made play with this—that the sums of compensation now to be payable in unfair closed shop dismissal cases are well in excess of the current median awards for unfair dismissal generally. The noble Lord argued that all unfair dismissals are equally to be condemned and indeed, in fairness to him, might equally receive higher levels of compensation. I have made the point already about the element of deterrent. If I may underline it, these enhanced awards arise out of the cases that I have mentioned. The crucial aspect about those cases is that the closed shop dismissals were carried out in the full knowledge that they were unfair. In this connection, it is perhaps worth quoting briefly from the decision of the tribunal in the Walsall dinner ladies' case. At paragraph 3 of their judgment given on 28th January the tribunal said:
"At the very outset of the proceedings the respondent authority [i.e. Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council], no doubt upon advice, and if we may say so with respect sound advice, conceded that it had unfairly dismissed each applicant within the meaning of section 58(3B)."
There seems only one logical interpretation of this statement in the judgment. It is that Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council knew at the point at which they dismissed Mrs. Todd and her colleagues that their dismissal was unfair; that they were being dismissed in defiance of their rights not to be unfairly dismissed and that therefore compensation would almost certainly have to be paid; and yet in spite of this, the employers went ahead with the dismissals nonetheless, which seems to me to be a quite disgraceful exercise by a supposedly responsible publicly-elected body.

That was not a situation where an employer dismissed an employee as he thought fairly, but then later the tribunal subsequently finding this unfair; this was a clear situation of outright defiance by the employer of statutory rights provided in law by Parliament. It is against a repetition of that kind of behaviour that it is necessary in the Government's view to provide a deterrent. I hope that when the tumult and the shouting had died this kind of dismissal, and this kind of activity, will become simply a horrid memory in the past. This provision in the Bill is designed to see that it soon becomes a horrid memory of the past.

If I may make one more point, there is another reason why it seems to me wholly justifiable to pay substantially higher compensation in cases of unfair closed shop dismissals. This is in order properly to compensate the people who suffer the dismissals. It is self-evident that persons dismissed for non- membership of a union in a closed shop may find it very difficult indeed to get another job in the same industry or locality, particularly where pre-entry closed shop arrangements are widespread. That would therefore be another reason for "upping" the amount that should be paid in this particular set of cases.

I hope, having explained the Government's policy, which was in response to widespread public anxiety on this score—certain anxiety which was far from restricted from supporters of the Government—that the Committee will not pass the noble Lord's amendment should he seek to press it.

I am afraid that I cannot accept any of that reply. The question that I asked the noble Earl—and he has not answered it—is: what is different? What is the difference between a dismissal for trade union membership and other types of dismissal? That is what our amendment is saying. It is saying that there is no difference, and he does not say that there is. For example, he tells me that he has to have a deterrent because he says that unfair dismissals continue to occur. Of course they do, but they just do not continue to occur in the very narrow area of membership of a trade union. They continue to occur all the time and indeed this Government, as a result of their order, have made it absolutely certain that a far larger number of unfair dismissals will occur than have occurred in the past, because they have put up the minimum period to 12 months and therefore hundreds and hundreds of unfair dismissals will occur which might not have occurred before because of what the Government have done. There is no deterrence about that. A million workers have been taken outside the scope of the unfair dismissal provisions and the Government do not propose to provide any deterrence.

He says that there is widespread concern. We know why there is widespread concern about the Walsall dinner ladies. It is because—and I am not attacking the ladies nor defending the council—for a very long time you could not pick up a newspaper without reading about the Walsall dinner ladies; and if, say, one-thousandth of the publicity had been directed at certain other kinds of unfair dismissals which are far more numerous and just as hard and tough to put up with, maybe we would have had rather more public concern about them too. So on nothing that the noble Earl has said here is he really suggesting that there is any real difference—a dismissal is a dismissal is a dismissal. And when he talks about the Walsall dinner ladies, I warn him that if we get much more talk about the Walsall dinner ladies we shall disinter Gennard.

He says that the Walsall dinner ladies did not get very much of a compensation award. That is perfectly true and it was because they were not entitled to it, bless their hearts. They were part-time workers; they did not work for very long; and they got a job very soon after. Therefore, bless their hearts, they got compensation which varied from £98 to £324—and quite right and proper too. Therefore the Walsall dinner ladies were nowhere near the £7,000 maximum. But in addition to compensating the Walsall dinner ladies, they were reinstated, and the reinstatement was refused so that they got a compensation award of something in the region of between £2,000 and £3,000.

Therefore the Walsall dinner ladies do not justify changing the Act at all. The only justification for changing the Act is either that you want to deal with a whole range of people, as I have said—for example, middle managers whose annual salary is considerably in excess of the present maximum. That is a decent, respectable reason. Alternatively, you are just involved in anti-trade union legislation. That is what this Bill is, that is what this amendment is seeking to correct, and that is why we shall press it to a Division.

3.24 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 48) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 35; Not-Contents, 104.

DIVISION NO. 1

CONTENTS

Ardwick, L.Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.]
Bishopston, L.
Blyton, L.McCarthy, L.
Briginshaw, L.Molloy, L.
Brockway, L.Northfield, L.
Caradon, L.Oram, L.
Collison, L.Paget of Northampton, L.
Crook, L.Ross of Marnock, L.
David, B.—[Teller.]Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
Elwyn-Jones, L.Stewart of Fulham, L.
Ewart-Biggs, B.Stone, L.
Fisher of Rednal, B.Strauss, L.
Gaitskell, B.Taylor of Mansfield, L.
Irving of Dartford, L.Underhill, L.
Jenkins of Putney, L.Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
John-Mackie, L.Wells-Pestell, L.
Leatherland, L.White, B.
Listowel, E.Wootton of Abinger, B.

NOT-CONTENTS

Abercorn, D.Killearn, L.
Airedale, L.Kilmarnock, L.
Alexander of Tunis, E.Kinnaird, L.
Amherst, E.Lane-Fox, B.
Auckland, L.Lauderdale, E.
Avon, E.Lloyd of Hampstead, L.
Aylestone, L.Long, V.
Beaumont of Whitley, L.Lyell, L.
Belhaven and Stenton, L.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
Beloff, L.Macleod of Borve, B.
Boardman, L.Marley, L.
Boyd-Carpenter, L.Mayhew, L.
Broadbridge, L.Mersey, V.
Buckinghamshire, E.Montgomery of Alamein, V.
Burton of Coventry, B.
Byers, L.Morris, L.
Caccia, L.Mottistone, L.
Campbell of Alloway, L.Mowbray and Stourton, L.
Campbell of Croy, L.
Chelwood, L.Northchurch, B.
Clancarty, E.Nugent of Guildford, L.
Clifford of Chudleigh, L.Orkney, E.
Constantine of Stanmore, L.Orr-Ewing, L.
Perry of Walton, L.
Craigton, L.Porritt, L.
Cullen of Ashbourne L.Rathcreedan, L.
Daventry, V.Reigate, L.
Davidson, V.Renton, L.
De Freyne, L.Rochester, L.
De La Warr, E.Sainsbury, L.
Denham, L.—[Teller.]St. Davids, V.
Derwent, L.St. John of Bletso, L.
Dilhorne, V.Saltoun, Ly.
Drumalbyn, L.Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
Effingham, E.Seear, B.
Ellenborough, L.Sempill, Ly.
Elliot of Harwood, B.Sharples, B.
Elton, L.Skelmersdale, L.
Ferrers, E.Spens, L.
Feversham, L.Stamp, L.
Gainford, L.Strathcona and Mount Royal, L.
Gladwyn, L.
Glanusk, L.Strathspey, L.
Glenarthur, L.Sudeley, L.
Gowrie, E.Taylor of Gryfe, L.
Grey, E.Thorneycroft, L.
Gridley, L.Trefgarne, L.
Harmar-Nicholls, L.Trumpington, B.
Harris of Greenwich, L.Vaizey, L.
Henley, L.Vaux of Harrowden, L.
Home of the Hirsel, L.Vivian, L.
Hooson, L.Ward of Witley, V.
Hylton-Foster, B.Wilson of Langside, L.
Kennet, L.Young, B.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

[ Ammendent No. 49 not moved.]

Clause 3 agreed to.

Clause 4 [ New special award]:

3.32 p.m.

Page 6, line 19, leave out subsection (1) and insert —

("(1) For section 71(2)(b)(i) of the 1978 Act there shall be substituted —
"(i) where the dismissal is of a description referred to in subsection (3), consisting of—
  • (a) a basic award (calculated in accordance with section 73),
  • (b) a compensatory award (calculated in accordance with section 74), and
  • (c) a special award (calculated in accordance with section 75A),".").
  • The noble Lord said: This amendment also goes to the question of compensation for unfair dismissal under Clause 4. In effect, it says to the Government that if there is to be a difference in compensation paid by reference to types of case, then the Bill as it stands has not got it right. In speaking to Amendment No. 50, which would replace Section 71(2)( b)(i) of the 1978 Act, I am also speaking to the amendment to Schedule 4. But I am conscious that other amendments to the schedules would have to be made, if this amendment were lucky enough to obtain favour from your Lordships' Committee.

    My noble friend has spoken to some extent about the matter of compensation. When we come to Clause 4, which creates the special award, we must realise the enormous difference which it is making to the system of unfair dismissal. In actual operation, today, most people come away from the tribunal, if they are lucky—only one-third are successful—with very little compensatory award, and often with a small basic award of a few hundred pounds, and certainly not more than £1,000. Under the new Section 58, dismissals for non-unionism or for trade union activity, there is to be a minimum basic award plus a special award of £10,000, plus £2,000, making £12,000 minimum in all, and with compensation added in a compensatory award it would be possible to go up to £31,000. The Government are changing the character of unfair dismissals by doing this, and they have not made out their case. That is why we wish to test it in this somewhat different context.

    First, the amounts are, from an employer's point of view—and I shall come back to him later—penal. Indeed, the noble Earl has said that they are meant to be a deterrent of such a kind that they are penal. It is worth noticing that in previous employment legislation, where deterrence has been the object of the compensation, the legislation has made it clear to the employer that that is so. In Section 30 of the 1978 Act, or in Sections 99 and 101 of the 1975 Act, dealing with unfair dismissal and redundancy compensation respectively, it is stated that the compensation is to reflect the seriousness of the employer's default in his obligations. In this case, the Government have chosen to put in a bid of an enormous character for non-unionists.

    I say that it is for non-unionists for this reason. Although, on paper, Section 58 dismissals are evenhanded, and although it says in the Bill, and will say in the Act, that someone dismissed for trade union membership or activity is to be paid on the same scale as someone dismissed for the principal reason of non-unionism, I assert, nevertheless, that it is known, and clearly shown, that dismissals for trade union activity are very hard to prove, whereas dismissal for non-unionism will be in the context in which it occurs. Certainly, as my noble friend has said, the publicity which it will be given, and has been given, will make it much easier, in practice, in the courtroom.

    Indeed, the Government mention a few cases, but they never refer to the decided cases at the tribunals, where you can see how it works. I wonder whether they have considered the case of Birmingham Corporation v. Beyer in 1977, in the Industrial Relations Law Reports 509. There a worker failed in a bid for compensation for unfair dismissal on two grounds. It is true that one was that he had given a false name, and it is not surprising that he failed on that ground. But he had good reason for giving a false name, because he had been hounded from job to job and was well-known to be a militant, a strong trade unionist. I do not know of what exact complexion he was, but he was dismissed within a very short time of being engaged—

    The noble Earl says that he was not a Conservative. I thought he might take some comfort from the fact that there might be some militant trade unionists among the Conservative trade unionists. But I can believe he was wrong. But this man was dismissed after a couple of days. The tribunal considered the case on the basis of whether he was dismissed for his trade union activities. The answer, of course, was, no. He had not had time to have any trade union activities. He had been got rid of before. That has happened in other cases. What happened elsewhere is known. The second problem—and this is central to the noble Earl's reply on the last amendment—is that he said that the need is to create an effective deterrent for dismissals on union grounds, as against the vast generality of cases; that the closed shop dismissals had continued to occur—he concentrated on them, so it is clearly about non-unionists—and continued to be deliberate, despite the 1980 Act.

    He talked about those cases that I have mentioned. He mentioned two—I am going to give up this convention of not referring to the facts, because it is time we went back to them—the Walsall dinner ladies and Sandwell. Where are the others? We have asked for them again and again. The answer, as my noble friend suggested, is that they are in the Gennard Report, and I say that that report shows that cases of this sort—and I choose the word with care—are atypical of the situation. Furthermore, the Birmingham Chamber of Industry and Commerce agree, because they said in their statements on the Bill:
    "In reality, there are only a relatively small number of people who are genuine victims of such circumstances. The attraction of higher compensatory awards may tempt others to assert that this was the principal reason for their dismissal".
    I hope that we can be given any further evidence, because, at the moment, after going through the Walsall and Sandwell steps, all the proponents of trade union intimidation and the vast number of unfair cases go into their act of putting on an anti-disposition—"Well, we know", or "We would if we could" and such ambiguous phrases. That is where they leave it.

    We need to be shown that this is a special case beyond the proof offered, and we need to be shown that it is a special case for another reason. It is to this point to which the Government's attention must be directed in the light of this amendment. These special cases in existing legislation arise when an order for reinstatement has not been complied with.

    Under the Bill, they arise for this special group where it is merely asked for. Then there is a parallel with the existing legislation. But in the existing legislation, discrimination does not extend only to the trade union grounds. It protects at the moment also discrimination on grounds of sex or race, with the additional compensation. If there are to be categories, why should we be given only the example of trade unionism instead of grounds of trade unionism and grounds of sex or racial discrimination?

    If the Government think that this compensation of a special award will be a deterrent, why do they think so lowly of racial or sexual discrimination as not to put those dismissals into the category? It is not I who ask the Government that question. The Government have been asked it many times by employers. The employers' group who put it best are the General Council of British Shipping who say:
    "It seems paradoxical to suggest that a special award for dismissal for non-compliance with a closed shop agreement could be three times that for dismissal on grounds of sex or race".
    I beg to move.

    I think that the House would probably like to take the Statement as soon as possible. I therefore beg to move that the House do now resume.

    Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

    Buckingham Palace Incident

    3.42 p.m.

    My Lords, with the leave of the House, I will now repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. The Statement is as follows:

    "With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a Statement.

    "I have to report to the House that a man was arrested in Buckingham Palace on Friday morning after entering the bedroom of Her Majesty the Queen. The House will admire the calm way in which Her Majesty responded to what occurred. It will also share my grave concern, and that of the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, at this most serious failure in security arrangements. A man appeared in court on Saturday, having been charged in connection with an earlier incident at the Palace. I understand that the facts have been reported to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who is considering the possibility of charges arising out of the latest incident.

    "In recent years a number of additional security measures have been introduced at Buckingham Palace; but this latest incident shows that the position is still not satisfactory and that more needs to be done. I have, of course, fully discussed the incident with the Commissioner, who is operationally responsible for Royal protection matters. On Friday he appointed Assistant Commissioner Dellow to carry out an urgent inquiry into what went wrong and what lessons are to be drawn for the future. Immediate steps were also taken by the Commissioner on Friday to strengthen security arrangements at the Palace.

    "Mr. Dellow has today submitted to the Commissioner and myself an interim report on this incident; we shall see a further report later this week. I am determined, as is the Commissioner, that the arrangements for safeguarding the security of the Queen should be as comprehensive and effective as possible. The rapid implementation of the measures resulting from his inquiry will require the closest consultation between the Palace authorities and the police, and will be pursued with the utmost urgency.

    "I shall make a further Statement to the House as soon as I can."

    That concludes the Statement.

    My Lords, the House will be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, for repeating the Statement of the Home Secretary. Does the Minister agree that it has disclosed a deeply disturbing state of affairs which I believe has shocked the whole nation? That it should fall to a Home Secretary to begin a Statement with the words:

    "I have to report to the House that a man was arrested in Buckingham Palace on Friday morning after entering the bedroom of Her Majesty the Queen".
    is indeed staggering and startling. First, may I express the relief of my right honourable and honourable friends and, I am sure, of the whole House that Her Majesty suffered no injury as a result of this appalling intrusion. We admire yet another example that Her Majesty has shown of her courage and coolness in the face of danger or potential danger.

    The Statement, I believe, calls for further clarification. It contains one sentence which seems to me to be highly ambiguous:
    "A man appeared in court on Saturday, having been charged in connection with an earlier incident at the Palace".
    Was it the same man? What was the earlier incident? What precautions by way of safeguarding and improving security followed that earlier intrusion? Have there not been other intrusions into the Palace or its grounds in recent months? Has this matter been taken sufficiently seriously? What steps have been taken? We shall expect a searching and full inquiry into this incident and we are relieved that in due course a report will be made upon it to the House. This is a matter which has shaken the country. The whole of the population will need reassurance that something is being done to avoid any recurrence of this appalling peril.

    My Lords, may I echo the expression of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones: that the nation has been deeply shocked by this incident and the enormous potential for danger to Her Majesty involved in it. The facts will be revealed later, but I should like to ask about one or two matters arising from the Statement. What time of morning was it when this incident took place? There is merely a reference to Friday morning. Was it in the hours of darkness? Was the other person mentioned in the Statement—if, in fact, he was not actually the same person—involved in any way with the man in this incident? One notices that the Statement says the man was arrested on Friday morning. Presumably he is still in custody. If so, have any charges been brought against him? Has he been brought before a court? These matters are obviously of the gravest concern to the country as a whole. One can only echo the admiration which has already been expressed about the way in which Her Majesty dealt with the situation.

    My Lords, in responding to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, I must emphasise that the Government, as well as all on the Benches behind them are no less deeply concerned than they are with the gravity of this issue, nor any less admiring of Her Majesty's calm in the face of this difficult and very worrying situation. The earlier incident involved a man on 7th June. The man is now in custody, and that is the man we are speaking of. I would rather not be drawn into details of this event for two reasons. One is the aspects of security which detailed discussion can reveal to others who are not aware of the situation. The other is that with prosecution under consideration the matter is, I am advised, sub judice and I should be ill-advised to discuss what it is alleged was done.

    My Lords, in applauding the calmness of Her Majesty during this extremely distressing occasion, may I ask the noble Lord whether he is aware that this is a Statement which the whole country would have preferred never to have had to hear? On the inquiry which is to take place—one appreciates that a great deal of it will be sub judice—would the noble Lord be prepared at this stage to say (a) whether the police division responsible is up to strength and (b) whether either the first man, the second man or, in fact, the two boys who were found camping in the Palace gardens some months ago, have any knowledge whatever of the inside of the Palace?

    My Lords, I think it proper that I should respond to detailed matters at a later stage, although the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, will be aware of the fact that for the first time in many years, the Metropolitan Police are now approaching their establishment figure. I am not aware that any of the people in question had knowledge from outside of the inside of the Palace, but I cannot make reference to the particular circumstances of this occasion, for the reasons I have already given.

    My Lords, is the noble Lord, Lord Elton, aware that questions on security arrangements do not, in my view, impinge upon the sub judice rule? Therefore I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, and I cannot be criticised—although there was probably no intention to do so. We are still left in a certain amount of confusion, although perhaps it is my own confusion of mind. Are we talking about two men, or are we talking about one man—the same man—who is concerned? As I understand it, there were two men. I believe the public will be anxious to know whether that is so or not, because it is by no means anywhere near clear. The most important thing, of course, is that there should be a thorough, immediate and urgent investigation of what went wrong and into what steps are now going to be taken to see that it does not happen again.

    My Lords, the man about whom allegations are now being made is the man who was charged for the original offence.

    I have to emphasise again that the urgency with which this will be pursued is something that depends on the absolute conviction of my right honourable friend that it is a matter of the first importance—not only out of his loyalty to Her Majesty, as a loyal subject, but in knowledge of the deep love and regard in which she is held by every Member of this House and by the nation. It will be pursued with ineluctable determination.

    My Lords, may I ask my noble friend why this man was not remanded in custody rather than being granted bail for the first offence? In addition, will he be good enough to let me know which regiment of Guards was on duty on the morning in question?

    My Lords, it is a question of the timing of the charge, which did not in fact allow the custody to take place in time to prevent the offence. As to the second question, I shall have to let my noble friend know in writing.

    My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Minister whether—quite apart from the question of the man—it does not seem that Her Majesty's quarters are left so that anybody can get inside? That is the thing that astonishes one. Her Majesty uses various rooms. How is it that someone can get to them?

    My Lords, I entirely understand the concern felt by the noble Baroness, which is shared by Her Majesty's Government, but, for reasons I have given—of security—it really is not proper to discuss what those arrangements are or how, to great surprise, they were defeated.

    My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Elton, is no doubt aware that the nation is appalled at what has happened, but may I point out to him that there is another dimension? Security already being tightened, no doubt, at Buckingham Palace, but there are other residences which Her Majesty the Queen has to visit from time to time. Will the Minister say, quite categorically, that they too—Sandringham and other places—will be subject to complete examination from a security angle, and also that other important places and offices of state where security might be at risk as much as at Buckingham Palace will be thoroughly examined so that nothing like this can ever happen again?

    My Lords, I can confirm that the security arrangements at the other Royal residences are also being reviewed. In the process, the general security of the Royal Family will be considered.

    My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said that the first offence was on 7th June and that, as a result of the second offence, the question of security is going to be pursued with "ineluctable determination". Can the noble Lord tell us, with what determination and with what results the question of improving security was given consideration between 7th June—the first offence—and the recent second offence?

    My Lords, I am extremely anxious not to commit myself to making a statement that can be used in court about the first occasion. As I understand it, the identity of the first intruder was not clear. I have already misled your Lordships; the identity of the intruder was not clear until the second occasion. But I do not want to go any further than that, because I am trespassing on ground that might be covered by courts and it would be improper for me to say anything which could prejudice the outcome of a trial.

    My Lords, with regard to the court appearance on Saturday, was the man charged with an offence committed on 7th June or was he before the court as a result of the incident which took place on Friday morning?

    My Lords, may I suggest that we consult Her Majesty's Mistress for the Robes, the Duchess of Grafton, who is herself a justice of the peace and a magistrate of very wide experience at every level? She has been with Her Majesty for many years, and I believe that she could be most useful with suggestions.

    My Lords, I will bring that idea to the notice of my right honourable friend.

    Employment Bill

    House again in Committee.

    3.56 p.m.

    I did not want to detain or indeed bore the Committee by rehearsing the arguments I made in trying to answer the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, on Amendment No. 48, because these are very substantially the same arguments. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, said that he wanted to test the Government on this same issue of why there should be greater levels of compensation for unfair dismissal in a closed shop situation than in connection with unfair dismissal generally. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, divided on the last amendment—and I congratulate him on his exposition, and I am not complaining about that—before I was able to get up and say that I had, in my view, tried to answer the central issue of what the difference is. The difference, in our judgment, is that in the cases we have mentioned—Sandwell and Walsall particularly—the dismissals were in open defiance of rights provided from Parliament and involved particularly severe consequences for individuals, because if one is sacked as a result of a closed shop dismissal one may have difficulty in getting a job later. That seemed to us to be an absolutely clear instance of why unfair dismissal in this sort of case should be compensated at a higher rate, apart from the issue of deterrents which I also mentioned.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, was quite exercised that in some way this position by the Government downgraded dismissals because of sex or race discrimination. Until I was translated to Northern Ireland, I was the Minister at the Department of Employment concerned with discrimination in employment on sexual grounds or on grounds of race. I share very strongly the noble Lord's distaste. Perhaps "distaste" is too weak a word—I share the noble Lord's condemnation of any such unfair dismissals, but there is no evidence of recent dismissals of this sort carried out in blatant defiance of employees' statutory rights. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, going back to that famous report which has caused us quite a lot of interest in this Committee, said: "Well, the cases of Walsall and Sandwell are atypical". So indeed they are, and we are quite determined to see that they remain atypical. That is exactly why there has been rather special attention paid to them, not least in Clauses 3 and 4 of this Bill.

    We have not in the sex and race fields had the unsavoury sight of public sector employers engaging in politically motivated defiance of statutory rights provided by Parliament. If we found some notionally extreme Right-wing council sacking somebody as a result of the colour of their skin, and if we did not feel that the compensation was adequate to deter other such notional councils in this regard, no doubt we would bring in legislation accordingly. But one cannot legislate for every notional case; and there is no evidence that this has been done. It seems to us, therefore, that there is no obvious need to increase the current deterrent against these sorts of dismissal. There seems to us also to be a clear distinction between attempting to protect employees from the ordinary run of unfair dismissals, and unfair dismissal legislation is now part of the industrial landscape—and these very unique and, I am glad to say, rare cases of employers openly defying Parliament.

    The last point I would make is that, though we have now disposed of Clause 3 for the purposes of this Committee stage, I would refer the noble Lord back to the fact that Clause 3 affects not only closed shop unfair dismissals but unfair dismissals of people who are union members or who want to become union members. Therefore, the rogue employer, or the employer who is seeking to deter people from becoming union members, is actually covered by the Bill as well. With that reassurance of evenhandedness, and with that reiteration of the extreme circumstances with which we found ourselves having to deal, I hope the noble Lord will have the good sense not to press this amendment.

    Baroness Seear; I think the noble Earl will not be surprised if I say that I find his reason for not including the other statutory obligations, the obligations in relation to race and sex, on the same terms as those for closed shop dismissals, very unconvincing. If the argument is that when the Bill is passed there is a special statutory obligation in relation to the closed shop, there is already a statutory obligation in connection with both race and sex. If the noble Earl were prepared to say that wherever there is a special statutory obligation the higher rate should apply, I for my part would be a great deal happier with this Bill.

    I venture to suggest that both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, have overlooked one very important fundamental matter, which is that the ordinary case of unfair dismissal is that of a dispute merely between the employer and the employee. But here the Government are attempting to deal with the special situation where a third party, that is to say, a trade union, is involved. For reasons which have already been deployed, it has been found necessary to strengthen the law in those cases where there is the third party. For that simple reason of, to my mind, principle, I feel that the Government are right in this matter.

    ; The noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, will remember that he and I participated in a debate on precisely this issue some time ago when he was Minister of State at the Department of Employment, when I raised the question of the dismissal of Miss Joanna Harris by the local authority in Sandwell, and subsequently in the course of that debate referred to the wholly outrageous behaviour of the Walsall Labour-controlled local authority which was persecuting part-time dinner ladies who were earning £9 and £10 a week. I find what the Government are doing here right. I think it would have been wholly wrong for the Government to ignore the deliberate defiance of the law by two local authorities who knew precisely their legal obligations and decided, quite coldly and deliberately, to defy and ignore those obligations. It seems to me that Parliament has an absolute obligation to defend the interests of people who were treated in this shameful fashion. I very much agree, therefore, with the general thrust of the Government's argument.

    I would like to add one point. I think we sometimes mislead ourselves by counting up the number of people who have been dismissed. That is only half of it, is it not? There are also the countless number of people who live in fear of dismissal lest they do something which offends what one must in many cases describe as their lawful masters. So it is not a quantifiable thing by any manner of means.

    I was a little puzzled by what the noble Earl said when he was dealing with the question of why we are now dealing with unfair dismissal in respect of union membership, but not in respect of sex discrimination and race discrimination. He said, if I recall his words correctly, that it is not possible to deal with everything at once.

    I am most grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to intervene. The point I was making is that dismissal under racial or sexual grounds is already covered by unfair dismissal procedures. The point we are making is: why should the new maximum level of deterrent only apply in the case of closed shop unfair dismissals? It was the special cases which the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has just outlined; the need for the Government to make a response to a deliberate act of defiance in the case of employees whose rights had been sought to be protected by the 1980 Act, and the special difficulties of re-employment should one's membershop card be withdrawn. Those were the reasons I was giving for this differential in the levels of compensation. It does not mean that unfair dismissal oil grounds of sex or race does not still obtain; and should there be evidence of employers defying legislation in respect of race or sex, I would, of course, be wholly prepared to look at this issue, but I have no such evidence and I am responding to a particular set of circumstances in the industrial economy.

    4.9 p.m.

    I feel that many of your Lordships will feel rather disturbed by the Government's response. May I take a small point to begin with. The noble Earl tried to deal with my illustration of the difficulty of trade union members proving that their activity or membership of the union was the cause of their dismissal by reference to the Beyer case, by pointing out the words of the section, including the words "to be or to become" a member of the union; and in that of course he is absolutely right. But I point out to him that it did absolutely no good for the plaintiff in that case, nor indeed in many other cases like it. The second and more grave area is that the Minister is pursuing the point that non-unionists are in a special position in that they cannot get work again because they are discriminated against in a special way as against and above all others. I say in general terms that there are many, many workers who are dismissed unfairly who are in an equal position in terms of finding other employment. Especially today it ill lies in the mouth of this Government to take up that particular point.

    However, there is a matter that is even more important than that. Before I make the point I wish to say that I for one was very sad to see that the noble Earl left or was moved from his place in the Department of Employment where he had a special interest and some of us thought a very effective interest in matters relating to racial problems in employment and problems of sexual discrimination. Indeed, I pondered as he spoke whether the Bill would be in quite this form if he had been there to fight an earlier corner.

    Although I do not attribute it to the noble Earl, I do say that this Bill as it stands says that the dismissal of a non-unionist is worth £10,000 more than the dismissal of someone by racial or sexual discrimination. That is what the Bill says and there is no way round it. All that the Government can do to justify that is constantly to pray in aid the Sandwell and Walsall dinner ladies.

    However, the noble Earl will forgive me if I repeat what I said on Second Reading. The Walsall dinner ladies may well have been very unfairly treated and no doubt compensation should be paid to them. But in looking at that one should look at the compensation paid for unfair dismissal generally—that is what we say—and see what types of case should be looked at. To place, on the basis of three or four isolated cases, this £10,000 difference—or £12,000 difference if we take it with the basic minimum—really will not do. I am not surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, was extremely disturbed by this, although I must admit that I was extraordinarily surprised, perhaps I should not have been, that the Social Democratic Party, through the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, appeared to think that the Government were absolutely right in the position that they had taken up.

    The noble Earl, Lord De La Warr, said that the number of people dismissed should not simply be counted but must be weighed. I appreciate that point. But let us think about that for a moment. In weighing the position of a young black worker who is dismissed on racial grounds in certain areas of the country, one could hardly say automatically and obviously that he is worth £10,000 less than a non-unionist, of whom so few can be produced anyway, but whose case, let us assume, is as unjust as one can imagine.

    Finally, there was another very disturbing point in the noble Earl's reply. Defiance of the law is a matter that we might debate. There are ways of defying the law and if the law is defied there is a ground for putting an extra penalty. Of course, if the Government come forward and say, "Those who defy the unfair dismissal law deliberately must pay another £5,000, and that is a bonus to the claimant", then that would be a matter that we could debate. However, that is not what the clause says: You have to pay it to non-unionists whether you defy the law or not. The noble Earl said—and I hope I do not misquote him—that it is politically motivated defiance of the law. I find that extremely disturbing. It is a matter that we should look at in the context of the clause as a whole and not in the context of this amendment. I wish to think about the matter until we come to the clause as a whole.

    But the main point here is of course the inability of the Government as a whole to understand that the words on the paper, by making the amendments they make, downgrade as a matter of fact, in terms of cash. There is £10,000 difference if you are black compared to if you are a black non-unionist and are lucky. If that is meant to get the confidence of the racial ethnic minorities of this country, I fail to see where the Government think they are going with their policy.

    4.15 p.m.

    I should like to take up that last argument because the noble Lord is a very experienced and persuasive advocate and I know that he would not wish to mislead the Committee. I think that the noble Lord was kind enough to throw me a bouquet. I am perhaps a little suspicious of Greeks throwing me bouquets but he was kind enough—and I accept it in good part—to throw me a bouquet for my time at the Department of Employment. I must also refer the Committee to the work of the noble Lord who has played an important and distinguished part in the formulation of the previous Government's labour legislation. It is really disingenuous of the noble Lord to pretend that those people who were dismissed because of union membership or because of union activity, were not given a special position and a special privilege under the 1974 and 1978 Acts. I have a note about the many instances of this kind of privilege. It is not a question of racial or sexual discrimination being in any degree better—in many ways I think that it is worse. What we are trying to do is to approach a position where a feature of the industrial history and industrial landscape of this country—which we regret but which we recognise has gone very deep into the texture of our industrial life—can create unique and extraordinary abuses for individuals who are caught up in it. The whole thrust of our legislation is to try to protect individuals who are unfairly treated as a result of a practice which is very difficult to defend in principle but which men of goodwill and men of reasonability have to recognise exists as part of our industrial landscape and where, I should have thought, we could gain support from the supposed party of the underdog opposite, in trying to help us ensure protections.

    It does not mean that protections for other kinds of abuse do not exist or should not exist or are not important; they are. But the noble Lord has got to show us the kind of wilful abuse in the race or sex fields that we have seen in the closed shop field, in order for the same kind of deterrence to be necessary. There is no evidence whatever of such abuse, and all credit to, I think it was, originally a Labour Government and it was reinforced by Conservative Governments, who brought in the necessary legislation to protect people in the race and sex fields. I am very much in favour of such legislation and all credit to those who brought it on to the statute book. But it really is a red herring, or certainly a pale pink herring on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, to try and confuse this closed shop issue with the race or sex issue.

    The noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, is much too experienced a Minister to know that if he distrusts my gifts or bouquets then I do not take easily to his pink herring. What he says is true. I hope that I did not mislead the Committee and if I did so I apologise. I shall put the following point in two or three sentences because what the noble Earl is now saying leads my noble friends and Ito even greater concern.

    Briefly, it is true that the previous Administration provided for what was called additional awards of compensation of a fairly modest amount—52 weeks' pay being the absolute maximum—in, broadly, three cases: trade union membership and activity, sex discrimination and race discrimination. Look at it as simply as you may, what the Government are doing is bringing in a fourth category: dismissal for non-unionism, which as the Minister rightly says, is not just confined to the closed shop. The noble Earl's intervention just now was rather a Second Reading intervention on the closed shop which I would like to debate with him on another occasion. Of course it is not just in the closed shop. So there are four categories sex, race, trade union membership and activity and non-unionism. Then you say that the last two will be worth £12,000 more, without any proof of anything else. Of course there is the reduction in the individual case and we are coming to that and I am trying to stay clear of that ground for the moment. But if the noble Earl tempts me on this amendment, then I will deal with it. However, we shall be dealing with it later in the clause. I do not understand how the Government can say that they are doing anything other than saying to the community that the deterrent required, which will be an effective deterrent for a non-unionist and trade union dismissal, is £12,000 more than for race and sex discrimination. I do not agree with the noble Earl that there is little evidence of racial discrimination in employment practices, and if we both looked at the reports of recent years we would see that there is certainly some evidence of that.

    I did not say that; I said evidence of unfair dismissals. I very much regret that some discrimination still exists, and I hope that it is rapidly disappearing. However, my point was about unfair dismissals.

    The noble Earl will know very well that one of the matters that most disturbs some workers in ethnic groups is the question of constructive dismissal, where the worker is treated so badly at work that he feels he has to leave, and whether he can prove a constructive dismissal in those circumstances. That may sound rather an arcane and mystifying point, but I am sure that the noble Earl knows very well what I mean. If one takes account of that, there is a very worrying area of unfair possible dismissal.

    Given that, and given the fact that we all know perfectly well that women workers are treated rather badly at work and dismissed from time to time—there are figures to show that—and as there are no figures at all on this case (except two: the five Walsall workers; the Government cannot include the railwaymen because that was in 1976), the Government are matching up such evidence as there is of racial discrimination and sex discrimination to the case of a handful of workers, and saying that this must be dealt with by £12,000 more. I do not think that that is satisfactory. I think that the debate has shown that it is not satisfying. My noble friends and I will press this amendment.

    Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I could make a few remarks in view of his brief but gracious remarks addressed to me at an earlier stage. Of course one objects deeply to racial discrimination in employment and to sexual discrimination in employment. Both are offensive. Of course, discrimination exists in both respects; the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, is entirely right. It may be that at some stage it will be right to look at the levels of compensation. But the question that we are looking at here is a different matter altogether. The issue that we are looking at is a deliberate defiance of the law by public authorities.

    I am not impressed by the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, that there have been only a handful of such cases. The fact that two large local authorities publicly indicated that they had no intention whatever of abiding by the law of this country seems to me to be a serious matter, and it is one to which Parliament should direct its attention. That is what we are being invited to do as regards this particular matter, and, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn—and I say this as a former Minister responsible for putting both the sex and the racial discrimination Bills through this House—it does not lie in his mouth to imply, delicately, that those of us who take the view that we do, do not have as strong feelings in these particular areas as he does.

    I did not wish to imply anything. I would say two things to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich. When he says that the question is different from the one to which I addressed myself—namely, that the question is of public authorities who dismiss workers—I say that that is not so. The noble Lord must allow my noble friends and me to pick our own amendments and draft them for ourselves. If we wanted to put down an amendment about dismissals by public authorities we would have tabled one, and we have not done so. I quite understand that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, would wish to vote for that. On the other hand, he is being asked whether he will or whether he will not vote for an amendment which would end the distinction of £12,000 between race and sex discrimination in dismissal and unionism and non-unionism dismissals. That is what he has to decide. No doubt his name will appear somewhere in the list. I beg to move.

    4.25 p.m.

    On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 50) shall be agreed to?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 42; Not-Contents, 97.

    DIVISION NO. 2

    CONTENTS

    Allen of Fallowfield, L.Listowel, E.
    Ardwick, L.Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.]
    Balogh, L.
    Bishopston, L.Lovell-Davis, L.
    Blyton, L.McCarthy, L.
    Briginshaw, L.Molloy, L.
    Brockway, L.Oram, L.
    Brooks of Tremorfa, L.Phillips, B.
    Bruce of Donington, L.Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.—[Teller.]
    Collison, L.
    David, B.Ross of Marnock, L.
    Davies of Leek, L.Shackleton, L.
    Davies of Penrhys, L.Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
    Elwyn-Jones, L.Stewart of Fulham, L.
    Fisher of Rednal, B.Stone, L.
    Gaitskell, B.Strabolgi, L.
    Houghton of Sowerby, L.Strauss, L.
    Irving of Dartford, L.Taylor of Mansfield, L.
    Jeger, B.Underhill, L.
    Jenkins of Putney, L.Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
    John-Mackie, L.Wells-Pestell, L.
    Leatherland, L.White, B.

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Abercorn, D.Lyell, L.
    Ailesbury, M.McAlpine of Moffat, L.
    Alexander of Tunis, E.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
    Ampthill, L.Macleod of Borve, B.
    Auckland, L.Marley, L.
    Avon, E.Marsh, L.
    Aylestone, L.Merrivale, L.
    Belhaven and Stenton, L.Mersey, V.
    Bellwin, L.Monk Bretton, L.
    Beloff, L.Montgomery of Alamein, V.
    Bessborough, E.
    Boardman, L.Morris, L.
    Boyd-Carpenter, L.Mottistone, L.
    Burton of Coventry, B.Mowbray and Stourton, L.
    Caccia, L.
    Campbell of Alloway, L.Norfolk, D.
    Chelwood, L.Northchurch, B.
    Clifford of Chudleigh, L.Nugent of Guildford, L.
    Constantine of Stanmore, L.Orkney, E.
    Orr-Ewing, L.
    Cullen of Ashbourne, L.Pender, L.
    Davidson, V.Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.
    De Freyne, L.
    De La Warr, E.Porritt, L.
    Denham, L.—[Teller.]Rathereedan, L.
    Derwent, L.Renton, L.
    Diamond, L.Rugby, L.
    Dilhorne, V.Sainsbury, L.
    Drumalbyn, L.St. Davids, V.
    Eccles, V.Saltoun, Ly.
    Ellenborough, L.Sandford, L.
    Elliot of Harwood, B.Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
    Elton, L.Sempill, Ly.
    Ferrers, E.Sharples, B.
    Gainford, L.Skelmersdale, L.
    Glenusk, L.Stamp, L.
    Glenarthur, L.Strathspey, L.
    Gowrie, E.Sudeley, L.
    Gridley, L.Swinfen, L.
    Harris of Greenwich, L.Taylor of Gryfe, L.
    Harris of High Cross, L.Teviot, L.
    Henley, L.Trefgarne, L.
    Home of the Hirsel, L.Trumpington, B.
    Hornsby-Smith, B.Vaizey, L.
    Hylton-Foster, B.Vaux of Harrowden, L.
    Kennet, L.Vivian, L.
    Kilmarnock, L.Wakefield of Kendal, L.
    Kinnaird, L.Ward of Witley, V.
    Lane-Fox, B.Wilson of Langside, L.
    Lauderdale, E.Young, B.
    Long, V.

    Resolved in the negative and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

    [ Amendments Nos. 51 and 52 not moved.]

    4.32 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 53:

    Page 6, line 40, after ("make") insert (", and the tribunal made,").

    The noble Lord said: With your Lordships leave, I shall move Amendment No. 53 and speak to Amendment No. 54, since there is a sense in which they involve the same central area of discussion and it may make for progress if I do that. Under the 1978 legislation which this Bill seeks to amend, the additional award of a modest kind of which I spoke in the last debate, required that the order for reinstatement be made and flouted. In this Bill the only threshold, as it were, which triggers the special award of much greater size is that the claimant should request the tribunal to order reinstatement and then they can make an award of special compensation of this £10,000, £2,000 basic on top.

    The request must, on the Government's own logic, be a charade because it is the Government's position that workers of this kind are in an intolerable position. They must not be dismissed but on the other hand the intimidation factor of which the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, spoke last week in Committee is so great, it is said—and frequently said—that such workers find it an intolerable position. Unless the request for reinstatement is to be no more than an indication to the tribunal that special award is required—in which case it would be perhaps more straightforward to make it a request for special award on the grounds stated in Section 58—then it really seems inconsistent of the Bill to make the request for reinstatement into the threshold in such a case.

    Indeed, one wonders why it would not be better for the Bill, as Amendment No. 53 suggests, to allow special award after an order for reinstatement has been either made, as the amendment suggests, or at any rate recommended at some lower level of a prima facie case. The Government might perhaps consider as an alternative to our amendment that a prima facie case of justifiability for reinstatement has been made.

    Amendment No. 54 suggests another way in which it could be done. Should it not be a requirement that the employer should express his willingness to comply with an order of reinstatement, or re-engagement, under Section 69 of the 1978 Act if it is made? Amendment No. 54 deals with a practical point which shows the unreal nature of the mere request for an order of reinstatement. Suppose an employer has dismissed a man for many reasons. To fall within the provisions of Section 58, the reason for the dismissal—that is, non-unionism, or trade unionism—will have to be a principal reason. But suppose the employers had long experience of a man who has not been pulling his weight. The workers on the shop floor are fed up with him; so is the foreman; so is the works manager. He gets suspended, as tends to happen in such a case, and ultimately he is dismissed.

    A lot of reasons have gone into that and the tribunal finds that the primary, or principal, reason, perhaps to the surprise of the employer—that happens, too—is that he is dismissed for non-unionism. The man then claims, or requests, reinstatement, and the employer says, "It really just is not possible to do it". In that case it seems sensible that either the position of the employer, as Amendment No. 54 suggests, or the view of the tribunal, as Amendment No. 53 suggests, should be interposed between the mere request and the right to the special award on the basis of the minimal evidence of the principal reason. The linkage between request for reinstatement and the bare evidence of principal reason does not seem strong enough.

    It may be that the noble Earl takes the view that there is another way, a different way, of making the link between the two which would make sense of the Bill. It could be, for example, that in such a case the special award should come into a rather more graduated form of compensation. That goes back to the argument that my noble friend put to the noble Earl earlier that various types of unfair dismissal should be looked at in relation to the unfairness to the particular worker and not so much in categories. But I say to the Government that this is not something which is just a drafting point, a lawyer's point, it is a severely practical point. For example, the Institute of Personnel Management has expressed great concern over the unscrupulous individual who exists in almost every large organisation and who would be attracted by the money. That is the money of the special award. It seems sensible for the Government to look again at the last part of Clause 4(2) in the spirit at least of the two amendments. I beg to move.

    The Committee may find it helpful if I first explain why the Government have introduced the special award in the form that they have. Currently, in a case where an employee who has been unfairly dismissed asks a tribunal to order his reinstatement or re-engagement but the tribunal declines to do so, his compensation for unfair dismissal will consist only of a basic award and a compensatory award. In practice, that usually amounts in total to a relatively low sum. In 1980, it was in terms of a median of under £600. The compensation in such a case is exactly the same as the employee would have obtained had he not sought reinstatement or re-engatement.

    The additional award payable when an order for reinstatement or re-engagement is not complied with can be a larger amount (26 to 52 weeks' pay in the case of dismissals relating to trade union membership and activities or non-membership); but as orders for reinstatement or re-engagement are rarely made—the Walsall case was an exception—the existing ad-existing additional award is rarely payable, and in 1980—to use that year again; it is the latest one for which I have information—reinstatement or re-engagement was ordered in only 3 per cent. of cases where dismissal was found unfair.

    Our introduction of the special award in cases relating to union membership or activities or non-memberhsip in Clause 4 means that employers will not in future be able to avoid liability for a large amount of compensation if an order for reinstatement or re-engagement is not made. The special award will be payable in these cases where the employee requests reinstatement or re-engagement but where this does not occur, whether or not a tribunal finds it practicable to make such an order. All employers will therefore think long and hard about carrying out such unfair dismissals in the future, and in the Government's view very few such dismissals will ever take place should the Bill become law.

    If an employer nevertheless unfairly dismisses employees for non-membership and a tribunal, as in the Walsall case, weighs all the pros and cons of reinstatement and then makes a reinstatement order, there will also be a considerable greater incentive to comply with the order. This is because non-compliance will result in a minimum special award of £15,000 being made. Thus, Walsall Council, instead of being faced with a "trivial" bill for the dismissals of all four dinner ladies of just under £10,000, would have faced a bill of just over £70,000 if the Bill's provisions had been in effect. That might make even a council like Walsall, as it then was, think twice before it defied an industrial tribunal order. I am glad to be able to say as the council "then was" because Labour lost control of Walsall at the recent local elections and the council is now controlled by what is described as an "anti-Socialist coalition".

    That, in short, is why the special award is constructed in the way it is, and this goes back to our previous debate. We have sought to have draconian levels of deterrence for a public authority which abused its position in that way. The amendment would restore the position broadly to what it is at present; that is, a special award would be payable only where a reinstatement or re-engagement order was not complied with. Employers would not in practice, therefore, be deterred from carrying out unfair dismissals in these cases because they would know that the chances of their having to pay a special award would be minimal since, as said, reinstatement or re-engagement is very rarely ordered. The amendment undermines the principle of the caluse and I therefore ask the Committee to reject Amendment No. 53.

    Amendment No. 54 is, if anything, even more unacceptable to us. It would make the special award dependent not only on the tribunal making a reinstatement or re-engagement order, but on the employer agreeing to comply with it. A moment's thought will show the absurdity of that proposition. To avoid liability for a special award, an employer would simply have to say that he was not willing to comply with a reinstatement or re-engagement order. Such a provision would drive a coach and horses through this clause and I ask noble Lords to reject it.

    The last anxiety outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, I think referred to the avaricious or rogue employee who might request a reinstatement or re-engagement order in order to receive compensation. There would be nothing to enable such an avaricious employee to get compensation so long as the employer did not sack him, and therefore I do not think the noble Lord's point is well-founded.

    The noble Earl made a number of points, and I shall refer to only a few of them. He said reinstatement was ordered in only a very small percentage of cases, and that is so; it seems still to be running at about 3 per cent. Why not go to the root of the trouble and make reinstatement an effective remedy? Reinstatement and re-employment at the moment are generally called among those who look at the situation, in the words of a recent article, "the lost remedy". It can be done because in Italy, under the Workers' Statute 1970, reinstatement is effective for unfair dismissal.

    The Minister then said that the new draconian remedies would make all employers think long and hard about such dismissals, although he later picked out public authorities, a point to which we shall have to return on later amendments. He said there would be an incentive to comply with the law. If that is thought to be the case, and it may be true, then it reflects on our whole debate so far—that is, if the Government are serious about unfair dismissal—because if the result is that you do not dismiss because you will have to pay us a possible £12,000, then let us all have £12,000 and none of us will be dismissed unfairly. The noble Earl cannot have it both ways. If it will be an effective deterrent and will stop the dismissals, and if you can show that to be the case, then the deterrent will be so big as to be that effective that nobody would be happier than I to see such a law, one which nobody would ever have to use.

    So far as unscrupulous individuals are concerned, in the words of the Institute of Personnel Management, or the similar people discussed with the Government by the CBI and the Engineering Employers' Federation (referred to often as "the bounty hunter" in Committee in another place) or, to use the phrase of the British Council of Shipping—a phrase I should never have thought of—"the rapacious seafarer", as they wrote to the Government, who might take undue advantage, the point is that with these sums of money around—not for everyone, but for those in a special category—why should the Government be surprised at the argument that some people may try improperly to get themselves into that category, when that is likely to be the case?

    The tribunals will try to stop that happening, as will the defendants and their lawyers—and the Bill will result in even greater formality and legalism in the industrial tribunals. So everyone will try to stop it happening except the claimant, and occasionally he may get away with it. The question is whether the deterrent is likely to be such as to balance against that the sort of problems for the tribunals and everything that goes with the procedure. This is an important and difficult matter. The linkage point, made primarily by Amendment No. 53, is an issue to which we shall return on Report, or perhaps the Government will think about it in the interim. We still think that the mere request makes it too easy for someone to get the tribunal into that area where you have to argue a great deal in regard to a much higher sum, so there should be a different kind of threshold. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendment No. 54 not moved.]

    4.48 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 55:

    Page 7, line 5, leave out ("104") and insert ("52").

    The noble Lord said: I will, with permission, speak at the same time to Amendments Nos. 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60. We are, as will be appreciated, in favour of the new special award in this provision, although our view about it changes when we begin to look at the scale of compensation payable. In this case, where an employee has been unfairly dismissed, he has the right to go to a tribunal and ask for reinstatement. If he succeeds, his employer has the right to reinstate him, if he so wishes, but in fact, and in most cases, will be unable to do so because it would completely upset the arrangements between both parties to the management agreement, being the trades unions and the closed shop. In the event of his failing at the tribunal to get an order for reinstatement, under the provision he still is entitled to compensation—and we agree with that. Where we disagree, as I have said, is in regard to the scale of the compensation.

    In the first case—that is, where an employee who has been wrongly dismissed has applied to the tribunal and his application has been rejected by it—the proposal under the Bill is that he should be compensated with two years' pay, or £10,000, whichever is the greater, with the maximum not to exceed £20,000. If your Lordships look at our six amendments together, you will note that what is proposed is that the compensation should be reduced to one year's pay—not two years' pay—and that £5,000 shall be paid, if it is the greater figure, and if it is not, one year's pay shall be paid, neither to exceed a total of £10,000.

    In the second case—that is, where the complainant has been successful before the tribunal and is not reinstated—in our view he should be compensated and to a greater extent, though not to the extent that the Bill would compensate him. We feel that in his case, instead of being compensated with three years' pay, he should be compensated with one and a half years' pay (that is 18 months' pay), that the figure of £15,000 should be reduced to £7,500—that is to say, £7,500 or 18 months' pay, whichever is the greater—and neither should exceed a total in this case of £20,000.

    So we are proposing that all the figures be cut exactly in half. There are numerous reasons for suggesting that. One reason is that we regard the scale of compensation as too high. Secondly, should a small company be faced with two or three cases at the same time involving this kind of compensation, it could be so unbearable as to lead to bankruptcy. I can see the argument as to what effect even our figures could have in some cases, but that would not be to the same extent as would arise from the figures now proposed in the Bill.

    Another point relates to the joinder provisions, which come later in the Bill. The joinder arrangements might involve an employer or an individual, and there could be a heavy burden for some small unions. The larger unions could probably bear it. So, in brief, without delaying the Committee any further, I would say that what we wish to do is to reduce all the proposed awards in this clause of the Bill by 50 per cent. If the Government are prepared to say that they will meet us in terms of 55 or 60 per cent. we would not wish to press the matter to a Division. I beg to move.

    Notwithstanding the succinct and modest way in which the amendment was moved by the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, I find it a very extraordinary one. Those of us interested in political life at the moment are of course all SDP-watchers to some extent. We are trying to tease out policy from the noble Lords on the SDP Benches. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, and the way in which he moved it, seemed to me to be wholly at variance with the quite trenchant support given to the Government on a previous amendment by the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich.

    I have already argued that in the light of continuing public concern over the operation of the closed shop, and its abuses—and we share this view with the Social Democrats—higher compensation is obviously necessary. Therefore, it seems to me to be very curious that the noble Lord is trying to diffuse it and reduce it by half. I do not think that the idea of coming to the rescue of the small business man in this respect holds up, because all that the small business employer has to do is not unfairly to dismiss his employee—and that should not be too difficult to avoid.

    I recognise that the amendments go a certain way with the Government, in that they do not remove the special awards in closed shop dismissal cases; nevertheless they reduce their value by half. Of course, we could argue about what should be the exact size of the special awards. I must point out that the Government had fairly extensive consultations on this matter before we published the Bill, and as my right honourable friend the Secretary of State pointed out in a debate on similar amendments during the Committee stage in another place, the higher the amount of the special award, the greater its deterrent value and the greater the incentive to reinstate. We are at one with the Social Democratic Party, and at one, I understand, with the Liberal Party, in believing that there should be deterrence, but equally in believing that there should be incentives to reinstate.

    I want to repeat something that I said to the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, on a previous amendment. The higher compensation is also available for unfair dismissal for trade union membership and activities because the Government believe that dismissal for non-membership of a union is equally wrong. The right to join a union must be protected, just as must be the right not to join. Throughout the Bill there is an evenhanded approach. The enhanced compensation in Clause 3 and the present Clause 4 applies equally to people who are unfairly sacked for being union members and to people who are unfairly sacked for not being union members.

    Since the noble Lords—how can I put it?—not immediately opposite, but behind the noble Lords immediately opposite, of the new party, have agreed with us on the principles of deterrence and of incentives for reinstatement, it seems to me most extraordinary that they are seeking to undermine their own good sense by this amendment. I can only conclude that the Social Democratic Party has not yet dotted every "i" and crossed every "t" of its industrial relations policy, and no doubt when it has done so it will return to the debate.

    4.59 p.m.

    I should like to take up the noble Earl's point about the earlier intervention of my noble friend Lord Harris of Greenwich. I do not think that there is here any inconsistency at all. I came to your Lordships Chamber this afternoon thinking that there might be something in the comparative levels of award proposed under the Bill and those awards usually made in regard to racial or sexual discrimination. I had that in my mind. However, during the course of the debate I was convinced by both the noble Earl opposite and by my noble friend Lord Harris that these issues were not strictly related; and in that debate the noble Earl and my noble friend Lord Harris carried me against the arguments advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton.

    Therefore, I think it worth stating for the record that the reasons why my noble friend Lord Aylestone has moved the amendment are strictly those that he has given. There is no inconsistency at all here. My noble friend talked about the possible plight of the small business man and the possible implications for the small union in regard to the awards of damages, which we shall come to later in the Bill. Those are the reasons why we on this Bench set down this series of amendments, and I do not think that the noble Earl can succeed in striving to drive a wedge between ourselves and our noble friends on that count.

    I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, will forgive me for not having been present as soon as he opened the debate on the amendment. I should like to say, very briefly, that the award proposed in the Bill reflects a very special situation, in which a man may lose his livelihood in a closed shop situation—and in these days of unemployment it may take a considerable time before he finds a suitable livelihood again. There are also problems with the union which, although it is not strictly within a disciplinary procedure, may nonetheless persist and affect the man's right. At the Bar, I know of several cases during the last five years in which a man who has been dismissed in a closed shop situation has not been able to find employment for years and years. Therefore, this is a rather special situation. I would for these reasons support the Front Bench in resisting this amendment, and I hope I have given a reasoned objection in support of doing so.

    if I venture to speak briefly in favour of these amendments, I hope the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie (diligent SDP-watcher and Alliance-watcher that he is) will not suspect that here is the appearance of an extension of the Alliance. I speak merely to the merits of the amendment on the Marshalled List, as is my habit, and I will leave the finesse of political bargaining to the noble Earl.

    I thought it appropriate earlier in our proceedings not to move Amendment No. 51 but, instead, to support this current series of amendments, so as to avoid two debates on amendments which have a certain amount in common. What the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, and I have in common is our dislike of the over-generous terms of compensation which a man, unfairly dismissed because of his refusal to join a union, can claim. It is a matter of judgment, of course, as to where the line should be drawn; the intermediate point between what the Government propose in the Bill and the total elimination of the special award.

    The noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, says he is in favour of the special award in principle. I am not. Therefore, in coming together as we do on this particular series of amendments, we seem to be literally meeting one another half way in that respect. I merely wish to give one illustration of how, as I see it, this proposed compensation is excessive; and I wish to make the point that such excessive compensation makes an employer vulnerable to dishonest practices by dishonest employees.

    The example that I will briefly give is hypothetical, but I believe it to be realistic—and my noble friend Lord Jacques and I have had it checked by an expert in these matters. I would take a man of 45 years of age with 10 years' service in his job, earning, shall we say, the average wage of £120 a week in a job where he is not getting on very well with his workmates. He is perhaps unhappy in his work, not through any fault of his employer but because of his personality and the way in which he fails to get on with his work- mates. Suppose, then, that the business in which he is employed is declining, and he thinks, perhaps with justification, that redundancies are in the offing and that he may well be one who is vulnerable in that respect. That is not, I suggest, a very unrealistic scenario.

    If such a man waits for redundancy in the ordinary way, he will get £1,440; but if he engineers his dismissal by giving up membership of his trade union he can get considerably more, even under the present law, in respect of the basic and the compensatory awards. The figures that I have total £5,000 if reinstatement is applied for and not ordered. Under the Bill, he has only to say that he wants reinstatement and he can qualify for as much as £17,500 if reinstatement is not ordered; and, of course, the figures are still higher if reinstatement is ordered and defied by the employer.

    My main point in this. What a temptation those figures represent for a man to aviod normal redundancy and to seek, by spurious but perhaps not easily detectable means, to arrange to be dismissed on grounds of non-unionism! That I believe to be a real danger, and it is because these amendments moved by Lord Aylestone go a considerable way towards mitigating this danger which I have tried to describe that I am speaking in suport of them.

    While it is fresh in the Committee's mind, I wonder whether I could answer the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Oram. I have already tried to show that it is simply not really necessary for employers to dismiss people unfairly. If employers can show that pressure has been put on them—disruption of their business, its continued decline or whatever—to dismiss a man, the tribunal would of course take that into account and that might not be considered to be unfair dismissal. Or there are the joinder provisions, to join the union and for pressurising the employer. We are talking a little as if these large sums of money could gratuitously be imposed on small businesses which could ill-afford them. All the small businesses have to do is to avoid unfair dismissal of the people concerned.

    The other point would seem to me to be that the whole habits of mind of industrial relations tribunals would take into account any deliberate disruption by the employee of his or her employers' industrial relations. It is relatively easy to spot a rogue employee. In fact, most of these provisions are designed against the the rogue employer, as I said earlier; and I therefore hope that the noble Lord can be slightly more confident in the existing work of industrial tribunals—which, after all, the Government of which he was a distinguished member did a lot to set up.

    The Minister explains himself further and further, and I am bound to say makes his case weaker and weaker. It is perfectly true, as he says, that this is in some ways an extraordinary amendment. But, then, this is an extraordinary Bill. It is somewhat strange to see these figures coming out of the air—and, of course, they do come out of the air, and the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, cannot really suggest that they do not come out of the air. But, then, the figures in the Bill come out of the air. These figures are arbitrary, but they are no more arbitrary than the figures in the Bill. In the phrase that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, used the other day, this is a small baby, but at least it is a small mercy. This amendment slightly cuts the compensation, and for that reason it is welcome. At least, it is welcome to us, even if we do not necessarily agree with and follow the arguments which are being put forward in respect of it.

    But when the noble Earl seeks to argue that there is no problem with this because you do not have to dismiss people and, therefore, small employers cannot go bankrupt because they do not have to dismiss people, he must face the fact that there are, in effect, four choices open to an employer as a result of this Bill. There would still be the same set of choices open to an employer as a result of these amendments, but at least the consequences would be less. Faced with one of the bounty hunters, he can dismiss him and pay the costs. That could be as much as £31,000 or, under the amendment, half that sum—and that could be serious for the small employer. Or he could decide to join the union in the action and perhaps halve the loss or more than halve the loss, but at the consequence, very likely, of deteriorating industrial relations and worse relations with his union than he has had in the past. Not a nice choice for the small employer. Or he could refuse to do anything: not dismiss—in which case he might get strike action, disruption of services against him as the workers in the firm are not prepared to put up with the fact that this man has dropped out of the union. Each one of these three options is not nice for the employer.

    But the noble Earl says that he could fail to dismiss the man and nothing could happen, and that if only the employer would stand up to it, then nothing untoward would occur at all. This is not the way we see it, because in that eventuality—and I am bound to say that probably is the most common eventuality at this stage of the economic situation—the union membership agreement will be a dead letter, a dead loss. Once again, we shall see that the Government are legislating to break up union membership agreements.

    It is significant, I suggest, that two of the most respected organisations in the country dealing with industrial relations, namely, the Institute of Personnel Management and the Industrial Society, both have expressed disquiet about the effects of these high levels of compensation available through the special award. The Institute of Personnel Management feels that they will offer too much scope for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals who may be attracted by the money; the Industrial Society has expressed similar views, and the same point was exposed very clearly in the discussion initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, last week when he referred to the special difficulties that could arise within the shipping industry in that connection.

    My fear is that in circumstances where so many British companies are having to reduce their work force in order to remain internationally competitive—an objective with which we all agree—individuals whose jobs are at risk may be tempted to engineer their own dismissal in order to gain financial benefits in excess of those to which they would be entitled on grounds of redundancy, and claims may arise which are vexatious. I know it can be claimed (and it just has been claimed) by the noble Earl that amounts can be reduced, for example, if the complainant has contributed by his own behaviour to his dismissal. I acknowledge that, but still feel that the amounts at present set are too high.

    Last week, the noble Earl made it plain—and, I think, again it was in discussion of the amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, concerning the shipping industry, that the intention of the Government here was not to undermine the closed shop. The noble Earl is, among other things, an honourable man and I can only accept the assurance that he then gave. But for my part I cannot escape the feeling that the effect of these awards, if not their intention, is not so much to give fair recompense to employees who are unfairly dismissed as excessively to penalise employers and trade unions who continue to operate the closed shop.

    On these Benches we have made plain on one or two occasions already on discussions on this Bill at this stage that we are in principle opposed to the closed shop: but here we are concerned with the practical effect of the Government's proposals. I am troubled about their consequences for industrial relations and I hope that even now the Government, on those grounds, will be prepared to reconsider this point.

    I acknowledge one more point to which the noble Earl has already drawn our attention: the grounds on which acceptance of this amendment are being argued are different, as the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, has already said, from those on which his noble friends argued against an earlier amendment. But the effect, I think it must be conceded, of accepting this amendment would not be markedly different from acceptance of the amendment earlier put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn. I noted, however, that the noble Earl made the point that there was room for argument about the extent or the precise amount of these awards—and it is with the principle that I am concerned.

    If the noble Earl were to say, for instance, that the amount by which we are here seeking to reduce these sums of compensation is rather too great, and that he would be willing to have another look at it to see if some figure between that now in the Bill and that suggested in the amendment might be more appropriate, then that is one thing. But to argue against the principle that we are here seeking to enunciate would not be acceptable to us. It is for that reason, in principle, that we have put down and wish for our part to pursue—I cannot speak for the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone—this amendment.

    5.18 p.m.

    May I answer the points of the noble Lord, Lord Rochester? As he knows from many occasions, I always like to carry him along with me. Certainly, again—and I do not want to repeat the little tease that I made about the Social Democrats—what he said seemed to be somewhat at variance with some of the positions taken by the I iberal Party in another place on closed shop issues. The very fact that these levels of special awards compensations are being set high seems to me to act as a deterrent not only to the employer not unfairly to dismiss the employee but also for the union as well; because the employer can join the union should the union misbehave, and the high levels of deterrence would surely stop the employer and the union from perhaps colluding against the individual. That seems to me to be a clear issue where the threat of being joined in an action would, in itself, deter the unions from putting pressure on the employer to dismiss the employee.

    I go back to the point that we are not trying to load additional costs on to employers. Employers—rather than myself, who was accused of this earlier—must not have it both ways. They have asked for some protection against unfair pressures from trade unions and the Government, but, equally, they must not give way to unfair pressures from unions. Those employers who are showing signs of not so giving way are doing well in this field.

    Another point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, was that this is rather high in absolute terms. Whatever the arguments about any given Administration's economic policy, we all know that unemployment is at exceptionally high levels over all the Western world. We are in a different, changed and unpleasant situation where the levels of employment are concerned. That covers countries like France, where President Mitterand is still wrestling with more traditional demands for management manipulation and the rest of it. All of us are suffering from very high levels of unemployment. It seems to me that it is really fearsome to lose a job these days. If you do, you need as much compensation as you can conceivably get particularly if you lose it through no fault of your own but because you have been unfairly dismissed by your employer. Therefore, it seems to me rather strange in the light of that situation for the noble Lord to pursue the line which he has.

    The best way of avoiding the special awards, which are designed to deal with the kind of exceptional cases that we have been debating earlier, is to hold a ballot. That is if it results in the closed shop being proved. The greater the compensation levels, the greater the incentive to hold ballots. Surely the Liberals and the Social Democratic Party want ballots. These amendments would reduce very substantially the likelihood of ballots being held. Therefore, I find it a deeply inconsistent point of view and I hope that rather than the Government thinking again, the Alliance will think again.

    May I say a few friendly words to the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie. I do not in any way mind the teasing of the SDP or the Alliance. I am quite sure that the Liberal Party approach it in an equally robust fashion.

    However, I found the closing remarks that he made remarkable. We are all looking forward to coming to a discussion on secret ballots at a later stage in the Bill. He will then find our enthusiasm for what we understand to be the policy of the right honourable lady the Prime Minister to be undimmed on these Benches and we are looking forward with a high degree of expectation to finding out whether the Government are prepared to adopt what we now understand to be the Prime Minister's position in ballots or whether they are clinging to the policy—the rather outmoded policy—of the Secretary of State for Employment who has taken a rather more cautious approach to the understanding of these questions.

    On the actual substance of what the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, has said in the past few moments, I put to him that he underestimates the problem facing many businessmen in small companies. There is no doubt so far as we are concerned about the need for the new special award. The only difference between us is on the question of what should be the level of compensation. Of course, the noble Earl is quite right, in a number of cases it is right that there should be a deterrent level so far as compensation is concerned. In my view, speaking as I did on a previous amendment, I certainly think that compensation of around the level set out in Lord Aylestone's amendment is just about right. My noble friend indicated—as did the noble Lord, Lord Rochester—that we are perfectly prepared to listen to any other proposal with which the Government may come forward. If the Government were to indicate that they were prepared to reconsider this matter, speaking for ourselves and our colleagues in the Liberal Party, I am quite sure that we would be more than happy to withdraw this amendment. But the noble Earl cannot, with great respect, underestimate the problem that faces the small businessman. Of course, a small businessman can behave in an arbitrary, intolerant and sometimes capricious manner. No doubt sometimes he could behave unfairly against an individual employee. Certainly, it would be wrong to say that the employee in such a situation should not be adequately safeguarded.

    The problem facing many small businessmen—and this, with great respect, the noble Earl did not appear to appreciate—is that he does not have this amount of expert advice available to large-scale employers to avoid getting into exactly the situation which we are now discussing. That is why it seems to me not at all unreasonable for the Government to consider seriously what has been said. After all, most of those who have spoken in this debate, other than those from the Labour Party, have agreed with this special award. What we are concerned about is the level of compensation. It seems to me not unreasonable in the light of what has been said for the noble Earl simply to indicate that he is prepared to look at the matter before Report stage. We are asking for no more than that. I cannot see why he is being so inflexible.

    Following what the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has said, would the noble Earl look at his approach again? There are a number of issues. There is the question of the deterrent. There has to be a degree of deterrence. We accept that. There is the question of the absolute amount to be paid. This is in relation to the small business, in particular, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has said. There is the question of the level in so far as it encourages people to suddenly discover a conscience. I do not suppose that there will be a lot of them but I am sure there will be some. With a large sum of money, if one is Just wavering on the brink, it encourages one to discover suddenly that one has never thought much of being in a trade union.

    Then there is the difference, coming back to previous amendments, in the levels that can be obtained for the different reasons for dismissal. Will the noble Earl, when he has his computer to do the sums, see whether there is any way of narrowing this difference by raising at least somewhat what is payable to people who are unfairly dismissed for other reasons? My computer is not working completely fully but it has a fairly useful indication. When the maximum award was first introduced by the Conservative Government in 1971, the figure was £4,160. In the period 1974 to 1978—a period which I just happen to have in my head—prices doubled. That would bring the figure to at least £8,320. The present maximum is £7,000.

    Then there are the other years which would bring it up higher still if it was to be in line with what the Conservative Government originally thought to be appropriate. If there could be some raising, it would go quite a way to get rid of some of the feelings that have been aroused in the discussions that we have had today. It would seem to me entirely logical that one should look to what one thought was the appropriate compensation originally and see why it should now be so different, for different it most certainly is.

    5.28 p.m.

    I tried to deal with the point of why we sought a differential compensation at an earlier stage of the debate. I shall of course bring to the attention of my right honourable friend the fact that it is the view of the noble Baroness that levels of compensation for ordinary cases of unfair dismissal are insufficiently indexed. The noble Baroness is well aware of the Government's position on that, that the way to get them fairer is to reduce the inflation that is going on. This is what we are trying to achieve. I shall bring that point to his attention. With respect, it is a slightly different point. Various people in the Committee have been, as it were, appealing to me to think again, hoping that they will not have to divide and hoping that in some way the Government may be able to meet them or that an amendment of this kind will have better treatment from the Government at Report stage.

    I am afraid that I think that would be misleading. Here we are dealing with questions of unfair dismissal. I do not agree that small employers need expert advice here. All they need to do is not unfairly sack individuals. If they do not sack unfairly, they will not have to pay compensation. If they are subject to unfair pressures from unions or other employees, then the employer can join them in any action which the individual takes.

    I must say to the notional employers being represented by the Social Democrats and the Liberals on this occasion, though not the Labour Party on this occasion, that it is wrong to ask the Government to stick up for the rights of individuals and to try and ameliorate the effects of too much in the way of employee protection if they are not also prepared to do their bit in resisting the bullying of unions and in resisting any temptations to treat employees unfairly. I have no evidence whatsoever that employers, of large or small businesses, are doing anything other than resisting this kind of bullying and pressure. I think they should continue to do so. I honestly do not think that there is any reason to reduce these levels of special award, which can so easily be avoided by avoiding the unfair treatment of employees. All parties in this House—perhaps the parties opposite particularly have made a thing of this—are in favour of trying to protect the rights of employees. The Government are doing so in this Bill, and in this part of the Bill, and I must say it surprises me that we are being criticised for doing so.

    In his earlier remarks, the noble Earl mentioned—he has done so subsequently—that the figures are set at this scale because they are a deterrent. One could argue that if they were set at double the figures they would represent a much greater deterrent. The noble Earl also mentioned the fact that there is no great interest in industry in the scale of the compensation awards. May I remind him that the British Institute of Management, the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors and the Institute of Personnel Management are all of the opinion that these compensation awards under the special award are much too high. If he really feels that he cannot accept our amendment, may I remind him that if he does accept it and we are proved to be wrong, then under the terms of the Bill the Secretary of State could restore some other figure with the approval of both Houses? That would be an absolutely democratic way of doing it. If he cannot accept the amendment, I am afraid I must divide the House.

    5.32 p.m.

    On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 55) shall be agreed to?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 66; Not-Con-tents, 96.

    DIVISION NO. 3

    CONTENTS

    Airedale, L.Kennet, L.
    Allen of Fallowfield, L.Kilmarnock, L.—[Teller.]
    Ardwick, L.Leatherland, L.
    Aylestone, L.Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.
    Balogh, L.
    Banks, L.Longford, E.
    Bernstein, L.Lovell-Davis, L.
    Birk, B.McCarthy, L.
    Bishopston, L.Mishcon, L.
    Blyton, L.Molloy, L.
    Boston of Faversham, L.Northfield, L.
    Briginshaw, L.Oram, L.
    Brockway, L.Peart, L.
    Brooks of Tremorfa, L.Phillips, B.
    Bruce of Donington, L.Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
    Burton of Coventry, B.Rathcreedan, L.
    Byers, L.Rochester, L.
    Chitnis, L.Ross of Marnock, L.
    Collison, L.Seear, B.
    David, B.Sefton of Garston, L.
    Davies of Penrhys, L.Segal, L.
    Elwyn-Jones, L.Shackleton, L.
    Fisher of Rednal, B.Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
    Gaitskell, B.Stewart of Fulham, L.
    Harris of Greenwich, L.Strabolgi, L.
    Hatch of Lusby, L.Tanlaw, L.
    Irving of Dartford, L.Taylor of Gryfe, L.
    Jeger, B.Taylor of Mansfield, L.
    Jenkins of Putney, L.Tordoff, L.
    John-Mackie, L.Underhill, L.

    Wedderburn of Charlton, L.Wilson of Langside, L.
    Wells-Pestell, L.Winterbottom, L.
    White, B.Wootton of Abinger, B.
    Wigoder, L.—[Teller.]

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Abercorn, D.Lane-Fox, B.
    Ailesbury, M.Lauderdale, E.
    Airey of Abingdon, B.Long, V.
    Alexander of Tunis, E.Lyell, L.
    Ampthill, L.McAlpine of Moffat, L.
    Annan, L.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
    Auckland, L.Macleod of Borve, B.
    Avon, E.Marley, L.
    Belhaven and Stenton, L.Marsh, L.
    Bellwin, L.Merrivale, L.
    Beloff, L.Mersey, V.
    Belstead, L.Monk Bretton, L.
    Bessborough, E.Montgomery of Alamein, V.
    Boardman, L.
    Boyd-Carpenter, L.Morris, L.
    Campbell of Alloway, L.Mottistone, L.
    Chelwood, L.Mowbray and Stourton, L.
    Clifford of Chudleigh, L.Norfolk, D.
    Constantine of Stanmore, L.Northchurch, B.
    Craigavon, V.Nugent of Guildford, L.
    Cullen of Ashbourne, L.Orkney, E.
    Daventry, V.Orr-Ewing, L.
    Davidson, V.Pender, L.
    De Freyne, L.Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.
    De La Warr, E.
    Denham, L.—[Teller.]Renton, L.
    Dilhorne, V.St. Davids, V.
    Drumalbyn, L.St. John of Bletso, L.
    Eccles, V.Saltoun, Ly.
    Ellenborough, L.Sandford, L.
    Elliot of Harwood, B.Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
    Ferrers, E.Sharples, B.
    Forester, L.Skelmersdale, L.
    Fraser of Kilmorack, L.Spens, L.
    Gainford, L.Stamp, L.
    Glanusk, L.Strathspey, L.
    Glenarthur, L.Sudeley, L.
    Gowrie, E.Swinfen, L.
    Gridley, L.Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
    Grimston of Westbury, L.Trefgarne, L.
    Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L.Trenchard, V.
    Trumpington, B.
    Harris of High Cross, L.Vaizey, L.
    Harvington, L.Vaux of Harrowden, L.
    Henley, L.Vivian, L.
    Home of the Hirsel, L.Wakefield of Kendal, L.
    Hornsby-Smith, B.Ward of Witley, V.
    Hylton-Foster, B.Windlesham, L.
    Killearn, L.Young, B.
    Kinnaird, L.

    Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

    [ Amendments Nos. 56 to 60 not moved.]

    On Question, Whether Clause 4 shall stand part of the Bill?

    5.39 p.m.

    We have now investigated at any rate most of the extraordinary areas of an extraordinary clause. It is said, as the noble Earl has mentioned more than once, that there are those who ask for protection; but the examples are few. Indeed they can be matched by far more examples of other types of discrimination that might be thought to be as bad. The figures have been discussed and while I, and indeed the party for which I speak, do not think this is the primary issue, nevertheless the Govern- ment's intransigence in the face of unknown calculations in regard to the figures seems to be very odd.

    The clause itself where what is required is a mere request, will amount, if one looks back over the clause as a whole, to what was called, "the bounty-hunting charter", in another place or, as I would prefer to call it, "the non-unionist's charter "—because of course it has been clear from our debates that it is primarily a question of non-unionists and indeed it is as a remedy to help them that it is being added to the Bill. The reason it is a charter is that you can create your own situation—a situation which the Government's answer will be inadequate to relieve. The situation is one where you can create your own prize and your own rules, and can afford yourself a free kick at the goal by sending off the goalkeeper before you take it. You can do that by throwing in your union card. There is no equivalent for the trade unionist to throwing in your union card.

    The noble Earl is quite right; this extends over a far wider area than the closed shop. In any situation where there is tension, where someone throws in his union card, and then there is pressure or discussion and the employer dismisses him by reference to his position as a non-unionist, there is a risk of a special award arising for the employer—but not just for the employer. I refrain from speaking about the joinder procedure under Clause 6, because we shall be coming to that. But before we leave this clause, one must keep in mind that the defendant against the £10,000, £12,000, £30,000 or £40,000 may be the union or, much more seriously, the shop steward or another group of workers. That is the scenario which the Government are presenting via the industrial tribunals.

    Often in another place—and it becomes relevant to put the point now, in view of what has been said on this clause—the Government's response has been that not very much of any evil kind will happen, because the tribunals are sensible and will reduce the compensation under the section. The new Section 75A allows the tribunal, where it considers that the conduct of the complainant before the dismissal makes it just and equitable to reduce his compensation, so to do. But the question arises: What do the Government suggest should be the attitude of the tribunals to someone throwing in his union card? On what basis is that to be regarded, in what is now known in employment law, as contributory industrial fault? When is getting out of a union contributory industrial fault?

    I suspect that there will be noble Lords who would say, very sincerely "Never", because you should always be able to do so. There would be others who say "sometimes, perhaps". But if that were so, the Government would have measured this clause by reference to some conscientious or other deeply held conviction. It cannot, surely, be a conviction that you are worth £10,000 more than the next man, just because you want to throw in your card.

    So the reductionism philosophy, which the Government adhere to so often in debates, and did in the other place, is merely to shift the buck of the problem from the legislator to the tribunal. But it is never good legislation which says "Yes, there is a problem. But leave it to the courts, because we cannot think of anything better to do." There are other features of the clause which have arisen and which are most unsatisfactory; not only the unrealities of the so-called even-handedness between unionists and non-unionists. This is a non-union measure. Noble Lords who support it felt passionately. In terms of non-unionism, none of them is going to get up and make the same sort of speech about trade unionists, although the noble Earl put it in an even-handed way.

    But he also made reference to another feature, which should be squarely, and quite sensibly, faced. Walsall council has been mentioned; public authorities have been mentioned; in particular, Labour-controlled public authorities. Why beat about the bush? That is what it is about. The noble Earl talks of politically motivated action and, at one point, said something to the effect that only a small sum—I believe, something like £10,000—was awarded in total to the Walsall dinner ladies. But under the present proposals it would be something like £70,000, which would be enough to get this council to think again or not to do the act.

    Of course, the matter goes further, because what happens to this large sum when it is awarded against a Labour council? It is something which the district auditor will have a look at and the Government know very well that that is so; it is what they want. Time and time again in another place, and it is beginning to be mentioned here—so let us get it out—it was said that the district auditor would not surcharge the Labour councillors on £2,000, but, if we are lucky—think the Government—might do so on £10,000, £20,000 or £30,000. The district auditor is being used, in the arguments for this clause, as a political instrument against Labour councils effecting policies upon which they were elected.

    It is no good noble Lords looking surprised, because if they look at the reports of the debates in another place they will find that the Minister of State once, and the Under-Secretary four or five times, referred to the need to stop these politically motivated councils, like Walsall, from carrying on in the way that they do. I know that the noble Earl does not want to misrepresent me and I must make sure that he does not misunderstand me. It is not a case of justifying anyone who breaks the law. That is not the issue. The issue is whether legislation, which is ostensibly labour law legislation, is ostensibly employment law legislation, has behind it the ambition to catch with a different penalty individuals who serve on local authorities and similar bodies.

    That is a most unfortunate aim in using labour law legislation of this kind, because it will all come back on the shop floor—let us get back to the industrial relations context—and will come back to the relationship between the employer and his workers. If the Government think that, by making Labour councillors bankrupt by £30,000 appearing in the annual audit of the council, they will contribute anything to politics or to industrial relations, they are very mistaken indeed. That is also why some of these bodies that have been mentioned are not happy about the proposal.

    The CBI is not unaware of the local authority context and dimensions of the problem, because the Government have made it plain, again and again, in debates in another place that that is the basic reason in that area where, to quote the Under-Secretary, speaking on 1st April at col. 900 of the Official Report:
    "The district auditor will step in and say 'Enough is enough. You knew what you were doing, Councillor So-and-so, and you were trampling on this woman's rights. You made up your mind from the beginning not to reinstate her, and you will pay and not the ratepayer'."—

    The Social Democratic Party give loud cheers. Of course, because that is what they want. They cannot see a way of solving the industrial relations problem, which is a very real problem of workers who feel very strongly that they want to work with trade unionists. Workers are few who have to be heard with justice, and who want not to be in the position of being pushed out. The SDP has no answer to many things and it has no answer to this. They say, "Let us support the Government's legislation", which means punishing the people they do not like. And those people are Labour councillors. All parties, other than my own in your Lordships' Committee, will unite around that. That is why they will unite around this clause.

    This clause is based upon ambitions which should not enter into labour law. There is muddle and lack of reason in terms of the division of categories of workers. I refer again to the categories of race and sex as against the categories of unionism and non-unionism. Their policy rests, as it does in the whole of this part of the Bill, on total ignorance of the position of employment law in this country. Time and again the right honourable gentleman the Secretary of State has justified this clause, along with Clauses 2 and 3 which go with it, on the basis that from time immemorial there were rights for British workers, of which they were deprived in 1974; that the legislation from 1974 to 1976 robbed British employees of their right not to be dismissed unfairly. There was no such right before 1971. The case which the Government themselves put to the Court of Human Rights in 1981 in its memorial said:
    "Prior to 1971, the termination of the contract of employment of an employee on grounds of refusal to join a union was subject to no special rules. Provided that due period of notice was given to the employee concerned, the termination of his contract of employment on the ground of his refusal to join a union was lawful and gave him no rights of any kind".
    That is an accurate statement of the law at that period. Why do the Government have to pretend that some rights, from time immemorial, were lost in 1974?

    The 1971 Act introduced unfair dismissal. A problem arose in respect of any kind of union security arrangement and unfair dismissal. That was a problem which the Government faced in 1971. It was a problem which the Labour Government faced in 1974. It is a problem which all Governments will have to face unless they abolish the law of unfair dismissal. That is why Clause 4 sums up the philosophy of the first part of the Bill so much. Clause 4 is objectionable because it tries to divert attention from the real problem. The real problem is that of the employer, the workers and the union on the shop floor reaching an accommodation. Research, both published and unpublished, shows this. Article after article shows that 99 per cent. of union membership arrangements provide for existing employees and for a wide range of people who are exempted. That has been so for many years, whatever the law says. There lies the real nub of the problem. To play with figures of special awards for non-unionists, especially when they are not given to those who are dismissed because they are black, smacks of not being able to face the real problems of our industrial society.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, spent a certain amount of his extremely vigorous speech upon referring to the difficulties which this clause might involve for local authorities in certain circumstances. The noble Lord can reassure himself. No local authority need put itself in this position. No local authority need use its position as employer to dismiss people because they will not join a union or will not join a particular union. Any local authority can protect itself from the dangers to which the noble Lord referred by refraining from that kind of conduct. The noble Lord did not seem to appreciate the particular indelicacy of Labour-controlled authorities doing just that. It is one of the well known facts of political life that the trade union movement is the major support of the Labour Party. It provides the greater part of the funds, the greater part of the support. For Labour in control of a local authority to use its power to further the interests of the unions who support it at the expense of those people who do not want to join a union is, in my view, an outrageous abuse of power. If a local authority does that, it deserves what it gets, because it has brought it upon itself.

    The only other aspect of the noble Lord's speech to which I would invite your Lordships' attention is the complete lack of any indication of sympathy whatever for a worker who, for one reason or another, does not wish to join a trade union. The noble Lord simply brushed these people aside as being insignificant and of no account. But whether the noble Lord likes it or not, there are quite a number of people who do not want to join. Does the noble Lord wish to intervene?

    I am sure that the noble Lord will remember that I said that those who are non-unionists may well be unjustly treated and that each case must be looked at on its merits.

    That is a somewhat chilling reference. It is not an indication of a realisation of what it means to somebody, particularly—as the noble Lord said on an earlier amendment—in the present employment situation in this country, to be dismissed and what an enormously serious thing it is. Therefore when it is done in circumstances which the noble Lord now says may be unjustifiable, the award that he should receive should be very substantial indeed. And the substantiality of that award is the very gravamen of the noble Lord's attack.

    The noble Lord went on—very pointedly, he may recall—to brush aside the position of a man who, as he put it, throws in his union card. I believe that trade unionism is a major and very valuable part of our national organisation but that members, workers, individuals, should join it and remain in it or not as they please. The person who turns in his union card is just as much entitled to protection as the person who did not have it when a closed shop was introduced. There are people in this country who have joined a union and been a member of it for years but who have turned in their union card because they are disgusted about the way in which their union is being conducted and do not wish to remain members of a body so doing.

    It may well be—I hope and believe that there are—people who feel that about the way in which NUPE are treating the hospitals and the sick. Surely it is at least comprehensible to the noble Lord that there may be members of the unions concerned who feel, however, strongly they may wish to increase their remuneration this year, that they are not prepared to take part in putting pressure on the sick for the purpose of getting more money. That seems to be a perfectly reasonable, human, perhaps even an admirable attitude. Therefore, people who feel like that may well wish to turn in their union cards. They should be entitled so to do if they want, otherwise the union is proceeding on the basis, which could be contrary to all that trade unionism used to stand for, of industrial conscription, compulsion. In order to keep your job you must retain your membership of the union.

    Your Lordships should not underrate the difficulty and the unpleasantness for the individual who decides that he has to do this. If somebody decides, because he cannot bear to be associated with what his union is doing at the moment, that he is going to leave that union, it will be difficult enough. There will no doubt be personal unpleasantness. Surely such an individual who loses his job as a result should be very fully and adequately compensated, either by the employer or, anticipating Clause 6, by the union, or by both of them.

    So I am bound to say that I found the noble Lord's speech—passionate, quick-fired, well-informed as it was—immensely depressing, particularly for two reasons. First he seeks to justify and to protect the position of local authorities which abuse their political power in order to impose conditions not desired by some trade unions which support them, with the consequence that other people find themselves losing their jobs. Secondly, because of his manifest lack of sympathy with those people who decide that, even though they may have been at one time trade unionists, they do not wish to continue. I say this to the noble Lord: that no one could be a worse threat to trade unionism in this country than one who seeks to build it up on the basis of conscription.

    6 p.m.

    When one hears some of the speeches in your Lordships' Committee, one feels that one has been here before, because the same arguments seem to occur on almost every clause of the Bill: the rights and wrongs of trade unionism. I was not going to speak to this clause, but when one listens to speeches, one wants to hear sympathy for the trade unionst. I want to see sympathy for well-organised trade unions with large memberships; but when one reads the Committee stage in another place, one has a feeling that what some persons on the Government side want is to see trade unionism weakened. What I should like to hear are some speeches of sympathy for strong, virile trade unionism.

    One has to remember the point made by my noble friend Lord Wedderburn of Charlton—a point that some of us made in our Second Reading speeches: where does all this fit in with sound, effective industrial relations? One has to speak not only to noble Lords in this House but also to men and women on the shop floor, as to where this will land us at the end of the day. We may not like it, and some noble Lords may not like it; but if one has a person who continually vilifies trade unionism and who goes out of his way to loudly attack trade unions, and then the men say, "We will not work with this man unless he joins", it is a matter of industrial relations. We do have such individuals. Some are very genuine people and others, frankly, are anti-social in their outlook; "I am all right, Jack." The men on the shop floor resent this and want to do something about it.

    To conduct this debate as if it is going to deal only with local authorities is just nonsense. It does not deal only with local authorities, it deals with everybody. I have not heard anyone talk about Foyle's dismissals. Perhaps we could have a few words about Foyle's dismissals and about what compensation those people may get and ought to get, where a firm is even saying that it would be better to close down rather than have trade unionism coming into the firm.

    I hope that noble Lords opposite will realise that passion can be on both sides and that conscience can be on both sides. I do not want to see honest individuals badly treated, but at the same time I want to think of the great mass of organised workers who believe in their trade union and who do not want to see it weakened. A few speeches by noble Lords opposite in that respect might be helpful. In this instance one must recognise that there will be genuine cases, but that there will also be individuals who will seek, if they can, to get £20,000 compensation. It will be absolutely foolish if noble Lords believe that can never happen. If there is a chance of £20,000 compensation, there will be some people with an anti-social outlook—and that is what some people who do not want to join a trade union have—who do anything do try to achieve it.

    I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, as one who longs to see established—I believe one would say re-establish—a strong, virile trade union movement, which was responsible and had effective control. But perhaps I would part company with him on this aspect: I would submit that the liberty for non-trade unionists which we are seeking to provide in this Bill will strengthen the trades union movement rather than weaken it. One cannot be dogmatic because, who can tell? All one can do is to have regard to the problem without passion and in a constructive way—the approach which the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, always adopts.

    I agree again with the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, when he says that the emphasis on local authorities is nonsense. Indeed it is. And how, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, can he indulge in this fantastic conceit that there is some trap to ensnare district auditors or Labour councillors? This is, as stated by the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, a nonsense.

    If the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, will allow me to intervene, I was saying that it is nonsense to suggest that the whole purpose of this clause is to deal with the position of local authorities. One has to consider speeches made in the other place, by Ministers in particular, dealing with district auditors.

    I am obliged to the noble Lord. I am not pretending that there is not an aspect of this—the spin-off—which could affect district auditors and Labour councillors in certain circumstances. But that is to distort the whole concept and turn it on its head. So many of the propositions of the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton—and I say this with respect—have just been turned on their head. It is a fantastic conceit, and a fantastic conception, that this clause is some kind of trap to ensnare district auditors or to disadvantage Labour councillors. It is a ridiculous concept because the issue is plainly a simple political issue. It is much broader than district auditors or Labour councillors. The issue is simply, are we to adopt the concept of individual freedom that recognises the rights of a non-trades unionist, or are we not? This Government, I believe with the support of the vast majority of the electorate, intend to recognise it. That is the point. If the process those who would oppose the will, if it be the will, of the Government and Parliament, find themselves in difficulties, I for one shall not grieve for them.

    I believe that this debate has been of great value to the Committee. The more we go on, the clearer it becomes that there is a fundamental gulf which lies between those who are in favour of this clause, as we are on these Benches, and those in the Labour Party who are most passionately opposed to it.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, who, as the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, said, made a most vigorous speech, will presumably be dividing the Committee on this clause. Therefore, I believe that we should address ourselves to the substantial issues which he raised in his speech and which have been raised in a number of speeches subsequently.

    First, there is the position of local authorities, to which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, has just referred. There is no problem whatever for local authorities, so far as this clause is concerned. A local authority only has to do one thing; it has to obey the law of this country. That is what the local authority has to do and nothing else. The problem, unfortunately, is that a number of Labour-controlled local authorities believe that they can defy the law of England and can get away with it. We had the example some years ago of the Clay Cross local authority. The Government, of which I was a Member, and so therefore I must accept some measure of responsibility, when they were returned to office, took certain action in relation to the members of that particular local authority which was profoundly mistaken.

    But we have subsequently had the cases of the local authorities in Sandwell and Walsall, and I make no apology for returning to these two cases because they are in my view fundamental to this clause and fundamental to this Bill. In both cases, I have not the slightest doubt, the local authority was advised by its legal advisers that the course of action they were adopting was unlawful. I have no doubt whatever that every member who then decided, notwithstanding that advice, to take that course of action knew precisely what he was doing.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton says that one of the most disgraceful features of this whole clause is that apparently in discussion in another place there were references to the district auditor. I very much hope there will be references to the district auditor if local authorities choose quite deliberately to flout the law of this country. That is why we have district auditors. They have an obligation to protect the ratepayers of that local authority from the consequences of the acts of members of those authorities who deliberately decide to break the law.

    One of the difficulties we have in this country is that in the last few years it has become fashionable to break laws which people do not like; there is a view that if a law is disliked, what more reasonable course of action should be adopted than deliberately to ignore it? I do not happen to share that view. I believe that laws passed by both Houses of Parliament should be observed by all our fellow citizens, and particularly by public authorities, who have an even clearer responsibility so far as this is concerned.

    The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, said that he very much hoped that in the course of this debate there would be some speeches in favour of the individual rights of trade unionists. I do not see any difficulty about that at all. I am surprised that the noble Lord necessarily believes that to be in favour of this particular clause means that one is passionately opposed to the existence of a free trade union movement. Quite the reverse. What we are trying to do is to safeguard the individual citizen from the oppressive behaviour of some employers, both in the public and, conceivably in certain circumstances, the private sector. There is nothing deeply antipathetic to a free trade union movement in this clause. I have been a member of a trade union since the age of 17 and I am still, I am glad to say, in good standing. I see no conceivable conflict between that position and support for the general purposes of this Bill.

    The problem about the whole range of issues we have been discussing in this Bill and discussing in this country in the last 18 months to two years is that the Labour Party has become increasingly incapable of ever taking an independent position against pressure from the trade union movement. That is in fact reality, and we all know it to be reality. We have seen this conduct—and the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, reminded us a moment ago—from NUPE shop stewards in recent weeks. I speak as someone who is strongly in favour of a more generous settlement as far as the nurses are concerned, but I see no case for this intolerable abuse of power by individual members of trade unions. The trouble is, I repeat, that the Labour Party is now quite incapable and quite unprepared ever to take an independent position against pressure from the trade union movement. That is why we are having this debate, and I very much hope that when the Committee divides this clause will be carried by a substantial majority.

    May I say one sentence? I have not taken part in this debate. I simply want to say that to speak about individual freedom in that wild way is simply not realistic in a country where there is as much inequality as there is now.

    I wanted to follow the extremely important statement the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, made when he said that it behoves every trade unionist to obey the law of this country. I think it behoves every Briton to obey and support the law of this country. What I find despicable and disdainful is when people like Lord Harris pick just on one sector. That is the failure of this debate both in the other place and here. We take a number of our British citizens, and in one aspect they are trade unionists. I hope Lord Harris with his tiny knowledge of trade unions will listen, because his knowledge will be increased by what I have to say. They are not only trade unionists.

    I was in Wales when I started my life in the mines, and I discovered that when a branch of the NUM in Wales commences its business everything is preceded by prayers, as in this House. I do not believe, therefore, that it is right for us to look at these 12 million of our fellow citizens as in a special category. There are bad characters among them. When the noble Lord, Lord Harris, talks about people who break the law of this country, I will tell him, and ask him to deny that what I am saying is true, that there are people who are much more venomous to the prosperity of Great Britain than all the trade unionists, and those are the crooks and the cheats that thieve us of £9 billion a year on the black market. If Lord Harris wants to deny that, I will give him 10 seconds to get up and say Yes or No.

    A number of my noble friends are trying to encourage me not to reply to the noble Lord, because I might take marginally more than 10 seconds to do so.

    There is an exhibition of courage the Committee will note. Let me go on to say further that what the Government ought to be aware of is this: that people who are coalminers, who are steelworkers, working in shops, who serve behind counters, people who drive lorries, people who make a massive contribution to the wealth of our nation—I do not think anyone would deny that; the point was made very ably earlier in the debate—in addition belong to their voluntary organisations, to their churches and chapels and synagogues; they belong to all the voluntary endeavour and sporting endeavour of this nation. Therefore, to put them in a tight little category because they are trade unionists I find entirely despicable, which is about the correct description of the speech we have heard from Lord Harris. I do not know which way he voted in 1980 on this particular issue; perhaps he will tell us. He used to be a Minister and he would not have been one of Her Majesty's Ministers if it were not for the endeavours and the money of the British trade union movement. When people behave like that we have a special name for them.

    I should be most grateful to the noble Lord if I may intervene to say that we are straying rather far from the amendment, which is incidentally not mainly about trade unions but about employers.

    I stand corrected. We are straying rather far from the clause. Nevertheless, in spite of my mistake, for which I apologise to the noble Lord and the Committee, we are straying very far from Clause 4, which is not about trade unionism generally but about unfair dismissal by employers.

    I accept the noble Earl's apology to me, but I am not prepared to accept his advice as to how to proceed. He should have been listening and he should listen very carefully in the future. What I was going on to say was that the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, in my judgment, made a very strone point in his speech. If it is wrong for me to comment on what Lord Boyd-Carpenter said a moment ago, it must be wrong for him to say what I am now going to comment on. I think that is very sensible, and with half an hour's thought I think it will sink into the noble Minister's mind. What Lord Boyd-Carpenter says often attracts me. He was not making a speech which was pathologically anti-trade union. Indeed, both he and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, said that at times they would like to see a strong British trade union movement. I find it most encouraging to hear that remark from the Benches opposite.

    But what I want to point out and ask your Lordships to consider is that this Bill was born out of a period of despicable trade union activity. It was born out of the winter of discontent in 1979, when the general unofficial activity was described by Mr. Michael Foot as a form of trade unionism that he could never recognise or he could never support, and I said similar words in another place. Out of that has come this Bill which is venomous. Out of that has come a completely irresponsible and heinous piece of legislation. Less than 1 per cent. of the entire British trade union movement was involved in that despicable behaviour in the winter of 1979. Is it the normal procedure of the Parliament of this country to make very certain that if 1 per cent. of a specific part of our community misbehaves, irrespective of how despicably, we punish the other 99 per cent. as well?

    I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I raise a matter of correction. This Bill was not so much as a twinkle in its father's eye during the winter of discontent. It is relatively modern in its inception.

    All that I can reply to that is that statements were made. I admit that the noble Lord Lord has a very strong point. In the other place, on 14th December 1979, a debate was held which involved Mrs. Thatcher and the then Secretary of State for Employment, and a motion was put before the other place, and was won, which roughly called for the following. It demanded that trade unions should have the freedom to apply for any wage increases they thought fit; to indulge in any form of activity they saw fit, including strike action; but that they should not be hedged in by measures which had not gone through Parliament, like the social contract, which limited their wage demands to 10 per cent. That was moved by the Conservative Opposition and I ask noble Lords to consider that very carefully and to read the report of that debate in December. It was won by a tiny majority in the other place. The argument went like this—

    I wonder whether the noble Lord would just let me speak before he starts?

    I will, indeed, let the noble Lord speak, but let me finish this first. The argument went like this. The social contract limited and placed a degree of inhibition on the free trade union movement of this country. It is perfectly true that it had nothing to do with Parliament, but it was just as much an agreement between the political wing of the Labour Party and its industrial wing as are many aspects of the Conservative Party and the Conservative Government with the CBI and the many people allied to them. The social contract helped our nation and there was a response from the trade union movement. Indeed, its membership increased and it helped the country to get back on its feet. I ask noble Lords to consider that when debating these measures. I give way to the noble Lord.

    I think it would have been more relevant if I had spoken before the noble Lord gave us his pattern of history, because I was going to ask him how that was relevant to Clause 4 of the Bill.

    It is relevant to Clause 4 of the Bill, because if what was proposed in that Motion earlier on had then been put into legislation, the Clause 4 that we are now debating would have been a massive turn face: it would have been absolutely inappropriate to put in the Bill. The noble Lord is tempting me to say that people should beware of the fact that what the Conservative Party does in Opposition to cajole and get people to think how liberally minded they are, they do not mean to follow when they get into Government.

    I sit down with one appeal. If we are going to place trade unionists in a special situation where it is not recognised that they are fellow countrymen and women and that they have lots of other other pursuits in which we all indulge, then all that can happen is that we shall create grave bitterness. I believe that the submissions made by my noble friends on the Front Bench on this particular clause, as indeed on others, ought to receive the full consideration of your Lordships' Committee.

    We have had a pretty stimulating debate. I do not know at what point the debate on a somewhat technical issue in this clause, not an entirely uncontroversial one but I should not have thought a very controversial one, about the levels of an award paid in compensation, became a debate on trade unions generally. It certainly was not my intention to stimulate such a debate, but, since we have had it, I want to make it very clear that the legislation being proposed in this clause is entirely even-handed and fair.

    The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, raised a point about why we did not hear about Foyles. If the Bill had been passed a few months previously, and if the tribunal had found, as it did, that the employees of Foyles were unfairly dismissed because of their being trade union members, and if the book shop had not sensibly decided to offer them reinstatement, then of course these enhanced levels of compensation would have applied. There has also been the charge that this has been a union-bashing provision. If anything it is an employer—although a rogue employer—bashing provision. That was the point made very effectively by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter and I do not think I need repeat it. He was backed up by my noble friend Lord Campbell.

    I am aware of a different kind of concern that was expressed a little earlier; namely, the concern about the employee who might seek to engineer his own dismissal in order to get the enhanced compensation which Clauses 3 and 4 provide. He has been called a bounty hunter. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, who started using football analogies. This putative bounty hunter would need the skills of Signor Rossi in order to get away with what is being claimed for him, but, even so, I think the tribunal would declare him off-side without much difficulty, should he go down that road.

    In response to Lord Wedderburn's anxiety about what happens to the person—another bounty hunter—who tears up his card, the simple fact of the matter is that a resignation from a union in a closed shop would attract no compensation whatever if the employer does not dismiss the employee concerned. So if employers and unions are prepared sensibly to remain relaxed about the odd non-member, then simply there will be no problem. It is sometimes said that Conservatives do not understand the solidarity nature of unions, which of course is nonsense. In that connection, the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, said that 99 per cent. of UMAs provide for or can cope with the odd employee. There is no reason why employers should dismiss unjustly and expect to get away with it.

    The last point I would make is that some of the debate has, I think, misunderstood our position on individual freedoms. We very passionately believe that individuals can, and indeed should, join unions. We have often argued that one of the reasons for the depressed competitive position of Britain in relation to some of the people with whom we have to compete in the industrial world at large has been the proliferation of unions, the fact that unions are not getting together, and the rest of it. But, just as we believe that an individual should not be compelled into union membership against his will, we therefore believe that he should be free to join a trade union if he wishes, and to take part in its activities. This particular clause has been dealing with abuses. Most of the Bill deals with abuses. Abuses, by their definition, are rare. By these provisions, we hope to make them rarer still.

    Before the noble Earl sits down, and with the leave of your Lordships, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, asked me a direct question about the position of the Labour Party on this clause, perhaps I could answer him. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, need have no fear. There have already been three Divisions on this clause, two of them on amendments proposed by us, which went to principle as against detail. Fundamentally, we oppose this clause, but we do not think that that position would be made any clearer by making everyone tramp through the Lobbies for a fourth time.

    Clause 4 agreed to.

    Clause 5 [ Reduction of compensation: matters to be disregarded]:

    6.32 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 61:

    Page 8, line 22, leave out from ("constitutes") to the end of line 24 and insert ("—
  • (a) a breach, or proposed breach, of any requirement falling within subsection (3);
  • (b) a refusal, or proposed refusal, to comply with a requirement of a kind mentioned in section 58(10A)(a); or
  • (c) an objection, or proposed objection, (however expressed) to the operation of a provision of a kind mentioned in section 58(10A)(b).").
  • The noble Earl said: This amendment is consequential on an earlier Government amendment to Clause 2; that is, Amendment No. 27. I beg to move.

    This amendment was introduced at a fairly late stage in another place and, in our submission, it is a part of the philosophy of the Bill which, it has been made quite clear, is not shared by members of the party opposite, or, indeed, the members of the Social Democratic Party. But the position that Clause 5 requires is, I suppose, a quite logical development—although one may question whether it is absolutely necessary as a practical matter—in terms of that philosophy. The industrial tribunal is being asked, in regard to dismissals that come before it on grounds which are principally those of unionism or non-unionism, to disregard action in so far as it constitutes any of the things set out in the clause; that is to say, a requirement that someone becomes a member of a union, or ceases to be or refrains from becoming a member, or

    "not to take part in the activities"
    of it.

    It is, I think, wrong to allow a clause of this kind to pass through your Lordships' Committee without asking what, in practice, that could mean. I fully appreciate that there might well be many cases which would fall within the clause where its imposition would be logical in respect of the clauses which your Lordships have now seen fit to pass over. But it also takes in other cases and, as the Government introduced it at rather a second-thought stage, it is perhaps right that at the Committee stage in this House—and I imagine that this is what this House is for—we ask them to look again so that on Report they could perhaps consider this kind of case.

    In my capacity as chairman of the Independent Review Committee of the TUC, I know of a case that was something like this but, to my knowledge and memory, not precisely so. But a man certainly belonged to a union which he knew was affiliated to the TUC; he knew vaguely that there were TUC disputes committees, and that they did something about disputes between inter-affiliated unions. I doubt very much whether he had read the Disputes Principles and Procedures of the TUC. The union which he joined, which we may say is union A, had a somewhat unhappy history with union B, which organised workers at similar places of work at contiguous points in the workplace. Both unions were affiliated to the TUC.

    Indeed, the Government have been—and I imagine that they would stay in this posture—in a position where they say that unions should support the TUC Disputes, Principles and Procedures—not in any way in a differential sense because there may well be things in the TUC's procedures which could be looked at, and the TUC regularly tries to revise them. But, the Government, in their Code of Conduct on Closed Shops in 1980, said about trade unions:
    "If affiliated to the TUC, the union should have regard to the relevant TUC guidance".
    It goes on to say:
    "When determining whom they might accept into membership, the factors to which unions may have regard include the following"—
    and the third is whether the TUC principles and procedures governing relations between unions or any findings a TUC disputes committee are relevant.

    Elsewhere in the code the Disputes Principles and Procedures are commended. If the Government still take that position—and I have no reason to believe that they do not in theory—they should consider whether their clause, as a part of the machinery which they are introducing, will do damage. Let us suppose that in this case a dispute breaks out between the two unions and it goes to a TUC disputes committee. As there is so much misunderstanding about this, let me say that TUC disputes committees are not some bureaucratic machinery imposed on unions; as I know the noble Earl knows, they are composed of experienced officers of unions not involved in the dispute between union A and union B. They come, as it were, as a trade union jury and try to see the merits of the case according to the principles.

    Let us say that in this case they decide against union A. Everyone tries to persuade the worker to leave union A and join union B, as happens every day across the face of industry where there is multi-unionism, where there is perhaps some difficulty at the edges. Although we often say that it is a special problem for us, let us not think that it is the only trade union system in the world that has this problem. The "no-raiding" agreement in the United States of the AFL-CIO during various periods of its history has tried to solve great difficulties. Other trade union movements have this problem, although in different forms.

    But the man refuses. He is one of the people who the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, would understand best. I hope that the noble Lord will not misunderstand me if I say that I sometimes have the feeling that he has less understanding of my position than I have of his. I am not trying to be arrogant, but I am sure that we both make extraordinray efforts to achieve this, and this is a case where he might well get there an inch or two ahead of me. But I wonder whether he would stay there, because management complains that things are getting pretty bad down there in the workplace, because feelings are high and men get fed up and cross about this issue.

    There is always a long history. Very often at the beginning of the history it is something quite small, but it builds into an issue. It is the flash point of which industrial strife is composed. Perhaps management was to blame and should have done something about it, but that is old hat now. What will you do about it? The TUC disputes committee says, "You have broken the principles; he must go and join union B", or, if it is not a closed shop, "At least he must resign from union A". The worker says that he will do it. He has the right to resign, but he will not do it. There might be a rule in the union rule book saying that union A can dismiss him, expel him or exclude him, just on notice, in order to put this into effect. That, in fact, is the model rule of the TUC, which was held by the Court of Appeal 20 days ago to be contrary to public policy. As it is still, I hope, sub judice on appeal to your Lordships' Judicial Committee, let us hope that at least it is not illegal, because if the Bridlington agreement is illegal, the Government should hastily introduce into this Bill a new clause on first, second, third and fourth thoughts, to make it lawful.

    Let us suppose that that at least can be put aside. He then gets into a position where he is eventually dismissed. The history would be long; he would, of course, be suspended, but eventually he might be dismissed. He might be dismissed as a non-unionist, or, at any rate, for refusing to join the particular union, and so on, and he would easily fall within Section 58. He would then come before the tribunal. The tribunal is told that this is a Section 58 dismissal. Therefore he must have the special award, subject to any reduction that you may think he should have. He says: "No. In my case you can't make a reduction because all the objections that I made were objections to Clause 5(3) requirements: that I be, or become, a member of a particular union, or cease to be, or refrain from becoming, a member of a trade union. That is all I was doing."

    What this clause says is that there is not ever any case when that kind of objection should allow for reduction. That is not reasonable. If there is one such case in the hunting for the tiny last grain of the enemy's strength against non-unionism, the Government have set out in this curious barque of Clause 5 on some voyage of the Hunting of the Snark, and suddenly found that something more like a Boojum has popped up in their face because they did not mean it. I am sure they cannot have meant it in its present form.

    I should like to make it clear that I am taking a case which would be unusual, but, I can assure the noble Earl, not impossible, where the man says, "My only objection is as to the union, or unions, that I shall leave, or join", and that that shall be disregarded in the kind of case I have put to him. The Government should give us some kind of intimation as to whether they share that view. I imagine they would not. Certainly, if I am wrong in it, why am I wrong?

    6.42 p.m.

    I confess that I am in some difficulty because the noble Lord has defeated me. I simply do not quite know what the Snark or Boojum that he chasing is. My understanding of Clause 5, and certainly of the purposes of this amendment, is quite different. I have a perfectly respectable speaking note about the amendment and why the Government have it down. I do not wish to detain the Committee on this because it is consequential on a previous amendment, but it may be that we have overlooked the point that the noble Lord is anxious about. I am happy, without any commitment, to have a look at the point when I am able to take it in on reading the Official Report. Either the noble Lord has clean bowled me or his ball has passed so far over my head that I am not able to strike at it. I beg to move.

    Are we not in a rather unsatisfactory position here? Apparently the Government do not know what their own clause means and have been unable to elucidate what my noble friend's questions are. How can we decide on a matter on which the Government are unable to elucidate?

    The Government understand perfectly well what their own clause and amendment are about. It is Lord Wedderburn's objection to it that they do not understand.

    I apologise to the noble Earl. May I try in a sentence? My objection, and my party's objection, to Clause 5 as a whole is made worse by this amendment. I thought it was worth speaking to it now rather than twice. If this amendment is passed it will make worse the central feature of Clause 5; namely, that in no case whatever will anyone in the Section 58 position be able to have used against him the reduction procedure which the Government are so keen on, because anything that can be put against him will be rebutted

    That is now clearer to me. The noble Lord did not, I think, make it quite clear to the Committee that his argument in objection was to Clause 5 as a whole, and not to this particular amendment of the Government.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Clause 5, as amended, agreed to.

    Clause 6 [ Awards against third parties]:

    6.45 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 62:

    Page 9, line 1, leave out ("either the employer or the complainant") and insert ("the employer").

    The noble Lord said: We now come to one of the most important clauses in the Bill. The point of Clause 6 is to build upon the procedure introduced by the Employment Act 1980 into industrial tribunal proceedings for unfair dismissal whereby the employer who previously had been the only possible occupant of a seat on the defendant's side of the case could call in the trade union, in certain types of situation, to demand compensation contribution or indemnity from it or its officials. I apologise to your Lordships in failing to say at the outset—may I do it now—that in moving Amendment No. 62 I link with it the consequential Amendment No. 66 to leave out "or the complainant" in line 12.

    This clause builds upon the section in the Employment Act 1980 by extending the provisions for what have come to be called joinder; that is, the joining of the union, or its officials, or members. From the beginning we have been opposed to this procedure. We have been opposed to it because it jeopardises the position of the industrial tribunals themselves. We also think that in terms of industrial relations practice the Donovan Commission got it right when at paragraph 564 it said:

    "It might be argued that it is unjust"—

    for the union not to be a defendant—

    "since it is the union not the employer, which stands to gain from an insistence on an employee's being in the union. But the decision to dismiss is the employer's, taken ultimately because he considers it to be to the advantage of his business."

    On that basis the Donovan Commission ended with a conclusion that the tribunal should be kept for disputes between employees individually and employers, and not range too far wide.

    It is true that we have moved a long way since then. I am criticising no particular Administration's legislation when I say that we should look at it carefully again with that prescription of the Donovan Commission in mind. But there was one area where the Donovan Commission has suggested it would never be right—on experience especially abroad, not least in France with their labour courts—for the tribunal to be invited to go, and that was in the judgment of the justice of industrial action. There are hundreds of reasons for that and they are given in the report, but of course the simple point is that strikes, lock-outs, and industrial action are not justiciable issues. The justice of a strike is a profound value judgment. That is why if we, in this Bill, defend the right to strike we do not necessarily defend, or attack, a particular piece of industrial action.

    The industrial tribunals were kept out of the area of industrial conflict both by saying that industrial pressure on an employer should be ignored in judging the case, and, secondly, by allowing—this was a kind of quid pro quo for that provision—the employer to sack all strikers so long as he sacked them all and did not victimise among them. Then the tribunal had no jurisdiction, and has none now. That we come to in Clause 8.

    This amendment goes to the question of the third party procedure. I have said what I have said because we want to make it clear that the whole joinder procedure is misconceived and indeed harmful, because it brings before the industrial tribunal the justice and equity of the strike, or industrial action. It does it by saying, "Yes, this was an unfair dismissal. Now we have to decide what percentage of the compensation should be paid by the union, and we can do that only on the basis of what the Act tells us, on the basis of what we consider to be just and equitable in the circumstances", and obviously the justice and equity of the industrial action must be before the court.

    Fortunately, we have had, so far as research can tell, or at any rate certainly so far as reported cases show, almost no joinder actions of any consequence. Why has that been the case? It is because the Government themselves made the case for this amendment in 1980 when they heroically stood up to pressure from the Liberal Party. In the form it took in the other place it was heroic because they resisted an amendment moved on 11th March to the effect that it was not fair, and one can see the case for it if it is put in simple terms. It is, "Here is an unfairly dismissed employee. Why should he not be able to join the union? Why should the power to join the union rest only with the employer? "The big change made by this Bill—in Clause 6, to which the amendment applies to leave out the complainant—is that now the complainant is to be allowed to join the union.

    It is necessary—because it appears not to be widely known—to put to your Lordships the case that was put in the other place on 11th March 1980 at cols. 1062 to 1072. I shall read only some sentences from those columns, but they must be read because the Government must answer this case. For example:

    "It is the employer who is ultimately responsible for the dismissal and who is in the best position to know what considerations led him to dismiss the worker. It is right, therefore, that he should make the primary claim of unfair dismissal, rather than a third party. If he believes, and wishes to contend, that his arm was twisted, the law should provide him with an opportunity to claim contribution. But so far as the employee himself is concerned, it matters not who provides the compensation. All that he is concerned with, I suggest, is that he has been unfairly dismissed. The tribunal has found that he should be compensated according to law in consequence."

    A little later:

    "There are considerations that bear upon industrial relations. A joinder claim can, in certain circumstances, give rise, or be thought to give rise, to disruption, and an employer may, in the totality of his interest, think that it is better not to proceed in an application for joinder. I think he might appear to be prejudiced if the employee, without reference to the employer, was entitled to go against the union himself. Since he can get the whole of his compensation from his former employer, there appears to be no real reason why he should be given the right to proceed against the union, with possible consequential disruptive effects for the employer's industrial relations".

    Mr. Mayhew, the Under-Secretary of State—it was he who was speaking—pointed out that the 1971 Act did not give the employee dismissed a right of joinder. Indeed, it did not; even the Industrial Relations Act did not do what this Bill wants to do. In concluding on the matter—your Lordships will note that it was a long debate on the point in another place—Mr. Mayhew said, speaking as Under-Secretary of State for the present Administration two years ago:

    "I have to concede there could be circumstances in which a union would be less ready to take this kind of pressurising action if it knew that it was at risk of being proceeded against by the individual worker. Against that, we have to balance the potential disruptive effect of this type of action. I say 'potential' because I do not believe it would necessarily follow. But there is a potential here for considerable industrial disruption to the disadvantage of the firm and its workers as a whole, to say nothing of the employer himself. It would be open to the individual, for example, not to sue the union as to sue individual workers. One might then have a kind of running sore that could lead to great disruption and bring harm to the firm itself".

    I think that case is convincing. The Government have been asked more than once what has changed in the last two years, and I hope they will not give the answer tonight to your Lordships that they gave consistently in another place—namely, that there was growing concern over the closed shop—because that is an attack of the vapours, not an answer. We need material; we need to know what has changed and why Mr. Mayhew's convincing case is now so unconvincing that it is 100 per cent. reversed. It is not just that the complainant can join the union, the shop steward or the members—and remember, this is £30,000 which may be enforced against the member or shop steward; it is not that he can do that under certain circumstances or with the employer's collaboration—but that when he falls within Section 58 he can do it at any time he likes.

    If the last Act was thought to be likely in that situation to cause a kind of running sore in industrial relations, then this Bill will attack certain enterprises with positive paraplegia. There really cannot be a justification for this and a last word to those of your Lordships who are, or are associated with—I suppose we are all associated with—employers; there is nothing the employer can do about it. Perhaps he did not want to dismiss the man—maybe some manager did it by mistake, and I shall return to that on a later amendment—but he sees that he is before a tribunal and it is an unfair dismissal. He replies, "I am very sorry". If the reply is, "I'm not satisfied with that", he may reply, "I will pay you. Take the money". But the reply could come back, "No. I have the right to have the union. What is more, I have the right to have the shop steward in". I can understand that because such things happen; people feel strongly about such things, like, for example, the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. Although he would not be vindictive in that way, I am sure he can understand other people being so. As an employer, he is not going to feel happy to see his industrial relations being smashed to pieces, as Mr. Mayhew, the Under-Secretary of State, suggested might well happen.

    It is true, no doubt—sometimes at any rate—that consitsency is the logic of small minds. But there is no excuse for being so big-headed that you cannot see what you saw two years ago, and so far the Government have shown no reason at all, except an ideological proposition for a complete change of course on this matter. This is a most important issue in terms of what happens on the factory floor. This could be one of the most important areas for flashpoints of conflict in industry created by a change of course, a U-turn, on the part of the Government.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, has described the amendment and the purpose of the clause and, as he said, the main purpose of the provision is to allow an employee to join as a party in unfair dismissal proceedings a union or other person who he alleges forced his employer by threat of industrial action to dismiss him because he was not a union member. It may help the Committee if I explain that under Section 10 of the Employment Act 1980, an employer already has this right of joinder. The extension of this right to the dismissed employee is intended to increase the likelihood of unions being joined in unfair dismissal proceedings and, therefore, of becoming liable to pay compensation where they force an employer to dismiss unfairly. I believe that this extension will act as a considerable deterrent against unions pressing the employer to dismiss in the first place.

    It is not difficult to see why this should be the case. We know that employers, for their own industrial relations reasons, will often be reluctant to join unions in unfair dismissal proceedings. They may, for example, fear the industrial relations consequences of doing so. However, the result is that unions at the moment know that they have a pretty good chance of getting away with it if they force an employer to dismiss unfairly. But, of course, a dismissed employee is unlikely to be swayed by the same considerations as his former employer. He may well choose to use his right of joinder where his ex-employer declines to do so. As a result, trade unions are more likely to find themselves joined in proceedings and having, as a result, to pay the price for their actions.

    The noble Lord argued that employee joinder will cause industrial relations problems. He pointed out that the principle of employee joinder was not accepted by the Government during consideration of the Employment Act 1980. But we all know that situations alter cases, and despite what the noble Lord said, changing circumstances have now made the case for employee joinder much stronger. The Government are not inflexible. They have changed with the times, and views have changed. In particular, the mounting public concern over the closed shop, and over the dismissals that have been carried out in open defiance of the 1980 Act, clearly requires that liability for closed shop dismissals should more often be laid, where it is right to do so, at the door of trade unions.

    Moreover, in the Government's view it is not the case that employee joinder will cause industrial relations difficulties. If any employer does not "join" a union in unfair dismissal proceedings, but his dismissed employee does, how can the employer be held responsible for that by the union concerned? The employer would be able to make clear to the unions that he had nothing whatever to do with his ex-employee's decision; that the employee was no longer on his premises, and was thus out of his sphere of influence. If the amendments were accepted, there would be no employee joinder and little prospect of unions being made to pay where they force an employer to dismiss someone unfairly for not being a union member.

    The noble Lord might like me to go a little further with regard to points concerning the change since 1980. I have mentioned the fact that the 1980 Act has already been defied in many cases. There is also the question of the judgment in the European Court case, as well as the question of evidence in regard to the opinion polls. The case is a strong one. If the unions are worried about being joined in unfair dismissal proceedings following a closed shop sacking, there is one very simple answer. It is not to exert any pressure on the employer to dismiss unfairly in the first place. I really cannot accept all that the noble Lord has said in his decrial of the whole of the clause and the entire business of joinder, and for that reason I must ask that the amendment be rejected.

    I find myself very worried indeed about this proposal. It seems to me that the question of whether a person has been dismissed fairly or unfairly might be extremely difficult to determine in any particular case. Indeed it is the whole basis of the Bill that this question is one which must be very carefully decided. For any person in an employer-employee situation it might be very difficult to know in advance whether the dismissal has taken place fairly or unfairly; it is not a matter that is immediately obvious in every case. Complex situations arise from time to time.

    What worries me here is that if the dismissed person, who is obviously the aggrieved person, has the right to put the finger (as it were) on the person whom he holds responsible for his dismissal, there will be a position in which no person in the organisation is likely to get himself into the situation of being held so responsible. Therefore it seems to me that in any situation of that kind a person would be mad to become a shop steward, because the consequence of it would be that all the time he would be holding himself out to the possibility of being dismissed.

    I know from personal experience the difficulty that can be experienced over years in persuading people to become what are called Equity deputies. It is an arduous task. One has to go around the place, pressing people to keep up their subscriptions. Nobody really wants to do it. They want to get on with their acting, to get on with their profession. But, fortunately, a number of people can be persuaded to be sufficiently public-spirited to hold the whole organisation together and to go on to do the arduous job of Equity deputy, who is in fact the representative of the organisation in the particular company concerned.

    An Equity deputy has from time to time the rather arduous and unpopular duty of badgering people for money. Sometimes, in representing the collective to the employer, he has to say to the employer, "You are not behaving as you should according to the contract", and thereby he runs the risk of being prejudiced regarding casting of future productions. It seems to me that in addition to all that disadvantage which he at present suffers, under the clause he might hold himself out to be sued personally for large sums of money as a result of an unfair dismissal, and at the time he might not have been aware that it was unfair.

    So there is a situation in which perhaps the deputy says to another person, "You must join the union", and he replies, "No." Eventually the deputy goes to the employer and says, "Look, this chap is refusing to join, and we can't work with him—otherwise the whole situation will break down". At that time the deputy might believe himself to be acting entirely within the law. He might say, "What I am doing here is what I have always done, since this is a situation in which the contractual obligation between employer and employee must be upheld". He holds a meeting with the company, and somewhat reluctantly it agrees that the Equity shop must be maintained, and a decision is taken accordingly.

    The employer then dismisses; and let us suppose that there has been some defect in the whole procedure. For some reason or other, possible entirely unknown to him at the time, the deputy has created a situation in which it is possible for the dismissed person to show that he has been dismissed unfairly. In those circumstances this entirely innocent individual will be severly prejudiced and might have to find substantial sums of money. I would suggest that in all the circumstances my noble friend has made his case here, and it did not seem to me that it was answered by the noble Lord who replied. I hope that the Committee will again look very carefully at this question, to see whether, possibly unwittingly, the trade union movement could be undermined to the extent of making it extremely difficult to persuade people to undertake the arduous and unpopular duty of deputy or shop steward.

    7.7 p.m.

    Surely the answer to the worry of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, is that no decent, honourably conducted trade union would allow a shop steward, involved in payment of compensation in the circumstances that we are discussing, to pay the compensation out of his own pocket. Any honourably conducted union would stand behind him, just as any other good organisation would. I am perfectly certain that the union with which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, was very much concerned—perhaps he is still concerned with it—would undoubtedly behave in that way. I do not know any union that would leave the shop steward high and dry.

    I think that my noble friend Lord Glenarthur did a most effective demolition job on the amendment. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, will not regard it as vindictive if I say that my noble friend really demolished his speech. There is only one further consideration that I would put before the Committee on this matter, and it relates to the point, which is crucial in regard to this amendment, concerning the right of the complainant to join the union. Given the very large sums that can be awarded to complainants in these cases (as has been frequently pointed out), in the case of a very small employer it is possible that the complainant himself might feel that his employer would be unable to meet the kind of figure that would be likely under the Bill to be awarded; or even if he could meet it, he would have to go into liquidation and so endanger the employment of other people, in order to find the money. Therefore, where there is involved a union with the kind of funds that most major unions in this country have available, it might he extremely sensible for the complainant to make sure that the union, which can certainly meet any payment that might be awarded, should be joined. That would be a thoroughly sensible and prudent step to take.

    On the general issue, I have always thought that it was really extremely unfair to an employer who, by union pressure and by the threat that if he does not yield to it there will be disruption of his business, has been compelled to dismiss someone, perhaps unwillingly, that there should be added to the insult of having to do that the injury of having to find the whole of the compensation awarded. If the effect of this clause as it stands, without the amendment, is, as my noble friend Lord Glenarthur I think rightly said, that unions are going to be more involved in the payment of compensation, this must be a good thing from two points of view: first of all, because it is plainly in these circumstances more equitable, and, secondly, because it could be quite an effective discouragement to unions from doing what most people think they ought not to do—namely, use their power to drive out of his job someone with whom they have a quarrel or disagreement, or who will not join them. Therefore, as a deterrent to union action of that kind—action which can only impose, if successful, hardship on individuals—it seems to me that this clause is quite a valuable improvement to our law, and I hope the Committee will reject the amendment.

    I was disappointed with the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, but in another way I was pleased that he put it forward in such a stark way because it showed the real position that the Government wish to adopt on this matter. I am wondering where the Government have got their advice. Why is it that very few employers have used this discretion, which is there already, to join a trade union or other person? Why have they not used that discretion? I wonder where the Government have got their advice now to allow this joinder to be made by an employee. Surely there is going to be a lot of diflerence in the exercise of this discretion between an employer, who has all the responsibilities, and a dismissed employee, who will not have the same sense of responsibility or sense of discretion when it comes to deciding what to do.

    The noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur (I wish I could take my shorthand better than I can), used the words "a deterrent against the union", "be laid at the door of unions", "the union must be made to pay", or words to this effect. But when one looks at the clause one sees that the words are
    "…pressure which a trade union or other person exercised on the employer by calling organising procuring or financing a strike or other industrial action or by threatening to do so".
    Therefore, one could have an attitude adopted by a person on the shop floor who says, "We are not going to stand for this any longer; this person has been acting in such a way in making the shop floor unhappy that we really have got to do something about it".

    It may not be the trade union, or even the shop steward, but an individual. It may be personal feeling between the dismissed individual and another person; but he is now going to have a discretion. It is a discretion which an employer would never dream of taking if he has a sense of responsibility, but the individual may do so. I therefore say again: I wonder from where the Government got their advice to proceed with this important change.

    I must confess to having been a convert from the view which was expressed in another place in 1980 to the view which is now in the Bill before us. I then believed that it was right that the employer, who actually discharges the man, makes the man unemployed, should carry the responsibility for it, no matter what pressure he came under. That was my view at that time. I have become convinced by the experience of the last two years of the fact that the employers feel, and understandably feel, great difficulty in provoking further industrial troubles by joining a union, that that course is not effective and that it has been necessary, as my noble friend Lord Glenarthur said, to bring in a more effective measure so that the complaint can go directly to those who are responsible for his dismissal, the union which applied the pressure. I therefore very much support the clause and the change of attitude that has come about during those two years.

    I hesitated before getting up (as, with leave, I wish to do just for a moment) because I did not know whether the noble Lords who sit on the Social Democratic Benches were going to say a word about the justice of this position. However, they are not, and so may I say three things. First, to the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, I would say that I have had cases demolished and I am sure the noble Lord has, too, but if the noble Lord says that, tonight, the noble Lord the Minister demolished the case for this amendment, then the noble Lord the Minister demolished the case put by the Government on 11th March 1980. I shall look up the records with interest to see whether the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, voted with the Liberal Party, spoke with the Liberal Party, marched with the Liberal Party against the Bill as it was then, which is completely contrary to what it is going to be after this Bill is passed. I doubt very much whether I will find that. Secondly, I have heard no evidence—

    Would the noble Lord allow me to interrupt him? Is the noble Lord such a conservative that he can never change his mind in the light of changing facts?

    Indeed, no; but I am sufficiently sensibly radical always to want reasons for the change, and none has been produced tonight—none at all. "Changing circumstances", "mounting coercion"—good phrases, but not a good case. Indeed, the words "employee joinder" have been used. But, of course (the next amendment will show, but let me put it now) this is not employee joinder; this is non-unionist joinder, because it does not apply to trade unionists who are dismissed. The case was that of the Government in 1980, and it really has not been answered tonight.

    I hope the noble Lord the Minister will forgive me because I forgot to pursue the Hunting of the Snark with the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, when he was here. I will do so now as a final point before your Lordships part with this amendment:
    "It is a pitiful pail', said the Bellman, whose face
    Had grown longer at every word,
    "But now that you have stated the whole of your case,
    "More debate would be simply absurd".

    Not for the first time, I am a little alarmed at following the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, but I think that perhaps I can start with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins. If in doubt the employer, of course, should not dismiss an employee. If an individual shop steward is in doubt as to whether he is likely to be joined in unfair dismissal proceedings, he should not put any pressure on the employer to dismiss him. It is perfectly true in all our lives that if we have any doubt as to whether or not some action we take might break the law, then of course we play safe and do not take it—and that, I think, applies just as much in this case as it does to the normal way of our lives. The noble Lord wishes to interrupt?

    I wish to clarify this point. Has the noble Lord never been in the position when he was absolutely convinced he was entirely right and had no doubt at all, and then subsequently found he was wrong?

    Yes, of course, that is true, but it is also true to say that it can be perfectly reasonable for someone to have very strong grounds for not wanting to take particular industrial action, for example, which he may feel might be politically motivated. He might feel very strongly about it, but I think that comes within exactly the same description as the noble Lord seeks to give.

    The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, asked for amplification of the term "other person". This could of course be a shop steward, who could apply pressure individually. Even a fellow worker might apply pressure. Indeed, it could be someone from another union who applies pressure. Literally anybody who applies pressure on an employer to dismiss an employee is the point which is being made here.

    It was asked by, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn: why have not employers used the power of joinder? Employers may well have been swayed by industrial relations considerations. On the other hand, the employee will not be swayed by the same considerations. If the employee joins a union, there is no reason why this should lead to industrial relations disadvantages. I am grateful for the support of my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter. He says things so much more neatly than I can possibly try to emulate. I am grateful for what he said. I get the impression from the Opposition Benches—it seems to represent to some extent their view of someone who resigns from a trade union, although I am expressing myself not very well—that greedy troublemakers could perhaps be the sort of people envisaged in this case.

    The noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon, who unfortunately is not here today, said in our debate last week that not everything a trade union does is defensible. Noble Lords opposite must recognise that, as I have said, many people leave trade unions on genuine grounds of principle because they do not want to take industrial action which may be politically motivated or which is harming the general public. If they are "hounded out" (as my noble friend, Lord Boyd-Carpenter described it) of their jobs by the trade union, it is only natural and right that the trade union should be held responsible at law. It is not a question of greed or spite; it is a matter of principle. That, as the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, has said, is what we are debating. It is not enough that justice should be done but that justice should be seen to be done. That is why this Bill provides that someone who has been unfairly dismissed because of trade union pressure will have a right of joinder against the trade union. That is why I ask the Committee to reject this amendment.

    On Question, amendment negatived.

    7.22 p.m.

    This is probably a convenient moment for the House to be resumed for the dinner break. Before I move that Motion, it might be helpful if I were to make a short announcement about the remainder of this Bill. As your Lordships will be aware, there is still a large number of amendments and clauses to be considered. I must tell your Lordships that if we are to sit no later than 11 o'clock tonight, as I believe to be the general wish of the Committee, unless considerably better progress is made during the rest of tonight and tomorrow, then tomorrow's sitting, which already must inevitably be very late indeed may literally have to be all night.

    We have heard the Government Chief Whip with some trepidation threaten us with an all-night Sitting. We on these Benches always do our duty. We rather regret that the Government are so inefficient that they bring forward a Bill of this order, of this controversial kind, at the very end of the Session. Noble Lords who have a lot to do—and some of us are not as young as we were—may have to sit all night because of the inefficiency of the Government.

    I will not be drawn by the noble Baroness, tempted though I might be at other times to be so. I must tell her that it is with even greater trepidation that I, myself, am awaiting the outcome of my forecast. I wanted to say what I believe to be a fair representation of the facts at the minute, because I do not want to spring anything on your Lordships tomorrow without due warning.

    As regards the dinner adjournment for this particular Bill, I think it would probably be right to resume the Committee stage no earlier than ten minutes past eight o'clock; and, therefore, I beg to move that the House do now resume.

    Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

    House resumed.

    Excise Duties (Deferred Payment) Regulations 1982

    7.25 p.m.

    The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security
    (Lord Trefgarne)

    rose to move, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 8th June be approved.

    The noble Lord said: I beg to move that the Excise Duties (Deferred Payment) Regulations 1982 laid before this House on 8th June be approved. Recent events have caused the Government to look closely at our procedures for deferred payment of excise duties. To meet our European Community obligations under Article 95 of the Treaty of Rome, we must ensure that the duty treatment of home-produced goods and goods imported from other Member-States has equivalent effect. In cases decided by the European Court, this has been held to apply not only to the actual rates of duty but also to the methods of assessing and paying duty. The arguments about precisely what this means in the context of payment methods are very complex, but the conclusion we have reached is that the only area of doubt as regards our present payment arrangements concerns beer, cider, made-wine and matches. We think that the differences between our treatment of imported and domestic products in these fields are such as to raise genuine queries under Article 95. This doubt could, of course, be removed either by extending duty deferment to imported goods or by withdrawing the existing duty deferment provisions for domestic products. The latter course would be an unfair blow to our producers and would be quite unjustified. Extending deferment to imported beer, made-wine, cider and matches is a relatively minor measure attracting a once-for-all cost in the first year of less than £5 million. Accordingly, we have decided to follow this course as a sensible way of removing any doubts or uncertainties.

    The regulations we are now discussing give effect to this decision and provide for deferment of the excise duties payable on imported beer, made-wine, cider and perry, and matches, which are in free circulation in the European Community, immediately prior to consignment to the United Kingdom. They will enable duty to be deferred whether the goods are delivered direct to the home market at importation or are first deposited in a bonded warehouse.

    In most respects, their provisions are similar to those which have been in operation for several years for customs duties. Importers must make prior application for approval from Customs and Excise and give security for the duty, normally by banker's guarantee. In return, payment will be deferred for an average period of 30 days.

    These provisions will give similar periods of deferment to those allowed to United Kingdom producers. I should perhaps, however, explain the position regarding beer, as it is slightly more complicated. For United Kingdom brewers an average of 40 days' deferment is allowed, as opposed to the average of 30 now proposed for imports. The reason for this is that duty on beer in the United Kingdom is assessed at an early stage of production. Imported beer, however, is in a finished state. The 10-day difference reflects the average time-lapse due to the production process, and thus ensures that the proposed deferment provisions will have an effect equivalent to those in operation for United Kingdom brewers. These regulations will come into force on 15th October, 1982.

    Moved, That the draft regulations laid before the House on 8th June be approved.—( Lord Trefgarne.)

    My Lords, may I thank the noble Lord for explaining the intricacies of this particular order. The Statutory Instruments Committee have examined the order and they have made no comment on it. It is necessary for this order to be laid, as the noble Lord has said, in order to implement the United Kingdom's obligation to the Community to enable excise payments to be deferred on imported beer, made-wine, cider and matches. I felt that this was rather an odd bunch of products. Beer, I can understand; and the noble Lord has explained to us the situation with regard to beer imported from the Community as opposed to beer which is made in the United Kingdom. I am wondering whether different regulations will apply with regard to the payment of duties for, say, beer imported from Australia, which is without the Community and is not made here either. Therefore, are there some different arrangements for payment of duty with regard to beer imported from elsewhere?

    I find "made-wine" a new term in the customs regulations. One feels it must be somewhat different from ordinary wine or different from fortified wine. Perhaps it is some form of reconstituted wine, some form of powder which is imported and will be transformed into British sherry or products of this nature. I wonder whether the noble Lord could inform your Lordships about this special category of made-wine. I also find cider a rather odd item on this list. I am not perhaps such a devotee of cider drinking as I was in my youth. I do not recall ever drinking imported cider. Maybe the noble Lord can inform your Lordships of the amount of cider that we import and what is the importance of this particular alcoholic drink included with the others?

    Regarding matches, this definitely seems the "odd man out" as it is not a drink of any sort. One wonders whether in fact one has been remiss, when returning from overseas, in not declaring any matches which one may have picked up in restaurants or hotels throughout the Community. I wonder whether the noble Lord can clarify that point as well.

    My Lords, first of all, the noble Lord asked about the application of these arrangements to Australian beer. As I understand it, this order applies only to our European Community obligations. It does not relate to the importation of spirits, for example, where I think there are no Community obligations; and it certainly does not apply outside the European Community. Made-wine is a fermented drink made from imported grape juice or the juice of other fruits imported. There is I understand a type of cider in France of which the noble Lord may not have partaken; and I must confess that I do not think I have done so either. Clearly some have, and that is why this regulation applies to that.

    As for matches, the noble Lord need not be concerned that he has failed to declare the odd box of matches that he has inadvertently brought in with him from his trips abroad. I understand that the rate of duty is £1·15p per short standard—and a short standard in regard to matches is 7,200 matches, no less. Therefore the noble Lord will probably not even need his Barclaycard to pay the duty.

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Building Societies (Special Advances) Order 1982

    7.33 p.m.

    rose to move, That the draft order laid before the House on 22nd June be approved.

    The noble Lord said: My Lords, under the Building Societies Act 1962, special advances are restricted to a maximum of 10 per cent. of all loans made in a year. A limit on special advances was first introduced in 1960 in response to certain speculative abuses which had developed in some building societies. The aim was to restrict loans which societies could advance other than for the finance of owner occupation. Because of problems of providing a legal definition of owner occupation, however, special advances were defined as being all advances to companies and large advances to individuals.

    This order increases from £37,500 to £60,000 the limit above which a sum lent to a person by a building society is treated as a special advance. Since 1960 this limit has been increased six times, the present figure of £37,500 being set on 1st January 1981. Setting the limit too low imposes a burden on societies' administration and can constrain societies in their competition with the banks for mortgage business. Too low a limit can also bring the system into disrepute because the control is seen as an unnecessary one in relation to its original purpose.

    With the entry of the banks into the market there is no longer a mortgage famine and any credit-worthy borrower who wants one can get one. In the light of these new conditions, we consider it right to make the figure up to what is an appropriate prudential level. The Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies is satisfied that setting the figure at anything below £60,000 (which is equivalent to about two and a half times the average house price) is unnecessary on prudential grounds. Furthermore, the Building Societies Association has reassured the Government that there is no intention on the part of any society to reduce its lending at the lower end of the market. The average building society advance in the United Kingdom in 1981 was less than £15,000 and it is reasonable to expect that the vast majority of advances will continue to be well below the new limit. The societies make considerable efforts to ensure that first time buyers and those seeking smaller properties are helped to the greatest possible extent.

    Although the effective date of the draft order is to be 1st September 1982, a building society will not be able to work to the new limit until its next following financial year. For most societies this will mean that they will be able to work to the new limit as from 1st January 1983. However, a number of societies, including two of the top five, have accounting years which end before 31st December and the order will, therefore, take effect for those societies for the year 1982–83.

    Although this is an increase of 60 per cent. of the previous figure, that is, similar in size to the percentage increase made by the last Government in 1975, it does contain an element for forward provision to avoid the need for a further increase for several years and the consequent demands on parliamentary time. It will help building societies in competing with the clearing banks and particularly assist those smaller societies who need to make high value loans because of higher house prices in their areas. I invite the House to approve this order. I beg to moved.

    Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 22nd June be approved.—( Lord Trefgarne.)

    My Lords, I wrote to the Minister to tell him of my interest in this matter. I am grateful to him for the explanation that he has given. This is, of course, not unexpected because the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the intention of the Government to do this when speaking at the annual banquet of the Building Societies' Association a few weeks ago. It was one part of his speech that was received with obvious satisfaction. There are other parts of his speech which were not so welcome—those parts being to remind the association that they had obligations towards a large number of members who had certain rights under the Building Societies Act and the constitution of building societies which must not be overlooked and which I am afraid do get overlooked in some of the operations of the mammoth building societies of today.

    Talking of grassroots in building societies, probably I am nearer the grassroots than most noble Lords and existing directors of building societies or indeed existing members of building societies. My family and I—my father especially—go right back to the beginning of building societies and we know how they started, why they started and we have seen how far they have progressed. So I am rather anxious, as the noble Lord knows, to utter a cautionary word whenever I see the building societies going into the realm of financial institutions, yet depending the while on their beneficial position related to the kind of service that they were intended to give to people. The noble Lord has mentioned, as did the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that this will assist the building societies in competition with the banks—as though the building societies and the banks were rival institutions in this field, each deserving some help in competition with the other. I do not see it in that light at all; nor do I see any reason, frankly, why the building societies should press for the lifting of this limit on special advances in present circumstances. Why do the building societies want to go into this field of special advances at a level where normally building societies have never gone before?

    This limit of £60,000 is a very substantial mortgage to grant on the purchase of an owner-occupied house. One feels this is hardly the semi-detached house in the suburbs of our larger cities, or indeed modest housing of any kind. This is tycoonery, and I am not sure that the building societies have any special claim to be lending money on advances of this size. I would have thought this was eminently work for the banks. After all, they can turn the tap on and off as money is available, without the sort of continuing policy of stability of building society lending.

    So I question this. I know that the Building Societies Associations want it but I do not see that as a justification for granting it as readily as all that. After all, the present limit of £37,500 was decided upon only just over a year ago and one wonders why it is now lifted to £60.000. It certainly has not to do with the rise in the price of property. This is not a rise in order to keep updated the £37,500. This increase is being brought in in order to give the building societies a fresh thrust into a market which they fear the banks will get exclusively for themselves if they are not in it, and I really do not see why they should be in it.

    As for the undertaking that the building societies will not reduce their lending at the lower end of the scale, what is that assurance worth? It is not the reduction of lending at the other end of the scale that we are worried about: it is the failure to increase it, I would have thought. That is where the help for home ownership really is needed, and while I understand the restrictions placed upon the total amount of special advances, to say that the building societies have given an assurance that they will not reduce the lending at the lower end of the scale does not seem to me to satisfy any criterion regarding the position and policy of building societies.

    We have in prospect a very important, and I hope, a significant review of the role of building societies and their institutional life. It may not come in this Parliament but it should certainly come very soon now, because the building societies are going far away from the intentions of their origin and from the conditions and privileges which the building societies Acts confer upon them because of their social value and because of their social policy. They are not in the market as moneylenders or as bankers; they are there to convert the savings of large numbers of people into home ownership of large numbers of people—a transfer of resources from millions of modest investors to the house purchase desires of millions of modest house owners. This is really the exchange level of the building societies—not between the small investors on the one hand and the £60,000 people on the other. That was not really the equation to be struck by building societies at all. And so, while I am not opposing this order—with the House in its present condition it is difficult to do anything else but be agreeable about it—at the same time, I think that an order of this kind related to building societies should not go as a matter of routine in your Lordships' House. I can only conclude by saying that, in my role as candid friend and vice-president of the Building Societies Association, not all that I say will be welcome to them but on the other hand I believe that perhaps a good deal of what I say may be good for them: at any rate I hope so.

    My Lords, I should like to say just a few words to add to the expert remarks of my noble friend Lord Houghton of Sowerby, and I should first like to thank the noble Lord for explaining the order. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, has commented on many of its facets. I think I understand it correctly that in fact there is no intention of increasing the percentage of building society loans which may be made as special advances and therefore we are assured that the remaining percentage will be used by the building societies in their traditional role of making loans for house purchase.

    In moving the order, the noble Lord explained why the category of special advances was introduced in the past. However, I may say that I was somewhat concerned that the noble Lord eventually had two contrary arguments about why there needed to be 60 per cent. increase in the amount at the present time. It is now two years since the previous order was made in 1980, and that seems to be something like a 30 per cent. a year increase in the amount of money which may be allowed on a special advance. The noble Lord said this figure had been hit upon because it included in it a provision for future inflation.

    Therefore, he was trying to make out the case, on the one hand, that the increase was really in line with what had gone before and with all the increases that had been made at previous times. Yet, on the other hand, he specifically said that one of the reasons for this increase in the amount which could be made as a special advance was to enable the building societies to compete more readily with the banks. I fail to see the force of that particular argument when put with the other argument which the noble Lord used which, as I said, was that it was basically to keep pace with inflation and to make allowance for future inflation. We do not oppose this order, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Houghton, has said, we think that a earful watch should be kept on this particular matter.

    My Lords, your Lordships will forgive me, I think, if I do not repeat all the rationale I deployed a moment ago for this particular increase. I should like, if I might, to conclude simply with this point. The building societies find themselves in competition with the banks in the supply of mortgages. The fact is that the banks work without restriction of any kind in this area, and we thought it right, having regard to that, having regard to the degree of inflation which has taken place since 1980 and having regard to the need to avoid coming back to Parliament time and time again for modest increases in this limit, to set the level at £60,000 as the order provides.

    I think that the point expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, about the supply of mortgages at the lower end of the market, is not one that need trouble him unduly. There is, of course, no fixed quantum of building society funds for mortgages. Their liquidity has recently been rising and I think that societies would certainly wish to increase their total mortgage lending, if they could. So an expansion of largeish advances would not mean any reduction in the level of smaller advances, which was the point concerning the noble Lord.

    It may be of interest if I tell the noble Lord that, so far as the current year is concerned, we shall not have figures with respect to total advances in this category, but for 1981 the average proportion of special advances for all societies was only 1.5 per cent. So we are very well inside the 10 per cent. limit, which is, of course, a feature of this arrangement. I hope that that clarification sets the fears of the noble Lord at rest.

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until ten minutes past eight o'clock.

    Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

    [ The Sitting was suspended from 7.52 p.m. until 8.10 p.m.]

    Employment Bill

    House again in Committee on Clause 6.

    moved Amendment No. 63:

    Page 9, line 4, after ("complainant") insert ("(i)").

    The noble Lord said: I rise to move Amendment No. 63 which is associated with Amendments Nos. 64, 65 and 68 to which, with your Lordships' permission, I shall also speak. These are amendments to Clause 6 which may be said to go to a part of the philsosophy of the Government's policy which is dear to the Government's heart. The Government have in another place, and to some extent here, stressed the importance of responsibility for one's actions. When we come to Clause 13—in some ways the most important clause in the Bill—it will be said that the trade unions must take responsibility in law for their actions. In Clause 6, as we have seen in previous debates on the clause, the Government are taking the view that not only should trade unions and their officials and members take responsibility for any actions which, by industrial action or by the threat of it, induce the unfair dismissal of a non-unionist but that the non-unionist must be allowed, whatever the consequences to industrial relations, to have the right to join those defendants in the tribunal and claim compensation from them.

    But there is another theme which the Government have made a central feature of their case for the Bill, though it does not appear in this clause; namely, that the Bill is even-handed. Clause 6, with the new Section 76A(1)( b), shows that the person who can use this procedure of joinder must be a non-unionist. It is only to be used where:

    "the pressure was exercised because the complainant was not a member of any trade union or of a particular trade union".

    It is true that the latter phrase could include a trade unionist who would not join another union, with the inter-union problems which that involves, but in general terms there is no equivalent provision in the Bill protecting trade unionists.

    It may be asked, how could that be so because there would not be industrial pressure against their joining trade unions in general. Of course that is right, but what the amendments do is to introduce into the Bill an element of personal responsibility on the part of three kinds of people. First, managers who victimise trade unionists would be able to be joined as defendants by the trade unionist when he is dismissed, just as a shop steward can be joined by a non-unionist when he is dismissed; secondly, advisers who give advice to employers as to who to dismiss and who not to dismiss; and, third, consultants who may do the same. In other words, what the amendment says is that managers, consultants, advisers and in particular those who distribute black lists of workers—which are very common in some industries—should be as personally responsible for their acts as the shop steward and the union member, the Government insist, must be for theirs. It is a case of sauce for the goose and sauce for the gander.

    It may be that some people say in regard to the first group that if it is a manager, the employer may dismiss him if he is preposterously wrong-headed in picking on trade unionists. I have no doubt that most employers would take that view, but not all of them would do so. Picking on trade unionists is known. My honourable and right honourable friends in another place wrote to the Guardian in October of last year citing the case in Scotland—the Lord Advocate is here and I am sure he will know of it—of a shop steward and active trade unionists being victimised. Foyle's has been mentioned in your Lordships' Committee this evening. A recent report by the Low Pay Unit in the case of stable workers and grooms, mostly women workers, showed that mere membership of the

    National Association of Grooms was regarded in some circles, on advice from other people, as a cause for dismissal.

    The matter goes further than that. So far as consultants and advisers are concerned, there are organisations in our society which, I am sure with all sincerity, regard it as their business to circulate black lists to employers urging them to dismiss people because they are militant trade unionists. They do it on a variety of grounds, and frequently they say it is because they are subversives and the like. But these are value judgments, founded always upon the simple fact that the worker in question is a militant or active trade unionist. I have a large file of illustrations of such cases taken from the newspapers. The ones I cite now are from the Guardian.

    On 11th May 1974 there was the case of Strongs Limited. Having encouraged a worker to apply for a management job they then backed down and said they could not have him because he had been a Communist election candidate. This was not true but, for my money, it does not matter whether or not it is true or false. The person who sends it should take responsibility. Trade union activity was also involved, because the trade unionists rang up the number they found on a document and found that it was the number of the Economic League. Similarly, on 23rd and 24th May 1977 there was the case of Greenwich Reinforcement Limited. There was a workers' occupation. The files of management were found and the evidence led to the Economic League sending records of workers in this respect. In the case of the Great Southern Cemetery and Crematorium Group, in 1978 a confidential memorandum was found. It said that if there was the slightest suggestion of any information held against a proposed employee from this source, he was not to be engaged. The source was checked by the Guardian and it happened to be the Economic League. In 1979 there was an item in the Financial Times which indicated the same story. The Economic League has been more forthcoming recently than it used to be in the past. I quote the Assistant Chairman of the League in 1978. He said:

    "The League puts considerable effort into monitoring the activities of subversive groups and individuals."

    They see it as their duty to send round this information about workers. Sometimes it is not wholly accurate or the full story.

    I say that there is a parallel and I say it for this reason: that the industrial pressure which the union puts on the employer to dismiss the non-unionist need not be illegal industrial pressure. The clause says nothing whatever about it being unlawful. It need not even be in breach of the contract of employment. It can be a work-to-rule or a go-slow which does not break a worker's contract of employment. So lawful action can take you into the tribunal and make you liable for up to £30,000 in the joinder procedure. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. Why should not managers take a similar responsibility or, if your Lordships balk at that, why should not third parties, certainly in the case of untrue information and possibly in the case of information put out of context which causes, as my honourable friends in the other place put it in the recent Scottish example, management to draw up a hit list of active trade unionists? Why should that not also engage personal responsibility in a tribunal?

    We have debated tonight how many cases there are amongst non-unionists. There may be a few more than we suggested on this side, but I should be happy to show at length that for every non-unionist in this situation there are tens, dozens, perhaps more trade unionists whose militancy or even modest activity has been and is still being—and, in the recession, is increasingly being—victimised by a small minority of employers who should not only pay themselves but whose advisers and consultants should also be brought into the full light of public interest and display, be they the British United Industrialists, the Economic League or whatever other organisation they are. I beg to move.

    8.20 p.m.

    The noble Lord, Lord Bishopston, says "Not enough" and I am bound to say that he might have taken the words out of my mouth; instead, he said them out of his own mouth from a sedentary position. The point we are discussing is quite simply the one where the employer was induced to dismiss the complainant by pressure which a trade union or other person exercised on the employer. That is the position—that the employer was induced to dismiss the complainant. Who is in the dock in this case? It is the employer. Who is responsible for the dismissal? It is the employer. Let us consider the person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the employer. Who is this person if it is not the employer in one form or the other? It is clearly someone who acts with the authority of the employer. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, asked about the manager. The manager would be acting on the authority of the employer and the employer would be the person responsible for the dismissal. If it is the manager who might have been the cause, clearly it is the employer who is the right person to defend in unfair dismissal proceedings.

    The amendment also refers to an adviser or consultant to the employer, but again, it is up to the employer to decide whether he likes the advice of his adviser or his consultant. If he does not, then it becomes his decision to dismiss the employee, and his is the responsibility for the dismissal. Again, the employer is the right person to defend the unfair dismissal proceedings. Advisers only advise and consultants are there only to be consulted. If they go around forcing employers to do this, that or the other, then they cease to be advisers or consultants in any normal sense of the words.

    Having dealt with the person acting on behalf of the employer, and with the adviser or consultant to him, we are left with only an associated employer. This term has been defined in legislation. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 says in Section 30:
    "any two employers are to be treated as associated if one is a company of which the other (directly or indirectly) has control, or if both are companies of which a third person (directly or indirectly) has control; and in this Act 'associated employer' shall be construed accordingly."
    Thus, at the very minimum we have two employers who are bound together as part of the same group of companies. If one suffers, ultimately they all suffer. So clearly, no employer is going to "join" an associate employer in tribunal proceedings even if—and I must say this seems pretty far-fetched—that associate employer puts pressure on him to dismiss the complainant. And why should an employee want to join an associate employer rather than his actual former employer? Ultimately, any compensation will come out of the same corporate purse.

    I feel that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, are—if I may say so—a little off-target. The right person to defend the unfair dismissal case in the situation envisaged by the amendment is clearly the employer, and there can be no sensible reason why the employee should want to "join" advisers, consultants or associate employers for the reasons I have given. I hope that your Lordships will agree that the Bill will be the better without the amendment.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, made two points with which I wish to deal very briefly. First, there was a sort of ex-cathedra pronouncement that the work-to-rule or go-slow does not involve a breach of contract of employment. That is not necessarily true in law. Secondly, the noble Lord introduced an irrelevance—another of what I have perhaps disrespectfully described on previous occasions as a "red herring". It is an irrelevance beyond the ambit of this clause for what appears to be the purpose of attacking an institution to which he referred as the Economic League. I am not here to defend any institution, least of all the Economic League, of which I know little. But it does seem to be a pointless exercise within the ambit of this clause in unfair dismissal. As the Front Bench says, unfair dismissal must be defended by the employer. It is the only point.

    May I deal with one of the points, at least, made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway? Perhaps I did not make myself clear. I meant, and hope that I said, that industrial action within the meaning of Clause 6 does not necessarily have to be industrial action which is in breach of a contract of employment.

    May I just finish the point? It is a very important point, because if it can be lawful but industrial action then it means that one is being joined in a tribunal for something which is less than a breach of one's contract of employment. I do not have the precise reference concerning that authority, although it comes on another clause; I hope to find that reference when we come to it. The name of the case, and it was a recent case, was Power Packing Limited v. Faust. It was either this year or last year, and if the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, looks at that case he will find, at great joy to his soul, that industrial action within the meaning of these terms need not involve a breach of contract, as it did not in that case.

    I perfectly well apprehend that in most cases a go-slow or work to rule—even a work to rule since 1972 and the ASLEF case which the noble Lord knows of as well as I—usually involves a breach of contract of employment. That is true. Whether that is so in Scotland the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate will be able to advise us better. In England it is normally so, but is not necessarily so under the clause because of the authority of that case, if no other.

    I am obliged to the noble Lord. The case to which he referred is known to me and is authority for the proposition which he mentioned. It is not authority for the proposition which he mentioned and I noted; and if I am wrong in my notes it will be seen in Hansard tomorrow, and I apologise in advance. The proposition I noted was that the work to rule or go-slow does not involve a breach of contract of employment. It was only on that point that I rose to speak and I hope that I shall be forgiven.

    I was speaking too fast, I am sure. The work to rule or go-slow does not necessarily involve a breach of contract—not always, not 100 per cent. in every single case, as in the Faust case. That is a minor point.

    The point put by the noble Lord the Minister struck me as astonishing. I take the point that consultants consult, that advisers advise, and that managers manage. That is what they are paid to do. What I am saying is that if one asks for some kind of equivalent pressure one will not find it, or at least one will not find it very often. One may find it from the associated employer, but there the noble Lord the Minister is on very weak ground with the associated employer in his answer, and it may well cause noble Lords to come back to this on Report.

    Consultants and advisers—well, of course, you will not find the same sort of pressure. What I am saying is, that if it is a matter of social and personal and moral responsibility to be turned into legal responsibility, albeit that you have done nothing legally wrong—that is to say, ab extra to the Bill itself—then I cannot understand why a body which sends black lists with slanted information about some workers rather than others should not be made to come to a tribunal, and for the tribunal to say, just as it says to the shop steward, "You did nothing wrong in law because you did not break the contract of employment and you did not even induce a breach, but you took or organised industrial action, so we are going to make you 10 per cent. 50 per cent, responsible for the £31,000" I do not see why a body which has advised an employer about the trade union activities which cause him to be selected first, when he would not otherwise have been so selected, for this missile, should not come along and for the tribunal to say, "Well, not 50 per cent., not 20 per cent., but you were 10 per cent. to blame and you pay 10 per cent. of the £31,000".

    There is a final point. The noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, kept saying that the right person to be the defendant is the employer. But apparently he is not the right person to be defendant when it is a question of trade unionists as third parties. He is not even the right person to decide upon joinder. All power is to be stripped from the employer when trade unionists are the third party and the plaintiff is the non-unionist. But give us a plaintiff as a unionist, with the possibility of, in equal moral terms, joining a non-union or indeed simply third party associated employer, not a bit of it, say the Government. Really, whcn the Government come to read their case in Hansard, can it be surprising that this Bill is seen as an anti-union Bill?

    I hate even to suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, that he may be producing somewhat of an irrelevance. I can only bring him back to the position in which we are. It is where the employer was induced to dismiss the complainant by pressure. Nobody else dismisses that man. It is the employer who is in the dock. He is the one who is being criticised; he is the one who has taken the action which is considered to be unfair. When the noble Lord says one ought to bring along a whole lot of people who operate black lists, I really think that is a irrelevance. It is the employer who is the person responsible for the action and he is the person the complainant is making the case against. If it is to be fair and the whole onus of unfair dismissal is against the employer for perpetrating the unfair dismissal, in all these cases it is bound to be the employer who is the person who must carry the can and who must defend himself.

    Would the noble Earl think that the corollary of that would be an exclusion clause in the Bill for trade union blacklists?

    On Question, amendment negatived.

    [ Amendments Nos. 64 to 66 not moved.]

    8.33 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 67:

    Page 9, line 12, after ("may") insert ("before the hearing").

    The noble Lord said: The question involved in Amendment No. 67 relates also to Amendment No. 69. I will try to be very brief on this matter. It is somewhat technical, or at least can become so. I am very glad to see the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate with us, because although he always says he is a Scottish lawyer he is always very helpful to your Lordships, more than I could possibly be, on matters of law in both jurisdictions. The 1980 Bill took care that only the employer should be the only party who could join to the action the third party trade unionists, but also that they should be joined before the hearing. It did that because of the arguments put on 11th March, the same occasion to which I referred on previous amendments, by the then Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Mayhew, especially at columns 1073 to 1074.

    Perhaps I may summarise, although I am perfectly happy to read the whole passage if any noble Lord so wishes. What the Under-Secretary of State said in

    1980 was roughly this. I quote him to begin with. He gave an assurance to the Opposition:

    "that it is recognised that the trade union or individuals at the sharp end of a joinder case must be notified at the beginning".

    Then he goes on to say, "That is what will happen under our Bill". He says this is what happens in a civil court under what is called the third party procedure, which is on all fours; that if a defendant, for example an employer, is served with a writ saying that he is sued for damages, if he believes the fault lies partly at least in somebody else, he notifies the court and the third party is notified that he is being blamed. Then he says that the procedure under the 1980 clause is parallel:

    "Right across the board the union has the power to take full part. It cannot be made to do so but it has the ability to do so. It is notified at the beginning"—

    that is to say, it is notified at the beginning that it is joined, and it has the right to be there. The right honourable gentleman went on—and this is the most important part:

    "I understand why right honourable gentlemen regard this as fundamentally important. It is fundamentally important and it will take place. All those requirements are met by the clause and by the tribunal's rules of procedure".

    I put that statement, and similar statements made by Ministers in this House and in another place—especially in another place because it was not much discussed here—on the basis of a moral undertaking to the trade union movement that if it or its officials are being joined in an unfair dismissal case they will be there from the beginning. That is an undertaking which is being reneged upon in this Bill. In this Bill it is possible, with the leave of the tribunal, to join the shop steward, member, official or union from the beginning, or with the leave of the tribunal during the proceedings of the tribunal.

    This is the technical part. Many noble Lords will know that there are two basic procedures of the High Court whereby further parties can be joined. One is the third party procedure under Order 16, especially under Order 16, Rule 2, of the Supreme Court's rules and orders; and the other is the procedure for adding a party who ought to be joined to the proceedings under the now revised Order 15, Rule 6. Order 16, Rule 2, gives the court the right and the power to add a third party, and it also gives one of the parties the power to add a third party.

    Without reading the whole of it, I submit that the meaning of Order 16 on contributions by a third party is clear, that first of all he must be added in the ordinary case from the beginning; that is to say, after service of the writ it is necessary to join your third party; albeit that you can join him after proceedings have begun, you should normally do so from the beginning. I say the same about Order 15, Rule 6, which is not a third party procedure but if the Government are going to rely upon it, albeit that parties can be added, then the basis of the thing is the sooner the better. It may be said—I think the Government will say this; I do not think this point has been canvassed before —"Oh well, it will be all right; leave it to the tribunal's discretion", because they have a discretion whether or not to join after the proceedings have begun.

    I protest that so much in this Bill is now becoming left to the tribunal's discretion—reduction of compensa- tion, whether to add a third party, whether it is just during the proceedings. But there is a difference. It is a difference that ought to be there. In the High Court you have pleadings; you have discovery. You have a certain paraphernalia that of course the laymen make fun of but which has its uses, albeit that I may well have criticised it myself in my time. One of the uses is that if you are adding another party, at least you can have a couple of days' adjournment and you can go away and read the documents and your lawyers can see what it is all about. I am not criticising the tribunals when I say that that is not so. I say that it ought not to be so. There is far too much formality and legalism in the tribunals. They were not set up to be High Courts with pleadings, discoveries and so on. There is far too much of it and it is not fair.

    So if after three days of argument the claimant says, "And what is more I want to join the shop steward", and if the tribunal exercises its discretion—whether we agree with it or not—and joins him, what on earth is the man to do? What on earth is the union to do? Why should the Government ignore his fate? They believe in justice for minorities. Here is a minority of one. A trade union official joined when he should not have been, but by the discretion of the tribunal. What does he do? They will say "Appeal to the employment appeal tribunal against the exercise of discretion". Appeals against discretion are not easy to win. If you win it in the appeal tribunal, you may have to go up to the Court of Appeal and we all know what happens there. You may have to come to the judicial committee. What an absurd position. An appeal to the House of Lords on the exercise of a discretion?—that cannot be the answer. The answer is to get rid of the phrase, "Before the hearing" and leave it as it is now; namely, that if you want to join a third party in an industrial tribunal, you who, after all, are the claimant and now have unadvisedly been given the power, must make the choice before you start the case in the tribunal. I beg to move.

    As the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, knows, Clause 6 of the Bill provides that employees or employers only have the right to require a union or other person to be joined to unfair dismissal proceedings if an application is made before the hearing of the complaint begins, as the noble Lord so adequately described just now. It is clearly desirable that, whenever possible, joinder takes place before the start of the hearing so that all parties to the complaint—the employee, the employer and the joined party can be present throughout.

    However, Clause 6 also allows joinder to take place once the hearing has begun with the consent—and I underline that word—of the tribunal. The reason for providing for this is, of course, that there may be cases where there is cause for allowing joinder once a hearing has begun. An example of this might be where the employee learns only during proceedings that pressure was in fact exerted by a union on his former employer to dismiss him.

    Perhaps I should make it clear to the Committee, however, that joinder will not be possible once a remedy for the unfair dismissal has been awarded. Before then all the facts surrounding the dismissal will have become known and there will have been ample opportunity for joinder to have been requested. Joinder after a remedy had been prescribed cannot therefore be justified.

    What is now proposed in the Bill in relation to tribunals having discretion to allow joinder after a hearing has begun, in fact accords, as the noble Lord described, with normal legal practice in the courts. I cannot see why this particular kind of litigation could be any different from any other kind of litigation. While it is difficult to draw exact parallels it is the practice in civil litigation both in England and Scotland to allow a litigant to bring in a third part as of right in the initial stages of a litigation, but only with the leave of the court in the latter stages. So there is no new precedent being created here. On the contrary, the position as regards joinder in unfair dismissal cases is in fact being brought more into line, as the noble Lord said, with the normal practice in the courts, and it is made quite clear in Rule 0.15 r.6. of the Supreme Court Judgment to which the noble Lord referred.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, quoted the 1980 Act and he indicated that the Government were now arguing a position totally different from that which they adopted in 1980. It seems to me that a perfectly adequate defence to this charge is that joinder under Clause 5 is now, unlike the situation in the 1980 Act, to be available either to the employer or to the dismissed employee. While the right of joinder extended only to employers, it was not essential to make any provision for joinder to take place after the commencement of the hearing, for the very simple reason that an employer will know before a hearing whether or not he has been put under pressure to dismiss and can thus reach his decision on whether to join a trade union at that point.

    However, the position changes with the extension of the right of joinder to the dismissed employee. He may not find out, until the evidence at the tribunal's hearing begins to emerge, that there was union pressure on his former employer to dismiss him, as I described just now. Therefore, it can be justifiable to provide a means whereby he, with the tribunal's consent, can invoke joinder at this stage.

    The amendment before the Committee would reduce the opportunity for joinder to take place. It would make it more likely that trade unions, which put pressure on an employer to dismiss unfairly, will escape all responsibility for their actions. I really cannot believe that that is right, nor can I ask the Committee to believe it and, therefore, I must ask the Committee to reject the amendment.

    I find that profoundly disappointing if not wholly surprising. The noble Minister says, "responsibility for their actions". That is what I thought I was asking for in the last amendment, and I did not get it. Now we have got it again, and why?—because the defendant is a trade unionist. The noble Lord points out that there are orders of the High Court—Order 15, Rule 6 and Order 16 whereby other parties can be joined. I was straightforward about this—during the proceedings; during the hearing. That is quite true. I said that the leave that you have to obtain is rather difficult. It is not what you are supposed to do and to obtain leave from the High Court will be very different from obtaining leave from an industrial tribunal because of the nature of the paperwork in the proceedings. It is a completely different type of action. The effect may well be—it may be that the Government intend this, but I hope not—yet again more formalism in the tribunals.

    What will happen? This is the final point and the main one. The Minister intimated that the employee will bring the action against the employer and then he will learn only during the proceedings about some aspect of the trade union pressure. Of course, that is what it is all about. The advice to non-unionists will be, "Get the employer in the dock; then get your lawyer along and cross examine him so as to find some union pressure". That is what the freedom association will be saying to its clients. The employer may hand out—as many employers do without any question of closed shops (there may be a closed shop or some informal arrangement)—union leaflets or membership cards when they are taking people on and say "Do you want to join?" Before long any Silk worth his brief fee will make this into pressure. In the middle of the case there will erupt some wrangle about pressure which the employer will try to resist in the majority of cases or if not he will say, "I will give in". What is being done is to legalise the procedures of the shop floor. So if there were anything in that—I give that scenario in all honesty because I think that will happen—then I do not believe it could not have been brought to the attention of the tribunal before the hearing began. It is not a question of asking at the time of the complaint; the complaints will be in; the response will be in.

    Let me make a further point; the pre-hearing will have been undertaken. The noble Minister I am sure appreciates that the new procedure for the tribunals, under the 1980 rules, involves a pre-hearing where the parties are sorted out, if there is any problem, because sometimes a claimant is told these days, "Don't go on with your claim or your may get fixed for costs" and normally a claimant will not be in the position of paying costs in a tribunal. But the pre-hearing aparatus was introduced in the last two years in order to sort out the issues. It is still possible at that stage before the hearing for the claimant to add the union. But the Government want more. After the pre-hearing you can still bring the shop steward in if your tribunal will let you, right at the end of the case. In 1980 the Government said that this was unjust. They gave a moral undertaking not to introduce it. They have now gone back on that undertaking.

    lf, as the noble Lord says, the employer shielded from the complaint that he was actually dismissed because of trade union pressure, what then was the excuse of untruth that the employer used to dismiss the employee? If the real reason was concealed initially but nevertheless the worker had the sack, what has happened in between as to why he was dismissed, if the real reason is not given until later on?

    First, may I deal with the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn. It seems to me that he is disputing what is regarded as normal court practice.

    Yes, it is. I am no lawyer, but I can assure the noble Lord that the views of the Government's legal advisers on this matter are perfectly plain. I do not propose to debate it point by point tonight; nor do I think the Committee would wish me to. On the noble Lord's other point, it is almost certainly the case that tribunals will be reluctant to allow late joinder. Tribunals are sensible bodies and can be relied upon to act sensibly here, as in every other case. I do not believe that there is any fear that joinder will be too readily granted once a hearing has begun.

    As regards pre-hearing, there is still no guarantee whatever that evidence of union pressure to discuss matters will emerge at this stage. On the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, it does not matter when the true reason for dismissal emerges so long as the employee has a chance to react when it does emerge, so long as the hearing has not finished. I hope that that is an answer to the question he asked me.

    With the greatest respect, may I say that the hearing is taking place because the employee was dismissed. That is how I understand it and how the noble Lord understands it. The employee was dismissed, apparently for some fictitious reason, and later on, because he was dismissed, the appeal goes to the tribunal and at some stage, lo and behold!, the truth emerges: it was because of trade union pressure.

    Yes, the noble Lord has made my point for me perfectly well. It does not matter at all when the true reason for dismissal emerges. It is exactly as I said.

    One point that puzzles me is that the Minister seems to be resting his case on his claim that what is proposed in this Bill is in line with normal legal proceedings. If that is so—and I am not one who can judge that—was it not also the case in 1980? Why was it not the Government's position, therefore, to rest it on the normal legal proceedings in 1980? What has changed?

    I think that, with all respect, the noble Lord cannot have been listening to the point I made earlier. The point was that while the right of joinder extended only to employers, it was not essential to make any provision for joinder to take place after the commencement of the hearing, for the simple reason—as I said earlier—that an employer will now know before a hearing whether or not he has been put under pressure to dismiss and, thus, can reach a decision on whether to join a trade union at that point. The fact remains that the Bill changes what the case was in 1980.

    On this amendment, in saying what we shall do with it, I would say this to the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, and to the Government. What the noble Lord has said is very true, that upon the back of an unjust extension of the joinder procedure they now build an unjust procedure yet again—an unjust-during-the-hearing joinder. Having extended it unjustly at the whim of the complainant, they now build on an unjust feature. Pelion on Ossa.

    In asking your Lordships' leave to withdraw the amendment, we do so, not because we do not feel strongly, but because we know very clearly that this point—it may seem a very small point—is about people who are brought into tribunals: trade union officials from the shop floor. It is already widely known—curiously enough, as a matter of procedure—that this unjust feature is being built into the Bill. There is a widespread feeling in the trade union movement that it is very unjust. I beg leave to withdraw this amendment on the basis that we may wish to come back to it on Report and hope that the Government will also wish to consider it.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 68 and 69 not moved.]

    I would draw your Lordships' attention to the fact that Amendments Nos. 70 and 71 appear to be alternatives and presumably will be debated together.

    8.55 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 70:

    Page 9, line 33, at end insert (", but no award made against a person other than a trade union shall exceed £500 or such other sum as the Secretary of State may designate by order.").

    The noble Lord said: No, we are in fact moving Amendment No. 70 and we shall move Amendment No. 71 subsequently. If they are alternatives, it is news to us. Amendment No. 70 is a very modest and simple amendment. The object of the exercise here is, once again, to attempt to limit the impact of the joinder procedure, but in particular to limit the impact of the joinder procedure on the individual; that is to say, the individual as against the union. The amendment says that although, obviously, the compensation may extend to £30,000 or so, and if that is decided entirely against the union, or substantially against the union, the union must find that money, there should be a limit on the amount which can be proceeded against so far as an individual is concerned, and that that limit should be £500.

    We are not here contesting the idea that there should be joinder. We are not here contesting any of the issues that we have argued so far in our amendments. We are saying that where there is a decision which goes against a union, the union should pay, but that if there is to be some joinder also of an individual there should be a limit, and that limit should be £500. We say this because the argument that if you are to go for the union official then you want to extract the maximum possible amount from the individual, makes sense only if the union is not standing behind. In most cases it is quite clear that there is a situation in which a closed shop or union membership agreement is presumed to be of benefit to the union.

    It is most unlikely that there would be a situation in which a tribunal would say that there was a responsibility, other than the responsibility exerted by the employer, which lay against someone else, either an individual or organisation, and you could have a situation in which there would just be an individual and no union; because the union membership agreement is something which benefits unions.

    On the other hand, of course, there could be situations where individual shop stewards or individual workers could become involved because they might have taken industrial action. It might be a union's policy to enforce a union membership agreement, but certain individuals might had taken industrial action which had precipitated the dismissal of the individual which had caused the case to come before the industrial tribunal. Therefore, the tribunal might want to say that not simply was the union involved, but also the individual. We believe it would be very unlikely that the individual would be involved without the union, but that it would be likely in many circumstances that both the union and perhaps a shop steward, a branch secretary or someone of that kind, would be involved.

    We are saying that it would be very bad in general terms for industrial relations if it were possible—indeed, we would say that it would be extraordinarily unfair if it were possible—for an individual to proceed against a shop steward, a branch secretary or a lay official for the maximum level of compensation which is allowed under this Bill. If the Government take the view that if the union is involved then the union must pay, and that is fair and equitable, we would say there is no need, and indeed it would be a bad industrial relations exercise, also to insist on proceeding to the full rigour against the individual shop steward. I beg to move.

    9 p.m.

    The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, argued that the amendment is designed to prevent an individual, possibly a trade union official, finding himself personally liable for an award of compensation of many thousands of pounds. But in arguing that I think that the noble Lord ignored three basic points. First, there is no absolute reason why an individual should ever have to pay this compensation. If a closed shop has been approved in a ballot, then providing the employer does not dismiss those who are protected under the law, the dismissal of the non-unionist will not be unfair. In that case the question of joinder will not arise. Even if the closed shop has not been approved by a ballot, an individual will be liable for compensation only if he does put pressure on his employer to sack non-unionists. If he exerts no such pressure there can simply be no risk of an individual having to pay out a large sum of money. Therefore, anyone who finds himself liable for compensation under this clause will be in that position solely because he chose to be.

    Secondly, we must bear in mind that if this amendment were passed it would go in completely the opposite direction from how the law stands at present and how it will remain under this Bill with regard to unlawful industrial action. The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, knows that there are no limits to the liability of an individual if he organises unlawful industrial action. That was of course the position under the last Government's legislation as well. In this case, there are limits in the sense that the maximum awards of compensation are limited. We see no reason to depart from the general position which does not, so far as unlawful industrial action is concerned, impose any arbitrary maximum on individual wrongdoers.

    Thirdly, one cannot ignore the position of an employer who finds himself squeezed, as it were, between Scylla and Charybdis, on the one hand of having to pay unfair dismissal compensation if he dismisses a non-unionist unfairly, and on the other hand of facing a strike threat, being worked up possibly by one individual, if he does not. There seems no reason in equity why that individual, just because he is an individual, should escape his fair share of liability, at the cost of the employer who would be made to bear far more than his fair share. That is exactly what could happen if the amendment were passed. The individual can wholly protect himself simply by not exerting such pressure in the first place. For these reasons, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, will not press his amendment.

    When I first read the TUC booklet on the question of this Bill I felt that they might be exaggerating. What they said in their introductory sentence was:

    "If trade unionists had any doubt about the present Government's hostility to trade unions, these have surely been removed by the publication of the Employment Bill on January 28th."
    I thought that might be pitching it a bit high, but as these proceedings have gone on the Government's hostility has become more and more apparent. That was no more clear than in the case of the refusal of this reasonable amendment. The noble Earl talks about fairness. Where is the fairness between what would be suffered by an individual as a result of penalty and the fairness which would be suffered even by a trade union, let alone by a large company? How can it be regarded as fair to place an individual, who possibly has never seen £30,000 in his life and is never likely to, in exactly the same position as a large trade union or an even larger company? What is fair about that?

    As for the question of his knowing what the consequences of his actions are, the noble Earl cannot have considered the situation that arises. The shop steward, as it may be, or the deputy in the case of an Equity deputy operating in a company will be doing no more than he has always done. He may be in no position to know whether there has, or has not, been an effective ballot, because nobody has clarified it to me yet—perhaps it will be done before we come to the end of these proceedings—and at the moment I do not see how the individual shop steward is to know under what circumstances a ballot has taken place on a basis which applies so far as he is concerned.

    Is a ballot which has taken place perhaps six months before over the whole of an organisation to be considered to be effective throughout the organisation? Or does there have to be a ballot in relation to each particular group of companies which sign a particular contract? Can one take a ballot which operates in perpetuity in a particular range of contracts? Or every time the contract is renegotiated does there have to be a fresh ballot to discover whether the renegotiated conditions of the contract are sufficiently different to justify a fresh ballot?

    These are questions which will be unknown to the individual when he tries to enforce what he always has enforced; that is, the 100 per cent. trade union position in the organisation to which he agreed to act as the unpaid deputy or shop steward. So the Equity deputy calls a meeting of the company and says, "This chap has not paid his subscription." The company says, "In that case, I suppose we ought not to work, because in our contracts it says we only work with members of Equity". He says, "That is right". Eventually, the case comes before a tribunal and it is judged that, whether he knew it or not at the time, the deputy who gave that advice was responsible for the consequences. Is he then, without any protection at all, to become liable to the full rigours of the penalties laid down in this law?

    The noble Earl talked about fairness and justice, and being aware of his actions. How can that be in the circumstances of industrial relations as they exist on the shop floor and in the multifarious conditions which exist all over the country? How can that possibly be fair? The small protection which my noble friend Lord McCarthy is seeking to insert—that the individual's liability should be limited to £500, which may be more to him than several thousand pounds would be to the firm that employs him—is surely where the justice of the matter lies, and the Minister should accept it.

    Let me try to clarify the matter. What we are talking about is discouraging bullying. The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, may want to hold his hands up in horror at that, but that it is what it is all about and what my noble friend was talking about. These problems arise only when people have power that perhaps they should not have; when a trade union official, of whatever sort, with a trade union behind him, can in certain circumstances exercise pressure on the individual, who does not have that sort of support. It is perfectly easy for that official to avoid getting joined, as my noble friend said, by not taking any action in this area, except perhaps by saying to other people that he would like something done. But he, as an individual, does not have to do anything. So this provision is a discouragement against bullying. There are other parts of the Bill which are a discouragement against bullying by employers, and I believe that as we work our way through it we shall find that the Bill is quite well balanced. We can go into detail on this and that sort of point, but if we keep at the back of our minds that what we want to do is avoid making it easy for people to bully, we shall get matters in better perspective.

    I do not know whether noble Lords opposite refuse to see or genuinely do not see. It is easy enough to attempt to answer in as reasonable a way as one can the various points that are put to us from the other side of the Committee, and I shall try to do that, but as my noble friend Lord Jenkins reminded me, we are reaching the point when something much more fundamental is involved. It is the fundamental hostility which we felt and which is coming into all the normal procedures and methods of carrying through trade union organisation. With respect to noble Lords opposite, what is most difficult to take is that it is all being done—and all the time it is being said it is being done—by people who have no hostility at all to trade unions. In some ways I prefer the attitude in another place of the Secretary of State, who does not pretend in that way.

    The fact is that every time we put a small amendment—in this case it would not mean that anybody would get less compensation or be any worse off—we are told that, for some reason, it cannot be accepted because we must prevent bullying. And every time we ask—we have asked all day today and we asked all day when we last discussed the matter—for the deatils of who the bullies are and what their bullying tactics consists of, we get the same small band of Walsall dinner ladies, Miss Joanna Harris, the three railway-men, and nothing else. We are reaching the point when we must say that we simply have hostility, a determination to make the life of the trade unions as difficult as possible, all in the name of people who say they are not against trade unions. That becomes difficult to take at this time of night. Nevertheless, I shall try to give a reasoned answer to the three arguments put forward by the Minister.

    The first was that the said there was no reason why anybody should have to pay up because that person did not have to take action designed to get anybody dismissed. That goes to the heart of it. People will do this because they believe in union membership agreements and genuinely believe that people should accept their obligations. They will do it in the context in which the Government, as a result of this measure and the 1980 Act, have created a in which, as I have said before, the closed shop is virtually unenforceable legally. It is virtually impossible to obtain the ballot figures. In any case, even if you do, almost anybody can argue that he has a conscientious or deep personal objection; and, if those two headings do not get you out, you can be an existing employee.

    I have said to the Committee that I am not against that particular escape hatch. But the situation is one in which it is virtually impossible for people to maintain union membership agreements in a legally enforceable and lawful way. Therefore, in order to maintain union membership agreements, they will find themselves in one way or another coming up against provisions of this kind. In his first argument, the noble Earl the Minister is saying, in effect, that they should give up union membership agreements altogether. Yet we are told this—and here again is the hypocrisy—by people who do not proceed against the closed shop per se; they do not make the closed shop unlawful per se. They kill it with a thousand cuts. They make it impossible, by imposing upon it impossible provisions. Then they say, "If somebody is likely to be caught by one or another of the provisions, he could always back off".

    The second argument that the Minister puts before me is that to do this small thing, to limit the compensation that could be awarded against an individual, is something that we do not normally do in English law. Well, there are many things that we do not normally do in English law which are in this Bill and which were in the 1980 Act. In other systems of law a limit is quite ordinary practice. For example, I understand that in Swedish labour law from 1928 to 1976 it was perfectly acceptable, in certain circumstances, to have a system of liability for workers and for trade unions, but in the cases of workers the liability was limited to a sum of 200 krona. That is a perfectly normal arrangement to operate in other systems of industrial relations, and I am suggesting that if we are extending joinder in this particular way, then perhaps we could take an example from somebody else. It is not an answer to say that we have not done it so far in our own labour law.

    The third defence that is put up by the noble Earl the Minister is to say that we are caught between Scylla and Charybdis, and to say that we might get a situation where an individual trade unionist is in fact the real person behind the whole thing. Well, that is once again for the Government to indulge in their customary belief that there is a small group of individuals who are stirring up workers who would otherwise be perfectly willing to tolerate non-unionists, and are doing it in all kinds of devious ways.

    Union membership agreement is an object of trade union policy, Trade unions do not believe that they have to apologise for it. They wish to practise it in civilised ways—and I do not say that they always practise it in civilised ways. But it is a normal object of trade union policy, and one does not get politically motivated minorities who are trying to get rid of individual non-unionists, trying to impose their will upon them in some form of coercion. It is an aspect of union policy. Noble Lords opposite might not like that, but it is the case. Therefore we do not have individuals who necessarily must be struck at. What we are saying is that even if they are struck at, limit the damages, limit the compensation, in the name of common humanity. If there is a trade union standing behind them, why take them for everything they have got?

    On Question, amendment negatived.

    9.18 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 71:

    Page 9, line 33, at end insert ("but no such award shall be made against a trade union except where the pressure was exercised in circumstances which would have caused the union to be liable for an act authorised or endorsed by a responsible person within the meaning of section 13(3) of the Employment Act 1982.").
    The noble Lord said: This amendment asks the Government to tell us the answer to a question or a problem. I am not in as good a position, at least by my lights, on this amendment, because whereas under Amendments Nos. 62 and 67 I was able to show to my satisfaction, though not to that of your Lordships' Committee, that the Government were wrong now when they were right in 1980 on a problem, in this case the Government did not face the problem in 1980, and as yet they have not told us the answer to the problem. However, partly because it is a technical problem, but also because it is a practical problem, I am confident that the Government will tell us the answer, either tonight or on Report.

    The question is a simple one. Under Clause 6 a trade union is ordered by the tribunal to pay to the claimant a contribution as is,
    "just and equitable in the circumstances",
    now that we have the trade union joined. The claimant has made it liable, and now it has to pay money. It has to pay money to the claimant. Why?—because of some human being's actions. And the question is, which person's actions? The lawyers know it as the problem of vicarious liability. The employer is liable for his employees in the course of their employment in a very complicated area of the law, where, to put it in a simple way, he is liable for what someone else does because it is his business. The law relates to the employees in the course of their employment, or in the scope of their employment, but at any rate, as some of the judgments have it, not when they are on a frolic of their own. That is the test in the well-known case in 1831 of Joel v. Morrison: that the employer, the company, is liable for their servants up to the point where they are on a frolic of their own.

    The question that the Government have not told the trade union movement the answer to is: When are union members, when are shop stewards, when are union officials, to be regarded as acting for the union, so that they engage the union in responsibility and liability to pay, or when are they acting on a frolic of their own? Is that to be considered entirely by common law rules or is it to be considered by some other special code of conduct? We have had this problem before, and we have had it for some time. Every time Conservative Governments have attempted to enact this (I will say it because I believe it is, and I do not see why I should not state my beliefs as other noble Lords can state theirs) anti-union legislation, they have always come up against this problem, because they are always trying to put into the context of trade union law the concept of vicarious liability, which does not quite fit.

    Of course, the reason it does not quite fit is that in employment law the employment relationship is a command relationship, at any rate historically and normally and practically in the modern world. So the employer is liable for people he can organise on command. The trade union may be liable for its officials by way of command, although that is a rather far-fetched concept in some cases; and, of course, it is not that kind of organisation. Therefore, in the 1971 legislation the courts had the most terrible problems because the legislature had not faced this question.

    Noble Lords will remember the case of the dockers' shop stewards and the dockers' unofficial action on containerisation which led to the case of Heaton's v. Transport and General Workers' Union, reported in 1973 Appeal Cases at page 15, where the blacking of transport by shop stewards was said to make the union responsible vicariously because the stewards had implied authority to act on behalf of the union. I do no justice to the complex arguments in the case by so stating it, but that is perhaps the nub of the question. In looking at that the courts took account—and the House of Lords said that you must take account—of the rule book and also of the custom and practice of the union.

    The uncertainty of the matter was stressed two years later in the case, also in the House of Lords, in which by three to two their Lordships in the Judicial Committee decided in the General Aviation Services case, which reached them in 1976, that similar shop stewards in the Transport and General Workers' Union at Heathrow Airport did not engage the responsibility of the union. There was fine argument by lawyers to distinguish the one case from the other, but it is difficult for the layman, I think, to see much of a difference.

    The question is: Do the Government want that to happen here? I do not say that in an aggressive way; I just ask. I want to know: Is it a conscious piece of planning to leave it as it was in the 1980 Act? Is the common law principle, as it is sometimes put, of respondeat superior to apply here, even though the difficulty in the trade union situation is to know who is superior, the national executive committee or the membership as a whole? It is a difficult concept; it is a democratic body; and that is the nub of the problem.

    The Government have seen this problem elsewhere, because the amendment suggests that there should be applied to the joinder situation that we are discussing the principles of vicarious liability set out in what I shall call the statutory code of agency which is to apply to trade unions under this Bill for the purposes of liability in tort. For tortious liability a code of responsibility is set out in Clause 13, in subsection (3) especially and in the other subsections which follow it, and we shall have to debate that very clearly. It is perhaps one of the most important provisions in the Bill, where the Government do not simply let the common law apply, with all its difficulties but with all its advantages.

    The Government have not imposed that code of agency to liability here. Of course, the technical reason might be said to be that they think that appropriate for liability in tort but not for liability in whatever this is—it is not tort and it is not breach of contract; it is a kind of breach of a statutory duty, except that it is not a statutory duty. It is a statutory liability in the discretion of the tribunals, because, as I have explained, it is not a duty not to act in breach of contract of employment; the wrongdoing in this case is whatever the tribunal says it is. So that it is a funny kind of statutory liability. It is even more important, in our submission, to know when and for whom the union is to be liable. If all the Government are going to say is, "Leave this to the good sense of the tribunals" —then we will know where we are. Any important case will be in the House of Lords within two and a half years and the only people who will profit will be the lawyers. I shall not be one of them but I wish luck to those who will. But that is not a very sensible thing to do. It is a responsibility of the Government to save the community the costs of litigation when it can? do so. The Government can save—and I am speaking not only of employees and trade unions but of employers and even of insurance companies and others—a lot of costs and time by saying, by an amendment on Report, if not tonight, what is the principle. I ask the noble Lord who is to reply whether he will tell us in a simple sentence what is the principle of vicarious liability in respect of which a trade union is to be made responsible under Clause 6, inserting Section 76A into the 1978 Act. I beg to move.

    The answer to the noble Lord's question is that the Government saw it wise to make provisions in relation to the problem of which Clause 13 is concerned, on the lines to which he has referred. On the other hand, in this clause we are not affecting basically the liability which trade unions had under the provisions of the 1980 Act, although we are affecting the people who can raise questions about it. In that situation, it does not seem wise to the Government, as we are presently advised, to make these special provisions which are appropriate for the context of Clause 13 in the context of this particular clause.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, has already pointed out, in language which I think accurately summarises the position, that there is a considerable difference between the problems with which Clause 6 are concerned and those with which Clause 13 are concerned. May I be allowed to say in supplement to what he said on Clause 6 that it is concerned with the statutory right of employees not to be unfairly dismissed on grounds of union membership or non-membership, and, of course, the contribution to such dismissal made by pressure of the kind described in the clause?

    In our view, accordingly, it is not necessary in this clause to make special provisions to define those for whom the union is responsible. The question for the tribunal will be: "Did the union act in the way described in the clause?" Certainly, it does not appear to us that it would be appropriate at this stage to add something of the kind here described to assist in the solution of that problem. For these reasons, I could not advise your Lordships to accept this amendment.

    I wonder whether my noble friend the Minister might be prepared to think again on this matter because everything on this particular clause that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, is very much, in my submission, to the point. If no special provisions are made, this problem of vicarious responsibility is just going to be a beanfeast for the lawyers. I must say that I am here speaking against my own profession.

    I support the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, in his plea to the Minister, and at the same time I support the plea made by my noble friend Lord Wedderburn of Charlton. We all agree that the massive amount of litigation that now exists in our lives is getting frightening. When one considers, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, has said, that we are making (I think he used these words) beanfeasts for lawyers—well, there are some beans and some feasts.

    By way of illustration, may I give the example of the tragic story of the GLC. Those councillors did not make that decision. They went to top flight lawyers in addition to those that they employed. Everybody who works in a trade union knows full well that the trade union has its legal department, people who have been to universities, who have taken legal degrees with honours in all sorts of things. They pay them lots of money to get misled. The GLC councillors were misled—at least so this House assumed. Some people doubt whether that was a correct judgment. This is the kind of thing that is happening.

    Are we going to impose what sometimes happens in the realms of very high business on the ordinary life of the working man and woman? Do the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate and the Minister believe that we want a situation where every coalminer, steelworker, transport worker or sailor queues up every week to negotiate holidays and rates of pay, one by one by the tens of thousands? The CBI would withdraw their support totally from the Conservative Party if they thought that was the aim. That is what we are moving to.

    It would be wrong to expect to have an answer to the supplication which I have made and the remarks that my noble friend Lord Wedderburn and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, have made. But if the Government can say this: "We cannot give a response tonight; it would be unreasonable to expect it", I would accept that. I believe that if they go back and talk to Ministers in another place we can make a realistic approach. We cannot get 100 per cent. agreement but we should try to get that kind of agreement—or disagreement even—where there is no bitterness and we enact legislation which is designed primarily, one way or the other according to our philosophy, to better what we may think is industrial life, and not merely—if I may repeat the phrase—make a beanfeast for lawyers.

    9.32 p.m.

    The noble and learned Lord—I am sure he will not misunderstand me—I felt was in one his of more Hegelian, metaphysical moods tonight. He kept telling us that the only question for the tribunal was: did the union do it? The union does not do anything. The union is some abstract concept. I appreciate that partnerships are incorporated in Scotland; but the whole question arises surely because we need to know when we can say in legal language, "the union did it". If the noble and learned Lord did it, then the Transport and General Workers would not—unless he is a member unbeknown to me—normally be liable. So the question arises because of that.

    Then he said that the Government did not see it wise to make provision on this matter in Clause 6. That was an answer. They saw it wise to make provision on this in Clause 13. Perhaps I can put it rather more clearly to the noble and learned Lord that Clause 13, which in this Bill is the Taff Vale clause—now I stop immediately; let us not waste time, for we want to make progress with this Bill and perhaps this will do something to get rid of a misunderstanding—revives liability in tort on the part of trade unions.

    The Government do not like the phrase "the Taff Vale clause". In another place they objected. At the time of Taff Vale, in 1901, there was not in the civil law—although there was in the criminal law—any protection in trade disputes. So the Government do not like the title. The principle of the Taff Vale case is the principle of Clause 13, especially when one goes on later and finds that the trade dispute defences are being whittled away to nothing. It ill lies in the mouths of people who whittle away the trade dispute immunities for them to tell us that we must not call it a Taff Vale clause. But the Taff Vale clause is there. As a matter of fact, the noble and learned Lord said it was not wise but I have to remind him of something that I did not say. I left so much out, as I am trying to make progress.

    Clause 13 imposes its statutory code of agency only in respect of certain torts—the Taff Vale torts and the industrial conflict torts. It does not impose the agency code for everything. I must ask the Government why, when we get there. That is why, of course, it is relevant here—because it is all very well for the noble and learned Lord to say, "It does not apply here: this is a special statutory liability", although no doubt we could look together for the words that describe the liability of Clause 6, except that the tribunal can do what it likes according to justice and equity. But if it is a new civil liability, it is only not a liability in "tort" because the laywers say it is not. It is the same thing really.

    No shop steward who is asked to pay £20,000 is going to care whether the lawyer lost the case because he could not argue the law of tort or because he could not argue the law of Clause 6 of the Employment Bill in civil liability. It is the same thing, and of course I join with the noble and learned Lord in saying that it is right to say that it could be missed out in 1980. It did not perhaps have to define in 1980 for whom the union would be liable because the sums were not very large; but when it is £30,000 you would think that the Government, having missed the point in 1980 and having had it pointed out to them now, would have had a better answer for ordinary men and women faced with such liabilities and for trade unions and even employers, faced with legal proceedings of complexity, than that they are determined to miss the point again.

    I wonder whether it would help if I were to suggest to the Government that there is a case for them to stay their hand for the moment on this particular amendment, if I have understood it correctly, until such time as we have been able to debate and decide on this same principle of vicarious liability in relation to Clause 13 and subsequent clauses, so that there might not be need this evening to press this particular point to a Division, as might otherwise be the case. The matter might be left open until that time. When we are clearer, as no doubt we shall be, as to the decision of principle, which, as a Committee, we shall take in due course on those later clauses, it might then be possible to come back to this at Report stage in a way that we might all find more generally acceptable.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, started off by referring to one of my Hegelian moods. There may be advantage on occasions, even on a subject of this kind, for being somewhat philosophical. The situation, so far as the Government are concerned, is that the special provisions which are incorporated in Clause 13 are still to be considered, and I do not know that I can necessarily accept from the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, or even from my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway, that legal disputes are necessarily avoided by making particular statutory provisions. For these reasons, I do not feel persuaded that this particular amendment should be acceptable to your Lordships; and I would remain of the view that I expressed earlier that I cannot advise your Lordships to accept this amendment.

    We understand that. We have criticisms of Clause 13(3) anyway, so we will come to them. We quite understand the position of the Government: they wish to leave it unspecified with all the problems of the Heatons case. However, the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, put the case to the Government that they might look at this again. They have given no undertaking that they will do so, but I suspect that after we debate the matter properly on Clause 13(3) they might well have second thoughts. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    9.40 p.m.

    moved Amendment No. 72:

    Page 9, line 33, at end insert—
    ("Provided that no part of a special award to which section 75A(2) applies shall be awarded against that person.").

    The noble Lord said: This is a short point. It deals with a concrete case with legal content, but with relative simplicity. That should appeal to all noble Lords on the Benches opposite. There is a bit for everyone. It deals with this case. If your Lordships consider page 7 of the Bill, you will find that in the new Section 75A, which is introduced into the 1978 Act, the minimum special award is put up from £10,000 to £15,000, or the equivalent number of weeks' pay from 104 to 156 in a situation which is very precisely specified.

    It is the situation where an order has been made against the employer to reinstate, but where he does not satisfy the tribunal that it is practicable to comply with the procedure under Section 69. Unless he satisfies the tribunal that it is not practicable to comply with the order, then he has to pay the extra £5,000. If he joins a union in such a case and the tribunal makes an order for reinstatement, it may or may not be reasonable for the tribunal to make the order or, indeed, reasonable for the employer to resist it.

    In this connection, I draw the attention of your Lordships to the fact that it is clearly established that the word "practicable" in this context does not mean expedient; it means what it says. As the Employment Appeal Tribunal put it, in the case of Qualcast Limited v. Ross in 1979, you really cannot improve on the word "practicable" itself. It may be said that in many of these cases it will not be practical to reinstate a worker, because the shop floor objections to him going back are, indeed, one of the main reasons why the new high compensation is awarded. But there will be situations in which the employer fails to show that he was reasonable in refusing to comply with the order. If no such case could possibly exist, there would be no reason at all for enacting Section 75A(2), where the extra £5,000 is imposed.

    So in this case the employee is getting a higher special award where an order has been made, and where the employer has failed to show that it is practicable to reinstate. In that situation, because of the employer's unreasonable failure to comply with the order to reinstate—and I stress that the tribunal may, in many cases, find that it is not unreasonable for an employer, in view of the union situation; but there must be such a case or the subsection would not be there—it is the employer alone, by definition, who must have caused at least the extra part of the special award. The amendment says that, in that kind of case, the special award shall not be enforceable against the third party—shop steward, worker or trade union.

    I apprehend that the Government may say "Your argument applies only to the excess"—that is, the extra £5,000—"of the increased minimum." If that be so, then although it would be rather a miserly and Scrooge-like attitude, no doubt the Government will consider amending in that form. This amendment goes further, because the employer who fails to reinstate when the tribunal finds that it is practicable and reasonable for him to do so, is surely someone who should take the brunt of the special award. Noble Lords will note that the amendment leaves other parts of the compensation as a possible element of third party contributions.

    This is the most modest of the amendments which we have so far moved. Where, in the view of the tribunal, the employer is the cause unreasonably of a failure to reinstate a worker in response to an order where it is practicable so to do, and the special award at the new ceiling of £15,000 comes into effect, we say that if you are going to allow the joinder procedure and all the injustices to which we have pointed so far you will surely not leave it to the tribunals. I hope that the noble Lord the Minister will not get up and say that we can leave this to the good sense of the tribunals. We have heard them say that we can leave it to the good sense of the tribunals to reduce the award in other contexts.

    I think the noble and learned Lord and I can find common ground that one of the reasons for drafting the statute clearly is to save the need to have to fight particular points in court. One could easily say that Section 75A(2) shall not give rise to a contribution on joinder, either to the full extent of the special award, as this amendment seeks to do, or to the excess portion of the minimum, which would be the very minimum of justice which could be done in this case. I find it difficult to see what the answer to that is. On the internal construction of the Government's own Bill, that is the logic of it, and I put it to the Government in that spirit. I beg to move.

    I long to be helpful to the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn. He said that he thought it was difficult to see what the answer is and he asked the Government not to leave it to the good sense of tribunals. Unfortunately, that is exactly what I am going to say to the noble Lord. The amendment provides that where an employer has to comply with a reinstatement order made by a tribunal, the union should in no circumstances be liable for the higher special award. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, argued that in this situation it is clearly the employer who is at fault in not taking the employee back and that therefore it would be wrong to penalise the union or some other third party for his misdemeanour. The noble Lord was very persuasive in what he said. But there is a crucial weakness in that line of argument. It ignores the fact that the employer's refusal to comply with the tribunal's reinstatement order may itself be the result of trade union pressure. For example, the union may threaten to come out on strike if the complainant is reinstated. In that situation, clearly it would be wrong for the union to escape all responsibility. It will, of course, dare I say it to the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, be for the tribunal to decide whether that is a sufficient reason for the employer's refusal to comply with the order.

    Tribunals are experienced and sensible bodies. If they come to the conclusion that an employer's refusal to comply with a tribunal's reinstatement order was entirely his own fault, one can be quite sure that they would not apportion any of the compensation against the union. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, heard what I said, so I shall repeat it in case his conversation with his noble friend took precedence. I said that if they came to the conclusion that an employer's refusal to comply with a tribunal's reinstatement order was entirely his own fault, then the noble Lord can be quite certain that they would not apportion any of the compensation against the union, for the simple reason that it would no longer be the union's fault that compensation was to be paid. But tribunals must be left discretion to examine all the circumstances of a refusal to comply with a reinstatement order so that if the union were to blame in some degree, the tribunal should have the power to apportion compensation between the employer and the trade union accordingly.

    The tribunals are given flexibility in Clause 76A(3) as inserted by Clause 6 of the Bill when the award which they make against the union must be what they consider just and equitable in the circumstances. It may well be that the award is nil, but it may well be that the award should be something, and that should be left to the tribunal.

    The noble Earl the Minister may rest assured that I have always listened to what he says. I was doing so while at the same time assuring my noble friend Lord McCarthy, that he had said what he did say.

    If I may say so to the noble Lord, I have always thought he was so versatile. I never realised he was as versatile as that. He must teach me sometime how to do it.

    We shall arrange a special amendment for the noble Earl the Minister. The answer that the refusal by the employer, when it is unreasonable, cannot engage the union in any responsibility because the tribunal will never make the award is exactly the case for enacting the amendment. If a tribunal will never make an award in that situation in respect of this part of the compensation, then the case for the amendment stands. However, we shall read in Hansard what the noble Earl the Minister has said. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    9.56 p.m.

    Page 9, line 33, at end insert—

    ("(4) An amount awarded under this section against a trade union shall be an amount "awarded by way of damages" for the purposes of section 15 of the Employment Act 1982.").

    The noble Lord said: May I put this point even more speedily. A sum of money awarded against the trade union under Clause 6 does not have a precise character in law under this Bill, at least not as I read the Bill. My question to the noble Earl the Minister is, am I correct? Some things have a precise character, especially under Clause 15. I appreciate that

    we are coming to debate that later. Clause 15 is important to trade unions because it deals with amounts awarded, and I quote,

    "by way of damages, costs or expenses—".

    The amount awarded on joinder is not expenses and it is not costs, and it does not seem to be damages. At least, it is not damages without a careful definition, which I cannot find in the Bill. The importance of that is, trade union funds of a particular kind, including provident benefit funds, are protected in certain ways by Clause 15.

    If the Government wanted to make some almost token gesture of content to the trade union movement, they could perhaps say that money paid under Clause 6 would be "damages" in the context of this Bill, such that the provident benefit funds, as under Clause 15, would not be able to be attacked, in execution of those sums. I beg to move.

    The Government understanding of the position on this Bill is that sums awarded under this clause would not be awarded by way of damages for the purposes of Section 15, as the amendment suggests. The Government's view is that the special limitations to which the amendment refers are not appropriate to responsibility of unions under this clause.

    First, in closed shop cases we are talking about individuals who have lost their jobs merely because they are not members of a trade union. We believe it is right that they should be able to obtain the maximum compensation to which they are entitled—whether it be from the employer or the trade union, or from both sharing responsibility. In our view, there is no justification for imposing limits on that compensation just because some element of it is to be recovered from the trade unions.

    Secondly, we believe that the more appropriate com- parison here is with the proceedings in tort resulting in personal injury specified in Clause 14(2). As we shall see when we come to discuss that clause, there are no limits on the damages which can be awarded against a trade union in such cases. In our submission it would not be appropriate to limit the sum in the way proposed in the amendment, although the matter we are discussing must be relatively academic, because in most cases the award to the individual will be small in comparison with union liability sums set under Clause 15. For these reasons, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, to withdraw the amendment.

    I cannot support the wording of this amendment, but surely there is something to be said for making it clear that the provident funds are not at risk.

    The noble and learned Lord's response is most disappointing. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, says perhaps the provident funds could be protected. I do not see that the noble and learned Lord has produced any case for their not being. He says, "Look at personal injury; the funds would be fully liable there". Well, that is true, but under the Taff Vale torts or the industrial torts the funds are protected. Which is this more like? Is it more like the case of running down in the street, or is it more like the case that comes out of a strike? If the Government are going to go on analogies what one sees again is that they give the advantage of a false analogy to non-unionists. When the noble and learned Lord looks at Hansard I think he will see that in setting up the two points of reference he has chosen the one which is less like the cause of action involved in order to give an advantage to the non-unionist. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    9.56 p.m.

    Page 9, line 33, at end insert—

    ("(5) The Secretary of State shall by order make regulations providing for a member of a tribunal to be excused on grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction from sitting in any case where a request is made under this section.").

    The noble Lord said: This is a very simple amendment, which goes to a point which we have most taken so far tonight. We are concerned here with the manning of industrial tribunals. As the Committee knows, tribunals are tripartite bodies which consist of a legal chairman, an employer and in normal circumstances a trade unionist. From 1974 at least trade unionists have been fulfilling an extremely useful role, and indeed, in terms of the constitution of the tribunals at the moment, an essential role, because it is a tripartite system, over a very wide variety of industrial dismissal cases. We are concerned about a situation which might become much more common as a result of the 1982 Employment Bill, in which trade unionists could genuinely believe—and I would ask the Committee to admit for a moment that they too can have conscience or deeply held personal convictions, even about the Government's Act—that they did not wish to participate in industrial tribunal proceedings which involved circumstances arising, for example, out of the application of Clauses 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Bill; that is to say, cases in particular involving the closed shop, and most especially cases involving joinder against trade unionists. The question is, what should these people do?

    What the amendment says—and we are perfectly prepared to take this amendment back if it is thought to be unsuitable—is that the Secretary of State should by order make regulations providing that members of a tribunal could be excused from sitting on particular tribunals on grounds of conscience or other deeply held personal conviction, in any case where a request is made under this section; that is, in particular joinder against trade unions. What we are saying is that if that is unacceptable to the Government—and I must say, given the direction of their thoughts so far today, it is very likely to be unacceptable to the Government—perhaps they would tell us what is the position for these people.

    It may be said that when one serves on an industrial tribunal one is normally told in advance what the case is going to be about; at least one is given some indication of what the case is about. People who serve on industrial tribunals are usually contacted by phone by the clerk to the tribunal, who says, "Would you like to come along on Thursday the 14th? We have a couple of cases about this and that", and they look in their diaries to see whether they can do so or not. It may be possible that a trade unionist did not want to get involved in this kind of case, and genuinely felt that he would be the wrong kind of person to judge such a case, because he does not accept the basis on which the legislation is assumed to be about. You might argue in circumstances of that kind that a trade unionist could very well say, "I cannot make it on that day. I do not want to come on that day". You might ask, "What is the problem? Why does he have to assert his conscience or other deeply held personal conviction?" You might further say, "This is the kind of argument that you, Lord McCarthy, have used when you have talked about conscience being a still small voice. Why do people have to make a fuss about it?"

    Those who know about tribunals will know that for inevitable administrative reasons there are reserve cases. You can get a certain amount of advance notification about what the case is going to be in an industrial tribunal, but you cannot be absolutely certain; because, in the interests of administrative efficiency, if somebody turns up at a tribunal and for some reason or another cannot hear that particular case, or may hear the first case and not the second case the clerks draw up other cases from the reserves and you cannot be absolutely certain what kind of case you will find in front of an industrial tribunal.

    We are saying that it might be a good idea if the Government would accept—in a way, it would be an act of clemency if the Government would accept—that their particular notions about UMAs, joinder and so on will not find universal acceptance among ordinary rank and file active trade unionists, who, in all kinds of other ways, even this Government accept, perform a very useful service in continuing the tripartite nature of our industrial tribunal system; therefore, maybe they should be excused. Our amendment is a way of allowing them to be excused. If the Government say: "This is unacceptable; we do not want it. Why should we do something for these people?", I am asking them tonight to make some kind of statement as to how they will view members of industrial tribunals—whose record is an excellent one in dealing with 99·9 per cent. of cases that actually come before industrial tribunals—who may not wish to serve on this particular kind of case. If they will not excuse them, will it be taken down and used in evidence against them? Is it in any sense going to be insisted that somebody who serves on an industrial tribunal must be prepared to take, without any reflection at all, any kind of case, including a closed shop case involving joinder? Is that to be the view of the Government?

    We are asking them very seriously if they will allow a way out; it they will allow a form of formal clemency. But if they turn this amendment down, then please tell us what would their attitude be to members of industrial tribunals who say that they have deeply held conscience or personal convictions which prevent them from serving on cases of this kind. I beg to move.

    With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, this surely must be a total misconception. With respect to the noble Lord, he must know that to be so from his own distinguished record because this is a quasi-judicial or judicial function. I cannot say that I get bored trying rate cases and I do not think that the chairman of an industrial tribunal should pick and choose. It is not for me to anticipate the Government's attitude. But, of course, in principle and with the greatest respect, this must be misconceived. The answer to the question is: If you do not want to do the job according to the law of the land, then you do not take it.

    I should like to add a word by way of postscript to what my noble friend Lord Campbell has said. When the law is amended as a result of implementing a Government programme declared before the electors at a general election, surely it is right, as my noble friend Lord Campbell has said, that somebody prepared to serve on an industrial tribunal should accept the law as Parliament has amended it, and not consider himself free to pick and choose. It would be impossible (would it not?) to have industrial tribunals manned by people who would be fussy about whether one provision in a statute had been introduced as a result of the initiative of one type of Government and another by another type? They must accept it in the broad, or not at all.

    With due respect, I have listened carefully, but, on this point, there was a case where, after an election, hundreds of thousands of people voted for a group of people to come to power who would reduce transport costs in London. That was completely altered outside by cases in law. In other words, the very tenet that the noble Lord puts forward to this noble Committee was not sustained at that time.

    With great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, he does not have this right, because what happened with regard to London Transport was that the law had not meanwhile been amended and the Law Lords were merely declaring the law as it was. They had a duty to do so.

    The noble Lord has misunderstood me and, before we get worked up, I must correct him. I am not talking about the chairmen of tribunals; I am talking about side members. A tribunal is a tripartite body. The chairmen are legally qualified and I am not talking about them. I am saying that we have here side members and that these side members are trade unionists. With great respect, there is a precedent for what I am saying. I hear what the noble Lord says and I want to know whether the Government agree with him.

    There is a precedent for what I am saying. In 1971 we had an industrial tribunals system and when the Industrial Relations Act was passed in 1971, the wicked Trades Union Congress decided that all the side members then appointed should not co-operate with the application and implementation of the Industrial Relations Act 1971. I happened to believe at that time that that was a very unwise thing for them to do, because the great majority of issues that went to industrial tribunals at that time did not concern the Industrial Relations Act 1971, or, rather, they did not concern those aspects of the Industrial Relations Act 1971, to which the trade unions objected. They concerned the run-of-the-mill unfair dismissal. Nevertheless, the trade unions could not be compelled to serve on industrial tribunals if they did not want to and they withdrew. As a result, some very funny people served on industrial tribunals and it took quite a bit of time to get industrial tribunals running smoothly in 1974. I want to avoid that happening again.

    There is a movement inside the trade unions to boycott industrial tribunals. There is a movement inside the tribunals to boycott all forms of tripartism which now exist. There may be some people on that side of the Committee—I do not say existing Members—who would like to see that happen. I would regard it as a tragedy. Therefore, we must have a little bit of understanding. It would be perfectly possible to define the regulations in such a way that the side members were not compelled to serve on all cases. Even today, as I say, you cannot compel people to serve on particular cases. One volunteers to serve on particular cases.

    If this amendment is turned down and irrespective of what the noble Lord the Minister may say, I would continue to urge that trade unionists should serve on industrial tribunals. If they do not want to serve on cases of this kind, they should not be compelled to come along and they should feel free not to come along. No one serves on an industrial tribunal on a full-time basis. You can go once a month or once every six months, as you wish. But I want to get this matter cleared up. I want it to be precise. I want to know what the Government's point of view is. I want to know whether the Government—as noble Lords opposite seem to be saying—will hold it against trade unionists if they find that they are not serving on cases of this kind. I think that that would be wrong; I think that it would be unwise; and I am trying to prevent it.

    10.10 p.m.

    May I say, with respect, to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, that he is ignoring the British genius which is to accept the verdict of democracy as expressed in a general election and in Parliament. As a result of doing so, people who are placed in a responsible position, whether as High Court judges, chairmen of tribunals, or, as the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, describes them, side members of tribunals, should be prepared objectively to apply the law as decided by Parliament and not to start being selective. If we cast aside our objectivity, we lose one of the great advantages of our democracy. I hope that on further consideration the noble Lord will not persist in that view.

    Would the noble Lord take it from me that all the phrases he has used—fussy, objectivity, abiding by the majority—are the language which trade unionists use about non-unionists: about oddballs. They say, "Why must they be fussy? Why must they be objective? Why cannot they accept the majority view?" He understands that people can have genuine, conscientious objections which make them stand out, which make them look fussy, which make them look subjective, which make them reject the majority view. What he cannot do is allow that those things can genuinely be a part of the outlook of a trade unionist.

    I have listened with great care to the noble Lord in his arguments, and I am grateful for the contributions made by my noble friends behind me. I must start by saying that this amendment is totally unacceptable to the Government. The noble Lord has argued that it is the equivalent of the closed shop conscience provision of the Bill. However, that is not a valid comparison. I shall not weary the Committee now by repeating the reasons why conscientious objectors to union membership in a closed shop need to be protected. These arguments were accepted by the Donovan Commission and by the TUC during the winter of discontent, as the noble Lord knows. But there is one point that I must stress yet again. The person who objects to union membership in a closed shop on conscientious grounds risks the loss of his livelihood if his objections are not respected. Therefore, to keep his job he must swallow his conscience.

    The noble Lord's amendment smacks of double standards to me. The industrial tribunal member who decides on grounds of conscience that he can no longer remain a tribunal member is in a totally different position. He has a clear option—he can resign. His livelihood is not at stake. Therefore, if there were to be tribunal members, who, after the passage of the Bill, decided that they could no longer sit on a tribunal in certain circumstances for reasons of conscience, they would have the perfectly simple option of resigning. Unlike the employee who resigned his union membership in a closed shop, they will not lose their job as a result.

    The noble Lord went further. It is of course possible that a few tribunal members may refuse to sit on closed shop cases once the Bill is through. It is unlikely that there will be many since, in the Government's view, the majority would have more good sense than to start picking and choosing between cases. Nor is it likely that there will be many closed shop cases. But if an individual did refuse to sit for certain types of case he would no doubt he warned that if he persisted he would not be called for other types of case. Equally, I imagine, he would have to be replaced.

    The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, talked about the TUC's boycott. Of course the Government are aware of the TUC's call for union members of tribunals to boycott closed shop cases once the Bill is law. Whether that call is likely to have much effect is doubtful, but the Government will in any case take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that the tribunal system remains fully effective, and it is too early to say, or speculate, what those measures might be. What is totally unacceptable is the provision for tribunal members to be able to pick and choose the types of case that they are prepared to hear. The industrial tribunal system is an important part of the judicial system in this country; a system which exists to uphold the law passed by this Parliament. It would be nothing short of monstrous if persons who are part of this system of justice were able to pick and choose between the laws which they are prepared to uphold and those which they are not. Yet that is precisely what would be the effect of the amendment, and I must therefore ask the Committee to reject it.

    Is there not the further danger that if the amendment were accepted, the trade union view which the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, would wish to have expressed, might remain unexpressed?

    On Question, amendment negatived.

    On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?

    10.16 p.m.

    We hope not to delay the Committee for long at this time of night but we feel that we must make our point about the clause as a whole and divide on it. We have said repeatedly in relation to the many amendments we have moved, why we regard joinder as a mistaken procedure. The Government have not put forward any arguments which in any way improve on the arguments which were adduced so unsuccessfully by the Member for Rochdale in another place at the time, in 1980, when he sought to make the 1980 Act substantially as this Bill now is under Clause 6.

    The arguments which were deployed—and they were rehearsed by my noble friend Lord Wedderburn earlier—by the Government spokesman on that occasion stand as they were then, and the Government have in no way advanced on any of them. All they have done is to seek to say that there is a great deal of public feeling—which the Government have done their best to work up, anyway—and somehow, in some unspecified form, that public feeling sets aside the strong and effective arguments which were used in 1980 against a provision of this kind. In our attempt to modify it, we have moved a whole series of amendments, which I shall not rehearse again at this stage, some of them of a very modest kind and some of them declaratory in that all we have sought to get the Government to do is to make clear in the Bill something they said was the case in any event. On each occasion the Government have refused to move. We should, therefore, be in a very inconsistent and illogical position on this fundamental, important and criticial clause if we did not divide the Committee, and that is what we intend to do.

    I wish to reinforce what my noble friend Lord McCarthy said, and on another occasion, when we come to the appropriate clause, I will spell out in detail why the Bill as at present drafted, and in particular this clause, will torpedo completely the entire Theatre Council arrangement on which the theatre depends. I could spell that out in detail on this clause, but I should prefer, having regard to the time, to do it on a later clause which is particularly relevant.

    If the Committee wishes to sustain the Theatre Council situation, which is required both by employers and employees and has been sustained ever since it was created by the third Viscount Esher many years ago, this clause and a later one which supports it will have to be amended, not particularly in relation to that situation, but generally so as to provide for those situations which can be sustained only by agreement by the employers maintaining a contractual situation which is applicable throughout the whole of the area along with making it legal to carry out those activities which have so far sustained the entire operation. At present, this clause and provisions like it, as I say, torpedo the entire position, and at a later stage I will, if I may, take the opportunity of spelling that out in chapter and verse.

    Before we move on, and while we are still considering the clause, I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, to clarify a point that he mentioned earlier. He was speaking very quickly in answering the debate on Amendment No. 7, but he quoted another country—I think it was Sweden—and referred to a strange currency, with which I am not familiar, since I do not travel to that country. As I understood it, the country placed a limit on joinders for individuals. Is that right? If it is so, it seems therefore that that country, which I know noble Lords opposite admire greatly in terms of industrial relations, has joinders for individuals. Therefore perhaps there is more to this clause than we might otherwise have thought.

    The situation that I was describing existed in Swedish law, on which I am not an expert, and I dare say that the noble Lord would not need three guesses to find out from where I got the information. It was a situation in which there was a peace obligation clause, which was of course legally enforceable in Swedish law, and which when broken was enforceable against the trade union. But it was also enforceable against individuals, and as I understand it, in those circumstances the damages were very limited. It was a peace obligation clause; it had nothing to do with unfair dismissal.

    I am not an expert on Swedish law either, and therefore I shall contain myself to English law, on which I am also not an expert. Rather like the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, who was commendably brief, I, too, shall contain myself to what the clause does. The noble Lord said that he was going to divide on it in any case, and so I do not suppose that it matters very much what I say. Therefore I shall content myself by saying merely that the whole purpose of the clause is about what happens in a position of unfair dismissal. In particular we think it right that where a union or other person uses industrial pressure to force an employer to dismiss an employee unfairly for not being a member of a trade union, that union or other person should be liable to pay its or his fair share of the price for its or his actions. The union or the person should bear its or his fair share of any compensation which may be awarded to the dismissed employee. That compensation may be none, it may be some, but we think it right that the union or the person should pay its or his fair share.

    10.22 p.m.

    On Question, Whether Clause 6 shall stand part of the Bill?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 58; Not-Contents, 26.

    DIVISION NO. 4

    CONTENTS

    Airey of Abingdon, B.Beloff, L.
    Avon, E.Belstead, L.
    Aylestone, L.Boardman, L.
    Bellwin, L.Boyd-Carpenter, L.

    Caldecote, V.Lyell, L.
    Campbell of Alloway, L.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
    Craigavon, V.Mancroft, L.
    Craigmyle, L.Mansfield, E.
    Davidson, V.Monk Bretton, L.
    De La Warr, E.Montgomery of Alamein, V.
    Denham, L.—[Teller.]Mottistone, L.
    Drumalbyn, L.Orr-Ewing, L.
    Elton, L.Renton, L.
    Ferrers, E.Rochester, L.
    Forester, L.Saltoun, Ly.
    Fortescue, E.Sandford, L.
    Gardner of Parkes, B.Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
    George-Brown, L.Seear, B.
    Glanusk, L.Sharples, B.
    Glenarthur, L.Skelmersdale, L.
    Greenway, L.Stodart of Leaston, L.
    Grimston of Westbury, L.Strathcarron, L.
    Harmar-Nicholls, L.Terrington, L.
    Harris of Greenwich, L.Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
    Harvington, L.Trefgarne, L.
    Killearn, L.Trenchard, V.
    Kilmarnock, L.Wilson of Langside, L.
    Long, V.Winstanley, L.
    Lucas of Chilworth, L.Young, B.

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Ardwick, L.Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.]
    Birk, B.
    Bishopston, L.McCarthy, L.
    Boston of Faversham, L.Oram, L.
    Collison, L.Pitt of Hampstead, L.
    David, B.—[Teller.]Stewart of Alvechurch, B.
    Davies of Leek, L.Stewart of Fulham, L.
    Elwyn-Jones, L.Stone, L.
    Ewart-Biggs, B.Strabolgi, L.
    Hatch of Lusby, L.Underhill, L.
    Jeger, B.Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
    Jenkins of Putney, L.White, B.
    John-Mackie, L.Wynne-Jones, L.
    Kirkhill, L.

    Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 6 agreed to accordingly.

    [ Amendment No. 75 not moved.]

    Clause 7 agreed to.

    Clause 8 [ Dismissal in connection with strike or other industrial action]:

    [ Amendment No. 76 not moved.]

    Amendment No. 77 seems to have been left out in the reprint of the Marshalled List.

    [ Amendment No. 78 not moved.]

    On Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?

    10.30 p.m.

    Many of your Lordships may have been mystified by the failure to move certain amendments which preceded the debate on "Clause stand part". The reason was that it appeared to my noble friends and to me that it was more sensible, perhaps, in view of the hour, to take the points on Clause 8 in general. Clause 8 is a clause to which my party and many working people in the trade union movement object strongly. It is about the right to strike, about the right to withdraw labour; and the mere fact that, at the moment there may or may not be hostility towards a particular strike or other industrial action, has nothing to do with this clause. As the American union leader, Samuel Gompers, said in 1908—and he was hardly a revolutionary:

    "It is our aim to avoid strikes but I trust the day will never come when workers in our country will have lost their manhood and independence so as to surrender the right to strike."
    The right to strike is enshrined in the social charter of Europe to which the United Kingdom has acceded and it must imply a limitation upon the dismissal of those on strike.

    I have already, on a previous amendment to a previous clause, spoken of the strange compromise which our law adopted, on a more or less non-controversial basis after 1974, that in cases concerning strikes where all the strikers were sacked by the employer or where all were engaged after, were re-engaged or not re-engaged, the tribunal at first had to find that it was a fair dismissal and, later, by subsequent amendment in the statute, was given no jurisdiction at all in that situation. But if that had been left without qualification, there can be no doubt in anybody's mind that the right to strike would have been made a laughing stock. Therefore, the line was drawn that if the employer victimised some of the strikers, if the employer picked and saw fit to choose, if he re-engaged some and not others of the relevant employees (as the section of the statute has it: Section 62 now of the 1978 Act) then "the jurisdiction of the tribunal would revive".

    A lot of the debate on this matter—and this is a matter on which feelings go very deep, I am aware, on both sides; but it is a very fundamental matter—and a lot of misunderstanding is probably caused by failing to pay sufficient attention to that last phrase:
    "the jurisdiction of the tribunal is revived".
    It does not mean that everyone dismissed is necessarily able to get compensation for unfair dismissal. Indeed, there are many cases which are well known (especially the case of the sacking of the stable lads at Newmarket) where the tribunal and the EAT have gone into detail about the considerations which they might consider proper or improper for an employer to take into account when dismissing only some of the strikers. "Fair" or "unfair" is still up for grabs. But it becomes very important when applying those rules, which are full of compromises, where the line is drawn in each case.

    The Government are changing the rules of the game in a way which we say is thoroughly unjustifiable. First, they are changing the reference group of relevant employees from all of those taking part in the strike to those who work at one establishment. There is case law on this matter, but unless the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate wants me to do so I shall not cite it because it does very little better than the Bill itself.

    The Bill is quite remarkable. On page 10 it tells you that, in defining "establishment", establishment means that establishment of the employer at or from which the complainant works. It is like telling you, if you want to know whether someone is riding an elephant that that elephant is the elephant which he is riding. "Establishment" will give rise to a great deal of difficulty but it is not just the legalism that is important. What is important is that it cuts the work group up into little packets.

    Even in the toughest industrial situation on both sides with passions high, most British employers do not sack strikers; but there are some who do, and the ones who do will benefit from this Bill and that will not help industrial relations at all. If they can look at each group and say: "We will have that little lot; they will go; and we will have that little lot, and they will go—but not the others", then everyone can see how feelings will be inflamed instead of pacified.

    So too with the other part of the amendment in the Bill, the amendment which says that the employer does not have to look at all of those who are taking part in the industrial action because he can now look only at those who are on strike—or, to be more accurate, who are taking part in the industrial action—at the complainant's date of dismissal.

    If the Committee will consider that for just one moment, it means that instead of having to take account of all the group who take part in the industrial action, the employer can tempt back the workers one by one. He can erode the industrial action at the edges. Noble Ministers may find that amusing; if you are out on the streets in industrial action, you do not find it amusing if the employer is eroding at the edges and it does not help settle the dispute; it does not help at all. It will not help ACAS; it will not help anyone in the long run.

    This clause is to get a few back, break the strike and then dismiss the hardcore. This is a clause which legalises the dismissal of those who are prepared to stand in solidarity the longest. In so doing, the Government are putting our law in breach of international obligation, going far beyond anything that is reasonable compared with other systems, Compared with other systems, this is totally unreasonable.

    There is a final point. When we said, "At least all of those who are taking part in the strike are the reference group", we were talking about all the people who lost their unemployment benefit. Now we are going to look at that group in packets and at the time of the complainant's date of dismissal. The effect of the whole clause can he no other than to make it more difficult to settle industrial disputes, inflame passions and find at the same time—and I say this quickly—no answer to the problem which is said to be there; some of the case law such as Stock v. Jones. The Stock v. Jones problem has been settled by later cases, and I hope that the Government will not rely upon a legalism of the Judical Committee's decision a few years ago in the Stock v. Jones case. That was dealt with in Williams v. The National Theatre Board in 1981. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accept that. Therefore, there is neither a legal reason nor an industrial reason for this clause and morally it should be thoroughly rejected. I hope that the Committee at this late hour will tell the Government that they should look at this matter again.

    I had something to say on this clause at Second Reading: that it would effectively enable employers to dismiss strikers selectively. I think on reflection perhaps it would have been more accurate for me to have said that the effect of subsection (2) appears to be to reduce from "perpetuity" to "three months" the possibility of an employer being open to legal action for selectively re-engaging. But is it not the case that in future, subject to the provision in subsection (3) confining the term "relevant employees" to those taking part in industrial action at the same establishment, that it will be open to employers to discriminate against certain people by not re-engaging them as long as three months have elapsed since the date of dismissal? I think that is perhaps another way of saying what the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, has put. Like him, as I have understood it, if people have been engaged in industrial action and the employer has wanted to sack someone regarded as a particular trouble maker, he has not been able to do so. He has had to dismiss either all of them or none. I stand open to correction, of course, on that interpretation, but that is my understanding.

    At this precise moment I am not taking up a rigid position on this matter. It is rather that we on these Benches certainly need to be satisfied why the Government consider it desirable to introduce now, from what the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, has said, what clearly trade unions will certainly regard as a provocative change of the law, and which may be represented—indeed he has just represented it—as effectively limiting the individual's right in the long term to withdraw his labour. We are concerned about this and look forward to hearing a little more precisely than has been apparent from the discussions in another place what the Government's answer to that contention is.

    I should like to support my noble friend in his challenge to Clause stand part, and also to follow up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, because he and I raised this point on Second Reading. The noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, replied. I will not weary the Committee by going through what he actually said, but he referred to the fact that it is necessary for an employer to dismiss all those on strike—which is what we knew already—but he made no reference to this part on re-engagement and one has to look very carefully to compare what he said with what the notes on clauses say. The notes on clauses say, referring to subsection (2);

    "It has the effect that if three months or more have elapsed between the time an employee was dismissed while he was taking part in a strike or other industrial action or whilst he was locked out, and an offer to him of re-engagement, then that offer does not open up the possibility of an industrial tribunal hearing a claim for unfair dismissal from another relevant employee."
    That is the important point we were making, that it opens the way to selective dismissals and for an unscrupulous employer, after three months have passed, to get rid of a "troublemaker", a shop steward or a trade union activist. There is no other interpretation one can put upon the notes on clauses than that.

    Differences have come in regard to dismissing all employees. Whereas if they were all engaged in a national dispute, taking in a number of plants, then the employer had to take cognisance of the fact that they were all in the same dispute, now this clause makes it only those who are engaged in one particular establishment. In the eyes of any active trade unionist or in the eyes of anyone who is a trade unionist at all, that can only be held to be an attempt, either wittingly or unwittingly, to break the national spirit in a strike.

    The only reason why people go on strike is to cause dislocation. If you do not cause dislocation you are not going to win the strike. We hope to avoid strikes by proper industrial relations. Once you start to pick and choose between one establishment and another, you are whittling away the unity of the trade unionists in that strike. That may be the intention of the Government. Our intention from these Benches is to get such good industrial relations that we can avoid the necessity for strikes. But when the strike comes, the workers must be put in a position where they can effectively carry out the strike. What is proposed in this Bill is aimed at that.

    But the most serious thing about this clause is the opportunity for selective dismissal after a period of three months. I hope that the noble Earl will read the report of what he said at columns 622 and 623 of Hansard, in reply to the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, and myself, because he will find that it does not fit in completely with the notes on clauses and with what the Bill says about selective dismissal.

    I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, could assist us in one matter. I realise that he was speaking as briefly as possible on this clause. I think he suggested that the clause represented some breach of an international obligation so far as the British Government were concerned. I am not clear whether he was referring to the European Convention on Human Rights, or to some other international obligation on this point. It would be helpful if he could assist us in the matter, in order to give the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate the opportunity of answering this point.

    With leave, I shall read the document that I cited. It is the European Social Charter—not the Convention on Human Rights, which is much weaker on this matter—signed in Turin on 18th October, 1961. Article 6 reads as follows:

    "With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the contracting parties undertake and recognise:
    (4) the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into."
    That is the document.

    May I ask the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, how long it is that he says an employee is entitled to remain on strike, exercising his right to strike, before an employer can dismiss him? Unless one can answer that question, one is not coming to grips with the essence of this problem.

    In our submission, Clause 8 is a rather modest measure, which is designed to tidy up the existing provisions and make them more workable, just as the Labour Government did in 1974 and 1975. Despite what has been said, we are introducing no new principles, no hidden weapons against employees who choose to strike and no new attack on union power. We are maintaining the principle enshrined in legislation since 1971, that if an employer discriminates between employees taking industrial action in like circumstances, he risks having to justify his action before an industrial tribunal.

    May I remind your Lordships of the three anomalies which Clause 8 seeks to correct? First, there is the question of re-engagement. As the law stands, if an employer dismisses a complete group of strikers in 1982 without discrimination, but re-engages one of them in 1983 or even in 1990, he faces unfair dismissal complaints from all the rest. We believe that this is wrong—indeed, absurd—and I noticed that there was no specific Opposition amendment directed to this matter. In our view, the three months' time limit which we are proposing to introduce is reasonable.

    It might be asked: why not take the end of the industrial action? This has been tried and, in practice, it has been found difficult to determine when industrial action has ended. In fact, less than 1 per cent. of industrial stoppages recorded last more than three months. Indeed, only about 6 per cent. last more than one month; and, of course, the shorter they are the better we should be pleased. Once three months has elapsed from the time an employee was dismissed, the employer should be able to re-engage without any question of discrimination being raised.

    The other two changes we are seeking to make are equally sensible and I find it difficult to understand why they are thought in some quarters to be so objectionable. The two changes that are particularly referred to are concerned with the definition of "relevant employees". That is the group with whom a dismissed striker must compare himself in determining whether he has been a victim of discrimination. As your Lordships have heard, a ruling of this House in 1978 means that it is discrimination, and therefore unfair dismissal complaints can be brought, if the employer does not give equal treatment to everybody who has ever taken part in the industrial action, including those who have returned to work. On the other hand, if the employer does dismiss those who have returned to work, then they can go to an industrial tribunal. It is surely nonsensical to leave this Catch-22 situation unresolved.

    The other problem with the current definition of "relevant employees" is that it requires an employer to treat employees striking at different establishments as if they were taking industrial action in like circumstances. This does not, in our view, reflect reality and we do not believe that it fits with the original intention of the provisions.

    The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, says that we have not defined "establishment". It is true that there is no specific definition of "establishment". It is a feature which this proposal shares with a good number of provisions already on the statute book. The noble Lord compared "establishment" to the elephant. It certainly shares with the elephant perhaps the ease of being recognised as an elephant with the difficulty of definition that the elephant poses. Therefore, it seems to us that to put people in the different establishments of a large employer in like circumstances is eminently reasonable.

    Of course there are other matters which one could raise to justify that. For example, if a group divides itself into subsidiary companies and operates each establishment as a separate company the situation will be different from that where the same group adopts a divisional structure, with one employer through all the establishments. Accordingly, our view is that this is nothing but making realistic the necessity to avoid discrimination in like circumstances as a basis for going to the industrial tribunal. So what we are saying is that the principle already in the law is simply being applied with somewhat more reality to the circumstances than hitherto, and I invite your Lordships to agree that Clause 8 should stand part of the Bill.

    I have the greatest respect and regard for the noble and learned Lord, but I have never heard such a shocking case. If this is modesty in dealing with the right to strike, the Minister should blush for shame. We shall vote against the clause.

    10.53 p.m.

    On Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 39; Not-Contents, 19.

    DIVISION NO. 5

    CONTENTS

    Airey of Abingdon, B.Killearn, L.
    Avon, E.Long, V.
    Belstead, L.Lucas of Chilworth, L.
    Boardman, L.Lyell, L.
    Campbell of Alloway, L.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
    Craigavon, V.Mansfield, E.
    Craigmyle, L.Monk Bretton, L.
    Davidson, V.Montgomery of Alamein, V.
    De La Warr, E.Mottistone, L.
    Denham, L.—[Teller.]Renton, L.
    Drumalbyn, L,Saltoun, Ly.
    Elton, L.Sandys, L.—[Teller.]
    Ferrers, E.Sharples, B.
    Forester, L.Skelmersdale, L.
    Fraser of Kilmorack, L.Stodart of Leaston, L.
    Gardner of Parkes, B.Strathcarron, L.
    Glanusk, L.Thomas of Swynnerton, L.
    Glenarthur, L.Trenchard, V.
    Harmar-Nicholls, L.Young, B.
    Harvington, L.

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Birk, B.Oram, L.
    Bishopston, L.Pitt of Hampstead, L.
    Boston of Faversham, L.Rochester, L.
    David, B.Seear, B.
    Davies of Leek, L.Stone, L.
    Elwyn-Jones, L.Strabolgi, L.—[Teller.]
    Jeger, B.Underhill, L.
    Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.]Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
    White, B.
    McCarthy, L.Winstanley, L.

    Resolved in the affirmative, and Clause 8 agreed to accordingly.

    11.1 p.m.

    Clause 9 [ Action relating to trade union membership]:

    [ Amendment No. 79 not moved.]

    Page 11, line 19, at end insert—

    ("(3) After subsection (1) of that section there shall be inserted—
    "(1A) Every employee shall also have the right not to have action (short of dismissal) taken against him for the purpose of enforcing a requirement (whether or not imposed by his contract of employment or in writing) that, in the event of his failure to become or his ceasing to remain a member of any trade union or of a particular trade union or of one of a number of particular trade unions, he must make one or more payments.
    (1B) For the purposes of this section, any deduction made by an employer from the remuneration payable to an employee of his in respect of that employee's employment shall, if the deduction is attributable to the employee's failure to become or his ceasing to remain a member of any trade union or of a particular trade union or of one of a number of particular trade unions, be treated as if it were action (short of dismissal) taken against the employee for the purpose of enforcing a requirement of a kind mentioned in subsection (1A)."").

    The noble Lord said: This amendment which is in the name of my noble friend is intended to parallel Amendments 27 and 61, Government amendments to Clauses 2 and 5. Amendment 27 to Clause 2 was designed to put beyond doubt that if a person is dismissed for refusing to make a payment in lieu of union membership, that dismissal is to be treated as if it had been for refusing to be a union member. This ensures that a person dismissed for refusing to make a payment in lieu of union membership enjoys all the same protections Clause 2 provides for the person dismissed for failing to be a union member. The amendment merely extends this line of reasoning to include the case where someone is being pressed by action short of dismissal to make a payment in lieu of union membership. Its effect is to give an employee the right not to have action short of dismissal taken against him by his employer to force him to make a payment in lieu in a situation where if he was dismissed for refusing to make such payment that dismissal would be unfair.

    In just the same way as the Government consider it indefensible to dismiss an employee for failing to make a payment in lieu of membership outside an approved closed shop, so we regard it as indefensible that pressure short of dismissal should be put on him to make such payments. The earlier amendment ensured that non-membership and non-payment in lieu are treated as the same thing for the purpose of Clause 2, and this amendment ensures that it is the same for the purpose of Clause 9. I beg to move.

    This is running over the ground that we ran over on Clauses 2 and 5. It does not make it any more acceptable. In fact it makes it less acceptable, because we are dealing here with action short of dismissal and not with actual dismissal. What is being said is that the convenient way of seeking to deal with one of the problems of non-unionism, by offering the conscientious objector or the reluctant trade unionist a possibility of paying to a charity or some other organisation, indeed on occasion to the union which is a form of agency shop, shall be denied, shall be unlawful, and it shall be unlawful even if the action taken to bring it about is only action short of dismissal.

    We have to ask ourselves what kind of action that would be. The Government never spell out what this kind of pressure short of dismissal would be which would find itself actionable in the circumstances envisaged by this clause. For example, let us take one of the perennial solutions which opponents of the closed shop put forward as an alternative to the closed shop; that is to say, benefits for members only—a situation in which the trade union negotiated wage increases confined to its membership, which is indeed quite common in the United States; a situation in which people did not get the benefits from certain pension schemes, pension schemes to which the union itself might contribute; or the most common discrimination between unionists and non-unionists—access to the procedure.

    It is quite universal in industry today that if you are not a member of a union, then the union will not progress your case through the procedure. No shop steward will act for a non-unionist. It is beyond all to expect someone to work, represent and look after the interests of somebody who is not a member of the organisation. But it is arguable that if you do not get your case progressed through the procedure, if you do not get access to the higher levels of management because a shop steward will not take up your case, then that is action short of dismissal, and action short of dismissal is unlawful under the Bill. We believe that that is wrong. We believe that the Government should clear up these questions and in the meantime we are moving this amendment. I beg to move.

    I thought that we were moving the amendments and not the noble Lord. However, the noble Lord has really asked for clarification.

    The noble Lord is asking for clarification on what comprises action short of dismissal. I am sure he realises what it is—it is anything which leads to an effect on a person's wages. It can involve promotion, wages—indeed, all sorts of things. I do not think that there is any point in my expanding on the matter any further at this time of night because, as the noble Lord has said, we have already been over the agreement in relation to the earlier amendments. I hope that the noble Lord will accept the amendment.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Clause 9, as amended, agreed to.

    Clause 10 [ Awards against third parties]:

    had given notice of his intention to move Amendments Nos. 81 to 86:

    Page 11, line 28, after ("union") insert ("or of preventing or deterring him from being a member of an independent trade union or from taking part in its activities at an appropriate time or of penalising him for so being or so taking part").
    leave out line 29 and insert ("(b) the employer").
    Page 11, line 36, at end insert ("or which was exercised by acts done by a person acting or purporting to act on behalf of the employer or as a consultant or adviser to the employer ").
    Page 11, line 37, leave out ("or the complainant").
    after ("may") insert ("before the hearing").
    leave out lines 41 to 45.

    The noble Lord said: I do not wish to move Amendments Nos. 81 to 86, but I should like to add the note that we have already spoken on the principle in relation to Clause 5 and the same arguments apply. It would perhaps be pointless to go over them again in view of the Government's response.

    [ Amendments Nos. 81 to 86 not moved.]

    Clause 11 [ Prohibition on union membership requirements]:

    had given notice of his intention to move Amendments Nos. 87 to 99:

    Page 12, line 13, at beginning insert ("Subject to subsection (8) below,").

    Page 12, line 14, after ("services") insert ("other than a contract between an employer and a worker").

    Page 12, line 21, at end insert ("and in this section "worker" has the same meaning as in the 1974 Act").

    Page 12, line 21, at end insert ("but no such term or condition shall render void or voidable any other term or condition of the contract").

    Page 12, line 21, at end insert—

    ("(1A) Subsection (1) above does not create an offence and contravention of that subsection does not of itself constitute a tort or unlawful means for the purposes of the law of tort.").

    Page 12, line 22, at beginning insert ("Subject to subsection (8) below,").

    Page 12, line 33, at end insert—

    ("unless in any such case he so acts or fails to act by reason of grounds of conscience.").

    Page 13, line 1, leave out ("ground, or one of the grounds,") and insert ("principal ground").

    Page 13, line 16, leave out ("ground, or one of the grounds,") and insert ("principal ground ").

    Page 13, line 26, leave out ("ground, or one of the grounds,") and insert ("principal ground ").

    Page 14, line 2, leave out from ("above; ") to end of line 4.

    Page 14, line 4, at end insert ("and against whom that contravention was directed ").

    Page 14, line 7, at end insert—

    ("(8) Nothing in this section shall apply to an act done for the purpose or principal purpose of ensuring compliance with the terms of an agreement or arrangement between one or more employers and one or more independent trade unions in so far as that agreement has the effect of requiring that the terms and conditions of employment in an area defined in that agreement require persons working in that area to be employed under contracts of service.").

    The noble Lord said: I would be failing in my duty, especially to my noble friends, if I did not make the point that I wish to make. On 2nd July, Clause 11 stood in the Marshalled List for your Lordships to consider. Clause 11 states that you cannot make arrangements to force people who are employed by another employer into union membership, or you cannot have a stipulation that work shall be done by union members only. We object to that. Indeed, we have many amendments which bring out the particularly vicious and nasty facets of the clause. They range from Amendment No. 87 to Amendment No. 99.

    However, we looked at the second Marshalled List of Amendments to be moved in Committee on 6th July—only four days afterwards, but some six or seven months since the formulation of the Government's proposals in the Bill after it has been through another place. I pause only to say that the lateness of the hour is one thing, but let us remember that the Government imposed a guillotine on this Bill in another place from Clause 4 onwards and we are now at Clause 11. However, it is true that Clause 11, bad though it is, pales into insignificance besides the new clause that was put down on 6th July. Therefore, it seems to my noble friends and myself that Clause 11, the new clause, and Clause 12 must be taken as a whole. If that cannot be done at the moment, it would be better for us to withdraw Amendments Nos. 87 to 99 and debate the matter properly in a session when it can be considered properly in relation to the new clauses and Clause 12, which refers back to Clause 11. Therefore, I shall not move Amendments Nos. 87 to 99.

    [ Amendments Nos. 87 to 99 not moved.]

    Clause 11 agreed to.

    I think that this is probably as far as we can usefully get tonight, and so I beg to move that the House do now resume.

    Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

    House resumed.

    Copyright Act 1956 (Amendment) Bill Hl

    Returned from the Commons agreed to.

    Cinematograph (Amendment) Bill

    Returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.

    Forfeiture Bill

    Returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.