My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

• Iron and Steel Act,
• Food and Drugs (Amendment) Act,
• Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act,
• Taking of Hostages Act,
• Supply of Goods and Services Act,
• Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act,
• Firearms Act,
• Local Government Finance Act,
• Cinematograph (Amendment) Act,
• Forfeiture Act,
• Copyright Act 1956 (Amendment) Act,
• Feltham Station Area Redevelopment (Longford River) Act.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, as the conclusions are rather long, I have placed a copy in the Library of your Lordships' House. The council examined in turn the pursuit of national food policies and strategies in developing countries, direct national and international measures to help eradicate hunger, the African food problem and the role of international agencies, and issues of world food security and trade. Britain is not this year a member of the council, but our representative was present as an observer and took part in formulating the common Community position, both for general debate and for the preparation of the conclusions.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very full reply, and I assure him that I shall read with great interest the Statement in the Library. May I ask him whether, in view of the need, he thinks that the conclusions are adequate? Did he note the statement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the council meeting, that shortage of food is now more critical than it has been since 1970, and that in Africa the average person today eats 15 per cent. less than he did a decade ago? Will the noble Lord agree that there are two main problems? One is the maldistribution of food, as illustrated by the fact that America is reducing production because the poorer people cannot buy. The second problem concerns the absence of agricultural development in the rural countries, as illustrated by the fact that only nine of the 61 countries which signed the FAO Rome Agreement some years ago have increased production?

My Lords, I am satisfied with the conclusions of the conference mentioned in the noble Lord's Question. However, I would point out that the object of the conference, which was set up in 1974, following the World Food Conference, was to provide a political forum where agriculture Ministers could, and should, meet annually to review the world food situation. Both of the points to which the noble Lord has drawn attention find expression in the communiqué concerning the conclusions and recommendations to which the Question refers. I most certainly agree with the noble Lord that these are the two most serious problems facing the world today.

My Lords, will not my noble friend agree that the rise of world hunger has followed startlingly the withdrawal of colonial power from a great part of the globe?

My Lords, that may be a fact, but I do not think it is the reason here.

My Lords, will the noble Lord agree that the shortage referred to is a shortage not of food, but of credit, and that to make some impact in reducing interest rates might make it possible for the purchasing countries to buy food and to feed their people?

Yes, of course, my Lords; I accept that there is currently a snarl-up in world interest rates, but I think that the most important thing is to give sufficient aid and instruction to enable the countries to grow their own food. This is probably the key to the whole problem.

My Lords, will not my noble friend agree that the aid should include encouragement to white colonials to remain and to help the oncoming countries?

My Lords, that is a matter for the Governments and countries concerned.

My Lords, is not the proposal on grain reserves one of the most important results of the conference, and will Her Majesty's Government seek to take an initiative in this matter? For instance, I gather from the noble Lord's original Answer that at the conference our delegate played a part within the Community's delegation. Will the Government continue to do that, since is it not the case that in terms of grain production the European Community is much better placed to take an initiative in the matter of grain reserves than we would be, as a single country, and as a considerable importer of food?

Yes, my Lords; certainly the Government attach great importance to our multilateral forms of aid, whether they be of grain or anything else, through our membership of the Economic Community. Regarding the special grain reserves to which the noble Lord referred in the first part of his supplementary question, I would say that this idea was noted with appreciation, but many questions were then raised, and have since been raised, about its economic and technical feasibility. The conclusions of the conference asked the director to do more work on it with other agencies concerned, and to bear in mind the related questions involved. In fact, it was agreed that there was a case for building up grain reserves in developing countries as part of their own stocks and production policies, as well as for protection against market fluctuations. The United Kingdom Government's view is that another thing which should go hand in hand with this is the solving of transport difficulties, which tend to preclude regional stores.

My Lords, may I ask a rather different question, of which I gave belated notice? May I ask the noble Lord this question: Arising from the meeting of the World Food Council, is it not desirable that there should be some simplification and co-ordination of the United Nations bodies on this subject? At present there are five different bodies, often rivals. Would it not be a good idea if the economic department of the United Nations sought to find some co-ordination of their activities and the ending of the bureaucracy which is present in many of them?

My Lords, I must note with some measure of approval what the noble Lord, Lord Brockway, has said, and point out that the World Food Council was set up to serve as a co-ordinating mechanism to provide overall, integrated and continuing attention for the successful co-ordination and follow-up of policies concerning food production, et cetera. Certainly one of the things with which it could well concern itself is the rationalisation of the bodies to which the noble Lord refers.

My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that the developing countries constitute the world's greatest reservoir of food production, that each country therefore has an obligation to pursue a food strategy which has a realistic chance of meeting basic internal needs, and that international aid should be conditional upon its being used primarily for this purpose?

My Lords, many of these countries about which we are talking this afternoon have enormous potential, but without help they are unable to realise this potential. That, I think, probably answers the noble Lord's question.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, in the White Paper the Government announced changes based on looking at 93 types of forms which mean 5 million fewer forms and leaflets for the public and businesses each year. Departments are now working on arrangements for improving the control and design of all forms. I expect that we shall be able to drop some, and we intend to make those which cannot be dropped easier and quicker to complete. That will save business time.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that encouraging reply, but I understand that there are 2,000 million forms in existence, and if we do them at the rate of 5 million a year I think it will take 100 years. Would my noble friend please assure me that the forms which are sent out are somewhat simpler than in the past, and easier to understand, and also that there is room on which to write the answers?

My Lords, my noble friend has clearly read the White Paper well; it has indeed been identified that there are something like 2,000 million forms. This includes not only forms sent out to be filled in for particular information but, of course, follow-up letters as well. It is an enormous task, and departments are now making arrangements to review all their forms to see which ones can be dropped and to give priority to those forms which have the widest distribution and are the most important.

My Lords, would the noble Baroness agree that the return for income tax purposes which many citizens have to make is one which might very well be dropped?

My Lords, I fear it might be replaced by another, even if it was a simpler one.

My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that part of the complication that arises on the drafting of certain of the forms comes from the complexity of the innumerable regulations that are issued by Government departments; and will she pay attention, please, to the necessity for simplifying a good number of the regulations with which the country is inflicted at the present time?

My Lords, I would agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bruce, that it is the complexity of some legislation which makes the design of forms most difficult; but the House may like to know that the leaflet entitled Filling in your VAT Returns in fact won a Plain English award last December from the National Consumer Council and the Plain English Campaign. So it is possible.

My Lords, would the noble Baroness the Minister say what the plain English was?

My Lords, I should be happy to send the noble and learned Lord one of the forms.

My Lords, will the noble Baroness ensure that her most praiseworthy efforts do not result in a long and complicated form sent out to all firms asking them which forms they want abolished or altered?

My Lords, in fact we are consulting businesses on the type of form; and, depending on the particular business and the particular form, we would of course consult appropriate representatives of that business in order to obtain their advice on the form in regard to both its intelligibility and its ease of completion.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, on the six productivity measures agreed last year between the railway unions and the British Railways Board, little substantive progress has been made, even though the board paid for these in advance. The unions have accepted the concept of open stations, and some pilot schemes are now in operation. The National Union of Railwaymen and the Transport Salaried Staff Association have accepted and are working flexible rosters, and are thereby enjoying the financial and social benefits which they bring. The remaining measures have not been implemented. In particular, the ASLEF Executive remain stubbornly opposed to flexible rostering for train drivers, against the obvious best interests of their membership.

My Lords, while thanking my noble friend for that rather disappointing reply, may I ask whether he is aware that Mr. Buckton, on behalf of ASLEF, frequently asks that more investments should be made in the railways? There is no one in Parliament who does not wish to see an efficient railway system. Can my noble friend say how much money has been invested in British Rail since the May 1979 election? Is not it rather unfortunate that with the electrification of the line from Bedford to St. Pancras, all the new rolling stock which has been supplied, costing £150 million, cannot be used because ASLEF have refused to operate these modern methods?

My Lords, of course on the latter point it is disappointing; and some might say it is more than disappointing. It has all sorts of implications. So far as the statistics are concerned, £1,500 million have been invested since 1979. Since 1976, that figure is £3 billion.

My Lords, would not the Minister agree that this type of Question, in the middle of what could be a disastrous industrial dispute, is hardly helpful to achieving settlement? Can the Minister not agree that over the last 10 years the trade unions in the railway industry have a great record of improved productivity? Can the Minister indicate how much has already been saved by the productivity measures, how much will be saved by flexible rostering on the locomotives only and how much has already been lost by this disastrous strike? Would it not be better if the Minister—not this Minister, but the Secretary of State—instead of making threatening speeches did something about trying to settle the strike which could have been done on an agreement which was reached on experimentation with alternative flexible rostering?

My Lords, I think the noble Lord has put to me about ten supplementary questions in one. I am at pains always in answering Questions to be as factual as I can and not to exacerbate situations which are very sensitive. Nevertheless, I think that in the interest of giving a few facts to answer the points that the noble Lord raises, I should say that the board's figures show that productivity between 1974 and 1979 rose by 5 per cent. and between 1979 and 1981 fell by I per cent. The noble Lord asked whether the Secretary of State should not (if you like) step in. I think the answer to that must be that the Government have no intention of intervening in what is a matter for the Railways Board to settle with its workforce. I think the noble Lord was less than his usual evenhanded self when he suggested that it is in any way the responsibility of British Rail for not being willing to talk about this matter when, having made their offer to do precisely that, it was ASLEF who called a strike. In those circumstances, there can be no meaningful discussions and negotiations; so that it is not too helpful.

My Lords, whether my noble friend's reply be helpful or not, is it not at any rate more helpful than the recent intervention by the Leader of Her Majesty's Government's Opposition?

My Lords, that certainly has not been helpful at all; I agree with my noble friend on that. It is not surprising that the leader of the National Union of Railwaymen has expressed his own dismay at that intervention.

My Lords, bearing in mind what was said about sensitivity in this issue, may I ask whether there is not some misunderstanding about what hours actually would be worked under the flexible rostering proposed by the Railways Board; and is there not some residual fear among many railwaymen that they will be asked to vary their starting and finishing time by such wide margins that it will destroy their social life? If this is incorrect, could not some statement of the British Railways Board be published to show what the effect will be on the average railwayman?

My Lords, perhaps it would be helpful to say that the ASLEF membership feared the very point that the noble Lord makes; but I would have to go on to say that the report of the Railway Staff National Tribunal proposed a series of safeguards to protect the interests of the drivers and to allay their fears; and that the board accepted these safeguards in full. It is worth pointing out that over 80 per cent. of British Rail guards are now working flexible rostering and that with only one exception all other European railways are successfully and fully operating flexible rostering.

My Lords, I asked the noble Lord whether he could indicate how much would be saved per year by adopting flexible rostering for the locomotive men. If the Minister does not have the answer, perhaps he could write to me, because ASLEF have claimed that the saving would be only £2 million a year.

My Lords, I am able to give an indication of that. It is that the benefits which would flow from the introduction of flexible rostering and associated items total over £35 million.

My Lords, may I ask the Minister—although I think he has already answered it in commenting on the supplementary question put by the noble Lord, Lord Underhill—whether, on the question of alternative flexible rostering, I am not right in remembering that this proposal was put forward by British Rail, that it was totally ignored by ASLEF for a period of, I believe, six days and ASLEF then replied with a national strike? We are now told by Mr. Ray Buckton on television that ASLEF wished to undertake flexible rostering and that it is the Railways Board who are being obdurate. Would the Minister agree that if that is correct, we might have it underlined and got over to the general public?

My Lords, so far as I am aware, what the noble Baroness has said is correct. I think the public are not being starved of comment and information about what is happening. I am sure they will come to their own conclusions, and they would probably be the ones the noble Baroness mentioned.

My Lords, could the noble Lord give an undertaking that once this dispute has been settled there will be no further delay in the investment programme of railway system modernisation in this country?

My Lords, the noble Lord will know that I can make no such comment on that.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that some of the information given us will be of interest to the electorate as a whole that many millions of people and businesses, too, are suffering grievous inconvenience as a result of what many people believe is an unnecessary strike, and that anything we can do to make the facts known to Parliament and the electorate must be helpful?

My Lords, I accept what my noble friend has said as to that.

My Lords, will the noble Lord confirm one figure from the reply he made to my noble friend Lord Underhill? He said that £34 million would be saved if the flexible rostering scheme had been accepted. Does that apply to flexible rostering for locomotive men, which was the subject of the supplementary question?

My Lords, the figure I gave is over £35 million. The figure I have is £35.4 million. As to what it refers, yes, it is to cover flexible rostering and associated items. If the noble Lord would like a breakdown, I will send it to him.

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.

A very great deal, my Lords. From 1979 to 1981 there have been 108 departmental scrutinies and three large service-wide reviews. Last year we published a White Paper, Efficiency in the Civil Service, in which we set out our policies for improving management and efficiency. We have since pressed ahead with new and substantial work, including our programmes of lasting reforms, of action to improve financial management, and of scrutinies and other reviews.

I am arranging, with the leave of the House, for a list of the scrutinies and service-wide reviews being conducted in departments as part of our central efficiency strategy for 1982 to be published in the Official Report.

My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend the Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House for that interesting and informative Answer. May I ask my noble friend whether she will be prepared to give further information to your Lordships on the benefits which it is hoped will accrue from this efficiency operation?

My Lords, potential savings of around £300 million a year and £37 million once-and- for-all savings have been identified. Savings from decisions taken so far are around £150 million a year, and as much again is still for decisions. We believe that the scrutinies and reviews have resulted in greater value for money, more streamlining, better management and, above all, a better service to the public. I should like to place on record that all this work has been done by civil servants themselves.

My Lords, is my noble leader satisfied that all those who examine and select candidates, particularly for the senior grades of the Civil Service, are sufficiently qualified and lacking in prejudice to select the best candidates? If she is so satisfied, is she aware that my information is quite to the contrary?

My Lords, if my noble friend in his question is referring to what we are doing on succession planning, I should like to say that the new arrangements that have been made should ensure that those who are going to the top of the Civil Service get experience of managing both people and money, and I believe that within the Civil Service we are fortunate in having very many very able people indeed.

My Lords, I am very sorry that my noble leader has misunderstood me; it is entirely my fault. I was referring to those candidates who are not yet in the Civil Service.

My Lords, if my noble friend is referring to applicants for administrative trainees, this year, I think I am right in saying, we are taking in about 45 administrative trainees and indeed we may not be able to fill all the posts.

My Lords, is the Lord Privy Seal able to give any indication at this point of time when the Government's response to the Megaw Report on the Civil Service is going to be discussed or the Government's reactions to it are going to be indicated?

My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord will appreciate, the Government are still considering their response to this important report. It is another question, but I hope that at an appropriate moment the noble and learned Lord will put down a Question on that subject.

My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that the recruitment of accountants into the Civil Service is proceeding far more slowly than the Government themselves envisage? Will she assure herself that there is no undue resistance on behalf of some of the administrative grades to the introduction of rather more accountants into the Civil Service, which process at the moment, as the noble Baroness is aware, is being conducted by Mr. Kenneth Sharp?

My Lords, I should like to assure the noble Lord that it is the intention of the Government that the number of accountants in the Civil Service will be doubled over the next 10 years. We are introducing new training facilities to give much greater training in financial management to all those seeking top posts in the Civil Service. These are important matters which will underpin our drive for greater financial efficiency throughout the Civil Service.

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available this evening at the usual time. The Committee stage of the Employment Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7 o'clock for approximately one hour and, during this adjournment, the two Town and Country Planning (Minerals) Regulations and the Agriculture Act 1970 Amendment Regulations will be taken.

It may also be for the convenience of your Lordships to know that the Grill Room will be open from this evening for the dispensing of refreshments, including breakfast, for so long as the House sits.

My Lords, I beg to introduce a Bill to enable citizens of the Falkland Islands to acquire British citizenship. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a first time.— (Lord Bruce of Donington.)

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

moved Amendment No. 99A:

After Clause 11, insert the following new clause:

When the noble Lord, Lord Mackay, said that there were certain mistakes in the amendment, I thought for one wondrous moment that the Government might have relented. I did not believe this amendment when I saw it and I hoped maybe they had thought better of it; and of course one should think better of it. But it was not the case. I do not say that this is the most important new clause; I do not say it is the most important clause. I say it is the most objectionable; I say it is the most immoral; I say it is the most unjustified. I say it represents a further incursion into trade unionism and the ordinary day-to-day practices and beliefs of those who believe in trade unions.

Those members of the Committee who were awake when we stopped yesterday may remember that it was necessary to withdraw the amendments which my noble friends and I had put down, dealing with the previous clause. That was a pity but it was necessary, and it was justified on our side because of the very much more objectionable nature of this clause—which is not to say that we found the previous clause in any way acceptable, but at least it could be said about the previous clause that it was to do with the closed shop.

It is perfectly true that it simply meant that no rank-and-file trade unionists, whether they were in a position of authority in local authorities, or the chairmen of Labour clubs, or branch secretaries in trade unions or whatever they might be, or whether they were rank-and-file journalists working with various types of casual journalists, were entitled to insist on the so-called "fair lists", because fair lists in one way or another include firms or are made up of firms who recognise trade unions and who in many cases operate a closed shop.

But this clause goes much further. It has similar widespread coverage to the previous clause—that is to say, it does not deal just with contracts but with all forms of commercial activity, such as tendering, cancelling, failing to enter into tender. All kinds of commercial activities are covered in the way that Clause 11 covers them, but this clause has nothing to do with the closed shop. No longer are we being told, "You must not make these requirements in cases of a closed shop", but, "you must not make these requirements if the only thing you are asking for is that people should recognise trade unions and carry out trade union rates".

I wonder what noble Lords opposite really believe to be the motivation of people who try to secure that contracts, undertakings and work go to firms who recognise trade unionism. As little while ago as the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, a previous Conservative Government—though it is embarrassing to the present Government to refer to it—understood this; and indeed, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act, for all its faults, contained a number of provisions to encourage the spread of collective bargaining. Even in 1971, men of good will on both sides of the Chamber believed in the encouragement and spread of collective bargaining. Noble Lords opposite have changed their minds. They want to discourage the spread of collective bargaining. They believe that anybody who seeks to use his position, and even his own money and his own work, to encourage the spread of collective bargaining is some kind of moral pariah who should be in some way penalised.

It is perfectly true that the noble and learned Lord told us that this Government is not against recognition and that they do not intend at this moment (although of course we must be careful, because we have not finished the passage of the Bill yet and we might get another clause on Report) but at this moment the Government are not against recognition—not yet—in the sense that they are not yet introducing a clause which actually makes the recognition of trade unions unlawful. But give them time. Step by step the seven league boots are still in place and we are promised another Bill and another Bill and another Bill. They may get round to it; and if they got up today and told me that they did not intend to get round to it, it would not mean much to me.

So we have to look at this clause. This clause is saying that people should not use their positions of authority to seek to encourage trade unionism—not the closed shop, not coercion, but trade unionism. So we have to tell noble Lords, since they have clearly forgotten, though they knew about it in 1971, why it is that people should want to do that. It is because they are old-fashioned enough to believe that recognising trade unions, negotiating with trade unions and paying trade union rates is a kind of shorthand for non-exploitation; because they believe that if you insist on this simple provision the chances are that the people whose business you put in their way will not be exploiting their workers, will not be paying "scab" rates, will be giving decent conditions and therefore you will not be negotiating practices which you consider to be unjustifiable. That is their belief, and that is the belief which this Government are now going to make an actionable belief.

I sought to argue late last night that one of the great weaknesses, one of the great emotional, cultural and moral weaknesses, of the party opposite is that they have forgotten—one wonders how far they ever knew it—the possibility that trade unionists can have morals, beliefs, convictions and conscientious objections to encouraging "scab" labour and low levels of pay and conditions of work which they consider to be a disgrace. And because they consider them to be a disgrace, they insist, whenever they can, on putting work in the way of trade union firms. This is a simple, ethical principle. We think this is an ethical clause, and we will certainly divide the Committee.

I do not understand how the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, can stigmatise this amendment as objectionable, immoral and unjust. We are not against recognition, but we are against abuse and we are against pressure to force recognition. Why are we against that? It is because we are committed to the concept of freedom of association and all that that entails, which is envisaged in this Bill. Indeed, the activities that gave rise to this amendment only highlight the problem that there is now, as I stated before, no recognition machinery to obviate poaching, or to deal with inter-union disputes, which adversely affect those with no interest in the dispute. By and large, the Bill does not purport to deal with the internal affairs of trades unions, and how it can be stated that this amendment is immoral and objectionable, when all that it seeks to do is to obviate abuse, wholly defeats me.

In supporting the objection to this new clause, I should also like to take into consideration some of the points which might have been made last night on Clause 11 stand part, if there had been time, because they are somewhat inter-related. I could hardly believe my ears when the reasons for this new clause were given by the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate. It may be that some of us are wrong, but it hits at the very principles and beliefs for which some of us have strived for over half a century, and have tried to do it with a sense of moderation, believing that our way was the right way to achieve them.

I asked yesterday what noble Lords on the Government side were doing to show their belief in trade unionism—not dealing with abuses—and nothing that has been said in favour of this clause can possibly be said to be in support of a belief in trade unionsim. I hope that all sides of the Committee will question this, because of where it will lead in future industrial relations. It was asked: what right have people to interfere?—I was going to say as a member of the working class, but that may be an out-of-date expression to use. But as somebody who believes in the advancement of the people of this country, as someone who believes that the trade union organisation is a step towards that, I have a right to interfere in order to see that other people get decent conditions of work, and that is why we are opposed to this clause. It is said that it is to protect contractors, particularly small firms. Has anything been said about the protection of workers who find that they are in competition with another contractor or sub-contractor who has no trade union agreement, does not observe trade union conditions of work and who undercuts?

The Minister referred to freedom of choice. What about my freedom of choice as a consumer? I do my very best to buy essential things that are British made. I also want to do my very best to ensure that the things I buy are produced by people whose firms give them decent wages and conditions. Clause 11 may prevent me from doing that. For years and years, the organisation with which I was associated would not give a piece of printing to firms that did not observe a fair list, not because we were saying that they had to be trade union members, but in order to ensure that the conditions of work were fair and that we were not having competition from jumped-up outfits which did not observe proper print conditions.

Under Clause 11, I cannot in future get a fair list. Will a firm still be able to put,

"Printed by Blank Blank Brothers (TU)".

to show that I am dealing with a decent firm and not one that is undercutting rates? I am concerned with trade union conditions of work, as well as with trade union membership, and why should I, as a ratepayer, not insist that my local authority does not give work out to firms that undercut union conditions?

I ask your Lordships to put trade union membership on one side for a moment. Let us talk about decent conditions of work. If I can avoid it, my local authority will not give any work out to a firm which undercuts, which does not have a trade union agreement and which will not observe trade union conditions of work. I believe that the whole attitude—not just the wording—shows that words which say, "We are not opposed to trade unionism" need to be reconsidered. We are talking about the right of people to ensure that other people have decent conditions of work.

I should like to take one final example—and I ask your Lordships to remember that we are not just talking about local authorities. There may be a firm or an authority with construction work. It has good agreements with its own workers, trade union agreements, and it observes all national conditions of wages and other matters. A contractor comes on the job and he has no trade union agreement and is undercutting conditions. What do you expect the workers in the first outfit to do? They will down tools immediately and say, "We are not going to put up with this." It is an obvious thing to do for people who want to preserve not only their own conditions, but the conditions of other people.

The noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate referred to the right of interference with materials. I am a moderate person, but if I knew that a firm which undercut trade union conditions, which did not observe trade union membership and did not even recognise a trade union was bringing in equipment and materials, I would stop it from being used in my firm. That is the spirit which still exists in the trade union movement, and this new clause, and Clause 11, are leading the way to further industrial action. I ask the Government to reconsider, and I also ask noble Lords on all sides to refuse to let this amendment go through, because it will be fatal for future industrial relations.

This debate, so far, has been immensely revealing in that it has shown that the normally moderate Lord Underhill and the normally immoderate Lord McCarthy are lined up together in quite vehement opposition to a proposal which appeals to most of us on this side as fair and reasonable. This indicates, regrettably, a very real gap in the thinking of noble Lords on the other side from that of noble Lords on this side.

The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, was extraordinarily emotional and used highly emotional terms, such as "scab rates" and "scab labour". What do those expressions really mean? They mean labour paid at rates lower than those negotiated by trade unions. But it does not follow from that, particularly in the present economic situation of the country, that those rates are either unreasonable in payment to the people concerned, or contrary to the national interest. Indeed, those rates may well mean that people are employed who otherwise would not be employed at all, because it is, if you like, a platitude of economic discussion that the higher you force up wage rates, the higher you force up the level of unemployment and vice versa. Therefore, to try to obscure a calm consideration of this matter by use of distinctly old-fashioned expressions of this kind—I think that the expression "scab" goes back to Victorian times—high in emotional, but low in intellectual, content does not help.

If I understand it aright, what my noble and learned friend's amendment means is that those who put out business should remain neutral as between those firms that recognise, accept and negotiate with trade unions and those who do not. If trade unionism does all the good which noble Lords opposite sometimes suggest—and I believe that it does quite a lot of it, though perhaps not all—that should be a sufficient advantage to the firms which recognise unions in terms of good industrial relations, co-operation, working together, of which we hear a great deal, and a great deal of it is very good sense, and should reward them sufficiently. But why should the purchasing power of particular purchasers—we are concerned here with local authorities and other politically motivated bodies—be used to discriminate between those who as a matter of good sense and good policy recognise trade unions and those who, as a matter of their own judgment of what is good sense, do not? Why should they be able to use their political power to discriminate in this way?

Why not?

The noble Baroness asks, why not? I am delighted that she asked that question. Let me take the case of a local authority. A local authority represents ratepayers of all political views, some of them no doubt loyal and determined trade unionists. Others have perhaps suffered from trade union action. Other people see—as many of us do—the harm which the excessive power of trade unions has done to the British economy in recent years. The ratepayers consist of people of all those different views. Why should a majority, perhaps a temporary majority, in political control of a local authority use that political power to discriminate in favour of trade unions and against those companies which do not recognise them? That seems to me to be a most dangerous thing to do.

If the noble Baroness will permit me, I shall follow this a little further. It is well known that the Labour Party owes most of its financial support and a great deal of its electoral support to the unions. There is to some of us something a little repulsive in a political majority, owing so much to the support of the unions, using its political power in the direct financial interests of its supporters. If this were done the other way round and one had a Conservative-controlled authority openly acting in the interests of employers, noble Lords opposite would be raising Cain and would be perfectly entitled and right to do so. But they must appreciate that what is sauce for the capitalist goose is sauce for the even larger and rather redder Labour gander. I think therefore that they must appreciate that there are a great many people in this country who, like myself, believe strongly in a fair and effective trade union movement but who very much dislike exercises of political power of this kind which are designed to benefit the supporters of the political majority concerned at the expense, maybe, of the ratepayers.

It does not seem to me that there is anything unreasonable in saying that those who place contracts of this kind should do so on the normal basis upon which a businessman places contracts: on the basis that the supplier is likely to supply the right sort of goods or services at a competitive price. Why they should get worked up and involve themselves in questions about alleged scab rates is quite a different matter. In the present situation in this country, it is a little unrealistic—as I say, it goes back to Victorian times—to talk about scab rates. In Victorian times there was such a thing and the union movement was a very strong and a very natural and proper reaction against them, but to go on talking about scab rates in the situation of 1982 is to suggest that one is not in the real or the contemporary world. There are rates below trade union rates. They may be perfectly good rates; and they are rates which people are prepared to work for. There is no divine dispensation about trade union rates which makes it, in the words of the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, immoral to pay less. It may well be—it is, in fact, the case—that some rates negotiated by some trade unions in recent years have been excessive and contrary both to the competitive power of the industries in which the people concerned work and therefore to the employment prospects of their own members. This is undoubtedly the case. Therefore, to say that as a matter of morality, again to quote the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, any firm which pays less than that is doing something immoral is not only, to most people's minds, an exaggeration but a blinding revelation of the mentality of some noble Lords opposite.

The noble Lord has mentioned me, so may I just comment? I have heard him make very many reactionary speeches, but the one which he has just made is one of the most reactionary.

Will the noble Baroness allow me? Her intervention is based on a misunderstanding. I did not mention her.

At the beginning of this discussion I think I can say that I had a completely open mind on this point. Until now we have been discussing union membership agreements. This clause has to do with union recognition requirements. I must confess that I was a little concerned as to the reason why this new clause was being suggested. I felt that it might indicate some feeling on the Government's part that union membership should in some way be discouraged. However, as I understand it, an abuse has been uncovered in which certain local authorities, or a certain local authority, is seeking to exclude from lists of tenderers firms which do not recognise trade unions.

I believe in trade unions. I have said before in this House that if there were not trade unions somebody would have had to invent them in order to protect working people. I would go further and say that I believe in the positive encouragement of people to belong to trade unions. But I do not think that that belief in trade unions should extend to a position where certain firms which are not unionised are excluded from work, all the more when such firms may employ very few people. Having therefore listened to the arguments on both sides, it seems to me that the Government case has been made out. I shall therefore recommend to my noble friends that we should support the insertion of this clause.

The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, concluded his speech by choosing a particular example. There is no reference in the amendment to local authorities. Local authorities do employ persons and they have to pay certain rates of wages, but this is an amendment which refers to employers, and the typical employer is a business person. It is intended, and I think rightly intended, that business people, whether or not they be local authorities, should pay the wages which have been negotiated by trade unions for the particular occupations of those whom they employ. It is not a device by which local authorities can somehow betray ratepayers by giving preference to people who are members of the Labour Party, as the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, apparently implied.

I never know how wise it is to appear to be ignorant, but I am completely ignorant on this matter. However, it may be that when I sit down, having exhibited my ignorance, I shall get an answer. In listening to—I was going to say to my noble friend Lord Underhill, whom I have always regarded as a moderate, I came to the conclusion that we were obviously not looking at the same amendment. I should be very grateful if somebody could explain it to me afterwards.

I should like to ask the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, whether what he was saying means that, when firms tender for a job, if, for example, one firm has better conditions, offers better pay and produces a good tender but does not recognise trade unionism among its member, then the job concerned will go to the firm which has none of those advantages but which does recognise trade unions? That seems to be the argument put forward, and I believe the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, is indicating that that is the case. Obviously my ignorance has been enlightened, and I totally disagree.

Perhaps I may move on from there. It seems to me most unfortunate that these days, when the trade unions have done so much and when there is considerable criticism about the wrong use of some of their powers, their friends should think they are in need of any recognition such as this. I would not have thought that any trade union of real standing—as most of them are—would feel that it needed to have written into the law that jobs were only to go to firms or to organisations which have a trade union membership. I believe that is completely wrong. The more I have listened to the vehemence on this side of the Committee, the more it seems to me that there is nothing unfair in suggesting that, while conditions should not be applied to the giving of contracts, we hope that they will go to the firm or tenderer offering the best tender and the best conditions for its workers.

I wish that I had been able to get in before the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, because I might conceivably have been able to explain one or two points in the clause which might have brought them to a rather different conclusion from that to which they have committed themselves. The reason why I would endeavour to do so—successfully or otherwise—is this. The new clause is titled Prohibition on union membership requirements. This clause and the previous clause, Clause 11, which has the title Prohibition on union membership requirements, and also the next clause, which is also the subject of amendments we are now discussing, entitled Pressure to impose union membership requirements, are all prohibitive.

It is within my knowledge that the British Actors Equity Association believing that these clauses—although not this new one—might inhibit the operation of their arrangements with theatrical employers, had a discussion with Mr. Tebbit and he gave them an assurance that it was not the intention of the Bill to intervene in any way in arrangements between employer and employee, and that the object of this series of clauses was to lay down conditions which would affect a contract of service in the sense which has been illustrated in a somewhat exaggerated form by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, as being something which a Labour-controlled council might carry out in relation to contracts which it would engage.

How much reliance one puts on an undertaking given by Mr. Tebbit is a matter of opinion.

No.

It appears to have satisfied Equity. However, I believe that if Equity had seen the new clause which has been moved this afternoon, they might have had second thoughts. What the clause says is:

" (1) Any term or condition of a contract for the supply of goods or services is void in so far as it purports to require any party to the contract"—

and so on. The point might be made that a contract of employment between an employer and employee is a contract of service and is not a contract for the provision of services. This is generally true but it is not true so far as theatrical employment is concerned. An actor is not on a contract of service but is on a contract for the provision of services. He provides his services on income tax Schedule D in the same way as any small businessman might. Therefore, it is my belief that he is caught by this clause.

The West End contract I have here is the one on which every actor in the West End is employed, and it contains within it a clause stating:

"The Society agrees"—

that is, the Society of West End Theatre Managers—

"that its members in the normal course of events shall not offer engagements for any of the said productions to artistes who are not full members of Equity or"—

et cetera. It is my belief that the proposed new clause after Clause 11 prohibits that condition in the society's agreement. We believe that the new clause put forward this afternoon combined with the other clauses which have been put in effectively scuppers the London Theatre Council. In fact, I believe that every contract existing in the West End will, after these clauses have been brought into effect, be null and void.

If the noble and learned Lord who has moved Clause 11 can give us an absolutely firm assurance that this is not the case, then it may be that we shall be able to tell Equity that the assurance they received from Mr. Tebbit has been carried out publicly and has been carried out here. But if the noble and learned Lord is not able to give such an assurance—and, whatever he says, I myself doubt whether the wording will support him—then what he ought to do, if Mr. Tebbit meant what he said, is to agree to the insertion of a manuscript clause at Report stage which would make it quite clear that, when the relationship between the parties is that of employer and employee, irrespective of the fact that it may be a contract for services and thus caught by this clause, it will under these circumstances be inapplicable. Without that manuscript amendment in the Bill, or in the Act as it will become, the consequence will be completely to destroy the entire theatrical employment set-up and it would be entirely contrary to the assurances which I understand Mr. Tebbit gave to Equity.

I am rather surprised that up to now no noble Lord has mentioned the local authority called East Kilbride. I had a copy of that letter many weeks ago. I know that the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, is very cross about this amendment, but I too was extremely indignant when I read the letter that went out to all local authorities on the East Kilbride list. It was clear to me—and although this is not evidence, it was clear to the Financial Times—that what East Kilbride were doing was deliberately trying, in advance of the passing of this Act, to get round its intentions. Noble Lords can have whatever views they like about the intentions behind Clause 11, but it seems to be monstrous when a local authority in advance of the passing of a Bill which will surely go through, makes provisions such as these which deliberately flout the law which is to come.

I am not going to say that this is what the Government had in mind, but I am sure that it was not very far from their minds. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, would help us by giving us an assurance, if he can, that in his opinion it was not the intention of East Kilbride to get round the provisions of this Bill. If he really believes that, then we shall be a little bit wiser about why he is so upset.

Will the noble Earl tell your Lordships whether he objects to the army of draftsmen who arrange the avoidance, quite lawfully, of Finance Bills and tax reviews which come before both Houses of Parliament? Is that to be stopped?

I really do not feel disposed to widen the debate that far.

My noble friend Lord McCarthy reminded us that we are under some threat that this Employment Bill will not be the last and that there are other measures contemplated by the Government in relation to trade unions. Reading this proposed new clause, I wonder whether one of those new steps will be a change of the House of Commons resolution concerning fair wages in Government contracts. In reading that and reading this new clause, I believe we are on the brink of passing a clause which runs contrary to that resolution of the House of Commons. I do not say it does; I do say it is a matter that we ought seriously to consider.

For that purpose I will read just two of the clauses in the House of Commons' Motion which concerns fair wages clauses in Government contracts. The House of Commons is of the opinion that such contracts should provide as follows:

The contractor shall pay rates of wages and observe hours and conditions of labour not less favourable than those established for the trade or industry in the district where the work is carried out by machinery of negotiation or arbitration to which the parties are organisations of employers and trade unions representative respectively of substantial proportions of the employers and workers engaged in the trade or industry in the district".

Further:

"The contractor shall recognise the freedom of his work-people to be members of trade unions".

I recognise that that is not directly contrary to this clause, but suggest that we are getting dangerously near to the point where, if the Government pursue the path they seem bent on pursuing, they will have to ask the House of Commons to change its own resolution, and if they do that I believe there will be trouble in store.

I do not want to intervene twice in this debate, but I have been asked a number of specific questions and I would like to reply to those briefly. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, was surprised at the degree of unanimity between myself and the noble Lord, Lord Underhill. So far as I can remember, we have never disagreed yet, so perhaps it is just the language we use. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, also asked me why I used phrases like "scab rates". I use the phrase "scab rates" because those are the phrases which are still used by people who are seeking to defend trade union rates and trade union principles.

Of course, if the world were full of nothing but trade union rates and nothing but employers who observe trade union principles such words would be old-fashioned and out of use, but while there still are "scab rates", which are rates below trade union minimum rates which are paid in order to under-cut trade union minimum rates, then we have to have a word for them, and the word in conventional normal usage is "scab rates".

He also asks me why I think, why anybody would think, that local authorities have a right to insist that they do not employ contractors who pay scab rates. The answer is because they believe in trade unions and they believe in trade union standards. The only thing which can be asked of them—and if this is what he said I would accept it entirely, and I do not know the answer on this one in East Kilbride—is that they should make no secret about that. This may not be the kind of thing that you put in election addresses, but I do not see why not. I do not see why a party with a majority should not say in an election, "We do not propose to employ contractors who do not observe trade union rates". If the electorate do not want to elect them on that basis that is a matter for the electorate, but if the electorate do elect them then they are perfectly entitled to do so.

This brings me to a question raised in particular by the noble Lord, Lord Oram. I should have said this, and it is my answer to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Rochester. It is quite true that there is an almost exact parallel with the fair wages resolutions, the fair wages resolutions of the Commons, which go back a very long time. Whether they are exactly the same, the noble Lord, Lord Oram asks; I do not know whether what we are doing is formally in breach of them. But their objectives are exactly the same as the objectives of the East Kilbride Council. Parliament in its wisdom at that time wanted to prevent giving public money to support "scab rates". That is what the fair wages resolution is all about. We understand that the present Secretary of State, so he has told us, intends to introduce legislation which will repeal the fair wages clauses whether or not that puts us in breach of various ILO conventions. So that is the answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rochester. The abuse, which he says has to be corrected, is the abuse of seeking to do in local authorities and private authorities and, so far as one's own money is concerned, what Parliament has done at this moment in time on the fair wages clauses. That is what is involved with this Bill.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Burton, says that she does not like it because we are asking for something to be written into law, that people shall recognise trade unions. We are not saying that. In the first place, it is a Government clause; it is not an amendment of ours. In the second place, we have not an amendment asking for it to be written into law that people must recognise trade unions. We are asking for it not be actionable at large if individuals or organisations want to support trade union standards in the way that Parliament at this moment of time, though God knows for how long, does through fair wages resolutions.

The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, has not translated my very simple question in the very simple terms in which I asked it. I said nothing about the public recognising trade unions. I did ask whether I had understood from what the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, had said—and he confirmed it—that what was suggested from the Opposition side of the Committee was that contracts should not be given to firms, whatever standards they offered, if they did not recognise trade unions in their establishment. That is quite different. Would the noble Lord care to correct that?

I would only say let us see what Hansard says tomorrow. I think I have got what the noble Baroness said right.

May I say that what the noble Baroness has just said is what I want, because I do believe that public contracts should not go to firms which do not observe trade union conditions and which oppose trade union agreements. I am certain that the Social Democratic Party will find itself in very great trouble if that proves not to be the policy of the Social Democratic Party.

I am sorry to be persistent and be a nuisance, but I am going to have this right because one gets tied with it for ever if one does not put it right. I did not say about recognising trade union practices; I said something quite different. I asked the noble Lord whether he would take it that firms which might offer better wages and better conditions than trade unions should not have a contract, and he agreed with me.

I wonder whether I could ask the noble and learned Lord a very simple short question, the answer to which I thought I knew when this debate started, but having listened to the debate I find myself in some doubt. The question is simply this: Is there anything in this amendment which would prevent an individual or a company, who wished to employ a contractor who observed certain conditions for his workpeople with regard to membership of trade unions, from doing so.

As I understand it, the amendment says that any condition to that effect shall be void. But does the clause go further than that? Is there any sanction to prevent an individual doing that? For example, if the TUC want to let out a printing contract, why should they not make it a condition of that contract that certain conditions shall be observed by the printer? Is there anything in the amendment which prevents that happening? I can understand the anxieties about the local authority abusing political power. I can understand the anxieties expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter. I can understand Lord Boyd-Carpenter's scorn at the use of emotive expressions by those concerned with trade union liberties. But is there anything in the amendment which would seriously interfere with the right of people who quite legitimately want to ensure that any work done for them shall be done under certain conditions?

I venture to think that the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, has underlined, as so often she does, if I may say so with respect, the confusion which has existed in a good deal of what has been said about this clause. The clause deals with provisions requiring a proposed party to a contract to recognise a union or to recognise its negotiating procedures. It does not deal with rates of pay, and as I understand the position the fair wages resolution of the House of Commons is not in breach of this clause—indeed, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Oram, who raised that matter accepted that to be so. He said that they were coming close, but this certainly is not in conflict with that resolution because of the distinction between conditions of work and recognition of a union.

It would be perfectly possible to have a situation at present in which a district council took the view that it should apply a clause such as this, requiring recognition of a union, to strike out from their list of contractors a contractor whose rates of pay were double those that the union required, but did not himself have union recognition in his business and where his employees were perfectly satisfied with that situation. Why should a person who has managed to arrange his affairs in such a way as not to require the intervention of a union between himself and his employees in a way with which the employees are perfectly satisfied, be prevented by conditions of this type from getting work from other employers?

The situation with which this clause is dealing is a situation in which there is a requirement about union recognition or union procedures in the contract and it outlaws such a requirement as part of the contract. It does not, of course, prevent a contracting party himself from employing union labour if he wishes to do so. The freedom of persons to join a union and, indeed, the protection of persons engaged in union activity, is not managed by this Bill at all. Indeed, the compensation provisions for people who are dismissed for trade union membership and activity are improved by the Bill. Accordingly, what the Bill does not affect is the right of an employer and employee to make arrangements between them about the union matters in that firm. What it does strike at is pressure from outside on these matters. In our view, it is that pressure which requires to be made unlawful and that is the purpose for which this clause is introduced.

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask one question which is very germane to this part of your Lordships' discussion? It is not about pay: it is about the lives and the security of people at work. Looking at the new clause—Amendment No. 99A—I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord how wide is the forbidden consultation in respect of which the four subsections extend? Would a requirement of one contracting party upon another, that the other party observe the requirements of Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, and that that other party consult with safety representatives and with safety committees which have been established in the last few years and which have saved a large number of lives and maimings in industry, also be forbidden within this new and extraordinary clause?

Before I answer that question completely, I would need to look at the detailed provision that the noble Lord has in mind. On a proper reading of the clause, I certainly would not regard this clause as striking at the consultation provisions of the Health and Safety at Work Act.

I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate whether he would be good enough to answer the question put to him by the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside. Would this amendment preclude or not preclude the Trade Union Congress from awarding a contract to a printer on the basis that that printer was a trade union house?

Before the noble and learned Lord answers that matter further—indeed, I thought that he did say something about it—I should like to focus his attention in particular on the provisions of subsection (4) of the amendment, which trouble me a little. I have not had much time to think about it, but it states:

"Subsection (2) … does not create an offence"—

so it is not a criminal offence—

"but the obligation to comply with it is a duty owed to each of the following".

and there then follows (a) and (b). It then goes on to say:

"and any breach of that duty shall be actionable accordingly (subject to the defences and other incidents applying to actions for breach of statutory duty)."

It was the implications of that which troubled me a little.

Before the noble and learned Lord replies to that point, would he agree that a court would interpret this provision of services which is made void if it requires recognition of a trade union, to apply to the employer/employee relationship which exists between Equity and the West End theatre managers? In those circumstances, would he accept a manuscript amendment to make it clear that that kind of relationship is not caught by the clause?

I should like to raise another matter which is germane to the other questions which have been raised. Would I be right in thinking that, if the clause goes through, it would still be open to any local authority, for example, to use the fair wage regulation which does not require union membership but which requires conditions no less good than union membership, and that in that case—to use a rather extreme example—they would then be in the clear? They could then employ IBM because it certainly has no less good conditions whereas if there is a ban on contracts where there is not union membership, they would not be able to employ IBM. Am I right?

Yes, as I understand the position, the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, is perfectly right. Indeed, that is what I was trying to say, although not so plainly, when I took up the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, made earlier. This clause strikes at matters related to union recognition and union procedures. It does not deal with rates of pay and conditions. I gave the illustration of a company that perhaps paid double the amount but did not recognise a union being excluded by the clause. So far as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, is concerned, I shall not expressly deal with the point that he raised because I think it would be unwise for me to try to deal with it and to give a view on it without the full text of the document from which he was reading. But I shall be very happy to have from him the use of a copy and to consider it later on. However, as I say, I think that it would be unwise to venture a view at the moment.

I endeavoured to deal with the question asked by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilson of Langside, and I said that this clause would strike at a condition of that sort as part of the contract. It would not, of course, strike at the relationship between the employer and the employee if the employer decided that he wished the work to be done for him by members of a trade union.

moved Amendment No. 99B:

Page 14, line 14, leave out ("subsection (1) of section 11") and insert ("section 11(1) or (Prohibition on union recognition requirements) (1)").

moved Amendment No. 99C:

Page 14, line 16, leave out ("subsection (2) of section 11") and insert ("section 11(2) or (Prohibition on union recognition requirements)(2)").

moved Amendment No. 100:

Page 14, line 18, at end insert ("and one of the facts relied upon for the purpose of establishing liability would satisfy subsection (2)(a) or (b) below").

The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, was kind enough to remind the Committee that my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate has had to be away, with good reason. I am here to take his place on this amendment. I must say that I am not fully happy at this substitution at this stage, but I will do my best. This is the first amendment to Clause 12 and therefore it may be helpful briefly to remind the Committee what the clause is about.

Clause 12 is really a mirror image of Clause 11. Whereas Clause 11 is mainly about employers who impose union labour only requirements on non-union firms, Clause 12 is about trade unions and trade union officials who seek to impose such requirements or to have them imposed. The clause operates by removing the immunity provided by Section 13 of the 1974 Act from those who threaten or organise industrial action to prevent work being done by non-union firms. Therefore, it is most important for the Committee to realise that all this clause does is to remove immunity from action to put pressure on an employer to discriminate against non-union firms. Removing immunity means that if a person, in putting pressure on an employer, induces a breach of contract, then he is liable; it is the interference with the contract which is actionable.

Subsection (1) removes immunity from those who threaten or call industrial action against an employer to pressurise him to put a void term in a contract or otherwise to contravene Clause 11. Subsections (2) to (4) are mainly concerned with industrial action taken or threatened after the contract has been awarded, to prevent a non-union firm from fulfilling the contract or to prevent goods provided under the contract from being delivered or used. This amendment focuses on subsection (1). That is the subsection which removes immunity from those who threaten or call industrial action against an employer to pressurise him to put a void term in a contract or otherwise to contravene Clause 11. The amendment seeks to limit the circumstances in which that immunity is removed by subsection (1) to cases where there has been interference or threatened interference with contracts of employment. In other words, to bring an action under subsection (1) it would be necessary to show that the trade union pressure on an employer to impose union labour only requirements had involved threatened or actual industrial action which had interfered with or threatened to interfere with contracts of employment.

I have to say that the Government do not believe that this would have much effect on the coverage or impact of subsection (1). In practice, the sort of pressure which is envisaged in the subsection is pressure which is exercised through threats of, or actual, industrial action. So in 99 per cent. of the cases which are liable to arise under subsection (1), there will have been the kind of interference with contracts of employment which are set out in subsection (2)(a) or (b).

There may, however, be the odd case where there is no clear interference with contracts of employment, but there is nevertheless clear pressure on employers to break commercial contracts. That will not arise very often in cases arising under subsection (1), but it might do so, particularly in cases involving pressure to terminate a contract with a non-union firm. It seems to us right that if such direct interference with contracts occurs, it should lose its immunity under this subsection. If the amendment were accepted, it would not do so. I emphasise again that there is not very much between the Government and the proposers of the amendment. All we are doing in subsection (1) is to remove the Section 13 immunity in certain circumstances from interference with contracts. The normal cases which arise under Clause 12(1) will be cases where there has been threatened or actual interference with contracts of employment.

The noble Lord asked me about a number of specific points. He asked me about the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974. That Act imposes duties on employers to consult safety representatives who are union nominated. The duties apply to employers in any case, and there is no need whatsoever for them to be imposed through commercial contracts by other employers. The noble Lord raised the question of liability for inducing a breach of statutory duty. As I said, the principal effect of Clause 12(1) is to disapply the Section 13 immunity, where there is trade union pressure to put union labour-only clauses in contracts, or otherwise to prevent non-union firms obtaining contracts or getting on to tender lists. That means that the principal cause of action will be for the well-known and well-established torts of inducing breach of, or otherwise interfering with, contract or threatening such, which is set out in Section 13 of the 1974 Act.

Therefore, despite there not being a very great deal between the noble Lord and myself on subsection (1), he will see that Clause 12 is critical to Clause 11, which we have just passed, and is the mirror image of it. Therefore I hope that he will not see fit to press the amendment.

I found the noble Earl's reply at one and the same time disappointing and revealing. Since I think that we shall have this thread during the debate, I would say that safety is a very important matter. I do not wholly accept the noble Earl's reply, though I am grateful for it. He suggested that because there is a statutory duty on an employer under the 1974 Act to take steps to allow safety representatives to operate and to consult safety committees where requested—which is a separate step under the Act—no pressure of contractual form would be needed to cause the obligations to be observed. Of course we all know that in matters concerning equal pay, safety, and so on the better employers—I do not now speak of trade unions—veryfrequently put pressure, sometimes commercial pressure, upon other employers to observe standards of this kind; and it is the erosion of such standards which is objectionable. But the question of safety does not rest there. I hope that there will be further intervention on safety when the noble and learned Lord perhaps deals with it on the debate on clause stand part. I pose the question now so that it can be thought about.

Under Section 2 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 there are various obligations; they are not all the same. There are regulations which enshrine some further provisions. There is then a code of conduct, which is not law, but guidance, and then there is a code of guidance, which is in fact further guidance, but is below the code. How far can either a union or another employer go in pressurising a "cowboy" employer to observe decent standards of safety for his workers in terms of consulting trade union safety representatives? Can he do only what the Act obliges the other man to do? Can he verge off into the regulations? Is he allowed to get into the code or the notes on guidance and the like? Without a specific provision in the schedule of the Bill this matter will be what I think would be called a "dog's breakfast".

As I said, the noble Earl's reply was revealing, and I should like to put the matter very quickly in the following way. He has confirmed that Clause 12(1) is really about industrial action. It is about threatened or actual industrial action. He has said that the practice of pressurising in the way that he has described would in 99 per cent. of cases involve threats of industrial action which would amount to inducing breach of employment contracts or the other tortious acts which are similarly described—by way of interference with contracts of employment. The noble Earl said that there might be 1 per cent. who break commercial contracts. Well, I do not agree with his batting averages, but that does not matter. That is the ground that he covers—interference with contract.

But where in subsection (1) is the provision that liability is restricted to that area? It would be quite improper of me in reply—and I am sure that the noble Earl would not so wish me—to try to go through the case law on breach of statutory duty in respect of civil liability. But there is much difficult case law in a certain chapter of a certain book to which I could refer the noble Earl, about the difficulty of knowing when the courts will construe a statute to impose a civil liability perhaps rather wider than Parliament had foreseen. That is why it is so important to get this matter right. I remember many occasions when in regard to other legislation the party opposite said, "Go and get it right". I do not believe that the noble Earl considers that on any ground subsection (1) is thoroughly satisfactory, but in view of the position that he has taken, we shall expect the Government to look at it again, and perhaps to debate it once more in a rather different way on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 101:

Page 14, line 18, at end insert ("and is, or (as the case may be) are, directed against the person by whom the action is brought").

Not amazed.

Not amazed; dumbfounded, perhaps. Who are the people "adversely affected "by reason—indeed, not "by reason", because the Bill does not say "by reason", but "adversely affected by its contravention"? That is even looser than "by reason". It must be that Carriages Limited has an action, and from debates in another place that is what the Government were thinking about, although actually I think they would come under another head, given my example. The wholesaler? It is difficult to say that he should not have an action if he has lost his profit on the deal. The retailers? Did they not depend on this practice not being engaged in? What other reason is there for them having suffered loss or being affected adversely but that this man chose the union firm instead of the non-union firm? And what about Bill, the consumer? Why should he be excluded—the little man? And what about the lady consumer? Where does she come in if she has suffered either physical or mental torture from this unhappy event?

Of course, I put the point in a somewhat jocular tone to the noble Earl, but I say that it covers a most serious problem. Under normal principles of law there is no universal duty of care to all the citizens of the United Kingdom to avoid a breach of each and every statute that might affect them adversely beyond all contemplation of the person who contravenes it, or, indeed, in many cases, even within the contemplation of the person who fails to observe the statutory duties. It is not a question of contemplation; it is a question of what the legislation says, and this legislation says that anyone can sue who may be—not who is likely to be, not who can reasonably be foreseen to be, but who may be—adversely affected by its contravention.

Amendments to Clause 11 could, as it were, have taken this point then, but as my noble friend Lord McCarthy said, we (I think quite properly) decided to debate these three clauses together in substance on the new clause and Clause 12. But I say to the Govern- ment that two things arise out of that analysis and that illustration. Firstly, is it not the case that the words "may be adversely affected" cover an enormous range and should perhaps be rather limited in the two ways that my noble friends' two amendments suggest? The first way, in Amendment No. 101, is that the contravention must be directed against the plaintiff who says he was adversely affected. This is an ordinary principle of law. If we are talking about the tortious liability of unlawful interference with trade, it is clearly established in the case that the plaintiff, in order to sue, must show that he was deliberately and directly aimed at by the defendant. That is quite different from this. This is a vague liability and covers a wide range. I say, first, that it should be limited to the intentional or deliberate act aimed in the clear direction of the defendant.

Secondly—and this would be Amendment No. 106 —if the Government cannot go that far, then at any rate (and this is a subsidiary point; in order not to go further, I make this, as it were, a totally separate second heading to the noble Earl) Clause 12 does not even tell you that the people who can sue the union are limited to the people who can sue the employer. What Amendment No. 106 does is to say that, whatever range of plaintiffs can sue the men in the commercial deal which you dislike so much in order to have consultation with unions prohibited and done down by commercial dealing, which must not be allowed, if you insist on saying that anyone who may be adversely affected can sue if he suffers loss—I see that the noble and learned Lord is with us, and he may not have heard the beginning of my speech. Of course, I accept that there must be causation; clearly causation of the loss must be proved, and so on; but given that, it is the range of plaintiffs and who may be adversely affected which I have illustrated.

If the Government insist on keeping that, then I say that it will be noted by the courts that it is not repeated in Clause 12, on which I think the courts will place considerable significance. Because the courts believe—the courts have to believe, because there is no other way of administering the law and justice—that there is such a thing as the intention of Parliament. We in this Chamber tonight may think of it only as some abstract thing high up in the ceiling that will go forth without us noticing it when we send this Bill away. But there is such a thing as an intention of Parliament, expressed not in the ceiling but in the Bill. If the Bill is left in this form, a court will be bound to say: "What a funny thing that they put subsection 7(d) at the end of Clause 11 and nothing parallel in Clause 12 and, therefore, as a second string, Amendment No. 106 (to which I speak as well) would say that only those who could sue under Clause 11 could sue the union under Clause 12. I beg to move.

The only thing which rather amazed me about most of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, is that it seemed to be about Clause 11 and who can sue under Clause 11. Under Clause 11, a person can sue if he is adversely affected by the unlawful practices set out there, but under Clause 12, which we are supposed presently to be debating, a person can sue in tort if he is a party to a contract which is broken or threatened by industrial action against a non-union firm. It was that which caused my expression of puzzlement when this sad story of the failed fish was enunciated from the Benches opposite—and not through any culinary inexpertise, as I am the cook in my household.

I am grateful to the noble Earl. Of course, I should have said the sentence expressly: if you accept this amendment, you will have to amend Clause 11. We did not have a debate on that. It was agreed that we should debate all the clauses together. I accept we will come to it on Report.

I am glad that the noble Lord and I are on side about that. If I could deal with the point he made—I accept wholly that it is a serious point—in his interesting story about the fish and chips, there may be those who can show that they have been adversely affected by practices outlawed by Clause 11, and, if so, they, too, may have a course of action under subsection 7(d) of Clause 11. But this does not over-ride the normal principles of law. Anyone bringing an action will have to show that he has sufficient locus standi to bring a case; in other words, that he has suffered loss as a result of the imposition of union membership requirements. It will sometimes be difficult enough for a contractor himself to prove that he suffered because of those practices. The more remote a person is from the union membership requirement, the more difficult it will be for the person to bring a case. It would be a mistake, therefore, to think that subsection 7(d) of Clause 11 will cause widespread legal actions. But we believe that anyone who can show a sufficient cause of action should be able to bring legal proceedings; and subsection 7(d) will enable them to do so.

Returning to Amendment No. 101 and to Clause 12, this amendment would restrict the right to take legal proceedings in tort by virtue of Clause 12(1) to a person against whom the trade union pressure to impose the union labour-only requirement was directed. This presumably means that in most cases only the employer whose employees were taking, or threatening to take, industrial action to persuade him to discriminate against non-union firms, will have a right to sue in tort, The non-union firms themselves and anyone else whose contract was interfered with by unlawful action could be prevented from taking legal proceedings. We do not accept the limitations which that amendment imposes on the rights of plaintiffs to take legal action against those acting unlawfully and, for that reason, I would ask the Committee to reject the amendment.

Before I sit down, if I understood the noble Lord aright, the noble Lord also gave me notice that he was speaking to Amendment No. 106. As I have said in response to the previous amendment, Amendment No. 101, we do not see justification for restricting those who may be able to take legal action under Clause 12. The effect of Clause 12 is to remove in certain circumstances the immunity from actions in tort provided by Section 13 of the 1974 Act. This means that anyone who is damaged will be able to bring legal proceedings, if he can show under the normal rules of the law on the relevant tort, that he has sufficient cause for action. This may be the employer of the employees who are taking the industrial action or the customer or supplier of such an employer if they are damaged directly as a result of unlawful action. There, in a slightly different context, the noble Lord's story of the fish may be relevant; or the non-union firm which has been prevented from fulfilling a contract. In practice, it is unlikely to include anyone more remote from the action than that.

I cannot leave this debate without returning to a point which has been made. There is one simple way to avoid being liable under Clause 12 and that is simply to remain within the law. If trade unions and trade union officials abide by the provisions of Clause 12 then it will not matter who can sue because no unlawful act will have been committed and no damage caused.

I must express disappointment that no other Members of your Lordships' Committee with legal knowledge is taking part in this debate, because the noble Earl has taken us into water which is very deep. I have brought forward some points which perhaps would have been made later but which now must be made here because they are germane to what he said. They fall under three headings. The first relates to his last remarks. I put it this way. It will not do for the Government to tell us when the Bill is obscure that the easy way to avoid problems is to stay within the law. That is a self-contradiction. What we are saying is that the law is not clear. "Tell us what the law is", we say, "and we will try to keep within it". But I do not know what it is, and the noble Earl has not told me; so that it is no good his getting up and saying that there is nothing wrong with the Bill, keep within the law and do not break it so as to effect a contravention. What I am saying is that the Bill is obscure.

May I take the two points that he put to me? I understand them. They engage with my argument but they do not answer it. The first was that the normal principles of law would apply and the ordinary law of the land—I have noted it—would be applicable. Of course, that is true. But the ordinary law of the land on this matter has become extremely complex. There was, for example, in 1981 an action taken to the Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House between Lonrho Corporation and Shell Petroleum based upon the issue of whether Lonrho could sue Shell because Shell, breaking the sanctions regulations, had put petrol and oil into Rhodesia for many years. Lonrho said: "Because you broke that criminal obligation in that case"— but that is not the only point of the judgment—" and the statute and regulations, we want damages because we suffered loss". As a matter of fact, they might well have been people who were adversely affected. They certainly were; and Shell could even foresee it, as was accepted.

The argument was whether or not the statute on its construction allowed for this plaintiff to sue in respect of that kind of loss. So the problem in the Lonrho case, albeit not parallel in every respect, is, nevertheless, precisely germane to the noble Earl's correct reminder that the normal principles of law apply. There, the Law Lords have recently clarified this area of the law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, in a unanimous opinion put it forward in two propositions—and I will read only thoseparts which make it absolutely clear—in page 461 of 1981 2 All England Reports. He says:

"First, there is liability where on a true construction of the Act it is apparent that the obligational prohibition was imposed for the benefit or protection of a particular class of individuals".

—such as in the Factory Acts. I am saying that this Act does not make it clear where the class of individuals is to be delimited. And it could do better. On Lord Diplock's principle, there, how do you get much help on the basis of anyone who may be adversely affected, except to say that it is very wide indeed? It is certainly wider than the Factories Act.

Then there is a second principle that where a statute creates a public right then a particular citizen who suffers can sue if he suffers particular, direct and substantial private damage. I apprehend that no one would suggest that the second principle applied. So we are left with the first principle, the ordinary law of the land. I say that it leaves the matter obscure.

I say with no hesitation that the law officers of the Government should pay attention and say to the Cabinet that this is a very serious matter. It has been to the courts and the appellate courts many times, and only in the last few weeks have there been cases on other statutes—it happens to be statutes that people want to use to control those who pirate and bootleg video tapes and so on, a constant source of litigation—but it raises the same point because the Acts are obscure as to who can sue for what. There is no reason why there should be very much obscurity about that. Any decent plaintiff can always raise a bit of dust; but there is no reason to leave it as obscure as the Bill does.

The noble Earl's second point was this. He said if you limited it to a liability for acts done which are directed at a person, then only the other party to a contract or in a similar relationship would be able to sue, and third persons, the non-union firms—which were really the losers down the line—would not be able to sue. With great respect, that is a simple confusion.

You can of course limit the range of plaintiffs to the other parties to a relationship. That is what paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Clause 11(7) do and by reference presumably thereby to Clause 12, although we have not had much response to the idea that perhaps the unions could be put in the same position as the employers by taking Clause 11(7) into Clause 12 as well. I hope that the Government are thinking about that. But it does not follow from the fact that you have limited the liability to acts which are done when they are directed against another person that that only reaches the other party to the transaction. That reaches a much wider area.

All the cases on unlawful interference and unlawful damage in trade and business show clearly that the plaintiff need not be a party to a contract. He need not be a party to a relationship. He must be someone in respect of whom the deliberate act of the defendant in breaking a statute which caused the duty to be owed to him caused damage of the type envisaged by the statute and caused proximate loss within the normal principles of causation. I take the noble and learned Lord, Lord Diplock, to be saying that in slightly different words in the first principle in the Lonrho case.

If the noble Earl does not like "directed", he can find something else; anyone who is deliberately done damage by the breach. I am not asking the noble Earl to take these words. I am saying—he said nothing about it at all—that Clause 11(7) is not in Clause 12, which means that the unions have no guidance at all. In so far as they would have guidance if it were put there, it would be poor guidance because his answer did nothing to clarify the meaning of "adversely affected". I cannot understand why the Government six months after they have put a Bill forward have the new clause which is what makes this such a big matter and imposes these areas of liability with hundreds of plaintiffs who may have to litigate and perhaps waste their money to see whether there is locus standi or not, and expect a revising Chamber to put it through. I expect that the Committee will put it through. With the greatest respect to the Committee, it shows the limitations of the House of Lords as a revising Chamber.

I should like to emphasise one point which occured to me when the noble Earl was speaking. One tried to follow the arguments as closely as possible. The point that I am trying to make is that the noble Earl referred to the fact that no one need worry if they keep within the law. Does he mean the law that might come if this Bill becomes an Act or the law at the moment extant?

It seems to my simple mind that if he means the existing law, there is no need for the Bill. If he means when the Bill becomes law then I am faced with the quandary that my very experienced noble friend Lord Wedderburn is in. This is not a political matter; no politics are involved in this. If it is a question of the law which ought to be reasonably easy for ordinary lay people to understand, I simply say that I found difficulty in following both the noble Earl's arguments and my noble friend's arguments. We shall not solve anything by having Divisions or political arguments—there are no politics involved in this is it therefore unreasonable, as my noble friend Lord Wedderburn has requested of the noble Earl, to ask that this particular aspect be taken back and that a fresh look be taken at it in the light of what my noble friend has said as an expert, and in the light of what I have said as an ordinary person who does not understand too much of the details of law?

I am extremely grateful for the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, because he has brought us back to earth. The fact of the matter is that I meant that there would not be difficulties—or I would have thought few difficulties—for people once this Bill became an Act to decide on their liability or on whether or not they could sue. The territory we are in in the arena of Clause 11 and Clause 12 of the Bill is pretty simple. It does not involve a great deal of learned expertise or difficulty. Clause 11 is designed to deal with what are generally known as union labour only requirements. We have debated the reasons why the Government find this long standing practice in some industries distasteful, particularly in view of the increasing use by public authorities. We can argue the merits or demerits in political terms. Here I respectfully disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Molloy; there is a political argument here about these practices.

If we pass Clause 11—as so far, for the sake of argument, we have—Clause 12 is only a logical extension of it in that Clause 12 goes on to make it unlawful for employees and unions to put pressure on employers to violate the laws that we have, so to speak, just passed under Clause 11. To even an unlearned figure like myself this does not seem to be a very difficult point to grasp. The noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn—with I acknowledge a great deal of flair and all the expertise of one who spent a lifetime in the distinguished practice of labour legislation—has both widened and narrowed the debate. He has taken our eye a little off the ball as to what these clauses are designed to do. As he is a skilful professional person, I may be forgiven a little if I suspect him of going into these regions in order to take the mind of the Committee off the rather simple provisions which exist in these clauses.

I know that the noble Earl will not think I am in any way being other than courteous and respectful. I want to remind the Government of an occasion—I have to admit that I do not remember which Bill it was, but I remember reading the Hansard account in 1974, 1975 or 1976—where the provisions of one of the trade union labour relations Acts or employment protection Acts caused the then Opposition to demand that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor come to the Chamber to explain them. I have made no such demand tonight, but we should all look at that occasion in Hansard. I suspect that provision was certainly not as obscure and strange as this one. Our eye was not off the ball. The noble Earl's eye was well on the ball when he diverted us to the simple point at the end. We shall not withdraw these amendments. Let them remain on the record.

moved Amendment No. 103:

Page 14, line 35, leave out ("reason, or one of the reasons,") and insert ("principal reason").

The purpose of subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 12 is to remove immunity from industrial action to interfere with the supply of goods or services from another employer on the grounds that the work in connection with these goods or services is to be or has been done by non-union or union employees. As with the imposition of union membership requirements by employers, it does not make much sense to consider in these cases, as these amendments would have us do, whether union membership was a major or a minor factor. If it was a factor at all in the union's action, then, in our view, it is right that the immunity should be removed. If the action is taken for other reasons altogether then the immunity is retained. That seems to us to be a reasonable criterion and to justify your Lordships in not accepting this amendment.

moved Amendment No. 103A:

Page 14, line 38, leave out from ("persons") to ("who") in line 39 and insert ("(other than persons employed by the relevant employer)").

moved Amendment No. 103B:

Page 14, line 40, leave out ("or").

moved Amendment No. 104B:

Page 14, line 44, at end insert ("or

(c) the supplier of the goods or services in question is not the relevant employer and the reason, or one of the reasons, for doing the act is that the supplier does not, or is not likely to, recognise, negotiate or consult as mentioned in section (Prohibition on union recognition requirements)(1)").

moved Amendment No. 104A:

Page 14, line 43, leave out (" (employed by another") and insert ("(other than persons employed by the relevant").

moved Amendment No. 104C:

Page 15, line 1, leave out from ("above") to first ("the") in line 2 and insert ("the "relevant employer" means").

It is, in the view of my noble friends and me, very important now to look at the clause as a whole and indeed, as I have said in regard to previous amendments, to look at Clause 12 as the final chance of the Committee to pass a judgment upon the trio of clauses. As I shall suggest later, they enact anti-union measures and indeed measures aimed at businessmen, who are happy with their relationships with their unions and merely want to see common standards and fair wages resolution standards applied in a decent way throughout a trade. It is not just unions who have things to fear from these clauses, and the message should go out to businessmen. As we have just seen over the last amendment, the Government do not care whether a businessman has 300 charitable reasons, 5,000 decent reasons and 600 justifiable reasons: so long as he has one reason that he wants someone else to recognise or consult with a union; that is enough for the Government. Then he is for the high jump and the whip or the hoop can be thrown by anyone who may be adversely affected.

There is a little recent history to this—the encouragement of employer—undercutting of basic rates; the problem of the—to use the Words of Alan Flanders—employer and union engaging in the joint regulation of the enterprise and, perhaps, of the trade, district or whatever is the relevant sphere; the whole concept of the extension of standards and decency in trades which many British employers are right to uphold. Many British employers do not like the cowboy outfits which do not observe safety regulations and which have standards that do not depend upon statute. Many British employers do not like people who cut rates, when they know that, somewhere in the background, there is not a payment of social security subscriptions or various other practices, to which I shall come later, in regard to self-employment.

This matter was discussed in 1980, and subjects of this kind were put to the then Secretary of State in regard to Section 18 of the Employment Act 1980. That was triggered by the report of Mr. Leggatt on SLADE, and its activities as a union to compel people into membership over a very wide area of activity. The Government then devised a clause which they said would stop the activities of SLADE and would not go very much further, because it was put to them "Wouldn't it be a very bad thing if, in this legislation, you stopped what in some industries are called fair lists?"

On 28th July, 1980, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Prior, said in Committee in another place:

"I do not particularly care for the fair list system operated by TASS, but I accept that it is an industrial practice and one with which I am not seeking to deal in this clause or in any other clause of the Bill".

He went on later:

"We are not seeking to abolish fair lists. The way fair lists are entered into as a result of an agreement, as is the case with the TASS agreement with the employers here, is something with which we all ought to be able to live in good industrial relations". —[Official Report.]

My noble friends and I were critical of Section 18, but it did not seem to us that the Secretary of State at that time was anything other than sensible about fair lists and similar arrangements.

It may be that there is a line to be drawn, but why ban them all, when in some industries they are the only reason why those employers who would be the black sheep employ their workers on contracts of employment, instead of on self-employment or lump labour, and when they are much more effective in upholding jointly regulated standards—I stress jointly regulated—than legislation? They are employer-union arrangements which are not harmful to competition and they are not harmful to costs, because, in the long run, they give the employer an opportunity of working with his work force, of participating with them and of gaining productivity and efficiency through consensus, rather than conflict.

They are part of arrangements between some of the best unions and employers in the country. But they will be more than at risk, and 90 per cent. of them will very likely fall foul of this Bill. There must be many in Birmingham, Leeds, Glasgow, Manchester and Cardiff who, when they read the report of this debate, will wonder what on earth was going on in London when these provisions were passed.

My second point is about the extraordinary way in which these three very wide liabilities in the clauses, and these three very wide areas of possible plaintiffs, have been justified in effect, by one area alone—local authorities. I said yesterday that gradually coming out of the Bill was the attack upon what the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, referred to as the politically motivated act by certain councils. I referred to the fact that the district auditor will be used in order to charge labour councillors for political convictions which the Government do not like, but on which they may well have been elected.

But this time the Government are not going to leave it to the courts, in case it goes wrong. They are going to say, "We do not care what your election programme was. You are not allowed by us, no matter what your local voters say, to make contracts on the basis of consultation with trade unions by the other contracting party". What a preposterous, outrageous proposition to put before the country! Indeed, was it ever put before the country? What was the consultation on this? Perhaps the Minister will tell us when he replies. What document was sent and to which union and to which employer? What are the views of the CBI? Does the EF agree, because they did not agree with many areas in the Bill? Can we know and, if we cannot, when will we be told?

The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, said earlier that these clauses are fair and reasonable and he could not understand why anyone should oppose them. The words that he used were almost exactly those used in a certain leader in The Times, which said that unhappy though it was to see this happening "we must preserve the rules of fair fighting". That was in 1872, when the gas strikers were convicted for the strike in the West End of London that was called a criminal conspiracy by Mr. Justice Brett. The terms of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, were very similar to The Times on that occasion which I do not have with me, but which I have well in mind in speaking of it.

This whole debate has shown again that the Government have forgotten some of the wisdom of those from whom they would claim descent, because when, in 1909, the wages councils or the trade boards, as they were called, were being set up, the President of the Board of Trade said on 28th April, at col. 388 of Hansard:

"It is a serious national evil, that any class of His Majesty's subjects should receive less than a living wage in return for the utmost exertions. It was formerly supposed that the workings of the laws of supply and demand would naturally regulate or eliminate that evil. The first broad division we make on that question is between healthy and unhealthy conditions of bargaining".

That was the basis of the Trade Boards Act and the wages councils which, if they have their head, I have no doubt the Government will get rid of, in view of the response of the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, in the debate initiated by the noble Lord, Lord Spens.

The President of the Board of Trade went on:

"Where in the great staple trades of the country you have powerful organisation on both sides, there you have a healthy bargaining which increases competitiveness in industry".

Later he said:

"But where you have what we call sweated trades you have no organisation, no parity of bargaining, the good employer is undercut by the bad and the bad employer is undercut by the worst".

The Government have forgotten all that. The Government are now going to legislate against the kind of organisation that prevents that. The speaker on that occasion was far more wise those many years ago. It was the President of the Board of Trade, Winston Churchill. This Committee should not accept Clause 12, nor, indeed, should it have accepted the previous two clauses.

A good deal of the latter part of the noble Lord's speech in relation to Clause 12 suffers. I suggest, from the same sort of confusion as was pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Burton, in connection with an earlier debate. The fact that these clauses seek to preserve for employers and employees the right to manage their own affairs without outside interference, is in no way to promote cowboy outfits in relation to safety or to promote sweated labour or anything of that sort. The conditions in which trade unions are able to invite people to join today are surely very different from those which prevailed in the history to which the noble Lord has been kind enough to treat us this afternoon.

So far as the Government are concerned, Clause 12, like Clause 11 and the new clause, is concerned with the imposition of union labour only and other requirements on contractors, but whereas Clause 11 and the new clause deal with the imposition of such requirements by employers, Clause 12 is aimed at trade union pressure to impose and enforce such requirements. The Government take the view that pressure of this kind, which is dealt with by this clause, is not appropriate and ought no longer to be lawful.

The clause is in two distinct parts, as your Lordships have seen, which it is convenient to consider separately. Subsection (1) is a direct consequence of the two previous clauses. It removes immunity from a union or other person who organises or threatens industrial action in order to put pressure on an employer to do something which Clause 11 and the new clause declare to be unlawful. In other words, if trade union representatives in a company threaten to call out the employees in that company unless that employer sub-contracts only to a sub-contractor with a closed shop or recognition agreement, they or their trade unions may be liable to be sued for an injunction or damages.

I hope no one is in any doubt why we are taking such a step. The Government are opposed to requirements about union membership and recognition, whether they are enforced by employers or trade unions. It would be absurd to make it unlawful for an employer to impose such requirements while leaving trade union action to persuade the employer to impose such requirements completely untouched. It would put employers in an impossible position, caught between the provisions of the law on the one hand and pressure from their trade unions on the other.

Subsections (2) to (4) of Clause 12 deal with the related but wider question of industrial action which interferes with the supply of goods or services from non-union companies. Two typical examples of such action which may be affected by these subsections are, first, the refusal of employees to work with or allow on to a site an employee of another company who cannot produce the requisite union card and, secondly, the refusal of workers in a company to handle goods or materials because they have come from a non-union source. It does not at all follow that because they are coming from a company which is a non-union source, the terms upon which the workers work are any less favourable than those which would obtain in a union situation.

They may be.

The noble Lord says they may be, but that shows that the mere fact of this sort of provision being put in has very little to do with conditions. It is a very different situation that the union wishes to achieve by pressure of this kind. It is to have the union recognised rather than specially to promote any particular conditions of employment. These practices are common in some industries, particularly where there is a long tradition of union membership or a high level of sub-contracting.

The noble Lord asked me about consultation and spoke of the practical difficulties of implementing these proposals which, in our view, are very justified in principle because of the practices which they are to outlaw. The possible consequences were considered. The Government consulted on these matters and set out the issues very plainly in the Green Paper on trade union immunities, and in a consultative paper on the Government's proposals we specifically sought further advice on this question before we made up our mind about the contents of the Bill.

The response to both the Green Paper and the consultative paper left us in no doubt about the strong views of employers and employers' organisations that these practices should be dealt with in the Bill, first because they are objectionable in principle and if we miss this opportunity to put up barriers to them they may take an even firmer hold; and, secondly, because without subsections (2) to (4) it was widely felt that the Bill's measures to make unlawful union labour only requirements would be incomplete—and dramatically incomplete.

We were impressed by these arguments and by the strength with which they were expressed. In the light of these explanations, I hope your Lordships will agree that this clause should stand part of the Bill.

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, I think he referred to the trade union immunities Green Paper. May I ask the noble and learned Lord where in the trade union immunities Green Paper, to which I am sure he referred, there is anything at all on prohibition of union recognition requirements. I do not think it can be found anywhere. Indeed, I cannot find a direct reference in it to any of the previous clauses on union requirements. But specifically I think the noble and learned Lord will find that there is nothing at all on the prohibition of union recognition requirements. It is something which the Government have invented in this Committee at the last moment.

As the noble Lord will remember when I introduced the amendment with the new clause about union recognition, I explained that the matter concerning this particular aspect had been drawn to our attention since the Bill was published. But the principle upon which it rests is exactly the same and the reason that it is obnoxious is exactly the same as the reason in principle upon which Clause 11 itself rests.

Before the noble and learned Lord finally resumes his seat, there is nothing in the document about that. May I ask him a second question? I asked, I think specifically, about fair lists. The Government specifically took a stand in 1980 and gave the reasons for their position on Section 18 of the 1980 Act. That position has now been overturned and these clauses do what the Government said they would not do in 1980. What specific points about fair lists have the Government taken into consultation and which parties on fair lists have they consulted?

If I correctly took the quotation which the noble Lord gave from my right honourable friend who was then the Secretary of State for Employment, he was making it clear that it was not the intention of the Government to deal with that particular matter in the 1980 Bill. The quotation does not suggest that it would not be appropriate to deal with it on a future occasion, once these matters had been consulted upon.