House Of Lords
Wednesday, 21st July, 1982.
The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Lincoln.
The Lord Maclehose Of Beoch
Sir Crawford Murray MacLehose, GBE, KCMG, KCVO, having been created Baron MacLehose of Beoch, of Maybole in the District of Kyle and Carrick and of Victoria in Hong Kong, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Rhodes and the Lord Caccia.
Lord Cornwallis—Sat first in Parliament after the death of his father.
Air Traffic Systems: Fuel Economies
2.47 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what was the response made to the request from IATA that Governments be requested as a matter of urgency to take all possible steps to rationalise Air Traffic Control systems and air route networks which could produce substantial fuel economies and financial savings.
My Lords, following the IATA Annual Meeting, one United Kingdom airline wrote to the Department of Trade about air route networks and fuel savings. The department and the National Air Traffic Services are fully seized of the need to reduce fuel consumption and considerable effort is devoted to this in the United Kingdom. NATS also play a full part in Eurocontrol and the European Air Navigation Planning Group of ICAO. Eurocontrol are currently considering changes in the route network which could lead in the short-term to savings of about 2½ per cent. Further savings could emerge in the longer-term. In addition, significant savings could arise from more effective air traffic flow management. Eurocontrol's central data bank should help in this connection.
My Lords, if the noble Lord the Minister will not take it amiss, I was expecting the Secretary of State to answer my Question, and so perhaps the noble Lord opposite will pass on to him what I was going to ask.
Oh!
I am not being offensive, my Lords, and the Minister will see where I am going. I wanted to ask the Secretary of State whether he was aware that it was the question of military airspace in Europe which was holding up the shortening of air routes as much as we would have hoped. I wanted to ask whether the Secretary of State for Trade would feel able to take this up with the Council of Ministers, as only Ministers would be able to persuade Governments to give up some of this airspace.
My Lords, I will certainly pass on to my noble friend the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry. I understand that, so far as military airspace is concerned, within each member state of Eurocontrol, it is the member states of Eurocontrol who tend to take decisions, certainly about military airspace, within their own countries. But, as the noble Baroness and the House will be aware, Eurocontrol comprises both military and civil representatives.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that this morning I have received from IATA details of 10 routes within the European Economic Community which could produce considerable savings to the airlines? As the annual amount estimated to be saved on fuel alone is 27 million dollars, I wanted to know whether the Minister would feel able to refer this matter to the Council of Ministers if I gave him full information, so that the whole question could be expedited?
My Lords, I am, as always, very grateful for the noble Baroness' figures and indeed the accuracy of her representations. Certainly I shall pass on her figures to my noble friend.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that both this proposal, and indeed other proposals submitted by the noble Baroness, Lady Burton, would do a number of things? It could make air travel more safe. It would make it more comfortable and easy for people. It would make fares much cheaper. In short, it could greatly improve not merely our European air services but world air services. May I therefore ask the noble Lord to take very seriously the submissions which the noble Baroness has made and ensure that they are communicated to the Secretary of State?
Yes, my Lords.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the area covered by Eurocontrol is a comparatively small one? Is he aware that there is a growing volume of opinion that would welcome the extension of Eurocontrol over a far wider area? Will his noble friend consider publishing a short White Paper which shows quite unequivocally exactly what the policy of Her Majesty's Government is towards Eurocontrol?—because so far it seems to be a little ambivalent where it is not obscure.
My Lords, the noble Lord will be one of the few people in your Lordships' House who might feel that Eurocontrol is ambivalent and obscure or in any way ineffective. I can assure the noble Lord and your Lordships—the noble Lord shakes his head; he is an accountant as am I, but neither of us are pilots—that Eurocontrol is very highly-thought-of in world air traffic circles. The noble Lord believes that Eurocontrol covers a comparatively small area. I do not think that is necessarily the case in Europe. Indeed, co-operation and association agreements with Eurocontrol already exist for Spain, Denmark, Italy, Greece and Portugal. Indeed, Portugal will become a full member once the new convention comes into force.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that I would not wish him to think me rude? It was only yesterday afternoon when I had discussions with his noble friend, who I expected to see here today, and in view of what I wanted to say, the noble Lord's appearance rather threw me.
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness that I cannot resemble my noble friend day by day. I am afraid I am not seized of the entire conversation of my noble friend and the noble Baroness. Nevertheless, I hope I have endeavoured to reply to most of her questions. I shall indeed undertake to pass on the specific points which she has asked me to pass on.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the problems to which he has referred are very well known to the Science Committee of the Council of Europe Assembly, which has now been trying for some years to get Eurocontrol to make annual reports to the Assembly committee with a view to co-ordinating all these complaints about it much more effectively and getting a more efficient and economic system? Up to now, quite contrary to what other bodies do, Eurocontrol has refused to report in this way to the Council of Europe Assembly. Would it not be a good idea and in everybody's interest, in view of what the Minister himself has said, to reopen the idea of an international assembly of this kind doing a little supervision?
My Lords, Eurocontrol, as I am sure the noble Lord is aware, is comprised of member states, and it is to their own member states that the representatives of Eurocontrol report.
My Lords, in considering this question, would the noble Lord please bear in mind the extreme importance of NATO's air forces being kept properly trained?
My Lords, I am very grateful for that question. We shall bear that very closely in mind.
My Lords, does not the noble Lord feel that it was quite unnecessary for him to apologise for appearing in a substitute capacity, because is this not another example of what we have heard described as flexible rostering?
My Lords, given the warm good wishes of the House, it appears that this form of flexible rostering, at least in our department, seems to work.
South Atlantic And Falklands Appeals
2.57 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the South Atlantic Appeal and the Falklands Appeal are registered as charities.
My Lords, I am advised by the Charity Commission that the trustees of the South Atlantic Fund have applied for its registration as a charity and that the application is being considered. I understand that it is not proposed to apply for charitable status for the Falklands Appeal but that its trustees have announced that any funds remaining after the immediate needs of the islanders and the cost of projects for the general benefit of the community have been met, will be paid to the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Trust which is a registered charity.
My Lords, in thanking the noble and learned Lord for that informative reply, may I ask him whether he is aware that I heard the organisers of the Falklands Appeal speaking on the radio as though it were a charity; and is he further aware that the Government stated on 25th May that the South Atlantic Appeal would not be a charity? If the Government themselves find it difficult to get it right and the public are left in some confusion, does not this lend some force to the argument which some of us have been propounding that the time has come to take a fresh look at the law on charities?
My Lords, I do not think the Government have misled the public in any way at all. The question as to whether the South Atlantic Appeal is a charity depends, first of all, upon the application to the Charity Commissioners and then on the answer that they give to the application, which is under consideration. So far as the Falklands Appeal is concerned, that is a different organisation altogether. I have here a press release which I think was not issued by the Government but which gives the objects of the Falklands Appeal, which in themselves, I should have thought, were not charitable. But I have stated the true position with regard to it. I am not sure what the noble Lord means by further consideration. I do not think there is any doubt about the situation at all.
My Lords, if the Charity Commissioners deem the South Atlantic Appeal to be charitable, may we assume that any monies already forwarded to that appeal will be treated as part of the charity?
My Lords, that is the assumption I should be inclined to make myself.
My Lords, may I ask the noble and learned Lord whether he could explain—I realise I ought to have deduced it—exactly what the difference between the two is, why one is a charitable appeal and not the other?
My Lords, the objects of the Falklands Appeal are to benefit the islanders and the islands. The objects of the South Atlantic Fund are to benefit those who were injured in the recent conflict and their dependants, and the dependants of those who died. The aims of the Falklands Appeal were set out in a press release. I understand that the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton, is a patron.
Civil Defence: Co-Ordination
3 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will name the counties in England and Wales in which Air Marshal Sir Leslie Mavor has co-ordinated voluntary effort in support of Civil Defence and what has been the result of such co-ordination; and whether they will give similar information with regard to the activities of Mr. F. G. Armstrong in Scotland.
My Lords, Sir Leslie Mavor has been in close touch with all county councils in England and Wales to encourage their effective use of volunteers. He has provided guidance, information on the work of voluntary organisations and agencies, and personal briefing. Sir Leslie Mavor receives regular progress reports from each county authority. The achievement by individual county councils has varied, but in general there has been significant progress in this important field.
The position in Scotland is similar. Mr. F. G. Armstrong has visited all regional councils and discussed the use of volunteers in civil defence with their emergency planning staffs.My Lords, I should like to thank my noble friend for that reply and to acknowledge the efforts made by the Air Marshal and by Mr. Armstrong, and the response which a good many local authorities have given to their approaches. But is it not about time that all local authorities prepared to deal with any emergencies that may arise in peace and war and to make full use of the many volunteers who are willing to help them in their humanitarian task?
My Lords, I should confirm that no county council has declined to carry out its minimum statutory duties—those are the duties as prescribed by planning regulations made under the Civil Defence Act 1948. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has said recently that he is considering urgently whether there is a need to amend those regulations. But I accept the point of my noble friend that we would wish that all county councils would do as much as the best are doing.
My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that authoritative and expert opinion has been moving rapidly in recent years, and even in recent months, towards the conclusion that there can be no effective civil defence against nuclear war, and is not the cancellation of the Government's Hard Rock exercise a recognition of this fact?
No, my Lords. No one can predict what might happen, but we believe that in a war there would be many millions of survivors. There would certainly be more survivors if both Government and individuals took sensible precautions.
My Lords, I should like to ask my noble friend whether it is right that civil defence is not merely for the purpose of nuclear war, but for other purposes such as the massive flooding of an area and so on, where civil defence workers can do a great deal of valuable and helpful work?
Yes, my Lords, I thank my noble friend for that question. It would, of course, be used in a conventional war should there be such an occurrence as well as in civil emergencies.
My Lords, has the noble Baroness noted that the British Medical Association has set up an inquiry into the effectiveness of civil defence in view of the danger of nuclear war, and that its introductory paper by experts says that even in the deepest shelter people would be asphyxiated to death? In view of those facts, would it not be better if concentration was placed upon urging the super powers to end not only nuclear war but chemical warfare and all weapons of mass destruction?
No, my Lords. The first part of the noble Lord's question in no way invalidates what I have already said about the need to take sensible precautions. Of course, the Government are committed, along with all other Western nations, to try to get multilateral disarmament.
Civil Defence: Definition
3.4 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government how they define "Civil Defence".
My Lords, civil defence is a matter of emergency planning. Such planning involves being prepared to deal with the effects of major emergencies, accidents and natural disasters in peace and war.
My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for that admirable definition. Is she aware—if she was not aware five minutes ago I think that she must be aware now—that there are persons who aver that civil defence is a waste of money because it cannot provide protection against full-scale nuclear attack? Would she agree that this attitude is almost perfectly analogous to a belief or a statement that it is a waste of money to buy an umbrella because umbrellas cannot keep out thunderbolts?
My Lords, yes, I would agree with what my noble friend has said.
My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware—bringing in the definition of civil defence which she has now given—that it may be a worthy thing, whatever we think of war, to pay a tribute to organisations like the St. John Ambulance Brigade, and to ask schools to train people more than ever in first aid? Because, in view of the incidents that take place in this violent world on football fields and with bands being blown up, it may be that a life can be saved by the elementary knowledge of how to stop a damaged artery bleeding a man to death?
Yes, my Lords. In peacetime certainly voluntary organisations participate in training exercises and to some extent in planning in civil defence. This applies particularly to volunteer scientific advisers and members of the Royal Observer Corps. Established organisations such as the British Red Cross, the St. John Ambulance Brigade and the Women's Royal Voluntary Service have all made valuable contributions to civil defence planning and training in their areas, and I would like to pay tribute to all the work they do.
My Lords, would my noble friend the Leader of the House not agree, as regards those county councils who are backward because they have been misled into concentrating civil defence in the nuclear area, that it would be in the interests of the country if the Government were to emphasise to them the very definition which my noble friend gave in answer to this Question; to point out to them that they really are barking up the wrong tree, and that it is time they got away from this type of mythical position that they have adopted and became practical in the interests of all the people in the country, including their own ratepayers?
My Lords, I hope that not only this Question and Answer session, but the debate initiated by my noble friend a short time ago on civil defence, will help to draw to the attention of the country the importance of civil defence. I think that it is a matter of responsibility for all of us in public life to try to explain to people the value of civil defence and the good effects of taking sensible precautions, both by the Government and by individuals.
But, my Lords, is not the noble Baroness aware that it is the Government who are concentrating civil defence upon nuclear war and creating the reaction that has been mentioned? Can the noble Baroness say, however, whether it is scientifi- cally the case that if one raises an umbrella in a storm, one is likely to get struck by lightning?
My Lords, the metaphor of my noble friend may not have been exact. However, I really do think that if we are talking about a serious subject there is a lot to be said for encouraging individual responsibility in matters of civil defence precautions as in other matters.
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the people who would rejoice most if we completely abandoned civil defence, as has been suggested, would be the men in the Kremlin?
Yes, my Lords.
My Lords, may I say that the Opposition endorse exactly what the noble Baroness has said. We believe that we must have adequate defence and we will play our part.
My Lords, I think that the whole House will be most encouraged to hear what the noble Lord the Leader of the Opposition has said on this matter, and I hope that he will bring his great influence to bear on some of the Labour-controlled local authorities.
Business
My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 this afternoon my noble friend Lord Elton will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is to be made in another place on royalty protection.
It may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available at the usual time this evening. The Report stage of the Criminal Justice Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7 p.m. for approximately one hour. During this adjournment the Third Reading of the Local Government and Planning (Scotland) Bill will be taken.Tees And Hartlepool Port Authority Bill
Read a third time, and passed.
Business Of The House
My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.
Moved, That Standing Order 37 ( Arrangement of the Order Paper) be suspended until the Summer Recess so far as is necessary to give the Government power to arrange the order of business; and that Standing Order 43 ( No two stages of a Bill be to taken on one day) be suspended for the same period.—( Baroness Young.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
Criminal Justice Bill
3.10 p.m.
My Lords, I beg to move that the Bill be now further considered on Report.
Moved, That the Bill be further considered on Report.—( Lord Elton.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 45:
Insert the following new clause—
( "Bail.
.—(1) Where a person has been convicted on indictment and has given notice of appeal, or as the case may be, notice of application for leave to appeal, the court of trial may, if they think fit, on his application admit him to bail pending the determination of his appeal.
(2) In section 19 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, after the words "of his appeal there shall be inserted the following subsection—
"(2) Where the appellant has applied to the Crown Court for bail and that court has withheld bail or imposed conditions the Court of Appeal may, if they think fit, grant bail or vary the conditions".").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I rise to move Amendment No. 45 which seeks to speed up the criminal process in order to save time and—something I am sure is near the heart of the noble Lord the Minister—to save unnecessary expense. The proposal is a simple one, although it may take a few minutes to explain. It is simply to give Crown Court judges the power in appropriate cases to grant bail to persons who have given notice of appeal against their conviction or their sentence, a power which has been exercised by magistrates in cases appealed to Crown Courts every day of the week all over the country.
It may appear surprising to your Lordships that if a person chooses summary trial and is convicted and sentenced, say, to six months' or possibly 12 months' imprisonment by the magistrate, he can immediately enter a notice of appeal and apply for bail, which will be considered by the magistrates. If that same person chooses jury trial and goes to the Crown Court and is equivalently convicted and sentenced to up to 12 months' or more imprisonment, he may fill in all the necessary forms "or launching an appeal to the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, but the judge before whom he has appeared and been convicted would not be able to grant him bail pending the hearing of the appeal. That would seem strange—would it not?—because it is the judge at the trial who has heard all the facts, who knows the whole of the background of the accused person, who has heard the evidence and, indeed, who has probably ruled on a matter of law which is to be taken up to the Court of Appeal; yet he is not the person who makes the decision whether or not that person should be granted bail pending the hearing of his appeal.
There are times when Crown Court judges feel that a miscarriage of justice may have taken place. In the judge's opinion the jury may have been swayed by local prejudice or may have returned what he considers to be a perverse verdict; or he may have ruled in law on a difficult question of law which he, above all, would like to hear reviewed in the Court of Appeal. He may agonise about a sentence, feeling that although the mitigation is overwhelmingly strong, he is apparently governed by some observation made by the Court of Appeal which impels him to pass a custodial sentence really against his wishes, and he would wish that matter to be reviewed.
What can he do at the moment? He can say to the accused or the accused's lawyers, "I hope you will appeal against this decision". He can grant a certificate saying that the case is fit for appeal, but he cannot go on to say that it would be outrageous if this person should go through the whole trauma of surrendering himself at the local prison only to be released a week or a month later having served that period of time, when in all probability his appeal will be allowed.
In my submission two serious mischiefs arise by this situation. First, because, of course, there are substantial delays in the hearing of appeals, appellants may well have served a substantial part of their sentence by the time their appeal is called on in the Court of Appeal Criminal Division; for instance, with regard to this Bill the situation of a 21-day order of a detention centre for a young person. Secondly, at the moment—and I do not say this in any offensive way—many appeals are fudged in the Court of Appeal by allowing appeals against sentence in these terms: "We allow this appeal to the extent that the appellant is released today "; whereas what they ought to do, of course, is to say that no custodial sentence should, in fact, ever have been imposed at all. It gives rise to this fudging system because of the results of saying that no custodial sentence should have been imposed when the man or woman has already served a substantial amount of time in prison.
At the moment, if you wish to get bail pending your appeal you have to fill in a number of forms. They have to be sent to the registrar of the Court of Appeal in London and must be accompanied by the appropriate documents, or they may be sent to the governor of the prison. Of course, notice must be given to the police and the prosecution. When the hearing of the application for bail is made, the lawyers and the police have to come all the way to London, at a great deal of cost and, in my submission, causing a great waste of time, in order that this application shall be made.
The noble Lord the Minister made four observations when I moved this amendment at the Committee stage. First, he recognised the desirability of the proposal and wanted time to consider it, which gives one hope that he is now further convinced by its good sense. Secondly, he said, surprisingly, that as an appeal has to be submitted in writing to a judge of the Court of Appeal, he would be the only person who would have the material on which bail might be granted. I hope that I have dealt with that objection because that is manifestly not so. But what I suspect he may have had in mind is that whereas on a matter of law and a matter where a certificate is granted the appellant has an absolute right of appeal, where it is a question of fact in law or fact only, or a question of sentence, he must seek the leave of the Court of Appeal to be enabled to appeal. In my submission that is no basic objection to this proposal; it is merely a matter of mechanics, because if leave was refused on an application, he would simply have to surrender himself, either to the court of trial, which would be the simple thing to do, and be put back exactly into the position he was in when he was found guilty, or to the prison, in exactly the same way as a person who appeals from the magistrates has to surrender himself in due course to whichever court it is which will deal with his particular case.
The third matter which the noble Lord the Minister raised was that the amendment, as set down then, meant that any Crown Court judge should have this power. That has been corrected in the present wording of the amendment to read, as, of course, it should have read, the judge of "court of trial" —that is, the judge who tried the matter.
The fourth thing that the noble Lord the Minister said was to throw me a sop in the sense that he understood that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice was minded to issue guidance to judges of Crown Courts to contact the registrar in London in cases of urgency to expedite the hearing of the appeal. I hope your Lordships would feel that, although of course that is excellent as an idea, so vital a matter as the deprivation of liberty of a defendant and the hearing of a possible miscarriage of justice should surely be governed by statute, should be dealt with openly, and should not simply be left to the goodwill of, if I may say so, a most humane registrar, the one who now fills that office, and the efficiency of solicitor, counsel, and the telephone system.
I assure the House that this reform is one which is much needed by practitioners and judges alike, but of course overwhelmingly by defendants who have to suffer the torture of an unjust and temporary incarceration. The amendment is backed by the All-Party Penal Affairs Group, and in its name I beg to move.
3.22 p.m.
My Lords, I should like briefly to support this amendment. Of course the power to grant bail to an appellant pending appeal is sparingly used at the moment and there is no reason to suppose that it would be any the less sparingly used if this amendment were accepted. But it would be a useful, modest improvement on the present position in two respects. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, has indicated, there are each year a distressing number of cases—not a large number, but a sizeable number—where defendants have served the whole of their sentence before their appeal is heard, and their appeal is eventually allowed and they are acquitted without, as they say, a stain on their character. That is very little consolation to them, and of course they are not entitled to any sort of compensation for the period that they have spent in prison in those circumstances.
If this amendment were in existence, it would in that small number of cases give the opportunity to the Crown Court judge, if it was clear to him that there was an arguable case on appeal, to grant bail straight away instead of having to wait for the inevitable delay of three, six, nine months that it sometimes takes before the application for leave can be heard by the Court of Appeal. The other type of case in which it might be of assistance is the criminal case which turns as a matter of law on a particular point, and it is recognised by the prosecution and the defence from the beginning that on the Crown Court's adjudication of that point of law the verdict will depend. Indeed, if the judge rules one way the prosecution offer no evidence; if the judge rules the other way on the matter of law the defendant frequently then pleads guilty, having at that time of course to accept the judge's ruling on that matter of law. In that situation, a judge sometimes feels that the point of law upon which he has to rule is a difficult one, and that it may well be that in due course it will take its way through the Court of Appeal and eventually to the Judicial Committee of your Lordships' House. He may therefore have very real doubts, although he has done his honest best to determine in his lights what the correct answer to the legal problem is. Again in those circumstances it would be only just that the Crown Court judge should be able to say that he has ruled to the best of his ability and that, having ruled, he is obliged to pass a prison sentence, but that he accepts that on the particular point he may well be wrong and therefore the matter will have to take its course through the courts, and it would be appropriate in some of those cases that he should therefore grant bail to the defendant on whom he has had to impose a prison sentence. I would regard this as a modest improvement but a real one that may help a certain number of defendants who would otherwise suffer a substantial injustice.My Lords, my name is on this amendment mostly because of the frustration I have experienced on behalf of people who wait so long for their appeals to come before Crown Court judges when they are in custody. I must admit that if I had had any influence with the right reverend Prelate I would have asked him to include a prayer today during Prayers that the All-Party Penal Affairs Group would not divide the Government on any of their amendments. However, as I have no influence with the right reverend Prelate, I hope, despite the fact that my name is on this amendment, that we shall not divide, because it was my understanding at Committee stage that the Lord Chief Justice was going to give formal advice on this matter, and I shall wait with interest to hear what the Minister says.
My Lords, my name is also on the amendment, and I should like to say a word in support of it and to echo the view of my noble friend Lord Wigoder, that the fact that it concerns only a small number of cases does not detract in any way from the merits of the amendment. I believe that, even if it was only one individual who had suffered unjust imprisonment as a result of the lack of a power in the lower courts to give bail, your Lordships would be justified in making this amendment so as to save that person from wrongful imprisonment.
I cannot imagine anything worse happening to a person than to spend upwards of six months in prison and then to be acquitted in the appeal court, and to be left with a burning sense of injustice and resentment against the system which had caused this to happen. If any of your Lordships can imagine it happening to himself, spending such a period of imprisonment, which would certainly not leave a stain on one's character, as my noble friend said, would leave a grave sense of resentment against the system. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord the Minister will come forward and say that he accepts the amendment. I believe there are cases that take more than the six to nine months that my noble friend mentioned. I had a case myself—I am not saying that the man was found innocent—where it took almost two years for his case to come on in the Appeal Court. It would be utterly deplorable that anybody should spend time in prison for as long as that and then subsequently be found innocent on appeal. I cannot think of any amendment which I would sooner were passed in the remainder of this Bill than this one, which has the support of the All-Party Penal Affairs Group. Since I can think of no argument against it, really the onus is on the Government to come forward and say why it should not be passed rather than for us to show why a few people wrongfully imprisoned should be released.My Lords, may I be allowed to support this amendment? I did so at Committee stage. I do so again. Everything that has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, with meticulous clarity, as one would expect with a background of vast practical knowledge, is wholly justified, wholly accurate and wholly true. Indeed, it has been supported by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, who also has considerable practical knowledge in this matter.
It is an unsatisfactory situation as it exists today. True this power will be used sparingly, there is no doubt about that. But there are these cases where, without this power, manifest injustice will be done. I support this amendment. It is not a matter on which, if driven to a Division, I would—and I say so now; I have not made up my mind—necessarily vote against my Front Bench, but I feel strongly about it and I hope it will be considered seriously.My Lords, I support the opinion expressed unanimously that the amendment would effect a modest and useful reform. It would also save money and time. My noble friend Lord Elystan-Morgan gives me an example of what can go on. Apparently he was appearing at the Cardiff Crown Court on a certain matter where, surprisingly, he did not succeed in his submission for the accused and was unable to apply to appeal to the learned High Court judge, who was then sitting in the Crown Court, under the present rules. However, he was able to enjoy a journey to London on behalf of his client a few days later to appear before the same judge, sitting in the High Court as a High Court judge, and on that occasion he succeeded in obtaining leave to appeal. It really is a nonsense, and an expensive one at that.
It seems extraordinary that magistrates can grant bail after a conviction and sentence where the defendant indicates that he wishes to appeal, but a Crown Court judge cannot grant bail pending the determination of the appeal. And, in the case of the imposition of short sentences, there is a real risk that the sentence will have been served before the appeal can ever reach the appellate stage. I therefore hope the Minister will be able to give way on this matter. I do not want to delay the House because we have a good deal of ground yet to cover, but perhaps I have said enough to indicate what I trust has been the receipt of a hopeful missive on this issue.My Lords, if people are imprisoned when they are innocent, are they not able to claim compensation? Might this amendment, if agreed to, save the Government paying unnecessary compensation?
My Lords, I fear that I must ask a few questions. Throughout the passage of the Bill we have had many contributions from members of the All-Party Penal Affairs Group, who appear to bring some sort of weight to our deliberations as a result of having discussed these matters prior to the rest of us. We have also had contributions from noble Lords who often earn their livelihood in the practice of the law. When they state the case to a mere magistrate like myself I do not always understand exactly what they are talking about. Indeed, I have often suffered from that while sitting on the Bench, so I must ask a few simple questions on matters which confuse me, and the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod, may agree with me on that.
As has been said, when, in a magistrates' court, hail is denied, the facts are put to the Bench and it is denied because of the nature of the offence. We are here discussing people who appear in a Crown Court, a higher court, so we assume that the nature of the offence must be of a more serious character. However, nobody has said in the course of this debate what sort of offenders we are talking about. We assume that they have appeared before a higher court because of the very serious charges involved. If someone has appeared on a serious charge and bail is denied, and they must remain in custody while awaiting appeal, one wonders why that should be the case. Equally, one wonders why these individuals are then finally acquitted. Nor do we know how many such cases there are. I have always been given to understand that we should never introduce legislation based on one or two cases. Unless we can have rather more explanation than the supporters of the amendment have given so far to show that there are a number of such cases, it is difficult to see what line to take. May we also be told the nature of the offence and why bail was denied? Do I gather that the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, is about to rise and give me the answer? We are entitled to answers to these questions.My Lords, the noble Baroness knows only too well that there are certain cases of triviality who ask for trial by jury.
My Lords, may I offer the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, a possible explanation? It is not so much the gravity or nature of the offence but the fact that the sort of problem which could arise is this: you are sitting trying a case with a jury and you have a difficult question as to corroboration, whether you should allow it and which way you should rule. Sitting there, you know that if you have made the wrong ruling and let the evidence in, it is inevitable that he will be convicted; whereas if you rule it out, then there is no evidence and therefore he must go free. That is the very sort of ruling on which the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, said that the judge or recorder agonises. In a case such as that, it is not so much dependent—it may be, but not always—on the type of offence. There are cases where you feel that the fair thing to do—they will be rare but there are such cases—is to see whether that ruling is right before the man actually goes to prison.
My Lords, I hesitate to interrupt my noble friend, of all people, but I would remind him that this is Report stage.
My Lords, I begin by saying that I think I understand the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, aright in that his intention is to give a judge who presides at a Crown Court trial the power to grant bail pending an appeal. The new clause as drafted does not, I think, achieve that end. As I read it, it still gives the power to all Crown Court judges, not just the one who presided at the trial. The expression "court of trial" means the Crown Court, which is one court, although it sits in many divisions and in many places. That is an important technicality which must be got right. The new clause also seems to preclude the possibility of the Court of Appeal's revoking bail if it thought that was appropriate. As there might be changes in circumstances which rendered such a course appropriate, I would have thought that would be a most understandable fetter on the Court of Appeal.
However, the noble Lord's main point, which he argued with exemplary clarity and brevity, is that a trial judge should have this power once the notice of appeal has been given. I ask your Lordships to consider what in practice this would mean. A notice of appeal is a form which is usually filled in by a solicitor. It has to be accompanied by reasoned grounds of appeal, which are usually drafted by counsel. They are sent to the Registrar of Criminal Appeals. The grounds must be real and carefully considered, otherwise it would be too easy for all appellants simply to file vague or frivolous grounds, but if they have substance, then the notice of appeal is complete. All this can be done quickly, but it cannot be done instantly. The fact that the grounds must be formulated and sent to the registrar, would, even on the noble Lord's proposal, as I understand it, inevitably mean that the Crown Court could not be asked for bail immediately; it would have to be re-convened at a later date. That is not mere mechanics but a serious consideration. Although, as I have said, the forms and procedure for initiating an appeal are relatively straightforward, your Lordships may wonder why they need to be as complicated as they are. The reason is that some 50,000 people are convicted in the Crown Court each year. Of these, at least 23,000 receive immediate custodial sentences, and 6,000 or so apply for leave to appeal, of whom only about 1,000 are in any way successful. I hope those are the figures for which the noble Baroness, Lady Phillips, was asking. Thus, most applications have no hope of success. Much of the work of the court and of the Criminal Appeal Office is to weed out these hopeless cases as early as possible so that the court can concentrate on appellants who do have an arguable case. Experience has shown that the number of appeals rises sharply if convicted defendants feel that they have nothing to lose in appealing, or that there is some collateral advantage, such as bail, in doing so. The effects of a flood of unmeritorious appeals from defendants whose real intention was not eventual acquittal but immediate bail would be administratively catastrophic. Again, this is not mere mechanics because the real losers would be the defendants whose appeals did have merit, because the Court of Appeal and Criminal Appeal Office would take far longer to deal with them than they now do. Therefore the noble Lord's proposal seems fraught with difficulty and delay, but even if it were not, I should have to ask your Lordships to consider—and many of you can do it better than I can—whether the trial judge is necessarily the best person to decide whether bail should be granted. I am always very diffident in questioning the abilities of judges to do anything, because I stand in great awe of them, and I mean nothing in detriment to their learned and wise capacities. But on many occasions the trial judge will have had no experience of sitting in the Court of Appeal. He will not know how the judges of that court deal with these difficult matters. He will have no power to grant legal aid, or to order an expedited hearing, which a single judge of the Court of Appeal has. The trial judge will not have before him all the necessary material to make a decision. He will have no transcript of the proceedings. His recollection of the precise words that he used in his summing-up, if that is the basis of the appeal, may be imperfect, or may not agree with counsel's recollection. The grounds of appeal may relate to a point which arose days or weeks previously during the trial. I would remind your Lordships, first, that the Crown Court judge is free to write to the Registrar of Criminal Appeals for an expeditious hearing and to recommend the grant of bail. Further, I can confirm what my noble friend suggested—that in the near future the Lord Chief Justice will issue formal guidance to judges and to the legal profession, so that all know how quickly bail can be considered, and how to set that machinery in motion more quickly. I fear that, even had the right reverend Prelate interceded in this matter, what I have said would not be regarded as an answer to his prayer, but it is the best that I can do.My Lords, as a layman with very little understanding of the courts, to me the position seems to be that the magistrate can deal with the matter, while the Crown Court judge cannot. That seemed to me absolutely inexplicable, and nothing that the noble Lord has said has explained it to me.
My Lords, there are three points which the noble Lord the Minister has not touched upon, and in my submission each and every one of them goes to the very root of the issue. I do not say that in any spirit of criticism of the noble Lord. These are highly technical matters, and they involve the kind of consideration that comes only to someone who tends to come up against such questions very often in daily practice. First, there is what might be called the provinces point. If an application for bail is to be made on behalf of a person convicted in the provinces, it can be granted only by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division. With very few exceptions, the Court of Appeal Criminal Division sits only in London. As my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones said, with great flattery so far as my own situation was concerned, quite often an application for bail means that the advocate has to travel up to London. The application is heard by a High Court judge, sitting as a single judge, as a member of the Court of Appeal. Sometimes, as has, by coincidence, happened in my own case, the judge will be a High Court judge from the very concourse of courts in the provinces from which the advocate himself has come. They both travel up to London. Counsel appears before the judge to make the application. The judge hears the application, and then they both travel back to the city in the provinces from whence they came. In my submission, that is a nonsense, but it happens from time to time.
Secondly, a further consideration is that the judge—for example, a circuit judge—who has tried the case is entitled after the conviction to hear an application by counsel that the matter should be allowed to go to the Court of Appeal without going through the sifting process of the single judge, if it is an appeal on a point of law. If the trial judge has that power, as he has under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, to circumvent the single judge, is there any earthly reason why the circuit judge should not be allowed to decide, on a much lower level, the question of whether or not bail should be granted? Surely the issue of bail must be regarded as being utterly ancillary to the primary consideration of whether or not there should be an appeal. The third point mentioned by the Minister was that if there was the prospect of bail, it might encourage persons to make frivolous applications. The answer to that is that when a frivolous application is made, the Court of Appeal, when it hears the application, is entitled to say that time already served by the defendant shall not be counted towards his sentence. In my sincere submission those are three very fundamental matters which I feel the Minister has not had the opportunity of considering. Therefore we would ask him not to come to a final conclusion on the question until he has had that opportunity.My Lords, there seems to be considerable support in the House for the amendment. I should like to say two things. I wish to address one of the points to the noble Baroness who was so mystified by the type of people with whom we are dealing; and I seemed to notice in her observations a rather basic hostility to lawyers in general. I should like to assure her that the amendment contains no advantage to lawyers, because if it were passed, instead of the nice, long journeys to London which have been referred to, lawyers would be deprived of the privilege of a night in London, as well as a fee for applying in London for bail, all of which they could do on the fee that is marked on the one brief at the trial.
My Lords, the noble Lord is most kind to give way. With the leave of the House, I would mention that I have a number of points, but I feel that I should make only one of them, since the noble Lord is now raising it. A High Court judge on circuit can grant bail. All that is needed is liaison by telephone with the Criminal Appeal Office in London. I am sorry to deprive people of many comfortable journeys.
I should like to complete what I was saying to the noble Baroness. We are dealing with ordinary people who are being tried by a Crown Court judge. The Crown Court judge has been entitled to grant such people bail during the trial. He has made up his own mind about the seriousness of the offence, the type of offence, and the background of the defendant. From day to day, during the trial, at adjournments before the trial, or during the months which may elapse before the defendant is committed and heard, the Crown Court judge can grant bail. The judge knows all about the particular defendant. The amendment proposes that, whether or not the case is a serious one, when the trial is over, armed with all the information, the judge can continue the bail that has previously been granted. Having used his discretion in the one case, the judge would be enabled to use his discretion when the trial is over. There is no mystery about it; that is simply the situation.
The noble Lord the Minister referred to a question of technicality, and I accept that. It is simply a matter of drafting, and it can be set right quite easily. The Minister said that the whole of the amendment is fraught with dangers of delay. That is exactly what one is up against throughout the consideration of the very sensible amendments which have been put forward on a non-party basis. Over and over again the brief that the Minister reads out uses such phrases as, "fraught with dangers of delay". There is no fraughtness at all about the amendment; absolutely none. What was said by the Minister in that regard reflects the imagination of someone sitting in an office, hermetically sealed from what goes on in the real world, conjuring up objections to something that is positive, sensible, clear, and, I would submit, in every way admirable. The noble Lord the Minister is perfectly happy to accept ridiculous, cosmetic, negative amendments such as those to stop people making speeches from the dock if they feel like it because they are bored with their barrister, and so on, but is not prepared to accept sensible, positive contributions to the criminal process. When I hear the noble Lord say that the poor judge who has sat for a week, a fortnight or a month on a case is not as suited as a High Court judge sitting in London, who knows nothing about the facts at all except for what he can glean from pieces of paper, and is not a man or woman who will understand the basis on which to grant bail because, for instance, he has not got a transcript of the proceedings which he himself has been listening to for the last few days or weeks, then, again, one despairs of this sort of reply. A man who has been conducting a trial does not have to have a transcript of the trial. He has been listening to the trial with his own ears, and making up his mind as the hours pass as to what is the basis of the matter. As for the question of the grounds of appeal and time having to be spent by some lawyer to get them right, and the days that would have to be spent by the lawyer sitting in his chambers trying to think up some brilliant ground of appeal, the reality of the matter is that the barrister or the solicitor present during the summing-up of the case is perfectly able during the next half-hour or hour that elapses, or even while the jury is out, to formulate sensible, clear, common sense grounds of appeal which summarise the point; and once those have gone in, of course, there is time to perfect them afterwards and to add to them if necessary. In all those circumstances, I feel bound to test the feeling of the House on this important matter.3.52 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 45) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 122; Not-Contents, 82.
DIVISION NO. 1
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Aberdeen and Temair, M. | Howie of Troon, L. |
| Airedale, L. | Hughes, L. |
| Amherst, E. | Hunt, L. |
| Ampthill, L. | Hutchinson of Lullington, L.—[Teller.] |
| Amulree, L. | |
| Ardwick, L. | Ingleby, V. |
| Auckland, L. | Inglewood, L. |
| Avebury, L. | Jacques, L. |
| Aylestone, L. | Jeger, B. |
| Bacon, B. | Jenkins of Putney, L. |
| Balogh, L. | Kagan, L. |
| Beaumont of Whitley, L. | Kaldor, L. |
| Beswick, L. | Kilmarnock, L. |
| Birk, B. | Leatherland, L. |
| Bishopston, L. | Listowel, E. |
| Blease, L. | Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. |
| Blyton, L. | |
| Boston of Faversham, L. | Lloyd of Hampstead, L. |
| Briginshaw, L. | Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. |
| Brockway, L. | Longford, E. |
| Bruce of Donington, L. | Mackie of Benshie, L. |
| Buckinghamshire, E. | McNair, L. |
| Burton of Coventry, B. | Masham of Ilton, B. |
| Caradon, L. | Massereene and Ferrard, V. |
| Carver, L. | Melchett, L. |
| Chitnis, L. | Merrivale, L. |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Milford, L. |
| Clifford of Chudleigh, L. | Mishcon, L. |
| Collison, L. | Molloy, L. |
| Cooper of Stockton Heath, L. | Monk Bretton, L. |
| Mottistone, L. | |
| David, B.—[Teller.] | Moyne, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Newall, L. |
| Derwent, L. | Oram, L. |
| Diamond, L. | Peart, L. |
| Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. | Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. |
| Porritt, L. | |
| Effingham, E. | Reilly, L. |
| Elwyn-Jones, L. | Rhodes, L. |
| Elystan-Morgan, L. | Richardson, L. |
| Ewart-Biggs, B. | Rochester, L. |
| Faithfull, B. | Ross of Marnock, L. |
| Foot, L. | Sainsbury, L. |
| Fortescue, E. | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Gainford, L. | Saint Oswald, L. |
| Gaitskell, B. | Sandford, L. |
| Glanusk, L. | Seear, B. |
| Glenamara, L. | Seebohm, L. |
| Gregson, L. | Sefton of Garston, L. |
| Grey, E. | Segal, L. |
| Gridley, L. | Smith, L. |
| Hampton, L. | Spens, L. |
| Harris of Greenwich, L. | Stedman, B. |
| Harvington, L. | Stewart of Alvechurch, B. |
| Hives, L. | Stewart of Fulham, L. |
| Stone, L. | Walston, L. |
| Strathcarron, L. | Wells-Pestell, L. |
| Strauss, L. | Westbury, L. |
| Taylor of Gryfe, L. | Whaddon, L. |
| Taylor of Mansfield, L. | White, B. |
| Trumpington, B. | Wigoder, L. |
| Vernon, L. | Winstanley, L. |
| Wallace of Coslany, L. | Wootton of Abinger, B. |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Alexander of Tunis, E. | Lloyd-George of Dwyfor, E. |
| Allen of Abbeydale, L. | |
| Avon, E. | Lucas of Chilworth, L. |
| Bellwin, L. | Lyell, L. |
| Beloff, L. | McFadzean, L. |
| Bessborough, E. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Blake, L. | Macleod of Borve, B. |
| Boyd-Carpenter, L. | Mancroft, L. |
| Bridge of Harwich, L. | Mansfield, E. |
| Caccia, L. | Margadale, L. |
| Campbell of Croy, L. | Mariey, L. |
| Cayzer, L. | Marshall of Leeds, L. |
| Clitheroe, L. | Montgomery of Alamein, V. |
| Cockfield, L. | Morris, L. |
| Craigton, L. | Mowbray and Stourton, L. |
| Dacre of Glanton, L. | Northchurch, B. |
| Daventry, V. | Nugent of Guildford, L. |
| De Freyne, L. | Pender, L. |
| Denham, L —[Teller.] | Penrhyn, L. |
| Donegall, M. | Portland, D. |
| Drumalbyn, L. | Rochdale, V. |
| Dudley, B. | Romney, E. |
| Duncan-Sandys, L. | St. Aldwyn, E. |
| Eccles, V. | St. Davids, V. |
| Ellenborough, L. | Sandys, L.—[Teller.] |
| Elliot of Harwood, B. | Sharples, B. |
| Elphinstone, L. | Skelmersdale, L. |
| Elton, L. | Stanley of Alderley, L. |
| Fraser of Kilmorack, L. | Stodart of Leaston, L. |
| Gardner of Parkes, B. | Stradbroke, E. |
| Geoffrey-Lloyd, L. | Strathclyde, L. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Strathcona and Mount Royal, L. |
| Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. | |
| Suffield, L. | |
| Henley, L. | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Holderness, L. | Thorneycroft, L. |
| Home of the Hirsel, L. | Tranmire, L. |
| Hornsby-Smith, B. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Hylton-Foster, B. | Trenchard, V. |
| Kemsley, V. | Vaizey, L. |
| Kilmany, L. | Vickers, B. |
| Lane-Fox, B. | Waldegrave, E. |
| Lincoln, Bp. | |
Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
Royalty: Protection
4.2 p.m.
My Lords, with the leave of the House I will now repeat a Statement which is being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. The Statement is as follows:
"With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a Statement. "When I reported to the House on 12th July, I said I would make—as soon as I could—a further Statement about the major breach of security at Buckingham Palace on 9th July. I have now received and considered a further report from Assistant Commissioner Dellow. I thought it right to place in the Library, and make available to honourable Members in advance of this Statement, a detailed account of the incident, the background to it, the failures that occurred and the subsequent action. "On 19th July I informed the House of the resignation of Commander Trestrail, the Queen's Police Officer, following his confession to having had over a number of years a homosexual relationship with a male prostitute. The confession raises further grave questions concerning the arrangements for the Queen's security. Accordingly I have invited Lord Bridge to investigate the appointment as Queen's Police Officer and the activities of Commander Trestrail with a view to determining whether security was breached or put at risk; to advise whether in the light of that investigation any change in security arrangements is necessary or desirable; and to report. Lord Bridge is chairman of the Security Commission, but would conduct this inquiry sitting alone. I am glad to say that he has agreed to undertake this task. I shall of course inform the House of his findings. Although I have no evidence of a connection between this matter and the incident on 9th July, I am arranging for Lord Bridge to see all the papers relating to the events on 9th July so that he can make any further inquiries he considers necessary and advise on the adequacy of the police inquiries. "I turn now to the events of 9th July. Mr. Dellow's inquiry has revealed that although there were technical failures, the basic cause of the breakdown of security was a failure by the police to respond efficiently and urgently. Furthermore, the incident revealed slackness and weaknesses in supervision. The Commander 'A' District has resigned from the force and the Chief Inspector at the Palace has been transferred to other duties. Those were the two officers charged with the supervision of the uniformed officers at the Palace. "Mr. Dellow has also outlined the serious errors and omissions which exposed the Queen to danger. As a result, four other police officers are subject to disciplinary inquiries. One of these officers has been suspended and two have been removed from their former duties. I am sure that the House will accept that the officers concerned have a right to a fair hearing. I must remind the House that I have an appellate responsibility in police discipline cases; and it is not proper for me to comment further on these individual cases. "I have considered with the Commissioner what further arrangements are needed to ensure efficiency, greater professionalism and effective supervision. I have accepted his proposal that the protection of Her Majesty the Queen, other members of the Royal Family, and their residences will be the single responsibility of a deputy assistant commissioner reporting directly to the Commissioner. Deputy Assistant Commissioner Colin Smith has been appointed to this new post. He will head a new department responsible for all aspects of Royalty protection. The senior officers in the new Royalty Protection Department, including DAC Smith, will work from Buckingham Palace. This will ensure the closest supervision at senior level and also effect the most direct links with the Household and staff of the Queen and the senior officers of the Household Division, who have promised their full co-operation. "Operational responsibility for all protection will thus be brought together. DAC Smith's first task will include a remit to make recommendations for revised arrangements for posting and training and to keep them under review. He will pay particular attention to establishing and maintaining a regime of duty which is adequately varied and testing. "Since the incident, the number of uniformed police officers on protection duties has been increased. Some new technical security devices have been installed; some existing devices relocated; and all thoroughly tested. Mr. Speaker, Assistant Commissioner Dellow's inquiry will continue in respect of assessments of further physical security measures. In this task, I have asked Mr. Dellow to draw on all sources of available expertise, in the public and private sectors. The results of this work will enable the completion of Mr. Dellow's inquiry. The work of keeping these matters under review will then be carried forward by DAC Smith. But all physical measures depend ultimately on the people who operate them being of high quality and properly supervised. The new leadership and arrangements I have outlined are designed to ensure this. "I have asked the chief officers of other forces in England and Wales, who have responsibilities for Royal residences, to review the arrangements they have made, and make any further recommendations beyond those measures which have already been implemented. The chief officers concerned will work closely with DAC Smith. My right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland has done the same within his area of responsibility. "I have decided to institute a new permanent group, comprising representatives of the Royal households, the police, the Household Division and the Property Services Agency, chaired by one of my senior officials. This group will meet regularly to examine the effectiveness of the arrangements made. It will not in any way lessen the operational responsibility of DAC Smith and the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. The group will report personally to me. "I believe that the bringing together under a DAC of the responsibility for all protection for the Queen and members of her family, the changes in staffing, the improvements in equipment, and the monitoring of the new arrangements I have announced, constitute the best approach to improving Palace security. I have also announced the terms of Lord Bridge's inquiry. And although I have no evidence that the incident of 9th July and the resignation of Commander Trestrail were connected I have arranged for Lord Bridge to see the papers relating to the former event. "Mr. Speaker, the shocking events of 9th July were handled by Her Majesty the Queen with great composure and resolution. But it is intolerable that Her Majesty should have been exposed to this intrusion and put at risk in this way. It is not the wish of Her Majesty, her Ministers or, I am sure, of this House, that she and other members of the Royal Family should be confined by measures of high security that deny private life and public accessibility. But the safety of the Sovereign must be paramount. There has been an appalling lapse of security and I know that the whole House—and the country—will demand that the lessons of this incident must be learned so that the protection that we give to the Queen and members of her family is the best that can be provided". My Lords, that concludes the Statement.4.5 p.m.
My Lords, the House will be grateful to the Minister for repeating that Statement. We would also extend our thanks for the speed with which Assistant Commissioner John Dellow has reported. The extreme gravity of this Statement is all too plain. It reveals a deplorable and astonishing sequence of failures which amounts to a devastating indictment of security at Buckingham Palace and the Minister and the Home Secretary have been commendably forthcoming about this. Setting aside the defence of the Realm itself and all that that implies, when it comes to personal security there can be no higher priority than the protection of the Sovereign, the Head of State. We must, I think, all accept—here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Elton—that it is not possible ever to safeguard against every conceivable contingency. That course would not be acceptable to the Queen and would thwart the basic aims of our free democracy.
Against that background there is one question in particular that I am bound to ask, obvious though it may be, and on which the nation will wish to be completely satisfied. While we welcome the changes announced and the separate matter of the appointment of Lord Bridge to conduct the inquiry, I would ask this. Are Her Majesty's Government satisfied that everything possible is now being done, so far as is practicable and appropriate, to ensure the safety of the Queen and the Royal Family? In asking this, I also ask the Minister to confirm that he is satisfied—and it is encouraging to see the indications in the Statement—about the proven competence of the personnel now to be involved and that all appropriate security aids which modern technology can provide are to be used. I say all this bearing in mind the lengths to which the terrorist will go, as is all too clear from yesterday's grotesque, indeed obscene, criminal acts, and that there is an even greater need for tighter security and a constant high level of vigilance. If we cannot be satisfied about the Queen's security, how can we be satisfied about other people's security? I would ask this specific point on these matters. Can the noble Lord say whether the Home Secretary or the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis visited the Palace on any occasion to review security between the series of earlier incidents which took place since 1979? I would ask this additional question. Very serious concern has been expressed because no criminal charge is possible arising from the intrusion into the Queen's bedroom. We understand this and of course appreciate that intent has to be established by the prosecution. Can the Minister say whether either the Law Commission or the Criminal Law Revision Committee is doing any work at all in this sphere at the moment? If not, can he say whether an urgent reference could be made to whichever of them seems most appropriate to see whether there is a gap in the law which could and should be filled? I end by expressing again—and joining with the noble Lord the Minister—the admiration of us all for the signal courage once more shown by the Queen and our sense of relief that no injury was caused to Her Majesty when that horrifying intrusion took place.4.14 p.m.
My Lords, it is indeed fortunate that it was a comparatively harmless intrusion into the Palace that has given rise to the discovery of the ludicrous laxity of the security arrangements there. I say, "comparatively harmless", because I do not think that one should ever underestimate the shock and distress that can be caused to any occupant of any premises by behaviour of the sort about which we have heard. I join in what has been said in total admiration of the self-composure that was so obviously displayed by Her Majesty at that difficult time.
The inquiry clearly has disclosed defects in the security system, not only as against the improbable risk which can sometimes be understood, but as against the probable risk, too. I do not believe that this is a moment for calling for heads to roll or for demanding political scapegoats of one sort or another. It is a moment for seeking to ensure that the arrangements are going to be wholly efficient in future. Having listened to the account which has been given by the noble Lord the Minister of the detailed arrangements which are now about to be set in force at the Palace, I do not think that any comment need be made except that clearly much will now turn upon the skill and efficiency of those who have to put these arrangements into effect. I do not think, either, that it helps to add to what might become a somewhat hysterical consideration of this topic if one proceeds to make any more wide-ranging remarks than that. As to the rather sad postscript about the Queen's Police Officer and his private life, that is a matter that of course must be left now to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bridge. Unless and until the noble and learned Lord discovers that there was any actual or potential security risk, I suggest that that unfortunate individual should be left to live his own life in his own way. The only other comment that I wish to make is this: I should like to ask the Minister whether he is not deeply concerned at the quite outrageous breaches of the law of contempt which have been committed by most of the newspapers and most of the broadcasting and television authorities too, to such an extent that the UK press Gazette—which is not by any means opposed to the interests of the press—referred to the prima facie contempt as being numerous and too plain to require explanation. Is there not a real danger that in the sensational case, such as the Yorkshire Ripper or this one, the media decide that provided they all break the law they are all absolutely safe? Is it sufficient for the noble Lord's right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General to issue a mild warning a day or two too late, and is it not desirable that some action should be taken in order to establish the supremacy of the law in this matter and the right of anyone, whatever he is alleged to have done, to a fair trial?4.18 p.m.
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for the way they have taken this very important Statement and which has emphasised the fact that it lies at the heart of the concern of this nation. If I may reply to Lord Boston's first question, I think the answer must be that we shall never be satisfied that everything possible is being done; we shall always exert ourselves to find out new ways to make security more secure. But at the moment—and I think that the noble Lord will see this borne out when he reads in Hansard what I have said—we have taken a very wide range of organisational, management and technical steps to remedy the faults which were discovered on these two occasions.
The noble Lord was anxious about whether or not a criminal act had been perpetrated and whether there was a charge available on the second occasion. The Law Commission reported on offences of forcible entry and their findings were implemented in the Criminal Law Act 1977. My right honourable friend would wish to reflect on this suggestion in the light of recent events. Likewise, Parliament considered the law on contempt most recently and passed the Contempt of Court Act 1981. My right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General will no doubt take note of the comments made today and the forceful way in which the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has expressed them. As to the question of visits to the Royal Palace, my right honourable friend has had the privilege of visiting the Palace on a number of occasions; but of course it would not be appropriate for him to involve himself directly in operational matters. That is a matter for senior police officers who have made a number of inspections. I agree with your Lordships that it is important that this should not be treated with hysteria and that the press should not develop a sort of "pack" psychology. The measured way in which the two noble Lords from their Front Benches opposite have received this Statement has done a good deal to bring this back into the serious perspective which it is owed.My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that many of us will agree with the sentiments he has just expressed, and that one of the least attractive features of this whole situation has been the relentless search for scapegoats? If I may say so, speaking as someone who is not a member of the same political party as the Home Secretary, I deplore the very venomous and, in my opinion, unjustified personal attacks which have been made on the right honourable gentleman. Secondly, is the noble Lord aware that many of us welcome the proposal to have a new permanent group headed by a senior official of the Home Office, who is going to bring together, as I understand it, all the various interests involved in guaranteeing the security of the Queen and other members of the Royal Family, including the police and officers of the Household Division and of the Property Services Agency? This seems to me an extremely sensible proposal.
Also, if I may, I should like to associate myself very warmly with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, about the quite deliberate breaches of the law of contempt by virtually every newspaper in this country. I would put it to the noble Lord that it is a serious matter when this takes place and it denies to people the right of a fair trial. I hope that the noble Lord's right honourable and learned friend will take the matter with the appropriate degree of seriousness. Finally, is he aware that there have indeed been some serious errors committed by officers of the Metropolitan Police, quite obviously? However, as the noble Lord recognised in the Statement, there are to be disciplinary procedures and it would clearly be most unjust to make any observations which would in any way prejudice their right to a fair hearing.My Lords, I welcome the endorsement of the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, of a number of the steps that my right honourable friend has taken and I welcome also his personal endorsement of the stature of my right honourable friend, which I believe to be considerable. I will, of course, bring to the attention of my right honourable and learned friend the concern expressed by the noble Lord and by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, regarding the matter of contempt of court.
My Lords, as the Criminal Justice Bill seems unlikely to come before your Lordships for Third Reading until nearly a fortnight has passed, would it not be possible for this gap to be filled by a simple amendment to be tabled by the Government, rather than having to wait for legislation in the next Session of Parliament? Would my noble friend agree that, if that gap could be filled as soon as that, many people would sleep more quietly in their homes meanwhile?
My Lords, if such an amendment could be drafted and tabled in the time; although it would be unusual in the conventions of this House to achieve legislation in that way, it might be a useful thing. However, my right honourable friend has been considering this matter and he feels it is not really the way to legislate on such a fundamental matter at such very short notice, quite apart from the need for parliamentary consideration, and that really the patient solution is likely to be the better one, whatever our anxieties may be at the moment.
My Lords, does the noble Lord recall that when the first Statement on this matter was made a few days ago I put forward the view that it would be perhaps not futile but certainly foolish if the security measures to be undertaken were confined simply to Buckingham Palace, because the Queen and her family on numerous occasions during the year do repair to other residences? Can the Minister therefore say that we shall not wait until something happens in one or other of the royal residences before there is a security examination there? Ought not all the other royal residences to be included in this examination as well as Buckingham Palace?
My Lords, as the noble Lord will find from perusing Hansard, this work is already in hand.
My Lords, can my noble friend give an undertaking that the Government realise that it is quite intolerable for it to be legal to go in this way and sit on the end of the bed of anybody at all in this Kingdom and not to commit an offence? This appears to be what has happened; somebody has gone and sat on the end of the Sovereign's bed and has not been prosecuted. I find that a quite extraordinary state of affairs. It is an extraordinary state of the law that anybody can go and sit on someone else's bed at seven o'clock in the morning—without being invited to go there, I hasten to add; and I find this an intolerable state of affairs. Would my noble friend please make sure that we look at this matter very urgently and very rapidly, in order to make sure that it comes within the criminal law as quickly as possible?
My Lords, I can undertake that it is a matter of great urgent concern. I cannot undertake that the problem will be elucidated as quickly as the noble Earl, and indeed we ourselves, would wish it to be. However, it is not at all a simple matter to construct an offence, even if it is differently expressed from the aspirations expressed by the noble Lord in his first question.
My Lords, I suppose we have got to accept that this intruder has not committed an offence and therefore cannot be punished, but is there any way of preventing him and members of his family from making substantial sums of money from the newspapers over this?—otherwise we have a situation in which it is positively profitable for people to behave in this manner.
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord that crime must not pay, and non-crime should not pay either. I take to heart what the noble Lord says and I will put it to my right honourable friend.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that the Press Council issued a judgment long ago that newspapers should not glorify the life of criminals by publishing their memoirs or those of members of their families? Should not the newspapers bear this closely in mind in the present instance?
My Lords, I think it is useful for your Lordships to deplore the conduct of the press when it is not as it should be, and of course the Press Council exists also for that purpose.
My Lords, if there was no crime, I find it difficult to see how there has been contempt.
My Lords, I think we should not get too deeply into this matter but, if the noble Lord will recall, two occasions were involved and for one of them there is a remand in custody.
Criminal Justice Bill
4.28 p.m.
Consideration on Report resumed.
moved Amendment No. 46:
After Clause 28, insert the following new clause:
(" Activation of suspended sentence
. In section 23(1) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973, the words "which have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed" shall be omitted.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this amendment, and I do so in the knowledge that it is not a self-explanatory amendment. It is the first time that it has been moved and it is necessary very briefly to elucidate the thinking behind it. It deals with suspended sentences; and suspended sentences, it has become clear in recent years, have become a popular addition to the armoury of the sentencer and will become increasingly popular when the partly-effective suspended sentence comes into force. With their increasing use as a form of sentence, three particuar drawbacks have emerged and this amendment is concerned with an attempt to deal with them.
The first problem is that many magistrate's courts and the Crown Courts are tempted on occasion to regard the suspended sentence as something which is just a little bit more effective than a probation order or a conditional discharge. It means there is something hanging over the head of the defendant if he commits another offence: yet he is allowed to leave the court and go free. There is a temptation to pass suspended sentences when, if that form of sentence did not exist as a penalty at all, it would never occur to the court to pass a prison sentence. That is the first problem that arises.
The second problem arises because there are courts which take the view—and, in many ways, it is a very sensible view—that a person on whom a suspended sentence has been passed will leave the court telling himself and his family and friends that he has got away with it. In those circumstances, there is a temptation upon courts to pass a suspended sentence of a very much longer period than they would have passed for an immediate prison sentence, in order to try to compensate for that factor.
The third problem that arises is that there are a number of cases in which a suspended sentence is passed, when the court is not fully aware of circumstances which subsequently come to light. They may be circumstances about a defendant's background, about his home life, about his previous convictions and, very often, about his mental condition, when the courts pass a suspended sentence but would never have thought of doing so if they had been fully informed at that time.
These problems arise, and it is very difficult to see how they can be avoided at the moment when the court is imposing the suspended sentence. It is true that, if the courts follow the procedures correctly, and only impose a suspended sentence having first decided that a prison sentence is necessary and then suspend the equivalent sentence, the first two sets of problems would not arise. But that is being a little unrealistic, having regard to the commonsense of sentencing as it is seen by many magistrates, by many Crown Court judges and, particularly, by many temporary or acting recorders or circuit judges who may not have very much experience of criminal sentencing.
The other aspect, where the facts are simply not available at the time and the court passes a suspended sentence which it would not otherwise have done, clearly cannot be dealt with in any way except, I suppose, by asking for an even more comprehensive inquiry at the point of time when the suspended sentence is passed. One then gets the situation in which for all these various categories suspended sentences are passed, which either ought not to be passed or are passed for terms which are longer than they should be. It is no good saying that the defendant has a right of appeal in those circumstances. It is true that he has, but no defendant that I have ever heard of has gone to the Court of Appeal and complained that a suspended sentence has been wrongly passed upon him and is too harsh, the reason being that, inevitably, the person with the suspended sentence is not troubled about an appeal, because, as I said, he thinks that he has got away with it.
What then happens is this. In some of those cases the defendant commits a further offence. He is then sent to prison for the further offence—quite rightly—but he is also sent to prison for the original sentence for which the suspended sentence was imposed. He is ordered to serve the full term of the suspended sentence and it is made, as it more or less has to be made by law, consecutive to his new sentence. The position therefore arises that, because of the fact that suspended sentences are activated in this way, there are people who are in prison for a longer period than they should be, because of the way in which the system works.
All that this amendment seeks to do is to give the court that is trying to decide whether the suspended sentence should be activated rather more discretion than at present it has. I apologise if this sounds for a moment like a lecture on the law; it is not meant to be. The powers of the activating court, as many of your Lordships will know, are covered by Section 23 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Acts 1973. If the court has to deal with someone who has committed an offence while a suspended sentence is in force, the court has four choices. First, it can order him to serve the suspended sentence in full, consecutive to the other sentence that has now been passed; secondly, it can substitute a lesser sentence, a suspended sentence; thirdly, it can further suspend the suspended sentence and, fourthly, it can take no action at all in the suspended sentence.
But the rub lies in the concluding words of subsection (1) of that section of the Act, which state that the court shall make an order that the suspended sentence shall take effect with the original term unaltered in full, consecutively,
"unless the court is of opinion that it would be unjust to do so in view of all the circumstances which have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed, including the facts of the subsequent offence."
All that this amendment seeks to do is to remove the words relating to the circumstances
"which have arisen since the suspended sentence was passed".
So the court, in deciding whether to activate a suspended sentence, can look at all the surrounding circumstances, can look at the whole of the defendant's previous history, can look, for example, at information that has come to light subsequently about his previous medical history and matters of that nature. If, having considered all that information, it does not find any special circumstances, then the law will be as it is at the moment, the court will make an order activating the suspended sentence and it is quite right that it should. But, on the other hand, there are cases where the court would want to take into account matters that arose before the suspended sentence was passed, is not allowed to do so under the present law and, as a result of activating suspended sentences, people are going to prison for rather longer than they should be. This is a matter which, I think, is of concern to us all. This small, modest amendment would increase the discretion of the courts in that limited way and enable them to see that justice is done, having regard to the whole of a defendant's previous history. My Lords, I beg to move.
4.37 p.m.
My Lords, we on these Benches have very considerable support for this amendment and very great sympathy for the reasons underlying it, as those have been articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder. Inevitably, the passing and making of a suspended sentence involves some element of casuistry on the part of the sentencing court. The task which Parliament has placed upon the court is, indeed, a difficult one. The court, in the first instance, has to consider whether or not the offence that it is dealing with merits imprisonment. Then having decided that it does, and having decided upon the term of imprisonment, the very next second, in theory, that court has to constitute itself into a parole hoard and to ask itself "Is it necessary that that man, whom we have just sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment, should remain in custody a moment longer?" It is a difficult consideration and it is one that cannot be avoided in the context of suspended sentences, which form a very important part of the armoury of the courts.
When it comes to the question of the activation or not of a suspended sentence, in respect of which there has been a breach, again the situation is not free from casuistry, for the court is, of course, enjoined, according to the decision of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division in the case of Ithell in 1969, to consider, first, the offence that has given rise to the breach and what penalty is appropriate in respect of that, and only then, if the words of the Court of Appeal are to be taken strictly, to consider what it should do in relation to the suspended sentence. I apprehend that the noble Lord the Minister will say in reply that the amendment must be rejected, because it would be wholly wrong for the court that is dealing with the breach to constitute itself, in any way, into some type of Court of Appeal that would comment upon or adjudicate upon the earlier sentence. As a basic proposition of law, that must indeed be sound. But that is where theory and practice part company and go in different directions. As one who spends most of his time in the criminal courts, my feeling is that in practice the courts inevitably look at the circumstances in which the earlier suspended sentence was passed. It seems to me that the Court of Appeal practically admitted that in 1971—in the case of Munday. May I quote the headnote to that report:In practice, therefore, it is difficult for even the most clear-minded judge or magistrate to avoid completely some proper consideration of the circumstances in which the first sentence was passed. Sometimes it is necessary to go a little further, for quite often there will be the question, in relation to the second offence, of a whole spray of offences to be taken into consideration which cover the period in time when the first sentence was passed. Because the second court will not have all the documents before it, there may be great doubt as to whether or not some, if not all, of those were taken into consideration at the earlier instance. It seems to me that the strict wording of Section 23 as it now stands technically precludes the court from that consideration. In short, therefore, it would seem that, in practice, as the Court of Appeal admitted as long ago as 1971, sentencers do pay limited but proper regard to the circumstances in which the earlier sentence was passed. That being the situation, is it not right and proper that we should now make an honest woman, as it were, of what has existed for so long? It is on that basis that we invite support for this amendment."Though it is not part of the function of a court considering the activation of a suspended sentence in any way to review its propriety, there are cases where justice cannot be done without fitting into the pattern of events leading to the further conviction the facts which led to the suspended sentence. To that extent, therefore, it may be necessary on the second occasion for the court to inform itself of the circumstances in which the suspended sentence was passed in order that proper assessment may be made of the overall position so as to determine the sentence which is to be passed and the grounds on which it is acting".
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, said—and this is to my certain knowledge, too—that if you impose a suspended sentence on one defendant and a fine on another, the man who is given a fine thinks that he is very hard done by, while the man who receives a suspended sentence thinks that he has got off. It is very important that if a person receives a suspended sentence he should realise that it will be activated—and that there will be no two ways about it—if he breaches his suspended sentence. Therefore, I should have thought that the judge who tries the second offence ought to have the opportunity to use his mitigating powers, if he so wishes, and to take into consideration the fact that there is a suspended sentence. It would be very unwise for any court to give the impression to a defendant that a suspended sentence is not going to be implemented. It would be seen to be undermining the opportunity to impose suspended sentences. Therefore I come down against this amendment, because it is very important that suspended sentences should be not only taken into consideration but always activated.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, has raised a matter of considerable significance. I am grateful to him for the opportunity he has provided by his amendment for the issue to be debated. The Act empowers a court which passes a sentence of imprisonment of not more than two years to order that the sentence shall not take effect unless during a period of not less than one year or more than two years the offender commits a further imprisonable offence.
This form of sentence was introduced originally in the Criminal Justice Act 1967 in recognition of the fact that there are many cases where the nature of the offence itself demands a sentence of imprisonment, but where the circumstances surrounding it and the situation of the offender permit it to be suspended, that suspension being contingent upon the offender's future good conduct. Its acceptance as a means of dealing with offenders, many of whom will have committed quite serious crimes, depends upon its being clearly perceived by all concerned that if the offender re-offends and if his new offence is imprisonable, then the sentence for the first offence will be enforced. If that is seen to be in any way unlikely—if the Sword of Damocles is not seen to fall—then the device, as my noble friend Lady Macleod of Borve has said, will get no credence and offenders will not be deterred by it. That is why Section 23 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 obliges the court to activate the suspended sentence on commission of a further imprisonable offence, unless it finds justifiable reasons for imposing a lesser period, or extending the operational period, or making no order. In practice, the suspended sentence is used pretty frequently. About 36,000 suspended sentences are passed annually. In 1980, rather fewer than one-third of them—about 10,300 in all—were dealt with for committing further imprisonable offences. Of these, 7,450 were required to serve the full term of the suspended sentence. In 350 cases, a lesser term was ordered to be served. In 560 cases, the operational period was extended, and there were 1,930 cases where no order was made. It was the intention of Parliament that the activation of the sentence should be the normal result of a breach. Those figures also show that in many cases the use of the sentence results in there being fewer people in custody than there might otherwise be. The sentence therefore is worth preserving. Would it be strengthened by the amendment or weakened by it? If the effect of the amendment is to multiply the number of occasions when the original sentence is not put into effect upon an offender—if it means that the Sword of Damocles falls rather less often—I fear that it may be weakened. But I have another doubt about what the noble Lord proposes, and it is this. At present, only things arising after the imposition of a sentence can be prayed in aid of a decision not to implement it by the court sitting, as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, put it, more or less as a parole board. This is as it should be. The noble Lord would have us consider also things arising before its imposition—things that were before the court when it considered the first offence. Those things should have been considered before, when the first sentence was passed. If they are things like medical reports, the medical condition of the offender will still be a matter for the court to inquire into on the second occasion.My Lords, I wonder whether I might ask the Minister to consider the case which came the other day before my court of a man who was an alcoholic. I do not think it was realised that he was an alcoholic at the time he was given the suspended sentence. When he came before us he had taken, while drunk, a few cans of beer and run out of the pub. Everybody there knew him and he was caught immediately. This further offence would have meant activating a sentence of six months. The only way to get round it was to order another psychiatric report and a social inquiry. It seems to me to be quite wrong that one should have to get round it in that way. I wonder whether the noble Lord could take that into account in his reply.
I shall try to do so, my Lords. I take it that what the noble Baroness is saying is that the second offence was so much less grave than the first offence. If it was sufficiently less grave to be a non-imprisonable offence, then the matter would not arise, because it is imprisonable offences with which we are concerned. I take it that whatever he did when he ran out of the pub was something for which he could be imprisoned.
Yes, it had to be, my Lords.
My Lords, it is very difficult to argue particular cases off the cuff, when one has not actually seen them, but I will certainly try to digest what the noble Baroness has said. Perhaps I may return to what I was trying to say, which was that, in reverting to the original circumstances, it seems that what the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, is doing, is producing a proposal for an element of resentencing between courts of equal status. That is a dubious principle. Doubts about the first sentence should be dealt with not at the same level, but on appeal. If, on the other hand, the doubts are only about the second instance, then it is the circumstances of the second instance which ought to be taken into consideration. I would like to know whether the noble Lord really wants to press this rather doubtful principle of resentencing into the Bill.
My Lords, may I say to begin with that I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod of Borve, and with the noble Lord the Minister that if a suspended sentence is passed, its effect depends very largely on the degree to which the defendant believes that it is going to be enforced in the event of him getting into further trouble. It is never possible to say to a defendant when one is imposing a suspended sentence, "If you commit a further imprionable offence, you will serve the suspended sentence". The most that anyone can say—and I believe this is the formula that most courts use—is, "You will amost inevitably have to serve the suspended sentence". The reason for that is, first, that the Act itself provides that there are other courses open in certain circumstances; secondly, that the courts have spent a little time trying to get around the situation anyway.
The noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, referred to the Munday case. Otherwise, I was going to trundle up at this stage the case of Boczkei in 1970, where the Court of Appeal decided that when the sentence is ordered to run consecutively, as it must do in the ordinary way, the court must ensure that the totality is not excessive. To this end, it may adjust either the suspended sentence or the sentence in the instant case. So in both the Munday and the Boczkei case, the Court of Appeal have spent some time in trying to get around the rigours of the existing law, and in effect in accepting the Act as it would read if this amendment were introduced into it. I am not seeking to weaken the existing Act in any way but perhaps I may simply say this: if the amendment were written into the Act, the section would still read:that the suspended sentence shall take effect—"and a court shall make the order "—
It would still be almost inevitable that the suspended sentence would be activated but not quite so inevitable as it is as at the moment. I take the noble Lord's point that some facts which would be sought to be raised on the second occasion had in fact been raised and considered on the first occasion, but there were facts that were not considered on the first occasion. When I introduced this amendment, I mentioned in particular the case where evidence has come forward about the defendant's mental history before he committed the first offence which was not available when he was dealt with the first time and of which a subsequent court, very properly, would want to take account. To that extent, there must be an element of re-sentencing. There must be in the Munday decision an element of resentencing, as there must in the Boczkei decision. It is a very moderate, limited element, but it is worth recognising, and it is worth legitimising in the present Act. Does the noble Lord, Lord Elton, wish to intervene at this point?"unless the court is of the opinion that it would be unjust to do so in view of all the circumstances, including the facts of the subsequent offence".
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, is the judge of the stage at which I might most profitably do so. Sometimes the pigeons do not fly quite fast enough. What I wanted to say was simply this: two practical considerations have been put to me with which I am not entirely familiar. I have grave doubts about the general principle. Some of the things the noble Lord has said have been extremely reasonable and anyone from the shires will know what I mean when I say that when one gets into the Monday country one has to go very carefully! That being so, and without wishing to raise any hopes in the mind of the noble Lord other than those which might already repose there, it might be a good thing if I considered this a little further before Third Reading. I am giving no undertakings other than that I will do that in the light of the material which has been brought forward. This is a lengthy introduction, and, if the noble Lord has anything else he wishes me to consider, perhaps he could bring it into his peroration.
My Lords, my peroration was going to be that I had no intention of dividing the House on this amendment. I believe completely in the power of persuasion. I was going to invite the noble Lord to reflect between now and Third Reading on whether anything had been put forward which might cause him to reconsider the matter. If he and I can reach some agreement, we will, no doubt, take the appropriate action. I am grateful to the noble Lord for what he said and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 1 [ Offences excluded from section 29]:
4.56 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 46A:
Page 67, line 11, at end insert—
("7. Trafficking in Class A drugs.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment, which stands in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, deals with Clause 29 of the Bill and it relates to the first schedule to the Bill. Broadly speaking, what we are discussing here are the emergency release arrangements which would be brought into operation if there were grave situations developing within the prisons. Many of us believe that, unless fairly early steps are taken to deal with the problem of the numbers in prisons, this particular section of the Act will be activated. In any event, it is obviously highly desirable for us to examine these provisions.
One provision which I am bound to say at the beginning I do not like, as I indicated at Committee stage, is the list of offences excluded from Section 29. They are listed on page 67 and include the offences of manslaughter, rape, kidnapping, assault of any description (the lack of qualification is an important one), riot and affray. What is provided for in this clause of the Bill is that, in the event of the Secretary of State deciding to bring this particular section of the Act into operation, and to release people six months before they would otherwise be released, in order to deal with a grave situation within the prisons, people who have committed the offences I have listed would in fact not be released.
It may be asked by some, not unreasonably in any way, that, if one objects to the principle of this approach, why is one seeking to add another category of offence? The reason is a very straightforward one. It seems to me that, if in our criminal law we are going to provide exceptions of this character, for the first time, so far as I am aware, in the law of this country, and say that, notwithstanding the decisions of the courts, certain people will be released and other people will not be released because of the gravity of their offences, then it is necessary to look at what the offences are.
It is self-evident what the Government have done, and the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said this to me in a letter dated 14th July. What happened was that the Home Secretary and the Home Office Ministers came under pressure when they were in Committee in another place to provide these exclusions. If I may quote from the letter, the noble Lord, referring to the letter I had written to him, wrote:
"I quite take your point about the seriousness of drug trafficking. The schedule of excluded offences was not, however, intended to be a definition of seriousness. It was, as I am sure you know, added to the the early release provisions of the Bill, specifically in order to meet the concern expressed during the Committee stage that prisoners convicted of violence offences should never be among those released early under the emergency provisions".
What I am seeking to add is a new category of people who have been convicted of trafficking in Class A drugs. Primarily, what I am referring to is heroin. I must say to the Minister at once—I am probably
pushing at an open door—looking at the precise argument which he advanced, in my view trafficking in Class A drugs is one of the most violent offences in the criminal calendar. What we are talking about here is something far more serious than a single act of manslaughter, far more serious than a single act of violence. We are talking about people who are trafficking in the most dangerous drugs available in this country, mainly heroin, and where we are already in something approaching an epidemic situation.
The House may recall that during Questions a few weeks ago the Minister disclosed to the House for the first time the amount of heroin which had been seized by Her Majesty's Customs and Excise in 1980, in 1981 and in the first six months of this year. I think it is desirable to remind the House of what those figures were. First, in 1981 the amount of heroin seized by the customs increased by well over 100 per cent. In the first six months of this year the amount of heroin seized by customs is already just about equal to all the heroin seized in 1981. We are talking about a business with a turnover of almost certainly well over £100 million a year. We are talking about drugs which kill large numbers of people. The heroin situation in this country is now viewed with extreme gravity within the police service and increasingly within the judiciary. What I am saying is that, if we are going to have excluded categories of offences, it is in my view absolutely essential to have this particular category, dealing as it does with some of the most serious offences being handled in the courts. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, has put the case most admirably. I really cannot add anything to his words and I am just pleased to be associated in this particular amendment with the noble Lord. It is probably not fair of me to verbally add a further category, which of course I would not expect my noble friend the Minister to give a direct answer on now. But if one is to have this list—and lists are always invidious and can be added to—I would ask him to seriously consider adding arson as a further category. The pattern of behaviour of the arsonist has never been properly discovered; so far as I am aware through conversations with several psychiatrists there is no pattern of behaviour that follows the character of the arsonist. It is an extremely difficult offence to deal with, either legally or from the mental point of view. But, in either case it seems to me that it is worth including arson, if in the future perhaps the Minister will think about this, with the ignoble and really dastardly crime of making profit from the lives of other people.
My Lords, I only intervene because the noble Baroness has indeed raised an interesting point, as to where one goes on with this list and what one ought to delete. If one tries to restrict oneself according to the rules, this is hardly the place to do it, but I would ask, if I may with the permission of the House, that the Minister should look again at the description of "assault of any kind", bearing in mind that this does include an ordinary common assault. Would he not, on reflection between now and Third Reading, care to alter that to grievous bodily harm?
My Lords, may I agree entirely with this amendment, speaking from the few years' experience I had as a member of the Parole Board. It is very obvious, not only from the figures the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has quoted, but also from one's own knowledge, that trafficking in these very serious Class A drugs is increasing far more quickly than perhaps some of us within this House realise. As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, said, it kills people; a very small amount can kill a great number of people. I wholeheartedly agree that it should be added to the list the noble Lord is proposing.
My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord the Minister to be extremely careful of adding offences to a list. The trouble about lists of offences is that everybody always thinks of the most serious case. In the criminal law you can have the most trivial examples of serious cases. For instance, there is here rape. People do not appreciate that all rape is having sexual intercourse with someone against that person's consent, and in many cases of rape it is a very marginal question as to whether the girl agreed or did not agree. Sometimes it is only just on a matter of balance, and the judge does not send the person to prison as a result, because he takes the view that it was a very fifty-fifty situation.
Equivalently, in an offence such as mentioned by the noble Baroness, arson. Arson can be burning down a garden shed; it can be a trivial little matter, which arises often with young people who are psychologically disturbed, and may not involve imprisonment at all. It would be a thousand pities if decisions are made by descriptions of offences which keep people in prison longer than they should be.My Lords, may I make one short comment on Lord Mishcon's point about assault, which of course is very often an extremely trivial matter. In order to come within the provisions here at all, it would have to be an assault which had merited a sentence of imprisonment of at least six months.
My Lords, I am beginning to be astonished at some of the utterances of noble Lords who have spoken. It is said it may be just a trivial assault. I recall a case in court where a boy attempted to snatch a handbag, and this is just what we were told by the counsel. Those who have ever had the experience of having another individual lurch at them, even if not actually attack them, certainly do not regard it as trivial.
I was rather astonished to hear the noble Lord say manslaughter was only one death. That is one death too many. Surely we must be very careful before we trivialise these offences. It is all too often said that there is petty crime, and particularly when talking about the minor assaults. I feel that any attack on the person should be regarded as serious whatever the end effect. While I support the amendment, I am sorry that we appear to be trivialising some very serious offences.My Lords, perhaps I could start by putting this in context. What we are discussing is a schedule which describes those people who may not be released under the emergency provisions, where the Secretary of State is empowered to release people before the full term of their sentence has expired. We are not weighing different matters delicately in the balance of justice. We are seeing who should actually get an unexpected bonus at the end of their sentence. That said—I may repeat it in other words—the schedule was inserted into the Bill in another place to take account of the concern expressed there that prisoners convicted of violence should never be among those released under the emergency provision for the early release of prisoners set out in Clause 29—that is what I was referring to.
Problems of definition are bound to arise in drawing up such a list and I stress that we do fully accept that such an approach does not provide a definitive measure of seriousness in relation to individual offences. That is best provided by the length of sentence and the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, made a very relevant indication of the importance of that. Your Lordships will recall that Clause 29 restricts the use of the early release power to those prisoners with no more than six months of their sentence left to run, and where the expedited procedure is followed, no more than one month of their sentence left to run. The purpose of the list in Schedule 1 is to exclude prisoners convicted of violent offences completely from eligibility for early release under the scheme. Thus we deliberately confined the list in Schedule 1 to those offences where violence on the part of the offender is an inherent element of the offence. I think I am right in saying that the assault, to which the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, referred as being trivial, is one that one would not expect to find imprisonable for six months. The noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong. That is the reason for the present exclusion of drug trafficking. The reason is not that is does not represent a serious offence in the Government's eyes. Indeed, the Government have every sympathy with the intention behind the noble Lord's amendment. Those who traffic in hard drugs are clearly a deep menace to society and are often responsible for more deaths than the individual murderer or person who commits manslaughter. The amendment as it stands is technically defective. But if your Lordships are content, and if the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Greenwich, will agree to withdraw it, I will undertake to return at Third Reading with an amendment which will give effect to what this amendment seeks to achieve and in the process I shall look with a good deal of hesitancy at what my noble friend has said about arson, because there are dangers in extending lists—My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord the Minister for giving way. While accepting everything that has been said in relation to arson, would he bear in mind, however, the next offence—that is, aggravated arson, arson with intent to endanger life, which is in a rather different category?
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord will find that arson with intent to endanger life, arson endangering life, is already covered by the schedule. However, I will keep all this on board while I look at the noble Lord's amendment between this stage and the next one.
My Lords, before the Minister sits down I should like to make one point because he kindly invited me to comment on his remarks on assault. Therefore, with the leave of the House, may I just say that I cannot conceive of a case where there could be an ordinary assault and one had a term of imprisonment of six months. I was only trying to be realistic in saying that it must be a case of grievous bodily harm because otherwise the charge would be wrong.
My Lords, I apologise to the noble Lord the Minister; he is quite right. That offence is, in fact, included. I am sorry for wasting the time of the House.
My Lords, I am obliged to the Minister for meeting the point in this amendment and, with the leave of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.15 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 47:
Before Clause 30, insert the following new clause:
(" Reference of cases of prisoners serving life sentences to preliminary review committee.
Parole for prisoners serving life sentences.
.—(1) Before the end of the period specified in subsection (2) below the Secretary of State shall refer to a preliminary review committee the case of any prisoner serving a life sentence whose case has not previously been referred to the Parole Board or reviewed by a local review committee; and the preliminary review committee shall consider and report to the Secretary of State on the suitability of his case for review by a local review committee.
(2) The period referred to in subsection (1) above is the period of ten years from the date on which the prisoner was sentenced, less any period by which, if he had been sentenced to a determinate sentence, the length of that sentence would have been treated as reduced under section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.
(3) Before a preliminary review committee considers a prisoner's case under subsection (1) above a member of the committee shall interview the prisoner if he is willing to be so interviewed.
(4) In this section—
- "local review committee" means a local review committee established under section 59(6) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967;
- "the Parole Board" means the Parole Board established by section 59(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1967;
- "preliminary review committee" means a body of two or more persons nominated for the purposes of this section by the Secretary of State; and
- "prisoner serving a life sentence" means a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for life or custody for life or sentenced to detention during Her Majesty's pleasure or for life.").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 47. The House is naturally preoccupied in discussing this Bill with the fortunes of young offenders and short-term prisoners. I must ask leave once again to turn for a while to long-term prisoners, including specifically the 1,500 or more life prisoners. For all such prisoners, by common consent, the Bill does nothing and I am afraid that the public on the whole is anxious to forget about them.
I do not underestimate the degrading conditions under which thousands of short-term prisoners are serving their sentences. But as I have remarked previously, long-term prisoners are degraded still more, particularly when, in the case of life prisoners, they are so often left without hope. The prisoners concerned arouse little public sympathy. In discussing prisoners as a whole, we often refer with a rather sweeping gesture of dismissal to those convicted of grave crimes as though they were beneath our Christian consideration. But in fact they share one thing in common with Members of your Lordships' House; they are all members of the human race.
I am glad that the right reverend Prelate is here because he will confirm one translation anyway of the sayings of the founder of the Christian religion when He said: "I have come to call not respectable people, but outcasts" and this amendment is pre-eminently concerned with outcasts. I represent, I hope, a small step in the direction of showing justice and mercy towards them in the spirit of the Christian Master, the great Jewish teachers and the great teachers of humanist philosophy.
I moved an amendment at the Committee stage which provided that after 10 years, at the outside, life prisoners should have a right to be considered by a local review committee—that is to say, they should have a right to enter the parole process. The works of the historian Lecky are, I know, familiar to the noble Lord, Lord Elton, because I attribute all culture to him in a general sense—that is his prerogative as a Minister at the Home Office. At any rate I must not invoke his father's name again because that was done last night and the noble Lord rather felt that it was hitting him below the belt. I will not do that again. At any rate, the great historian Lecky said of the Act of Union between England and Ireland that the whole unbribed intellect of Ireland was opposed to that measure. It is not for me, perhaps, to use quite that language here, but I can say that my amendment on the last occasion was supported by the Labour Party, the Liberal Party, the SDP and some distinguished independents, including the noble Viscount, Lord Ingleby. However, it was defeated by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, and his faithful cohorts.
I am trying again today with a much emasculated version, a version so timid that I am rather ashamed of it myself because it does not express my full feelings in anyway at all. On the last occasion the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, was unfortunately absent, although he sent a message of support. It may be that if he had been present, we would have prevailed. It may be that, after today and after I have consulted with him, I may feel it better to return to the earlier amendment at the next stage, because there are certain unsatisfactory technical features—difficulties of drafting—involved in the present amendment. However, we shall see how we get on.
My present amendment, of course, does not go anything like as far as the last one. It simply says, in effect, that life prisoners, after not more than 10 years, would be allowed a personal interview with the committee that plays a crucial part in deciding their fate. Strictly speaking, this committee—three members of the Parole Board and two members of the Home Office—would make a recommendation to the Home Secretary, but we can take it that nearly always this recommendation would be decisive. All that I am asking is that a prisoner, after he has been in prison for more than 10 years, should be allowed to meet these people face to face.
Your Lordships may ask whether this does not happen at present. There was little argument last time as to whether members of the Parole Board met prisoners and whether they descend on prisons. I do not think that anyone doubts that they descend on prisons. But if your Lordships ask whether they have personal discussions, one to one discussions with prisoners, then my experience is that they do not do so. I cannot say that they never do, but my experience is that they do not, and I have met many life prisoners in recent years. For example, one life prisoner who has been in prison for 17 years had a personal interview with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, 15 years ago. But during the last 15 years this particular prisoner has never been conscious of having had a personal interview with any member of the Parole Board or with one of the members of this committee. Of course, one may say that one could have an interview with a member of the Parole Board without knowing who the person was, and that is just possible, but I think that most prisoners are well aware of who the noble Lord, Lord Harris, was. Whether they would know who the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod, was, I do not know—perhaps she took them unawares.
However, speaking broadly, I am simply saying that life prisoners do not see the people who decide their fate. They can be there for years and years and as far as they are concerned, their fate is decided by someone with whom they have never had a conversation. So I am making a very small request that that should now be available to them.
I must not take up too much time today, although this happens to be a subject on which I feel all too strongly. But there was one major objection raised by the noble Lord the Minister last time. The noble Lord, Lord Elton, in effect said that a proposal such as the one I brought forward in Committee was not kind to prisoners, that it was not in their true interests. To me that argument is utterly bogus; it is really rather disingenuous. I am afraid that I must view this a little through the eyes of prisoners and their families, and their legal representatives, who, one may say, would be slightly dispassionate. I cannot imagine that, if one took that group, or any section of it—the families, the prisoners or the representatives—they could be persuaded to agree that the Home Office plan of not letting them see these mysterious individuals who would decide their fate was in their true interests. Therefore, to repeat myself, I regard that as a bogus argument which I hope we shall not have trotted out again today.
There was one rather sinister implication in the remarks made by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, last week. I suppose that I cannot ask him to repudiate it because remarks are not usually repudiated by Ministers between the Commitee and Report stages. However, perhaps I may refer him to something he said on 1st July at column 356 of Hansard. He said many things, but he said this:
"If this amendment went through …"—
and that was the amendment which I was proposing—
"what would happen would be that a judge would sentence a notorious and dreadful villain"—
that is quite emotive language for a Minister and I do not like a Minister using that particular language, but those are the words—
"to a life sentence which society would expect to be served."
Are we taking a new attitude to long-term prisoners? We know that the average sentence served by a life prisoner is perhaps fewer than 10 years, but are we beginning to accept that in future quite a few life prisoners will serve the whole of their lives and die in prison? To the best of my belief that approach has never been adopted up till now. We had capital punishment and we got rid of that—it is one of the few real advances that has been made in penal reform in my lifetime. But are we to substitute this—an almost equally barbarous idea? The noble Lord may have used that expression without very much reflection, but if that is to be the objection to my amendment—that people of this kind must expect to spend their whole lives in prison—it would mean putting back the clock 100 years.
Therefore, I shall give way to other speakers. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, said that my last proposal was moderate, and this can only he described as timid. But heaven forbid that any Government in this country—which I would still call Christian, and I know that the noble Lord's Christianity is as strong as mine—should reject a timid little amendment of this kind because we want to keep some of these people in prison all their lives. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very glad that the noble Earl, Lord Longford, has returned to this subject again because I think that your Lordships need to consider the situation that has arisen in the last decade when the life sentence population of our prisons has, in fact, increased enormously. I refer to the excellent Home Office Research Study No. 51, Life Sentence Prisoners, which was published in 1979, where it was shown that the life-sentence population of the prisons in England and Wales was only 133 prisoners at the beginning of 1957 and that by the end of 1977 that had increased to 1,353—more than a ten-fold interest in 21 years. As the noble Earl, Lord Longford, said in his remarks, that has now gone up again to over 1,500. So this is a serious and growing problem of the number of long-term prisoners in England and Wales, and the question is whether or not any additional consideration should be given to feeding those cases into the parole system.
Just by way of preliminary, may I say that the increase to which I have referred does not have anything to do with the abolition of capital punishment, as has been suggested in some quarters. If one looks at the figures, between 1956 and 1964—the date of abolition—the number of executions did not exceed five in any one of those years, and in the last three years it did not exceed two. So we must look to other causes for the major increase in the number of long-term life-sentence prisoners, and that may be something which we should debate on another occasion. Here, as the noble Earl has said, we are considering an extremely modest proposal for having an additional review of long-term life-sentence prisoners at the end of the first 10 years of their sentence. When the noble Lord, Lord Elton, replied to the debate on the previous occasion, he said that the system already provided a much more civilised alternative than was proposed by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, because the first review of the life-sentence prisoner was carried out by a joint committee of the Parole Board and the Home Office within three or four years of a man being sent to prison. He said that if the joint committee does not consider that it is yet time for a date to be fixed at which the case may be referred to the LRC, then it asks for the case to be put before it main at some future date, and, as I understand it, that process continues more or less ad infinitum until the committee finally considers that the case ought to appear before the LRC or the man dies, whichever is the sooner. I must emphasise that what the noble Earl, Lord Longford, proposes is in addition to these reviews: it is not in substitution for them. He is not suggesting—and he did not suggest on the previous occasion—that the three- to four-year process outlined by the Minister should be cancelled in favour of the 10-year process that he was suggesting, but that this is an additional consideration that would be given to the cases of the long-term prisoners at the end of 10 years. So the noble Lord, Lord Elton, was quite wrong when he assumed that the noble Earl, Lord Longford, was trying to cancel the existing three- to four-year reviews for the sake of his argument, as he did on 1st July. In a particular case, about which the noble Lord, Lord Elton, knows, it was emphasised that fresh minds ought to be brought to bear on the consideration of parole for a particular individual. I think it reasonable and sensible that another opinion should be sought. If a man is seen by a different governor, a different wing officer, chaplain or welfare officer if may help to secure better consideration of his case. So why does not the same principle apply to the next stage of the process where the reports of those officals are considered? A 10-year period is a very substantial chunk out of any man's life, and it is proper that after being in prison for that length of time he should have his case examined by a new agency other than the special joint committee of the Parole Board of the Home Office which, as we have heard, has already been looking at his case for the last six or seven years. The other important feature of the noble Earl's amendment, and I am glad he emphasised this, was that the prisoner would have a chance of appearing personally before the persons nominated by the Secretary of State to consider these cases. It is well known that many prisoners are not good at expressing themselves in writing and are therefore unable to take advantage of the right they are supposed to have to make representations either to the local review committee or indeed to the special joint committee which the noble Lord mentioned on a previous occasion. However, they might well be able to advance considerations of material importance to their case if they were able to appear before such a body in person, as this amendment suggests. As the noble Lord, Lord Elton, knows, I am particularly worried about the position of non-English speakers in our prisons. We came across a case the other day where the noble Lord was good enough to tell me that there was no Spanish welfare officer in the Isle of Wight and therefore the Minister was prepared, in the circumstances of the case, to agree that a Spanish-speaking prisoner in, I think, Parkhurst, should be transferred to Maidstone where he might have better facilities for communicating with other prisoners and staff. We have had Arabic-speaking prisoners, again on the Isle of Wight, who were totally incapable of communicating with the rest of the inmates and the staff. It seems likely to me that among the 3,500-odd foreign nationals in the prisons of England and Wales there will be many lifers who would need a great deal of help if they were to present any sort of a case in writing to the special committee. But if they could appear before this prelimiary review committee, as the noble Earl suggests then obviously they would have a right to interpretation, as they are supposed to have in disciplinary proceedings before the governor and the board of visitors. This is a modest proposal but one that would give some hope to lifers of an additional stage in the consideration of their parole, and therefore it would hold out some hope to them of a fairness in the system which they do not see at present.5.33 p.m.
My Lords, my reason for rising in this discussion is mainly because I was so extensively quoted by the noble Earl, Lord Longford, during the Committee stage when he presented a different shaped amendment, that I thought I could not with honour sit here, having been a kind of disembodied voice on the previous occasion, and disclaim what was said on my behalf. I can, and gladly do, confirm that what the noble Earl said that I felt about his amendment is in principle correct. But I am not entirely happy—and I have told the noble Earl this—about the method that he is proposing. He has acknowledged that the method may have to be thought about again. The point here is that the preliminary review committee to which the amendment refers, as the noble Lord, Lord Elton, knows very well, is an informal and unofficial body which is in the business, and has been since 1973, of looking at all cases of lifers to see whether and if so at what appropriate point of time, their cases should be put into the formal review process. I question whether in a statute it would be proper to make reference to an informal and unofficial body of that kind, and whether the Home Secretary could be required to give instructions to such an informal and unofficial body.
That is really by the way, because I strongly believe in the principle behind this amendment. It is right that the formal process of reviewing life prisoners should begin at about the 10-year mark, if it has not begun, at the instance of that informal and unofficial body, earlier. I believe that is absolutely right—of course, without prejudice to the views in the formal process of the local review committees and of the Parole Board, to say nothing of the views of the trial judge and of the Lord Chief Justice. It is a long-drawn-out and lengthy process, and it is right that it should be a long-drawn-out process. I also believe that, as happens in parole for determinate prisoners, the life prisoner, when his review takes place, as I think it should at, if not before, the 10-year mark has been past, should have the right to refuse to have his case considered. He should have the right to opt out. This is a proper safeguard which places the onus on the prisoner to risk disappointment if, as is almost certain to be so in a few cases of particularly heinous crimes, no recommendation for release is going to be made following that 10-year review. It may well be that the view of the Parole Board, the recommendation to the Home Secretary of the Parole Board, is that the case should not be reviewed again for perhaps three or as much as five years. At least that will have been the risk taken by the prisoner in allowing his review to go forward and not refusing to have it looked at. That is better than oblivion. I believe strongly in the principle of the amendment, which is to ensure that a life prisoner has a milestone ahead to look forward to. Having read Hansard, I am well aware that the views of my noble friend Lord Harris in this matter, and from a similar experience, are quite different from mine. I have visited life prisoners. I could list to your Lordships the eight or nine prisons I have visited, where I have spoken to life prisoners. In all cases I can say that they live on hope. Whatever one may feel about the heinousness of the crimes they committed—and they are not all criminals, in the sense that they did something once that was dreadful and maybe they would not think of doing such a thing again—the one thing they have a right to expect is to have some hope rather than to deteriorate (which, if they have not got hope, there is a grave danger of their doing)—into vegetables. There are perhaps some of your Lordships who will say that that is no less than they deserve. I can only say that I profoundly differ with such a view. Only yesterday I spent a considerable time, the whole afternoon, with a probation officer who until recently had served four years in the lifers' wing at Maidstone Prison, her responsibility being to do social work among those prisoners. She confirmed absolutely the views which I am now expressing from an inside view, from a human contact view with human beings. I can only say that that strengthened my belief that the principle of this amendment is right, and I support it.My Lords, I should like to support the amendment moved by my noble friend and to which I have my name. Most of the arguments in favour of the amendment have already been used and explained. The main resistance to the amendment moved by my noble friend at Committee stage—and he referred to it—was that it was cruel to give hope when that hope would not be realised. But, together with other noble Lords who have spoken in favour of the amendment, I believe that it is far more cruel to feel ignored, isolated, and forgotten.
Whether the vehicle that my noble friend has chosen is quite right or not—and I listened with great attention to what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said, and it is right that in a statute a statutory body should be written into it—what attracts me about this particular amendment, although it is rather more mild or, as my noble friend said, more timid than his previous amendment, is the opportunity, if the prisoner is willing, that he should be interviewed by a member of whatever committee it is, a local review committee or another sort of committee which could be incorporated in the statute. This point of the opportunity for contact with another human being is absolutely essential. If the answer is to be, "What is the point of that if the prisoner will be told that it is useless our talking about him getting parole for the next unimaginable number of years?" The fact that it is spoken about and that the person is able to hear it from another human being is very important. He knows in his own mind often the hopelessness of his case, certainly in the short and medium term. Nevertheless, the fact that there is contact—personal contact, not something just considered by a committee removed from him—makes all the difference. Having many years ago worked as a prison visitor at Holloway and having there dealt with some very long-term prisoners, I am convinced that this human contact on a one-to-one basis is of the greatest importance, and therefore I support the amendment.5.41 p.m.
My Lords, I too support the amendment from the point of view of maintaining hope and allowing personal contact with a member who will make the recommendation.
My Lords, I supported this amendment in its stronger form and I support it in its lesser form.
My Lords, let us start by looking at what now happens—and with two eminent ex-chairmen of the Parole Board and one probably silent chairman present, I shall be corrected if I am wrong. As I explained at an earlier stage, when a life sentence prisoner has been detained for three to four years—and in some cases it may be earlier—the joint committee meets to consider the facts of the case and all the reports that have been made on the prisoner during his detention so far. It then either recommends a date when the case should be referred to the local review committee or, if it is clear that he could not be released for several years, or not immediately clear how soon he might be released, asks to see the case again after a specified interval.
Although the joint committee may not immediately recommend a date for the review and ask to see it again, the great majority of cases are referred to the local review committee well before the prisoner has been detained for 10 years. Even where it is apparent that the prisoner will not be released for many years, the joint committee follows a working rule that it will always look at his case again after he has been detained for 10 years. So it is not a question, as the noble Earl, Lord Longford, claimed, in Committee, of the file being brought out and some officials sitting round and deciding not to look at that particular file again for some time.The Minister seems to be saying that I got something wrong, my Lords. May I ask him to say what I got wrong? So far as I am concerned, the procedure he has described is the one. I have been denouncing.
My Lords, I am trying to establish whether what the noble Earl is denouncing is what I am describing, and he has now confirmed that it is. As was made clear more than once in the debate, officials are in a minority on the joint committee. Senior members of the Parole Board, including the board's chairman and vice-chairman, form the majority, and it is right that that should be so because the committee is, in effect, winnowing the cases to be presented to the local review committee and the full board so as to present to them only those cases with at least some prospect of success.
The review process is elaborate and thorough and it would be wrong for the whole of it to be put into action in every case and at short intervals where there is no prospect of doing anything but consuming the time of free men and dashing the hopes of the prisoners; and the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, referred to the importance of not dashing the hopes of the prisoner and giving him the opportunity of opting out of the stress of that process if he feels that suits him. In the relatively small number of cases where a prisoner has been detained for 10 years and no date has yet been set for his case to be referred to the local review committee, the case will have been seen by the joint committee at least twice. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, regards that as a milestone, but it is not 10 years languishing with one's case unconsidered; nor, as the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, suggested, is the prisoner ignored, isolated and forgotten.My Lords, perhaps I may make it clear that the fact that the case has been looked at twice up to the 10-year mark by an unofficial and informal body gives no knowledge to the prisoner concerned as to the outcome of those two reviews. Therefore, he or she will not know what the outcome is going to be, or will have been, until the formal review process has been gone through.
My Lords, I am obliged for that comment because I am anxious to learn. What the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is saying is wanted is an indication to the prisoner of the progress of what I might call his case, and that did not seem to me to be the principal object of the amendment. I am informed that the prisoner knows at every stage of the review—and I see the noble Lord, Lord Harris, a more recent occupant of the hot seat, nodding his head. That being so, I think what Lord Hunt has advanced is somewhat weakened.
I was referring to what the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, referred to as the prisoner being ignored, isolated and forgotten. He is in fact interviewed very frequently indeed by people skilled in doing that—governors, probation officers, chaplains and so on—and their considered reports are before the joint committee for their consideration. Apart from the Parole Board's psychiatrists, who may interview a prisoner on behalf of the board—but that is rarely done—it is true that the present members of the joint committee are not necessarily skilled in interviewing. We must accept that in prison we have not only people who, some of us feel, perhaps are there only by mischance and who are straightforward and honest people in other respects, but also people who are consummately skilled in misleading those to whom they talk. The judge of course has skills, and the chairman of the board may very well have those skills too, but it is not the training of other people, and interviews on behalf of the local review committee about the prisoner's representations are, I think, the appropriate point at which the prisoner has contact with this procedure.My Lords, the point I make about representations is that many prisoners are not able to communicate in writing and that foreigners would not be capable even of communicating in the English language, whereas if they could appear in person before the special committee—which the noble Earl, Lord Longford, advocates—they would make verbal representations with an interpreter present.
My Lords, it is difficult to deal with such views put in one after the other. Noble Lords are saying that there should be personal contact, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is saying that where the person is a foreigner, it is better that the translation should be done verbally than on paper, so the point he makes is the same as the point other noble Lords are making. I have to be advised in these things, and when I look at the annual report of the board for 1977 I see that personal hearings, while they might work to the advantage of the sophisticated criminal, could "disadvantage the unsure and the inarticulate". I am quoting the Parole Board, in its report—and I should have thought that the members of the board are the people with the most direct experience. Then:
It is a difficult case. In the light of the weight of the advice that I have quoted—the views of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, support what I have said—it appears that your Lordships are asking for something which appears so simple, but which I do not feel will in fact amount to what you would expect of it. I hope that before he comes to a final decision, the noble Earl will consider very carefully his amendment, which he has himself said he finds not altogether satisfactory."There is much to be said for the view that the good documentation by the people with knowledge of the prisoner over the years is the best method of guiding those who have to decide whether parole should be granted".
My Lords, to put the noble Lord out of any anxiety, I say at once that I shall not today be dividing the House on this question. This is mainly for the reason mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, which has already occurred to me—that it is not a very satisfactory amendment. However, it is a straight issue of principle affecting a number of human beings. Last night we rightly discussed a question of principle affecting one woman and one child. It was rightly considered that that raised a great question of principle.
Life prisoners might in the past have deserved badly of society, but they are now among the most agonised and vulnerable people. Our whole approach to them raises a question of principle, which should be very carefully considered. I shall discuss the matter with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, the noble Baroness, Lady Birk, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, who, over such a long time, has taken such enormous interest in prisoners. I shall discuss with them all the question of what is the most suitable amendment to put down, but I shall certainly put down something—My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down—
I am not sitting down quite yet.
My Lords, I am an optimist. I wonder whether the noble Earl will be kind enough to give some indication whether it is the frequency or the formality of the review with which he is principally concerned; or is it the immediacy aspect?—that is the personal interview, which the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has rather emphasised might be the main concern. If the noble Earl would give such an indication, I would be clearer about the focus of his intentions.
The noble Lord will be clearer about my intentions before the next stage, my Lords, since I gather that the Government are allowing several months for all of us to think over these matters; I do not suppose that we shall again be going into the question yet awhile. But I should like to try to answer the noble Lord's point. Certainly I consider that it is monstrous that the prisoner should not be seen by a member of the committee. That principle is accepted in the case of the local review committees. It is argued that a member of the local review committee—a local bank manager, for example, as it may well be—is not capable of interviewing a prisoner. To be told that the noble Lord, Lord Harris, with all his immense abilities, is incapable of interviewing a prisoner, is not acceptable. The same would apply in relation to the noble Baroness, Lady Macleod of Borve, or the noble Lord, Lord Windlesham. Such eminent people command the attention of your Lordships whenever they speak; yet we are told that they cannot interview a humble prisoner, that it must be left to someone more skilled. That is what we were told just now—
My Lords, as it happened, I specifically exempted the chairman of the board. It is a small point.
I see, my Lords. Well, it is a funny sort of board, with about 50 members, if only the chairman is capable of interviewing. That argument is quite absurd; I can say that without giving offence. It is asked, who can interview the prisoners? The noble Lord says that they can be interviewed by governors and other people on the spot who know them well. Well, let us accept that arbitrament. I must not go into detailed cases, but I know of more than one case where the prisons collectively are entirely on the side of the prisoner being sent forward for parole. We know who has been standing in the way of that. If it were said, hand over the matter to the prison, there would be many prisoners known to me who tomorrow—I would not say that they would be out—would pass to the review process. The argument there, I am sorry to say, is far removed from reality. However, let us leave it there. To use the noble Lord's expression, I have to be advised; and I hope that he will be advised better next time. If he is not, I feel that it will not be for want of other people, as well as his own official advisers, trying to help him. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
5.55 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 48:
Before Clause 30, insert the following new clause:
( "Supervised release scheme
.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, a person who after the commencement of this Act is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than 3 years shall be released on a supervised release licence when he has served one third of his sentence or one month; whichever is the longer; or such later date as may be necessary to take account of any forfeiture of remission.
(2) Where a court considers that it is necessary for the protection of the public, it may order that an offender who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than three years shall not be released on a supervised release licence under subsection (1) above.
(3) A person subject to a supervised release licence—
(4) For the purpose of this section consecutive and concurrent terms of imprisonment shall be treated as a single term.
(5) A person whose sentence is reduced by the operation of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (reduction of sentence of imprisonment by reference to periods spent in custody on remand) shall for the purposes of this section be treated as if any period taken into account under that section were included in his sentence.
(6) A person shall remain subject to a supervised release licence until he has served two-thirds of his sentence, with the addition of any period for which he may have forfeited remission unless the licence is revoked under subsection (7) below.
(7) A person subject to a supervised release licence who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with a requirement imposed under subsection (3)( b) above shall be guilty of an offence and liable on summary conviction to—
(8) Where a person subject to a supervised release licence commits an offence punishable with imprisonment, a court may order his return to custody for a period not exceeding—
whichever is the longer").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, in rising to move Amendment No. 48, I would remind your Lordships that we had a very good debate on the matter in Committee on the evening of 28th June, when, unfortunately, only very few of your Lordships were present. I withdrew the amendment, saying that I would bring it up again, which is what I am now doing. I am well aware that Ministers' main hope of reducing the grossly-overcrowded prison population rests on Clause 28, and on what I call the crisis measure embodied in Clause 29. I realise, too, the inclusion of my amendment in the Bill would possibly add to the difficulties of the courts. The Government have stated firmly that they have already made their choice in the two clauses.
We—and in saying "we" I am talking about that much referred to body, of which I shall give only the initial letters, so as not to spell it out again: APPAG—feel that the issue is much too crucial for such finality of judgment. We have no confidence in the measures
embodied in the other two clauses. That is why I am now persisting in the proposals which I shall briefly outline once more to your Lordships, assuming, rightly or wrongly, that you may not have read Hansard of 28th June.
The amendment as it now appears has been slightly modified. Its purposes are two-fold: first to reduce the present prison population to within manageable, safe, and morally acceptable limits; and, secondly, to enable many more prisoners, both within and below the present threshold of the parole scheme, to benefit by support and supervision in the community before the end of their sentences.
Subject to directions by the courts—which are contained in subsection (2) of my amendment, as modified from the previous amendment at the Committee stage—that the full period of the sentence, less, of course, remission, should be served in prison, offenders sentenced to periods ranging from three months to under three years would serve the middle third of their sentences non-custodially, but under a supervised licence. Unlike partly-suspended sentences, the second part is intended, as with parole, to be a positive and rehabilitative period, with advice and support from a probation officer.
The proposal is not new, but it is a new concept of sentencing, possibly with wider implications in the future for all determinate sentences. The idea was put forward by the Home Office itself in its review of parole in England and Wales, published last year. Explaining that proposal in the House of Commons on 23rd July last year, Mr. Patrick Mayhew, the Minister of State said, at col. 694 of the Official Report:
"I … take this opportunity to emphasise that what is envisaged would not be a reduction in sentence lengths as such. Rather it would be a question of restructuring the nature of sentences so that part of the sentence is served in custody and part under supervision in the community".
If I may say so, I think that the Government Minister put it very well.
The proposal received favourable comments from, among others, the Lord Chief Justice himself. However, in later references—this was really unfortunate—it became known as automatic parole, regardless of the discretion given for the courts not to apply the non-custodial part of the sentence. In my submission, that power makes the use of the word "automatic" both misleading and quite inappropriate.
Apart from the primary purpose of making a very significant reduction in the prison population, which is of crucial importance, the proposal has the merit of important savings in the parole assessment procedures in respect of 3,500 prisoners serving sentences of under three years but more than 18 months. That advantage would enable the Parole Board, and, before it, the local review committees, to concentrate on the more difficult cases of those serving longer sentences for more serious offences. In saying that, I am not in any way underrating the seriousness of any offence which commands a lesser sentence.
I would stress again the importance we attach, from parole scheme experience, to contacts with and help from supervising probation officers, even for short periods of down to one month. That, under this proposal, will include, I believe, something in excess of 4,000 prisoners, and it will certainly include many recidivists, who need that kind of help most. Again, under a partly-suspended sentence they would not get it, and that fact accounts in no small measure for many failures to survive in the community without re-offending on release when suspended sentences have been imposed in the past.
As regards the potential saving of the number of people in prison at any one time, the Home Office gave an optimum figure of 7,000 to the scheme they adumbrated in their review of parole, but on the basis of a threshold of six months. My amendment proposes a lower threshold of th ee months, and that should add up to another 1,000 prisoners. Of course, this potential (if your Lordships have done your mental arithmetic correctly, as I am sure you have) of 8,000 does not take into account the numbers who might be disallowed by the courts under subsection (2).
But bear in mind these facts: first of all, that these prisoners serve shorter sentences for the less serious range of offences; secondly, that prolonging imprisonment certainly does not deter most offenders, and certainly does not enable recidivists to survive and go straight; thirdly, that the rate of re-offending while on parole has been consistently within 5 per cent.; and, finally, that all within my bracket will, within a matter of months, return to the community, if the middle third of their sentences is disallowed by the courts, with no support and no strings attached. Bearing all these facts in mind, I would not expect more than a quarter, 25 per cent., to be so disallowed by the courts. I am therefore confident of a reduction in the prison population of some 6,000 places.
This amendment is bound to be called a radical step, but so was parole when it was being considered in your Lordships' House and in the other place in 1967, when the Criminal Justice Act of that year was passed. There were serious reservations about it, including (and I am glad to mention them) the National Association of Probation Officers, who, incidentally, are expressing misgivings about this amendment now. But, as we all know, parole soon came to be looked upon as a great leap forward in penal reform. It is now an established feature in our criminal justice system, and there is clear evidence that parole supervision has reduced the rate of offending. I can see no reason why this proposal should not come to be accepted by everyone as another important advance in enlightened penology.
I do not believe for a moment that the judges would increase the length of sentences if this proposal found its place in the statute book. Nor do I doubt that probation officers, if it becomes law, would make a success of it, as they have of parole. If further resources are needed for the probation service—and they may well be—I say with emphasis that this, too, is a positive and desirable step. It would be offset, and more than offset, by savings in the prison establishments and savings in the enormous cost of keeping so many individual prisoners inside. In moving this amendment, which I now do, I repeat what I said in Committee. The nettle of prison overcrowding must be grasped. It was the Home Office itself which initially gave the lead, but they retreated from it. Now, I submit, is the time to advance again. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to support this amendment so admirably moved, if I may say so, by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. This Bill has been much criticised for its major deficiency in failing to contain a provision which would be sure of substantially reducing the prison population. We have many times canvassed and described the intolerable conditions in our prisons, and I think that about that there is substantial agreement on all sides of the House. But the problem that we have endeavoured to grapple with is by what means we can, for instance, get somewhere near the report of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons, proposing the progressive reduction of the present prison population from 44,000 to 37,000. We have the further recommendation of the Prison and Borstal Governors' Branch of the Society of Civil and Public Servants, calling for a reduction to 32,000. Our fear is that what the Government have proposed in their proposals will come nowhere near achieving that result, and the horrid conditions of prisons, especially local prisons, will continue in spite of all our endeavours.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has explained, the new clause provides for the introduction of an automatic, supervised release scheme for prisoners serving sentences of less than three years, but with the proviso that a court may exclude an offender from automatic release on supervision where it considers that this is necessary for the protection of the public. That proviso meets the objection which the judges, and in particular the Lord Chief Justice, had previously in respect of automatic supervised release. Your Lordships will recollect the speech of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chief Justice in this House in April of this year, when, referring to this proposal, he said:So one has there a backing for the scheme from perhaps the most responsible judicial source, and certainly the most authoritative. My Lords, whether or not the Minister agrees with the precise estimate of the figures given by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt—that is, whether or not he agrees that the proposal for this concept of a new kind of sentence (which has been termed a custody plus supervision sentence) will produce the precise reduction the noble Lord has indicated—we feel it will indeed be a very considerable reduction. What I think is significant is that there is now clear evidence from Home Office research that release on parole licence, which combines supervision by a probation officer with the deterrent effect of recall to prison for misbehaviour while on licence, for which the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, provides, does reduce the offender's likelihood of re-conviction. So we believe that there are powerful arguments in favour of this scheme, combining the impact of a short period in custody with controls over an offender's future behaviour of the kind contained in a parole licence. It is a new initiative; we believe it is a responsible one, and I hope that at this stage the Government will accept it."The judges suggested that there should be power to non-apply that rule in specific cases particularly where the public require protection. That suggestion was turned down flat. But if that suggestion were adopted I would respectfully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that there is no possible objection to the scheme."
My Lords, I merely want to add to the very thorough exposition so far that the only reason of a substantial kind that we have ever been given for not adopting this system is that the courts would not accept it. We now have the word of the Lord Chief Justice that he, at least, would accept it with the proviso in subsection (2), so I think the case against it is really totally demolished. We have spent I do not know how many days on this Bill, but I believe that this is very much the most important thing in it that we have discussed. I hope that we shall get some change which will save the inevitable disaster which is facing us in the prisons if we do not.
My Lords, I should like to support this amendment. We have a prison in Lincoln which I visit from time to time, so I am well aware of what has been described as the conditions of overcrowding in our prisons, and of the extreme seriousness of that. For that reason alone I should want to support this amendment. I had prepared a few words, but the points that I had in them have already been made very clearly and cogently by Lord Hunt and Lord Elwyn-Jones, and there is no point in going over things which have been well put already. I should have thought that this new venture would also provide the sort of space in which those likely to be responsive to rehabilitation may find some sort of encouragement, and again that is something to be in favour of. For those reasons, I support the amendment.
My Lords, a person sentenced to three years may be released after one year if he qualifies for parole and receives the full one-third remission of his sentence, so that he is released after 12 months. But a person who is sentenced to 18 months in prison may still be released after one year because he does not qualify for parole. It is absurd that a person serves the same actual length of sentence when the courts have thought fit to impose a difference of two to one in terms of the length of sentence given. They finish up by serving the same length of time as a result of the inoperation of the parole system on short sentences.
My Lords, I should like to speak against the amendment. I know that the Magistrates' Association is against the proposal for several reasons. First, it would drastically reduce the sentencing power of magistrates' courts to, I should like to say, a ridiculously low level. The maximum sentence of imprisonment available to a magistrates' court at the moment is six months. If you deduct one-third of that for the automatic one-third remission and then this proposal would knock off another two months, the maximum term of custody that a magistrates' court would be able to impose would be a net two months.
The second reason is that it must put a considerable extra burden on the probation service. I am rather doubtful whether they are ready at the moment for that additional burden. Having said all that, one would not object to such a proposal if this early release under supervision had to be earned. I understand that parole has to be earned. If the threshold of parole could be lowered to sentences of six months, then I think this release under supervision would be acceptable. Being automatic, it is not acceptable. If magistrates' courts are going to have the power to imprison at all, a net of two months is totally inadequate.My Lords, I did not intend to speak because everything seems to have been said. But I felt that I must do so in view of the contribution from the noble Earl, Lord Fortescue. I am also a member of the Magistrates' Association, but disagree with them. I was not aware that they came out officially against this. I am not sure they have. It may be just a view expressed by a number of the members of Magistrate's Association.
My Lords, they have come out officially against it.
My Lords, on the other hand, the Justices' Clerks' Society is for it. One of the points that the noble Earl, Lord Fortescue, made, was the unwillingness of the probation officers. The Conference of Chief Probation Officers has repeatedly welcomed this proposal. When the noble Lord said that two months was not a deterrent, I would take issue with him. It is generally accepted at the moment that it is the first few weeks or days in prison which act as a deterrent before the person gets used to it and is institutionalised. With great respect, if one has not been in prison—and most of us have not—it is probably impossible to judge the effect of this. I think that two months is a deterrent, but this provision would also be helpful in emptying the prisons.
My Lords, this is a subject about which I know very little. My instinct tells me that there is a great deal of merit in the amendment. I should like to support it. However, with regard to Clause 7, why should a man who fails to comply with the requirements of his licence not be made to go back and serve the rest of his sentence? If he has to serve an additional sentence of only a maximum of 30 days, he may end up with less sentence than the courts gave him in the first place, although having broken the terms of his licence.
My Lords, there is one small thing. Obviously, I support this amendment. I have my name to it. My noble friend Lord Fortescue says that it will put an extra strain on the probation service. Even if there is an extra strain on them, the probation service have said they like the idea. The lack of strain or the release of strain on the prison service will outweigh any extra strain that might be put on the probation service.
My Lords, at the Committee stage the noble Lord brought to the House a proposal for a scheme for supervised release which my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway showed to be mandatory and in which the element of discretion was entirely executive. After much discussion, he prudently took it away and he has now, as he threatened, brought it back. It has undergone a certain amount of surgery in the interval with the result that the court now does have a discretion. In what the noble Lord sees as the normal way of things, an offender would still leave custody, under supervision, after only the first third of his sentence has run but in what are, I suppose, intended to be exceptional cases the court will have the power to disapply that decision and the noble Lord has sought to quantify the number of occasions when that would happen.
So it may be, my Lords, but the discretion is important in more than one respect. The discretionary measure may have mitigated one of the features to which the judiciary have taken exception but at the same time it has opened the arrangement to one of the objections which the noble Lord and his friends, apparently have to the alternative scheme, at present in the Bill, of partly-suspended sentences. We were told, were we not, that the benefits to the prison system of that scheme—our scheme—were uncertain, since no one could tell how the courts would choose to use their power? To the extent that this discretion meets the objection that the courts must be free not to apply supervised release, it becomes open to the objection that the numerical benefit to the prison system is uncertain and potentially small. Now that is not an academic consideration, because the noble Lords opposite—and not only opposite, either—have sent up a very great cry at several critical junctures that what this Bill lacks is any certain impact upon the excessive number of people in prison. If the concession the noble Lord claims to have made is a real one, this measure now joins those others whose effects are uncertain. If it is not, his gesture to the judiciary is a hollow one and will not serve to commend his proposal to them.My Lords, I must intervene on this answer. The argument about the suspended sentence is that the range is from plus-4,000 to minus-4,000, roughly speaking. You have a figure of 6,000 in the figure here, which may be reduced by a percentage. If it were reduced by 100 per cent., you still have nought. There is absolutely no question of its going widely the other way, and the analogy is quite false.
My Lords, I do not know that the analogy is false, but I am merely using the arguments in exactly the same circumstances that the noble Lord has used them himself against my discretionary scheme. I was told that the scheme that we have in the Bill is discretionary and will not therefore certainly reduce the prison population, whereas the scheme produced in the amendment when it came to this House at Committee was automatic and it would not reduce the prison population. That was the principle reason that it was commended to your Lordships. Now your Lordships opposite have introduced the discretionary element and if you had done so in an unfettered way, as it is in our arrangements, then the noble Lord's amendment is open to exactly the same objections as what is in the Bill. If, on the other hand, he had not, then it does not meet the objections of the judiciary which it claims to do.
I noted with interest the arguments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, that release on parole reduced the likelihood that an offender would reoffend and be reconvicted. But that surely is an argument for selectivity in the parole process, and to the extent that this is a mandatory scheme that is lost. So, what he is arguing for is selectivity and not automatic release. What I have said so far merely places the noble Lord's proposal at the same level for consideration as what is already in the Bill. That alone would not be enough to persuade your Lordships to prefer the Government's plan to theirs. But is not, of course, the only consideration, and the Government are acutely conscious of this because the debate which now occupies your Lordship's House is to us a very familiar one. It has already been argued within Government itself when we ourselves faced the choice between a discretionary scheme of partly suspended sentences and a discretionary scheme of supervised early release. What commends our scheme to us, my Lords, is that first that it is ready to hand. The power existed in the Act as we implemented it. Secondly, that it secures, where suitable, an even greater reduction in sentence lengths (to a quarter of the sentence as against one-third); and thirdly, there is the not inconsiderable matter of cost. If, as the noble Lords' opposite hope, their scheme was widely used and rarely disapplied, the actual volume of supervisory work would be very considerable indeed. That would cost money and that is always a consideration for Government. It is a consideration, of course, that must be carefully and even willingly gone into where there are certain or even hopeful benefits perceived. But the regrettable fact is that the benefits of supervision in this case are very much less indeed than certain. The comments that the Government received upon the likely benefits from schemes of compulsory supervision over short periods of unwilling clients make us despondent of any great benefit—particularly so since prominent among those with grave doubts was the probation service itself—and the noble Lords who have advanced the case of supervised release with such conviction this evening had better remember the even greater conviction with which they told me on Monday that it was irresponsible to fly in the advice of exactly that service upon professional matters.My Lords, as the conference of chief probation officers is taking place at this moment I should be interested to know exactly to whom he is attributing these views.
My Lords, I am attributing them to the probation service, who run this. What we are offered—
My Lords, if the noble Lord says the probation service, I am asking him specifically what is the view of the conference of the chief probation officers. The noble Baroness, Lady Birk, said something wholly different on that point, and the noble Lord is appearing to contradict her and then when challenged he is saying that he is not prepared to specify to whom he is referring.
My Lords, I shall burrow into the background of my information and revert to that, as is my habit. What we are offered in place of our scheme—and it is a choice; I really do not think that we can have both in the Bill although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, has not put down an amendment to remove what is now in the Bill, the two would sit very oddly side by side—one that could be made to work only at the expense of an elaborate and costly supervisory effort provided by a probation service that is already exceedingly hard worked, and that appears to be profoundly sceptical of its benefits, and if the scheme really did combine genuine discretion and the prospect of a greater reduction in the prison population, it might be worth preferring it to a partly suspended sentence, despite the disadvantages. But it cannot provide a significant element of discretion without eating equally significantly into the expected benefits to the prison system. What we would have is a scheme not perhaps dramatically worse than what we already have but something, nonetheless, that really is not as good and to be had only by much trouble and great expense. But it would be a deception to think that discretionary supervised release can conjure up a reduction in the prison population which is not available through partly suspended sentences. It is quite simple: the existing sentencing powers give the courts discretion to fix sentences no longer than the seriousness that the case demands. That is what the courts do. The Lord Chief Justice has made that clear to this House himself. The power to suspend all or part of a sentence enables the courts to reduce the amount of the sentence which the offender actually serves. Discretionary supervised release will achieve no more than that—indeed, given that the proportion of the sentence to be served would be fixed at a third of or two thirds, it offers less. There is no reason to suppose that the courts should find it possible to use this early release power more frequently than the power of partial suspension. By definition, a discretionary scheme could not compel the courts nor should it. On any basis, it is they who fix the lengths of sentences.
I had hoped to reply with chapter and verse to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, but I am not sure that I can pursue it through the index. I admire the aspirations of noble Lords opposite. I am not sure that I admire the way in which they deplore that fact that the Government have considered this matter at considerable length and as a result of their reflection have changed their mind as though that is an improper result of reflection. I think that a Government which cannot change their mind is likely to be in very great trouble. Nonetheless, I admire the aspirations of noble Lords opposite. I admire their ideals and their evident philanthropy but the hard fact is that what they have put before your Lordships is less flexible to the courts (because the discretion is all or nothing) and less welcome to the supervisory service (because an unwilling short-term clientele is the least treatable and rewarding to work with and the least likely to benefit). My Lords, I have now been told that the answer to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Harris, is that I was referring to the National Association of Probation Officers.My Lords, I am much obliged to the noble Lord, He will, of course, appreciate what he said: he referred to the probation service, implying a unanimity of view. He has now indicated that it is one part of the probation service that he was referring to. It is a point of substance, as I think he may agree.
My Lords, yes, it is a point of substance; but it is a prestigious body involved in this work. Your Lordships told me to ignore their advice at my peril only two days ago. I quote their advice in support of my case and I do not see why I should be denied that pleasure. I was saying that it would be less welcome to the taxpayer because that same supervisory effort, though of limited and doubtful benefit, will give rise to certain and inescapable costs. I think it will be less welcome to the prisoner, who would stand to serve a slightly larger portion of his sentence. Those various counts all add up to a great many discontented customers. I hope that your Lordships, too, will feel discontented and will follow me to the left below the Bar if the noble Lord presses this to a Division.
My Lords, I do not think it would be right to pretend that this decision was in any way an easy one for the Government to take. I say that at the outset. In the middle of last year I was consulted by Home Office officials, at the request of the Home Secretary, on his own proposals. On that occasion I ventured to give a number of opinions. I was only giving a personal reaction at that time, and the first important point I put forward was that I hoped this was not going to be called "parole", because it was not. It was, in fact, an early release system; there was no qualitative judgment on the individual cases coming before anything approaching an institution like the Parole Board itself. It was in fact an early release scheme and there was a principle of automaticity. There are problems about automaticity and about imposing a form of supervision on people who do not want to be supervised. I accept that at once. Though I do not object to the Government's changing their minds, the warm agreement being expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, on this point disguises the fact that it was his Government who were putting forward the proposal in the first place.
Exactly, my Lords.
My Lords, the noble Lord has just made the point that the Government have changed their mind, and asked: should they be censured for that? No, of course they should not. But I think that a number of us are concerned about the character of the new decision. I do not believe there is any serious comparison at all between the partially-suspended sentence and what is proposed in this amendment.
First, as to the numbers concerned, the claims made by the enthusiasts for the partially-suspended sentence are pretty modest and, as my noble friend Lord Donaldson has pointed out, it is possible that there will be an increase in the size of the prison population rather than a reduction. I do not propose to become involved in that argument all over again, but that is the real situation. On the other hand, my noble friend Lord Hunt has pointed out that, as far as this amendment is concerned, we could be facing an increase in the number of people subject to supervision by the probation service in the community of somewhere in the region of 6,000. If I may say so, that demon- strates the very substantial differences that exist between two schemes. Of course the Government were faced with a very difficult position at the end of last year. We know there was some opposition from some members of the judiciary. I do not want to become involved in the argument as to who were consulted, but it would not be right to suggest that all members of the judiciary were consulted on the matter, because that is not so. The problem undoubtedly was that there was some significant judicial opposition to what was proposed, and there was opposition from the Magistrates' Association and also from the National Association of Probation Officers. I would not dispute that. I believe there was dispute about that, just as there was over the original parole scheme itself, as far as the National Association of Probation Officers was concerned; and I do not think they were too keen on community service either, so far as I can recall. I make this point because it is right to recognise that the Government did face a genuine difficulty. But the problem we face in this matter was not really dealt with at all by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, because, as he well knows, the problem is one of what is to happen in the prisons. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lincoln was discussing conditions in one of the grieviously overcrowded local prisons in this country: Lincoln. When I last went to Lincoln Prison just after the POA dispute, the Governor told me there was a great possibility of breakdown in that prison. What did he mean by that? He meant that the main services and the whole of the sewage system could basically bust up as a result of the sheer pressure of numbers in that institution. That is what we are talking about when we refer to prison over-crowding. It is not simply a question of discomfort—though, heaven knows!, there is plenty of discomfort—but the real problem is one of an imminent breakdown of the service. This has been dealt with by the former first independent Inspector of the Prison Service, the late Mr. Pearce, in his first annual report. Those of us who go to prisons are aware of the great concern of the entire prison service about what is now happening. What is the Government's approach to this? We have Clause 29. I believe that will one day be implemented. I must say to the Minister—and I apologise for coming back to a point which a number of us made on Committee stage—that of all the possibilities the Government have examined, the least attractive option of all is the executive release system which is set out in Clause 29 of the Bill. It is now even worse because of the exceptions which have been made—this is the view of many experienced prison governors—which will cause widespread unrest if it is ever implemented. I repeat that there is a high degree of likelihood that it will have to be implemented because, if it is not, we shall have a total breakdown of the prison system. That is the problem the Government faced, and although I recognise only too well the difficult character of the decision they had to make, I fear they have made the wrong decision. I think the proposal of my noble friend Lord Hunt answers the difficulties and, if I may say so to the noble Earl, Lord Fortescue, when he said that the powers of magistrates would be dangerously reduced, there is in fact a power to dis-apply, so that the magistrates, as the Crown Courts, also, would have to make a judgment in each case as to whether they were going to dis-apply or not. To come back to the point that was made by everybody who has spoken on this debate, there are a series of choices and I think that this is by far the most sensible way of dealing with it. I think there would be a greater degree of public sympathy and support for this approach, certainly as compared with the executive release scheme which, in my view, will cause widespread public anxiety. I will gladly give way to the noble Lord.My Lords, the noble Lord was good enough to give way so that I might intervene. I now have before me the submissions of the National Association of Probation Officers, the Conference of Chief Probation Officers and the Central Council of Probation and Aftercare Committees, all of whom express grave reservations. I think it right to put that on the record. The noble Lord was then addressing himself to the overcrowding, which we are all aware of; but what your Lordships have to accept is that we want a method that will produce certain results, and this method is no more certain than what we propose and it has certain disadvantages.
My Lords, I accept that. When the noble Lord mentions reservations, of course there are reservations among many institutions which have been consulted. The question, however, is whether they opposed the Government's proposal in principle or whether they did not. We all have reservations on virtually every possible scheme we have been considering. There are painful and difficult choices in this matter. I believe the Government have taken the wrong decision and that, if this amendment is not carried and not added to the Bill, we shall be driven into the executive release scheme, which I believe will be a profound error and will cause widespread public anxiety and further trouble in the prisons.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Harris for making an admirable summing-up speech, which saves me from making one myself. I do not think it would be the wish of your Lordships that I should go into the argument again. I valued enormously the contributions made in the debate on my amendment, and I should particularly like to say how much I valued the intervention of the right reverend Prelate. There is only one point which I am in duty bound to clear up. The noble Earl, Lord Swinton, referred to subsection (7) of my amendment, and asked why a person who infringed his licence should not come back and serve the whole balance of the sentence. If he looks at subsection (8), he will see that there are two conditions in which a person could be recalled; one for breach of his licence and the other for committing a further offence. The breach of his licence may be for not keeping appointments with a probation officer on a number of occasions. It is the much lesser offence, although to be deplored, and not the criminal offence, in any sense, that is catered for in subsection (7). Therefore, I hope that the noble Earl will not feel that that is wrongly drafted.
Your Lordships have listened to a very interesting interchange between what I had to say at the beginning and what the noble Lord the Minister said at the end. Late on 28th June, when I made a slightly longer speech, I was not sure whether I would be meeting in the semi-final today the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, or the noble Lord, Lord Elton and which encounter I looked forward to most. I enjoyed enormously what the noble Lord had to say and I hope that he has not taken personally any remarks that I made; for instance, about the Government changing their minds. I change my mind very often, on reflection. All we are asking the Government to do is to have the courage to change their mind again. I should like to mention one point, about which there has been a lot of discussion; that is, the attitude of probation officers. It is perfectly true that the Conference of Chief Probation Officers has expressed reservations about having adequate resources. But subject to that, they have welcomed this and I know that that is the attitude of the Central Council of Probation and After-Care Committees. As regards my friends, the National Association of Probation Officers—and I was their president for something like seven years—I would only say to them that, whereas on many occasions they reflect correctly the attitudes and concerns of the probation officers, they being the professional body and trade union, I believe that they are quite wrong on this occasion, as they were wrong in 1967 in not opposing, but expressing strong doubts about, parole. I do not believe that those strong doubts, which they believe to be in the best interests of probation officers, are shared by many probation officers in post around the country. There is nothing more that I need to say, except that I propose to divide the House, because I believe that this amendment puts down a marker for those of us who will not accept that, with more than 44,000 prisoners in establishments whose certified normal accommodation is 37,000, we can go on as before, with the courts putting away offenders for ineffectually long periods in prison, as opposed to non-custodially out of prison—many of them in the scandalous conditions of local prisons—and notwithstanding the time required, to say nothing of the cost, to build more establishments to contain those prisoners. I put it to your Lordships that we should not rely on the proposition of the partially suspended sentence, or on that sentence alone, with all the reservations and doubts which have been expressed about it and which were aired during the Committee stage of this Bill. Suspended sentences have largely failed, because they have failed to support those on whom they are imposed. Nor do I, with my noble friend Lord Harris and others, believe that we should await a breakdown in the administration of our prison system, and wait for a crisis to arise, before resorting to the early release proposal, which it is suggested the Home Secretary should have as a power of last resort, in a crisis. That is quite the wrong way to approach the prison problem. Something more effective and more continuous in its effects must be introduced into this Bill, and I suggest that this amendment does it. In conclusion, this really is not a measure which is put forward by "wets", unless your Lordships like to consider me in that category, nor by people who have scant regard for law and order. We are moved as much by pragmatism as by considerations of humanity. We are convinced that law and order are better served in this way. So having given an all-party lead to an amendment which I believe can be fitted in, in addition to the partially suspended sentence, although it creates more difficulties, I urge your Lordships—and I wish that I could be heard in the Bars and lounges—to give a non-party lead by coming into the Division Lobby in favour of this amendment.6.46 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 48) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 70; Not-Contents, 89.
DIVISION NO. 2
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Ardwick, L. | Kennet, L. |
| Avebury, L. | Kirkhill, L. |
| Aylestone, L. | Lincoln, Bp. |
| Banks, L. | Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. [Teller.] |
| Barrington, V. | |
| Beaumont of Whitley, L. | Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. |
| Bernstein, L. | Longford, E. |
| Birk, B. | Lovell-Davis, L. |
| Bishopston, L. | Mackie of Benshie, L. |
| Blease, L. | Mayhew, L. |
| Boston of Faversham, L. | Melchett, L. |
| Briginshaw, L. | Mishcon, L. |
| Brockway, L. | Molloy, L. |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Onslow, E. |
| Clifford of Chudleigh, L. | Peart, L. |
| Collison, L. | Pitt of Hampstead, L. |
| David, B. | Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. |
| Davies of Leek, L. | Rochester, L. |
| Denington, B. | Ross of Marnock, L. |
| Diamond, L. | Stedman, B. |
| Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. | Stewart of Alvechurch, B. |
| Elwyn-Jones, L. | Stewart of Fulham, L. |
| Elystan-Morgan, L. | Stone, L. |
| Evans of Claughton, L. | Strauss, L. |
| Foot, L. | Swinfen, L. |
| Gladwyn, L. | Taylor of Gryfe, L. |
| Hall, V. | Underhill, L. |
| Hampton, L. | Vernon, L. |
| Harris of Greenwich, L. | Wallace of Coslany, L. |
| Hughes, L. | Walston, L. |
| Hunt, L. [Teller.] | Wells-Pestell, L. |
| Hutchinson of Lullington, L. | White, B. |
| Ilchester, E. | Wigoder, L. |
| Ingleby, V. | Winstanley, L. |
| Jenkins of Putney, L. | Wynne-Jones, L. |
| Kagan, L. | |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Abercorn, D. | Cockfield, L. |
| Auckland, L. | Coleraine, L. |
| Avon, E. | Colville of Culross, V. |
| Bellwin, L. | Colwyn, L. |
| Beloff, L. | Cork and Orrery, E. |
| Bethell, L. | Craigton, L. |
| Blake, L. | Cranbrook, E. |
| Brougham and Vaux, L. | Crathorne, L. |
| Caithness, E. | Dacre of Glanton, L. |
| Campbell of Alloway, L. | Davidson, V. |
| Cathcart, E. | De La Warr, E. |
| Chelwood, L. | Dilhorne, V. |
| Drumalbyn, L. | Merrivale, L. |
| Duncan-Sandys, L. | Mersey, V. |
| Ellenborough, L. | Monk Bretton, L. |
| Elles, B. | Montgomery of Alamein, V. |
| Elphinstone, L. | Mottistone, L. |
| Elton, L. | Murton of Lindisfarne, L. |
| Fortescue, E. | Northchurch, B. |
| Gainford, L. | Polwarth, L. |
| Gardner of Parkes, B. | Portland, D. |
| Glanusk, L. | Renton, L. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Ridley, V. |
| Glenkinglas, L. | Rochdale, V. |
| Gridley, L. | St. Davids, V. |
| Grimston of Westbury, L. | Sandford, L. |
| Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. | Sandys, L. [Teller.] |
| Sempill, Ly. | |
| Harmar-Nicholls, L. | Sharples, B. |
| Henley, L. | Skelmersdale, L. |
| Hives, L. | Stanley of Alderley, L. |
| Holderness, L. | Stodart of Leaston, L. |
| Hylton-Foster, B. | Strathclyde, L. |
| Killearn, L. | Strathcona and Mount Royal, L. |
| Kimberley, E. | |
| Lane-Fox, B. | Terrington, L. |
| Lauderdale, E. | Teviot, L. |
| Long, V. [Teller.] | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Lucas of Chilworth, L. | Thorneycroft, L. |
| Lyell, L. | Torphichen, L. |
| Mackay of Clashfern, L. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Macleod of Borve, B. | Trenchard, V. |
| Mancroft, L. | Trumpington, B. |
| Mansfield, E. | Vickers, B. |
| Marley, L. | Young, B. |
| Marshall of Leeds, L. |
Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
6.55 p.m.
My Lords, at this stage I think that it would be suitable to discontinue our consideration of the Report stage of the Bill in order to take further business and to return for further consideration on Report at eight o'clock. I beg to move.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Local Government And Planning (Scotland) Bill
Read a third time, with the amendments, and passed, and returned to the Commons.
My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until eight o'clock.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[ The Sitting was suspended from 6.57 until 8 p.m.]
Criminal Justice Bill
Further considered on Report.
moved Amendment No. 49:
Before Clause 30, insert the following new clause:
( "Remission of sentences
.—(1) The Secretary of State may by order made by statutory instrument vary the amount of remission granted under Rule 5 of the Prison Rules 1964 so that it shall not exceed one-half instead of one-third of the periods specified in the Rules, and may exclude from the operation of any such order such classes of prisoner as may be specified by reference either to the nature of the offence committed or to the length of the sentence imposed.
(2) An order shall not be made under this section unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment represents not only a fall-back position, but if one fell back any further one would finish up flat on one's back. It is the barest minimum which I venture to put forward as a proposal to the Government to enable them to take some steps in relieving the vast overcrowding in our prisons, about which so much has been said during the course of both Committee and Report stages.
I do not propose to repeat anything that has been said. The conditions are inhumane for the prisoners and are intolerable for the prison staff. The dangers for the community as a whole of letting those conditions develop are self-evident. There is now little in this Bill—particularly since the previous amendment was defeated—to provide hope of any immediate remedy to this overcrowding situation. There is the executive release proposal, which I believe is recognised on all sides as being undesirable except as an extreme. There is the partly suspended sentence proposal, about which opinions vary as to the likely results. In seeking any other possible remedy, one is forced to look to the question of whether the amount of remission might be increased. All that this amendment provides is that the Secretary of State may by order, and, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament increase the amount of remission from the present one-third to whatever amount seems appropriate, to a maximum of one-half—that being the amount which is available in Northern Ireland.
I would accept at once that there may be grounds for going carefully on this matter. It is obviously necessary that any such proposal should be acceptable to the public. Perhaps one ought to remind your Lordships that the view sometimes expressed that the public would find it totally unacceptable to increase the amount of remission appears to be based on the belief that there is no remission at all at the moment. The public accept a situation in which sentences are passed in court, and yet for all prisoners, whatever their crimes and whatever their records, remission of one-third is in practice available provided that they behave themselves in prison.
Not only must such a proposal be acceptable to the public; I believe it must be acceptable also to the judiciary. I say that, not in order to put the judiciary in a separate category or to give them a power of veto, but simply because there is no purpose in increasing the amount of remission if the judiciary as a result are going to increase the length of sentences. Therefore, any such proposal would have to be made in consultation with the judiciary, in order to discover precisely what was acceptable to them.
I believe it may be that the Secretary of State already has the power to vary the amount of remission. What I do not believe he has the power to do is to add to it the possible exclusions which I have indicated in this amendment. One is that, at his discretion and subject to the approval of Parliament, he might exclude from the operation of any such order certain classes of prisoner; for example, those who have committed serious offences of violence. The other is that the Secretary of State might, at his discretion, exclude certain prisoners by reference to the length of their sentence—imposing neither a minimum nor a maximum—as seems to him to be appropriate. The proposal that if there are to be prisoners excluded from any increase of remission, then it should be done by a reference of that sort rather than allowing it to be subject to the discretion of the judge in the individual case (which was the proposal in the previous amendment) may be rather more acceptable to the judiciary. I doubt that they would want the task of trying to distinguish between one case and another. If they were to have that power, it would give rise to a torrent of appeals by prisoners who were aggrieved because in their individual case an order had been made.
This amendment has, I hope, the virtue of being completely fluid and of allowing the Secretary of State time to consider the present situation and to take such soundings and to have such consultations as he thinks fit; then moving on as quickly as he possibly can in the circumstances to increasing the amount of remission, subject to whatever provisos, again, that he thinks fit and subject to the approval of Parliament, in order that at least some steps can be taken in the near future to decrease the burden of overcrowding in our prisons. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is the last opportunity that the House will have at this stage of the Bill of inserting a provision that will make it certain that machinery has been devised for bringing about a swift reduction in the prison population. I was astounded by the reaction of the noble Lord the Minister in relation to the immediately preceding amendment. May I say, in parenthesis, that I regard it as a pity that one has to discuss these various and alternative proposals individually rather than all together, when one would be able to weigh the merits and demerits against each other and come to some sort of global conclusion at the end.
I was astonished that the noble Lord the Minister was exhibiting such messianic fervour in his condemnation of the proposals in Amendment No. 48. If in fact that scheme is so fallacious, why did the Government consider it for a moment as their main proposal for the reduction of the prison population—as was their policy some nine months ago? What the House is entitled to know is this: when the Government decided upon the partly suspended sentence, did they decide upon it on its own merits, as an institution which would probably find its place in the whole scope of the disposal of criminal cases; or did they decide upon it on the basis that it was, in their view, the most sure way of bringing about a reduction in the prison population? As I understand it, the Government are committed to that end. At the Committee stage of this Bill, the noble Lord the Minister said that he regarded that as being one of the main objectives of this legislation. If it be that they held up the two plans—the partly suspended sentence on the one hand and the one-third plan on the other—to the light of scrutiny, and said, "We come to the conclusion that on the whole the partly suspended sentence will bring about a greater reduction in prison population", I believe every Member of the House could well under stand that approach to the problem. But I doubt whether any Member of the House would say, on the evidence that one could reasonalby come to that conclusion. It is perfectly clear, of course, that in relation to the partly suspended sentence, putting it at its lowest, there must be a real risk that the uncertainty is not as to the numbers brought about by way of reduction but as to whether there would be an increase or a reduction. What I think the Minister must, with great respect, tell the House is whether that was their approach to the very problem itself. If that was their approach, upon what basis did they come to the conclusion that the ends we all seek to attain would be best achieved by the partly suspended sentence? What were the criteria involved? What were the facts upon which they based their judgment? If, on the other hand, they say, "It never was like that at all. We considered Section 47 as being something entirely separate, and came to the conclusion that there was every case on merit for it to be included in the range of criminal disposal "—what it means is this: that even though they say the main objective is a reduction of the prison population the Government have not applied their minds to any single plan. They are unable to say that they have weighed the possibilities of one plan against another at all. If that be the case, then, with the greatest of respect, it would not be proper for them to say that they have made a genuine effort to bring about what they say is the main objective of this piece of legislation. I have no doubt that when the noble Lord the Minister comes to reply he will say that there are really two basic objections to this amendment. One is that the gap between the gross sentence and the net sentence that would in practice be served by the convicted person is too great to maintain credibility between those two, the difference between, let us say, three years sentence and the 12 months actually served. Secondly, they will say that there is the danger that the judges will take that into account and will "up" their sentences, so that it may well he that the actual time served in the end will be longer than under the present system. The first point has already been dealt with by the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder. So far as the second point is concerned, in my submission, there is not the slighest evidence that judges have ever taken remission into account. They certainly did not take parole into account. There is no statistical evidence, as far as I know—and I should certainly welcome rebuttal on this point if that is the case—to show that there was any policy on the part of Her Majesty's judges that reacted to parole in 1967 by upping the level of sentences. This is not an ideal amendment. The Government have left the House in the position that it is now the only possibility that is left if the main objective of this legislation, as described by Her Majesty's Government, is to be achieved.My Lords, it obviously was not the main objective of the Government to reduce the prison population, or we should not have been left at the end of the day with the partly suspended sentence, which by agreement of everybody who has looked at it does not permit one to predict with any degree of certainty whether, or indeed by how much, the prison population is to be reduced. The noble Lord even failed to see, on the previous amendment, the difference between the Government's solution, which may lead to either a plus or a minus in the prison population, and the supervised release system, which, although subject now to the protection of the public qualification, would have led to some reduction; whether it be as large as the figure of 6,000 quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, or some lesser figure is a matter for argument and debate, but undoubtedly there would have been a certain and significant reduction in the prison population. Therefore, I say it is impossible to believe that the Government have set out as having one of their main objectives that the prison population should be reduced.
If that had been the desire, I prefer the scheme proposed by my noble friend, even though it has had to be watered down into a permissive power instead of the substantive one that he suggested putting in at Committee stage. Among other arguments, it is a step towards uniformity throughout the United Kingdom, and I believe that is a substantial plus in its favour. As your Lordships know, there has been one-half remission in Northern Ireland for some time. The system works well there, and the Northern Irish will confirm what the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, has just said; that when the system of half remission was introduced it did not lead to any discernible change in the sentencing practice of the courts. My noble friend has taken account of the objections that were raised during the Committee stage, and has now made the concession that the Secretary of State will only have the power to increase remission by any amount up to one-half, and this would accommodate the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Monson, whom I am very glad to see in his place, who said that while he would accept some cautious advance in the remission up to 40 per cent., he did not think that at this stage it was possible to go as far as 50 per cent. So if we can move in steps towards 50 per cent., not getting there all at one time, while satisfying the public and also the judiciary that no harm has been done by increased remission, but that it does lead to a reduction in the prison population, then I think the conservatives would have every reason to be as happy about the amendment as the liberals. If I may put one final point, it was mentioned on the last amendment that executive release was really a matter of last resort, and I certainly hope that it would be. In the executive release scheme the excluded offences are actually written into the Bill, and there is nothing we can do about it afterwards, in spite of the objections that have been made to that provision. But my noble friend has said that one could have excluded offences as part of his system, but his could be a matter for wide consultation before the Secretary of State decided whether to have excluded offences, and, if so, what they should be. So I am much more inclined to suggest to the Government that this power, which gives them all the flexibility they could possibly want, ought to be the power of last resort rather than executive release, and I very much hope the noble Lord will see it that way and write it into the Bill.My Lords, may I say a word in brief opposition to this amendment. I agree wholly with the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, that it must be acceptable to the public and it must be acceptable to the judiciary. In submission there is no evidence whatever that it is acceptable to the public here as distinct from the public of Northern Ireland. There is no evidence that it is acceptable to the judiciary, and I rather decline to entertain the notion that even if it were not acceptable to the judiciary this would in any way be reflected in sentencing, because I do not think that it would.
So perhaps your Lordships may think that the true emphasis, the real emphasis, is on acceptability to the public. If that is right, the only justification must be to ease the overcrowding situation in the prisons. This, as has already been stated by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, may well involve a weighing of the merits, as he puts it. I agree with that. But surely it will not do to say, "Well, we have a problem of overcrowding" and then to produce an answer which is unacceptable to the public, an answer which indeed, could well affront public opinion, and to entertain, at this stage of your Lordships' deliberations a circuitous consideration of available options. Surely it is too late for that process, and one reverts to the sole question: If this is not acceptable to the public then surely it would be wrong to support the amendment?I should like to make a brief comment on what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, has just said. He has laid great stress on the importance of this amendment, or perhaps any measure designed to reduce the prison population, being acceptable to the public. I really do question that as being a criterion. It may sound an odd thing to say, but if it had been put to the public—however one addresses oneself to the public on complicated matters like this—as to whether there should be remission of a sentence of one-third. I would very much doubt if they would be in favour of it. My own hunch is that the great majority of the great British public have no idea that remission exists. If it had been put to the public that the middle third of the sentence should be subject to parole—release under certain conditions—I am quite certain that in 1967 the public would not have worn it. So I just do not think that it is right to lay quite so much stress on that aspect. The Government of the day have to give a lead to public opinion and prove by experience that these things work before, in some cases, the public come to accept them.
I intervene at this stage because I spoke briefly on this subject in Committee as the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has indicated. I have slightly mixed feelings about this amendment because I fear that there is a tendency among those who might loosely be described as "penal reformers" to become impatient with the attitudes of the general public towards crime and punishment. I think that what we have just heard from the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, illustrates that.
However, in a democracy I contend that the public's voice ought to be heard and I am very glad that the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, acknowledged that. In my view the public would be outraged if those guilty of crimes of violence were eligible for more than one third remission of their sentences. Certainly my qualified support for 40 per cent. remission did not extend to those guilty of crimes of violence. However, I do not believe that the public have any strong feelings one way or the other about crimes not involving either violence or intrusion into their homes. Therefore, I would have been happier if this amendment restricted itself to crimes not involving violence or vandalism. However, on studying the amendment I see that it is so drafted that both Houses of Parliament would have to approve any order made under the new section, and the fact that the Secretary of State would have the power to exclude certain types of offence from the operation of the order are probably safeguards enough. Therefore, on balance, I support the amendment.8.24 p.m.
My Lords, the noble Lord who has just spoken has not read this as carefully as he should have done because subsection (1) says:
That is not the same as Lord Wigoder's original amendment. But this is a permissive amendment; it does not entirely deal with the point which the noble Lord has just made and I hope that he will agree with that. As regards the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, I point out that I was a Minister in Northern Ireland in charge of prisons and penal affairs when our arrangement was made. We were fully aware that we took a risk that the public might object. Noble Lords must realise that the attitude of the public towards crime in Northern Ireland is much more intense than it is of the public towards crime here because there we were talking about terrorists who were killing people. We came to the conclusion that we had the biggest proportion of our population in prison of any country in Europe and that it could not go on like that. It was doing absolutely no good. It was curing nothing and the situation was becoming unmanageable. It was my business to persuade my boss—of whom I was very fond but who took a hell of a lot of persuading—that something had to be done. He is a brave man. He took the risk and it went through. Two things happened. The first, is that the public as a whole ignored it—a few people objected but as a whole they ignored it. Secondly, because we had a Lord Chief Justice no less powerful and no less imaginative than the one we have here, who told his judges—and of course we consulted him—that this was something that he thought could work if they would play ball, they played ball. I am absolutely certain that, if we did something of that kind, the judiciary, with the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary saying to them, "We are doing this as an experiment and we want you to make it work and if it does not work we will remove it", would play ball as they always have done. It would work in exactly the same way as the one third remission has worked, which nobody—either judges or public—has ever noticed. It is a most extraordinary thing. There has never been a comment in the whole of the penal history of the last 30 years on the 30 per cent. remission. Yet, in a way, when one comes to think of it, it is a violation of the court's right to sentence. It is something to which the public might easily object, but it never have done so I believe that it is absolutely wrong to suppose that they would do so. I now come to the real point. We are nearly at the end of this Bill. In many ways it has been a very good Bill, particularly in small matters. We have a lot of small concessions from the Government for which we are very grateful, and I think that the noble Lord on the Front Bench—I was going to say my noble friend—has been flexible on a number of matters and has persuaded his colleagues to meet us. But the truth of the matter is, as my noble friend Lord Harris said earlier, that we are on the verge of a really serious breakdown. Anybody who says anything from inside knowledge about the prisons, says the same thing. It is intolerable in my opinion that we should have a Criminal Justice Bill which makes no effort whatever to deal with that situation. When I say "whatever" that must be qualified in that the partially suspended sentence is a shot in the dark which could do some good, but which could do some harm. I would have preferred the last amendment but we lost that and so we are concerned with this amendment. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, would make a reduction of, I think it is, between 2,000 and 4,000 prisoners if it were adopted. That would make the prison population slightly more manageable in one year and much more manageable in two years. It might save the kind of thing that we think is going to happen. So I beg the noble Lord to take this back as his last chance in this Bill. There is no other chance in this Bill of doing anything which will affect the situation. I beg him at least not just to say, No, but to take it back as the last chance of dealing with an explosion which I prophesy in this House will occur within the next three years."may exclude from the operation of any such order such classes of prisoner as may be specified by reference either to the nature of the offence committed or to the length of the sentence imposed".
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, for returning to the charge and being able to move this amendment himself at the Report stage, on a principle which has already exercised us. I think I have made it clear already that the Government's view is that any proposal to increase remission equally for all prisoners or any class of prisoner from the present one-third of the sentence to one-half is open to fundamental objections, which I have already outlined in previous debates in relation to supervised release. I do not propose to preface my remarks by going over the ground of the comparison between the partly suspended sentence and the scheme of supervised release. After all, we did that on Amendment No. 48 immediately before dinner. We are now on Amendment No. 49; and as to the basis of the comparison which exercises the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, I refer him to the debate on his noble and learned friend's amendment and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, at Committee stage, where I fully described it.
This part passu, if I may so call it, increase of remission would automatically increase the gap between the nominal sentence passed by the court and the effective period served in custody. I stress the word "automatically", because it is that feature of the scheme which goes to the heart of the problem. It is already possible under the parole scheme for a prisoner to be released before he has served half his sentence, but the parole process is founded on the principle of selectivity, and that is why it commands the confidence of both the courts and the public. I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Monson, said. Certainly in a democracy, and I should have thought in any civilised society, the view of the public has to be taken into account. But a universal reduction is something of which every court must always be aware when setting a sentence, and what they will aim at is the proportion of the sentence that they know will be served; and the scale of reduction now proposed is such that it could not be ignored in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, has said that it has been so far.My Lords, the noble Lord has said that the scale of reduction now proposed is anything that the Secretary of State chooses to make it—between one-third and one-half.
My Lords—
My Lords, we are not in Committee. If the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, will be brief, I will give way to him, but after that I must stick to my irons.
My Lords, I will be brief; but to hear the noble Lord, Lord Elton, say that a judge takes into account the amount of remission that is to be awarded is absolutely against all principles of sentencing. No judge in this country ever takes into account the amount of remission. He is trained not to do so. It is nothing to do with him whatever. I really would ask the Minister to think again before he makes an observation of that kind.
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord for that interruption and for his brevity. I observe, of course, that on occasion judges recommend that life sentences should have a minimum period to run and I was under the impression that judges were concerned about the length of time a prisoner remains in prison. But if the noble Lord corrects me, I stand corrected. As I made clear at the Committee stage, we are certainly not opposed in principle to extending the benefits of parole to a wider range of prisoners, provided that the principle of selectivity is not undermined.
I think that I must also repeat that we welcome the movement towards shorter prison sentences, to which the courts, under the guidance of the Lord Chief Justice, are committed. But, again, the essential feature of that strategy is that it is left to the discretion of the courts to determine the shortest sentence that is compatible with the nature and the seriousness of the crime. An increase in remission imposes a blanket reduction in sentence lengths. That would work against the grant of judicial discretion and, therefore, run the risk of jeopardising what we firmly believe to be the best prospect of achieving a sustained reduction in the prison population; namely, the policy of encouraging and reinforcing the movement towards shorter sentences in appropriate cases. The blanket reduction is an approach which we do not think is justifiable in principle or in practice. I do not think that it is counter to the arguments that I have adduced against an increase in remission to suggest that certain categories of prisoners could be excluded. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris, pointed out in the debate in Committee, to have a scheme under which different prisoners, perhaps within the same prison, are subject to different rates of remission is likely to aggravate tensions. But, more crucially, it does not overcome the arguments about the need for any reduction in effective sentence lengths to be on individual and selective bases if the sentencing discretion of the court is not to be affected. The seriousness of an offence is determined primarily by its category. It is by the length of sentence passed by the court; and if remission were increased for certain categories of sentence length the courts might respond by increasing overall sentences within the range affected. But if the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, and others who have spoken in favour of this amendment are not swayed by these considerations—and I do not detect that they are in the mood to be swayed by anything that I say, even if I could say it more cogently and mellifluously than I am now attempting to do—then I must refer them to Section 25 of the Prison Act 1952, because that already enables the Secretary of State to vary the amount of remission to any extent he chooses by amending Prison Rule 5, which is contained in the amendment of the Prison Rules 1964, and to differentiate between the classes of offender according to the length of sentence, but not by the category of offence. What is more, he can do so by the negative resolution procedure, whereas the noble Lord's amendment would require the affirmative procedure. In other words, the change that he proposes would just marginally increase the difficulty of doing what the noble Lord wants done and which can already be done. The opportunity that he seeks to create already exists. If he was looking for an amendment, it would be a question—though I am not sure that it would be advisable—of considering whether the differentiation that already exists might be by category of offence as well as by length of sentence. But what he asks for he already has on the statute book. I know that this is disappointing to your Lordships, because the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, in particular feels that this is a great cornucopia of relief of tension in prisons which can somehow be magically unleashed. But if it is, it is in the statutes already, and if it is not a cornucopia it is not worth pursuing, so I hope that he will not press his amendment.My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, am I right in understanding that as things stand at the moment the Home Secretary could announce that the remission would be increased from one-third to two-thirds or a half? Is that what the noble Lord has said?—because, if so, it is something I did not know, and if it is true it makes a very great difference to this amendment.
My Lords, it is and it does.
My Lords, before the noble Lord is deemed to have sat down, may I say that the noble Lord has said very fairly that the Government wish to see in principle the benefits of parole extended to a wider community. Of course, the noble Lord has said at an earlier stage—as, indeed, has his ministerial colleague in another place—that a review is now taking place with regard to the powers that might be taken under Clause 30 of the Bill.
My Lords, by leave of the House, if the noble Lord would be kind enough to give way, may I point out that this is the Report stage and I do not think that the noble Lord moved this amendment, which does not give him a right of reply, and he appears now to be making a second speech. I am very ready to be corrected if I am wrong, but I think that he is probably out of order. Is that not right?
My Lords, I certainly would not wish to be out of order, and if the Minister does not wish to deal with that particular matter there is no way that I can take it up.
My Lords, it is not a question of my wishing to deal with it or not. Both the noble Lord and I have now used up our ration of speech at the Report stage.
My Lords, I accept that.
My Lords, leaving aside the last altercation, I still find these proceedings faintly baffling. We have just heard the Minister say why the amendment that I have moved is totally undesirable. It is totally undesirable because it might lead to a blanket reduction; it is totally undesirable because the judges might want to compensate for it in the sentences that they pass; and not only is it totally undesirable, but the Secretary of State already has the power. The logic of the Minister's argument is that he should table an amendment himself to repeal that power, because he clearly regards it as so totally unacceptable.
I only want to make one or two comments on the very interesting debate that we have had. First, I deal with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. I entirely accept that any such proposal would have to be acceptable to the public. That is right. At the same time, one must bear in mind that the public have accepted the parole system. They have accepted that in certain cases there can be an increase, in effect, in remission—people can be let out before they have served two-thirds of their sentence. Without wishing to be too dramatic about it, I am not at all sure whether the choice, so far as the public is concerned, is not going to be whether they find an increase in remission acceptable or prison riots acceptable. It may be as stark as that. I therefore venture to think that this is a matter of considerable urgency. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, has misread the amendment. He spoke about its being quite unacceptable that there should be an increase in remission of one-third to one half. That is not proposed. It is one-third to any amount not exceeding one half. It could be 35 per cent. as a start. I find it difficult to think that that, for example, would be unacceptable. The noble Lord spoke about the effect on the judges. I can only echo what the noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, has said; judges are trained not to take account of that, and I think never have. Certainly if there were a modest increase now in the amount of remission I am certain that the judiciary, if their views were taken on this, would say that of course they would find that entirely acceptable and not seek to compensate for it by longer sentences. The noble Lord repeatedly used the words "a blanket reduction in the length of sentence served". But that is what we have: the one-third remission is a blanket reduction. All I am suggesting is perhaps a slightly larger blanket would have a beneficial effect. I accept, as I indicated in the course of my original observations, that the Secretary of State already has a similar power, although not quite as extensive as in this amendment. I wish there was some indication that the Secretary of State had reflected carefully as to whether he might exercise his present powers under the section of the Prison Act to which the noble Lord referred. I think in the circumstances that the proper course here is not to seek to divide at this stage; it is to ask to withdraw the amendment, but in the hope that the noble Lord the Minister of State will reflect upon the position between now and Third Reading and may be able to offer by then some gleam of hope that the Secretary of State has been reminded by this debate of his existing powers and will actively consider engaging in consultations with all parties, including the judiciary, to see to what extent he can implement them in the near future. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
8.43 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 50:
After Clause 31, insert the following new clause:
( "Days of imprisonment
(1) A court which passes a sentence of imprisonment of not more than 12 months for any offence, or fixes a term of imprisonment for failure to pay any sum of money shall express the sentence or term of imprisonment imposed by reference to the number of days for which the offender is committed to custody, and that number shall be specified in the warrant of commitment.
(2) This subsection applies to any enactment or subordinate instrument which as regards any offence makes a person liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding a specified number of months, not being more than a total of 12 months.").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this is a quiet and simple amendment. It is simple in its aims and in its language. I hope it can easily be understood. I should like in that way to contrast it with the Government Amendment No. 52 which comes shortly. This is an amendment that asks for prison sentences of 12 months or less to be expressed in days. Sentences are normally expressed in years or in months and rarely in days, although there is nothing in any Act to prevent sentences being expressed in days, and that I accept.
This means that a sentence of a month or X months is of variable duration according to the time of the year it is passed, since it starts from the month in which it takes effect plus any subsequent months. A defendant sentenced to one month in February would serve 28 days or 29 in leap year, and a defendant sentenced in April, June, September or November would serve 30 days, and any other of the seven months 31 days. Passing shorter sentences of imprisonment in days would have the following advantages. The unfairness which arises through sentences being expressed in months by reason of the variable length of sentence would be removed. Offenders would know more precisely the period for which they were committed to prison.
Sentences expressed in days would be welcomed by the prisons. It would be easier when calculating the proportion of the sentence to be served and suspended for the purposes of a partly suspended sentence under Section 47 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. It would help courts to think in terms of multiples of seven or 10 days rather than months, and this is likely to encourage courts to pass shorter sentences of imprisonment. A sentence of 50 days is just as likely to be as effective as one of two months, or 100 days as one of four months. There would be greater flexibility. The upshot, we hope, would be marginally shorter prison sentences and marginally fewer people in prison. This is a simple amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I find myself in the position of supporting the objectives underlying this amendment, but having to say that we should not legislate to achieve these objectives in the way that the noble Baroness has suggested. Of course, we want to encourage shorter sentences—and I think this is common ground between us—of imprisonment where this is appropriate. But of course we should build on the now widely aknowledged proposition that it is the first days or weeks of a sentence which have the most salutary effect on offenders. And, of course, we should ensure so far as practicable that all offenders are treated equably. This is a point that the noble Baroness made, among other points she raised.
As regards the question of ironing out the vagaries in the calender, we are up against a particular point here. It is of course a fact of life that there are very many circumstances in which the inequalities in the length of our months cause some inequalities in the treatment or entitlements of individual people. But, as demonstrated by this amendment, if one tries to tackle the inequalities caused by calender months an anomaly is immediately created between sentences of up to and including one year and those longer than a year. The inequality of calendar months is not the only factor which may produce unequal terms of imprisonment. Where a prisoner is due for release at the weekend or on a bank holiday, the practice is for him to be discharged on the nearest preceding weekday. That results in prisoners with identical sentences serving different periods. It is therefore impracticable to give absolute equality of treatment. Such inequalities as do arise, however, from unequal calendar months are reduced by the effect of remission. Then, if it is agreed that there are advantages in shorter sentences, it is open to the courts to pass such sentences within the present framework. They can, and do, sentence in days, weeks, months or years as appropriate to the particular case. But to oblige the courts in all cases, where a sentence of 12 months or less is involved, to express the sentence in days seems both an unnecessary interference with their discretion and lacking in principle if the idea is thereby to induce shorter sentences. And there can be no certainty that it would achieve that result. Indeed, on what basis can we assume that a sentence of, say, three months would be rounded down to 90 days? Would not 100 days—a much rounder figure—become the norm, increasing rather than decreasing sentences overall? There would be uncertainties in the administration of sentencing law. The noble Lord, Lord Hutchinson, referred to this. Many inter-dependent parts of sentencing legislation rely on calendar months. Take for example the provisions relating to partly suspended sentences in Section 47 of the Criminal Law Act 1977. They now apply to sentences of not less than six months and not more than two years. If a court was minded to pass a sentence of the minimum term to which partial suspension may apply, but was required to sentence in days, it would need either to compute the exact number of days in the period concerned, which in this example of six months can vary from between 181 and 184 days, or take 180 days and add on four days in all cases in order to ensure that the sentence was valid. This is a mathematically straightforward proposition, but it does appear to be totally contrary to common sense. I can point to other examples when confusion might arise—the limit of six months' imprisonment available to magistrates' courts for a single offence; the minimum term of six months for the application of a suspended sentence supervision order. And there would also be implications for parole eligibility and many aspects of prison life. Those examples demonstrate that we could not adapt a measure along the lines which the amendment suggests in isolation. We should need to carry out a comprehensive review of all provisions relating to sentences. I think I have said enough to indicate the Government's view that, far from being a very straightforward and simple amendment, there are many wide complications which stem from both the vagaries of the calendar and problems of administration, and I hope the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the amendment.My Lords, I intervene with some trepidation, not being a member of the legal profession. I seem to recall that, in Scottish law, 60 or 90 days is often awarded by the sheriff court for an offence like poaching salmon, which is always a far more serious offence in Scotland than in England. In the courts-martial system, 120 or 140 days' detention is awarded and, so far as I am aware—I speak as a complete layman here among some very distinguished lawyers—that does not have a very deleterious effect on the defendant. Having examined the amendment, I hope the Government will look at it again, whatever period of time is imposed—be it in weeks, months or days; there must be certain difficulties with any of them—because days imposed for short sentences would appear to result in a provision of greater clarity.
My Lords, I am grateful for that support from the noble Lord, Lord Auckland. I never heard such a lot of flannel as came from the Minister; just words, words, words. There are such things as calculators nowadays if one wants to work out how many days, weeks or months are involved. I should have thought this was a simple proposition. Of course, I shall not press the amendment, but I must ask the Minister if he will look at the matter again because his answer was totally unsatisfactory and stupid.
My Lords, my honourable and learned friend Mr. Patrick Mayhew, Minister of State, raised two interesting, points on this matter on 25th March in Standing Committee when, at column 803, he put the situation much better than I have:
the idea of expressing days rather than months—"Certainly the Magistrates' Association, which has been in favour of the idea"—
He put the situation very fairly; that to legislate to require this to happen would be unsatisfactory."is aware of our view that sentences expressed in days can provide a finer sentencing tool, and in so far as the approach may lend itself to shorter sentences, there are cases in which that is to be welcomed. But that does not mean that I believe we ought to legislate to require courts to adopt that approach. There are difficulties in such a requirement which oblige me to advise the Committee not to accept the new clause".
My Lords, I shall read again the lengthy first speech of the Minister and decide what to do at the next stage of the Bill, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 34 [ The standard scale of fines for summary offences]:
moved Amendment No. 51:
Page 35, line 33, leave out ("contained in an Act passed after this Act ").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, Clause 34 establishes a standard scale of maximum fines for summary offences and provides that enactments which specify maxima by reference to levels on the scale shall be construed as meaning the scale with the values as shown in the clause or whenever those values are altered by order. The amendment is merely a drafting correction to ensure that this meaning applies to any enactment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 35 [ General increase of maximum fines for summary offences under Acts of Parliament]:
moved Amendment No. 52:
Page 36, line 27, at end insert—
("(3A) An enactment in which section 31(6) and (7) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 (pre-1949 enactments) produced the same fine or maximum fine for different convictions shall he treated for the purposes of this section as if there were omitted from it so much of it as before 29th July 1977 had the effect that a person guilty of an offence under it was liable on summary conviction to a fine or maximum fine less than the highest fine or maximum fine to which he would have been liable if his conviction had satisfied the conditions required for the imposition of the highest fine or maximum fine.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a somewhat technical amendment to ensure that Clause 35, which abolishes enhanced penalties on second or subsequent convictions, will operate correctly on certain enhanced penalty provisions affected by the Criminal Law Act 1977. I could, if necessary, give a fuller explanation of the necessity for the amendment, but perhaps what I have said may suffice. I beg to move.
My Lords, this is the most perfect example of gobbledygook the House has confronted for a very long time. It is worth reading aloud:
and then for some reason which is not absolutely apparent to me, there appears in parenthesis:"An enactment in which section 31(6) and (7) of the Criminal Law Act 1977 "—
Whether that is a state of historical fact or whether it is relevant to some important legal principle is not immediately apparent. It goes on:"(pre-1949 enactments)".
This measure will be applied in magistrates' courts and Crown Courts throughout the country. It does not begin to make sense. May we plead that this should be sent back to the draftsman with our best wishes and prayers that he can produce clarity out of gobbledygook?"produced the same fine or maximum fine for different convictions shall be treated for the purposes of this section as if there were omitted from it so much of it as before 29th July 1977 had the effect that a person guilty of an offence under it was liable on summary conviction to a fine or maximum fine less than the highest fine or maximum tine to which he would have been liable if his conviction had satisfied the conditions required for the imposition of the highest fine or maximum fine".
My Lords, I am sure the draftsman would be the first to acknowledge any help that the noble and learned Lord might have thought fit to offer him on an improvement of this matter, but the problem with which the provision deals is, as I said, rather technical. I think it might be possible to read the amendment in a way which would convey its sense even better than the reading that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, was able to do for us, but I fear that in Hansard it might look the same as his reading, so I will not attempt it.
The problem is that in 1977, the provisions that were introduced to modify existing penalties, without modifying each statutory provision which contained penalties, had to work on a fairly broad brush principle, and in particular it had to operate on provisions in which there was a different fine for the first offence from the fine for the second offence. When one sees how they operate, one sees that in some cases—because of the provisions here referred to, and the part in brackets to which the noble and learned Lord referred is intended simply to state the sidenote for the sections—these sections have the effect that the first offence and the later offence would have the same penalty. If we operated now only on the second part, we should have two levels of penalty for the different offences, according to whether they were the first or second offence, and the policy of the Bill is to get rid of the enhanced penalties for the second offence. That is the rather difficult problem which this provision addresses, and so far I have not seen anyone suggest anything better than this form of words to deal with that problem, but naturally we shall be glad to receive any suggestions for its improvement.My Lords, is my noble and learned friend saying that what he is trying to do is to put right the complications of the Criminal Law Act 1977, which presumably was passed by your Lordships' House when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, was Lord Chancellor, so he is therefore trying to straighten out what went wrong before?
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Schedule 3 [ Maximum fines to be increased by more than the general increase]:
9 p.m.
moved Amendments Nos. 53 and 54:
Page 71, leave out lines 29 to 31.
Page 73, leave out lines 26 and 27.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, with the leave of the House, I should like to deal with these two amendments together. They delete from Schedule 3, which secures special increases in maximum fines, the entries relating to the Cinematograph Act and to Section 106 of the Food and Drug Act 1955. These provisions have now been catered for respectively by the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982 and the Food and Drugs (Amendment) Act 1982, and therefore are no longer necessary. This at least is a fairly simple series of amendments. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 54A:
Page 73, line 34, at end insert—
| ("Housing Act 1957 (c.56) Offence under Section 27(1) (Permitting unfit premises to be used in contravention of a Closing Order). | Section 27(1) | £100 and £20 per day following conviction. | £1,000 and £50 per day following conviction.") |
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving the amendment, I should like briefly to explain its significance. I brought this matter forward earlier at Committee stage. At that time it was slightly different, in that I included a proposal about a continuing penalty which was then not acceptable to the Government. However, I think it very important that I should bring back the matter again. The Government have accepted two amendments which I earlier put forward and which are now included in the Bill between lines 28 and 34, on page 73, relating to the Housing Act. If a person uses premises that are declared unfit for human habitation because a demolition order is placed on them, or because there has been a contravention of an undertaking, the penalty would be £1,000. With regard to the manuscript amendment, in view of the fact that the column headings are not shown, I should like to make clear that the £100 and £20 per day following conviction refer to the existing maximum penalties. If one goes on using a property on which there is a closing order, there is a maximum fine of £100, which is quite different from the other penalties for similar offences, which now go up to a maximum of £1,000. So I should like the inconsistency to be rectified by adding what is proposed in the amendment.
It should also be appreciated that in some areas there is a problem where people secure closing orders on properties simply to have the tenant rehoused by the local authority, which then has an obligation placed on it. Having got rid of the tenant, the owner is then quite free to relet the property with a risk of only £100 fine, which is not a sufficient deterrent.
So I move the amendment on two grounds. One relates to the present gross inconsistency. The other ground is based on my view that it is wrong that people should be rehoused in this way, taking priority over everyone else on a housing list, only for the property to become empty and then re-used in a way that was not intended in the first instance, the closing order having been imposed because the property was unfit for human habitation. I should like to emphasise that the London Boroughs Association and the Association of Metropolitan Authorities are both very anxious to see the penalty brought into line with the other penalties that have already been accepted and are now part of the Bill. My Lords, I beg to move.
My Lords, from these Benches we support the amendment.
My Lords, the problem with regard to amendments of this kind is to know to which other offences one should relate them. However, in the very particular circumstances, and awaiting perhaps a more general review of offences in this area, I would be prepared to accept the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord very much.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Schedule 4 [ Special increases of maximum fines]:
moved Amendment No. 55:
Leave out Schedule 4.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, for the leaving out of a schedule to be described as a drafting amendment is to me at the moment incomprehensible, but I am sure that it is right.
My Lords, I am not sure whether the noble and learned Lord means that the schedule is incomprehensible to him, or the explanation is incomprehensible. At the Committee stage amendments were made in the interests of simplicity to take into Schedule 3 all the special increases in maximum fines specified in Schedule 4, with the result that Schedule 4 became unnecessary. Therefore I think it is reason- able to describe the deletion of Schedule 4 as a consequential drafting amendment.
My Lords, I was not disposed to shed tears about the loss of Schedule 4; indeed I am quite happy to see it go.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 56:
After Clause 38, insert the following new clause:
(" Byelaws relating to the burning of straw or stubble.
. Any byelaws relating to the burning of straw or stubble made by a local authority under section 235 of the Local Government Act 1972 (byelaws for good rule and government and suppression of nuisances) may provide that persons contravening the byelaws shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £500 and, in the case of a continuing offence, a further fine not exceeding £5 for each day during which the offence continues after the conviction thereof; and any such byelaw in force at the coming into force of this section which specifies £200 or any smaller sum as the maximum fine which may be imposed on summary conviction of an offence under any such byelaw shall have effect as if it specified £500 instead (but with no change by virtue of this section in the maximum daily fine, if any, for which it provides).")
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, I think that this amendment will, to your Lordships, have an appearance of similarity. In speaking to the main amendment, Amendment No. 56, I should like to take also Amendments Nos. 57 and 123. These amendments flow from the undertaking given in Committee in response to my noble friend Lord Stanley of Alderley to consider applying the new maximum fine of £500 for offences connected with straw and stubble burning directly to the relevant local authority by-laws, instead of only to the primary legislation by which they are empowered.
As was explained in the Committee, the general approach in this Part of the Bill is to affect maxima in primary legislation, but to leave the penalty provisions in subordinate legislation for revision under these powers when the relevant instruments are re-made by the authority responsible for the subordinate legislation. However, in the light of my noble friend's reasoning that it was particularly important in this instance to preserve consistency in maxima in all by-laws relating to straw and stubble burning, and since the Criminal Law Act 1977 achieved that by applying the then maximum directly to the by-laws, we have agreed to adopt a similar approach. The amendments that I now ask the House to accept, therefore, provide a new clause for this purpose in substitution for Clause 39, and make a consequential repeal in Schedule 15. My Lords, I beg to move.
My Lords, the Question is, Whether Amendment No. 56 be agreed to. As an amendment to this amendment I call Amendment No. 56A, Lord Monson.
My Lords, if it is in order to speak on No. 56 first, before we go on to the amendment to the amendment, I should like to thank my noble and learned friend for tabling this amendment. I am not in order?
No, my Lords. Amendment No. 56A has been called.
moved, as an amendment to the amendment, Amendment No. 56A:
Line 6, leave out ("£500") and insert ("£1,000").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 56A and, with the leave of the House, I shall speak at the same time to Amendment No. 56B, which is consequential. First, I should like to thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate and the Government for the partial concession that they have made; but we do not think it goes far enough. The purpose of these amendments is to raise the maximum permissible fine to £1,000 from the £500 proposed, and I stress that it is a maximum. Of course, the average fine imposed in practice would almost certainly be less.
Some of your Lordships may remember that many of us spoke in favour of broadly similar amendments in Committee, but we did not press them at the time because the Minister promised to give the matter further consideration. Following the Committee stage, the noble Lord, Lord Elton, was kind enough to write to me at considerable length setting out the reasons why, in the Government's view, they did not favour raising the maximum fine to £1,000. Both I and other noble Lords to whom I sent copies of the Minister's letter have studied it with the greatest care, but, with respect, we find it difficult to accept the Government's arguments.
In Committee I gave instances of other offences in the Bill, seemingly of lesser gravity, or at any rate of no greater gravity, where the Government had nevertheless thought it right to fix a maximum fine of £1,000—double that proposed for the straw and stubble burning offences. The first instance I cited concerned selling a car with a defective reflector or reflectors, bearing in mind that both this and irresponsible stubble burning can occasionally cause road traffic accidents. In his reply the noble Lord, Lord Elton, suggested that the latter—that is to say, selling a car with a defective reflector—was a deliberate offence, whereas straw and stubble burning offences were accidental. I am bound to say that I find this rather hard to accept, given that replacement reflectors will almost certainly cost less than one half of 1 per cent. of the value of the second hand car being re-sold. It would hardly be worth a trader's while to omit to replace them deliberately. As for straw burning offences, the effects, of course, may be accidental, but the motive quite often is not. To be blunt, there is money to be made.
Another instance cited where the Government propose in this Bill to raise the maximum fine to £1,000 concerns tree-felling offences under the 1967 Forestry Act, which hardly seemed to me more serious than straw burning offences. However, the Minister replied that the forestry offences
"affect the promotion, establishment and maintenance in Great Britain of adequate reserves of growing trees, with serious long-term economic and environmental consequences for the country as a whole".
I am bound to say that this seems more appropriate to the age of Queen Elizabeth I than Queen Elizabeth II. It may well be that we need more men o'war—indeed, that is what the navy lobby are claiming—but men o'war nowadays tend on the whole to be iron-clad or even aluminium-clad; they are no longer built of
stout English oak. But I do not want to go any further down the path of the 1967 Forestry Act except to point out that there are no laws to ensure the establishment and maintenance of good agricultural land or to preserve it from the depredations of developers.
Lastly, the Minister pointed out that the fine proposed was unusually large for a by-law offence. This is quite true; we should not wish to deny that. But although it is not the case that there has always to be a first time, it is true that there is no reason why there should not be a first time if circumstances demand it. Suchrespected bodies as the National Farmers' Union, the Country Landowners' Association and the Association of County Councils all believe that circumstances now demand it. None of these organisations has any enthusiasm for drastic punishment as such, but they do believe that a £1,000 maximum fine is necessary as a deterrent in view of the profits that can be made by a small minority of rogue farmers in the absence of such a maximum. I beg to move.
My Lords, I seem to have started a little early last time. I should like to thank my noble and learned friend for tabling the first amendment, and I hope he will not think me ungrateful because I am asking for more. I am only following a good Tory principle of trying to do better. I would have preferred that the habitual offender was banned. I was not able to get that so I am supporting the £1,000 maximum fine. I would ask the Government whether it is possible for them to publicise the merit of these straw-burning by-laws to local authorities. There are still local authorities in straw-burning areas in the South and East who have no by-laws. I know it is not the Government's job to tell local authorities what to do but perhaps they could publicise it for it would be very helpful for all in straw-burning areas to have by-laws so that we were all equally treated if we offended against the straw-burning code. I hope that the Government will accept this amendment of £1,000 maximum fine. If they cannot do that, then I ask that they give the House a categorical assurance that by the harvest of 1983 the maximum fine will be raised to £1,000 for contravening the by-laws.
My Lords, I should like to support this amendment. It may seem peculiar that somebody who is probably, without boasting, one of the largest straw burners in East Anglia should support an increase of fine over that which the Government propose; but I think—the National Farmers' Union with whom I frequently disagree, also think—that it is of enormous importance that the public should come to realise that responsible farmers are just as aware, if not more so, of the dangers and damage done by indiscriminate straw burning as is the ordinary urban or rural dweller who is not a farmer. I think it important the farmers should be made to realise their responsibilities with regard to straw burning. These days, it has become an essential part of many farming systems. We cannot ban it altogether. I hope it will never come to that. But in order to prevent a universal ban it is necessary that farmers exercise proper control over their burning.
I do not agree entirely with the noble Lord, Lord Monson, when he talks about the profit which comes from straw-burning. It is a convenience. Farmers do not burn carelessly in order to increase their profits. They do it because they have got to get on with the job. For example they say: "I cannot be there myself. I have to carry on somewhere else with the combine. I will leave it to the boy to do it. We cannot plough round properly because there is not time to get the tractor out". It is the sense of urgency which comes at harvest time which is understandable. Unless it is very clear that this is a serious offence that attitude will continue. The best way of bringing to farmers the seriousness of the offence is by having this very substantial fine. Therefore, I hope that the Government will accede to this amendment and will raise the maximum fine from £500 to £1,000.My Lords, I should like to say that I think the Government have it about right as they have it now. I agree with my noble friend Lord Stanley that local authorities ought to be notified of this so that they can all put themselves in the same position to deal with the rogue in the same way. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Monson, was taking to task for using the word "profit" in connection with straw burning. That is not why any of us do it. I am not as big a straw burner as the noble Lord, Lord Walston, but I am one who, like him, does it with great care—with youngsters, it is true, but well supervised. I hope that the Government will give no undertaking to my noble friend Lord Stanley about what they will do in future. Let him be satisfied with the tact that they have gone a long way to meet his point. It seems that they have it right. Let them leave it at that.
My Lords, I speak on this not only as a countryman but on behalf of my noble and learned friend Lord Elwyn-Jones and my noble friends Lady David and Lady Llewelyn-Davies whose enthusiasm on this matter knows no bounds. The support that was given on a previous occasion was explained by a careful examination of all those substantial arguments in favour of the higher penalty. We remain utterly unrepentant in relation to those matters and utterly unremitting in our attitude.
9.18 p.m.
My Lords, I should like also to support this amendment. I confess to being an unrepentant straw burner and hope to be able to go on doing so. Like my noble friend Lord De La Warr, I cannot burn as much as does the noble Lord. Lord Walston, but I intend to do my best in the forthcoming harvest and consider it important. I am afraid that the conservation lobby, if this thing gets out of hand, will achieve a total ban on straw burning. This is the danger we face. The deterrent has got to be realistic. Had the noble Lord, Lord Monson, put down £2,000, I should have supported it; I think that £1,000 can mean little to a farmer of the standing of Lord Walston.
My Lords, we have to make this a serious offence if we are to get across to irresponsible farmers the importance of it. I speak sometimes on behalf of county councils. They are the fire authorities responsible in the arable areas of England, if not the metropolitan areas. As I am sure my noble friend on the Front Bench knows only too well, they are very keen that the penalty should be realistic and they have made repeated representations to Government that the penalty must be increased to £1,000 and more as inflation goes on. They again today have confirmed that they feel very strongly that we should, if at all possible, keep the penalty as high as we can.My Lords, I should like to support this amendment. We have been careless in the past with straw burning. The penalty was not a strong enough deterrent. I entirely support my noble friend in the figure of £1,000 and perhaps more.
My Lords, I am no farmer, but I have gazed through Schedule 3 and I find no logic in the maximum penalties newly allocated for various offences. Therefore, its seems to me that the Government can readily agree to this amendment without being inconsistent with the other factors in Schedule 3.
My Lords, listening to some of the speeches in connection with the amendment, I am reminded of someone who in your Lordships' House told me the other day that they had been pressing hard for the enforcement of the speed limit in a particular locality, and not long after they pressed successfully for that they were the first to be prosecuted.
I am not suggesting that that would happen to anyone who has spoken here; but it is a fact that the penalty is being raised from £200 to £500, which is a considerable advance on the existing position. Secondly, it has to be remembered that these offences are by-law offences concerned essentially with negligence in carrying out an activity which is not in itself unlawful and which as my noble friend was saying he would like to see continuing in that category. They are concerned specifically with the provision of fire breaks, observance of the times allowed for burning, supervision of the activity and, in some by-laws, notification of the fire brigade. They cannot therefore be placed on a par with more serious offences triable by the magistrates' courts where the maximum fine available is generally £1,000. Some of your Lordships have argued that other offences were subject to maxima of £1,000; but all of those quoted are in Acts of Parliament not by-laws which are of a selective, local application at the local authority's discretion, as indeed has already been emphasised. Thirdly, where a farmer can be shown to have failed in the duty imposed on all employers and self-employed persons to conduct his operations so as to ensure that those not in his employment are not exposed to risks to their health and safety, he may be prosecuted for breach of Section 3 of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, the maximum penalties there being £1,000 on summary conviction and two years' imprisonment or a fine at the discretion of the court, or both, on conviction on indictment. That provision has successfully been invoked in cases where, for example, road accidents have been caused by smoke from straw burning. It is clear therefore that the general laws that may be used against farmers for the consequences of their failure to exercise proper control over burning are serious. We should not duplicate the general law by upgrading the by-laws to try to cover offences with which they are not designed to deal. Finally, the new maximum of £500 made available for by-laws relating to straw and stubble burning under Section 235 of the Local Government Act—like all summary maxima in enabling powers—once the Bill receives Royal Assent, will be subject to increase by order to take account of changes in the value of money. My honourable and learned friend Mr. Mayhew has already indicated in another place that the order-making power to increase maximum fines will be exercised as early as practicable next year. The timing will be affected by a number of factors, but that is the way he has put the matter. There is every likelihood, on the basis of the calculations which have been made, that the appropriate factor by which this fine will be multiplied will be two so that, on the basis of what has been said, the likelihood is extremely strong that fairly early next year this particular maximum will be increased to £1,000 in the primary legislation. I hope that, in the light of these explanations, although I well appreciate what has been said by so many of your Lordships about this particular offence, your Lordships will feel able to agree that this amendment should not pass and the Government amendment should stand on its terms. The Government have moved a considerable distance in this matter and I hope the House will recognise that by accepting the amendment as the Government have proposed it.My Lords, I hope the House will not. I really do not think the noble and learned Lord is right to suggest that an increase from £200 to £500 is significant when all of us who are involved in farming—along with other noble Lords, I am a farmer who also burns straw—know perfectly well that there is a very real possibility that straw burning will be banned altogether. Against that background, an increase from £200 to £500 is not adequate at all, and that view has quite clearly been expressed from all sides of the House both tonight and during the Committee stage.
The noble and learned Lord also mentioned the penalty available under the Health and Safety at Work Act. It seems to me that argument could go both ways. If somebody could be fined under one piece of legislation for a particular offence, there is surely some merit in suggesting that similar fines should be available under other legislation which applies to very similar activities. That seems to me to strengthen the case for suggesting a fine of £1,000, as proposed by the amendment. The noble and learned Lord then went on to talk about the automatic uprating which will occur some time next year. He was not able to give us any guarantee—I must say I did not think that he would be—about the precise timing of that. It is, of course, crucial if next year's harvest and straw burning is going to be affected that the increase should take place before that. In any event it seems to me that the job of your Lordships' House tonight is to make a decision about the level that is suitable for this offence in relation to other penalties in existence at the moment. As the noble Lord, Lord Monson, said, it is quite clear that £1,000 is certainly not too high a penalty for the sort of consequences that can arise from the unsafe or irresponsible burning of straw for whatever reason—whether carelessness, profit or whatever it may be. As we heard at the Committee stage from a number of noble Lords, the consequences can be very serious indeed and can lead to serious accidents and loss of life. Finally, the noble and learned Lord tonight, as did the noble Lord, Lord Elton, at Committee stage, has suggested that this is not really suitable for a by-law. It seems to me that your Lordships' House can perfectly well decide that the right penalty is £1,000. If the Government then decided that the right offence is not a by-law but is some other one, the Government are free to take action and amend the Bill in a suitable way. What we are being asked to decide tonight is that £1,000 is by no means too high a fine for irresponsible and careless straw burning, and I hope the House will do decide.My Lords, I do think we must get this matter right for harvest 1983. The Bill will be too late for harvest 1982. It is really a question of whether the by-law fines will be in time or not for the harvest of 1983.
I do not feel entirely satisfied that my noble and learned friend has been able to give an assurance that is quite adequate for this purpose. Most definitely, we need to get this matter under proper control in order to avoid a total ban on straw burning, which might follow if we do not. A total ban on straw burning would be most regrettable economically and we should avoid it if we can. There is no doubt that the farming industry must be made to get this situation under control, in order to avoid a total ban which, nationally, would be most costly. In view of all this, I must support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Monson, because we must be sure of getting things right for 1983, whatever other consequences might arise there-after.My Lords, may I say how very grateful I am to the many noble Lords in all quarters of the House who were kind enough to support this amendment. I am sorry if it appeared to one or two noble Lords that I was suggesting that there were enormous profits to be made from straw burning. All I meant to say was that it was often less unprofitable to contravene the by-laws than to obey them. I think that the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, put that very well. I feel strongly that the maximum penalty for this offence, whatever it is, ought to go more or less hand in hand with the maxima fixed for the other offences which I cited, both in Committee and this evening, such as selling a car with a defective reflector, or offences under the 1967 Forestry Act.
I should like to thank the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, in particular, for dealing more than adequately with the arguments put up by the Government. I think it is right that we should test the opinion of the House and, at least, give the other place a chance to look at these amendments. If, after due consideration in October, when I gather they are going to look at our amendments, they reject them, all well and good, but I think we ought to have the opinion of the House tonight.9.32 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 56A) to the amendment shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 63; Not-Contents, 30.
DIVISION NO. 3
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Abinger, L. | Killearn, L. |
| Ailesbury, M. | Llewelyn-Davis of Hastoe, B. |
| Airey of Abingdon, B. | |
| Auckland, L. | Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. |
| Avebury, L. | Lucas of Chilworth, L. |
| Birk, B. | Mackie of Benshie, L. |
| Bishopston, L. | Massereene and Ferrard, V. |
| Blease, L. | Melchett, L. |
| Brougham and Vaux, L. | Monk Bretton, L. |
| Chelwood, L. | Monson, L.—[Teller.] |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Montgomery of Alamein, V. |
| Colville of Culross, V. | |
| Cork and Orrery, E. | Mottistone, L. |
| Cranbrook, E. | Oram, L. |
| David, B. | Peart, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Penrhyn, L. |
| Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. | Pitt of Hampstead, L. |
| Elliot of Harwood, B. | Ridley, V. |
| Elwyn-Jones, L. | Rochester, L. |
| Elystan-Morgan, L. | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Faithfull, B. | Sharples, B. |
| Ferrier, L. | Stanley of Alderley, L.—[Teller.] |
| Fortescue, E. | |
| Gardner of Parkes, B. | Stone, L. |
| Glanusk, L. | Taylor of Gryfe, L. |
| Hall, V. | Teviot, L. |
| Harris of Greenwich, L. | Torphichen, L. |
| Hatch of Lusby, L. | Underhill, L. |
| Hives, L. | Vernon, L. |
| Houghton of Sowerby, L. | Vickers, B. |
| Irving of Dartford, L. | Walston, L. |
| Kagan, L. | White, B. |
| Kemsley, V. | Wigoder, L. |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Abercorn, D. | Lyell, L. |
| Avon, E. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Beloff, L. | Marshall of Leeds, L. |
| Campbell of Alloway, L. | Mersey, V. |
| Craigmyle, L. | Murton of Lindisfarne, L. |
| De La Warr, E. | Orkney, E. |
| Denham, L.—[Teller.] | Portland, D. |
| Elton, L. | Rochdale, V. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Sandys, L.—[Teller.] |
| Grimston of Westbury, L. | Skelmersdale, L. |
| Harvington, L. | Stodart of Leaston, L. |
| Henley, L. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Hornsby-Smith, B. | Trenchard, V. |
| Kinnaird, L. | Trumpington, B. |
| Long, V. | Vaizey, L. |
Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment to the amendment agreed to accordingly.
9.39 p.m.
moved, as an amendment to the amendment, Amendment No. 56B:
Line 12, leave out ("£500") and insert ("£1,000").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 56B, which is consequential upon the amendment I have just moved.
On Question, amendment to the amendment agreed to.
My Lords, the Government show their generosity by moving Amendment No. 56, notwithstanding the fact that Amendments Nos. 56A and 56B have been carried. I beg to move.
On Question, Amendment No. 56, as amended, agreed to.
Clause 39 [ Bye-laws relating to the burning of straw or stubble]:
moved Amendment No. 57:
Leave out Clause 39.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is consequential, and I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 44 [ Power to alter sums]:
moved Amendment No. 58:
Page 42, line 30, at end insert—
("(fa) paragraph 11(2) of Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955 and to the Air Force Act 1955 and Schedule 4A to the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (compensation orders);
(fb) paragraph 14(1) of those Schedules (recognisance from parents and guardians);").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I speak also to Amendments Nos. 82, 84A, 106, 117 and 127 together with Amendment No. 58. These amendments deal with changes in the armed forces Acts, such as the Army Act 1955, et cetera, which are necessary in consequence of the changes made in this Bill. The powers of armed forces tribunals—the court martial and the standing civilian court—are usually kept broadly in line with the powers of the criminal courts in England and Wales. The main amendments are Nos. 82 and 84A, which together set out a schedule of changes to the armed forces Acts.
In consequence of Part I of the Bill, these amendments abolish imprisonment for offenders aged under 21 and replace it with custodial orders and custody for life. There is provision for service offenders to be allocated to appropriate institutions in England and Wales, as if they had received sentences under Part I of this Bill. The powers of the standing civilian court when imposing financial penalties on a juvenile are amended to bring them in line with the changes made in Clauses 25 to 27. Amendment No. 58 makes changes in line with Part III of the Bill, to increase and inflation-proof the financial penalties available to those tribunals. The whole purpose of these amendments is to bring the armed forces provisions into harmony with the provisions we are making in the Bill. I should like to give notice now that it might therefore be necessary to make further small changes to account for amendments made to the Bill as it goes through this House. I hope that your Lordships will bear with us if it proves necessary to bring forward such amendments to do that on Third Reading. I beg to move.
My Lords, the only matter that puzzles me a little is this: those who have to enforce the Army Acts, armed with the manual of military law, will not have the benefit of having the Criminal Justice Act with them. How will these important matters, which will obviously affect the armed forces (and I am not querying the content of what is proposed but merely the procedure), be wedded into the Army Act? On a consolidation I can quite understand its happening, but I am a little puzzled at the moment as to why we see these Army Act and Air Force Act amendments appearing in the Criminal Justice Act. I may be missing the obvious, but it is not very clear to me at the moment.
My Lords, I would never expect to leap at once on something which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Elwyn-Jones, did not find obvious. Incidentally, I regret that he did not receive the document I hoped he might have had, which explains some aspects of this matter, but not the aspect to which he applies. Plainly, the effects of this Bill will be carried into the legislation with which the noble and learned Lord is concerned, and I imagine that the manuals will be updated. This is an important matter and I will find out the machinery by which it is actually achieved and will write to the noble and learned Lord at the first opportunity. I can tell him that the provisions are now scattered throughout the armed forces Acts and that they will probably be consolidated in 1986. The noble Lord is anxious, no doubt, to know how justice will be conducted in the armed forces between now and 1986, and I shall try to enlighten him.
I am most grateful to the noble Lord.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No.59:
Page 42, line 33, at end insert—
("(ga) the Table in section 31(3A) of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973; (gb) section 8(1)(b) of the Armed Forces Act 1976 (maximum fine awarded by Standing Civilian Courts); (gc) paragraph 22(1) of Schedule 3 to the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 (various offences relating to sex establishments); (gd) paragraph 23(2) of that Schedule (permitting persons under 18 to enter sex establishments and employing persons known to be under that age in the business of sex establishments); (ge) section 7(4)(a) of the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982 (using premises without licence);").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, Clause 44 lists the provisions which are affected by the power to alter maximum fines and certain other sums by order. The amendment merely adds to the list the table of maximum periods of imprisonment in default now applicable to Crown Courts by virtue of Clause 60, the maximum fine available to standing civilian courts under the Armed Forces Act 1976, the relevant provisions of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 which provide maxima higher than £1,000 for offences relating to the licensing of sex establishments, and the similar provision in the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982 relating to the licensing of cinemas. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 45 [ Fines for certain offences under Merchant Shipping Acts and Prevention of Oil Pollution Act 1971]:
moved Amendment No. 60.:
Page 43, line 36, after ("(fa) "insert ("shall").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, it may be convenient to take Amendments Nos. 60, 61 and 62 together. Amendments 60 and 61 are merely drafting corrections to the provisions in Clause 45 on fines under Merchant Shipping and Oil Pollution legislation. Amendment 62 simply makes provision for different categories of persons to be guilty of an offence under regulations and to be subject to maximum fines according to those categories. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is getting a little late and I am obvoiusly getting tired. I cannot at the moment understand these amendments at all. In line 36, if we put in the word "shall" after "(fa)" we shall make it two consecutive "shalls"; so it will read:
Then if we go to line 37 it will read:"nor paragraph (fa) shall shall be substituted for".
"shall be substituted for paragraph (f) shall".
My Lords, I think this is a matter I can look at further. I do not believe it is right to delay the House at this point to try to explain this further.
My Lords, does the noble Lord wish to withdraw the amendment?
No.
My Lords, can we agree to this which says, "shall shall"? Surely not. It does not make any sense. We have to treat the thing seriously. I think the amendment should be withdrawn.
My Lords, the noble Lord the Minister is just as capable of reading what it says on the Marshalled List as anybody else in the House, including my noble friend. Either my noble friend is right and the amendment does cause the Bill to read "shall shall", or my noble friend is misreading the amendment and the Bill as amended would make perfectly good sense. It is a simple matter on which I would have thought the noble Lord would have no difficulty in making an immediate reply.
My Lords, I thought it might be easier for me to explain this later to the noble Lord, Lord Wigoder, but if your Lordships wish me to do it now I certainly shall—and that is the third "shall". If your Lordships look at line 36 you see that what is provided there is:
and then there is a quotation"in the words following paragraph (g),"
and that ends the quotation and then it goes on "shall be substituted for". What this amendment is doing is putting a "shall into the quotation; and there is nothing wrong in saying the quotation ending with "shall" shall be substituted for paragraph (f). So the matter is by no means a nonsense. But I would hope that perhaps I would avoid delaying your Lordships by explaining that. The same explanation applies to the next amendment."neither paragraph (f) nor paragraph (fa)",
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 61:
Page 43, line 37, at end insert ("shall not").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 62:
Page 44, line 28, after ("regulations,";") insert—
("(bb) that, in such cases as are prescribed by the regulations, such persons as are so prescribed shall each be guilty of an offence created by virtue of paragraph (b) or (ba) of this subsection;").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 47 [ Variation of instalments and means inquiries.:
9.52 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 63:
Page 46, line 7. at beginning insert—
("( ) Section 85 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 shall be amended by inserting after the words "under section 82(5) above" the words", or where the offender is serving a term of imprisonment or detention in a detention centre, or a sentence of youth custody,"").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this amendment deals with the matter of fines outstanding when a defaulter is in prison and it is necessary because of a judgment in the House of Lords. In Forrest v. Brighton Justices the House of Lords held that a magistrates' court was not authorised by Section 82(5) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 to issue a warrant of commitment against an offender serving a sentence for default in payment of sums ordered to be paid, without giving prior notice to the offender and giving him an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, the Lords have emphasised that the issue of a commitment warrant under Section 82(5)( b) is a judicial act to be performed only at a hearing of which notice has been given.
The effect of Section 82(5)( b) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 is to enable a magistrates' court to issue a warrant of commitment against a defaulter who is in prison without any necessity for holding a means inquiry at which the defaulter is present. One reason why Parliament did not require a means inquiry to be held in such circumstances was, presumably, that the majority of defaulters in prison would have no money, so that the inquiry would be futile. Another reason might have been that any period of imprisonment for default would generally be ordered to run concurrently with the sentence which the offender was already serving, so that its length would have little practical effect. An offender will always welcome a commitment warrant for a concurrent term being lodged because it means that it will wipe the slate clean, and he will come out of prison no longer owing fines.
Many magistrates acknowledge that while the lodging of a commitment warrant for a concurrent term means an offender is being let off his fines, it may, nevertheless, help to encourage him to make a fresh start, and avoid the possibility of his being returned to prison a few weeks later for unpaid fines. From the court's point of view, this arrangement has the advantage of writing off the books of the court, fines which might otherwise prove difficult to recover after the offender's release.
Before the decision in Forrest v. Brighton Justices, it was the policy of most magistrates' courts to lodge commitment warrants for unpaid fines, generally for concurrent periods, as a matter of routine practice. Since that decision, a notice of hearing must be given whether a warrant of commitment is to be issued for a concurrent or consecutive term, and a hearing before at least one justice must take place. With the advent of the court hearing there is some evidence to suggest that, having given notice to the defendant, magistrates are scrutinising the question of lodging a warrant more closely and the incidence of consecutive terms being ordered has increased. If this tendency were to be reflected nationally it would have an adverse effect on the prison population.
In busy magistrates' courts, a dozen or more warrants will need to be lodged every week. The procedure that must now be followed adds significantly to the administrative work of the courts, and, we suspect, to that of the prison service. In return, there is no real benefit or gain in the majority of cases where warrants for concurrent terms are ordered.
We accept the reasoning behind the House of Lords decision, that the rules of natural justice require a notice of hearing to be given before a consecutive term of imprisonment is ordered, but the decision is wasteful of public resources for the majority of cases where the court is content to order concurrent terms. With a view to simplifying the procedure, we propose that as an alternative to lodging a commitment warrant, a magistrates' court should have power to remit a fine, on being satisfied that the offender is detained in prison. The power to issue and lodge a warrant of commitment after notice of hearing had been given, should remain for those cases where the court considered a consecutive term should be ordered. We believe, however, that in most cases courts would adopt the simpler procedure of remission and not wish to consider ordering consecutive terms. If this amendment were accepted, it would save both the courts and the prison service time, and the defendant would emerge from prison with a clean slate and the opportunity of a fresh start. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have listened with care to what the noble Baroness has said, and although the Government have every sympathy with proposals which might relieve the judical and administrative burden, to which she has referred, falling on magistrates' courts, they cannot support the amendment. It is readily accepted that the decision of this House in the case of Forrest v. Brighton Justices, to which she has referred, requires courts to go through procedures which place a burden on them and which end up with what is, in effect, very much the same result as would be achieved if this amendment were accepted and brought into effect. That is to say, at present the court will frequently lodge a warrant in default of payment of a fine which requires a term of imprisonment concurrent with the imprisonment the defaulter is at present serving, so that he effectively serves no extra term and leaves prison with outstanding fines wiped off the slate, as the noble Baroness mentioned. But there is an important point of principle here. The very issue of a warrant of commitment in default is an expression of the court's displeasure that the offender has failed to fulfil his duty to pay the fine which was imposed upon him. Whether the displeasure should extend to ordering a term of imprisonment in default to run consecutively to or concurrently with the term the prisoner is at that moment serving is rightly left to the judicial discretion of the court.
The power to remit a penalty which is contained in Section 85 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980—the section which this new clause would seek to amend—is rather special. It allows the court to interfere with a penalty it has previously imposed if at a subsequent inquiry the court discovers that the offender's circumstances have changed since his conviction and if it forms the view in consequence that it would only be just to set aside the whole or a part of the fine originally imposed upon him. Its essential purpose is to protect the individual who has been fined from unjust enforcement of the fine if he subsequently falls on particularly hard times—he might have become unemployed through no fault of his own or becomes ill and unable to work because of that. But the present new clause would equate the mere fact of imprisonment with such circumstances, and remission of any outstanding fines would quickly become seen as an entitlement for persons who are sent to prison, regardless of whether or not they still have means which would allow them to meet those outstanding liabilities. What is proposed in the present amendment would come into effect only when a person had committed an offence for which he was fined and thereafter had defaulted in payment of the fine and, what is more, been convicted of a further offence for which he had been imprisoned. By the operation of a provision along the lines of this amendment, that person would then be placed at a distinct advantage over the offender who paid his fine immediately and he would be placed on a par with a person whose circumstances have changed so much since his conviction and sentence that it is only just that the fine be set aside by the court. I cannot agree that that should be the position.My Lords, I thought that this was a suggestion which would save the courts a great deal of time, and I think that the prisoners would benefit from it and come out with a clean slate. There would still be the opportunity for the courts to impose fines and get the money if, in fact, they thought that the prisoners were being treated too generously. I do not think that it would prevent that from happening. However, I shall, of course, read what the Minister has said, and if I am not convinced, as I feel I am not convinced at the moment, I can come back at the next stage. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 64:
After Clause 48, insert the following new clause:
(" Attachment of earnings orders
.—(1) The Attachment of Earnings Act 1971 shall have effect subject to subsections (2) and (3) below.
(2) If it appears to a court by which a sum has been adjudged to be paid by a conviction that the offender is a person to whom earnings fall to be paid, the court may, after inquiring into his means, make one or more attachment of earnings orders.
(3) A court shall not make an attachment of earnings order under subsection (2) above unless the offender has defaulted in payment of the sum or consents to the making of the order.").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, this clause, which has the support of the All-Party Penal Affairs Group, would enable the courts to make an attachment of earnings order at the time a fine is imposed, provided that the offender consents. At present the offender may apply for an attachment of earnings order to be made at any time, including the time the fine is imposed, but unless he himself takes the initiative and applies for an order to be made, the court has to wait until he has defaulted in payment before it is empowered to make an attachment of earnings order.
We went over this ground on Committee, so I shall not go into the argument that then took place. It was evident that it was not clear. The noble Lord, Lord Elton, accepted the point that there was a difference between saying to the offender, "Are you willing to have an attachment of earnings order?" and the offender saying, "Are you going to ask me to do so?". The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, said that he had been a recorder for over 18 years and did not know that this existed that way round.
It ended with the Minister saying that he agreed that it was desirable for a provision of the kind contained in the amendment to be included in legislation if it was felt that it was not clear, and he agreed to take advice on the best way of clarifying the courts' powers in this regard. As an amendment has not yet been put down, we have put this down again and hope now to get a positive response from the Minister. I beg to move.
My Lords, I should like to support this amendment, because the amount of time that the police spend on collecting and dealing with fines is out of all proportion to what needs to be done. I have never known anybody ask for an attachment of earnings order. They have never known that such a thing exists.
My Lords, in my experience a lot of court time is wasted in dealing with fine defaulters. Unfortunately, I am not too well acquainted with the details of the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971. If a man is brought before the court for failing to pay a fine and he is in employment, by far the easiest way of getting that fine paid is to make an attachment of earnings order.
The court on which I sit is close to a Royal Air Force base. Many of the people who are fined are members of the Royal Air Force. But for some extraordinary reason, the employer has to consent, and in the case of this particular Air Force station—I do not know whether it is general in the Air Force—they will not accept an attachment of earnings order. I do not know whether that helps in this present discussion. I apologise if this is rather like a Second Reading speech.My Lords, I do not think that an employer can refuse to accept an attachment of earnings order. I do not think it has anything to do with him. The person who has to accept it is surely the employee.
My Lords, perhaps I can start by saying—and this will illuminate the last two exchanges—that in most instances an attachment of earnings order is very much a soft option for the offender. When such an order is made, all the duty for making regular payments to the court which settle the fine passes away from the offender on to the shoulders of the employer. I imagine that if the employer is the Crown, the employer stands in rather a different relationship to the court than if he is a private person or a corporation. The offender, when the order is made, is relieved of any need to discipline himself to make the payments, although of course he loses the money. Therefore, it has certain attractions from the offender's point of view.
May I come back to the main ground of the discussion. There are two things here which concerned us last time. One was the question of where the initiative lay and the other the question of whether anybody at all knew that the initiative was there to be taken. May I summarise the first issue as follows. The difference between the present situation and what the noble Baroness would have is that her amendment would mean that the courts would have to say, "Do you mind if we make an order?", and as things now are they have to say, "Do you want us to make an order I think that when we said, when we were last discussing this matter, that it was a question of semantics, that was right. I am very much seized of the point that there is not the knowledge of this arrangement that perhaps there should be. Noble Lords will be aware that Government departments are extremely reluctant to give guidance to the courts which would appear to be interpreting the law. However, I am satisfied in this particular case that some advice could and should be given to the courts in an appropriate manner, and we shall seek an opportunity to do so. That opportunity may arise fairly soon, as the department is at present considering how it should follow up the report of the Working Group on Magistrates' Courts which, among other things, makes a number of suggestions as to ways in which fine enforcement could be improved. The report has already been sent to the courts. Once they have had time to consider it, we have it in mind to draw their attention to particular ways in which fine enforcement methods could be improved, and we would certainly include mention of this point. As in everything except the detail of what the phrase is at the moment that the decision is taken to make the initiative, I hope the noble Baroness finds that that meets her concern.My Lords, we shall probably have to accept that, but I think it is fearfully halfbaked. What one wants to happen is for the court to be able to say to the man it is fining, "How much do you earn?" and if he replies, say, "£40", the court should then be able to say, "Your fine is £50. We can give you an attachment of earnings order of £5 for 10 weeks. Would that be satisfactory?" At present that cannot be done. The court can only say, "If you ask us to do it, we can do it". That is on the periphery of silliness, and the law should not be silly. The law should be straightforward and right. But it is not worth while keeping the House over this point now.
My Lords, I am not sure which of us is being silly. It seems to me that the court is in a position to do exactly what the noble Lord wants; it is just a question of the mood of the verb in which it is expressed. Perhaps he can discuss it with me afterwards, but the substance of what the noble Baroness wants is there to be had.
My Lords, if the Minister is saying that in the guidelines to the courts this will be spelt out and it will be made clear to them that the initiative will lie with them, then, from my point of view, I should find that satisfactory, and my noble friend probably would as well. But we wait to see the wording. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 49 [ Power to alter certain fines and other sums]:
moved Amendments Nos. 65 and 66:
Page 48, line 32, leave out ("of this Act").
Page 48, line 37, leave out from ("section 289B(6)") to end of line 41 and insert—
("of this Act;(b) section 289G(2) of this Act; (c) section 407(1A) of this Act; (d) section 435(e) of this Act; (e) section 453(3) of this Act; (f) section 7(4)(a) of the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982; (g) paragraph 19(3) of Schedule 2 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Act 1982.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, these amendments add to the list of sums which can be altered to take account of changes in the value of money regarding summary fines which have been provided for offences under the Cinematograph (Amendment) Act 1982 and paragraph 19(3) of Schedule 2 to the Civic Government (Scotland) Bill. In these respects they achieve for Scotland what Amendment No. 59 achieves for England and Wales.
On Question, amendment, agreed to.
Clause 50 [ Revision of penalties for summary offences and of certain other sums]:
moved Amendment No. 66A:
Page 51, line 1, after ("the") insert ("fine or").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this is a drafting amendment. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 67:
Page 51, line 10, leave out from first ("the") to end of line 11 and insert ("commencement of this section.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, with permission, I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 68 and 72. These amendments replace references to the passing of the Criminal Justice Bill with references to the coming into force of the relevant provisions in the Bill. They are designed to ensure that the Bill has the correct effect on enactments passed between the date on which the Bill is passed and the date on which the fines provisions are brought into force.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 68:
Page 51, line 22, leave out from ("before") to (";and") in line 24 and insert ("the commencement of this section").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 69:
Page 53, line 12, leave out from ("in") to ("any") in line 13.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 69, with the permission of your Lordships I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 70 and 71. These are purely drafting amendments. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 70:
Page 53, line 13, leave out from ("enactment") to ("to") in line 14.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 71:
Page 53, leave out from beginning of line 15 to ("shall") in line 16.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 72:
Page 53, line 45, leave out from ("before") to end of line 46 and insert ("the commencement of this section.").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 73:
Page 54, line 17 at end insert—
("(8) Where an enactment to which subsection (5) above applies confers a power such as is mentioned in subsection (4)(a)(ii) above, the power shall be construed as a power to make a person liable to a fine or, as the case may be, a maximum fine of the amount corresponding to the level on the standard scale to which the enactment refers by virtue of subsection (4) above or of a lesser amount.").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment achieves for Scotland what Clause 42(2), as inserted at the Committee stage, achieves for England and Wales; that is, it confers upon the makers of subordinate legislation the discretion to provide in their subordinate legislation fixed fines or maximum fines of an amount less than that specified in the relevant enabling power, even where such discretion is not currently conferred by the enabling power itself. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 52 [ Schedules 7A to 7D to the Criminal Procedure ( Scotland) Act 1975 and Schedules 7 and 8 to this Act]:
[ Amendment No. 74 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
moved Amendment No. 74A:
Page 59, line 32, leave out ("Subsection (3) above does") and insert ("The amendments provided for in Schedule 8 to this Act, other than paragraph 4 thereof, do").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 74A, with permission I should like also to speak to Amendment Nos. 74B and 75. These amendments are designed to make it clear that the district court can impose fines of up to £500 for common law offences in respect of which proceedings have been instituted after Schedule 8 comes into force, even if the offence were committed before that schedule comes into force. This is desired because the increase effected by Schedule 8 in the district court's sentencing powers for common law offences is in the nature of a jurisdiction change, rather than an increase in criminal penalties. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendments Nos. 74B and 75:
Page 59, line 34, leave out ("it") and insert ("that Schedule"). at end insert—
("(5) The amendment provided for in paragraph 4 of Schedule 8 to this Act shall not apply in relation to proceedings commenced before the coming into force of that provision; and for the purpose of this subsection, proceedings shall be taken to have been commenced on the day on which the petition or complaint is served on the accused.").
On Question, amendments agreed to.
Schedule 7 [ Schedule to be inserted as Schedule 7D to the Criminal Procedure ( Scotland) Act 1975]:
moved Amendment No. 76:
Page 80, leave out lines 28 to 32.
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is consequential. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 77:
Page 81, line 24, at end insert—
| ("PUBLIC HEALTH (SCOTLAND) ACT 1945 (c. 15) | |||
| . Section 1(5) (contravention of regulations as to treatment and spread of certain diseases). | For "one hundred pounds" substitute "level 5 on the standard scale". | £100 and £50 per day during which the offence continues. | £1,000 and £50 per day during which the offence continues."). |
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, this amendment effects an increase in the penalty for offences under Section 1(5) of the Public Health (Scotland) Act 1945, similar to that which is effected by Schedule 3 in the penalty for the corresponding offences in England and Wales under the Public Health Act 1936. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendments Nos. 78 to 81:
Page 85, line 2, column 4, leave out ("£200") and insert ("£500").
Page 85, line 4, column 2, leave out ("3") and insert ("4").
Page 85, line 9, column 4, leave out ("£200") and insert ("£500").
Page 85, line 12, column 2, leave out ("3") and insert ("4").
The noble and learned Lord said: My Lords, with your Lordships' permission, I should like to move Amendments Nos. 78, 79, 80, and 81 en bloc. These amendments increase the penalty for offences under Sections 98(2) and 132(2) of the Rent (Scotland) Act 1971 to a fine not exceeding £500. This increase is in line with the increase effected by Schedule 3 in the penalty for similar offences under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1962. I beg to move.
On Question, amendments agreed to.
10.15 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 81A:
Before Clause 53, insert the following new clause:
(" Her Majesty's Chief Inspectors of Prisons.
.—(1) The following shall be inserted after section 5 of the Prison Act 1952—
" The Chief Inspector of Prisons
Appointment and functions of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons.
5A.—(1) Her Majesty may appoint a person to be Chief Inspector of Prisons.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Chief Inspector to inspect or arrange for the inspection of prisons in England and Wales and to report to the Secretary of State on them.
(3) The Chief Inspector shall in particular report to the Secretary of State on the treatment of prisoners and conditions in prisons.
(4) The Secretary of State may refer specific matters connected with prisons in England and Wales and prisoners in them to the Chief Inspector and direct him to report on them.
(5) The Chief Inspector shall in each year submit to the Secretary of State a report in such form as the Secretary of State may direct, and the Secretary of State shall lay a copy of that report before Parliament.
(6) The Chief Inspector shall be paid such salary and allowances as the Secretary of State may with the consent of the Treasury determine.".)
(2) The following shall be inserted after section 6 of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952—
" Appointment and functions of Her Majesty's Chief
6A.—(1) Her Majesty may appoint a person to be Chief Inspector of Prisons for Scotland.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Chief Inspector to inspect or arrange for the inspection of prisons in Scotland and to report to the Secretary of State on them.
Inspector of Prisons for Scotland.
(3) The Chief Inspector shall in particular report to the Secretary of State on the treatment of prisoners and conditions in prisons.
(4) The Secretary of State may refer specific matters connected with prisons in Scotland and prisoners in them to the Chief Inspector and direct him to report on them.
(5) The Chief Inspector shall in each year submit to the Secretary of State a report in such form as the Secretary of State may direct, and the Secretary of State shall lay a copy of that report before Parliament.
(6) The Chief Inspector shall be paid such salary and allowances as the Secretary of State may with the consent of the Treasury determine.
(7) In this section references to prisons include legalised police cells within the meaning of section 14(1) of this Act.".").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment concerns the post of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons. As many of your Lordships will recall, the Committee of Inquiry into the United Kingdom Prison Services, which reported in October 1979 (the May Committee), recommended that there should be a system of inspection of the prison service distanced as far as may be practicable from the prison department. It recommended that there should be constituted within the Home Office an independent department called the Prison Inspectorate, with a senior rank. When the post of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector was first created following this, it was agreed that the appointment should be made by the Crown on the advice of the Home Secretary in order to emphasise its stature and the holder's special relationship with the Home Secretary.
The appointments of the first Chief Inspector in England (the late Mr. W. H. Pearce) and the Chief Inspector of Prisons in Scotland (Mr. D.A.P. Barry) were made in anticipation of legislation with the agreement of the Palace, the Civil Service Department (as it then was) and the Civil Service Commission on the understanding that legislative cover would be sought at the next opportunity. This amendment is in fulfilment of that commitment. The amendment provides, separately for England and Wales and for Scotland, for a Chief Inspector to be appointment by Her Majesty. It sets out briefly the duties of the Chief Inspector, and arranges that he should, as the May Committee recommended, produce an annual report which the Secretary of State is to lay before Parliament.
In moving this amendment perhaps I could pay tribute to the way in which the first Chief Inspector, Mr. Pearce, discharge his duties in this important new post. His untimely death was a great tragedy both for the inspectorate and for the prison service, whose work he subjected to such searching and careful scrutiny. I am sure that his work has done much to establish the Inspectorate as an important and useful feature of our constitutional arrangements for prison matters.
However, it is also my pleasure to take this opportunity to announce, on behalf of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, the appointment of Mr. Pearce's successor. Her Majesty's next Chief Inspector of Prisons will be Sir James Hennessy, and his appointment will take effect from 1st September this year. I am sure that other noble Lords will wish to join with me in wishing good fortune to Sir James, who has an experi- enced career in the diplomatic service which may well stand him in very good stead in this important and exacting post. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am sure the House will wish to join in the expression of thanks to the late Chief Inspector, and to wish good fortune to his successor.
My Lords, I should like to join the noble and learned Lord in what he has said, but I should like to add that the proceedings during this Bill have not indicated that the Home Secretary is taking much notice of the very grave and serious warnings which Mr Pearce gave in his report.
My Lords, may I also welcome the appointment of Sir James, and wish him every possible success. This is an important new clause, which I certainly welcome, even if it is brought forward at a comparatively late stage of this Bill. Purely in order that we may ensure that in due course the Long Title is correct, would the noble Lord the Minister be kind enough to indicate on what basis he says that this is in fact relevant to this Bill?
My Lords, if I could perhaps strike not quite so happy a note, in view of the history that my noble friend gave us, why is this coming forward as an amendment at Report stage instead of being part of the original Bill? It seems quite extraordinary.
My Lords, the processes by which this sort of legislation is generated are complex and slow, and it was not apparent until a latish stage that it would be possible to have it ready for your Lordships in time for this Bill.
However, in the light of the fact that we had given this undertaking and in the light of the fact that we now had an appointment to make, it seemed proper to create the statutory provision in time for the appointment of the new incumbent. This is a purpose connected with the other purposes set out in the Long Title of the Bill.My Lords, with leave, would the noble Lord be good enough to say which purpose?
My Lords, the Long Title of the Bill—and I will not read it out in full because the noble Lord has it before him—at the end says:
This is one of the purposes that is connected to the other purposes."and for connected purposes".
My Lords, which purpose is it connected to?
My Lords, I think it is connected in the sense that the warnings of the prison inspector are essential to the proper running of the prisons and are not at the moment being taken notice of.
My Lords, it is just as connected as the amendments which aim to reduce the number of people who may be sent to prison by reducing the number of things which are subject to criminal law. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Elton, will agree with that.
My Lords, the purpose of the Bill is to try to reduce the population of the prison, which is what everybody is urging us to do. The noble Lord, Lord Donaldson, has taken my right honourable friend to task for not having sufficiently acknowledged the crucial rôle which the reports of Her Majesty's Chief Inspector play in this purpose. The appointment is central to what the Bill sets out to do.
My Lords, with leave—and I am sorry, but I am trying to be persistent for it will affect matters later in the Bill—there is nothing in the Long Title of the Bill about reducing the prison population or anything to do with that. How can this be a connected purpose to that?
My Lords, the Long Title and the Bill itself are about the sentencing and treatment of offenders and the Inspector of Prisons inspects the treatment of offenders.
My Lords, this is the last time. With respect, it is not about the sentencing and treatment of offenders but about the power of the court with regard to the sentencing and treatment of offenders. The appointment of the Inspector of Prisons can have nothing to do with the powers of the court in relation to sentencing and treatment of offenders.
My Lords, this can go on for ever. It seems to me that, where you have courts with a power to sentence to institutions inspected by an inspector, there is a close connection between the court and the inspector; and that is the person of the prisoner and the building of the prison.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 82:
Before Clause 53, insert the following new clause:
(" Courts-martial and Standing Civilian Courts.
. Schedule ( Courts-martial etc.] shall have effect in relation to offenders who come before courts-martial and Standing Civilian Courts.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to this amendment with Amendment No. 58. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
[ Amendment No. 83 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.]
moved Amendment No. 84:
Before Clause 53, insert the following new clause:
(" Cautioning.
.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, where a person who has not previously been cautioned for or convicted or found guilty of an offence admits that he has committed an offence, he shall not be charged with the offence but shall instead be cautioned by a police officer.
(2) No person shall be cautioned under subsection (1) above if it appears to a police officer not below the rank of inspector that his offence was so serious that a caution would not be justified.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move this amendment, which on the face of it really is quite clear. I do not intend to detain the House by expanding on it. I would say that in a number of debates on amendments to this Bill at the Committee and Report stages, and during Second Reading, it has been clear that the major concern of this House is the number of people who end up in prison. It is also clear that once a person has embarked, as it were, not on a criminal career but on a career through penalties, starting maybe with a conditional discharge or a fine and progressing through more serious penalties to institutions, it is extremely difficult to stop. We have heard repeatedly about the extraordinary high percentage of people, young and old, but particularly young, who are sent to some institutional penalties and who are reconvicted within a comparatively short time
Therefore, it seems to me that in looking at the way the courts are able to treat offenders one of the priorities should be to try to do our utmost to keep offenders from getting on to this career through penalties. By far the most effective way in doing that is to increase the use of the police caution. This is widely used in some areas but much less widely used in others, and one of the arguments in favour of the amendment seems to me that it may lead to more standardisation of practice between different police forces in the use of the caution. More important, I hope that by laying down a criteria of the kind that I have in the amendment it will lead to a considerable increase in the use of cautioning in circumstances where I do not believe anybody could possibly object to its use, and that would be a considerable benefit.
There is a great deal of evidence that young people or first offenders who are cautioned are no more nor less likely to re-offend in a given period than anybody subjected to any other penalty. They are a lot less likely to re-offend than people who are put in custody of any sort. That seems to me to be an extremely powerful argument in favour of the amendment, which I hope the Government will able be to accept and send us all home to bed in a good mood. I beg to move.
My Lords, if this amendment were accepted, I should be grateful to know whether in the case of a child's or a young person's cautioning, it would be put down on the police record.
My Lords, I shall not answer for the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, but I think it certainly should not. What we want is that the police should feel more ready to use a caution than they are today, and the evidence is that a large number of young people are charged who have never been cautioned. This is a very important amendment and I hope that the Government will be sympathetic to it, because if does not seem to be subversive or awkward in any way but to be the first item in the Bill that will have some influence on the number of people who go to prison.
My Lords, I wish to say one word in opposition to this amendment. Again, your Lordships are faced with a problem of overcrowding in prisons, so your Lordships are invited to endorse this innovative experiment which puts far too great a degree of discretion in the power of the police. It is, in my submission, something which should not be accepted.
My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, can he tell me what is innovative about this? The procedure of cautioning offenders is extremely widely used by police forces throughout Great Britain. The idea that there is anything new in this is, if I may say so, quite ridiculous.
My Lords, I am fully alive to the system that is operated at the moment where there is a degree of discretion in the police which, to the general satisfaction of everyone, so far as I am aware, operates and is accepted publicly. If the purpose of this amendment is to achieve anything further, it is objectionable for the reasons that I have given. If it is merely to state in this form what in practice happens already, it is otiose and irrelevant to the problem of overcrowding the prisons. There is, in my submission, absolutely no merit in this proposal at all.
My Lords, I am always anxious to provide the noble Lord, Lord Melchett, with an agreeable nightcap; but perhaps his prospect of getting it would be better in the bar than in the Chamber. Nonetheless, I do not think that we are very far apart—at least in what we wish to achieve. The new clause would require that a caution be issued to a first-time offender who admits the offence, save in the case of serious offences. It would thus remove from the police and others who want to bring criminal proceedings against first-time offenders for non-serious offences the discretion to prosecute. It has a number of clear technical deficiencies and would give rise to a number of perverse results. I shall not go over these; I will come straight to the issues of principle which the noble Lord has raised.
Cautioning itself is a non-statutory procedure, and the circumstances in which a caution should be issued do not, of their very nature, lend themselves to statutory form. Guidance issued to chief officers in the case of juveniles lays down certain criteria for the issue of a caution. These criteria are generally followed in the case of adults: the evidence must be available to support a prosecution; the offender must admit the offence; and the offender (for a juvenile, his parents or guardian) must agree to the issue of a caution. If all these criteria are met the decision then turns on the circumstances of the offender, the nature of the offence and the attitude of the victim or aggrieved person. The noble Lord's new clause, however, goes beyond laying down criteria for the issue of the formal caution; it puts on the police an obligation to issue a caution, rather than to initiate criminal proceedings in certain circumstances. It is a long-established principle that the police should have discretion in deciding whether to bring criminal proceedings or deal with an offender by some other means. I do not believe that it would be right for this House to remove that discretion, nor for the police to be prevented from bringing criminal proceedings in the case of all first-time, self-confessed, minor offenders. None of this is to say that the Government do not recognise the important part the formal caution has to play in the criminal justice process, particularly in the case of young offenders. It allows the police, taking account of all relevant circumstances, to give a self-confessed offender, a formal warning and to give that person the opportunity to mend his ways; the need for criminal proceedings, which might have effects on the offender and his family beyond all proportion to the seriousness of the offence (and I think this is what the noble Lord has in mind) can be avoided. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure noted the considerable variations in the use made of the formal caution by different police forces and recommended that it should be put on a more consistent footing. But, as the Royal Commission itself observed, some of these variations can be explained by different social and geographical factors in different areas. Nonetheless, there is a greater degree of variation than that would allow for. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary does fully accept the case for seeking to reduce these variations so far as possible. The Home Office is at present discussing the issue with chief officers of police, and we hope that these discussions, which will be aided by research findings, will show whether there is scope for a reduction in the variations and how this might be achieved. We do want the same thing. We are setting about it in a rather different manner. I hope the noble Lord will be able to reflect upon that peacefully upon his pillow, because we are trying to finish up in the same place.My Lords, will the noble Lord say whether the criteria are published, and will the new criteria be published when they are decided and agreed upon? We are very grateful to see the sympathetic approach to the process of cautioning the first offender who has confessed to his offence.
My Lords, it is the sympathetic approach of my noble friend that I have to wait upon before I can reply to the noble and learned Lord. The answer is that they are not published but they are not secret. If the noble and learned Lord thinks it would be helpful to have them available either to his noble friend or otherwise, I will discuss that with him, if that would be helpful.
My Lords, I am very grateful for my noble and learned friend's intervention. I think it would be very helpful indeed for him to discuss it with the noble Lord. Also, it might be possible for me to see the criteria.
I tabled this amendment at the Committee stage, and, unfortunately, was not able to be in your Lordships' House when it was eventually reached. But, since then, there has been a television programme, which some noble Lords may have seen, where a number of people concerned in the criminal justice process, including chief officers of police and, I think, my noble and learned friend as well, were involved, where this subject was discussed and the grounds on which a caution might be used were put to the test. It seemed to me that, although in the programme, all those involved decided that somebody charged with a first offence of possession of cannabis would actually end up with a caution, the reality in a great deal of the country is very different indeed from that. It seemed to me to support very strongly what the noble Lord, Lord Elton, said, that there is a very wide variation in the use of the caution between different areas and that must be undesirable and unfair to individuals. It is not right that whether they ended up with a criminal record or a caution depended on which side of a county boundary they were when they were arrested. It is a more serious matter than that. So I very much welcome what the noble Lord said about attempting to draw up some new criteria, and it would be very helpful, in reaching a decision about whether or not something should appear in statute about this before we come to the Third Reading of the Bill, to see what exists at the moment. Finally, if I may just answer the noble Baroness's question, I think I am right in saying—I stand to be corrected by people who know more about this than I do—that the police force would obviously keep a record of those who were cautioned, because it would be necessary to know, if somebody was re-arrested, whether or not he had already been cautioned. But the process of receiving a caution would not give somebody a criminal record for the purposes of employment, and all the other things which are very seriously affected by a criminal record. That is one of the things which makes it such a very important and attractive procedure. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Elton. I hope that we can have an exchange of information before the next stage of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
10.37 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 84A:
Before Schedule 9, insert the following new scheduler—
("SCHEDULE
COURTS-MARTIAL ETC.
1. Section 71A of the Army Act 1955 and of the Air Force Act 1955 and section 43A of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (powers of courts in relation to juveniles) shall have effect subject to the following amendments—
- "(1A) Where a person under 21 years of age is convicted of murder or any other civil offence the sentence for which is fixed by law as imprisonment for life, the court shall sentence him to custody for life unless he is liable to be detained under subsection (3) below.
- (1B) Where a person aged 17 years or over but under 21 years of age is convicted of any other offence for which a person aged 21 years or over would be liable to imprisonment for life, the court shall sentence him to custody for life if—
- (a) it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate; and
- (b) it considers that a custodial sentence for life would be appropriate.
- (1C) For the purpose of determining whether any method of dealing with a person to whom subsection (1B) of this section applies, other than sentencing him to custody for life, is appropriate, the court shall obtain and consider information about the circumstances, and shall take into account any information before the court which is relevant to his character and his physical and mental condition";
2. In section 71AA of the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955 and in section 43AA of the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (custodial orders)—
- "(1A) The court shall not make a custodial order in respect of a person unless it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate.
- (1B) For the purposes of determining whether there is any appropriate method of dealing with a person other than making a custodial order in respect of him the court shall obtain and consider information about the circumstances, and shall take into account any information before the court which is relevant to his character and his physical and mental condition.";
- "(6A) Section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (supervision of young offenders released otherwise than on licence) shall apply to persons released from a term of detention under a custodial order as it applies to persons released from a term of detention under a detention centre order or a term of youth custody."
3. In section 85 of the Army Act 1955 and the Air Force Act 1955 (powers of different descriptions of Courts-martial)—
4. In section 145(1)( b) of those Acts (forfeiture of pay for absence from duty), for the words "Borstal institution" there shall be substituted the words "youth custody centre".
5. Paragraph 10 of Schedule 5A to the Army Act 1955 and to the Air Force Act 1955 and Schedule 4A to the Naval Discipline Act 1957 (custodial orders) shall have effect subject to the following amendments—
- "(1A) The court shall not make a custodial order in respect of an offender unless it is of the opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate.
- (1B) For the purposes of determining whether there is any appropriate method of dealing with an offender other than making a custodial order in respect of him the court shall obtain and consider information about the circumstances, and shall take into account any information before the court which is relevant to his character and his mental and physical condition.";
- "(3A) Where a Standing Civilian Court makes a custodial order in respect of an offender, it shall state in open court the reason for its opinion that no other method of dealing with him is appropriate.
- (3B) A Standing Civilian Court shall cause a reason stated under sub-paragraph (3A) above to be specified in the Custodial Order and to be recorded in the proceedings.";
- "(6A) Section 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 1982 (supervision of young offenders released otherwise than on licence) shall apply to persons released from a term of detention under a custodial order as it applies to persons released from a term of detention under a detention centre order or a term of youth custody."
6.—(1) In paragraph 11(2) of those Schedules (compensation orders) for "£400" there shall be substituted "£1,000".
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) above has effect only in relation to offences committed after this paragraph comes into force.
7. The following sub-paragraph shall be substituted for subparagraphs (1) and (2) of paragraph 13 of those Schedules (imposition of fines on and making of compensation orders against parent and guardian)—
8.—(1) In paragraph 14(1) of those Schedules (recognisances from parents and guardians) for £50 there shall be substituted "£500".
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) above has effect only in relation to offences committed after this paragraph comes into force.
9. In paragraph 15(3) of those Schedules (scale of punishments and orders)—
10.—(1) In section 8(1)( b) of the Armed Forces Act 1976 (powers of Standing Civilian Court to fine and sentence) for "£400" there shall be substituted "£1,000".
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) above has effect only in relation to offences committed after this paragraph comes into force.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I spoke to this with Amendment No. 58. My Lords, I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 85:
After Clause 53, insert the following new clause:
( "Applications to Crown Court for bail by persons remanded in custody.
.—(1) In section 81 of the Supreme Court Act 1981—
- (f) who has been remanded in custody by a magistrates' court on adjourning a case under—
- (i) section 5 (adjournment of inquiry into offence);
- (ii) section 10 (adjournment of trial);
- (iii) section 18 (initial procedure on information against adult for offence triable either way); or
- (iv) section 30 (remand for medical examination), of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980;";
- "(1A) Where the Crown Court grants a person bail under subsection (1)(f) it may direct him to appear at a time and place which the magistrates' court could have directed and the recognizance of any surety shall be conditioned accordingly.
- (1B) The Crown Court may only grant bail to a person under subsection (1)(f) if the magistrates' court which remanded him in custody has certified under section 5(6A) of the Bail Act 1976 that it heard full argument on his application for bail before it refused the application.".
(2) In subsection (6)( a) of section 5 of the Bail Act 1976 (supplementary provisions about decisions on bail) after the word "Court", in the first place where it occurs, there shall be inserted the words "or if it issues a certificate under subsection (6A) below".
(3) The following subsections shall be inserted after that subsection—
- "(6A) Where in criminal proceedings—
- (a) a magistrates' court remands a person in custody under any of the following provisions of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980—
- (i) section 5 (adjournment of inquiry into offence);
- (ii) section 10 (adjournment of trial);
- (iii) section 18 (initial procedure on information against adult for offence triable either way); or
- (iv) section 30 (remand for medical examination), after hearing full argument on an application for bail from him; and
- (b) either
- (i) it has not previously heard such argument on an application for bail from him in those proceedings; or
- (ii) it has previously heard full argument from him on such an application but it is satisfied that there has been a change in his circumstances or that new considerations have been placed before it. it shall he the duty of the court to issue a certificate in the prescribed form that they heard full argument on his application for bail before they refused the application.
- (6B) Where the court issues a certificate under subsection (6A) above in a case to which paragraph (b)(ii) of that subsection applies, it shall state in the certificate the nature of the change of circumstances or the new considerations which caused it to hear a further fully argued bail application.
- (6C) Where a court issues a certificate under subsection (6A) above it shall cause the person to whom it refuses bail to be given a copy of the certificate.".
(4) In section 30 of the Legal Aid Act 1974 (scope of legal aid) the following subsections shall be inserted after subsection (1)—
- "(1A) Legal aid which may be ordered to be given to any person for the purposes of any proceedings by a legal aid order under section 28(2) above, whether or not in the circumstances mentioned in section 29(1)(c) above, shall include, in the event
- (a) of his being remanded in custody in those proceedings; and
- (b) of the court issuing a certificate under section 5(6A) of the Bail Act 1976 (refusal of fully argued bail application), legal aid for the purpose of proceedings in connection with an application for bail to the Crown Court.
- (1B) Notwithstanding anything in subsection (1) above, legal aid in connection with an application for bail to the Crown Court shall not include representation by counsel except in a case where by virtue of subsection (2)(a) below legal aid ordered to be given for the purposes of the proceedings before the magistrates' court included representation by counsel.".").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this new clause fulfils an undertaking which the Government gave at the time of the Bill's passage through another place. Its intention is to provide that defendants who are refused bail by a magistrates' court after a full application will have a further avenue of application to the Crown Court. It also provides that legal aid will be available for the purposes of such application. Legal aid will be provided by an automatic extension to existing legal aid orders; there will thus be no need for the defendant to make a separate application for it.
The avenue of application will be available where the magistrates' court adjourns a case for a later hearing before the same court, and where it refuses bail to the defendant after hearing a full application for bail from him. In such a case, the magistrates' court will be required to issue a certificate to the effect that it has refused bail after a full application and the Crown Court's power to grant bail will be limited to cases where such a certificate has been issued. Noble Lords will note that I have emphasised that the avenue of application will be available only after a full hearing. Your Lordships will be aware of the effect of the case of Regina v. Nottingham Justices ex parte Davies, which was that, where a magistrates' court has taken one full application for bail, then its decision on that occasion should bind the court, which would not have to hear further applications unless it could be shown that there had been a change in the circumstances of the defendant since the date of the first application. It is not intended that a court's decision that there has been no change in circumstances, and that it therefore need not hear a full application, should be capable of appeal to the Crown Court. The essential purpose of the new clause, therefore, is to allow the defendant to secure a review of the magistrates' court's substantial decision that, given the full range of circumstances existing at the time of his application, bail should be refused. The Government hope that this new clause will assist defendants to pursue their applications for bail at a rather more convenient forum than the High Court at present represents. My Lords, I beg to move.
My Lords, the Minister has indicated that this amendment is in response to the proposals in another place concerning the position of the applicant for bail in the Crown Court who has been remanded in custody and who has to function without legal aid. The provision of legal aid in those conditions is of very great importance. The House will be grateful to the noble Lord for what is proposed. It has long been pressed for. There was an attempt to introduce a similar provision in the Supreme Court Bill. But better late than never.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 86:
After Clause 54, insert the following new clause:
( "Social inquiry reports on persons who have not previously served prison sentences.
The following section shall be inserted after section 20 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973—
"Social inquiry reports for purposes of s. 20.
20A.—(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, the court shall in every case obtain a social inquiry reports for report for the purpose of determining under section 20(1) above whether there is any appropriate method of dealing with an offender other than imprisonment.
(2) Subsection (1) above does not apply if, in the circumstances of the case, the court is of the opinion that it is unnecessary to obtain a social inquiry report.
(3) Where a magistrates' court passes a sentence of imprisonment on a person of or over twenty one years of age on whom such a sentence has not previously been passed by a court in any part of the United Kingdom without obtaining a social inquiry report, it shall state in open court the reason for its opinion that it was unnecessary to obtain such a report.
(4) A magistrates' court shall cause a reason stated under subsection (3) above to be specified in the warrant of commitment and to be entered in the register.
(5) No sentence shall be invalidated by the failure of a court to comply with subsection (1) above, but any other court on appeal from that court shall obtain a social inquiry report if none was obtained by the court below, unless it is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case it is unnecessary to do so.
(6) In determining whether it should deal with the appellant otherwise than by passing a sentence of imprisonment on him the court hearing the appeal shall consider any social inquiry report obtained by it or by the court below.
(7) In this section "social inquiry report" means a report about a person and his circumstances made by a probation officer.".").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment meets the undertaking which we gave in Committee to the noble Baroness, Lady David, that we would bring forward a provision to require a court, unless there are reasons to the contrary, to obtain and consider a social inquiry report before imposing a first sentence of imprisonment on an adult offender. The amendment is modelled on the similar provisions of Clause 2 relating to young offenders and brings Section 20 of the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 into line with them. I hope that the House will accept this amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I understand that there is a manuscript amendment, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady David, Amendment No. 86ZA, which is an amendment to the proposed amendment, Amendment No. 86.
moved, as an amendment to the amendment, Amendment No. 86ZA:
At end insert ("or by a social worker of a local authority social services department").
The noble Baroness said: My Lords, first I should like to thank the Minister for having produced this new clause, which is in accordance with the promise made at the Committee stage. We are very grateful. There is a very small amendment to it which I have had the courage to add. At the very end of the new clause, subsection (7) says:
"In this section 'social inquiry report' means a report about a person and his circumstances made by a probation officer".
My amendment adds "or by a social worker of a local authority social services department". I have been bold enough to put down this amendment, because the Government Amendments Nos. 96 and 97 to Schedule 12, which is about community service orders, make a similarly worded amendment, which again was almost promised at the Committee stage. Although this is possibly for older defendants, there are still families who are involved with the social services, and the social worker may be in a better position to make the report than perhaps a probation officer. This would save everybody's time and a certain amount of expense. I hope, therefore, that the Government will be minded to accept this amendment as they have accepted it in Schedule 12.
My Lords, I fear that the encouragement given by our acceptance in principle of a number of the matters which the noble Baroness raised on the provision of social inquiry reports may have given rise to a degree of over-enthusiasm in this particular instance. We are dealing with the new clause introduced by the Government Amendment No. 86, with the requirement that social inquiry reports are to be provided in the case of offenders who have attained the age of 21. The responsibility for the preparation of such reports on adult offenders is solely in the hands of the probation service. There is no share or division of the responsibility with social workers, as may be the case with offenders under the age of 21. Where there is a shared responsibility, it is of course appropriate to include in the definition of the social inquiry report a reference to social workers as well as probation officers. That is achieved in Clause 2(9) and will be achieved by Amendment Nos. 96 and 97 in relation to the community service orders to which we shall come later.
Such a reference is inappropriate in relation to reports on offenders for which, as I have said, the probation service takes sole responsibility. Where, however, a social worker has relevant information on an adult offender, the probation officer, in the preparation of his report, will obviously liaise closely with him. Social workers are concerned with offenders under the age of 17 and not, as in the case of Amendment No. 86, adult offenders of 21 years of age. In the light of what I have said I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady David, will feel able to withdraw her amendment.My Lords, I shall have to accept what the noble Lord says, although, as I said, I am aware of social workers who are involved with whole families and have a great deal of information which they can provide. No doubt that information will be shared with the probation officers. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment to the amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
On Question, Amendment No. 86 agreed to.
My Lords, I believe we have now reached a part of the Bill where we might well adjourn. I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
London Transport (General Powers) Bill
Reported from the Unopposed Bill Committee with amendments.
Lloyd's Bill
Returned from the Commons with the amendments agreed to.