House Of Lords
Wednesday, 28th July, 1982.
The House met at a quarter-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR On the Woolsack.
Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Bristol.
Baroness Carnegy Of Lour
Elizabeth Patricia Carnegy, having been created Baroness Carnegy of Lour, of Lour in the District of Angus, for life—Was, in her robes, introduced between the Lord Mowbray and Stourton and the Baroness Young.
Lord Gormley
Joseph Gormley, Esquire, OBE, having been created Baron Gormley, of Ashton-in-Makerfield in Greater Manchester, for life—Was, in his robes, introduced between the Lord Blyton and the Lord Taylor of Mansfield.
Air Security Charges Review
2.44 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are in a position to announce the date on which they expect to make a Statement in both Houses of Parliament on the review of air security charges and related matters now being conducted by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Trade.
My Lords, a Statement will be made tomorrow.
My Lords, is the Minister aware in the first place that it is really refreshing to receive an affirmative reply? However, if I may pursue the matter a little further, presumably, in accordance with what has been said in the past, the Statement will be made in both Houses. Will it, as we expect in both Houses, be an oral Statement on which we shall have an opportunity of questioning the Government?
My Lords, a Statement will be made in both Houses, but following the normal practice in matters of this kind the Statement will be made by way of reply to a Question for Written Answer.
Oh!
My Lords, not being able to argue with the Minister on the precedents—I expect that he has the details of what is done regarding this type of reply—may I ask whether he is aware that a number of us in both Houses, and on all sides, have been following this matter for some months, that we disagree with what we think has been done, that we expected to have the opportunity of putting questions to the Minister, and that neither House welcomes a Written Answer on the day before the House rises?
My Lords, I should have thought that the noble Baroness would have been pleased by the promptness with which I have dealt with the matter. Secondly, if the Statement is made by way of reply to a Question for Written Answer, the noble Baroness will have time to study it before she comes to a conclusion on what the Government say.
My Lords, may I ask the noble Lord how it comes about that there is to be a Question for Written Answer in both Houses tomorrow? Is it not an odd procedure—two Questions, one in each House?
My Lords, it is quite normal; it has been done on many occasions.
My Lords, is the Minister suggesting that I put down for tomorrow a Question for Written Answer?—because as yet I have certainly not done so. Is he further aware that I had no idea that a matter which we have been pursuing for so long, and which the airlines have been pursuing, would be shuffled out of by means of a Written Answer to which people cannot reply?
My Lords, there will be plenty of opportunity for the noble Baroness to make her views known when she has seen the terms of the Answer.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that a Written Answer on a matter of this importance is really not good enough? It is not satisfactory, and will he be good enough to consult his right honourable friend the Prime Minister and his other right honourable friends in order to ensure that there is made in both Houses a Statement instead of a Written Answer?
My Lords, it is in fact standard practice for Statements of this kind to be made in reply to Questions for Written Answer. It would be difficult to say that this matter, which relates solely to the question of financing the costs of security, is of such overriding public interest that it demands an oral Statement in your Lordships' House, to the detriment of the other business on the Order Paper.
My Lords, which Member of your Lordships' House has asked the Question to which the Written Answer is to be given tomorrow?
My Lords, I imagine that such a Question will appear on the Order Paper when it is published.
My Lords, does not the noble Lord agree that a mere exercise in one-upmanship is not a substitute for a reasoned Answer?
My Lords, this is not an exercise in one-upmanship; it is an exercise in trying to make the information available at the earliest possible date. I dealt with the matter finally only this morning. The terms of the Statement have not yet been settled. I should have thought that the noble Lord would appreciate my dealing with the matter with such speed, instead of following what no doubt he regards as the normal practice of taking more time.
My Lords, will the noble Lord say how my noble friend can pursue this matter before the middle of October?
My Lords, I was under the impression—and I thought that the noble Lord also knew—that your Lordships' House will be sitting next week.
My Lords, is it not a coincidence that we were asked to approve the order relating to air security charges last week, instead of after the outcome of the review is known?
No, my Lords; the effect of the order last week was to reduce the security charge. I should be surprised if the noble Lord felt that the security charge should not have been reduced.
My Lords,—
My Lords, we have now had five minutes on this matter—
Oh!
I appreciate that your Lordships very much want to know what is in the Statement which will be given by way of a Written Answer tomorrow. As has already been indicated, the House does not rise until Tuesday, and there will of course be other opportunities to pursue the matter. May I suggest that we take one more supplementary question, and then move on to the next Question.
My Lords, as the Question for Written Answer has apparently not yet been set down and the oral Question by the noble Baroness, Lady Burton of Coventry, has been on the Order Paper for some time, would my noble friend explain why it was not possible to give an answer to the noble Baroness in order that she should have the opportunity to ask a supplementary?
My Lords, a full and comprehensive reply was given to the noble Baroness's Question, which read as follows:
That I have answered."To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they are in a position to announce the date".
There has been no opportunity for a supplementary.
The answer to it is that a Statement will be made tomorrow. It would have been perfectly possible, I may say, if the noble Earl's object is to try to meet the noble Baroness's interest in this matter, which has been evidenced over a long period of time, to have decided to make the Statement in a week's time; but I cannot see what advantage that would have compared with the decision that I in fact took, which was to make the Statement as soon as possible, which is tomorrow.
My Lords, may I ask the noble Baroness the Leader of the House whether she can help—because perhaps I misheard what the noble Lord said, and we have got rather lost with all these exchanges. I thought I heard the noble Lord say that it would not be helpful to make a Statement tomorrow in this House because that would be to the detriment of the business in another place. I do not think that has anything to do with it, but that is certainly what I understood him to say. I do not know whether the Leader of the House could help us, in view of the contributions we have had from all sides of the House. It may be a most excellent Statement, but we have not seen it. Could she possibly use her influence to see whether we could have an oral Statement tomorrow?
My Lords, as the House knows, it is quite common practice to have Statements by way of Written Answer. I have used this means myself already in the course of the last year, and I think all Ministers do at some stage or another. It is really a decision which would usually rest with the Minister responsible for the department. It is a matter, I recognise, about which the House feels very strongly indeed, and we all know of the noble Baroness's interest in this matter. I will, of course, reflect on what has been said in your Lordships' House today, but I hope that both the noble Baroness and the House will feel that my noble friend, in giving the reply that he did today, has actually followed what is quite normal practice. The House will have an opportunity, when the Statement is published tomorrow, to see what it is that the Government have in mind on this particular matter, and I hope noble Lords will feel that that is not in any sense an unusual procedure.
Anglo-French Economic Discussions
2.53 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether discussions have taken place between them and the French Government about the latter's adoption of economic policies which show that the French Government recognise the need for firm control on Government borrowing and inflation.
My Lords, the opportunity arises frequently for Governments to exchange views on economic affairs; for example, at meetings of the European Council and the Finance Council. The French Government indicated a change in emphasis in their policies at the EMS realignment meeting on 12th June. The annual Anglo-French summit will take place in November, and will provide a further opportunity for an exchange of views.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that full reply. May I ask him whether he would not agree that there now seems to be common ground among the parties in this country that we cannot buy our way out of recession, as M. Mitterrand tried to do initially? Indeed, my noble friend Lord Boardman made this very point last Monday. Was not M. Mitterrand's initial reflationary policy further proof of this?
My Lords, I entirely agree with what my noble friend says. The French Government that came into power just over a year ago came in on the basis of a reflationary policy. They have since had to modify that policy in very material respects.
But, my Lords, is the noble Lord aware that there is hardly anything in the Government's record that justifies their being able to give any advice to anybody? Would it not be far better if the noble Lord decided to devote some interest to his own country and to its prosperity, as distinct from the disaster into which his own Government have put it?
My Lords, I was not giving advice to anybody, although from time to time I am tempted to give advice to the noble Lord himself. He will find that after 12 months in office the French Government have had to devalue the franc twice, have had to introduce a freeze on wages and prices, have had to reduce Government expenditure and have now set a limit of 3 per cent. on the budget deficit—a figure somewhat comparable to our own.
My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the almost jocular way in which he approaches these questions does not give much encouragement to the 3 million unemployed, two-thirds of whom were created by this Government; nor to the hundreds made bankrupt every day; and does he not think that a policy which deliberately creates inflation is a form of governmental masochism so that they may get credit for reducing it? Is this not a serious issue that ought to be treated by any Government spokesman in a most serious way?
My Lords, the noble Lord will not be surprised to hear that I do not agree with a single word that he says. These matters were debated at length in your Lordships' House as recently as Monday; and, if I may suggest it with respect, the noble Lord having participated in that debate, it would pay him to read the record of the whole of the debate again.
My Lords, did I understand from my noble friend that we have contact with the French Government through the EMS? Does that mean that, although we are not members of the EMS, we do take part in any discussions arising within that organisation?
My Lords, my noble friend raises what is in effect a very technical point. We are in fact members of the EMS, but we are not members of the exchange rate mechanism.
My Lords, will the noble Lord not find it embarrassing to exchange views with a Socialist Government? Is there not a danger of him being converted?
My Lords, the answer to both parts of that question is, "No".
My Lords, as the noble Lord referred, in answer to one supplementary, to whether another noble Lord had read the debate on unemployment held last Monday, may I ask him whether he has re-read that debate, and whether he recalls that from all sections of the House there was pressure for constructive capital expenditure, including from the CBI, and that he did not reply to those points?
My Lords, I have in fact re-read the whole of the debate. I indicated at the time that I would be reading it, and I did in fact re-read it. I have nothing to add to the very full and comprehensive reply I gave to the debate or to the opening speech that I delivered on behalf of the Government.
Police Powers To Stop And Search
2.59 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they favour strengthening the power of the police by giving them the authority to stop and search for offensive weapons, as recommended by the Phillips Report.
Yes, my Lords; and we hope to bring forward legislative proposals accordingly.
My Lords, in thanking my noble friend for that brief but satisfactory reply, may I ask him whether he agrees that prevention of crime is much better than punishment for crime which has taken place; and would he not agree that the example of Scotland, where this matter has already been tried out during the last eight months and where searches in 530 cases revealed offensive weapons in 206, proves that crime levels must have been reduced and that this power will therefore benefit the rest of the country?
My Lords, my figures are a little more recent. I support my noble friend's statement that the Scottish experience is successful. In the first 10 months of operation of the new power, just over one-third of the 750 or so persons stopped and searched were found to have an offensive weapon on them.
My Lords, may I ask my noble friend whether, when he says "accordingly", he intends to supersede the powers in various Private Acts giving to certain police forces in this country the power to stop, search and detain? In addition, will he ensure that whatever powers are included will be national rather than local and will go further than just searching for offensive weapons, following the lines of the Metropolitan Police Acts, which were primarily concerned with stolen property?
My Lords, I can confirm that we want to have a uniform procedure throughout the country and that at present there is a patchwork of local enactments which ought to be superseded. As the noble Lord asked and as the Royal Commission recommended, it is also intended to rationalise existing powers of stop and search in relation to stolen goods by extending them throughout England and Wales, and to create a new power in relation to housebreaking implements.
Peace Studies In Schools
3.1 p.m.
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question which stands in my name on the Order Paper.
The Question was as follows:
To ask Her Majesty's Government what is their attitude to the teaching of peace studies in schools and institutions of higher education.
My Lords, since the noble Lord's Question lacks any definition of the term "peace studies", I can only answer that the Government regard it as essential that what is offered in any institution should always be education and never indoctrination.
My Lords, perhaps I should declare a non-pecuniary interest as a long-standing honorary member of the School of Peace Studies in Bradford, and professor in Zambia. May I ask the noble Lord whether he realises that the term "peace studies" has been used by members of his own Government, including the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Department of Education? Therefore I assumed that it was not necessary to define it. Would he say whether he and the Government stand by the attack made by the Under-Secretary of State in a public speech in which he described peace studies as a Trojan horse; and would he agree that peace studies themselves, in the teaching of mediation as an alternative to force, have a very valuable part to play, not only in this country but throughout the world?
My Lords, I note the noble Lord's interest and I would point out that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in any department is never a member of the Cabinet—I say with regret. As to Trojan horses, I have not read my honourable friend's precise words, but any subject can be a Trojan horse and it must be the case that the quality and content of what is taught in our schools depends above all else upon the qualities of those who teach it. The most innocent curriculum can become dangerous in irresponsible hands and the most dangerous curriculum doubtless can be put to some good use.
My Lords, would my noble friend agree that a valuable component in serious peace studies would be the history of the balance of power?
Yes, my Lords, and I would go on to say that the sort of balanced analysis of human behaviour which the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, quite rightly thinks should be pursued in our schools has for many generations been pursued in the subjects of history, geography and economics.
My Lords, would the noble Lord agree that in the last 40 years in our universities and institutes of higher education, departments of history, politics, international law and international relations have been set up which exist to promote the study of why states come into conflict with each other? Does he not agree that there is no need of further proliferation? Is he aware that in universities there is some suspicion of some of those who promote peace studies, in that it is feared that they are interested in propagating a particular explanation of this subject rather than considering dispassionately the whole of the evidence relating to peace, as would be customary in any university which had a regard for scholarship?
My Lords, in response to that, I should like to say that peace, like salvation, is very greatly to be desired, and our concern is that in their consideration of how to achieve it our young people should be given guidance which is realistic and balanced. Prejudice in pursuit of either aim is a fatal handicap.
My Lords, is my noble friend the Minister aware that the Institute of Peace Studies in the University of Bradford has been described some years ago in relation to both its content and the type of student who attended it as being a rest camp for urban guerrillas? Is the noble Lord further aware that since the proposed affiliation of the National Union of Teachers to the CND, parents are rightly disturbed about what "peace studies" might mean in the schools?
My Lords, the first half of my noble friend's supplementary question I note with great interest in the context of Lord Hatch's declaration of interest. As to the second, I am well aware that there is a wide unease about this subject, but, as I said in my opening reply, it has not actually been defined and it does not, in the terms of secondary education as I understand it, yet lend itself to definition. What matters is the quality of the teachers and the way they put across what they are teaching. It is my experience that a good teacher will give good guidance, irrespective of his own personal convictions or prejudices in either direction, on matters in which children ought to be taught to make up their own minds—and that is what we want to pursue.
My Lords, is it not important that the peace studies should contain an account of the important part played by the Atlantic Alliance in keeping the peace over the last 30 years?
My Lords, I would entirely agree, and I am tempted to follow that theme wider into the area of the question of the validity of deterrence as a means of keeping the peace; but in order to keep the peace in your Lordship's House I thought I would not.
My Lords, arising from the original Answer of the Minister in which he deprecated documentation to schools—
"Indoctrination".
I am sorry my Lords; I misheard. I substitute the word. Is he aware that in a Written Answer to a Question by me this week the Government acknowledge that they send to schools their documents about disarmament? Seriously, may I ask him this: the United Nations has now decided to set up a world disarmament campaign to distribute information. Will that information be available in the schools?
My Lords, Her Majesty's Government do not exercise censorship over what goes into schools unless it is obscene. The publications of Her Majesty's Government are available to all schools and so, indeed, are the publications of the Government of the Soviet Union. It is to make up their minds that our children must be taught.
As a non-urban guerrilla, may I ask the noble Lord whether, in the light of his original Answer to me, he will take this opportunity of dissociating himself from the words used by the Under-Secretary when he described these studies as a Trojan horse? Is he further aware that there are five universities in this country with schools of peace studies, training teachers of peace studies, and therefore that the term "peace studies" is defined and is being taught under the aegis of our universities? Would he invite his honourable friend the Secretary of State and his noble friends behind him to visit these schools of peace studies and see what is being taught there and whether it is not helpful to the peace of the world that we are all seeking?
My Lords, I would never dissociate myself from the words of my honourable friend on such an invitation as I have now been offered. But I would say, as I said at the beginning, that the term, as used, is not defined in our schools and I am not prepared to condemn out of hand something which the noble Lord has not specifically described. If the noble Lord's Question is addressed to matters other than the schools, I ought to apprise myself of that also. But I do not think that will be helped if all my noble friends and I were to tramp through the classrooms in the first instance.
Business
My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I announce that dinner will be available at the usual time this evening. The Report stage of the Employment Bill will be adjourned at approximately 7.0 p.m. for approximately one hour. During this adjournment the Northern Ireland Assembly (Day of Election) Order 1982 and the Valuation (Postponement of Revaluation) (Scotland) Order 1982 will be taken.
Woolworths (Aberdeen Development) Order Confirmation Bill
Read a third time, and passed.
Employment Bill
3.12 p.m.
Report received.
moved Amendment No. 1:
Before Clause 1, insert the following new clause:
(" Employee participation.
.—(1) In this section—
references to "the Act" of any particular year are to the Companies Act of that year;
"directors' report" means a report by the directors of a company which by section 157(1) of the Act of 1948 is required to be attached to a balance sheet of the company prepared under section 1 of the Act of 1976 (or under that section taken with section 150 of the Act of 1948); and
"employment" means employment other than employment to work wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom; and "employed" and "employee" shall be construed accordingly.
(2) This section applies to every directors' report of a company which relates to a financial year beginning on or after 1st January 1983 where the average number of persons employed by the company in each week during the financial year exceeded 200; and for the purposes of this subsection that number shall be the quotient derived by dividing by the number of weeks in the financial year the number derived by ascertaining, in relation to each of those weeks, the number of persons who, under contracts of service, were employed in the week (whether throughout it or not) by the company and adding up the numbers ascertained.
(3) In every directors' report of a company there shall be contained a statement describing the action that has been taken during the financial year to introduce or develop arrangements aimed at—(a) providing employees systematically through their managers or supervisors with information on matters of concern to them as employees; (b) consulting employees or their representatives on a regular basis so that the views of employees can be taken into account before decisions are made which are likely to affect their interests; (c) encouraging the involvement of employees in the company's performance through means such as employee share ownership schemes; (d) achieving a common awareness on the part of managers and employees of the problems involved in allocating resources for such purposes as pay and investment.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, this amendment is a revised version of one that I introduced at Committee stage two weeks ago at four o'clock in the morning when it was not possible for a number of your Lordships to be present. I should therefore first briefly describe the purpose and content of the proposed new clause. Its aim is positively to improve this country's industrial relations and performance by increasing the extent to which employees participate in the activities of the company in which they work.
The amendment seeks to make it a statutory requirement that in every directors' report of a United Kingdom company which relates to a financial year beginning on or after 1st January 1983, and where the number of employees exceeds 200, a statement should be included describing the action that has been taken during the year to introduce or develop arrangements aimed at furthering employee participation in the ways that are set out in subsection (3)( a) to ( d) which I hope will speak for themselves.
The content of the subsections has been altered slightly from the original version to take account of views which were expressed in Committee and helpful advice that I have received from all parts of the House. I should like to take this opportunity to acknowledge gratefully that help. Perhaps the best way to summarise the discussion which took place at the Committee stage is to say that when the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, replied to the debate, he observed that every noble Lord who had spoken on the amendment seemed to have been mildly in favour of it.
I should add that in summarising the Government's own position he went on to express what might be described as mild opposition to the amendment in saying, at col. 321 of Hansard for 13th July:
"we like the idea but we have misgivings about it. We are sympathetic to the amendment, and we have not ruled out a legislative step of this kind in the future, if industry makes insufficient progress on a voluntary basis. But I think it would be risky to take this step without further and careful consideration".
I should like to return to that point now, if I may. From these Benches, we have given the Government broad support on many of the more contentious provisions of this Bill concerning such matters as unfair dismissal, closed shop ballots and trade union immunities. We have done this despite the practical difficulties to which they may give rise. If there are risks for industrial relations involved in this legislation, it is in those provisions that they reside, and compared with them any that are attendant on acceptance of this proposed new clause are surely insignificant.
I was once altogether a voluntarist on this question of more employee participation; but the trouble about voluntarism is that there have to be volunteers. In the past exhortation concerning the need for speedier progress in this matter has proved largely fruitless. The Liberal Party have for the past 50 years wished to go much further in the direction in which this amendment points.
For my part, I have reached the conclusion that the time has come to make it a statutory requirement that in every company employing more than a certain number of people there should be consultative bodies of some kind. But in the present instance we are asking only for the very limited legislation contained in this amendment. Everywhere people are now seeking to exercise more influence over the making of decisions that affect their lives. They cannot surely for much longer be denied that influence only while they are at work. Some legislative action is therefore called for in this field. I should like to see the initiative for that action coming from this House.
In Committee, the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, said also that the Government were doubtful about imposing a rigid legal system on all employers irrespective of their particular needs and circumstances. So, my Lords, am I. But all that the new clause requires is that companies should expose to public view what progress, if any, they are making in this field. Within it they are not obliged to take any action at all. If they are altogether inactive in the matter there will simply be no progress to record.
We have also tried hard in subsection (3)( a) to ( d) to strike the right balance between the needs, on the one hand, to be reasonably specific concerning some of the general areas in which employee participation has been proved by this country's most progressive companies to work, and, on the other hand, to avoid rigidity and encourage flexibility by leaving companies free to act or even not to act in those areas as they think best. Then it was argued that the directors' reports are costly to produce, and the longer the report the more the expense that is incurred. It was claimed also that paradoxically a requirement of the kind proposed in this amendment would impose the greatest burden on those employers who already have well developed employee involvement policies.
In response to those criticisms, I would say two things: first, the amendment is concerned with the activities of companies in relation to their most precious asset—people. What information in the report of a company could offer better value for money than a statement about the involvement in its activities of the people it employs? Secondly, in order to comply with the spirit of this new clause, companies with admirable employee participation arrangements might indeed wish to state in the first year of their operation what in general was being done in the area covered by subsection (3)( a) to ( d). Thereafter there might be little for them to say, but their reputation for good industrial relations would not suffer on that account for it would continue to depend not on their words but on their actions; so they would have nothing to fear. On the other hand, this amendment sets out to activate the directors of other less well run companies, particularly those of medium size, to pay more attention than they now do to the need to develop employee participation.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, rightly probed more deeply. He said that we were in an area of attitude-changing and he had misgivings as to whether legislation at this time would produce real change. I respect his views, and indeed he and I both know from experience how difficult it is to effect changes of attitude by another means—industrial training. But what I know is possible, because I have seen it happen, is that marginal modifications in behaviour can be brought about which eventually lead to attitudinal change by building on what has already been shown to work in practice and thus to contribute to improvements in motivation, productivity and competitiveness.
This Bill is called the Employment Bill. As it stands, it aims to do nothing to further employee involvement; but the proposed new clause would remedy that omission, not least in being seen to occupy pride of place as the first in the Bill. I do not for a moment suggest that the wording of the clause cannot be improved, but the principle underlying it is clear enough. If the Government consider such a clause should not form part of this Bill I will gladly withdraw the amendment, provided that they will undertake to bring forward another Bill dealing with this question as soon as possible in the next Session of Parliament. Alternatively, if they are prepared to discuss the matter with me and others between now and the Third Reading of the Bill in October, with a view to improving the wording of the amendment or putting down an amendment of their own on similar lines, again I will happily withdraw this amendment.
What will not be acceptable is either an outright rejection of the new clause or to be told that there is need for the Government to consult further with employers, trade unions and others before any legislation of this kind can be introduced. We have had years and years of consultation. Nowhere in the field of industrial relations has there been more talk and less action than on the question of developing employee participation. The time has surely come for this first tiny statutory step to be taken towards that goal. I beg to move.
3.24 p.m.
My Lords—
My Lords, I think that perhaps this side of the House has priority? I am much obliged—
My Lords, with respect to my noble friend, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, although his name is not on the amendment, may be speaking for his noble friend Lord Aylestone.
My Lords, I thank the noble Earl for his intervention. In fact my name is not on the amendment but that of my noble friend Lord Aylestone is, so I hope I may be taken as an acceptable substitute. Briefly, throughout this Bill we have been discussing the righting of certain wrongs and the imposition of further restrictions on the closed shop, on immunities and on the definition of trade disputes. This is the first time we have been able to discuss properly something positive, something which is designed to avoid or to reduce such disputes in the first place. The forerunner of this amendment came up at something like 3.45 a.m. on the last day of the Committee stage when we had all rather run out of steam; so I am delighted that the noble Lord has brought it forward again at "prime time", when all our minds are fresh, or at least fresher.
Proposals to improve industrial relations through some measure of employee participation are not new. The trouble is that they have tended to be either so bland as to have little practical effect, or so rigid as to put companies in a straitjacket. The attraction of this new clause is that it avoids both defects. It is perfectly specific in that it requires directors to make a statement, which can be as long or as short as they like but which must be there in their report. At the same time it recognises that there are a number of possible routes to participation and that different companies may prefer to go different ways, and some further than others. It recognises the merits of a pluralist approach and it avoids the straitjacket. Participation is not in itself a cure for our industrial ills, but it will be vital if the technological changes, which we cannot possibly resist, are to be introduced with the co-operation of the workforce in this country. It could be said that at no previous time in our industrial history have good communications between management and workers been more necessary. My party therefore proposes to make it obligatory on large firms to introduce participation in some form, but we do not propose to shackle companies by the imposition of statutory directors or single-channel balloting for elected posts. We believe it is vital to give as much freedom as possible to workers and employers to devise the form of participation that suits them best. It seems to me that this amendment—that is, the new clause proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rochester—is drafted very much in that spirit. It also has another attraction for me. If it is accepted, as I hope it will be, it will provide a rich source of information concerning the way different companies go about participation. It will make it possible for one company to learn from another. It may be that a standard or code of practice will emerge in a particular industry and we shall be halfway to where we want to get, without any further legislation. This requirement upon directors of companies may seem a modest thing at first sight, but we believe that it could play a very important part in the development of employee participation and industrial democracy in this country. Finally, let us remind ourselves what this Bill does. It seeks to right certain injustices to individuals and to oblige the trade union movement to put its house in order. But we must recognise that in very poor market conditions it is not only the unions which have obligations to society. Employers must, as far as humanly possible, take the workforce into their confidence and seek to involve them in a creative way in the future of their companies in the difficult times that lie ahead. If that is the case—and I believe it is—how satisfying it would be if we sent this Bill back to the other place a little less lopsided by the addition of this new clause. That is a contribution to better industrial relations that this House can and ought to make.My Lords, may I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, for the misunderstanding a moment ago. As he says, and I think he deduced, it came about because his name did not appear on this amendment and I had no reason to suppose, therefore, that he was speaking on behalf of his noble friend.
I have a great deal of sympathy with the purpose and intention of this proposal. Indeed, to some extent I can come before your Lordships in the unaccustomed apparel of a white sheet on a good deal of its contents. I happen to be chairman of a company which, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, knows, has been in the forefront of developments under all four of the headings included in subsection (3) of his amendment. Indeed, on employees' shareholdings we go a long way beyond what he suggests in the third paragraph, inasmuch as already slightly over 90 per cent. of those who work for us in the United Kingdom are shareholders in the company. I say that in order to indicate that I am far from being hostile, either in practice or in theory, to what is the plain purpose that the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, has in mind in bringing this proposal forward. Having said that, I must say that I am very doubtful about the means which he has sought to adopt for helping these excellent developments. I very much doubt whether mandatory inclusion in the annual report, and indeed in the directors' report section of the annual report of a company, is the right way to encourage this kind of development. I can see it only too easily passing into a kind of stylised formula used year after year and conveying remarkably little. And I honestly doubt whether the annual report and accounts, which are, of course, as he knows, required by the Companies Acts and for their purposes, are the proper vehicle for a company to draw attention to its developments in this direction. Indeed, on a small point, in my own company's case such references as we make—and I think we make them every year—to our employee shareholding scheme almost always appear, not as this amendment would wish them to appear, would hind them to appear, in the report of the directors, but in that part of the document which is described somewhat misleadingly as the chairman's speech; because, may I say in parenthesis, I do not inflict on our shareholders the cruelty of having to listen to me at considerable length. I reserve that ill behaviour for your Lordships' House. But I feel that this is the wrong way of doing it and, indeed, would be somewhat discouraging. Also, it would be, as T think was mentioned in the small hours, a little unfair to those companies, such as my own, which have already made such progress in this matter. One would be bound by these proposals to refer to the introduction of things of this kind. We introduced them years ago. We presumably, therefore, could not on a strict reading of the amendment refer to them. And if the noble Lord says that, of course, it is also the development that is covered, there again we have an effective scheme which is operating extremely well and which, for further development, depends on Her Majesty's Government, from the point of view of adjusting the quite severe taxation restrictions, which still tend to inhibit the development of employee shareholding schemes. To compel companies, in a document that they are compelled to produce every year, to try to set out what they are doing on these sometimes delicate and sensitive issues, such as the consultation one, would not serve the purpose which the noble Lord wants. I think that it could produce even a little counter-reaction, even a little feeling that what a sensible company does, for good and sensible reasons of its own, does not need to be set out in a legal document under legal compulsions every year. It very soon, as the noble Lord knows, becomes known—becomes known, very often, by the performance of the company—when companies are progressive in this way, and it is a much better expedient to let a company's sensible handling of these matters speak for itself. I do not know what my noble friend Lord Ferrers will say about it, but I am disposed, on balance, to object to the insertion of any further compulsory material in a company's annual report. We are bound by statute to include a great deal; we are bound by the rules of the Stock Exchange and of the auditor's profession to include a great deal and it is quite a laborious business. To include under statutory compulsion what we are doing as a matter of sensible policy for the fostering of co-operation would not only be counterproductive; it would tend to produce a little prejudice against developments of this kind. I very much hope that, after your Lordships have debated this amendment, we will not put it into this statute.3.35 p.m.
My Lords, I added my name to this clause, because it represents a meeting of minds rather than any change in political alignment. But my noble friend Lord Rochester is the secretary of the House of Lords Industry Study Group, of which I have the honour to be chairman. If that is not a commercial, I do not know what is. I could also refer to the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Aylestone, was a colleague of mine in the Labour Government, so I think that the support for this new clause has a respectable background.
May I, for a moment or two, say why I think that this new clause should go into the Bill? I think that it would give it a balance which it does not have at the present time, because this Bill is mainly about the conditions under which workers and management may confront each other. To some extent, the provisions of this Bill supplement the Employment Act 1980, which began to draw afresh the lines of conflict. Both of these measures represent a kind of new Geneva Convention on the rules of war. I do not think there is much hope for this country in all this, unless it is a sort of run-of-the-mill approach to fundamental upheaval, politically and industrially. What I am sad about is that the word "co-operation" is becoming obsolete in the vocabulary of industrial relations today. "Participation" is not the vogue word that it was. In our economics, Keynes is out, Friedman has been briefly in and now Karl Marx is stirring in his grave—stirred by travellers and fellow travellers who are keeping political leaders and trade union leaders awake at night. They surely are. If noble Lords are wanting a suggestion for reading during the Recess, I would recommend Mass Unemployment and the Future of Britain by Bill Jordan. It is nice and gloomy. The author predicts that some time in the mid-1980s, and probably during the year after the next General Election, the country will become increasingly ungovernable.says the author. That sort of perception seems to reduce this Bill, and indeed this amendment, to a sort of tawdry irrelevance; at least, one might be forgiven for thinking so. Though I think, on second thoughts, it is the Bill that is the real irrelevance, because this new clause is relevant, quite apart from the Bill. But I think that it would add something to the Bill. For myself, I am all for scrutinising the use of power. It is the most dangerous thing in the world in human affairs, whether it is the power of Government, of bureaucracy, of monopolies, of employers or of trade unions. Where power lies, there is the likelihood of abuse and abuse can become tyranny. That is one of the dangers confronting the world today. Taken to pieces and looked at bit by bit, some of this Bill may be needed to curb excesses, but taken as a whole it presents a sinister purpose in the eyes of a great many people. And it may indeed have that purpose. Call it a threat, or call it an attack, or call it anything you like. It has been called all those things, and worse. The trade unions would not take it from the Labour Government, and some appear now to be preparing to reflect on their defiance in the solitude of a prison cell. I hope that the Official Solicitor will be on hand to get them out. But in this amendment there is a faint shaft of light in the gloom of the English summer which has now settled on the countenance of Mr. Tebbit. It requires companies to extend their reports beyond the list of directors' fees, which are constantly rising. If one wants to know about pay increases, only have a look at directors' fees. We want to know a little more than that. One of the things we want to know is what they are doing about the workers. What is in the new clause is all conventional stuff, really. We are asking companies to tell us a little more about how good they are at communications and consultation, if not positive participation. We are debating this new clause in the shade of Bullock, the fifth directive and all the other plans to change the face of capitalist enterprise. Against that background, this new clause is a mere flick of a feather. The noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, criticised the proposal to add more to the statutory obligations of directors in their companies' reports. This ought not to trouble them in the least. It seems to me that it would probably add to the interest of company reports. It would enable them to include more—more that is relevant, perhaps, to the workers' interests—about their relations with their staff in the supplement which many companies admirably produce for the special interest of their employees."Strong forces of left and right will confront each other on the streets of Britain",
My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord would give way?
Yes, certainly, my Lords.
My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord will agree that there is nothing whatever to prevent a company which wishes to set out its activities of this kind in some part or other of its annual report from so doing, and as I told the noble Lord we in fact do it from time to time.
My Lords, I agree entirely but there are times when just a gentle nudge helps, and this is what the new clause suggests. It does not tell companies what they must do. It merely asks them to tell us what they are doing. And that I think is of great interest, because it is one of the most important aspects of industrial relations today. My firm conviction is that our existing system cannot last unless there is a better understanding between management and workers under our existing system. I do not think that prosperity lies the way of this Bill; I do not think it puts us on the way at all. But if this new clause went into the Bill, it would be the one thing which indicated that there was some constructive proposal in the Bill to establish evidence of a better relationship between management and workers. So I sincerely hope that the amendment will not be brushed aside by minor objections.
The noble Lord's own company ought to be proud to include in its reports what it has done in this particular field and it might get some satisfaction from looking at the reports of other companies to see whether they have got anything to match it. Let us have rivalry in industrial relations as well as in profitability and in other aspects of industrial and commercial enterprise. I feel that there is great merit in this proposal. It would be highly diverting for the members of many companies to read what their directors are doing in this field, and it would not be without interest among the workers, who would be very glad indeed to read the directors' version of their relations with the staff.My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, moved this amendment, he made mention of my contribution to the debate in the early hours of the morning. He was kind enough to say that I had talked rather more deeply about the philosophy of it. I still think that it is a desirable attitude-changing thing. I said also at that time that to use the directors' report was an ingenious way of getting it into the system but that I wanted to reflect upon it. I think I said at that time, and I say it again, that what the noble Lord has put into subsection (3) is much too detailed. Subsection (3)(d) in particular has got an element of bias in it which does not make it encouraging. But what is important is whether it is in the right place.
Since the Committee stage I have taken advice from companies and from the CBI. Their main point has been very well put to us by my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter. I shall not go into that point too far, but I was disappointed to hear from my noble friend that he deprives his shareholders of the most eloquent speeches which he gives to us. I think it would be only fair to them if he were to expand on his speeches. Perhaps he might take Lord Rochester's advice and in his directors' report or his chairman's report at least give them that part which relates to the subject of this amendment. Having said that, the point is that it is not very suitable to put in a Bill of this nature something which is more suited to a Companies Bill. It is a bit of a trick to try to put legislation relating to annual reports and directors' reports into an Employment Bill. For that reason, although the idea is a good one, I should not have thought that it ought to go into this Bill. By that I mean that the idea of encouraging companies to do what is set out in subsection (3) is a good one. I am persuaded, however, that the directors' report is not the right place for it. My noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter has told us why, and I endorse what he said. I support also very much the fact that it would become a rote for those companies which were not doing it properly. What one wants to do is to get the thinking there so that it develops. I do not think we shall get it there just by making people write something down every year. Many enthusiastic companies have been doing this kind of thing for 10 years or more. The ones who are not enthusiastic—I had experience of this in an earlier job—will shuffle through and give some kind of a cosmetic report which means nothing, while the ones who want to do it do not need to put it down. This is the conundrum. It would be nice if there were an element of compulsion, but even if you introduce an element of compulsion you cannot bring it about unless you send people to prison if they fail to do it. It can only be done by persuasion. The question therefore is how to introduce the persuasion. I should have thought that if you are to do it by persuasion it needs to go a little wider, but I suggest that you cannot do it by legislation. Therefore we are back again at trying constantly to get the message across, to make speeches, to get trade associations to tackle it for their industries, to get the CBI to encourage it, which indeed they do, and then gradually to get across the message that if one does not do these things then one's company is not going to be so profitable. That is one of the factors to which one returns. Unless one gets the message through that there should be a degree of communication which involves the people in one's employ, one will not get the extra profitability that one needs. That is the key message—but one does not do that by legislation; one does that by all sorts of other means. I am sorry, but for those various reasons I do not believe that this amendment should be supported, but I shall be most interested to hear what my noble friend on the Front Bench has to say.3.51 p.m.
My Lords, I am by no means disposed to brush aside the amendment in the manner suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby. I have the utmost sympathy with what it proposes as an end, but, like the noble Lords, Lord Mottistone and Lord Boyd-Carpenter, I am doubtful about its inclusion in the statute as a means. I entered industry when I was 20 and retired when I was 70. I had 50 years in industry and during all that time I never worked for, was a director of or was associated as a consultant with any firm that did not bend over backwards to try to develop its relations with its employees.
One of the most careful and meticulous in this respect was Joseph Lucas, of which I was a director for many years. We took an enormous amount of trouble to publish a special balance sheet which explained to the laity, as it were, what the official balance sheet meant, and a special edition of the cash flow statement and profit and loss account in simplified terms which enabled everyone to understand it. I remember that at Schweppes, the chairman Sir Fredrick Hooper used to have a regular meeting of his shop stewards at which he explained his progress in the financing of the company. At Lucas, for example, if we included in the directors' report and accounts all that we were doing with our employees by way of employees' relations, we would have trebled or quadrupled the length of the directors' report and accounts. That is what the house magazine is for, and it is the development of house magazines over the last few years which has done so much. Furthermore, in incorporating such a thing into the statute, one is rather taking it out of the discretion of the directors just how far various acts of judgment they have to make are to be regarded. All boards of directors operate under various Stock Exchange conventions and rules for security in relation to whatever might create an artificial value for the shares in the context of mergers, takeover bids and so on. It is a very difficult thing to know just how far one can go in taking this matter, which is of substantial interest to employees, into employees' confidence in this sort of way. It must be a matter of judgment, and I do not believe that it should go into the statute. But, in saying that it is for this reason that I cannot vote for the amendment, I would not in any way like to withold my sympathy from what it aims for as an end, although I cannot agree with this as a means.My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, moved a similar new clause at Committee stage, I gave it my support, but was unable to express myself in any terms of enthusiasm. I noticed that the version which the noble Lord has now moved includes some changes which he has explained, but I must say that my enthusiasm is not greatly enhanced by the changes he has made.
I regard this proposition as a commendable tentative first step in what is a much more fundamental problem of industrial democracy than the noble Lord appears to appreciate, in the way in which he has drafted his amendment. It reminds me of a bather putting a tentative toe into the water, but being afraid to take the plunge into the sea. What is involved in the achievement of a worthwhile system of industrial democracy is, I believe, much more than the provision of information or even the establishment of consultative committees for employees. It goes much deeper than that. If workers really are to be involved in decision-making in industry, then it is my view that they should be much more involved in ownership and real control than is provided for by the orthodox schemes of share ownership, such as that which has been described by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, and such as those advocated with enthusiasm by the Liberal Party. I suggest that this is not the occasion on which to spell out the details of a more fundamental approach. I feel sure that if we did engage in such a debate, my views and those of the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, would fairly soon take divergent paths—not least on the question which his amendment ignores, of the degree to which trade union organisations should be involved in planning and the control of industrial enterprises. I reiterate what I said at Committee stage; that I gave his proposition mild support. I believe that he and I ought to rest content today with that very modest degree of agreement, rather than take things any further at this stage.My Lords, may I support the spirit of this amendment, which seeks to introduce this concept of worker participation; a peculiarly English concept of consultation before decision making and a measure of participation in profits. The distinction between this concept and other concepts is of importance because of the obligations arising by virtue of United Kingdom accession of the Common Market. I refer to worker participation in the sense of worker representation, which the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby, has touched upon. There are two types, your Lordships will appreciate.
The first type is the worker participation referred to as such in paragraph 999 of the Donovan Report where the concept of worker participation in management bodies below board level is discussed and adversely commented upon, The other type of worker participation is that at board level, which really is the subject matter of all the talk, talk, talk which has gone on. That stems from the 5th draft directive in 1972, Bullock in 1977, and the Vredeling draft—all within the Community context—in 1980. Very recently (this year in fact), there was the report of the Legal Affairs Committee. That is the concept which reflects the two-tier structure of the Netherlands and West German companies. This amendment has nothing whatever to do with those other concepts of worker participation which are in effect forms of worker representation. Why do I support this so strongly? First, because in the technological age—the age of the microchip—and with the development of the new service industries, it is conducive to a better order of industrial relations, because these new developments are bringing about very substantial changes in the pattern of employment. Secondly, because these proposals are conducive to the national interest, because they provide a means, albeit a small means, of seeking to relate pay to profitability and beating the bogey of inflation. Furthermore, they provide the employee with a sense of involvement, they provide him with a spur, an initiative. So far as the employer is concerned, they constitute what your Lordships may think is a timely and requisite exhortation, an exhortation without compulsion, because the employer is under no obligation to disclose any sensitive information, and in fact, as pointed out by others, the employer is not really under an obligation to do anything, to take any positive step other than to say in his report what he has done. Here I go along with the noble Lord, Lord Houghton of Sowerby; we do need a new initiative, we do need a new approach and we do need a new spirit within the framework of existing law. This amendment, if it does nothing else, seeks to herald this new approach. It is a step, and in my submission an important step, in the right direction. Whether one regards it as the brainchild of the union of its sponsors or as some hybrid adoption, this is at least indigenous; it is related to our needs and is in accordance with our traditions. But, surely, before this could be brought into law the views of all interested parties ought to be canvassed, and they ought to be known before any legislative proposals are made. The questions arising are not only as to the substance but as to the means, as the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, so rightly observed. Furthermore, surely the other place could hardly be expected to welcome this surprise bundle on its doorstep at this stage of the legislative process. Finally, within the dimension of the European Community, to which of course we are bound, surely consideration has to be given to the deveolpments there which to some degree could overlap with the proposals here, and furthermore and in particular the degree to which the 1975, 1977 and 1978 directives are relevant. They affect consultation over redundancies, protection or workers, amalgamations, mergers, takeover situations, the question of guaranteed wages for insolvency when insolvency is used, and that will come into effect in October next year. All these aspects surely have to be considered in relation to this matter. Finally, if only my noble friend the Minister were able to give some assurance that this subject of worker participation should find its way into the next Green Paper, with a view, if possible, to introducing legislation, after consultation, before the next general election, surely that would commend itself to many, if perhaps not most, of your Lordships. I most respectfully ask—while expressing gratitude to the sponsors for having brought forward this very important idea and this very useful constructive proposal, while acknowledging the rectitude of their approach and the sincerity of their purpose—would it not be premature to move towards legislation in this sphere, for the reasons I have given, without adequate consultation?4.4 p.m.
My Lords, may I take one or two brief points. We have already taken rather a long time on a rather long Report stage. I was delighted to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, that the company of which he is chairman—and one would expect it of a company of which he is chairman—already engage in this type of participation. What I cannot understand is his reluctance to put the fact in the annual report. It does not require, as has been suggested, paragraph after paragraph about detail as to whether the tea break shall be taken in half an hour and so on. What it does require is instruction in the annual report of major decisions that have been taken by the company in consultation with their employees. Nor does it require the employees always to agree. The fact that they have been consulted is the important thing.
My point is that this would be of great value to shareholders. Shareholders get a copy of the annual report; they do not all get a copy of the house magazine—in fact, few of them do. A shareholder reading the annual report will feel that any suspicion has been laid of possible trouble that could have arisen because of something that was happening within the company. A short paragraph would unquestionably help to diffuse the fear in the minds of shareholders that things are not being carried on as they should be. My final point is that those companies that are already doing this—there are many; I know of some and they are doing it extremely well—would have little or no objection to putting a short paragraph or two into the annual report. But if this amendment is approved and becomes legislation it will help to persuade those companies which are less helpful in this direction to move, and to move rather quickly.My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, would he clarify his usage of one word? He spoke of the amendment requiring major decisions—
My Lords, I wonder if I may interrupt the noble Earl. I realise he is asking for clarification, but it is Report stage and he has spoken once. I think we might be contravening custom if the noble Earl made a second speech.
My Lords, may I speak for three minutes on this? I have often spoken on it before. I think it is a very nice idea and I have always supported it. But one has to be practical in these matters. I have had experience of being a small employer. Of course, the average small employer takes his employees into his confidence, but it is far more difficult in a big public company, and I think it would be almost impossible in a nationalised industry. I am all for giving bonus shares—I am talking now of public companies—but if you give bonus shares in public companies the employees will instantly sell them. You have to give a special sort of share that they cannot sell straight away. Otherwise, giving these shares would seem pointless. The object of giving employees shares is to encourage them to take an interest in the company.
One of the most important aspects is to try to explain a balance sheet to employees. It is extremely difficult. If an employee reads in the newspaper that such and such a company has made a profit of £1 million he thinks, "I should like some of that". If only it could be explained to him where that …1 million goes! A great deal goes in tax; a lot goes back to the reserves to keep the employee employed and for new machinery; the balance goes to the shareholders who have to pay their tax and who are the people who have taken all the risk. So the majority of the money goes to the state, to pay for the employees' children at school and all the social benefits. If only we could explain that to the employee! I have found it very difficult. In my experience the average employee is interested only in the size of his wage packet. He is rather inclined to live in the present. However, I am all for some form of employee participation and sharing financially. I have in mind the speech of the noble Lord opposite who spoke on workers' ownership, and I wonder whether the workers would be prepared to see their savings go if the company fails. Any business is a gamble and not every business succeeds. In fact, hundreds go down every year. Is the employee prepared to take the risk, the gamble, that the employer is prepared to take? I have sometimes thought that an amendment like this should be in a Bill, but, with great respect to the mover of this amendment, I do not think that this is the right Bill. As my noble friend behind me said, it is really a matter for a Companies Bill, but it would be extremely difficult in big public companies to have such a statutory arrangement.My Lords, I should like to take up the points raised earlier this afternoon by the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, and the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone; to agree with what they said; to add—your Lordships will be happy to learn—very little to it; and to dissent ever so mildly from their conclusion. They were quite correct when they said that many firms already do these things—and the firm with which the noble Lord, Lord Boyd-Carpenter, is connected is a notable example of that—and do not need encouragement. They were also correct in saying that there were a number of firms that would do these things in a phantom or spurious way, giving lip service to the idea. However, there is a great group of firms in between those two groups, many of whom will respond to the kind of encouragement which the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, quite rightly said was the best way to go about these things. However, I am sure that when he reflects he will agree that even encouragement sometimes needs help.
Ideas of this type have been around for quite a considerable time. I think that noble Lords will agree that progress has been slow, glacially slow. Anything which agitates the process, which makes progress quicker, ought to be encouraged. I think that noble Lords, on reflection, will agree with me that legislation has often been used for the purpose of education and for encouragement, as well as for the ordinary uses of legislation which we understand perfectly well. It seems to me that this is a situation in which the prod or goad of legislation, added to the kind of encouragement that the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, argues is necessary, might increase the pace towards the aim which most noble Lords in all parts of the House seem to agree is required. I hope that your Lordships will agree with this amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, will not withdraw it. In fact, I hope that he will pursue it and that, if he does so, noble Lords on all sides of the House will support him, as I certainly shall.My Lords, I do not want to keep the House long. According to my calculations we have had seven speeches in favour of this amendment and, I think, four against it. I want to support it in much the way in which we on these Benches supported it when it came up on Committee. I think that the arguments for it have been put very fully this afternoon, much more fully, of course, because we have discussed it at a much better time than when the arguments were put last time.
I want merely to point to a paradox, as I see it, in the arguments, to some extent in the source of the arguments, of those so far who are opposing the amendment. It is a paradox which I think would be particularly notable if it were to be reflected in the speech of the Minister when he replies. It is what one might call the recrudescence of voluntarism. We are told that people do this already, so why can we not leave them alone? We are told that even if they do not do it already, there is nothing to prevent them from doing it; and anyway we are told that it has been done for years. We are told: "These are good practices; they are excellent things; people ought to be like this, but you cannot force them. You have to allow for the voluntary system; you must trust the voluntary system". Indeed, that is very much what the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, said when the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, put forward this argument first of all in the 1980 Industry Bill. As I recollect it, he said that it was reasonable enough but he could not accept it because the voluntary method was the way, and anyway there were no powers in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Rochester, has come back and has put it forward again. This time there are some powers, but when we discussed the matter in Committee we received from the noble Earl the same arguments: "There is nothing to prevent it; we have done it for years; you cannot force people to do it; trust the voluntary system". This is extremely paradoxical, when you compare it with the general drift of the debate which we had all through the Committee stage and which we shall be having later on tonight and again on Monday about legislating about the conditions of UMAs, picketing and responsibility in trade unions, and probably in the next Bill when we talk about elections and trade union government. When we have these things we have moved away from voluntarism in all those areas. But there is nothing to prevent it. We have told you—and am afraid it is Professor Gennard again—that the great majority of UMAs have all these things. In other words, they have done it for years. That argument does not do for the greater part of the Bill: it only does for this amendment in this particular clause. I suggest that it does not do there either.4.19 p.m.
My Lords, we have had an important debate on what is a very important matter. The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, said that he wondered when I spoke whether I was going to use the argument that this was the recrudescence of voluntarism. I am bound to say that I do not know whether I am going to do so because I am not quite certain what the expression means. But I am quite certain that every other noble Lord knows what it means, and I shall listen to my speech with interest to see whether in fact I shall achieve what the noble Lord anticipates! We had a similar debate on an almost identical amendment during the previous proceedings in Committee, and I am bound to say that I admire Lord Rochester's parliamentary dexterity in ensuring that, by putting this amendment down for mention even before Clause I, his arguments and his amendment will be properly considered, as opposed to what happened when the matter was dealt with at 3.46 in the morning. He certainly has ensured—and quite rightly so—that it has had a good hearing.
I think that everyone agrees with what this amendment seeks to achieve in the overall sphere of industrial relations. This afternoon, as indeed in our previous debate, there has been no dissension from the general proposition that it would be for the benefit of the economy generally if greater advances were made in British industry towards employee involvement. I think the differences arise over what one considers to be the best methods by which the common objective of making progress would be achieved. My noble friends Lord Mottistone and Lord Boyd-Carpenter and the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, all thought that legislation was not the right way in which to achieve this. I should like to assure your Lordships that the Government are firmly committed to the principle of managements informing and consulting their employees about matters which affect them; but we are equally opposed—and I am bound to say this—to imposing rigid and possibly inflexible legal systems on employers which take no account of their particular needs or circumstances. I agree with my noble friend Lord Mottistone that in the end it is a question of persuasion and not of legislation. I think that there has been much progress in what one might generally call employee involvement. A recent survey by the Confederation of British Industry some nine months ago showed this to be the case, but some understandably wished the progress to be greater. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon, who used that graphic expression that it was "glacially slow". The amendment which the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, has tabled would require directors of companies over a certain size to include in the annual report, which is required of them under the companies legislation, a statement of the arrangements which have been introduced or developed by the company during the financial year concerned to promote employee participation and economic understanding. If this amendment is accepted, this they will have to do year after year, every year. I agree with my noble friend Lord Boyd-Carpenter that there is the danger that these reports may become routine or anodyne. There is a similar reporting requirement which was introduced under the Companies Directors Reports (Employment of Disabled Persons) Regulations 1980. This requires directors to include in their report a statement describing the company's policy towards the employment of disabled people. No formal review has been conducted of the statements which are made under these regulations, but an initial analysis has revealed a considerable number of brief and rather bland statements, and it is by no means certain that the legislation is stimulating employers to adopt more progressive policies. I think that it would be wrong to legislate in this way unless industry itself believes that the costs and the burdens, which would undoubtedly be imposed upon it, would be outweighed by the resultant benefits. I agree with my noble friend Lord Mottistone that the concept of employee involvement is one of the changing of attitudes. It must be done consonant with the fortunes of a company. Employee involvement, desirable though it is—and I think that we all desire it—does not of itself ensure success, and the worst way to encourage genuine progress towards employee involvement would be to create difficulties or opposition within companies by imposing a legal obligation to report annually on the steps which they have taken towards what is, after all, a social goal, and a commendable one, but one which may be considered by some in certain circumstances—but not all—to be distant from economic enhancement. I would, therefore, urge your Lordships not to accept this amendment until such time as industry itself has indicated that it is convinced that the benefits would outweigh the costs. The noble Lord, Lord Rochester, prayed in aid that he and his colleagues had supported the Government over the Bill and he hoped, therefore, that the Government would, in return, be enabled to accept this amendment. I am bound to say that I appreciate the support of the noble Lord. I do not think that it emanates from any natural feeling of generosity that he may have, but merely, probably, because he thinks the Government are right in the Bill. I commend him and his party for their judgment. The noble Lord said that he would be prepared to withdraw this amendment if the Government would consult with him. But then he made the quite extraordinary remark, if I may say so, that it was no good the Government saying that they would consult with employers, trade unions or others, provided that they consulted the noble Lord, Lord Rochester. It is certainly the case that there will shortly be placed before the Council of Ministers proposals from the European Community Commission for directives about employee involvement. Before we start serious discussions on these proposals there will have to be consultation and discussion about the best method of achieving employee involvement. I fancy that those consultations will display strong support for the Government's current policy. But it will provide an opportunity for interested parties to register further their views about how progress could best be made. I do not think that the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, could genuinely say that it is all right to discuss this with him, but not with those who are intimately involved. I must stress that all this Bill—except Clausel, which is different and totally separate—has been the result of discussion and consultation; and I agree with my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway, who said that it would be unfortunate to include in legislation something which, however commendable the objective may be, has not been discussed with those who will be deeply affected and something over which many of your Lordships, while expressing sympathy, have nevertheless expressed a reservation. The amendment is similar to a Private Member's Bill which was introduced in another place. By raising it now, the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, has made it quite certain that company reports will be considered in the forthcoming debate on the European Community directives on employee involvement. But I urge upon your Lordships the desire that we should not put into legislation in this Bill something which, however good it may be, has not had the fullness of consultation with others and which might not achieve the admirable intention which the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, seeks to achieve.My Lords, before the noble Earl sits down, I should like to ask him one question. He said that these matters are best dealt with by persuasion, and I am inclined to agree with what he said about the undesirability of very rigid legislation. But can he tell me how this persuasion will be put across, who will do it, and what proportion of business magnates he thinks is likely to respond to it?
My Lords, with the leave of the House, perhaps I may reply to that intervention by the noble Lord, Lord Somers. I would ask him to look back over the last 10 years and see the enormous progress which has been made by industry over employee participation, over the general understanding of the new ways in which people think. No one person is responsible for doing the persuading. It is a matter of fact and it is a fact of life that public opinion persuades people to change their attitudes.
My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, which I think has been worthy of the subject matter. I do not want to detain your Lordships for very long and I think it would be fair to say that I endeavoured to anticipate in my opening remarks a number of the arguments which have been adduced against this amendment. But a number of points have been made to which I think I should offer some reply because they are new.
First, perhaps I may turn to what the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, had to say. I was disappointed that he should feel that in subsection (3)(d) there was a certain bias. The wording in subsection (3) is specifically framed in order to avoid that bias. At the moment the trouble is that managers and employee representatives often have different ideas as to how resources should be allocated for the purposes of pay and investment, for example. That was why this subsection is framed to indicate that what we are after is the achievement of a common awareness on the part of great groups as to the problems that arise in that connection. The noble Lord came very near to telling me that there was an element of trickery in my having sought, along with my noble friends and allies, to include, a clause of this kind in the Bill. I hope on reflection that he will absolve me from any such motive. The sole purpose of seeking to introduce this clause into the Bill is to give it a positive complexion as opposed to the necessarily negative attributes that it now has.My Lords, would the noble Lord allow me to reassure him that at no stage was I trying to indicate that there was any trickery on his part or that of his noble friends in any way?
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. We are good friends and I am grateful for that assurance. The noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, if he will forgive me for saying so, seemed to come very near to being complacent in this matter. I can only say that, if he has been engaged throughout the 50 years of his distinguished industrial connections with only those firms which have good employee involvement policies, he must have been very fortunate.
I wish that Sir Raymond Pennock had already taken his seat and had been able to take part in this discussion. I am not for a moment suggesting that he would necessarily have supported this amendment, but I am sure of one thing, and that is that, since he has made it perhaps the major theme in his two years' presidency of the CBI that there are still far too many firms with inadequate employee involvement policies, he would have been heartily behind the objective which this amendment seeks to achieve. The noble Lord, Lord Oram, seemed to feel that it did not go far enough. That was a change. In particular, as I understood it, he thought that there was insufficient emphasis given to trade union representatives in the consultative exercise here proposed. I should like to reassure him that, in so far as employee representatives are trade unionists, as they are in the firm for which I used to work—where I think I am right in saying they are still all shop stewards—it is they who of course would be engaged as the employee representatives in the consultation exercise. I am more grateful than I can say to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, for the support he offered at least to the principle underlying this amendment. I am sorry that the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, when he replied did not even take up the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell, that at least this question of employee representation should feature in the consultations that the Secretary of State is to have with employers and trade unions on other matters in connection with ballots. I was disappointed but not altogether surprised by the response of the noble Earl. He is certainly right to say that in so far as we have given the Government support on the main issues of this Bill it is because, in general, we have felt that, despite the practical difficulties to which I referred earlier, they deserve that support, but certainly there was no element of horse-trading involved in the suggestion that I made that, that support having been given, for some reason the Government should support this amendment. This amendment is left to be supported on its merits or not at all. Similarly, I am sorry that he should have felt that it was inconsistent of me to say, as I understood it, that I was seeking consultation on the part of the Government with me but not with others. The point of the distinction was one of time. If there were consultations with me and others between now and Third Reading, that would place a maximum time on the process of 10 weeks. If there were to be further consultations with employers and trade unions, at the rate at which these consultations have taken place in recent years, I certainly would not see anything happening this side of the next general election, if then. A clear division of opinion has arisen in the House today. Our views are strongly held, they are sincerely held, and I should like to take the advice, for which I was grateful, of the noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon, that the distinction is great enough to mean that I should divide the House.4.37 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 116; Not-Contents, 112.
DIVISION NO. 1
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Airedale, L. | Elwyn-Jones, L. |
| Amulree, L. | Esher, V. |
| Ardwick, L. | Evans of Claughton, L. |
| Auckland, L. | Ewart-Biggs, B. |
| Aylestone, L. | Fisher of Rednal, B. |
| Banks, L. | Gaitskell, B. |
| Barrington, V. | Gladwyn, L. |
| Beaumont of Whitley, L. | Glenamara, L. |
| Beswick, L. | Gosford, E. |
| Bishopston, L. | Grey, E. |
| Briginshaw, L. | Hampton, L. |
| Brockway, L. | Hatch of Lusby, L. |
| Brooks of Tremorfa, L. | Houghton of Sowerby, L. |
| Bruce of Donington, L. | Howie of Troon, L. |
| Burton of Coventry, B. | Hughes, L. |
| Byers, L. | Hunt, L. |
| Chitnis, L. | Hunter of Newington, L. |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Hylton-Foster, B. |
| Clifford of Chudleigh, L. | Ilchester, E. |
| Collison, L. | Jacques, L. |
| Cooper of Stockton Heath, L. | Jeger, B. |
| Craigavon, V. | Jenkins of Putney, L. |
| Crook, L. | John-Mackie, L. |
| Cudlipp, L. | Kennet, L. |
| David, B. | Kilmamock, L. [Teller.] |
| Davies of Leek, L. | Kinloss, Ly. |
| Diamond, L. | Kitchener, E. |
| Donaldson of Kingsbridge, L. | Leatherland, L. |
| Lee of Asheridge, B. | St. Davids, V. |
| Lee of Newton, L. | Seear, B. |
| Listowel, E. | Sefton of Garston, L. |
| Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. | Shinwell, L. |
| Lloyd of Hampstead, L. | Simon, V. |
| Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. | Stamp, L. |
| Longford, E. | Stedman, B. |
| Lovell-Davis, L. | Stewart of Alvechurch, B. |
| McCarthy, L. | Stewart of Fulham, L. |
| Mackie of Benshie, L. | Stone, L. |
| McNair, L. | Strabolgi, L. |
| Mais, L. | Strathcona and Mount Royal, L. |
| Mar, C. | |
| Mayhew, L. | Strauss, L. |
| Molloy, L. | Tanlaw, L. |
| Ogmore, L. | Taylor of Gryfe, L. |
| Oram, L. | Tordoff, L. |
| Parry, L. | Underhill, L. |
| Peart, L. | Vernon, L. |
| Phillips, B. | Wade, L. |
| Plant, L. | Wallace of Coslany, L. |
| Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. | Walston, L. |
| Porritt, L. | Wells-Pestell, L. |
| Raglan, L. | Whaddon, L. |
| Rathcreedan, L. | White, B. |
| Redcliffe-Maud, L. | Wigoder, L. |
| Ritchie of Dundee, L. | Willis, L. |
| Roberthall, L. | Wilson of Langside, L. |
| Robson of Kiddington, B. | Winstanley, L. |
| Rochester, L. [Teller.] | Wynne-Jones, L. |
| Ross of Marnock, L. |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Ailesbury, M. | Gray, L. |
| Airey of Abingdon, B. | Gridley, L. |
| Aldenham, L. | Hailsham of Saint Marylebone, L. |
| Alexander of Tunis, E. | |
| Ampthill, L. | Halsbury, E. |
| Avon, E. | Hankey, L. |
| Balerno, L. | Hatherton, L. |
| Balfour of Inchrye, L. | Hawke, L. |
| Belhaven and Stenton, L. | Hayter, L. |
| Bellwin, L. | Henley, L. |
| Beloff, L. | Hives, L. |
| Belstead, L. | Holderness, L. |
| Bessborough, E. | Home of the Hirsel, L. |
| Boyd-Carpenter, L. | Keyes, L. |
| Caccia, L. | Killearn, L. |
| Campbell of Croy, L. | Kilmany, L. |
| Carnegy of Lour, B. | Kimberley, E. |
| Cathcart, E. | Lane-Fox, B. |
| Clitheroe, L. | Lauderdale, E. |
| Coleraine, L. | Long, V. |
| Constantine of Stanmore, L. | Lyell, L. |
| Cork and Orrery, E. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Cullen of Ashbourne, L. | Macleod of Borve, B. |
| Daventry, V. | Mancroft, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Mansfield, E. |
| De La Warr, E. | Margadale, L. |
| Denham, L. [Teller.] | Marley, L. |
| Dilhorne, V. | Massereene and Ferrard, V. |
| Drumalbyn, L. | Mersey, V. |
| Duncan-Sandys, L. | Milverton, L. |
| Ebbisham, L. | Minto, E. |
| Eccles, V. | Morris, L. |
| Elibank, L. | Mottistone, L. |
| Ellenborough. L. | Mountgarret, V. |
| Elles, B. | Moyne, L. |
| Elliot of Harwood, B. | Murton of Lindisfarne, L. |
| Elton, L. | Newall, L. |
| Faithfull, B. | Orkney, E. |
| Ferrers, E. | Pender, L. |
| Ferrier, L. | Penrhyn, L. |
| Fortescue, E. | Platt of Writtle, B. |
| Fraser of Kilmorack, L. | Rankeillour, L. |
| Gainford, L. | Reigate, L. |
| Gibson-Watt, L. | Renton L. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Rochdale, V. |
| Glenkinglas, L. | Romney, E. |
| Gowrie, E. | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Sandys, L. [Teller.] | Thorneycroft, L. |
| Seebohm, L. | Trenchard, V. |
| Selkirk, E. | Trumpington, B. |
| Sharples, B. | Vaux of Harrowden, L. |
| Skelmersdale, L. | Vickers, B. |
| Soames, L. | Vivian, L. |
| Spens, L. | Wakefield of Kendal, L. |
| Swinfen, L. | Westbury, L. |
| Teynham, L. | Young, B. |
| Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
Resolved in the affirmative, and amendment agreed to accordingly.
4.46 p.m.
Schedule 1 [Compensation for certain dismissals.]:
moved Amendment No. 2:
Page 27, line 10, after ("applicant") insert ("and, so far as is practicable, the relevant employer and the relevant trade union specified in the union membership agreement,").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I will, with permission, speak also to Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5. First, however, I would remark that I would give the noble Earl full marks for the recrudescence of voluntarism, in view of the last contribution he made. This series of amendments is concerned with the schedule which spells out what the objectives are in Clause 1, and we return to the issue we raised in Committee about the degree of discretion given to the Secretary of State under this procedure. In Committee we tried to insert a number of conditions on those wide areas of discretion. We wanted the grounds of the discretion specified, we wanted a role for industrial tribunals and we wanted to provide the same basis for the payment of compensation as other forms and so on; but in all those attempts we were unsuccessful. However, today may prove a precedent, so we can hope.
We were told two things by the Government on that occasion. It was said that all our attempts to introduce some modification of the discretion given to the Secretary of State were unnecessary either because they would happen anyway—because he would act in the ways we tried to prescribe he should act—or because (and in particular we were told this by the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie) it was really an administrative process and not a judicial one. We do not accept that. We consider that to pay out money for past circumstances in which it is alleged that people were unfairly dismissed—or would have been unfairly dismissed if the law had been otherwise—is just as much a judicial process as to pay out compensation in cases of unfair dismissal which happen today under the 1980 Act.
Therefore we have returned to the same issue and we have tried to do it in a very modest way, because in this series of amendments we are really only dealing with a situation where there may have been a mistake—that, in terms of paragraph (9) of the schedule, it has been thought that maybe there is a case for a reconsideration of the decision because it may have been,
"made in ignorance of, or was based on a mistake as to, some material fact."
We are saying that it should be possible for that kind of process to be started not only by the complainant, but by other interested parties, too; for example, the employer, or the trade union. They should be able to invoke the procedure whereby they claim that the decision,
"was made in ignorance of, or was based on a mistake as to, some material fact".
The other interested parties should be able to invoke the procedure just as much as the complainant can invoke it.
The only argument that I see it might be possible to advance against our proposal was, in a slightly different form, advanced by the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, at col. 689 of the Official Report of the Committee stage on 6th July. He said that so far as he could see, going back to the model of an administrative process, the facts, and ascertaining them, was a simple matter and in effect was no concern of the union or the employer. He said at col. 689:
"The Government accept that the dismissals of those who will be eligible to apply under these arrangements were not unlawful at the time. There is no question of seeking to establish whether these dismissals were right or wrong in some legal sense. The sole questions at issue now will be factual ones which—and again I must emphasise this—cannot lead to any liability on the part of a former employer or trade union. In view of this there can be no case for giving a former employer or trade union the right to state their views, as these amendments seek. In fact, the views of the employer or of a trade union are neither here nor there".
We would submit that the noble Earl went on somewhat to argue against himself when he subsequently admitted that there were cases where the facts might be in dispute, and it might not be all that apparent. If that were the case, then, going back to the first defence of the Government—that they would do all the things, anyway—the employer or the union almost certainly would be contacted. He stated:
"Then, of course, in other cases there will be more difficulty in establishing the facts. In these cases the appointed person will no doubt wish to ask the former employer and possibly the union concerned for details, and this the Bill permits him to do".
He then said:
"I need hardly say that if there is any doubt about the facts of a dismissal or about the loss which the applicant has suffered, then the appointed person will seek the facts from any individual or organisations who may be able to help".
The point that we are making is, how can we be certain that the appointed person, prompted, as he may well be, by the complainant, knows whether there has been ignorance of facts, so far as he is himself concerned? How does he know about his own ignorance? How does he know whether he has based his decision on a mistake as to some material fact? Of course, if he bases his decision on a mistake as to some material fact which affects the complainant, we can expect the complainant to set him aright. But it is not true, nor is it fair, to say that the union and the employer are not involved. They may well wish to argue that there was not an unfair dismissal in the terms of the legislation. They may wish to feel, and may very well feel, that to suggest that there was an unfair dismissal is a slight upon their own procedures. They may very well have had operating in the period their own domestic procedures, which allowed for conscientious objection, and allowed existing employees to opt out of union membership agreements. Therefore, they may feel that those facts are material, and that in one way or another the decision must have been based on a misstatement of fact, believing that the actual facts were in their favour.
So the aim of the amendment is simple and straightforward, and we look forward to hearing the Government's arguments. We believe that the parties are involved. We believe that in a minority of cases they could correct the facts upon which the decision of the appointed person is based, and the object of the amendments is to give them the right to do that. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am greatful to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, for taking Amendments Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 together. This group of amendments reverts to a theme which, as he quite rightly said, we discussed at the Committee stage. At that stage your Lordships debated whether the opinion of an applicant's former employer and the relevant trade union should have to be sought before payments could be made under the provisions. Now, with Amendment No. 2, the noble Lord seeks to have all decisions notified to the former employer and trade union, and with Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5 he seeks to allow employers and trade unions to be able to request reconsideration of a decision on compensation, on the grounds that the decision was based on a mistake as to, or ignorance of, some material fact.
Perhaps I may be permitted to look at each amendment in turn. Amendment No. 2 would require the Secretary of State to inform not only each applicant of his decision on each case, but also so far as was practicable, the former employer and the trade union concerned. I ventured to make clear in Committee—the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, this afternoon has reminded us of this—that it is wholly mistaken to view the former employer or trade union concerned as being in any sense parties to the applications. I think that the noble Lord quoted the words that I used—that it is nothing to do with them. In Committee I tried to make it plain that no blame or liability will attach to any employer or trade union as a result of an application under Clause 1 of and Schedule 1 to the Bill. They are not the ones who are being judged. They have nothing to gain and nothing to fear from the outcome of the applications. If that is so, in my view there can be no justification for requiring the Secretary of State to inform them of his decisions on individual applications. Amendment No. 3 seeks to allow the former employer or trade union to apply for a reconsideration of the Secretary of State's decision. I must say that I find that unacceptable. As I have said, neither the employer nor the union will in any way at all be parties to the applications, and yet here it is being argued that nevertheless they should be able to come along and say, "Excuse me, I know that the outcome has nothing to do with me, but you must look at this again". With the greatest of respect to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, that simply does not make procedural sense, if it makes any other kind of sense—which I rather doubt. In Amendment No. 4 the noble Lord seeks to require the Secretary of State to inform the employer and trade union concerned as well as the applicant if, off his own bat, he decides to reconsider an application. This is the same well-worn theme, and so I shall not repeat myself yet again, other than to say that the employer and the union would not have been parties to the original application, and therefore they would not be parties to the Secretary of State's reconsideration. Amendment No. 5 seeks to impose on the employer and the trade union concerned a time limit of three months in which to apply for a reconsideration. Well, perhaps we should be grateful for small mercies. If we were to allow employers and trade unions to apply for reconsideration of someone else's application, at least it would be nice to be able to limit the time in which they could do so. I have suggested that the Government do not see it right to tread down that cobbly, old path, and I would ask the House to reject this amendment, as well.My Lords, I would not say that the noble Earl has disappointed me, but there it is. He has gone through each amendment and, as he has said, he has repeated his well-worn track answer that it has nothing to do with anybody other than the Government and the complainant. What we are saying fundamentally is that it has something to do with other parties, and that they should have at least the very limited rights that we are suggesting. I do not feel disposed to withdraw the amendment.
On Question, amendment negatived. [Amendments Nos. 3, 4 and 5 not moved.]5 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 6:
Page 27, line 40, leave out sub-paragraph (2) and insert—
("(2) Where the Secretary of State, after reconsideration of a case under paragraph 9, is satisfied that a payment has been made by reason of a fundamental mistake as to some material fact, he may, within three months of the payment being made, cause the person to whom it has been made to repay such part of it as he considers just and equitable.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, we are still on Schedule 1, and this is the final attempt on our part to inject a little equity and fairness into this procedure. We feel, as we have said, that it is biased against those who consider the fairness and justice of the original dismissal. What we are trying to do is to widen the basis on which, in this case, there might be repayment through some mistake, fraud or something of that kind.
At the moment, as I understand it, the schedule allows for liability for repayment in one extreme case and in one extreme case only, and that is in paragraph 10 on page 27:
"Where … any person misrepresents or fails to disclose any material fact, whether fraudulently or otherwise".
An example, I suppose, would be where he was warned five times for unsatisfactory work: that that is why he was dismissed and it was not anything to do with his union membership. Or it might be that he had refused to obey a lawful order, or something of that kind. If he suppressed or fraudulently misrepresented the facts of his dismissal in a circumstance like that, then, I take it, that would be covered by this part of the schedule. The most common case, I suppose, would be where he had already obtained an alternative job somewhere else and wished to leave anyway, and where the throwing in of his union card, or whatever, was simply a way of applying for the money. If it could be shown that these statements were made, or had failed to be made, and that therefore there was fraud, there would be a liability for repayment.
What we are suggesting in this amendment is that in some ways it is an exceptional circumstance that fraudulent misrepresentation exists. We do not suggest it is common. More common, I would suggest, given the administrative nature of this procedure—what we called at Committee stage this hugger-mugger procedure; that is, the privateness of this procedure and the distance from the event (because these are circumstances in which the decision by the appointed person is some two, three or four years from the event itself)—is the innocent mistake of fact. The most common one, I suppose, might be the date on which a UMA became operative. It may be that the individual was not in fact in employment at the time; or, rather, to put it the other way round, that the UMA did not come into operation when he was first engaged but came into operation subsequently or previously, or there was some mistake about the date on which the UMA became operative. That might affect whether or not he had a case for compensation under the Act, and some innocent mistake might be made in that respect.
A further example might be where there was an appeals machinery. If one tries to give this clause a little concreteness, one is reminded of the case of Miss Joanne Harris, who, we understand, failed to use the machinery for appeal which was available to her. That might be taken into account—I do not know—by the appointed person if he knew of it. I do not know about Miss Harris; perhaps she forgot that there was such machinery. It might quite innocently he forgotten that there was a form of redress and that the form of redress was not followed. These are facts which could quite innocently have been withheld from the tribunal; and they are mistakes of fact, not deliberate matters of misrepresentation. It is this kind of thing that we are trying to cover in this amendment, and we are saying that there should in effect be an additional reason why there could be a reconsideration of a liability for repayment, not simply when there is some misrepresentation but when there is some innocent misstatement of fact. I beg to move.
My Lords, we have had our two old friends pop up from the Committee stage again—Professor Gennard, and now hugger-mugger. I wondered whether we were going to see them appear again. As Schedule 1 is presently drafted it will make an applicant liable to repay compensation which he has been awarded only where he has been at fault; for example, by failing knowingly to disclose some material fact. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, could require him to repay compensation where he in fact has acted in perfectly good faith but where some mistake has nevertheless occurred.
I am bound to say at the outset that I think that the amendment is directed at an eventual which seems unlikely to occur very often, if ever, but I also accept the fact that it is proposed in perfectly good faith. But if the facts cannot be established, payments will not be made; and if the facts have been deliberately misrepresented or concealed with the consent or the connivance of the applicant, the Bill already provides for a liability on the applicant to repay. The noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, is entirely right in saying that that appears in paragraph 10(1) of the schedule. But this amendment seeks to go further by making the applicant who has acted with total honesty nevertheless liable to repay compensation if a mistake occurs elsewhere. My Lords, let us consider the case of a person who makes an application, in good faith, in which every particular is true to the best of his knowledge and belief. After the appointed person has considered his case and has made his recommendation, the Secretary of State makes a payment. The applicant might well use that money straightaway to pay off debts, to take a holiday or to do whatever else he likes to do with it. Then, two months later, the Secretary of State might write to him and say, "I am terribly sorry, I have made a mistake; my calculations were wrong"; or, indeed, he might say," I made a mistake; your former employer has now sent me some further facts which he did not send when my assessor first asked him about your application, and therefore you ought to repay the money which you received ". I do not really believe that it would be right or just that that person should repay the compensation because of a mistake for which he was not responsible. In prescribing that it would be wrong for the applicant to have to repay in such circumstances, the Government have followed the precedent—and, indeed, virtually the same words—in two other similar Acts, both passed by the previous Government, which provide for payments of compensation. They are the Vaccine Damage Payments Act and the Pneumoconiosis Act. The same principle is also present in the Social Security Act 1975, where it provides that repayment of benefits will not be required so long as the beneficiary can show that he has used due care and diligence to avoid overpayment. So, while I sympathise with what the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, is trying to achieve, I think he will agree that if his amendment were to be made to the Bill it would really be putting an imposition on the recipient of the money for reasons for which he was not responsible and in conditions in which it would be unfair for him to have to repay.My Lords, I accept what the noble Earl says and I thank him for it. Certainly he is perfectly correct to say that if our amendment were introduced as it appears on the Marshalled List—at least, I think he is right—we might be getting at people who had, in the terms of, I think he said, the pneumoconiosis legislation, used due care and diligence, and I would not want to do that. I would say that if somebody has done his best to present the truth—and I think "due care and diligence" is a very good phrase; it should have been in our amendment—then I should want to leave him outside.
But, as I indicated in my example, I was thinking of somebody who was not aware that when he came to the place of work there was indeed a UMA. People forget, and they may not always know. These things do not always work in the proper way; and so he believes that the UMA came after he arrived when in fact the UMA was there before. If the appointed person knew that, he would rule the case out, and then, to take the noble Earl's own case, subsequently the employer gets to know the true facts and writes to him. This is one of the arguments for having the employer play a role in this matter, but the Government have ruled that out. The employer gets to know the evidence on which the appointed person has taken his decision and says, "That is quite wrong; in fact we have had a UMA in this establishment for two years, or four years, and it is quite wrong. I do not suggest that the man was not using due care and diligence, but he just happened to be wrong That is the kind of circumstance I was trying to deal with and I still maintain that it is one which it would be fair to put in the Bill, but I must accept the point made by the noble Earl that it is not there in our amendment. Therefore, I am prepared to withdraw the amendment. Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.5.10 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 7:
Page 2, line 47, leave out from ("agreement") to end of line 5 on page 3 and insert—
("(3A) Subsection (3) shall not apply where within six months of the delivery to the employer of a petition signed by not less than 20 per cent. of those employees of the employer who on the day of the delivery of the petition belonged to the class to which the union membership agreement relates and calling for a ballot on the question whether the agreement should apply in relation to them the union membership agreement has not been approved in relation to employees of that class in accordance with section 58A provided that no such petition for a ballot has been made within the preceding three years.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 7 and in doing so I should first apologise to the House for the very convoluted wording of this amendment. In fact, the wording is not really my responsibility. I do not think that I could have composed it on my own. It is taken—with one addition—from an amendment that was moved in Standing Committee in another place by a member of the Social Democratic Party. I spoke to the principle contained in this amendment on Committee stage and pointed out at the time that it appeared that the so-called alliance between the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party had broken down in the Standing Committee and that it was only right that the country should know where they stood on this very important principle of how they intend to deal with the closed shop.
The noble Lord, Lord Rochester, in speaking about a similar amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Jacques, objected to the references I made at that time, by saying that the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, had faithfully reflected the ideas and words of their honourable friend Mr. Cyril Smith in the Standing Committee. That is perfectly true. But what I think we are entitled to know is just where this alliance stands on this issue. We know, broadly, where the Government stand. I had thought that the Government would support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Jacques at Committee stage, because I had always believed that the Government supported the principle of contracting-in rather than contracting-out. This amendment, and the amendment of my noble friend Lord Jacques, is based upon contracting-in as far as balloting is concerned.
We were left just as mystified—except in the vote on that amendment—as we had been before. In the vote, the members of the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party voted together, with the Government, against the amendment. This afternoon I should like to invite them both to clear up this matter. During my speech at Committee stage, the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, pointed out that his objection to the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Jacques was that the use of what is known as the trigger mechanism for balloting, rather than the automatic five-year balloting, was open to the abuse that it could be used too frequently; that there could be constant requests for ballots and that this would ruin the whole principle of the idea.
I have allowed for the objections of the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, which have some point to them, by adding the words of his honourable friend in the Standing Committee in another place. The provision at the end of this amendment is:
"that no such petition for a ballot has been made within the preceding three years".
I am not fussy about whether it is two years or three years, but that is put in specifically in order to make sure that there is no covering over of the objections which he made during Committee stage.
My Lords, the other objection made was the difference between the amendment of my noble friend Lord Jacques and the amendment proposed in Standing Committee by the member of the SDP. Whereas my noble friend Lord Jacques had referred to 10 years, Mr. Bradley in the Standing Committee had referred to 20 years. The 20 years is now there. Therefore, it would seem to me that we are entitled to know where stands this alliance, which claims to be considered a future prospective Government.
In the Standing Committee it was clear that the Liberal representative was so passionately opposed to the whole concept of the closed shop that he would not accept the amendment that had been moved by the member of the Social Democratic Party, because he believed that it might weaken the attack on the closed shop which is represented in this Bill. At the same time, in the Committee stage in this House the members of the Social Democratic Party voted against the amendment that allowed for the trigger mechanism, as opposed to the automatic five-year balloting—so where do they stand?
Let me say one thing about the Social Democratic Party in this House. I make a distinction here between those members of the Social Democratic Party who were never members of the Labour Party and those who have defected from the Labour Party. The members of the SDP in this House, as distinct from those in another place, who have not defected were mostly splendid, delightful, independent Members of your Lordships' House who contributed very greatly, with their expertise and their experience, to the work of the House. We welcomed on many occasions the stands that they took. Then they apparently began to feel lonely—a quite normal, human emotion—and wanted to join a community. Well, they have moved one step. I think it is fair to say that moving into the Social Democratic Party from independence is one step towards the recognition of the Socialist message. So we welcome that.
That is very different from the case of those whose public life has been based largely on support of the Labour and trade union movement. Nevertheless, they claim to be one party and they also claim to be a part of a political alliance; and I should like to hear from the Front Benches of the Liberal Party and from the Back Bench of the Social Democratic Party whether they have a policy towards balloting in connection with Clause 2 relating to the closed shop. I invite them to clear up this matter so that we and the country may know where they stand.
Is it the case, as appeared to be exhibited in the Standing Committee, that the Liberal Party and the Social Democratic Party are engaged in battle over whether there should be an automatic five-year ballot or whether there should be a trigger mechanism for such a ballot? To what extent is the Social Democratic Party accepting the known obsessive dislike, indeed hatred, shown by some members of the Liberal Party towards the closed shop? Whether that is cleared up or not, I still submit to the Government that if they are genuinely concerned, as they claim to he, with industrial relations in this Bill, as distinct from antiunion ideology and hostility towards the closed shop, then they will recognise that there is at least a very strong case to be answered as to whether the automatic five-year ballot concerning the closed shop will not provoke industrial unrest, chaos in many industries and hostility within the trade unions inside those industries.
I pointed out at Committee that, if it is known that in 1987 there is going to be a ballot regarding the closed shop, then the preceding six months to a year will be taken up with lobbying, with pressures, leafleting, meetings and so on, which is not going to help industrial relations in this country. That automatic form of ballot, as contained in the clause as it presently stands is, as the Government will accept, opposed and disliked by both employers and trade unions. One can quote—as the noble Lord, Lord Jacques, quoted in a similar debate in Committee—the Engineering Employees' Federation, and I am sure that the Government Front Bench know of the opposition of the merchant shipping employers. It is also opposed totally by the trade union movement. So this is surely a prescription for industrial unrest.
With those two points, and a request to both the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party to let us know where they stand so that we know whether we may count on their votes in the Division Lobby, together with a request to the Government to take seriously the danger that their present proposals will lead to serious industrial unrest, I move Amendment No. 7.
My Lords, I suppose I should respond briefly to the bait put before me by the noble Lord, Lord Hatch. But it will be brief. I think that he is stirring the pot. I think that he is wasting the time of the House, in that we have better things to do than argue on this point. Briefly, on behalf of my party, I have made it plain that we oppose the closed shop in principle but we have some reservations on practical grounds concerning the operation of the ballots. It is for that reason, your Lordships will remember, that we put forward certain amendments which were designed to reduce the percentage of support required before an existing closed shop would retain protection. We made it plain that we prefer the Government way of approaching this method, however, by that kind of ballot rather than by the trigger mechanism. It may be that there has been some difference of emphasis on this matter between my party and our allies in the Social Democratic Party. That is for them to comment on as well as myself.
What irritates me, frankly, is the reaction to any minor difference of opinion on complex matters like this. It may not be a bad thing that in Committee and in your Lordships' House there are these differences. In the last vote, for example, certain members of the Conservative Party had the courage to vote with members of the Liberal and Social Democratic and indeed Labour Parties. I do not think that they deserve reproach for that for one moment. Any differences that there may be of this minor nature between my party and the Social Democrats as our allies are as nothing compared with the vast gulf which lies between right and left wings of the Labour Party.5.26 p.m.
My Lords, I do not know whether a Report stage on a trigger amendment should give rise to a general debate on the state of the Alliance. I note that the Members of the SDP present shake their heads, and that the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, has already spoken. I suggest we leave that for another occasion.
My Lords, would my noble friend allow me to speak? Would not such a debate be most appropriately conducted during the dinner adjournment?
My Lords, I think that is an excellent idea. This is another trigger amendment which, apart from the discussions in the other place to which the noble Lord has referred, has been very well discussed in this House at the Committee stage. The noble Lord who moved the amendment suggested that we ought to have been more attracted to it because of our views about contracting in and contracting out. Frankly, I think that analogy bears on an individual's right to contract in and out. In an authorised closed shop, subject to the provisions concerned, he has to contract in and cannot contract out, so I do not accept the analogy.
The difficulty with trigger ballots lies in the problems which employees would be likely to face in practice in achieving the required threshold level to "trigger" a ballot. We must remember that efforts by individual employees to canvass or simply inquire into possible support for a ballot among fellow employees could in many cases be strenuously resisted by the trade unions concerned. It must be realistically expected that in many cases people attempting to promote a ballot would suffer attempts to dissuade them from such a course. I do not think it can be right that 20 per cent. or any other percentage of employees should declare themselves in order to gain the right to vote in a secret ballot, particularly when those prepared to press publicly for a ballot could suffer actual or threatened disciplinary action from their union as a result Noble Lords will remember the quotations from rule books to which I referred previously. This provision—indeed, any trigger provision—might result in ballots hardly ever being held even where employees would like them, as indeed the opinion polls tend to show that they would. We therefore do not consider that trigger ballots are an acceptable substitute for the automatic balloting in the provisions of this Bill. We believe—and we made this clear at Committee stage—that it is likely that there will be much less disruption on an automatic check with the alternative ways of doing that check which in closed shops which have the support of the vast majority allows the alternative of 85 per cent. of those voting. I am puzzled that trigger ballots should continue to be recommended rather than what I would have thought would have been supported by many responsible trade unions—or ought to be supported—namely, the great authority they are bound to draw from an authorised closed shop position should they have the authority of a secret ballot every five years. That must give them much greater strength than an authorised closed shop which has not been checked, and which it would be difficult to check, which has existed for years and years and years. I therefore ask the House to resist this amendment.My Lords, I think it was right that my noble friend Lord Hatch should seek clarification from various quarters in the House of the attitude of different parties to the ballot. He has achieved two-thirds of his objective in that we have had statements from the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, and the Minister who has just spoken.
My Lords, I wonder if I may intervene to make the noble Lord, Lord Oram, aware that the representatives of the Social Democratic Party behind him nodded when I asked them whether they wanted to say anything further—that is to say, they nodded that they did not want to say anything further.
My Lords, I am sorry that I cannot see the gesticulations of the Social Democratic Party behind me, but I should like briefly to remind the House of the purpose which my noble friend Lord Jacques and I sought to serve at the Committee stage when we moved a similar, though somewhat weaker, amendment than that which is before the House now. Our purpose was to ensure that where closed shop arrangements had been satisfactorily operated over the years, particularly in large and complex business organisations, then those arrangements should not be easily disturbed unless there was sufficient evidence that there was opinion within the workforce in favour of a change.
That is why in our amendment at the Committee stage we suggested that requisition by 10 per cent. of the workforce was reasonable. It was put to us during that debate by the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, that 20 per cent. might be a more reasonable and certain figure; and my noble friend Lord Jacques indicated that he was not particularly sticking on the 10 per cent. figure. Moreover, the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock, quite validly made the point that there was nothing in our amendment to prevent a whole series of requisitions for ballots, even if those ballots did not lead to the turning down of the existing closed shop arrangements. We consider that both points put by the noble Lord, Lord Kilmarnock—whether he is shaking his head or nodding, I cannot be sure at the moment—were valid points, and I am glad my noble friend, Lord Hatch, has included in this amendment words which fully take into account those words spoken by the noble Lord during his intervention last time. Therefore I hope that we may hear briefly from the noble Lord on behalf of the Social Democratic Party, not in terms of how divided or how allied they are with this, that and the other party, but what he thinks about this particular "trigger" suggestion.My Lords, I did not want to intervene in this debate, but the noble Viscount the Minister has made a number of statements which I think must be corrected. We do not argue on this side of the House for trigger ballots. If someone comes along and introduces statutory ballots—and it is the Government who would introduce statutory ballots, automatic statutory ballots—in certain circumstances, by and large there is a balance of advantage in favour of trigger processes rather than automatic processes. It is as broad as it is long. The problem with this amendment is that although it gets rid of automaticity it introduces a trigger ballot over a rather shorter period, but we are not coming before the House arguing for trigger ballots. Unfortunately, the main objective, which was to get the Social Democratic Party to say what they would like to do, has not been fulfilled because they will not say anything.
The only other thing I would say is that once again, in arguing against trigger ballots, the noble Viscount has gone back to a statement he made in an earlier debate about rule books. He really must not make this statement about rule books in the way that he does. He quotes general expulsion rules. Every voluntary association has a general expulsion rule: that is, the equivalent of Section 40 of the Army Act. Judges have said in cases of expulsion that you cannot operate unions without general expulsion rules because those who sought to do so would require vast rule books which specified every conceivable thing that a member might do which might in some way lead him into trouble. Every organisation has general expulsion rules. It is quite a different thing how you impose those rules and how frequently you cause them to be used to expel people; and even if you do that you must really appreciate that there were first-class common law defences and protections against the abuse of general expulsion rules, long before the 1980 Act.My Lords, I am sorry I have been unable to elicit clarification of the position of the Social Democratic Party towards this important issue—I think the noble Lord, Lord Rochester, somewhat played this down—regarding the future of industrial relations. I still think we are entitled to know where the Social Democratic Party, as well as the Liberal Party, stand in their view on the future of industrial relations and how they would deal with this important matter if they achieved their aim as the Government. However, it may be that the position of the Social Democratic Party in politics has been aptly represented by the noble Viscount's comment that they nodded when they meant "No".
My noble friend Lord McCarthy has put his finger clearly on a very important issue that was raised at Committee Stage and which apparently has not yet sunk into the mind of the noble Viscount the Minister. I think he revealed the thinking of the Government when he said in his argument against the trigger mechanism that if there was a trigger mechanism perhaps ballots would not often be held. But do we want ballots to be held? We certainly do not, and nothing that is in this amendment is designed—I assure the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, about this—to support the principle of balloting. It is only if ballots are going to be put into the Bill that we would then be trying to minimise the damage they will do. We think it is less dangerous to have the trigger mechanism than to have the automatic ballot. When the Minister says that one of his objections to the necessity for 20 per cent.—one in five—of the workforce to ask for a ballot concerning the closed shop, and that that provision would lead to ballots being held only infrequently—here I am paraphrasing his actual words—that reveals, to me at least, what the thinking of the Government is. Why do the Government want to force these ballots against the wishes of the employees and the trade unions? What we have been trying to do is to minimise the insistence of the Government that ballots should be held, by saying that ballots will be held when the people concerned—only one in five of them—show that they want ballots. We are not going to force ballots on them. The point that has been made regarding the danger to members in collecting that 20per cent. has surely been exploded by now. What evidence has there ever been that there is any substantial appreciation, pressure or intimidation by members of trade unions regarding the decisions that they take? That was challenged in another place, it was challenged in Standing Committee and there has been no answer to it. I do not believe that the noble Viscount has made out a case for saying that the kind of dislocation and hostility that would be created in the lead-up to these ballots would be less under his automatic system, than it would be if the trigger mechanism were to be adopted. All I am suggesting in this amendment is that the damage to industrial relations would be less—it will apply, anyway, from this clause—if it were a requirement that a ballot would be held at the will of 20 per cent. of the workforce, rather than an automatic ballot held every five years.My Lords, just let me say to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, that I certainly do not today want to enter into the question of whether or not there is a case for changing or regulating rule books. I merely pointed out that the existence of the rule book and not just the expulsion clause, together with the closed shop, creates a very strong position. Many of us who have spent our working lives in factories know that the pressure can be considerable, and that it is not easy in a closed shop situation to put forward something that a union may feel is against their interest. We still feel that and I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Hatch, that there is less likely to be disturbance, even in extremely contentedly working closed shop areas, by an automatic ballot, which we believe even unions will come to welcome as being a good way of giving backing to their authority. I hope that they will and, anyway, I hope that the House will resist this amendment.
On Question, amendment negatived.5.44 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 8:
Page 4, line 6, at end insert—
("(7A) In any case where neither subsection (4) nor subsection (7) has the effect of displacing subsection (3) and the employee—
The noble Viscount said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 8, 1 do not think I shall need to encourage the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, or the noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon, to speak, if they wish to do so, to Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 which are in their names. The House will remember that at the Committee stage the noble Earl and the noble Lord sought to protect the position of professionally qualified people, who might face a conflict of interest in an approved closed shop situation. I argued that we felt that the position was fully covered in the Bill and, to a degree, was supported by the 1980 Act and by a code of practice which had been issued following the 1980 Act.
In fact, the Government still believe that that is the case, but we cannot prove absolutely that that would specifically be the case on every occasion. As a result, and as a result of the noble Earl and the noble Lord pressing the point that they were not looking for a specific protection of people's opinions, consciences or firmly held convictions, but were looking for protection for people who found themselves with a conflict of interest, we have come forward with Amendment No. 8, which seeks to put in what could be called a subsection to deal with a conflict of interest, and in that way to avoid weakening the generality of subsection (4), which deals with conscience or deeply held personal convictions.
I hope that the noble Earl and the noble Lord will feel that we have met their points, and I should like to thank them both, and other Members from all quarters of the House who took part in the very interesting Committee stage discussion which we had on this subject. If accepted, this subsection will be a good demonstration of the value of the experience in which this Chamber abounds, and I couple that particularly on this occasion with the names of the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, and the noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon. My Lords, I beg to move.
My Lords, I am extremely obliged to the noble Viscount for coming forward with this amendment in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, on behalf of the Government, and I have no hesitation in supporting it in the form in which it now stands. It is similar to my Amendment No. 21 at the Committee stage, but, of course, I have always conceded that on a Government Bill the Government draftsmen must have the last word on the actual wording of the clause, and I accept that.
At the Committee stage, I withdrew the original amendment against a promise by the noble Viscount of sympathetic study in the interim, and I would entirely endorse what he has just said about the value of the Committee stages of these Bills as a dress rehearsal for the in-fighting which comes at Report stage, and the opportunity they give to study with good faith the various points involved. He promised to write to me and he kept his promise with commendable despatch. I have had plenty of time to study his arguments. I came up with an alternative in response to points made by many in the Committee stage that prevention is better than cure, and that it would be better not to allow a situation to arise than have to rectify it by giving damages if it did. I succeeded in drafting an amendment which comes forward as Amendment No. 11 and which I shall not now move at this Report stage. But, of course, you have to pay a price for what you achieve, and the price I had to pay for Amendment No. 11 was that it invalidated all the closed shop agreements, unless they were amended and that gave opportunities for demanding renegotiation and so on, which might be thought a high price to pay for achieving that. Meanwhile, the noble Viscount's promise of sympathetic study was honourably kept and he has come forward with this amendment, which I have no hesitation in accepting as a fair alternative to my own. It gives me what I have been arguing for since 1971 and, if your Lordships see fit to support the Government amendment on this occasion, I shall go home this evening a very contented Member of your Lordships' House.My Lords, I want to say relatively little on this occasion, because we have discussed this matter on at least half a dozen occasions, in my experience, and many more in the experience, which goes back much longer, of the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury.
I want to begin by congratulating the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and thanking him for two things. First, in the Committee stage debate he undertook to send out a letter giving the Government's attitude on this matter to the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, and myself, and to other noble Lords who were interested, and to place a copy of it in the Library. That letter was the most clear and convincing statement of the Government's attitude on this matter which we have had in the course of the discussions over the last several years, and I thank him for it. I found it convincing. The noble Earl also found it convincing, because it gave him his points. It did not quite give me mine. I found it convincing, but not convincing enough—only in the sense that the letter was based on the Government's strategy which leans on the concept of fair and unfair dismissal. I know that many of the concepts which we have discussed in these debates on employment legislation are hallowed by time, but this concept of unfair and fair dismissal is hallowed only as far back as 1971. I do not regard that as terribly hallowed. It is the kind of short hallowedness which could be unhallowed in due course, and I hope that in some future Bill it will be. I want not the concept of unfair or fair dismissal, but the dismissal not to happen at all, but I do not want to push my luck too far. Therefore, I should like to go on and give my second congratulation and thanks for this amendment which the Government have put down. It does not quite meet the point I made in earlier discussions, but I am perfectly sure that it goes as far in my direction as the Government reasonably could be expected to go. Since I had been under the impression that this Government were virtually immobile in such matters, any movement of this sort I welcome with open arms, and I hope that the House will, too. My own amendment, Amendment No. 12, which I do not intend to move when the time comes, was based on the letter which the Minister sent out to the noble Earl and to myself and to others. I took up the point made by the Minister that paragraph 54 of the code of practice on the closed shop was the key to the question, because it had to be considered by an industrial tribunal if a case came before it. I have argued all along that this particular matter should not be in the code but should be in the appropriate Bill. That is what I sought to do in my amendment. I took the provisions of paragraph 54 of the code and put them into the Bill, because that seemed to me to be the logical, clear and, above all, simple place for them to be. When they were in the code of practice, they seemed to me to be too far removed from the point of application and too tenuous in their connection with the problem. Although the Government cannot meet me on that, they have gone a very long way towards meeting the principle. I shall certainly look at the application of the Bill, when it becomes an Act, assuming that this amendment is accepted by the House, and see how it affects the professional engineers and other professional people about whom I have been worried. If the Government's proposals work, I shall be delighted. If it turns out that the Government's proposals do not work, I fear that I shall be required to come back to the House at some later suitable stage in order to try to press the point which I have made on a number of occasions. In the meantime, I hope the House will accept the generous proposals made by the Government.My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Howie of Troon, I am very glad that the Government have been able to go this far, but regret that the question is only one of unfair dismissal and not of retention of the job. It seems to me that where the professional code or the statutory duty conflicts, this should take priority. It remains to me monstrous that a man in that position is going to lose his job, albeit he is going to be compensated.
My Lords, I think that somebody from these Benches should say just two things. First, may I express appreciation to the Government for their response to what was, during the Committee stage, the general feeling of the Committee and for coming forward, therefore, with this amendment. It is good to see the parliamentary system working in this way and after a certain amount of pressure Ministers coming forward to that Box with something designed, at least in part, to meet the strong feelings expressed at the Committee stage. Secondly, may I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Halsbury, on the climax of, as I think he told us, 11 years of struggle. It is an admirable example to us all of the value of persistence. If I may add a speculation, those who have the good fortune to live in the near neighbourhood of the noble Earl may well find their sleep later tonight disturbed by the popping of corks.
My Lords, I feel like the guardsman who was out of step and the lady who was left waiting at the church. Firstly, may I say that we agreed with the Minister. When we saw—it came at an early stage, though no doubt the Minister had his reasons—for the first time this clause (and I do not claim now to have fully explored its ramifications because it is not exactly like the one put down by the noble Earl, for it goes beyond statutory professions, for example) we wondered what were the reasons for the Minister having changed his mind, because he was extremely persuasive. As he said again today, Section 4 of the 1980 Act protects, Section 7 of the 1980 Act protects, the code of practice protects, and in the only case that is cited the professional man won his case. Yet he comes to us today and does not say that he has changed his mind. He does not say that as a result of all the correspondence and listening to all the arguments he now finds that he was wrong.
I have not read his letter. He did not send one to me, though it is no doubt in the Library. But I am told by the noble Lord behind me that that letter restated his position with even greater clarity. So I am in a bit of a maze as to why in fact he has changed from the position which I thought we shared the other night. The only thing he has told me is that he could not be sure. He could not prove, he says, that if a professional man had come in front of an industrial tribunal, the decision would have gone that way. Well, no. That is what the judicial process is all about. You cannot prove it. Nevertheless, he wants to make it clear in the legislation. Well, all right. Let me say that we are not here today—and we were not at the Committee stage—trying to support situations in which people used closed shops to get professional men the sack. That is not what it is about. We disagree with this Bill in all kinds of ways. We disagree with what is done with union membership agreements, mainly because we believe that the way those agreements are operated in practice takes into account these problems. In addition, the Government have legislated with Section 4 of the 1980 Act, Section 7 of the 1980 Act, and so on, and now want to go further. I am not here to stop them. All I am saying is that I wish that when we put down amendments which the Government say are declaratory and which we say cannot be proved, they would be equally generous to us.
My Lords, I did use certain words which I hope will be clear when the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, reads the account. I mentioned that this conflict of interest was not specifically covered. We still felt, as we expressed both in the Committee stage and in the letter, that in all probability the Bill would have covered an unfair dismissal in this situation. But we believe that, due to the particular pressure of a conflict of interests, including areas where there was statutory backing to that conflict of interests, this issue should, on reflection, be specifically covered.
As far as the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, is concerned, I understand what she has in mind, but the Government view, I believe rightly, is that, as a Government, they can best protect people by working on the unfair dismissal and the consequences of it. A statement to say that someone must not be dismissed—or, as was suggested at Committee stage, should not be expelled—is a statement, but there is no absolute guarantee that it will be carried out. So the Government believe that, with the very strong deterrents for unfair dismissal in these cases, that is the strongest way for a Government to achieve what I believe the noble Baroness is after. On Question, amendment agreed to.6.1 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 9:
Leave out Clause 2.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg leave to move the amendment in my name. Since putting down Amendments Nos. 9 and 10, I have read the little red booklet which advises us what is proper and what is not proper. I find that Amendment No. 9 is proper because it is my intention to press this amendment, but that Amendment No. 10, as it was for the purpose of discussing the subject, is not proper at Report stage. Therefore, with the leave of your Lordships, I announce now my intention not to move Amendment No. 10, because I gather that it would be inappropriate to move an amendment that is only for debate.
I hope, however, to persuade your Lordships to accept the argument that I shall put forward in regard to Amendment No. 9. I have greater hope of doing so now than I had when I came in because the amendment which has just been not only moved but accepted by the Government indicates a degree of appreciation of the nature and complexity of the problem which has been absent hitherto. I rather hope that, during the course of this debate, that degree of appreciation will extend to the point where the Government will be able to say, "We will abandon Clause 2 altogether". I hope that when the reply comes from the Government Front Bench it will be more affirmative in character than I had expected at the beginning.
I am also encouraged in that thought by the fact that, in the course of the debate in the last session, the Government indicated that their minds were not closed. Another factor which may help the Government here is that by not moving Amendment No. 10, I am making it quite clear that it is my intention that the existing Sections 58 and 58A of the 1978 Act shall remain. Therefore, the removal of Clause 2 would simply leave in being the existing legislation; legislation which has worked and which I would have thought the Government might find reasonably satisfactory, without introducing this new business of complicated ballots which I hope to demonstrate will prove to be very difficult. I will go further than that—I believe that they are going to be quite impossible.
I rather suspect that, in drawing up these provisions in Clause 2, the model which the Government have had in mind has been the shop floor of the factory. I concede that it is just possible—although with some difficulty—that this clause could be made to apply and could work in a factory situation. But it is not the case that most people in this country work in factories. A large and important minority work in factories and I do not wish to indicate any lack of appreciation for their very great importance. But most people are not in a factory situation, and where we shall run into problems and chaos all over is in every situation which is not a factory situation. In fact, I do not know how it can be applied at all, and I wonder whether, in practice, the Government will ever bring in Clause 2 if they pause to examine the consequences of doing so. Let me illustrate one case that I know well.
To do so, I will quote, if I may, a letter from the general secretary of Equity which has been quoted already in the other place. What he wrote was this:
"Equity has been party to union membership agreements since the 'Thirties, and I believe that the employers and their associations have long shared our view that the maintenance of those agreements where they exist is in the interests of artists, employees and the entertainment industry in general. For example, in the theatre, this union and the managers' associations have long joined to form joint industrial Councils (the London and Provincial Theatre Councils, the first of which was established by a previous Minister of Labour). These Councils approve standard conditions of employment which provide, inter alia, that no manager may engage artists under those terms unless he is registered with the Council as an approved manager, and no artist may be so engaged unless he is similarly registered as an approved artist. Managers are approved if they belong to the appropriate trade association (or register with the Council and pay deposits to it to safeguard payment of salaries) and artists are approved if they are members of Equity. This ensures, to a great extent, not only that there are standard conditions which prevent unfair competition by undercutting, but also that those who are unlikely to be able to meet their obligations are unable to mount productions and employ artists. The Theatre Councils also require disputes to be referred to them for resolution "—
in other words they are stabilising forces for good industrial relations—
"and Equity undertakes to those Councils that it will use that procedure before taking industrial action. In addition, there are provisions ensconced in Theatre Council agreements whereby managers may apply to Equity to use non-members and have a right of appeal to the joint Councils if there request is rejected—and the quota system in the provincial theatre itself is the major area for entry to Equity and to the profession. The system has worked well without major industrial unrest in the theatre for nearly 50 years."
I will not quote the whole of the letter, but there is just one other piece that I would like to add, where the general secretary of Equity goes on to state:
"The proposed provisions concerning periodic review of union membership agreements cause my Council some concern. The vast majority of our members are employed or engaged on a casual basis. In films and television, employment can normally be measured in weeks if not days. In the theatre, although there are some artists engaged by the year, the vast majority are engaged for short periods or for the run of the play '. In those circumstances, it is difficult to see how any realistic ballot or periodic review could sensibly be held and how any benefit could be obtained thereby. Most of our agreements with employers are negotiated at regular intervals in any event."
If I may explain that a little further, the "agreement", which is the general agreement, is this document in my hand—the agreement for West End theatres. There are a number of others, but this is one of them. This agreement lays down the broad general conditions of employment and it applies to everyone who is employed in that area. There are similar documents in films, and similar agreements for the BBC and ITV covering television. There are also similar documents in the provincial theatre. These documents are regularly negotiated. They form the basic conditions. It is fair to say that over the years the conditions of employment have gradually been improved; it has, in other words, been a successful agreement between the two parties, without, as the letter says, any major industrial dispute. There have, of course, been minor disputes from time to time; it is natural that there should be. But I do not think any of your Lordships can remember any general stoppage in the theatre at all.
This document covers the general conditions. But there is subject to that—and this is probably the only document that the individual actually sees, though he may refer to that one from time to time—the standard contract. Here we have a contract which the individual enters into. These contracts are being signed at different places and at different times all over the place. The details filled in in the contract are different in every case. It is subject to a minimum salary and the holiday period is provided as a minimum period, but the actual conditions of employment can vary enormously, as your Lordships will readily imagine. For example, one actor may be on something rather less than £100 a week, even substantially less than that. Another one, a star, may be on 10 times that figure and possibly a share of the profits of the production as well. So that the range of remuneration is very large indeed. But the standard conditions apply. This complex operation is held together by the existence of a union shop which is interpreted and which is achieved in the manner described to your Lordships in the letter.
So we have this complex situation, that on the one hand the general terms of the agreement are negotiated periodically, perhaps once a year, perhaps rather more. This particular agreement I am holding in my hand was negotiated in 1981, in the early part of 1981, and I know is in course of discussion, with the idea that a new document, with somewhat improved conditions, one hopes, will be available later this year. This one is dated January 1981, but the whole of this condition is negotiable.
The complexity is this. What are we talking about when we are talking about ballots? Are we to say that there shall he a ballot related to the negotiation of this general document? If so, who does one ballot? Who does one know who is going to be employed under this contract? Nobody knows. At any one moment there will be a number of people, perhaps 300 or 400, engaged under this contract. But in a year's time there may be an entirely different 300 or 400 engaged under the contract. How can one select? Is one then to ballot the entire union membership? Why? Some people will never work under a West End contract. Some people work only in films or in television, and therefore under these circumstances would be voting in respect of a contract under which they are not currently engaged and under which they are probably unlikely ever to be engaged. Therefore, one has this terribly complex situation.
If one then says "No, one does not ballot all those on this. One ballots only the small group who are currently engaged in the particular theatre", is one then to have a continual series of ballots? Is one to say to the group employed in the theatre when they sign their contracts, "You six have got to ballot as to whether you will have this particular contract or whether you will not accept the union shop clause in it?" I do not see that that is a practical proposition, when contracts are being individually signed all over the place, not on the same day, when agents are negotiating and making agreements on behalf of other people of which those people may not be precisely aware at the time because they have given their power of attorney to the agent to conclude agreements on their behalf. It seems to me that what is being proposed here is totally impracticable; it simply will not work.
Not only will it not work in the area of theatre, but there are a number of other areas where it will not work. I do not see how it is going to apply in the area of shipping. There are other areas where I think the complexities I have illustrated would equally apply. I would seriously ask the Government to look again at this whole problem, and to say that they recognise, however good the intention may have been, that this is not a practical proposition. It is not capable of universal enforcement. In these circumstances I ask them, as the amendment suggests to leave out Clause 2, and I beg to move.
My Lords, very briefly, as somebody with an interest in this, I do not think the Government have thought this out in depth, both so far as seamen are concerned and certainly in regard to theatricals. I know this from within my own family, somebody trying for a contract. Person A may have no knowledge whatsoever of what is going on anywhere else. They are particularly concerned through their agents in getting a job in pantomime and so on. They may never reach the echelons of the West End or the higher echelons, they may be in small repertory theatres throughout Britain. Without going into the argument any more in depth, because it has been well covered by somebody who knows much more about it than I do, I think this should be looked at again before all this verbiage—and look at the length of it—is left here. It is not clear, it is not precise and it does not spike down exactly what the Government anticipated it would spike down.
My Lords, at Second Reading I mentioned this problem that is being raised by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, and as I remember I mentioned it in relation to Equity, being wholly ignorant of his vast experience and identity with Equity. Again, if I remember aright, my noble friend Lord Mottistone mentioned the question of shipping in this context. I am not going to take up your Lordships' time, but is it not right that there are certain situations where derogations might have to be granted in the interests of fairness and practica bility? If that is so, is it not right that there should be some form of machinery to provide the requisite elasticity to make this work? There is, of course, none. Although I fully support the broad intentions of my Front Bench in this matter, I would most respectfully ask that they give serious consideration to the matters that have been raised today by the noble Lords opposite.
My Lords, if I may intervene to explain the position with regard to the General Council of British Shipping and the National Union of Seaman, the position is not quite the same as has been explained to us by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins. The situation is that the General Council of British Shipping and the shipping companies are reorganising the method of the employment of seamen by agreement with the union; they have started that already. As they are organised at the moment they would have the same sort of problem. All they are asking is that the Government shall delay the introduction of these clauses sufficiently to give them time to complete their reorganisation. What they have been asking for is five years and what I have been seeking in various amendments is that period. The Government are aware of this and I understand that there have been very many meetings between the general council and the Government. I imagine that Equity would have done the same type of thing. So both sides are fully aware of the problem.
In the case of the seamen, it looks as though we may get two years from the date that this Bill is enacted, and what with the lead-up time that there has been from the beginning of the Bill being laid in another place, it will work out at something not far short of a total period of three years. That is marginally all right, but it does mean accelerating a reorganisation which was already in contemplation by the shipping companies. Therefore, the situation is not so serious and it is not one which I would seek to pursue any further than I have already, except to say to the Government that I trust, indeed, that they will stick to their idea of two years rather than one year, on which I gather they have not yet quite made up their mind.My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, for putting down this amendment. I do not think that I am betraying any confidence in saying that we sought at first to find, if we could, a way in which we could put down an amendment at this stage in the proceedings to deal with the special narrow problem that he has discussed with such knowledge and such eloquence tonight, but in fact we could not find one. The fact is that there is no way.
The noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, quite rightly in an attempt to deal with the problem of the shipping industry, sought to deal with it by giving them time. Fortunately, because of the reorganisation of the shipping industry, he tells us—he knows more about it than I do—that three years will do and that at the end of a three year period, it may be possible for the shipping industry to deal with what is the single most difficult problem for them; namely, to have a ballot at which they could get the requisite figures. But there is no way in the case of Equity. As the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, has said, whether it be three years, 30 years or 300 years, they cannot have a ballot, because the people who would be balloted are constantly moving. Therefore, there is no way and there was no way that we could find in Committee to deal with this situation. We put down a whole series of amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, said quite reasonably afterwards that there was, in fact, no amendment which dealt with the Equity situation, because no amendment will deal with it. The only thing that will deal with it is the removal of the clause and that is why we have this amendment down today. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell, is quite right to take up this point, because this is virtually the basic reason why we have parallel organisations to union membership agreements, in professions. That is why we have them in the law; theirs is a client relationship and the only way in which we can protect a client relationship is by what in the trade union movement they would call a "union shop", but which in the professional associations they call a "register". That is the only way in which it can be done. While we have this Bill and while we have this clause, I regret to say that we have no alternative but to move against it.My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, in moving this amendment, despite the fact that he has cloaked a lot of what he wants to say in relation to Equity, has certainly opened the opportunity for a debate on the principle that there should be ballots of existing closed shop arrangements, and perhaps on the principle that we should protect non-union members in a closed shop. I am very glad that he is not going to move Amendment No. 10, as that amendment, by repealing Section 58 of the 1978 Act, would also have removed the basic rights of employees to join trade unions and to take part in their activities. No doubt his own Front Bench would have had something to say about that.
But, leaving that matter aside, I am afraid that we do find ourselves on a fairly familiar treadmill. As your Lordships will know, Clause 2 of the Bill introduces new rights against unfair dismissal for non-membership in a closed shop. In particular, it provides that after a transitional period, dismissal for non-membership will be unfair where a closed shop has not been approved as required in a secret ballot. I do not think that I need burden the House by responding to arguments which have been raised previously against the closed shop balloting provisions of the Bill. Most of them now look decidedly threadbare. We kept hearing, for example, that the closed shop balloting provisions were disliked by employers who feared the industrial relations consequences. It has not been raised today, but I think it is worth pointing out that there was an article in the Financial Times on Monday referring to a poll taken earlier this month among 500 senior directors in large companies. That poll showed that most regard the Employment Bill as presenting little threat to industrial relations in their companies. A fair majority—60 per cent.—thought that the Bill was "about right", compared with 20 per cent. who thought it went too far and 13 per cent. not far enough. Only 2 per cent. thought that it would lead to a confrontation. So like so many of the other arguments which we have heard against the closed shop provisions of the Bill, the one about employers fearing the industrial relations consequences of the Bill's closed shop provisions just does not hold water. All these provisions have received many hours of debate both in your Lordships' House and in another place. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, will hardly be surprised to learn that we simply cannot accept this amendment which is effectively a wrecking amendment. We firmly believe that where employees are required to work under a closed shop agreement or arrangement, they should have the opportunity peridiocally to make known their views in a secret ballot, as to whether or not they want to continue to work under a closed shop arrangement. I must emphasise that the Government—and I am sure all of us on this side of the House—find this principle wholly unexceptionable and entirely justifiable. It is saying no more than that people are entitled to say whether an arrangement which can quite clearly conflict with their individual liberty is, nevertheless, one under which they wish to work. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins strikes a fairly familiar note when he talks about Equity and what amounts to collectivism versus individual rights in a closed shop. He argues that the majority have rights in a closed shop and that we are wrong to seek to safeguard the individual non-member, as we do in this Bill. Of course, the majority have rights: they have the right to be union members; the right to take part in trade union activities; and the right to organise and seek recognition from their employer. But why should these rights extend to forcing the odd non-union member to join a union? By staying out of the union he is not preventing the majority from exercising their rights to be in a union, but they seek to prevent him from exercising his basic right to choose whether to join a union or not. There is no doubt that as a Government we dislike the closed shop for precisely these reasons. We, of course, would prefer that it did not exist. If it were likely to be practical, we would seek to outlaw it, but because that it is not in our view a practical possibility, we are, instead, introducing the additional safeguard in this Bill, such as ballots, to ensure that the limitations on individual freedom, which the closed shop inevitably entails, should not be imposed on any individual unless it is quite clear that the overwhelming majority of his fellow employees are content for their freedoms to be restricted in this way. Contrast this, my Lords, with the attitude of the trade union movement. The TUC's guide to the Bill, asks unions to tell their employers that the policy on the closed shop should be "business as usual", and in particular advises unions to tell employers thatOne is forced to ask, "What is it that the TUC is so afraid of?" Can it be that if, for once, union leaders actually asked their members what they thought, they might not get the answer they wanted? Can it be that union leaders, in fact, know that the closed shop is just as unpopular with their members as it is with the public at large? Perhaps it is much safer, from their point of view, not to risk finding out. We reject this philosophy entirely. We think that individual employees have every right to make known their own views as to whether or not they want a closed shop to continue. That is what Clause 2 provides and that is why I shall ask your Lordships to reject this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, spoke particularly about Equity. I understand his concern about Equity. I have to say that I think that his fears are misplaced. There is nothing in these balloting provisions which need stop closed shop agreements in the entertainment industry from continuing to operate so long as they are genuinely wanted by the employees concerned. It will not be difficult—as the noble Lord suggests—in any way for employers in the entertainments industry to hold closed shop ballots. All they will need to do is to ballot all of their employees who are in their employment on a particular day. It will be up to them to choose a suitable day, and that is why the Bill's provisions are made deliberately flexible. My noble friend Lord Campbell made a point in connection not only with Equity but with Shipbuilding. It seems to me that he is seeking some form of exemption from the closed shop provisions for particular groups, rather like the approved closed shop provision of the 1971 Act. But there is a difference. The 1971 Act outlawed the closed shop; this Bill does not. If ballots are held, closed shops in entertainment can continue as though they were perfectly lawful. The Secretary of State is still considering whether to bring these balloting provisions for existing closed shops into effect one or two years after Royal Assent, but he will obviously have to take into account what has been said in your Lordships' House before reaching these decisions. In the light of what I have said and the particular comments that have been made in relation to the whole principle of Clause 2 of the Bill, which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins, seeks to remove, I trust that your Lordships will reject this amendment."secret ballots should not be held on the continuation of union membership agreements ".
My Lords, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, has been answering some other debate which took place in some other place on some other day. No doubt he was given a brief to do that in the belief that perhaps I would raise the general principle of the closed shop. As your Lordships will be aware, on this occasion I uttered no word of general condemnation about what the Government's intentions were. I do condemn them, but I did not do so on this occasion. I simply sought to deal with the question of practicability. My entire remarks were directed to the question of whether or not the clause was workable, and the reason that I asked your Lordships to reject it was not because I think it is wrong in principle—although I do—but purely because it is not practicable. It will not work; it cannot work; it will create total chaos.
The noble Lord, in the one moment when he touched on the matters which I have raised, suggested that there might be a day selected on which the ballot would take place. How does one select this day and who ballots? Everybody on that particular contract will be on a contract which already contains a closed shop clause. Who will be balloted—everybody on that particular contract at the moment? What are to be the consequences of the ballot? There is perhaps one area in which Equity differs from some other trade unions; it is that there has never been any case whatever of any breach of contract. The negotiations that take place at Equity take place on a general proposition which operates over the whole area. That general proposition, that general agreement, is negotiated about once a year. Subject to that, the individual actor is engaged on another document which is his personal contract, The general proposition is negotiated, and if one fails on that then no personal contracts are signed. But once a personal contract is signed between a manager and an actor, it is never broken by the actor or by the manager; it operates for the duration of that contract. In those circumstances, you cannot get an effective ballot operating, because the circumstances are not those which exist in the model in theminds of the Government, which is a factory floor situation. It is a situation in which—as I said in my introductory speech—people are signing contracts at different times all over the place, and sometimes are having contracts signed on their behalf. We have only touched on the beginnings of the complexity of the situation. I have talked about the theatre. A similar situation exists in films and television, with different kinds of contracts and different councils. But all these agreements are on the same basic principle of a general agreement which operates between the union and the managerial association and which does not at the time of its agreement concern any particular group of people. It envisages that there will be a group of people, all of whom are members of the trade union, who will come into the position which is affected by the negotiation. I want to make one more remark before I sit down. I went through this clause trying to discover some particular amendment to it which would create a special position to provide for the particular circumstances which I have described to your Lordships. I have not been able to find it. Nor has my noble friend on the Front Bench been able to find it; nor could the noble Lord, Lord Wedderburn, find it. We could not find any way of amending the contract which would provide for a workable exception to be made for the set of circumstances which I have described to your Lordships. In those circumstances I had no alternative but to move that Clause 2 be left out, because there is no practicable way of amending it. Therefore, I have no alternative but to ask your Lordships to divide and to support my amendment that Clause 2 be omitted.6.38 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 9) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 44; Not-Contents, 128.
DIVISION NO. 2
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Ardwick, L. | Bishopston, L. |
| Bernstein, L. | Blease, L. |
| Beswick, L. | Blyton, L. |
| Birk, B. | Briginshaw, L. |
| Brockway, L. | McCarthy, L. |
| Brooks of Tremorfa, L. | Molloy, L. |
| Bruce of Donington, L. | Oram, L. |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Parry, L. |
| Collison, L. | Peart, L. |
| David, B. | Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L. [Teller] |
| Davies of Leek, L. | |
| Elwyn-Jones, L. | Ross of Marnock, L. |
| Ewart-Biggs, B. | Stewart of Alvechurch, B. |
| Glenamara, L. | Stewart of Fulham, L. |
| Hatch of Lusby, L. | Stone, L. |
| Houghton of Sowerby, L. | Strabolgi, L. |
| Jacques, L. | Taylor of Mansfield, L. |
| Jeger, B. | Underhill, L. |
| Jenkins of Putney, L. | Wallace of Coslany, L. |
| John-Mackie, L. | White, B. |
| Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B. [Teller] | Willis, L. |
| Wynne-Jones, L. | |
| Lovell-Davis, L. |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Airey of Abingdon, B. | Kinloss, Ly. |
| Alexander of Tunis, E. | Kinnoull, E. |
| Auckland, L. | Lane-Fox, B. |
| Avon, E. | Lauderdale, E. |
| Aylestone, L. | Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. |
| Balerno, L. | Long, V. |
| Bellwin, L. | Lyell, L. |
| Beloff, L. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Belstead, L. | McNair, L. |
| Bessborough, E. | Mais, L. |
| Burton of Coventry, B. | Mansfield, E. |
| Caccia, L. | Margadale, L. |
| Caithness, E. | Marley, L. |
| Campbell of Alloway, L. | Massereene and Ferrard, V. |
| Cathcart, E. | Mersey, V. |
| Clifford of Chudleigh, L. | Milverton, L. |
| Cockfield, L. | Mottistone, L. |
| Colwyn, L. | Mountevans, L. |
| Constantine of Stanmore, L. | Moyne, L. |
| Cork and Orrery, E. | Murton of Lindisfarne, L. |
| Craigavon, V. | Napier and Ettrick, L. |
| Craigmyle, L. | Newall, L. |
| Cullen of Ashbourne, L. | O'Neill of the Maine, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Orkney, E. |
| De La Warr, E. | Pender, L. |
| Denham, L. [Teller] | Penrhyn, L. |
| Diamond, L. | Platt of Writtie, B. |
| Eccles, V. | Rankeillour, L. |
| Ellenborough, L. | Renton, L. |
| Elles, B. | Rochdale, V. |
| Elliot of Harwood, B. | Rochester, L. |
| Elton, L. | Romney, E. |
| Evans of Claughton, L. | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Ferrers, E. | Sandford, L. |
| Ferrier, L. | Sandys, L. [Teller] |
| Fortescue, E. | Seear, B. |
| Fraser of Kilmorack, L. | Selkirk, E. |
| Gainford, L. | Shannon, E. |
| Gardner of Parkes, B. | Sharples, B. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Skelmersdale, L. |
| Glenkinglas, L. | Spens, L. |
| Gowrie, E. | Stamp, L. |
| Gridley, L. | Stedman, B. |
| Halsbury, E. | Sudeley, L. |
| Hampton, L. | Swansea, L. |
| Harmar-Nicholls, L. | Swinfen, L. |
| Harris of Greenwich, L. | Tanlaw, L. |
| Hayter, L. | Taylor of Gryfe, L. |
| Henley, L. | Terrington, L. |
| Hives, L. | Teviot, L. |
| Holderness, L. | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Home of the Hirsel, L. | Tordoff, L. |
| Hornsby-Smith, B. | Tranmire, L. |
| Hylton-Foster, B. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Ironside, L. | Trenchard, V. |
| Kennet, L. | Trumpington, B. |
| Killearn, L. | Tryon, L. |
| Kilmany, L. | Tweedsmuir, L. |
| Kilmarnock, L. | Vaux of Harrowden, L. |
| Kimberley, E. | Vickers, B. |
| Vivian, L. | Whaddon, L. |
| Wade, L. | Windlesham, L. |
| Wakefield of Kendal, L. | Young, B. |
| Walston, L. |
Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
[ Amendments Nos. 10, 11 and 12 not moved.]
Clause 3 [ Basic Award]:
6.46 p.m.
moved Amendment No.13:
Page 6, line 33, leave out ("by virtue of section 58 or 59(a)")
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 13 and should like to bring in Amendment No. 15. We return now to the issues in the Committee concerning the basic award for unfair dismissal. We argued there that we did not accept the distinction between dismissals on grounds of the reason for dismissal. We were arguing that we thought that, for example, dismissal on grounds of discrimination for sex, or race discrimination, or for incapacity without due notice, or for so-called insubordination without taking into account the circumstances, all situations in which a tribunal might well decide that there was a case of unfair dismissal—either that the true reason was an unfair reason or because the employer had acted unreasonable according to the provisions of the unfair dismissal legislation—there was no basis on which to make a distinction so that all those cases would carry with them a lower level of award of compensation, a lower maximum of compensation, and to set them on one side and on the other side to set up, as it were, dismissal on grounds of union membership.
We never could see, and we cannot see today, the basis on which the Government make their three tier approach to unfair dismissals. It seems to us that in practice any unfair dismissal on any grounds could be, in principle or in practice, either less, or more, serious to the individual concerned than any other dismissal in any other grounds. Whether a dismissal is serious or not depends on the period out of work, whether you can immediately get another job and as good a job, the type of job you eventually obtain, and whether the dismissal itself—I suppose this is the argument that the Government used on Committee stage—was given on a ground which made it more difficult, if the cause and grounds were known, for the individual to get a job somewhere else.
Here again we thought that there could be just as many cases where people could be known to be unfairly dismissed on grounds of certain heart conditions, for example, or because they were thought to be unsuitable in various ways. Although it may be known that unfair dismissal on those grounds had been corrected in that compensation had been given, nevertheless the knowledge would follow people around from place to place and they could be hit just as hard—even more so—in certain circumstances as individuals dismissed because they would not join a union. We pointed in particular in Committee to the case of middle managers, say, who were earning substantial sums and who therefore could look forward to maximum compensation, perhaps of 50 per cent. of annual salary.
But the Government would have none of it and the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, said—reported at cols. 12 and 13 of Hansard of 12th July—that none of it was appropriate because the Government were seeking to create an effective deterrent and were responding to deep public concern. Because of those two things—and he quoted very few examples of deep public concern or the possible effects of the deterrent—the Government were justified in what they were doing, he said. There was no answer to our point, yet unfair dismissals continue at much the same rate outside the area of union membership. If one wants to practise a deterrent, why not practise it there? If one wants to deter unfair dismissals, why not increase the value of the compensation all round and deter by that means? Why instead do what the Government have done and abolish the old basic award and remove more than one million people from the effective protection of unfair dismissal? That cannot be justified as the result of any fall in the number of unfair dismissals.
We have therefore tabled another amendment which does not attempt to spread the £2,000 on the basic award or the special compensation award to everyone. Instead, it seeks to return to the position as it was previously; that is, to go back to the old-fashioned basic award of two weeks—that is the effect of Amendments Nos. 13 and 15—and thereby to return to a universal situation in which compensation maxima are the same for all, so that all are equally having available to them the two weeks' minimum basic award.
6.53 p.m.
My Lords, a similar amendment was moved in Committee, and the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, acknowledged that. Noble Lords opposite made the point then, as the noble Lord has now, that all unfair dismissals are to be equally condemned and that if limits for awards of compensation are to be raised at all, they should be raised for all cases. I agree that all unfair dismissals are to be regretted, and there is no difference between me and Lord McCarthy on that. As I pointed out in Committee, we believe that certain kinds of unfair dismissal merit the substantially enhanced levels of compensation which the Bill provides, and the reasons are simple. First, we are dealing not with dismissals which have been carried out because of some altercation between employer and employee or vice versa, but with dismissals which have been carried out in open defiance of rights specifically and recently passed by Parliament, and that is something we wish to deter very emphatically.
Secondly—this answers the substantive argument adduced by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy—it is surely the case that those who find themselves unfairly dismissed in these circumstances (in the closed shop circumstances) are likely to suffer considerably more as a result of their unfair dismissals than is the case in the generality of other unfair dismissals. That is one of the evils of the closed shop; it can frighten people as to the possibility of their not being employed in the future at all. I do not want to detain the House by repeating in detail the very black histories I outlined on earlier occasions, which I even outlined in some detail on the passing of the 1980 Act—the Walsall and Sandwell dismissals. The point there was that the dismissals were made by employers in direct violation of recently enacted statutory rights and in the knowledge that the employers would be liable to pay compensation. So they were not cases where an employer was acting, as he thought, fairly but subsequently found that a dismissal was unfair. The employers knew perfectly well that they were acting unfairly, and they were acting unfairly as a deliberate political act in outright defiance of statutory rights provided by Parliament. It was particularly lamentable that those renegade employers were supposedly responsible members of public authorities. I have made it quite clear that we want to deter such employers very fiercely, but the second reason is probably the reason which should commend itself more closely even to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy. It is surely self-evident that persons dismissed for non-membership of a union in a closed shop may find it difficult, if not impossible, to get another job in the same industry or locality, particularly where pre-entry closed shop arrangements are widespread. We firmly believe there is an urgent need for the enhanced compensation which the Bill provides in the case of unfair closed shop dismissals. The amendment would defeat that intention. There is a clear difference of view between ourselves and the Opposition on this score and I must therefore ask that the amendment be rejected.I am not surprised at that reply, my Lords, and I wish to take up only one point the noble Earl made because he was right to say that we have been round this matter a number of times. We have given examples of cases where we believe people could—in fact do—suffer as badly, if not worse, outside closed shop areas. However, I wish to take up one point he made because it has been made repeatedly in these debates and this may be the last opportunity to answer it. It is the point that there was something uniquely reprehensible in the conduct of Walsall and Sandwell Councils in the sense that they defied the Act.
There is nothing unusual in an employer deciding to dismiss someone and pay the compensation. It is not a criminal offence; he has decided to pay the compensation, and I make no criticism. One of the first things solicitors say to employers when they are called in on unfair dismissal cases is, "Of course, you can always pay your way out. The average award is only £750", and it is perfectly fair for them to say that because that is the legal position. We have carefully not given people a right of reinstatement, and if people are not given such a right, then of course it is always possible for any employer, public or private—it is no better and no worse whether he is public or private—to decide that he wants this particular man out because, whatever an unfair dismissal tribunal may say, he thinks he is a rotten workman, is lazy, is no good and he has just had enough. That is the state of the law. It happens every day and it is no good the noble Earl looking shocked. On Question, amendment negatived.
My Lords, I think that it might be for your Lordships convenience if we now took a break. Therefore, I beg to move that consideration on Report be now adjourned until eight o'clock.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Northern Ireland Assembly (Day Of Election) Order 1982
7 p.m.
My Lords, I beg to move that the draft Northern Ireland Assembly (Day of Election) Order, which was laid before this House on 14th July, be approved. The draft order which, if approved, will be made under Section 27(7) of the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, appoints Wednesday, 20th October, as the date on which the election to a new Northern Ireland Assembly will be held. The Assembly was dissolved with effect from 28th March 1975 under Section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1974.
The proposed election to the Northern Ireland Assembly will be fresh in the minds of your Lordships who have so recently discussed, and given their approval to, what is now the Northern Ireland Act 1982. The scope of the present draft order is very narrow—it simply appoints the date of the election to the Assembly. The House will be in no doubt about the Government's commitment to offering the people of Northern Ireland a framework for political progress and your Lordships will, I am sure, agree that to proceed to an early election to an Assembly is the right course. I am convinced that there is an expectation of, and a desire for, progress in Northern Ireland, and after much speculation about how the act will work, surely there is nothing to be gained by delay in putting its provisions into effect by electing an Assembly at the earliest reasonable opportunity. We believe that the date chosen, 20th October, allows sufficient time for the chief electoral officer and his staff to prepare for the election, and for the Northern Ireland parties to campaign effectively after the holiday season, while at the same time the date avoids the oncoming winter period, with its limited daylight hours, and weather, and possible security problems in consequence. The election will take place on a Wednesday—like local elections in Northern Ireland—so that the counting of votes, which inevitably will be a lengthy process in the larger constituencies, can be completed before the weekend. The order setting out the election timetable and the rules for the conduct of the election, which is subject to negative resolution, will be made shortly, thus giving the electoral staff and the parties plenty of time for preparation. I commend the draft order to the House.Moved, That the draft order laid before the House on 14th July be approved.—( The Earl of Gowrie.)
My Lords, I should like to thank the noble Earl the Minister for explaining to the House the general outline and details of the order. In welcoming the order, I note that it was debated at some length in another place on Monday last, 26th July. As one who has actively participated in the political life of Northern Ireland for almost 50 years, I am pleased that there now appears to be concern expressed and debated by Northern Ireland political parties and politicians about upholding and supporting the principles of parliamentary democracy. I consider that this is a pleasant change, for I can recall the great hostility and vigorous resistance shown by some Northern Ireland politicians towards the labour and trade union campaign for changes in the Northern Ireland local government franchise and for the adoption of the Westminster principle of one man, one vote.
However, I agree with the noble Earl that there is an expectation of, and a desire for, an early election for the Assembly to be held, and I believe that that expectation and desire are based on the reasons stated by him in regard to timing. Indeed, I would go further. I would say that if ever there was a time when Northern Ireland needed friends and understanding, that time is now. I would hope that in the forthcoming election for a Northern Ireland Assembly citizens from all walks of life, and from the various interests in the Province, will offer themselves as candidates for the new Assembly. I believe that the political and economic issues confronting the Northern Ireland people require that the electorate should be given a real opportunity to decide who should genuinely represent them in the new Assembly. I note what the noble Earl the Minister has stated in the House on a previous occasion, and what has been repeated in another place, about the current review of the criteria for disqualification from the United Kingdom Parliament, and that the findings of the review should have a close link with the criteria for the Assembly. I support the view that we should await the outcome of the review before deciding any changes concerning the Assembly. There is just one point that I should like to put to the Minister. I understand that the proposed Northern Ireland Assembly election will be held under the Electoral Law (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 and the Polling Schemes Regulations 1972. I hope that I am right in that assumption, and I think that this is an appropriate occasion on which I should put this question to the Minister. Will the Minister give an undertaking that every possible facility and opportunity are given to provide adequate and suitable siting of polling stations to ensure reasonable access to all wishing to record their vote? I believe that there are 545 separate premises designated by the chief electoral officer in his report for the period ended 31st March 1981. Perhaps since that date a few adjustments in the siting arrangements are necessary. With those remarks I certainly welcome and support the proposal for an election to be held for the new Assembly.My Lords, I, too, should like to thank the noble Earl for introducing the order fairly briefly, and once again I congratulate him on slipping from Bill to order and back to Bill with such apparent ease. The order is consequential upon the passage of the Northern Ireland Bill which we supported, and the arrangements seem entirely satisfactory to us. I would say that my party, and I am authorised by the noble Lord, Lord Donaldson of Kingsbridge, to add the SDP, support the Government in the order.
My Lords, I, too, should like very briefly to support what has been said. There can be no doubt that those of us who have supported the principle of the Assembly can do no other than support the arrangements and decisions made about the election. I think it very important that there has been no postponement. On the one hand people have expected the election and have made preparations for it, and postponement could only have encouraged the forces of disruption in the feeling that they had succeeded in what, tragically, they have already started to try to do.
I should like to make just one point in support of what my noble friend has said regarding the one problem that has posed itself in the context of the Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act. This matter has already been raised, and the Minister gave us to understand that the criteria would be examined and that there would be a report on it. One can only stress the importance of the fact that the future of the Assembly depends on there being strong cross-community support for the election, and it would seem too tragic if there were an obstacle and an excuse were given to certain people—An excuse, an excuse.
Not to participate in the election, and therefore the future were undermined. So I would implore the Minister to do whatever he can to find a way around this predicament. It is a question not just of the anomalies in the Disqualification Act, but also the results that will arise from the disqualification of certain people. So much is in the balance, and I hope that a way can be found to get around the problem.
My Lords, I am extremely gratified by the response of the two noble Lords and the noble Baroness who have spoken, and I should like to offer my thanks to them. I should like to answer in reverse order the two points that have been made to me. Obviously I am very much seized of the problem which the noble Baroness has outlined. But it is difficult to alter primary legislation in respect of individual cases and for individual activities, whether successful or unsuccessful, that are still somewhat hypothetical. I do not think that quite enough people appreciate that the parliamentary machinery is very cumbersome and parliamentary timetables are inevitably very crowded. However, I shall consider the point. I would perhaps prefer to direct the noble Baroness's attention to the very wise words uttered by her noble friend Lord Blease from the Labour Benches, expressing the hope that those who stand for the Assembly, or who freely chose to stand, will exercise choice in the interests of all the people of Northern Ireland. That would seem to me to be where, perhaps, I should leave the point for the moment.
On the question put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Blease, the Assembly Election Rules, which will form the second Schedule to the Northern Ireland Assembly Elections Order 1982, which my right honourable friend is making, will provide for the chief electoral officer, who is an independent official, to provide a sufficient number of polling stations for the election. The chief electoral officer will, as he has had to do in other Northern Ireland elections, devise a polling station scheme for the Province which strikes a balance between making polling stations readily available to all electors in the Province, as the noble Lord, Lord Blease, quite fairly wanted, while taking into account, of course, the resources available to the security forces in order to give adequate protection to polling stations at the same time. It is a sad and inevitable fact that the path to political progress and free choice in Northern Ireland is very easily interrupted by violent activities. It is all the more essential that people be as protected from these as best they can be, and that the purpose of the community as a whole is not deflected in any way in response to the men of violence. But I will take the point that the noble Lord has made and will refer it to the chief electoral officer, and I am sure he will do his best. On Question, Motion agreed to.Valuation (Postponement Of Revaluation) (Scotland) Order 1982
7.12 p.m.
rose to move, That the order laid before the House on 6th July be approved.
The noble Earl said: My Lords, from the detailed debate which we had on 7th April on the Valuation (Scotland) Order 1982, I know that your Lordships are already acquainted with the history of the proposal to hold a partial revaluation next year and I do not therefore propose to dwell on that at length. The order which we considered then gave effect to the Secretary of State's decision that the rating revaluation to be held in Scotland in 1983 should apply to non-domestic property only. We acknowledged at that time that there were a number of problems inherent in holding a partial revaluation, and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Ross of Marnock, and other noble Lords, drew attention to many of them.
Subsequently, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State met representatives of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities to discuss the resolution of the practical problems associated with the partial revaluation. The convention's representatives made strong representations that they considered the likely results of a partial revaluation to be sufficiently difficult to work with that it would be better to delay revaluation to a later year than to hold a partial one. In the light of these representations the Secretary of State reconsidered his decision, and announced on 18th June that he intended to revoke the order which prescribed a partial revaluation in 1983–84 and, in its place, to introduce an order deferring the next Scottish revaluation for two years; in other words, until 1985–86.
In implementation of this decision the Valuation (Postponement of Revaluation) (Scotland) Order 1982, which we are considering today, was laid before Parliament. It is, of course, a very simple order indeed, as it does only two things. First, it prescribes 1985–86 as the next year of revaluation in Scotland, and, secondly, it revokes the previous order. Given the concern which was expressed in our earlier debate over the proposal to hold a partial revaluation, I would think that your Lordships will welcome this order. The concept of the partial revaluation was introduced to enable valuation rolls to be kept up to date while the Government consider the future of the domestic rating system. It is still important that rolls should be kept up-to-date for as long as the rating system is with us, and that is why this order postpones revaluation for only two years, thus allowing the next revaluation to proceed seven years after the previous one, which is, of course, the same period as occurred between the last two revaluations in 1971 and 1978. Assessors now have over two-and-a-half years' notice of the intention to proceed with a new revaluation in 1985, and this should be time enough to make a fresh start and complete a revaluation then.
I would say that the fact that my right honourable friend is not proceeding as he originally proposed is proof of his willingness to heed the views of the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities and, if he is persuaded that they have a good case to make, to go along with those views. I trust, therefore, that your Lordships will agree that it is sensible to postpone for two years, abandoning the 1983 partial revaluation. I commend this order to the House and beg to move.
Moved, That the order laid before the House on 6th July be approved.—( The Earl of Mansfield.)
My Lords, we have to thank the Minister for his explanation of this order. I have been sitting here waiting, wondering what the explanation was going to be: whether it was that they had found some legal snag, because, remember, the last order came before us only on, I think it was, 7th April. I am the last person who should forget that date, because it happened to be my 71st birthday. But that order was no birthday present, because it was departing considerably from what we in Scotland had prided ourselves on; namely, that apart from the one period that the Minister mentioned, which really was created by the reorganisation of local authorities, we have a very good record in maintaining the quinquennial revaluations in Scotland. That is essential, because unless you keep the rolls up-to-date, and unless you give the opportunity (many people would argue that five years is long enough for that) to get rid of the anomalies that come to light during those five years, then you get into very considerable elements of unfairness. It was disappointing to me, though not surprising, that we got this partial revaluation promised us for 1983.
We have to bear in mind, too, the work of the valuation officers. We do not call them that in Scotland; we call them assessors. Whereas in England and Wales this is done by the Inland Revenue department, in Scotland it is done by assessors who are appointed by the local authorities—easy to appoint but very difficult to sack, for the simple reason that they must have a measure of independence. But these assessors in Scotland have another job as well. When there is an election—and I am sure my noble friends from Northern Ireland will be interested in this—they become the electoral registration officers. I could see building up, following a year of revaluation and the necessary appeals that follow that, a considerable amount of work for them. We have been told fairly recently that the Prime Minister would like to have an election next year, and I think this would run into some difficulty. Indeed, I wondered whether that was the reason for this order. But, no, the reason is that there are difficulties, and these difficulties have been brought to the notice of the Government by the local authorities, by COSLA. I am surprised that they were not brought to the notice of the local authorities by the Scottish Valuation Advisory Committee—and, remember, we have been waiting. We have just had the first order. Your Lordships will remember that when we passed the 1981 Act, which was only just about this time last year, it was provided that if there was to be a revaluation in part then that was to be done by order. We had that order, which was to come into force on, I think it was, 8th April. We were then expecting another order, because under, I think, Section 2(b) the Government had to come to the House with an order telling us how they were going to do it, the method of revaluation of these properties—not in this case the specified properties but (because they had done it the other way round) the unspecified properties. They also had to tell us how they were going to do the impossible: to have this revaluation of only part of the subjects—and the subjects were industrial properties, commercial properties and the miscellaneous properties. But when that had been done, they had to produce a formula that meant that the domestic properties that were unvalued had not to pay any more than the share of rates that they had been paying previously. It was pointed out to the Government, both when we passed the Act of 1981 and when we discussed this matter in April of this year, that partial revaluation is not a simple process—and these words should ring in the ears of the Minister because these were the words that were used by Mr. Rifkind who, since he dealt with this matter in the Statutory Instruments Committee in another place, has now gone to sort out the Foreign Office. I think that this is what the Government are now discovering. It is usual to give for revaluation about two years' notice to those who have to do the work. I think it was in January 1981 that the Secretary of State announced that there was going to be partial revaluation. My colleagues in another place pressed him then and kept on pressing him as to what was going to be done. We must remember that this is to come into operation in the beginning of April next year. This means that the Government and everyone else concerned will want the estimates by November of this year; because even the rate support grant calculations depend upon the assessments, and if not the rate support grant itself, the division of rate support grant among the local authorities depends upon what the estimates are. The estimates are then divided out, and one of the very considerable factors affecting this is the actual assessments for each valuation area. Now here we are. We have been waiting for this second necessary order to come. Let us remember that we told them about its difficulties and complexities. We discussed them, the Minister agreed but he brushed them aside and said that it was going to be quite easy; that, after all, there are fewer properties and plenty of time. After passing that in April—two months ago now—we have got this; just revoking that one altogether and going back to a general revaluation, and that a postponed one. It had to be postponed now because it was far too late to do the statutory one for 1983–84. My Lords, what does that mean? It means that where I complained that in respect of the domestic properties there were unfairnesses that had arisen over five years, and where people had the opportunity of appealing in a year of revaluation the fact that there was going to be only partial revaluation meant that they were being dealt with unfairly, now, they have to wait for another two years before they get that opportunity. But the other point is this. I wonder whether the Minister can remember the justification that was given for the partial revaluation. This is the Minister responsible speaking on 31st March this year:well, we are not having regular ones but having it postponed for two years. He continues:"It is generally accepted that for as long as the rating system remains with us, the rating base should be kept fairly up to date. That can be achieved only by having regular revaluation "—
that is, this year—"It is, for example, quite likely that a revaluation at this time "—
But, whether we like it or not, the Government have done not a U-turn but a double somersault with twists—and these people who, a few months ago, could not be left to shoulder this burden have got to shoulder the burden until 1985–86. How can that be justified? Let us remember that we have also the complications of this alternative domestic rate. We were given the impression that something was going to be done about it within the lifetime of this Parliament. One of the reasons we could not have a general revaluation in Scotland was given in these words:"may tend to shift the rating burden away from some of the older property occupied by traditional industries and commerce. It would not be fair that those sectors should continue to shoulder a burden that is no longer properly theirs".
that is, a general revaluation. The reason is that if you revalue it takes years to sort the thing out in respect of appeals and of appeals to the courts. As a matter of fact, it was only last March that people in a certain part of Troon had their valuations heard and upheld. This is true. That was a revaluation which took place several years ago—over four years ago—so that if you are going to have a revaluation in 1985–86, it is going to be about the end of the decade before it is settled; and you are not going to get any major reform within that. Obviously if you are going to have a general revaluation in 1985–86, that will be after the next election. My Lords, to put the blame for all this muddle and this floundering around in the very deep and murky waters of valuation and revaluation on the local authorities is just a little unfair. I know that the Minister is having a heavy day and I have tried to help him as much as possible by not interfering in this House. He has had to help in the announcement to the people of Invergordon that there will be no smelter there; that the Government have failed to get a new operator. He has had the job of giving the local authorities in Scotland today the bad news about the rate support grant, how Government manipulation has been continued in respect of that. Now he comes along and says, "Ah, but we listened to the local authorities about their difficulties and it is they who are responsible for this order". It is not. It is the muddled thinking of the Government, eventually facing up to the practical difficulties of revaluation, even partial revaluation, and realising that it cannot be done. I should have been grateful if the Minister had been honest about it. The Government were told about it in another place, they were told about it in March of this year. They were told about it in this House; but, no, they went ahead. When I consider how valuable is parliamentary time and how it is here being wasted by the Government in this way, with their coming forward with an ill-considered order and then within a couple of months or so, revoking that order and completely changing their policy, there is no vote of thanks from me for this "Mansfield miracle" tonight—rather a lack of confidence in Ministers and doubt about whether they know what they are doing in this or any other local government field. I will not be opposing it."We could not embark on genuine reform if that had been pre-empted by a major step to preserve the existing system "—
7.30 p.m.
My Lords, if I may intervene—only for a minute or two—I certainly undertake that I shall not stand in the way of my noble friend Lord Mansfield in replying to the noble Lord, Lord Ross. I have only one small complaint to make. I readily accept I have an interest in this matter—it is not a financial one but it is an important interest—and this is in the general sport and enjoyment of the whole of Scotland. But in particular I have an interest regarding the racecourse at Ayr. As the noble Lord, Lord Ross, will know, it had been counting upon a revaluation because those connected with the course were led to believe that there was very good hope of having a reassessment of their rate burden which would allow those concerned to continue with Ayr racecourse on the same high class lines that they have learned to show to all who attend the races, notably those who attend the September meeting when the Ayr Gold Cup takes place. This attracts so many good horses, trainers and owners. It has a good attendance of people who count on seeing the best at a very good time of year for Scotland.
Then again, talking about my own particular interest (for which I hope your Lordships will forgive me), Ayr is also the site of the Scottish Grand National. Whenever doubts are voiced—I hope they are not serious ones—about continuation of the Grand National at Liverpool, it has always been at the back of my mind that at any rate the Ayr Grand National, a four-mile steeplechase of very high class, would go some way towards preserving what I regard as a national sport from an English point of view and also from a Scottish point of view, too. I must not waste time, which is limited, but the point that I endeavour to make is the gross unfairness between the situation of that racecourse and the situation with comparable English racecourses. The racecourse of Newcastle, I think most people would agree, is just about comparable to Ayr. What are the rates they are required to pay? They are required to pay between £7,000 and £8,000 a year. What are the rates that Ayr is required to pay? It is required to pay between £80,000 and £90,000 a year. I say quite frankly to my noble friend that that is a figure which, if allowed to continue indefinitely, could kill dead the racecourse at Ayr and with it the finest racecourse in Scotland, and I—One of the finest racecourses, my Lords.
Yes, my Lords; I readily agree with my noble friend about that. But does he really understand how serious this matter is? The noble Lord opposite—with whom I disagree about very many things—feels that what I am saying on this point is worthy of support. I want to beg of my noble friend to bear this in mind and see what can be done. Looking at what we are now discussing, I cannot see it being made any easier to do. But that does not prevent my hoping and urging my noble friend and his right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Scotland to realise the danger and do something without too much delay—indeed, without any delay at all—to set it right.
7.35 p.m.
My Lords, I do not wish to follow what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord Kilmany, in this matter which is of great interest to himself and obviously equally to my noble friend Lord Ross—
My Lords, and also to the Secretary of State for Scotland, who is the Member of Parliament for Ayr.
Yes, my Lords, but it is enough for me to keep it to members of this House at this stage. I particularly would not want to follow it in view of the intervention by the Minister when he, I thought, made a rather oblique reference to Scone in comparison. So I will leave that alone.
I must apologise to the Minister because a meeting in another part of the building delayed me from getting here and so I heard only the last part of his remarks. I gathered enough from what my noble friend Lord Ross said to understand that the noble Earl did not persuade 100 per cent. my noble friend that everything was being done as it ought to be done. My noble friend is obviously right that, if you depart from the quinquennial valuation, anomalies will persist and there will be people who feel that they are being unfairly done by. I should like to add that when the valuation takes place there will be a new group of people who will feel unfairly done by. I think I can say quite truthfully that those people whose properties have not been altered in any way since the last valuation—and they generally are by far the greatest number of people concerned—feel badly done by, because I think it is a matter of knowledge that at each valuation that takes place the local authorities take advantage of it to get more money out of the ratepayers. Theoretically, it ought not to change anything. As the value goes up, the rate poundage should go down. All experience shows that the rate poundage does not go down sufficiently to balance the rise in the actual value. So out of (perhaps my noble friend would say) the evil of deferring this for two years will come the bonus for some people that it will at least remove from local authorities the opportunity of creating a surreptitious rate increase.7.38 p.m.
My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords who have taken part in the debate. I wondered when the noble Lord, Lord Ross, was speaking what was the point to which he was gradually drawing. Eventually it was a mixture of "I told you so" and "having it both ways", accusing the Government of acting, at best, with incompetence and, at worst, in bad faith. So there was nothing new about that.
The House will recall that the Green Paper was issued and thereafter my right honourable friend started to have consultations—and I refer now to the autumn of last year. The detailed consequences of having a non-domestic partial revaluation could not be realistically discussed with local authorities until the Secretary of State announced—and it happened in January—that he was going to hold a partial revaluation. It was then important as a matter of urgency to bring forward the order defining the lands and heritages to be revalued as assessors, as the noble Lord, Lord Ross, said, in effect only had a year to complete revaluation before 1983. So during that period, of course, our consultations concentrated on the scope of revaluation rather than on its details. Then it became apparent that there were real difficulties, and these were put up by the convention. And here is where the noble Lord, Lord Ross, seeks to have the matter both ways. If the Government make up their minds to govern and provide a lead, we are then told that we do not pay attention to the democratically-elected local authorities, that the Secretary of State acts as a dictator or gauleiter, or some such expression, and that the Government in fact have no mandate and therefore are ill serving the people of Scotland. When we do consult the convention, take very seriously what it says and act accordingly then, once more, we are acting wrongly. I do not think that in all the circumstances the matter could really have been taken further or faster than it has been. The noble Lord, Lord Ross, once more directed our attention to Troon. If the partial revaluation had taken place it would have made not the slightest difference to the householders of Troon in any event. As I understand it, the final decision in the original Troon case was taken only in 1981 and there is still a further consequential appeal outstanding; so their position has not been changed at all. The people whose position has been changed are the non-domestic ratepayers who would have been taken into account, so to speak, within their own sector. Here I come to the matter raised by my noble friend: Ayr racecourse. May I say that my purpose in intervening to say that Ayr was only one of many outstanding racecourses in Scotland was by no means to provide a "puff" but merely to set the record straight. I am no great racing man, I am afraid, but I have had the odd extremely pleasurable afternoon in Kelso, which is set in beautiful grounds, and I do not think my noble friend, however keen he is to extol the delights of Ayr, should quite make that claim. There are a number of cases which are very similar to Ayr, and not only racecourses. My right honourable friend has received a number of representations from racing interests, among others, to the effect that racecourses do have unduly high valuations considering how few days in the year they are used. Of course, one has to say two things to my noble friend. First, certainly their circumstances have changed for the worse since the 1978 revaluation took place. The second thing is that the rate poundages have gone up enormously, and not least in Strathclyde and Kyle and Catterick. Therefore I know that my noble friend will be applauding the efforts of my right honourable friend to contain the local authorities in their general extravagance—because it is this which represents one of the reasons why such places as Ayr racecourse now have to pay such a very high rate. At any rate, what my right honourable friend did when he received these representations was to advise the racecourse proprietors to discuss their predicament with the assessors' association with a view to the assessors adopting a scheme of valuation at the next revaluation which would result in a lightening of the burden on racecourses. I believe this is a process which has started, but I do concede to my noble friend that because of what has happened they must now wait a further two years for any benefit. I need hardly say that my right honourable friend and indeed I, in my personal capacity, are very sympathetic to the problem which comes about and which is only too clearly exemplified by Ayr racecourse; but neither my right honourable friend nor local assessors can do anything to bring about what I might call an amendment of a valuation roll in between revaluations, unless of course there is a change of circumstances—and I do not anticipate that there has been, so far as Ayr is concerned. For that I am very sorry.My Lords, if the Minister will allow me, he is quite wrong there. They could introduce points into an Act of Parliament, as indeed they did in respect of certain aspects of revaluation in the last local government Act we had.
Yes, my Lords; of course we could bring in primary legislation, and Parliament can do whatever it likes in primary legislation. What I was saying was that, short of such drastic action and bearing in mind that the revaluation will be within two and a half years, there is nothing that can be done short of a change of circumstances. As I have said, I do not think I can take the matter further. It is unfortunate that the period between revaluations is going to extend for this extra period but I hope I have convinced the House that it has been done with good reasons and from the best of motives. On that note, I commend the Motion to the House.
On Question, Motion agreed to.My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn during pleasure until eight o'clock.
Moved accordingly and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
[ The Sitting was suspended from 7.46 until 8 p.m.]
Employment Bill
Further considered on Report, on Clause 3.
moved Amendment No. 14:
Page 6, line 33, leave out ("section 58 or 59(a)") and insert ("a ground described in section 71(3)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 14, and, with leave, will speak also to Amendment No. 17. Under present legislation when a case of unfair dismissal is upheld, the basic award is generally 13 weeks' wages as a minimum and 26 weeks' wages as a maximum. There is a slight increase in the award of 26 weeks' wages as a minimum and 52 weeks' wages as a maximum, where the grounds for dismissal involve trade union membership activities and cases of sex discrimination and racial discrimination under the 1975 and 1976 Acts respectively.
The Bill brings in a fourth special category of dismissal on the grounds of not being a member of a trade union. For this additional category the minimum basic award is £2,000, plus the possibility of a special award of up to £10,000, as well as the possibility of a compensatory award making a total of, I think, £32,000. But these provisions do not at all cover dismissal on the grounds of sex discrimination or racial discrimination, as in the present legislation. In this amendment we ask why. Why should the special awards and the new compensation be limited only to two categories of dismissals—although there are now four special categories—that is, where trade union membership or refusal to join a trade union are concerned?
The Government say that it is necessary to have the additional awards in those two cases as a sufficient deterrent, and that point was made by the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, in Committee. But, surely, the same argument could be used in the case of sex discrimination and racial discrimination; that we must have a deterrent order to stop employers from acting in that way. If I may quote the noble Earl, he said during the Committee stage in column 12 of the Official Report for 12th July:
"It is our view that unfair dismissals, because of non-union membership of a union in a closed shop or because of trade union membership or activities call for substantially greater compensation than is the case in regard to the generality of unfair dismissals."
But I am not referring to the generality of unfair dismissals. I am referring to the special cases for which there is now an additional minimum award outside the generality of cases; that is, the racial discrimination dismissals and the sex discrimination dismissals.
I have read very carefully the report of the Committee stage, but I shall not take up the time of your Lordships by making quotations. I appreciate that the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, accepted the position advanced by my noble friend Lord Wedderburn and he shared his condemnation of unfair dismissals involving race or sex. I readily accept that the noble Earl is as much concerned, and I think that he used the word "condemnation" as being stronger than the word "distaste". But the noble Earl's general case seemed to be that, because there were very few cases of dismissal involving sex and racial discrimination, there was therefore no need to put anything into the Bill.
I ask your Lordships: Can we regard that as an acceptable argument? I am certain that such an argument would not impress a young black, who already feels discriminated against in many parts of the country. Even if there are only a few limited cases, we can surely say that there are only a few known cases of dismissal for non-trade union membership—a point which my noble friends Lord McCarthy and Lord Wedderburn have made time and time again. There is only a handful of cases. Therefore, the argument that there are insufficient cases of dismissal because of sex discrimination or racial discrimination does not hold up.
The issue is that, at present, there are three special categories and the Government have added a fourth. In this clause we are asking: Why should these special awards cover only two of these special categories? Why should there be a possibility of upwards of £12,000 compensation for those two cases of dismissal for trade union activities, or for not joining a trade union, when there is only minor compensation for dismissal due to racial discrimination or sex discrimination?
My noble friend Lord Wedderburn referred in Committee to the statement by the General Council of British Shipping, and as that council was mentioned in another context, I should like to quote what he said. The General Council of British Shipping stated—and I am quoting my noble friend Lord Wedderburn at column 18 of the Official Report for 12th July—
"It seems paradoxical to suggest that a special award for dismissal for non-compliance with a closed shop agreement could be three times that for dismissal on the grounds of sex or race."
Here we are not arguing about the principle of bringing in the new class of dismissal for non-membership of a trade union; neither are we arguing about the principle of the new award. What we are saying is that it is absolutely wrong to cover those two special cases, and to leave the most important cases of racial discrimination dismissals and sex discrimination dismissals outside the provisions of this clause. That is the principle involved, and I hope that the Government may feel disposed to accept the amendment.
My Lords, I should like very strongly to support this amendment. I understand that the reasons given for the very high levels of payment in the closed shop cases were, first, that there should be a deterrent; and, secondly, that such cases were in breach of a piece of legislation and contrary to the law. Both those arguments apply in relation to offences under the Sex Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act. It is embodied in Acts of Parliament that there should be no discrimination. So, to that extent, closed shop considerations are on all fours with being embodied in an Act of Parliament. Similarly—and I would argue even more strongly than in the case of closed shop cases—there is a need for deterrence in relation to both sex discrimination cases and race relations cases. We know that the law in this country is much weaker in both regards than the law in the United States. I am not arguing that the law should, in itself, be greatly strengthened, although some changes would be advantageous. But it is not a strong deterrent and this would give that extra element of deterrence which our present legislation does not possess. I very much hope that the Government will accept this amendment.
My Lords, I should like to add my voice, very briefly, to the pleas that have been made by my noble friend Lord Underhill and by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, particularly as I was the first to raise this issue during the Committee stage and pressed the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie, to explain to us how he saw the difference between unfair dismissal on the grounds on non-union membership, and unfair dismissal on the grounds of sex or racial discrimination. His answer to me—and I quote from column 723 of the Official Report for 6th July—was:
But as both my noble friend and the noble Baroness who have preceded me have said, surely the issue of deterrence is as important in the case of unfair dismissal under either the Sex Discrimination Act or the Race Relations Act. All the way through the Bill the Government have stoutly objected to our accusation that the Bill is anti-union. If they want to maintain that position, surely it is incumbent upon them to include all forms of unfair dismissal rather than, as the Bill now stands, to give a preference, in deterrence and in compensation, to the person who is objecting to union membership or to the closed shop. I would go further than the noble Baroness. It seems to me that it is even more important to have a deterrence against unfair dismissal on grounds of sex or race than on grounds of conscientious objection, whatever form it may take, to membership of a union. Surely the difference here is that one is born with one's gender and one's skin colour. One is born with these, and there is no way in which an individual can change them. On union membership, while I fully sympathise with those who have a conscientious objection to membership of anything, that is a decision of the mind. They can decide, Yes or no. But on sex and race there is no question of deciding. You are permanently of one gender or the other and of one skin colour. Although I know that a number of members of the noble Earl's party would be somewhat hesitant about accepting the argument on sex or race, particularly on race, I am certain that he himself is not. I am also quite certain that the pleas which are being made to him tonight on the ground of unfair dismissal because of sex or race would to him be at least equal if not more serious than the ground of unfair dismissal because of objections to union membership. So I would plead with the noble Earl at least to take this back and look again at it. If he does not, it will appear, not just in this country but elsewhere, as though the Government consider that the objections to membership of a union are more important and warrant greater deterrence and greater compensation than unfair dismissal on grounds of either sex or race."I made no apology for the strong element of deterrence in this legislation."
My Lords, may I be permitted to say a word in opposition to this amendment. Let us assume that there is a common element in deterrence. Let us assume that there is a common element in what the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, referred to as the breach of law clement. But superimposed on this there is something which is not a common element. The reason for this distinction is that in these days it is difficult to find employment and that the loss of employment which arises from this situation can cause very substantial damage to the workman. It is not only difficult to prove through the ordinary, judicial process of the courts, but often in practice it involves a delay of some two to three years—as I know, having appeared in the High Court for workmen in such circumstances. With the utmost respect to the noble Lords opposite, there is a real distinction. It is therefore wrong to equate all this as though it were covered totally by a common element.
8.15 p.m.
My Lords, I had intended to wait until the Minister had spoken before intervening, but I cannot wait any longer. The very arguments which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, has used for supporting the additional award because of people being dismissed for conscientious objection to belonging to a union hold equally true for people dismissed because of their colour or their sex. The truth of the matter is that it is common knowledge that people do have difficulty in getting employment because of the colour of their skin. If, therefore, they are deprived of such employment as they have managed to secure because of the colour of their skin they are in a very serious plight. So it is an even stronger argument for them than for people who are deprived of their employment because of conscientious objections to being members of a trade union.
How shall I put it? The problem of discrimination is more of a continuing one than the problem of facing up to the fact that you will or will not join a union. As my noble friend Lord Hatch of Lusby said, you may decide that you cannot take the pressure any more and that although you have a conscientious objection you will join the union. You still have that choice. But if you are black you are black, and if the objections to your having a job are because you are black there is nothing you can do about it. Therefore, I am afraid that they are not on all fours. The noble Earl's argument for a special award was that there should be a strong deterrent. I should have thought that that argument was stronger still on the deliberate abuse of the Race Relations Act. Under that Act it is illegal to discriminate against a person because of race, colour, ethnic or national origin. However, as the law now stands, the employer who has been brought before a tribunal can elect to pay. If he can elect to pay, he should have to pay such a large sum that he will hestitate to elect to pay. Again, I am merely using the argument which the noble Earl used earlier. If you need a strong award in order to deter employers from deliberately flouting the law, which is what will happen if they dismiss people because of their conscientious objection to joining a trade union, they should also be flouting the law if they dismiss people because of the colour of their skin or because of their sex and the same principles should therefore be at stake. Since I cannot speak again—that is why I was going to wait until the Minister had spoken but the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, forced me to use my right at this stage—may I say that I hope the Minister will recognise the points which have been made to him. I know that the Minister may personally share many of the views I am expressing, and I hope that the brief he has been given of the situation vis-à-vis the department will enable him to take all this on board. If he cannot say tonight that he will accept the amendment then I hope he will at least undertake to look at this matter again.My Lords, I was going to jump up at the precise moment at which the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, did to answer the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, although I wanted to intervene briefly in order to put one or two points to the noble Earl, Lord Gowrie. But the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, has covered virtually all the points that I was going to make to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, except one. The point he made which was not answered by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, was that in cases which he had been concerned with—especially, I believe he was saying, in relation either to exclusion or expulsion from a union, or it could have been unfair dismissal—sometimes a case took a long time; that it might take two years. That is exactly what could be said about any dismissal case or any case of unfair exclusion from any organisation. It all takes a very long time. So far as I know, there are no figures which would justify our giving extra compensation on the basis that a particular kind of dismissal takes rather longer to get to the tribunal than any other kind of case. I do not think that is a distinction which we can accept.
To come to the point I want to put to the noble Earl, a number of arguments have been put forward today and all of them make the point that we are seeking to make in this amendment. The only point on the other side is something which the noble Earl said on 12th July (Hansard, column 23), and which I will come to. What has been said tonight by the noble Baroness, Lady Seear, and it is very true, is that public policy is quite clear: sex discrimination and race discrimination is particularly ruled against in the 1975 and 1976 Acts. So as far as public policy is concerned, if we want to stand by what we say we believe, then we should put race discrimination and sex discrimination at the very least alongside union membership and union activity. Those things should be square so far as public policy is concerned. From the point of view of options and of choices, as the noble Lord, Lord Hatch of Lusby, has said, it is additionally and especially the case that we should have extra compensation — not even the same, but extra compensation, because union membership or non-membership is a matter of choice whereas one cannot opt not to be of a particular race or of a particular sex; at least, if one tried to do the second it would be all rather complicated. So we come to the final reason, and I think the only reason, which was put forward by the noble Earl on 12th July, when he said:and I suppose one might say, as a result of their sex,"We have not in the sex and race fields had the unsavoury sight of public sector employers engaging in politically motivated defiance of statutory rights provided by Parliament. If we found some notionally extreme Right-wing council sacking somebody as a result of the colour of their skin,"
The difficulty with that is that we do not have any facts on which the noble Earl rests his case. It is true that we have had our old friends Salford Council and one or two other examples given to us. Maybe the noble Earl has such figures and I should be pleased to see them. We have not been given figures, for example, in respect of the number of unfair dismissals by local authorities which relate to sex or race, and whether in relation to sex or race there are fewer or more cases of unfair dismissal by local councils going against those councils, cases which are therefore, presumably, equally in defiance of the Act as the two cases we have been given in respect of trade union membership. If we do not have these figures, how can the noble Earl come before us and say,"and if we did not feel that the compensation was adequate to deter other such notional councils in this regard, no doubt we would bring in legislation accordingly."
because he does not have the figures? If he says that this is being done for the deterrent effect, I suppose that is his final answer. What we are saying is, why not have an equally deterrent effect, if you do not have the figures to support your argument, both for sex and race as well as for trade union membership?"If we found some notionally extreme Right-wing council … ",
8.25 p.m.
My Lords, some frustration occurs in debates not when people disagree but when they are in very substantial agreement and both parties cannot understand why, given the overall level of agreement, the other party cannot see the point of view being, expressed. This was put very clearly by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt of Hampstead, when, admittedly in a different context, he said that the provision was not "on all fours" with the sentiments expressed deploring sexual and racial discrimination.
The provisions in this part of the Bill are indeed not on all fours with sexual and racial discrimination. Sexual and racial discrimination is covered by the law. It is unlawful to refuse to engage someone on the grounds of their sex or race, except in a very few cases which nearly everybody agrees about as being reasonable. It is not unlawful to refuse to engage somebody in respect of union membership or non-membership. This is where the point made very eloquently by my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway comes into being. If someone is dismissed in an era of rising high unemployment on account of his sex or the colour of his skin, then of course that is a very grave matter for him. But the matter is somewhat different when he is dismissed on grounds of refusal of or conscientious objection to trade union membership or a closed shop problem, because the withdrawing of the union card may preclude the person statutorily or quasi-statutorily from further employment. That is why we sought to make this distinction in this part of the Bill. Coming to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, I make no apology for saying that this part of the Bill was partial. We were out to "clobber" certain types of person; certain types of employer. We were out to "clobber" the rogue public employer, and we gave as the instances the Sandwell and Walsall cases where a public authority was using its authority and its public position to behave in a way we thought was quite wrong. The Government have always made it clear that where industrial relations legislation is concerned they are committed to a step-by-step approach. On an earlier occasion, I tried to gloss this by saying that a step-by-step approach was really an abuse-by-abuse approach. If it is clear that there are these rogue public authorities who are dismissing people because they are black or some other colour, or because they happen to be male or happen to be female, it would be perfectly reasonable to amend the legislation in this way. But there is no evidence whatsoever that I am aware of that any public authority is behaving in that manner. It was for what we thought were the two sensible reasons of providing a deterrent effect to public authorities, occasioned by known and consciously effected abuses in the Sandwell and Walsall cases, and because of the distinction which is engendered by the possession of a union card in terms of much modern employment, which has been brought to the attention of the House by my noble friend, that we decided to have this special level of deterrence. I really cannot apologise for that. It seems to me to be in no way on all fours with the sentiments on racial and sexual discrimination which have been expressed from the opposite side of the House and with which I myself and indeed my party are in total agreement. I just do not think that in this amendment we have been comparing like with like at all, and that is why I think the House should resist the amendment.My Lords, would not the noble Earl, however, agree that, although, as we understand it, he has openly said that he and his party are out to clobber certain public authorities in the closed shop area, there are also cases in the private sector of employers who, on the grounds of race or colour, may find it possible to make people redundant, for example? Are there not cases of injustice of that kind which it is fair to treat on a par with those he mentions in relation to public authorities in another connection?
My Lords, if you are an employer, and you unfairly dismiss on grounds of sex or race, you can be sued for unfair dismissal. The higher level of compensation in the cases of unfair dismissal where a closed shop situation is involved is distinguished precisely for the reason given by my noble friend Lord Campbell, that a person may be precluded from getting another job because of his refusal to become a member of the union. That is the reason for the distinction. I go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pitt. He says very fairly that it is equally grave to lose your job if you are black or a woman or whatever, and of course it is equally grave, but in terms of future hiring you are covered by anti-discrimination legislation, which does not cover you in the case of union membership or non-membership. So the distinction is quite clear.
My Lords, I think the noble Earl, frankly, has done his best with a bad case. The reference he makes to the fact that discrimination on grounds of sex and race are included in other Acts does not alter the matter; if we want to be logical, where is the deterrent? I do not want to be unfair, but at the Committee stage I see that in column 23 the noble Earl said:
So the Department of Employment was sufficiently worried about discrimination to put the noble Earl in charge of that particular matter. Surely that will justify making an adequate deterrent to stop its going on. That is what we are trying to do in this amendment The noble Earl has not moved at all on behalf of the Government. I think the case has been made from this side. It is a principle. We are not arguing about the merits or demerits of the new classification brought into the Bill; we are not arguing about the merits or demerits of the additional awards. What we are saying is that if there is sufficient justification for special awards in the case he has mentioned we ought to do likewise and have an adequate deterrent for the detestable practice of discrimination in employment on grounds of race or sex. On that basis we must ask the House to divide."Until I was translated to Northern Ireland I was the Minister at the Department of Employment concerned with discrimination in employment on sexual grounds and on grounds of race."
8.35 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said Amendment (No. 14) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 49; Not-Contents, 69.
DIVISION NO. 3
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Ardwick, L. | Mais, L. |
| Aylestone, L. | Milner of Leeds, L. |
| Birk, B. | Molloy, L. |
| Bishopston, L. | Oram, L. |
| Blease, L. | Parry, L. |
| Brockway, L. | Peart, L. |
| Byers, L. | Phillips, B. |
| Caradon, L. | Pitt of Hampstead, L. |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.—[Teller.] |
| Collison, L. | |
| Davies of Leek, L. | Rea, L. |
| Evans of Claughton, L. | Rochester, L. |
| Ewart-Biggs, B. | Ross of Marnock, L. |
| Hatch of Lusby, L. | Seear, B. |
| Hirshfield, L. | Sefton of Garston, L. |
| Jeger, B. | Stedman, B. |
| Jenkins of Putney, L. | Stewart of Alvechurch, B. |
| John-Mackie, L. | Stewart of Fulham, L. |
| Kilmarnock, L. | Stone, L. |
| Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.] | Taylor of Gryfe, L. |
| Tordoff, L. | |
| Lloyd of Kilgerran, L. | Underhill, L. |
| Lovell-Davis, L. | Wade, L. |
| McCarthy, L. | White, B. |
| Mackie of Benshie, L. | Wynne-Jones, L. |
| McNair, L. | |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Alexander of Tunis, E. | Beloff, L. |
| Auckland, L. | Belstead, L. |
| Avon, E. | Boardman, L. |
| Bellwin, L. | Campbell of Alloway, L. |
| Cathcart, E. | Lyell, L. |
| Chelwood, L. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Cork and Orrery, E. | Mansfield, E. |
| Crathorne, L. | Marley, L. |
| Cullen of Ashbourne, L. | Marshall of Leeds, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Massereene and Ferrard, V. |
| De La Warr, E. | Mersey, V. |
| Denham, L.—[Teller.] | Mottistone, L. |
| Drumalbyn, L. | Moyne, L. |
| Eccles, V. | Murton of Lindisfarne, L. |
| Elles, B. | Orkney, E. |
| Elton, L. | Platt of Writtle, B. |
| Fairfax of Cameron, L. | Rochdale, V. |
| Ferrers, E. | Romney, E. |
| Ferrier, L. | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Fortescue, L. | Sandys, L.—[Teller.] |
| Gainford, L. | Sharples, B. |
| Gardner of Parkes, B. | Skelmersdale, L. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Sudeley, L. |
| Gowrie, E. | Teviot, L. |
| Gridley, L. | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Hayter, L. | Tranmire, L. |
| Henley, L. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Hives, L. | Trenchard, V. |
| Holderness, L. | Trumpington, B. |
| Home of the Hirsel, L. | Vaux of Harrowden, L. |
| Hornsby-Smith, B. | Vickers, B. |
| Inglewood, L. | Vivian, L. |
| Killearn, L. | Windlesham, L. |
| Kilmany, L. | Young, B. |
| Long, V. |
Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
[ Amendment No. 15 not moved.]
Clause 4 [ New special award]:
8.42 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 16:
Page 7, line 32, after ("74") insert ("but to which the provisions of section 75 shall not apply where the dismissal is to be regarded as unfair by virtue of section 58 or 59(a)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 16. I am advised in my amendment by the Institute of Journalists. It deals with a slightly different aspect of what we have recently been discussing. I understand that when the Government published their proposals for the Bill last November, they intended not only to introduce new and basic special awards for workers unfairly dismissed for trade union reasons, but also to remove the upper limit on the compensatory awards in such cases. The new basic and special awards survive in the Bill, but the upper limit on the compensatory awards—currently £7,000—has not been removed. The Government, it is understood, modified their original attitude on this point in response to fears widely expressed by employers that unlimited compensation combined with the special awards would encourage greedy and unscrupulous workers to engineer their own dismissals for trade union reasons. These fears, though natural, do not stand up to examination.
The Government themselves have conceded in a letter from my honourable friend Mr. Waddington, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment, to the general secretary of the Institute of Journalists, on 17th March this year, that the removal of the limit on compensatory awards will make no difference, save in the most exceptional cases. This view receives full support from the statistics.
In 1980, the latest year for which figures are available, total awards were less than £750 for 58.3 per cent.
of the successful applicants and less than £1,500 for 80.9 per cent. The median award was £598. The maximum compensatory award, which was then £6,000, applied in only 0.4 per cent. of the cases. The figures for preceding years are comparable. In any case, as I see it, under Section 74 the amount actually awarded, whether with a limit or not, is at the discretion of the tribunal, subject to all kinds of rules set out in that section. It follows that the retention of the limit on the compensatory award does nothing in reality to meet the employers' fears but it does create the possibility of injustice, unless it is thought that exceptional victims do not deserve justice.
The special awards are substantial and it is not difficult to think of cases in which they could be too little. For example, the dismissed worker might be a middle-aged, highly-paid person in an occupation in which closed shops are general or in an area where opportunities are limited. Not only will his dismissal mean the immediate loss of substantial income, but he is likely to face the choice between permanent unemployment and a bady paid job without the opportunity to use his talents, with the frustration that this will induce.
But the greatest injustice is created for a dismissed worker who does not apply for re-employment. As the concluding words of the subsection make clear, he will be ineligible for special awards and receive only the basic and limited compensatory awards. However, he may have excellent reasons for not wanting his job back. He may know that if he gets it, his employer or fellow workers will set out to make his life intolerable or, at the earliest opportunity, a new pretext will be found to dismiss him; yet his dismissal may have been grossly unfair and his consequent loss particularly severe. It cannot be right that the sum that he is awarded should be substantially and automatically less than that given to a worker whose loss may be much slighter, but who elects to apply for re-employment.
I suggest that this simple amendment meets all those points. It adds nothing in reality to the financial burden on employers and trade unions, save in that minute portion of cases when it is only right that their liability should be greater. Furthermore, I must re-emphasise that in removing the upper limits on compensatory award the amendment simply accords with the Government's original thinking on this Bill as announced last November. I beg to move.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, is a dangerous man because he always sounds so reasonable. This amendment is what I call, "the insult to injury amendment". It is an attempt to add still further to the discrimination, to the bonanza, which the Government insist on introducing for the non-unionist. As the noble Lord says, it has the effect of removing any limit on compensation at all for this one single group of unfairly dismissed people. The Government have just turned down our attempt to put sex and race discrimination at square with this. Now we are being asked further to widen the difference between those who are dismissed on grounds of union membership and all other forms of dismissal.
It is perfectly true, as the noble Lord said, that it is possible for there to be a dismissal of someone in a non-union situation where the consequence, the damage, the disadvantage, goes beyond £31,000. Of course, it is possible. If somebody is earning £21,000 a year and he is dismissed and he does not get a job for two years, you have gone beyond £31,000. But the case, as I have been arguing all day, is that a middle manager who gets £10,000 goes beyond the maximum on unfair dismissal grounds on every other reason when he goes beyond £7,000. So, of course, unless the sky were the limit for all forms of unfair dismissal, someone could always, in any category, go beyond the limit. But, since the sky is not the limit in any category of dismissal, we must ask ourselves why, now that the Government have made this special provision for union membership, we should further put them in, as it were, an extra special category and make them the only people who, in effect, can get full compensation for what they do. I do not think that in that respect the noble Lord has put forward any answers at all. He has not really used any arguments. He has merely pointed out that these people may sometimes go beyond the limit of £31,000. Of course—but other people's limit is much lower than that now and we see no reason whatever specially to privilege this man further.My Lords, I should like to support this amendment. What my noble friend has said very ably, which I do not think the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, has taken account of, is that if a man seeks to get his job back and fails, he can then get the special award. If, as is very likely, he is, say, a highly-paid ournalist—he does not have to be a journalist; he may be a highly paid executive—who finds that it would be intolerable for him to go back on account of the conditions of his dismissal and relationship with his colleagues, then he is not able to ask for that which, if refused, would give him the opportunity to get the special award. He is then limited to the basic award and the compensatory award. There may be cases—and I think what my noble friend has said has shown us that there will not be very many, but they can be significant—where a man is inadequately compensated if he is subject to the limit, which is at present £7,000.
My noble friend is not asking the Government to give away very much in money, because we know what few people are likely to be affected. But surely they can properly be said to be disadvantaged if they find it understandably desirable not to seek to get their jobs back, but to go off and seek their livelihood in some other way that may well be considerably lower paid. I very much hope that the Government will take this on board and do what they can.My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, is it not true to say that it is not quite as he said? It does not stop at £7,000. He gets the £2,000 basic in addition. Of course, if he applies and the tribunal decides that it is not practicable, he still qualifies.
My Lords, as I understand it he gets the £2,000, but he cannot get more than a compensatory £7,000 in addition. So it is £9,000, and our case is that for a highly-paid executive who suffers in this way that may be too little.
My Lords, I hope that we may receive some firm explanation as to why these special categories are deserving of this special consideration. A tribunal decision can inform a person that he has been unfairly dismissed and he can be offered his job back. But he knows very well that if he goes back people will make merry hell for him. At the moment he only comes under the very low level; he does not come under special awards at all. Surely there is a justification there as well. For some strange reason certain people are being put on a pedestal, which is something that we have said throughout our consideration of this Bill.
8.55 p.m.
My Lords, it may help your Lordships in considering my noble friend's amendment if I very briefly recap on the compensation which the Bill will introduce for cases of unfair dismissal because of non-membership of a union or for union membership or activities. First, there will be a basic award which, as now, will reflect the employee's age, salary and length of service but will be subject in the cases we are considering to a minimum of £2,000 under Clause 3. The maximum of this award is currently £4,050.
Secondly, there will be a compensatory award which is not affected in any way by the Bill's provisions. This is currently subject to a maximum of £7,000 and is to cover actual losses such as loss of earnings or pension arising from the dismissal. Finally, where the employee requests but does not obtain reinstatement, he will be eligible for a special award under Clause 4. This award, as noble Lords will know, will comprise two years' pay, subject to a minimum of £10,000 and a maximum of £20,000, where an order for reinstatement is not made; and three years' pay, subject to a minimum of £15,000, where a reinstatement order is made by the tribunal but defied without good cause by the employer. This amendment seeks in addition to these increases to remove the £7,000 limit on the compensatory award. My noble friend Lord Mottistone has pointed to the higher paid employee who may not seek reinstatement after an unfair dismissal, in which case he will only be eligible for the basic and compensatory awards which might not, in my noble friend's view, cover his total loss. I, of course, understand the concern that has led by noble friend to move the amendment, but I wonder whether I can ask him and the House to reflect with me for a moment on what an employee unfairly sacked from a closed shop is likely to receive as compensation even if he does not seek reinstatement. In such a case he will normally be eligible for a basic award of £2,000 which in the case of an older higher paid employee could rise to over £4,000. In addition, depending on the actual losses which he has suffered as a result of his being unfairly dismissed, he will be eligible for up to £7,000 as a compensatory award. We are, therefore, talking of a potential maximum award of over £11,000, which is far from an insignificant amount. I accept that even so there may be the very odd case—and I think that my noble friend Lord De La Warr said that there would not be many cases here—where the £7,000 limit on the compensatory award will limit the compensation which might otherwise be received. That is precisely why when we issued our consultative paper with proposals for legislation on 23rd November last year we proposed that in trade union membership cases the limit on the compensatory award should be removed. However, the response to that proposal, particularly from employers' organisations, convinced us that the prospect of "unlimited" compensation—however theoretical or unlikely to be applied—might have been an incentive to unscrupulous employees to seek to engineer their dismissals simply to obtain compensation. Employers also pointed out that it was not normal for tribunals—as opposed to courts—to be able to award unlimited compensation. The Government listened carefully to these arguments as part of our consultation process, and we were persuaded by them. We therefore decided to retain the existing limit on the compensatory award. Although my noble friend has, as always, presented his case forcefully he has not convinced me that our decision to retain the upper limit on the compensatory award, taken as it was after consultation and representations by many employers, was wrong. In taking this view, I am mindful of just the risks which my noble friend pointed to in Committee in relation to shipping, when he argued that overall the Bill's proposals on compensation were in danger of causing disruption, and he argued, of course, cogently about the problems which might be caused by rogue or piratical employees. I think that my noble friend's fears along those grounds could, indeed, be aggravated by this amendment and I, therefore, hope that, on reflection, he will agree to withdraw it.My Lords, I feared that my noble friend might see that I was arguing a case the other way at Committee stage for another purpose. I must say that at that stage I had not read Clause 74 of the 1978 Act. I made this point in my opening remarks, but I think there is great significance in the fact that we are only talking about maximums, we are not talking about "actuals". People get fixed in their minds if there is a special maximum, or an unlimited position in this sort of situation, it is automatically going to the people you do not like. The answer to that is that it is not.
It is clear to me—and I shall not bore your Lordships by reading the whole of Section 74—that the tribunal carefully directed as to what it should award the compensatory amount on. It could well come to the conclusion as a tribunal that in the case of these relatively few people—and I think we are all agreed that it is relatively few—who might be otherwise unfairly dealt with, it will follow the strict rules in Section 74 and give the award accordingly. However, it could well be that there will be certain cases in which the £4,000 plus £7,000 that my noble friend mentioned would not be enough to meet the rules of Section 74. All we say, where this happens, is: could it not be permissable for the tribunal to go up to whatever the right figure should be? I do not know whether my noble friend would care to comment on that before I finally reach a conclusion on this point.My Lords, I do not, I am afraid, think that I have much to add over what I have said. The general principles under which the Government have been guided throughout not only the present Bill but the 1980 Act have been to make proposals, to take consultations, to try to see how things would work out on the ground, and in the light of the representations made to us we are not convinced that it would be right to change things in the way that my noble friend suggests.
I do not think that I can add more to that. My noble friend was kind enough, in his courteous way, to give us notice of what he wanted to say. We looked at it closely. It is always painful not to be able to give in to one's most experienced and loyal supporters, and it is with that grief that I have no more comment to make.My Lords, courtesy will get you nowhere! I accept the points made. I am not entirely happy. Although it would be unusual, I appreciate, I should like to reserve the right to say something perhaps by way of an amendment at Third Reading when we come to it, and in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. (Amendment No. 17 not moved.)moved Amendment No. 18:
Page 7, line 34, after ("59(a),") insert ("and the tribunal determines that special compensation should be awarded having regard to equity and the substantial merits of the case,").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to reduce what we might term the automaticity of the special award which can, as we know, carry the compensation up to £31,000. We say that there should be a kind of trip, and that the tribunal should determine, at the point where the complaint could go on to the special award, that special compensation should be awarded
"having regard to equity and the substantial merits of the case".
The position at the moment, as we all know, is that the complainant, if he sustains his case before a tribunal in a trade union membership dismissal, gets the basic award. That is an automatic, and not reducible for contribution to dismissal, £2,000 minimum. It may advance to £4,000 in certain circumstances but it is £2,000 minimum. There then comes the compensatory award. That, as the noble Lord, Lord Mottistone, said, is based on the provisions of Section 74 of the 1978 Act.
I am bound to say, having listened to what the noble Lord said in his last contribution to our debate, that I do not see why he is so concerned that the non-unionist, or would-be trade unionist, would not get, under the calculations of the compensatory award, everything to which he is entitled. The compensatory award is related to the loss attributable to the action taken by the employer. That is what Section 74 says. It says:
"The said loss shall be taken to include—
any expenses reasonably incurred by the complainant in consequence of the dismissal, and
subject to subsection (3), loss of any benefit which he might reasonably be expected to have had but for the dismissal".
Therefore, so far as his actual loss is concerned, if he can show himself to have had a £7,000 loss, then he will get the maximum of the compensatory award. If he has not got a loss of £7,000, if he got an equally good job the next day, then he will not be in need of anything more than £7,000. But he will still have the basic award, which is automatically not reducible for contribution, going to run at £2,000. Therefore, we say: why should he automatically go on to what I will term the Rolls-Royce award, which is a minimum of £10,000 if no reinstatement is awarded and a maximum of £15,000 if reinstatement is awarded but not accepted?
To go back to a point made in the earlier debate, note that the complainant does not have to take reinstatement. He has to offer himself for reinstatement, and there is no particular reason why he should not because of course it is up to the tribunal to decide whether reinstatement is reasonable. The tribunal might decide that no reinstatement should be awarded because it is not reasonable, and therefore he qualifies for the £10,000 minimum, but if they think it is possible and they offer £15,000 and the award is not accepted, then £15,000 is what he gets.
It is true, of course, that the special award can be reduced. We do not know enough to say how it will be reduced. The Bill suggests that it could be reduced, for example, if the worker goes beyond the anniversary date for calculation of the pay due. Or it is where the conduct of the worker is thought to justify it, though we are not told what that conduct would be. Or if he is given by the tribunal an offer which has the effect of reinstatement and he unreasonably refuses such an offer. None of that, at least so far as I can see, is related to the actual degree of loss. The only element in this complicated structure related to the actual degree of loss is the compensatory award.
None of it is related to the actual degree of loss and none of it is related to the difficulty of finding an alternative job, or whether indeed he even looks for such an alternative job. As I read the Bill—I hope the noble Earl will tell me if I am wrong—the only part of this complicated structure which leads to a possible maximum of £31,000 which relates to the conduct of the employee himself, in terms of the actual loss or the attempts he makes to mitigate that loss, is the compensatory award. The implication surely is that in most circumstances the complainant will go on to the maximum, irrespective of the circumstances of the dismissal. The object of the amendment is to put in a trip and to say: The man has his £2,000 minimum. He has whatever compensation he requires because he suffered actual loss up to £7,000. Surely at this point the tribunal might stop and consider the equity and substantial merits of the case and introduce the special award only if it thinks that is justified.
My Lords, the amendment would mean that instead of a special award being payable virtually automatically—I must say that "auto-maticity" sounds like something dreamed up by Saatchi & Saatchi for the Electricity Board—to employees who are unfairly dismissed for non-membership of a union, the special award would be payable only at the discretion of the tribunal where they thought it should be paid having regard to equity and the substantial merits of each case.
I understand the concern of those who are worried that employees could gain large amounts of compensation by engineering their dismissals, but, as I said earlier, we have provided extensive powers in the Bill to cope with that possibility. On the noble Lord's point that the compensatory award is enough, the point surely is that many people dismissed unfairly for non-membership of a union will not have very high actual losses. The compensatory awards to the four Walsall dinner ladies were, in three of the four cases, under £850. The point therefore is that compensation of this size is clearly not enough to deter such dismissals, and hence, as I have argued previously, the special nature of the awards. If an employee opts out of trade union membership in a closed shop—this is back to the point about engineering ones own dismissal—and then sets about disrupting his employer's business in order deliberately to be dismissed, he would surely be judged to be fairly dismissed because of that conduct. But even if the dismissal were judged unfair—because he was dismissed for non-membership—he would almost certainly have any special award reduced under Section 75A(4) which requires the tribunal to reduce the special award where it considers that it would be just and equitable to do so on account of any conduct of the complainant before dismissal. There is a further answer to these worries. If you are an employer, why not ballot your employees? And if you are a trade union, why not co-operate with the ballot? If your closed shop is genuinely popular you have nothing to fear, and if, as a result of the ballot, the closed shop is approved, you will have no cause for concern about the unscrupulous employee; so both objections and both anxieties are covered. For all those reasons I hope the noble Lord will not press the amendment.Automaticity or not, I am afraid it was automatic that the noble Earl would reject the amendment, and we shall have to leave it there.
On Question, amendment negatived.Clause 5 [ Reduction of compensation: matters to be disregarded]:
9.13 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 19:
Page 9, line 35, leave out from ("and") to ("him") in line 36 and insert ("requires").
The noble Earl said: This is virtually drafting, my Lords, the parliamentary draftsman cutting down on superfluous words. The amendment replaces the words,
"has the effect in practice of requiring"
with the single word, "requires". I hope that meets with the approval of the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, because compared with his words such as "auto-maticity"—which apparently is not even in the dictionary—and such phrases as "recrudescence of voluntarism", this amendment is short, simple and intelligible.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 20:
Page 9, line 37, after ("of") insert ("any trade union or of").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, in moving this amendment, if I may, I should like to speak at the
same time also to Amendments Nos. 21, 29, and 30. These amendments are all virtually drafting amendments. Clause 2 of the Bill establishes a general right, that is qualified in some circumstances in a closed shop, not to be unfairly dismissed for not being a member
"of any trade union, or of a particular trade union, or of one of a number of particular trade unions".
We are concerned that that particular phraseology should be used throughout the Bill. Therefore, I beg to move Amendment No. 20, which seeks to achieve that.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 6 [ Awards against third parties]:
moved Amendment No. 21:
Page 10, line 19, at end insert ("or of one of a number of particular trade unions").
On Question, amendment agreed to.
moved Amendment No. 22:
Page 10, lint 20, after ("or") insert ("(with the leave of the tribunal on an application made by him before or during the hearing)").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I am a little worried about this amendment because I was going to say that it is the one about joinder, but I am not sure that that is in OUD, either. I think that the terms are all in Webster, but it is obvious that the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, does not use Webster—
I wonder whether they are in Gennard, too, which the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, will realise we have not seen, though which I believe he has seen.
Well, the noble Earl must be the only one left in the world who has not seen Gennard—he and the Secretary of State. It is worth seeing, believe me; but it will be too late when the Government publish it.
So, as I way saying, the present amendment is about joinder, and the aim of the clause as it stands is to create a situation where the complainant is given equal rights with the employer to join the union in an action. The clause as it stands provides that the tribunal must grant the request if it is made before the hearing begins; that is to say, before the consequences of the justice of the matter can be assessed. The purpose of our amendment is to preserve that arrangement for the employer only. We are saying that the tribunal must give leave. This returns us to another argument which we used at the Committee stage, when we debated the dangers of the joinder procedure. Members on this side of the Chamber quoted, for example, the Donovan Report, which stated that the decision to dismiss was the employer's decision and that he should take the responsibility. Personally, I consider that more persuasive than that was the argument that any other action which would join the union, or which would result in joinder, would involve the courts in making a decision as to the justice or equity of particular forms of industrial action, and we believe that that is something that the courts should do very sparingly, and indeed not at all if they can help it. But, of course, joinder is especially dangerous when it can be invoked by the complainant unilaterally—which is the position under the clause, which the amendment wants to change—and when the complainant can do that irrespective of the wishes of the employer, and in a way which, I emphasise, has no effect whatever on the compensation. The compensation is awarded by the tribunal and the complainant receives the compensation, whatever it is. So in fact joinder is not affecting the complainant per se in terms of the money he receives; it is simply the point that presumably he wants the union to be joined. Not surprisingly, we have not had from the Government any general arguments as to why they particularly want the provision. All we have had is an argument advanced by both the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, and the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers. At col. 65, on 12th July the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, put it with commendable frankness. He said:Well, of course we know that; but why?—"The extension of this right to the dismissed employee is intended to increase the likelihood of unions being joined"—
In reply to that we asked the Government, why do you want to join the trade union? Why, in particular, do you want to join the trade union if the employer does not want to join the trade union? To that Lord Glenarthur replied, "So what?". Or, rather, he said:"in unfair dismissal proceedings and, therefore, of becoming liable to pay compensation where they force an employer to dismiss unfairly".
So the Government admit this. The noble Lord continued:"We know that employers, for their own industrial relations reasons, will often be reluctant to join unions in unfair dismissal proceedings. They may, for example, fear the industrial relations consequences of doing so."
So we say: What about the industrial relations consequences? What about the employer, and his fearing industrial action? To that we are told:"However, the result is that unions at the moment know that they have a pretty good chance of getting away with it if they force an employer to dismiss unfairly. But, of course, a dismissed employee is unlikely to be swayed by the same considerations as his former employer. He may well choose to use his right of joinder where his ex-employer declines to do so."
which seems to be a contradiction. It goes on:"… in the Government's view it is not the case that employee joinder will cause industrial relations difficulties",
I suggest that this is nonsense and that the Government know it is a nonsense. I suggest that the Government are much more honest when they said, in the first quotation I made from the noble Lord, Lord Glenarthur, that in fact they do not really care if the result is industrial action; that they want the union to be "got", and they want the union to pay irrespective of what the employer wants to happen and, in fact, in defiance of the employer's wishes. It is nonsense to say that if people feel that this is disruptive industrial relations they do not know about it and the Government do; and that the Government's view is that it will not have the effect which in the employer's view it will have, because the Government believe that the workers will say, "How can the employer be held responsible by the union concerned, because he did not start the action?" I suggest that the Government know that that is not true. I suggest, in fact, that the arguments which the Government used when a similar proposal was put forward in another place in 1980 by the Member for Rochdale are the proper arguments, which they know are as true now as they were when they were put forward then. Because, on 11th March 1980, in col. 1072, in the Official Report, the then Under-Secretary of State said, answering the Member for Rochdale:"If any employer does not 'join' a union in unfair dismissal proceedings, but his dismissed employee does, how can the employer be held responsible for that by the union concerned? The employer would be able to make clear to the unions that he had nothing whatever to do with his ex-employee's decision; that the employee was no longer on his premises, and was thus out of his sphere of influence."
We suggest that the Government know this all too well. Indeed, it is pitifully obvious; and the object of this amendment is to let the tribunal have a reserve power to take action to prevent it if they think there is good reason to do so. I beg to move."There is a potential here for considerable industrial disruption, to the disadvantage of the firm and its workers as a whole, to say nothing of the employer himself. It will be open to the individual, for example, not to sue the union as to sue individual workers. One might then have a kind of running sore, which could lead to a great disruption and bring harm to the firm itself".
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, has quoted at length what I said at the Committee stage. We made it clear that the main intention of Clause 6 of the Bill is to increase the likelihood that trade unions will have to face the consequences of their actions where they force an employer to dismiss an employee unfairly for not being a union member. It is with this firm intention in mind that I approach these amendments.
I accept that the amendments do not take away entirely the employee's right of joinder, but they do reduce that right considerably. Clause 6 of the Bill currently provides that either the dismissed employee or the employer has the absolute right to require a third party to be joined in unfair dismissal proceedings if such a request is made before the hearing of the complaint begins. If a request is made during the hearing but before a remedy for the unfair dismissal is awarded, then joinder will take place only with the tribunal's consent. This is perfectly normal practice in civil litigation. These amendments seek to qualify the employee's right of joinder but not the employer's, so that the employee can join a third party to proceedings only with the tribunal's consent, no matter when he requests that that joinder should take place. I submit that there is no justification on procedural grounds for these amendments. Where joinder takes place before a hearing begins, whether it be through the employer's or through the employee's request, all parties to the complaint can be present throughout the hearing. Additionally, if a late request for a joinder is made, whether by the employer or the employee, and this request is allowed by the tribunal, any inconvenience to the joined party can be accommodated through an adjournment. But there is no case for treating the rights of a dismissed employee and employer differently on procedural grounds. They give rise to precisely the same issues of timing and convenience. We have heard the argument that tribunals should have discretion over whether to allow employee joinder because otherwise this could harm the employer's industrial relations. We had this argument in Committee. Again, I can only repeat our view that we do not believe that an employee joinder will cause industrial relations difficulties. If an employer does not join a union in unfair dismissal proceedings but his dismissed employee does, how can the employer be held responsible for that by the union concerned? The employer would be able to make clear to the union that he had nothing to do with his ex-employee's decision, that the employee was no longer on his premises and thus was out of his sphere of influence. If we were to accept these amendments, there would be no automatic right of joinder by an employee and, therefore, much reduced prospects of unions being made to pay where they force an employer to dismiss an employee unfairly for not being a union member. That is simply not acceptable. Therefore I must ask your Lordships to reject the amendment.My Lords, the noble Lord says that it is not acceptable. We know that it is not acceptable. He does not give us any reason; he just keeps saying that he does not think it will happen. He does not say why we should not believe the Under-Secretary of State on 11th March 1980. I do not withdraw the amendment.
On Question, amendment negatived. [Amendment No. 23 not moved.]9.28 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 24:
Page 10, line 41, at end insert—
("(4) Pressure is exercised by a trade union within the meaning of subsection (1) above where and only where one or more of the acts which constitute the pressure are done by a person acting on behalf of the union.").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, the aim of this amendment is to start a debate about the principles of trade union pressure. This may be the amendment on which we are going to get a change of batting on the part of the Government; I am not sure. If so, then I shall probably be out-classed on this matter, but I struggle on all the same. The aim of this amendment is to start a debate on the principles of trade union pressure. We want to ask the Government to help us by defining the kind, type and rules—the code—which will govern the pressure and the responsibility for exerting pressure in this Part of the Bill.
It seems to us that there are two alternative sets of principles which could govern the rules of responsibility in respect of pressure. In the past, in the area where unions were liable for the acts of their agents, we relied in crude terms on the common law, on what one might call the Heaton principle; that is to say, in broad terms the union was responsible under the rules, or rather, was responsible under the rules as modified by the custom and practice of the union concerned.
This was summarised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wilberforce, when he said:
"If the authority to take a particular type of action is not excluded by the rules and if the authority is reasonably to be implied by custom and practice, then such authority will continue to exist until it is unequivocally withdrawn".
We take the view that our amendment would have the effect of embodying what I have called the Heaton principle from the point of view of responsibility for pressure.
The alternative would be the approach of the Bill. This Bill has a different code of responsibility, as set out in Clause 14. In Clause 14 the Government create this artificial construction of the responsible person. The union is responsible if the responsible person does something, whether he is the general secretary, president, or a principal of the executive committee or some other authority, unless of course he repudiates it in ways which are laid down in the Bill. That is one code of responsibility; the common law code of responsibility is another.
We tried in Committee to get the Government to say that they would have one code of responsibility both for industrial torts and what might be termed non-industrial torts. But the Government were not prepared to say that. They preferred a mixed system and they seem to prefer an equally—if not mixed—confused system. There is nothing in this Part of the Bill which tells us exactly what principles, code of responsibility or rules the tribunals are to use in deciding in joinder whether the union really was in terms of the organisation responsible for what has been done. What we are really asking in this amendment is whether it would be a good idea to say what those principles would be. Our personal preference is for the Heaton principles. I beg to move.
My Lords, I have to compliment the noble Lord on the accuracy of his forecast in one respect, but one respect only. Regarding the argument that he has advanced, having attended to it as closely as I can, I consider that the amendment still seems to me to be unnecessary and potentially confusing. The amendment seeks to provide that a union cannot be found liable for compensation as a result of having been joined in an unfair dismissal case unless the pressure, or some part of the pressure, which has been exerted on the employer has been exerted on behalf of the union. The point is surely a simple one: whether one includes such words or not there can be no question of a union becoming liable for something not done on its behalf.
As the noble Lord pointed out, we have provided detailed rules in relation to industrial torts later in the Bill; but it does not appear necessary to provide detailed rules at this stage and the basic provisions on which this amendment operates are the provisions which were incorporated in the 1980 Act. It was not found necessary to depart from the principles of the common law in relation to the 1980 Act and I do not see why it should be thought necessary to depart from that principle in relation to this same basic liability in the joinder provisions of this Bill. Equally, it was not thought necessary in the 1980 Act to make explicit that unions were only to be liable for compensation where action had been taken by them or on their behalf. That was considered to be, and remains, self evident.My Lords, does that really mean that if an ordinary trade union member committed some act or made some threat which was nothing to do with his branch, region, national officers, general secretary or president, nevertheless they could be held guilty for the behaviour of one single member? That act might be done deliberately to get somebody in an embarrassing situation. Does it mean that?
No, my Lords. The answer to that is short and immediate. The law, without the amendment, is the same as the law with the amendment. The amendment appears to me to be unnecessary and confusing. The union will be held liable only if the court regards the pressure as exerted truly on behalf of the union or exerted truly by the union. So the point that the noble Lord, Lord Molloy, made is very properly met—a point which think ought to be met and is met. I hope for these reasons that your Lordships will find it possible not to accept this amendment.
My Lords, I do not know whether the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate was present when the Government were saying in a previous amendment that of course they knew it did not make ally difference but they could not be sure, so they would accept it. I said at the time that I wished they would be equally generous all night, but they are clearly not going to be. We will not press this to a Division.
On Question, Amendment negatived. [Amendment No. 25 not moved.]Clause 8 [ Dismissal in connection with strike or other industrial action.]:
moved Amendment No. 26:
Page 11, line 36, leave out from ("who") to end of line 37 and insert ("took part in it").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, at present efforts by an employer to victimise some of the employees who may be involved in industrial action have some limitation placed upon them. If an employer was enabled to re-engage just some of the employees involved, that would imperil almost every industrial action, and as noble Lords opposite have agreed with those from this side of the House that workers have the right to strike where the circumstances justify it, I am certain the Government would not wish to see any industrial action imperilled by victimisation by any employer.
The present law enables a tribunal to consider a claim for unfair dismissal where an employer makes an offer of re-engagement to only some of the employees who have been involved in industrial action. In this clause, the Government are seeking to change the rules in two ways. First, it is narrowing the description of the establishment to be at or from that which the complainant works. Therefore, industrial action in a number of different departments or depots will no longer cover all the plants but only the particular plant at or from which a particular complainant works.
The second change proposed by the Government is varying who are the relevant employees to be considered. The Government are proposing that an employer does not have to consider all the employees involved in industrial action. He has to take account only of thoses who were actually taking part in industrial action at the date of the complainant's dismissal. That is a considerable change from the present law, and under the Bill as drafted an employer could tempt some employees to go back to work and break the strike and maybe he could do that by picking off employees one by one. In effect, the Bill will do what I asserted at Second Reading—legalise the dismissal of those who are the activists, maybe the leaders of the majority of the employees.
For that reason I spoke against this on clause stand part, at the Committee stage. In the debate that followed, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate dismissed the objections put forward because he said it was very a modest measure. Subsection (3) of the clause relates a strike or other industrial action to—here I quote:
"those employees at the establishment who were taking part in the action at the complainant's date of dismissal."
I would say to the noble and learned Lord that this amendment is also a very modest measure, because it proposes to leave out certain words and replaces them by other words so that the new phrase would read:
"in relation to a strike or other industrial action at the establishment who took part in it."
That would refer to any employee who took part in the industrial action and not just those who were still taking part in it at the date of the complainant's dismissal. That is a very important change, and the amendment says that we must go further to encourage any unscrupulous employer to have legal support in splitting his employees where there is industrial action. I hope that all noble Lords who believe that the workers have a right, where it is justified, to take industrial action will support this amendment, because it puts the law back to where it ought to be and does not restrict it as proposed by the Government. I beg to move.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Underhill, has explained, this amendment would preserve an anomaly in the existing provisions which Clause 8 seeks to correct. It may be helpful if I seek to remind your Lordships of the background. When the principle that employees have a right not to be unfairly dismissed was introduced for the first time in 1971 by the then Conservative Government, it was decided that a balance had to be struck between the need for employers to be able to dismiss employees in fundamental breach of their contracts, and the right of individual employees to be protected against dismissal which could be accounted unfair, even though by their actions they had repudiated their contract of employment. The balance was struck in the test of discrimination which is currently set out in Section 62 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
Section 62 excludes the industrial tribunals from jurisdiction to hear a complaint of unfair dismissal made by an employee who was participating in a strike or other industrial action, or involved in a lockout, at the time of his dismissal, provided the employer has dismissed all the "relevant employees":—that is, those who took part in the action in question—and either does not make any of them at any time an offer of re-engagement, or makes an offer of re-engagement to all of them. A decision of your Lordships House sitting judicially in 1978, in the case of Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton), found that there was discrimination, and a claim of unfair dismissal could be heard, if the employer had not dismissed all employees who had participated at any time in the industrial action in question, rather than, as had previously been generally thought, just those who were striking or taking other industrial action at the time of the dismissal in question. This means that if an employee who had participated in the action returned to work, the employer could face a claim for unfair dismissal from any of the other employees who continued with the action, even if he dismissed them all. However, if the employer also dismissed those who had returned to work, then they would be able to complain to an industrial tribunal, because they were dismissed while not taking industrial action. So at present, under the clause as so construed, an employer with a strike on his hands is, so far as this provision is concerned, in a "Catch 22" situation. Some very strange examples can arise from this and let me just give one. An employer could allow strikers back to work in the belief that the action was ended, without knowing, or having any means of knowing, that others who possibly could be based in a different part of the country proposed to continue the action, even at a later date. If he accepted the return to work of the first group, he would risk complaints of unfair dismissal in the way described if he dismissed those who continued to strike. On the other hand, if he delayed their return until he was certain that none other of his employees intended to participate in the action, then he would be ignoring the wish of the first group to remedy the fundamental breach of contract involved in taking industrial action, and might be held to have locked-out his employees although he had been forced into that situation by the anomaly in the law as it now operates. The noble Lord, Lord Underhill, referred to the possibility that the leaders or activists might be victimised, if our provision proceeds in its present form. But the truth of the matter is that our provision would differentiate between those who have returned to work and those who have remained on strike. Therefore, if what the noble Lord is saying is that those who remain on strike are the leaders, then they have ceased to lead because they have lost their flock and the flock have returned to work. Why should the law not recognise the fact that the flock have voluntarily decided, on their own, to go back to work, that the leaders no longer lead and are now taking action in which the flock do not follow them? Why should the law operate in this way in that situation? Accordingly, in my submission, the proposal that we are making for a change is a very reasonable one, and I ask your Lordships not to accept this amendment.My Lords, I have listened very carefully to what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has said and there are two points which I wish to take up. First, he said that one could have a situation where workers have returned to work from other parts of the country; but the clause being put forward by the Government defines the establishment where the employees are concerned as being only at or where or from which the complainant works. Therefore the question of other parts of the country must be dropped from this argument.
Secondly, the noble and learned Lord spoke about all the flock having gone back to work. We are discussing a situation where the employer can reengage just a few people and take them back into work but not take the whole lot back. All the trade unions regard this as legalisation of the possibility of victimisation. This is a principle which I am certain everybody in this House would stand for, and in the light of the Government's refusal we must press it to a Division.9.46 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 26) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 35; Not-Contents, 60.
DIVISION NO. 4
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Ardwick, L. | McCarthy, L. |
| Aylestone, L. | Mackie of Benshie, L. |
| Birk, B. | Mais, L. |
| Bishopston, L. | Milner of Leeds, L. |
| Blease, L. | Molloy, L. |
| Cledwyn of Penrhos, L. | Oram, L. |
| Collison, L. | Parry, L. |
| David, B.—[Teller.] | Peart, L. |
| Ewart-Biggs, B. | Rochester, L. |
| Hirshfield, L. | Seear, B. |
| Houghton of Sowerby, L. | Sefton of Garston, L. |
| Jeger, B. | Stedman, B. |
| Jenkins of Putney, L. | Stewart of Alvechurch, B. |
| John-Mackie, L. | Stewart of Fulham, L. |
| Kilmarnock, L. | Strabolgi, L. |
| Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.] | Underhill, L. |
| White, B. | |
| Lovell-Davis, L. | Wynne-Jones, L. |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Alexander of Tunis, E. | Elliot of Harwood, B. |
| Auckland, L. | Elton, L. |
| Avon, E. | Ferrers, E. |
| Bellwin, L. | Ferrier, L. |
| Belstead, L. | Fortescue, E. |
| Boardman, L. | Gainford, L. |
| Campbell of Alloway, L. | Gardner of Parkes, B. |
| Cathcart, E. | Glenarthur, L. |
| Chelwood, L. | Gowrie, E. |
| Cork and Orrery, E. | Gridley, L. |
| Craigmyle, L. | Hives, L. |
| Crathorne, L. | Holderness, L. |
| Cullen of Ashbourne, L. | Home of the Hirsel, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Hornsby-Smith, B. |
| De La Warr, E. | Killearn, L. |
| Denham, L.—[Teller.] | Lauderdale, E. |
| Drumalbyn, L. | Long, V. |
| Eccles, V. | Lyell, L. |
| Elles, B. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Mansfield, E. | Romney, E. |
| Marley, L. | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Marshall of Leeds, L. | Sandys, L.—[Teller.] |
| Mersey, V. | Sharples, B. |
| Mottistone, L. | Sudeley, L. |
| Murton of Lindisfarne, L. | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Renton, L. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Rochdale, V. | Trenchard, V. |
| Trumpington, B. | Vivian, L. |
| Vaux of Harrowden, L. | Windlesham, L. |
| Vickers, B. | Young, B. |
Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
9.53 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 27:
Page 11, line 40, at end insert—
("(3A) After subsection (4)(c) there shall be added—
("(d) "taking part in the action" in paragraph (b) above means taking action with the same or a connected interest in a dispute, whether or not different groups of those employees take the action by way of a strike or of other various forms of industrial action.".").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 27. The House will remember that at Committee stage, because at that time we were under timetable pressure, we dealt not with specific amendments to Clause 8 but with the clause as a whole. In so doing the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate took the same stance in relation to this clause as the Government do to the Bill as a whole. As my noble friend Lord Underhill pointed out in relation to the last amendment, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate suggested that this clause was modest in its intention and effect. He suggested that its purpose was little more than to clear up anomalies which had emerged, particularly in case law. In fact, I believe that that argument is but the sheep's clothing that attempts to conceal the wolf underneath.
The effect of this clause, in my view, as of the Bills of which it is a part, is to undermine certain fundamental pillars of trade union strength. Its purpose and its method are to make unity of action by trade unionists much more difficult to achieve. On the one hand, it seeks to divide those who are resolute about a particular dispute from those who are less resolute, and, on the other hand, it seeks to divide employees in one establishment of a business from those in other establishments.
Unionists often quote the slogan, "United we stand, divided we fall". Clause 8 seeks, in my view, to ensure that trade unionists shall be divided and therefore shall fall, and it will give to employers a greatly increased capacity to divide and conquer. That I believe to be the effect of the clause if it goes un-amended, because by virtue of Clause 8 the employer no longer has to look at all those who are taking part in the industrial action, but only at a more narrowly defined reference group at a particular establishment, and, as I see it also, at those engaged in a narrowly defined dispute.
The purpose of the amendment which I am moving is to prevent at least some of the stresses and divisions between workers which the Bill will bring about. The amendment would ensure that a wider range of employees would be able to bring valid complaints to an industrial tribunal than would be the case if Clause 8 were not so amended. It would ensure that the definition of "relevant employees" for the purposes of Clause 8 was not so restricted as to isolate a few workers from their fellow employees who might be taking similar action, such as working to rule rather than striking, in relation to a different but clearly connected grievance. If my amendment is accepted, as I hope it will be, it would not, of course, remove the fundamental objection which my noble friends and I have to the clause as a whole, but it would at least, in my judgment, limit to some extent the harm that the clause as it stands threatens to cause. It is for those reasons that I beg to move.
My Lords, as I understand the amendment, it seeks to define the phrase "taking part in the action", which I must say at first sight seems a fairly simple phrase, readily comprehensible, by a fairly long formula, and not to do much more than that. As the noble Lord, Lord Oram, has said, the amendment is concerned with the definition of "relevant employees". The amendment aims to include explicitly in the definition of "relevant employees" all employees with the same or a connected interest in the dispute and all employees involved in industrial action irrespective of the form the action takes. We believe that these classes of employees are already included in the provisions and, as it seems to us, included more simply in the phrase "taking part in the action". When one looks at the factual situation one sees what the action is and you just take all the employees taking part in that. I must say, with great respect, that I do not see that the noble Lord's amendment adds anything to that or does anything to effect the general purpose he mentioned.
I understand perfectly, of course, his objection and that of his noble friends to Clause 8, which has been expounded very clearly both tonight and earlier. But, at the moment anyway, I do not see that this particular amendment assists the matter and for our part we would prefer to rest with the simple words, "taking part in the action". I hope that your Lordships will find it possible to agree with us.My Lords, I do not think that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate dealt with the point that I attempted to make, that "action" is not sufficiently defined. It might or it might not include action like working to rule where one group might be on strike and another group might be working to rule, and they might be involved in a related, but not exactly the same, dispute. It is the purpose of my amendment to make sure that that wider definition is incorporated in the Bill. However, I heard what the noble and learned said about how, in his view, the present wording is wide enough for that purpose. I wish to look at what he said more closely. Certainly, I do not wish at this stage to press this particular amendment to a Division and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.Clause 9 [ Action relating to trade union membership]:
moved Amendment No. 28:
Page 12, line 16, at end insert—
("(1A) In section 23 of the 1978 Act there shall be inserted after subsection (1)—
"(1A) An employee shall not have the right conferred by subsection (1)(c) above except in respect of action which deprives or threatens to deprive him of some benefit or advantage relating to this employment which has not been the subject of collective bargaining between the employer and a recognised trade union.".").
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 28. In my opinion this is the most reasonable amendment that we have put before the House in the entire Committee stage and Report stage. It is an attempt to preserve the right of benefit for members only. We did not move it at the Committee stage because there was not time and it is rather complicated and needs some explanation. However, I will deal with it as quickly as I can.
The Government have now created a right to be protected from action short of dismissal to force someone into a union. Indeed, the aim of the present Clause 9, as we debated in Committee, is to make it clear that it is action short of dismissal to operate an agency shop—that is even if you do not belong to the union, you might pay an equivalent in dues. We are not concerned with the agency shop aspects of Clause 9 tonight: we are aiming to use this to add a new section to the 1978 Act dealing with the general extent of the liability of action short of dismissal in the case of non-unionism. We do not want to prevent a situation where all that the employer is doing is to deprive the non-unionist of the results of collective bargaining. That, in effect, is a rather legalistic way of providing benefits for members only.
There was a time when the Conservative Party was very much in favour of benefits for members only. This was one of the ways in which they argued against a need for the closed shop. They used to ask at the time, for example, of the giant strength, why the trade union movement needed a closed shop, and when the answer was that it was to make people accept their obligations and not to be free-riders they said, "There is a simple way out of that; you just give the trade union benefits to members of the trade union and if you are not a member of the trade union you do not get the benefits, you do not get the wages, you do not get the conditions. That is perfectly fair and as a result people will join the union because they will see the relationship between benefits and union membership"—benefits for members only.
There always were good reasons why the trade unions were somewhat reluctant, in this country at least, to operate the principle of benefit for members only. Traditionally, trade unions have believed that the way in which you demonstrate to non-unionists the benefits of trade unionism, is to get benefits for all so that you operate what the Webbs called "the common rule"; and when people ask, "What are the benefits of trade unions?", you can say, "The benefits are the terms and conditions of employment which you enjoy, whether you are a member of a union or not. Do you not think that as we have all these things for you and you are enjoying all these things, you ought to join a union?" That was the traditional argument against benefits for members only.
But, secondly, of course, they always feared—particularly where they were weak and where they had certain suspicions of employers—that the employers might be given an incentive to employ non-unionists; if you could not get non-unionists at lower rates and conditions of employment, then you had to pay trade unionists. So, for these reasons, in this country at least, the trade union movement—not universally, but generally—turned its back on benefits for members only.
But there were examples. For many years, there were some examples in, for instance, the Post Office of certain benefits negotiated for members only, and there are many more examples in other industrial relations systems. The United States' benefits for members only for a period was a very common way of inducing people to join the union. We are saying, "Let us make this lawful; let us make this legal". In the days when the closed shop was easily enforceable, benefits for members only were perhaps not an attractive alternative. But if you are making the closed shop—as you are—increasingly impossible to operate, as we have sought to argue tonight, as we have argued in particular in respect, say, of Equity and as I think we shall also go on to argue in respect of certain other amendments when we come to Clause 11, for unions that are in a very difficult situation, surely it ought to be possible for them to operate benefits for members only.
It may be that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate will tell me that, in fact, Clause 9 does not strike at benefits for members only—I do not know. If he does, I say let us have this amendment because he cannot prove it, in the same way as he or his noble friends could not prove it earlier about professional men. But, if there is any doubt, let us have it.
Of course, it would mean that such things as wage increases and reductions in the working week—all the things that were quite clearly the result of collective bargaining—could, if the employer and the union agreed, be confined to members only; whereas other things, for example, promotion opportunities, non-negotiated benefits, merit ratings and so on—all those aspects of the employer's relationship with the employee which he does not bargain about, and there are still a large number of those—would not be covered by this clause.
It is not just that we are trying to make something possible for unions which they do not do now and which you might say that they have shown very little sign up to now that they would necessarily want to do. There is a real problem here, and I should very much like the Government to tell me what they take the law to be.
There is one way in which trade unions universally now give benefits for members only, as has always been the case. You cannot gain access to a procedure in industry, if that procedure is a joint procedure and if it is operated by, for example, shop stewards. No shop steward will ever take up a grievance for a nonmember and I think that that is reasonable. If the stewards operate the system and represent the people in the system, they will not represent the interests of non-members. One of the traditional ways in which open shop unions have members, is that a non-unionist has not seen the point of trade unionism until he has a problem and he has wanted someone to go to the foreman and argue on his behalf. The foreman may say, "I think you ought to get yourself a shop steward".
So the non-member has said to the shop steward, "I would like you to take up this grievance", and
the shop steward has said, "You are not a member". Of all the recruiting agents that is probably the single most important recruiting agent of trade unionism—people with problems who want a representative. We are not certain—perhaps the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate is certain—whether a practice in which trade unionists said, and in which employers co-operated, that you could not get access to the higher levels of the procedure (for example, you could not get a grievance raised about whether or not your job evaluation assessment was correct) because that is a benefit which is confined to trade unionists only, could be said to be something which was against this clause—that is, action short of dismissal. There are a range of benefits which de facto tend to be confined to trade unionists, so we are saying, let us make this clear, self-evident and lawful, and let us accept the amendment.
10.10 p.m.
My Lords, as the bowling has returned to me, the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, will have the satisfaction of knowing, as he put it in his own words, that he will not be outclassed, so he may relax. The noble Lord generously acknowledged that his amendment was complicated. I will also acknowledge that Clause 9 is complicated and is quite difficult to follow. It may therefore help if I briefly explain the background to the clause before I deal directly with the noble Lord's amendment.
Section 15 of the 1980 Act provides a general right in closed shops, although it is one which is qualified, for an employee not to have action which is short of dismissal taken against him by his employer in order to compel him to join a union. What might be action short of dismissal has in fact never been defined in legislation, but it could clearly cover actions such as withholding promotion, or taking away fringe benefits, or even giving lower pay. Of course it was the Government's view that it was right that where no closed shop existed employees should not be forced by these methods into union membership. The position, though, where a closed shop is in operation is of course a different one. The 1980 Act recognised that fact by giving the right not to be forced into union membership only to those employees who cannot be fairly dismissed if they are not members in a closed shop under the 1980 Act. Clause 9 of the Bill does no more than to extend the rights of an employee in a closed shop not to be forced in this way to be a member to the additional situations in which dismissal for not being a member will be unfair under the provisions of Clause 2. This will be principally where a closed shop has not been approved in a secret ballot. Lord McCarthy's amendment adopts an alternative approach whereby all employees in a closed shop would have the right not to have action short of dismissal taken against them to compel union membership, except if the action against them amounted to depriving them of benefits which have been negotiated by a trade union, in which case such action would be all right. It has been argued that if a union has negotiated benefits for its members and certain employees refuse to join or remain in that union, they should not be entitled to the union-negotiated benefits—the old argument of the free rider. Therefore, if an employer deprives them of these benefits he is, goes the argument, justified in doing so and he should not be subject to tribunal proceedings on that account. This line of argument, I suggest with respect, misunderstands the right given to employees in the 1980 Act and which is extended by this clause. For this right to apply it must be shown that the employer has taken action against his employee for the purposes of compelling him to be a trade unionist. There is nothing to stop an employer negotiating a benefit for his employees with a trade union, such as an extra week's holiday, but withholding this from his nonunion employees. That is perfectly fair, so long as he does not do this in order to compel them to join a union. May one give an example. It is perfectly acceptable for union members to be paid, say, 5 per cent. wages above non-union members, but it would be obviously unfair to have wage increases for union members but none to those who are not union members. An employer is not prevented from ever differentiating between his union and non-union employees. But the whole point of this clause is that he must not use this differentiation process as a backdoor method to force into union membership an employee who does not wish to join, and whose employer knows that dismissing him for non-membership would constitute an act of unfair dismissal. The amendment, by contrast, could allow such an employee to be squeezed into membership without a remedy. I do not think that is reasonable, and that is why I hope the noble Lord will not press the amendment.My Lords, I must say immediately that I acquit myself of any desire to put myself in the same class as the Minister. I was not trying to do that at all but merely implying that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate outclassed me, certainly when it came to the case law, or what I always refer to, in relation to my noble friend Lord Wedderburn, as "Stock v. Jones and all that jazz". When it comes to that, he outclasses me.
Having said that, I come to remarks of the noble Earl, and a considerable part of them I found reassuring. I only hope that some such legal luminary as the new Master of the Rolls might take a similar view if the matter ever came before him. He said, if I understood the noble Earl aright, that you could take action as an employer, for example, to give 5 per cent. more wages to the trade unionist than the non-unionist, and that that would not be action short of dismissal. That is well worth having on the record. I was not so happy when he said you could not give any increase to the non-unionist, because I am not sure of the difference between giving 5 per cent. more—that is, 5 per cent. of nothing—rather than 10 per cent. and 5 per cent., and I am not sure the Master of the Rolls would follow that either. It is, however, helping us. The difficulty of what the noble Earl says is that you must not do any of it with the purpose of compelling anybody to join a union, when in a way that is the purpose; it benefits the members only and it is a way of getting people to see the point of trade unionism. I gave a concrete example of what actually happens, but he did not answer me on that. Take, for example, the case where somebody is deliberately—by the shop steward and with the acceptance and encouragement of the employer—blocked off from the use of certain procedures, which may or may not result in upgrading. Would that be action short of dismissal? There could be no doubt about the purpose; namely, to compel people to join the union. What the shop steward says is, "I am not going to do all this work for somebody who is not even a member. Go away and be a member". I am not sure whether the noble Earl is saying that that is action short of dismissal and would or would not be unlawful. As, therefore, he has not reassured me on all those matters but only some of them, I cannot withdraw the amendment.My Lords, may I ask the noble Earl, Lord Ferrers, to say what he means by "compel"? If you offer somebody a lower level of pay, which is not a nice thing to be offered, it might induce them to go, without compelling them to go; they could still take a lower level of pay if they wished to do so. You may be inducing them or motivating them in that direction, but not compelling them. May I ask the noble Earl to explain that rather more fully?
My Lords, I will, with the leave of the House, try to answer that question and the point worrying the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy. I would say that it is perfectly reasonable to have a differentiation, for instance, between wage rates for union and non-union members. It is perfectly reasonable to say, "Those who are union members will get a 5 per cent. rate above non-union employees", and I take that merely as an example. When negotiating new wage rates, maybe they will all go up, and you will still have a 5 per cent. differentiation. What would be unfair would be to say, "We shall negotiate a wage increase for union members and union members will have a wage increase, but meanwhile non-union employees will have no increase". However, it would not be unfair to have differentiation between the two.
The noble Baroness asked what is meant when one talks about "compelling". Clearly, it would be unfair if an employee were, for instance, to have taken away from him his company car because he was not a member of a trade union. Likewise it would be unfair if it were said that because a person were not a member of a trade union, he would be denied promotion. That would be unfair, but it would not be unfair to have a differentiation between rates of pay, provided that they are consistent.My Lords, I should like to raise just one point before the noble Earl finally sits down. This is a very important matter, and the noble Earl is giving us great help. But I should like to ask, how does one move towards that situation? There is now the situation where everybody is on the same rate of pay, and one wants to move towards a situation, which the noble Earl says would be lawful, where trade unionists receive 5 per cent. more than non-trade unionists. But the only way to achieve that is to give a 5 per cent. increase to trade unionists and nothing to non-trade unionists. That is how one would reach the situation which the noble Earl says would be lawful, but it would be reached by what he says are unlawful means.
On Question, amendment negatived.moved Amendment No. 29:
Page 13, line 4, at end insert—
("(4) In subsection (1)(c) of that section, for the words "a trade union" there shall be substituted the words "any trade union or of a particular trade union or of one of a number of particular trade unions".").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, this amendment is consequential upon Amendment No. 20. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 10 [ Awards against third parties]:
moved Amendment No. 30:
Page 13, line 13, leave out ("a trade union") and insert ("any trade union or of a particular trade union or of one of a number of particular trade unions").
The noble Earl said: My Lords, this amendment is in the same vein; it is also consequential. I beg to move.
On Question, amendment agreed to.
Clause 11 [ Prohibition on union membership requirements]:
[ Amendments Nos. 31 and 32 not moved.]
My Lords, in calling Amendment No. 33 I should say that, if it is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 34.
10.23 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 33:
Page 15, line 34, leave out from ("above;") to end of line 36.
The noble Lord said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 33, with which goes Amendment No. 34. We are endeavouring to amend and make narrow in its scope subsection (7). The subsection defines those to whom a duty is owed to comply with subsection (2), which deals with lists of potential suppliers and people who may be invited to tender. If the duty is not carried out, there is a contravention and damages may be claimed. Subsection (7)( d)—which we are seeking to amend—adds to the people to whom a duty is owed and who can claim damages,
"any other person who may be adversely affected by its contravention".
Surely that is far too wide a category. The danger is that we have here a subject which can easily feed the litigious, or feed the zeal of a paranoid or a crank. The subsection in effect opens the front door and invites anyone and everyone to come to the party and try to win a piece of cake.
The amendment simply proposes that the obligation to comply is a duty owed only to the excluded person against whom the contravention was directed. But as it appears in the Bill, subsection (7) is a step in the dark, a step into the unknown. It refers to any person "adversely affected". How long must the train of causation be before someone is excluded from taking action? Can damages be claimed, for example, by the creditors of a company who have not been paid because the company was left off a list? The sub-contractor of an excluded main contractor may presumably claim damages, and so presumably could an employee of the sub-contractor who has been made redundant through its plight.
Of course, the courts have rules about the remoteness of damage, but where does the remoteness stop? It is argued that a plaintiff would have to show a locus standi, but will this be really difficult? How far can a plaintiff get in an action before proving that he has suffered damage? Can he drag a defendant into court on what may prove to be a useless but expensive and time-consuming exercise? It is these fears that have caused us to put down this amendment, and surely it is one which is sheer common sense and which the Government ought to accept.
My Lords, very briefly, I see the problem raised by the noble Lord opposite, but persons adversely affected, questions of causation and questions of remoteness of damage really and truly belie exact definition, and any attempt to do so could only add a wholly unworkable provision. All that one can do within this sphere is to take aboard the case law in the three aspects of this problem that exist and allow the tribunal to adjudicate accordingly. There is no way that this can be improved by definition. One of the problems of law is seeking to over-define, and, in submission, there really is no advantage in this amendment.
My Lords, if I may say this to the noble Lord, look at the clause. In number and circumstances the clause already defines these things in the widest possible way. If you ask to whom a duty is owed, then already a large number of people are mentioned in a whole range of circumstances. The clause covers all or part of work done under a contract for the supply of goods or services; it covers lists of suppliers; it covers failing to permit a particular person to submit a tender; it covers work done or likely to be done.
Then there are the circumstances in which the liability is to arise. If one asks who, then, is to be compensated, the clause says the would-be supplier of goods or services; any other party to the contract who is affected; any other person covered by subsection (3), which is a person excluded from the tender process, a person not permitted to submit a tender; or a person otherwise affected—Surely one would be justified in thinking that, already, the clause included virtually everyone under the sun; and yet at subsection (7)(d)—and this is all that my noble friend is saying—we have yet another unspecified general character:"otherwise determining not to enter into a contract with a particular person for the supply of the goods or services".
All we are saying is, can we not drop that paragraph from the clause?"in any case, any other person who may be adversely affected …".
My Lords, with this amendment we return to the question of who can bring a legal action for a breach of statutory duty under Clause 11, and since we did not perhaps debate this question fully at Committee stage it may be helpful if, at the outset, I remind your Lordships how Clause 11(7) is constructed.
As the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, has just said, subsection (7) sets out those who have a right of action under Clause 11. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (7) give that right to those who are directly on the receiving end of the unlawful practices described in subsections (2) and (3). In other words, broadly the non-union firms who are excluded from a tender list or a party to a contract which is terminated or otherwise prevented from tendering for or entering into a contract on union membership grounds. The purpose of paragraph (d) is to cover anyone else who may be able to show that he has suffered loss as a result of such union membership requirements. It is this paragraph which the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, by this amendment, seeks to remove. Perhaps I should say, in passing, that if the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, is right that (a), (b) and (c) cover everything under the sun, (d) adds nothing; so there is no point in removing it. Paragraph (d) is based on the simple principle that someone who suffers loss or damage as a result of an unlawful act should have the right to bring court proceedings against the wrongdoer to recover the loss. This is not a new principle. It runs through much of the statute and civil law of this country; and it is fenced around with the principles that the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, referred to, of remoteness of damage and the courts take a realistic view of these matters in considering particular cases. I believe that, in another context, even noble Lords opposite would not want to question this general principle very much. The reason they do so in this case is that they disagree not just with this paragraph or this subsection but rather with the clause as a whole. They do not accept that union membership requirements should be made unlawful and therefore they want to limit as much as possible the rights of those who are on the receiving end of such requirements. This is the fundamental difference between the Government and noble Lords opposite on this question. At root, it is not a difference of legal interpretation or application but a difference of policy. We believe that union membership requirements imposed on contractors are unacceptable. It follows from this that anyone who suffers loss as a result of these practices should have a legal remedy. That is why we cannot accept the noble Lord's criticism of paragraph (d). The noble Lord has questioned who will come into the category covered by paragraph (d). The answer is: anyone who can show he has suffered loss directly as a result of the unlawful acts described in the clause. This does not mean that everyone will have a cause of action, however remote he is from the unlawful act, or however slight the effect he has suffered. I think that Lord Ardwick in moving his amendment recognised that. As my noble friend Lord Gowrie explained at Committee stage, anyone bringing proceedings will have to show that he has sufficient locus standi to establish his case; that is to say, that he is party to a legal relationship sufficient to enable him to state a case. Nevertheless, we believe that if he can show a sufficient cause of action he should have the right to bring legal proceedings. Perhaps I can give two examples of people who might be able to show a sufficient cause of action to bring legal proceedings and who might be deprived of that right if paragraph (d) were removed. First, there is the employee of the contractor who may, for example, be made redundant by the contractor because the contractor fails to get a contract or has his contract terminated on union membership grounds. Secondly, there is the subcontractor—and this is one of the questions the noble Lord asked—to the main contractor who is not a direct party to the contract concerned but who may suffer loss as a result of the main contractor having his contract terminated because of union membership requirements. There is, of course, also the point that the only people who have anything to fear from Clause 11 are those who continue with the practices which it makes unlawful. In other words, they will only be liable to be sued under any branch of subsection (7) if they act unlawfully under one of the earlier branches of the clause. From the Government's point of view, the possible widening by paragraph (d) of those who may take action to advantage must surely increase the effectiveness of the main provisions. I hope that in the light of these reasons the noble Lord may feel able to withdraw his amendment and that, if he does not, your Lordships will feel able to reject it.I do not propose to withdraw it. We dealt with the contractor, and the sub-contractor; but you can have the sub-sub-contractor. It does seem that it can go on for a long, long way and has its absurdities.
On Question, amendment negatived. [Amendments Nos. 34 and 35 not moved.]10.34 p.m.
moved Amendment No. 36:
Page 15, line 39, at end insert—
("(9) Nothing in this section shall be held to void a contract which is a contract of service or a contract for the supply of services between parties whose relationship is that of employer and employee or whose service is or services are provided personally by one of two contracting parties.").
The noble Lord said: This amendment refers to Clause 11 but, as noble Lords will be aware, Clauses 11, 12 and 13 (to which I also have amendments) deal with the same subject and come under a general heading. Therefore, although I am moving only Clause 11, at this late hour it might be for the convenience of the House if I spoke not only to the amendment to Clause 11, but also to the amendments we have down to Clauses 12 and 13. I do not know whether that is going too far; but I think it would be generally agreed that these clauses are all dealing with a single subject. Therefore it might be for the convenience of the House if we were allowed to speak to all the amendments.
The point one wants to make, dealing with the amendment to Clause 11, is this. In seeking to prevent the enforcement of a trade union obligation upon contractors, these clauses catch a group of people whom it was not intended to catch. They appear to me—and correspondence with the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has not entirely removed the problem—to catch any person who is in an employee relationship if that person is engaged on a contract for services and not on a contract of service.
I accept the point made on behalf of the Government by the noble and learned Lord in a letter that he has been good enough to send me, that if a person is an employee in the ordinary sense of the word and is engaged in a contract of service, as is the case with an employee—that is, somebody who pays PAYE and is in the ordinary position of an employee—then he is not caught by any of these three clauses.
The noble and learned Lord will agree with me when I say that there is a group of people, those who are on a contract of service who are in the business of providing a service rather than selling their services, who are still caught under these clauses. That is why the amendments have been put down. The amendments seek to exclude from the clauses a group of people which the Government did not intend to catch in them but which nevertheless are caught. The three amendments with which I am associated all seek to protect the interests of this group.
There is a good deal of confusion in the documents which have been issued in support of an explanation of the clauses. In the Notes on Clauses, referring to Clause 11 and Clause 12 the explanation begins by saying that the clause will make void any term in a commercial contract requiring a contractor to use only union labour or only non-union labour in fulfilling the contract. It envisages, in other words, a contractual situation between a contractor and a principal. It is not the intention—and it is not suggested in the explanation—that it covers a person whose relationship is in effect that of an employer and employee.
If one looks at the Notes and Guidance, it says that Clause 11 makes void any term in a commercial contract requiring the contractor to use only union labour. The document from the Conservative Central Office is in a state of total confusion. This document, issued by the Conservative Research Department confuses—I think accidentally—Clausel2 with Clause 11; and Clause 10 with Clause 11. In a section about Clause 13 it talks continuously about Clause 12. This confusion which exists in the Conservative Research Department document of explanation can only do harm in what is a complex clause by creating a certain amount of confusion in the minds of noble Lords if they are relying on this document to understand this rather complex situation.
My amendment seeks to insert the following words:
"Nothing in this section shall be held to void a contract which is a contract of service or a contract for the supply of services between parties whose relationship is that of employer and employee or whose service is or services are provided personally by one of two contracting parties".
I accept that the exact wording of this amendment may not necessarily be acceptable to the Government, and if in replying to this debate the Government were able to give an assurance that they accept that the clause as at present drafted embraces a body of people it was not intended to embrace, and if they would say they will look at this problem with a view to excluding the kind of people I have in mind, I—and I hope my noble colleagues will agree with me—would not seek to press this to a Division. But if the Government
are not able to do that, then I hope that my noble friends on this side of the House will say that it must be pressed to a Division, because I believe that in these clauses the Government are doing something which they did not seek to do. In my opinion, it is impossible for any rearrangement to be made which will exclude the freelance person who offers his services.
I believe that person is caught under the clause as at present drafted. I believe that the Government recognise that they are caught; and in saying that the employee or employees should rearrange their arrangements so as to exclude themselves they are in fact saying: "We have drafted the clause in these words and they catch these people: so these people must do something to get themselves out of it". That is not right. It is the legislation which should be altered and not the relationship between people. For that reason, I beg to move this amendment.
My Lords, if I have got it right—and after what my noble friend has just said I am not at all certain that I have got it right—this amendment and these other amendments are an endeavour to distinguish between an ordinary commercial contract and a contract between an employer and a worker for the supply of his services. The definition of a worker of this kind was given in the Act of 1974, which refers to the worker who is an independent contractor, provides his own labour and hires out his labour on the basis of an independent contract.
The object of the amendment in effect is to exclude such contracts from the clause. Such workers are in one respect self-employed persons and in another they are employees and they are, or have been until now, responsible not only for their own national insurance payments but also for directly paying their own income tax. It is not, or was not, the responsibility of the employer of people who are under contract for services to deduct tax, but I will come back to that in a minute. I have worked in various newspaper offices alongside a number of people who have had a contract with our employer for their services. Usually these were "star" writers, celebrities, people with several strings to their how—novelists, broadcasters and so forth. Sometimes they are earning more than the editor himself, but in a newspaper office they were indistinguishable from all of us who were working under ordinary contracts of employment. They belonged to our union, they took part in the meetings of the chapel—indeed, they were eligible for positions in the chapel—and, of course, they responded normally, like the rest of us, to editorial disciplines. On some newspapers that I have served it was part of their contract that they must be members of the National Union of Journalists, or more delicately, that they were expected to be members of the NUJ. When I was an editor, if there had been an Act of this kind I should not have been able to recruit the services of some highly gifted people without making it a condition that they should be members of the union. But now an editor might not be able to recruit a star writer or a cartoonist, because he cannot insist that he should be a member of a union. Yet if he is not willing to become a member, there will be trouble with the chapel. The Minister may say that it is impossible to distinguish between a virtual employee on a contract for services and an outsider who contracts to do the occasional job—like the late T. W. H. Crosland, who described himself as a jobbing journalist, on his card, adding "Cashiers waited on in their own apartments." Although the Department of Employment may not be able to distinguish between the two, the Inland Revenue has, only during the past few weeks, found a way. An edict has been issued that newspaper managements in Fleet Street who have journalists employed under contracts for their services must deduct PAYE, and they are saying that these employees can no longer be treated as Schedule D payers. I understand that the Musicians' Union, and even people on North Sea oil rigs, have recently been caught in this same net. The Revenue seem to regard people in these circumstances, whatever their contracts, as having a master and servant relationship, which I think is precisely what the Department of Employment is denying. The Department of Employment says that it can make no such distinction. You may not insert a condition about union membership in a contract for the service of somebody, though you may insert it in a contract of employment. It seems to be an absurdity, an inconvenience to employers and a potential cause of unnecessary friction.My Lords, I do not want to delay the House for very long. I merely want to point to something at the end of a very helpful letter from the noble and learned Lord. Lord Mackay of Clash-fern, in which he says—and if he thinks about it, he knows that he connot mean it—
Everything that has been said from our side of the House tonight has been to show that there is everything to prevent Equity, theatre managements, the National Union of Journalists, the Daily Mirror or anybody else from acting in this way. The fact is that the nature of the work is such that these performers or jobbing journalists cannot be dealt with as though they were simply routine contract of employment workers, and that is the essence of our amendment."There is, of course, nothing to prevent Equity or the theatre managements from exempting themselves from the provisions of these clauses by ensuring that in future contracts under which performers work are contracts of employment".
My Lords, this amendment, as has been explained, is primarily designed to exempt members of, for example, the British Actors' Equity Associations, with the particular arrangements that they have, from the provisions of Clause 11. Because the principles are the same in relation to the later amendments to which the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, referred, it is helpful to discuss them all at the same time.
As noble Lords are aware, Clause 11 is about the imposition of union membership requirements through commercial contracts—about the practice of companies and councils refusing to do business with other firms or individuals because they do not use trade union members to carry out the work. I think I should say at the outset that Clause 11 and the subsequent clauses do not affect the requirements about union membership or recognition which appear in contracts of employment or contracts of service. This means that it does not impinge upon the normal employment relationship between an employer and his employees. I think there may have been some confusion about this point at earlier stages and it perhaps appears again in the amendment. When we talk about employees as a matter of law, we are referring specifically to those who work for an employer under a contract of employment or a contract of service. If a person works under any other contract, he is not regarded by the employment legislation or by the law generally as an employee. So, in saying that the clause does not affect the relationship between an employer and his employees, we have in mind specifically those who work under contracts of employment or contracts of service. Perhaps I should say at this stage that on the previous occasion when we discussed this I think the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, referred to an undertaking given by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Employment and made some remark about the reliability or worth of such undertakings. I felt it right to inquire into this. So far as I know, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Employment has given no undertaking of any kind to Equity. He was not himself able to meet Equity. They did in fact meet my honourable and learned friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Employment who sought to explain the position to them. But so far as I understand the matter, no assurance was given in relation to the matters that were then raised.My Lords, if indeed I have made a statement which was incorrect, I unreservedly withdraw it. However, my strong impression is that Equity have the idea, rightly or wrongly, that some kind of undertaking was given to them. If, however, I am wrong, I withdraw.
I am much obliged to the noble Lord. All I can do is to state the position as I understand it to be. It may be just as well to clear up the point in case there is any misunderstanding. I am sure it will be in the nature of a misunderstanding and not anything deliberate in the way of misleading people. It is useful that we should take the opportunity to dispose of any misunderstanding which may exist, and I am obliged to the noble Lord for what he has just said.
Following our earlier debate, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, very kindly supplied me with a copy of an Equity standard contract which I undertook to study with Clauses 11 to 13 in mind. This standard contract, under which many actors and performers work, includes many detailed provisions of minimum standards and terms and conditions of work. While many of these are features which would also be found in a contract of employment, it seems likely that for the purposes of the law the contract would be regarded not as a contract of employment but as a contract for services. After saying that, perhaps I should pause to point out that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, himself kindly wrote at the end of the contract that this, although a contract of employment, is also a contract for the provision of services. I think he recognised that it is hardly possible to be both. Therefore, closing the quotation, he added an exclamation mark. The situation is that many actors wish the benefits of being self-employed for tax purposes. If that is what they seek, then it is not surprising that the contract under which they work is a contract for services and not a contract of service. In taking work in that form they forgo the benefits which accrue to an employee working under a contract of service. The problem underlying this amendment is therefore that, in some circumstances, actors and actresses work under contracts which are not contracts of employment. This applies to others who the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, figured in the course of his observations. By choosing to work under contracts for services they are not employees but are in what the law regards as a commercial relationship with theatre managers. This means that they come within, and are affected by, the provisions of Clauses 11 to 13, in the same way as the other self-employed people and small businessmen whom the clauses are designed to protect. I should emphasise that we do intend to protect people in this category. Because it is impossible to distinguish between the actors' contracts for service and contracts for service under which other small businessmen perform work, it follows that it is impossible to exempt the acting profession, for example, from Clause 11 in the way proposed in the amendment. If we were to accept the noble Lord's amendment, it would exempt from the provisions of the first part of this clause all self-employed people; freelance artists, draughtsmen, building contractors—some of the people who are most in need of the protection against the imposition of union membership requirements which Clause 11 provides. In other words, although the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkins of Putney, arises principally from his concern about actors and performers, its effects would be very much wider. I must, however, question the noble Lord's assertion that Clauses 11 to 13 will have a very important effect on employment in the theatre and entertainment industry, or on the agreements which Equity has negotiated with such as the Society of West End Theatre Managers—a copy of which he kindly provided. The Bill is concerned only with the specific problems of union membership and recognition requirements in commercial contracts. It does not invalidate any provision of a collective agreement between a trade union and an employers' body. Nor does it make unlawful other provisions of commercial contracts or contracts for service which do not involve union membership requirements. I believe it is important to emphasise this last point, because it means that the minimum standards and minimum terms and conditions of employment which Equity has negotiated—many of which are contained in the standard form of contract—can continue to be enforced as before. There is nothing, for example, in Clause 11 to prevent a theatre manager from agreeing with Equity that the theatre will employ only actors who have served their time with a repertory company or have attained an agreed level of proficiency. There is nothing in Clause 11 to stop other Equity terms and conditions from being imposed through contracts. The fact that Equity has negotiated them does not mean that one has to be an Equity member to be paid a particular rate or to work for so many hours. Indeed, if Equity contracts are used unchanged after the passage of this Bill, the only effect of Clause 11 on the terms of the contract will be to make void the union membership requirement. The other terms and conditions would retain their enforceability under the contract. To sum up, we understand the concern which underlies this amendment but we would not accept it—even if we thought it desirable to do so—because it would go much wider than the acting profession, or the journalistic examples which the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, gave, and would deprive many self-employed people of the protection of Clause 11, which in our belief is very much required. I hope that in the light of that explanation, at least the position is clear between us, even if I have not been able to meet fully the position which the noble Lords would desire to attain.But, my Lords, there is a very—
Order! My Lords, if the noble Lord, Lord Ardwick, wants to ask a question, he may say something before my noble friend sits down. But he really must not ask a question at this stage.
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate places us in a very difficult situation. He does not in fact say, as I hoped he might, that the Government would see whether they could devise a form of wording which would exclude from the provision persons who, although not contractually and legally in an employer/employee relationship, had a relationship which was nonetheless that of an employer and employee. This clause does not intend to catch people who are in that relationship.
I accept that my own amendment has not succeeded in excluding such persons, because, in wording it to cover as wide a group of people in that area as possible, I may have gone too wide for the Government's convenience. At the same time, it seems to me that the Government have not answered the point that the clause as at present drafted does in fact catch a large and important group of people whom it does not intend to catch. In view of the fact that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Advocate has not been able to say that he will devise a form of words, or even try to devise a form of words, which would have the effect of excluding that group of people, it is my own feeling that we have no alternative but to press this amendment.11.1 p.m.
On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 36) shall be agreed to?
Their Lordships divided: Contents, 17; Not-Contents, 55.
DIVISION NO. 5
| |
CONTENTS
| |
| Ardwick, L. | Lovell-Davis, L. |
| Birk, B. | McCarthy, L. |
| Bishopston, L. | Oram, L. |
| Blease, L. | Peart, L. |
| Brooks of Tremorfa, L. | Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.—[Teller.] |
| David, B. | |
| Ewart-Biggs, B. | Underhill, L. |
| Jeger, B. | White, B. |
| Jenkins of Putney, L. | |
| Llewelyn-Davies of Hastoe, B.—[Teller.] | |
NOT-CONTENTS
| |
| Alexander of Tunis, E. | Long, V. |
| Avon, E. | Lyell, L. |
| Aylestone, L. | Mackay of Clashfern, L. |
| Bellwin, L. | Mackie of Benshie, L. |
| Belstead, L. | Mansfield, E. |
| Boardman, L. | Marley, L. |
| Cathcart, E. | Marshall of Leeds, L. |
| Chelwood, L. | Mersey, V. |
| Cork and Orrery, E. | Mottistone, L. |
| Craigmyle, L. | Mountgarret, V. |
| Cullen of Ashbourne, L. | Renton, L. |
| Davidson, V. | Rochester, L. |
| De La Warr, E. | Romney, E. |
| Denham, L.—[Teller.] | St. John of Bletso, L. |
| Drumalbyn, L. | Sandford, L. |
| Eccles, V. | Sandys, L.—[Teller.] |
| Elles, B. | Seear, B. |
| Elton, L. | Sudeley, L. |
| Evans of Claughton, L. | Thomas of Swynnerton, L. |
| Ferrers, E. | Tordoff, L. |
| Fortescue, E. | Trefgarne, L. |
| Gardner of Parkes, B. | Trenchard, V. |
| Glenarthur, L. | Trumpington, B. |
| Harmar-Nicholls, L. | Vickers, B. |
| Hives, L. | Vivian, L. |
| Holderness, L. | Windlesham, L. |
| Hornsby-Smith, B. | Young, B. |
| Kilmarnock, L. | |
Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
11.9 p.m.
My Lords, I think that this is probably the time, in what has been rather a long session, at which we should interrupt the proceedings tonight. I therefore beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned.
Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.
Greater London Council (Money) Bill
Reported from the Unopposed Bill Committee without amendment.