My Lords, before business begins, I take the opportunity to inform the House that I am to chair the 23rd European Ministers of Justice Conference in London on Thursday 8th June when the House will sit. Accordingly, I trust the House will grant me leave of absence.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

What has been the outcome of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions' review of the use of Stansted airport as the Government's preferred airport for dealing with hijacks, following the major hijack incident involving an Ariana Boeing 727 in February.

My Lords, as noted in my reply to the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, on 15th February, all UK airports must be capable of handling hijacked aircraft. Policy on handling of hijacks is reviewed as a matter of course after an incident such as that at Stansted. The review is well under way but, for security reasons, the results will not be made public.

My Lords, I hope that the review will take account of the fact that when Stansted first became the preferred location for dealing with hijacked aircraft there were fewer than 250,000 passengers a year using it. Is the Minister aware that the figure is now close on 10 million a year and that statistics published over the weekend demonstrate that, with an increase of 37.5 per cent, Stansted has the second biggest increase in throughput of passengers in the world? Is it not time to choose an airport where hijacks would cause far less disruption, fewer diversions and fewer cancelled flights? These incidents are an enormous inconvenience of the travelling public.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for reminding us of the increase in traffic at Stansted, an airport which has advantages over other London airports because it is easier to reduce disruption to air traffic and to isolate aircraft more effectively. The United Kingdom has a national aviation security programme which recommends that all airport managers should produce and develop contingency plans for an aircraft hijack in consultation with local police authorities.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that it is absolute nonsense for the Government to declare that a particular airfield, aerodrome or airport is to be used for hijacked aircraft? Would not terrorists regard that information as most useful? Should not the Government continue to utilise the airports which are most convenient for planes which are hijacked rather than designate a specific airport?

My Lords, I am grateful again for that intervention. I stress that the Government have not singled out any one particular airport. All airports are required to have in place security programmes as recommended through our national aviation security plans.

My Lords, the Minister referred to requirements placed on all airport managers. Do they include military airports? On the assumption that one of the priorities in dealing with a hijack is to minimise inconvenience to the public, the use of a military airfield to receive a hijacked aircraft would have many advantages over a civil airfield.

My Lords, the primary consideration clearly is to ensure the safety of the people on the aircraft and on the ground. It might not be conducive to that if hijackers feared they were flying into a military airfield. Our plans cover commercial airports.

My Lords, having access to an understanding on how to influence the Taliban is a principal challenge. What is being done in that regard? And who were we dealing with in matters relating to the hijack?

My Lords, I sit beside my noble and learned colleague Lord Williams of Mostyn who no doubt would confirm that the issues in this case are now sub judice.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

What action the Lord Chancellor proposes to take about the oath of loyalty to the Queen traditionally sworn by Queen's Counsel in Northern Ireland.

My Lords, the noble Lord's Question assumes that, at present, new Queen's Counsel in Northern Ireland swear an oath of loyalty to Her Majesty. That is a false assumption. In fact there has been no such requirement since 1995 when the previous administration decided that the oath would no longer be administered but that a declaration should be made in the same terms as that made in England and Wales.

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor for that clarificatory Answer. However, I have read of the recent court ruling about the so-called oath taken by Queen's Counsel and reports of the attitude originally taken by the Lord Chancellor. Therefore perhaps I may congratulate the noble and learned Lord on his wholly admirable, wholly robust and characteristically firm ruling on this matter.

Is he aware that many people have been worried, for example, about the recommendation of an official report that symbols of royalty should be removed from courts in Northern Ireland; and about moves on other symbols such as the name and the cap badge of the RUC. Whatever decisions come before the noble and learned Lord to be considered, may I ask him to bear those considerations in mind because they cause anxiety?

My Lords, yes.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

How they propose to respond to the final report of the Nuffield inquiry into the United Kingdom's foreign language needs over the next 20 years.

My Lords, we regard it as very important that we have the right level of language capability to help us compete in global markets. The Government will consider the recommendations over the coming months and a cross-departmental working group will reflect views across Whitehall.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that Answer. While the report duly acknowledges that in this country, including our industry, we neglect other languages partly through an exaggerated perception of the current world-wide status of English, will the Minister agree that it makes some valuable suggestions on a wide range of matters such as the training of teachers and the needs of business in languages far beyond the standard fare of GCSE French?

Will the Minister (though I recognise that this is outside his normal bailiwick) comment on the Government's likely reaction to one particular recommendation in the Nuffield report which seems to me to be of special interest? It is to create a new category of primary schools, perhaps 1,000 in all, which will specialise in foreign languages and enable parents to have a choice of their children learning German, Russian or even Mandarin; and to have that target language, whatever it may be, the medium of instruction from as young an age as perhaps six or seven?

My Lords, we agree that the Nuffield report makes some valuable suggestions and we shall review them with a cross-departmental group over the coming months. As regards teaching children in primary schools, the research on early language learning suggests that benefits are mixed and that children introduced to a formal learning structure at secondary level achieve results on a par with those who have studied at primary level.

However, our Early Language Learning Initiative, which is managed by the Centre for Information on Language, Teaching and Research, will give practical help to primary schools in teaching languages. Over two years, the project will develop high quality curriculum materials for teachers, develop and disseminate models of good practice and establish a network of practitioners.

My Lords, why is the Minister so confident that the English state is right in teaching languages only at secondary level, whereas in every part of Europe they are taught at primary level? Should he not advise his noble friends that we might be wrong and that the French, the Germans, the Hungarians and everyone else might be right and that languages should be taught at an earlier level? And I remind the Minister that when he was at an independent school, it did!

My Lords, if that were the case, it was a prime example of why such a policy failed! As I hope my original Answer made clear, we are not rejecting the proposals. We have examined the evidence and are taking initiatives to encourage such teaching on a wider scale.

My Lords, does the Minister believe that, in addition to the impact of this excellent report on business and education, he could encourage politicians to give a lead in making such learning more widely known and accepted? Is he aware that for Members of this House the German Embassy sponsors a language class Thursday lunchtimes and that the average attendance is two? Could he encourage some of the new Members of this House to take advantage of the generosity of the German Embassy?

My Lords, perhaps I may congratulate the two Members who attend. I am happy to place my full weight behind encouraging more people to do so.

My Lords, does the research to which the Minister has referred shed light on why Britain seems to be so bad at teaching foreign languages and why other countries are more effective, and what lessons we can learn from their experience?

My Lords, it is not clear that the lack of language competence is due to failures of teaching; it may be due to failures of motivation. What is worrying is the number of people in this country who are happy not to know foreign languages. It is as much an issue of motivation and the ease of travelling around the world with English as it is of failures of teaching.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the experience in Wales, where children are taught Welsh at primary level, indicates that they gain a head start not only in their ability to speak Welsh but all other languages which they then attempt to learn?

My Lords, that is an admirable example and one upon which we should all reflect.

My Lords, will the noble Lord bear in mind the difficulties which arise at secondary level when some primary schools have taught French and some have not? That is where schemes have previously fallen down.

My Lords, that is not a subject with which I am familiar. I shall write to the noble Earl about the matter.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that a large part of the Nuffield report deals with languages in business? Does my noble friend agree that skill in languages is a key to success in overseas markets?

My Lords, the answer to that is emphatically "yes". The present situation is that, even today, exports to countries where the main language is not English amount, I believe, to approximately 60 per cent of the UK's total exports. It is quite clear that some of our major markets for the future lie outside the non-English speaking markets, such as east Asia and Latin America. Therefore, we believe strongly that it is necessary to have a mastery of language in order to exploit those markets.

My Lords, further to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, does the Minister recall the words of the Prime Minister in August 1998 in a published letter saying:

"There has never been a time when the ability to communicate with other cultures and in their own languages was more important to our nation's well-being and prosperity"?

Are the Government making this a point of national policy?

My Lords, of course, I well remember the Prime Minister's remarks. As I hope I made clear, our response to the report is cross-departmental and we want to carry this out on a cross-departmental basis because we believe that it is of major importance.

My Lords, the previous government introduced a foreign language into the national curriculum. Can the Minister tell the House whether pupils leaving school are gaining an increasing number of passes at GSCE and A-levels?

My Lords, I believe that from 1992 to 1999 there was a decline in the number of pupils taking A-levels. However, I believe that the pass rate increased significantly.

My Lords, at a convenient time after 3.30 p.m. my noble friend Lady Scotland of Asthal will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is being made in another place on Sierra Leone. The Statement is likely to be taken immediately before the debate on Clause 108 stand part.

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That it be an instruction to the Committee of the Whole House to whom the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill has been committed that they consider the Bill in the following order:

• Clauses 1 to 46,
• Schedule 1,
• Clauses 47 to 57,
• Schedule 2,
• Clauses 58 to 73,
• Schedules 3 and 4,
• Clause 74.—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Bassani of Brighton.)

moved Amendment No. 160:

Page 39, line 21, at end insert ("and").

The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 160, 162, 163, 192, 197A, 197B, 198, 202A, 203, 204, 205, 205A and 205B are all government amendments. In moving Amendment No. 160, I shall speak to the other amendments in this group. I can do so briefly.

Amendments Nos. 160 to 168 and 205A and 205B are drafting amendments. They include those recommended by parliamentary counsel and make drafting improvements to the Bill. The other amendments in the group are all technical amendments to Schedule 15, which deals with consequential amendments. They do not reflect any change of policy. I should be happy to explain the purpose of each of the amendments, if necessary. However, if the Committee does not require further explanation, I beg to move Amendment No. 160.

moved Amendments Nos. 162 and 163:

Page 46, line 22, after ("(3)") insert (", 8").

Page 46, line 25, leave out ("7") and insert ("8").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 95, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 164:

After Clause 95, insert the following new clause—

DETENTION OF TERRORISTS

(" . Schedule (Detention of terrorists) shall have effect with respect to the detention of terrorists and persons suspected of being terrorists.").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 164, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 165. These amendments concern internment. Under the Conservative government internment remained part of the terrorism legislation for Northern Ireland. In, I believe, 1998, the present Government chose to remove it. At the time, we said that we believed that to be a mistake. We still believe it to be a mistake, although I believe it is fair to say that for a period it appeared not to be useful.

However, I believe that a number of factors, some of which have arisen recently, are very important. First and most importantly, the people with whom the Government are dealing on the friendly side are in the Irish Republic. So far as concerns terrorism, the Irish Government are very much our partners in managing the problems of Northern Ireland. They still have internment on the statute books. They are probably wiser than most of us in these matters. They have had experience of Sinn Fein/IRA, the IRA and various other forms of Irish terrorist organisations for longer than the life of Northern Ireland. Some of them may still remember the days when it all started.

On a more positive note, it appears that there may be a road of peace ahead of us. Those who were considered our enemies are now sitting down in government. They are sitting down in a British government, which they feel very uncomfortable about. They are sitting down with colleagues of Unionist persuasions who feel even more uncomfortable that they are sitting with Sinn Fein.

However, history tells us (and we do not have to look back many years) that the pattern of Irish terrorism evolves frequently in the same way. Some sort of peace is made and then there are dissident groups. Once again, we see the dissident groups of republicanism flexing their muscles and currently making a serious nuisance of themselves. I do not think I am giving away any secrets; most of it is in the press. The intelligence reports state that the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA are two organisations which work pretty closely together with many youngsters but one or two, or three or four, well-qualified terrorists.

I was not in the country at the time of the Hammersmith Bridge bomb but heard about it within hours of it happening, as I am sure did most of Europe. We know the gentleman who made that bomb. We know where he lives. When I say "we" I use the term loosely. The Irish Government and the Garda Siochana know. His signature was very clear.

Changing tack a little, in the 1970s, internment was a failure. There is no doubt that it was badly used by British governments and that it fell into serious disrepute. We had little intelligence and no moles, spies or intelligence agents within the IRA. We interned foot soldiers but rarely officers and never generals. Now, life has moved on. I can speak only from when my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew left power. At that stage we had an extremely sophisticated, competent, reliable intelligence force or forces operating within Ireland both within and outwith the IRA, feeding those who needed to know extremely hard, good, reliable information.

On the assumption that the present Government have not reduced that level of intelligence in any way—I have no reason to believe they have—we should still have a significant level of intelligence. I hope I demonstrated that a few moments ago by telling noble Lords that it did not take very long for the intelligence service to inform those in authority and in need of knowledge who made the Hammersmith bomb, where he lived, and so forth.

That might be a one-off. Noble Lords have often heard me play devil's advocate and cynical advocate on Northern Ireland from this Box. They will not be surprised to hear me say that I do not have great faith in the political future as it stands. I wish I had, but I do not. I am pretty confident that the strength, knowledge and technology of what are now called the dissident groups will rapidly increase. I believe that both governments, Westminster and Dublin, will wish to work closely together, decisively and swiftly, to stop a major increase in and spread of terrorism by new dissident groups. I suggest that one way to do that is to have the power of internment on the statute book. Whether or when it would ever be used, one never knows.

The Bill is not a high-profile, Irish anti-terrorist Bill but one which the Government are rightly introducing to help tidy up our terrorist legislation and help protect the United Kingdom from international terrorism. If internment was put onto the face of the Bill, there could be an occasion when, working together with Dublin and possibly all the political parties in Northern Ireland, including Sinn Fein/IRA and the republican movement, a decision is taken secretly and decisively that certain people should be quickly picked up, taken out of Ireland and interned for as long as it takes to deal with a situation. If internment was on the statute book, I believe it would be possible to save many lives and to save a significant increase in destruction.

Furthermore, for those concerned with human rights, as indeed I am, as one is duty bound to be, there is an inordinate amount of protection in the old Act for those arrested under internment legislation. It would not be dealt with lightly. The powers are already available to lift/arrest people for a short period of time. I cannot remember the number of days. However, I believe there are up to 40 weeks before the internment procedure would have to be turned on and decisions made as to whether such people were arrested and interned for a considerable time.

In summary, I believe that this would be in the interests of the safety of this country, Northern Ireland, and perhaps even Ireland. The Irish Government could not use internment if we did not also do so. I believe that is the present political situation. If tucked away in this Bill, the amendment could become a powerful weapon in the fight against future Irish terrorism. I believe that we now have the intelligence services and technology to use it intelligently and selectively. I beg to move.

To those on these Benches, the amendments are completely unacceptable, both on practical and legal grounds. Detention or internment, as the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran called it, was, as we all know, tried at an early stage of the troubles in Northern Ireland. It caused immense not only among the republicans but among the whole of the nationalist population in Northern Ireland. It was an immensely powerful recruiting sergeant for the IRA. I believe that if detention was re-introduced in the context of Northern Ireland, it would have exactly that effect again. It also caused immense ill will among the people of the Republic of Ireland.

I believe that detention in Northern Ireland, even if introduced at the same time as detention in the Republic of Ireland, would seriously risk creating the same level of once again. It is a blunt instrument which does a great deal of damage, not only to the people it is intended to damage but to the whole community in Northern Ireland.

It was abandoned after a relatively few years. Even if it remained on the statute book, it was never brought back during the 18 years of Conservative government starting in 1979. I believe that it would be disastrous on practical grounds.

Legally, there is a plain conflict between the amendments and Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Under that article, detention is permitted only after conviction or pending trial. The amendments would allow the Secretary of State to order detention for an indefinite period without trial on the basis of a report by an adviser. If a detainee does not ask for his or her representations to be submitted to the adviser, there will not even be a report.

The post of adviser is not a judicial office and proceedings before an adviser are not judicial proceedings. It is true that judicial review of a decision of the Secretary of State under these amendments would not be excluded. But judicial review, with its difficult test of irrationality, would not be enough to satisfy Article 5 of the European convention.

It is true that a crisis could arise which was so acute that detention was a reasonable cause of action. The detention of Sir Oswald Mosley and other Nazi supporters in 1939 was plainly justified by the level of crisis prevailing at the time. Both the European convention and the Human Rights Act recognise that special circumstances of that kind may arise by allowing derogation in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. But that derogation must be only to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Those powers can be found in Article 15 of the European convention and in Sections 14 to 18 of the Human Rights Act.

A derogation from Article 5 to authorise the detention of suspected terrorists for a period up to seven days without access to the court has been upheld by the European Court of Human Rights in the Brannigan case. So the European court recognises that special circumstances may occur. If the power of detention under these amendments could be exercised only after the Secretary of State made a derogation order under the European convention and under the Human Rights Act, and if that power was also subject to an affirmative resolution of both Houses to confirm it within 40 days of its coming into effect, then I accept that our objections would be a good deal less strong. But it is arguable that, even so, the breach of a right to liberty is so fundamental that the insertion of a power of detention should require primary legislation.

In a real crisis, as it has shown on many occasions before and several times in relation to Northern Ireland, Parliament can act very quickly. And I find it difficult to understand why the Conservatives have not linked their proposal to insert a power of detention into the Bill to the making of a derogation order. As the amendment now stands, we have no hesitation in opposing it. We believe that it is both contrary to the law and, in practical terms, presents no advantage whatever.

Before the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, sits down, can he say whether or not the Irish Republic retains the power to intern on its statute book?

I cannot speak for the Irish Republic in saying why it retained that power of detention. The Irish Republic, like ourselves, is party to the European Convention on Human Rights. In the circumstances, since plainly there is no immediate threat to the nation, any exercise of the power of detention by the Irish Republic would not pass the European court.

I rise briefly to say that one argument against the noble Lord's amendment is that internment did not work last time. It will add problems to the present delicate situation and we are better off without it.

It seems to me that those who have held office, especially myself, go back to that period of office to illustrate any point they want to make and I am sorry not to be able to avoid that today. However, perhaps the Committee will indulge me for a brief time.

It was always in the back of my mind when I had the privilege of implementing the policies of the government in which I served that a number of extra miles could justifiably be travelled, and I believe that those miles have been travelled to beneficial effect. But it was also in my mind that at the end of that process we would probably be left with a hard core of extremely evil, violent, fanatical people. I am afraid that recent events have shown that the latter part of that expectation has been fulfilled.

Of course, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, about the undesirability of having to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights if that were necessary, but he reminded us, fairly, that we have already done that and had that derogation upheld by the court. To do that impinges upon the human rights of liberty. But it also impinges upon the human rights of liberty, and indeed of life, if one happens to be a visitor or townsperson in Omagh when the Continuity or Real IRA explodes a bomb which kills or maims oneself or one's family. Not for the first time, therefore, we must strike a balance.

I welcome the close relationship that the present Government have, and indeed my government had though I am sure that that has been developed by the present Government, with the Republic of Ireland. That relationship ought to enable the Minister to answer the question already alluded to this afternoon as to why the Republic of Ireland retained internment on its statute book. After all, it has made much wider use of detention than the United Kingdom ever did in Ireland, and it must be said much better use—that would not be difficult for the reasons already mentioned by my noble friend Lord Glentoran. But in the legislation introduced following the Good Friday agreement, it was notable that the republic did not take the opportunity to remove from the statute book the power to detain within its jurisdiction. Why not? The answer will have an important bearing on the decision of the Committee if there is a Division on that question today. I hope therefore that the Minister can give us an answer. No doubt the question has already been raised with him and it will not be a breach of confidence for him to tell us.

It is axiomatic that, if detention is to be of any use at all, it has to be available on both sides of the Border to be implemented at one and the same time. I am aware of the disadvantages of detention. In considering the amendment I was troubled by the undoubted discord that it would occasion at a time when there are propitious signs for advance. But I always believed it to be right to retain it, for the reasons I have tried to advance. Indeed, I opposed its removal by the present Government two or more years ago. Unless I hear a compelling response from the Minister, recognising the disadvantages, I feel that the balance now lies in favour of restoring detention.

We have debated the question of internment in this Chamber on more than one occasion in the past three years. On each occasion it was felt appropriate not to restore that power. I am not persuaded that anything has changed which suggests that it should now be brought back. After all, the devolved Assembly is back in operation—it met for the first time yesterday following the restoration of powers to the Executive. At this time of all times, to say that we will take powers possibly to use them in circumstances undefined would be provocative and would be misunderstood in the whole of Northern Ireland. It would be seen as a signal of the Government's possible intention to give effect to internment.

I think the onus is on the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, and those who support him to indicate the circumstances in which a power of this kind could be used. It is hard to find any. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, had the power of internment at his disposal during the years he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Yet—and perhaps he can tell us—I am not aware that there was any occasion during his time in office, and indeed during the time of two or three of his predecessors, when it was thought appropriate to give effect to the power of internment. If it were not necessary in the days when the IRA was unleashing its campaign of bombs and murder, I do not understand why we need to have it now when the IRA is on cease-fire and when we are left with a small number of dissident groups—one or two on the republican side and one or two on the loyalist side—who are not on cease-fire.

The noble Lord has invited me to intervene. I was in the process of travelling the extra miles and those extra miles have now been travelled to very beneficial effect. Still we have the very evil hard core. Next time it may not be two pounds under Hammersmith Bridge; next time it may be an attack which replicates or even goes further than what occurred in Omagh. That is the only kind of occasion for which it would be appropriate.

I understand what the noble and learned Lord is saying, but I still do not agree that it would be appropriate to use internment in such circumstances. Over the years we have had terrible outrages—with perhaps not as many people killed and injured as at Omagh—yet it was not thought appropriate to intern the perpetrators in so far as they were known to the Government and to the intelligence services. Today, we mercifully have only a small number of individuals involved in terrorist organisations that are not on cease-fire and it seems to me that it is therefore not the time to use such an onerous power against them, nor indeed has it been suggested today that we should use it.

I ask again: in what circumstances would the noble and learned Lord suggest that we use such a power? Without that guidance, it is hard to think of a situation when we, as a country, would wish that power to be used in our name, unless the noble and learned Lord is suggesting that that power would be used immediately.

For a country that believes emphatically in the rule of law to abdicate that belief in legislation on the supposition that at some unstated point in the future we alight wish to use it is not the right way forward. I believe the Government are right to resist reintroducing the power of internment. At the moment, there is no reason for us to have that power on the statute book and I hope that the House will resist the amendment.

The noble Lords, Lord Dubs and Lord Goodhart, said that when the power was used in the 1970s it was counterproductive; that it was a recruiting sergeant for violence; and that it was later not used. Surely the answer to them is that we have moved on a very long way since then in two important respects.

First, the main protagonists on the nationalist side—Sinn Fein/IRA—has agreed, by joining the Executive and by taking part in the power sharing, not to continue with terrorist tactics. Secondly, the co-operation and collaboration between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of the Republic of Ireland is at a level totally different from what it was in those early days. It seems to me that the answer which should be given by the Minister is not only as to why the Republic of Ireland has thought it necessary to retain this power but also whether the Republic would feel it would be helpful for us to have this power to deal with a minority so small, so violent, so irrational and so evil that they appear even to be abandoned by Sinn Fein/IRA.

I did not intend to take part in this debate at all but I am bound to say that, having listened to some of the speeches that have been made on the other side of the House, I am profoundly disturbed at the possibility that this Committee may divide on the issue.

I make one point from my past experience, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, did from his. I sat on that side of the House when we were in Opposition and gave strong support in almost totality for the policies which the then government were promulgating. It was not an easy thing to do. From time to time I was considerably disturbed at the fact that my party had pledged that sort of support for the then government, of whom the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, was such an ornament. However, we did it, and I find the idea that, at this time when events in Northern Ireland are at a stage of such delicacy, the Conservative Opposition are going to divide this House on the issue of whether internment should be restored a staggering proposition.

I make two other points on this issue. The noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, started his speech by saying that the Irish Government still have this power and that therefore we should have it. I am not actually aware—I may be wrong because I am not privy now to the intelligence sources that the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, in opposition obviously is—that the Irish Government are agitating very hard that the British Government should reintroduce this provision. I have not heard very much coming out of Dublin to say that there is this imbalance across the Border which necessitates us now to reintroduce a policy which has proved a failure in the past. It was a failure.

That was a slight misinterpretation of a point that I made. I made the point that the Irish Government have retained the right to internment. I did not suggest that they had made recommendations or suggestions that we should do the same. But I made the point that they cannot use that power if we do not have it available, and I gave several examples of how it may want to be used.

I hear what the noble Lord says. But I do not think the point is given greater force by repetition, if I may put it that kindly. It seems to me that the argument was that the Irish have the power; the British do not have the power; and that somehow that creates an imbalance and a difficulty which we should put right. I do not believe that. I have not detected any great sense of urgency on the part of the Irish Government that this imbalance should be corrected and that this anomaly should be removed.

The final point I would make is simply this. I cannot imagine—I can imagine some things, but this is in the category of those that I find difficult to imagine—anything more provocative to the republicans or the nationalists in Northern Ireland than the reintroduction of internment by the British Government. It is all very well for the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, to say that Sinn Fein is now part of the establishment in Northern Ireland and therefore it would not be directed at it; it would be directed only at the dissident fringes. I do not believe that is how it would be received at all in Northern Ireland. It would be received, if it were to be reintroduced, with great joy on the part of some dissident unionists and absolute rejection on the part of most nationalists, moderate and extreme.

I hope that the Opposition will ponder very hard indeed before they go down the road which appears to be indicated this afternoon. This is not a time and this is not an issue upon which this House should divide.

The noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, puts his case clearly and simply. He says that his proposed amendment is in the interests of safety because the Irish Government have that power and they could not use it if we do not have the power. He said that having this amendment could be a very valuable weapon "tucked away" in this Bill.

First, as regards the position of the Irish Government, the Irish Government have commissioned a wide-ranging, independently chaired review of their offences against the state legislation, including the internment powers. That review is in accordance with what was agreed in the Good Friday agreement. So with the greatest respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, the fact that they did not repeal the powers immediately after the Good Friday agreement is not necessarily as strong a point as he suggested.

I understand that it may be some months before the review reports. The offences against the state legislation is complex and covers a wide range of police powers and court procedures. So it is more than simply a matter of considering the internment power. It is right to say that the Irish have the internment powers now. Whether they are retained remains to be seen. Obviously, I cannot speak for the Irish Government.

Finally, the Irish Government have exerted no pressure whatever on the UK Government to introduce those powers. The noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, said—in my view, rightly—that the Irish Government were wise in a number of areas in that respect. The fact that they are not pressurising us in any way to reintroduce internment brings its own message.

Secondly, he says that having this provision would be a very valuable weapon "tucked away" in this Bill. We need to examine that proposition very carefully indeed. The Government's position remains that while we never say "never", we remain to be convinced that internment could be an effective security policy. That is why we removed the power in 1998 in accordance with our previously given commitment. We still remain firmly of the view that reintroducing the internment powers at this time would be a retrograde step. I welcome the line taken by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, and others in that respect.

Perhaps we may, for a moment, take stock of where we are today. We are in the very welcome position that devolution has recently returned to Northern Ireland. It is hoped that the implementation of the Good Friday agreement, in full, is in sight. Indeed, this Bill is a reflection of the Government's commitment under the agreement to remove emergency powers as soon as it is safe to do so.

In that context, we need to consider very carefully indeed the value of the amendments. In our view, they would mark a significant backward step at a time when we are normalising the security situation in Northern Ireland.

In advancing his argument, I think that it is incumbent on the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, to answer a few points. What signal would it send out at this time to return these powers to the statute book? In what way does he think it would build security and confidence in our security policy? I reject the proposition that this measure is necessary to protect the democratic institutions. We have a firm and fairly applied security policy in Northern Ireland which must be recognisably within the rule of law if we are to maintain public confidence.

We need to consider also in what circumstances the powers would be used. We cannot and should not legislate for hypothetical situations. Again, I feel that it is incumbent on the noble Lord to set out his position on this point. When does he say that those powers would be used? It is not sufficient, as was said in another place, to advocate the reintroduction of those powers on a just-in-case basis or to rely on the argument that the powers send out a useful warning signal.

To put it bluntly, if we reintroduce those powers we must be prepared to use them. The amendments take us in the opposite direction to the policy of normalising the security situation in Northern Ireland. As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, pointed out, their use would require a derogation from the European convention.

The noble Lord must consider the significant downside to what may be a short-term security gain if those powers were used. As has been acknowledged throughout the course of the debate, it is widely accepted that the last operation of the internment powers led to significant recruitment by the terrorist organisations. It does not necessarily follow that better intelligence and targeting of the powers would avoid similar consequences today.

We must also consider the effects on the wider community. Of course, the vast majority of people in Northern Ireland would not be tempted to join a terrorist organisation in any circumstances. But what damage would be done to their faith in the peace process if the Government took such a draconian step? Can the noble Lord imagine moderate opinion on both sides of the community supporting such a measure? For a short-term gain we may face a long-term worsening of cross-community relations and a lack of faith in the Government's security policy. I think it is rather optimistic to describe the power as being "tucked away" in this Bill.

I appreciate that the amendments are tabled with a genuine concern for the maintenance of a good security situation in Northern Ireland. But in this climate, we do not believe that the amendments are helpful. In fact, they would be damaging. As I said at the outset, our position remains that we would never say "never", but we believe firmly that there is no call for these provisions at this time.

I hope that the noble Lord will consider very carefully indeed his position in relation to the amendments and will not press them.

The noble Lord, Lord Richard, said that, when in opposition, he had supported the policy of the Conservative government. But that is not entirely true of the Labour Party in another place, as I have good reason to recall.

But it is also the case that, from these Benches, both in this place and another, throughout the past several years since 1997, we have supported the Labour Government in what they have done. We have done so with hope at all times, sometimes with a heavy heart and sometimes by giving advice, both privately and publicly, as to how we thought matters should operate. But, nevertheless, we have given a great deal of support. That does not necessarily mean that we should for ever support the Government in whatever they do without making any differences at all.

But this is a particular difference which we are now considering. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, spoke of the European convention derogation and so on. I believe that for a number of years the Northern Ireland situation has been, and still is, a potential public emergency threatening the life of the nation— I use the words of the convention. After all, the basic objective of Sinn Fein/IRA concerns the integrity of our national territory. It is about whether part of our national territory should be taken away and put under another jurisdiction against the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants there. That is what this argument is all about. In my judgment, that is a threat to the life of the nation which is supported, from time to time violently, by a very small number of people but, nevertheless, a number capable of doing a great deal of damage.

I should not object to at least some modification of the detail of the amendment; for example, the affirmative order to which the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, referred. But that does not go to the nub of the question. I am not arguing about the precise detail of the amendment before us.

We have been asked a number of times—and have endeavoured to explain a number of times—about the circumstances in which we think it likely that executive detention, internment, might be a valuable addition to security policy. I cannot add much to what was said by my noble friend Lord Glentoran and my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew about the possible scenario in which we continue to have a successful Assembly and Executive but in which there are still a small number of very evil dissidents who resist what is happening.

As has been pointed out, we have seen them in action this time round, as it were, in Omagh, and on Hammersmith Bridge just the other day. Irish history tells us that that has happened on almost every occasion when there has been an agreement of some sort in the past. It is highly likely that we shall be faced with small groups capable of extreme violence.

Those are the circumstances in which internment may be necessary because of the great difficulties—of which we have had 30 years' experience, if not more—which exist in convicting terrorists in the normal courts of law, even as modified—the Diplock courts and so on. As my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew pointed out, they threaten the rights of those people who get mixed up in their ghastly acts; as, indeed, their own rights are threatened by this amendment and the powers that it represents.

None of us supposes that what we are suggesting by way of this amendment should be used next week, next month or whenever. We are not suggesting a precise scenario or that the power should be effective at once; we are suggesting that it should be a reserve power and that it should be retained. It is in fact retained because it is still in primary legislation, even though it was not renewed the last time out, as it were, by secondary legislation. We need to retain the power because, unless it is in primary legislation, it cannot be used.

Internment would not be a success without a number of factors being present, some of which have already been mentioned; for example, it would not be a success without the co-operation of the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, as we have heard, it would require extremely good intelligence and its operation needs to be absolutely sudden. It cannot wait even for accelerated primary legislation to pass through this and the other place. Should the Government wish to do so—they have done so occasionally—the fastest that we can pass any Bill and put it on the statute hook is about a day, or so. But a day is enough for the individuals concerned to vanish, go underground and make the internment ineffective in the first instance. Indeed, it would probably continue to be ineffective. That is why the power needs to remain, so to speak, under the counter.

There is another effect to which I have drawn noble Lords' attention on previous occasions when we discussed the matter. I refer to the fact that the very existence of the power makes operations more complex for evil groups, because the very thought that it might be introduced makes them take precautionary measures which make their lives more difficult.

The Minister said that the Government would "never say never", but, if we do not have this power in the Bill, we are in effect saying "never" to internment because we could not introduce it as primary legislation and expect to be able to use it the following day. For all those reasons, I believe it is important for us to retain the power on the statute book. I commend the amendment to noble Lords and wish to test the opinion of the Committee.

moved Amendment No. 166:

moved Amendment No. 167:

Page 136, line 33, after ("Chancellor") insert ("by statutory instrument").

The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 167 and 168 are drafting amendments. These amendments include those recommended by parliamentary counsel and make drafting improvements to the Bill.

Amendment No. 167 is a drafting amendment to put beyond doubt the status of the Lord Chancellor's rules and to ensure consistency with other references in the Bill. The rules in question are made under the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and relate to the national security certificate tribunal established under that Act. Amendment No. 168 is a technical amendment. I beg to move.

Lord Cope of Berkeley: I realise that Amendment No. 168 is highly technical but it would help the Committee if the noble Lord explained what it seeks to achieve. It appears to concern certificates of the Secretary of State which relate to licences and other matters being sent by post. It seems odd to have a special regime to deliver such certificates.

I am not certain what the answer to the noble Lord's point is. If it reaches me shortly, I shall tell him what it is; if not, I shall write to him in due course.

I look forward to receiving a letter.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 168:

Page 138, line 45, leave out ("(4)") and insert ("(3)").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 13, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 169:

Page 51, line 6, at beginning insert ("either—

(i)").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 169, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 170 and 171. These amendments seek to strengthen and—if I may say this without causing offence—to tidy up the provisions concerning proscribed organisations under the Bill and specified organisations under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998.

As the Bill stands, only organisations that are specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and are also proscribed under the Bill would be subject to some of the emergency legislation introduced after Omagh. Organisations such as the IRA, the UVF and the UDA would be excluded. We do not feel that this can be justified. Our amendments would tighten the definition for specification under the Terrorism Bill to include organisations that are not, for example, decommissioning their illegally held arms and explosives. In short, we want to remove from this Bill the subjectivity in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act.

The Bill defines a specified organisation as one which is specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and is, or forms part of, an organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of the Bill and is therefore listed in Schedule 2. At present the Real IRA, the INLA, the Provisional IRA and Continuity IRA are not proscribed. In order to be specified under the Terrorism Bill an organisation has to be both specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act and—

Continuity IRA and the Real IRA are proscribed under that Act.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for that. Can he therefore confirm that "The Irish Republican Army", which is at the top of the list in Schedule 2, includes all those organisations?

Only four organisations are specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act—the Real IRA, the Continuity IRA, the Red Hand Defenders and the Orange Volunteers. Perhaps I have misunderstood what the noble Lord said and my intervention was badly judged, but those are the only four organisations specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act.

Perhaps I may recap what the noble and learned Lord said. Under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act we have the Continuity IRA, the Real IRA, the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders; we do not have the INLA or the LVF because they have been despecified.

This is where the confusion arises. As I understand it—I shall go back to my script because the matter is quite complicated—the Bill defines a specified organisation as one which is specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act and is, or forms part of, an organisation which is proscribed for the purposes of this Bill. Therefore, as I understand it, the organisations on the list of those specified also have to be proscribed. According to my reckoning, the Real IRA, the INLA and the Provisional IRA are not currently in Schedule 2.

It is a matter of some detail. As we are all a little at sixes and sevens on this—I spent some time trying to sort it out—there is room for confusion.

In order to be specified under this Bill, an organisation has to be both specified under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act and proscribed under the Terrorism Bill. As I understand it, Clauses 108 to 111 will be applicable only to an organisation that is specified under the Terrorism Bill. Under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, organisations such as the IRA, UVF and UVA are not specified organisations and therefore would not be specified under this legislation. They would not therefore be subject to the powers available in Clauses 108 to 111. Given their failure to decommission, we feel that this cannot and should not be justified. The effect of both of our amendments would be to tighten significantly the criteria by which an organisation is specified and therefore subject to the powers available in Clauses 108 to 111. They will make specification automatic if any of the four factors in the Northern Ireland Sentences Act are not being satisfied. Those four factors are set out in Section 3(9) of the Act. It states:

"In applying subsection 8(b) the Secretary of State shall in particular take into account whether an organization—

(a) is committed to the use now and in the future of only democratic and peaceful means to achieve its objectives;

(b) has ceased to be involved in any acts of violence or of preparation for violence;

(c) is directing or promoting acts of violence by other organisations;

(d) is co-operating fully with any Commission of the kind referred to in section 7 of the Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act 1997"—

known as the de Chastelain commission—

"in implementing the Decommissioning section of the agreement reached at multi-party talks on Northern Ireland set out in Command Paper 3883".

These amendments would not remedy the defects in the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act but they would avoid repeating them in this Bill. Our Amendments Nos. 169 and 170 would ensure that an organisation was automatically specified under this Bill if it failed to satisfy any one of those four factors.

Amendment No. 171 would ensure the automatic specification of any organisation that failed to fulfil its obligations to decommission its illegal arms and explosives under the decommissioning section of the Belfast Agreement—that is,

"the complete disarmament of all paramilitary organisations".

We have discussed which are the specified organisations under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act and which are the proscribed organisations under the Terrorism Bill.

As I understand it, the present arrangement in the Bill allows for significant discrepancy and for the possibility of setting up two classes of terrorists—that is, those who are subject to Clauses 108 to 111 of the Terrorism Bill and those who are not subject to those clauses.

I apologise if it sounds rather complicated. I have done my best to explain, but it is a somewhat difficult area. I look forward to the Minister explaining it all very simply. I beg to move.

The Committee should be grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, and his co-sponsors of these amendments. Over hundreds of years your Lordships' House has developed a tradition—which I am sure the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General supports—of being precise, particularly in matters affecting the law of the United Kingdom. That is why, collectively as a House, we do our best to distil matters, over a period of careful consideration, into language that does not contain ambiguity. If I may say so, I think we succeed in that.

A problem has been indicated by the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, which has pertained in Northern Ireland over the past three years or so and which runs a coach and horses through the laws which your Lordships go to so much trouble to make perfect. When a particular point is raised—be it on a security or a judicial matter—there is no calm deliberation such as we have in your Lordships' House. It appears to me, as an outsider, that spin doctors summon a gathering; they meet behind closed doors; they blind each other with endless forms of words; they are starved of sleep, and sometimes of food and drink; and in the end they achieve a form of words which appears to satisfy all present. But when they wake up the next day to what they have agreed, they get as many as four different versions of what they think they have achieved.

As I see it, that will be an on-going problem. I am not seeking to lay an additional burden on the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General, but we are on firm ground in suggesting that we should define clearly what we mean. We should ensure that others tampering with the law in another place are not permitted to run amok and make a total mess of what has been achieved at great expense in terms of time and energy.

I support the noble Lord's amendments. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be able to give an assurance that this matter will be looked at again. As the noble Lord, Lord Glentoran, said, I hope that the whole matter can be tightened up so that there cannot in future be different interpretations of even a single sentence.

I welcome the opportunity for a serious, detailed and precise discussion about these provisions, just as there was when they were introduced during special Sittings of Parliament in September 1998 following the terrible atrocity in Omagh. The Government recognise that these are indeed very serious provisions. Those are special provisions that can apply in respect of a certain number of specified terrorist organisations. We must also recognise the reality that they were introduced, and have been retained, in order to deal with very serious circumstances. We believe that they continue to represent a proportionate response to the serious threat posed by those groups which remain opposed to the peace process and are prepared to use serious violence, such as we witnessed at Omagh, to further their cause.

The intention behind the amendments is that organisations should be included within the scope of these additional powers if they fail to satisfy any of the four factors set out in Section 3(9) of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, or if they have not implemented the decommissioning section of the Good Friday agreement. In response I would emphasise that these powers are not a political tool; they are hard-hitting additional powers designed to equip the RUC and the criminal justice agencies with the tools they need to combat those organisations which are violently opposed to the peace process in Northern Ireland.

They are draconian measures. The Government have said that before. We make no excuses for that. But we have a corresponding responsibility to ensure that they are targeted properly at those organisations that are prepared to carry out further atrocities, such as that experienced by the people of Omagh. That is why the Government have restricted the use of the powers against only those organisations that are not maintaining complete and unequivocal ceasefires. That is the test set out in Section 3(8) of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, and that is why the Bill has a direct read-across from that legislation. That requires judgments to be made by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State, taking all the necessary factors and information into account—judgments which are kept under review in the light of the latest security information and intelligence. As Members of the Committee will be aware, these judgments have on one occasion been tested in court through the judicial review process and have not been found wanting.

Clause 107 requires—replicating the existing law—that for the special provisions to apply to an organisation it has to be specified under Section 3(8) of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act; that is, it has to be an organisation which is not observing the ceasefire. Presently there are four such specified organisations, the Real IRA, the Continuity IRA, the Red Hand Defenders and the Orange Volunteers. Those are organisations specified under Section 3(8) because they are not complying with the ceasefire. In addition, it has to be an organisation proscribed under Schedule 2 to the Bill. The first on the list of proscribed organisations is the Irish Republican Army. That would include the Real IRA, the Provisional IRA and the Continuity IRA, but only the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA are also specified under Section 3(8) as organisations that are not observing the ceasefire. So it is only to those two organisations—the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA within the rubric of IRA—that the special provisions apply.

It is a complicated explanation, but I believe it to be precise and I believe it to be tight. It is perfectly plain what the provisions are trying to do. They are targeting these additional powers only at those terrorist organisations which are not observing the ceasefire. We believe that to be a sensible approach. We are pushing the law to its limits with these draconian powers; and it is right that where one pushes the law to its limits, it should be properly focused and properly targeted. When these powers were introduced, we described them correctly as appropriate and proportionate. We said that because they were used in a targeted manner against those dissident groups opposed to peace. While these powers unfortunately remain necessary, as we judge them to be, it is vital that they also remain targeted appropriately. They should not be used as political levers. The proper place for the issue of decommissioning to be resolved is not through this legislation but through political negotiation. It was during thorough and painstaking negotiation that recent breakthroughs and progress were made.

The purpose of these provisions is to combat only those organisations which remain opposed to such progress. With that explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will not press his amendment.

I am sure that I am being very stupid—I apologise to the noble and learned Lord—but is he saying that in Schedule 2 on page 63 of the Bill, the first on the list, the Irish Republican Army, does not actually mean the Irish Republican Army but two other organisations which have in the past been associated with it?

No, I am not saying that. It is my fault for not explaining it adequately and clearly to the Committee. In order for the special post-Omagh rules to apply to a prescribed organisation, the organisation has to satisfy two tests: first, it has to be a specified organisation under Section 3(8) of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act. That means that it has to be an organisation which in the judgment of the Secretary of State is not complying with a ceasefire. Under the rubric "IRA", two bodies presently are specified organisations: the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA. So the first condition for the special provisions to apply is for the organisation to be a specified organisation under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act. Secondly, the organisation must be a proscribed organisation under Schedule 2 to the Bill. Under Schedule 2, the Irish Republican Army will include the Provisional IRA, the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA. As the Provisional IRA is not a specified organisation under the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, although it is a proscribed organisation under this schedule, it does not satisfy the requirements of Clause 107 of the Bill to make the special provisions apply to it. I am sorry that the explanation is so complicated, but that is how we get there.

What will happen if an organisation currently on ceasefire withdraws from the ceasefire? What will happen if a completely new organisation is formed which announces that it will not be on ceasefire?

As far as concerns organisations which are presently on ceasefire but then cease to be on ceasefire, it will then be a matter for the Secretary of State, under Section 3(8), to determine whether it is a specified organisation in those circumstances; that is, one which is not complying with the ceasefire. If it becomes a specified organisation and is also proscribed under Schedule 2, the special provisions will apply to it. As to new organisations, I shall have to check to see what is the order-making power under the Bill. Perhaps I may write to the noble Lord in relation to that.

Before we started the debate I thought I understood which organisations were in which category. I am now beginning to wonder. I apologise for pressing the noble and learned Lord further, but in response to my noble friend Lord Marlesford he explained that the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA were part of the Irish Republican Army as listed in Schedule 2 and therefore were covered because they were also covered by the other provision. So the Provisional IRA and, for that matter, any parts of the Irish Republican Army other than the two I have mentioned, remain proscribed organisations. It is illegal to belong to them or to wear their uniform. There are also other matters covered earlier in the Bill. On the other hand, however, the powers in this part of the Bill do not apply to them.

Perhaps I may put the following point to the Minister. Let us suppose that the authorities of the Irish Republican Army disown at some point the Real IRA and/or the Continuity IRA—after all, some people closely connected with the IRA as a whole have already criticised the Omagh and Hammersmith Bridge bombs. If the authorities of the Irish Republican Army were to do that, that would mean that the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA were no longer part of the IRA. We do not control who is part of the IRA; the IRA does. If the authorities of the Irish Republican Army threw them out, they would no longer be proscribed and for that matter no longer be covered by the provisions in this part of the Bill.

With great respect to the noble Lord, that is completely the wrong way in which to regard Schedule 2. That schedule contains the phrase, "The Irish Republican Army". The question here is: what does that rubric cover? It covers the Real IRA, the Provisional IRA and the Continuity IRA. It does not depend on the precise relationship between those three groups; the issue is whether they are part of an organisation that properly falls within the rubric of the Irish Republican Army. The answer is that they would be, irrespective of what the relationship has been. This is a mechanism. It does not, as it were, depend on the precise relationship between the various groups.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his patient explanation. I still feel that there is room for a degree of clarification and tidying up of the drafting here. After the earlier part of our debate on Schedule 2, I wrote to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, and I have received a response. I understand from that reply that Schedule 2 is to be amended and changed by an order to be brought in by the Government at a point soon after the Bill becomes an Act. For the purpose of today's debate, I should like to think over the matter further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary. The Statement is as follows:

"When I made the first Statement to the House, I announced that the British military presence would be of value in securing two objectives: to get British nationals out and to get more UN forces in. I am pleased to report to the House that we have made good progress on both objectives.

"The UN force has expanded rapidly over the past month and by next week we expect it to be at its original authorised strength of 11,000. This successful build-up has been possible only because of the increased efficiency which the British presence has brought to logistical movements. We have provided security for the airport and provided a lead which has encouraged the UNAMSIL contributors to deploy quickly.

"The security situation has much improved, in part because of the UK presence. The rebel advance on Freetown has been reversed and their leader is under arrest. All the 500 UN personnel who had been seized by the rebels have been released but we continue to watch with care the situation of Major Harrison and Mr Smith.

"We remain on course for our target of withdrawal by mid-June. The first battalion of the Parachute Regiment has already withdrawn and we expect Four Two Commando to be withdrawn next week. At that point, security of Lungi airport will be transferred to the UN. At the weekend I spoke to Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the UN, who expressed his appreciation for what he described as the magnificent effort by the British troops in helping to stabilise the situation in Sierra Leone.

"Much more remains to be done to ensure that the UN mission is not only at full strength but also an effective force. We will continue to provide valuable back-up to the UN operation, including better communications to its units and military advice to its headquarters.

"The achievement of the past month has been to avert an immediate threat to Freetown. Sierra Leone, as a result, may have dropped out of the front pages, but we will secure lasting stability in Sierra Leone only if we, the international community, and the government of Sierra Leone follow through the gains of the past month with a sustained effort. We must also expect some local reversals before we succeed in bringing the conflict to an end. On Thursday I will be visiting Sierra Leone to explore with President Kabbah how we take forward our work in partnership. Today I wish to outline to the House our strategy for building on the progress of the past month. The strategy has three priorities: repel the rebels; restore the peace process; and rebuild Sierra Leone.

"The first priority is to equip the government of Sierra Leone with an effective and accountable army of its own. Since the Lomé agreement of last year, Britain has been the lead nation in training a new Sierra Leone army. We propose to accelerate OUT training in order to achieve a rapid boost in troop capacity. We will therefore be providing a short-term training team to provide an intensive infantry course for a thousand new recruits, all of them screened recruits over 18 years old. This training will be conducted by around 180 personnel drawn from 2 Royal Anglian. They will be supported by HMS "Argyll", RFA "Sir Percivale", which will provide communications and back-up offshore. In addition, 40 junior officers of the Sierra Leone army have this week commenced training in Ghana with the British military and advisory team there.

"We anticipate that the intensive phase of initial training will be completed over the next two months. In the longer term, we will retain the lead in military training of the Sierra Leone army and in advising the government of Sierra Leone on structures for the democratic accountability of their army. We will be deploying shortly the lead elements of a long-term training team of around 90 personnel, but their full deployment will depend on establishing a secure environment.

"The second priority is to restore momentum to the peace process. Before the recent return to conflict, over one-third of the armed groups had entered the disarmament process started by the Lomé agreement. It is vital that the option of demilitarisation remains open to all those willing to lay down their arms.

"The United Kingdom is by far the largest donor to the peace process in Sierra Leone and we have committed some £70 million from the development budget. We will be seeking further support of other donors, including the World Bank, to help to match the resources required by the shattered economy and society of Sierra Leone.

"The amnesty within the Lomé agreement applied only to crimes committed before the date of its signature. It does not provide immunity For crimes committed in the recent conflict. The rebel leader, Foday Sankoh, is now under detention and must remain so until he is brought to justice.

"The third priority is to reduce the incentive which the illicit trade in diamonds has provided for armed conflict in Sierra Leone. Diamonds have fuelled this war. The people of Sierra Leone remain among the world's poorest while the wealth of its diamonds goes to rebels. In the medium term, the objective must be to bring the diamond area under the control of the government and of the UN. In the mean time, we must take action outside Sierra Leone to regulate the trade in its diamonds We are exploring with partners in the Security Council our proposal for a UN resolution banning the trade in diamonds from Sierra Leone except where they are certified as legitimate by the government of Sierra Leone.

"Any action to halt the flow of diamonds out of Sierra Leone and the flow of illicit weapons into Sierra Leone would have a much better prospect of success with the co-operation of neighbouring countries, especially Liberia. I regret to inform the House that there is significant evidence establishing close links between the rebels in Sierra Leone and supporters in Liberia, and that Liberians are profiting from illegal diamond smuggling. We are consulting with the United States and the European Commission on how we can jointly step up international pressure on Liberia to close down its links to the rebels.

"The position in Sierra Leone has greatly improved in the month since my first Statement to the House. British troops have made a big contribution to this turnaround. The whole House will want to record its appreciation of the professionalism with which they have carried out their duties and the commitment with which they have served in challenging circumstances.

"But there remains a long way yet to go before Sierra Leone is free from conflict. The best way we can express our appreciation for the efforts of our troops is to make sure that we build on the gains that their presence has secured. We are determined to do so and we will continue to make every realistic contribution open to Britain. Our objective is to ensure that the people of Sierra Leone are offered a realistic prospect of stability and peace and are freed from the violence of a brutal rebel minority".

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for repeating this very full Statement by the Secretary of State on the situation in Sierra Leone. I completely support and endorse everything that has been said about the expertise and excellence of our troops and their skill in performing sensitive and complex tasks. I know that we expect nothing less of them, but it is always warming to see it in action. They will recognise that Members on all sides of the House feel very proud.

The Statement is meant to be about strategy. I confess that some of us find it no easier now to understand what is the long-term strategy towards poor Sierra Leone and all its agonies than we did previously. Is the aim to remain in Sierra Leone? What is the nature of the commitment referred to by the Secretary of State, or of his partnership with President Kabbah, as mentioned in the Statement? Is the main priority now the training of the Sierra Leone army, such as it is? Or is the main priority to stiffen the UN, which was the original idea? Which of those two will do the fighting that is continuing?

If the aim has now shifted slightly towards helping the SLA, that is quite a mouthful. The SLA is a chaotic organisation. It has rebel troops fighting alongside it as well as rebel troops shooting at it. The RUF is advancing, not retreating—it has just "nabbed" two more towns—and, of course, it is still in control of the diamond fields. So we need to know a little more about how that situation will be handled.

A stronger UN presence is obviously welcome. But are we now moving into a major long-term UN commitment? If so, where has the questioning been done—I hope, at the UN in New York—about where the forces and reinforcements in the longer term will come from to back up this operation? You cannot enter into such commitments without readiness to back them up with reinforcements if they go wrong, or if they become prolonged, which they invariably do. We need to know more about the part that we are playing in seeing that the UN gears itself up for what could be a massive and prolonged commitment in this part of Africa, aside from its other commitments all over the continent.

As to the question of "conflict" diamonds and the attempt to control them, we certainly wish that attempt well. I hope that it can be done. There is recognition that it is an immensely complex market. There is difficulty enough in tracking uncut diamonds, even with finger tracing and so on, but tracking cut diamonds is almost impossible. Although we are aiming for some UN resolution, I am not clear how in practice we distinguish between diamonds that are approved officially and which generate revenue for Sierra Leone or other states, and diamonds that are "unofficial". It will be a fiendishly difficult task. Then there is the problem of bringing Liberia into line, which was commented on in the Statement.

We must ask whether this commitment means more arms supply, and what sort of arms? How are we to ensure that they do not end up in teenage hands? It is fine saying that trainees should not be under 18, but how can we guarantee that? How can we avoid hair-raising stories of the kind filed by the Evening Standard journalist, Alex Renton, in his brilliant dispatches about young children being trained to kill?

Finally—I am sure that the noble Baroness expects this point to be made—in order to understand what will happen next and in the future, we need to understand a great deal more about what has occurred in the past. There is still a good deal of mystery about the Lomé agreement and how on earth anyone ever came to do a deal with Sankoh and to put in place a butcher—which he is—as vice-president of a republic. Who backed that deal, and why did it happen? If we cannot answer those questions today, we shall have to return to them. Unless we understand what went wrong and ensure that it is not repeated, we shall not avoid other fatal mistakes in future of the kind that have led to so many deaths and so much tragedy and mutilation.

We welcome what the troops are doing. We welcome the effort to bring the diamond situation under control, which will be difficult. However, we still want to press the Government further on the question of our long-term commitment, and on what our partnership really is, in this benighted country and on how we can ensure that our undertakings and fine words are turned into action.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. Like the noble Lord, Lord Howell, I should like to express our great appreciation for what might be described as a classic operation by an outstanding group of British troops. Anyone realising the speed with which the situation has been stabilised and the change in confidence on the part of the Sierra Leone Government must be extraordinarily impressed.

On these Benches, we do not find the Government's motivation quite so difficult to understand. In a situation where, clearly, far too much of Africa is slipping towards anarchy, largely because of the commercial exploitation of oil, diamonds and other natural resources, it is essential that the rule of law is restored and maintained. We believe strongly that the United Nations must be an instrument in that, and that the Government are right in attempting to back the UN in this situation.

We are pleased to hear the decision that the training of the Sierra Leone army will be done by the Royal Anglian Regiment. Will training also be undertaken by other Commonwealth countries? Are we right in assuming that in the take-over in part from the British troops—many of whom will now be leaving Sierra Leone—there has been an impressive strengthening of the Government's position as a result of Indian troops coming to the scene, who are equally well trained and battle hardened? It is worth saying that this is also classic Commonwealth operation. It indicates how important the Commonwealth continues to be, right up to the present day.

Can the Minister tell the House anything about the position of the Ghanaian troops at Lunsar, which I understand to be the crucial town between the diamond areas and Freetown. Have they fought their way out of what appeared to be a difficult position? Will the Minister confirm that the RUF is retreating, not advancing, and that at Rogberi Junction it fled into the bush after confronting UN troops?

On the issue of arms, what steps have been taken to ensure that further arms do not fall into the hands of the rebels? Can any extra action be taken in terms of certification, safeguarding of the arsenals and so on?

The Minister implied a worrying rise in the official export from Liberia of diamonds and diamond pieces. I understand that it rose by 30 million dollars last year. As Liberia is not a major diamondiferous area, that suggests that a good many diamonds are being smuggled out through that area. I underline the Minister's remark about the importance of the United States in this area, given its close ties to Liberia, and the possibility that it can bring pressure to bear on Mr Taylor, whose role in this whole affair is far from attractive.

An extremely welcome report in today's Financial Times suggests that the UK is taking the initiative in suggesting an international diamond regime that would enable all diamonds to specify their origin and that would require the major diamond companies to agree not to use diamonds that did not indicate their origin. As that has already been dealt with in Angola and is now being dealt with in Sierra Leone, could it also be extended to cover the Democratic Republic of Congo, where I understand there is a major outbreak of fighting over Kisangani, which is also within the diamond-hearing areas?

Finally, will the noble Baroness confirm that perhaps one of the few ways in which we can bring some sort of established peace to this very rich area of west Africa is by making sure that those who exploit the deep suffering and sacrifice of other people will be prevented from making money out of it, whether the source of that money is diamonds or oil?

My Lords, I thank both the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, for their welcome comments about the sterling efforts of our troops. It is heart-warming to hear praise for those efforts echoed from all sides of the House.

Both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness raised a number of points, and I should like to deal with them in the order in which they arose.

The noble Lord asked about training. It is quite clear that training is a hugely important issue if we want to see within Sierra Leone a democratic and accountable army. There are efforts in relation to keeping a sizeable force—in the Statement I mentioned 180 personnel—to that end. There has been a deal of concern about the way in which the Sierra Leone army has operated in the past. We are very concerned about the reports that British weapons may have been in the hands of children, as the noble Lord mentioned. We have instructed the Commissioner in Sierra Leone to remind President Kabbah of the assurance he gave in March 1999 that those weapons would be used only by regular SLA soldiers in accordance with international law and responsible human rights standards. We expect those assurances to be kept.

This is just one of the reasons why the UK-led military advisory training team announced by the Prime Minister on 27th March is needed in Sierra Leone: to create the responsible and accountable Sierra Leone Army that we would all like. A condition of the establishment of the MAT is that children shall not be used by the Sierra Leone armed forces or the civil defence force. The release programme announced on 23rd May will be carefully supervised by British military personnel on the ground to ensure that any British weapons go only to adult soldiers and to the Sierra Leone army for training or for legitimate operational requirements. Only by training and making sure that the army has the proper ability to respond appropriately and effectively shall we be able to bring about the long-term change that we all know is absolutely crucial in the area.

We hope that by the time our troops withdraw there will be up to 13,500 UN troops on the ground. The UN has taken very seriously the need to increase those troops. Noble Lords will remember that the Secretary-General mentioned that he would like to see the troop numbers increased to 16,500. That matter is being addressed. Minds are being very clearly focused on the long-term needs.

Both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness mentioned diamonds. The Statement also elucidated that this is an incredibly important issue. Diamonds have been the fuel. As the noble Lord said, it is a very difficult task. Her Majesty's Government have been determined that the issue should be addressed. I hear what the noble Baroness says about the Congo. Obviously, we shall take that very seriously too, because the issue of oil and diamonds is of wider application than just to Sierra Leone.

Britain wants to see international action to curb the illicit trade in diamonds now. The proposed new United Nations Security Council resolution on Sierra Leone provides a golden opportunity to focus the international mind on addressing the problem and exploring measures to tackle it. Britain is proposing ideas to prevent the RUF having access to Sierra Leone diamonds and the diamond market, and to help the development of a regulated and sustainable diamond industry in Sierra Leone. We believe that if our ideas are accepted and implemented they will go a long way to eliminating the reason for the conflict and encouraging a secure and stable peace in Sierra Leone. It is difficult, but we have set our hand clearly to achieve that, and we are hopeful that we shall receive support.

The noble Baroness raised the issue of training. The Commonwealth countries are participating very creatively in this. It warms our hearts that that is so, and that we are seeing this united approach. We shall continue to consult them and work with them, and we very much value their contribution, as we value the contribution made by the Ghanaian troops. I cannot give the noble Baroness specific details about their position, but I can say that she is right in saying that the RUF is retreating in many areas and that the UN efforts appear to be going very well.

I come to the Lomé agreement, which I remind noble Lords was voluntarily entered into by all the participating parties. Noble Lords will remember that Britain at that stage was an observer, not a participant. We have to be very careful not to be presumptuous in our approach to what is best for others. The people around that table included not merely Foday Sankoh, but many other rebels, who have held to their side of the bargain. They decided that it was the best way forward for Sierra Leone. At the time the agreement was warmly and wholeheartedly welcomed. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but sometimes it can be a very dangerous instrument to employ.

We have to look to the people in Sierra Leone to make decisions on the future. We shall rely on them, as we relied on them before, to determine what is best for themselves—obviously with our assistance and with the support of all other international contributors who wish them well.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness the Minister for repeating the Statement. In it she referred to the fact that the United Nations would be assuming responsibility for the security of the airfield at Freetown. That airfield, of course, could be of immense importance to any further moves that Her Majesty's Government might need to make either to increase the troops who remain or to extract them. What confidence can the Minister give the House that the United Nations will be capable of securing that airfield in the event that the RUF should mount attacks against it?

My Lords, we know that our troops have been very successful in securing the airport. We have been involved very closely with those who will take over to develop a strategy for managing this matter. We are informed that there is every confidence that the UN troops who will replace our troops will have the ability and capacity to hold that airport securely for the benefit of others.

My Lords, first, may I remind the noble Baroness the Minister that the middle of June is Thursday week? Am I right in understanding that she tells us that the Foreign Secretary has undertaken that all British troops, except the 180 left for training purposes, will leave Sierra Leone by Thursday week? Secondly, how long will those 180 troops remain in Sierra Leone? Thirdly, what arms and other equipment have been guaranteed or offered to the government there by the British Government?

My Lords, our expectation is that the combat troops of whom I have already spoken will be withdrawn by next week. I cannot give the specific date. We are on target in relation to that.

As regards the training, there is no specific limit on how long the 180 will be there, but the noble Lord will know that our commitment to training the Sierra Leone army is not a short-term one; it is a long-term commitment that we had before this conflict arose, and we shall continue to pursue it. It is hoped that the 180 troops—it may be a slightly higher figure—will be able to train over 1,000 recruits of Sierra Leone origin. I am sure the noble Lord agrees it is most important that Sierra Leone is able to look after herself in the long term without being dependent on international forces to assist her in this regard. Therefore, the provision of training, not simply the 180 troops, is a long-term commitment.

My Lords, now that Mr Sankoh has been in custody for some time, can my noble friend inform the House whether Her Majesty's Government are confident that they can identify the individuals who are effectively in control of the rebel forces at this time? Have any attempts been made to contact those individuals and, if so, what success has been achieved?

My Lords, I am unable to give your Lordships specific information. Those details are not fully available to me, although they may be available to others under more secure circumstances. We know that strenuous efforts are being made to identify and contact those responsible for the rebels in order to bring them under control. We are aware that the intelligence-gathering process is very efficient and thorough.

My Lords, in view of the remarks of the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, do the Government anticipate further demands on British troops in the rest of Africa, or the world, either for this or any other kind of operation? First, are Her Majesty's Government confident that they have enough troops to satisfy any potential demand without any degree of overstretch, which is a matter that worries a number of noble Lords at the moment? Secondly, can the Minister inform the House whether the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has any jurisdiction in west Africa? If not, would that be desirable; or is the standard that applies to the Balkans different from that which applies to west Africa?

My Lords, I deal with the last point first. The War Crimes Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in relation to Africa, and it is absolutely plain that exactly the same rules apply to Africa as to anywhere else. As to the noble Viscount's first question, I wish that I had a crystal ball. When I took over my post in July I thought that the problems of the world were in good part solved; they are not. We never know when or what conflicts will arise. However, to date we have had sufficient forces for all of the unfortunate incidents with which we have had to deal. Obviously, we shall continue to review the position and ensure that that happy position continues.

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that since the Statement was drafted the 21 Indian peacekeepers, who were surrounded by the RUF in the eastern town of Kuiva, have been taken into custody by the RUF and moved to Pendembu? Is the noble Baroness able to inform the House what has happened to the other 220 Indian peacekeepers who are blockaded in the Kailahun district? Is the noble Baroness able to explain the strategy of the United Nations to prevent the RUF from exploiting its hold over the peacekeepers as a means of deterring the Sierra Leone Government from pursuing their offensive against the rebels in the east?

Does the noble Baroness agree that the original coup against President Kabbah by the military government, which lasted for several months, was motivated by rivalry between the regular armed forces and the Kamajors, an ethnic Mende militia, which has now been resurrected in the guise of the Civil Defence Force? Does the Minister agree, therefore, that it is extremely dangerous that Sierra Leone should have two, if not three, separate armed forces, only one of which is completely under the control of the civil administration? Is one component of the Government's long-term strategy to beef up and regenerate the armed forces of Sierra Leone an attempt to ensure that the Civil Defence Force is disbanded and demobilised and that the soldiers who belong to that militia are re-integrated into the regular armed forces of the government?

As to the demilitarisation of the RUF, has any further attempt been made to establish contact with its commanders in Kailahun and Makeni? Are we entirely dependent on the good offices of President Charles Taylor in this regard'? As to the illicit diamond trade, can one suggest that the services of Ambassador Fowler, who has done such a brilliant job in Angola, should be deployed by the United Nations in an attempt to stop up the flow of illicit diamonds as the Government's strategy demands? In that regard, can the noble Baroness say whether investigations are being made into the article in the Observer last Sunday in which it was claimed that diamonds purporting to come from the war zone in Sierra Leone had been offered to dealers in Hatton Garden who made no bones about accepting them? Does the Minister agree that steps should be taken to prevent the acceptance by diamond dealers within our own country of these illicitly mined gems?

My Lords, I deal with the last point first. The illicit sale of diamonds is a matter of acute importance which we are addressing with vigour in the way I described earlier. I understand the concern expressed by the noble Lord. If dealers in Hatton Garden behave in such an unscrupulous way, that is a matter of great concern and we can do nothing but deplore it. The UN informs us that it has lost communication with the 21 peacekeepers. We are unable to provide direct information about their whereabouts or wellbeing, but that is a matter of concern which will continue to be considered. The noble Lord is also right to point out the proper concern about the rivalry within the Civil Defence Force.

I reiterate Her Majesty's Government's clear view that for Sierra Leone to have one identifiable army must inure to the long term benefit of that country. That is the best way to enhance the security and stability of that country and its borders without having to rely on outside assistance. In relation to all those matters I agree with the noble Lord. I am unable to provide a specific answer about contact with Charles Taylor, and perhaps I may write to the noble Lord in respect of that matter.

My Lords, is the Minister able to provide a little more information, without hazarding security, about how it is proposed to deal with the seat of all this trouble: the diamond fields? I heard what the noble Baroness said but I did not understand exactly, or in broad strategic terms, what was to be done. Is it not apparent that there must be strict military control and containment of the diamond fields? Is it right that the United Nations has agreed to take total control of that operation? If so, what part, if any, will our troops play in it? To leave aside the diplomatic efforts with Liberia for one moment, how is this military containment to be effective? If it is not, the trouble will continue.

My Lords, the hope and expectation are that the Sierra Leone army, together with the UN troops, will be in a position to retake the whole of that territory. Noble Lords will know that the RUF is currently in control of a number of the diamond-producing areas in Sierra Leone. So the strategy would be for the UN, together with the Sierra Leone army, to retake that area and make it secure. Then, having made it secure, the strategy would be to bring it back under the democratic rule of the properly elected government and subject to the normal rule of law.

My Lords, could the noble Baroness endeavour to answer the last question posed by my noble friend Lord Tebbit about the supply of British arms to the Sierra Leone army? Could she also say what arrangements have been made, after training the troops, as we are doing, to arm them?

My Lords, the arms that are currently being made available by Britain will be under the control of British military personnel. They will be responsible for the distribution and the identification of who has them and on what conditions. Your Lordships will know that we face a very fluid situation. I cannot give you the exact quantum of those arms. But they are being very carefully negotiated and will be kept under proper control by authorities who will make sure that they are distributed only to those who will use them to good purpose; namely, in the democratic support of the Sierra Leone government and of the UN initiative.

My Lords, I understood the noble Baroness to say that the troops who have made such an enormous difference and who have started the whole improvement are to be withdrawn next week. Surely this is perhaps a little unwise. Can the noble Baroness say what better job they could be doing than the one they have done there?

My Lords, they have done an absolutely superb job and we are immensely proud of them. However, the job that they have done is now complete. We said that they would go in to help to secure the airport so that those who wished to leave could do so. We also said that they would be there to help and support the UN troops so that the UN could get the proper numbers on the ground to carry out its duties. They have done those things. By the time they leave we hope that there will be at least 13,500 UN troops on the ground.

We also reasonably expect that those UN troops will be able to keep the airport safe and secure to enable further UN troops and other supplies to come in as necessary. Although I join wholeheartedly in praise of our troops, I would not like anything we have said here today to be seen as deprecating the commitment that has been made by the 13,500 UN troops who have been drawn from all over the world and who have come together to support the UN initiative to bring security and safety back to the people of Sierra Leone. They too are worthy of our plaudits and our congratulations: they too are worthy of our support.

My Lords, however much we may congratulate them and applaud them, how can we, following up what the noble Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has said, frankly have confidence that the UN troops will be able to hold the airport when they have not even been able to protect themselves? They have ended up being captured, and apparently the Indians too have been captured—and, as the noble Baroness has said, they are probably among the best in Sierra Leone.

My Lords, we have done much since the British troops arrived. One of the most important contributions we have been able to make is in relation to building and creating an effective strategy to assist the UN troops in their deployment and in taking the initiative forward. The training and technical assistance that we are making available are given not only to those on the ground in Sierra Leone, but technical assistance is being given by our British experts on military affairs in the UN in New York also. We shall continue to be closely involved in the strategy that has been so effectively deployed by our troops.

I do not say that there are not challenges ahead; clearly there are. However, we must not undermine what has been achieved in conjunction with those same UN troops within a very short compass. The British input has been very effective and it has been effective because it has been accepted willingly by those with whom we have worked.

My Lords, an international position in regard to diamonds is long overdue and ought to be encouraged. More specifically, following on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, what provision is being made to protect our forces who are training the Sierra Leone army? What medical facilities and provision have been made for our forces, given that I understand a large number of malaria cases have now been reported?

My Lords, the troops who are being left behind will include those who will in effect protect the trainers and so it is likely that there will be 80 or 90 people specifically doing the training. Other troops will be there also to protect those who are involved in the training. That is the first point.

On the second point in relation to malaria, I can confirm that there have been a small number of reported cases of malaria among the British forces deployed in Sierra Leone during the current operation. We are at present seeking to establish the circumstances in which the personnel concerned have contracted this disease, but we know that all the personnel who have been infected are responding well to treatment. The malaria outbreak is small, it is contained and it is being effectively dealt with.

This clause replaces a section to a similar effect which was enacted in the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act 1998. That Act was passed after a two-day debate in your Lordships' House at the beginning of September 1998 in the aftermath of the Omagh atrocity, obviously as emergency legislation. That special section has so far never been relied on in a court in the United Kingdom; and I have to say I believe that this Bill, as its successor, probably never will be, even if it is enacted. This clause, or rather its predecessor, was subjected to a devastating analysis in September 1998 during the debate of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, who I am glad to see in his place. I hope that he will repeat that analysis.

Therefore I shall try to be brief in speaking about this. On these Benches we believe that this clause is both improper as a matter of law and useless in practice. It is improper because it is surely for the court to decide whether an accused belongs to a proscribed organisation on the basis of the evidence before it. The opinion of a police superintendent, or a higher police officer, is not evidence of the accused's membership, even if you call it so.

What is happening is not that the police superintendent is giving evidence but that we are transferring part of the court's power of decision-making—the power to decide whether the accused is a member of a proscribed organisation—from the court to a police officer. Of course it is not a transfer of the whole of that power of decision but it does transfer an important element of it. The opinion of a police officer may, and no doubt will, be based on the evidence as presented to him.

But that opinion is not itself evidence; and whether the evidence justifies the opinion is a matter for the court and not for the police officer.

Under this clause, the police officer's opinion would still be treated as evidence, and possibly a crucial piece of evidence, even if that opinion were based on a belief in the probability rather than the certainty of its truth. The opinion could, and perhaps in a number of cases would, be based on an inadmissible confession. Unquestionably, as a matter of legal procedure, it is plainly inappropriate. It would no doubt be regarded as inappropriate in Strasbourg; and, unquestionably, it would be regarded—quite apart from the European Convention on Human Rights—as a breach of the fundamental tradition of the British legal systems.

Furthermore, it is not only improper, it is useless. Let us consider what will happen at the trial. The first questions which counsel for the accused will ask the police officer is, "What is the evidence you base your opinion on?" If the police officer says, "I'm sorry, I cannot tell you because of risk to our intelligence sources", almost inevitably the court, the judge having been trained in the judicial traditions of this country, will disregard the evidence as being unreliable and untrustworthy. In the unlikely event of the police officer saying what the grounds of his opinion are, counsel for the accused is entitled to say, "We want to hear the primary evidence from people who can give it, not evidence second hand from you, the police officer".

The clause was introduced in haste and should be repented of at leisure. It should never have been included in the 1998 Act; and it surely should be removed from the statute book now. I believe that Clause 108 should not stand part.

I support the noble Lord. I can be brief because he has covered most, if not all, the arguments and I am in the process of losing my voice.

When the criminal justice Bill was before the House in September 1998, I was opposed to Clauses 1 and 2, which are reproduced in Clauses 108 and 109 of the Bill currently before the Committee, on the ground that they would achieve nothing in practice. However, I voted in favour of the Bill because in the aftermath of the bombing at Omagh it seemed to me that something was needed then, even if it were only a gesture. The time for gestures has now passed. There has been time to think again about Clauses 108 and 109. I had hoped that Clause 108 would have quietly disappeared never to be heard of again.

I shall not repeat the arguments which I sought to advance on the last occasion. They came to this: that no judge in Northern Ireland—I am lucky enough to know most, if not all, of them—would take account of the opinion of a police office, however senior, as to whether an accused was a member of a specified organisation unless he could back up that opinion with some evidence. Without evidence it is mere opinion, and mere opinion is worthless in a court of law except when it is given on expert grounds; and on this a police officer is not an expert.

The only evidence which a police officer could use to back up his opinion of the membership of an accused of a specified organisation would almost certainly be the evidence of an informer or other evidence from some secret source which could not be given in court. Therefore there could be no effective, meaningful cross-examination of the police officer on the opinion he had expressed.

If, perchance, a judge were to take account of an opinion of a police officer in these circumstances in convicting a defendant—let us bear in mind that the provisions apply to the conviction of a defendant as well as the committal of an accused for trial—such a conviction would almost certainly be upset on appeal because it would have been in part based on evidence which had not been given in open court and therefore would be contrary to any number of provisions of the Human Rights Act.

To make the opinion admissible in court is, I have to suggest to the Committee, a complete waste of breath. Earlier today the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, described these two provisions as being hard hitting, additional powers. If by that description he refers to Clause 108, I can only disagree, sadly, with him. It hits, and will hit, nothing.

I am not surprised that Clause 108 has apparently not been used in a criminal court since it was enacted. In this Chamber one is not allowed even to think, "I told you so". I shall not say that but only that I am not in the least surprised it has not been used.

I am sorry the noble Lord, Lord Richard, is not in his place. From this side of the Chamber, I rise to support the Government. Although we have an immense respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, to say nothing of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, it would be inconsistent for me to attempt to persuade the Government to remoke these paragraphs in this part of the Bill which is clearly for Northern Ireland emergency situations.

Clause 108(3)(b) gives considerable protection. It states clearly that,

"the accused shall not be committed for trial, be found to have a case to answer or he convicted solely on the basis of the statement"—

that is, the statement from the police officer. Those of us who work and live in Northern Ireland know only too well how unbelievably difficult it can be to get any evidence in time before a court. In that situation, and with the use of this part of the Bill that the Minister made clear, we support the Government.

The Government have never disguised the fact that these are serious provisions. As we acknowledged at the time they were introduced, they take the law to its very limits. Nevertheless, the Government believed then, and continue to believe now, that the provisions were an appropriate and proportionate response to the serious threat posed by active dissident groups opposed to the peace process.

That threat was demonstrated at its most deadly by the appalling events in Omagh on 15th August 1998. Despite all the existing legislation and the information and intelligence available to the security forces, it was not possible to prevent the bomb that detonated in the heart of Omagh on a busy Saturday afternoon, killing 29 innocent men, women and children. That atrocity reminded us all that there were extreme elements which were determined at all costs to frustrate the will of the people expressed in their support for the Good Friday agreement. It was vital that the governments took action, North and South.

Unfortunately, that threat has not gone away. Dissident groups remain violently opposed to peace. There have been a number of attacks in recent months in Northern Ireland and, although it is still too early to be definitive, last week's bomb attack at Hammersmith Bridge may also underline that the threat is still very real.

However, the Government also recognise the need to comply fully with our human rights obligations and with the natural requirements of fairness and justice. Our guiding principle is that where powers are introduced which go beyond the normal criminal law, as these undoubtedly do, appropriate safeguards must be built in to ensure that they are not used inappropriately.

I can assure the Committee that the judgments which were made in relation to the European Convention on Human Rights were made only after the fullest consideration, otherwise my noble friend Lord Bassam would not have made the declaration he did under Section 19 of the Human Rights Act. In that respect, it is important to note the safeguards which are in place in this clause.

First, Clause 108 requires that a police statement must be given by a senior officer of at least the rank of superintendent, and must be given orally, with the opportunity for cross-examination by either party or by the judge. That cross-examination can examine the basis on which the police officer makes his statement.

Secondly, subsection (3)(b) provides that an accused cannot be convicted solely on the basis of a police officer's statement. It must be corroborated by other evidence.

Thirdly, the clause provides only for the evidence of the admissible. It will be for the courts to determine what weight, if any, to give to such evidence and that will depend on the circumstances in particular cases. That is an important safeguard, as I hope that noble Lords will recognise.

Finally, as was discussed in relation to the earlier amendment, this provision is targeted very specifically at only a small number of organisations in Northern Ireland which remain wedded to violence. Currently, there are only four specified organisations to which Clauses 108 to 111 apply: the Real IRA, the Continuity IRA, the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders.

I also remind Members of the Committee that these provisions are kept under review with regard to their continuing requirement. They can at any point be "switched off" by order. That review process will take account of the approach of the government of the Republic of Ireland to their equivalent provisions since cross-border co-operation has been an important factor in their history.

Like many noble Lords, I look forward to the day when stringent, indeed draconian, measures such as these can be removed from the UK statute book. I sincerely hope that that day is not far off. But I believe that it would be premature to dispose of an integral piece of our armoury at this stage. I commend Clause 108 to the Committee.

I am grateful in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for his speech. He repeated the arguments which he persuasively addressed to the House in September 1998.

I am afraid that I am unable to accept that there are adequate safeguards in the Bill. First, the fact that the opinion must be that of a middle-ranking police officer—a superintendent—rather than someone more junior is not a form of safeguard. The safeguard in subsection (3)(b), that no one can be found to have a case to answer solely on the basis of the statement, is of little value, and it seems that there is a dilemma. If there is evidence to justify conviction without taking into account the opinion of the police officer, why give evidence of the police officer's opinion at all? If, on the other hand, the police officer's opinion is an essential piece of the jigsaw leading potentially to conviction, we shall run up against the problem pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd; namely, that no judge brought up in the traditions of the courts of Northern Ireland, which in this respect are plainly the same as those of Scotland, England and Wales, will accept that evidence as the basis for conviction. I talk about the "judge" because it is almost inevitable that such trials will be held under the Diplock procedure.

The fact is that any society which regards itself as governed by the rule of law, as we certainly do, must apply the rule of law even when it is inconvenient and frustrating for it to do so. And here I do not use the expression "human rights"; I use the expression "rule of law", which is a different and older tradition. It certainly goes back many centuries in this country. I do not believe that Clause 108 satisfies the tests of the rule of law.

It is not my intention today to seek to divide the Committee on Clause 108, but we may well return to the issue on Report. I withdraw my opposition to the Question that Clause 108 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 108 agreed to.

Clauses 109 to 115 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 172:

Page 139, line 19, leave out paragraph (e).

The noble Viscount said: Amendment No. 172 refers to page 6, paragraph 32, of the report of the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee, which draws attention to the fact that Schedule 14 permits information obtained by authorised officers to be passed on to listed person or,

"to a person specified by order of the Secretary of State for use of a kind specified in the order".

This is a probing amendment, but the Committee seeks an explanation of why these powers should be drawn in such wide terms. Our amendment seeks to restrict the width of those powers. I look forward to hearing the Minister's reply. I beg to move.

I can well understand the thinking behind the amendment. Indeed, the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee in its report encouraged your Lordships' House to probe the need for such a wide provision allowing the Secretary of State to add by order to those to whom information acquired by examining or authorised officers might be made available and for what purpose. I hope that today I shall be able to allay any underlying concerns.

First, this type of provision is not novel. Indeed, a similar provision is to be found in Sections 21 and 22 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 in relation to the supply of information acquired by immigration officers. I am sure that the noble Viscount is aware of that because I recall that his noble friend Lord Cope moved a similar amendment to that Bill when it was before your Lordships' House.

In the case of the Terrorism Bill, the provision concerns information acquired by an examining officer or an authorised officer. The point of the provision in both cases is, of course, to provide flexibility for the future, but with safeguards.

At the moment, the key frontier control agencies with which the police, as examining officers, work, and with which it makes good operational sense to exchange information, are Customs and Excise and the Immigration Service. Closer co-operation and working relationships between them are developing at all times. In addition, the police work closely with their colleagues in the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad. All those organisations are named on the face of the Bill.

However, I believe that one can say fairly that in framing new anti-terrorist legislation we have tried as far as possible to be "future proof". We have added the new provision concerning the seizure of cash at borders by authorised officers. With that in mind, it seems prudent to us to provide the Secretary of State with a reserve power so that he can add extra agencies to the list if developments suggest that that might be operationally beneficial.

At the moment we do not plan to use the power. If we had other organisations in mind, of course we would name them on the face of the Bill. However, times change and links with other agencies may develop or relevant responsibilities may change. It could be to the general benefit of all concerned that the supply of information to other agencies is sanctioned.

The Bill proposes that the addition of a further agency to the list of those to whom information may be supplied should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. We consider that to be the appropriate level of scrutiny in these circumstances. It is an important power which concerns the passing of information to third parties and it is right that this level of safeguard is provided.

I hope that that explanation is clear and that the noble Viscount will not seek to press his amendment.

I thank the Minister for that comprehensive reply, which we shall study carefully. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 14 agreed to.

Clause 116 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 173:

Page 54, line 36, leave out ("subsection (3)") and insert ("subsections (3) and (4)").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 173, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 176, both of which stand in the names of my noble friends and myself. These amendments concern the question of whether it is appropriate for the Director of Public Prosecutions to consent to prosecutions in terrorist cases which are concerned mainly with overseas terrorism or whether that consent should be given, as we suggest, by the Attorney-General.

It will be a useful safeguard to require consent to be given at a high level to the prosecution of offences under the Bill. Of course, we welcome that. Clause 117 as it now stands requires that in all cases the consent be that of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Our view is that the consent of the DPP is indeed sufficient where the case relates to what I might describe as "internal terrorism". However, a prosecution, for example, for funding of allegedly terrorist activities outside the United Kingdom, or, to take another example, weapons training for overseas terrorism prosecuted under Clause 54, may raise very sensitive political issues.

If the organisation in question to which the accused person is said to belong is proscribed under the Bill, the decision is in some ways much simpler. The political decision regarding the justification of prosecution for membership of or activities under the aegis of that organisation will already have been taken by the Secretary of State when he made the proscription order. Therefore, we believe that in the case of prosecution for offences under Clauses 11 to 13, which come into play only when the relevant organisation is a proscribed organisation, the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is adequate. However, all the offences referred to in Amendment No. 176 can be committed by members of an organisation which is not proscribed.

At Second Reading of the Bill, I, as did a number of other speakers, touched on the difficulties concerning overseas terrorist organisations which conduct fundraising, organisational or other activities in this country. They raise the question of whether the activities of such an organisation are ones that we support to an extent which would make it inappropriate to prosecute, even if technically they come within the definition of terrorism. I do not believe, for example, that in this country we would have wished to prosecute someone who raised funds in the 1980s for the African National Congress, even though some of the activities carried on by the ANC during the course of its armed struggle undoubtedly came within any reasonable definition of terrorism. Therefore, a decision would have to be taken as to whether the ANC was an organisation whose members we should prosecute if they conducted fund raising or training in this country.

The Director of Public Prosecutions is a civil servant. He or she is and should be non-political. However, the decision to prosecute for involvement in overseas terrorism requires to be taken by someone who certainly has political experience and good political antennae. Of course, the decision must not be taken as a political decision. If that happened it could lead to disaster, as, indeed, happened with the decision of Sir Patrick Hastings, the Attorney-General in the first Labour government in the Campbell case in 1924.

However, we believe that the decision must be taken by someone who has a political background and, above all, by someone who sits in one or other House of Parliament and who can be called upon to explain himself in that House. I do not intend in any way to be disrespectful to Mr David Calvert-Smith, the present DPP, but I certainly believe that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Williams of Mostyn, would be admirably placed to undertake the difficult task of deciding whether or not prosecution should be authorised in these borderline cases.

The Conservative amendments propose to require all prosecutions under the Bill to have the consent of the Attorney-General. We do not object to that in principle but it seems to us that the decision in cases of domestic terrorism is likely to depend much more on nuts and bolts issues, such as whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution. Our own feeling is that those decisions can properly be taken by the DPP and thus save the time of the Attorney-General. However, I express the hope that the Government will be willing to accept the principle behind either our amendment or that of the Conservatives, which we would support in default of our own. I beg to move.

As the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, has just pointed out, we also have two amendments in this group, Amendments Nos. 174 and 175, which go slightly further than the Liberal Democrat Amendments Nos. 173 and 176, also being debated. First, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said with regard to his amendments concerning overseas terrorism and making the case that proceedings should not be instituted without the consent of the Attorney-General where they concern terrorism wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom.

There is also a case for saying that, given the political nature of all terrorist offences, the Attorney-General is the right person to sanction prosecution for all these offences, whether or not they are concerned with foreign terrorism. That is obviously the effect of our amendments. However, apart from that, there is a potential difficulty in trying to distinguish between terrorism which is wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom and terrorism which is not.

Much of the terrorism about which we have been speaking this afternoon, though by no means all, is in connection with Ireland. There is reason to suppose that a good deal of the capacity of PIRA and other related organisations exists outside the United Kingdom; that is, substantially in the Republic of Ireland and, to a small extent, further afield. Is PIRA terrorism, therefore, wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom? When PIRA was active, the bombs it let off and the incidents it perpetrated were within the United Kingdom. The same can be said now of the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA. But there are other organisations at the Protestant end of the scale, the loyalist end, which have carried out attacks in the Republic of Ireland. I do not think they would claim to have carried out more offences in the Republic of Ireland than in Northern Ireland; nor would anyone point to that fact. Certainly, they are not doing so at present.

However, I mention that to draw attention to the potential difficulty of trying to distinguish in this way between terrorism wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom and other terrorism; that is to say, within the United Kingdom. That is one reason for marginally preferring our Amendments Nos. 174 and 175 to those moved by the noble Lord on behalf of the Liberal Democrats. I believe the point is worth the consideration of the Committee.

I do not want Members of the Committee on the Benches opposite to get too excited, but my speaking note starts, "Resist-but".

It is common ground between us that there should be a consent provision in relation to the main offences in the Terrorism Bill. Clause 117 of the Bill provides for that. The issue is whether these offences in some or all circumstances should be subject to Attorney-General rather than Director of Public Prosecution consent.

Amendments Nos. 173 and 176 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, propose that where offences relate to terrorism wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom there should be Attorney-General consent for a prosecution to go ahead. At Second Reading the noble Lord indicated that he supported such an approach because of the difficult and sensitive issues which can arise in connection with such cases. Perhaps I may say that he developed that argument very well this afternoon, with his usual talent. He said that political antennae were required. I believe that that is, indeed, the case.

The noble Lord also stressed the importance of the involvement of someone directly accountable to Parliament in issues which can touch on international relations and related matters. That is a wise observation.

I am sure that the Committee will recall that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, indicated on the first day of Committee that we have sympathy with those arguments. We recognise the particular sensitivities that may apply in international cases. However, we are not entirely persuaded that Amendments Nos. 173 and 176 quite do the trick. On a technical point, they do not cover Northern Ireland. We take the view that any change to the current consent provisions should also apply there.

More substantively, we should like to look carefully at the formula proposed for defining an international case. That may have some bearing on the comments made by the noble Lord. Lord Cope. It is important that the right ground is covered, and as clearly as possible. We need to reflect further on whether the phrase,

"terrorism wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom",

fully meets those tests. For instance, we are not sure that it is entirely clear whether the formula applies to acts that take place wholly or mainly outside the United Kingdom or to acts undertaken in the United Kingdom or elsewhere to advance a cause wholly or mainly connected with a place other than the United Kingdom, or both. This is far from straightforward territory. I am sure that the noble Lord will appreciate that we want to consider further whether the approach adopted in the amendments is the best one in all the circumstances.

As we have indicated, we have sympathy with the concern underlying the amendments, although we cannot accept them in their current form. We should like to take them away for further consideration with a view to tabling further amendments of our own at Report stage.

I turn to Amendments Nos. 174 and 175 tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope. These amendments go further—although the principle is the same in terms of the major offences under the Bill—in arguing that they should be subject to Attorney-General rather than DPP consent.

We believe that the amendments perhaps go a step too far. We have indicated that we have sympathy with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Cope. We accept the case for requiring the involvement of the Attorney-General in international cases because of the sensitivities which have been alluded to in the debate. However, we do not think that it is necessary to require his personal consent for prosecutions under the Bill which do not have an international dimension. That is not to say that we do not recognise the many delicate issues which may be involved in deciding public interest in such cases. However, the DPP is well used to making such decisions in complex and sensitive areas. It is always open to him to consult the Attorney-General on particularly difficult and sensitive cases. Indeed, the Attorney-General is informed as a matter of course of all serious cases. The Director of Public Prosecutions can and does raise individual cases of concern in their regular discussions.

It is important that Attorney-General consent to prosecution is reserved for the most sensitive and serious cases of all and that the numbers of categories of cases he has to consider personally are kept to a manageable number so that he can give them the sufficient detail of attention they require. I think the House will agree that a line has to be drawn somewhere.

We have indicated that we intend to table amendments at Report stage to provide for Attorney-General consent in international cases, but we are not persuaded that the case has been made also to require his personal involvement in cases without that international dimension.

The fact that some cases under the PTA are currently subject to DPP consent—primarily Sections 16A and B concerning the possession of articles or information for terrorist purposes—indicates that the DPP will not be taking on an area of work with which he is entirely unfamiliar.

In the light of our undertaking to table the amendments I have described at Report stage, I trust that noble Lords will not seek to press their amendments.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for what is certainly a more than moderately encouraging reply. I am grateful that he has accepted the principle behind our amendments. I have enough knowledge of the problems of parliamentary drafting to recognise that opposition amendments are rarely perfect. I am sure that ours could be improved upon. I shall look forward with interest to seeing what is proposed at Report stage. I therefore beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 176A:

After Clause 117, insert the following new clause—

moved Amendment No. 178:

Page 55, line 7, at end insert ("any of").

The noble Lord said: Before addressing the amendments in this group in detail, it may be helpful for me briefly to explain Clause 122.

The clause lists the Bill's order-making powers and provides that they should be made by statutory instrument and may contain savings and transitional provisions. Importantly, it also says which orders are subject to affirmative or negative resolution. An urgency procedure is provided by subsections (4) and (5).

During the Report stage of this Bill in another place, my right honourable friend Mr Adam Ingram advised that, although the Government felt that the delegated powers in the Bill were subject to the appropriate scrutiny, the powers would of course be looked at carefully by the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Deregulation of this House.

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but it seemed to me that he may be talking about the subsequent amendment. Is he talking about Amendment No. 178 and thus Clause 118?

Perhaps I should have indicated that I am talking to Amendment No. 178 and working through the other amendments which are similarly grouped. I thought I made it clear that I was addressing the grouping.

If the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee felt that any of the procedures were inappropriate, we would have regard to its recommendations.

Amendment No. 178 is a minor and technical drafting amendment. It gives more flexibility in the making of regulations under Clause 118. Amendments Nos. 178, 190, 191 and 208 are also minor and are technical drafting corrections.

Amendment No. 180 corrects an error which was spotted by the DPSC at paragraph 42 of its report. Amendment No. 181, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cope, addresses the same point, but I trust that he will agree to withdraw his version.

The more substantive amendments in this group concern whether certain order-making powers in the Bill should be subject to the negative or affirmative procedure. Paragraph 17(4) of Schedule 7 requires the kind of passenger information which carriers may be required to provide to be specified by order by the Secretary of State. Paragraph 21 of Schedule 8 requires provision to be made, by order, for Scotland, allowing a solicitor to be present at interviews, subject to any conditions set out in the order.

Those two powers are currently subject to the negative procedure. The DPSC recommended, at paragraphs 39 and 41 of its report, that they should be subject to the affirmative procedure on the first occasion that they are made. We considered the committee report carefully and decided to accept those recommendations. Amendments Nos. 179 and 185 put that decision into effect.

Amendments Nos. 183 to 188, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cope, would make those two powers subject to the affirmative procedure on every occasion when they are used. We are not persuaded of the need to go that far; we do not believe that is necessary. So having started from a proposal that the powers should be subject to negative resolution, and having considered the concerns outlined in the DPSC report, we believe that the "first-time only" affirmative procedure strikes the right balance. I beg to move.

We are pleased that the Government accepted the requirement that a first-time order should be subject to affirmative resolution. We regard that opinion by the committee to be important and constructive and are pleased that the Government are accepting it.

As a member of the committee, I join with the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, in saying that we are happy that the Government accepted the recommendation.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 118, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 119 to 121 agreed to.

The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has already spoken to Amendment No. 179. But I should remind the Committee that, if it is accepted, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 183, 184, 187 and 188 as they will have been pre-empted.

moved Amendment No. 179:

Page 57, line 30, at beginning insert ("Subject to subsection (2A),").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No 180:

Page 57, line 40, leave out ("118(2)") and insert ("118(1) or (2)").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 182:

Page 57, line 41, after ("52(1)") insert ("(a) or (b)").

The noble Lord said: With the leave of the Committee. I shall move Amendment No. 182 on behalf of my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton. This is a drafting amendment, but I am happy to explain it more fully than usual as it has been requested, properly, that it be dealt with on its own.

Paragraphs 45 to 52 deal with insolvency in relation to forfeiture and restraint orders—this relates to Schedule 4 of the Bill—and cover the whole of the United Kingdom. Paragraph 51 provides protection for insolvency practitioners who seize or dispose of property subject to a restraint or forfeiture order. The key provision is paragraph 51(2), which says that, provided the conditions in 51(1) are fulfilled,

"The insolvency practitioner shall not be liable to any person in respect of any loss or damage resulting from the seizure or disposal except in so far as the loss or damage is caused by his negligence".

However, paragraph 51 only works for insolvency practitioners in the United Kingdom. But it is also possible that property may be seized or disposed of by an insolvency practitioner based outside the United Kingdom.

Paragraph 52, which replicates paragraph 34 of Schedule 4 to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, therefore provides that:

"An order may be made … to secure that an Islands or external insolvency practitioner has the same rights [in relation to property in the UK] … as he would have if he were an insolvency practitioner in that part of the United Kingdom".

The procedure for making the order under paragraph 52 depends on which part of the UK the property is situated in—and this is where we come to the amendment.

Under paragraph 52(2), if the property is in Great Britain, the order is made by the Secretary of State. Such orders are to be subject to the negative resolution procedure by virtue of Clause 122. But if the property is in Northern Ireland, the order is made by the Department of Economic Development in Northern Ireland. The procedure for an order of this kind is set out in paragraph 52(3). It is to be subject to negative resolution within the meaning of Section 41(6) of the Interpretation (Northern Ireland) Act 1954. That replicates the provision in subparagraph (7) of paragraph 34 of Schedule 4 to the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, which was added to the 1989 Act by the Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989.

Because the procedure for orders under paragraph 52(1)(c) is set out in paragraph 52(3), it follows that the procedure in Clause 122 should not apply here; that is, in Clause 122. But the present wording of Clause 122(2)(letter "i") suggests that all of paragraph 52(1) is included. That overlap could cause uncertainty. That is why we have tabled the amendment. It clarifies that for orders under paragraph 52(1)(c), the procedure to be followed is that in paragraph 52(3) of Schedule 4, not Clause 122. I hope that that is sufficiently clear to explain to the Committee why the Government are moving this particular amendment.

I thought that was a very clear explanation of this highly complex matter. My only quibble is that I think it is actually (i) rather than (1).

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 185:

Page 57, line 44, at end insert—

("(2A) In the cases of—

(a) the first order to be made under paragraph 17(4) of Schedule 7, and

(b) the first order to be made under paragraph 21 of Schedule 8,

the order shall not be made unless a draft has been laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament (and subsection (2)(j) or (1) shall not apply).").

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 189:

Page 58, line 19, after ("opinion") insert ("and his reasons for holding that opinion").

The noble Viscount said: This subsection allows the Secretary of State to override Parliament in matters of urgency. The amendment seeks to require him to give the reasons for his opinion when making such an order. I beg to move.

The amendments in my name, Amendment Nos. 189A and 189B, are grouped with this amendment. The clause as it stands requires the Secretary of State to get an affirmative resolution from each House of Parliament in order to proscribe an organisation. However, as we discussed at an earlier stage at Clause 122(4), the Secretary of State has the power, if he is of the opinion that it is a matter of urgency, to proscribe an organisation without the approval of Parliament, and that proscription remains in force for a period of 40 days after which, if it has not then received the approval of both Houses of Parliament, it lapses.

I objected to this on the first day of Committee and I gave the example that the Secretary of State could proscribe an organisation one morning at 10 o'clock and that a person going out and collecting subscriptions on behalf of the organisation at 10.05 would be committing an offence which might land him in prison, even though he had no knowledge that the order had been made. This is fundamentally unjust. Proscription is such a serious measure that it should always be sanctioned by Parliament and we should not extend that power to the Secretary of State the power an organisation at five minutes' notice and without the knowledge of the members of that organisation.

When we were discussing this previously, I do not believe that the Minister gave the Committee much of an indication of how or in what circumstances the urgency power would be used. As far as I am aware, that power that has not been used in Northern Ireland. Perhaps the Minister will explain what circumstances the Government envisage might occur in the Province which justify the use by the Secretary of State of such an extreme power. What is the justification for extending it to the whole of the United Kingdom? Terrorism has flourished in Northern Ireland in the past. There may have been new organisations of an extremely dangerous character springing up which may theoretically have justified the Secretary of State acting urgently in order to prevent those activities from continuing over the next 40 days until an order was made by Parliament. But can we imagine that such a development would occur on the mainland of the United Kingdom? Is it not always within the power of Parliament, if it sees that the circumstances justify it, to make emergency legislation extending the powers that have already been granted to the Secretary of State and to say that it is not enough to have an affirmative resolution and that we must give Ministers this power of urgency which did not exist before?

In the Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act which came before your Lordships in the summer of 1998, we went through every stage of the Bill in a single day. So, it is not that Ministers cannot take powers if they really need them to deal with terrorist threats as a matter of extreme urgency. If there is no proper justification for the power, it should not be included in the Bill. I hope that the noble Lord who is to reply will either give us a thorough explanation or say that this will be reconsidered on Report.

Perhaps I may raise another point which arises from these amendments in my noble friend's name. It seems to me that there is a problem as regards what happens if an order is made under the urgency procedure relating to the proscription on an organisation and that order is not then approved within the 40-day period. Clause 122(5)(b) states:

"an order's ceasing to have effect shall be without prejudice to anything previously done".

I understand why there is that provision. Obviously you do not want people who have taken actions on behalf of the Government in reliance on that order to be subject to prosecution for what was done under an order that had legal authority at the time. But it seems to me that there is a particular problem if anybody has been convicted. I think it unlikely, in practical terms, that anybody would be convicted within 40 days, but it is possible. In those circumstances, if Parliament has not seen fit to endorse the order by an affirmative resolution, it would be inappropriate for somebody who has been convicted under that order to have that conviction standing on the record. While this seems to me to be a pretty improbable circumstance, should not there be a provision in the Bill to ensure that, in such circumstances, that conviction does not stand?

Clause 122(4) provides for an urgency procedure for most of the affirmative powers in the Bill. Amendment No. 189 in the name of the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, would add to this procedure a requirement that an order made in this way should include a declaration of the Secretary of State's reasons for his opinion that the urgency procedure is necessary. Although we recognise that Parliament has a legitimate interest in seeing that such procedures are not misused, we cannot accept the need for, or the value of, this particular amendment.

As the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee said in its report on the Bill:

"The use of emergency or urgency procedures is a well-trawled concept, and Parliament only agrees to these where they are considered strictly necessary. The appropriateness of the use of such powers is no doubt one which the future Human Rights Committee will keep under review".

That is right but it is a much broader issue than we can properly address in the context of this Bill. The noble Viscount's proposal should be considered in that broader context. Meanwhile, of course, I give an assurance that no Secretary of State under the present Government will use the procedure without proper reasons and obviously the same would be true of any other likely government.

I turn to Amendments Nos. 189A and 189B in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury. We are grateful to him for raising the issue of what happens if an organisation is proscribed by an order made under the urgency procedure and Parliament subsequently withholds its consent for the order.

We do not believe that an amendment along these lines is necessary. We can see that the noble Lord's amendments are intended as a safeguard against abuse of the urgency procedure. We believe that we have already provided an important safeguard in the appeals process set out in Part II. Our view currently is that an organisation which believes that it should not be proscribed should rely on that process rather than seeking to use Parliament as a kind of appeal court.

We accept that not for the first time the noble Lords, Lord Avebury and Lord Goodhart, have raised an important and interesting point.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. We are not suggesting that the organisation will use Parliament. That is a most unlikely scenario. We are suggesting that, for whatever reason, Parliament declines to pass a resolution to approve the order. The result of that is that the appeals process never comes into existence so that somebody who has been convicted cannot rely on that process of deproscription and the right to appeal following a deproscription order. There is nothing left to be done. It seems to me that that is a small but not unimportant lacuna in the Bill.

I have said that noble Lords on the Liberal Democrat Benches have raised an important and interesting point. No doubt we shall consider again on Report the whole area of proscription. Therefore I give an undertaking that we shall think further on this matter before then. I believe that that is really what the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, wanted from me today. We shall come back either with an amendment or with a fuller reassurance as to why such an amendment is not needed.

I was asked whether the urgency procedure has ever been used in Northern Ireland. The answer is that it has. If a new organisation made itself known by means of a terrorist outrage, the public would obviously expect any government to act immediately. The noble Lord used the phrase "proscription at five minutes' notice". That may have been a form of words but it is a misapprehension on his part. "Urgency" is not five minutes' notice. It is well established and already used for the whole of the United Kingdom.

As the Committee will probably be aware, those orders are made to come into force on the following day. That is a detail only but perhaps it is worth putting it on the record.

The question was raised as to whether a prosecution could reach that point within the 40 days. I am not quite sure whether it is 40 days full stop or 40 sitting days. Clearly, the Summer Recess is relevant to that. There may be times when it is difficult for the Government to act if Parliament is not sitting and not likely to be sitting for some weeks, as occurs during the Summer Recess. It may be necessary to use the power in those circumstances.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for that. I can tell him that it is 40 sitting days.

In which case, it is more likely that a prosecution may proceed far enough for the amendment to be relevant.

I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances. In view of the undertaking that we can look again at this matter on Report, I certainly shall not press my amendment.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for his response to Amendment No. 189 which I shall read with care in Hansard. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendments Nos. 190 and 191:

Page 58, line 36, leave out paragraph (b).

Page 58, line 38, at end insert—

("( ) Subsections (1)(a) and (3)(d) do not apply to an order made under regulations made under section 96.").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 122, as amended, agreed to.

Clauses 123 and 124 agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 192 to 202:

Page 140, line 2, at end insert—

("Criminal Justice Act 1967 (c.80)

.—(1) The Criminal Justice Act 1967 shall be amended as follows.

(2) In section 67(7)(b) (computation of sentences) 1 or "section 14 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989" substitute "section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000".").

Page 140, line 30, leave out ("paragraphs 1(1), 2 and 5 of Schedule 8 to") and insert ("any provision of").

Page 140, line 45, leave out sub-paragraph (7) and insert—

("(7) For section 61(9)(b) (fingerprinting: disapplication) substitute—

"(b) applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions." ").

Page 141, line 3, leave out sub-paragraph (8) and insert—

("(8) For section 62(12) (intimate samples: disapplication) substitute—

"(12) Nothing in this section applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions; and subsection (1A) shall not apply where the non-intimate samples mentioned in that subsection were taken under paragraph 9A of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000." ").

Page 141, line 7, leave out sub-paragraph (9) and insert—

("(9) For section 63(10) (non-intimate samples: disapplication) substitute—

"(10) Nothing in this section applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions." ").

Page 141, line 22, leave out sub-paragraph (12) and insert—

("(12) For section 118(2)(a) (definition of police detention) substitute—

"(a) he has been taken to a police station after being arrested for an offence or after being arrested under section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000, or".").

Page 141, line 33, after ("74(2)(d)") insert ("and (e)").

Page 141, line 35, at end insert ("or

(e) an order under section 111 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (forfeiture orders),".").

Page 142, line 23, leave out from ("substitute") to ("to") and insert (""sections 37 and 38 of, and Schedules 5 and 6").

Page 142, line 28, leave out ("paragraphs 1(1), 2 and 5 of Schedule 8 to") and insert ("any provision of").

Page 142, line 37, leave out from (""(b)") to ("applies") in line 38.

Page 142, leave out lines 41 to 43 and insert—

(""(12) Nothing in this Article applies to a person arrested or detained under the terrorism provisions; and paragraph (1A) shall not apply where the non-intimate samples mentioned in that paragraph were taken under paragraph 9A of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Act 2000."").

Page 142, line 45, leave out from ("Article") to ("applies") in line 46.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 202A to 205:

Page 143, line 18, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

("(b) for paragraph (f) there shall be substituted—

"(f) section 111 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (forfeiture orders)." ").

Page 144, line 34, at end insert—

("Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (c.35)

.—(1) The Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 shall be amended as follows.

(2) In section 5 (fixed term prisoners: special cases)—

(a) in subsection (2) for "section 16(2) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996" substitute "section 80(2) of the Terrorism Act 2000",

(b) in subsection (3)(a) for "section 16(2) of the 1996 Act" substitute "section 80(2) of the 2000 Act",

(c) in subsection (4) for "section 16(2) of the 1996 Act" substitute "section 80(2) of the 2000 Act", and

(d) at the end of subsection (4)(b) insert ", and

(c) section 16(2) of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996."

(3) For section 14(3)(a) (inadmissibility of evidence or information in certain proceedings) substitute—

"(a) be admissible in proceedings on applications made under paragraph 1, 2, 5. 11, 13, 22, 28 or 30 of Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000.".

.—(1) This paragraph applies to a reference in section 14(2) of the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 (inadmissibility of evidence or information in certain proceedings) to an offence under a provision ("the old provision") of—

(a) the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, or

(b) the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996.

(2) The reference shall be taken as including a reference to an offence under this Act which is committed in circumstances which would have amounted to the commission of an offence under the old provision before it ceased to have effect.").

Page 144, line 43, leave out ("(g)") and insert ("(h)").

Page 145, line 1, leave out ("(h)") and insert ("(i)").

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 15, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 205A and 205B:

Page 145, line 46, column 1 leave out ("Paragraph 2") and insert ("Part I").

Page 145, line 46, column 3, at end insert—

("Part I of Schedule 2.")

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Schedule 16, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 205C:

Page 59, line 4, after ("report") insert ("prepared by a professional legal adviser who is independent of the Government").

The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 206 and 207. Clause 125 provides for a report to be prepared on the workings of the Bill, or the Act as it will become. That is in line with what has happened in recent years in relation to the emergency legislation which is being replaced by the provisions of this Bill.

To a certain extent the amendments are probing but they are intended to get on the record a little more detail about what the Government have in mind as regards that report. There are three points listed in the various amendments.

First, it is important that we continue to have the benefit of an independent report on the working of this legislation. We all know that, as has been said this afternoon, we are passing draconian provisions to apply in circumstances when we all accept that draconian provisions are necessary. Nevertheless, it is right that we should ponder them from two points of view: first, to make sure that draconian provisions are still required and that the necessity for them still exists. There is no doubt about that in my mind at the moment but, nevertheless, that should he reviewed and in detail. But, secondly—and more importantly—we must make sure that they are working properly so that we do our best to defeat terrorism, while also ensuring that proper regard is being paid to human rights and everything that we, as a civilised country, hope to keep in mind in applying draconian legislation.

Such reports have been prepared for the past few years by Mr John Rowe QC, to whom we paid tribute earlier. Indeed, his work was much quoted in some of our previous debates. Formerly the reports were produced by other distinguished lawyers, notably by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross, for quite a few years. It is important that such reports should continue to be prepared by a "professional legal adviser" who is independent of the Government and is of similar standing to those distinguished gentlemen.

Secondly, Amendment No. 206 provides that the reports should cover not just the legislation itself, as specified in the Bill, but all the orders and regulations that are made under it. It has been absolutely apparent throughout our discussions that a great deal of the important detail of these provisions lies in orders and regulations made under the Act. Therefore, it is the way that the orders and regulations are being applied which is important, as well as the Act in general.

My third point is made in a slightly sideways sense in Amendment No. 207. This amendment would ensure that, as at present, such reports should be debated in "each House of Parliament". That is currently achieved by way of the relevant legislation expiring unless it is debated, which is an extremely fierce form of guillotine to ensure a parliamentary debate. We do not propose such a process, but we suggest that there should at least be a trip-wire in the provision to ensure that the Government do lay the reports before Parliament and gain its approval for the way in which the draconian legislation is applied. I beg to move.

It gives me great pleasure to support both the amendment and the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley. In a previous incarnation I had the privilege of appearing before many of these distinguished persons. Although their conclusions were sometimes a little inconvenient to some of us—and even more inconvenient for some governments—their reports instilled confidence in the community in general. They disarmed critics of the legislation from abroad—usually people with very little real knowledge of the situation with which we were dealing. We have benefited greatly from the views and services of those distinguished persons. I warmly support the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Cope, for his explanation of the amendments and especially for drawing attention to their probing nature. This is both a necessary and an important discussion.

It has long been the case that annual reporting on the operation of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act has greatly assisted both this and another place in our respective consideration of the annual renewals. The Government accepted at an early stage of the Bill that an annual report to both Houses of Parliament would be welcomed, and brought forward an amendment to that effect which now appears in Clause 125.

I shall work through each amendment in turn, and begin with Amendment No. 205C. It is our intention here that the report will continue to be prepared by someone entirely independent of government; in other words, someone with an independent mind and an independent view. I am happy to place that on record. With that clear commitment, I see no need for the matter to be placed on the face of the Bill.

However, I should not be so happy to accept the other proposition in Amendment No. 205C; namely, that the reviewer must have a legal qualification. I see no reason for the proposition, although a legal background could undoubtedly be beneficial. I yield to no one in my admiration for the legal profession—I dare not, I live with a lawyer. But, having said that, such an absolute requirement might rule out other individuals equally suited to the post who may bring to bear different but equally valuable experience—experience, indeed, which in a sense guarantees their independence. To use a well-worn phrase, we want to find the right person for the job.

Amendment No. 206 would require all orders and regulations made under the Act to be covered by the annual report. I see the aim behind the amendment, but I do not believe that such a provision is entirely necessary. After all, the report is intended to cover the operation of the Act. In our view, this will catch the operation of powers exercisable under secondary legislation. The term "working of this Act" is deliberately wide to enable the report to cover the operation of the powers to whatever extent the reviewer wishes. For example, in his annual reports on the counter-terrorist legislation that is currently in force, Mr John Rowe QC goes to the trouble of looking at letters of complaint to central government on the operation of the Acts.

I ask the noble Lord to bear in mind a further point. In Northern Ireland, the holding centres are subject to a separate review mechanism; and, under this Bill, there is a mechanism for the independent review of the military complaints procedures. So it would not be necessary for these matters to be covered in the annual report, though the reviewer could, as I explained, look at them if he or she wished to do so. I believe that it is far better for us to leave it to the discretion of the independent reviewer to decide what specific ground should apply. As drafted, Clause 125 gives him or her the latitude to cover the noble Lord's point.

I turn finally to Amendment No. 207, which would require an annual debate on the report, with a move to quarterly reporting if Parliament does not approve the most recent report. Clause 125 will ensure that the Secretary of State should lay a report before "both Houses of Parliament" about the working of the Act as a whole. But we believe that the question of whether to hold a debate on that report should be left to the proper procedures of this and, indeed, another place, where this clause was added to the Bill.

Many reports are laid before Parliament each year and, clearly, it would not be possible for them all to be debated. It is for this Chamber and another place to decide which reports should be the subject of a specific debate. We do not want to bind Parliament or fetter its discretion, as this amendment would do, to have to debate this report every year; or, as the amendment suggests, more frequently if there were concerns about the content of the report. In the final analysis, we believe that the decision would be best taken year on year in respect of each report, through the usual procedures of the House. With that explanation, I trust that the noble Lord will not press his amendment.

There was a crumb or two in the Minister's response. First, so far as concerns Amendment No. 205C, we now know that the report will be prepared by an independent adviser. However, the Minister also said that it would not necessarily be prepared by a lawyer. At that point, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor came into the Chamber. I was not quite sure whether he had done so in order to intervene on behalf of his profession, but perhaps his entry relates to later business.

I must admit that I was surprised by what the Minister said in that respect. It seems to me that it is essentially a legal job to report on this legislation. I cannot recollect off the top of my head all those who previously prepared reports, but I believe that I am right in saying that all of them have been distinguished lawyers—

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I shall be brief. My only connection with the legal profession was when I served for many years as a justice of the peace, but I was then "holding the ring", so to speak, and not necessarily on anyone's side.

I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, made a valid point earlier. We need to reassure the public. The public perception is that a person who is learned in the law, for example, can be trusted to act impartially and to give an impartial view.

I agree with those comments. It is important that a distinguished lawyer should prepare the report. Perhaps the Minister can tell me whether under the previous legislation the report was prepared by someone who was not a leading lawyer. However, as far as I can recall, a leading lawyer has always prepared it.

I received more than a crumb, as it were, on Amendment No. 206 as the Minister assured me that all orders and regulations were covered by the provision. As regards Amendment No. 207, I received, if more than a crumb, only half a loaf. The Minister said that it was for Parliament to decide whether to discuss the report. Strictly speaking, that is correct. However, I hoped that the Minister would say that it was the Government's intention to suggest that both Houses of Parliament should discuss the report. We all know that the Government have a great deal of influence over what is discussed in both Houses of Parliament. The Government have extensive, although not complete, control over the time allocated to business in both Houses of Parliament. I thought that I would be given an undertaking that it was the Government's intention that the report should be discussed in both Houses of Parliament. I certainly think that it should be.

However, I shall not press the matter at this stage. We shall consider it further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendments Nos. 207A and 208:

Page 59, line 10, leave out ("section 2(2)") and insert ("sections 2(2) and (Defences)").

Page 59, line 13, leave out subsection (2).

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 207A and 208 en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 127, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 209:

Page 59, line 15, leave out subsections (1) and (2) and insert—

("( ) Where, immediately before the coming into force of section 2(1)(a), a person is being detained by virtue of a provision of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989—

(a) the provisions of that Act shall continue to apply to him, in place of the corresponding provisions of this Act, until his detention comes to an end, and

(b) nothing in paragraph 4 or 7 of Schedule 15 shall have effect in relation to him during his detention.").

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 209, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 210 and 211. These are technical amendments to do with the transitional provisions in the Bill.

As the Committee knows, the Bill replaces the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1989, (the PTA). Subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 128 deal with what happens to people who are being detained under the PTA at the moment when the Bill takes over.

The effect of the Bill as currently drafted is that, if someone is arrested under the arrest power in Section 14 of the PTA, the police will have to apply the Bill regime to their detention as soon as the Bill comes into force. But if someone is arrested under the ports powers in Schedule 5 to the PTA, the PTA regime continues for them up to the end of their detention. We believe that this position is anomalous in that it could lead to different regimes applying to people who were detained at the same time. We are also concerned that the idea of switching to the "Bill" detention regime half-way through someone's detention, as contemplated by Clause 128(1), could be difficult in practice.

We have therefore decided that it will be simpler and just as effective to allow for the PTA detention regimes to continue to the end of the detention period for anyone arrested under the PTA, whether under the arrest power or the ports powers. This is achieved by Amendment No. 209. I remind the Committee that the maximum period any detention could last under this transitional regime is one minute short of seven days.

I should stress that this is very much a belt and braces provision for use in the circumstances where someone is being detained when the Bill comes into effect. We do not envisage that it will be used much—and, of course, it has an extremely limited shelf life.

Amendment No. 210 is a general transitional proposition. It is immediately intended to deal with any problems which might arise in Schedule 15 where the Bill substitutes references to detention under provisions of the Bill for references to detention under provisions of the PTA, but where the policy intention is that references to the former should include references to the latter.

Amendment No. 211 clarifies transitional arrangements for the specific case of Section 14 of the EPA. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 210 and 211:

Page 59, line 32, at end insert—

("( ) A reference in this Act or any other enactment or instrument to a provision of this Act shall (so far as the context permits) he taken to include a reference to a corresponding provision repealed by this Act.").

Page 59, line 32, at end insert—

("( ) The repeal by virtue of this Act of section 14 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1996 (young persons convicted of scheduled offences) shall not affect its operation in relation to offences committed while it was in force.").

The noble Lord said: I beg to move Amendments Nos. 210 and 211 en bloc.

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 128, as amended, agreed to.

Remaining clauses agreed to.

House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

rose to ask Her Majesty's Government what is the legal aid expenditure to date, and what is the projected funding, for the multi-party actions by Gulf War veterans and sheep farmers.

The noble Countess said: My Lords, I declare an interest in that I am patron of the Gulf Veterans' Association. In addition, although I believe that I suffer the chronic effects of repeated low-level exposures to organophosphate sheep dip, I do not, and never have had, any personal interest in the ongoing litigation. Like those who have spoken to me about their concerns, I am having some difficulty in understanding what is going on. I am unhappily aware that "there is something rotten in the State of Denmark". I hope that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will be tolerant with me and that he will be able to clarify matters.

It is with reluctance that I raise this matter in your Lordships' House tonight. I have large numbers of letters from farmers and Gulf veterans in which the writers state that they ask only for recognition and treatment for their illnesses and that future cases are prevented. It is the culture of denial that has forced them to turn to the law.

I voice the severe reservations held by members of the Gulf veterans, the sheep farming communities and others involved with these cases, about the manner in which the group actions are being managed. There are huge amounts of taxpayers' money involved in legal aid spending. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will agree that the legal aid moneys should be spent wisely.

I accept that this type of action is expensive. Both these actions are breaking new ground and we are dealing with the cutting edge of scientific knowledge. I understand that the Gulf veterans' case is the first multi-party action to be brought against the Crown since the repeal of Section 10 or the Crown Proceedings Act of 1947. Some of the claimants are entitled to a full legal aid certificate; others will be required to make some contribution towards their costs; and yet others will be privately funded. Claimants who are required to make monthly payments are expressing very real concerns. They have already paid sums amounting to several thousand pounds. There is no clear time span. Rumour has it that their cases may continue for as long as 20 years, although I hope that that is not the case.

Recent events, which I shall explain, have caused them to have second thoughts about continuing with their action. They now find that they are unable to get off the financial treadmill because they will still be responsible for their share of the generic costs—an unknown sum. None of these claimants could be described as wealthy. Most are men and women with young families. They are struggling to work in order to maintain a roof over their heads despite chronic ill health. They can ill afford this additional monthly burden. Not surprisingly, they are worried.

These group actions have an interesting and extraordinarily complex history. As far as I am able to ascertain, the first sheep clip case was started in 1981. Since then, at least 60 firms of solicitors, from small provincial firms through to large, City firms, have been involved with a growing number of claimants. I know of several sheep dip cases that have fallen by the wayside after large amounts of legal aid moneys have been expended, leaving claimants confused and dissatisfied with the system.

The Gulf veterans had begun their actions by late 1994. By mid-1995 the Legal Aid Board had apparently granted a generic legal aid certificate to Donn & Company, a Manchester firm, for the Gulf cases. The Legal Aid Board then asked for tenders for the generic work from firms with certificates prior to March 1995. After an hiatus, the generic certificate was awarded jointly to Dawbarns of Kings Lynn and Wolferstans of Plymouth in January 1995. Those firms were tasked with carrying out research and co-ordinating the legal process. Late in 1996, it was decided that the sheep dip and the Gulf veterans' cases would be run in tandem because of the organophosphate links. At some later stage the decision was taken to split the Gulf cases involving post-traumatic stress disorder from the remaining Gulf issues, and the PTSD generic certificate was transferred to another Manchester firm, Linder-Myers. I shall disregard the PTSD cases.

In April 1998, the Norfolk legal team working on the sheep dip and Gulf cases moved to a London firm—Hodge, Jones & Allen. The generic certificates were transferred with them. By this time, a pilot study to support scientifically and medically the claimed link between the various factors that may have caused ill health in both the sheep farmers and Gulf Veterans had been set up. There had been some inevitable delays in setting up the study—for example, funding, coordinating a group of high-powered medical and scientific specialists, and the unforeseen death of one of those specialists. Then, in March 1999, the decision was taken to concentrate all the sheep dip claims on the High Court, and Master Miller was appointed to oversee them.

We now come to the actions that have caused so much concern. By April 1999 there were rumours that the Norfolk team had left Hodge, Jones & Allen for another legal firm. These rumours were eventually confirmed. For several weeks none of the claimants knew whether the generic certificates were to remain with Hodge, Jones & Allen, whether Wolferstans was still involved, or what was happening to the individual cases. The Gulf Veterans' Association officers had contacted the Legal Aid Board as early as February to express their feelings of disquiet about the way their members' cases were being handled. Initially they dealt with the Cambridge office. At the end of April, they were, exceptionally, granted a meeting—which was originally to last for a quarter of an hour and eventually lasted three and a half hours—at the London headquarters of the Legal Aid Board. The National Gulf Veterans and Families Association was not advised of the changes officially until 9th July 1999, and the Gulf Veterans' Association was never formally advised. The secretary of the latter organisation wrote to Mr Mason at the Cambridge office of the Legal Aid Board on 13th July 1999, again expressing his concern and pointing out the shortcomings of the various courses being pursued by the solicitors and the fact that more than 250 veterans had complained about the way in which their cases were being handled. Nothing seems to have come of those representations.

I have a letter from one of the sheep farmers. He has told me that for some time it has been impossible to get any sense out of the lawyers. The whole issue was behind the "generic contract" wall. He says he found that he was being sent to an inappropriate medical coordinator, chosen by a lawyer without any reference to the expert group, and whose summary evidence was then thrown out by Master Miller. He goes on to say:

"It looks very much as if it was deliberately handled in a way that would maximise the lawyers' profits while minimising the chances of any case's success".

The first advice to the medical and scientific specialists of the changes within Hodge, Jones & Allen was received by one of them at the beginning of July 1999. It rapidly became clear that the new legal team did not understand what it was that the specialists were supposed to be doing. Instructions were confusing and contradictory; there was a failure to grasp simple science and a failure to understand that junior solicitors had neither the mandate nor the understanding to design medical investigations. No arrangements have been made for further essential control group studies which would give authority to the medical findings.

Of enormous concern is the fact that the medical data for the sheep dip cases were sent out to individual clients' lawyers in a corrupted form. The wrong medical results were attributed to the wrong clients. Raw medical data were sent to farmers themselves, without explanation and without medical or scientific approval. Until the Legal Aid Board was asked to intervene, solicitors took upon themselves medical decisions about whether experts could contact clients' physicians. The senior partner of Hodge, Jones & Allen threatened one of the orthopaedic experts.

The next development was that Mr Peter Bright of Wolferstans was instructed to hand over all his generic and individual sheep dip cases—some 500 cases in all—to Hodge, Jones & Allen without any satisfactory explanation.

In the middle of December 1999, Mr Augustus Ullstein, the QC who had been involved with these cases for five years or so, wrote to the senior partner, Mr Patrick Allen, asking what was happening. On 23rd December, Mr Allen informed Mr Ullstein that he was reviewing the whole team, and as he did not see eye to eye with Mr Ullstein he was dismissed from the case. His replacement, Mr Stephen Irwin, QC, was, I understand, totally unfamiliar with all that had occurred previously. Thus the entire working relationship and trust between the carefully chosen experts and counsel was destroyed at the whim of one man with no scientific understanding.

Since then there has been a lack of any consultation with clients or clients' solicitors. Everyone, from individual clients through to the experts, has been in the dark about what progress is being made. Rumour has it that the plaintiffs' evidence is to be simplified and that it is now intended that the valuable scientific evidence gathered so far will not be built upon or even used. If that is the case, I understand that the claimants will be liable for the cost of the work that has been funded by legal aid, said to be £900,000.

As I said, these two group actions are totally different from any previous actions. It is significant that, unlike other successful personal injury group actions that the lawyers cite in their curricula vitae, it would be extremely difficult to take the simplified route whereby the claimant is expected to show that on a particular day at a particular place he or she was exposed to a particular hazard that resulted in a specific harm to him or her. The sheep farmers and the Gulf veterans both recognise that it is essential that the science of causation is proven. Many of those who set out in the hope that they would see justice done are now totally disillusioned. With the passage of years they have seen no progress. What hope have they?

The involvement of government in both these actions is also significant. In the case of the sheep farmers, the Government are not one of the defendants, but the farmers were required, under successive sheep dipping orders issued between 1975 and 1992, to dip their sheep in approved chemicals that included organophosphates once or twice a year. Government were responsible for licensing the products.

I should like to ask the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor one or two questions. What has been the total legal aid bill for all these cases so far and what is the projected expenditure? Does he believe that the taxpayer is getting value for money for the legal aid payments that have been made, particularly in view of the recent corruption of the work of the expert group? If he does, what is it that is of value? If he does not, does he share the concerns of the Gulf veterans and the sheep farmers that I have raised today? Does he have any proposals for restoring the momentum of these actions and getting them firmly back on the rails? Would he agree to a meeting with representatives of all the parties concerned if there is anything that is obscure and which could be cleared up?

Finally, the noble and learned Lord should know that I received a letter dated 3rd May 2000 from Mr Patrick Allen of Hodge, Jones & Allen. I found the contents of this letter disturbing in that they contained at least one thinly veiled threat. I am happy that the noble and learned Lord should see this letter and come to his own conclusion.

My Lords, the noble Countess, Lady Mar, raises some important issues. In discussing the ongoing litigation, the first thing to establish is that all of us have at heart the interests of those who have been poisoned by organophosphates and those who are the victims of Gulf War illness.

I declare an interest both as a solicitor and as someone who formerly advised the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, an association for whose members, activities, expertise and commitment I have a high regard.

Like the noble Countess, my purpose is not to address the facts of the claims against the Ministry of Defence and the manufacturers of organophosphates but to look at the conduct of the legal actions, except in so far as they are subject to confidentiality or where they are sub judice. There are in fact some 300 to 1,000 potential claimants of Gulf War illness and some 30 to 60 potential claimants of organophosphate poisoning against a number of manufacturers. The latter cases—those dealing with organophosphate claims—are much more advanced than the Gulf War cases and it is expected that those cases will come to court perhaps within the next 18 months.

In discussing these facts and the cases it is important to note that they are funded under the legal aid regime applying before the Access to Justice Act was passed. As the noble Countess pointed out, there are not many precedents for this kind of case. There are vibration white finger cases, asbestosis cases, growth hormone CJD cases, haemophiliac cases and Opren MMR but not a large number of cases. They are the only ones that readily spring to mind as past and present examples of other group actions. These group actions are extremely complicated and require great skill in execution and a very large amount of medical and scientific investigation is required.

The Lord Chancellor and his department and the Legal Services Commission are to be congratulated on setting up a special multi-party contract unit in February of last year and a panel of some 18 or so law firms deemed qualified to act in this kind of case. In fact the number of firms on the list could, if anything, be tightened. What is clear, however, is that the multi-party action unit of the Legal Services Commission exercises very close oversight over cases such as those under discussion and as the multi-party contractual arrangements make very clear.

Proposals for research or medical investigations are looked at very carefully. If complaints about the conduct of a case are received, they are heard by representatives of the commission, formerly the Legal Aid Board, and if necessary they insist on a change in representation. That certainly has happened in these cases.

The law firm involved in the present case, Hodge Jones & Allen, is known to be highly competent as a personal injury law firm. It has worked closely with the Legal Services Commission and its predecessor, the Legal Aid Board, and is one of the few firms really well qualified to prosecute multi-party actions. Throughout the two actions in question the commission and the board have agreed on the investigations to be carried out and have granted legal aid to pay for it. Whether the commission will be able to recover those costs depends on the outcome of the action and the judge's ruling on costs at the end of the case.

I shall not attempt here a detailed rebuttal of what the noble Countess, Lady Mar, said, but I can point to a number of areas where her account of matters is partial, to say the least. With regard to the relationship between the National Gulf War Veterans and Families Association and the senior partner of Hodge Jones & Allen, the senior partner of Hodge Jones & Allen addressed by invitation the annual meeting of the National Gulf War Veterans and Families Association on 25th March this year. I cannot say that that does not demonstrate a reasonably close relationship.

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord. There are two organisations. There is the National Gulf Veterans and Families Association and the Gulf Veterans Association.

My Lords, I thank the noble Countess for that intervention. I am very well aware of that, but her case was that the relationship between both associations and the law firm in question was poor. As I understand it, the relationship between the Gulf War Veterans Association and the firm in question is cordial and, if anything, closer with the National Gulf Veterans and Families Association. So the law firm in question has attempted successfully to keep good contact with those associations. In terms of the change of representation in June of last year, that took place in June and was communicated in July. There was no way in which communications to the experts could have been carried out any faster. In terms of the supervision of the cases, the same senior partner of Hodge Jones & Allen has undertaken the supervision of those cases since April 1998. So the supposed break in ability to assess expert evidence is illusory. I suspect that some of the facts on which the noble Countess is relying derive from mischief-making by one of the experts. I am not going to name him, but I think it is fairly clear that that is where some of the mischief arises.

An impression is being given in this case that injustice is being done to the claimants and that poor management is taking place. From my investigation of these cases that does not appear to be the case. With regard to the allegation about the communications in this case, I have seen the regular newsletters that go out to the claimants in these cases. The organophosphates newsletters in particular are regular and very clear. They make it utterly clear where the case now stands. With regard to the allegation regarding the expertise of the counsel available, it is well known that the counsel who has now been chosen by the law firm in question is highly competent. I believe there is little to be gained by casting doubt on his expertise.

Finally, I turn to the question of the veiled threat in the letter from the senior partner—a very serious allegation to make—of the law firm in question. The paragraph to which I assume the noble Countess alludes states:

"I have discussed your concerns with my leading barrister. We are both very worried that a public debate about these issues will adversely affect the interests of sheep dip farmers in the litigation. Any details raised in this debate will be seized on by the defendants and used if possible to argue that legal aid should be withdrawn from the farmers".

I do not believe that is a veiled threat. The noble Countess had already tabled her Unstarred Question by that point, as I understand it, or at least had indicated her intention of doing so.

I hope that to some degree I have helped to redress the balance of the facts in this case. If the facts are in dispute then clearly the Legal Services Commission will take the necessary action under its own powers. If the Lord Chancellor indicates his wish to do so, I am quite sure that the law firm in question would be only too delighted to take the Legal Services Commission through, yet again, the facts of the case and the work that it has done on the case to date.

Strangely enough, at the end of the day my concerns lie not with the conduct of the current cases or the extent of legal aid assistance granted in these cases, or indeed its cost effectiveness, but with the prospects for the future of this kind of case. The funding code by which the Legal Services Commission operates rightly emphasises the public interest as a determining factor in whether legal aid is granted in these cases. That said, however, the eligibility levels for income by which a judgment is made whether or not to fund legal aid are lower than they were for this kind of case before April this year.

The real problem, however, is the fact that the commission seems to believe that it can set hourly rates at an impossibly low level, lower than are now received under the previous regime, and expect to attract good solicitors and barristers to work in this field in the future. I ask this question: what leading counsel of the Lord Chancellor's acquaintance is prepared to work for £80 or so an hour? The skills required in these cases are considerable. Good team management, excellent budgetary control and outstanding litigation expertise are necessary. I fear that the claimant with small means in these large multi-party cases is going to be unable to get redress against the big battalions of business and government in the future. The argument of the Lord Chancellor's Department and the commission is that if these cases are successful firms will recoup their full costs. The fact is, however, that a law firm cannot afford to lose even one case of this type. After all, on winning, a firm is able to receive only its proper costs and no more than that.

As a harbinger of this I cite the recent tobacco case. It was taken on on a speculative basis and the solicitor involved, Martin Day of Leigh Day & Co, has said that the firm cannot afford to fight this type of case any more. I think that that demonstrates that at least we should have some fears for the future.

My Lords, unlike the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I do not have sufficient intimacy with the facts of this case to pass judgment on the submissions of the noble Countess, Lady Mar. But such is the reputation of the noble Countess in your Lordships' House for probity and for fearless advocacy on behalf of those in distress, that I know the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor will be taking what she has had to say to your Lordships very seriously indeed.

Whatever the ultimate facts about the causal link between the distress in which these large numbers of people have found themselves and its alleged cause, organophosphates, there is no doubt that there are a large number of bewildered people who do not understand the legal processes into which they are, together with the public purse, pouring a great deal of money. At the end of the day, it may be that the problem turns out to be not so much one of bad advice, but rather the inability of lawyers to communicate with their clients about what they are doing on their behalf. That may prove to be a lesson for all lawyers, not only those who are Members of your Lordships' House—including myself—but those outside as well.

This type of case is extremely complex. It also has a particular characteristic in that it requires a great deal of money to be paid up front before a proper assessment can be made of the likelihood of success or failure. Although I was one of the sternest critics of the Access to Justice Bill of the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, one thing I applauded was his decision to single out for special treatment this kind of dispute.

As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, has already said, the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has set up a multi-party panel of solicitors. I believe it comprises 16—

My Lords, it comprises 18 lawyers.

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord for that correction. Moreover, a new multi-party unit has been set up within the commission. It is there to supervise the disposition of funds.

In this case, the decision has been taken to instruct a single group of lawyers to deal with the problem of causation. This group of lawyers has moved from one firm to another. In the end, it will be for the newly established commission to decide which group of lawyers in which firm will deal with which case. That is not a decision upon which I am in a position to comment. Only the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor, using the brief that he will receive from the commission, will be able to give a definitive answer to that.

I know that this matter is causing great distress to many people. The noble Countess, Lady Mar, should be warmly congratulated on her efforts in raising it on the Floor of the House. I now look forward to hearing what the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor has to say in response.

My Lords, multi-party actions are claims brought by several different parties who have been affected by a single incident, like a major transport disaster or a common cause such as an allegedly harmful chemical. It is common for the Legal Aid Board—from 1st April this year, the Legal Services Commission—to fund one test case in the first instance.

Because the defendants in these cases are typically large organisations with substantial resources available to them, there is a great deal at stake in the claims. It is therefore important that public funds are made available to help litigants to put sue such claims before the courts. The Legal Services Commission has special arrangements for handling these complex and costly cases to ensure that they are pursued as efficiently as possible.

In most, individual clients may retain their own solicitors, but the generic work, which includes all the key issues of law and fact in the case, is handled by an expert solicitor drawn by tender from the quality assured panel of legal firms which make up the multiparty action panel. To win a place on the panel, solicitors' firms must show that they have recent experience of co-ordinating or handling generic work and sufficient resources to handle actions of this size.

As has already been said, contracts for the generic work in each multi-party action are managed by the commission's own multi-party action unit. Each contract has a dedicated case manager, a senior solicitor experienced in handling multi-party actions and employed by the commission. The aim of these managers is to ensure that cases are taken forward effectively in the interests of the clients, consistent with the need to protect the public purse. If the unit is dissatisfied with a firm's conduct of a case, it can terminate a contract and may enter into a new contract with another firm. Significant decisions on multi-party actions made by the unit can also be referred to the multi-party action committee, which is made up of representatives of the legal profession and consumer associations and the Legal Services Commission.

Perhaps I may turn now to the two multi-party actions to which the noble Countess has referred. I take it that she favours the grant of public funding for these cases and of course her vigour in publicising the concerns of the Gulf War veterans and sheep farmers is, as has been noted by the noble Lord, Lord Kingsland, well known to this House. The first is an action by a group of ex-servicemen who fought in the Gulf War. They allege that they sustained injuries as a result of exposure to substances, including organophosphates, used, they say, without proper precautions. Some claims concern birth defects said to arise from the fathers' exposure to these substances.

Around 500 legal aid certificates have been issued. The amount spent so far on generic work —that is, work on the issues common to all the certifications—is just under £0.9 million. The action is still at the investigation stage and expert evidence is being assembled. No proceedings have yet been issued. As to the future, it is not the practice to make public projected fundings for actions supported by legal aid lest that information give any forensic advantage to defendants. The generic work is being handled by the firm Hodge Jones & Allen.

The second multi-party action is a claim by farmers and their workers against the manufacturers of' products containing organophosphates used in sheep dips for alleged failure to make the products safe or to give full advice on their safe use. Seventy-two legal aid certificates have been issued so far. To date, a total of £1.1 million has been paid, of which £0.8 million relates to the generic issues. This action is more advanced than the Gulf War case. Full statements of claim and applications for specific disclosure are now being considered. The generic work is again being handled by Hodge Jones & Allen.

Both the Gulf War and the sheep farmers' multi-party actions were originally, as has been noted, handled by Dawburns, a Norfolk firm. That firm was also handling a third multi-party action involving alleged damage caused by a vaccine. The facts of what happened are these. In 1998, the team handling the three multi-party actions moved from Dawburns to the London firm, Hodge Jones & Allen. The contracts for all three cases were transferred to Hodge Jones & Allen, which formed a large team to handle the cases, including the members of the original Dawburns team. In July 1999, however, the team split. The individuals originally from Dawburns decided to move to another firm, Alexander Harris.

It has to be said that both Alexander Harris and Hodge Jones & Allen are experienced personal injury firms who are members of the commission's multiparty action panel and are capable of handling complex multi-party actions. After some discussion in that new state of affairs, Hodge Jones & Allen and Alexander Harris jointly proposed that the Gulf War and sheep farmers' cases should remain with Hodge Jones & Allen and that the vaccine case should transfer to Alexander Harris. The two firms issued a joint statement to inform their clients of the proposals.

At that stage, the Gulf Veterans Association approached the Legal Aid Board to express its disquiet at the upheaval that would follow the splitting up of the team and to raise some complaints about the handling of the case thus far. These were the only representations made to the Legal Aid Board. None was received from the larger representative body, the National Gulf Veterans and Families Association. There is no evidence of which I am aware of any general client dissatisfaction with the handling of the claims either by Hodge Jones & Allen or the by the Legal Aid Board, now the Legal Services Commission.

Of course it is disquieting for clients when there is a split of this kind in a legal team. The Legal Aid Board recognised that there was subjective client loyalty to the original Dawburns team. However, the board's responsibility was to make an objective assessment of how the cases could most effectively be taken forward in the interests of the clients. In agreeing that the Gulf War and sheep farmers' cases should remain with Hodge Jones & Allen, the Legal Aid Board took into account the following factors.

First, the three actions had grown to such an extent that it was doubtful that any one firm could effectively manage all three. Secondly, there was a particularly strong overlap of scientific issues in the Gulf War and sheep dip claims—because both actions related to the use of organophosphates—indicating that a single firm should be responsible for both. Thirdly, imposing a division of the work contrary to the agreed proposals of the two firms might have delayed progress while the firms contested the decision and could have jeopardised future goodwill and co-operation between them. Fourthly, although the resources at Hodge Jones & Allen were initially severely reduced by the move, Patrick Allen of that firm was able in a short period to assemble an impressive team of eight solicitors and scientific and support staff, including Mark Mildred, one of the most experienced multiparty solicitors in the country. Finally, although expertise had been lost from Hodge Jones & Allen, the same would have been true had the work been placed with Alexander Harris, which would have had to replace the support staff and the medical and scientific expertise which had chosen to remain with Hodge Jones & Allen.

I hope that these general explanations reassure your Lordships and the noble Countess that the Legal Aid Board, now the Legal Services Commission, does take account of the interests of clients and the taxpayer at every stage in the handling of multi-party actions. Of course, I cannot possibly comment on the allegations made by the noble Countess, having only just heard them. They are quite worrying allegations to make against professional men and women. If the level of dissatisfaction that she expresses is really there and widely there, that is troubling.

It appears to me that this is a matter for the Legal Services Commission rather than for me. However, I can certainly say from this Dispatch Box that the Legal Services Commission will be more than happy to meet those who are complaining and to evaluate the nature of the complaints. Having listened to the noble Countess, however, I believe that the Legal Services Commission would find it much easier to assist if the complaints were set out in writing, in detail, so that they could be considered in advance. Certainly, the Legal Services Commission will listen with care to all complaints that are made, as it is its objective to ensure that the interests of clients and the beneficiaries of legal aid are advanced.