My Lords. I have to inform your Lordships that, pursuant to the Order of the House, I, together with the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, the noble Lords, Lord Strathclyde and Lord Boston of Faversham, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley and the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank, waited upon Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Queen Mother yesterday with the Message of this House of 13th July and that Her Majesty made the following reply:

"My Lords and Members of the House of Commons:

"I was deeply touched by your messages of congratulations and by the sentiments you expressed on the occasion of my 100th birthday.

"I feel fortunate that during the last Century I have been given the opportunity to serve our Country in times of war and peace, and I have always been helped and uplifted by the love of my family, by the fortitude and courage of our people, and by my faith in Almighty God.

"I pray that future generations will live in peace and prosperity, and I send to you all my heartfelt thanks for your kind messages on my birthday."

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, we continue to consult with partners on our ideas for guidelines that could help the Security Council decide when and how to respond to large-scale violations of humanitarian law and crimes against humanity.

Discussions on humanitarian intervention will doubtless feature at the millennium summit and millennium assembly in September. We shall, of course, take this opportunity to build further consensus around our ideas as we continue to refine them. We do not envisage tabling any formal proposals on this occasion.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that reply. However, does she agree that it is also essential to develop more flexibility and imagination in supporting the Secretary-General on initiatives, peacemaking and conflict resolution before it becomes necessary to deploy military forces? When military forces are deployed in the name of the UN, does she not agree that it is always essential to have a clear political analysis of how they will contribute towards a political solution, as well as ensuring that there is strengthened administration of those forces both in the field and back in the UN?

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that those issues are of real importance. It is for that reason that this debate has to take place. There has to be a thickening of the understanding between nations in this regard. We are firmly of the view that prevention is far better than cure. This is a matter, therefore, that we shall continue to pursue.

My Lords—

My Lords, I am sure the Minister is aware of two specific points made by the Secretary-General in his millennium report. I wonder whether she might comment on them. First, cannot the Government take further the suggestions made in that report about standby arrangements both as regards troops that may be seconded for military intervention, but perhaps more radically the proposal for standby arrangements for non-governmental and civil groups which can enter quickly into a disaster situation? Secondly, the Minister will be aware that the Secretary-General praised, in particular, the United Kingdom Government, along with the Canadian, Swiss and German governments, for their work on targeting sanctions towards the political elites of countries which are in breach of the United Nations humanitarian standards. Can she tell the House what work has been done by the Government in that regard and what she hopes may emerge from it?

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for the recitation of the praise which rightly attaches to the efforts we have all tried to make in targeting sanctions so that they are more effective. The noble Baroness is right in saying that the highlighting of that by the Secretary-General was most telling.

As regards the suggestions concerning standby arrangements and the use of civil troops, the noble Baroness will know that those issues are being considered in depth and are being explored. I cannot help the noble Baroness as regards the stage which we have reached. However, the important fact is that the issues are being debated and given the appropriate level of informed concern.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree—

My Lords, does the Minister agree that, while humanitarian intervention is a noble impulse, it is also a nebulous concept and does not appear to be covered properly by the existing UN charter or UN law? There is a need for clarification and either changing the law or defining more clearly when humanitarian intervention is justified. What line will the Government take about either changing the specifications at the United Nations or recognising that NATO has a right to intervene in European security matters regardless of what is decided at the UN?

My Lords, at this stage it is critical that we all understand that there has to be definition and clarity. There is a great deal of anxiety about how, when and under what conditions humanitarian intervention should take place. It is for that reason that Her Majesty's Government think it important that the debate, discussion, definition and attempt at increasing and enhancing clarity among nations should start. We have been very clear that this is a matter we wish to promote and talk about with our partners. Noble Lords will be aware that we have already put forward preliminary ideas trying to scope the ambit of the way forward. We shall listen with acuity to the international response we receive to this endeavour.

My Lords—

My Lords—

Archer!

My Lords, while I agree that prevention is by far the best way forward, does the Minister accept that major displacements of population should be one of the criteria? Will she take note of what has happened in eastern Turkey in recent years? Further, can the noble Baroness confirm that, so far, some 300,000 people have been displaced from their homes in the Moluccas in Indonesia?

My Lords, Her Majesty's Government firmly believe that we have a shared responsibility to act when confronted with massive violations of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity. Indeed, we have made that absolutely clear. We note the developments in the areas that the noble Lord has just highlighted, which, of course, are matters of great concern. For that reason, we feel it essential to build the broadest possible consensus on the conditions and circumstances that make international action appropriate and, thereby, strengthen the ability of the Security Council to respond effectively and promptly. As I said earlier, we are discussing these issues to try to achieve that consensus. However, we must bear in mind the fact that any intervention must be focused so that it does more good than harm. We must be very balanced in the way we proceed in this area.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree—

This side!

Archer!

My Lords, I am sorry. I have not been present throughout the whole of the debate on this Question, but I understand from what is being said around the House that my noble and learned friend Lord Archer has been trying to ask a question for some time. I believe that he should ask his question.

My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend.

Where the Security Council is paralysed by the use of the veto, does my noble friend the Minister agree that it is inevitably left to groups like NATO to exercise a citizen's arrest and that, however necessary that may sometimes be, it is never as satisfactory as enforcing the rule of law in the name of the whole international community? Is my noble friend aware of Charter 99? Further, will the Government be supporting the call of Charter 99 for charter revision in the hope of modifying the veto in the interests of democratic global government?

My Lords, not surprisingly, I agree with much of what my noble and learned friend has said, but am unable to agree with some of it. Noble Lords will know that I have said from this Dispatch Box in the past that there is much in Charter 99 with which we concur, although we cannot accept some of it. The veto has played a very important role in the past; indeed, it is something that Her Majesty's Government do not intend to give up. We have not exercised our veto for the past 10 years. We believe that it is incredibly important for those who have the veto to exercise it responsibly and prudently. We would wish others to follow our example. However, I cannot tell my noble and learned friend that we think it would be prudent to do away with it.

My Lords—

Next Question!

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, the total cost to the taxpayer in the current financial year of the House of Commons is £246 million compared to £263.7 million in the last financial year. For the House of Lords, the figure is £50 million this year compared to £45.3 million last year. The costs of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly are a devolved matter and are funded from within the budgets of the devolved administrations.

My Lords, if I may put it this way, I thank the noble Lord for escaping answering the point about the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. Given the obvious cost of creating more and more elected assemblies, can the noble Lord say whether there is any moment at which the Government might pause and think again about their commitment to nine directly-elected regional assemblies in England? Is he aware of any enthusiasm for that idea, other than perhaps in the North West and the North East? Surely this is a time for reflection and for considering whether it is really wise to go ahead.

My Lords, that is an interesting departure, at a tangent, from the original Question. The noble Lord, Lord Renton, will no doubt he aware that in the Comprehensive Spending Review announcement yesterday the Chancellor of the Exchequer said that he was allocating another £500 million to the regional development agencies. Very considerable expenditure is being devolved to the regions of England. Therefore, the case for local democratic control of that expenditure has some significance.

My Lords, given the fact that the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly were created by this Parliament and bearing in mind their importance to the whole United Kingdom political process, as well as to Scotland and Wales respectively, would it not be better if there were an effective way of those parliaments reporting to the Parliament that created them so that we can have meaningful debates both in this House and in the other place about their effectiveness?

My Lords, it is right that the administrations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland report to their own elected assemblies. What notice Parliament in Westminster takes of them is a matter for Parliament. I have not heard any specific demand for a change in our arrangements.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that we cannot half-devolve? We either devolve power or we do not. If we have devolved power, particularly to the Scottish Parliament, it is for the Scottish Parliament to take decisions and for the Scottish electorate to judge them. It is not for this House and this Parliament.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for confirming the view that I took in response to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.

My Lords, leading on from the question of the noble Lord, Lord Richard, does not the money that goes to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly come from the Barnett formula? If so, it is of some interest to this House and the other place. Can the Minister confirm that the Barnett formula will continue to be used so that the Scottish Parliament, with its new building and so forth, which is very expensive, can he funded? Will he assure us that he will not take the advice of Mr Charles Kennedy and the Liberal Democrats who want to scrap the Barnett formula?

My Lords, it is not only Mr Charles Kennedy who wants to scrap the Barnett formula; it is also my noble friend Lord Barnett. But the Government have no plans to depart from the Barnett formula.

My Lords, perhaps I should make it clear to my noble friend, as I know he is aware, that I am in favour of scrapping the Barnett formula. It gives disproportionate amounts to certain parts of the country. Parts of the North West and the North East should receive more and Scotland should receive less. But if my noble friend and the Government wish to keep a formula called the "Barnett" formula, I do not object. It could be a Mark II.

My Lords, my noble friend is already a Mark II and effectively renews himself from time to time. The Barnett formula has a crude justice. It is based on population. The distribution of revenues to the regions of England is a matter for the Westminster Parliament.

My Lords, since the Barnett formula is based on increasing in Scotland the same proportion of expenditure as is increased in England, will account be taken of the increased costs of Parliament at Westminster, both the other place and this House, in so far as they relate to England, in calculating what will be allowed in the Barnett formula for the cost of the Scots Parliament? In other words, will the Barnett formula be consistent when it comes to the cost of the Scots Parliament? The noble Lord, Lord Barnett, looks a bit dazed at that suggestion. I am dazed myself, but it seems only fair.

My Lords, the question of the noble Baroness contains a complex piece of thinking which I do not entirely follow. The Barnett formula is based on population. What happens to the money allocated to Scotland within the Barnett formula, including the cost of the Scottish Parliament, is entirely a matter for the Scottish Parliament? As to the costs of Parliament at Westminster, the figures I gave show that the cost of the House of Commons is actually lower this year than last, in contrast with the House of Lords, which is higher.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, the safety of staff is our prime concern. A thorough review of the terrorist threat to all our missions overseas was conducted last year. A programme of increased protective measures is being undertaken where those are considered necessary.

We are thoroughly examining the events surrounding the murder of Brigadier Saunders. We shall ensure that any lessons learnt are reflected in our application of security measures in Athens and more widely. I am unable to give details without affecting the security of staff overseas.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. While effective diplomacy does carry risks, and with the fortress approach not being an option, how can United Kingdom diplomats avoid being a soft target in an era of international terrorism and given that the Americans have battened down the hatches? More specifically, as the murder was Kosovo driven, will the Minister ensure that front-line diplomats are suitably protected from contentious policy issues?

My Lords, first, perhaps I can say straight away that it is of the utmost importance to Her Majesty's Government, as it has been important to every government before us, to secure the well-being of our diplomats who serve us so bravely abroad. Secondly, this wicked murder demonstrates the real service that our diplomats give to this country and the risks in which they place themselves on a daily basis. Regrettably, that is all too rarely acknowledged.

However, in line with that we have undertaken the most rigorous reviews. There was a review as a result of the Dar es Salaam incident in 1998 when a matrix was developed to try to identify those missions which may be at most risk of collateral damage. That informed our policy. We have made sure that those issues continue to be examined and we shall spend sufficient money to ensure that they are addressed. This Government have made a large commitment—an additional £22 million—to the security of our people and every penny is well spent.

My Lords, does the Minister believe that the measures taken by the host countries in many cases are sufficient to protect diplomats?

My Lords, we ascertain what measures are in place. That is a factor which is played into our security assessment so that when deciding the level of protection a specific post should have, we are conscious of the security protection provided by the host community. We also look at the mission's proximity to other missions which may also be subject to threat to enable us to make an assessment of the risk of any collateral damage to our mission. It is therefore a matter of which we are very much aware. We take it extremely seriously and try to factor it into our thinking as well as we can.

My Lords, will the noble Baroness accept that we on this side totally associate ourselves with the sentiments she expressed in relation to this tragedy? Also, we welcome her comments about increased security for our diplomats. That underlines what I said from this Dispatch Box the other day: diplomacy today is becoming a dangerous occupation and those who fulfil those duties are extremely brave people Although I recognise that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has done a fair amount in recent years to increase security for ambassadors and their staff, can the noble Baroness reassure us that any extra money will be used to increase security further? In that way we can try to prevent, although it may never be completely possible, the kind of horrific tragedy that occurred in Athens with Brigadier Saunders.

My Lords, I welcome the comments of the noble Lord and entirely associate myself with them. It is right that we continue this effort and I can assure the noble Lord that our energy will be properly directed to that end.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the widow of Brigadier Saunders, Mrs Heather Saunders, and her two daughters visited your Lordships' House yesterday and that all who met them were deeply impressed by their courage and dignity? On leaving, Mrs Saunders expressed their great joy at the day they had spent here. Might it not be appropriate to send a message to the Saunders family expressing your Lordships' pleasure at their enjoyment and sending the family the good wishes of your Lordships' House?

Hear, hear!

My Lords, I can assure my noble friend that I was so aware. Indeed, I was privileged to be able to meet and spend some time with both Mrs Saunders and her daughters. We have much to be grateful for. They are great British people and great ambassadors for Britain. They have shown the sort of courage and tenacity that no one could have expected them to demonstrate in these circumstances. It was a small thing that they were able to come here, but I know that the whole House will join me in sending them our heartfelt best wishes. We wish them Godspeed in coming to terms with this terrible, wicked tragedy.

Hear! Hear!

My Lords, perhaps I may associate these Benches with the tributes paid to the family of Brigadier Saunders and to the members of the Diplomatic Service, and those from other departments who work with them, who have to put up with very difficult circumstances. Cannot more be done through co-operation with our partners in the European Union to deal with the causes of terrorism, which lead to situations such as the assassination of Brigadier Saunders?

My Lords, the noble Lord makes a very good point. This issue is being considered by a number of our partners. It is a tragic reality that terrorism is now truly international. It is something with which, regrettably, we have all to deal.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, steps are being taken to investigate the leak to the press of the Prime Minister's memorandum. The noble Lord will be aware that, in order to safeguard the effectiveness of both the investigation and the security arrangements in place to prevent leaks, it has been the practice of successive governments not to disclose information about how leak investigations are conducted.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord and congratulate him on his reply. He is quite clearly above suspicion. But is the Minister aware that as this leak of the Prime Minister's confessional is one of five leaks to date this month, there are some people who think that the leak is a new form of twisted spin? Can he give the House an assurance that this leak was in fact a genuine leak which the Government regret rather than a press hand-out, in which the Government delight?

My Lords, my colleagues are whispering that all spins are twisted. I think noble Lords perhaps appreciate my background. Before I came into this House, when people mentioned "spinners" to me I thought it was a pop group from the sixties. Although we make light of it at the moment, it is a very serious issue. I know that the noble Lord would wish to support the Government on this issue and to join us in condemning the circumstances surrounding the leak. I should also mention that the Government take the question of security very seriously. All government departments are responsible for ensuring that stringent security measures are in place. Where there has been a leak of sensitive information, inquiries will be undertaken to establish who is responsible.

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House when a leak inquiry last identified and disciplined the leaker? Does he think that it may perhaps be better to take further action on the Freedom of Information of Bill and publish the whole darn lot of these things? It would probably be much to the Government's advantage to get it all over with on a regular basis so that Ministers cannot stab each other in the back in the press so easily.

My Lords, I simply say to the noble Lord that successive governments have developed policies similar to that which exists at the moment in relation to leaks of this nature. I can assure the House that they are not routine and are not undertaken on a routine basis. While it may not be possible in some cases to identify the individuals responsible, the inquiry process itself has a guarding effect and raises security awareness within departments. Where leaks occur, the Government will take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that the culprits are found.

My Lords, perhaps I can help the noble Lord. I think that the answer to the question of my noble friend Lord Tebbit is "never"—at least that is the experience of those of us who were in government. Is it true that a game of pass-the-parcel was played in the office of the Leader of the House to see who would answer this Question and that the music was rigged by the Minister's elders—and, dare I say, betters—to make sure that the parcel stopped with him? Furthermore, has he read the leaked memo? Has he read in particular the sentence,

"It is bizarre that any government I lead should be seen as anti-family"?

Can I tempt the Minister to agree with me that what is bizarre is that any Prime Minister of the United Kingdom should ever write such self-pitying guff?

My Lords, as to the noble Lord's point about me answering the Question, the Cabinet Office Minister, for whom I am deputising, is away on official business of a long-standing nature. I simply make one point in response to the noble Lord's comments—that is, that it would seem that the leaks issue is orchestrated against the Government in order to deflect attention from what the Government are doing at the moment. I am quite certain that many noble Lords would rather debate today the £43 billion spending review that the Government announced yesterday than this issue.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that perhaps there is not a leaker; perhaps the culprit is a hacker?

My Lords, that is certainly a consideration we should take on board. The Government have announced that an investigation will take place. We are not aware that there is any connection between the recent graffiti on the Cabinet Office website and the latest leak. However, I can assure my noble friend that the inquiry will explore a full range of possibilities, of which this will be one.

My Lords, in view of the apparent dearth of plumbers in Westminster, could some of the £43 billion be spent in training them?

My Lords, I am sorry, I did not quite catch the noble Countess's question.

My Lords, in view of the apparent shortage of plumbers around Westminster, could some of the £43 billion be spent on training them?

My Lords, I thank the noble Countess for her question. I realise that there is a pun in there somewhere and that there should be one in the reply. However, having said that, the Government take the leaks very seriously. Whether we need plumbers or training in this direction I am not sure, but certainly the Government take the issue of establishing responsibility for these leaks very seriously indeed.

My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House to know that the usual channels have agreed to a change in tomorrow's business. Owing to the number of Peers who wish to speak on the Second Reading of the Football (Disorder) Bill and other business tomorrow, the first Committee day of the Countryside and Rights of Way Bill has been postponed until next Tuesday, 25th July, which was to have been the second Committee day. Every effort is being made to ensure that all those with an interest in the Bill are made aware of this change.

My Lords, I thank the Government Chief Whip for that wise and sensible statement. Perhaps I may put on record that we hope that all future statements from the Government about business management will be equally wise and sensible and that we shall have appropriate announcements in due course.

My Lords, when the Opposition Chief Whip says that I am being wise and sensible I am very suspicious.

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That the Third Report from the Select Committee (HL Paper 85) be agreed to.—(The Chairman of Committees.)

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a second time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a second time.—(Lord McIntosh of Haringey.)

On Question, Bill read a second time; Committee negatived.

Then, Standing Order No. 46 having been suspended (pursuant to Resolution of 18th July), Bill read a third time, and passed.

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a third time.—(Lord Astor of Hever.)

On Question, Bill read a third time.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Astor of Hever.)

On Question, Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill be now read a third time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a third time.—(Lord Peyton of Yeovil.)

On Question, Bill read a third time.

An amendment (privilege) made.

My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. I know that this is not the moment for a speech but I should like to inject a note of civility and gratitude in the direction of the Government Chief Whip, who has been most helpful. Perhaps I may express the hope that his natural helpfulness and courtesy will prove a means of influencing his colleagues in another place to see the light which is so obvious to himself. Perhaps I may also ask him to pass on to Mary Robertson a note of my gratitude and everlasting admiration. I am most grateful.

Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Peyton of Yeovil.)

On Question, Bill passed, and sent to the Commons.

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 5, line 37, leave out subsections (11) and (12)

My Lords, as the Minister said, I was one of those who had misgivings about the order-making power, particularly because it would have enabled the Government, by order, to extend some of the definitions in the Bill so as to be able to intercept e-mail traffic without the safeguards provided. That was not desirable. I quite understand that the Minister, his colleagues and advisers found it difficult to draft a different order-making power which would have had precisely the effect that we had suggested. In the circumstances, I believe that the Minister has done the right thing in withdrawing the order-making power through Amendments Nos. 1 and 12 and those that go with them.

My Lords, if the spirit of this afternoon is to be "When in doubt, leave it out", we shall make very rapid progress indeed,

moved Amendment No. 2:

moved Amendment No. 3:

My Lords, I should like, first, to thank the noble Lord, Lord Cope, and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for working so closely with the Government on this group of amendments. I pay tribute to their pragmatism as regards this issue. In the debate on Report the noble Lord, Lord Cope, said—quite rightly—that the principle was more important than the detail here. He made it clear that he was less concerned about the detail than the basic proposal for a board. Indeed, he has reflected that in his comments this afternoon. In my response on Report I said that not much lay between us on this issue. It was only the vehicle and detailed mechanisms that we were debating. What has been tabled today is a set of amendments which we believe will be far more workable.

Before I address the substance of the amendments, I wish to clarify one point. Some commentators have rather dramatically overestimated the number and range of telecommunications service providers on whom an interception capability requirement may be imposed. The consultation paper we published in June last year set out the kinds of areas we have in mind. These include the Internet service provider industry and the satellite market.

However, notices under Clause 12 will not be served wholesale across a market sector. In particular, I should like to emphasise that we do not envisage serving notices under Clause 12 with respect to telecommunication services provided solely to the financial markets. Interception is only ever used as a method of last resort—that is how we see this matter. We do not believe that requiring such services to develop and maintain an interception capability would be appropriate. I hope that this commitment will reassure those who are concerned that we may serve a notice on such companies and that they will derive further reassurance from the wording of the order which the Secretary of State will make under Clause 12 in due course.

Turning to the set of amendments before us, I shall explain how they achieve three things. First, they seek to clarify the function of the technical advisory board in considering a reference. Secondly, they provide that a notice is effectively suspended pending consideration by the board. Thirdly, they make it clear what may happen when a reference is made. Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord Cope, acknowledged, they introduce an element of further flexibility as to the constitution and membership of the advisory board.

I am glad that noble Lords opposite have joined together in tabling these amendments. On the question of the membership of the advisory board, as I said earlier, I know that no firm views were expressed as to the precise membership when this matter was debated last week. Some suggestions were made that voices above and beyond those of the communications industry and law enforcement should be heard on the advisory board. I am not entirely convinced that that would be appropriate. The board is likely to need to consider highly technical issues. It will need to focus its attention on such matters. None the less, the order-making power which is proposed in Clause 13 allows for flexibility here.

More important is that the flexibility engendered by the order-making power gives the Government some further time to consider the question of who should act as the chairman of the board. This is a point that has been raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cope, on previous occasions. It is a difficult issue to which we should like to give proper thought, along with industry. We shall consult with representatives on that matter.

Finally, we are yet to speak to industry about the precise composition of the board and would like to take those views before establishing it in an order made under the Bill. The important point to note is that the board should include representatives of industry, as identified at subsection (2)(a) of the proposed amendment; that the board should include membership from those who apply for interception warrants, as identified at subsection (2)(b); and, crucially, that there should be a balance between these two groups as stipulated at subsection (2)(d)

I shall be happy to work with these amendments. The joint drafting has greatly improved their quality and, as I said earlier, I am most grateful to noble Lords for their assistance in this matter.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, perhaps I may make a brief comment. Although the Minister was obviously not in a position to see for himself, when he reached the point he made about a possible chairman for the board, the noble Lord, Lord Desai, clearly indicated that he was a candidate.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for his advice.

My Lords, perhaps I may intervene to make a brief remark. I have been a Member of your Lordships' House since 1971. In that time I have seen many all-party amendments being passed on legislation. However, I do not ever recall seeing one to which a Government Minister had added his name. I hope that this is a good omen for the future. The mechanism may be suitable for dealing with technical and complex matters such as this.

moved Amendments Nos. 4 to 6:

moved Amendment No. 7:

moved Amendment No. 8:

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, pointed out, my name is also added to the amendment, which seeks to implement the decision that noble Lords took on Report with regard to cost.

With regard to the previous group of amendments, the Minister said, most helpfully, that the Government do not expect to make any requirement under Clause 12 to service providers who deal only with the financial services industry. I believe that that measure will be widely welcomed, as the Minister suggested. I hope that there will be great awareness of it.

Neither the amendment nor the Bill defines "fair". The proposed subsection (1) in the amendment states,

"such contribution as is, in the circumstances of that person's case, a fair contribution".

That permits the Government to allocate different proportionate contributions in different circumstances. It is right and fair in some circumstances—particularly in the case of a small company—for the Government to pay the whole cost of what is required; that is, the black boxes. As the black box will carry out the work that is required by the agencies of the Government, the police and so on, the presumption should be that it is fair that the agency concerned should pay the major cost of it.

I appreciate that it is argued that in some cases the equipment will also benefit service providers by providing them with extra information and facilities. Nevertheless, the main purpose of the black boxes is to serve the interests of the Government. Therefore, it is right that the taxpayer should pay the major part of the cost. Anyone who feels aggrieved at the settlement could no doubt seek judicial review in regard to the proportion of the cost that is considered fair.

I turn to the total cost. I admit to having become a little confused with regard to the sum of £20 million. I may have inadvertently contributed to my confusion and perhaps to other people's on this matter. However, my original understanding was that the sum of £20 million was the estimated cost of the black boxes, part of which was to be borne by the Government and part of which was to be borne by the ISPs.

However, my subsequent understanding was that the sum of £20 million was the total cost of the Government's contribution to the scheme. That implies that the total cost of the black boxes will be higher than that. For example, it might be £30 million, of which the Government would pay £20 million and the ISPs £10 million. It is, of course, difficult to estimate the cost because we are not sure how many service providers will be asked to install such equipment, or what the nature of the equipment is. The Smith report began a discussion on that matter but it by no means concluded it. The recommendations of the Smith report no longer appear to be a sound basis on which to proceed.

A large proportion of the costs will comprise the extent to which the facility is used. That is difficult for those inside government, let alone those outside, to determine. The facility may develop over time, but so may the cost of an individual black box. The one thing of which we can be certain is that the technology which is appropriate today for this purpose will probably have developed out of all recognition in a year or two, or three years, and probably in an even shorter period. That fact also makes any estimate of costs liable to change. However, this is an important matter. Whatever sum of money is paid by service providers—however large or small—will damage the competitiveness of British service providers compared with those overseas who do not have this overhead.

I appreciate that other countries may, in time, follow the lead given by the Government; so the competitive position may even out slightly if they do the exactly the same and adopt the same charging arrangements. But in the mean time—possibly for ever in regard to some smaller countries, especially tax havens—whatever the figure is, it will prove a competitive disadvantage to British service providers and others subject to the charge. I am sorry to expand at some length on this matter, but it is important. We should do our best to be clear about this before finally sending this piece of legislation on its way.

We have gone along with the Government a great deal in all these matters and they have moved in our direction a great deal. But the question of cost, and of how much of the cost will finally come out of the pockets of British service providers, is important to whether or not British electronics companies remain competitive in the world.

My Lords, I should like to associate myself with the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Cope. As he said, we have moved a long way from the Bill's starting-point and the implication that the police, the security services and others could specify whatever equipment they thought necessary and the service providers would pick up the bill. There is now much less of a "blank cheque" approach.

However, the Alliance for Electronic Business has raised the point that service providers will, as their part of the bargain, be responsible for hardware and software, opportunity cost, IT development time and the costs of planning and management time. Is it clear, in return, that what is on offer from the Government is a Treasury-capped £20 million over three years? If that is what is on offer, the approach seems rather churlish. As all sides concede, we are entering unknown territory. It is difficult to understand how it is possible to be "fair" while capping and restricting the nature of the Government's commitment in advance. Industry is eager to know whether its understanding is correct; namely, that it is a hard fact that all that is on offer is £20 million over three years, capped by the Treasury.

My Lords, I welcome the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, and his department have taken so constructively the decision of this House when this matter was put to a vote on Report. It is definitely an improvement to have the word "fair" included in the Bill, and to have some further explanation of what that means.

Building on points raised by the two previous speakers, surely the £20 million mentioned previously by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is only an example for reference purposes. Clearly, we cannot say on the one hand that it is impossible to specify the amount of money that is to be set aside for this purpose when we do not yet know what the total bill will be, and, on the other, have a categorical statement in the Bill that the contribution by the Secretary of State will be "fair". Estimates of the total bill range from the upper hundreds of millions of pounds to some tens of millions of pounds, as put forward by the Government.

I should be grateful if the Minister will confirm that the figure he mentioned was a Treasury estimate and that it in no way binds the Government, or at least is in no way meant to be used by the courts in interpreting a "fair" contribution.

My Lords, perhaps I may make one small point. As time moves on, the technology in this field becomes cheaper, not more expensive. That will be of some consolation to my noble friend.

My Lords, I support what my noble friend Lord Cope said. It is enormously important that we do not get ourselves into the reverse position of that on flood defences—where people campaign to have the Government spend millions of pounds on defending properties worth a few tens of thousands because they are not required to make any contribution to saving their homes. The situation is to some extent reversed, although it is much better now than it was under the Bill as originally drafted, whereby the contributions required from industry could have been out of all proportion to those asked for from the Government.

It is important that the Government pay their fair share of the cost. It is important, however, that industry should pay something. The idea of people being able to charge the police for helping the police with their inquiries is undesirable. But we need to see the Government making a fair and, in concept, at least an equal contribution to the costs. That will keep the Government honest in terms of what they are asking for. I very much hope that the noble Lord will be able to give us that comfort.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has almost made my argument for me, and I am grateful to him.

A number of valuable and valid points have been made in this brief exchange. I shall try to give such comfort as I can. We believe that the regulatory impact assessment figure of £20 million which we made plain last week is the best possible estimate in the circumstances. It can only be that. But spending up to that figure is in the gift of the agencies involved in carrying out the work. In a sense, how much they require must be their decision. That will obviously affect the amount of money spent.

As I said, we believe that £20 million is the best estimate in the circumstances, and there is a degree of reassurance in that. I do not always think that we get it absolutely right, but we believe that that is the figure that we need to pay in these circumstances and that it is fair. Although we do not have a precise mechanism to determine "fairness" in each and every case, the fact that our approach is on a case-by-case basis in terms of the individual circumstances of the service provider means that we shall endeavour to operate the regime as fairly as we possibly can. A number of points have been made, but they all come back to the issue of what "fairness" will mean in each circumstance. We shall have to see how the regime works out.

The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was right to say that it will come down to ensuring that people pay a reasonable price in the circumstances. We believe that we have got it right, but we shall continue to listen to those who make representations to us. We now have a mechanism for achieving that objective.

In the early stages of the debate there was—I shall not say a degree of hysteria, but certainly overblown concern about the costs. We have tried to keep a sense of proportion and we believe that, on balance, we have got it about right. The £20 million will work for a three-year period. During that time we shall have further opportunity to reflect carefully on how the system is working. We do not want to put UK companies at a competitive disadvantage. The noble Lord, Lord Cope, was right to raise that issue. For that reason, the smaller companies will be given rather greater assistance. Clearly, we do not want to do anything that stifles their growth and activity at the outset. We shall take very careful account of matters such as the planning costs of smaller companies, which I am aware is an important issue.

I am grateful to all noble Lords who have made constructive comments. I am aware that there is a great deal of concern about this issue. I believe that we were right to bring fairness into the legislation and to qualify it in a sensible way. I congratulate those who have played a part. I hope that we can now agree these amendments and carefully monitor the operation of the arrangements to ensure that they work in the best interests of industry. In this way we can guarantee the security of the system and combine fairness with a sense of proportion so that in future this part of the legislation works for the benefit of everyone.

moved Amendments Nos. 9 and 10:

Page 16, line 43, at end insert-

("() For the purpose of complying with his duty under this section, the Secretary of State may make arrangements for payments to be made out of money provided by Parliament.").

Page 16, line 44, leave out subsection (3).

moved Amendment No. 11:

My Lords, I am to answer for the Government today on this issue. It is a shame that the noble Lord has been unable to take advantage of the offer made by my noble friend to facilitate further discussions and briefings on these matters. I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Cope, took advantage of that opportunity which was also available to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and his party. It is a minor shame that the noble Lord and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, were unable to take advantage of that offer. I hope that when I come to explain the Government's position all will be put right.

My Lords, with respect I thought that that was precisely what I had said. To continue, I shall be grateful if when the noble Lord, Lord Bach, responds he is able to confirm that trawled interception of communications can be lawful only if, first, it takes place subject to a Clause 8(4) certificated warrant, and, secondly, that it can apply only to external communications. If one reads Hansard one sees that at the previous stage the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said that it was still the Government's intention that Clause 8(4) warrants should be aimed at external communications. There was a scintilla of doubt put into my mind by that formulation.

This matter harks back to the problem of overlapping warrants and the informal regime that has grown up hitherto. I seek reassurance in the clearest possible terms that the regime of overlapping warrants does not, and cannot, allow trawling and the utilisation of the material trawled in relation to internal communications.

I make one further plea to the Government. Is it possible that in dealing with these very difficult clauses, with the interlocking parts of the Bill which are necessarily brought in by reference, the Government can develop an extra-statutory protocol with the interception of communications commissioner in order to agree just how a mixed catch of internal and external communications is to be handled in practical terms? I am still mystified by the fact that Clause 16 (Clause 15 at Report stage), which is concerned with extra safeguards in the case of certificated warrants, provides that,

"the requirements of this section … are that the intercepted material is read, looked at or listened to by the persons"—

no definition of "persons" is provided—

"to whom it becomes available by virtue of the warrant",

and so on. How can one know which are the internal and which are the external communications—the sheep and the goats—without reading, listening to or looking at the same?

My first point in relation to the notion of an extra-statutory protocol is that it may cover precisely how the interception of communications commissioner or his staff sit alongside the staff at GCHQ, or wherever, and engage in the business of sorting the sheep from the goats to ascertain, as far as is humanly possible, that the provisions of Clause 16(1) are complied with; namely, that such communications are looked at, listened to or read to the minimum extent necessary to decide which manner of beast they are. Secondly, there should be a regime of destruction of the material that is trawled which is not external. I believe that if that was the case a good number of noble Lords on this side of the House, on the Government Benches—this is not a partisan issue—and many outside this place would be greatly relieved. I shall be grateful if, when the Minister replies, he will consider that suggestion. I beg to move.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, raised the question of whether or not we should have engaged in private briefings. The Government have been extremely generous and helpful in the progress of this Bill. However, we should not fall into the trap of believing that private briefings, however reassuring, are a substitute for provisions on the face of the Bill or words spoken from the Dispatch Box. I see the noble Lord nodding assent. Sometimes I worry, particularly in the world of spookery, that parliamentarians and politicians become intimidated, perhaps dazzled, by the intelligence world. Sometimes they are beguiled by the luxury of knowing something that the rest of us are not privileged to know, but if only we knew it we would understand why it was being done. In dealing with the intelligence community and its activities Parliament should always resist that tendency and retain a healthy scepticism in these matters.

Therefore my question is simple and innocent. It has been a recurring theme throughout the Bill. Are we seeing here an extension of the powers of the security services or simply an update of the powers of previous legislation? I have never been quite clear about that. If it is an extension it may be entirely justifiable. If so, it should be justified and should not masquerade as simply an update.

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions of the two Front Bench spokesmen from the Liberal Democrat Party. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, is right: there should always be some separation between the role of Parliament and briefings. It is fair to say that in some cases briefings are more important than others. I suspect that this instance may be one of them. No criticism is implied. Sometimes these meetings cannot take place; sometimes they can. I rather wish that in this instance it had. I think that I can go some way towards satisfying the noble Lords' concerns about this part of the Bill.

The provisions in Section 3(3) of the Interception of Communications Act, which are taken forward in this Bill as Clause 16(3), provide an important weapon for the law enforcement and security agencies. They allow for interception of external messages to or from a named individual in the British Islands, under the specific authority of the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State must consider that the interception is necessary and proportionate to the objects it seeks to achieve, just as he would if he signed an ordinary Clause 8(1) warrant in respect of that individual.

Why is this separate power provided? It is in fact less intrusive than a Clause 8(1) warrant. A warrant under Clause 8(1) would allow interception of all communications to or from a subject. In most cases the majority of these communications would be with other persons in the British Islands, and so would qualify as internal communications. But a certificate under Clause 15(3) refers to a warrant under Clause 8(4), the target of which can only be external communications. Therefore, a Clause 8(1) warrant will allow the interception of all my communications; but a Clause 8(4) warrant—that is what we are discussing in the amendment—with exactly the same safeguards in place will only allow the interception of my external communications, for example my international communications. It is not as intrusive as a Clause 8(1) warrant.

In some cases the external communications are all that is needed, and so there is no justification for obtaining the more intrusive Clause 8(1) warrant. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has been full of examples during the passage of the Bill, sometimes using Christian names very similar to those of some noble Lords on this side of the House. However, I shall not fall into that trap but I shall give an example.

Criminals in foreign countries often target victims in the UK, in an attempt to defraud them of large sums of money. The criminals communicate with their victims and take forward the fraud by various means, including telephone calls, faxes and e-mail. It is not practical to select these messages by reference to the foreign end, as the criminals take care to use a wide variety of telephone boxes, public fax machines and Internet cafés to hide their tracks. The best way to combat such a fraud will often be to select by reference to the victim's address, wholly innocent as that victim is. There would be no justification for intercepting the whole of the victim's internal communications; but to intercept only the external communications might be a proportionate and effective response. In such a case, the noble Lord's amendment would force the authorities to seek an unnecessary and excessive warrant—a Clause 8(1) warrant. This cannot be right. Using a Clause 8(4) warrant would be less intrusive than a Clause 8(1) warrant.

Why are we removing a safeguard, as it is perceived, that exists in the current Interception of Communications Act? I believe that this is the background to noble Lords' questions. We argue that we are not. The Bill in fact provides a more comprehensive set of rules than the current Act on when communications to or from targets in this country can be looked at under a certificated warrant. First, as I have said, no factor referable to an individual known to be in the British Islands can be used to determine what is "read, looked at or listened to" except with the Secretary of State's personal authority. This is, in terms of safeguards, as good as a warrant; and like a warrant, the permission is limited to three months.

So not only is there an inhibition on what goes into the certificate; there is also a direct connection between what is in the certificate and what may be looked at. This is a connection which is made explicit for the first time. In other words, what is on the certificate is all that cart be looked at. It is not present in the 1985 Act. It offers a legal guarantee that external warrants will not be used to target individuals in this country except in the circumstances I have described.

These provisions are indeed complicated. I am attempting to assure the noble Lord that the safeguards attached to the system are as robust as under the current Act—in some respects more so. The interception commissioners have in the past been careful and diligent to ensure that these provisions are properly followed. It almost goes without saying that we are confident, and the House can be confident, that the new commissioner will confirm this scrutiny.

I hope that my remarks go some way towards relieving the noble Lord's concerns about this part of the Bill.

My Lords, perhaps the Minister can clear my mind about what seems an important issue. Is it not true that the Echelon network can already intercept any telephone call and any e-mail anywhere in the globe from satellite interception? If so, are not some of the warrants somewhat irrelevant?

My Lords, I do not know the answer to the noble Lord's question. Even if I did, I am not sure that I would think it proper to answer his question today. These are matters of important concern. It is necessary to be careful in what one says from this Dispatch Box and anywhere in this House on matters of this kind. If the noble Lord would like an answer to his question, I shall be happy to give it at some future time.

My Lords, there is nothing classified about this matter. It has all been in the public domain and public print. I am not sure why the question cannot be answered.

My Lords, I am sure the noble Lord is right because he is an acknowledged expert in this field, as I am not. I shall be happy to answer ham when I know the answer myself.

My Lords, perhaps I may say from ray experience as commissioner that I see nothing dangerous or objectionable in the proposed new clause. The degree of coverage of external communications appears to be no wider than it has ever been, but more precisely spelt out. The effect of the amendment proposed by the noble Lords, Lord McNally and Lord Phillips, would unduly narrow the scope of what can be intercepted and would, indeed, be against the public interest.

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister's comments. His practical illustration was easier to follow than some of the explanations given hitherto and I suspect that it shed more light on one aspect of the Bill. That is not a criticism, but I wonder whether when we are faced with such difficult and dense Bills it would help those on non-government Benches to have worked-through illustrations. They would make the whole task more approachable.

I am grateful for the Minister's explanation. I shall read Hansard carefully because I am not sure that I picked up every point that was made. The Minister did not refer to my final point about the practical illogicality of not reading and listening in order to sort the sheep from the goats and the prospect of an additional statutory protocol agreed between the Government and the interception of communications commissioner in order to verify this aspect of the workings of the Bill. It is important and we all understand that someone must look at the material in order to decide what is internal and what is external and must then forget all that is internal. Could that form a clear procedure? That would give great reassurance beyond these walls. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 [Lawful acquisition and disclosure of communications data]:

moved Amendment No. 12:

Page 26, line 12, leave out subsections (8) and (9).

moved Amendment No. 13:

Page 27, line 9, at end insert—

My Lords, the noble Lord has given us a timely reminder of the need to police by consent. Those are wise words. Given the intrusive nature of surveillance, they are well chosen words.

I am sure that the House is aware that the noble Lord and I discussed an almost identical amendment on Report. However, this amendment is different in that the noble Lord seeks to limit his request for judicial authorisation to subsection (4)(a) rather than to paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (4), as previously requested. Clearly, on Report my powers of persuasion were limited and insufficient for the task set by the noble Lord. I did not then entirely satisfy or meet the intention behind the amendment, but I trust that I shall have more success today.

At that stage, the noble Lord's main concern appeared to lie with the level of authorisation and I shall try to address that issue particularly as it pertains to the more intrusive communications data. As I explained, under the non-statutory arrangements agreed between the law enforcement agencies and the telecommunications industry, access to more intrusive types of communications data is authorised at a more senior level within the relevant agency. For example, the most intrusive communications data must be authorised by an assistant chief constable—a very senior level in the police service. More importantly, I can again assure the noble Lord that we intend to insist on higher level authorisations for intrusive data in an order which we shall make under Clause 25(3) and which will be set out in the codes of practice.

It should also be remembered that the Bill introduces the necessary and proportionate requirements, along with the new statutory provisions which provide independent oversight by the interception commissioner. I hope that that oversight by the commissioner's office in the annual report, where the audit team will examine the use made of the power, will offer the noble Lord a degree of comfort with regard to the accountability process. The scope for abuse, which, rightly I believe, is behind the amendment, is the issue on which we need to satisfy not only the noble Lord but others.

I accept that it is not only the level of authorisation which the noble Lord is concerned about; he is also concerned about what that higher level of authorisation should be. However, I am not entirely persuaded of the necessity of calling for a higher level of judicial authorisation. We suggest that access to communications data, even at the top end of the scale, is not more intrusive than directed surveillance—a point that I made before—or the use of covert human intelligence sources as set out in Part II of the Bill.

Quite rightly in our view, those Part II provisions have been approved by both Houses of Parliament without the introduction of judicial authorisation for that type of activity. Instead, the Bill provides for directed surveillance or the use of covert sources of intelligence to be authorised at a specified level within a designated public authority. I would argue that accessing communications data is comparable. Therefore, I see no strong reason why the internal authorisation procedures for accessing them, with the restrictions and oversight provisions that we have already set out, should be any different.

We both agree that there should he different levels of authorisation for the different levels of communications data requested. I believe that we differ only on whether to involve the judiciary in the authorisation procedure.

I hope that I have provided sufficient reasons as to why the Government are not persuaded that it is necessary to go down this route. I believe that the accountability provided by the commissioner's office, the level of authorisation and the seriousness with which we view it, and the important tests of reasonableness and proportionality should offer sufficient satisfaction and confidence in this particular part of the regime. I trust that on the basis of what I have said, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful for that explanation. I believe that we shall have to wait to see how the matter develops in practice. When the commissioner examines how the power is being used, I hope that he will report to us in sufficient detail so that we may see and understand what is being done. I hope that we shall be able to see from his report that, in particular, location data on mobile phones is used either extremely infrequently or frequently so that we may know whether it is an occasional practice authorised at a very high level or a regular practice due to the fact that it is such a good method of obtaining information in many types of ordinary cases. I believe that if it is the latter, we should examine this area again.

I hope that I can rely on my understanding of what the Minister said with regard to the commissioner; that is, that when he reports he will provide us with sufficient information so that we may know that that is what is happening. However, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 14:

Page 54, line 31, leave out from beginning to ("performance") in line 32 and insert ("necessary for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper").

My Lords, I believe that the use of the word "necessary" in this particular sub-paragraph is preferable to the words "likely to be of value" which were used previously. It brings it into line with some of the other clauses, including Clause 49(2)(b)(i) and the others related to it. I believe that it is a helpful improvement to the Bill.

My Lords, I confirm what the Minister said. My desire was to see the bar cleared and raised a little. I believe that the Minster has done that and I thank him.

moved Amendment No. 15:

My Lords, the aim of the first part of the amendment is already implicit in the Bill. Clause 49(4)(b) requires that disclosure notices must describe the protected information to which the notice relates and Clause 49(4)(f) requires that they must set out the disclosure required and the form and manner in which it is to be made. We are not sure that there is a need for the universal requirement suggested by the amendment. If the disclosure of plain text was required from a legitimate organisation, for example, the amendment would be redundant. The requirements set out in paragraphs (a) to (g) of Clause 49(4) set out what all notices must include. They are not optional requirements.

I think that I understand the concern behind the first part of the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. He may be worried that persons could be forced to hand over a master key rather than, say, a session key because the authority serving the notice provided insufficient information. Clearly, a notice must contain enough detail to enable the person served with it to know exactly what is being asked of him or her. That is also in the authorities' best interests.

We are addressing that in the code of practice. We have already set out a first stab at what a disclosure notice might look like in the initial draft code that we published last week. As your Lordships will have seen, we suggest, for example, that the notice makes it clear that where the disclosure of keys is required, or where someone does not have the relevant plain text in their possession, they have the flexibility to disclose any key of their choosing that carries out the necessary decryption. To do that, they will clearly need to know to what information the notice relates. That is properly a matter best left for the code of practice.

The second part of the amendment covers similar ground. We discussed a similar amendment on Report, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. In this case, if a recipient of a Section 49 notice did not have the relevant protected information in his or her possession and there was no direction in the notice requiring that a key be disclosed, the person with permission to serve the notice would be required to deliver all that information to the recipient to allow him or her to decrypt it or disclose any key of his or her choosing that would decode it.

We cannot accept the amendment. As I said on Report, we recognise that there may be cases in which the recipient of a notice does not have the relevant protected information in their current possession, but has a relevant key. In such cases, providing the relevant protected information to a person may well be sensible, practical and right. There is no statutory bar to giving access to the information. However, there may be other cases in which it is not right to do that, such as when notices are to be served on persons suspected of criminality. That would make no sense. We do not believe it right that people should be supplied with the relevant protected information in all cases.

When the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, moved a similar amendment on Report, he wondered whether someone served with a disclosure notice who was not in possession of the relevant protected information at that time could be penalised unjustly under the Part III powers. I think that he described it as the "Willie and Steve" scenario. The short answer is "No". We recognise that the recipient of a disclosure notice will not always have the relevant protected information in their possession. In the scenario painted so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, it is entirely possible that someone may have received a message, decrypted it and destroyed it. They cannot be penalised for that. By virtue of Clause 50, they may disclose a key. If the circumstances are right, it may be possible for them to be given the protected information.

As I said on Report, we do not believe it right to include a blanket provision that a person serving a notice must in all cases provide the recipient of a notice with all the relevant protected information that they do not possess. That would be the effect of the amendment. In some cases that will be appropriate, but in others it will not. The issue is best dealt with in the code of practice. As I said on Report, we shall take away the comments of your Lordships and other interested parties and try to reflect them in fleshing out the details of the code on this point.

I hope that that will give the noble Lord some comfort and that he will feel more than able to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, will he answer the last point that I put to him? Am I right in thinking that, under the current wording of the Bill, if, for what everybody considers perfectly good reasons, a person is not provided with the protected information and is in effect required to hand over keys, he does not enjoy the protection of Clause 51, as he would if there was simply a direct request for the keys? If the police say, "We have some protected information and we require you to provide the plain text, so give us your keys", he has no protection, whereas if they just say, "We want your keys", he has protection. If that is the case, it is very undesirable, because the police will take the easy route. Rather than going to the chief of police to get permission to have the keys, they will just not produce the protected information, so that they can get the keys with a much lower level of authorisation.

My Lords, I understand the noble Lord's concern. He is probably correct that there is no statutory power. We shall need to examine the issues on a case-by-case basis. The law enforcement agencies will have to approach the issue carefully. We shall take careful note of the noble Lord's comments and give careful consideration to the phraseology in the code of practice, because we can offer more comfort there than we can on the face of the Bill.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for that reply. I am happy with what he said about the code of practice, and that being the right place to do things, for the first part of this amendment. He is obviously of the opinion that in principle the Bill covers everything which needs to be covered, and that issues can be fleshed out and dealt with in detail in the code of practice.

But, as we come to this part of the Bill, we are placing a great deal of reliance on the amendments which the Government made on Report, in what is now Clause 51, and on the amendments which are to be made to it today. If the amendments are accepted, people can have confidence that their keys will not be divulged on a whim. A very high level of authorisation will be required. Reference must be made to the commissioner, who is an independent member of the judiciary, and that will be done promptly. That is an environment in which people can feel relatively safe and can be sure that things are done well.

There is then apparently a great hole in the Bill where there are no safeguards or authorisations. All that has to happen is that the police have a piece of protected information that the "noticee" no longer has and they can open up his key box with hardly a "by your leave".

The amendment as it is now is not perfect, but unless this amendment is passed now the Government will not have the opportunity to set this matter right in another place. I am sure the Government do not intend that there should be this great hole in the Bill as it stands.

No discourtesy is intended to the noble Lord in pressing this amendment. He has done a great deal to improve this Bill as it is, but it has been done in a great rush. It seems to me that here is a major hole in the reassurances which the noble Lord has been providing, and which we have all been seeking. In respect of everything else that they have done, I seek to give the Government a little more time to consider whether something should be done to ensure that all of us, in particular major businesses, can feel entirely comfortable that our keys are safe in practice. I commend the amendment to the House.

moved Amendment No. 16:

Page 55, line 18, at end insert—

("and the time specified for the purposes of paragraph (f) must allow a period for compliance which is reasonable in all the circumstances.").

My Lords, I welcome the amendment and thank the Minister for his generosity in tabling it.

My Lords, as we do from these Benches.

moved Amendment No. 17:

My Lords, we enjoyed several short debates on Report on the protection due to legally privileged material. Our position now is the same as it was then: some of these amendments are unnecessary because the protection they seek is already in the Bill; and other amendments seek to do things which we believe can be done more precisely in the code of practice and with more consultation. But I welcome the opportunity shortly to restate our position on this important subject.

First, we recognise the important status of communications between lawyer and client. Those communications need proper protection, not absolute protection because of the risk, in any sector and any profession, of abuse, but robust protection none the less.

Perhaps I may expand on that. Our starting position is that legal communications should not, in the normal course of law enforcement, be the subject of targeting by police and other agencies. But that is not all. It is also important that police and others are aware of the situations where they may come across legal communications inadvertently and know how to deal with those cases too.

Amendments Nos. 17, 29, 30 and 32 relate to no obligation to disclose legally/medically privileged material. Amendments Nos. 29 and 30 would ensure that a key cannot be required if its disclosure means a lawyer or doctor giving access to legally or medically privileged material. We agree with the sentiment. But we do not think the amendments are quite right, and we do not believe they are necessary. They are not right because they do not take into account the case where a key protects both privileged material and material of a quite different nature which is not privileged. In that case, and remembering that disclosure of a key is going to be unusual in any event, it may make more sense for the key to be disclosed but for law enforcement to be inhibited from looking at the privileged material.

The amendments are not necessary because nothing in the Bill reduces the protection given in law to privileged material. If it is protected from a disclosure requirement now, whether that is by virtue of English, Scots or Northern Ireland law, a notice under the Bill will not override that protection. The code of practice makes that clear. The Bill applies only to material that comes lawfully into the possession of law enforcement. In most circumstances, legally privileged material simply will not find itself in this position.

There is, of course, the question of exactly how far legally privileged material should be protected; for example, if there is no statutory bar on its being accessed by means of some other power, or where its status only becomes clear on decryption. As I said on Report, and repeat, we look forward to getting that question right in the codes of practice, in consultation with the professional bodies in all parts of the United Kingdom.

Amendments Nos. 17 and 32 are similar. Amendment No. 17 prohibits access to any legally privileged material. Amendment No. 32 focuses on the position of the lawyer confronted by a Section 49 notice. Again, we think they envisage a situation that for the most part simply will not exist. What is the underlying power that would enable the police to say to a lawyer, "Show us the communications you have had with your client"? If there is no such power, Part III of the Bill presents no danger to legal confidentiality.

We agree, however, that we need to get right both the procedure and the precise degree of protection for when a Section 49 notice does encroach on to legally privileged material, for whatever reason. We look forward to doing that, with help from others, in the code of practice.

Amendment No. 31 recrafts the protection given to professional legal advisers against the tipping-off offence. In principle, we do not disagree with the amendment. But we have looked at it closely and do not believe it adds anything to the Bill that is necessary. The amendment covers legal advice from the lawyer to the client or client's representative. So does the Bill, in Clause 54(6) and 54(7). The amendment covers advice in the context of actual or contemplated proceedings. So does the Bill. The amendment covers all other legal advice as well while the Bill at Clause 54(6) limits that to advice about the effect of Part III of the Bill. We believe the limitation in the Bill to be justified. A person served with a disclosure notice containing a secrecy requirement may well need legal advice on what the notice means and its consequences. The Bill allows for that, and the standard form of notice, which will be in the code of practice, will encourage him to seek legal advice.

Finally, the amendment appears to make the protection for legal advice an exception to the offence rather than a defence. Perhaps I may make two points. First, it is quite common for these provisions to be framed in terms of a defence. All the recent tipping-off offences do it in that way. We would find it difficult to accept an argument that that imposes a difficult or unjust burden on the legal adviser, remembering that the defence need only be established on a balance of probabilities, and that the facts supporting the defence are comfortably within the lawyer's reach. Secondly, we do not think that the amendment changes the position. That is because the general rule of law is that statutory exceptions to a criminal defence, available in special circumstances or by persons of specified classes or with special qualifications, are for the defence to prove.

Much of what I have had to say concerns the codes of practice. We are placing much emphasis on them. There is legislation in which some statutes explicitly protect legally privileged material. Here, the precise protection due to this material requires careful consideration. It cannot fall outside it altogether but it needs to be protected. We are convinced that our codes of practice are best placed to achieve that. Why do we say that? Codes of practice are, in effect, much more flexible than words that appear on the face of a statute. At present, we are negotiating with various organisations: legal, medical, spiritual and journalistic, to name but a few. The point is that safeguards must be specific and drafted in close consultation with representatives of those sections of those professions. We have started the process and had contact with representatives from all those organisations, including the BMA. We look forward to continuing the discussions so that we can put sufficient and appropriate safeguards in the code of practice.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Fraser of Carmyllie, asked about PACE. He is right; PACE does not apply in Scotland. However, there are other common law protections given to legal material in Scotland. It is not for me to say whether such protections are better or worse than protections in England, nor, we would argue, a matter for the Bill. The key points are that the Bill does not subtract from legal protection given to legal material, whether such protection is statutory or non-statutory. The code of practice will say what should happen if, by virtue of these powers, law enforcement comes across legally privileged material. We repeat what we have often said: we intend the codes to provide tough safeguards against legal privilege being undermined.

We do not agree, should the argument be put forward, that codes of practice are somehow useless and not as good as having the words on the face of the statute. The codes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act in England and Northern Ireland have done a great deal to regulate and govern police practice to the benefit of citizens.

Clause 72(1) imposes a legal duty on police officers and others, including in Scotland, to have regard to the codes of practice. Relevant provisions in codes of practice not only are, but must be, taken into account by courts when dealing with these matters. I repeat our willingness, indeed, our desire, to have full consultation on the codes of practice.

Amendment No. 35 adds a definition of "professional legal adviser". There is no definition in the Bill as presently drafted. We do not believe that one is necessary. There is no definition in other similar provisions creating tipping-off offences. However, we are confident that the term "professional legal adviser" covers all the things listed in Amendment No. 35.

The noble Lord asked a question about the National Health Service. He was good enough to give me advance warning of the point. At this stage it is impossible to say which Internet service providers will be subject to Clause 12 obligations. We have debated at considerable length how Clause 12 will work. Perhaps the best assurance I can give him is that the grounds for interception are extremely limited. Procedures for dealing with sensitive or privileged material will be addressed in the code of practice.

I am grateful to the noble Viscount for having tabled the amendments today and for a good debate. However, we do not believe that the amendments should be pressed.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, perhaps I may ask a question. In the light of the importance of the consultation on these difficult issues—which are extremely difficult; particularly, I suggest, as regards foreign lawyers who will be much affected by the Bill—is it the normal pattern of consultation to have a meeting to discuss such issues? Given the complexity and the importance of the issues to be dealt with on this aspect of the consultation, I am sure that the Law Society and the Law Society of Scotland would desire such a meeting.

My Lords, I believe that consultations take place in different ways and at different times. However, I can see no objection to meetings between the organisations mentioned by the noble Lord and the Home Office. Indeed, I believe that such meetings would be helpful. I am grateful to the noble Lord.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his reply on various issues. As he stated, it is extremely important for full consultation to take place with such organisations as the BMA on the code of practice. Indeed, serious issues are raised concerning the National Health Service and its Internet service providers. It is crucial that the doctor/patient relationship is preserved. It is also crucial that any worries they have do not stop doctors using the Internet, which is of enormous value to them. It would be dangerous and bad for the National Health Service, and for doctors and patients if, as a result of concerns about the use of confidential material, they stopped using the Internet. That is a concern which I realise the Minister took on board. However, I hope that he will take it back to his colleagues in the Department of Health and that there will be full consultation.

I turn to the remarks made about Scottish law. I am standing in for my noble and learned friend Lord Fraser of Carmyllie. I have to admit to being half-Scottish. However, I should not dream of trying to become even half a lawyer. I am a pale shadow of my noble and learned friend. I am grateful for the remarks the Minister made on those amendments. I wish that I knew enough about Scottish law to come back to him on various points. However, I shall have to retire, thank him for his response and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 18:

Page 56, line 21, leave out ("putting it into") and insert ("disclosing it in").

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for taking into account the arguments which I passed on to him, for finding an elegant solution to the problem raised and for explaining the problem so much more eloquently than I did.

moved Amendment No. 19:

My Lords, I seek only to emphasise what my noble friend Lord Lucas said. We are all keen to reduce the number of occasions on which keys are required for a variety of reasons which we have discussed on previous occasions. That is why Amendment No. 19 is desirable, or something along those lines. My only hesitation is that I am not sure that what is sought to be done by Amendment No. 19 cannot be achieved by a less formal means than changing the statute. Subject to that, an obligation to prove the correctness of the plain text may help in some cases.

My Lords, as the noble Lord will appreciate, this amendment takes us back to an earlier discussion. Again, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, for his earlier suggestions. That is probably as far as I can go on Amendment No. 19, but I can be more encouraging on Amendment No. 20.

As we continue to state, where the authorities are dealing with an entirely legitimate organisation which is not, of itself, of security concern or suspected of involvement in any criminality, requiring the disclosure of the plain text—rather than a key—will be the norm. That is similar to what happens now when, for example, the police need to approach a bank for information stored electronically. They rely on the bank's integrity and, where necessary, use them as witnesses. We envisage the same sort of scenario over encrypted material. So when the authorities are dealing with a legitimate organisation it seems to us unnecessary to stipulate that evidence be obtained attesting to the accuracy of the disclosed information.

So if the provision is unnecessary for legitimate organisations, we must ask when it might be of use. We do not believe it would be appropriate where notices are served on persons or organisations who are suspected of being involved in criminality, for obvious reasons. Let me reiterate a couple of points I made on Report.

First, if someone is a suspected criminal, it does not seem to us to be appropriate to trust that person to go and prove, presumably by means of a third party, the authenticity of the relevant plain text. Secondly, there is also the timing point. There may be critical timing considerations involved in a specific investigation. An additional evidential stage or test would mean time taken up for compliance, for reviewing the evidence supplied and for responding to the view taken of the evidence. We really do not see how all of that can be built into the procedure without potentially damaging the effectiveness of the Part III power. I am sure there are few in your Lordships' House who want to undermine an effective and coherent approach to investigation. It would cast the investigating agency into an uncomfortable quasi-judicial role as reviewer of evidence.

Amendment No. 20 would further restrict the cases where a key must be disclosed. I understand entirely the spirit behind the amendment and to a large degree share the intent. I hope by now noble Lords will acknowledge our sympathy with this aim. We have done what we can, even to the extent of recently tabling amendments to bolster the principle that plain text is the norm. I am therefore genuinely sorry to have to oppose this amendment.

The amendment would apply to the person who has the protected information in his possession and a key to that information, but not all the keys necessary to produce plain text. The noble Lord would allow the person to seek the assistance of the person who has the missing key and by that means to deliver plain text.

I hope that those arrangements would normally apply. But as I explained on Report, we cannot allow the recipient of a notice as of right to tell someone else about the Section 49 notice, whether to seek assistance or for some other reason. That is because the notice may contain a secrecy requirement. On the other hand, where there are no operational reasons for preventing that sort of disclosure, I agree that it should be allowed.

This afternoon I give an undertaking that we will expressly make that point in the code of practice. I realise that that may not entirely satisfy the noble Lord's second amendment. However, it may be a neater and ultimately more effective way of achieving what the noble Lord is seeking. I trust with that explanation the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful for the last point made by the Minister. At this stage we should accept the Government's decision on the other matters. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

[Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.]

[Amendment No. 20 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 21:

moved Amendment No. 22:

My Lords, perhaps I may begin by picking up the Minister's final point. In that way, I can at least have the benefit of the thoughts of my colleagues on the Front Bench on my thoughts, and that might give me some guidance. I turn, first, to my Amendment No. 27. It seems to me that the procedures of this House are in the hands of the House. It is always possible for this House to do what it wants. If the noble Lord would care to indicate what amendment he would like to see, I am sure that with the agreement of the House nemine dissentiente, as the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor said the other day, we could find some way of putting such a provision into the Bill.

However, if that is not possible, the sensible way to deal with the matter is to pass the amendment. The noble Lord could then set it right this afternoon in the other place. Either way, it seems to me that it is a very important reassurance for those companies that will be studying this Bill to know that it is not a seven-day delay. There is much opportunity for things to go wrong and for the situation to be made difficult during a seven-day period, whereas, if the reference is immediate or, in effect, immediate, people will feel pretty confident that the judgment of the commissioner will be the one that holds sway. With the commissioner being an independent judicial figure, I believe that that will give people a great deal of comfort.

I believe, therefore, that my amendment is important. It will cause the Chief Whip a minor inconvenience as regards this Bill making a brief reappearance in this Chamber, to general approbation, sometime tomorrow or, perhaps, the following day. Other than that, it should cause little inconvenience to get this part of the Bill right. In my view, it would make a great contribution to the overall effect of the Bill, as far as concerns the major players on the Internet.

With that in view, I have a few further questions for the Minister in the context of these amendments. First, am I right in thinking that the circumstances under which the Government envisage requiring keys come under two headings only, which might be called "trust" and "timeliness"—in other words, the first is the situation where they do not trust the person to provide plain text, and the second is where they need the information fast? Am I correct in thinking that those are the only two circumstances in which the Government envisage requiring such keys?

Secondly, on looking at the amendments that we have made to the Bill, it seems to me that the Government have an opportunity in another place to address the defect which both sides of the House seem to agree exists and which formed the subject of the amendment that I lost earlier. There is a route under Clause 49 for keys to be demanded that does not trigger the safeguards that now exist in Clause 51. I believe that a simple change to the references at the beginning of Clause 51 would put the matter right. I am sure that I could not draft it "on the fly" myself, but if the Government are willing, they will have the opportunity to do this in another place. I should, therefore, very much like to know from the Government whether they agree that this lacuna exists. I also hope that they will agree that it might be put right by such an amendment.

My Lords, I shall speak, first, to the main amendment in this group, Amendment No. 26. It is good that an element of judicial oversight has been brought into the question of the disclosure of keys. It has been one of the most difficult and criticised aspects throughout our debates on the Bill that government agencies were acquiring the rights to require other people to give them keys.

That requirement has gradually been narrowed down a little during the proceedings on the Bill—notch by notch, as it were—and the safeguards have been increased. I have in mind, in particular, the new safeguard that keys shall be asked for only by direction of a chief officer of police, or the equivalent officer in Customs and Excise. Nevertheless, it was still the police who were going to make the decision. There are occasions when the time-scale would probably make that necessary and essential; for example, when terrorism and other types of very serious crime are being investigated. But, at the same time, for the police to approve such a requirement without any immediate oversight seems to be a disadvantage. Therefore, it seems to me that making the chief constable report to the commissioner that he has given such permission is an extremely important safeguard. That is particularly so when we consider the later amendments—Amendments Nos. 38, 39 and 40—which make it clear that the commissioner can make a report to the Prime Minister at any time.

A chief constable, an equivalent officer from Customs and Excise, or whoever, may require such a key. On learning about this a few days later, the commissioner may think that the officer concerned should not have done so in the particular circumstances. The fact that the commissioner can then report immediately to the Prime Minister that such action has taken place is a great reassurance. I think that will mean that in doubtful cases chief officers of police will obtain clearance in advance from the commissioner before requiring a key.

The commissioner will also be in a position to observe whether a pattern is developing in this regard, perhaps within a particular force or within the Customs and Excise. If he noticed several requests for keys, he could report that to the Prime Minister. It would take a determined chief officer of police not to think carefully before continuing with that course of action. More immediate judicial oversight is likely to prove more effective than the annual report of the commissioner—which, inevitably, is issued well after the event—in ensuring that keys are demanded only in special circumstances. This is an extremely important and welcome concession from the Government with regard to keys.

I turn to Amendment No. 27 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas, which seeks to speed up the giving of the notification to as soon as possible, and not longer than seven days, after the giving of the direction to which it relates. That is a highly desirable amendment. I accept that it may not be perfectly drafted. It is always possible for amateurs such as my noble friend and myself to overlook some legal point when drafting amendments. I am sure that if the Government and the House wished, we could put that matter right straight away. I hope that the Minister will suggest that. The amendments seem to me to constitute an extremely valuable additional safeguard with regard to the most sensitive aspect of the Bill; namely, demands for keys.

My Lords, the Minister has made some important and welcome concessions. My noble friend Lord Lucas may be only an amateur but he is a gifted one in this regard. The Minister has suggested that my noble friend's amendment cannot be accepted on procedural grounds. However, the amendment could be referred to the other place, should that be the will of the House.

My Lords, we on these Benches concur entirely with what has been said by the noble Lords, Lord Lucas and Lord Cope of Berkeley. I suppose that there is a curiosity to see whether or not the reporting requirement to the chief surveillance commissioner on the one hand and the intelligence services commissioner on the other is sufficient. However, I fully accept that there is a right to report to the Prime Minister. In the light of experience Parliament may want to review whether there should be any further embellishment of that requirement and whether the relevant commissioner should have to refer the matter to a High Court judge with the matter in issue being, in effect, suspended until that occurs. Subject to that question mark, we are entirely in support of what is a crucial amendment to one of the heartland provisions of the whole Bill.

My Lords, I am not the world's greatest expert on procedure but the Companion states that manuscript amendments are not permitted at Third Reading and that the principal purposes of amendments at Third Reading are to clarify any remaining uncertainties, to improve the drafting and to enable the Government to fulfil undertakings given at an earlier stage of the Bill.

I fully accept the spirit in which the noble Lord's amendment is moved. However, it introduces an element of contradiction. Our amendments have imposed a duty on chief constables to notify the judicial commissioner of the giving of a direction within seven days of the giving of that direction. The noble Lord wants to tighten that time-scale to as soon as possible after the giving of the direction. We argue that that is not necessary. It would constitute bad policing and poor management to hold back a notification for longer than is necessary. We believe that the duty on chief officers is as robust as that which the noble Lord seeks. The wording that the noble Lord suggests might delay matters. Therefore, I cannot accept an amendment that is outside the procedures of the House. As I said, it is not necessary.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, does the noble Lord accept that, should the House accept my noble friend's amendment, that amendment would then be considered in the other place and it would be open to Members of the other place to amend my noble friend's amendment to correct the drafting problems which the Minister has mentioned and we could all live happily ever after?

My Lords, does the Minister agree that if the amendment has been accepted it is within the procedure of the House? To say that the amendment is outside the procedure of the House is wrong and contrary to the rules of the House.

My Lords, the point I tried to make when I said that the amendment was outside the procedure of the House is that if the noble Lord were to rewrite the amendment, it would be a manuscript amendment. However, I also questioned whether the amendment is necessary. I said that I fully accept the spirit behind the amendment. I also thought that I made it plain that we do not feel that it is necessary to include the amendment in the Bill as we can include it in an appropriate form in the code of practice. The code of practice will be an important measure, particularly in regard to interpreting legislation. As I say, we cannot accept a defective amendment and we cannot, as it were, spirit up a manuscript amendment and accept it simply because we feel that that is the right thing to do. Amendments should be properly circulated to enable them to be fully debated.

My Lords, what action would the Minister take if the House accepted the amendment?

My Lords, it is for the House to decide whether to accept the amendment. If the amendment were to be accepted, we would have to advise the other place that we considered the amendment to be defective. We would invite the other place to reconsider it and suggest a more appropriate wording.

Earlier the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, referred to the matters of trust and timeliness. I readily confirm that those are precisely the values which we seek. We see no reason why anything else should be the case. I hope that I have answered the noble Lord's point.

I am pleased with the debate that has taken place with regard to the Government's amendments. We think that we have the balance right. We have an element of judicial involvement. As the noble Lord, Lord Cope, has rightly acknowledged, it would be foolish for law enforcement officers to ignore the reference to a judicial commissioner, particularly where the latter was concerned by the pattern of events.

We feel that we have got an appropriate level of authorisation. I am pleased that there is an acceptance of that. I ask your Lordships to reject the noble Lord's amendment; it would be wrong and inappropriate if it were to be agreed to. I urge the House to accept the government amendments in the spirit in which they have been moved and agreed.

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, has he any reply to the other question I asked about whether he accepts that there is a lacuna in Clause 49, which allows keys to be obtained without going through Clause 51 procedures? Does he intend to see anything done about that in another place?

My Lords, I am not sure that I do accept that a lacuna exists. I shall take the point away and give it further consideration. That is the best way I can leave it today.

moved Amendment No. 23:

moved Amendment No. 24:

My Lords, I, too, welcome the amendment. No doubt we will in due course accept the government amendment; to my mind, too, its drafting is rather better.

I have one question for the Minister. The noble Lord will recall that on Report we debated, as my noble friend said, the interaction of key disclosure provisions with confidentiality requirements from other jurisdictions. As I understood the noble Lord's response, it is not unreasonable to suppose that such obligations will always be compromised to some extent by national rules requiring disclosure of information. I can understand that; I have no problem with it. But this argument does not address the point that it remains possible for the disclosure of a key to compromise the confidentiality of information that is wholly unconnected to that which is subject to the notice.

Of necessity, this class of information would not be subject to a statutory obligation of disclosure. In effect, cross-jurisdiction obligations of confidentiality would be breached without any legal defence. It is perhaps to state the obvious that this has the capacity to create considerable legal uncertainty about the regime among the international business community—and that, in turn, could have serious consequences on the competitiveness of the UK as a centre for e-business and financial services.

Are the Government entirely satisfied that the current provisions on the face of the Bill and in their amendment are free from the legal uncertainty to which I have referred? I should welcome any comment the Minister can make to relieve my anxieties.

My Lords, this matter continues to be of concern to industry. A brief from the London Investment Bankers Association refers to,

"the particular concerns of our Members about the interaction with other confidentiality requirements to which they are subject in other countries, particularly where disclosure of a key could compromise the confidentiality of information (with possible criminal consequences) which is not the subject of a Section 49 notice".

We have debated this issue many times, but industry is concerned that the transfer of a key will open up doubts about confidentiality, particularly for the members of the London Investment Bankers Association, who have wide and very confidential international responsibilities.

My Lords, I shall be popping up on several occasions in the hope that the message will wing its way from the box to the Minister to deal with the back end of the amendment that we lost. My understanding of what the Minister said at that time is, yes, there is a lacuna in the Bill; yes, if the police, or whoever, were in possession of protected information that they were not prepared to reveal to the subject of the notice, they could force a disclosure of a key; and that disclosure would not be subject to the Clause 51 safeguards. If that is the case, then this amendment is all very well but it will not achieve anything because there is a great, gaping hole in the Bill around the side of it.

I should like to know at some stage whether I have completely misconstrued the Bill and what the Minister said, or whether there is a problem and we should be looking at ways of dealing with it.

My Lords, we are at Third Reading and we are dealing with amendments tabled for Third Reading; we are not at Committee stage. I shall reply to the amendment moved properly by the noble Lord, Lord Cope, and suggest why our amendment is to be preferred. Some background questions have been asked. Whether they should have been asked is another matter—but they have been and I shall do my best to respond to them.

As far as concerns Amendment No. 24, we are all on the same side. We can see exactly what the noble Lord is trying to get at. He is trying explicitly to include in considerations of proportionality any considerations related to the potential impact on a business. We do not think that his amendment is in the correct place in Clause 51. We believe our amendment will achieve the same effect by amending subsection (5) of Clause 51. He is quite right, the word "reputation" does not appear in our amendment as it does in his. That is because we believe the value of the reputation in this context lies in its value for business. I ask the noble Lord very gently if he will consider withdrawing his amendment in favour of ours, which I should like to move next in our proceedings.

The point made by the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, concerns information other than the protected information which is covered by a key. That danger led to Clause 51(5), which was inserted at the instigation of the noble Earl, Lord Liverpool. We are as confident as we can be in relation to the matters mentioned by the noble Earl. We know that there are concerns from a business point of view. We have met them as best we can. But I really do not feel that Third Reading is the time to go over matters that were debated fully and properly at the Committee stage.

My Lords, I rise only briefly to express my regret—

My Lords, we are at Third Reading and the rules of Report stage prevail. I am looking to the Table to see whether I am right about that. The last thing I want to do is to stop the noble Earl speaking, but those are the rules.

My Lords, as between the two amendments—the government amendment and my amendment—I am convinced by the Government's case. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

moved Amendment No. 25:

moved Amendment No. 26:

Page 58, line 40, at end insert-