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Lords Chamber

Volume 616: debated on Monday 24 July 2000

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House Of Lords

Monday, 24th July 2000.

The House met at half-past two of the clock: The LORD CHANCELLOR on the Woolsack.

Prayers—Read by the Lord Bishop of Manchester.

Drought Relief

What measures they are taking to relieve the drought in west and south Asia.

My Lords, the Department for International Development has contributed over £3.2 million for drought relief activities in west and south Asia. This support has been channelled through the World Food Programme for its regional operations; through Oxfam, Christian Aid and Tearfund in India; and through Save the Children in Pakistan. DfID also seconded a five-person team of specialists to support the UN in its assessment of the drought in Pakistan. The Government are monitoring the situation carefully and currently considering what further assistance to provide.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. However, does she not agree that damage through drought is caused at least as much by the absence of a local water harvesting strategy and infrastructure? Is DfID doing anything about that?

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that water shortages, which are partly the result of low rainfall, have been exacerbated by poor management of limited resources and by overpopulation. That is why our funding so far has been carefully targeted to agencies that seek to address some of these longer term issues. For example, in India we support cash and food for work schemes where local communities are employed to rehabilitate traditional water harvesting structures. International NGOs working on the provision of safe and adequate drinking water, fodder for livestock and health issues have also been supported.

My Lords, I am glad that the noble Baroness mentioned India. Does she agree—I am sure she does—that an unprecedented number of droughts and associated famines, and often floods, too, are occurring and that Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and other states of India are a particularly cruel example? All over Asia we are seeing droughts on an enormous scale—in China, North Korea, south Pakistan, Afghanistan and many other places. While it is not possible for governments to solve those problems, does the noble Baroness accept that water management, and the politics and technology of water management, are becoming the central issue in development tasks and in development policy? Will she assure us that our support for water management advances and for research into water technology is strongly focused to meet this new and vast area of tragedy to which there is no immediate solution?

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that we must take the whole issue of water management and environmental sustain ability extremely seriously. That is why we have given resources to assist developing countries in assessing their vulnerability to natural disasters. We plan to reduce that vulnerability through sustainable environmental and economic management. This is an approach we have taken for some time and will continue to take.

My Lords, what steps are taken to ensure that the relief reaches those for whom it is intended? How far is the human rights record of the domestic government taken into account? For example, in Afghanistan are any conditions imposed on the domestic government?

My Lords, noble Lords will recall that we have previously discussed in this Chamber the human rights record not only of Afghanistan but of other countries where we give humanitarian assistance. We make a distinction between the giving of humanitarian assistance in crisis situations and our long-term bilateral programmes where we are much more careful about supporting governments committed to pro-poor policies and to long-term economic development. As regards Afghanistan, we have had some difficulty working with NGOs on the ground. The security situation in Afghanistan also presents us with some difficulty. However, some funds are being channelled through the World Food Programme.

My Lords, I declare a broad interest covering water in the Middle East. Why does Britain fail, through lack of ECGD support, to promote British technology for providing developing countries with water supplies, in contrast to the support given in other European Union countries?

My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble Viscount that we fail to give support to countries which need assistance in terms of water management and resource development. The whole area of environmental sustainability is one we have taken extremely seriously. Through our development programme we have prioritised that area of work in many of the countries we are now discussing.

My Lords, the noble Baroness knows of my interest in Plan International and therefore I shall not declare that interest yet again. Is she aware that in India NGOs such as Plan must work with a local partner and that the Indian Government will not allow many of them to work independently? Does that make any difference to the aid given by DfID? Is India the only country where that occurs?

My Lords, I do not think that India is the only country in which NGOs are expected to work with a local partner. I shall certainly write to the noble Baroness having made further investigations into the matter. We are working through NGOs because we are very keen to ensure that the resources that we contribute to assist in the drought get to the local communities. That is often the best way to be effective.

Rail Fares And Station Parking Charges

2.42 p.m.

Whether recent increases in fares and car parking charges on the railways are consistent with the objectives of their integrated transport strategy.

The Minister of State, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Lord Macdonald of Tradeston)

My Lords, under the Railways Act 1993 the franchising director has powers to regulate rail fares. Key fares—approximately 40 per cent of fares—have been capped at 1 per cent below the rate of inflation. Her Majesty's Government are committed to increasing rail use by 50 per cent by 2010. We are looking to train operators to play their part by setting the price of unregulated fares and car parking charges accordingly.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that Answer. He has raised the question of unregulated fares. Is he aware that the fare from Liverpool to London has quadrupled since privatisation? Is he further aware that restrictions on when one can turn up and travel—supersavers, cheap day returns and so on—have been altered in such a way that they no longer suit many passengers? Does the Minister have any way of dealing with this problem, which offsets many of the advantages achieved in other parts of the rail network and the rail fares system? In particular, has he considered referring the issue to the competition authorities?

My Lords, I should point out that 70 per cent of passenger journeys by rail are made with discounted fares. Since privatisation, in the four years from 1995–96 to 1998–99, the increase in standard class fares of 9 per cent was against an inflation rate in RPI of 9 per cent. Therefore there has been no real increase. Those figures take us until March of last year and will be updated in October of this year. We welcome the proposal of the Association of Train Operating Companies to band the 90 ticket types into six generic groupings to make the current fares structure easier to understand. We are talking to the Shadow Strategic Rail Authority about future fares regulation in the light of the current franchise replacement process.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that at stations on the Hereford to Paddington line there has been an increase in car parking charges, a reduction of space and capacity for cars, and a universal refusal to install CCTV cameras, despite evidence of theft and vandalism at those stations—allegedly because there is not enough money to install them? Does the Minister agree that CCTV cameras at station car parks should be a standard service for the benefit of car owners?

My Lords, unlike fares, there are no provisions in the franchising agreements in relation to car parking charges. The previous government instructed the franchising director to let franchises in a way which left maximum scope for initiative, with requirements no more burdensome than necessary. However, the franchising director is seeking improvements in many areas, including asking operators to put additional security patrols on trains and in car parks, and to look at the provision of CCTV at stations and car parks.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the case for subsidised station car parks as a congenial and cost-effective way of relieving congestion has been made ever since the Buchanan report? Should we therefore conclude that this is one of those cases which is too sensible ever to get attention?

My Lords, we are giving attention to the matter. Indeed, recently in the South West, a proposal from a train operating company to put up car parking charges encountered great local resistance and the charges were subsequently reduced.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that it should be a condition on the franchisee that car parking charges are not hiked by 60 per cent—as happened recently at Reading—and that car parks are not let out to local offices? Cannot those measures be incorporated in the new franchises?

My Lords, we can certainly examine the issue. It is not proposed that the franchising director should regulate car parking charges directly under the provisions of the Transport Bill. However, it is expected that there will be reasonable commercial and contractual incentives on operators to keep car parking charges to a minimum. The importance of car parking has been confirmed by the SRA and others as a result of consultation with customers.

My Lords, the whole point of the exercise is to get people to leave their cars at the station and then use a train. Would it not be sensible if the authorities made a regulation to deal with this matter rather than leaving it to the random effects of economic pressure?

My Lords, we shall certainly discuss with the SRA whether it is worth overturning the considerations of the previous administration in this regard. I should also say to the noble Baroness who tabled the Question that we are looking to the rail regulator to keep his eye on rail fares as regards competition.

My Lords, if the Minister and the Government want to administer the detail of railway operation, would not the sensible, effective and moral way of doing so be to renationalise it?

My Lords, after years of rail fragmentation and confusion which are only now coming to an end, it would be very unwise to go into another extended period of dislocation—especially when we are on the verge of investing £60 billion in the railways, which I hope will open up a new era of expansion and increase by 50 per cent the number of people travelling on the railways by 2010.

My Lords, I did not fully understand my noble friend's answer in connection with the competition authorities. Did he say that the competition authorities have no locus with regard to the setting of prices for railway journeys and no locus in regard to dealing with car parks, which in most cases are a monopoly? Is he saying that somehow the legislation was devised so that the competition authorities cannot deal with this subject?

No, my Lords. I am saying that the Rail Regulator is the competent authority concurrent with the Director General of Fair Trading to enforce the provisions of the Competition Act in respect of rail fares. I was also saying, perhaps not clearly enough, that the regulator has received a number of complaints from the public and from Members of Parliament concerning recent fare increases. He takes the matter very seriously in considering whether to take any further action under the Competition Act.

My Lords, did I hear the Minister just now say that "we" are in the process of investing £60 billion in the railways? Do I assume that by "we" he means the Government? Can he say how much of that money is government money and how much of it is private sector money?

My Lords, I said "we" in the context of the partnerships about which the Government are extremely enthusiastic. I should confirm that we will be putting in £15 billion of public investment through the 10-year plan, £11 billion of public resource revenue investment, and we shall look to the private sector to come forward with investment of £34 billion.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that on previous occasions when the railways have faced significant increases in demand the reaction of the government of the day—of both parties—was to encourage the industry to choke off demand by putting up prices well above the rate of inflation? Can we be sure that, with the 10-year plan and the very welcome commitment to the 50 per cent increase in passenger usage, the rail companies will not be allowed to rip off the customers and will be required to invest in new facilities and new capacity?

My Lords, we will certainly not encourage any traditional habits of pricing customers off the railway in that way. In fact the RPI-1 formula is in place for the next three years. I should also remind noble Lords that since 1974 real income has increased by 185 per cent, whereas the cost of travelling by rail has increased up by 150 per cent. However, the total cost of travelling by car has remained at 100 per cent. So we wish to make rail and indeed bus travel more competitive against car travel.

European Union: Enhanced Co-Operation

2.52 p.m.

Why they are opposed to Franco-German proposals for enhanced co-operation within the European Union, and whether they will in future support proposals to allow those countries that wish to integrate at a faster speed within the European Union to decide that for themselves.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
(Baroness Scotland of Asthal)

My Lords, enhanced, or closer, co-operation has been possible since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty. We are not opposed to it and recognise that in an enlarged EU it may prove useful. The Amsterdam IGC also agreed certain conditions governing the use of enhanced co-operation intended to ensure that it protected the coherence of the EU, in particular the single market. The issue for the IGC is whether those conditions are too restrictive. We will examine proposals for change carefully.

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for that reply. Can she say what harm to British interests could conceivably result from France and Germany, for example, introducing a carbon tax or harmonising their corporation tax rate or co-operating on environmental matters, provided these did not cut across legislation on the single market? Is it not the case that Europe, with the Danish opt-outs, the British opt-outs and with the Schengen agreement, is already a multi-speed, variable geometry Europe? Is it not time that the Foreign Office stopped its obsession with so-called "influence" and "dining at the top table", and, if I may mix my metaphors, stopped behaving generally like a dog in the manger?

My Lords, I am surprised that the noble Lord should so describe Her Majesty's Government. It is not a description which I recognise or with which I could possibly agree. The noble Lord will know well that closer co-operation was set out in Amsterdam. The reason that those conditions were attached was so that there would be coherence within the Union. The noble Lord will know that the Government are committed to enlargement. We are one of the countries leading the way in relation to that matter. It is extremely important to those countries that wish to join Europe that they know exactly what they are joining. For that reason we do look at the conditions that were attached at Amsterdam. It is a new structure. We should like to wait to see how matters develop. But it is right to say that this matter is being talked about.

My Lords, perhaps I may ask my noble friend to beware of any proposals that come from the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, on European Union matters, whether they are faster or slower. Does she not agree that the idea in principle of allowing, in an enlarged community, non-qualified majority voting so that member states could do precisely as they wished would create the kind of chaos the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, might like but which would not be sensible in a serious European Union?

My Lords, I cannot but respectfully agree with my noble friend. We would wish to see a Europe functioning at its best. We believe that the system is there to allow that to happen. This Government are determined that Britain should remain relevant, as opposed to becoming increasingly irrelevant.

My Lords, is it not the case that subsidiarity is becoming ever more important, particularly with enlargement of the EU? Should that not apply at every level, from the region upwards? In anticipating the next Question, might it not help to prevent over-legislation at Westminster?

My Lords, subsidiarity is of course a matter of importance. But Her Majesty's Government feel, and with force, that we have to create in Europe a fair playing field for all countries so that we know the way in which we are going and the conditions which apply to all of us.

My Lords, is it not the case that the real agenda of many Conservative Euro-sceptics is to take the UK out of the European Union altogether? On the question of subsidiarity, is it not outrageous that they are quick to accuse Brussels of a breach of subsidiarity but at the same time involve themselves in the domestic affairs of Denmark by interfering in Denmark's euro referendum?

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness that it is a matter of great concern to hear reports of such interference. If it is happening, it is right that we should deplore it.

My Lords, can the Minister give one example of co-operation, enhanced or otherwise, in the European Union by the previous government? Does she agree with me that Britain's entry into and exit from the exchange rate mechanism perhaps provides a lamentable example?

My Lords, I would love to agree wholeheartedly with my noble friend. I must confess that I cannot immediately think of one example, but I am sure that noble Lords opposite may have a longer memory than mine.

My Lords, to pick up the expression of my noble friend Lord Lamont, is it not time that the British dog got out of the federalist manger? If we were to allow those who wish to create a federal Europe—certainly the German foreign minister is among them—to get on with it, among those countries that wish to do so, we could then exact a price in terms of the reorganisation of the Community which would accelerate the entry of the central European countries and others and allow us to regain control of, for example, our own agricultural policy.

My Lords, the noble Lord is talking about a century which has now gone. The Government are committed to the future and to reality. They remain centred on that. Britain's interests are best placed with Europe. As long as this Government remain in office, that is where we will be.

My Lords, is it not the case that if there had been more enhanced co-operation between France and Germany over the past 130 years we would all have been saved a great deal of trouble? In the forthcoming IGC and in regard to the Treaty of Nice, should not the attitude of the Government be relaxed and flexible towards these bilateral links that other European powers may wish and these pioneering ideas which may or may not carry European integration forward? I suspect that in some cases it will be backwards. What about the alliances that we should be forming with other European countries? Should we not be much more supportive towards, for instance, Poland and the other applicant states, which are now becoming increasingly disillusioned by enlargement and threatening the entire movement towards greater European integration?

My Lords, as I have already said, closer co-operation is possible under the conditions laid down in the Amsterdam Treaty. The noble Lord knows that we are encouraging Poland and the other applicant states to join. That situation will continue.

Regional Government

3 p.m.

What is their intended timetable for the introduction of elected regional government in England.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
(Lord Whitty)

My Lords, no timetable has yet been drawn up for moving to directly elected regional government in England. We remain committed to do so where there is support demonstrated in referendums. In the meantime, governance in the regions is evolving through the work of the regional chambers, regional development agencies, government offices and others at the regional, sub-regional and local levels.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. He has confirmed that the amount of governance and decision-making undertaken at regional level is already high and is increasing. Is it not the case that the bureaucracy which is developing needs to be matched by equivalent democracy in order to make it legitimate? Furthermore, is the Minister aware of the increasing impatience and envy of people throughout all the regions of the north of England when they see the considerable amount of local decision-making now available in Wales, Scotland and, indeed, Greater London? There is a limit, I suggest, to the patience of those living in the North. The sooner that a timetable can be provided, the better.

My Lords, I recognise some of what the noble Lord says. Many people in the northern regions wish to see some movement towards a greater degree of accountability of regional government in their areas. That is not necessarily the same as the demands that have been made in Scotland and Wales or, indeed, in Greater London. We are looking at possible solutions that will suit each region. For that reason, the regional chambers and others within each region are considering possible constitutional settlements. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, was involved in the North West constitutional convention which recently brought forward its interim report.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that the northern region has not only set the pace in this matter, but has also set an excellent example in how regional government ought to be implemented? If, as I understand, the policy is to be implemented region by region, can the Minister give an assurance that, in view of what has been achieved so far in the northern regions, every possible help will be given by the Government to encourage full implementation as soon as possible?

My Lords, I recognise, as I have recognised on previous occasions, that developments in some northern regions have moved somewhat ahead of those elsewhere. I believe that the North West is now catching up with speed. The detailed work: undertaken by local government and business within the northern regions must be taken into account when the Government decide on their priorities for regional government. Whether the model that has been developed in the North East is directly applicable elsewhere, is, I believe, a matter for each region to consider. However, the work that has been completed will be fully recognised.

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the boundaries of the new regions were agreed with the European Union? If that is the case, would he admit that it may be at least a twinkle in the eye of Brussels that any new regionally elected assemblies should end up reporting to our European masters, thus making Westminster more redundant than even our colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches would like?

My Lords, the fevered imagination of the noble Lord as regards all things European never ceases to impress. The development of more regional government and the other elements of devolution and local decision-making which are supported and will continue to be supported by this Government are matters of British and English democracy. They are not determined by Brussels and are not relevant to any ambitions held in Brussels or elsewhere. If put in place, they will reflect the desires of English people in their own regions.

My Lords, I should declare an interest as a trustee of the Joseph Rowntree reform trust which supports the campaign for English regions. Last week we heard announcements regarding the spending review and transport plans until 2010. Bearing in mind the incredible increase in resources to be made available to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and, in particular as regards transport to London, is it not the case that not to have established any form of timetable suggests a somewhat pedestrian approach to the Question put by my noble friend Lord Greaves?

My Lords, allocations made in the SR 2000 announcement and those concerning the 10-year plan for transport, which relate to my own department, will greatly benefit all regions in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Some decisions, relating, for example, to future transport proposals, should, indeed, be taken at the regional level. The pace of change is not determined by the Government or by announcements made by the Chancellor. The pace is determined by the people of the regions themselves.

My Lords, as the immediate past chairman of the North West Regional Assembly, perhaps I may thank the Minister for his comments on the progress being made. Does my noble friend agree that the most important process which now needs to be developed is that of ensuring that a proper debate takes place? This issue is not much talked about among ordinary people in the North West, or even in the North East. Does my noble friend agree that more needs to be done to help local people understand how a system of devolved, elected regional assembly will benefit them?

My Lords, I agree entirely with my noble friend. I was slightly cautious when the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, in raising the initial Question, implied that this is a matter of priority that is debated in every pub and club throughout the northern regions. The reality is that only a limited number of people have addressed the issue. I believe that more should be encouraged to do so. Indeed, as my noble friend stated, the next stage should be to develop a wider public debate.

Business

3.6 p.m.

My Lords, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m., my noble friend the Leader of the House will, with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement which is being made in another place on the G8 Summit. The Statement is likely to be taken immediately after the grouping of amendments to the Local Government Bill that commences with Amendment No. 10.

Protection Of Animals (Amendment) Bill

Brought from the Commons; read a first time, and to be printed.

Warm Homes And Energy Conservation Bill

Brought from the Commons; read a first time, and to be printed.

Business Of The House: Disqualifications Bill

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Leader of the House, I beg to move the Motion standing in her name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That Standing Order 49 (Commons Bills, if not taken up in twelve sitting days, to be dropped and not to be further proceeded with except after eight days' notice) be dispensed with to allow the Second Reading of the Disqualifications Bill to be taken on Thursday next.—(Lord Carter.)

My Lords, I am grateful to the Government Chief Whip for moving this Motion standing in the name of his noble friend the Leader of the House. I saw that she was present in the Chamber a moment ago. Perhaps she slipped away to do something more important.

The Opposition have given their approval to taking the Disqualifications Bill on Thursday afternoon. However, can the Chief Whip explain why this Motion is necessary and why eight days' warning was not given to the House? After all, this is a piece of legislation which since January has been languishing in the black hole of the legislative dustbin in this House.

My Lords, I believe that the Leader of the Opposition knows that a Standing Order of this kind has not been used since 1980. Indeed, I had the privilege of serving with the group charged to revise the Companion. The members wondered whether this Standing Order was still required, but apparently that is the case.

It was last used on 1st August 1980, a year when the House finally rose for the Summer Recess on 8th August 1980. The Standing Order is required because we received notice about it only at the end of the last week. I am sure noble Lords will appreciate that the timing of Bills relating to Northern Ireland is always sensitive. The Government have sought to take this Bill forward at a time when it was felt that it would be most helpful to the process taking place in Northern Ireland. It was agreed that it would be best to take the Second Reading before the Summer Recess. The only way in which that could be done was to table the Motion before the House today.

My Lords, I am not sure that I understand the Government Chief Whip correctly. Did he mean to say that the last time that this Standing Order was set aside was in 1980? I suppose that he takes some comfort from that; but I do not. It is extraordinary that we should be setting aside the order purely for the convenience of Her Majesty's Government, who have made a mess of their legislative programme. If they do so, that is their problem, but we should not alter the Standing Orders of the House to make it easier for an incompetent administration to shove through more legislation.

My Lords, I welcome the words of the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, that the Conservative Party was prepared to agree to this Motion being passed. Unlike the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, I do not think it is a question of incompetence. What the noble Lord, Lord Carter, has said is manifestly sensible. It is desirable to have this matter dealt with on Thursday at a time when we shall be dealing with Northern Ireland business.

My Lords, that is exactly the position. We are merely suspending the Standing Order; we are not exactly doing away with it. It was the intention to take the Second Reading of the Bill in the overspill. It became apparent towards the end of last week that, as part of the sensitivity of the Northern Ireland process, it would be helpful if the Second Reading were taken before the Summer Recess. I am extremely grateful to the Official Opposition and the Liberal Democrats for their assistance.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Standing Orders (Private Business)

My Lords, I beg to move the Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That the Standing Orders relating to Private Business be amended as follows:

Table of Fees
  • Line 2, leave out "£3,500" and insert "£4,000"
  • Line 3, leave out "£3,500" and insert "£4,000"
  • Line 23, leave out "£3,500" and insert "£4,000"
  • Line 29, leave out "£1,750" and insert "£2,000"
  • Line 36, leave out "£1,750" and insert "£2,000"
  • Line 41, leave out "£1.40" and insert "£1.60"—(The Chairman of Committees.)
On Question, Motion agreed to.

Sea Fishing Grants (Charges) Bill

Read a third time, and passed.

Local Government Bill Hl

3.12 p.m.

My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments be now considered.

Moved, That the Commons amendments be now considered.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

Commons Amendments

[ The page and line refer to Bill 87 as first printed for the Commons.]

Commons Amendments

1 Clause 2, page 2, line 8, leave out from ("to") to end of line 10 and insert ("their strategy under section 4")

2 Clause 4, page 3, line 6, leave out ("is to have power to") and insert ("must")

3 Page 3, line 6, after ("strategy") insert ("(referred to in this section as a community strategy)")

4 Page 3, line 8, at end insert ("and contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in the United Kingdom.

() A local authority may from time to time modify their community strategy.")

5 Page 3, line 9, leave out ("any strategy under this section") and insert ("or modifying their community strategy")

6 Page 3, line 10, leave out ("may consult or") and insert ("must consult and")

7 Page 3, line 16, at end insert —

("() In its application to Wales, this section has effect as if for any reference to the Secretary of State there were substituted a reference to the National Assembly for Wales.")

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1 to 7.

These amendments relate to matters that we discussed in some detail when the Bill was first considered by this House. After considering carefully the views expressed by your Lordships and others, the Government concluded that there should be a requirement on local authorities to have regard to the community strategy when exercising the well-being power. Amendment No. 1 introduces that requirement.

Amendment No. 2 would place authorities under a duty to prepare community strategies. We agree with the arguments that such a duty provides the best way to encourage councils to tackle local problems in a more effective way. We have added to that through Amendment No. 4, so that community strategies will contribute at the local level to achieving sustainable development in the UK.

Amendment No. 6 introduces a requirement for local authorities to consult and seek the participation of such persons as they consider appropriate when preparing a community strategy.

Amendment No. 7 makes it clear that the provision of guidance on community strategies in Wales will be a matter for the National Assembly, not the Secretary of State.

I believe that these amendments reflect concerns expressed in this place and elsewhere at earlier stages. I therefore commend the amendments to the House. I hope that noble Lords will also support the other amendments in the group.

Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 1 to 7.—(Lord Whitty.)

My Lords, we welcome the inclusion of the requirement that the strategy should contribute to sustainable development and to the duty (rather than merely providing a power) on local authorities to prepare an over-arching strategy for well-being and sustainable development.

The Minister will not be surprised that I ask whether he can give any even slightly warm words of reassurance to local authorities in regard to the funding that they may look for in exercising this important new duty. I hope that the Secretary of State will use the opportunity given to him in the Bill to lift the obligation to undertake many other strategies, and that the new strategy will be in its place. Even so, this will be quite an exercise for local authorities. It is one which many will be enthusiastic to undertake; nevertheless, one should not ignore the costs that will be incurred.

My Lords, the noble Baroness will recognise that the increase in available resources indicated by my right honourable friend the Chancellor last week will provide significant sums to local authorities. It is up to local authorities in the main to decide how they apply those funds, within the guidance given by legislation and by the Government. I should therefore expect resources to be adequate for them to be able to carry out the duty laid down in these clauses.

On Question, Motion agreed to.

Commons Amendment

8 Clause 6, page 4, line 12, at end insert—

("(4A) In exercising the power under subsection (1), the Secretary of State—
  • (a) must not make any provision which has effect in relation to Wales unless he has consulted the National Assembly for Wales, and
  • (b) must not make any provision—
  • (i) in relation to legislation made by the National Assembly for Wales, or
  • (ii) which has effect both in relation to Wales and in relation to any enactment to which section (Power to modify enactments concerning plans etc: Wales)(2) applies,
  • without the consent of the Assembly.

    (4B) The National Assembly for Wales may submit proposals to the Secretary of State that the power under subsection (1) should be exercised in relation to Wales in accordance with those proposals.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 8.

    Clause 6 of the Bill confers a power on the Secretary of State by order to amend, repeal, revoke or disapply any enactment, whenever passed or made, which requires a local authority to prepare, produce or publish any plan or strategy relating to any particular matter. I should point out, for the avoidance of doubt, that this power could not be used to change any provisions in Part II of the Bill.

    Amendment No. 9 (which introduces a new clause) and Amendment No. 8 make provision for the exercise of this power by the National Assembly for Wales. In doing so, they seek to balance the Assembly's legitimate desire to have a degree of control over legislation affecting Welsh authorities, while reflecting the basis of the devolution settlement that Parliament retains primacy in relation to primary legislation.

    Amendment No. 8A, tabled by my noble friend Lord Williams of Elvel, is relevant to this issue. With the leave of the House, I should like to invite my noble friend to speak to it.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 8.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No8

    8A That this House do disagree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 8, but do propose the following amendment in lieu thereof—

    Clause 6, page 4, line 12, at end insert—

    ("(4A) In its application to Wales, this section has effect as if for any reference to the Secretary of State there were substituted a reference to the National Assembly for Wales.")

    My Lords, I beg to move, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 8, Amendment No. 8A. My noble friend Lady Farrington has explained the context of the amendment. Clause 4 creates a duty on local authorities to prepare community strategies. The National Assembly for Wales is prepared to give guidance, and is doing so, to local authorities in Wales and to other organisations.

    Given the simpler structure of Wales in terms of local authorities and the smaller scale of the Principality, we believe that community plans will be prepared on a more systematic basis than in England and that they will prove in the end to be more influential.

    Clause 6 is in essence consequential on Clause 4. The amendment to Clause 6 introduced by my noble friend allows the statutory requirements for the plans to be amended over time by the Secretary of State, not by the National Assembly for Wales.

    I gave notice to my noble friend that it is the view of the Welsh Local Government Association that the nature of community planning will develop rather differently in Wales and that, therefore, there is a practical need for the powers of secondary legislation in Clause 6 to be devolved in their entirety to the National Assembly.

    There is an underlying theme. Do the Government believe in devolution to Wales or not? If they do, I very much hope that they will accept my amendment in lieu; if not, I should be glad to hear the reason for it from my noble friend.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 8A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 8, be agreed to.—(Lord Williams of Elvel.)

    My Lords, I thank my noble friend for explaining his amendment. Before I respond, I should like to make absolutely clear that the Government support devolution to Wales. Under the devolution settlement primary legislation remains the reserve of Parliament, as does the approval of any secondary legislation relating to matters that have been reserved to the UK Government. In relation to devolved matters, the National Assembly now draws up and approves its own secondary legislation. For the great majority of secondary legislative powers this distinction works well, but the broad rule of thumb becomes more difficult to operate in relation to so-called Henry VIII powers which, as the House will be aware, enable secondary legislation to be used to change primary legislation. Such powers are found in nearly all legislation, most commonly to enable minor or consequential changes to primary legislation.

    In recent years Parliament has approved Henry VIII powers which allow more wide-ranging changes to primary legislation, and the provisions in the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 and Section 16 of the Local Government Act 1999 are examples of that. Clauses 5 and 6 of this Bill also contain such powers. In legislating for such powers there is the very evident possibility of tension between the wishes and expectations of the Assembly in relation to control over secondary legislation and the sovereignty of Parliament in relation to primary legislation.

    In the great majority of cases, the Assembly exercises the same secondary powers in relation to Wales as the Secretary of State does for England. In Parts II and III of the current Bill, for instance, there are well over 40 powers to make regulations and orders, and in all but one case the National Assembly exercises equivalent powers to the Secretary of State. The exception is in relation to elections which are a reserved matter. Where Henry VIII powers are involved, however, a more sophisticated approach is necessary to balance the respective roles of Parliament and the National Assembly. Our general approach is that where such a power is relatively narrow the Secretary of State and the National Assembly should exercise equivalent powers in relation to it. Clause 42 of this Bill, which provides for incidental, consequential or transitional provisions to primary legislation, is an example of that approach.

    We believe that where wider-ranging powers are involved a more measured approach is necessary. In relation to the very wide-ranging power in Clause 5 the Bill enables the Assembly to propose uses for the power, but the laying of any order under that clause is reserved to the Secretary of State and approval of any such orders is, I stress, reserved to Parliament. In studying this particular aspect of the legislation the Secretary of State needs to seek parliamentary approval.

    In relation to the somewhat narrower Clause 6 power, we have proposed that the Assembly should exercise the powers in that clause in relation to plans concerning policy issues that have been devolved to the National Assembly.

    My Lords, I apologise for intervening. Did my noble friend intend to refer to parliamentary approval or approval by the National Assembly for Wales?

    My Lords, in relation to the retained power to amend primary legislation by order, the Secretary of State must place such orders before Parliament. Therefore, there must be approval by Parliament through the action taken by the Secretary of State.

    If the plans in subsection (2) of the new clause were regarded as the complete list the National Assembly might feel somewhat short-changed. However, the list is not intended to be comprehensive and the Secretary of State has power to add to it by order. We are in the process of identifying which plans should be added to the list. My noble friend is right that the role played by the National Assembly is developing. For example, I would expect plans for children's services and community care plans to be added to the list.

    Unfortunately, my noble friend's Amendment No. 8A seeks to give the National Assembly for Wales unfettered use of the Clause 6 powers and we do not believe that that is right. The range of plans that can be amended using Clause 6 includes reserved as well as devolved matters. For example, there are a number of statutory plans relating to crime, disorder and policing. They are reserved matters and only Parliament should be able to amend legislation that relates to them. Some plans are hybrid, such as best value performance plans. Some of the provisions relating to plans form part of a wider framework of legislation. Best value performance plans provide a good example. The best value provisions at the heart of the Local Government Act 1999 form the basis for the audit, inspection and intervention provisions in that legislation.

    The National Assembly exercises wide powers to regulate and issue guidance on the content of such plans in Wales, and it is right that it should. But the Clause 6 powers would enable the primary legislation relating to such plans to be amended, or even repealed, with significant consequences for provisions elsewhere in the Act. The working of the whole best value framework as approved by Parliament could be subject to significant change. It is our view that such wide-ranging changes to primary legislation should be the preserve of Parliament. As with Clause 5, the Assembly has been given powers to propose any such changes to the Secretary of State, who may then use his Clause 6 powers to seek Parliament's approval of them. Our amendments also safeguard the National Assembly's own legislation, in that the Secretary of State cannot use the Clause 6 powers to change it without the Assembly's consent.

    I apologise for speaking at such length, but I believe that the wider context is important in understanding the specifics of this Bill. The House will recognise that the particular issues that arise in relation to Henry VIII powers and the devolution settlement for Wales are particularly important. Such powers vary from Bill to Bill and the House will want to consider in each case whether the balance that the Government propose between the respective roles of Parliament and the National Assembly is correct. We believe that in relation to Clause 6 Amendments Nos. 8 and 9 moved in the other place strike the right balance, and we invite the House to agree to them. I hope that with the explanation that I have given my noble friend will not feel it necessary to press his amendment.

    My Lords, I am most grateful to my noble friend for her long explanation, which is essential, of the powers of the National Assembly for Wales and the United Kingdom Parliament. I do not disagree with my noble friend. I believe that to a certain extent my noble friend has reinforced the authority of the National Assembly for Wales. I am not sure that my friends in the Principality will be wholly supportive of my noble friend's explanation. Nevertheless, the Minister has gone a long way to calm any disturbance about the provisions of the Commons amendments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment No. 8A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 8, by leave, withdrawn.

    On Question, Commons Amendment No. 8 agreed to.

    3.30 p.m.

    Commons Amendment

    9 After Clause 6, insert the following new clause—

    Power To Modify Enactments Concerning Plans Etc: Wales

    (" .—(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (6), the National Assembly for Wales may by order amend, repeal, revoke or disapply any enactment to which subsection (2) applies so far as that enactment has effect in relation to a local authority in Wales.

    (2) This subsection applies to—

  • (a) section 49(1)(c) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990,
  • (b) section 2 of the Home Energy Conservation Act 1995,
  • (c) section 84(2)(b) of the Environment Act 1995,
  • (d) any other enactment (whenever passed or made) which—
  • (i) requires a local authority to prepare, produce or publish any plan or strategy relating to any particular matter, and
  • (ii) is specified in an order made by the Secretary of State under this subsection.
  • (3) The power under subsection (1) may be exercised in relation to—

  • (a) all local authorities in Wales,
  • (b) particular local authorities in Wales, or
  • (c) particular descriptions of local authority in Wales.
  • (4) The power under subsection (1) may be exercised in relation to a local authority only if the National Assembly for Wales considers—

  • (a) that it is not appropriate for any such enactment as is mentioned in that subsection to apply to the authority, or
  • (b) that any such enactment should be amended so that it operates more effectively in relation to the authority.
  • (5) The power under subsection (1) to amend or disapply an enactment includes a power to amend or disapply an enactment for a particular period.

    (6) An order under subsection (2)(d)(ii) which specifies any enactment may provide that the power under subsection (1) may be exercised in relation to that enactment only if the National Assembly for Wales complies with any conditions specified in the order.

    (7) In this section "enactment" includes an enactment comprised in subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978).")

    My Lords, I spoke to this amendment with Commons Amendment No. 8. I beg to move.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 9.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    10 Leave out Clause 9

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 10. In speaking to Amendment No. 10 I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group and indicate a preliminary view.

    Commons Amendment No. 10 goes to the heart of the Bill. It is the policy that every council must adopt a new constitution giving increased efficiency, transparency and accountability. It was to sustain that policy that the Government and the House of Commons rejected the previous view of this House on the basis of a Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, that this should all be left to voluntary action by councils. For that reason, also, we cannot accept Amendments Nos. 10A, 11A and 13A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, which have the effect of negating this fundamental requirement for change. His amendments would allow the status quo—even if he says that in practice many councils would do a different thing—and would cut across the whole of the Government's strategy. That is in total opposition to a main plank of the Bill. While it goes against the grain for me to accuse the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, of being an extremist, in this context he takes an extreme position.

    In previous debates in this House and in another place there have been calls for greater flexibility in the Government's position. We have listened. We have talked to local government. Amendment No. 10B, and so on, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would give additional flexibility of the type sought. The approach encapsulated in the amendments is one which, after discussion, we are persuaded, both by the noble Baroness's arguments and by many in local government, is acceptable. It is an approach which the LGA has warmly welcomed. The chair of the LGA has "urged all parties in the Lords to support" the noble Baroness's amendments. Indeed, while the Joint Committee, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, which scrutinised the draft Bill, made a case for more flexibility, it did not argue that the status quo should be an option. The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, ignore that broad consensus.

    In contrast, the noble Baroness's amendments reflect growing consensus in this area. The Government have listened and have taken the issue on board. The amendments open the possibility that for certain councils the options for new constitutions from which local people can choose will, in addition to the range of executive constitutions, include constitutions based on a modernised committee system. As I shall make clear in speaking to later amendments, we have sought to enhance the powers available to overview and scrutiny committees which, as we have continuously stressed, are central to all our new arrangements.

    We are prepared to accept that for small shire district councils in England—those with a population of fewer than 85,000—this kind of revamped committee constitution could work in terms of delivering the increased efficiency, transparency and accountability which the Government and everyone wish to see. The amendments in the noble Baroness's name will also allow the Secretary of State, and in Wales the National Assembly, to specify in regulation other descriptions of groups of councils which could have this additional flexibility.

    I speak also to Amendments Nos. 12, 14 and 17 and in that context will ask the House to oppose Amendments Nos. 12A and 14A, again in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith. Those amendments deal with a separate issue. The Commons amendments in this group will put in place a clear process for making available to councils other options for executive arrangements which go beyond the three broad frameworks on the face of the Bill. The amendments respond to and build on the amendments proposed in this House by Opposition parties and others during Third Reading. They provide further flexibility.

    The amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, would not provide that flexibility. They would not deliver an effective and practical regime for making available additional forms of executive.

    In terms of the somewhat complicated procedure today, I point out that were the House to accept Amendment No. 10A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, many of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, with which we agree, and with which we ask the House to agree, and which are the cornerstone of the amendments in her name, could not be moved. I shall, therefore, ask the House to adopt what I think is the compromise position and not the position of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 10.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 10

    10A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree"

    My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 10A. The Minister is right to describe this provision as the heart and core of the Bill. I do not apologise for taking what the Minister chose to call an extremist view on the matter. We need to be careful what we are about. As the Minister said, these amendments would allow local authorities to have their existing committee structure amended to make it more efficient and accountable if they choose so to do. That is outwith what the Minister himself said when he introduced his Commons Amendment No. 10.

    The Minister began with the words "every council must". Unfortunately he went on to support amendments which provide that every council "need not". I believe that he has launched a considerable torpedo at the principle he enunciated in his opening remarks.

    I accept that the amendments of the Liberal Democrats would give a small degree of flexibility by permitting the continuation of present practice for a limited number of small authorities. If one asks the views of the generality of local government, the conclusion is rather different from that of the Government. There is strong support for extending the principle of flexibility achieved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to local government generally. The fact that the Minister thinks that he needs to have compulsion in the Bill does not indicate to me a high degree of confidence in the benefit that would come from the proposals. Over the years, local governments have successfully adopted and adapted legislation—on many occasions it was not particularly good legislation—and made it work. They will do that again if necessary. To compel local government to do so seems wrong.

    The background history to the issue goes back a long way. Local government originated from local single purpose boards which raised rates to undertake specific functions. Legislation brought those boards together in the form of local government which gradually evolved into that which we see today. It is a matter of deep regret to me that the standing of local government—when originally formed its standing was high not only in this country but also internationally—has gone down in inverse proportion to the volume of regulation and legislation that has been put upon local government. It gives me no satisfaction to say that.

    Behind all this is a British tradition of good local government that involves the participation by election of large numbers of people representative of the community in the executive decisions of authorities. The Bill seeks to change that and place responsibility for executive action in the hands of a limited and differentiated number of councillors. I do not find that principle acceptable, which is why I take an extreme position on this issue.

    That idea is a foreign import. It either comes from the Continent, where mayors are wont to have more power and councils are smaller, or from America—where many councils are much smaller. We have imported the idea but not the culture. The culture in both those instances is a much lower level of general representation on local councils.

    If the Bill did for local government something that had been established in London with the Greater London Authority, even though I might disagree, there might be some hope that the proposals would work. However, nothing is being done about the number of councils. A large number of people elected by their local communities will see their role as being diminished and be extremely frustrated. That is not acceptable.

    We should be careful before imposing on local government an idea that is superficially attractive—anyway, it looks like a frightfully good wheeze. We are about something more serious—keeping a system working that is within our customs and traditions and which is acceptable to our communities. The representations that I have received from throughout the country do not suggest that is the case.

    Moved, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".—(Lord Dixon-Smith.)

    3.45 p.m.

    My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments Nos. 10B to 10N and Amendments Nos. 71A to 74A—all of which are grouped with Amendment No. 10A.

    I would not call the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, an extremist. We share an enthusiasm for the local element. If he is an extremist in that, so am I. However, we have reached a point with which the House is familiar—how far we should go in challenging the elected Chamber and how serious we are about prolonging the legislative process without the serious intention of blocking the Bill. We have to consider how much more we might achieve by accepting that the Government will get their Bill and instead seek alterations that the Government might agree even at this late stage.

    It will come as no surprise to your Lordships that we on these Benches share the view taken by some that the new structures should not be imposed on local government. We are aware that the old ways, particularly among old Labour local authorities, do not always serve their communities well, but we must recognise political reality. Many authorities, seeing the way that the Government are moving, have already started on the path of executive scrutiny. I am sad that we are not to benefit from pilots of the new arrangements. I say that less than three months after the election of a new form of government for London that makes a clear distinction between executive and scrutiny and a mere three weeks since the formal launch of the Greater London Authority. I should explain to your Lordships that I am deputy chair of the Assembly.

    Not least among the issues to be addressed is how best to marry the so-called big tent approach of cooperative politics involving all parties—grown-up politics—with the necessary scrutiny of an executive. It is a pity that there will not be the opportunity before legislation to learn from London or pilot local authorities. That said, many authorities have invested a great deal in the new arrangements. If the Bill becomes law—I fear that there is not the will to prevent that—it will do no service to our colleagues in local government to extend the interim period or fail to take the opportunity to make changes where there is most concern. Nor will it help them to lose the considerable benefits of Part I—the powers in respect of the promotion of well-being, which are close to a power of general competence for which we on these Benches have long argued, and the duty to work towards sustainable development.

    The Government's acknowledgement of the position of the National Assembly for Wales, which will have a regulation-making power, and the alterations that the Government are prepared to make for access to information and open decision-taking, are matters that we will deal with later but they are part of the approach.

    Changes of particular concern relate to smaller authorities, particularly where there is a history of non-party operation. That tradition concerned the Joint Select Committee that considered the draft Bill. The proposed new clause introduced by Amendment No. 10E provides for alternative arrangements in the case of certain local authorities. Districts with a population of fewer than 85,000—I understand that there are 86 of them, which is almost 21 per cent of the total—and other local authorities able to persuade the Secretary of State or National Assembly, could apply to make alternative arrangements that do not involve a separate executive. They must consult the electorate and others and look for arrangements securing continuous improvement to economy, efficiency and effectiveness—the first value duty.

    The provisions—this is not current government policy but a future Secretary of State may take a different view—would allow for regulations for other categories of authorities, such as all districts in a county, all authorities sharing particular characteristics or even tiny unitaries, such as Rutland. If they can persuade the Secretary of State or National Assembly that they can meet the conditions, flexibility will apply to them too.

    Districts with a population of slightly more than 85,000 may wonder why the threshold is set at that figure. In discussion with the Government that was the point at which we were able to reach an accommodation. Bluntly, it was horse trading. The Government resisted including too many authorities while I was seeking to include as many as I could.

    As the Minister said, the amendment has been welcomed by the Local Government Association. In response to the original Bill, it expressed concern that the operation of an executive would not mean better decision making. I am pleased that it welcomes the amendment and I thank its members for their assistance throughout the passage of the Bill.

    The amendments standing in my name build on an amendment which I proposed during the Bill's last stage in this House. It allowed different arrangements when certain criteria were met. Your Lordships agreed to that amendment and to complete flexibility. I hope that your Lordships will agree to the proposal before the House today.

    My Lords, I support the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and regret that I cannot support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith.

    The issues have been before the House, and previously the Joint Committee, since May last year. Seldom has a Bill had so much careful and thorough consideration. During that period the Bill has considerably changed and adapted. That has been as a consequence of the arguments in favour of adjustment made from Members on all Benches in this House. Perhaps I may rapidly remind them of that.

    First, the area committees are a valued and important part of local government structures and therefore need to have a prominent role in legislation if councils so wish them. Secondly, access to information was an area of concern to some Members. That has been recognised in another place and there will no longer be concerns that executives might be excessively secret. Thirdly, the major amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, allows small districts, if they wish, to exempt themselves from the full separation of functions. They do not have to do so if they do not want to. That is a massive change which, it is to be hoped, reflects the eloquence of the arguments rather than the expediency of the Government in wanting to get the legislation through before the Summer Recess.

    I want to mark two aspects on which I invite the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, to reflect further in deciding whether to press his amendment. The first is the argument that the provisions put power only in the hands of a small cabal of people and that the rest of the council is denuded of influence or role. I do not believe that the evidence supports that, particularly in the light of the guidance issued by the department and heavily consulted on across local government.

    The role of the council is, first, to approve the constitution of that body. Secondly, it is to approve the budget, including the capital budget, of the authority. Thirdly, it is to be able to approve any variations to the budget that the executive wants to make. It cannot make variations without the prior approval of the council. All statutory plans, and a wide range of non-statutory plans, have to be decided by the council and not by the executive. The executive proposes, but the council will decide. There is a clarification of powers of the council which, in some cases, go considerably further than exist at present in some authorities. So in some authorities, there will be a strengthening of the powers of the council rather than a diminution.

    The final point is the affirmation of the importance of scrutiny. The Bill is as much about strengthening scrutiny in local government as it is about developing executives. Perhaps your Lordships will bear with my repeating what I said at previous stages, but I missed out on scrutiny during the 30 years I served as a local government officer. I did not see much of it taking place, but the Bill will reverse that. More scrutiny is essential to the health of local government.

    The second aspect is the argument that there is no need for change; that things are all right and should be left alone. Yet 30 years ago the Maud committee was highly critical of the way in which the traditional committee system worked. Some 10 years ago the Audit Commission stated that we cannot carry on like this, yet we have done so. In 1993 the local authority associations—which the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, had the honour to lead and which I. had the honour to serve at some staged—worked jointly to examine the current model and recommended that it could not persist in its current form and had to be changed.

    After more than a year of debate the Society of Local Authority Chief Executives and the Local Government Association state clearly that we must move forward and make these changes. Most local authorities say the same. They recognise that during that period a remarkable amount of development has taken place within local authorities. I compliment many Conservative and Liberal Democrat-controlled councils which have pioneered the arrangements. They want to get on with them and do not want to see further hesitation or messing about. They have seen the progress that has been made, in particular in your Lordships' House, as a result of the amendments made to the Bill.

    Finally, the legislation, as amended by another place and brought before us today, allows a massive range of variation in structures and options. It allows more variations than did the Bill when this House last considered it. It should also end the current practice as regards decision making. It does not take place in transparent open forum in councils, but in a small leadership clique which is not usually open to scrutiny or challenge if such decisions are supported by a majority group. We must sweep away that old-style form of local government politics which was not subject to debate, challenge or scrutiny. I have to say that were the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, to be carried, it would perpetuate that form of practice which would not serve local government well. I believe that most Members of the House want to see a stronger system of local government and to see central government treating it more seriously than did the previous administration, and perhaps this Government. Regrettably, the best way of ensuring that those who do not want local government to have a significant place in the future would be to support the amendment standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith.

    My Lords, I was a member of the Joint Select Committee dealing with the draft Bill and pressed for more flexibility from the Government. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and I again pressed for more flexibility. I believe that the Government have reacted to that argument for flexibility and, much as I dislike not standing shoulder to shoulder with my colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, as has been the case for many years, I shall in this instance support the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

    My Lords, I support the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith. I must contradict the Minister because the Local Government Association does not support the amendments. I am vice-chairman of the association and at this time perhaps I, rather than its chairman, might be able to speak for its majority.

    The LGA discussed the Bill last week and although it supports most of it, it does not support the rigidity of the executive/non-executive split. We do not support the idea of two classes of councillor. Last week, the majority of members, including the Liberal Democrats, supported that line. If they have changed their minds, that is new and we have not discussed it at a meeting of the association. Therefore, the association would be against the amendments. I must speak for the Local Government Association and it is wrong that the chairman can speak for us at this stage. At the recent local government conference, the Minister responsible for local government received a slow handclap from the Liberal Democrats when she tried to present the proposals. I am surprised by the amendments the party has tabled today.

    I am the leader of Essex County Council. It is one of the largest authorities in the country. It is larger than many American states and EU countries. Three months ago, in conjunction and co-operation with the other two group leaders, we introduce a pilot scheme. For three months we have been operating on a cabinet:select committee split. We have established five select committees and we have put all our members on two select committees in order to try to involve them. I am the leader of the council, so I have a nice job; I am the executive. I have eight portfolio members and we are taking the decisions of the council. But my colleagues from all parties are most unhappy. Indeed, the Labour members are more unhappy than any of the others. They feel totally dissociated from the decision-making processes within the council. A revolt is taking place because they hate the system.

    I beg your Lordships to take more notice of the unhappiness in local government. It was divided over local government reorganisation but it is even more divided over this issue. We cannot have two classes of councillor. It is all very fine for executive members. We have 79 councillors: eight of them have a fulfilling role, but 71 are now sidelined. I beg your Lordships to review the matter and to think again before we pass these amendments. It is all very well for 86 councils to be excluded from the new system.

    I was contacted by Rushmoor—a small district council with a population of 86,000. There will be dozens of such councils which are excluded from the new system. What about poor Rushmoor, which wants to have its own system? I can see that the arbitrary figure of 85,000 will be subject to judicial review and all kinds of arguments for many years to come. I beg both the Government and the Liberal Democrats to think again because this will be a most divisive system.

    We all agree that we should speed up the processes of decision-making. I am the first to agree with that, and I am the first to agree that we cannot stand still. In Essex we have never stood still. We need to review our practices and to modernise our councils. No one disagrees with that. However, having an arbitrary line between two types of council is so divisive that we should try to avoid it. Therefore, I beg noble Lords to support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith.

    4 p.m.

    My Lords, I am no authority on local government and my sole purpose in intervening is to seek clarification. As I understand it, the amendment of my noble friend Lady Hamwee clearly spells out the matter. It limits the powers of a council with a population of under 85,000 to seek relief under Clause 28.

    I want to ask for clarification of the position of a council in Wales—my own council, Powys County Council—which is approximately 140 miles in length. It covers 2,000 square miles but its population is 123,000. I do not suppose that there is a comparable council in England. It is run entirely on a shire committee basis with supervisory control. One councillor has to travel 70 miles back and forth to the county town.

    Will the limit of 85,000 apply in Wales or will it be open to the Welsh Assembly to make an exception with regard to a council such as Powys County Council, which is run entirely on a non-party basis? I do not believe that there is any grouping of parties there. Therefore, the need for flexibility cannot be demonstrated better than by the need of Powys.

    My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hanningfield described to the House the feeling of members of his council about the introduction of this new system. He is not alone. Many other councillors up and down the country, where the flirtation has already taken place with the executives, are, if I can put it no higher, utterly brassed off with the whole situation. They are brassed off, despite what the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, said, because they do not have a meaningful role to play. Eight or 10 of them are having a marvellous time. They are making the decisions, spending the money, and being excessively well paid for doing the job and for carrying the burden of the council on their shoulders.

    It does not matter about the others. Whatever one says about scrutiny—and I have no difficulty with decisions being scrutinised—under this proposed system there is still no role in decision-making for the majority of members of a council. They are not part of the decision-making process.

    The noble Lord, Lord Filkin, mocked the fact that decisions used to be taken in private and behind closed doors. I challenge that. There have always been some perfectly atrocious councils, and I am glad to say that most of them have not been in my party. There have been some atrocious councils where things have gone wrong but, by and large, all decisions must be taken in the open. Some say that when decisions are taken everyone is put under a whip and must do what they are told. However, many decisions have been overturned because they have been taken in public. The public have access to meetings and councillors who are elected to represent their members have the right to take decisions in the open.

    What will happen if we do not allow that type of flexibility? No one on this side of the House is asking that the executive system should be abandoned. We are asking for councils to have the flexibility to decide whether they want to commit to, or continue with, a committee system whereby the responsibility for decisions lies on the shoulders of all members of the council. We are asking for that to be an option. I believe that it is inescapable that there will be a role for scrutiny within that option. We are asking for the option of a committee system, or something similar, to remain for councils which wish to go forward with that system.

    That does not seem to me to be a tremendous concession for the Government to make. They have sold their scheme of executives and mayors to a number of authorities. However, I believe that what undermines the whole situation is the fact that so many of their own labour councillors do not like it. I am sure that I am not the only person to have received a letter from some of those Labour councillors saying that they do not like it and that they are not part of the council. They believe, as do I, that if this system goes ahead without including another option, the next thing that we discuss in this Chamber and elsewhere will be the reduction in the number of councillors who represent any community. For, peradventure, there will not be enough jobs for them to do and, peradventure, they will not want to stay or offer themselves for service to their communities.

    I believe that at this stage it is sad that once again we are having to debate this issue. I am somewhat demoralised that the Liberal Democrat Party, which stood so firmly, shoulder to shoulder, with us, as did the Cross-Benchers, having believed that this was a matter of principle as well as a matter of concern, should have decided that there are other ways of achieving an end. It is not an end which I want; nor do I believe that it is one that either my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith or Members of this side of the House want. Therefore, I support the amendment of my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith.

    My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, cast some doubt on the position of the Local Government Association. I want to record that I received a letter today from the chairman of the Local Government Association, Councillor Sir Jeremy Beecham, as, I imagine, did many other noble Lords. In it he says:

    "I am writing to you to express the Association's support for the Baroness's"—
    that is, my noble friend Lady Hamwee—
    "proposals and hope that you too will support them (although I do need to say that the LGA Conservative Group is not in support). I believe that through existing provisions, namely Section 10(5) which provides for other forms of executive, and the Baroness's amendments, the Bill now adequately provides for the flexibility that local government and many other supporters of local government like yourself have been calling for".
    That is a very clear expression of support from the association. Of course, he makes the point that the Conservative Group does not support it, but the majority of the members of the association support the amendments. I suggest that it is reasonable, therefore, to say that the proposal is supported by the association.

    I say to my colleague from local government—the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, whom I have known in London government for many years—that we must now ask, as, indeed, must she, how far the Conservatives are prepared to push their opposition. Are they prepared, for example, to put the whole Bill at risk? Although many of us share the concerns that have been expressed, there is much in the Bill which we support and which we want to see on the statute book as soon as possible. Are they prepared to push it to the extent that we lose the Bill? Are they prepared to push it to the extent that in the end the Government get their way and we do not even have the concessions that my noble friend Lady Hamwee has fought very hard to wring out of the Government?

    We feel that this is the right compromise and that it will serve local government best. I am very pleased to support my noble friend's amendments.

    My Lords, I hope that the Minister will answer specifically the questions asked by the Labour Campaign—I stress the word "Labour"—for Open Local Government. It has written to 694 Members of the House,

    "to point out the dangers to local democracy—despite the concessions made by the government".
    The letter then lists the dangers. The first is:
    "The 'behind closed doors' secrecy still implicit in the legislation".
    The second is:
    "The concentration of power in too few hands with a cabinet or executive system and in particular with a directly elected mayor".
    Thirdly, the letter refers to:
    "The discarding of all other councillors from the decision-making process".
    The fourth danger is:
    "The fact that so-called 'scrutiny' does not work in the proposed structures and was more effective under the old system".
    As reference was being made to that letter, but nobody was quoting from it, I thought that your Lordships should know the concerns of the Labour Campaign for Open Local Government.

    My Lords, as I said at Second Reading, I am the leader of a council. I welcome the thrust of the Bill and the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. They will allow flexibility. The three options that were put forward may have been too much of a straitjacket for smaller councils.

    The amendments define smaller councils by size, although we may want to have another definition by function, because the two main activities of district councils are probably planning and housing. If housing has been transferred to another provider, there is not a lot for an executive to do, because planning is not a function that can be exercised by an executive.

    After more than 20 years' experience in local government, I was intrigued to know what kind of nostalgic world the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, was referring to when he was describing what went on. It was not a description of any council system that I know of, party-controlled or not. In no council in this country does every councillor exercise a similar influence on how decisions are made. Some councillors have more influence than others. That is simply being recognised by making it clear who is an executive or non-executive councillor.

    The noble Lord, Lord Hanningford, said that in Essex many councillors who are not in the executive do not have enough to do. That says more about the system in Essex than it says about the Bill. There is a great deal that councillors can and should be doing. As well as scrutiny, which is an important and recognised part of the Bill, we want councillors to contribute to policy. Many council policies, including the budget, have to be gone through at a full council meeting and will need to be scrutinised properly.

    In addition, the Bill reminds and encourages us all to get out and work in the community. Not all the work of local authorities is done in the town hall. We want councillors to work with people in their communities to ensure that what happens in the town hall is a better reflection of what local people want.

    As the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, said, we all regret the lack of recognition of the work of local authorities in the turn-out at local elections. Most people are confused about who makes the decisions. Many think that the mayor does, even though most parts of the country have a non-executive mayor. I hope that the Bill will help by identifying who makes the decisions. If we can make sure that people in the community with an interest in what is going on know who to approach directly about particular issues, local government will be improved. We should support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and not support those of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith.

    4.15 p.m.

    My Lords, there is clearly a fundamental difference on this issue between me and the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, but we are all united in our respect for the record of local government in Britain and, in this context, in England and Wales in particular. Great work continues to be done by local government. This national Government have been the first to recognise that. That work has been achieved in a changing world and in changing circumstances for local authorities.

    The noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, accuses me of compulsion and of trying to impose a straitjacket. We are moving from a system in which only one structure of local government—the committee-based system—is available to all authorities regardless of their geographical area or their form of political control to provide three alternatives, as well as the additional possibility in the amendment. Local government and local people will have a choice.

    Our consistent policy has been that every council must adopt a new constitution, giving it increased efficiency, transparency and accountability, and that local people should decide. That is the element of compulsion—to require choice for local people. We are moving away from a straitjacketed system that has been condemned—or at least adversely commented on—from the time of the Maud committee through to the recent report of the Joint Committee of this House and another place, to which the noble Earl, Lord Carnarvon, referred.

    In contrast, the Conservative amendment would not provide such choice, except by providing the additional option of the status quo. The noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, said that he was the first to agree that councils could not stand still. To that extent, I accept—perhaps more than does my noble friend Lord Smith of Leigh—that Essex has not stood still. The same applies to many other councils. However, they have been constrained by the committee system. The Conservative amendment would allow councils to stay still. That option would undoubtedly be taken by the least effective councils.

    The Conservative amendments are not about choice. There will be choice in the structures that we have proposed. The councils to be given special provisions under the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will also have to make a choice. They, too, will have to examine and review their constitution to ensure that it meets the overall obligations of efficiency, transparency and accountability. Those councils will be able to choose not to adopt executive arrangements, but they will still have to reform. In particular, they will have to adopt overview and scrutiny arrangements.

    It is important to recognise that all councils need to assess their structures and that they should all be involved in the Bill. However, it is equally important to emphasise the element of choice.

    The noble Lord, Lord Tope, said that the concession on English shire districts with a population fewer than 85,000 had been wrung out of the Government. I am probably the one that it was wrung out of—and I feel squeezed accordingly. It seems a sensible provision. I accept that it is not what everybody wants, but it does not torpedo the principle, as the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, suggested. It is a legitimate and sensible compromise and I commend it to the House. The Secretary of State could designate other such groups. To respond to the noble Lord, Lord Hooson, the National Assembly for Wales could allow any variation of the type to which he referred.

    The other criticism which has been made has run through the whole course of the Bill. It relates to the division between executive and scrutiny and overview members. The noble Lords, Lord Hanningfield and Lord Elton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, all referred to that and we have discussed it many times. But to say that councillors outside the executive have no real role fails to understand the nature of overview and scrutiny committees. I suggest that it also fails to recognise the nature of people who win council seats.

    Clearly, there will be something of a hiatus as we move into the new system. Things will need to settle down and people will need to adapt to their new roles.

    But as my noble friends Lord Filkin and Lord Smith have both said, those roles are as important—and in some ways more important—in safeguarding the public interest than those of individual members of the executive. All councillors will have an important role. All councillors will have a role to play in policy development.

    The noble Lord, Lord Elton, referred to things happening behind closed doors. We shall discuss that on Amendment No. 52. I believe that he is wrong to describe that situation as being behind closed doors. Nevertheless, some adjustments are being made in that context and have been made in another place.

    The noble Lord, Lord Tope, has spelt out the real position in relation to the LGA. Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Hanningfield, is right that there are many within the LGA and many within all parties in local government who do not like elements of the Bill. But recognising the situation we are in, the LGA has supported the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The Government, with some persuasion, have also agreed to it. It seems to me that after the many hours we have spent on the Bill, a compromise is a sensible way forward. The Government have moved from their original position; the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, has yet to move from his position; rather than pursue his amendment, I suggest that he should now do so. I suggest that he should pursue the noble Baroness's amendment and not support his own.

    4.15 p.m.

    My Lords, we have had a good debate on this subject. The quality of the debate, if nothing else, has justified the tabling of these amendments.

    I am most grateful to the Minister for his response. The noble Lords, Lord Smith, Lord Tope and Lord Hooson, my noble friends Lady Hanham, Lord Hanningfield, and the noble Earl, Lord Carnarvon, have all made a number of points which had common themes. I shall try to sum up the themes which have come through rather than address every individual point.

    Something has been made of the fact that there was a Joint Committee of the two Houses which did not recommend the status quo. If my memory is correct—and I am open to correction—that Joint Committee was considering a draft Bill. Therefore, it considered what was before it. If it had been invited to consider a blank sheet of paper, it might well have reached a different conclusion. I say no more on that. That remains a fact.

    I deal next with the question of the executive/scrutiny split. Quite fortuitously, I happened to meet the former chairman of the Institute of Directors. Knowing that he was the former chairman of the Institute of Directors, I inquired how he was passing his time. He said, "I am still working extremely hard. I have a large number of non-executive directorships". "Oh", I said, "That sounds fun. How do you find it?" He said, "Well, it is extraordinary but we find that we have more and more work and are under more and more pressure and we do not seem to be able to avoid being executive".

    We need to be well aware that there is no clear dividing line between responsibility for executive action and responsibility for scrutiny. If scrutiny is to work and be effective, it must have power to control executive action. As soon as it has that power, it is taking executive action indirectly itself. We must not miss that.

    Something has been made of the fact that under the present system, party groups may well take decisions behind closed doors. Party groups are party groups. They are not banned under the Bill and they will continue. They will continue as they have done in the past. They will not be able to do anything without the consent of the majority of their members on the council. It does not matter whether or not there is an executive. That remains the fact: ultimate decisions are taken in the open.

    Nothing in this Bill prevents party groups from existing and behaving as they have done in the past. But they depend now and in the future on the consent of the members of the authority.

    I want to come back to the degree of disillusionment that there is among councillors of all parties at the present time. That arises because they are experienced people who know the job of a local authority. They see their ability to act on behalf of their community being reduced.

    It may well be that many people who feel like that will not stand at another election and there will be a new generation who feel that what they are doing is adequate. But I suspect that that will be because they do not know what they have missed.

    That just about sums up the situation. Two other things need to be said. Both the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Tope, ask how far we are prepared to go to hold up the Government on this matter. That is not an easy question for me to answer because the Minister did not come to me with a proposal. But I should not have stopped at 20 per cent. The price would have been higher. If we cannot agree in the end and the Government want the Bill as badly as they say they do—and I want a great deal that is in this Bill too—it is always open to them to concede the issue. But I do not suppose that they would be as generous as that. That is not my problem.

    We have had a very good and worthwhile debate. The amendments which I put forward do nothing to prevent the creation of executives in local government. I go back to where I began. The fact that that is what was on offer in the Bill is, in my view, a weakness and a lack of confidence by the Government in the system which they are proposing. That is neither right nor acceptable. My amendments are appropriate and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

    4.28 p.m.

    On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 10A), as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 10, shall be agreed to?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 169; Not-Contents, 221.

    Division No. 1

    CONTENTS

    Aberdare, L.Hanham, B.
    Ackner, L.Hanningfield, L.
    Allenby of Megiddo, V.Hanson, L.
    Anelay of St Johns, B.Harris of High Cross, L.
    Arran, E.Hayhoe, L.
    Astor, V.Henley, L.[Teller]
    Astor of Hever, L.Higgins, L.
    Attlee, E.Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, L.
    Barber, L.Hogg, B.
    Bell, L.Home, E.
    Belstead, L.Hooper, B.
    Blackwell, L.Howe, E.
    Blatch, B.Howell of Guildford, L.
    Bledisloe, V.Hunt of Wirral, L.
    Boardman, L.Hurd of Westwell, L.
    Bowness, L.Hylton-Foster, B.
    Brabazon of Tara, L.Jellicoe, E.
    Bramall, L.Jenkin of Roding, L.
    Bridgeman, V.Johnston of Rockport, L.
    Brigstocke, B.Jopling, L.
    Brittan of Spennithorne, LKelvedon, L.
    Brougham and Vaux, L.King of Wartnaby, L.
    Burnham, L.[Teller]Kingsland, L.
    Buscombe, B.Kirkham, L.
    Butterworth, L.Knight of Collingtree, B.
    Buxton of Alsa, L.Laing of Dunphail, L.
    Byford, B.Laird, L.
    Caithness, E.Lamont of Lerwick, L.
    Campbell of Alloway, L.Lane, L.
    Campbell of Croy, L.Lane of Horsell, L.
    Carlisle of Bucklow, L.Liverpool, E.
    Carnegy of Lour, B.Lucas, L.
    Chadlington, L.Luke, L.
    Chalfont, L.Lyell, L.
    Clark of Kempston, L.McColl of Dulwich, L.
    Coe, L.McConnell, L.
    Cope of Berkeley, L.Macfarlane of Bearsden, L.
    Courtown, E.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
    Cowdrey of Tonbridge, L.Mancroft, L.
    Cox, B.Marlesford, L.
    Craig of Radley, L.Mayhew of Twysden, L.
    Cranborne, V.Miller of Hendon, B.
    Crickhowell, L.Molyneaux of Killead, L.
    Cumberlege, B.Montrose, D.
    Darcy de Knayth, B.Mowbray and Stourton, L.
    Dean of Harptree, L.Moynihan, L.
    Denham, L.Murton of Lindisfarne, L.
    Dixon-Smith, L.Naseby, L.
    Eccles of Moulton, B.Nickson, L.
    Eden of Winton, L.Norfolk, D.
    Elles, B.Northbrook, L.
    Elliott of Morpeth, L.Northesk, E.
    Elton, L.Norton of Louth, L.
    Ferrers, E.O'Cathain, B.
    Fookes, B.Onslow, E.
    Forsyth of Drumlean, L.Onslow of Woking, L.
    Freeman, L.Oppenheim-Barnes, B.
    Gardner of Parkes, B.Oxfuird, V.
    Geddes, L.Park of Monmouth, B.
    Gilmour of Craigmillar, L.Peel, E.
    Glentoran, L.Perry of Southwark, B.
    Goschen, V.Peyton of Yeovil, L.
    Gray of Contin, L.Pilkington of Oxenford, L.

    Platt of Writtle, B.Sharpies, B.
    Plumb, L.Shaw of Northstead, L.
    Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.Sheppard of Didgemere, L.
    Porter of Luddenham, L.Soulsby of Swaffham Prior, L
    Prior, L.Stewartby, L.
    Pym, L.Stodart of Leaston, L.
    Quinton, L.Strange, B.
    Rawlings, B.Strathclyde, L.
    Rawlinson of Ewell, L.Swinfen, L.
    Reay, L.Taylor of Warwick, L.
    Rees, L.Thatcher, B.
    Rees-Mogg, L.Thomas of Gwydir, L.
    Renton, L.Trefgarne, L.
    Roberts of Conwy, L.Trumpington, B.
    Rotherwick, L.Vivian, L.
    St John of Fawsley, L.Waddington, L.
    Saltoun of Abernethy, Ly.Weatherill, L.
    Sanderson of Bowden, L.Willoughby de Broke, L.
    Seccombe, B.Wolfson, L.
    Selbome, E.Wolfson of Sunningdale, L.
    Selsdon, L.Young, B.
    Younger of Leckie, V.

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Acton, L.Donoughue, L.
    Addington, L.Dubs, L.
    Ahmed, L.Eatwell, L.
    Alderdice, L.Elder, L.
    Alli, L.Evans of Temple Guiting, L
    Amos, B.Evans of Watford, L.
    Andrews, B.Ezra, L.
    Archer of Sandwell, L.Falconer of Thoroton, L.
    Ashley of Stoke, L.Falkender, B.
    Ashton of Upholland, B.Falkland, V.
    Attenborough, L.Farrington of Ribbleton, B.
    Bach, L.Faulkner of Worcester, L.
    Barker, B.Filkin, L.
    Barnett, L.Fitt, L.
    Bassam of Brighton, L.Fyfe of Fairfield, L.
    Beaumont of Whitley, L.Gale, B.
    Berkeley, L.Gavron, L.
    Bernstein of Craigweil, L.Gladwin of Clee, L.
    Billingham, B.Goldsmith, L.
    Blackstone, B.Goodhart, L.
    Blease, L.Gordon of Strathblane, L.
    Borrie, L.Goudie, B.
    Bradshaw, L.Gould of Potternewton, B.
    Bragg, L.Graham of Edmonton, L.
    Brennan, L.Gregson, L.
    Brett, L.Grenfell, L.
    Bridges, L.Hamwee, B.
    Bristol, Bp.Hardy of Wath, L.
    Brooke of Alverthorpe, L.Harris of Greenwich, L.
    Brookman, L.Harris of Haringey, L.
    Brooks of Tremorfa, L.Harris of Richmond, B.
    Bruce of Donington, L.Harrison, L.
    Burlison, L.Haskel, L.
    Carnarvon, E.Hayman, B.
    Carter, L.[Teller]Healey, L.
    Castle of Blackburn, B.Hilton of Eggardon, B.
    Chandos, V.Hogg of Cumbernauld, L.
    Christopher, L.Hollis of Heigham, B.
    Clarke of Hampstead, L.Hooson, L.
    Clement-Jones, L.Howells of St. Davids, B.
    Clinton-Davis, L.Howie of Troon, L.
    Cocks of Hartcliffe, L.Hoyle, L.
    Cohen of Pimlico, B.Hughes of Woodside, L.
    Crawley, B.Hunt of Chesterton, L.
    Currie of Marylebone, L.Hunt of Kings Heath, L.
    David, B.Hutchinson of Lullington, L.
    Davies of Coity, L.Hylton, L.
    Desai, L.Irvine of Lairg, L. (Lord Chancellor)
    Dholakia, L.
    Diamond, L.Islwyn, L.
    Dixon, L.Jacobs, L.

    Janner of Braunstone, L.Rennard, L.
    Jay of Paddington, B. (Lord Privy Seal)Richard, L.
    Jeger, B.Richardson of Calow, B.
    Jenkins of Putney, L.Rodgers of Quarry Bank, L.
    Judd, L.Rogers of Riverside, L.
    King of West Bromwich, L.Roll of Ipsden, L.
    Kirkhill, L.Roper, L.
    Laming, L.Russell, E.
    Layard, L.Russell-Johnston, L.
    Lea of Crondall, L.Sainsbury of Turville, L.
    Lester of Herne Hill, L.Sandberg, L.
    Levy, L.Sandwich, E.
    Lipsey, L.Sawyer, L.
    Lockwood, B.Scotland of Asthal, B.
    Lofthoase of Pontefract, L.Scott of Needham Market, B.
    Longford, E.Serota, B.
    Lovell-Davis, L.Sewel, L.
    Ludford, B.Sharman, L.
    McCarthy, L.Sharp of Guildford, B.
    Macdonald of Tradeston, L.Shepherd, L.
    McIntosh of Haringey, L. [Teller]Sheppard of Liverpool, L.
    McIntosh of Hudnall, B.Shore of Stepney, L.
    MacKenzie of Culkein, L.Shutt of Greetland, L.
    Mackenzie of Framwellgate, L.Simon, V.
    McNally, L.Simon of Glaisdale, L.
    Maddock, B.Smith of Clifton, L.
    Mallalieu, B.Smith of Gilmorehill, B.
    Manchester, Bp.Smith of Leigh, L.
    Mar and Kellie, E.Stoddart of Swindon, L.
    Mason of Barnsley, L.Stone of Blackheath, L.
    Massey of Darwen, B.Strabolgi, L.
    Methuen, L.Symons of Vernham Dean, B.
    Miller of Chilthorne Domer, B.Taylor of Blackburn, L.
    Mishcon, L.Thomas of Walliswood, B.
    Mitchell, L.Thomson of Monifieth, L.
    Molloy, L.Thornton, B.
    Morgan, L.Tomlinson, L.
    Morris of Castle Morris, L.Tope, L.
    Morris of Manchester, L.Tordoff, L.
    Murray of Epping Forest, L.Turnberg, L.
    Newby, L.Turner of Camden, B.
    Nicol, B.Uddin, B.
    Northover, B.Varley, L.
    Orme, L.Walker of Doncaster, L.
    Patel of Blackburn, L.Wallace of Saltaire, L.
    Peston, L.Walmsley, B.
    Phillips of Sudbury, L.Warnock, B.
    Pitkeathley, B.Warwick of Undercliffe, B.
    Plant of Highfield, L.Watson of Invergowrie, L.
    Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.Watson of Richmond, L.
    Portsmouth, Bp.Wedderburn of Charlton, L.
    Prashar, B.Whitaker, B.
    Prys-Davies, L.Whitty, L.
    Puttnam, L.Wigoder, L.
    Ramsay of Cartvale, B.Wilkins, B.
    Randall of St. Budeaux, L.Williams of Crosby, B.
    Razzall, L.Williams of Elvel, L.
    Redesdale, L.Williams of Mostyn, L.
    Rendell of Babergh, B.Williamson of Horton, L.
    Woolmer of Leeds, L.
    Young of Darlington, L.

    Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

    4.40 p.m.

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 10

    10B

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, at the end to insert "and do propose Amendments Nos. 10C to 10N in lieu of the words so left out of the Bill"—

    10C Clause 24, page 16, line 21, at beginning insert ("Subject to section ( Alternative arrangements in case of certain local authorities),")

    10D Clause 27, page 18, line 44, at end insert ("unless, by virtue of any provision made under section 30(3A), the authority operate alternative arrangements in place of the executive arrangements")

    10E After Clause 28, insert the following new clause—

    Alternative Arrangements In Case Of Certain Local Authorities

    (" .—(1) This section applies to—

  • (a) any local authority which falls within subsection (2), and
  • (b) any local authority which falls within any description of local authority specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.
  • (2) A local authority falls within this subsection if—

  • (a) it is the council for a district comprised in an area for which there is a county council, and
  • (b) the resident population of the authority's area on 30th June 1999 was less than 85,000.
  • (3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(b) the resident population of any area on 30th June 1999 is to be taken to be the Registrar General's estimate of that population on that date.

    (4) A local authority to which this section applies must either—

  • (a) draw up proposals for the operation of alternative arrangements of a particular type permitted by regulations under section 29, or
  • (b) draw up proposals under section 24.
  • (5) In deciding whether to draw up proposals under this section or proposals under section 24, a local authority to which this section applies must take reasonable steps to consult local government electors for, and other interested persons in, the authority's area.

    (6) In drawing up proposals under this section a local authority must consider the extent to which the proposals, if implemented, are likely to assist in securing continuous improvement in the way in which the authority's functions are exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.

    (7) A local authority which draw up proposals under this section must comply with such requirements as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this section.

    (8) The provision which may be made by virtue of subsection (7) includes provision which applies or reproduces (with or without modifications) any provisions of section 24 or 25.

    (9) Nothing in subsection (8) affects the generality of the power under subsection (7).")

    10F Clause 29, page 19, leave out lines 22 to 27 and insert—

  • ("(a) which do not involve the creation and operation of an executive of the authority,
  • (b) which include arrangements for the appointment of committees or sub-committees of the authority to review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge of functions of the authority, and
  • (c) which the Secretary of State considers are likely to ensure that decisions of the authority are taken in an efficient, transparent and accountable way.")
  • 10G Page 19, line 37, leave out paragraph (c) and insert—

    ("(2A) Regulations under this section may make provision with respect to committees or sub-committees falling within subsection (1)(b) (including provision which applies or reproduces (with or without modifications) any provisions of section 20 or paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 8A and 9 of Schedule 1).")

    10H Page 19, line 44, after ("(2)") insert (", (2A)")

    10J Clause 30, page 20, line 9, at end insert—

    ("(3A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for or in connection with enabling a local authority to which section (Alternative arrangements in case of certain local authorities) applies which are operating executive arrangements to operate alternative arrangements in place of the executive arrangements.
    (3B) The provision which may be made by virtue of subsection (3A) includes provision which applies or reproduces (with or without modifications) any provisions of section 24, 25, 26 or (Approval of outline fall-back proposals).")

    10K Page 20, line 12, leave out from ("to") to end of line 13 and insert ("operate alternative arrangements which differ from the existing alternative arrangements in any respect.

    (4A) The provision which may be made by virtue of subsection (4) includes provision which applies or reproduces (with or without modifications) any provisions of section 24 or 25.")

    10L Page 20, line 21, after ("subsection") insert ("(3B), (4A) or")

    10M Page 20, line 22, leave out ("(5)") and insert ("(3A), (4) or (5) (as the case may be)")

    10N Clause 92, page 64, line 29, after ("11(6)") insert ("( Alternative arrangements in case of certain local authorities)(1)(b)")

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move the Motion that stands in my name as Amendment No. 10B.

    Moved, as an amendment to the Motion, that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, at the end to insert "and do propose Amendments Nos. 10C to 10N in lieu of the words so left out of the Bill".—( Baroness Hamwee.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 10, as amended, agreed to accordingly.

    G8 Summit

    4.41 p.m.

    My Lords, with the leave of the House I shall now repeat a Statement being made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. The Statement is as follows: "With permission, Madam Speaker, I should like to make a Statement about the G8 Summit I have just attended in Okinawa, Japan. Copies of the communiqués we issued and the accompanying Okinawa Charter on the Global Information Society have been placed in the House Library. I give thanks to Prime Minister Mori, who hosted the occasion with great skill.

    "We discussed, first, the state of the world economy, which is now recovering well from the financial crises of 1997 and 1998. The reform of the international financial architecture we set in hand when the UK chaired the G8 is firmly on track. Thirty countries have now signed up to IMF assessment of their compliance with the new international codes and standards. The IMF's new Contingent Credit Facility for countries in crisis is in place. We have established a Financial Stability Forum to look at weaknesses in the global financial system and taken action to involve the private sector more effectively in resolving crisis.

    "We agreed at Okinawa that the next priority is to improve the existing mechanisms for crisis prevention, by strengthening IMF surveillance, to reform the Multilateral Development Banks to strengthen their focus on poverty and to promote improved co-operation and co-ordination between the IMF and the World Bank. Though the worst of the international financial crisis is behind us, there is no room for complacency. Above all, there was clear recognition at the summit that we must try to launch a new WTO trade round this year. Nothing is more important for the world economy than the early and successful conclusion of a new comprehensive trade round.

    "Secondly, prior to the summit, Prime Minister Mori of Japan chaired a discussion with representatives from the G7, the OAU, the NAM and ASEAN which underlined once again the immense problems faced by many of the world's least developed countries, particularly in Africa—a debilitating and self-reinforcing cycle of conflict, poverty and weak governance. The G8 agreed on the following: a renewed effort to implement the Cologne agreement on debt relief. Already nine countries are receiving additional relief under the HIPC scheme, worth over 15 billion dollars. We agreed to quicken the process to get another 11 countries through to decision point by the end of this year—a further 20 billion dollars of debt relief—and to reach out to the countries currently in conflict to see how they can be brought into the process.

    "We agreed to go further and faster on trade. The European Union is already committed to giving the least developed countries duty-free, quota-free access to our markets for almost all products by 2005. We agreed to strengthen the effectiveness of our development assistance and after years of wrangling finally secured a firm timetable for untying aid from January 2002 based on recent progress in the OECD.

    "We agreed to support concrete quantitative targets for reducing deaths from AIDS, malaria and TB by between 25 and 50 per cent over the next decade and backed those up with a strong commitment to provide increased resources. We for our part are doubling our support for international efforts to develop new drugs and technologies for priority diseases.

    "The G8 also agreed to take forward the UK initiative on conflict diamonds. Britain and Russia will now chair an international conference to consider an international agreement on a certification scheme for rough diamonds, and to tackle the link between the trade in illicit diamonds and the conflicts in Sierra Leone and other diamond-producing countries in Africa.

    "At present, it costs far more to access the Internet in Uganda or Kenya than it does here or the United States. We agreed a series of measures set out in the charter to close the digital divide between the developed and the developing world, with huge potential for delivering educational and medical services cheaply or free across the Internet.

    "This comprehensive programme reflects the real sense at the summit that with our own economics in good shape, the time has come to devote more attention and more priority to the plight of the world's poorest countries. This is not only a matter of solidarity and justice, it is also a hard-headed economic investment in our markets of the future.

    "Third on our agenda was the enormous problem of drugs and organised crime. With the global market for drugs now estimated at up to 500 billion dollars a year, we need to see the international cartels for what they are—major international businesses with the same need for banking facilities, working capital and investment funds as any other business. The G8 agreed to a further clampdown on money laundering, tax evasion and banking secrecy. That will be underpinned by eight standards developed by G7 Finance Ministers in a new report published at Okinawa which set out the measures with which financial centres will need to comply to avoid sanctions in future.

    "Fourthly, we discussed the issues raised by GM foods and crops. Obviously there are still differences of view within the G8 on the risks associated with the new GM technologies. But we all agreed on the need to work harder to establish a clearer scientific consensus and to base policy and trade decisions on science.

    "Fifthly, we discussed the environment, where we agreed to tackle illegal logging, and to encourage renewable energy in developing countries where 2 billion people currently have no electricity, and pledged to work harder on early entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.

    "In addition to the formal business of the summit, I had bilateral meetings with the other G8 leaders. My meeting with President Putin was especially valuable. I also had a useful discussion with President Clinton on the Middle East, the Balkans and Africa.

    "People will always find plenty to criticise when international leaders gather. But it is worth remembering that it was the decisions made following the Birmingham Summit two years ago that led to a new financial architecture that has brought greater stability to the world economy; good for jobs; good for living standards. It was at Cologne last year that we made the big breakthrough on debt, and contributed substantially to ending the conflict in Kosovo. And as a result of the decisions made this year in Okinawa, over time fewer children will die of killer diseases like AIDS, TB and malaria; more children will be lifted out of poverty; more children will get access to basic education; more people in the developing world will get access to computers and electricity, and the measures agreed in relation to crime and drugs will make a real difference in a fight that can be won only at the international level.

    "Britain played a leading role in shaping the agenda and the main outcomes of the summit. Both on the world stage and in Europe, the Government are standing up for Britain and standing up for what is right".

    My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

    4.49 p.m.

    My Lords, I am immensely grateful to the noble Baroness for repeating the Statement made by her right honourable friend the Prime Minister a few moments ago in another place. But I wonder whether the noble Baroness read the Guardian this morning, and whether she has any response to the conclusion that it reached that Okinawa was a "talking and eating shop".

    Naturally enough, in his Statement, the Prime Minister did not report on the alleged costs of this summit. However, can the noble Baroness confirm the reported cost? Is £500 million not a little on the steep side for such a meeting? Indeed, it would keep this House running not for just a weekend but for a decade. We can imagine what that amount of money could have done to relieve poverty and sickness in Africa. Can the noble Baroness tell the House whether the Foreign Secretary, whose taste for frugal living is so well known, raised any concerns over the level of spending? Can she also tell us what specific action the Government will take to encourage a limit on spending at future summits?

    We note the active involvement of President Putin in the summit. Can the noble Baroness tell the House whether Mr Putin's visit to North Korea led to any breakthrough on the North Korean missile programme and whether there was any discussion on the proposal of the United States for an anti-missile shield? If so, can she tell us how her right honourable friends set out the UK's policy to Mr Putin on AMD? Further, was the Prime Minister able to support Mr Putin's proposal to hold the next meeting of the G8 in Russia?

    Can the noble Baroness tell us whether the Prime Minister had the opportunity in these bilateral discussions to raise the now increasingly fatuous boycott of Austria by the EU 14? Did he try to involve Japan or the United States in a diplomatic boycott of Austria? If not, is it not high time to drop participation in this boycott unilaterally? If the Government fail to raise it, does it not mean that they have no real commitment to it?

    The conclusions that have been reported refer to discussions on GM foods at the summit. Can the noble Baroness tell the House how the Prime Minister set out the UK position? Did he, as has been widely reported, echo the views of President Clinton that GM foods are safe and that that trade should be opened up? I wonder whether that is consistent with current United Kingdom policy and the very real fears that are held by people in this country.

    Before the summit, the Prime Minister set out the central issue for the summit as being to carry forward action on third-world debt, and pledged his leadership on that issue. He said that he wished to be associated as closely as possible with the conclusions. There is a feeling that, once again, in this as in much else, rhetoric was followed by failure. Can the noble Baroness tell us whether anything new was actually achieved in this area? For example, was any debt cancelled as a result of this summit at Okinawa? Were new defences put in place to prevent future irresponsible spending on arms and lavish living by élites in highly indebted nations? Is the noble Baroness aware that we on this side of the House would welcome real progress on debt relief, accompanied by such measures? But, sadly, we see none as a result of this summit.

    What new thinking emerged from this summit reflects credit on the Japanese presidency. It tried to cut through verbiage to find ways to help poorer nations, to extend the IT revolution, and to combat disease and poor education. But how will that now be translated into very real practical action? The problems of malnutrition, poverty, disease and inadequate education are too real and too painful to be assuaged by fine words alone. This summit must not be allowed to go the same way as did so many in the past that the Prime Minister has attended—seemingly fine words, followed by hollow and empty inaction. On this occasion, we must all hope that that pattern is not repeated.

    4.53 p.m.

    My Lords, on behalf of these Benches, I, too, thank the noble Baroness the Leader of the House for what I regard as the unrewarding chore of repeating the Statement made by the Prime Minister in another place. I put it that way because, despite the enjoinder in the Statement, it is right to be deeply sceptical about the purpose and achievements of Okinawa; and, indeed, of G7, and now G8, generally.

    I agree with the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, to the cost of the event. There were reports of television screens being provided for the whole of Africa under one initiative. Indeed, there were times when one thought of men and women in many of the worst-affected parts of the world sitting in front of their computer screens surfing the Internet, while dying of poverty or AIDS. I am glad to say that later in the summit some attention was given to those matters. But it is easy to believe that such occasions sometimes border on the frivolous when dealing with some of the most fundamental issues of our time.

    However, the problem of G7/G8 goes beyond the events of Okinawa. It is right to ask whether there is a crisis of identity that the Government should address as regards the future of G7 and G8. For example, the European Union has four places on G7, but the very important East Asian group of nations—particularly important financially—has only Japan to represent it. Russia is included in G8, not for reasons of its wealth but for geo-political reasons. If Russia is included, why not China? Then there is the role of Canada. Canada is included, although the United States is an adequate representative of North America. But Australia, which has an important geo-political role and is a rich country, is not represented in either G7 or G8.

    The latter are important issues. I do not expect the noble Baroness to give a detailed reply, but I should find it reassuring if she were to say that such matters are in the Government's mind and that they are considering whether G7 and G8 in their present forms will really serve our purpose best in the future. I should also like to know whether Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the right mechanisms exist for ensuring that summit decisions are implemented. Alternatively, do the world leaders go from summit to summit, year after year—for example, Birmingham, Cologne and now Okinawa—paying very little attention in the mean time to what happens in between to implement their decisions?

    Of all recent summits, it is true to say that there is a dangerous gap between declaration and delivery as regards the aspirations of summits, which are often worthy, and the consequences of the decisions that have been made. For example, that would apply to a number of references to the future made in the Statement that I believe all of us can welcome. I have in mind the references in its closing paragraphs to health and other matters. We have to say that these remain aspirations until there is evidence, next year and thereafter, that steps are being taken to implement such declarations.

    When it comes to the question of debt, the issue of delivery is particularly in evidence. When we debated the Cologne Statement and the question of world debt on 21st June last year, I recall that I asked (at col. 680 of Hansard) what "practical steps" would then be taken to implement the decisions taken over that weekend; in other words, I wanted to know precisely what would happen after the summit. I was struck this Friday by the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, seeking to justify what appeared to be a lack of progress in this respect. I make no criticism; indeed, I found her arguments to be quite strong. However, at the same time, the Prime Minister's team in Okinawa was suggesting that he was surprised at the shortfall and was making inquiries as to how it had occurred. We need to know whether the Government are keeping abreast of developments on the repayment of world debt.

    Here I turn, again, to the Statement and what it says about the new timetable. It indicates that the summit hopes that the countries to which G7/G8 were committed last year will begin to gain the benefits of the decision on their debt by the end of the year. Could the noble Baroness tell the House what practical steps will be taken now to implement that decision? Within the next few months, how can we measure whether we are making adequate progress in that direction?

    We can welcome some of the things in the Statement, but given past performance overall, I believe that we in this House and the nation need persuading that it was not just another meeting of world leaders, useful in itself, but with its importance much exaggerated.

    The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, referred to discussions on defence. I add my voice in asking whether—obviously not in the main conference, but on its margins—there was any discussion about the Strategic Defence Initiative. In this context we must remember that the show was stolen by President Putin. If there was discussion at the margins of the meeting, what did President Putin say about his discussions in North Korea and what in turn did the Americans say as to whether or when they might push the matter forward?

    5 p.m.

    My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Lords for welcoming the Statement. I begin with the point that each of them made concerning the cost and what they referred to as the extravagance of the summit, and its appropriateness. As always, both noble lords were immensely courteous and considered in their responses. But I believe that the individual criticisms of the way in which the Japanese Government hosted the conference perhaps verge on the discourteous. It is clearly not for the UK Government to criticise their host in that way. When the Birmingham Summit was held two years ago, the cost to this Government was £6.5 million. That was considerably less than the cost of the Okinawa Summit. However, it is worth pointing out what the Japanese Government and their spokespeople have pointed out on several occasions; namely, that a great deal of the expenditure was investment in what is quite a poor area of the Japanese economy. As I say, it is not for the UK Government to criticise the way in which their host chose to hold this particular event.

    The question of debt was clearly the most important and, in some ways, the most difficult part of the summit itself. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged that there was not such fast progress as the UK had hoped for. But there have been positive moves on debt repayment. For example, more has been achieved in the 10 months since the last IMF meeting on debt repayment under the HIPC II agreement than was agreed in three years under the previous initiative. There has been more done in one year than there was in the previous decade on that basis. That means that there has been real progress. Countries such as Uganda and Bolivia came within the scope of the original debt relief. They have already been in receipt of an extra 1.3 billion dollars to spend on their own economies. In a sense, that answers some of the issues on the way those economies and the people who live within them will be directly affected.

    As noble Lords will be aware, nine countries have so far come within the terms of the HIPC II agreement. As a result of the Okinawa Summit it is hoped and intended that a further 11 countries will come within its scope. In practice that means that of the 100 billion dollars agreed at Cologne last year, as I am sure the House understands, 50 billion dollars of that figure was for the states themselves to "forgive", if that is the appropriate word, and give up the requirement on the debt repayment. At the moment around 20 billion dollars have been repaid. If we include the extra 11 countries by the end of the year, there will be another 15 billion dollars. Therefore, we are talking about making progress towards three-quarters of the target suggested at Cologne.

    As I have said, the Prime Minister himself has acknowledged that from the perspective of the United Kingdom, we would have preferred to go faster. But those particular achievements should be neither ignored nor underestimated, particularly in the context of the previous decade of non-activity in this field.

    It is also worth underlining what the United Kingdom has done bilaterally. It has taken a leading position. We understand that the HIPC countries owe us £1.7 billion. So far, of the nine countries which have reached their so-called decision point, we as a country have been writing off about £241 million which they owe us. If the further 11 countries reach their decision point by the end of this year, the total UK Government write-off will then be £659 million for the 20 countries. That leaves £1.6 billion of HIPC debt outstanding.

    It should be pointed out that a great proportion of this money is from countries involved in conflict. That is the problem for many of the countries which have not reached the decision point in the overall HIPC plan, and precludes writing off the debt. It would be quite inappropriate for the debt to be written off with the understanding that any of the moneys that became available were being used to finance internal conflict, unlike Bolivia and Uganda where we hope that they have been used for investment in public services and so forth. That would be entirely inappropriate and against the programme's objectives.

    We have expressed concern about keeping up the momentum. In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank, we will monitor closely the progress of the other 11 countries. We believe that the United Kingdom has made good progress in this field. Overall, three-quarters of the agreements made at Cologne will have been achieved by the end of this year. The other agreements have not been achieved largely because of internal concerns, particularly wars within the countries which have not yet reached the decision point. They might be potentially eligible for relief, but not under those circumstances.

    The noble Lord, Lord Rodgers, raised the question in general as to whether the G7 or G8 has any locus in the context of discussing the issues leading to proper action. It is worth recalling that there have been substantial agreements in the past, and indeed at this particular summit, as a result of the leaders coming together in an informal context leading to frank and useful discussion. For example, when one considers the things achieved by G8 since the Birmingham Summit which this country hosted, one sees that we have secured substantial reforms of the international financial architecture in response to the Asian financial crisis. That was begun under the presidency of the United Kingdom. I say in parenthesis that material relating to the meetings of the finance ministers before the summits which produced the detail on this subject and financial crime have been placed in the Library. They are ongoing and are additional back-up to the G8 process and they are useful in that way.

    Another achievement has been the united response to the India-Pakistan nuclear testing question.

    There is also the question of heavily indebted countries' relief. As I have said several times, we are making slightly slower progress than we had hoped. However, progress would probably not have taken place at all but for the G7 and G8 arrangements. I believe it would be widely agreed that in 1999 the G8 was the effective forum for negotiating the Kosovo peace agreement culminating in Russia's reconciliation with the West. Indeed, this particular summit has enabled President Putin to play a very important part and to be a significant player at international conferences in a way which we perhaps might not have been foreseen some time ago.

    As regards President Putin's involvement in the summit and the Russian situation, it is not the case that the missile plans of the United States were discussed formally within the summit. My understanding is that the only issues which were talked about as regards nuclear safety concerned the surplus Russian weapons grade plutonium. How that is dealt with is obviously of paramount importance for the fulfilment of a G8-shared non-proliferation and disarmament goal. Once again, once sees the G8 format and forum as a medium through which these matters can be moved forward.

    As far as I understand—I was not present—the Russians did not ask for debt rescheduling or to host any summit in the future. I was not personally present. I believe they recognised that as they are not yet even members of the WTO, they need to improve some of their international arrangements, particularly on the financial side, before that type of issue can be discussed in any realistic way.

    The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, asked me about GM foods and whether anything which had been said, either within the summit or in the policy statements and press conferences since then, reflected a change in UK government policy. As has been said consistently, there has been no change in UK government policy either pro or anti-GM foods or crops. However, we have consistently argued—and did again at Okinawa—that there should be a sensible debate based on science rather than emotion, as the Statement said. That was the rationale behind the Edinburgh conference on GM food safety that the UK funded. The UK is keen to see the development of other fora based on scientific exchange of information and view of that kind. We hope that that will be progressed as a result of the discussions at Okinawa.

    On the general point of debt relief, I mention again not just the enormous change that has occurred in the past 10 months as a result of the agreements at Cologne but also the fact that the aid budgets have been increased. The UK aid budget, for example, has increased by 20 per cent under the new CSR agreement. That is something of which we should be proud, both as a government and as a people.

    I was slightly surprised to hear the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, criticise the record of the Government in this international development area when one considers the record of the previous administration where the aid budget was reduced and where in 18 years no progress was made on any kind of debt settlement of the kind which I have described as having occurred in the past 10 months and the past year. However, I fully recognise—as did my right honourable friend in the Statement—that we have not made sufficient progress, but something is better than nothing.

    5.11 p.m.

    My Lords, does my noble friend agree that while many of us would applaud what she said about the record of this Government in their commitment to the third world, there is on this side of the House profound disappointment about the progress made on debt? For many of those working in the front line of development, debt is a life or death issue. After the British Government have given such a magnificent lead, it is disappointing that the response of others has not been better. Does not my noble friend agree that it would be unfortunate if the message that went out was one of rationalising that some progress has been made rather than one of profound disappointment that more progress has not been made? Does my noble friend also agree that while it is excellent that Russia is becoming part of these conversations about the future of the world—that cannot be anything but good for the future of the world—part of that process means that one must abide by the spirit and the commitments of those who are already in the club? I hope therefore that my noble friend can assure the House that a firm line was taken with Russia on the totally unacceptable way in which it has conducted its campaign in Chechnya.

    My Lords, I am grateful for my noble friend's comments. I hope that he took from what I said that the UK Government have been concerned about the rate of progress on the debt issue and recognise that a number of the NGOs, for example, Jubilee 2000 and Oxfam, with which my noble friend has a distinguished association, were disappointed by what happened. I believe that that is reflected in the tone of the Statement. As I said earlier, we should acknowledge what has been achieved; namely, that a great deal of debt which might not have been cancelled has been as a result of the G8 process. I am sure that my noble friend would acknowledge that some of the other progress made at Okinawa, particularly as regards the commitment to untie aid by the end of next year—it is estimated that the tying of aid reduces its effectiveness by up to 25 per cent—is a great support for development of a productive kind in the developing world. Other matters such as the commitment to tackling health concerns in the developing world, particularly AIDS and tuberculosis, will assist the development and prosperity of those countries. As was mentioned in the Statement, the UK has agreed to double its commitment to health expenditure in those fields in the developing world.

    My noble friend referred to Russia and Chechnya. I reassure him that the UK Government's concerns about Chechnya were expressed to President Putin. I am sure that all members of the group who met in Okinawa expressed those concerns. However, I reinforce what the Prime Minister has said on several occasions; namely, that engagement with President Putin and with Russia is the best way to achieve influence with that new government.

    My Lords, the Government's Statement referred to the proposal for the introduction of a scheme for certification of diamonds in international trade by which each stone would be accompanied by a certificate of origin. If this is the case, I have serious doubts about its practicality. I hope that the Government will consider this matter again for the following reasons. It is only too easy to see that the certificate could be detached from a diamond and itself become an object of value. It is impossible by examining a diamond to determine from where it comes as they all resemble each other with certain rare exceptions; the one that is familiar to me being yellow diamonds which come from Brazil, artificially manufactured diamonds for industrial use which come from the United States, and blue diamonds which are so expensive that one ought not even to think of buying them. Would it not be better to think of an alternative arrangement of a central market-place in which each diamond producing country would be responsible for the authenticity of the diamonds it presented and they would have to appear on a list approved by the Security Council of the United Nations?

    My Lords, the noble Lord suggests an interesting and useful way to tackle this dilemma. I am sure that the noble Lord and the whole House recognise that problems arise in such countries as Sierra Leone where the illegal diamond trade—if one may express it in that way—is obviously financing and fuelling a vicious internal conflict and internal war. Therefore, some degree of regulation needs to be sought, even if it cannot be achieved perfectly, as the noble Lord suggests.

    I hope that I may correct the noble Lord on a small point which I was confused about. I understand that the proposed scheme does not relate to individual diamonds but to blocks of diamonds—if one may use that term—in the sense of the resources of particular products from individual markets. That is being taken forward by a working group known as the Kimberley Group, which has brought together a number of those involved in the industry and in the production of diamonds in several countries, notably from South Africa—as noble Lords will gather from the group's title—but also from other countries.

    This process has been ongoing for some time. I do not know whether the group has considered the noble Lord's proposal for a practical solution to the problem, but it is considering many different issues. The Okinawa conference agreed that there should be an expert conference to review the outcome of the Kimberley Group's findings and perhaps to take on board some other good ideas, such as the one we have just heard. That will be co-chaired by the UK and Russia as countries with a particular historic and current economic interest in that field.

    My Lords, in her positive account of the achievements of Okinawa, my noble friend the Leader of the House referred only briefly to market access which is of key importance to developing countries if they are to lever themselves out of poverty. Can she say a little more about what happened there and whether the Government achieved their aim?

    My Lords, my noble friend rightly mentions market access as being of immense importance to the developing world. The UK Government have led calls for strengthened commitment to that for the least developed countries. The G8 committed to go further with much greater urgency in this area. The UK would have preferred there to be a specific deadline agreed of 2005. This has been agreed by the EU as its target date for duty free access for nearly all goods. However, the general expectation that this was an important issue on which more and greater action needed to be taken was recognised at Okinawa.

    My Lords, at future G8 summits will the United Kingdom retain its own separate place if this country joins the euro?

    My Lords, I see no reason to suppose that any change of this country's position on the euro would have any impact on its G8 status any more than it has done in the case of other countries.

    My Lords, the Statement referred to major communicable diseases; I welcome the British additional contribution on this front. Does the Statement mean that additional funds will be available to the World Health Organisation? Does the Leader of the House consider that using this organisation, in partnership with developing countries, is the best way of tackling the problem?

    Very briefly on organised crime, will the noble Baroness, as Minister for Women, take a special interest in the trafficking of women for prostitution? Can she try to ensure that police forces in various countries do not try simply to contain this, but really make an effort to stop it?

    My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. On the health issue, I agree with him that the WHO is clearly a very important partner in this area. He will know very well how the funds for the WHO are arranged, which is not through the G8 but through the member governments of the WHO. The overall commitment to agree the very ambitious targets—on, for example, AIDS and TB—will require additional funds if they are to be fulfilled. Of course, although the WHO is very important—indeed, it is probably the leading player in this international field— others are involved. We have, for example, worked with the international pharmaceutical business and others to try to reduce the prices of expensive drugs in the developing world.

    One cannot overestimate the need within the developing countries—particularly in sub-Saharan Africa—for a basic improvement in primary healthcare before any sophisticated changes in terms of new pharmaceuticals and new drugs can usefully be exported, and before any new technologies for dealing with these infectious diseases can be taken on board.

    Education is also very important in this area. Health promotion and health education are particularly important in relation to, for example, the fight against the spread of HIV and AIDS. Substantial budgets and resources to support the role of health promotion and education are probably almost as important as the enormous expenditures needed for the treatment and care of those already infected.

    As to crime, I am grateful to the noble Lord for rightly raising the issue of the growing problem of trafficking in women. It is an issue which, wearing my other hat as Minister for Women, I have taken up with the European Parliament and the European Commission. It is one of the issues which, extraordinarily enough, leads in this country, although obviously not in the developing world, to a circular arrangement in which other infectious diseases are imported precisely through this route. So, as well as for reasons of social justice and the appalling crime involved in the trafficking in women, there are self-protective reasons which lead this country to take an active interest in the problem.

    My Lords, does the Leader of the House agree that the indebtedness of some of these countries has been caused by misappropriation of funds in the past, which have been spent on arms and on the personal expenditure of many of the leaders? Can she assure the House that in future no British taxpayers' money in aid—or, indeed, in forgiveness of debt—will be allowed to increase the profligate expenditure of these people?

    My Lords, as the noble Lord will be aware, poverty reduction is the main aim of this country's bilateral aid programme, as it is of most of the multilateral programmes to which we subscribe. The noble Lord is right, there are countries in which the issue of the way in which their internal governance is arranged—this covers most of the points raised by the noble Lord—is at least as important as some of the other matters I referred to in my original answers to the noble Lords, Lord Strathclyde and Lord Rodgers, which concerned, for example, issues relating to internal conflict.

    The noble Lord asked me to make a commitment. It would be foolish of me to do that from the Dispatch Box. On the other hand, as I said, poverty reduction is the main aim of the Government. We have said in relation to the HIPC initiative that some 12 countries have failed to come up to their eligibility status because at present they do not have agreed programmes under the IMF poverty reduction programme. Some of the disturbing factors of their internal governance, to which the noble Lord referred, are instrumental in that.

    My Lords, do Her Majesty's Government have a view on how long the current arrangement of G7 plus one—that is, G8—should be maintained, or whether it would be much better to look for an early conversion from G7 to G8? I raise the issue because I am not at all clear about the substantive reasons for maintaining the current situation. President Clinton is purported—I stress, purported—to have said that it is simply a question of finance; that is, that it is necessary to discuss the finances of a debtor country among its creditors in private, without the debtor being there. I find that rather strange. Does not the noble Baroness agree that it would be much better if, at the earliest possible occasion, the Russian Federation should become part of the G8?

    Does not the Minister further agree that perhaps the Federation's behaviour in Chechnya might have been rather more acceptable if it had become a proper member of the club and had been bound into the G8, rather than being held somewhat on the outside of it?

    My Lords, my noble friend Lord Grenfell makes a rather hypothetical and retrospective point about Russia in relation to its activities in Chechnya. We could discuss that matter in a theoretical way, but it would not throw much useful light on the future so far as concerns Russia's membership of the G8. As I said in reply to an earlier question from my noble friend Lord Judd, as a country and as a member of the G8, we are concerned to see that Russia plays its full part, and we are fully committed to supporting its integration into the global economic family of democratic states.

    My noble friend raised the question of whether Russia's exclusion rests solely on financial matters; I referred to its lack of membership of the WTO and its continual indebtedness. I know that my right honourable friend and other participants in the G8 forum were very impressed by the contribution made by President Putin, but there are other elements to Russia's record—for example, its respect for international norms of human rights—which must be taken into account before the G7 becomes fully the G8.

    My Lords, I, too, warmly applaud the Government's emphasis in the Statement on poverty reduction, and the length of time that the Leader of the House took to consider those problems. I also associate myself with the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Judd.

    However, my question concerns the issue of the trade round. Is the noble Baroness aware that in our recent debate on the World Trade Organisation, a number of very experienced Members of the House voiced their concerns about going ahead so quickly with a new trade round, bearing in mind the failures of the multilateral agreement on investment and the Seattle summit? Why do the Government wish to take the European Union line of proceeding so quickly with a new trade round?

    My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for his overall support of the underlying point of the Statement. I fully take on board the concerns he expressed about the speed of the indebtedness programme, which I reinforced in my response to my noble friend Lord Judd. As to the WTO, we need to keep the existing structures in place. Obviously those were enormously threatened last year by the failure of the Seattle meeting. But the international community, as represented in Okinawa, is concerned to see that there is not a dissipation of the structure, however skeletal and inappropriate it may have been demonstrated to be last year. Therefore, although it may seem like a rush to something which may or may not need further work and support to achieve a successful outcome, it would appear that if one relinquished the ambition to achieve the new round before the end of this year, that would be a counsel of despair.

    My Lords, can the Leader of the House tell us what percentage of the funds to reduce the debt of third-world countries, which were committed with much fanfare by the Chancellor of the Exchequer following the Jubilee 2000 campaign, have now been delivered?

    My Lords, if the noble Lord is referring to the UK's position on this matter, I can repeat—I am sure that he can do the arithmetic—the figures I gave previously. The heavily indebted poorer countries owe the UK £1.7 billion. As I said in repeating the Statement, nine countries have reached their decision point, eight of which owe money to the United Kingdom. We are therefore writing off the £241 million owed by the nine that have reached their decision point.

    If the 11 countries reach their decision point by the end of this year, the total the UK will be writing off is £659 million from the 20 countries. That leaves, as I am sure the noble Lord has already worked out, £1.6 billion of outstanding HIPC debt. Sixty-five per cent of that is owed by Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo, countries for which the effect of conflict undermined progress on the commitments to poverty reduction and hence to debt relief. We have already discussed those points in a way which will have made clear to your Lordships' House the kind of barriers that still exist to debt relief on a universal scale.

    Local Government Bill

    5.30 p.m.

    Consideration of Commons amendments resumed.

    Commons Amendment

    11 Clause 10, page 5, line 32, leave out ("which determines to adopt executive arrangements")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 11.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 11.—(Lord Whitty.)

    [Amendment No. 11A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 11, not moved.]

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    12 Clause 11, page 5, line 40, leave out ("An") and insert ("The")

    My Lords, I beg to move that this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 12.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 12.—(Lord Whitty.)

    [Amendment No. 12A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 12, not moved.]

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    13 Page 5, line 40, leave out ("may") and insert ("must")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 13.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 13.—(Lord Whitty.)

    [Amendment No. 13A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 13, not moved.]

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    14 Page 6, line 22, leave out subsection (5)

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 14.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 14.—(Lord Whitty.)

    [Amendment No. 14A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 14, not moved.]

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    15 Page 6, line 32, leave out ("each member of which is") and insert ("some or all of the members of which are")

    16 Page 6, line 33, leave out ("of") and insert ("for")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 15 and 16. With the leave of the House, I shall speak also to the other amendments grouped with them. This large group of government amendments is made up of minor technical, consequential and drafting amendments to the provisions in Part II of the Bill and the related issues dealt with in Clause 90 which relate to the social services functions.

    These are largely drafting amendments but also respond to certain issues raised in your Lordships' House and in another place. I should particularly like to draw attention to Amendments Nos. 428 to 436 which together with Amendments Nos. 46 to 49 and 51 strengthen the overview and scrutiny arrangements. The Government believe that robust overview and scrutiny committees are central to all executive-based constitutions and equally central to the additional arrangements made available by the noble Baroness's amendments which we agreed earlier.

    The amendments include ensuring the position of diocesan representatives in the overview and scrutiny arrangements in education authorities, the importance of which was highlighted in our earlier debates by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn, who I gather is on rather happier business today. With these amendments we have met the right reverend prelate's outstanding concerns, as we undertook to do. I hope that noble Lords will support the other amendments in the group.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment Nos. 15 and 16.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    17 After Clause 11, insert the following new clause—

    Additional Forms Of Executive

    (" .—(1) In deciding whether to make regulations under section 11(6) prescribing a particular form of executive, or which provision to make under section 16 in relation to that form of executive, the Secretary of State must have regard to—

  • (a) any proposals made to him under subsection (2),
  • (b) the extent to which he considers that the operation by a local authority of executive arrangements involving that form of executive would be likely to ensure that decisions of the authority are taken in an efficient, transparent and accountable way,
  • (c) the extent to which that form of executive differs from the forms of executive for the time being permitted by or under section 11,
  • (d) the number and description of authorities for which he considers that that form of executive, if prescribed in regulations made under section 11(6), would be an appropriate form of executive to consider.
  • (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a local authority may propose to the Secretary of State a form of executive in relation to which the authority consider that the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are satisfied.

    (3) Those conditions are—

  • (a) that the operation by the authority of executive arrangements involving that form of executive would be an improvement on the arrangements which the authority have in place for the discharge of their functions at the time that the proposal is made to the Secretary of State,
  • (b) that the operation by the authority of executive arrangements involving that form of executive would be likely to ensure that decisions of the authority are taken in an efficient, transparent and accountable way, and
  • (c) that that form of executive, if prescribed in regulations made under section 11(6), would be an appropriate form of executive for all local authorities, or for any particular description of local authority, to consider.
  • (4) A proposal under subsection (2)—

  • (a) must describe the form of executive to which it relates,
  • (b) must describe the provision which the authority consider should be made under section 16 in relation to that form of executive, and
  • (c) must explain why the authority consider that the conditions mentioned in subsection (3) are satisfied in relation to that form of executive.")
  • 18 Clause 12, page 7, line 10, at end insert—

    ("() Subject to any provision made by this Act or by any enactment which is passed or made after the day on which this Act is passed, any function of a local authority which is not specified in regulations under subsection (2) is to be the responsibility of an executive of the authority under executive arrangements.")

    19 Page 7, line 22, leave out subsection (3)

    20 Page 7, line 25, leave out ("may") and insert ("must")

    21 Page 7, line 28, after ("authority") insert—

    ("() to be a function which is not to be the responsibility of such an executive,")

    22 Page 8, line 14, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

    ("(b) may be discharged only in accordance with any provisions made by or under this Part which apply to the discharge of any such function by that form of executive.")

    23 Page 8, line 16, at beginning insert ("Accordingly")

    24 Page 8, line 31, at end insert—

    ("() Any reference in this section to a function specified in regulations includes a reference to a function of a description specified in regulations.")

    25 Clause 14, page 10, line 21, after ("makes") insert ("or has made")

    26 Page 10, line 22, leave out ("at that or any subsequent time")

    27 Page 10, line 27, leave out second ("executive")

    28 Clause 15, page 10, line 39, leave out ("executive") and insert ("council manager")

    29 Page 10, line 42, leave out ("council manager") and insert ("executive")

    30 Page 10, line 43, at end insert—

    ("(2A) In deciding—

  • (a) whether or how to discharge any functions, or
  • (b) whether to arrange for any functions to be discharged by the executive or an officer of the authority,
  • the council manager must have regard to any advice given by the elected mayor.")

    31 Page 10, line 45, leave out first ("council manager") and insert ("executive")

    32 Page 10, line 45, leave out second ("council manager") and insert ("executive")

    33 Page 11, line 1, leave out ("an executive or council manager") and insert ("a council manager or executive")

    34 Page 11, line 2, leave out ("a council manager") and insert ("an executive")

    35 Page 11, line 3, leave out ("executive or council manager") and insert ("council manager or executive")

    36 Clause 17, page 11, line 26, after second ("committee") insert ("or sub-committee")

    37 Page 11, line 27, leave out from ("authority") to end of line 29 and insert ("which satisfies the conditions in subsection (4),")

    38 Page 11, line 30, at end insert—

    ("(4) A committee or sub-committee of a local authority satisfies the conditions in this subsection if—

  • (a) the committee or sub-committee is established to discharge functions in respect of part of the area of the authority,
  • (b) the members of the committee or sub-committee who are members of the authority are elected for electoral divisions or wards which fall wholly or partly within that part, and
  • (c) either or both of the conditions in subsection (5) are satisfied in relation to that part.
  • (5) Those conditions are—

  • (a) that the area of that part does not exceed two-fifths of the total area of the authority,
  • (b) that the population of that part, as estimated by the authority, does not exceed two-fifths of the total population of the area of the authority as so estimated.")
  • 39 Clause 18, page 12, line 2, leave out first ("is") and insert ("are")

    40 Page 12, line 20, leave out (" 15(3) and (4)") and insert ("15(2A) to (4)")

    41 Clause 19, page 12, line 41, after ("section") insert ("101(2) or")

    42 Page 12, line 46, after ("section") insert ("101(2) or")

    43 Page 13, line 6, at end insert ("committee or")

    44 Clause 20, page 13, line 30, leave out ("and") and insert ("or")

    45 Page 13, line 31, leave out ("their inhabitants") and insert ("the inhabitants of that area")

    46 Page 13, line 40, at beginning insert ("Subject to subsection (4A)")

    47 Page 13, line 41, at end insert—

    ("(4A) If or to the extent that a local authority's function of conducting best value reviews under section 5 of the Local Government Act 1999 is not the responsibility of an executive of the authority, the authority may arrange for their overview and scrutiny committee (or any of their overview and scrutiny committees) to conduct such a review.")

    48 Page 13, line 45, at end insert—

    ("() A sub-committee of an overview and scrutiny committee may not discharge any functions other than those conferred on it under subsection (5)(b).")

    49 Page 14, line 27, at end insert—

    ("() Subsections (2) and (5) of section 102 of the Local Government Act 1972 are to apply to an overview and scrutiny committee of a local authority, or a sub-committee of such a committee, as they apply to a committee appointed under that section.")

    50 Page 14, line 28, at end insert ("or a sub-committee of such a committee")

    51Page 14,line 33,at end insert—

    ("() A person is not obliged by subsection (11) to answer any question which he would be entitled to refuse to answer in or for the purposes of proceedings in a court in England and Wales.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 17 to 51. I have already spoken to these amendments.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 17 to 51.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    52 Clause 21, page 15, line 26, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

    ("() as to the circumstances in which meetings mentioned in subsection(2), or particular proceedings at such meetings, must be open to the public,

    () as to the circumstances in which meetings mentioned in subsection (2), or particular proceedings at such meetings, must be held in private,")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 52. With the leave of the House, I shall speak also to the other amendments in the group.

    The Commons amendments in the group provide the foundations of the robust regime for public and media access which we are establishing for councils' new executive constitutions yet take account of the debates on this issue both in this House and in another place. The access regime will ensure that people will know what decisions the executive is planning to take, how they can make their input into those decisions, what decisions have been taken and the reasons for those decisions.

    Using the powers provided in Commons Amendments Nos. 52 and 53, we intend to make regulations establishing this regime. We have drafted those regulations. The last draft of them was placed in the Library of the House on 3rd July. The regime will also include a requirement that where a council's executive meets to take key decisions—those which impact on the lives of people in local communities—those meetings must be open. That touches on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, in an earlier debate. Our aim through those regulations, taken together with statutory guidance, is to deliver both the letter and the spirit of the intention for open meetings without compromising the aim that an executive can have proper time and space to allow it to think the unthinkable away from the public glare or that, for example, a mayor is able to call his or her colleagues together at short notice to chew over an issue.

    We will ensure that our intention for open meetings cannot be subverted by an executive separating a pertinent discussion about a key decision from the meeting where it collectively agrees that decision or through its scheme for delegating formal decision-taking to an individual member of the executive or an officer of the authority. The principle is clear. Where executives meet formally to discuss key decisions, they should do so in public regardless of who will formally take the decision. In that way I believe that we meet the concerns previously expressed and the concerns underlying Amendments Nos. 52A and 52B standing in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Those amendments, as drafted, may not achieve the outcome which I have described. I hope that the noble Baroness will not press her amendments. Our amendments, together with my explanation, will meet most of the objections that have arisen in relation to access to the meetings of the executive.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 52.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 52

    had given notice of her intention to move, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 52, Amendments Nos. 52A and 52B.

    52A Clause 21, leave out lines 2 to 4 and insert—

    ("() requiring meetings mentioned in subsection (2), or particular proceedings at such meetings, to be open to the public when discussing matters pertaining to decisions (whether or not to be made at the meeting) or taking decisions,")

    52B Leave out lines 5 to 7

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I shall not press Amendments Nos. 52A and 52B. Perhaps I may take the opportunity to raise two matters with the Minister. First, he referred to the regulations which will deal with what are to be key decisions on the part of local authorities. Can he confirm that the definition of a key decision will not vary widely between authorities of a similar type and size? Secondly, the Minister has dealt with discussion about decisions which will be taken by individuals. Can he reassure the House that where decisions are based on draft reports, disclosure cannot be avoided by circulating drafts rather than final versions?

    My Lords, I wanted simply to comment that these improvements are welcome. As the Minister has explained, they take matters forward as a result of our debates at a much earlier stage of the Bill. I observe, however, that although guidance will be produced and regulations made in this matter, the question of what will form a key decision will remain in the hands of the councillors themselves via the council. That is how I understand the position.

    If the councillors are to decide what is to be a key decision to be taken in the open, unless strict regulation is put in place, of which I do not generally approve, we may be putting in place a fallible system. Perhaps the old rules of openness which, in their blanket application, were rather more simple and straightforward—apart from appropriate exclusions—were better. However, perhaps that comment is unnecessary because I do not want to oppose the amendment.

    My Lords, I owe both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord some explanation of the position as regards key decisions. If we are to avoid too little information being disclosed, or alternatively a huge amount of paperwork masking the real issues of concern, key decisions will require careful definition. We are still in the process of consultation on this. We are analysing the responses we have received. However, the vital principle is clear. Where a decision will have any significant impact on the community, the electorate involved should be able to influence that decision. That means that it must be made openly and in public.

    With regard to key decisions, regardless of whether they are being taken collectively by the executive or by an individual officer, people will be told about the planning behind such a decision, they will know how to contribute to the decision-making process and they will have a right of early access to papers. In that regard, we shall prevent by regulation any abuse covering the disclosure of draft reports. Reports will need to be available at least three days before any decision is taken. I hope that that goes some way towards meeting the point raised by the noble Baroness.

    Although I cannot give the House a definitive interpretation of a "key decision", I am sure that the responses we have received to our consultation will guide us towards formulating a definition that will meet the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith.

    [Amendments Nos. 52A and 52B, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 52, not moved.]

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    53 Page 15, line 48, at end insert—

    ("(9A) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision for or in connection with requiring prescribed information about prescribed decisions made in connection with the discharge of functions which are the responsibility of a local authority executive to be made available to members of the public or members of the authority.
    (9B) The provision which may be made under subsection (9A) includes provision—
  • (a) requiring prescribed information to be made available in advance of the prescribed decisions mentioned in that subsection,
  • (b) as to the way or form in which prescribed information is to be made available.")
  • 54 Clause 24, page 16, line 23, at end insert—

    ("(1A) Before drawing up proposals under this section, a local authority must take reasonable steps to consult the local government electors for, and other interested persons in, the authority's area.")

    55 Page 16, line 27, leave out ("which or) and insert ("the extent to which")

    56 Page 16, line 30, leave out paragraph (a)

    57 Page 16, line 35, leave out second ("and") and insert—("() A local authority")

    58 Page 16, line 36, at end insert ("for the purposes of this section")

    59 Page 17, line 3, after ("consult") insert ("the")

    60 Page 17, line 4, after ("electors") insert ("for")

    61 Clause 26, page 17, line 32, leave out ("(within the meaning of section 29)") and insert ("of a particular type

    permitted by regulations under section 29")

    62 Page 17, line 34, leave out ("In") and insert ("For the purpose of")

    63 Page 17, line 35, after ("consult") insert ("the")

    64 Page 17, line 35, after ("electors") insert ("for")

    65 Page 18, line 17, leave out ("(2)(b), (3)(a) and (b)") and insert ("(1A), (2)(b), (3)")

    66 Page 18, line 20, leave out ("(3)(a) and (b)") and insert ("(1A),(3)")

    67 After Clause 26, insert the following new clause—

    Approval Of Outline Fall-Back Proposals

    (".—(1) A local authority may apply to the Secretary of State for the approval of outline fall-back proposals involving fall-back proposals which are not permitted by or under this Part but which would be so permitted if the necessary regulations were made under section 11(6) or 29 (as the case may be).

    (2) The form and content of an application under subsection (1) must comply with any directions given by the Secretary of State.

    (3) Where the Secretary of State approves a local authority's proposals under subsection (1)—

  • (a) the authority may use those proposals as their outline fall-back proposals for the purposes of section 26, and
  • (b) the timetable referred to in section 26(13) shall be extended to the extent that there is any delay in making the necessary regulations under section 11(6) or 29 (as the case may be).")
  • 68 Clause 28, page 19, line 3, leave out ("enabling") and insert ("the operation by")

    69 Page 19, line 4, leave out ("to operate") and insert ("of")

    70 Page 19, line 10, after ("26,") insert ("( Approval of outline fall-back proposals),")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 53 to 70.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 53 to 70.—(Lord Whiny.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    5.45 p.m.

    Commons Amendment

    71 Clause 29, page 19, line 23, after ("efficient") insert (", transparent")

    My Lords, I apologise to the House. The procedure here is a little confusing. I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 71.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 71.-(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 71

    71A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I agree that the procedure is somewhat confusing here. I beg to move.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 71A, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 71, be agreed to.—( Baroness Hamwee.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 71 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendment

    72 Page 19, line 25, leave out ("by or under") insert ("under either or both of the following—

    (i)")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 72.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 72-(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 72

    72A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 72A, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 72, be agreed to.—( Baroness Hamwee.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 72 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendment

    73 Page 19, line 26, leave out ("or") and insert ("and

    (ii)")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 73.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 73.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 73

    73A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 73A, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 73, be agreed to.—( Baroness Hamwee.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 73 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendment

    74 Clause 30, page 20, line 1, at beginning insert—

    ("() A local authority may not operate alternative arrangements unless required to do so by virtue of any provision made by or under this Part.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 74.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 74.—(Lord Whitty.)

    As An Amendment To Commons Amendment No 74

    74A Clause 30, line 3, after ("unless") insert ("permitted or")

    My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 74A as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 74.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 74A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 74, be agreed to.—(Baroness Hamwee.) On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 74, as amended, agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    75 Page 20, line 11, leave out ("is") and insert ("are")

    76 Page 20, line 15, leave out ("is") and insert ("are")

    77 Page 20, line 20, after ("26,") insert ("(Approval of outline fall-back proposals),")

    78 Clause 31, page 20, line 25, leave out ("receives") and insert ("receive")

    79 Page 20, line 37, leave out ("the proper") and insert ("an")

    80 Page 21, line 15, after ("26,") insert ("(Approval of outline fall-back proposals),")

    81 Clause 32, page 21, line 26, leave out ("a particular") and insert ("such")

    82 Page 21, line 26, at end insert ("as may be specified in the direction")

    83 Page 21, line 40, after ("26,") insert ("(Approval of outline fall-back proposals),")

    84 Clause 33, page 22, line 16, after ("26,") insert ("(Approval of outline fall-back proposals),")

    85 Clause 34, page 22, line 20, at end insert ("or alternative arrangements")

    86 Page 22, line 23, leave out from ("information") to end of line 24

    87 Page 22, line 32, at end insert—

    ("() A local authority must supply a copy of their constitution to any person who requests a copy and who pays to the authority such reasonable fee as the authority may determine.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 75 to 87.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 75 to 87.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    88 Clause 36, page 22, line 42, at end insert—

    ("() An elected mayor of a local authority in England is to be entitled to the style of "mayor".
    () An elected mayor of a local authority in Wales is to be entitled to the style of "mayor" or "maer".")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 88. In speaking to this amendment, I should like to speak to the other amendments grouped with it. These amendments make clear the details of the regime for electing directly elected mayors and for local people to decide in referendums whether they want to have such a mayor for their area.

    I should like to draw your Lordships' attention to Amendment No. 107, which responds to points made in Committee by the noble Baronesses, Lady Hanham, Lady Byford, and Lady Hamwee, about how polls are taken. It makes it clear that through regulations we can provide for referendums to be conducted in a number of ways, for example, using all-postal voting.

    I commend the amendment to the House, and I hope that noble Lords will also support the other amendments grouped with it.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 88.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    89 Page 23, line 5, leave out from beginning to ("an") in line 6

    90 Page 23, line 7, leave out ("for the purposes of the enactments relating to local government")

    91 Page 23, line 8, leave out ("and") and insert ("or")

    92 Page 23, line 8, at end insert ("for the purposes of such enactments (whenever passed or made) as may be specified in regulations made by the Secretary of State under this subsection")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 89 to 92. I spoke to these amendments with Commons Amendment No. 15. I commend the amendments to the House.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 89 to 92.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    93 After Clause 36, insert the following new clause—

    Election As Elected Mayor And Councillor

    (" .—(1) If the person who is returned at an election as the elected mayor of a local authority is also returned at an election held at the same time as a councillor of the authority, a vacancy shall arise in the office of councillor.

    (2) If the person who is returned at an election ("the mayoral election") as the elected mayor of a local authority—

  • (a) is a councillor of the authority, and
  • (b) was returned as such a councillor at an election held at an earlier time than the mayoral election,
  • a vacancy shall arise in the office of councillor.

    (3) Subject to subsection (4), a person who is the elected mayor of a local authority may not be a candidate in an election for the return of a councillor or councillors of the authority.

    (4) A person who is the elected mayor of a local authority may be a candidate in an election for the return of a councillor or councillors of the authority if the election is held at the same time as an election for the return of the elected mayor of the authority, but subsection (1) applies if he is a candidate in both such elections and he is returned both as the elected mayor and as a councillor.")

    94 Clause 37, page 23, line 21, leave out subsection (2)

    95 Clause 39, page 23, line 37, after ("election") insert ("for the return")

    96 Clause 40, page 24, line 14, leave out ("the election expenses of candidates") and insert ("election expenses")

    97 Page 24, line 26, after first ("or") insert ("any provision of")

    98 Page 24, line 26, after ("enactment") insert ("(whenever passed or made)")

    99 Page 24, line 33, at end insert ("or under")

    100 Page 24, line 34, leave out ("Act") and insert ("Part")

    101 Page 24, line 35, leave out (", or made under,")

    102 Page 24, line 35, after ("enactment") insert ("(whenever passed or made)")

    103 Clause 41, page 24, line 43, at end insert—

    ("() If the result of a referendum held by virtue of regulations or an order made under any provision of this Part is to approve the proposals to which the referendum relates, the local authority concerned must implement those proposals in accordance with any provision made by the regulations or order.
    () If the result of a referendum held by virtue of regulations or an order made under any provision of this Part is to reject the proposals to which the referendum relates, the local authority concerned may not implement those proposals but must instead comply with any provision made by the regulations or order.")

    104 Page 25, line 8, leave out ("made by or under") and insert ("of")

    105 Page 25, line 9, after ("enactment") insert ("(whenever passed or made)")

    106 Page 25, line 15, at end insert—

    ("() about the limitation of expenditure in connection with a referendum (and the creation of criminal offences in connection with the limitation of such expenditure),")

    107 Page 25, line 18, leave out paragraph (d) and insert—

    ("() as to when, where and how voting in a referendum is to take place,
    () as to how the votes cast in a referendum are to be counted, and")

    108 Page 25, line 21, leave out ("this section") and insert ("subsections (1), (2) to (4) and (6)")

    109 Page 25, line 22, leave out ("or 28")

    110 Page 25, line 22, leave out ("under section 31 or 32") and insert ("or an order made under any provision of this Part")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House to agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 93 to 110.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 93 to 110.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    111 After Clause 41, insert the following new clause—

    Amendments To The 1972 Act

    (" . Schedule ( Amendments to the 1972 Act) which contains amendments to the Local Government Act 1972 has effect.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 111. I shall speak also to the other amendments grouped with it.

    The amendment introduces a new schedule to the Bill which makes a number of amendments to the Local Government Act 1972 consequential upon the establishment of executives and elected mayors under Part II of the Bill. The government amendments to the Commons amendments in this group simply add several modifications to that schedule.

    Throughout the passage of the Bill, including in its latter stages in the Commons, we indicated that we should need to make a number of consequential amendments to existing legislation, and particularly to the 1972 Act, to take account of the existence of executives and directly elected mayors. In particular, we need to make sure that the relevant provisions in the 1972 Act which govern elected members are applied to elected mayors. This new schedule, as added to by Amendments Nos. 437A to 437E, helps to achieve that.

    I commend the amendment to the House, and I hope that noble Lords will also support the government amendments to some of the Commons amendments later in the group.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 111.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    112 Clause 42, page 25, line 27, leave out ("of") and insert ("made by or under")

    113 Page 25, line 27, at end insert—

    ("(2) The provision which may be made under subsection (1) includes provision modifying any enactment (whenever passed or made).

    (3) The power under subsection (2) to modify an enactment is a power—

  • (a) to apply that enactment with or without modifications,
  • (b) to extend, disapply or amend that enactment, or
  • (c) to repeal or revoke that enactment with or without savings.")
  • 114 Leave out Clause 43

    115 Clause 44, page 25, leave out lines 40 to 43

    116 Page 25, line 43, at end insert—

    (""alternative arrangements" has the meaning given by section 29(1),")

    117 Page 26, line 5, at end insert—

    (""enactment" includes an enactment contained in a local Act or comprised in subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978),")

    118 Page 26, line 9, at end insert—

    (""fall-back proposals" and "outline fall-back proposals" are to be construed in accordance with section 26(1) and (2),")

    119 Page 26, leave out lines 18 to 21

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 112 to 119. I spoke to these amendments with Commons Amendment No. 15.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 112 to 119.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    120 Page 26, line 31, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

    ("(b) in the case of a London borough, is a reference to the person who (disregarding paragraph 5A of Schedule 2 to the Local Government Act 1972) is referred to in Part I of that Schedule as the mayor of the borough,")

    As An Amendment To Commons Amendment No 120

    120A Clause 44, line 3, leave out ("paragraph 5A") and insert ("paragraphs 5B to 5I")

    My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 120A to Commons Amendment No. 120, to which I spoke with Amendment No. 111. I ask the House to agree to the Commons amendment, but as amended by Amendment No. 120A.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 120A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 120, be agreed to.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 120, as amended, agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    121 Page 26, line 37, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

    ("(b) in the case of a London borough, is a reference to the person who (disregarding paragraph 5A of Schedule 2 to the Local Government Act 1972) is referred to in Part I of that Schedule as the deputy mayor of the borough.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 121.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 121.—(Lord Whitty.)

    As Amendments To Commons Amendment No 121

    121A Line 3, leave out ("paragraph 5A") and insert ("paragraphs 5B to 5I")

    121B Line 5, leave out ("of the borough")

    My Lords, I beg to move Amendments Nos. 121A and 121B, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 121, to which I have already spoken.

    Moved, That Amendments Nos. 121A and 121B, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 121, be agreed to.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 121, as amended, agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    122 Page 26, line 44, leave out third ("of") and insert ("made by or under")

    123 Page 26, line 44, at end insert—

    ("() Any functions conferred on a local authority by virtue of this Part are not to be the responsibility of an executive of the authority under executive arrangements.
    () Any directions given by the Secretary of State under any provision of this Part—
  • (a) may be varied or revoked by subsequent directions given by him under that provision, and
  • (b) may make different provision for different cases, local authorities or descriptions of local authority.")
  • My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 122 and 123.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 122 and 123.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    124 Clause 45, page 27, line 8, at end insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    125 Page 27, line 11, at end insert ("(other than police authorities)")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 124 and 125. I shall speak also to the amendments grouped with them.

    The effects of the amendments are straightforward. As drafted, the Bill treats Welsh police authorities as relevant authorities in Wales for the purposes of Part III. But policing in Wales is a non-devolved matter and Welsh police authorities are the responsibility of the Secretary of State and not the National Assembly. Part III therefore needs amending to reflect that fact.

    Amendment No. 124 and those grouped with it ensure that Welsh police authorities are subject to the principles and codes of conduct drawn up by the Secretary of State for English authorities, not those prepared for other Welsh local authorities by the National Assembly.

    In drawing up the principles and codes of conduct, the Secretary of State will be obliged to consult the Assembly as well as the Commission for Local Administration and Welsh police authorities themselves. Any breaches of the code of conduct in these authorities will be investigated by the local commissioner in Wales rather than the standards hoard. The reason for that is that the local commissioner in Wales is already responsible for investigating maladministration in Welsh police authorities. It therefore makes sense that he should also investigate breaches of the code of conduct in those authorities. These arrangements properly reflect the non-devolved status of Welsh police authorities. I commend the amendments to the House. I hope that noble Lord will also support the other amendments grouped with them.

    Moved, The House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 124 and 125.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    126 Page 27, line 14, leave out ("local government") and insert ("relevant authorities")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 126. I shall speak also to a large group of Commons amendments, most of which are minor drafting and technical amendments to tidy up the Bill. They cover a large number of clauses and issues. If the House insists, I am happy to go through each in detail, but I suspect that that is not the wish of the House! If noble Lords want to raise any points on the amendments, I will take them.

    Perhaps I may merely draw attention to the more important and substantive amendments. Amendment No. 129 adds both the Metropolitan Police Authority and the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority to the list of relevant authorities to which Part III should apply.

    At present, Commons Amendment No. 332 inserts new subsections to Clause 77. Subsection (6) will ensure that the standards board is able to consider breaches of the mandatory provisions of the model code of conduct by members even where an authority has failed to adopt a code.

    I turn to Amendment No. 456A. Commons Amendment No. 456 ought to tidy up the legislation relating to employees of fire authorities. However, in trying to clarify the position, we believe that that amendment went further than we should wish and introduces an inconsistency in the way in which different fire employees are treated. Amendment No. 456A would therefore restore the position prior to the Commons amendment.

    Commons Amendment No. 468 clarifies the duty of the monitoring officer. It has been tabled following consultation with existing monitoring officers and local government representatives and is intended to simplify the way in which monitoring officers will work.

    The remaining amendments in this group are technical and consequential and in some cases grammatical, and are intended to tidy up the Bill. I commend the amendments to the House and I hope that noble Lords will agree to them.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 126.—(Lord Whitty.)

    My Lords, having listened to the proceedings for the past half-hour, the Minister now tells the House that the Bill just requires a little tidying up. I believe that the Bill requires a good deal of tidying up and is an example of bad legislation to be passed by this House. I hope that in future the Government will take more notice of this.

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    6 p.m.

    Commons Amendments

    127 Page 27, line 18, at end insert—

    ("() Before making an order under this section so far as it relates to police authorities in Wales, the Secretary of State must consult—
  • (a) such representatives of police authorities in Wales as he considers appropriate,
  • (b) the Commission for Local Administration in Wales, and
  • (c) the National Assembly for Wales.")
  • 128 Page 27, line 21, leave out ("local government") and insert ("relevant authorities")

    129 Page 27, line 33, at end insert—

    ("() the Metropolitan Police Authority,
    () the London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority,")

    130 Page 27, line 39, leave out ("established under section 3 of the Police Act 1996")

    131 Clause 46, page 28, line 10, after ("England") insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    132 Page 28, line 10, at end insert ("of conduct)")

    133 Page 28, line 13, after ("Wales") insert ("other than police authorities")

    134 Page 28, line 13, at end insert ("of conduct).

    () The power under subsection (1) or (2) to issue a model code of conduct includes power to revise any such model code which has been issued.")

    135 Page 28, line 14, at end insert ("of conduct")

    136 Page 28, line 21, leave out from ("section") to end of line 22 and insert (" 45, before an order is made under that section")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 127 to 136.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 127 to 136.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    137 Page 28, line 24, leave out ("representative of local government in England") and insert ("body")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 137. The amendments in this and the next group starting with Amendment No. 137 respond to various points raised by noble Lords and make a number of important changes. The amendments grouped here relate to the codes of conduct, standards committees and the duties of both the monitoring officer and relevant authorities. Amendments Nos. 137, 139 and 142 make it clear that, should the Secretary of State wish to do so, he may invite more than one body to submit proposals to form a code of conduct or revise an existing code.

    Amendment No. 155 responds to points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and will ensure that if a relevant authority publishes its own newspaper it should include publicity about the adoption of a code within that paper as well as in a local newspaper circulating in the area.

    Amendments Nos. 159 to 161, 163 to 165 and 167 to 169 relate to circumstances—which, we hope, will be few—in which a relevant authority fails to adopt a code of conduct within the timescale set out in the Bill, and ensures that the mandatory provisions of the model code governing councillors' behaviour will apply anyway, in spite of that authority's failure.

    Amendments Nos. 162, 166 and 310 are essentially technical amendments but have the important effect of clarifying the provisions in Clause 48 to ensure that the code of conduct applies to any member of a relevant authority.

    Amendments Nos. 174, 183, 186 and 195 deal with the ability of the Secretary of State to regulate effectively the size, composition and appointments to standards committees. They also allow the Government to regulate the proceedings of such committees, including access, agendas and publicity.

    Amendment No. 196 clarifies the ability of the standards committee of a district council to delegate its functions in relation to parishes to a sub-committee of the standards committee, should the authority choose to appoint one. Amendment No. 197 duplicates that provision for Wales.

    Amendments Nos. 43 and 268 will ensure that, where it is warranted, the Secretary of State (or the National Assembly) can require a monitoring officer report, or recommendations or action resulting from such a report, to be made public. This is important for the credibility of the authority's standards committee and will ensure that the public can have confidence in the integrity of local government.

    Amendment No. 314, together with Amendments Nos. 312 and 313, prevents the consideration of reports from a case tribunal being delegated, thus requiring it to be considered by the whole council, or a standards committee of that council.

    Amendments Nos. 315 and 316 address concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, when this Bill was last before the House. They clarify that the monitoring officer has responsibility for maintaining the register of members' interests and remove the requirement that members have to register the interests of their partners and other members of their household.

    Amendment No. 321 makes provision within Clause 76 to allow for a separate code of conduct for the council manager. Amendment No. 326 further amends the clause so that the definition of "qualifying employee" refers to all relevant authority employees except those excluded by regulations.

    I thank all Members of the House with a wide range of experience in local government who have contributed. We have listened carefully and considered their points. The amendments pick up many of the points that flow from that knowledge. I commend Amendment No. 137 to the House and hope that the other amendments in this group will be accepted.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 137.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    138 Page 28, line 26, at end insert ("of conduct or proposed revisions to such a model code")

    139 Page 28, line 28, at end insert—

    ("() may be made to more than one body,
    () may be limited to particular descriptions of authority,")

    140 Page 28, line 29, leave out ("code is") and insert ("proposals are")

    141 Page 28, line 31, leave out ("codes, or different provisions of a code,") and insert ("proposals")

    142 Page 28, line 33, leave out ("the representative concerned") and insert ("any body to which the invitation is made")

    143 Clause 47, page 28, line 35, leave out ("each") and insert ("a")

    144 Page 28, line 36, leave out ("an") and insert ("the first")

    145 Page 28, line 40, leave out from ("conduct)") to end of line 41 and insert—

    ("(1A) It is the duty of a relevant authority, before the end of the period of six months beginning with the day on which any subsequent order under section 46 which applies to them is made, to pass a resolution—
  • (a) adopting a code of conduct in place of their existing code of conduct under this section, or
  • (b) revising their existing code of conduct under this section.")
  • 146 Page 28, line 42, after ("resolution") insert—

    ("(a) adopt a code of conduct in place of their existing code of conduct under this section, or
    (b)")

    147 Page 29, line 2, after ("code") insert ("of conduct")

    148 Page 29, line 7, leave out ("in subsection (1)") and insert ("under subsection (1) or (1A)")

    149 Page 29, line 11, after ("code") insert ("of conduct")

    150 Page 29, line 17, leave out ("their principal office") and insert ("an office of the authority")

    151 Page 29, line 24, leave out ("their principal office") and insert ("an office of the authority")

    152 Page 29, line 26, leave out ("their principal office") and insert ("that office")

    153 Page 29, line 28, after ("England") insert ("or a police authority in Wales")

    154 Page 29, line 29, leave out ("or")

    155 Page 29, line 31, at end insert—

    ("() Where a relevant authority themselves publish a newspaper, the duty to publish a notice under subsection (5)(b) is to be construed as a duty to publish that notice in their newspaper and at least one other newspaper circulating in their area.")

    156 Page 29, line 35, leave out subsection (7)

    157 Page 29, line 39, at end insert ("(and accordingly, in the case of a relevant authority to which section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972 applies, is not to be a function to which that section applies)")

    158 Page 29, line 40, leave out subsection (9)

    159 Clause 48, page 29, line 43, at beginning insert ("A person who is a member or co-opted member of a relevant authority at a time when the authority adopts a code of conduct under section 47 for the first time—

  • (a) must, before the end of the period of two months beginning with the date on which the code of conduct is adopted, give to the authority a written undertaking that in performing his functions he will observe the authority's code of conduct for the time being under section 47, and
  • (b) if he fails to do so, is to cease to be a member or co-opted member at the end of that period.
  • (1A)")

    160 Page 29, line 46, leave out ("existing code of conduct") and insert ("code of conduct for the time being")

    161 Page 30, line 1, leave out subsection (2)

    162 Page 30, line 10, leave out ("elected as") and insert ("who becomes")

    163 Page 30, line 11, after ("apply") insert ("at any time after the authority has adopted a code of conduct under section 47 for the first time")

    164 Page 30, line 13, leave out ("existing code of conduct") and insert ("code of conduct for the time being")

    165 Page 30, line 14, leave out subsection (4)

    166 Page 30, line 23, leave out ("Any person appointed as") and insert ("A person who becomes")

    167 Page 30, line 23, at end insert ("at any time after the authority has adopted a code of conduct under section 47 for the first time")

    168 Page 30, line 25, leave out ("existing code of conduct") and insert ("code of conduct for the time being")

    169 Page 30, line 27, leave out subsections (6) to (8)

    170 Clause 49, page 31, line 10, after ("England") insert ("or a police authority in Wales")

    171 Page 31, line 10, leave out ("terms") and insert ("term")

    172 Page 31, line 12, after ("England") insert ("or a police authority in Wales")

    173 Page 31, line 23, at end insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    174 Page 31, line 25, leave out ("and") and insert—

    ("(ba) with respect to the access of the public to meetings of such committees,
    (bb) with respect to the publicity to be given to meetings of such committees,
    (bc) with respect to the production of agendas for, or records of, meetings of such committees,
    (bd) with respect to the availability to the public or members of relevant authorities of agendas for, records of or information connected with meetings of such committees,")

    175 Page 31, line 30, leave out ("local") and insert ("relevant")

    176 Page 31, line 30, after ("England") insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    177 Page 31, line 32, at end insert ("or a police authority in Wales")

    178 Page 31, line 35, after ("England") insert ("and a police authority in Wales")

    179 Page 31, line 38, after ("England") insert ("or a police authority in Wales")

    180 Page 31, line 44, after ("Wales") insert ("other than police authorities")

    181 Page 32, line 2, at end insert—

    ("() as to the term of office of members of any such committees,")

    182 Page 32. line 7, leave out ("standards")

    183 Page 32, line 9, at end insert—

    ("(da) with respect to the access of the public to meetings of such committees,
    (db) with respect to the publicity to be given to meetings of such committees,
    (dc) with respect to the production of agendas for, or records of, meetings of such committees,
    (dd) with respect to the availability to the public or members of relevant authorities of agendas for, records of or information connected with meetings of such committees,")

    184 Page 32, line 10, after second ("of") insert ("any")

    185 Page 32, line 12, after ("Wales") insert ("(other than police authorities)")

    186 Page 32, line 15, at end insert—

    ("() The provision which may be made by virtue of subsection (6)(ba) to (bd) or (11)(da) to (dd) includes provision which applies or reproduces (with or without modifications) any provisions of Part VA of the Local Government Act 1972.")

    187 Clause 50, page 32, line 34, at end insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    188 Page 32, line 37, at end insert ("(other than police authorities)")

    189 Page 32, line 39, leave out ("local") and insert ("relevant")

    190 Page 32, line 40, at end insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    191 Page 32, line 42, leave out ("local") and insert ("relevant")

    192 Page 32, line 43, at end insert ("(other than police authorities)")

    193 Page 32, line 44, leave out subsection (8)

    194 Clause 51, page 33, line 23, leave out ("terms") and insert ("term")

    195 Page 33, line 45, after ("and") insert ("(ba) to")

    196 Page 34, line 7, leave out subsection (11) and insert—

    ("(11) Any function which by virtue of the following provisions of this Part is exercisable by or in relation to the standards committee of a relevant authority which is a parish council is to be exercisable by or in relation to—
  • (a) the standards committee of the district council or unitary county council which is the responsible authority in relation to the parish council, or
  • (b) where that standards committee has appointed a subcommittee under this section, that sub-committee;
  • and any reference in the following provision of this Part to the standards committee of a relevant authority which is a parish council is to be construed accordingly.")

    197 Page 35, line 10, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

    ("(7) Any function which by virtue of the following provisions of this Part is exercisable by or in relation to the standards committee of a relevant authority which is a community council is to be exercisable by or in relation to—
  • (a) the standards committee of the county council or county borough council in whose area the community council is situated, or
  • (b) where that standards committee has appointed a subcommittee under this section, that sub-committee;
  • and any reference in the following provision of this Part to the standards committee of a relevant authority which is a community council is to be construed accordingly.")

    198 Clause 53, page 35, line 25, leave out ("under") and insert ("by")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 138 to 198.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 138 to 198.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    199 Page 35, line 26, at end insert—

    Page 35, line 26, at end insert—
    ("() In exercising its functions the Standards Board for England must have regard to the need to promote and maintain high standards of conduct by members and co-opted members of relevant authorities in England.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 199.

    I am content to take noble Lords through each of the amendments contained in this large group. However, many of them are technical. It may be more helpful to the House if I explain the main purpose of the amendments. During the Committee stage, the noble Lord, Lord Filkin, drew our attention to the fact that the scope and arrangements for the standards board had changed significantly since the publication of the draft Bill. Because of these changes, the Government believed that it would be helpful to provide a broad purpose to guide and inform the way in which the board performs its various functions. Therefore, Amendment No. 199 introduces a general duty to,
    "have regard to the need to promote and maintain high standards of conduct by members and co-opted members of relevant authorities".
    Amendment No. 204 and others in this group respond to concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, and put beyond doubt the ESO's powers to investigate former members of relevant authorities. Similar provision has also been made for Wales. We picked up another of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, during Report. Amendment No. 206 makes clear that if the standards board considers an allegation should not be investigated it should take reasonable steps to inform in writing the person who made the allegation of the decision and the reasons for it. Amendment No. 253 makes similar provision for Wales. We have also made various amendments to Schedule 3 dealing with the status and general powers of the standards board.

    I again thank noble Lords who have contributed from their knowledge to make the Bill more effective. I commend the amendment to the House.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 199.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    200 Page 35, line 29, leave out ("section 55") and insert ("this Part")

    201 Page 35, line 30, leave out ("in relation") and insert ("and police authorities in Wales on matters relating")

    202 Page 35, line 31, leave out second ("the")

    203 Page 35, line 32, after ("authorities,") insert—

    ("() may issue guidance to relevant authorities in England and police authorities in Wales in relation to the qualifications or experience which monitoring officers should possess,")

    204 Clause 54, page 35, line 37, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    205 Page 35, line 41, after ("to") insert ("one of")

    206 Page 35, line 42, at end insert—

    ("() If the Standards Boards for England considers that a written allegation under subsection (1) should not be investigated, it must take reasonable steps to give written notification to the person who made the allegation of the decision and the reasons for the decision.")

    207 Clause 55, page 36, line 6, after ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    208 Page 36, line 25, at end insert—

    ("(5) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in England, the reference in subsection (4)(c) to the monitoring officer of the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as a reference either to the monitoring officer of the relevant authority concerned or to the monitoring officer of that other relevant authority (and accordingly an ethical standards officer who reaches a finding under subsection (4)(c) must decide to which of those monitoring officers to refer the matters concerned).")

    209 Clause 56, page 36, line 27, leave out subsection (1)

    210 Page 36, line 36, at end insert—

    ("() Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in England, an ethical standards officer may, if he thinks it more appropriate than making such a reference as is mentioned in subsection (3)(b), refer the matters which are the subject of the investigation to the monitoring officer of that other relevant authority.")

    211 Page 36, line 38, at end insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    212 Page 36, line 41, leave out ("or sub-committee") and insert ("sub-committee, joint committee or joint subcommittee")

    213 Page 37, line 5, at end insert ("or any breach falling within paragraph 3(2A) of that Schedule")

    214 Clause 57, page 37, line 12, leave out ("authority's") and insert ("relevant authority concerned's")

    215 Page 37, line 21, leave out ("that authority") and insert ("the relevant authority concerned")

    216 Page 37, line 22, at end insert—

    ("(5) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in England, any reference in subsection (4) to the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as including a reference to that other relevant authority.")

    217 Clause 58, page 37, line 27, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    218 Page 37, line 42, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member")

    219 Page 38, line 2, leave out ("written")

    220 Page 38, line 31, leave out ("this section") and insert ("subsection (2) or (4)")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 200 to 220.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 200 to 220.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    221 Clause 59, page 38, line 35, at end insert ("57 or")

    222 Page 38, line 39, after ("officer,") insert ("the Commission for Local Administration in Wales,")

    223 Page 38, line 40, leave out ("a tribunal drawn from") and insert ("the president, deputy president or any tribunal of")

    224 Page 39, line 15, after ("information") insert ("or a document")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 221 to 224. These amendments make amendments to Clause 59, which deals with the circumstances in which an ethical standards officer can disclose information. They are relatively straightforward changes which clarify the situation.

    Amendment No. 225 deals with the creation of a criminal offence where an ethical standards officer discloses information and the Secretary of State or local authority has issued a notice that it would be against the public interest for the information in question to be disclosed. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has tabled Amendment No. 225A. I have had some discussions with the noble Baroness and others. With the leave of the House, it is perhaps more appropriate to allow the noble Baroness to speak to her amendment before I respond.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 221 to 224.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    225 Page 39, line 15, at end insert ("or (3)")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 225.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 225.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 225

    225A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 225A. It seems to us an offence too far. As the Minister explained, it would make an offence under Clause 59(4) the disclosure of a notice in the circumstances set out in subsection (3).

    When the Bill left this House an ethical standards officer who disclosed information would commit an offence under Clause 59(4), facing up to two years' imprisonment. An amendment in the Commons broadened this offence to any other person. My amendment rejects the broadening of the offence. I beg to move.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 225A, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 225, be agreed to.—( Baroness Hamwee.)

    My Lords, the noble Baroness shares with the House the reason for her amendment.

    We accept that the change in the Commons would apply this sanction not only to ESOs but also to any other person. Therefore I think that the noble Baroness is right in saying that the provision is too widely drawn. If we accept the noble Baroness's amendment, we shall revert to the previous position. I therefore accept the noble Baroness's amendment.

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 225 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendments

    226 Clause 60, page 39, line 26, at end insert ("of the relevant authority concerned")

    227 Page 39, line 30, leave out ("that relevant authority") and insert ("the relevant authority concerned")

    228 Page 39, line 35, at beginning insert ("subject to subsection (3A)(b)")

    229 Page 39, line 38, leave out ("that relevant authority") and insert ("the relevant authority concerned")

    230 Page 40, line 3, at end insert—

    ("(3A) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in England—
  • (a) the references in subsections (1)(b), (c) and (d), (2)(c) and (3)(c) to the relevant authority concerned are to be treated as including references to that other relevant authority, and
  • (b) an ethical standards officer who reaches a finding under section 55(4)(c) must refer the matters concerned either to the monitoring officer of the relevant authority concerned or to the monitoring officer of that other relevant authority.")
  • 231 Page 40, line 5, after second ("members") insert ("(or former members of co-opted members)")

    232 Page 40, line 8, leave out ("member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned") and insert ("person")

    233 Clause 61, page 40, line 14, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

    ("(1) Where he considers it necessary in the public interest, an ethical standards officer may, before the completion of an investigation under section 55, produce an interim report on that investigation.")

    234 Page 40, line 19, after ("members") insert ("(or former members or co-opted members)")

    235 Page 40, line 23, leave out ("a relevant authority") and insert ("the relevant authority concerned")

    236 Page 40, line 25, leave out ("or (5)(b)")

    237 Page 40, line 26, after ("suspend") insert ("or partially suspend")

    238 Page 40, line 28, leave out from second ("suspended") to ("not") in line 31 and insert ("from being a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned for a period which does")

    239 Page 40, line 39, leave out ("member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned") and insert ("person")

    240 Page 40, line 43, leave out subsection (7) and insert—

    ("(7) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in England—
  • (a) the second reference in subsection (3) to the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as a reference to that other relevant authority, and
  • (b) the reference in subsection (6)(b) to the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as including a reference to that other relevant authority.
  • (8) In this Part "partially suspended" and cognate expressions are to be construed in accordance with section 77(7) and (8).")

    241 Clause 62, page 41, leave out line 6 and insert (" 60(2)")

    242 Page 41, line 22, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    243 Page 41. line 23, at end insert—

    ("() the publicity to be given to any such report, recommendations or action.")

    244 Page 41, line 30, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    245 Page 41, line 35, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    246 Page 41, line 39, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    247 Page 41, leave out line 46 and insert (" 60(2)")

    I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 226 to 247.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 226 to 247.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motions agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    248 After Clause 62, insert the following new clause—

    Consultation With Local Commissioner

    (" .—(1) If, at any stage in the course of conducting an investigation under section 55, an ethical standards officer forms the opinion that the matters which are the subject of the investigation relate partly to a matter which could be the subject of an investigation under Part III of the Local Government Act 1974, he may consult the appropriate Local Commissioner about the investigation and, if he considers it necessary, inform any person who made the allegation which gave rise to the investigation of the steps necessary to initiate a complaint under Part III of that Act.

    (2) If, at any stage in the course of conducting an investigation under Part III of that Act, a Local Commissioner forms the opinion that the complaint relates partly to a matter which could be the subject of an investigation under section 55 of this Act, he may consult the Standards Board for England about the investigation and, if he considers it necessary, inform the person initiating the complaint of the steps necessary to make an allegation under section 54.

    (3) Consultation under subsection (1) or (2) may relate to any matter concerned with the investigation, including—

  • (a) the conduct of the investigation, and
  • (b) the form, content and publication of any report relating to the investigation.
  • (4) Nothing in section 32(2) of the Local Government Act 1974 or section 59(1) of this Act shall apply in relation to the disclosure of information in the course of consultation held in accordance with this section.

    (5) In this section "Local Commissioner" has the same meaning as in Part III of the Local Government Act 1974.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 248. In moving the amendment I speak to the amendments grouped with it.

    These provisions will enable ethical standards officers (ESOs) to form a close working relationship with the ombudsman where appropriate. We have had discussions with the ombudsman and with the Audit Commission since the last passage of the Bill through this House. We have defined what we believe to be the best and most appropriate relationship with these bodies. Bearing in mind the ombudsman's obligation towards the protection of the anonymity of the complainant and the sensitivity of much of the information the ombudsman collects it was considered that a power to consult was the best way to define the relationship between the ombudsman and the ESO. I hope that that meets general approval.

    Moved, that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 248.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    249 Clause 63, page 42, line 9, after ("Wales") insert ("(other than police authorities)")

    250 Page 42, line 11, after ("authorities") insert—

    ("() may issue guidance to relevant authorities in Wales (other than police authorities) in relation to the qualifications or experience which monitoring officers should possess,")

    251 Clause 64. page 42. line 33, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    252 Page 42. line 36, at end insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    253 Page 42, line 39, at end insert—

    ("() If a Local Commissioner in Wales considers that a written allegation under subsection (1)(a) should not be investigated, he must take reasonable steps to give written notification to the person who made the allegation of the decision and the reasons for the decision.")

    254 Page 43, line 8, at end insert—

    ("() Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in Wales, the reference in subsection (3)(c) to the monitoring officer of the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as a reference either to the monitoring officer of the relevant authority concerned or to the monitoring officer of that other relevant authority (and accordingly a Local Commissioner in Wales who reaches a finding under subsection (3)(c) must decide to which of those monitoring officers to refer the matters concerned).")

    255 Clause 65, page 43, line 22, at end insert—

    ("(5) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in Wales, a Local Commissioner in Wales may, if he thinks it more appropriate than making such a reference as is mentioned in subsection (4), refer the matters which are the subject of the investigation to the monitoring officer of that other relevant authority.")

    256 Clause 66, page 43, line 37, at beginning insert ("subject to subsection (3A)(b)")

    257 Page 44, line 6, at end insert—

    ("(3A) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in Wales—
  • (a) the references in subsections (1)(b), (c) and (d), (2)(c) and (3)(c) to the relevant authority concerned are to be treated as including references to that other relevant authority, and
  • (b) a Local Commissioner in Wales who reaches a finding under section 64(3)(c) must refer the matters concerned either to the monitoring officer of the relevant authority concerned or to the monitoring officer of that other relevant authority.")
  • 258 Page 44, line 8, after second ("members") insert ("(or former members or co-opted members)")

    259 Clause 67, page 44, line 16, leave out subsection (1) and insert—

    ("(1) Where he considers it necessary in the public interest, a Local Commissioner in Wales may, before the completion of an investigation under section 64, produce an interim report on that investigation.")

    260 Page 44, line 21, after ("members") insert nor former members or co-opted members)")

    261 Page 44, line 25, leave out ("a relevant authority") and insert ("the relevant authority concerned")

    262 Page 44, line 27, leave out ("or (5)(b)")

    263 Page 44, line 28, after ("suspend") insert ("or partially suspend")

    264 Page 44, line 30, leave out from second ("suspended") to ("not") in line 33 and insert ("from being a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned for a period which does")

    265 Page 44, line 43, at end insert—

    ("(7) Where a person is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in Wales—
  • (a) the second reference in subsection (3) to the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as a reference to that other relevant authority, and
  • (b) the reference in subsection (6)(b) to the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as including a reference to that other relevant authority.")
  • 266 Clause 68, page 45, leave out line 6 and insert (" 66(2)")

    267 Page 45, line 22, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    268 Page 45, line 23, at end insert—

    ("() the publicity to be given to any such reports, recommendations or action.")

    269 Page 45, line 30, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    270 Page 45, line 35, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    271 Page 45, line 39, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    272 Page 45, line 42, at end insert—

    ("() In its application to police authorities in Wales, subsection (1) has effect as if for the reference to the National Assembly for Wales there were substituted a reference to the Secretary of State.")

    273 Page 45, leave out line 46 and insert (" 66(2)")

    274 After Clause 68, insert the following new clause—

    Law Of Defamation

    (" . For the purposes of the law of defamation, any statement (whether written or oral) made by a Local Commissioner in Wales in connection with the exercise of his functions under this Part shall be absolutely privileged.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 249 to 274.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 249 to 274.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    275 Clause 69, page 46, line 10, leave out from ("the") to end of line 11 and insert ("Lord Chancellor.

    (3A) The Lord Chancellor —
  • (a) must appoint one of the members of the Adjudication Panel for England as president of the Panel, and
  • (b) may appoint one of those members as deputy president of the Panel.")
  • 276 Page 46, line 19, at beginning insert ("Such members of")

    277 Page 46, line 19, leave out ("must include persons possessing") and insert ("as the Lord Chancellor thinks fit must possess")

    278 Page 46, line 20, leave out ("Secretary of State") and insert ("Lord Chancellor")

    279 Page 46, line 21, at beginning insert ("Such members of")

    280 Page 46, line 21, leave out ("must include persons possessing") and insert ("as the National Assembly for Wales thinks fit must possess")

    281 Page 46, line 24, after second ("president") insert ("(if any)")

    282 Page 46, line 33, at end insert—

    ("() The Lord Chancellor must obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before making any appointment under subsection (3) or (3A) or any determination under subsection (6).")

    283 Clause 70, page 47, line 1, leave out subsection (4)

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 275 to 283.

    The quality of objectivity and independence of the decisions made by the adjudication panel will be crucial to the success of the new ethical framework. With that in mind and following the discussions with the council on tribunals we have decided that the appointments to the panel should be made by the Lord Chancellor. Amendments Nos. 275 to 282, 286 and 287 make the necessary provisions in this respect. Amendment No. 285 makes provision for declarations of interest by members of the adjudication panel and prevents a member sitting on a case tribunal that conducts an adjudication into a hearing where he or she has an interest.

    The Government are concerned that as the Bill left this House it does not treat councillors who may be disqualified under its provisions fairly. Ordinarily a vacancy would result in a by-election being held usually a month or so after the vacancy occurred. In a case where the by-election had been triggered by the member's disqualification there would be insufficient time for the courts to hear any appeal before the councillor had lost his seat. We therefore believe that the provisions in the Bill should be brought into line with the provisions of the Local Government Act 1972 relating to the disqualification of councillors who have been convicted of a criminal offence.

    We believe that this strikes a reasonable balance. A councillor should not carry on with his duties but nor would he lose his seat through a by-election until his appeal had been heard. Amendment No. 461 achieves that.

    Amendments Nos. 283, 288, 289, 290 and 291 are technical and drafting amendments. In moving these amendments, I support the other amendments in this group.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 275 to 283.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    6.15 p.m.

    Commons Amendments

    284 Clause 70, page 47, line 16, after second ("member") insert ("(or former member or co-opted member)")

    285 Page 47, line 20, at end insert—

    ("(8A) A member of the relevant Adjudication Panel who is directly or indirectly interested in any matter which is, or is likely to be, the subject of an adjudication conducted by a case tribunal or interim case tribunal—
  • (a) must disclose the nature of his interest to the president or deputy president of that Panel, and
  • (b) may not be a member of a case tribunal or interim case tribunal which conducts an adjudication in relation to that matter.
  • (8B) Where there is no deputy president of the relevant Adjudication Panel, the reference in subsections (3) and (8A) to the deputy president is to be treated as a reference to such member of the Panel as the Lord Chancellor or (as the case may require) the National Assembly for Wales may specify.")

    286 Page 47, line 26, leave out ("Secretary of State") and insert ("Lord Chancellor")

    287 Page 47, line 28, at end insert—

    ("() The Lord Chancellor must obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing any guidance under subsection (10).")

    288 Clause 71, page 47, line 44, at end insert—

    ("() The president of the Adjudication Panel for England may, after consultation with the Secretary of State, give directions as to the practice and procedure to be followed by tribunals drawn from the Panel.

    289 Clause 71, page 48, line 2, at end insert—

    ("() The president of the Adjudication Panel for Wales may, after consultation with the National Assembly for Wales, give directions as to the practice and procedure to be followed by tribunals drawn from the Panel.")

    290 Page 48, line 12, leave out sub-paragraph (ii)

    291 Page 48, line 15, at end insert ("(including provision with respect to interest and provision with respect to the enforcement of any such award)")

    292 Clause 72, page 48, line 29, leave out (" 67") and insert (" 67(3)")

    293 Page 48, line 33, leave out from ("concerned") to ("not") in line 39 and insert ("for a period which does")

    294 Page 48, line 46, after ("must") insert ("give details of the suspension or partial suspension and")

    295 Page 49, line 15, leave out ("cease to have effect on the day that") and insert ("not extend beyond the day on which")

    296 Page 49, line 19, leave out ("member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned") and insert ("person")

    297 Page 49, line 21, at end insert—

    ("() In a case where section 61(7) or 67(7) applies, the references in subsection (3) and (8)(b) to the relevant authority concerned are to be treated as including a reference to the relevant authority of which the person concerned was formerly a member or co-opted member.")

    298 Page 49, line 28, at end insert ("or partial suspension")

    299 Clause 73. page 49. line 39, leave out from ("(4)") to end of line 6 on page 50 and insert—

    ("(4) A person may be—
  • (a) suspended or partially suspended from being a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned, or
  • (b) disqualified for being, or becoming (whether by election or otherwise), a member of that or any other relevant authority.
  • 300 Page 50, line 8, leave out ("or (5)(a)")

    301 Page 50, line 9, after ("suspended") insert ("or partially suspended")

    302 Page 50, line 12, leave out ("or (5)(b)")

    303 Page 50, line 16, leave out ("or (5)")

    304 Page 50, line 23, after ("suspended") insert ("or partially suspended")

    305 Page 50, line 23, leave out ("or (5)(a)")

    306 Page 50, line 28, after ("suspended") insert ("or partially suspended")

    307 Page 50, line 28, leave out ("authority") and insert ("relevant authority concerned")

    308 Page 50, line 29, leave out ("to the extent") and insert ("in the way")

    309 Page 50, line 34, leave out ("or (5)(b)")

    310 Page 50, line 39, leave out ("being elected or appointed, a member or co-opted") and insert ("becoming (whether by election or otherwise), a")

    311 Page 51, line 6, at end insert—

    ("() Where the person concerned is no longer a member or co-opted member of the relevant authority concerned but is a member or co-opted member of another relevant authority in the same country (that is to say, England or Wales)—
  • (a) a copy of any notice under subsection (2), (8), or (11) must also be given to the standards committee of that other relevant authority,
  • (b) the references in subsections (4)(a) and (9)(c) to the relevant authority concerned are to be treated as references to that other relevant authority,
  • (c) the duty to give notice to the standards committee of the relevant authority concerned under subsection (9) is to be treated as a duty—
  • (i) to give that notice to the standards committee of that other relevant authority, and
  • (ii) to give a copy of that notice to the standards committee of the relevant authority concerned,
  • (d) the reference in subsection (13)(c) to the relevant authority concerned is to be treated as including a reference to that other relevant authority.")
  • 312 Clause 74, page 51, line 14, leave out from beginning to ("about") in line 16 and insert ("A case tribunal which has adjudicated on any matter may make recommendations to a relevant authority")

    313 Page 51, line 29, leave out ("must") and insert ("may")

    314 Page 51, line 30, at end insert ("(and accordingly, in the case of a relevant authority to which section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972 applies, is not to be a function to which that section applies)")

    315 Clause 75, page 52, line 4, leave out ("Every") and insert ("The monitoring officer of each")

    316 Page 52, line 28, leave out subsections (6) to (9) and insert—

    ("(6) A relevant authority must ensure that copies of the register for the time being maintained by their monitoring officer under this section are available at an office of the authority for inspection by members of the public at all reasonable hours.
    (7) As soon as practicable after the establishment by their monitoring officer of a register under this section, a relevant authority must—
  • (a) publish in one or more newspapers circulating in their area a notice which—
  • (i) states that copies of the register are available at an office of the authority for inspection by members of the public at all reasonable hours, and
  • (ii) specifies the address of that office, and
  • (b) inform the Standards Board for England that copies of the register are so available.")
  • 317 Clause 75, page 52, line 39, leave out ("Wales") and insert ("standards committees of relevant authorities in Wales (other than police authorities)")

    318 Page 52, line 39, leave out ("(4)") and insert ("(5)")

    319 Clause 76, page 52, line 45, at end insert ("and police authorities in Wales")

    320 Page 53, line 3, at end insert ("(other than police authorities)")

    321 Page 53, line 3, at end insert—

    ("() The power under subsection (1) or (2) to issue a code includes power—
  • (a) to issue a separate code for council managers (within the meaning of Part II of this Act), and
  • (b) to revise any code which has been issued.")
  • 322 Page 53, line 6, leave out ("local government, and of local government employees, in England") and insert ("relevant authorities in England, and of employees of such authorities")

    323 Page 53, line 9, at end insert—

    ("() Before making an order under this section so far as it relates to police authorities in Wales, the Secretary of State must consult—
  • (a) such representatives of police authorities in Wales, and of employees of such authorities, as he considers appropriate,
  • (b) the Commission for Local Administration in Wales, and
  • (c) the National Assembly for Wales.")
  • 324 Page 53, line 12, leave out ("local government, and of local government employees, in Wales") and insert ("relevant authorities in Wales, and of employees of such authorities,")

    325 Page 53, line 19, leave out from ("code") to end of lire 20 and insert ("for the time being under this section which is applicable")

    326 Page 53, line 22, leave out from ("means") to end of line 27 and insert ("an employee of the authority other than an employee falling with any description of employee specified in regulations under this subsection.

    () The power to make regulations under subsection (7) is to be exercised—
  • (a) in relation to England, by the Secretary of State, and
  • (b) in relation to Wales, by the National Assembly for Wales.")
  • 327 Clause 77, page 53, line 35, leave out ("has") and insert ("and "elected executive member" have")

    328 Page 53, line 35, at end insert ("and (2)")

    329 Page 53, line 38, leave out (", in relation to a local authority,")

    330 Page 54, line 1, after ("code") insert ("of conduct"")

    331 Page 54, line 2, at end insert—

    (""police authority" means a police authority established under section 3 of the Police Act 1996,")

    332 Page 54, line 9, leave out subsections (2) to (4) and insert—

    ("(2) Any reference in this Part to a committee of a relevant authority, in the case of a relevant authority to which Part II of this Act applies, includes a reference to a committee of an executive of the authority.

    (3) Any reference in this Part to a member of a relevant authority, in the case of a relevant authority to which Part II of this Act applies, includes a reference to an elected mayor or elected executive member of the authority.

    (4) Any reference in this Part to a member of a relevant authority, in the case of the Greater London Authority, is a reference to the Mayor of London or a London Assembly member.

    (5) Any reference in this Part to a joint committee or joint subcommittee of a relevant authority is a reference to a joint committee on which the authority is represented or a subcommittee of such a committee.

    (6) Any reference in this Part to a failure to comply with a relevant authority's code of conduct includes a reference to a failure to comply with the mandatory provisions which apply to the members or co-opted members of the authority by virtue of section 47(4)(b).

    (7) Any reference in this Part to a person being partially suspended from being a member or co-opted member of a relevant authority includes a reference to a person being prevented from exercising particular functions or having particular responsibilities as such a member or co-opted member.

    (8) The reference in subsection (6) to particular functions or particular responsibilities as a member of a relevant authority, in the case of a relevant authority to which Part II of this Act applies, includes a reference to particular functions or particular responsibilities as a member of an executive of the authority.

    (9) A person who is suspended under this Part from being a member of a relevant authority shall also be suspended from being a member of any committee, sub-committee, joint committee or joint sub-committee of the authority, but this subsection does not apply to a person who is partially suspended under this Part.

    (10) A person who is suspended under this Part from being a member of a relevant authority to which Part II of this Act applies shall also be suspended, if he is a member of an executive of the authority, from being such a member, but this subsection does not apply to a person who is partially suspended under this Part.

    (11) A person who is disqualified under this Part for being or becoming a member of a relevant authority shall also be disqualified—

  • (a) for being or becoming a member of any committee, subcommittee, joint committee or joint sub-committee of the authority, and
  • (b) if the authority is one to which Part II of this Act applies, for being or becoming a member of an executive of the authority.
  • (12) Any function which by virtue of this Part is exercisable by or in relation to the monitoring officer of a relevant authority which is a parish council is to be exercisable by or in relation to the monitoring officer of the district council or unitary county council which is the responsible authority in relation to the parish council; and any reference in this Part to the monitoring officer of a relevant authority which is a parish council is to be construed accordingly.

    (13) Any function which by virtue of this Part is exercisable by or in relation to the monitoring officer of a relevant authority which is a community council is to be exercisable by or in relation to the monitoring officer of the county council or county borough council in whose area the community council is situated; and any reference in this Part to the monitoring officer of a relevant authority which is a community council is to be construed accordingly.

    (14) Any functions which are conferred by virtue of this Part on a relevant authority to which Part II of this Act applies are not to be the responsibility of an executive of the authority under executive arrangements.

    (15) Any functions which are conferred on the Greater London Authority by virtue of this Part are to be exercisable by the Mayor of London and the London Assembly acting jointly on behalf of the Authority.

    (16) Subsections (12) and (13) of section 51 are to apply for the purposes of subsection (12) as they apply for the purposes of that section.")

    333 Clause 84, page 57, line 9, leave out ("and (5)(b)") and insert ("(5)(b), (7) and (8)")

    334 Clause 85, page 57, line 22, after ("take") insert ("or has begun to take")

    335 Page 57, line 27, after ("section") insert ("and section 19B")

    336 Page 57, line 42, after ("taking") insert ("or continuing to take")

    337 Page 57, line 44, leave out ("specified in the notice under paragraph (b)") and insert ("(as the case may be)")

    338 Page 58, line 29, leave out ("a copy of a notice or statement") and insert ("any document")

    339 Page 58, line 32, after first ("at") insert ("or sending it by post to")

    340 Page 58, line 33, leave out ("revoked") and insert ("withdrawn")

    341 Page 58, line 36, leave out ("order") and insert ("notice")

    342 Page 58, line 37, leave out ("revocation") and insert ("withdrawal")

    343 Page 58, line 41, leave out from beginning to second ("the") in line 45 and insert—

    ("() where the notice relates to a decision, to make or implement the decision,
    () where the notice relates to a course of action, to take or continue to take the course of action, or
    () where the notice relates to an item of account, to enter the item of account,

    unless and until")

    344 Page 59, line 3, leave out ("reasons") and insert ("statement")

    345 Page 59, line 4, leave out from ("19A(6)") to end of line 6 and insert ("the consequences of doing the thing mentioned in the paragraph of subsection (1) which is relevant,")

    346 Page 59, line 7, after ("body") insert ("or officer")

    347 Page 59, line 8, after ("auditor") insert ("of the accounts of the body")

    348 Page 59, line 19, leave out ("revoked") and insert ("withdrawn")

    349 After Clause 85, insert the following new clause—

    ("Maladministration Etc

    Payments In Cases Of Maladministration Etc

    .—Where a relevant authority consider—

  • (a) that action taken by or on behalf of the authority in the exercise of their functions amounts to, or may amount to, maladministration, and
  • (b) that a person has been, or may have been, adversely affected by that action,
  • the authority may, if they think appropriate, make a payment to, or provide some other benefit for, that person.

    (2) Any function which is conferred on the Greater London Authority under this section is to be exercisable by the Mayor of London and the London Assembly acting jointly on behalf of the Authority.

    (3) In this section—

    "action" includes failure to act,
    "relevant authority" has the same meaning as in Part III of this Act.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 284 to 349.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 284 to 349.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    350 Clause 86, page 60, line 33, at end insert—

    ("() Before making any determination, issuing any guidance or giving any directions under this section relating to all local authorities in England or Wales or any description of such authorities, the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the National Assembly for Wales must consult—
  • (a) such local authorities or representatives of local authorities as appear to him or it to be appropriate,
  • (b) such recipients, or representatives of recipients, of welfare services as appear to him or it to be appropriate, and
  • (c) such providers, or representatives of providers, of welfare services as appear to him or it to be appropriate.")
  • 351 After Clause 86, insert the following new clause—

    Disclosure Of Information

    (" .—(1) Subsection (3) applies to information which is held by, or by a person providing services to, the Secretary of State and which relates to income support or income-based jobseeker's allowance.

    (2) Subsection (3) also applies to information relating to housing benefit which is held by—

  • (a) an authority administering housing benefit, or
  • (b) a person authorised to exercise any function of such an authority relating to housing benefit.
  • (3) Information to which this subsection applies may be supplied to—

  • (a) a local authority to which any grant is or will be paid under section 86, or
  • (b) a person authorised to exercise any function of that authority relating to that grant,
  • for purposes connected with the application of that grant towards expenditure falling within section 86(1) or (2) (as the case may be).

    (4) Information which is supplied to an authority or other person under subsection (3) may be supplied by the authority or person to a person who provides qualifying welfare services for purposes connected with the provision of those services.

    (5) For the purposes of this section a person is to be regarded as providing qualifying welfare services if—

  • (a) he provides welfare services,
  • (b) a local authority contribute or will contribute to the expenditure incurred by him in providing those services, and
  • (c) that contribution is or will be derived (in whole or in part) from any grant which is or will be paid to the authority under section 86.
  • (6) In this section "local authority" and "welfare services" have the same meaning as in section 86.

    (7) The Secretary of State may by order make such modifications of this section as he considers necessary or expedient in consequence of any provision corresponding to section 86 which is enacted by the Scottish Parliament.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House to agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 350 and 351 and speak to the other amendments in the group.

    This group of amendments deals with welfare services and will improve the implementation of the Government's commitment in Supporting People. We want Supporting People to enhance the quality of support services and to ensure that the right service is provided at the right time.

    Amendment No. 350 requires the Secretary of State and the National Assembly to consult with local authorities, with people using the service and with service providers. Consultation is already an important part of the development of the Supporting People proposals on welfare services and we intend that such formal and informal consultation should continue in the future. That should provide some reassurance to all stakeholders concerned.

    Amendment No. 351 allows transfer of information at the point of transition to the new programme. This is effectively a technical amendment but will allow support services to be maintained until a thorough review of the service or scheme has been undertaken. This will protect people who currently receive support services, for example, older people in sheltered housing about whom some concern was expressed at earlier stages of the Bill.

    Clause 87 of the Bill provides that housing benefit and to some extent other benefits will cease paying for the vast majority of support services once Supporting People is implemented. Block grants will he paid to the provider rather than individual grants to the tenant. We want to make sure that the support charge payments that providers are receiving through the relevant benefits before 2003 continue under this scheme at least until the scheme is reviewed. It is, therefore, vital that the grant-making body responsible for distributing money knows which providers in a given area should receive a support service grant to cover the charges no longer covered by benefit.

    The disclosure of this information allowed by Amendment No. 351 is in the best interest of claimants so that the provider does not start to charge them for services which are being funded out of the grant and to aid a seamless transition.

    Amendment No. 352, to which the noble Baroness has an amendment, will protect the rights of benefit claimants from unlawful disclosure of information relating to a particular person. The other amendments in this group are consequential.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 350 and 351.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    352 After Clause 86, insert the following new clause—

    Unauthorised Disclosure Of Information

    (" .—(1) The persons to whom this section applies are—

  • (a) any person ("the recipient") to whom information is supplied by virtue of section (Disclosure of information),
  • (b) any person who is or has been a director, member of the committee of management, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the recipient, and
  • (c) any person who is or has been employed by the recipient.
  • (2) A person to whom this section applies is guilty of an offence if he discloses without lawful authority any information which is supplied by virtue of section (Disclosure of information) and which relates to a particular person.

    (3) It is not an offence under this section—

  • (a) to disclose information in the form of a summary or collection of information so framed as not to enable information relating to any particular person to be ascertained from it, or
  • (b) to disclose information which has previously been disclosed to the public with lawful authority.
  • (4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that at the time of the alleged offence—

  • (a) he believed that he was making the disclosure in question with lawful authority and had no reasonable cause to believe otherwise, or
  • (b) he believed that the information in question had previously been disclosed to the public with lawful authority and had no reasonable cause to believe otherwise.
  • (5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is to be liable—

  • (a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine or both, or
  • (b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both.
  • (6) For the purposes of this section a disclosure is to be regarded as made with lawful authority if, and only if, it is made—

  • (a) in accordance with section (Disclosure of information)(4) or any other enactment,
  • (b) in accordance with an order of a court,
  • (c) for the purpose of instituting, or otherwise for the purposes of, any proceedings before a court or tribunal, or
  • (d) with the consent of the appropriate person (as defined in section 123(10) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992).
  • (7) The Secretary of State may by order make such modifications of this section as he considers necessary or expedient in consequence of any provision corresponding to section 86 which is enacted by the Scottish Parliament.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 352.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 352.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 352

    352A Clause 86, line 11, leave out ("a particular person") and insert ("any identifiable individual")

    My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 352A and speak also to Amendment No. 352B. In agreeing Amendment No. 351 your Lordships have added a new clause which allows information relating to the payment of certain benefits to be exchanged between various authorities. A further new clause creates an offence relating to the unauthorised disclosure of such information in a form that identifies "any particular person". The word "person" includes both an individual and legal entity such as a company, so the offence would not be limited to disclosures about identifiable benefit claimants or recipients, where the case for disclosure in the interests of privacy is clear. The offence could also be committed by revealing information about hotels, hostels and housing association accommodation communicated under the new clause added by Amendment No. 351.

    It would be an offence to identify a hotel at which a housing benefit recipient lives if the information was obtained under that new clause but not if provided to the authority directly by the hostel. My amendments would restrict the offence to disclosures about identifiable individuals without criminalising disclosures that merely refer to organisations.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 352A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 352, be agreed to.—(Baroness Hamwee.)

    My Lords, I understand the noble Baroness's concern, but her amendment would render the situation worse for individuals as well as excluding organisations and providers.

    The term "particular person" is used elsewhere, such as in the Section 123 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992, which makes it an offence to disclose any information about any particular person obtained in connection with a claim to benefit. Hence the structure of confidentiality is based on the use of that phrase. Changing the wording to "identifiable individual" would allow the identity of providers of grant in respect of tenants on housing benefit to be disclosed. In the case of small housing associations, as the identity and premises would be disclosable it would be an easy read across to identify particular individuals in receipt of benefit.

    Benefits staff have a general duty of confidentiality in respect of any information acquired in the course of their employment. If they are to share that information with other departments in the local authority during the transition and after and disclose information to the grant-making team, it is only right that the duty of confidentiality and the offence that applies to them should be extended in the same terms to the other departments. I emphasise that the offence as drafted applies only to social security information disclosed under Amendment No. 351. General information about providers will not be affected and will be shared publicly. If the offence were amended, it could make the sharing of information difficult—which, I am sure, is not the aim. Therefore, I ask the noble Baroness not to press the amendment.

    My Lords, I am grateful for that explanation, which confirms that we have some way to go with making legislation more cohesive and comprehensible. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment No. 352A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 352, by leave, withdrawn.

    [Amendment No. 352B, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 352, not moved.]

    On Question, Commons Amendment No. 352 agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    353 After Clause 87, insert the following new clause—

    Access To Information; Background Papers

    (" .—(1) In section 100D of the Local Government Act 1972 (inspection of background papers) for subsection (1) there is substituted—

    "(1) Subject, in the case of section 100C(1), to subsection (2) below, if and so long as copies of the whole or part of a report for a meeting of a principal council are required by section 100B(1) or 100C(1) above to be open to inspection by members of the public—

  • (a) those copies shall each include a copy of a list, compiled by the proper officer, of the background papers for the report or the part of the report, and
  • (b) at least one copy of each of the documents included in that list shall also be open to inspection at the offices of the council."
  • (2) In subsection (2) the words "of the list, or" are omitted.")

    354 After Clause 87, insert the following new clause—

    Meetings And Documents: Notice Etc

    (" .—(1) In section 100K of the Local Government Act 1972 (interpretation and application of Part VA), after subsection (2) there is inserted—

    "(3) The Secretary of State may by order amend sections 100A(6)(a) and 100B(3) and (4)(a) above so as to substitute for each reference to three clear days such greater number of days as may be specified in the order.

    (4) Any statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (3) above shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."

    (2) In Schedule 12 to that Act (meetings and proceedings of local authorities), after paragraph 4 there is inserted—

    "4A.—(1) The Secretary of State may by order amend paragraph 4(2) above so as to substitute for the reference to three clear days such greater number of days as may be specified in the order.

    (2) Any statutory instrument containing an order under subparagraph (1) above shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."").

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 353 and 354.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 353 and 354.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    355 Clause 88, page 61, line 16, leave out ("of an executive")

    356 Page 61, line 18, leave out (""executive" and "local authority" have") and insert (""local authority" has")

    357 Page 61, line 40, leave out ("which are operating executive arrangements")

    358 Page 61, line 42, leave out ("executive") and insert ("council")

    359 Page 61, line 44, leave out ("and") and insert ("or")

    360 Page 62, line 2, leave out ("every") and insert ("a")

    361 Page 62, line 3, leave out first ("and") and insert ("or")

    362 Page 62, line 4, after ("functions") insert ("as may be specified in the regulations")

    363 Page 62, leave out line 6 and insert—

    ("(3BA) Regulations under this section may make provision for or in connection with enabling a panel established by a body specified in the regulations to exercise such functions as may be specified in the regulations in relation to allowances, or pensions, allowances or gratuities, payable to members of such district councils, county councils or London borough councils in England as may be specified in the regulations.
    (3BB) Regulations under this section may make provision for or in connection with the establishment by the National Assembly for Wales on a permanent or temporary basis of a panel which is to have such functions as may be specified in the regulations in relation to allowances, or pensions, allowances or gratuities, payable to members of county councils and county borough councils in Wales.")

    364 Page 62, line 14, at end insert—

    ("() Regulations under subsection (3BA) may include provision—
  • (a) with respect to the number of persons who may or must be appointed to a panel mentioned in that subsection,
  • (b) with respect to the persons who may or must be appointed to such a panel.
  • () Regulations under subsection (3B), (3BA) or (3BB) may include provision—")

    365 Page 62, line 15, leave out ("the panel of a council to consider and") and insert ("a panel mentioned in that subsection")

    366 Page 62, line 16, leave out first ("the") and insert ("a")

    367 Page 62, line 18, leave out from ("enabling") to ("which") in line 20 and insert ("such a panel to make recommendations to a council as to")

    368 Page 62, line 21, leave out ("executive") and insert ("council")

    369 Page 62, line 22, at end insert—

    ("() which permits different recommendations to be made in relation to different councils or descriptions of council."")

    370 Page 62, leave out lines 33 and 34

    My Lords. I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 355 to 370.

    These amendments respond to debates in this House and the other place in relation to the remuneration of councilors—in particular, the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and by the honourable Member for Bath. The amendments cover the issues of giving councillors access to pensionable remuneration and allowing for the regulations to provide for an independent remuneration panel to be established for more than one council—in particular, so that the National Assembly for Wales can maintain a panel for all councils.

    Moved, that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 355 to 370.—(Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    371 After Clause 89, insert the following new clause—

    Indemnification Of Members And Officers Of Relevant Authorities

    (" .—(1) The Secretary of State may by order make provision for or in connection with conferring power on relevant authorities in England and police authorities in Wales to provide indemnities to some or all of their members and officers.

    (2) The National Assembly for Wales may by order make provision for or in connection with conferring power on relevant authorities in Wales (other than police authorities) to provide indemnities to some or all of their members and officers.

    (3) An order under this section may apply—

  • (a) to all relevant authorities, or
  • (b) to any particular description of relevant authority.
  • (4) Before making an order under this section, the Secretary of State or (as the case may be) the National Assembly for Wales must consult—

  • (a) such representatives of relevant authorities,
  • (b) such representatives of employees of relevant authorities, and
  • (c) such other persons,
  • as he or it considers appropriate.

    (5) In this section—

    "member", in relation to a relevant authority, includes—
  • (i) a member of any committee or sub-committee of the authority, or
  • (ii) a person who is a member of, and represents the authority on, any joint committee or sub-committee,
  • "police authority" and "relevant authority" have the same meaning as in Part III of this Act.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 371.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 371.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 371

    371A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, at the end to insert "and do propose the following consequential amendment to the Bill"—

    My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 371A to insert a new clause regarding indemnifying members and relevant officers. It will provide that such an order would be subject to an affirmative resolution of both Houses.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 371A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 371, be agreed to.—(Baroness Hamwee.)

    My Lords, I am happy to say that the Government agree with the amendment.

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No 371, as amended, agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    372 Clause 90, page 63, line 27, leave out ("which operates executive arrangements") and insert ("(within the meaning of that Act) which are operating executive arrangements (within the meaning of Part II of this Act)")

    373 Page 63, line 31, leave out from beginning to ("For") in line 32 and insert ("After section 1 of that Act there is inserted the following section—

    "Meaning of "social services functions".

    1A.").

    374 Page 63, line 39, leave out ("subsection") and insert ("section")

    375 Page 63, line 40, leave out subsection (4)

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 372 to 375.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 372 to 375.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    376 After Clause 90, insert the following new clause—

    Recoupment By Local Authorities Of Cost Of Providing Day Care

    (" .—(1) In subsection (3) of section 29 of the Children Act 1989 (recoupment of cost of providing services etc.), after "subsection (1)" there is inserted "for a service provided under section 17 or section 18(1) or (5)".

    (2) After that subsection there is inserted—

    "(3A) No person shall be liable to pay any charge under subsection (1) for a service provided under section 18(2) or (6) at any time when he is in receipt of income support under Part VII of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 or of an income-based jobseeker's allowance."").

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 376. It would insert a new clause relating to charging for local authority childcare. Commons Amendment No. 484 is consequential.

    The effect is to allow, not require, local authorities to charge parents in receipt of working families tax credit and disabled persons tax credit for the childcare that authorities provide. That would apply unless they are parents of children in need, when they will receive that childcare free. People on benefits who currently receive free local authority childcare will continue to do so.

    There are a number of reasons for that change being important and necessary. Tax credits provide income for parents to enable them to purchase childcare, so it is illogical to offer childcare free to those in receipt of it. Tax credits provide more generous and widespread support than the benefits they replaced. In the first six months since working families tax credit was introduced, more than 1 million families have taken it up—far more than family credit. Through the working families tax credit, parents could receive support of up to 70 per cent of childcare costs, up to a maximum of £70 per week for families with one child and £105 for families with two or more children. Those in receipt of the tax credit could include parents earning up to £42,000 a year. Surely they should be expected to contribute to the costs of childcare.

    A number of authorities have pressed hard for change. Local authorities have a necessary and valuable part to play in increasing the availability of childcare places delivered through the national childcare strategy. Fee income from parents helps them to fulfil that role. Free local authority childcare creates an uneven playing field for other childcare providers and parents who do not have or cannot get local authority childcare. We shall continue to ensure that local authority childcare is provided free to the parents of children in need. The Government recognise that children in need require particular support. The new provisions will take effect as soon as possible. Amendment No. 376 is a practical, fair and logical measure called for by local authorities and I commend it to your Lordships.

    On Question, Motion agreed to.

    6.30 p.m.

    Commons Amendment

    377 Leave out Clause 91.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 377. The amendment and those grouped with it deal with a situation which received substantial attention during the passage of the Bill. It relates to the provision of what used to be known as Section 28.

    The Government's position on Section 2A, as it now is, of the Local Government Act 1986 has been clear and consistent throughout the passage of the Bill. We consider it bad law; we consider its drafting imprecise; we consider its effect misleading; and, above all, we consider its indirect effect as having been extremely damaging in the provision of education and other parts of public service and to a number of often vulnerable people. We have therefore repeatedly said that it must be repealed and we shall strongly continue to impose any attempt to reinstate what we regard as a discriminatory and confusing piece of legislation on the statute book.

    Amendment No. 377 would remove Clause 91 from the Bill. That clause was proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Young. Amendment No. 378 makes good our commitment by reinstating the repeal of Section 2A. Amendments Nos. 388, 389, 478 and 482 are consequential to this and other repeals.

    From what I have said during the passage of the Bill, it will not surprise noble Lords to hear that we shall oppose Amendments Nos. 337A and the other amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, all of which seek to overturn the Commons amendments.

    The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman, has tabled Amendment No. 378B, which is intended to replace Section 28 or Section 2A. I have some sympathy with the intentions of the amendment but believe that it may well cause confusion. At this stage I am not convinced that it meets what is required.

    Those who here and in the wider world support the retention of Section 2A have argued at length in this Chamber and elsewhere that, without its protection, children in schools would be at risk of inappropriate teaching and that local education authorities would seek to promote homosexuality. That argument has been the most emotive and frequently repeated in the whole debate. Even when Section 28 was first passed, that argument was wrong.

    Moreover, the argument deliberately ignores the key changes that have taken place in the relationship between school and local education authorities in England and Wales since the original legislation was passed. It ignores the fact that Section 28 never directly, legally applied to schools. However, as there was such an enormous reaction to the passage of the clause by its proponents, its entire effect in practice was deeply damaging.

    School governors and teachers felt inhibited in providing support to gay and lesbian students and in explaining to those who were doubtful about their sexuality the position with regard to homosexuality. It did nothing, to put it at its mildest, to help to tackle the misery of homophobic bullying.

    Your Lordships will be aware that more recently we put into effect safeguards in relation the education system. Since the original Bill was discussed, guidance has been issued by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment, and amendments have been made to the Learning and Skills Bill. All have one firm and central purpose: the protection of children from inappropriate teaching and from materials inappropriate to the delivery of sex education in schools.

    That new guidance, on which considerable comment was made during the passage of the Learning and Skills Bill last week, is a major step forward. I should point out that the previous government never mentioned marriage, for example, in sex education. This Government introduced marriage into the curriculum for sex education for the first time. Circular 5/94, which our guidance replaces, contains no mention whatever of marriage.

    Our guidance, which is given its statutory base by the Learning and Skills Bill, adopted by this House last week, provides a much more robust protection for our children. What better protects our children: is it a confusing piece of legislation, which has been subject to enormous emotive arguments on all sides of the issue—a piece of legislation which does not apply to schools and a piece of legislation which is subject to enormous misinterpretation on all sides—or is a better protection for our children a clear statutory safeguard set out in the Learning and Skills Bill and the related guidance to schools?

    I believe that with the issuing of that guidance and with the passage of the Learning and Skills Bill, we are now in a different situation. Some of your Lordships could have been forgiven for believing that the argument about Section 28 or Section 2A—

    My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Does he recall the words of his colleague, the Minister dealing with the Learning and Skills Bill? He told me in response to a question which I asked that what we did in the Learning and Skills Bill had no read-across whatever to Section 28 or Section 2A, in this debate and with regard to this Bill.

    My Lords, precisely; because Section 28 did not apply to the powers of governors and teachers who will be carrying out the guidance under the Learning and Skills Bill. There is no direct read-across. My point is precisely that. It has always been wrong to say that Section 28 affected the way in which teachers, governors and head teachers provided sex education in schools. Section 28 relates to the role of local authorities.

    Your Lordships may well have been misled into thinking that it applied to schools. Much of the propaganda on all sides has related to schools. In fact, Section 28 applied to the role of local authorities. Therefore, having dealt with it under the Learning and Skills Bill and clarified the situation in relation to the teaching of children, for whom there are understandable concerns in this House, we are left with the services provided by local authorities. The bulk of those services relate to adults.

    Some Members of this House may not like my argument. Some may believe that any provision of services to the gay and lesbian members of our society is of itself wrong. We on the Government side do not accept that. We believe that those whose sexuality is different from the majority are citizens of this realm and are entitled to receive from the public authorities of this realm treatment equal to that given to those whose sexuality is more of the majority.

    Local authorities provide a number of services to gay and lesbian people. They provide health and medical advice, social services, counselling services and so forth. It must be right and proper that local authorities should be able to continue to do so without running into the danger of being accused of promoting homosexuality under Section 2A or Section 28.

    I have no doubt that we shall have a long, but I hope not too emotive, debate on the subject. The central question is whether in the 21st century we are prepared to accept that members of our society who happen to be gay and lesbian are entitled to services from their local authorities which they elect and to which they pay taxes.

    The House of Lords must recognise that in another place a large majority of Members were in favour of the repeal of Section 2A or Section 28. Clearly, as always, the House must take very seriously an attempt to overturn that.

    But today the House has another, even greater, responsibility in considering how to deal with amendments which seek to overturn the Commons repeal. I remind your Lordships that this House has always seen itself as having, and constitutionally had, a special responsibility to protect the rights of minorities. If we retain Section 28, we shall be doing precisely the opposite.

    When the Bill left the Lords, the Government did not feel able to assure the House of Commons that the Bill was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. With all the legislation that has passed through this House, that was a serious and totally unprecedented move. We should not now be diverted to discussing the situation within schools. The guidance contained within the Learning and Skills Bill has protected and clarified the position in relation to children.

    Primarily at issue now are the human rights of adult citizens. Of course I understand the concern in relation to the sex education of our children. It has been mentioned throughout the debates in this House and in the media and elsewhere. However, we resolved the issue of sex education last week. Before us now in the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is an attempt to provide a means to deny human rights and equality to a group of our citizens. That is the issue before your Lordships today.

    I have no doubt that the debate will range wide and that much extraneous material, in all senses, will be referred to. As with the Learning and Skills Bill and unlike previous debates on this issue, I hope that we shall have a calm and reasonable debate which deals with the facts rather than with misleading and prejudiced assertions. I believe that today the House has a heavy responsibility to protect minorities. Therefore, we should agree with the Commons amendment in order to restore the reputation of this House as a defender of all citizens, including a minority of citizens. I shall refer to the other government amendments shortly.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 377.—(Lord Whitty.)

    6.45 p.m.

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 377

    377A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree".

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 377A and wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 378A, 388A, 389A, 474A, 474B and 482A, which are consequential.

    In rising to speak this evening, I am conscious that we are going over well-trodden ground. In moving my amendment, perhaps I may start by saying that, when the House of Lords accepted it last February, it did so with a further amendment which added another safeguard against bullying.

    At this late stage I do not want to do more than touch on what I see as the salient points in this great debate. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that I shall deal with the facts of the situation because I believe that the facts of the situation speak for themselves. I hope that anyone who is minded to speak in support of the repeal of Section 28 has looked at the facts and has looked at the material being placed in front of children up and down the country, as we speak now, before deciding that it can be repealed with impunity.

    First, Section 28 came about because parents were worried about what their children were being taught in schools—in some cases, in primary schools. They were equally concerned at the type of material that was being put in front of their children. The movers for Section 28 were parents and they remain at the centre of the debate. The response of the then government of the day was Section 28. Perhaps I may say that I have been most moved at the support that I have received for keeping Section 28 from all parts of your Lordships' House and from representatives of all the great religions: Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs; the issue crosses them all.

    What does Section 28 permit? It permits facts about homosexuality to be discussed in the classroom; it allows the counselling of pupils; it allows local authorities to provide services to homosexuals; and, importantly, under Section 2A(2) local authorities have a duty to promote public health. Therefore Section 28 cannot stop money going towards helping HIV patients or those who suffer from sexually transmitted diseases. Those are not my words; they come from the accompanying memorandum to the Local Government Act 1988.

    As for bullying, I believe, as I am sure we all do, that all bullying is wrong, whatever the cause. By law, every school must have a policy on it under Section 61(4) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998. We know that Chris Woodhead, the Chief Inspector of Schools, has gone on record as saying that in the course of his many inspections he has not come across any evidence of bullying as a result of Section 28.

    Therefore, what does Section 28 prevent? It prohibits local authorities from promoting—the verb is important—homosexuality over a range of services in schools, children's homes, youth groups, government training courses, in-service courses for teachers and publications. That, again, we know from the evidence of what is currently happening in local government today.

    As the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, referred to it, since we last debated this matter we have passed the Learning and Skills Bill. The House carried amendments to that Bill last Tuesday and, although they are not as strong as I should have wished, I welcome them and the guidance that accompanies them. However, we must all remember that the guidance has no force of law. Section 28 does.

    However, as my noble friend Lady Blatch has already pointed out, the amendments to the Learning and Skills Bill concern only sex education in schools. They will not protect children who are in youth groups, in children's homes or in any of the other circumstances that I have just enumerated. It is simply not true to say, as did the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that they have no effect. They do have an effect. Section 28 is important, and we need both that section and the Learning and Skills Bill amendments as carried. Section 28 has worked well in practice. As your Lordships can imagine, it is unusual for me to quote Peter Tatchell in a debate such as this. However, he has gone on record as saying that he knows of at least 36 cases of self-censorship by local authorities.

    I know from our previous debates on this matter that some of your Lordships are greatly concerned about the issue of human rights. I have taken legal advice on that from Heather Swindells, QC, one of the leading experts on family law and the European convention. She has argued clearly that Section 28 is fully consistent with the convention. Should any noble Lord wish it, I should be happy to read in full what she said on that point, but I feel somehow that the House would prefer me simply to accept that her advice is quite clear.

    Finally, we must ask ourselves what would happen if Section 28 were repealed, because that is what the debate is about tonight. First, of course, we know that repeal is deeply unpopular with the British public. During my long years in public life, I have never known an issue that has touched so many people so immediately and so deeply. I am not talking only about the 5,000 letters that I have received from consultants, doctors, social workers, teachers, parents, grandparents, young people and old people from one end of the United Kingdom to another. In Scotland, that very brave man, Mr Brian Souter, conducted a poll in which he attracted a million votes in support of keeping Section 28 in Scotland. I have not the slightest doubt that, were there to be a referendum in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, it would show the same figures. The turnout in the referendum in Scotland was greater than that in the English local government elections or the European elections.

    I am pleased to see that since the issue has come before our notice, Kent County Council has said that it will pass its own legislation should Section 28 be repealed. I understand that Surrey County Council may follow suit. Were the section to be repealed, I hope that other local authorities would do the same.

    The truth is that, if Section 28 is repealed, there will be no safeguards to stop local authorities promoting homosexuality outside education, in youth groups, children's homes, social services, in-service training, courses for teachers and governors and other areas. Within education, the safeguards will apply only narrowly to sex education, not to any other subject in the curriculum. It will be perfectly legal for a local authority to promote homosexuality in English lessons. A book published by the Open University explains how. It is entitled Lesbian and Gay Issues in the English Classroom and sets out six lessons for us to follow. It will be legal to promote gay rights in citizenship lessons, which, I understand, are shortly to become compulsory.

    A book produced by Camden and Islington NHS trusts tells teachers how to get round the law on promoting homosexuality in other subjects, such as English and History. Parents have no right to withdraw their children from lessons in those other subjects. The Islington and Camden book says:

    "It is possible to include many of these issues"—

    that is gay and lesbian issues—

    "within the national curriculum areas, which means that pupils would not be withdrawn by their parents. The requirement for a sex education curriculum resulting from the 1993 Education Act allows parents to only withdraw their children from any part of the school's agreed sex education curriculum".

    So we know what they think about it.

    The repeal of Section 28 would send out a clear message and a signal to local authorities to promote homosexuality. Almost within the past week we have seen one example of that in the material produced by Bristol City Council, which has worked closely with Avon health authority. The council has announced that it will step up funding for the project, which was so closely involved with producing the appalling material, which we had on exhibition in February, called Beyond a Phase, a teacher's handbook and video intended for children aged 13 and above. Many of your Lordships will have seen both in the exhibition that I held last February. On the video, one of the young people suggests that children should

    "try experimenting with other boys and girls and see who you feel most comfortable with".

    What a message to put in front of children as young as 13. Those are facts, not something that I have invented. The material is available for anybody to see.

    The noble Lord, Lord Whitty, talked about the human rights of adults. I have argued consistently throughout the debate that what adults choose to do in private is a matter for them. It is certainly not a matter for me and not one on which I wish to comment. However, what we put in front of children is a matter for us all. I shall fight for the protection of children while I have breath in my body. It matters far too much. Those under 16 are children in law. They are being subjected to some appalling material. People do not need to take my word for that. They should look for themselves and make an individual judgment. One thing that I know for certain is that the overwhelming majority of parents do not want that kind of teaching in our schools. Neither do they want such material to be paid for by taxpayers and council tax payers—by us all.

    I conclude with a final constitutional point. I am pleased to see the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, in her place. She has said on more than one occasion that the new House is more legitimate. We are perfectly entitled to take a view on this matter. I am certain that, were we to vote to keep Section 28, the House of Lords would be speaking once again for the overwhelming majority of the British people. I beg to move.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 377A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 377, be agreed to.—( Baroness Young.)

    My Lords, we have debated this subject a good many times before. Since 1994, the noble Baroness, Lady Young, has had an innings of a length worthy of Don Bradman. I congratulate her on it, but I doubt whether half a dozen votes in the House have shifted as a result of the debate. That is sad, but I believe it to be the case. Sooner or later, we probably should reach the point at which the debate has to stop. If the House prefers, we could continue it for the rest of our natural lives, but I doubt that that is what most of us wish.

    Were the noble Baroness, Lady Young, to be victorious tonight, that would not be the end of the matter. Your Lordships have heard from the Minister the voice of principle and commitment. We have heard that from the Government right through. I am sure that the House agrees that I am not a distinguished member of the Prime Minister's fan club, but on this issue we have heard from him substance, not spin; principle, not the pursuit of advantage. I congratulate him on that. If the noble Baroness were to be victorious, the issue would come back, whether in this Bill or in another, whether the day after tomorrow or next year.

    The other reason why I believe that the issue is certain to come back even if the noble Baroness is victorious tonight is that there is a difference between age groups. The noble Baroness has conceded the point before. She accused me of suggesting that she was over the hill, but if she is, so am I. We are both in the over-60 group.

    My Lords, I am flattered to be bracketed with the noble Earl, Lord Russell. We should both be careful, because I gather that there is a new directive ruling out discrimination on the grounds of age.

    My Lords, if the noble Baroness had waited just a moment, she would have heard my point, which is not a discriminatory one. When a cause is more popular among the young than the old, the proportion of opinions necessarily shifts over the decades, even if nobody changes their mind. According to the 1998 British social attitudes survey, almost two-thirds of people aged 65 and over thought that sexual relations between two adults of the same sex were always wrong. That is compared with less than one-fifth of the people aged 18 to 24.

    I claim no superiority for any age group over any other. But, in putting forward any law, one should consider its impact on the group that it is most likely to affect. In that group, the noble Baroness's horse is already stolen. The lock on the stable door is too late.

    Before sitting down, I ask her to consider just a little whether there is any limit at all on the powers of a majority in a democracy. I do not necessarily claim that I speak for the majority. But that figure in relation to the over-65s may indicate why she believes as she does. I am not so sure.

    I take two cases with which I hope the noble Baroness will agree. First, if the majority wants to stop somebody who believes it is right to write graffiti on other people's houses, that the majority is eminently entitled to do. But let us suppose that we had a majority—and in a couple of decades, we easily might—of people who disbelieve in and dislike religion. It would not be right for them to use the school system to teach people that religion is wrong, even if they had the majority behind them. I hope that the noble Baroness will agree with that proposition. If she does, she admits that there is a sliding scale from things the majority may do to things it must not do, with things it perhaps should not do in between.

    The purpose of government by the majority is to secure consent. As soon as you set out to label a group of people inferior, you destroy the reasons why they should consent. That is unwise.

    7 p.m.

    My Lords, if you could question all of us who sit on these Benches, whether present or absent today, you would find us in agreement on at least four important points in relation to the matters before us in these amendments, even though we may not all be found in the same Lobby when the matter comes to a vote.

    First, as last Tuesday evening showed, we are gladly and firmly convinced of the priority of marriage within sex and relationships education in schools. I regret that I could not be present to participate last Tuesday in expressing that conviction. Had I been here and had the opportunity to speak, I should have asked when the Government intend to reissue the guidance produced earlier this month, updated in accordance with their support for the amendment tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn. As they consider how best to do so, I hope that they will find helpful some of the suggestions that I and others made for strengthening the draft guidance in respect of an appropriate emphasis on marriage when we spoke in your Lordships' House on 23rd March of this year.

    We are equally united in the conviction that victimisation, ill-treatment, stigmatisation and verbal or physical violence of any sort are as wrong against individuals of any age who are or who are thought to be homosexual as they are against anyone else. I am confident that we are all also sensitive to the responsibility that lies upon anyone who speaks publicly about these matters, to guard, as far as possible, against their words encouraging or being thought to justify such behaviour and such victimisation or bullying.

    And we should be found united too in supporting the provision, everywhere in this country, of appropriate counselling, personal health education and medical care for those who are, or wonder whether they may be, homosexual.

    Where, perhaps, we may be found to come to differing judgments on this section, which has regrettably gained such symbolic importance, is in our determining priorities between those shared convictions and in their application; in our view as to which course will promote the greater good, the more consistent welfare and the health of this society now and for many years to come; and in the ways in which we balance what may, in those matters, be the competing needs, even the competing rights, of society on the one hand and of a small minority of individuals on the other; in our preparedness or not to face charges of discrimination, arguing that that particular discrimination is justified if we do not treat identically and equally what used to be called "estates", and, therefore, individuals who participate in them.

    My own judgment of those matters still leads me to argue against, and to vote against, the Government's amendments. It seems important at this point, in the light of something which I believe I heard the noble Earl, Lord Russell, say just now, to say that there are principles and commitments on more than one side of this discussion.

    It is important to note too what a peculiarity it is of our society and of others like it in today's world, let alone down the centuries, that it should be thought that age must, in every respect, give way to youth in matters especially of ethics and moral behaviour.

    Of course I recognise that the wording of Section 2A leaves something to be desired. I recognise too that in the relevant clauses of the Learning and Skills Bill, the Government, significantly assisted by Archbishop Vincent Nichols and by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn, have attempted to replicate as many of the requirements of Section 28 on those now responsible for schools as the Government consider desirable. But I believe that our schools are not all that we should be concerned about in this debate, a point well made just now by the noble Baroness, Lady Young. Yet it was to schools alone, and almost entirely alone, that the Minister referred as he opened this debate.

    It seems to me that it needs saying that the reality is that local authorities—and rightly—continue to have responsibility for PSHE training and advisory service and for libraries. In the provision of both, they will be the first line of decision making as to what constitutes the appropriate teaching and materials required by the DfEE's sex and relationship education guidance. Very significantly in that context, local authorities have extremely important responsibilities for a range of services for children, young people and young adults outside schools.

    They also provide, in collaboration with health authorities and trusts, health education or promotion services for young people and young adults. I regret that I have not found the time to develop with others an amendment analogous to that in the Learning and Skills Bill proposed by the Government and accepted both in the other place and in this which would have the effect of bringing those authorities and trusts within the scope of Section 2A. And local authorities have the power to distribute public money to a great range of causes, events and voluntary organisations.

    In all those, I believe that there are today delicate, difficult distinctions to be drawn between the properly publicly-funded provision of education, support and care and health promotion and protection for homosexual people on the one hand and, on the other—and I quote the Chief Rabbi, who referred to,
    "the promotion of a homosexual lifestyle as morally equivalent to marriage".
    For those whose responsibility it is to draw those distinctions in decisions about the use of public funds, I continue to believe that Section 28 continues to provide what my friend the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Lichfield described in a debate here earlier this year as "a stabilising benchmark".

    So, if we are concerned for the welfare and stability, the health in those senses of this society—health which is substantially critically dependent on our continuing to honour and sustain the estate of marriage in public policy—then I judge that we shall be most unwise to agree to the removal of that section. And so I shall join those who vote for its reinsertion in the Bill.

    My Lords, last week this House came to a consensus that was both principled and inclusive. In my view, it paved the way for the repeal of Section 28 by removing many of the hurdles, some legitimate, that had been in its path. I am sure that I speak for many noble Lords when I praise the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn who worked so hard to find a way for this House to come to a settlement. He cannot be in his place today but I thank him anyway.

    Tonight we have a chance to build on that consensus, a chance to repeal Section 28, safe in the knowledge that there is now clear guidance on sex education and clarity about the responsibilities of head teachers, governors and parents in agreeing what is taught in our schools. We can be secure in the knowledge that marriage and family life are at the heart of sex education in schools. For, like the majority in this House, I believe that marriage and family life are a cornerstone of our society, but in saying that I do not intend to denigrate other people's relationships or my own. Society is about living with other people based on our common bonds and not negatively exploiting our differences.

    I want to focus on our common bonds. I do not want to be painted by the opponents of the repeal as a champion of the gay rights movement. I do not want to be blamed for material that I find as offensive as do many other noble Lords and that should never find its way into the hands of our children. Instead I want to play my part in securing a consensus in this House. In my belief, that consensus is best served by building on last week's vote with the repeal of Section 28.

    I have re-read the debates on this subject and I have found myself asking the question: what purpose does this piece of legislation actually serve now? Since the section was introduced 12 years ago, it has never been used against a single local authority. Noble Lords must question why a piece of legislation that sits on the statute book has never been used, particularly given the alleged mountain of material that others would have one believe is making its way into our schools.

    So, it must have a symbolic power for those who believe that homosexuality is wrong, just as it does for those of us who believe that the rights and dignity of the individual should be protected. Tonight I want to examine and to refute the main arguments that underpin the case against repealing Section 28, which seem to break down into three broad categories: first, that without Section 28 our schools will be flooded with gay propaganda produced by local authorities; secondly, that without Section 28 one must be in favour of promoting homosexuality to children; and, thirdly, that homosexuals are sinners with whom we should have nothing to do.

    First, let me deal with unsuitable sex education material. A number of speakers have highlighted publications produced by health authorities and trusts. At Second Reading and again today, the noble Baroness, Lady Young, expressed concerns about material from Avon, Camden & Islington, Lambeth, Southwark and Lewisham. Much of that material was never intended for schools but, in any event, parents, head teachers and teachers have responsibility for what is in our schools and not the local authorities. Last week we agreed that the choice and responsibility for sex education policy, quite rightly, lie with schools themselves, with their head teachers, governors and parents. That is how it should be.

    My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Does he agree that that obligation does not rest with youth club leaders nor with people in children's homes?

    7.15 p.m.

    My Lords, I accept much of that criticism. However, under the law, parents have the right to withdraw their children if they disapprove of sex education lessons in schools. This argument, especially the argument of the noble Baroness, really falls down when one considers that Section 28 does not apply to independent schools. No one has suggested that those schools have been flooded by gay propaganda.

    The second broad argument is basically that if you want to repeal Section 28 you must be in favour of promoting homosexuality to children, otherwise why not leave it on the statute book? As the noble Lady, Lady Saltoun of Abernethy, put it:
    "The repeal of Section 28 will remove the small amount of protection which it has provided for the past 11 years against the manipulation of even quite young children against their parents' wishes by a small but vociferous and determined minority".
    But, I say again, under the new guidelines this cannot happen. The policy on sex education in schools is determined by head teachers, parents and governors and delivered by individual teachers. No Member of this House has alleged that any teacher has been promoting homosexuality. If they have been doing so, they should say so now. I am sure that the Minister of State for Education would investigate such claims.

    My Lords, the reason that no teachers have been caught promoting homosexuality is precisely that Section 28 is on the statute book.

    My Lords, I do not accept that. To discuss is not to promote. When children ask questions about sexuality they need and deserve an honest answer, if only to prevent bullying in the playground. Sometimes knowledge is their only protection in an ugly world. No one suggests that knowledge of racism makes a person black and no one suggests that knowledge of anti-Semitism makes a person Jewish, so how can knowledge of homosexuality make a person a homosexual? That argument defies logic and evidence. Research shows that straight people cannot be "converted" into gay people. It is hard enough to teach children to read and write let alone to attempt to change their very nature.

    The third main argument is that homosexuality is morally wrong; to quote the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, it is "unnatural". I know that these are honestly and deeply held opinions, but surely they are not a basis for our legislation.

    The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford was right when he said:
    "Irrespective of the judgements we make about people's personal lifestyles and choices, the law has a duty to refer to all citizens with the respect required by their God-given dignity".
    A noble part of the heritage of this House has been its willingness to scrutinise and improve legislation and to ask the questions that have not been raised in another place. We have fulfilled that task. Equally noble has been the ability of this House to reach conclusions that are consensual and inclusive. We have fulfilled that task too. There are procedures and guidelines in place to teach, to guide and to protect children. There is no longer a legal need for Section 28. It is a redundant piece of legislation.

    My Lords, I apologise for intervening. Does the noble Lord accept that the guidelines are wholly unenforceable? Does he accept that Section 403(1)(a) of the Education Act 1996, as amended, is wholly unenforceable to secure compliance? The noble Lord has referred twice to the guidelines.

    My Lords, I do not accept that at all. I hope when the Minister replies that he will certainly affirm that that is not the case.

    This is a Bill about local authorities; it is not an education Bill. As every Member of the House knows, we have had that debate. Tonight we have real choices to make about what kind of House this is. Having achieved our aims, do we continue to wreck this legislation or, having concluded our constitutional duty, do we allow the repeal of Section 28 to proceed? We have agreed that marriage and family life are cornerstones of our society. Let us now put away the dogma. Our objectives have been achieved. Let us now extend to others the tolerance and understanding that we try to give to each other in this House. Let us now agree that the time for Section 28 is past. Let us remove from our statute book a piece of gesture politics. I ask your Lordships to vote for the repeal of Section 28, but if noble Lords cannot do so, I ask them to abstain.

    My Lords, I intend to be brief because I gave my views on this question on 7th February when we last debated the matter. I want to make just one point in relation to the essential issue on which we shall be voting tonight.

    The marginal note on the Marshalled List of Commons Amendments on page 36 describes Amendment No. 378 as,
    "Repeal of prohibition on promotion of homosexuality".
    Section 2A of the 1986 Act says,
    "A local authority shall not … intentionally promote homosexuality or publish material with the intention of promoting homosexuality".
    We are not discussing services, which the Minister spoke of at some length; we are discussing the intentional promotion of homosexuality. When we come to vote tonight the issue will be whether or not we consider it right, appropriate and sensible for a local authority to promote homosexuality in its work. If we do, then it is right and reasonable that we vote for the government amendments. If we do not, then we should vote for the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Young. That is the simple issue and nothing else stands up against it.

    My Lords, it is a shame that the debate on a great issue for the people of our country should be divided politically; it should never have been allowed. This issue should have been freely discussed between responsible Members of this ancient House without the burden of a Whip on one's shoulder.

    Having said that, perhaps I can share a bit of history with noble Lords. It was way back in 1954 when I was invited by the then Home Secretary—I was then chairman of the London County Council—to sit on the Wolfenden Committee, which was set up to consider and make recommendations on the law and practice relating to homosexual acts. At that stage people were liable to imprisonment, and indeed suffered imprisonment even though they were committing homosexual acts as between consenting adults in private.

    I am the only surviving member of that committee and will not guess what our recommendation might have been today. All I know is that, against the injustices that such criminality resulted in, such as blackmail and the invasion of criminal law into the home, I and other members of that committee—there was only one dissentient—recommended that homosexual acts between consenting adults in private should no longer be a part of the criminal law but should be a matter of moral law. It was a long time before that victory was achieved by a provision being placed on the statute book. We reported in 1957. There was a Conservative government and a bit of a Labour government before the 10 years elapsed. We were unable to persuade politicians of all parties that the cancellation of that injustice should be registered on the statute book. In 1967–10 years later—it was achieved in the Sexual Offences Act.

    That was followed by the gratitude of the homosexual community, who accepted that victory as being a victory for justice and decency. What happened afterwards was an awful pity. Some local authorities acted in a completely irresponsible way—I could use stronger words, but I will not—and a minority of the homosexual community decided (and I regret it) to be quite aggressive in regard to homosexuality itself. As I said, I shall not state the opinion of those who are no longer with us. But knowing of the discussions that we had, I believe that members of that Wolfenden Committee, who sat and deliberated for three years, would have discouraged that attitude. Whether or not they would have recommended that we deal with the issue by legislation and by direction to local authorities is another matter into which I shall not enter at this stage. It was dealt with by legislation and we have got that legislation.

    The extraordinary thing is—this is why I talked of it being a shame to deal with this matter politically—that if I were to address every single Member of this House and ask the question, "Do you think local authorities ought to promote homosexuality?", I would receive the answer from all sides, "No, not promote". And if the amendment had been tabled for which I pleaded on a previous occasion, which said, after "prohibition promoting", "but local authorities should, in all their actions, preach tolerance towards others who are not quite as we are", such an amendment may well have been approved by this House. But, as a previous speaker said, the amendment in front of us makes it extremely difficult for those who feel as I do to vote, as I would always want to do if in conscience I could, for my own Government.

    What are we asked to approve by way of a Commons amendment? Anyone referred to our statute book will not be referred to the Learning and Skills Act, as it will become, even if that is relevant—I believe it is. There is no reference to that. Generations to come will not know of your Lordships' speeches in this House, even if generations present know what we say in this House in this debate. They will see in the Bill, when it becomes an Act, the words,
    "Insert … (Section 2A of the Local Government Act 1986 (prohibition promoting homosexuality by teaching"—
    we were told that teaching had nothing to do with this and never did have—
    "or by publishing material) ceases to have effect)".
    You do not have to be skilled in the law; you can read this wording as an ordinary layman. Let us take the usual gentleman who inhabits the top of the Clapham bus. He is told here that all this business about prohibition on "promoting homosexuality" ceases to have effect. The amendment refers to "Repeal of prohibition" in the rubric, but puts nothing in its place. As I sit down, I repeat: what a shame that this was not a discussion instead of being a political debate. All that we can do is to make the best of things that we can, knowing that we are voting in honesty. I do not think that, in honesty, I can vote for what this amendment says; indeed, it says, "Look at me! I am saying that it is repealed; it is to have no effect—and that includes teaching". That cannot be right.

    7.30 p.m.

    My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, that it is a great pity that this is a political debate. As my colleagues on these Benches know, I thoroughly disapprove of the fact that there is a three-line Whip on a matter that should be discussed quite apart from political pressures. I agree with my noble friend Lord Russell that if the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is passed this evening, it will not be the end of the matter; but neither will it be the end of the matter if her amendment is defeated. The truth is that we have got ourselves into a situation where we are called upon to exercise our wisdom.

    Surely it is possible to analyse the real problem. It is a problem that concerns a very small minority. It is not homosexuals; it is not heterosexuals: it is the zealots on either side, who are very difficult to deal with. If the Government were wise, they would look for a means to solve the problem which I believe is provided by the amendment tabled in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman. I have attached my name to it because I thoroughly approve of it. Indeed, this amendment was tabled at a much earlier stage.

    Let us look at the conceived or the perceived evil of Section 28, as far as concerns the homosexual community. Section 28 is the exclusive concern of the zealots of homosexuality. However, we all know that there are also zealots who advocate early sex and experimentation on a heterosexual basis. Therefore, why should we distinguish between the two? If we look at the proposed amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman, we see that, instead of Section 28 being totally repealed, it is amended so as to include the words:
    "Subject to the general principle that the institution of marriage is to be supported, a local authority shall not encourage, or publish material intended to encourage, the adoption of any particular sexual life style".
    Subsection (3) of the amendment goes on to state:
    "This section does not prohibit the provision for young persons of sex education or counselling services on sexual behaviour and associated health risks".
    Therefore, it gets rid of the problem of the insult—as it is regarded—to the homosexual community. It applies the prohibition to both the heterosexual and the homosexual communities. If these words had been included in the original Section 28, it would have afforded all the protection for which the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and others, are looking. If that is the protection required, why on earth do not the Government take themselves, as well as everyone else, off the hook on this matter?

    We are dealing with a difficult subject. Here I disagree with my noble friend Lord Russell. It is not a question of youth against age. A few young people may be more anxious to promote homosexuality, but this is an area where the older generation can provide some wisdom and guidance. Surely that is what we are looking for in this regard. That is why I believe that this House should look most carefully at the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman.

    My Lords, in opposing the amendments that support the retention of Section 28, I wish to put forward two simple arguments: first, that Section 28 is now redundant and unnecessary; and, secondly, that it is open to misinterpretation, thereby, giving permission for stigma and prejudice.

    Section 28 is redundant because the concerns that it was designed to satisfy are now amply covered by legislation, such as the Education Act 1996, and new guidance on sex and relationship education about which we heard tonight. There is ample evidence to show that parents and young people want sex and relationship education. They want to learn the skills and information for improving relationships and sexual health.

    In response to those concerns and those of professionals who have worked with young people, several recent sets of guidelines have been issued, one of which is the sex and relationship guidance. For many years, in law, schools have been required to have a policy on sex education, which must be available to all parents every year. Of course, Section 28 does not apply to schools, although many people believe that it does. Governing bodies are responsible in law for sex education, and one-third of their number are parents.

    The new guidance specifies what should be in the policy. It should cover: how the education should be delivered and by whom; how it is monitored; and what parents should do if they wish to withdraw their children. It also talks about evaluation. In addition, there are special sections on materials and their appropriateness, on teaching strategies, and on issues such as the importance of teaching appropriate to Asian culture, as well as the importance of involving boys and parents. Moreover, paragraph 6.6 applies to youth workers.

    The guidance builds on the framework of personal, social health education, which was set out last year. This will be inspected by Ofsted from this year, wherever it appears in the curriculum. It is not a single subject; indeed, health education could never be a single subject. All this surely provides a totally adequate framework to protect young people from inappropriate teaching, if any such teaching existed. The Care Standards Act contains much that will prevent young people being abused. Most importantly, such guidance is also concerned to stress the responsibility of family life in sex and relationship education.

    We must all surely be concerned about the threat of AIDS, about teenage pregnancies and about young people forming good relationships. Continued confusion about Section 28 is not conducive to encouraging professionals who work not only in schools but in prisons, the youth service, the police and so on. Parents, concerned about their children's health and well-being, have said by a huge majority (2:1) that they want Section 28 to be removed. I do not believe that professionals who work with young people are evil and trying to corrupt young minds. All those I know of are without exception caring and careful. They do not try to make young people homosexual. In his recent speech about common sense for schools William Hague spoke of children being taught,
    "by teachers who enjoyed the professional respect and freedom they deserve".
    We have heard about unsavoury teaching materials. My own children went to three different comprehensive schools in London. The only targeting that went on was by zealots of the National Front. Fortunately, children at those schools were good at resisting pressure, which is something that personal health education is keen to promote. We have heard about a video being produced in Avon. I have made inquiries about it. I understand that it has not been widely distributed. Teachers are not finding it useful and of 10 teachers whom I asked, only one had heard of it. Sexual relationships guidance makes it totally clear that health authority material which may be used in schools must be in line with the guidance.

    I too visited the display of material set out by the noble Baroness, Lady Young. I respect fundamentally her wish to protect children. But the vast bulk of that material was not intended for use in school s and teachers would not have found it remotely useful I can assure the noble Baroness that material produced by education authorities and educationalist for use with young people is sensitive and appropriate to local needs. I believe that she would approve of it.

    In the 1980s material was produced by health authorities and voluntary organisations as part of the fight against HIV and AIDS. Norman Fowler, the then Conservative Minister for Health, bravely supported that fight. As a result the HIV-AIDS epidemic in the United Kingdom was not as serious as predicted. This material was not promoting homosexuality but combating a potential disease, which we would be foolish to be complacent about. The material was not designed for use in schools.

    Perhaps I may continue briefly to say why I believe Section 28 is harmful apart from the reasons I have just given. A law which allows the possibility of a group in society being treated unjustly is bad law. Section 28 does that by inferring—I stress that word—that homosexuality should be condemned even though it is a state into which people are born. I wish to quote a parents organisation, the Friends and Families of Lesbian Gays, which has 25 branches throughout the country and a substantial membership. It is vehemently opposed to Section 28. The parents know what their sons and daughters have suffered. I wonder what would happen if the letter writers supporting Section 28 were to meet the parents in that organisation. I wonder who would convince whom.

    There is also an organisation of Catholic parents who have gay children. I quote from a letter from one such parent. It says,
    "I know that Section 28 is wrong. It is a law that should now be removed. We have three sons who are well adjusted and caring young men who have never broken the law or been violent, raped or injured and who have respect for people. My eldest son was born gay. Nothing in society or his home or friends made him choose to be gay. He is seen by many as worse than criminal, as evil, depraved, unnatural and not normal. I am proud that he accepts his sexuality as nothing other than normal to him. My support of gay people and their lifestyle does not mean that I undervalue family life and marriage".
    The parents have been married for 27 years. The letter continues:
    "Both of these are vitally important to children in general, but so are tolerance, non-prejudicial judgment and care of others".
    We do not need Section 28. It is not productive. It is not necessary, given the guidance to schools and the powerful role of governors and parents and the guidance we have been given for youth workers. A value central to civilised society is not only tolerance of difference but the celebration of difference. Those who are different in this case have made, and make, contributions to society which are respected and admired. I do not see why we should continue to insult them with a piece of bad legislation.

    7.45 p.m.

    My Lords, I believe that the time has come for me to say a word about my Amendment No. 378B. I am not speaking to any other amendment. My amendment is relevant only if the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Young, is not successful so that Section 28 is repealed. The Commons amendment states that the Section 28 prohibition against promoting homosexuality shall cease to have effect. My Amendment No. 387B would add two subsections to the Commons amendment. The object of the amendment is to fill the vacuum which would arise as a result of repealing Section 28 and putting no words in its place. If a section of an Act of Parliament states that a local authority shall not promote homosexuality and that section is later repealed, the obvious inference is that a local authority is thereafter permitted to promote homosexuality.

    I am not concerned with whether that is the strict legal effect of Section 28: I simply do not know. But I am absolutely certain that it is the inference which will be drawn by the public as a result of the repeal. Therefore, the question which arises is what words can be added to the words of repeal—if your Lordships decide that that should take place—which will prevent that inference being drawn and will not detract from the repeal and will accord with government policy so far as we know it.

    Amendment No. 378B provides a possible answer. The amendment has two subsections with three components. The first component refers,
    "to the general principle that the institution of marriage is to be supported".
    Those words are taken directly from Section 1 of the Family Law Act 1996. That Act provides that regard is to be had to certain general principles, the first of which is,
    "that the institution of marriage is to be supported".
    That Act was introduced by a Conservative Administration, but the principle was equally accepted by the Labour Opposition. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Archer of Sandwell, speaking from the Opposition Front Bench said,
    "It is common ground in your Lordships' House that we are anxious to support the family as an institution and to support marriage as an essential factor in that".—[Official Report, 22/2/96; col. 1153.]
    The first component of my amendment, that the institution of marriage is to be supported, is therefore unassailable. The Government cannot object to that wording without back-tracking on what they said from the Front Bench when they were in Opposition.

    The second component of my amendment is that a local authority,
    "shall not encourage … the adoption of any particular sexual life style".
    I am no expert on local government, but when I pay my council tax I expect my money to be used for maintaining and lighting streets, keeping them clean and doing 101 other things which make for good local administration. I do not expect local councillors to set themselves up as a court of morals; that is for the Churches and the education authorities. It therefore seems to me right expressly to preclude local authorities from encouraging the adoption of any particular sexual lifestyle; it is simply not their job.

    Precluding local authorities from encouraging the adoption of any particular sexual lifestyle will help to allay the fears of those opposed to the repeal of Section 28, if your Lordships decide that Section 28 must go. The amendment avoids giving offence to the homosexual community. It does not single them out for mention. It does not seek to disparage them. It is totally neutral. The important thing is that it fills the vacuum which would otherwise be left by the bare repeal of Section 28.

    I turn to the third component of Amendment No. 378B which provides that,
    "This section does not prohibit the provision for young persons of sex education or counselling services".
    Your Lordships may recall that at Second Reading the reason given by the Minister for repealing Section 28 was that local authorities,
    "are in effect prevented by Section 2A of the 1986 Act—
    that is to say, Section 28—
    " … from providing young people with information to deal with issues relating to their sexuality".—[Official Report, 6/12/99; col. 1026.]
    That was the reason given by the Minister. The third component of Amendment No. 378B is included for the purpose of making it absolutely clear that the objection raised against Section 28 by the Government cannot be raised against my amendment.

    I hope that I may pull the threads together by reading the repealing clause as it will exist if Amendment No. 378B is accepted by your Lordships:
    "(1) Section 2A of the Local Government Act 1986 (prohibition on promoting homosexuality by teaching or by publishing material) ceases to have effect.
    (2) Subject to the general principle that the institution of marriage is to be supported, a local authority shall not encourage, or publish material intended to encourage, the adoption of any particular sexual life style.
    (3) This section does not prohibit the provision for young persons of sex education or counselling services on sexual behaviour and associated health risks".
    I do not speak against the Motion of the noble Baroness, Lady Young. I am merely trying to provide a fallback position—a safeguard—if your Lordships come to the conclusion that Section 28 has to be repealed.

    My Lords, I hope that future generations will look back on your Lordships' decision today as a moment when we achieved a proper balance. I include as an item in that balance the new guidance to which reference has been made—I refer to the amendment which noble Lords passed last week—which is a safeguard, as the Minister has said.

    Speaking previously on behalf of my noble friends from these Benches, I have made our position clear. It was a manifesto commitment on our part to secure the repeal of Section 28. As I have made our position clear, I shall not attempt to cover the whole ground but merely to pick out a few points. The support on these Benches for the repeal of Section 28 is not support for the proselytization of homosexuality, nor is it a green light for corruption.

    The term "promote" has led us into all kinds of difficulties. I believe that it is inapposite. It is simply not possible to promote homosexuality. I believe that my noble friend Lord Russell said that one might as well seek to promote left-handedness or some other inherent characteristic. Nor do I believe—I hope that this goes some way to answer the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman—that it is within the powers of local government to promote homosexuality, even were that to be possible. Local authorities are creatures of statute. Their powers are matters of statute. I do not believe that this is a power which they have.

    Not only do I believe that the section is nonsense; I believe that it is dangerous nonsense. None of us supports bullying. I absolutely accept the points which have been made by the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and others about their concern to protect the vulnerable. However, we have different evidence. We on these Benches, in particular my noble friend Lord Tope, have much evidence of homosexual bullying and the inability or refusal of teachers to intervene. Teachers are confused as to what they can or cannot do. Some of them may use the existence of the section as a reason or excuse not to intervene or assist. Much distress, misery and, indeed, tragedy have been caused.

    I am aware of the real anxieties about some of the material that has been cited, some of which, as has been said, has been issued under the aegis of health authorities—which is irrelevant to the debate. However, for the good of young people, we must permit first-class information to be issued. The noble Lord, Lord Alli, rightly pointed to the fact that no prosecution has occurred under the section despite the length of time during which the material has existed.

    I regard Section 28 as bad legislation. If it is not repealed today, what effect will that have? Reference has already been made to the certificate attached to the Bill. Will the Bill, when enacted, be incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights? Will it contravene our own Human Rights Act which comes into force in October? Will the Minister confirm that the courts could therefore give a declaration of incompatibility and the Government would then be able to use a fast-track procedure to abolish the provision? It should be abolished. We regard it as offensive. It reinforces stigma. It does nothing to assist inclusiveness of society. It reinforces discrimination and we shall be delighted to see the back of it.

    My Lords, like the noble Lords, Lord Mishcon and Lord Hooson, I also regret that this is a political debate. However, there are two things that we cannot avoid. First, this amendment was added to the Local Government Bill by the Government; it was never intended to be included. Secondly, it constituted a Liberal Democrat manifesto pledge.

    At the outset we were accused of concentrating on schools. I make no apology for concentrating on the education of our children in schools. The government Minister, and others who have supported him, have completely ignored youth clubs, play areas and children's homes, on all of which local authority spending can have an impact. If repeal goes ahead, local authorities will be free to fund the voluntary sector organisations which are determined to produce material of the kind we are discussing. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, that much of the material that we are discussing is pertinent to schools. I have some of it with me. If noble Lords wish to see it, I should be only too willing to show it to them.

    The guidance which was approved last week, which I predicted would be proposed in this debate as a substitute for repealing Section 28, is weak; it is very weak. The House refused to strengthen it.

    It is also unenforceable, as my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway said, both in its aims and because one cannot legislate for children to learn. One can legislate for children to be taught, but not for what they learn.

    I am delighted that a number of local authorities, led by Kent and Surrey, will put in place something equivalent to Section 28 if repeal goes ahead. This is not about making gay and lesbian people second class, as has been suggested; it is about making all of our children first class. The Minister said that we have a right to protect minority interests. I agree with that—but not at the expense of the majority, which includes all the children of our country.

    The noble Lord, Lord Alli, was concerned about the role of teachers. I advise him that Section 28 does not prevent teachers discussing homosexuality; nor does it prevent teachers counselling, or referring children to other agencies for advice and counselling. Indeed, the statutory guidance that goes together with Section 28 positively encourages teachers to do just that.

    The noble Earl, Lord Russell, said that on this issue the Prime Minister was more substance and less spin. I am about to prove otherwise. In the leaked memo, the Prime Minister said:
    "It is bizarre that any Government I lead should be seen as anti-family".
    The memo is very revealing on so much, but particularly relevant to this debate are the Prime Minister's comments on the family. He said:
    "We need two or three eye-catching initiatives that are entirely conventional in terms of their attitude to the family … I should be personally associated with as much of this as possible".
    In addition to seeking the repeal of Section 28, the Prime Minister heads a government who are actively considering allowing transsexuals to marry and to adopt children; who are considering using the Parliament Act to lower the age of consent for homosexuals to the age of 16; and who are generally relaxing the law as it relates to gays and lesbians and to people cruising on our public roads for sex.

    It is not homophobic to care about the moral and spiritual education of our children; it is not homophobic to argue that the promotion of homosexuality to our children, in or out of the classroom, is not acceptable; it is not homophobic to promote marriage and to teach that marriage provides a strong foundation for stable relationships and the most reliable framework for raising children; and it is not homophobic to prohibit local authorities using their funds—taxpayers' funds—either directly or indirectly through third parties, to allow materials or individuals to promote homosexuality as equal to marriage as a lifestyle.

    Thousands of people—parents, grandparents, teachers, faith groups of all denominations—have written imploring Members of the House to oppose the repeal of Section 28. They know that local authority money is spent, either directly or through other organisations, to produce offensive materials, some of which have been circulated to school-age children, both in schools and in their play areas, in youth clubs and in children's homes. They, like I, find it objectionable.

    My noble friend Lady Young has fought courageously, and I have been proud to stand with her, to support the vast majority of parents by opposing the Government on this issue. Should my noble friend Lady Young succeed with her amendment tonight it would represent a vote in favour of the majority of the people in the country, as well as a vindication of the patient and painstaking way in which my noble friend has fought to retain Section 28.

    However, should the Government succeed in their Herculean and time-consuming attempts to repeal Section 28, the more militant gay and lesbian groups will dance for joy; so, too, will the Government's supporters. But tears will be shed by many parents, grandparents, Christians and other faith group members throughout this country. Our duty is to support them and it is for Parliament to protect our children.

    8 p.m.

    My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, on one thing—and probably on only one thing: that the discussion of this very important Bill on the reform of local government has been—in this House at least—utterly dominated by consideration of this issue. Much of the public consciousness of the proceedings of this House over the past 12 or 18 months has likewise been dominated by our consideration of Section 28 and the way in which we approach homosexuality. That is to be regretted on both counts.

    Nevertheless, one has to be realistic. This is a deeply symbolic issue to people on all sides of the argument. It has a symbolism which is way beyond its actual importance. It is a piece of legislation which is subject to different interpretations by different groups of people in different contexts—and it has never been used. For all those reasons, in any other context the House of Lords would undoubtedly conclude that this must be seriously bad law.

    There is also the societal aspect. The noble Earl, Lord Russell, rightly said that there is an age-related differential attitude in society to this issue. It is unfortunate, but it is true. We live in a changing society. It is a changing society which I am afraid that the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and many of her supporters refuse to accept or recognise. But it is the very society with which not only our children but our young adults, and many of our middle-aged adults, have to come to terms. It is that reality that we should be addressing in the House of Lords rather than some of the more symbolic issues that have been referred to today.

    Much of the debate has still related to the position in schools. It is almost as if the Learning and Skills Bill and the guidance issued by the Secretary of State had never existed. Therefore, I shall need, once again, to refer to the Learning and Skills Bill and to the guidance given under it, which places the responsibility of sex and relationship education firmly on teachers and school governors and makes it clear that local authorities have no power in determining sex education in schools. It puts a requirement on schools that they should be statutorily obliged to have regard to the guidance issued by the Secretary of State; for the first time, it requires that pupils should be taught about the nature and importance of marriage to family life and to the bringing up of children.

    My Lords, it does not require them to be taught at all; that was the amendment that was lost. It requires children to learn.

    My Lords, the aim of the guidance is that children should learn. As I understand it, the aim of all teaching is that children should learn. What they should learn in this context is that society is varied; that marriage is an important element for the stability of our society, but that there are other ways of life with which they have to come to terms.

    The guidance also protects children from inappropriate teaching and teaching materials; it requires health service bodies to have regard to the guidance; and it reaffirms the rights of parents to withdraw their children from sex education.

    A number of things have been said by the opponents of the Government's position which are not correct. The noble Baronesses, Lady Blatch and Lady Young, said that the guidelines have no force of law. That is not true. The Learning and Skills Bill, on which we reached consensus last week, provides clear statutory requirements on the Secretary of State to issue guidance, and heads and governors will have a clear legal responsibility to have regard to that guidance.

    My Lords, I wish to ask only one question, which is central to what the noble Lord is saying. I am receiving different guidance on this myself. If someone who is subject to the guidance is taken to the High Court for not having done what is in the guidance, and says to the High Court, "I have had regard to the guidance but I did not agree with it", is it not the case that there is nothing further to be done against that person?

    My Lords, if a statute indicates that someone has to have regard to guidance, they have to have regard to the content of the guidance and to behave reasonably in the light of that guidance. They cannot reject that guidance in the way that the noble Lord suggests.

    My Lords, perhaps I may assist the Minister. Does he agree that most teachers are more afraid of the disapproval of their professional superiors than they are of the courts?

    My Lords, I had better not comment on that. However, the noble Lord is undoubtedly right about some teachers I know. Nevertheless, the courts do have a role here as well.

    The noble Baroness, Lady Blatch, said that when the Learning and Skills Bill becomes law that will have no effect in relation to youth workers and the youth service. That is not correct. The DfEE guidance specifically covers youth workers. It says specifically that it is inappropriate for youth workers to promote sexual orientation, that they will be expected to respect its guidance when dealing with school-aged children and that their individual views should not affect the independent advice given. Moreover, the youth service itself is inspected by Ofsted in order to ensure that it operates properly in accordance with those guidelines.

    The noble Baroness also suggested that if sexuality could not be taught in sex education lessons it could be taught elsewhere. Again that is not true. The provision in the Learning and Skills Bill will apply to sex education wherever a school delivers it. If it occurs in an English lesson, a literary lesson, a history or a citizenship lesson then the guidelines continue to apply. It is not true that teachers would be free to promote homosexuality in English literature. They are, however, allowed to refer to the fact that homosexuality exists.

    The noble Baroness, Lady Young, said that she did not like gay and lesbian issues being referred to in history lessons. But what are we supposed to do? Airbrush the whole of the gay and lesbian community over the ages out of history, and not refer to the lifestyles of some of our greatest painters, artists, generals and indeed politicians? Of course gay and lesbian matters can be referred to. But when it comes to explicit sex education, whether it takes place in a citizenship lesson or whether it takes place in a sex education lesson, the guidelines apply. It is also not the case that social workers are excluded from any of that legislation. They too will be subject to the legislation to be brought forward with regard to the general care standards authority.

    Therefore, there has been much said today which is actually not true. The Government have not only brought forward the guidelines, indicated their general approach and taken account of what has been said in your Lordships' House by right reverend Prelates and others with regard to the importance of marriage, and what has been said elsewhere, but they have also extended the effects of their decisions to these other areas where young people may be affected by local authority activity.

    The question therefore is why are we persisting with retaining Section 28? The Government have indicated how all the fears which were run, and in many ways exaggerated during earlier consideration of the Bill and in the more irresponsible parts of the media, have been met under the auspices of the Learning and Skills Bill. Yet we persist in thinking that we need Section 28 in order to protect someone.

    Part of the problem was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman, when he said that if we delete the clause, that is carte blanche for local authorities to promote sexuality. That is why he has presented his own alternative amendment should the noble Baroness's amendment fall. I have some sympathy with what that amendment tries to achieve, but I have some concerns regarding its wording. First, the meaning of the term "sexual lifestyle" is in any case far from clear. Secondly, while the amendment does not prohibit the provision of sex education or counselling by local authorities for young people, how does that apply to adults who are doubtful about their sexuality or are themselves homosexual or bisexual. Thirdly, in relation to schools, it is unnecessary in view of the developments under the Learning and Skills Bills.

    While I recognise the need which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman, identifies to replace what he sees as a vacuum were Section 28 to be removed, I do not believe that that is necessary. Indeed, he asks what would happen if the repeal were simply adopted as the Government wish. That would not give local authorities any powers to promote homosexuality in schools or anywhere else. Local authorities can only undertake those activities for which they have specific powers. Therefore, the strict legal effect is not to give local authorities any additional powers over and above that which Section 28 gives them to promote homosexuality.

    Behind all that is what we mean by "promote". If we mean proselytise, if we mean hassle and pressurise people into homosexuality, then clearly we are all against it, as we would be in terms of pressurising young people in particular, and indeed adults, into any form of sexual relationship. But it is clear from what the opponents of repeal have said that they do not regard promotion as simply those objectionable facets. They regard promotion of homosexuality almost as any reference to homosexuality and certainly to any explicit sexual information provided either in terms of education or in terms of counselling and social services to the homosexual community or those who may feel that they might be homosexual. It is for that reason that the word promotion cannot be taken at its face value. It has not been defined ever by the proponents of Section 28; it has not been defined in earlier debates on the Bill; and it has not been defined today. As long as people regard any mention of homosexuality, any explanation of what homosexual relations mean as being the promotion of homosexuality, then the words of Section 28 are impossible to interpret with any degree of objectivity.

    My Lords, noble Lords opposite cry "No". But we have heard references in the debate and outside this Chamber to the provision of what is called "explicit sexual material". Any sex education refers explicitly to sexual activity. It is helpful for children and young adults to know what is being talked about in that respect. If noble Lords opposite object to any such explicit material in whatever context it is put, however much it is surrounded by a social and emotional context, if they regard that as promotion of homosexuality, and many of them do, and much of the media do, then the word "promotion" is seriously misleading and should be taken out of the law. It should be recognised even by the proponents of Section 28 that that has greatly undermined its effect.

    Behind this also is the need for us not to use the law of the land to enforce moral judgments on specific members of our society. Three hundred years ago we broke the link between the ecclesiastical courts and the civil and criminal courts. Many people appear to want those who appear to favour or give comfort to those who are homosexual—whether in counselling, education or wherever—to be guilty of some kind of civil offence. We should continue to separate out the sphere of our moral leaders from those of our legal enforcement process. I recognise that many people have deep religious convictions, both in this House and elsewhere, that homosexuality is wrong. Many other sexual activities by those same people would probably be regarded as almost equally wrong— fornication, adultery and so on. But these activities exist in our society and many people engage in them. In our society young adults need to know about them. We have to pick up the consequences of relationships which are based on them.

    My Lords, does the Minister recognise that while this is a swashbuckling presentation of some of the issues, it really does not seem to me to meet the range of points which have been raised this evening. It appears to me that he has manifestly misrepresented what I said earlier. I have no doubt that among noble Lords on all sides of the House who may be considering how to vote this evening, there is a much wider and more nuance series of positions than he is allowing the possibility of there being.

    My Lords, there are nuance positions. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman, is attempting a nuance position. Some other people in the course of the debate have had more nuance positions. But those who introduced Section 28 in the first place, those who are the most vociferous in its support and the need for its retention do not have a nuance position; they have a deeply prejudiced position and one which we need to remove from the statute book.

    The right reverend Prelate referred to Section 28 as being a stabilising bench mark. That is an entirely erroneous position. It is not a stabilising benchmark. It is, unfortunately, the spark of a deep dispute within our society. It is one which has been seriously misinterpreted, I would agree, by the zealots on all sides of the matter and it is one which has deeply misled the teaching profession, the media, politicians and parents. It is not one on which we can base a sensible approach either to sex education or to dealing with sexual matters in the rest of our society.

    Given that we have a deeply destabilising benchmark here, one which has caused great conflict and one which is incapable of rational interpretation, is it not also rational, therefore, for the House of Lords to remove it? Why has the House of Lords hitherto—I hope that noble Lords will change their minds tonight—resisted its removal? It is very strange of this House, because normally it is a well recognised role of this House to defend the position of minorities. It may very well be that the majority of people out there, fed by slightly misleading information in our media and elsewhere, support the retention of Section 28—certainly those aged over 40—but it still remains the responsibility of this House—it is one of the great constitutional checks and balances of our system—to respect and protect the interests of minorities against a populist majority. In this case, for reasons known only to those who oppose the repeal, they have done exactly the opposite.

    At the end of the day, it is a human rights issue. It is an issue for individuals. It is an issue of equal treatment of citizens. Section 28 cannot be said to be compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The House of Lords should recognise that that is an important statement for the Government and others to have made. I do not believe, therefore, that the House of Lords can, with any light conscience, continue to vote against its repeal. By doing so, it is sending a divisive signal to our society, and one which will encourage discrimination, whatever interpretation noble Lords might benignly try to put on the words of Section 28.

    As was said earlier, I fear that there are not a lot of minds to be changed on this issue. However, I hope that when noble Lords go through the Lobbies they will also think of the reputation of this House.

    My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, will he make entirely clear the Government's attitude to the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman? If the House accepts the repeal of Section 28 but then votes for the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, will the Government accept that, regardless of the textual deficiencies to which the Minister referred? If they will do so, it seems to me that that should satisfy any right-minded person. If, on the other hand, we are told that the Government reject that amendment, I feel that many noble Lords will want to vote a different way. Can the noble Lord be entirely clear on where the Government stand on the noble and learned Lord's amendment?

    My Lords, I thought that I had made it clear earlier that, although I regard the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brightman, as a significant move away from the discriminatory wording of Section 28 and believe that it is in that sense an improvement, it has some serious flaws and serious uncertainties. I would not therefore wish to encourage the House to vote for something which is as equally subject to different interpretations as Section 28 itself. If the House were to pass that amendment, following a defeat of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Young, the Government would have to consider that position and consider whether subsequent changes would be necessary or whether we could continue to live with that amendment, given that it is—I accept the good will in these matters of the noble and learned Lord. Lord Brightman—an improvement on the current situation. However, I think that a cleaner answer tonight would be to vote for the repeal of Section 28, to reject the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Young, and to give a clear signal that this House does not wish to give any succour to those who discriminate against any section of our community.

    My Lords, I should like to thank all those who have spoken in support of me today. I thank in particular the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Winchester. He said—I think I quote him correctly—that Section 28 is a stabilising benchmark. In using those words, he used the precise words that were used by the noble Lord, Lord Habgood, when we debated this matter previously. The right reverend Prelate said something else which I think is profoundly true. One of the tragedies of life today is that what has always been accepted—the wisdom of one generation being passed on to another—has been given up; and, because it has been given up, adults have abnegated their responsibility to children. If I may say so to the Government, there is no greater example of that abnegation than the guidelines on sex education. I have read all 33 pages. It is difficult not to draw the conclusion that they are value free and that they are just saying to young people, "Do what you feel comfortable with and take contraceptive advice". That is not a very good message to give to young people.

    I should like also to thank the noble Lord, Lord Mishcon, who spoke from a wealth of experience. I thought that his wise words are ones to which we should all pay attention. I am grateful for the support that I have had all the way through from my noble friend Lady Blatch, who has been consistent and steadfast in her support on these matters.

    Perhaps I may conclude by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, that I was very sorry to hear what he said in his final remarks. He attributed to me a good many opinions which I do not hold. If he reads what I actually said, he will see that I neither said them nor think them. He based his arguments very largely on the guidelines for sex education. Before entering the debate, I, too, took legal advice. I simply make two points. First, the local authority employs teachers. It is therefore responsible ultimately for the actions of its employees. Secondly, to say that Section 28 has no effect is simply not true; nor is it true that children will be protected in other subjects outside sex education. The legal advice which I have been given suggests that that is not the case.

    This question is not about discrimination towards adults. We are not talking about adults at all. As I said earlier, how adults choose to conduct their lives is a matter for them. The whole question of Section 28 started with parents concerned about children. At the centre of it have always been parents and, above all, children. If we really care about what happens to children—what is said to children in schools and outside—and if we are to fulfil our adult responsibilities, we will vote to keep Section 28. I commend the amendment to the House.

    8.28 p.m.

    On Question, Whether Amendment No. 377A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 377, be agreed to?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 270; Not-Contents, 228.

    Division No. 2

    CONTENTS

    Aberdare, L.Archer of Weston-Super-Mare, L.
    Ackner, L.Armstrong of Ilminster, L.
    Ahmed, L.Arran, E.
    Alexander of Weedon, L.Astor, V.
    Allenby of Megiddo, V.Astor of Hever, L.
    Ampthill, L.Attlee, E.
    Anelay of St Johns, B.

    Bagri, L.Freeman, L.
    Baker of Dorking, L.Gardner of Parkes, B.
    Barber, L.Geddes, L.
    Barber of Tewkesbury, L.Gibson, L.
    Bell, L.Glenarthur, L.
    Belstead, L.Glentoran, L.
    Blackwell, L.Goschen, V.
    Blatch, B.Gray of Contin, L.
    Blease, L.Greenway, L.
    Blyth of Rowington, L.Griffiths, L.
    Boardman, L.Griffiths of Fforestfach, L.
    Bowness, L.Habgood, L.
    Brabazon of Tara, L.Hambro, L.
    Bradford, Bp.Hanham, B.
    Bramall, L.Hanningfield, L.
    Bridgeman, V.Hanson, L.
    Bridges, L.Harris of High Cross, L.
    Brightman, L.Harris of Peckham, L
    Brigstocke, B.Hayhoe, L.
    Brookeborough, V.Henley, L.[Teller]
    Brooks of Tremorfa, L.Higgins, L.
    Brougham and Vaux, L.Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, L.
    Burnnam, L.Hogg, B.
    Buscombe, B.Holderness, L.
    Butler of Brockwell, L.Home, E.
    Butterworth, L.Hooper, B.
    Buxton of Alsa, L.Howe, E.
    Byford, B.Howell of Guildford, L.
    Caithness, E.Hunt of Wirral, L.
    Campbell of Alloway, L.Hurd of Westwell, L.
    Campbell of Croy, L.Hussey of North Bradley, L.
    Carlisle of Bucklow, L.Hylton, L.
    Carnarvon, E.Hylton-Foster, B.
    Carnegy of Lour, B.Inge, L.
    Carr of Hadley, L.Islwyn, L.
    Carrington, L.James of Holland Park, B.
    Cavendish of Furness, L.Jauncey of Tullichettle, L.
    Chadlington, L.Jellicoe, E.
    Chalfont, L.Jenkin of Roding, L.
    Chalker of Wallasey, B.Johnston of Rockport, L.
    Chilver, L.Jopling, L.
    Clark of Kempston, L.Kelvedon, L.
    Cocks of Hartclifie, L.Kimball, L.
    Coe, L.King of Wartnaby, L.
    Colwyn, L.Kingsland, L.
    Cooke of Islandreagh, L.Kirkham, L.
    Cope of Berkeley, L.Knight of Collingtree, B.
    Courtown, E.Laing of Dunphail, L.
    Cowdrey of Tonbridge, L.Laird, L.
    Cox, B.Lamont of Lerwick, L.
    Craig of Radley, L.Lane, L.
    Cranborne, V.Lane of Horsell, L.
    Crathorne, L.Lang of Monkton, L.
    Crickhowell, L.Liverpool, E.
    Croham, L.Lloyd of Berwick, L.
    Cumberlege, B.Lofthouse of Pontefract, L.
    Dean of Harptree, L.Longford, E.
    Denham, L.Lucas, L.
    Dixon, L.Luke, L.
    Dixon-Smith, L.Lyell, L.
    Donaldson of Lymington, L.McColl of Dulwich, L.
    Donoughue, L.McConnell, L.
    Dunn, B.Macfarlane of Bearsden, L.
    Eccles of Moulton, B.McFarlane of Llandaff, B.
    Eden of Winton, L.Mackay of Clashfern, L.
    Elles, B.MacLaurin of Knebworth, L.
    Elliott of Morpeth, L.Manchester, Bp.
    Elton, L.Mancroft, L.
    Erroll, E.Marlesford, L.
    Evans of Parkside, L.Marshall of Knightsbridge, L.
    Feldman, L.Masham of Ilton, B.
    Fellowes, L.Mason of Barnsley, L.
    Ferrers, E.Mayhew of Twysden, L.
    Fitt, L.Miller of Hendon, B.
    Fookes, B.Mishcon, L.
    Forsyth of Drumkan, L.Molyneaux of Killead, L.

    Monson, L.Ryder of Wensum, L.
    Montrose, D.Saatchi, L.
    Moore of Wolvercote, L.St. John of Bletso, L.
    Moran, L.Saltoun of Abemethy, Ly.
    Mowbray and Stourton, L.Sanderson of Bowden, L.
    Moynihan, L.Seccombe, B.
    Murton of Lindisfarne, L.Selborne, E.
    Naseby, L.Selkirk of Douglas, L.
    Neill of Bladen, L.Selsdon, L.
    Nickson, L.Sharpies, B.
    Nolan, L.Shaw of Northstead, L.
    Norfolk, D.Sheppard of Didgemere, L.
    Northbrook, L.Shore of Stepney, L.
    Northesk, E.Shrewsbury, E.
    O'Cathain, B.Simon, V.
    Oliver of Aylmetton, L.Simon of Glaisdale, L.
    Onslow, E.Skidelsky, L.
    Onslow of Woking, L.Slim, V.
    Oppenheim-Barnes, B.Soulsby of Swaffham Prior, L.
    Orme, L.Stallard, L.
    Oxfuird, V.Sterling of Plaistow, L.
    Palmer, L.Stewartby, L.
    Park of Monmouth, B.Stodart of Leaston, L.
    Parkinson, L.Stoddart of Swindon, L.
    Patel of Blackburn, L.Strange, B.
    Patten, L.Strathclyde, L.
    Pearson of Rannoch, L.Swinfen, L.
    Peel, E.Taylor of Warwick, L.
    Perry of Southwark, B.Tebbit, L.
    Peyton of Yeovil, L.Tenby, V.
    Pike, B.Thatcher, B.
    Pilkington of Oxenford, L.Thomas of Gwydir, L.
    Platt of Writtle, B.Tombs, L.
    Plumb, L.Trefgarne, L.
    Plummer of St. Marylebone, L.Trumpington, B.
    Porter of Luddenham, L.Vincent of Coleshill, L.
    Prentice, L.Vinson, L,
    Prior, L.Vivian, L.
    Pym, L.Waddington, L.
    Quinton, L.Wakeham, L.
    Quirk, L.Waverley, V.
    Rawlings, B.Weatherill, L.
    Rawlinson of Ewell, L.Weinstock, L.
    Reay, L.Wilcox, B.
    Rees, L.Williamson of Horton, L.
    Rees-Mogg, L.Willoughby de Broke, L.
    Renton, L.Winchester, Bp.
    Renton of Mount Harry, L.Windlesham, L.
    Richardson of Duntisbourne, L.Wolfson, L.
    Roberts of Conwy, L.Wolfson of Sunningdale, L.
    Rochester, Bp.Young, B. [Teller]
    Rotherwick, L.Young of Graffham, L.
    Younger of Leckie, V.

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Acton, L.Blackstone, B.
    Addington, L.Bledisloe, V.
    Alderdice, L.Borrie, L.
    Alii, L.Bradshaw, L.
    Amos, B.Bragg, L.
    Andrews, B.Brennan, L.
    Archer of Sandwell, L.Brett, L.
    Ashley of Stoke, L.Bristol, Bp.
    Ashton of Upholland, B.Brooke of Alverthorpe, L
    Attenborough, L.Brookman, L.
    Bach, L.Bruce of Donington, L.
    Baldwin of Bewdley, E.Burlison, L.
    Barker, B.Burns, L.
    Barnett, L.Carlile of Berriew, L.
    Bassam of Brighton, L.Carter, L.[Teller]
    Beaumont of Whitley, L.Castle of Blackburn, B.
    Berkeley, L.Chandos, V.
    Bernstein of Craigweil, L.Christopher, L.
    Billingham, B.Clement-Jones, L.
    Birt, L.Clinton-Davis, L.

    Cohen of Pimlico, B.Kirkhill, L.
    Craigavon, V.Laming, L.
    Crawley, B.Layard, L.
    Currie of Marylebone, L.Lea of Crondall, L.
    Darcy de Knayth, B.Lester of Herne Hill, L.
    David, B.Linklater of Butterstone, B.
    Davies of Coity, L.Lipsey, L.
    Davies of Oldham, L.Lloyd-Webber, L.
    Desai, L.Lockwood, B.
    Dholakia, L.Lovell-Davis, L.
    Diamond, L.Ludford, B.
    Dormand of Easington, L.McCarthy, L.
    Dubs, L.Macdonald of Tradeston, L.
    Eatwell, L.McIntosh of Haringey, L. [Teller]
    Elder, L.McIntosh of Hudnall, B.
    Evans of Temple Guiting, L.MacKenzie of Culkein, L.
    Evans of Watford, L.Mackenzie of Framwellgate, L
    Ezra, L.Mackie of Benshie, L.
    Falconer of Thoroton, L.McNally, L.
    Falkender, B.Maddock, B.
    Falkland, V.Mallalieu, B.
    Farrington of Ribbleton, B.Mar and Kellie, E.
    Faulkner of Worcester, L.Marsh, L.
    Filkin, L.Massey of Darwen, B.
    Freyberg, L.Merlyn-Rees, L.
    Fyfe of Fairfield, L.Methuen, L.
    Gale, B.Miller of Chilthorne Domer, B.
    Garel-Jones, L.Mitchell, L.
    Gavron, L.Molloy, L.
    Gilbert, L.Morgan, L.
    Gilmour of Craigmillar, L.Morris of Castle Morris, L.
    Gladwin of Clee, L.Morris of Manchester, L.
    Goldsmith, L.Murray of Epping Forest, L.
    Goodhart, L.Newby, L.
    Gordon of Strathblane, L.Nicol, B.
    Goudie, B.Northover, B.
    Gould of Potternewton, B.Norton of Louth, L.
    Graham of Edmonton, L.Oakeshott of Seagrove Bay, L.
    Greaves, L.O'Neill of Bengarve, B.
    Greengross, B.Oxford, Bp.
    Gregson, L.Peston, L.
    Grenfell, L.Phillips of Sudbury, L.
    Hamwee, B.Pitkeathley, B.
    Hardy of Wath, L.Plant of Highfield, L.
    Harris of Greenwich, L.Ponsonby of Shulbrede, L.
    Harris of Haringey, L.Portsmouth, Bp.
    Harris of Richmond, B.Prashar, B.
    Harrison, L.Prys-Davies, L.
    Haskel, L.Puttnam, L.
    Hattersley, L.Ramsay of Cartvale, B.
    Hayman, B.Randall of St. Budeaux, L.
    Healey, L.Razzall, L.
    Hilton of Eggardon, B.Rea, L.
    Hogg of Cumbernauld, L.Redesdale, L.
    Hollick, L.Rendell of Babergh, B.
    Hollis of Heigham, B.Rennard, L.
    Holme of Cheltenham, L.Richard, L.
    Howells of St. Davids, B.Richardson of Calow, B.
    Hoyle, L.Rodgers of Quarry Bank, L.
    Hughes of Woodside, L.Rogers of Riverside, L.
    Hunt of Chesterton, L.Roll of Ipsden, L.
    Hunt of Kings Heath, L.Roper, L.
    Hutchinson of Lullington, L.Russell, E.
    Irvine of Lairg, L. (Lord Chancellor)Russell-Johnston, L.
    Jacobs, L.Sainsbury of Turville, L.
    Janner of Braunstone, L.St Albans, Bp.
    Jay of Paddington, B. (Lord Privy Seat)St John of Fawsley, L.
    Jeger, B.Sandwich, E.
    Jenkins of Hillhead, L.Sawyer, L.
    Jenkins of Putney, L.Scotland of Asthal, B.
    Joffe, L.Scott of Needham Market, B.
    Judd, L.Serota, B.
    Kennedy of The Shaws, B.Sewel, L.
    King of West Bromwich, L.Sharman, L.
    Sharp of Guildford, B.

    Shepherd, L.Varley, L.
    Sheppard of Liverpool, L.Walker of Doncaster, L.
    Shutt of Greetland, L.Wallace of Saltaire, L.
    Smith of Clifton, L.Walmsley, B.
    Smith of Gilmorehill, B.Warnock, B.
    Smith of Leigh, LWarwick of Undercliffe, B.
    Stern, B.Watson of Invergowrie, L.
    Stone of Blackheath, L.Watson of Richmond, L.
    Symons of Vernham Dean, B.Wedderburn of Charlton, L
    Taylor of Blackburn, L.Whitaker, B.
    Thomas of Gresford, L.Whitty, L.
    Thomas of Walliswood, B.Wigoder, L.
    Thomson of Monifieth, L.Wilkins, B.
    Thornton, B.Williams of Crosby, B.
    Tomlinson, L.Williams of Elvel, L.
    Tope, L.Williams of Mostyn, L.
    Tordoff, L.Winston, L.
    Tumberg, L.Woolmer of Leeds, L.
    Turner of Camden, B.Young of Dartington, L.
    Young of Old Scone, B.

    Resolved in the affirmative, and Amendment No. 377A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 377, agreed to accordingly.

    On Question, Commons Amendment No. 377 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendment

    378 After Clause 91, insert the following new clause—

    Repeal Of Prohibition On Promotion Of Homosexuality

    (" . Section 2A of the Local Government Act 1986 (prohibition on promoting homosexuality by teaching or by publishing material) ceases to have effect.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 378.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 378.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 378

    378A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree"

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 378A.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 378A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 378, be agreed to.—( Baroness Young.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 378 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendments

    379 Clause 92, page 64, line 14, after ("provision") insert ("or savings")

    380 Page 64, line 16, leave out paragraph (b)

    381 Page 64, line 20, at end insert—

    ("(2A) The provision which may be made under subsection (2) includes provision modifying any enactment (whenever passed or made).")

    382 Page 64, line 21, leave out ("(2)(b)") and insert ("(2A)")

    383 Page 64, line 21, leave out ("enactments") and insert ("an enactment")

    384 Page 64, line 22, leave out ("enactments") and insert ("that enactment")

    385 Page 64, line 23, leave out ("enactments") and insert ("that enactment")

    386 Page 64, line 24, leave out ("enactments") and insert ("that enactment")

    387 Clause 93, page 65, line 2, at end insert—

    ("(3) Any reference in Schedule 1 to the National Assembly for Wales (Transfer of Functions) Order 1999 to an Act which is amended by this Act is to be treated as referring to that Act as amended by this Act.
    (4) Subsection (3) does not affect the power to make further Orders varying or omitting that reference.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 379 to 387.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 379 to 387.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    388 Clause 95, page 65, line 9, leave out (" 91") and insert ("( Repeal of prohibition on promotion of homosexuality)")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 388.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No.388.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 388

    388A Baroness Young rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree"

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 388A.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 388A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 388, be agreed to.—( Baroness Young.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 388 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendment

    389 Page 65, line 10, leave out from first ("of") to end of line 11 and insert—

    ("(i) section 2A of the Local Government Act 1986,
    (ii) section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988,
    (iii) paragraph 63 of Schedule 37 to the Education Act 1996, and
    (iv) paragraph 13 of Schedule 30 to the School Standards and Framework Act 1998,")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 389.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No.389.—(Lord Whitty.)

    Motion Moved On Consideration Of Commons Amendment No 389

    389A Baroness Young rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree"

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move Amendment No. 389A.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 389A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 389, be agreed to. —( Baroness Young.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 389 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendments

    390 Page 65, line 14, at beginning insert ("The following provisions of this Act—

    (a)")

    391 Page 65, line 14, after ("to") insert ("(Disclosure of information), (Unauthorised disclosure of information),")

    392 Page 65, line 14, after ("87") insert—

    ("(b) in Schedule 4, paragraphs 3A(a), 4C, 4D, 5, 6A, 7 and 9F, and
    (c) in Schedule 5, the repeal—
  • (i) in section 80(1)(e) of the Local Government Act 1972,
  • (ii) of sections 94 to 98 and 105 of that Act,
  • (iii) in section 265A(1)(b) of that Act,
  • (iv) of the provisions of the Local Government Act 1974, the Local Government Act 1985, the Transport Act 1985 and the Financial Services Act 1986 specified in Schedule 5,
  • (v) of sections 19. 31 and 32(1) of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989,
  • (vi) in Schedule 11 to that Act,
  • (vii) of the provisions of the Local Government Finance Act 1992, the Local Government (Wales) Act 1994, the Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, the Environment Act 1995, the Police Act 1996, the Police Act 1997, the Audit Commission Act 1998 and the Greater London Authority Act 1999 specified in Schedule 5,")
  • 393 Page 65, line 19, leave out subsections (5) and (6) and insert—

    ("() The Secretary of State may by order provide—
    () for paragraphs 15A and 16 of Schedule 3 to come into force before the time appointed by subsection (4),
    () for paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 to come into force before the time appointed by that subsection,
    () for any of the provisions of Part III of this Act so far as they relate to police authorities in Wales to come into force before the time appointed by that subsection, or
    () for any of the other provisions mentioned in that subsection to come into force in relation to England before the time appointed by that subsection.
    () The National Assembly for Wales may by order provide—
    () for paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 to come into force before the time appointed by subsection (4), or
    () for any of the other provisions mentioned in that subsection to come into force in relation to Wales before the time appointed by that subsection.")

    394 Clause 96, page 65, line 30, leave out ("This section and")

    395 Page 65, line 30, after ("sections") insert ("(Disclosure of information), (Unauthorised disclosure of information),")

    396 Page 65, line 31, leave out ("Paragraph 16 of Schedule 3 extends") and insert ("This section, paragraphs 15A and 16 of Schedule 3 and paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 extend")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 390 to 396.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 390 to 396.—(Lord whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    An amendment (privilege) made.

    Commons Amendments

    398 Schedule 1, page 66, line 11, leave out ("the deputy mayor of the executive") and insert ("his deputy (referred to in this paragraph as the deputy mayor)")

    399 Page 66, line 13, leave out ("of the executive")

    400 Page 66, line 13, at end insert ("resigns as deputy mayor or")

    401 Page 66, line 16, leave out ("of the executive")

    402 page 66, line 18, leave out ("of the executive")

    403 Page 66, line 21, leave out ("of the executive")

    404 Page 66, line 24, leave out ("of the executive")

    405 Page 66, line 25, leave out ("of the executive")

    406 Page 66, line 27, leave out ("or the authority")

    407 Page 66, line 27, at end insert—

    ("() In the case of a local authority in Wales, the deputy mayor is entitled to the style of "dirprwy faer".")

    408 Page 66, line 30, at end insert—

    ("() The executive arrangements may include provision with respect to—
  • (a) the election and term of office of the executive leader, and
  • (b) the appointment and term of office of members of the executive appointed under section 11(3)(b)(ii).")
  • 409 Page 66, line 36, at end insert—

    ("() Section 101 of the Local Government Act 1972 does not apply to the function of determining the number of councillors under sub-paragraph (2)(a).")

    410 Page 66, line 39, at end insert—

    ("() The executive arrangements may include provision with respect to the appointment and term of office of the council manager.")

    411 Page 66, line 41, leave out ("the deputy mayor of the executive") and insert ("his deputy (referred to in this paragraph as the deputy mayor)")

    412 Page 66, line 43, leave out ("of the executive")

    413 Page 67, line 2, leave out ("of the executive")

    414 Page 67, line 2, at end insert ("resigns as deputy mayor or")

    415 Page 67, line 5, leave out ("of the executive")

    416 Page 67, line 7, leave out ("of the executive")

    417 Page 67, line 10, leave out ("of the executive")

    418 Page 67, line 13, leave out ("of the executive")

    419 Page 67, line 14, leave out ("of the executive")

    420 Page 67, line 22, at end insert—

    ("() The reference in sub-paragraph (9) to a committee or sub-committee of the authority includes a reference to a joint committee on which the authority is represented or a sub-committee of such a committee.")

    421 Page 67, line 33, after ("appointment") insert ("by the elected mayor")

    422 Page 67, line 34, leave out ("advisory")

    423 Page 67, line 35, leave out ("advisory committee or committees") and insert ("committee as is mentioned in sub-paragraph (12)")

    424 Page 67, line 36, at end insert—

    ("() In the case of a local authority in Wales, the deputy mayor is entitled to the style of "dirprwy faer".")

    425 Page 67, line 40, leave out paragraph (a)

    426 Page 67, line 44, at end insert—

    ("Meetings Of Executives And Executive Committees

    . A member of a local authority who is not a member of the authority's executive is entitled to attend, and speak at, a meeting of the executive, or of a committee of the executive, which is held in private only if invited to do so.")

    427 Page 68, line 9, leave out sub-paragraph (4)

    428 Page 69, line 13, leave out from ("the") to ("which") in line 14 and insert ("maintained schools which are maintained by the authority concerned and")

    429 Page 69, line 17, leave out from ("no") to ("which"') in line 18 and insert ("maintained schools which are maintained by the authority concerned and")

    430 Page 69, line 30, leave out from first ("the") to ("which") in line 31 and insert ("maintained schools which are maintained by the authority concerned and")

    431 Page 69, line 47, leave out ("in the area of") and insert ("which are maintained by")

    432 Page 70, line 5, after ("enactment") insert ("(whenever passed or made)")

    433 Page 70, line 11, leave out ("in the area of) and insert ("which are maintained by")

    434 Page 70, line 18, at end insert—

    ("8A. The following provisions of the Education Act 1996, namely—
  • (a) section 496 (powers of Secretary of State to require duties under that Act to be exercised reasonably), and
  • (b) section 497 (powers of Secretary of State where local education authorities etc. are in default),
  • are to apply to the performance of any duty imposed on a local authority by virtue of paragraph 6, 7 or 8 as they apply to the performance by a local education authority of a duty imposed by that Act.")

    435 Page 70, line 19, at beginning insert ("Except for the expression "local authority",")

    436 Page 70, line 19, leave out ("8") and insert ("8A")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 398 to 436.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 398 to 436.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    437 After Schedule 2, insert the following new schedule—

    ("Schedule Amendments To The 1972 Act

    1.—(1) Section 2 of the Local Government Act 1972 (constitution of principal councils in England) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (2) there is inserted—

    "(2A) Where a council mentioned in subsection (1) or (2) above are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive, the council shall consist of an elected mayor, a chairman and councillors."

    2.—(l) Section 21 of that Act (constitution of principal councils in Wales) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

    "(1A) Where a council falling within subsection (1) are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive, the council shall consist of an elected mayor, a chairman and councillors."

    3.—(1) Section 25A of that Act (title of chairman or vice-chairman of county borough council) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (2) there is inserted—

    "(3) This section does not apply where a county borough council are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive."

    4.—(1) Section 245 of that Act (status of certain districts, parishes and communities) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

    "(1A) Subsection (1)(b) does not apply where the council are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive."

    5.—(1) Schedule 2 to that Act (constitution and membership of London borough councils) is amended as follows.

    (2) After paragraph 5 there is inserted—

    "5A. Where a London borough council are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive—

  • (a) the council shall consist of an elected mayor, a chairman and councillors,
  • (b) for any reference in paragraphs 2 to 5 above to "mayor" (except in the expression "deputy mayor") there is to be substituted "chairman",
  • (c) for any reference in paragraph 5 above to "deputy mayor" there is to be substituted "vice-chairman"."").
  • My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 437.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 437.—(Lord Whitty.)

    As Amendments To Commons Amendment No 437

    437A Line 11, at end insert—

    (" .—(1) Section 3 of that Act (chairman of principal council in England) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

    "(1A) A member of the executive of a principal council may not be elected as the chairman of the council."

    (3) After subsection (4) there is inserted—

    "(4A) Subsection (4) above shall have effect in relation to a district council which are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive as if it provided for the elected mayor of the council to have precedence in the district, but this subsection shall not apply if the executive arrangements provide for it not to apply."

    .—(1) Section 5 of that Act (vice-chairman of principal council in England) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

    "(1A) A member of the executive of a principal council may not be appointed as the vice-chairman of the council."").

    437B Line 18, at end insert—

    (" .—(1) Section 22 of that Act (chairman of principal council in Wales) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

    "(1A) A member of the executive of a principal council may not be elected as the chairman of the council."

    (3) After subsection (4) there is inserted—

    "(4A) Subsection (4) above shall have effect in relation to a principal council which are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive as if it provided for the elected mayor of the council to have precedence in the area of that council, but this subsection shall not apply if the executive arrangements provide for it not to apply."

    .—(1) Section 24 of that Act (vice-chairman of principal council in Wales) is amended as follows.

    (2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

    "(1A) A member of the executive of a principal council may not be appointed as the vice-chairman of the council."").

    437C Line 24, at end insert—

    (" .—(1) Section 80 of that Act (disqualifications for election and holding office as member of local authority) is amended as follows.

    (2) In subsection (1)(a) after "or deputy chairman" there is inserted "or, in the case of a local authority which arc operating executive arrangements which involve a leader and cabinet executive, the office of executive leader or member of the executive".

    .—(1) Section 83 of that Act (declaration of acceptance of office) is amended as follows.

    (2) In subsection (1), after "councillor" there is inserted "or elected mayor".

    (3) In subsection (3), after paragraph (a) there is inserted—

    "(aa) an elected mayor of the council to which the declarant is elected; or".

    .—(1) Section 84 of that Act (resignation) is amended as follows.

    (2) In subsection (1), after "Act" there is inserted "or elected as an elected mayor".")

    437D Line 30, at end insert—

    (" .—(1) Section 270 of that Act (general provisions as to interpretation) is amended as follows.

    (2) In subsection (1), after the definition of "Easter break" there is inserted—

    ""elected mayor" has the same meaning as in Part II of the Local Government Act 2000;".

    (3) In subsection (1), after the definition of "electoral area" there is inserted—

    ""executive", "executive arrangements" and "executive leader" have the same meaning as in Part II of the Local Government Act 2000;".

    (4) In subsection (1), after the definition of "land" there is inserted—

    ""leader and cabinet executive" has the same meaning as in Part II of the Local Government Act 2000;".

    (5) In subsection (1), after the definition of "local statutory provision" there is inserted—

    ""mayor and cabinet executive" and "mayor and council manager executive" have the same meaning as in Part II of the Local Government Act 2000;".

    (6) After subsection (4) there is inserted—

    "(4A) Where a London borough council are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive, subsection (4) above shall have effect with the omission of paragraphs (a) and (b)."").

    437E Leave out lines 34 to 43 and insert—

    (""Modifications Of Preceding Provisions

    5A. Where a London borough council are operating executive arrangements which involve a leader and cabinet executive—

    (a) paragraph 2 above shall have effect as if the following sub-paragraph were inserted after sub-paragraph (1)—
    "(1A) A member of the executive of a London borough council may not be elected as the mayor of the borough.",.
    (b) paragraph 5 above shall have effect as if the following sub-paragraph were inserted after sub-paragraph (1)—
    "(1A) A member of the executive of a London borough council may not be appointed as the deputy mayor."

    5B. Where a London borough council are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive, the preceding provisions of this Schedule shall have effect with the modifications specified in paragraphs 5C to 5I below.

    5C. The council shall consist of an elected mayor, a chairman and councillors.

    5D. Paragraphs 2(1) and 2(5) above shall have effect as if for the expression "mayor of a London borough" there were substituted "chairman of a London borough council".

    5E. Paragraph 2 above shall have effect as if the following subparagraph were inserted after sub-paragraph (1)—

    "(1A) A member of the executive of a London borough council may not be elected as the chairman of the council."

    5F. Paragraphs 2(2) to (4) and 3 above shall have effect as if for any reference to "mayor" there were substituted "chairman".

    5G. Paragraph 2(5) above shall have effect as if it provided for the elected mayor to have precedence in the borough, but this paragraph shall not apply if the executive arrangements provide for it not to apply.

    5H. Paragraph 5 above shall have effect as if for subparagraphs (1) to (3) there were substituted—

    "(1) A London borough council shall appoint a member of the council to be vice-chairman of the council.
    (1A) A member of the executive of a London borough council may not be appointed as the vice-chairman of the council.
    (2) The vice-chairman shall, unless he resigns or becomes disqualified, hold office until immediately after the election of a chairman at the next annual meeting of the council and during that time shall continue to be a member of the council notwithstanding the provisions of this Schedule relating to the retirement of councillors.
    (3) Subject to any standing orders made by the council, anything authorised or required to be done by, to or before the chairman may be done by, to or before the vice-chairman."

    51. Paragraph 5(4) above shall have effect as if for the expression "deputy mayor" there were substituted "vice-chairman"."

    .—(1) Schedule 12 to that Act (meetings and proceedings of local authorities) is amended as follows.
    (2) In paragraph 5, after sub-paragraph (3) there is inserted—
    "(4) A member of an executive of a principal council may not be chosen to preside under sub-paragraph (3) above.
    (5) Sub-paragraphs (2)(c) and (3)(c) above do not apply where a London borough council are operating executive arrangements which involve a mayor and cabinet executive or a mayor and council manager executive."").

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with Amendments Nos. 437A to 437E, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 437.

    Moved, That the House do agree with Amendments Nos. 437A to 437E, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 437.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to and Commons Amendment No. 437, as amended, agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    438 Schedule 3, page 71, line 17, leave out ("and")

    439 Page 71, line 18, at end insert ("or

    () the functions of the president, deputy president or any tribunal of the Adjudication Panel for England.")

    440 Page 71, line 25, leave from first ("being") to end of line 26 and insert ("or becoming (whether by election or otherwise), a member of a local authority or a member of a relevant authority")

    441 Page 71, line 28, leave out ("elected, or being, a member of a local authority") and insert ("or becoming (whether by election or otherwise), a member of a local authority or a member of relevant authority")

    442 Page 71, line 29, leave out ("local") and insert ("relevant")

    443 Page 71, line 31, leave out ("local") and insert ("relevant")

    444 Page 71, line 31, at end insert—

    ("(2A) An ethical standards officer is to be treated as being in breach of the terms of his employment if—
  • (a) he becomes disqualified for being, or becoming (whether by election or otherwise), a member of a local authority or a member of a relevant authority,
  • (b) he becomes a member or an officer of a relevant authority, or
  • (c) he becomes a member of a committee, sub-committee, joint committee or joint sub-committee of a relevant authority.")
  • 445 Page 72, line 8, at beginning insert—

    ("(A1) Subject to sub-paragraph (A2), the Standards Board may appoint a chief executive but any such appointment requires the consent of the Secretary of State.
    (A2) The first appointment to the position of chief executive may be made by the Secretary of State after consultation with the chairman (or chairman designate) of the Standards Board.")

    446 Page 72, line 8, after ("appointing") insert ("a chief executive and")

    447 Page 72, line 16, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—

    ("() assisting any ethical standards officer in the conduct of an investigation under section 55, and")

    448 Page 72, line 20, leave out ("it thinks fit") and insert ("the Board, with the approval of the Secretary of State, thinks fit.")

    449 Page 73, line 22, at end insert—

    ("Law Of Defamation

    . For the purposes of the law of defamation, any statement (whether written or oral) made by an ethical standards officer in connection with the exercise of his functions shall be absolutely privileged.")

    450 Page 74, line 16, at end insert—

    ("Parliamentary Commissioner

    15A. In Schedule 2 to the Parliamentary Commissioner Act 1967 (departments etc subject to investigation) the following entry is inserted at the appropriate place—

    "Standards Board for England."")

    451 Schedule 4, page 74, line 25, at end insert—

    ("Children And Young Persons Act 1933 (C 12)

    . In section 34A of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (attendance at court of parent or guardian), in subsection (2)(b) for the words "stand referred to their social services committee under" there is substituted "are social services functions within the meaning of".

    . In section 55 of that Act (power to order parent or guardian to pay fine etc), in subsection (5)(b) for the words "stand referred to their social services committee under" there is substituted "are social services functions within the meaning of".")

    452 Page 74, line 26, at end insert—

    (" . In section 2 of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 (local authority to establish social services committees)—
  • (a) in subsection (1), for paragraphs (a) and (b) there is substituted "their social services functions",
  • (b) subsection (2) is omitted.")
  • 453 Page 74, line 27, leave out ("the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970") and insert ("that Act")

    454 Page 74, line 30, leave out from ("subsection") to end of line 31 and insert ("(3), for "2(2)" there is substituted "1A".")

    455 Page 74, line 33, leave out ("inserted "6(6A)"") and insert ("substituted "1A".

    . In Schedule I to that Act (enactments conferring functions assigned to social services committees) after the entry relating to the Housing Act 1985 there is inserted—

    "Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act 1986 (c. 33)
    Sections 1 to 5, 7 and 8 except in so far as they assign functions to aRepresentation and assessment of disabled persons.".")

    local authority in their capacity as a local education authority.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 438 to 455.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 438 to 455. — (Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    456 Page 74, line 34, at end insert—

    ("3A. In section 80 of the Local Government Act 1972 (disqualifications for election and holding office as member of local authority), in subsection (1)—
  • (a) in paragraph (e) the words "or under the Audit Commission Act 1998" are omitted,
  • (b) after that paragraph there is inserted—
  • "or
    (f) holds any paid office or employment appointments to which are or may be made or confirmed by a fire authority—
    1947 C 41
  • (i) which is constituted by a combination scheme under the Fire Services Act 1947, and
  • (ii) in relation to which the local authority is a constituent authority."").
  • My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 456.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 456. —(Lord Whitty.)

    As An Amendment To Commons Amendment No 456

    456A Schedule 4, leave out lines 7 to 14

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with Amendment No. 456A, as an amendment to Amendment No. 456.

    Moved, That the House do agree with Amendment No. 456A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 456.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to, and Commons Amendment No. 456, as amended, agreed to.

    Commons Amendments

    457 Page 74, line 35, leave out ("the Local Government Act 1972") and insert ("that Act")

    458 Page 74, line 38, leave out ("under section 73(4)(a)(i) or (ii)") and insert ("or partially suspended under section 62, 68, 72 or 73")

    459 Page 74, line 39, leave out ("discounted") and insert ("disregarded")

    460 Page 74, line 43, after ("suspension") insert ("or partial suspension")

    461 Page 74, line 43, at end insert—

    ("4A. In section 86 of that Act (declaration by local authority of vacancy in office in certain cases), in subsection (1)(b) after "1998" there is inserted "or section 73 of the Local Government Act 2000".

    4B. In section 87(1) of that Act (date of casual vacancies)—

    (a) after paragraph (e) there is inserted—
    "(ee) in the case of a disqualification under section 73 of the Local Government Act 2000, on the expiration of the ordinary period allowed for making an appeal or application with respect to the relevant decision under that section or, if an appeal or application is made, on the date on which that appeal or application is finally disposed of or abandoned or fails by reason of non-prosecution thereof;",.
    (b) in paragraph (f), for "(e)" there is substituted "(ee)".

    4C. Sections 94 to 98 of that Act (restrictions on voting) cease to have effect.

    4D. Section 105 of that Act (disability for voting on account of interest in contracts etc) ceases to have effect.")

    462 Page 75, line 1, at end insert—

    (" . In section 25(1) of the Local Government Act 1974 (authorities to which Part III applies) after paragraph (bf) there is inserted—
    "(bg) a fire authority constituted by a combination scheme under the Fire Services Act 1947;"").

    463 Page 75, line 2, leave out ("the Local Government Act 1974") and insert ("that Act")

    464 Page 75, line 6, at end insert—

    ("Adoption Act 1976 (C 36)

    . In section 2 of the Adoption Act 1976 (local authorities' social services), for the words "stand referred to the authority's social services committee" there is substituted "are social services functions within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970".

    National Health Service Act 1977 (C 49)

    . In section 28A of the National Health Service Act 1977 (power to make payments towards expenditure on community services), in subsection (2)(a) for the words from "any function" to "committee" there is substituted "any social services functions (within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970)".

    Registered Homes Act 1984 (C 23)

    . In its application to a registration authority which are operating executive arrangements (within the meaning of Part II of this Act), section 13 of the Registered Homes Act 1984 (right to make representations) shall have effect as if for subsection (5) there were substituted—

    "(5) If he informs the registration authority that he desires to make oral representations, they shall make arrangements to enable him to make such representations."

    Children Act 1989 (C 41)

    . In section 22 of the Children Act 1989 (general duty of local authority in relation to children looked after by them), in subsection (1)(b) for the words "stand referred to their social services committee under" there is substituted "are social services functions within the meaning of".

    . In section 42 of that Act (right of guardian ad litem to have access to local authority records), in subsection (1)(b) for the words "stand referred to their social services committee under" there is substituted "are social services functions within the meaning of".

    . In section 81 of that Act (inquiries), in subsection (1)(a) for the words "the social services committee of a local authority" there is substituted "a local authority which are social services functions within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970".

    . In section 105 of that Act (interpretation), in subsection (5) for the words "which stand referred to the social services committee of that or any other local authority under" there is substituted "of that or any other local authority which are social services functions within the meaning of".

    . In its application to a local authority (within the meaning of Schedule 6 to that Act) which are operating executive arrangements (within the meaning of Part II of this Act), paragraph 6 of that Schedule (right to make representations) shall have effect as if for subsection (5) there were substituted—

    "(5) If he informs the local authority that he desires to make oral representations, they shall make arrangements to enable him to make such representations."").

    465 Page 75, line 14, leave out ("that authority's head of") and insert ("the head of that authority's")

    466 Page 75, line 22, at end insert ("and")

    467 Page 75, line 24, leave out from first ("authority") to end of line 25 and insert ("police authority or port health authority."")

    468 Page 75, line 25, at end insert—

    ("() In subsection (2), the words "or of any code of practice made or approved by or under any enactment" are omitted.

    () In subsection (2), as substituted in relation to the Greater London Authority by section 73(6) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, in paragraph (a) the words "or of any code of practice made or approved by or under any enactment" are omitted.

    () After that subsection there is inserted—

    "(2A) No duty shall arise by virtue of subsection (2)(b) above unless a Local Commissioner (within the meaning of the Local Government Act 1974) has conducted an investigation under Part III of that Act in relation to the proposal, decision or omission concerned."").

    469 Page 75, line 27, at end insert—

    ("() After that subsection there is inserted—
    "(8A) Any reference in this section to the duties of a monitoring officer imposed by this section, or to the duties of a monitoring officer under this section, shall include a reference to the functions which are conferred on a monitoring officer by virtue of Part 111 of the Local Government Act 2000."").

    470 Page 75, line 27, at end insert—

    ("6A. Section 19 of that Act (members' interests) ceases to have effect.")

    471 Page 75, line 38, at end insert—

    ("Audit Commission Act 1998 (C 18)

    9A. In section 37 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 (social services studies for Secretary of State), for subsection (2) there is substituted—

    "(2) In this section "social services functions" means functions which are social services functions within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970."

    9B. In section 49 of that Act (restriction on disclosure of information), after subsection (1)(d) there is inserted—

    "(dd) for the purposes of the functions of an ethical standards officer or a Local Commissioner in Wales under Part III of the Local Government Act 2000".").

    Greater London Authority Act 1999 (C 29)

    9C. In section 6 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (failure to attend meeting of the Assembly), after subsection (4) there is inserted—

    "(5) Any period during which an Assembly member is suspended or partially suspended under section 62, 68, 72 or 73 of the Local Government Act 2000 shall be disregarded for the purpose of calculating the period of six consecutive months under subsection (1)."

    9D. Section 13 of that Act (failure of Mayor to attend meetings) is to become subsection (1) of that section and after that subsection there is inserted—

    "(2) Any meeting of the Assembly which the Mayor is unable to attend because he is suspended or partially suspended under section 62, 68, 72 or 73 of the Local Government Act 2000 shall be disregarded for the purposes subsection (1) above."

    9E. In section 31 of that Act (limits of the general power), in subsection (5), for paragraphs (a) and (b) there is substituted "any social services function within the meaning of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970".

    9F. Section 66 of that Act (the Secretary of State's guidance on ethical standards) ceases to have effect.")

    472 Schedule 5, page 76, line 4, column 3, at beginning insert—

    ("Section 2(2).")

    473 Page 76, line 8, at end insert—

    ("1972 c. 70.Local Government Act 1972.In section 80(1)(e), the words "or under the Audit Commission Act 1998".
    Sections 94 to 98.
    In section 100D(2), "of the list, or".
    Section 105.
    In section 265A(1)(b), "94 to 98".")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 457 to 473.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 457 to 473.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    474 Page 76, line 13, at end insert—

    ("1976 c. 57.Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976.In section 25(8), the words from "Without prejudice" to "inhabitants of its area)".
    1978 c. 50.Inner Urban Areas Act 1978.In section 13, the words "section 137(1) of the Local Government Act 1972 or".
    1985 c. 51.Local Government Act 1985.In Schedule 14, paragraph 13.
    1985 c. 67.Transport Act 1985.In section 74(12), "section 94 of the 1972 Act or".
    1985 c. 68.Housing Act 1985.Section 11A(4).

    1986 c. 10.Local Government Act 1986.Section 2A.
    1986 c. 60.Financial Services Act 1986.In Schedule 16, paragraph 8(a).
    1988 c. 9.Local Government Act 1988.Section 28.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 474.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 474.—(Lord Whitty.)

    As Amendments To Commons Amendment No 474

    474A Schedule 5, leave out lines 15 and 16

    474B Leave out lines 19 and 20

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with Amendments Nos. 474A and 474B, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 474.

    Moved, That the House do agree with Amendments Nos. 474A and 474B, as amendments to Commons Amendment No. 474.—(Baroness Young.) On Question, Motion agreed to and Commons Amendment No. 474, as amended, agreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendments

    475 Page 76, line 14, column 3, at beginning insert—

    ("In section 5(2)(a), and in section 5(2)(a) as substituted by section 73(6) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, the words "or of any code of practice made or approved by or under any enactment".")

    476 Page 76, line 14, column 3, after ("Sections") insert ("19")

    477 Page 76, line 15, column 3, at end insert—

    ("In Schedule 11, paragraphs 22 and 23.")

    478 Page 76, line 15, at end insert—

    ("1992 c. 14.Local Government Finance Act 1992.In Schedule 13, paragraph 32.
    1994 c. 19.Local Government (Wales) Act 1994.In Schedule 15, paragraph 25.
    1994 c. 29.Police and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994.In Schedule 4, paragraph 7.
    1995 c. 25.Environment Act 1995.In Schedule 7, paragraphs 9 and 10.
    1996 c. 16.Police Act 1996.In Schedule 7, in paragraph 1(2)(h), "98(1A)" and paragraph 21.")

    479 Page 76, line 16, at end insert—

    ("1997 c. 50.Police Act 1997.In Schedule 6, paragraphs 1 and 2.")

    480 Page 76, line 24, column 3, leave out ("and (5)(b)") and insert ("(5)(b), (7) and (8)")

    481 Page 76, line 27, column 3, at end insert—

    ("In Schedule 3, paragraph 3(1).")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 475 to 481.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 475 to 481.—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Commons Amendment

    482 Page 76, line 27, at end insert—

    ("1998 c. 31.School Standards and Framework Act 1998.In Schedule 30, paragraph 13.")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 482.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment No. 482.—(Lord Whitty.)

    482A

    rose to move, as an amendment to the Motion that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment, leave out "agree" and insert "disagree"

    The noble Baroness said: My Lords, I beg to move.

    Moved, That Amendment No. 482A, as an amendment to Commons Amendment No. 482, be agreed to.—( Baroness Young.)

    On Question, Motion agreed to and Commons Amendment No. 482 disagreed to accordingly.

    Commons Amendments

    483 Page 76, line 27, at end insert—

    ("1999 c. 29.Greater London Authority Act 1999.Section 66.
    In Schedule 8, paragraphs 6 and 7.")

    484 In the Title, line 4, after ("services;") insert ("to amend section 29 of the Children Act 1989;")

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 483 and 484.

    Moved, That the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments Nos. 483 and 484—(Lord Whitty.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    Football (Disorder) Bill

    8.57 p.m.

    My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

    Moved, That the House do now resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Bassam of Brighton.) On Question, Motion agreed to.

    House in Committee accordingly.

    [THE DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES (Baroness Lockwood) in the Chair.]

    Clause 1 [ Football matches: prevention of violence or disorder]:

    Page 1, line 11, leave out ("believes") and insert ("is satisfied").

    The noble Lord said: I believe that I should speak rather slowly for a moment or two while Members of the House depart for more attractive occupations than that of listening to the proceedings at Committee stage of the Football (Disorder) Bill.

    Amendments Nos. 1 and 33, grouped with it, concern the standard of proof required to obtain a banning order. Two elements comprise this procedure. First, what evidence is required of past behaviour before the banning order can be made? Later amendments in the list will propose that the necessary standard of evidence should be a conviction. The second element in the standard of proof is this. What evidence is required of the probable future behaviour of the person who is to be made subject to the order? Amendments Nos. 1 and 33 deal with that point.

    At present, a court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder. Where a banning order is clearly imposed as a punishment—that is the case where it is given as part of the sentence following conviction—I accept that having reasonable grounds for believing that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder is sufficient. After all, the court is allowed to impose punishment and this is a form of punishment.

    The situation is quite different where the banning order is made not as part of the sentence but on an application by the police for the making of a banning order based on past behaviour and prospective future behaviour. Clare Montgomery QC and Rhodri Thompson, in a thorough opinion given on the Bill for Justice—I declare that I am vice-chairman of the council of Justice—say that the application for a banning order is in effect criminal proceedings, even if not formally so, and is likely to be regarded as criminal proceedings by the European Court of Human Rights.

    They say that the standard of proof for probably future behaviour,

    "falls well short even of a civil standard of proof of the state of affairs justifying the order, namely, that the individual concerned intends to cause trouble at a match. It appears to us that the court should be entitled to make such an order only where it is satisfied that the order would have the desired effect, not where it is satisfied merely that there are reasonable grounds to believe that to be the case".

    I believe that part of their opinion to be both good law and good sense.

    Amendments Nos. 1 and 33 make it clear that in a case where a banning order is sought on an application, that banning order cannot be made unless the court is satisfied that the suspect intends to cause violence or disorder. I beg to move.

    9 p.m.

    I support unreservedly the amendment. It is not a question of having consulted with the noble Lord. There has been too little time in which to do that. The noble Lord is correct. According to the authority of Benham, in the view of the Court of Human Rights these proceedings are criminal proceedings. Therefore one is not only concerned with clarifying the burden of proof—my Amendment No. 31 does so—but also the standard of proof. My Amendment No. 31 does not do that; nor does this amendment.

    As far as it goes, it is clear that the amendment should be accepted. As it stands, the Bill is totally unacceptable. It should be built on to establish the standard of proof.

    According to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, the standard of proof will be the civil standard for certain parts of the Bill—I have here the reference to Hansard but the hour is somewhat late—but the criminal standard of being sure beyond reasonable doubt in other parts of the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, has never elucidated which parts of the Bill to which diverse standards will apply.

    I support the amendment. However, it requires extension and clarification along the lines I have suggested. I understand that the introduction of the reverse burden is not involved. That was considered recently by the Appellate Committee of this House in Kiberlene.

    We have a straightforward burden of proof which has to be proved by the applicant. The question is this: to what standard?

    My Lords, I support the amendments without professing legal knowledge as to whether they are right and achieve the effect they set out to achieve. My Amendments Nos. 18 and 34—for some reason they are grouped elsewhere—address the same question.

    It seems unsatisfactory that the matter is left unspecified in the Bill. A crucial aspect of the Bill involved the basis on which magistrates are to come to a decision. We are looking at a penalty which by all standards is a criminal penalty. However it is expressed, it will be as burdensome as a criminal sentence for the person subject to it. He or she will suffer exactly the same stigma, inconveniences and burdens which they could under a criminal penalty. That it should be called civil merely seems to be a form of words to which we should not apply ourselves. We should apply ourselves to the fact.

    Given the tendency to assume that we should have a burden of proof which is beyond reasonable doubt, we may wish to step back from that: for the test not to be beyond reasonable doubt but heavier than the 50:50 standard civil regime. If we enter that territory we cannot leave it to fate to spell out. We cannot leave it to the Secretary of State's obiter dictum in some form of secondary legislation. It has to be on the face of the Bill. I do not express any preference for any form of wording. But we have to establish on the face of the legislation what the burden is to be.

    I am not sure of the logic behind the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in drawing a distinction between banning orders made on conviction and those resulting from a complaint. The noble Lord and I are satisfied with the proposed Section 14A but he is not satisfied with proposed Section 14B.

    If it is desirable to have as a preventive measure banning orders based on the respondent at some time having caused or contributed to violence at a football match or something else, it is logical that if the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds, there should be a banning order. I cannot see why the noble Lord draws a distinction. I have more sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which are designed to make clearer in the Bill the standard of proof cited in another place as being necessary to satisfy a court that a banning order ought to be made.

    I am not a lawyer but either the proof should be beyond reasonable doubt—the criminal standard—or on the balance of probabilities, which is the civil standard. The Government said on a number of occasions that they intend the lesser, civil standard. I do not find that anywhere in the Bill. Whichever standard is decided should be in the Bill, so there can be no doubt and/or a great legal argument through the courts at some point, in deciding the burden of proof. If the standard is not in the statute or made legally clear in some other way, it is no use the Minister thinking it ought to be one thing or another.

    The second strand is whether or not there should be a different test for proposed Section 14B, covering banning orders made on a complaint, as opposed to Section 14A. I understand the argument that where an order is based on a conviction obtained beyond reasonable doubt—the criminal standard—it can be based on one set of words, whereas when the order is to be made on a complaint and the balance of probability in the first place, the wording may need to be different.

    There is a clear difference between proposed Section 14B(4)(b), which states that
    "the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder",
    and the words that would appear if Amendment No. 33 were adopted, which are
    "the court is satisfied that making a banning order would help".
    That presents a bigger hurdle for the police to clear before a banning order could be put in place. As a lesser standard of proof would be required on the balance of probability, there is something to be said for Amendment No. 1. I await with interest the Minister's response.

    I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, because, on the ground of consistency, the Bill has got it right—as my noble friend Lord Borrie said.

    Amendments Nos. 1 and 33 suggest that the test should be that the court is satisfied that a banning order would help prevent violence and disorder at future matches. The words "reasonable grounds to believe" were added by the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999. It seems to me that it remains the right test and is reflected in new Section 14A. We need to have consistency between new Sections 14A and 14B. I do not believe that that part of the test for the court should be different following conviction and an application by complaint. There must and should always be the need for an objective ground for belief and for that reason I urge the Committee to reject the amendment.

    9.15 p.m.

    It does not seem to me that there is consistency. The Minister says that there is because the words in new Sections 14A and 14B are the same. If the standard of proof required is different, the effect is different. It is not consistent. Although the standard of proof for new Section 14B is not on the face of the Bill, we are told that it is the balance of probability. To prove something on the balance of probability is one thing, but, where an offence is involved, to prove it beyond reasonable doubt, as the court would require, is not consistent. The words are consistent but the different standard of proof makes it inconsistent.

    Surely there is a consistency. Whereas the conviction in new Section 14A must satisfy the criminal burden of proof, the requirement in subsection (2) that,

    "the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help",
    is the same as in new Section 14B. In other words, the civil burden of proof applies to both.

    May we put on one side, totally forget and ignore what we are told in this Committee the Government intend but is not on the face of the Bill? That is no way in which to approach legislation. We are repeatedly told that the Government intend the civil test. At Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, when dealing with this issue, said that there are two tests; the civil test for some matters and the criminal test for others. We have no clarification about either.

    The only way in which we can proceed in a meaningful and constructive fashion is to consider the Bill as it stands without what the Government intend.

    The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, paid us all the compliment of responding in a most assiduous way to at least some of what was said at Second Reading. May I remind him of what was said by my noble friend Lady Hanham? She is a magistrate of considerable experience and she expressed the greatest misgivings about the problem which would face the court unless there was expressed on the face of the Bill the intended standard of proof.

    The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, said that in certain circumstances the civil standard of proof will come upwards on the scale to something closely approaching the criminal standard. That is where it applies to matters of exceptional importance. That does not help a lay magistrate and it does not do much to help a magistrates' clerk.

    Therefore, I beg the noble Lord to think again and to express on the face of the Bill in plain language what the standard of proof is intended to be in each relevant particular. Otherwise, we shall have what is a difficult and controversial jurisdiction for the police and magistrates to discharge made much more difficult and dangerous.

    Perhaps I may add a further point of explanation. As I explained at Second Reading, proceedings under new Section 14B are civil proceedings; they are proceedings initiated by complaint and not a prosecution for a criminal offence. There is common understanding of that. Therefore, the burden of proof is there for the civil standard. It is not practice to spell out the standard of proof in each statutory provision. For example, proceedings for an anti-social behaviour order follow the same procedure as that proposed in new Section 14B.

    I believe that the burden of proof is something of a red herring. Of course a conviction must be proved beyond reasonable doubt but we move on to the test in new Sections 14A(2) and 14B(2). That part of the test is the same in both cases and means exactly what it says. That picks up and amplifies the point made by my noble friend Lord Borrie.

    The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, was right to say that at Second Reading I reminded the House of the level of proof that we were seeking to establish and we stick by that higher burden of civil standard of proof. We believe that that is right and appropriate in the circumstances, and I quoted the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scarman, to that effect.

    I am happy to take away the points that have been raised in this discussion and I shall of course do so. However, I believe that we are being consistent and that this follows on from something that is already established.

    In view of the discussion that we have had, I am most grateful to the noble Lord. When he takes away this matter, could he separate in his mind the burden of proof, which remains on the applicant and is not so stated in the Bill, in order to avoid the problem of the reverse burden which had to be considered in the case of Kibelene?

    Secondly, having attended to that as a separate matter, will the noble Lord then deal with the standard of proof? The noble Lord refers to it as the "level of proof": it is the same thing. What level of proof is applicable to each relevant article of the Bill? We wish to know that by tomorrow when we must deal with the matter, and it will be crucial to our considerations. I apologise for labouring the point but it may save much time, not only today but tomorrow as well.

    I hesitate to add to this already long debate on the first amendment. We may be here until a very late hour this morning. However, I believe that there is a misunderstanding in relation to the tests. Of course, the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, is right in saying that under new Section 14A there must be criminal proof beyond reasonable doubt before one reaches the second hurdle of civil proof under which one must be,

    "satisfied that there arc reasonable grounds to believe".
    However, one must consider both tests together in each section in order to make sense of them. In new Section 14A there is a criminal test followed by a civil test; in new Section 14B there is a civil test followed by a civil test. The trouble with new Section 14B, as was said many times at Second Reading and as will be said many times tonight, is that the double test in new Section 14B—the civil test and the civil test—is simply inadequate to protect the citizen, particularly when in new Section 14B(2), to which the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, referred, that hurdle is pathetically low. It is simply that,
    "the respondent … at any time … contributed to … disorder".
    Disorder is defined in the feeblest of ways and does not involve anything more than word or gesture. Therefore, I believe that there is a major difference in the tests when the two are considered together.

    I cannot accept that the test of disorder is feeble. I believe that words, gestures and actions provide a clear basis on which to form an opinion of someone's intent. I am surprised that the noble Lord makes the point in the way that he does.

    First, no intent is provided for, although one of the amendments will provide it and it should be on the face of the Bill. However, "disorder" is defined as any insulting word, behaviour or sign. If the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, pretends that at no point in his early adult career was he guilty of an abusive gesture or insulting word, he is much more puritanical than I take him to be. I can certainly hold my hand up to a thousand insulting and abusive words, gestures, signs or placards, and any student demonstration will provide thousands who fall into that category. He really should not continue to say, and I cannot believe that he considers, that the tests under new Section 14B(2) are anything but derisorily low.

    Perhaps I may intervene before the Minister attempts to answer what I believe to be a strong case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. He is, after all, likely to appear on one side or another in the courts, eloquent as he is. I am pleased to see the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate. I believe that the Minister heard me say at an earlier stage that I had done things for which I must hold up my hand. However, at a game, I might make a gesture suggesting that the referee needed new glasses, with no intention of causing any sort of disorder. A word from a steward, or even from a constable, rising up to a police officer of the—if I can call it such—stature of the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie, would be enough to deal with the situation. We are not talking about a calm evening such as this in your Lordships' House. People at a football game do not behave as one might tonight, let alone as one might at a symphony concert.

    I understand what might be in the Minister's mind when he talks about abusive chanting or racial activity. However, if he is concerned about racial comments, he might wait until one of the great Glasgow clubs comes south and hear some of the songs that are sung.

    I agree to a great extent with the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. I hope that at some stage—perhaps even at many stages—during the evening we shall hear the marvellous wisdom of the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie, who must have had to deal with many of the practical issues that we are talking about tonight. No doubt he will be able to give us much practical help. I ask the Minister to bear in mind that people can say and do things at a football game with no intent to cause disorder. One tiny gesture with no intent can easily be dealt with by a steward and, in extremis, by a police officer.

    The debate has ranged rather wider than this narrow amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, asked why there was what he perceived as an inconsistency between our treatment of banning orders made under Section 14A and those made under Section 14B. The noble Lord, Lord Cope, explained why there was a legitimate difference. However, I should like to add a little more.

    When someone is convicted of an offence involving football hooliganism, it would be legitimate for the Government to authorise a court to impose a ban on the accused going to a football match for a year or two years, regardless of whether there was any evidence that they were likely to offend again. After all, banning orders can be enforced on people convicted of careless or dangerous driving without any evidence that they are likely to reoffend. The Government have provided for a low standard of proof, but one could say that at least that is better than nothing, which would be legitimate.

    The situation under Section 14B is different, because in that case the court is not imposing a further punishment for a previous conviction, let alone imposing a punishment for something that has not led to a conviction in the past. The foresight of what is likely to happen is an essential element in making the order. We propose that the court should be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence. If there was reckoned to be a one in three chance that an order might help, that might be considered reasonable grounds. However, that would not satisfy the civil standard of proof, which requires that there should be a probability. If there was a two in three chance that making an order would help, that would satisfy the civil standard, but not the criminal standard. So it seems to me that the words "reasonable cause to believe" in Section 14B(3) set too low a standard of evidence required for the making of the order. That is why I moved this particular amendment.

    Having heard the arguments—

    9.30 p.m.

    Before the noble Lord withdraws his amendment, if that is what he is about to do, I should like the opportunity to complete my arguments on this matter, having been so stimulated by what he has said.

    Indeed, the Government should admit the facts of what is in the Bill. The new Section 14B(4)(b) condition is not subject to the civil standard of proof, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said. It is very much a sub-civil standard of proof. It exposes someone to what is, to all intents and purposes, a criminal penalty on the basis of an extremely loose definition of disorder, which includes using insulting words. All I need to say is, "Get lost, Lord Bassam", and I cannot go to a football match again.

    I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has ever been involved in an argument with a policeman or a traffic warden. Such an argument can become quite heated and you can find yourself having your words recorded. I am sure that I have been recorded as having insulted a policeman in the heat of the moment. It is a very little thing, arguing about whether you have or have not driven in a way that you should not have driven. It is extremely easy to disagree forcefully with the policeman who has stopped you, even though it may be considered unwise to do so. That will be recorded in the files and for ever afterwards, on the basis of that, under this Bill, anybody who has done that is recorded as having committed a new Section 14B(2) offence.

    This measure provides a sub-civil standard of proof in subsection (4)(b) where anything reasonable enables the making of a banning order. That is a very light basis to apply to a matter which is a criminal offence. It may be argued that that is not so in technical terms but that is its practical effect.

    The noble Lord has received a copy of the opinion which has been sought by Justice on the European Court of Human Rights aspects of the Bill. It is quite clear from that, in its discussion in paragraph 48, that it regards Article 6 as being quite definite in its application to this Bill in saying that this will be regarded, for European human rights purposes, as being a criminal proceeding. Therefore, for the purposes of the Human Rights Act, as we are about to have it in law, the standard of proof set out in new Section 14B for a person who is not a criminal will be wide of the mark and will not hold up under the Human Rights Act. That opinion must be taken seriously as the facts as presented to us by the Government, as opposed to the words which they stick to in the Bill, support that at every turn.

    The Government should realise the bargain which they have struck with this House when it agreed to take this Bill through in the way that has been agreed. As a House, we have agreed that the Government will have their legislation. That must be on the basis of the Government co-operating, understanding and being responsive to the extreme difficulties which we find with some aspects of the Bill.

    We must deliver a Bill which is acceptable in a very short time. It will be extremely difficult, indeed very time-consuming, if the Minister just sits there with his sheet of paper saying "Resist" and is not constructive and imaginative in his replies. We have very little time to deal with the Bill. I hope that the noble Lord and his advisers may take the time between now and when we return to this subject on later amendments to consider how they can respond positively to the points which have been made. Otherwise, they will find themselves stuck with wording in the Bill that they do not like as a result of amendments tabled at Report stage. Surely it is better that something is agreed now, that we have a constructive discussion and that the noble Lord realises the reality of the points that are made to him, rather than trying to pretend that they do not exist.

    With apologies for not having heard the beginning of the discussion on this amendment, perhaps I may add a few words. As I understand it, we are dealing with an issue which at its lowest is quasi-criminal. I cannot readily think of any aspect of the criminal law that is dealt with by a court on a foundation other than the foundation of proof. It seems to me that "belief" is not the same as "proof", whether proof to a civil standard or to a criminal standard. It introduces an unhealthy subjective element of opinion—not fact—to the decision-taking process and I suggest to the Minister that that would impair the credibility of the whole process.

    The debate has taken a slightly unusual course in having speeches not only after the Minister has spoken, but also after the mover of the amendment has spoken.

    Perhaps I may point out that this is Committee stage and that everything that has been done is entirely in order.

    Even in Committee it is a little unusual to speak after the mover of the amendment. Having said that, it would be churlish of me to object because what the noble Lords, Lord Lucas and Lord Alexander of Weedon, have said on the matter has been put more strongly and more persuasively than I could. Therefore, I have little to add, except in relation to the Minister saying that he will take this matter away for consideration. I hope that he is serious about that because there is a real problem, particularly in relation to Section 14B, with the standard of proof required for the making of a banning order. On this occasion, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 1, line 17, leave out paragraph (d).

    The noble Lord said: This is the first of a group of amendments intended to delete altogether the summary power to detain suspected hooligans. The other amendments in this group are Amendments Nos. 9, 11 and 56, of which Amendment No. 56 is the main one because it leaves out the whole of the new Sections 21A, 21B and 21C which have been inserted into the Football Spectators Act 1989.

    The summary power will enable a constable with no authority from any senior officer to detain any person during a controlled period relating to overseas football matches. The constable can detain if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the conditions for a banning order have been met and that a banning order would help to prevent violence at the regulated match. On the previous amendment we heard about the unsatisfactory nature of the words "reasonable cause to believe".

    A constable can detain a suspect on his own authority for four hours and that is extendable to six hours with the consent of an inspector. With the consent of an inspector, the constable can order the suspect to appear before magistrates within 24 hours, not to leave England and Wales before then and to surrender his passport. The constable can arrest the suspect if he believes that it is necessary to do so in order to ensure compliance with the order.

    These powers are draconian. They apply to British citizens only. Perhaps the Minister will explain why they are so narrowly limited, particularly as they plainly appear to be discriminatory on the grounds of nationality. There is no need to have reasonable grounds to believe that a suspect has committed a crime or intends to do so in the future. The effect of the order will be that the suspect will miss his flight or train. Even if no banning order is made by the magistrates and he can obtain a new ticket, he may not be able to afford one and get to the match in time.

    Why and how will the power be exercised? Many speakers at Second Reading made the point, as I did, that we cannot go to Gatwick and identify hooligans simply by their appearance. Serious hooligans will not travel in Cross of St George T-shirts and carry cans of lager in open bags. They will dress tidily. If the police rely merely on appearances they will make a lot of mistakes; lots of embarrassing stories will appear in the newspapers about perfectly innocent travellers being hauled off their planes because they look unshaven, or worse; and a great deal of compensation will have to be paid.

    The police are aware of that. Therefore they will rarely stop someone on the basis of their appearance when they turn up at the airport ticket in hand. They will only stop a suspect on the basis of intelligence which they already have in their possession. From the National Criminal Intelligence Service, or somewhere else, they will obtain the names of suspects and be looking out for them at the airport check-ins. If the suspect they pick up is already subject to a banning order, there is no problem. That suspect is committing an offence and could be arrested under existing powers.

    But what if the suspect's name has been given to the police and he is not subject to a banning order? The question is, in those circumstances, why not? There are two possible answers. First, the police may not feel they have sufficient evidence to obtain a banning order, in which case they ought not to be stopping that subject at the airport. Secondly, the police may have evidence, but have decided in the past not to seek a banning order unless and until the suspect turns up at an airport with his ticket and passport in his hand. That course of action may save time and money. But it is wholly wrong to wait until the last possible minute to obtain a banning order. It is unfair to the suspect, who may miss a match even if no order has been made and would have spent money on a ticket which he would not have spent if a banning order had been made. It is also unfair to the suspect even if a banning order has been made.

    If the summary procedure is based on circumstances which are not known to the police in time to enable them to apply for a banning order, I would have no objection to that limited power. But the position is this. First, the police will not stop suspects on their appearance. If they did so they would infringe many people's perfectly legitimate rights and have to pay a great deal of compensation. Secondly, if people turn up drunk and disorderly at the airport, already having tanked up before getting on the plane, there are perfectly adequate powers already available to deal with them. Thirdly, the police will almost always only stop people on the basis of intelligence. If that intelligence is not good enough to support a banning order, then it should not be used as the basis for stopping a traveller. If it is good enough to support a banning order, then the police should not wait until the last minute before applying for it.

    The use of summary powers to avoid the need to obtain a banning order in advance is a clear breach of European Union law as explained in the opinion already referred to by Clare Montgomery and Rhodri Thompson. I believe that, unless the summary powers are limited to the narrow extent that I indicated earlier in my speech, they should have no place in this Bill. I beg to move.

    I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, in his amendment. I regret that I was unable to be present at the Second Reading debate. But, having read the report in Hansard, I find myself in almost complete agreement with what was said on that occasion by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, and with a great deal of what was said by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas.

    I am not concerned at present with the new Sections 14A and 14B to the 1989 Act, but I am very much concerned with new Section 21A, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, explained, entitles a police officer, without warrant, effectively to arrest someone on reasonable suspicion that he has complied with certain conditions. Those conditions are set out in new Section 14B(2). It seems to me that that is introducing something quite novel in England criminal law. New Section 14B(2), which sets out those conditions, does not in any way create an offence. It is a fundamental part of English criminal law that a police officer can arrest without warrant only if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that an offence either has been committed or is about to be committed.

    As I said, the conditions set out in new Section 14B(2) do not create an offence. The Minister will be well aware of a similar argument that I advanced in relation to what are now Sections 41 and 42 of the Terrorism Act. I made exactly the same point on that occasion, but I did not persuade the Minister of the effect of what was being done and how far removed it was from ordinary procedures of English criminal law. However, in relation to that Bill, there were at least other good grounds where one might seek to make an exception to the ordinary rule.

    In the case of football hooliganism, I cannot see that there is any basis for making an exception to the procedures that were thrashed out when the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 went through both this House and the other place. As far as I know, that legislation has been treated as the model of what is, and what is not, permissible in respect of a police officer's powers of arrest without a warrant. Those powers are jealously guarded by the courts and very jealously scrutinised because they are such an obvious infringement of the liberty of the subject—a point made many times during the Second Reading debate.

    I find it very difficult to accept the proposed new Section 21A as it stands, without much greater consideration being given to it than has been possible because of the way in which the Bill has been brought forward at the last moment. As I understand it, if Clause 1(1)(d) is deleted from the Bill, as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, it follows that Section 21A will fall with it. I support the amendment.

    9.45 p.m.

    I must say that I find myself very much in sympathy with the amendment. It is common ground that we have a very serious problem before us in regard to violence at football matches. We hear from the Government that we must act quickly because of the match due to take place in Paris in early September and the further match in October between England and Germany. Therefore, we must accept that this legislation is to be taken through both this and another place at quite a speed.

    Obviously, some noble Lords believe that there is no problem in this process, while others have concerns about it. We must remember that we are aiming to maintain the balance between what we seek to achieve—the maintenance of public order—and some of the other aspects involved, such as a restriction on the rights of the unconvicted, private individual. I can understand why the powers proposed to be taken under paragraphs (a) to (c) of Clause 1(1) as regards convicted individuals have, at least in principle and subject to the detail, both weight and thrust. However, when it comes to Clause 1(1)(d), it seems to me that we may tip that balance quite substantially in a way which was not originally envisaged and which may, in my view, tip the balance too far.

    I also strongly support what the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said about the way in which the powers are likely to applied. Determined hooligans will certainly seek to evade them. My noble friend Lord Cope of Berkeley spoke about the various loopholes, to which we shall return later. The police will be very concerned about using these powers or they will use them until they make a real "Horlicks" of a particular case and there is extreme adverse publicity. In that case they will seek to use the powers thereafter. We need to go extremely carefully in any case, and certainly in a piece of legislation as rushed as this, concerning any proposal that will give authority an opportunity to act capriciously. Potentially capricious action is at the heart of this clause.

    My noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew spoke about this being the ninth piece of legislation concerning football hooliganism. We are giving the authorities three additional sets of powers. I do not believe that we need to rush through the fourth set which is envisaged and which will probably be ineffective and possibly not used. In any case it involves a considerable impact on our civil liberties. I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, who talked about this House having a role to provide checks and balances. This is a check and a balance. I support the amendment.

    I had considerable sympathy with this amendment before any noble Lord spoke. Having heard the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, I wholly accept that the sympathy was well placed. I point to just this. The reasonable grounds are no more and no less than intelligence 97 per cent of the time. Accepting that must be subject to the proviso as to the burden of proof and the condition under Section 14B of the Act. We shall return to that again and again.

    I am not much good at citing cases, but under the old poll tax case of Benham, it is perfectly plain that these are criminal proceedings. Their substance is criminal. There is arrest, imprisonment and default. There is a substantial invasion of individual rights which could never be imposed by a civil court in any circumstances. These are criminal proceedings.

    Unless the Government are prepared to accept the criminal burden of proof, we shall be bedevilled throughout this Bill with that problem and I shall not let go. That is not a threat—I never threaten—but that is what I intend to do. It is manifestly plain that it is a criminal situation with consequences for the subject. It is an assault on individual freedom. I agree that it has to be done, and I support it, but on a criminal burden of proof.

    Perhaps the balance has been tipped too far and perhaps it has to be. But if there is a criminal burden of proof I will accept that, but without it I am concerned. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has other affairs to attend to, but he may be able to read Hansard tomorrow. Perhaps he could take this matter on board. It is really not lawyers playing tricks. It is a matter of constitutional importance that affects the liberty of the subject.

    I do not wish to go over the Second Reading ground again other than to make just one simple point. I do that not as a lawyer but as someone who has spent an enormous amount of time watching football matches not just in this country but also with the England team abroad. I have been horrified at the events that have taken place at those matches ever since the early 1970s.

    To assume that somehow or other we can remove Part IV and be left with a meaningful piece of legislation is nonsense. I believe that Part IV constitutes the first attempt that we have made in this country to solve the problem of the England supporter travelling abroad. It seeks to place us on the same level as the German authorities established with the legislation that they passed immediately before the Euro 2000 competition. With hindsight, I think that it would have been better if we had passed similar legislation.

    The Daily Mail of 1st June stated that,
    "German authorities … last night began confiscating hundreds of passports from known hooligans, including many without convictions for violence … In Germany … politicians last month passed a law that effectively suspends the civil liberties of known soccer thugs. Armed with the new powers, police have begun confiscating their passports, which will be held for the duration of the tournament. German interior minister Otto Schilly said concerns about civil liberties took second place to ensuring that there was little or no chance of a repeat of violent scenes involving German supporters in France for the World Cup two years ago".
    That report is a little colourful. I have established that the withdrawal of passport sanction exists but is not used for soccer hooligans. However, they have adopted a measure which is similar to measures which are contained in the Bill; namely, they have established a reporting condition which requires people to be put under a regular reporting duty to their local police stations for particular periods of time during which they are unable to leave Germany. A stamp was put in the passports of others who were prohibited from travelling to Belgium and/or the Netherlands for a limited period of time. That restriction is applied on the basis of some kind of police proceedings to do with hooliganism, although no prior conviction is necessary.

    The third area was the establishment of two databases and a special list set up for the tournament with details of thousands of people. Those people were not under a formal travel restriction but were subject to informal spot checks by German border authorities when travelling to Euro 2000 matches. People who appeared on either of those databases were then subject to a further check at the border and if there were additional reasons for suspecting they may be dangerous they were prevented from leaving the country. I do not believe that what we propose in the Bill is very different from that. I hope that noble Lords will not persist with amendments to remove Part IV.

    Is it not the case that within the Schengen area—Germany is within that area—you do not necessarily need passports to cross borders; you can travel with an identity card, which I believe were not taken away from the German fans in question? Will the noble Lord clarify that point?

    My understanding is that those were suspended for the duration of Euro 2000, so that the Germans could tackle the problem in the way that I have described.

    The noble Lord has waxed eloquent about the article in the Daily Mail. Who passed the legislation he mentioned? Was it federal or state legislation? I am not a lawyer. I am sure that with his background the noble Lord can enlighten me on this point. However, I remember that there was a serious prospect of disorder in a match between Eindhoven of Holland and, I believe, Leverkusen of Germany. The clubs and the relevant state authorities of North Rhine Westphalia took certain action. However, the noble Lord said that the German Parliament did or did not take certain measures. Does he believe that passing a law will mean that just because people say that they are going nowhere near a match they will not cause a disturbance in a city which could be as far away as we are from Reading?

    I am most grateful for those comments which allow me to correct an impression that I may have given inadvertently. The Daily Mail article of 1st June gave a certain impression of what had taken place in Germany. The Germans did not need to change the law. They introduced a new regulation covering a passport restriction. Those caught breaking the passport restrictions were then held to have committed a criminal rather than an administrative offence. It was very much a tightening up of the regulations that were in place beforehand but which were applied specifically to deal with Euro 2000. That is what I understand my noble friend is attempting to do with future designated matches involving England.

    10 p.m.

    Before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I may ask him whether he has seen a copy of the Home Office note in relation to the German legal position vis-à-vis these issues. It was issued after assiduous attempts by members of the Home Office team to find out exactly what is the situation in Germany. Has the noble Lord seen that note?

    I am certain that we share the note the noble Lord is referring to.

    Perhaps it would help the Committee if I read from it. It is headed "Withdrawal of passport" and it states:

    "The right to withdraw a person's passport exists, but is only used for those who have committed very serious offences, and is not used for those such as football hooligans".

    That is exactly the extract that I read out at the beginning of my speech. It may be that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, was not in his place when I said that.

    I was; but the impression I gained when the noble Lord was quoting from the Daily Mail was that some vast change had overtaken German law and that large numbers of people were affected. Perhaps I may read further in order to help the Committee as to reporting conditions. It states:

    "A small number of people have been put under a regular reporting duty"
    As to restrictions on passports in terms of stamping them, it states:
    "A further small number of people have had a stamp put in their passports".
    The net result is that,
    "There has been a suggestion that these laws are new. This is not the case".

    The noble Lord has quoted from the same piece of paper as the one I am quoting from. If he were to go on, it is the section about databases and the stopping at frontiers which is analogous to what is being proposed in Part IV of the Bill. That is why there is a useful comparison to be drawn between the two.

    This has clarified what, for me, is an important issue in the Bill—that is, where the centre of gravity of action has been. In his speech at Second Reading, with which a number of us had great sympathy, the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer of Leeds, differentiated between the measured targeting —I hope that I paraphrase him fairly—of those who, on concrete information, have been properly focused on as potential subjects of a banning order and an indiscriminate attempt at ports to restrain people and to bring them before magistrates. That is a very helpful distinction. Like him at Second Reading, I found the second approach concerning and unattractive.

    I have also heard suggestions that the real burden on magistrates will take place at ports. If that is right, it suggests that the centre of gravity of this operation will be substantial arrests at the port rather than earlier applications for banning orders. I understand a provision for an arrest at a port on certain, closely circumscribed conditions, but not a general provision which allows an arrest on the wide grounds stated in the proposed new Section 21A.

    As I have referred to the proposed new Sections 2A to 21C, when the Minister comes to deal with the principle of those amendments, will he comment on the very clear and strong opinion raised by Justice that proposed new Sections 21A and 21C would contravene not only the European Convention on Human Rights—soon to be implemented in our own Human Rights Act—but also the provisions of European Union law? In view of the importance of this issue to civil liberties, would he be good enough by that stage of the debate to have available for us the view of the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General on this issue? I shall be interested to hear what he will say about the validity of the issue of the opinion provided by Justice and on what authority he will say it.

    I have considerable sympathy for the Minister because, as I said I recognised at Second Reading, there has been a political imperative on the Government to come forward with some kind of legislation proposing a measure which meets the proper balance that has to be applied between liberty and providing for order and which, at the same time, has not yet been tried. If I may, I have a suggestion to which I will come in about one minute.

    Perhaps I may first draw the attention of the House to the fact that my noble friend Lord Alexander has just spoken of a widely based right of arrest. I am not in the slightest degree surprised that he used the word arrest, because that is effectively what the Bill gives a police officer. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, pointed out, that is actually a criminal measure and it gives a power to arrest. Successive governments have tended to refer to detention because it is less disagreeable than, for instance, internment, which is what it was called in the early stages in Northern Ireland. But the power to detain here is effectively the power to arrest.

    I am certain that in ministerial circles there is a feeling of mounting irritation that these points are being taken when there is an urgent issue to be addressed. That is often the case when civil liberties are infringed purportedly in a good cause. Our constitutional history is—I was going to say littered—bejewelled with instances where that temptation has been resisted. I am not madly impressed by what may or may or not have been done at whatever level in Germany, because German people on the whole—if one may generalise—are much more liable to do what they are told than are British people. It may be regrettable that that is the case. We may have had cause to regret that in the past. None the less, I believe it is a truthful observation.

    One of the points that has to be recognised is that if people are affronted, and are reasonably affronted by the way in which the law allows them to be treated, their support for the agencies of the law—the police and the magistrates—is liable to be lost. It is crucial not to lose that respect for the law if we are to maintain the rule of law in our country.

    The final point I wish to make is that the Minister has a way out here. There is plainly a worrying degree—I leave myself out of this of course—of opposition to the Bill in that regard. Would it not be sensible for the Government to say that they need to pass the Bill in a hurry—that is recognised on all sides—but within the provisions of the Bill at the moment there are the means to return to the Bill and add or subtract from it within one year. That provision will remain in the Bill I do not doubt. Would it not be a way out, and a sensible one, without any loss of face at all, for the Government to accept the amendment that has been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. But, without prejudice to their rights, after further experience as well as thought they could return to it in one year's time by asking Parliament to do so by the measures provided?

    Perhaps I may take the Committee back to the Second Reading debate and what the Home Secretary said in the other place. The NCIS, the body charged with trying to get to grips with the problem of football hooliganism, has roughly 1,000 thugs on its list. Of the 965 people arrested and deported from Holland and Brussels during Euro 2000, only 30 were from that list of roughly 1,000. Of the 965 deportees only four were prosecuted and only two of them for violence. In addition, Jack Straw himself made the point when he kindly came to meet us that the figure for convictions of British adult males aged 30 and under for offences of violence and dishonesty is 30 per cent of the age group.

    What mystifies me is just how this new "sus" power could and will be implemented. Will the Government automatically use the new powers of new Section 14B or the new powers of Section 21 to target the 1,000 people on the NCIS list; or will they target the 965 recently deported Britons? No, we know that they will not do that because, as Jack Straw said, that was a totally unreliable trawl and many of the people involved were guiltless of anything. The good Jack Straw said, "We will not even consider those people for banning orders". Will they go further and look at all the people with convictions for violence in the 30 and under age group? If that is the case, we will be dealing with hundreds of thousands of people. How on earth will these preventive powers be used? Do the Government have a plan to round up thousands of people for banning orders before the match occurs; or will all police be relieved of their off-duty hours to enable them to appear at all the ports in the land, with huge lists of people which they have drawn up?

    Frankly, we are in danger of having the legal equivalent of "Fantasy Football". The trouble is that the issue is a good deal more serious than that. We are dealing with basic and fundamental civil liberties. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, so clinically exposed, what the Government are proposing in new Sections 21A to 21C is a novelty, and a dangerous novelty. While we sympathise, as we have said ad nauseam, with what the Government are doing, we do not understand how the measure will work. If it comes, as it is bound to do, to almost total arbitrariness, the concern is that the arbitrary nature of the decisions taken as to who should be arrested on suspicion will fall disproportionately on that group to whom we in this Chamber constantly have regard and whom we know are already in the most disadvantageous position in our society.

    Perhaps I may refer back to our debates on the proposed reduction in the right of jury trial and to the fact that after debate the Government very properly decided to withdraw that part of the Bill which required magistrates to review the issue of right to trial by jury according to the reputation of the person before them. We are reintroducing into this clause that same dangerous and potentially unfair element. It is reputation quite apart from past conduct that will be at the heart of the arbitrary exercise of the impossible task with which the police, let alone the magistrates, will be lumbered by the new sections.

    I did not speak during the Second Reading debate and so I apologise for intervening at the Committee stage. However, I believe that what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, said towards the end of his remarks was very appealing and contained a good deal of common sense. It is necessary to do something about football violence before the match in September. Let us take that for granted. It is also a fact that two or three of the four propositions in the Bill command a great deal of support. It is with regard to the fourth one that there are grave objections.

    I am persuaded by the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, because I recall that when Parliament was recalled after the Omagh bombing—a very tragic incident—we passed a piece of legislation. At that time the noble and learned Lord said clearly and clinically that the legislation would not work. I remember it well. Not a single person has been convicted under that Act. It is a farce. There is a problem with passing legislation in great haste in the belief that it is effective, when technically skilled people tell us beforehand that it will not work.

    My appeal is that we should follow the broad outlines of the solution proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew. We should take the bulk of the Bill through, and remove proposed new Sections 21A to 21C about which we are all unhappy. If in a year's time we find that the legislation has not worked, the Government can return to the House and say, "We told you that it would not work; we needed the proposed new sections". We shall then have plenty of time to think the matter through and add safeguards for civil liberties. Legislation passed in haste does not work; one such example is the Dangerous Dogs Act. The provision is particularly troublesome because of the serious inroads that it makes on civil liberties.

    10.15 p.m.

    If there is one thing that worries and puzzles me, it is this: I am afraid to say that I would rather see a lot of yobs in the Champs Elysées misbehaving and drunk and having their heads bashed in by the CRS, and bringing English football into disrepute, than a serious attack on the liberties of the subject. I say that after very considerable thought. Those liberties of the subject—Englishmen's liberties, human rights, call them what you will—are so dear to the core of what all in this House believe. After all, courts abroad are quite capable of sending those responsible for really nasty yob behaviour to Devil's Island or God knows where if they wish to. Under those circumstances it is up to them to produce their own peace; it is not up to us to offend our immensely noble tradition of civil liberties which we invented for the world and for which many Englishmen have died over the past 300 or 400 years. We must be very, very careful. I really do not think it is worth doing just because of the French, the Belgians, the Congolese or the Japanese, or wherever people play football. It seems to me unnecessary that we should abuse our own liberties.

    At Second Reading, I expressed a great deal of sympathy for much in the Bill but said that I had considerable concerns about this particular area. I should like to examine it in a little more detail.

    First, I accept that there can readily be circumstances in which the authorities would need an exceptional provision at the point of exit from the country. If the world were fair, that would be a calm, orderly event known well in advance so that many of the problems that we have in mind could reasonably be tackled. However, I suggest that there are circumstances in which that may not be the case. Perhaps I may expand on the point.

    The nub of the matter is the test applied in proposed new Section 14B(4)(b); namely, whether or not it is likely that there will be certain outcomes as a result of a person going abroad. The person may not actually be violent or cause violence, but could merely be associated with violence. So, are we dealing with a small number people? There is a tendency to believe that one is talking of only a small number of people.

    I should like to quote a short passage from the August edition of the magazine When Saturday Comes. That publication, which is aimed at football fans, will not be found on the bookshelves or reading lists of many noble Lords, but I commend it to the Committee. The editorial on page 4 makes one or two points that it is worth keeping in mind in addressing the matters before us this evening:
    "For too many of the fans who follow the national team, going abroad is about asserting England's superiority—not necessarily with violence, but with songs and aggressive behaviour that is meant to be (and is) intimidating to the locals … It seems we can't imagine a relationship with the rest of Europe (in football or anything else) that does not involve either conquest or humiliation … But when the actions of a large minority among England's travelling support are so objectionable, innocent supporters will always be tainted by association".
    The two lessons that I draw from that passage are: first, that the kind of behaviour that would not in certain circumstances be expected to lead to violence may do so, and certainly potentially many thousands of young males, not a few hundred, engage in such activity; secondly, the fans themselves recognise that these people represent a large minority.

    I suggest one or two circumstances in which the situation at the ports may be difficult. During Euro 2000 England played one game and no trouble followed it. At a subsequent game there was trouble. A few days later at the time of yet another game there was heightened concern about what to do about the situation. If these powers had been in existence the police at the ports would have been less than human had they not been exceptionally cautious about whom to allow to go abroad. Whom should they stop—people who may sing abusive songs or, regrettably, drop their trousers and expose their buttocks, as some lads do, or burn the flag of another country? Such abhorrent behaviour may be engaged in, not by the 100 or 200 hardcore ringleaders, but a great many young men.

    In many European club competitions, in addition to international competitions, typically there are home and away games only two weeks apart. A home game takes place in this country and there is trouble between the rival clubs. Everyone expects trouble a few days later at the return game. No opportunity is provided for the considered, careful process, if possible, that we all support. In other words, the circumstances in which the proposed legislation may be implemented will not be logical, calm and well considered. It will face its great test when the media, including the press, talk about trouble that is to come and the Government of the day are concerned to ensure that it does not happen. It will become known to the police at the ports that they must ensure that they do not let through anyone who may cause trouble. The terms that may be applied are so wide-ranging that it will not be possible to take a careful look at the intelligence to spot the real hard core, because the police at the ports and the Government will look extremely foolish if masses of people go abroad and trouble erupts.

    There is great danger that inequities may occur. I have described the circumstances of a European club match where, there having been trouble in this country, the authorities want to ensure that no troublemakers go abroad for the return game. I have described the international tournament at which three or four days earlier there was trouble and the authorities want to ensure that it does not happen again. It is almost beyond the wisdom of man to avoid inequities in those circumstances. However, with regard to a Manchester United game arranged six months in advance, there is a calm, ordered atmosphere in the ports. No trouble is expected and none occurs.

    The legislation is drawn up in such a way that the magistrates and the police who decide to take individuals before a court will be influenced by the atmosphere faced. Once one goes from the hard core, easily identifiable, group of people to an amorphous group who may have caused trouble, may have been associated with trouble, or may cause trouble in a few days' time the situation will be very difficult indeed.

    I anticipate that many people could be involved. Therefore I shall be grateful if the Minister will address this concern. Under these provisions—they are drawn up generously for authorities which want to stop almost anyone from going abroad—how can we prevent the attitude that "we must make sure that trouble does not happen"? How do we ensure that hundreds, if not thousands of people, will not be stopped with the consequent sense of injustice and inequity? In some circumstances, people will walk through the ports; in other circumstances—it is nothing to do with the people—the rules may be applied differently.

    Can the Minister indicate the tone of his response to later amendments relating to the setting out of clear evidence which individuals will have the opportunity to rebut, with proper representation? In the circumstances I have outlined, it is unlikely that those requirements will be met in the tests at present to be applied.

    I understand the considerable pressure on the Government to bring forward this legislation. When trouble is expected at ports or airports, there will be great pressure to do something. We would all want something to be done but in an equitable way so that individuals can judge whether or not they may face such a charge. If they are faced with such a charge they should have a reasonable prospect of being able to defend themselves. It would seem almost impossible to defend oneself against such an allegation if one has been involved before in disruptive or violent behaviour.

    I hope that the Minister will take the opportunity to give a run down on how he envisages new Section 21A being used. At Second Reading, it was described as a power which would not be much used. The noble Lord, Lord Woolmer of Leeds, has raised the possibility of it being used to a large extent. The noble Lord, Faulkner, said that with the German example the equivalent to proposed Section 21A was the major line of defence. We ought to know how the Government view the balance between the Section 14A and 14B procedures and the Section 21A procedures. I hope that the Minister will reiterate what I understood him to say on Second Reading, that proposed Section 21A will be used only occasionally.

    The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, drew comparisons with the German situation, but the fans stopped at the border were on a database and presumably knew. In this country a fan would know that he was likely to be in trouble at the border. Also, the penalty for the Germans fans was that they could not go abroad for five days. Here we are considering the full stretch of proposed Section 14B, which encompasses 30 per cent of the population because they have committed a suitable criminal offence. The minimum sentence they can receive is a two-year banning order, which is entirely out of proportion to the sort of use to which the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, referred.

    If there is to be an effective procedure for stopping people at the ports at the last minute to deal with panic and the feeling that a match is going wrong, the sentence must be a few days' inconvenience—not five years, which is the minimum under the Bill.

    10.30 p.m.

    Before the noble Lord sits down, if he were to get an assurance—as I hope he will—that the Minister intends that proposed Section 21A should be used sparingly, is there any way, with respect to the judicial process, that the Minister could make that assurance good?

    Only by giving instructions to the police.

    This is far from the first time that Parliament and government have addressed the question of international hooligans. That was the subject of the whole of Part II of the 1989 Bill and the subsequent legislation that built on it. The question underlying the Bill's most difficult provision is whether or not it will work. One test is to give the Government the power temporarily to enact the measure. Following the meeting with the Home Secretary, the sunset clause was introduced by the Government. We still believe it is rather long, but we will return to that aspect.

    There is considerable doubt that the provision will work. If it does, it will be seen as a "sus" law. It is specifically stated that there will be detention and restriction if a police officer suspects that certain facts are the case. The key question is the centre of gravity of reaction. What will be the extent of the use of the proposed Section 21A, which applies at airports and seaports—which are the only places that measure is likely to be used? With any banning order that the police seek in advance, presumably they will not need the detention order. They will simply turn up and say to the person, "You must appear at the magistrates' court this afternoon or tomorrow, to answer why a banning order should not be imposed on you".

    The only point of the detention is to pick someone out of the queue at the ticket barrier and say, "We need to telephone the NCIS and check our records to make sure that you are the person we think you are and to decide whether we are going to serve a notice on you". If it turns out that he is not the person, he may after six hours have missed his flight. He may be in difficulty about where he is going and have lost his ticket and money in the process. That is the only circumstance in which new Section 21A will be used.

    The Minister told us earlier that such action will not be taken mainly at ports and airports; it will be taken before people arrive there. We must wait and see, but wherever it takes place it will be on the basis of intelligence. That will presumably start with the NCIS list of people known to have caused trouble. We have been told that about 1,000 people are on the list but at the end of Second Reading the Minister told us that there will be only hundreds of banning orders, not thousands. I understand the vagueness and that the banning will not go much further than those on the NCIS list, if indeed it covers all of them.

    In any case, as we have been reminded, only 30 of the 1,000 people sent home from Belgium, following the trouble which gave rise to the legislation, were on the NCIS list or known to the police. I am sure we all appreciate that during the round-up some people on the list may have been nippy enough to get out of the way of the Belgian police. In some respects there is reason to doubt the efficiency of that round-up. Therefore, no doubt more were in Belgium and may have been involved in the violence.

    All that makes one wonder how much the legislation has been thought through and what the effect will be. There is no doubt that if we were to pass the amendments in this group we would knock out not the most controversial but, from the Government's point of view, the most important power in the Bill. The Government have not backed it up with a great deal of argument, but we must decide whether it is right to gram this temporary power.

    We must ponder it between now and Report stage tomorrow; we do not have much time but nor does the Home Office. However, this is the most important clause in the Bill as regards its level of controversy and its importance to delivering the aims which we and the Government share.

    I hope that Members of the Committee will forgive me for intervening again but something troubles me. The NCIS list contains, say, 1,000 names. How many of those do the police consider likely to cause trouble and how many have been convicted of a football-related offence or other serious violent offence? That information would be apposite to the value of the list.

    This has been a long debate. When we started proceedings on the Bill today I thought I might get home for some cocoa but I now believe that I might get home for breakfast. This has been a long but important debate. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Cope, put his finger on it when he said that this was the fourth in our package of measures. We should make plain that if this amendment is carried tonight, or perhaps tomorrow, it would remove that fourth measure. That would be the sum total of its effect and it would—I say this advisedly—be a serious hole in what we believe to be an important package of measures. I believe that they need to be taken and considered together.

    I want to run through the various arguments that have been made in the debate and I shall try to answer as many of the questions as I can. I shall certainly try to answer the last point made by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. The noble Lord, Lord Alexander of Weedon, asked me to set out the Government's view on Justice's opinion and, if the Committee will bear with me, I shall seek to do that.

    The opinion obtained by Justice expressed the view that the provisions of the Bill—and, indeed, by implication, the provisions of the Football Spectators Act 1989 because much of the Bill is drawn from that, adds to it and updates it—are contrary to the requirements of European Community law and the European Convention on Human Rights. Several Members of the Committee have expressed concern about the human rights implications. It is true that the Bill raises serious issues of competing rights. However, I can assure the Committee that before introducing the Bill careful consideration was given to the position of Community and ECHR law, including the issues specifically canvassed in the opinion obtained by Justice.

    I assure the Committee that the most careful scrutiny has been applied to the issues raised and the Government remain of the view that the Bill's provisions are compatible with all the United Kingdom's international human rights obligations. The rights of free movement under Article 59 of the EC treaty and under Directives 73/148 and 64/221 are not absolutes. The right to travel to receive services may be restricted in the interests of public policy and public security. Those restrictions must be applied on the basis of the personal circumstances of those concerned and on the judgment that those concerned represent a genuine threat to public order.

    The scheme of the Football Spectators Act, as amended by this Bill, meets those criteria and represents a balanced and proportionate package of measures. Once made, a banning order does not automatically impose a reporting requirement in relation to each game overseas. That requirement is imposed only after considering each individual's circumstances. The order is targeted at particular individuals and can apply in respect of particular matches for particular periods. There are provisions for exemptions and appeals against the refusal of exemptions.

    As I made clear during the Second Reading debate, I accept that serious issues are also raised under the European Convention on Human Rights by the provisions relating to banning orders by complaint and the summary powers contained in new Sections 21A and 21B. However, I remain of the view, as expressed at Second Reading, that those provisions are compatible with Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the convention. As I said at Second Reading, a banning order is not a criminal or a penal act. It is a targeted, preventive measure to help to prevent violence and disorder.

    Anyone detained under the power in new Section 21A will either be speedily released or speedily brought before a court.

    I believe that it is worth making the point that by comparison with what is alleged to be the case in Germany, our provision is rather superior because it makes plain that jurisdiction will have to apply and that people will have to be brought before a court of law and the application tested. I believe that that is an important distinction between our approach and a measure which seems to me to rely on an administrative procedure.

    For the sake of completeness, I should add that I believe the Bill to be compatible with Article 14 of the convention. The powers in Sections 21A and 21B are exercisable only in relation to British citizens. It is well established in Strasbourg jurisprudence that measures may have different effects on different nationalities if, as we believe to be the case here, there is an objective and reasonable justification for the distinction. Although banning orders will be available regardless of nationality, the mischief that we are seeking to address is the havoc wreaked by British citizens. Preventing other nationals travelling, perhaps to their own country, would raise different issues, as would the seizure of passports of foreign nationals. British passports remain the property of the Government.

    It would be unrealistic to expect unanimous agreement with the conclusions that the Government have reached on these issues. However, I hope that what I have said may be enough to make it plain that we have carefully examined and thoroughly thought through the human rights issues at stake. We think that we have struck the right balance, but that is a question that your Lordships will need to think on some more.

    I shall try to go through the points that have been made during the debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, made a cogent point that police powers are normally exercised on suspicion of offences. However, as he acknowledged, there are many other powers to detain for other reasons. He mentioned the Terrorism Act provisions. There are parallel powers on immigration detainees, patients, those in need of protection from themselves or those in breach of the peace. This is another exception. We are providing for a short period of detention to enable inquiries to be made on the grounds that it will prevent violence and disorder. That is an important consideration.

    Football hooliganism is a unique challenge to us, reflecting our society's need to curb violent behaviour overseas by our citizens. The police will still be acting to prevent violence and disorder when they exercise their Section 21A and 21B powers. We believe that the powers will be firmly acted on in the best traditions of British policing.

    The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, again compared the power in the Bill to a "sus" power. I do not believe that it is a "sus" power. "Sus" powers are about criminalising people. We are not seeking to criminalise. The power will not be exercised in the same way and it will be subject to a judicial test. That is an important consideration.

    The noble Lord also said that the police were going to be lumbered with the power. The police want it. The National Criminal Intelligence Service made that clear to us before, during and after the recent Euro 2000 experience. The Association of Chief Police Officers has also made plain its belief that the power is in the best interests of the police in trying to tackle the issues that have caused such public alarm and concern.

    10.45 p.m.

    Has not the Police Federation said that it does not want the power? It represents the bobby on the beat who will be on the front line.

    I cannot comment on the internal dynamics of the Police Federation, but in all the contact that I have had in recent weeks and months with ordinary serving police officers, they have made it clear to me that if the power is exercised in the way that we suggest, they will welcome it. It will be an extra string to their bow and an extra power in their armoury. They believe it to be right and proportionate. We heard on Second Reading what the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate, thought about the power. He seemed to believe that it would be very welcome.

    My noble friend Lord Desai compared the power fleetingly with the Dangerous Dogs Act 1989. I know that that Act is not everybody's favourite, but it has been peculiarly effective. It may not have the best drafting. Indeed, as an official I once complained about its drafting and wondered about its effectiveness. However, I also know from our statistics and experience that it is very effective. So I am not quite sure that it helps to take the cause any further forward by quoting that in aid of the argument.

    I want to reflect on the comments made by my noble friend Lord Woolmer. Along with my noble friend Lord Faulkner of Worcester, he made one of the best contributions during the course of the Second Reading debate.

    My noble friend Lord Woolmer was making a case for the proportionate use of this piece of legislation. I believe that that is how it will be used. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, made a similar point, that this power could be used to sweep up hundreds of thousands of people. I made it clear on Second Reading that we did not expect there to be hundreds of thousands of people swept up as a by-product of this part of our package of measures. But, obviously, it is a very useful power which will have a preventive virtue. People will know that if it is considered that they are going abroad simply to carry out acts of violence, acts of disorder, acts of abusiveness, racism and xenophobia, then the police have the power to make a temporary detention which can be tested at some later point in the courts. That has a preventive virtue of its own.

    My noble friend Lord Woolmer made the quite proper point that the circumstances surrounding a return fixture may have a bearing on that. On reflection, perhaps those circumstances should have a reflection on the way in which new Section 21A is used.

    We should put this into context to try to make it a bit real. Let us suppose that it had been the other way round and there had been a knifing of a Leeds United supporter in Leeds as part of the first leg of that two-legged fixture earlier this year and there was the suggestion that Leeds supporters might want to travel abroad to wreak revenge on Galatasaray supporters. In that case, this power might have had some benefit because those people who felt inclined to go abroad and carry out acts of violence might have been made to think again about it because they would know that the police had a power to use in a targeted and proportionate way to affect the outcome of human behaviour in another country. The measure has a value because of that.

    For me, the most absurd and bizarre argument advanced in support of removing this measure from the Bill was that of the noble Earl, Lord Onslow. Essentially he was saying to the Committee that he wanted to protect for ever the freedom of the right of an English citizen to go abroad and fight on the streets of the Champs Elysées. That is what the noble Earl was saying.

    That is absolutely not what I said. I said—and the noble Lord should listen—that it is the duty of the French police, the CRS, to control their own streets. Of course, I have never given any approval, by any hint of an eyebrow or a turn of phrase, of that sort of behaviour. But I say that it is the duty of the British police, the British Government and the British authorities to maintain Her Majesty's peace in this country; and it is the duty of the foreign police to maintain the peace in their country.

    If our people go abroad and breach their peace, it is up to them to face the consequences. It is not up to us to remove people's civil liberties. That is the point I make. If the noble Lord cannot understand that, he cannot understand why people are objecting to the fact that they see their civil liberties threatened by the Bill.

    I shall study Hansard very carefully. But I thought I heard the noble Earl make it plain that he felt that somehow the right of people to travel abroad to have a fight on the Champs Elysées was a right which he wanted to protect. As I said, I shall study Hansard very carefully but that seemed to me to be his line of argument and that seems to be where his argument leads to.

    I must reject that argument. I believe that we have a duty to work here and with our European colleagues to prevent the sort of disorder which brought great shame upon our nation before, during and after the events which took place at Euro 2000. To fail to do that would beggar belief. Nor do I believe that the British public would understand that.

    I turn to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew of Twysden. He said that we should allow experience to direct us so that we can return to the matter in a year's time. Just how much more experience do we need before we take some form of effective action? We have had appalling scenes on the streets of Charleroi and Brussels.

    The Minister uses the word "effective". If he is to satisfy the Committee that the measure is effective he needs to show some reason why we should believe that it will impact on the guilty rather than on the innocent. I have listened to him with great care in order to hear an answer to that question. I have not heard one.

    I make the point in another form. On the issue of effective action, the question is whether it is constitutional within the law and whether it is proportionate, reasonable and acceptable according to our standards. That is the point.

    We need this measure on the statute book in order to see how effective it will be.

    The Minister has just said that we should pass this Bill and see whether it works, and if it works that is all right. That is a very dangerous way of passing legislation.

    I find that argument most strange. Surely, if a piece of legislation works and is effective that proves the point that the legislation has worked and been effective. I do not understand the noble Earl's argument. My argument is that we need the opportunity to test out this legislation. I suggest that Parliament would be wise to pass it so that we can put it through the rigours and tests to which it, quite rightly, should be subjected. I take the point and I follow the argument that it needs to be both targeted and proportionate. I believe that the police consider that it covers both those points. They want to use it in an entirely proportionate way. No doubt they will be careful in the way in which they exercise the powers provided in this piece of legislation.

    We have had a long discussion on this matter. I was asked one or two points of fact. The noble Earl, Lord Onslow, asked how many people on the list of 1,000 had previous convictions? I believe the number is in the region of 500. About 100 had international banning orders and about 400 had domestic banning orders, so they had previous convictions.

    I suggest to the Committee that to remove the fourth measure from the Bill will undermine the general effectiveness of this new piece of legislation. Acting on the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Alexander of Weedon, we have picked up the point that there should be a "sunset" clause. We shall look at the legislation after one year and after a further period of four years so that we can see how effective it has been. I believe that was a helpful and a wise suggestion which will help us, particularly in regard to the fourth power, because we shall have the basis of experience, monitoring and judgment to test how effective it has been.

    If we do not take action and if we do not put this piece of legislation on the statute book, I believe that people in the wider world will wonder what we should legislate for. They will consider that we have the wrong priorities. For that reason, I believe that this piece of legislation and the fourth measure deserve to be supported.

    The Minister is putting forward a rather extraordinary idea of the way in which we should legislate, that we should just accept any Bill if it is time-limited. Perhaps we could try executing engine drivers if they do not run their trains on time. We could try that for a year to see how it works! The Committee must be allowed to perform its function. While taking note of the fact that the legislation is limited, in which case the Committee may let it go further than it would normally, and taking note of the urgent need for it, we must subject it to proper scrutiny. I do not believe that the Minister has made anything like a case for this part of the Bill. He started by saying that this measure would be used only occasionally and then welcomed with open arms the scenario painted by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer of Leeds, of it being used to stop 20,000 fans travelling to a match in Turkey. We have had no explanation of how that will be achieved.

    11 p.m.

    I said that I felt that the police would use this legislation in an entirely targeted and appropriate way. I said that in the circumstances I described it would have been an extremely useful power. In fact, I challenge the noble Lord to say exactly what sort of power the police should have in those circumstances to prevent the sort of disorder which I am sure the noble Lord will accept pours shame on our nation, causes misery and upset abroad, and damages our great national game.

    That was not the point I was addressing. I was asking the Minister to explain how the legislation would work. Presumably the police are sitting at the airport while the flights to Turkey are taking off. They form a line in front of the check-in desks and ensure that people pass whatever tests they set. They will not be on the database; that is only 1,000 strong. We are looking at people who simply turn up at the airport who the police know nothing about yet about whom they will make decisions. Based on what? How will it work? What practical procedures will the police go through to enable them to use this clause and achieve the results the Minister is positing?

    I contend that there are no such tests. The provision cannot be used in this way. There is no practical way in which the police can operate through "sus"—"I do not like the look of you. You are 25 and white so go home". The system cannot and will not work that way. The legislation is totally ineffective from that point of view. If we are going to do that, it must be on the back of what the Germans did; that is, a database of people who are likely to be picked up at the frontier. All this provision will do is to cause immense aggravation to fans who have every right to go to a match. The only way the police will be able to deal with it under the scenario painted by the Minister is by the wholesale moving of people back from abroad. There will be no other basis for doing it.

    To save a little time, perhaps I can ask the Minister respectfully and in the most friendly of fashions, what is the position? All sides of the Committee, even his own Benches, formed the sort of composite opinion which has been expressed. Will the Minister, between now and tomorrow, assimilate this opinion and respond to it? Or will he, according to the way in which I understood his speech, maintain the rectitude of his attitude on his brief? That is what Ministers usually do; but this is not a usual occasion. We must get this Bill through its stages by tomorrow. Is it worth our while to stay here, move amendments and make suggestions? Why not go home, unless there is a faint scintilla of a prospect that the Government will consider some of my noble friends' amendments, even if they do not consider mine?

    I am grateful for the support which this amendment received from all sides of the Chamber. I thank particularly the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for pointing out the wholly exceptional nature of the power being sought. Basically, it gives the power to arrest people not because they are thought to be guilty of an offence, but in order to bring them before a magistrates' court which will impose what may be described as a civil penalty; something in the nature of an injunction. That is wholly unprecedented.

    The only speaker from the Back Benches who gave real support to the Government was the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, who relied rather heavily on the German precedent. But, as is made clear by the very document on which he based his speech, the German situation is very different from what the Government now propose. Indeed, the article in the Daily Mail that referred to the Germans seizing people's passports was a complete contradiction of what happened. In fact, no one's passport has been formally withdrawn in Germany.

    The Germans do impose reporting conditions, and quite rightly so. That power has been effective under the Football Spectators Act and there is no reason why it should not be equally effective under the extensions to that legislation which it is proposed to make under this Bill. But they will only be made after a banning order has previously been made. The stamp in the passport is an interesting idea but not one to which the Government have given any thought on this occasion.

    I slightly regret the fact that the noble Lord, Lord Cope, from the Conservative Front Bench did not give more than very qualified support to this amendment. I disagree with him saying that this is, even in the Government's eyes, the most important part of the Bill. One cannot tell what the Government consider to be a matter of particular importance. From the Government's point of view, it seems to me that the most important element of the Bill is the proposed new Section 14B; that is, what might be called the "civil banning order". That is something on which the Government ought to concentrate.

    To a large part—for example, when he was talking about the way in which these orders were properly well targeted—what the Minister said was a defence not of the summary procedure but of the basic banning procedure. I do not agree with him that these orders are targeted at all; but there it is. That is nothing to do with the summary procedure. If the summary procedure is relied upon at all, it seems clear to me that it will lead to a great deal of injustice to many innocent people who will be picked up in error. If the Government were to make proper use of these banning orders and get them in place in time, rather than waiting until the last minute and picking up people when they go to the airport or to the ferry port, that would be quite unnecessary.

    Therefore, I am wholly unable to accept—

    Does the noble Lord accept that, as mentioned by my noble friend Lord Woolmer, circumstances change with regard to the nature of upcoming football matches? In those circumstances, surely it would be quite appropriate and not unreasonable to expect to use the powers contained in this measure.

    No. Again, the power is a banning order. Where you have a banning order, you may not seek to impose a restriction every time that someone wants to go abroad. Frankly, that is rather unlikely. However, if someone is a Leeds fan, perhaps you would not wish to impose a restriction on him if he is going abroad for a Manchester United game. One needs to get the banning order into position first. Then one decides whether to make use of it to impose a restriction on the occasion of a particular match. I am wholly unpersuaded by what the Minister has said. It is obviously quite impossible to call a Division at 10 past 11 at night.

    I should prefer not to do so. I believe that I am much less likely to be successful now. I know that the Government will have maintained their defensive Whipping. I shall beg leave to withdraw the amendment now, but we shall undoubtedly return with it tomorrow. It is very likely that we shall then seek to divide on it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 1 agreed to.

    Clause 2 [ Disclosure of information by NCISI]:

    Page 2, line 3, at end insert—
    ("(3B) A statutory instrument containing regulations under subsection (3A) shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament."").

    The noble Lord said: This amendment has the effect that regulations prescribing persons to whom the National Criminal Intelligence Service can disclose information for the purposes of the Football Spectators Act will be subject to the negative resolution procedure. The amendment gives effect to the first recommendation of the Delegated. Powers and Deregulation Committee. The Government are very grateful to its members for their very speedy and thorough report on the Bill.

    I speak also to Amendment No. 7 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope, and others. It is designed for the same purpose, but I am advised that it is preferable to have the procedure for the regulations set out in the appropriate place in the Police Act 1997 rather than in Clause 3 of the Bill. I beg to move.

    The Government's amendment is a small piece of good news in this Bill. We accept that it is preferable to our Amendment No. 7. It certainly follows the recommendation of the committee's report. We welcome the amendment.

    I, too, am happy to welcome this amendment. It follows the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee. As is the usual practice of the Government, they have accepted the recommendation of that committee.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Clause 2, as amended, agreed to.

    11.15 p.m.

    After Clause 2, insert the following new clause—

    "Extra-Territorial Offences"

    (" .—(1) Any act or omission which—

  • (a) takes place outside England and Wales, and
  • (b) would if taking place in England or Wales constitute a relevant offence within the meaning of the Football Spectators Act 1989,
  • shall, for the purposes of the law of England and Wales, constitute that offence (an "extra-territorial offence").

    (2) Proceedings for an extra-territorial offence may be taken, and the offence may for the purposes of those proceedings be treated as having been committed, in England or Wales.").

    The noble Lord said: At Second Reading I ventured to suggest that one way in which the difficulties faced by the Government might be addressed would be to insert into the Bill an extra-territorial power enabling football-related offences committed abroad to be prosecuted here. This amendment is devised to that end. For those who are interested, it is based on the extra-territorial wording of the legislation dealing with extra-territoriality between Northern Ireland and Ireland.

    It is extremely fortunate for your Lordships' House that we have had such a long and clear debate on the second group of amendments in which the striking out of new Sections 21A to 21C of the Football Spectators Act has been thoroughly considered. I say that it is fortunate, because that dealt with a great deal of the background to this proposed amendment. The feeling on these Benches was made very clear during the course of the debate; namely, that we dislike that provision intensely. It would seem that those on the Conservative and Cross-Benches and several Members of the Committee on the Labour Benches are of comparable mind.

    We recognise the difficulties that the Government face, but we believe that the worst of all worlds here would be to legislate in a way which was both dangerous in terms of precedent and civil liberty and ineffectual to boot.

    I have to be frank and say that the more we consider this Bill, and in particular new Sections 14B and 21, and the more one hears contributions from all sides of the Chamber, I say with no attempt to score points that I believe that the Government's hopes are likely to be severely confounded. I remind the Minister that we have not yet had an answer to the points which I, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and others made as to exactly how it is proposed that the powers will work in practice. The Minister has talked about targeting—he used the expression several times—but has given no indication whatever as to how that targeting would be achieved or on what basis.

    Therefore the amendment might, and I hope, will be—I recollect that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, gave a qualified welcome to this proposal at Second Reading—an effective way of introducing something that works without falling prey to some of the more hopeless aspirations which we believe attach to new Sections 21 and 14B. It would do so in a way that is both safe in terms of our traditional methods and in not attempting to recategorise a criminal offence as a civil one in order to lower the test that must be met in order to obtain convictions. It would be practical—I shall come back to that in a moment—and would not add to the panoply of powers that we already have to deal with football offences and disorder offences generally.

    The main objection voiced by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, when he summed up the Second Reading debate was that it would not achieve the preventive purpose that new Section 21 in particular is designed to achieve. He also said:

    "It would be preferable if those British citizens who commit offences abroad were prosecuted rather than deported. As I said earlier, that is a point we shall continue to press and upon which we need to work very closely, and in co-operation, with our European partners".—[Official Report, 20/7/00; col. 1261.]

    That point was made by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons. While it would have been preferable if the Belgians, for example, had taken a much more forceful line on the less serious offences of disorder of which there were plenty, the fact is that they did not. I suspect that the general attitude of foreign police forces to posses of disorderly British football fans is to say, "Let's get them the Hell out of here as soon as we can and let the Brits deal with them". I suspect that they confine themselves only to prosecuting for serious cases of assault. That is why I believe that our proposal would be much more effective than anything that the Government propose in new Sections 21 or 14B as it would enable us to get a grip on these people and to ensure that when they come back to this country exemplary prosecutions take place, and plenty of them. I believe that in terms of preventive action that would be infinitely more effective than any tinkering around with this new and dangerous category of powers that the Government seek to take in parts of the Bill.

    People may ask about arrests and evidence. We already expend a huge amount of time, money and manpower in seeking to control football violence. We already send large numbers of British police to co-ordinate with their foreign colleagues. They go over before a match, during and after it. I see no problem in extending that co-operation to local police to use their arrest powers to deport people back to the UK. The British police with whom they are co-operating would make jolly sure that those people are arrested the moment they hit British soil and are then dealt with under the vast array of powers which we already have. If any noble Lords doubt that, they should look at Schedule 1 to the Bill which sets out a list of about 25 existing pieces of legislation which are considered to be football related. I believe that this is one of those rare cases where the notion of extra-territoriality would work quite simply.

    As to foreign police forces being willing to co-operate, they would be immensely keen to co-operate with a system that relieves them of the obligation of prosecuting anything but the most serious offences, leaving it to us to do our own dirty work. I have no doubt whatever that they would be hugely co-operative. I have no doubt that if it was necessary for police officers to come and give evidence, they would readily do so. It would be a great deal cheaper for them—as well as for us—to give their full assistance to our own efforts to prosecute vigorously and in an exemplary fashion.

    For all those reasons I seriously hope that the Government—even though we are galloping the Bill through the House—will consider whether or not this would be a central, effective plank of the measures they are now seeking to bring in; at the same time, although it is not a component of this amendment, allowing the release of proposed new Section 21 in particular, and the amendment of proposed new Section 14B to proceed, to ensure that the Bill passes through the House. I beg to move.

    I would have a great deal of sympathy with the amendment if it provided an alternative to the fast track method proposed by the Government. However, I have a serious problem with it. It seems to me that it would catch foreign football hooligans as well as English and Welsh football hooligans. A Belgian hooligan arriving in this country for a holiday or whatever, could find himself arrested when he next came here and made subject to an English banning order.

    The principle which underlies all criminal law is that it is territorial in scope—a point very well put, if I may say so, by the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, in the course of the debate on the previous amendment. There are very few exceptions to that principle. The best known exception is a case of murder; an Englishman who commits a murder abroad can be tried in England for that murder. Apart from that, there are almost no other exceptions that I know of. Clearly football hooliganism—however unattractive—does not fall in the category of murder. The extra territoriality, although ingenious, makes it difficult to see how this can become law.

    Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, am I not right in saying that the Bill is confined in its scope to British subjects?

    I thought the whole object of this amendment—certainly as drafted—is that it catches acts committed by anyone abroad as if committed in this country. If I am wrong about that, then I am wrong about it. Perhaps the noble Lord can point out where it is confined to British subjects.

    I cannot put my hand on it immediately, but I think in the Bill there is a provision that it applies only to British citizens. It is certainly my intention that that would be the case. I hope that the point made by the noble and learned Lord is thereby dealt with.

    Although I strongly support nearly all the Liberal Democrat amendments to this Bill, I am afraid that I cannot support this one. Unlike my noble and learned friend, I am not a lawyer, but I have always felt uneasy about the concept of extraterritorial offences. Yes, I suppose there is a case where murder is concerned; there is probably a case where serious sexual offences against children are concerned—I believe my noble friend Lord Hylton had something to do with that—but no one surely can possibly contend that, tiresome though it undoubtedly is, football hooliganism is remotely in the same category as those two extremely grave and heinous offences. I contend that this amendment is an example of overkill.

    I am stunningly flattered by what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said.

    And so I should be, as my noble friend Lord Lucas said. I am very attracted to the amendment because I, too, do not like those disgusting people whose human rights I am attempting to defend. I do not like the way that they behave, but I dislike more the way the Government are attempting to treat them through administrative detention. "We think you might do something naughty. We have no proof. We are going to stop you getting on the aeroplane. You have missed your flight? Bad luck. We are going to lock you up for six days". There is something unpleasant about that. The idea of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, is a good one. I suspect that one could be charged for piracy extra-territorially, because by its nature piracy must be extra-territorial. I suspect that there are more offences than just murder. I agree also that these are very serious offences.

    The concept of extra-territorial legislation, provided it is done within the scope of English laws and English liberties, is extendable. If someone hurls a brick through Fouquets in the Champs-Elysées and is pursued by a very cross gendarme and is seen on television, it is perfectly reasonable that he could be arrested, charged and sentenced here. He has committed a crime. The crime is there. I am not suggesting that the crime should not be punished. I do not like the idea of, "You might do something, so we will stop you". No one is objecting to crime being punished. If it is a problem, and it is obviously perceived to be a problem, the view I take is that it is up to the foreigners to deal with our people if they get stroppy. It is the same if Turks from Galatasaray came over here and behaved badly; we would not say to the Turkish Government that they should keep them away, we would say, "Either you do not come in, or, if you do, we are going to bang you up after due process of trial". It is our problem. If we are worried about the issue, the concept of extra-territorial legislation is an extremely good way out.

    Before the noble Earl sits down, does he agree that if television picked up a picture of an Englishman who had nothing to do with football, hurling a brick against the window of a jeweller's shop in the Champs-Elysées in order to steal the jewellery therein, he should also be tried possibly in this country? Surely there is not much difference between the offences in terms of gravity.

    I would rather that happened than what the Government are doing with their abuse of human rights now.

    That surely is the point. Are we really going to legislate extra-territorially for football offences and not for exactly similar offences which are not connected with football? We had that problem with the War Crimes Bill. It was very odd in my view, and in the view of some who opposed it, that British subjects who committed war crimes abroad should be subject to being pursued, whereas those who were of another nationality—typically, Russian—were not. It did not really make sense.

    Perhaps I may apologise to the Committee for not having attended the opening debates on Amendments Nos. 1 and 2. Frankly, it never occurred to me that those matters would be debated under that head because there are so many amendments proposed by the Government, notably the compensation amendments, which appear to me to have a major bearing on whether or not the Bill is acceptable.

    In relation to new Section 21A I would just say—I accept that I have not heard the arguments and have apologised for that—that I cannot envisage a police officer standing at an airport check-in point being able, even if he wanted to, arbitrarily to pick people out of the queue and say, "I want to investigate you". Under the terms of the Bill, he has at that moment to have reasonable grounds for suspecting that a condition in new Section 14B(2) has been met. New Section 14B(2) requires that the respondent—I do not think he is a respondent; that is a fudge—
    "has at any time (whether before or after the commencement of this section) caused or contributed to any violence or disorder in the United Kingdom or elsewhere".
    One could not just pick people out of a queue on that basis. Substantial evidence would have to be available to the police officer. So I do not think that there is any risk of random picking of people. If there were, the chief constable would find himself with a very heavy bill for compensation, and quite rightly so. I rose primarily to say that I am against extra-territoriality in this field.

    11.30 p.m.

    I hope that the Committee will not mind if I respond to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, on extra-territoriality. He made the point that the provision is targeted at football hooligans and asked why it is not targeted at people who throw bricks through a jeweller's window. The whole of the Bill is targeted at football hooligans. Many of us do not like the fact that we have here a Bill targeted at a single group; but that is how it is. My feeling is that the extension of extra-territoriality to just this group of offences, which is clearly defined, as compared with the disadvantages and, some would say, evil of other aspects of the legislation, is much the lesser of evils.

    Perhaps I may invite another parallel. Am I not right in thinking that we have legislation against paedophiles travelling to the Far East for holidays with young children? Is it not extraordinary that we do not have anything parallel to this Bill for paedophiles? We cannot stop them at airports. We cannot issue them with banning orders when they have not been convicted of anything. Is that not a much more substantial and horrific offence than anything we are considering under this Bill? If the Bill is right for football hooligans, is it not right for paedophiles?

    We have sympathy for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. The Minister in another place, Mr Clarke, said that the Bill concerned only citizens of this country and not citizens of any European Union or other country. In the short time available to me, I have not quite discovered where in the Bill that provision may be found. My noble friend can no doubt tell me.

    New Sections 14A and 14B have no restrictions as to the nationality of anyone; only restrictions as to residence. The restrictions as to nationality occur only in respect of Section 21. Under new Sections 14A and 14B one could bang up a Chinaman if he happened to be living in Leeds.

    That is interesting. I shall have to look at the reference again. When the Bill was debated in another place it was said that 2.5 million foreigners live in this country. The complaint was made that they would not be covered by the Bill. My noble friend is saying that they are covered in a certain way. Perhaps the Government will respond on that point and tell us whether European Union citizens or citizens of other countries come under the Bill if they are resident in this country. I understood not, but I should be grateful for clarification.

    I thank my noble friend for giving way. New Section 14B(1) states that a,

    "person may be made by the chief officer of police for the area in which the person resides or appears to reside, if it appears to the officer",
    and so on. Therefore, I would assume that it is a residency and not a nationality test.

    I am grateful to my noble friend. My noble friends seem to have studied the Bill with great care. I hope that the Government have studied the Bill with equal care and will be able to confirm what my noble friends have said.

    The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said that we want people prosecuted, not deported, when they commit offences in Europe. Sadly, there is no evidence that that has happened in the past. We have seen vast numbers of people—900—being arrested. We then saw three people in court and the one case of conviction was a failure. It reminds me of the problem we had over asylum seekers with regard to previous Bills that we have discussed. Sometimes the authorities in Europe turn a blind eye to asylum seekers because they know that they are on their way to this country. They let them go through even though they are caught in a safe country in Europe. An attitude has prevailed along the lines of, "Let's get rid of them and hope that they do not come back again". That is disappointing because they ought to be prosecuted in the country in which they committed the offence. I believe that the Minister would agree with that.

    If there is a certain reluctance to prosecute, what can be done to help local police services? If it was possible for criminals to be charged and for their cases to be heard here, they might be charged more frequently. British police officers attend major European football matches. A huge number of video cameras, CCTV and news reportage cover such events. Indeed, we have seen horrendous film of known, recognised, named thugs—if I may so call them—blatantly committing acts of violence in front of the television cameras. Those people were not charged in Belgium, nor were ways sought to extradite them.

    The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said that the amendment as it stands could catch foreign hooligans when next they came over here. I presume that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, could redraft his amendment to sort out that point. In any case, it would depend on the prosecuting authorities and whether they wished to pursue such an action. I doubt that they would.

    The amendment has revealed a new aspect of the Bill. It is one in which noble Lords should take an interest. It seeks to have cases heard where the offences are committed. Failing that, it would enable them to be heard in this country. That would be a great deal better if hooligans who go abroad and behave badly were convicted on that rather than go through this unknown, tortuous, untried process—we can see already that this will be fraught with difficulties—of being banned from a match.

    This kind of process has been used in the past, although I accept that it has been used in relation to terrorism. It has worked well between this country and Ireland. The legislation has been useful and has thrown up few problems. Noble Lords should consider whether such a provision should be added to the Bill.

    I recall an American saying that when you are up to your neck in alligators, it is sometimes difficult to remember that the original idea was to drain the swamp. Listening to our debates this evening, I think that the Minister is up to his neck in legal alligators. Indeed, that is one of my major concerns as regards the Bill.

    On Second Reading the Minister and I shared the objective of wishing to find a way of cutting away from football the yob culture that has attached itself to the game. As I listen to the debate, and in particular to the interventions of our legal colleagues, I am filled more and more with foreboding that the Government are trying to take action in this manner and with such haste. That feeling has become stronger since listening to the intervention of the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, speaking from his experience.

    When my noble friend Lord Phillips put forward the notion of extra-territoriality in the debate on Second Reading, I tended to side with the Minister, who was of the view that that would be shutting the stable door too late and that the Government's proposals would be pre-empted; the action proposed by my noble friend would be only reactive. But the more I have heard about the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, and from my own experience, the more I have realised that there is very little trouble at the airports and docks. It is not while these characters are travelling that the trouble occurs. If the police start trying to extract individuals—particularly those protesting their innocence—at airports and docks, that could well be a recipe for disturbance rather than a cure for it. So perhaps the Minister's solutions are not so pre-emptive as they seemed at first blush.

    As to the solution proposed by my noble friend Lord Phillips, it has annoyed me as a football fan, in relation to both domestic and international games, that one reads of extensive disturbances but then the number of arrests or prosecutions is minute. The big danger is that it removes any sanction or fear from such characters. The idea they receive is: the odds are stacked in your favour; you can go abroad and misbehave and you will come back home again with no sanction at all.

    We should at least explore this option. Remembering about draining the swamp, one of the things that would begin peeling off the yobs from soccer is if they were hit, and hit hard, by prosecutions. I agree that we should encourage and attempt to obtain the co-operation of host nations to use their laws and their police powers to prosecute in their countries. But we should also look at this option and make people pay for their disturbances. That is way that we can peel them off.

    I say to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, that I would much prefer us to go down the road of going after real hooligans who have committed real crimes than the Government's alternative of an entirely speculative "sus" power which they believe will act as a deterrent.

    Turning to the objection raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, it is odd that, given the whole range of reasons why people can go abroad to cause disturbances, we should focus on football. But that is what we have decided to do. Therefore, this does not disbar the suggestion by my noble friend Lord Phillips.

    At Second Reading, the Minister showed a degree of sympathy for this proposal. We are trying to get to the root of the matter; we are trying to peel the yobs away from soccer. This seems to be one method of making them pay, in a way that they are not presently experiencing. It could be the most effective way of draining the swamp.

    The debate has been interesting; I do not say that merely for the sake of it. It is the case that at Second Reading I expressed some interest in the argument advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. I recognise that it has merit. However, the debate needs to be set in a broader context. I suspect that it takes us to the heart of the some of the discussions and debates that have begun to develop around the notion of corpus juris, in which the Liberal Democrat Benches have expressed great interest. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, voiced the idea: why should it apply only to football; why should it not apply in other areas? That argument comes into play in the whole debate about corpus juris.

    I also have misgivings to which the noble and learned Lords, Lord Donaldson of Lymington and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, have given good expression. Extra-territorial jurisdiction is not a regime with which our courts are at all familiar. It exists for murder, some terrorist offences and serious sexual offences, as well as for a few offences established under international conventions, but not very many. It remains rare for offences committed overseas to be tried in British courts. Before we create a whole new raft of circumstances to which extra-territorial jurisdiction might apply, considerable discussion and preparatory work will need to be undertaken with our international colleagues in the judicial field to make it effective.

    11.45 p.m.

    If someone is seen throwing a brick through a window in the Champs-Elysées by an English policeman who happens to be on the scene and it is on television so the evidence is cut and dried, I do not see why we cannot prosecute him almost without reference to the French authorities. Where do they come into it?

    I believe that the French authorities would have a great deal to say about it. Perhaps the noble Earl will permit me to develop the argument. The noble Earl needs to think hard about the views of the French authorities. I am sure that they would want to protect the right to prosecute in their own jurisdiction.

    To go further, one of the reasons jurisdiction has not been extended is the profound problem of securing evidence. The noble Earl makes a case based on an event that is witnessed by a British police officer and may be recorded on a CCTV system. First, that system would not be ours and it would be one to which we would need to gain access. Secondly, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, paints a picture in which there are many, if not hundreds, of police officers abroad during an exercise in which they monitor people who are, or may be, football hooligans. I do not believe that the British police are in a position to allow hundreds of officers to travel abroad to monitor events in those circumstances. Certainly, that has not been the case in the major exercises that we have conducted in the past few months. We provide adequate support in a targeted and proportionate way.

    Does the Minister agree it would be very odd if a person committed a criminal offence triable in this country because it was witnessed by an English policeman but not if it was witnessed only by a French policeman?

    It comes down to gathering evidence to a British evidential standard, securing proper identification, and ensuring that witnesses are transported here from an overseas jurisdiction and fully understand how our jurisdiction works. All of those matters must apply for extraterritorial jurisdiction to work effectively. At the time of Euro 2000 we believed it most important to secure the co-operation of our colleagues in Belgium and Holland to act and to prosecute where people committed offences in their jurisdiction. That was the basis on which we signed the various protocols, and we believe that that is the preferable course.

    I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McNally; it is important that people are prosecuted and are subject to the full force of the law. However, that does not deal with one of the important arguments that we have advanced for this legislation and its principal purposes; namely, to prevent unruly, unpleasant scenes like those on the streets of Charleroi, Brussels, Copenhagen and earlier in Istanbul. We want a strategy which in part rests on prevention rather than cure. That is where the extra-territorial jurisdiction line of argument leads us.

    I have a great deal of respect for the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, but his proposal is not a strategy. It is not even a part of a strategy. It may be of some use in the future if we can put all those factors in place so that they can work effectively—equal evidential standards; the ready identification of suspects; the easy transportation of witnesses; and witnesses able to operate within a British court so that they can explain what they saw where offences were comparable. Those difficulties present us with considerable hurdles to overcome in adopting readily the amendment although as I said at the outset, and at Second Reading, I have some sympathy with the point that the noble Lord seeks to make.

    Relying on extra-territorial jurisdiction would not prevent people from leaving this country who were intent on hooliganism, violence and acts of racism and xenophobia abroad. The amendment would not have that virtue. For all those reasons we do not think that we can rely on extra-territorial jurisdiction for football hooliganism offences. Nor do we think that it offers a viable alternative strategy for beating the overseas football hooligan problem that we have experienced.

    For that reason, sympathetic as I am to the noble Lord's position, we cannot accept Amendment No. 4.

    Before the Minister sits down, perhaps he will kindly answer my question about who is covered by the provisions. Am I right to believe that the Bill covers only a British citizen, resident or nonresident, in this country? Does it cover a European citizen resident in this country?

    My understanding is the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. Only Section 21 applies to a British citizen. All the other parts of the legislation apply to someone who resides in this country.

    As we are in Committee, I am entitled to ask the Minister to think a little further about the objective of prevention. He has no difficulty in convincing any of us that that objective is desirable. However, he has to convince us of two things: first, that the objective is possible; and, secondly, that it can be achieved without bringing in a large trawl at the end of it.

    I know that in politics the unexpected always happens. However, if the Home Secretary were to describe Mr Roger Gale as a woolly Hampstead liberal, that would be beyond the realms of the unexpected; it would be near the miraculous. However, I have been looking at Mr Gale's speech in another place. I paraphrase as the rules of order demand. He said that many of his constituents going about their lawful business, going across the Channel to buy their booze, were as likely to be picked up under the provisions of the Bill as any football hooligan. He said that the Bill was inviting the Kent police to use a crystal ball. The Minister has shown no inclination to respond to that charge. We badly need to hear a response. Before he again invites the argument of prevention, can the Minister try to address that point because it is vital?

    Presumably Mr Gale's constituents would not have tickets for the match and, therefore, prima facie would not be likely to be hooligans out to cause nothing but trouble.

    One of the factors the noble Earl forgets is that this piece of regulation will operate only during a controlled and, therefore, limited period of time. That is an important consideration. We are being proportionate in the way we propose this piece of legislation.

    I listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson. He made it clear that the exercise of the power could not be conducted in the very arbitrary way in which several Members of the Committee have suggested. The police could not act in that arbitrary way. As the noble and learned Lord said, the police would run the powerful risk of running up big bills in terms of compensation and the exercising of their powers unlawfully. That is not what the police want.

    They want to be able to use these powers where they will be effective. I think that they will be effective in the way the police seek to exercise these powers.

    The Minister said that the control periods would be relatively short. If one adds up all the potential measures and considers how they are distributed in time, do they not cover half the year?

    There are probably some 20 football matches a year where they might be of benefit. If the control period is five days, that makes 50 days throughout the year.

    One is talking about 100 days at most. Given the way in which the power will work, the constraints on the police and terms of compensation, the police will be extremely careful about the way they exercise the power. Leading police officers have said that they want to exercise the powers in the Bill in a targeted and entirely proportionate way.

    The Minister says that the power will be used with great restraint. Where do we get back to—

    If the noble Earl had listened carefully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, he would have heard that the way the legislation is phrased, the police will have to operate lawfully and in an entirely proportionate and appropriate way.

    I listened with care to what was said about preventive arrests that could have taken place in the case of Leeds supporters, had the Galatasaray game been the other way around. How many Leeds supporters need to be stopped with care? The Minister implied an awful lot. Could he elaborate?

    I said in the other debate that in those circumstances, the police would have found the power of use and value. No doubt they would have been careful about the circumstances in which they exercised the power.

    I am grateful for the Minister's response to this mini debate and for other contributions. As to the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, I thought that the Bill confined itself to British citizens throughout but in fact that is only true of Clause 21—which could be remedied by redrafting my amendment.

    The Minister did not envisage that the police would want to send enough officers across the Channel for the game in France on 2nd September but implementing proposed Section 21 would involve a massive deployment of police resources if it is to have any effect. I urge the Minister to look the practical consequences of Section 21 fully in the eye. It will not achieve its purpose anymore than the NCIS list of 1,000 key hooligans—which was not remotely effective despite all the efforts to stop hooliganism in Charleroi.

    The NCIS exercise was extremely effective. Only a small number of persons identified as potential troublemakers bothered to travel abroad. They were put off. That was the beauty of it. The problem was that hundreds of other English supporters abroad were intent on causing trouble in any event.

    Midnight

    I am grateful to the Minister because he made my point precisely. Despite all that, the outcome was that 965 British fans were arrested and deported. Of that number, only 30 were on the NCIS list. That is another way of saying that it is impossible to tell who will cause an outbreak of violence. It will be no more possible in future and therefore no more possible to identify at any port who is likely to be the cause of the violence in order to utilise the powers under new Section 21. That is the practical point.

    We are beginning to slip into treating all 900-odd as guilty. I urge the Committee to remember that a large number were herded together and deported with no evidence whatever that they were causing trouble. I want to make that point in case the noble Lord's analysis begins to blur it. Many citizens feel extremely aggrieved about what happened to them.

    I am grateful to the noble Lord for reminding me of a point I made at Second Reading. We are entering deep and unnecessary water, but one of the reasons for that remark was that the need for the legislation is less than it might be.

    The truth of the matter is that the practicalities of controlling British football hooligans are beyond prediction and the targeting constantly referred to by the Minister. They are untargetable, which is why the Government did not do so at Charleroi. They have too much drink and away they go chucking plastic chairs about.

    That is why I want the Minister to reconsider our proposal overnight. The one sure way of discouraging hooliganism is to punish those guilty of it. Under present arrangements that is not happening. They returned in their hundreds and only two are being prosecuted. If of the 965 arrested and deported there were 100 prosecutions with exemplary sentences that would do something to discourage the others, that would be a real deterrent and that would be preventive. That is why I hope the Minister will reconsider the proposal.

    The standard of proof is not a difficulty. Indeed, it is a bit rich the Minister worrying about standards of proof when Section 14B(2) is in his Bill. That provides the lowest hurdle that man ever had to jump in order to get someone into a criminal position.

    Finally, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, and the noble Lord, Lord Monson, said that it is worrying to extend extra-territoriality beyond the limited range of murder, piracy, treason and paedophilia. I accept that it is a large extension of extraterritoriality. However, I put it to the Committee that it is justified here for the same reason as it is justified in the cases in which we have it; namely, that as regards those offences there is a strong national interest in being able to prosecute here. Normally, in respect of a theft or an assault there is no British national interest in prosecuting for an offence committed in Greece or Holland. However, the purpose of the Bill, as the Minister has repeatedly said, is that national pride, identity, status and world renown are affected by these offences. That is why I believe that there is a real case for extraterritoriality.

    There is a slight dent in the noble Lord's argument. The Americans believe that an American national interest is involved in making it a criminal offence for their citizens to set foot on Cuban soil. The noble Lord and his colleagues may disagree, but that is the case. It is true that the law is not enforced with great rigour, but it remains on the statute book. If one speaks of national interest as superseding all other considerations, is not that the kind of danger into which one might run?

    I must respond quickly and sit down. It is of course dangerous, but the point about the Bill is that it is basically about protecting the British status and national interest as regards people who defame our name. That is why I believe that there is a national interest warranting an extension of extraterritoriality. On that note, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 3 [ Supplementary]:

    Page 2, line 6, leave out ("transitory").

    The noble Lord said: I should like to know what effect this amendment would have. I beg to move.

    Perhaps I may speak to Amendment No. 6 in my name. It is grouped with Amendment No. 8 in the name of my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway. Amendment No. 6 takes account of the report of the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee which—

    If the noble Viscount is short in moving his amendment, which I shall be asking him to withdraw, he may be pleasantly surprised by what I have to say.

    I am delighted by that intervention from the noble Lord because I was merely speaking to my amendment. The previous amendment was being moved. I shall let my noble friend Lord Campbell of Alloway speak to his amendment.

    In the circumstances and at this hour, I shall not move my amendment.

    I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. Perhaps I may deal, first, with Amendment No. 5 and—

    I had hoped to speak to Amendment No. 5. I shall simply say in passing that the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, would have been pleased by what I would have said on his amendment had I spoken.

    With regard to Amendment No. 5, I have taken the advice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Simon of Glaisdale, on this clause. He tells me that off the top of his head he cannot think of any other case where he has seen the word "transitory" appear in legislation. Clearly in some way it is opposed to the word "transitional". I do not understand the difference. Therefore, I should like to know with as much precision as the Minister can manage in what way the force of the Bill would be changed if the word "transitory" were left out. As Pickwick would have had it: gentlemen, what does this mean?

    With regard to Amendment No. 5, the noble Lord raises an interesting semantic point, not for the first time. I am advised that there is a difference between "transitory" and "transitional" and that it is common practice to refer to both. In short, "transitory" means temporary whereas "transitional" means moving from one state of affairs to another. I hope that that explanation will satisfy the noble Lord. If it does not, that is the best that I can do.

    I move, perhaps more importantly, to Amendment No. 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope, which has been spoken to by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor. This amendment seeks to give effect to the Select Committee's second recommendation that any amendments to an affirmative instrument made under Clause 3 should be by affirmative instrument.

    I should emphasise that the power to make amendments under Clause 3(1) is limited. It does not give Ministers carte blanche to rewrite the statute book. It is limited to supplementary, incidental, consequential or transitional provisions in consequence of or to give full effect to the Bill. I accept of course that amendments to primary legislation should be subject to affirmative resolution procedure, and that is already provided for in Clause 3(4).

    As we made clear at Second Reading, the Government's reluctance to accept the Select Committee's recommendation on this point was due largely to our desire to ensure that there is no obstacle to the availability of legal advice and assistance to those who may need it from commencement. I am happy to tell the Committee that we shall bring forward amendments on Report to overcome that difficulty. As a result, we now accept in principle the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope. We are advised that the drafting should be slightly different and amendments will be brought forward on Report to give effect to the Select Committee's recommendation.

    Before the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, speaks, I should like to say that we are very happy with this amendment. It is a problem that the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee pointed out and I am glad that it has been accepted that affirmative resolution should be required, not only for primary legislation but for secondary legislation which itself was dealt with by the affirmative procedure.

    I thank the Minister for having accepted the substance of the amendments.

    I am grateful to the Minister. I shall not move Amendment No. 6. I leave it to my noble friend Lord Lucas to see whether he understands the difference between temporary and moving from one to another.

    Of course I understood the grammar entirely. I credit the noble Earl, Lord Russell, with having spotted the issue on Second Reading. I tabled the amendment because I was awake later than he was, I suppose.

    I have not seen the word used in any other legislation. I want to know the effect of taking it out. What provision that the Government intend to bring forward would they not be able to bring forward if the word was not there? The word implies that something will be done under the Bill that has not been clone under any other Bill that I have ever paid attention to. I want to know what the word will permit the Government to do that they would not be permitted to do if it was not there.

    I suggest that the Minister should inquire of his officials whether there is any precedent for the word and why it should be in the Bill. I should like a demonstration of what the Government intend to do with it. If not, perhaps we might have an amendment on Report to take it out. Would the Minister be happy either to provide me with reasons why it is in the Bill before Report or to take it out?

    I, too, would like to know whether we need to return to the issue tomorrow. I should be extremely grateful for any information that could ensure that we did not need to. If that information could be forthcoming, I should be very interested in it.

    I always hesitate to disagree in any way with the noble Earl, Lord Russell, but he would need to return to the issue today, not tomorrow, I think.

    More seriously, if the Secretary of State decided that a particular match required particular alteration—

    I think that today does not end until we reach the end of the Committee stage.

    I am much obliged. I tried.

    More seriously, I suppose that the Secretary of State might want to introduce some amendment or alteration relating to a particular match or period and the Bill would enable him to do that. I do not want to encourage that, but I do not believe that the power does us any harm. If he had good cause to do that, it would be a pity if he did not have the power.

    If the Minister will agree to provide me with the official government explanation before I lose any chance to table an amendment on Report, I should be most grateful. Will he agree to do that?

    The noble Lord heard what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, said. That was a very good way of putting the point. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment now so that we can get on and discuss some real issues.

    It is an interesting extension of the principle in Pepper v. Hart that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson, can make policy for the Government. I require an official statement of government policy. I know that it is not forthcoming from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, or he would have given it to me much earlier. May I please have it in writing before Report stage? I do not think that that is an unreasonable request. Some explanation should be given of a word that is in the Bill and the use that the Government intend to make of it.

    Not just the noble Earl, Lord Russell, but the Library will have a copy, too.

    In view of that generosity, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    12 15 a.m.

    [ Amendments Nos. 6 to 8 not moved.]

    Clause 3 agreed to.

    Clause 4 agreed to.

    Clause 5 [ Commencement and duration]:

    [ Amendment No. 9 not moved.]

    Page 2, line 34, leave out ("one year") and insert ("six months").

    The noble Lord said: This amendment seeks to leave out "one year" and to insert "six months" in the provision setting out the initial period. With it is grouped Amendment No. 12 which reduces the subsequent period of the length of this legislation to one further year.

    There has been ample demonstration already this evening, in the past few hours, of the problems of this legislation. They flow in part from the very great speed at which the legislation has been put together; at a time of great strain for the Home Office because it has a vast amount of legislation; at a time when our Summer Recess is approaching; and when there are some football matches to which the Government want this legislation to apply. The first match which has been mentioned is the match in Munich on 4th August. That was referred to by the Home Secretary as a match with regard to which it would be valuable to have these provisions in place. The next is in early September, in France. In those circumstances, the legislation has had to be extremely rushed. I doubt whether it will be possible to implement it fully by 4th August, even if everything happens as the Government hope in Parliament. However, that seems to be the aim.

    The fact that this legislation has been extremely rushed has been amply demonstrated in the past few hours and will continue to be demonstrated as we go on to discuss some of the later amendments.

    The case is very simple. In these circumstances of haste and pressure on the Home Office, the Bill should not last long before coming back for reconsideration. It should be tried out in practice. Many practical questions have already been exposed and no doubt more will emerge in the course of the evening. But in these circumstances, let us see the Bill tried out for a short while; then, when we see how it works in practice, we can come back to the underlying points of principle, as well as points of detail.

    There are a number of matches over the course of the next six and 18 months. So the Bill will have been thoroughly exposed to the practicalities of the matter during that period. At the same time, that also gives enough time for the Government and the rest of us to think further about this so as to try to achieve the aim that we all want—of making a real impact on this serious problem. I beg to move.

    I support this amendment. I rather wish that the period suggested was three months because the more I have listened this evening, the more this Bill appears to me to be very unpleasant from the point of view that the civil liberties arguments have not been addressed. The impracticalities and the fact that nothing will work have been highlighted even by those Members of the Committee who were vaguely in sympathy with the Bill. For example, the opposition of the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, is far more valid than mine because I do not believe in the Bill in principle. But coming from where the noble Lord does, his opposition is extremely powerful. We have had no real answer from the Minister as to the who, how, when or where of this Bill or how many people will be stopped from travelling or put into preventive detention. It is an extremely unpleasant and unworkable Bill.

    If the Bill has to become law, surely we could try it out between now and State Opening, by which time we may have an answer. There is a match in Munich, the anniversary of the outbreak of the 1914 war, the anniversary of the collapse at Sedan of the Second Empire in September and the fall of the Third Empire in Paris, so there are lots of historical analogies which the beautifully educated football hooligan can apply. The noble Lord, Lord Carter, points, with elegance, to myself. There are plenty of occasions when this Bill can be put to trial. Those noble Lords who really do not like it may be slightly tempted to go away and hide in their tents if the Minister cuts the time allowed to the barest minimum.

    I rise to oppose this proposition for two or three reasons. I am unhappy about the haste with which this legislation has emerged. Once it has passed through the Committee stage, it would be extremely unfortunate if we were equally hasty in forming a view about how it was working. It seems to me to be impractical to expect to be able to judge whether it is working within a six-month period. Every few months, we could be invited to change our minds and to play around with the legislation. I hope that it is given a fair wind for 12 months.

    At Second Reading I said that I believed that noble Lords should tell the public that there is no quick fix and that this is a matter of concentrating on the application of this legislation year after year. I should prefer to take the slow route which means looking at it year after year. Nothing dramatic will happen after a few months. If over the next 12 months the Bill results in an improved situation and many of my concerns about it do not arise, I shall not be surprised, but pleasantly pleased. I hope that in its second year there will be improvements, and in the third year also.

    For us to tell the public that we will judge it after six months and that there will have to be primary legislation after 12 months, will give entirely the wrong impression. I hope on this occasion that the Minister will not feel able to be as generous as he was a short while ago.

    The scenario painted by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer of Leeds, that the less successful this Bill is, the longer it should carry on, is truly horrific. We are looking at granting the Government powers over our civil liberties that we should hardly contemplate; and the more we go into the Bill, the more horrific it becomes. To revise this Bill properly we must look at shortening the time-scale, although six months may be rather a short period. I am not enamoured with Amendment No. 10, but I believe that Amendment No. 12 is essential. I hope that that will find favour on the Government Benches. It would certainly cut short a lot of later discussion and I hope would please the Chief Whip among others.

    I support the amendment. I shall give my reasons tomorrow as it is far too late now. This Bill is approaching emergency legislation; it is the nearest thing to emergency legislation that I have seen since the war. This emergency could well be over in six months' time.

    Can the Minister or the noble Lord, Lord Bach, advise me at which fans new Sections 14 and 21 are aimed? We are looking at the football calendar. Most of the speeches from the Government Front Bench, and indeed comments that have been made since Euro 2000, have been directed at fans attending matches where England is playing.

    I believe I am right in saying—no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, will be able to confirm this—that there is a plethora of club matches taking place in Europe and the final of the European championship will be the last Wednesday in the coming May. Should an English club work its way to the final it will have some impact on what we are discussing tonight. But, as I understand it, there is a great cry for 2nd September 2000 when England play Paris in France in a friendly game. I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, will be able to advise the Minister on that. Perhaps therefore the period of 12 months may be too long. But a period of six months may be too short.

    My understanding—I confess I have not checked this—is that only two games will be caught by a six-month period. One is the match against France and the other is a World Cup qualifying game some time in the autumn against Finland in Helsinki. Nothing else would come within the six-month period.

    On the other hand, England will be playing away in World Cup qualifying competition and those games will be caught by a 12-month or 10-month period. I believe those games are normally played during the season or just spilling over. Players have to go on holiday because their knees and their bodies crack up at some time in June. We are therefore looking at a first experimental period between now and June. But that is if this measure applies only to England fans going abroad.

    Am I not right in thinking that the Bill applies to any football fan going abroad? For instance, if Manchester United or Leeds plays abroad, the provisions apply. Presumably, therefore, there are many more of those matches which will take place within the 10 months or six months.

    It will apply to European club competitions, the UEFA Competition and the European Champions League.

    My name is associated with Amendment No. 12, which is grouped with Amendment No. 10. The noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, introduced those two amendments. I hope that between now and Report we can reach agreement on an effective trial period for this legislation if it is to go through.

    The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, made the point that the Bill has taken on the appearance of emergency legislation. Well, I am a great fan of "Frazier", the American television programme. On Sunday nights old editions are shown on cable television. Last night there was an exchange between Daphne, the English girl in the series, and Frazier. Daphne said rather defiantly, "England has given many good things to the world", and Frazier sneered back, "Yes, like football hooligans".

    So the football hooligan problem has been around a long time and the worry that we are slamming this legislation through in the last few hours of this parliamentary Session demands that the Government understand that the life term of this legislation must be extremely short. Yet against that we have to balance the valid point of the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, that we must give it time to test. But I submit that that could, with goodwill, be resolved by the usual channels between now and the Report stage, as long as the Government are not excessive in their demands for the duration.

    I hope that the Government will meet that point constructively and that they will not make it necessary for those of us on this side to impose a solution upon them. We do not want to do that. We would prefer the Government to be genuinely realistic about the fact that they are putting through this legislation in this way, while meeting the legitimate point made by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer.

    12.30 a.m.

    I listened to this debate with considerable care; indeed, I always listen to what the noble Lord, Lord McNally, says on these matters. Both he and I share very similar views about football, the events that surround it and the need for a change in the atmosphere of such matches to be reflected not only in legislation but also in other action. For example, ticketing arrangements have been mentioned, as well as the responsibility of the clubs and of the FA, and so on, for changing the current atmosphere surrounding the England team when it travels abroad. I believe that we broadly agree on such issues.

    The whole notion of a sunset period was usefully introduced into the debates on this legislation by the noble Lord, Lord Alexander of Weedon, at what I considered to be an important moment. The response of the Home Secretary was characteristic: he said that he would take the matter away and think about it. Indeed, that is what he did, after having agreed that it was a good idea. The notion that we need to have a sunset period is very fixed in our minds. It is just a matter of sorting out between us what is an appropriate period.

    I should like to go through the arguments carefully to try to persuade the Committee of what might be an appropriate way of considering this proposal. Effectively, there are two sunset periods. We need to look at the relationship between the two. Amendment No. 10 would reduce the first of those periods from one year to six months. As I understand it, during that six-month period the following England fixtures will take place. On 2nd September there is a match between France and England in Paris. On 11th October, a World Cup qualifier is to be played in Finland. I very much doubt whether many England supporters will travel to Finland, although a number of them will do so. Indeed, the England team is always well supported abroad. In November there is a proposed friendly match to be played in Italy, and Albania will entertain England on 28th March next. Again, I question whether the "hooligan hoards", as it were, will be making their way in vast numbers to Albania. Nevertheless, that is a fixture that would be caught by the six-month proposal.

    I venture to suggest that those four fixtures would barely be an adequate test of the effectiveness, or otherwise, of this legislation were it to be amended in the way suggested. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, recognised the reality of the situation. In all probability, we shall need to have a 12-month period to test the effectiveness and the voracity of the legislation so that a reasonable degree of analysis can come into play.

    The noble Lord, Lord Lyell, knows well enough that there is a complex fixture list of European club matches that would be caught in that test period. As he said, the finals are usually played in May. Therefore, the first 12-month period is most important. It would enable us to consider whether the legislation should be renewed by the affirmative resolution procedure.

    When we go beyond that period then the second sunset clause comes into play. In the current situation, there would be a further four years. During that period England participate within the World Cup to be held in Japan in 2002, if they qualify. England would seek to qualify for the next European championship which takes place in Portugal in 2004. Both of those competitions should have a bearing on how we view the effectiveness or otherwise of this legislation. My argument would be that we need to take a longer view. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, is right in that regard. We need to see how the legislation will work in those circumstances, how effective it is in terms of prevention, and with other measures outside the scope of legislation, in changing the attitude of England and English club supporters when they travel abroad.

    My inclination would be to continue to consider the length of the second sunset period. I accept that there is some scope for movement on our part in that regard. I am not closing the door on it. I am open to sensible propositions. But we need properly to consider how the legislation will work to cover us through the qualification period for the next World Cup leading up to 2002 and also playing in the European championship again in 2004.

    The sunset proposal is a very good one. It will focus minds and enable our police service and NCIS to very carefully work out what a thorough and good assessment will be. In terms of assessment, we are obviously very open to ideas. There is flexibility. I invite the Members of the Committee who have put these proposals together tonight to consider just how long a time will be needed to measure effectiveness here. That is important.

    I take the point about legislation that has been put together fairly rapidly, but with a degree of consideration. Some of the proposals have been in existence and debated not just in the past few weeks and months, but over the past few years. We need to reflect on how the legislation works. That is very important. I am very grateful to those noble Lords who made the practical suggestion in the first place and who are obviously thinking very carefully about how we shall measure the effectiveness of the legislation as it now stands.

    Can the noble Lord help me a little? For the sake of argument let us assume that this legislation is enacted. Let us assume that some dozen, two dozen or even 100 people are stopped before each of the matches. Let us then assume for the sake of argument that those who were arrested were about to do absolutely nothing and that those who were about to riot had caused mayhem in Paris, Munich or Helsinki. Do the Government then say, "Whoops, we have made a booboo" or do they say, "This is such a good piece of legislation we must extend it for another year"

    There has been an accretion of legislation to try to tackle the violent disorder associated with football over the past 15 years. I believe that that is commonly accepted across the political divides in your Lordships' House. We shall need to reflect on whether or not these measures, coupled with the other things that we need to do for the game, with the FA and the clubs, are effective. If we see a reduction in the disorder, violence, xenophobia and racism when England and English clubs travel abroad, then I believe that we can fairly say that the legislation has had a salutary effect. We shall then need to consider what the implications might then be of saying that the legislation has worked and we no longer have a need to retain it on the statute book. We shall have to have another debate at that stage. But let us try to get to the happy point where we can at least have that debate and reflect on whether or not the measures have been effective.

    That is exactly the question I did not ask. I asked what happens if exactly the opposite happens. I did not ask what happens if suddenly the whole world is full of smiling people and everyone walks gently down the Champs-Elysées with a malacca cane and a top hat as opposed to being daubed in war paint with a lager can in their left ear. I asked what happens if it does not work. Do the Government say that it does not work but we must still have it, or do they say, "Oops, we have made a booboo"? That is the simple question that I asked.

    If the legislation is not as successful as we would wish, we shall have to consider other measures. No doubt the noble Earl would make some excellent proposals.

    To summarise this short debate I should say that Amendment No. 10 has had a mixed reception. My noble friend Lord Onslow wanted to reduce the period to three months; some thought that six months was about right, but some thought that it was too short. We have learnt much about future national features to be held in the six-month period and about an unknown number of club fixtures to be held during that period. Nevertheless, I shall not pursue the six-month proposal further because of the way in which it has been received.

    I shall not pursue the one-year proposal this evening. The noble Lord, Lord McNally, made the useful suggestion that we should think further about Amendment No. 12. The Minister said that there had been discussion over some years leading up to the measure. I accept that there has been a certain amount of discussion of the first three proposals in the Bill. However, the sunset clause applies only to new Sections 14B, 21A and 21B, which I believe is how it should apply.

    We are all trying to balance the restriction on civil liberties in the Bill with the necessity to deal with the problem as best we can. We need to reflect on the matter a little more. However, in the meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 not moved.]

    Page 2, line 42, after ("Act") insert (", and
    (b) the arrangements in force in Scotland and Northern Ireland for ensuring the proper working of the provisions of this Act,").

    The noble Lord said: The Bill provides that before an order is laid to extend the powers in the Bill beyond the initial period—whatever that turns out to be—the Secretary of State shall report on the working of the Act before each House of Parliament. That is a helpful measure. The amendment seeks to ensure that the report also covers the arrangements in force in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

    As we discussed at Second Reading—I said a great deal then which I shall not repeat now—there is a large loophole in the Bill with regard to the position in Scotland and Northern Ireland. At the moment there appears to be no intention for any action to be taken by the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Parliament to close the loophole from that end. There is not a great deal that can be done at this end to close that loophole. Nevertheless I believe that more consideration will need to be given as to the extent that the loophole may be used by fans to avoid the legislation and as to whether something more effective can be done if greater thought is given to it.

    I understand that the report will be compiled by an independent person—we presume that that will be a senior lawyer. We want the report to cover not only how the arrangements will work in England and Wales but also in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

    Amendment No. 14 goes to an entirely different point. I shall leave the noble Earl to speak to that, at least at this stage. I beg to move.

    12.45 a.m.

    My Lords, we on these Benches can offer one cheer to Amendment No. 13; it is a sensible idea. I do not think that it fully addresses the depth of the problem of the relationship between this Bill and the devolved jurisdictions. I am not sure that my amendment addresses the whole of it either; we may need to go further.

    My amendment seeks to delete subsection (2) of Clause 6, which states:
    "But the amendment or repeal by this Act of an enactment extending to Scotland or Northern Ireland also extends to Scotland or, as the case may be, Northern Ireland".
    It may be an exaggeration to say that that drives a coach and horses through the principle of devolution, but it does at least make a significant dent in it.

    I should like to know, first, what consultation has taken place about this; whether there has been any with the Northern Ireland Executive, with the Northern Ireland Assembly or with the Scottish Executive; and whether I am right in believing that it was not possible to consult the Scottish Parliament because it is not at present in session.

    It seems a rather unfortunate moment to invoke the reserved power in the Scotland Act. I admit that the reserved power allows Westminster to legislate for Scotland, even in a devolved matter. It was one which always caused a certain misgiving north of the Border. It was thought that one could say about that what they used to say about the Royal Prerogative: that it was to be used as God does his omnipotence, upon extraordinary occasion. I am not quite sure that this will appear to be a sufficiently extraordinary occasion north of the Border.

    It also does not seem to me to be particularly wise to inject this into the period of the Scottish National Party leadership election. It is a period when the Scottish Nationalists will be arguing among themselves how far they are prepared to live with devolution.

    There also seem to be some quite unexpected consequences of applying this legislation in a devolved context. I cannot quote specifically from speeches in another place. I shall therefore direct the Minister to the reference from which I intend to draw material. In another place on 17th July (Commons Hansard, col. 127) my honourable friend Sir Robert Smith asked the Home Secretary whether under the powers in the Bill it was possible to prevent a Scot in England returning to his home in Scotland. The Home Secretary answered "Yes".

    Before the Minister signed the certificate of ECHR compatibility with the Bill, did he take advice on the question of how far it was compatible with Article 8 of the European convention (respect for privacy and family life)? I cannot think of precedents anywhere in recent times of people being restrained from returning to their own homes within the British Isles when no serious charge is being brought against them and in circumstances where one wonders whether there may be anything against them at all.

    I do not see how the Bill will be made to work with the devolved jurisdictions, especially when one takes account of the porousness of the modern Irish Border. Once people have got there, they can get out of British jurisdiction without causing any further trouble at all.

    There is a great deal that has not been thought through. If the Minister can convince me that I am mistaken in that belief, I shall be extremely relieved.

    There is another delightful aspect to the question raised by the noble Earl, Lord Russell: under proposed new Section 14B, you can be got only if you are a resident of England or Wales. Under proposed new Sections 21A and 21B, you can be picked up if you are a Brit. So a constable can come along to a Scotsman and chuck him in the brig for four or six hours; but he cannot then do anything with him because the power in new Section 21B(4) refers to,

    "the appropriate chief officer of police to the court in question".
    For a Scot there is no such person. He cannot then actually charge him with anything. What the Bill gives at the moment is a power to pick up Scots and put them in chokey with no prospect of a prosecution for anything at all. That does not seem to be a way to spread happiness between ourselves and our colleagues north of the Border. I hope that that and the other points the noble Earl has raised will be taken seriously into consideration.

    Amendment No. 13 seeks to give the Bill an extent which it cannot have. The Football Spectators Act, which the Bill amends, extends only to England and Wales. It is not clear what arrangements the proposers of the amendment have in mind. Formal arrangements to prevent departures from Scotland and Northern Ireland cannot be forced on the Scottish Executive, which has devolved responsibility for the matter. Indeed, the Scottish Executive, which has been consulted, has made it clear that in the near future, at least, no such formal arrangements will be put in place beyond police co-operation. There is no evidence to suggest that the measures need cover departure from Northern Ireland. The Executive has not been consulted. I am conscious that no parallel arrangements could be put in place in respect of the Republic of Ireland, which provides better routes to many places in Europe.

    Clearly, the report to be submitted to Parliament on the workings of the Bill will need to assess the impact of the current arrangements and whether or not there is evidence to suggest that suspects are evading our controls via that route. On the basis of that assurance I hope the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, will agree to withdraw his amendment.

    Before the noble Lord sits down, is it not a fact that the question of whether it is possible to evade the requirements of passport surrender is almost entirely irrelevant because the effective power is the power to order someone to turn up at a police station at a specified time? That will prevent him from going abroad because, if he does not comply with that, he will go to prison. So the business of evading orders about surrendered passports is irrelevant.

    Turning to Amendment No. 14, standing in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the amendment, if passed, would mean that measures which are repealed or amended for England and Wales by the Bill will not be similarly amended for Scotland. The only UK-wide enactment which is affected is the Police Act 1997 provision which prevents NCIS from sharing information with non-law enforcement bodies. That provision is amended by Clause 2 of the Bill. It makes no sense, since NCIS is a national body, to create a different set of legal obligations north and south of the Border. The suggestion made in the amendment is one which the Government do not consider to be practical.

    The noble Earl asked whether consultation had taken place. He knows that consultation has now taken place with the Scottish Executive. He knows that it has not taken place with the Northern Ireland Executive.

    So far as concerns Article 8, I cannot answer the noble Earl's question specifically. But he will of course know that both in another place and in this House the respective Ministers have signed the necessary form to suggest that in their opinions the Bill before the Committee is one which satisfies the Human Rights Act.

    Restrictions on movements between England, Wales and Scotland, are precedented in other circumstances. For example, bail conditions for a criminal offence or injunctions in matrimonial or other civil matters can be so set out that movements between the two countries involved—between all the countries—are affected. It has not been suggested that that is against the Human Rights Act.

    I thank the Minister for that careful and considered reply. His point about NCIS sharing information is a serious, practical one. It is not the kind of point on which anyone needs to go to the wall. However, on the more general question, he said that we have not put forward a scheme for how the Bill should cope with the problem of devolved powers. I must plead guilty to that charge; first, because I did not lay the Bill before Parliament; and, secondly, because I do not, purely individually, have the expertise on devolved powers that is needed. It would need a consultation with quite a number of people to get that right. At present I am not convinced that there is any right answer to this problem.

    I hear what the Minister says about past restriction on movement between England and Scotland. I did not hear him quote any case of a person being restrained from returning to what remains his domicile. In domestic violence cases, I can understand that there may be a restriction on returning to what was one's former domicile. But being restrained from returning to one's present domicile is a more serious matter. It would take quite an effort to convince me that that was a serious practical proposal. If the Government can think any further about finding a solution to how the Bill will mesh in with the devolved powers, it will make their task easier. But I admit that they cannot find something that is not there.

    The noble Earl, Lord Russell, said that my amendment does not solve the whole problem. I did not say that it solved the whole problem. I just hoped that it made a contribution to solving the problem.

    In a newspaper report the other day, the Prime Minister's official spokesman was quoted as saying that Tony Blair was determined to plug any loophole in the proposals with regard to Scotland. The report stated:
    "Ministers at Westminster hope that closer co-operation between police forces north and south of the Border could … prevent English thugs from circumventing the proposed travel restrictions".
    The Minister was kind enough to confirm that Ministers think that police co-operation is the way forward. However, the newspaper went on to say that senior Scottish police officers had admitted that they would be powerless in the matter. That is the truth of the matter.

    The Scottish loophole does exist and will go on existing. It is clear, as the Minister said, that the Scottish Executive and Parliament do not propose to do anything about it. It would be a good thing for whoever makes the report on the legislation to cover the loophole. The Minister seemed to confirm that that was likely to happen if it proved to be a serious loophole. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Clause 5 agreed to.

    Clause 6 [ Extent]:

    [ Amendment No. 14 not moved.]

    Clause 6 agreed to.

    Clause 7 agreed to.

    Schedule 1 [ Amendments of the Football Spectators Act 1989]:

    Page 4, line 15, at end insert ("and is a prescribed tournament").

    The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 15 to 17 are motivated solely by my usual desire to be helpful to the Government. I strongly believe that something has gone seriously wrong with the drafting of the Bill and that that will produce unintended consequences. That is best explained by means of an example. It is helpful to look at new Section 14 of the 1989 Act on page 4 of the Bill. Let us assume that Manchester United, who will be playing in the European Champions Cup, has an away match at the beginning of the group stage which the Secretary of State decides should become a prescribed match. That Manchester United match will therefore become a regulated match and, as a consequence under the provisions in new Section 14(3), the European Champions Cup will become an external tournament.

    If one turns to see what would be the control period, it is clear that it will begin five days before the prescribed, regulated Manchester United away match, but will not end until after the final of the European Champions Cup. I understand that the group stages begin relatively early, possibly at the end of October. Thus the control period will last continuously for a period of six months.

    If one turns to new Section 19, it is clear that that will mean that someone who has been required to surrender his passport at the beginning of the control period would not be able to get it back until the end of the six-month period as laid down in new Section 19(6), whether or not Manchester United remains in the competition. Frankly, that would be intolerable. Furthermore, I cannot believe that it is something which the Government intended to achieve.

    For that reason, I have proposed Amendment No. 15, which would mean that an external tournament would not arise automatically because it included a regulated football match outside England and Wales; it would also have to be a prescribed tournament.

    I can see that what the draftsman may have had in mind was a tournament like Euro 2000, which was played continuously over a period of three weeks. In that case it is perfectly understandable that the Secretary of State might decide to prescribe the whole tournament.

    1 a.m.

    I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me. He has spoken so eloquently about this matter that we are more than half persuaded that a valid point has been made. Perhaps I may suggest that he withdraws his amendment tonight. We shall return on Report tomorrow with something which, it is hoped, will meet his needs. We shall be able to discuss the matter when that amendment is put before the House.

    I do not wish to cut off the noble Lord in full flow, but he has to an extent convinced us that a point needs to be answered here.

    I am most grateful to the Minister. I shall not develop my argument on Amendment No. 15 any further. However, perhaps I may touch briefly on Amendments Nos. 16 and 17.

    Amendment No. 16 arises simply because I found it difficult to understand what was meant by the words in line 30 on page 4,
    "any period described in an order made by the Secretary of State".
    At first I wondered whether the word "described" could be a misprint of the word "prescribed", but I am by no means certain that that is the case. Subparagraphs (6)(a) and (b) lay down mandatory starting and finishing days for the control period. I cannot see, therefore, what function is intended by these words. Amendment No. 16 is in effect a probing amendment to find out exactly what these words mean.

    Amendment No. 17 is intended to shorten possible control periods where an England team or club is knocked out at some time before the final stage of the tournament. It proposes that the control period should end when the last "regulated" football match outside England and Wales which is included in the tournament has finished or is cancelled. That would mean that if under paragraph 14(2), for example, the Secretary of State had decided in relation to Euro 2000 that a prescribed match was any match in which the England team was involved, the control period would come to an end when England was knocked out of the competition; therefore, so far as concerns England, the tournament would have finished. I should have thought that there was no reason why, once England was out of a tournament, a control period should continue up until the final.

    The noble Lord, Lord Bach, may be able to advise me on one point. He gave encouraging news which cleared my mind, but what is the present arrangement for "prescribed" matches? I understood, probably wrongly, that matches were "prescribed" at every round in club tournaments. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said that matches start in October. So far as I can remember, they are starting fairly soon—certainly so far as concerns Scottish clubs, which have not had great success in recent years. I believe that Manchester United will be playing in the European championship fairly soon.

    My thinking was that the prescribed period would be five days for each match where the Secretary of State believed that there was a problem. I did not think that he classified the games as "regulated" or "prescribed" under the 1989 Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, explained—in other words, right through until the end of May. I thought that where there was a likelihood of problems occurring, the Minister could designate a match and say that it would be regulated or prescribed. Presumably that would cover matches involving English clubs. There is just a chance that it might cover other matches where English clubs were not involved.

    The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was right about Euro 2000, and about the World Cup to be played in 2006, which may last three weeks or a month. But am I right in thinking that a "prescribed" match in European football would mean a control period starting five days before the match, and that the period would stop when the match was over, at midnight or early next morning? Someone who had a problem over his passport could go in the intervening time.

    Following the Minister's intervention, I do not feel the need to speak to Amendment No. 15. However, I find somewhat bizarre the wording in subsection (6) of Amendment No. 16 and I look forward to the Minister's explanation.

    I should like to take away Amendments Nos. 15 and 16. I do not want to take away Amendment No. 17; we do not believe that the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, as regards that amendment, are as good as those he made on the other two. His Amendment No. 17 would make the endpoint of a controlled period in relation to an external tournament the last "regulated" match rather than the end of the tournament.

    We do not believe that the control period should effectively end when the last English team is knocked out of an international tournament. We do not think that any of us would want to see hooligans subject to banning orders free to travel back to a tournament and settle old scores as soon as England or an English club had been safely eliminated. We believe that the law will have greater certainty and clarity if it covers the entire tournament. I hope that the noble Lord will consider withdrawing Amendment No. 17.

    The noble Lord, Lord Lyell, asked some questions about prescribed matches. I am not in a position to answer him adequately at present. Perhaps I may look carefully in Hansard later today and come back to him.

    Time is a problem here. The Minister said that he would take back Amendment No. 16. That is helpful. To aid the Committee so that it will have some understanding of the position when the Minister tables a new amendment—perhaps Members of the Committee will want to consider whether they, too, want to table an amendment—can the noble Lord explain what is meant in subsection (6) by the words,

    "any period described in an order made by the Secretary of State"?
    The Committee will find it helpful to understand the purpose of that provision.

    I do not want to waste the time of the Committee. I am looking forward to Report stage tomorrow when we deal with this matter in one way or another. To do anything else would be to waste our time tonight.

    I find the Minister's response most extraordinary. We are trying to help the Government. This Bill is to be dealt with in two days. In order to have any understanding of the Government's position, we and the Liberal Democrat Benches need to be able to consider whether it is necessary to table amendments to government amendments. This is not our Bill but the Government's and the Minister must answer the question. To hear these excuses is quite intolerable. We are trying to be as helpful as possible in dealing with this Bill, but we need to know what the Government mean. The response is not good enough; we want an answer from the Minister.

    What I have tried to say on two occasions already—this is the third—is that the noble Lord may have a point in seeking by Amendment No. 16 to leave out those words on the basis that they are otiose. We want to look at it. If those words are otiose we shall remove them; if not, they shall remain. I believe that their meaning speaks for itself.

    I am most grateful to the Minister for agreeing to take away Amendments Nos. 15 and 16 and for acknowledging that they give rise to a serious point. I believe that the Minister's concern about Amendment No. 17 is rather far-fetched. It is very unlikely that hordes of hooligans who have not previously been allowed to visit a tournament will dash over to it once the England team has been knocked out and have anything of interest to concern them. Frankly, it is not by any means the most important amendment on the Marshalled List. Obviously, I shall not press the amendment this evening, and it is unlikely that it will be brought back again. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 16 and 17 not moved.]

    I must point out to the Committee that there is a mistake in Amendment No. 18 as printed. The reference to "page 5, line 3" should be to "page 5, line 4".

    Page 5, line 4, after ("satisfied") insert ("on the balance of probabilities").

    The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 18, I should like to speak also to Amendment No. 19. Following the tradition of this evening, these amendments deal with two completely separate subjects, but at least we have already covered the subject of Amendment No. 18. I should be satisfied to hear from the Minister merely a statement that that is the test to be applied to this particular clause of the Bill and that the Government intend that it should be subject to the balance of probabilities. I should also be delighted to hear that the Government agree to insert these words, or something to their effect, in this part of the Bill so that everybody knows that that is the case.

    Amendment No. 19, which we have not covered before, is concerned with the level of discretion to be allowed a magistrates' court. At the moment, if a person is convicted of a relevant offence and the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the making of a banning order will help, and so on, it must make such an order. Given that under subsection (4)(b) conviction includes an absolute discharge, it seems extraordinary that, if that is the order, the court is none the less compelled to impose a banning order. That does not treat the courts as they should be treated. The courts should be given the discretion to apply the banning order as they think proper in all the circumstances. We should trust them to do that. We should, therefore, substitute "may" for "must". I beg to move.

    1.15 a.m.

    I support Amendment No. 18, and in particular Amendment No. 19 where the discretion which the amendment would allow the magistrate is important and necessary. I remind the Committee that at Second Reading I drew attention to the fact that on the Crime and Disorder Act the Government made a virtue of the fact that the courts were left with a discretion as to whether or not they were going to impose such an order. The same discretion should be available here.

    I, too, support the amendments. We must clear up the burden of proof. I am only interested that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is so merciful to the Government that he stops at the civil standard of proof. I wonder whether he was tempted to go a little further.

    The vital point relates to "must" or "may". When the Home Secretary spoke to us in Committee Room 5, he admitted that it is a mandatory sentence. If a mandatory sentence happens to be just in the case in which it is imposed, that can only be so by coincidence. There are a good many circumstances in which it would be inexpedient and unjust to make this sentence mandatory.

    Let us take, for example, the case of someone permanently employed in a European Union country who is exercising his freedom of movement under the Treaty of Rome. I do not see how one could restrain him without infringing European law. Let us suppose, for example, that the order were applied to someone who is an employee of the European Court of Justice. I think that we might hear of that rather quickly. Alternatively, let us suppose that as well as attending the football match, the person also hopes to visit a dying parent somewhere on the Continent. It could well be argued that it could be unjust to restrain him from doing that.

    I do not see how one can pass any just sentence until one is empowered to consider all the circumstances of the case. The whole point of the mandatory sentence is that it directs the court's attention to one single circumstance of the case—the type of crime committed—and restrains the court from looking at any other circumstance. That is a restriction of the powers of the court to look at relevant evidence. I think that it is a bad mistake.

    I, too, support both amendments. In their different ways, each would make the Bill slightly more acceptable.

    In Amendment No. 18 the noble Lord seeks to make clearer provision as regards the burden of proof and so on. The test for the court in making an order under new Section 14A which covers orders following conviction for a relevant offence is as set out in the current provisions on football banning orders in the Public Order Act and the Football Spectators Act. We have not invented the power anew. It is brought in. The test is also the same as that proposed in banning orders made on a complaint under new Section 14B. The test is self-explanatory and I am not sure that it would be helpful to add to it. The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence or disorder in connection with regulated football matches. So the test there is of reasonable grounds. That is the test on which we should rely.

    Amendment No. 19 would have the strange effect of reversing one of the changes introduced last year by the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act which was to require the courts to make a banning order if they were satisfied that the test in new Section 14A(2) was met. Of course, if the courts are not satisfied that making an order would help to prevent violence or disorder in connection with matches, they need not make the order. Courts have been reluctant to make orders. We want them to make defendants face up to the full implications of their actions. If the court is satisfied, a banning order should be made. We believe that such orders have a salutary effect beyond the individual case. If we want a tough measure, we must insist that this provision remains. I urge the Committee to reject the amendment.

    If we do not succeed in getting right freedom of movement under the Treaty of Rome, we shall certainly hear of it and the Bill will probably turn out to have no effect. The Minister was warned on Second Reading that that point was going to be raised. If he cannot produce a satisfactory answer, he might as well withdraw the Bill now.

    I addressed that issue in one of our early debates. The argument is about being proportionate in the circumstances. It rests on the greater good and whether public order is to be protected and safeguarded. In terms of human rights and freedom of movement, it is correct to include this measure in the Bill and it does not infringe the European Court of Human Rights or human rights legislation. Clearly we disagree but we have examined ECHR considerations and believe that we are right to insist on our approach in the circumstances.

    I was not asking about the ECHR on this occasion but about the European Court of Justice—the Treaty of Rome, which is a very different issue. Has the Minister consulted other European Governments? If not, why not?

    I cannot say that we have consulted precisely on this measure in the terms that the noble Earl has raised the point. I recognise that there is a valid issue at the core of what he is suggesting but we think the measure is right. We were well advised on that point when drafting the Bill, but time will tell.

    I am grateful to the Minister for his replies. I am satisfied with his comments on Amendment No. 18. As he said, the phrase is from an existing Bill. We will see what is meant by it. In any event, it concerns conditions that apply where the individual has been convicted of another, related offence. It is probably reasonable in the circumstances. I am not so satisfied with the noble Lord's response to Amendment No. 19 and will consider my position when we reach that amendment. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment No. 18.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 5, line 7, leave out ("must") and insert ("may").

    The noble Lord said: I beg to move.

    1.24 a.m.

    On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 19) shall be agreed to?

    Their Lordships divided: Contents, 17; Not-Contents, 22.

    Division No. 3

    CONTENTS

    Addington, L.Desai, L.
    Astor, V.Goodhart, L.
    Attlee, E.Henley, L. [Teller]
    Brougham and Vaux, L.Lucas, L. [Teller]
    Campbell of Alloway, L.McNally, L.
    Cope of Berkeley, L.

    Monson, L.Phillips of Sudbury, L.
    Onslow, E.Russell, E.
    Parkinson, L.Tebbit, L.

    NOT-CONTENTS

    Amos, B.Faulkner of Worcester, L.
    Bach, L.Gavron, L.
    Bassam of Brighton, L.Gordon of Strathblane, L.
    Brett, L.Goudie, B.
    Burlison, L.Hunt of Chesterton, L.
    Carter, L. [Teller]Hunt of Kings Heath, L.
    Chandos, V.McIntosh of Haringey, L. [Teller]
    Davies of Coity, L.Mackenzie of Framwellgate, L.
    Davies of Oldham, L.Ramsay of Cartvale, B.
    Elder, L.Woolmer of Leeds, L.
    Farrington of Ribbleton, B.Young of Old Scone, B.

    Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

    1.33 a.m.

    Page 5, line 9, leave out ("not").

    The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 20 is a relatively minor amendment but, I believe, perhaps more important than it appears. It removes the word "not" from new Section 14A(3), which states that if a court is not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order will help to prevent violence, it must in open court state that fact and give its reasons. There is no particular reason why a court should, if it is not satisfied, explain that. There is no reason why it should not but it does not seem to matter very much one way or the other.

    The really important point is that if the court is satisfied that a banning order should be made, it should give its reasons in open court. A defendant in criminal proceedings who has just been convicted of a relevant offence may wish to appeal against the sentence. If he wishes to appeal against the imposition of a banning order, he obviously needs to know the court's reasons.

    If the court refuses to make an order, it does not matter whether it gives reasons in open court, but if it makes an order, justice requires that it should state its reasons in open court so that the defendant can find out the grounds on which he can appeal. I do not particularly object to new Section 14A(3) as it stands. The important point is that if the court is satisfied, it must give its reasons. I beg to move.

    When I first looked at the amendment, I failed totally to understand what the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, was on about. However, after his eloquent explanation, I now understand. If one accepts the Government's argument that the court should give reasons if it is not satisfied, a more suitable amendment might be to say that it should give reasons whether or not it is satisfied. That would be clearer and more open and would ensure that the court had to give reasons whatever the outcome. That might be a more sensible solution. I should be interested to hear the Government's view.

    This point came up a number of times when we were considering child support appeal tribunals in the first year of this Parliament. So far, the Government have always conceded it. If the Minister wishes to look at a fuller exposition of the reasoning, he might look at the judgment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in the case of Fayed v. Home Secretary in November 1996. That is a truly memorable judgment that every Minster should have on their desk, particularly every Home Office Minister.

    Amendment No. 20 would amend Section 14A, which simply re-enacts the existing law on banning orders made on conviction for an offence. It would require the court to state openly its reasons for imposing a banning order following conviction for a football-related offence.

    At present, Section 14, as amended by the Football (Offences and Disorder) Act 1999, requires a court to state the reasons why it has not made an order. That is consistent with the expectation that a banning order must follow upon conviction for a football-related offence.

    The ground for a banning order under Section 14A is conviction for a relevant offence. On such a conviction, no explanation is necessary or, in our opinion, appropriate. The amendment would change a provision that seems to work perfectly well in existing law that we want to carry over into the new legislation.

    What harm would it possibly do to accept the amendment? It would clarify matters and it would be fairer. I do not totally blame the noble Lord because I have heard Ministers from this side, when we were in government, reading from those bog-entrenched, civil servant issued briefs. There is no intention to listen to what anybody else says. All those noble, gallant and intelligent human beings on our Front Bench did exactly the same. And I see the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, falling into that. Surely he is a bigger man and he can listen to something which is as intelligently and reasonably put forward as this has been and not come out with that sort of trench warfare ministerial guff which I have heard for 30 years in this Chamber.

    Before we leave this matter, will the Minister explain to the Committee how it is possible to lodge an appeal if no reasons are given against which you can appeal?

    Surely, as in any other situation, you appeal against the decision, stating reasons for the appeal. That much is clear.

    The noble Earl, Lord Onslow, made a debating point. He asks what harm it will do to accept the amendment. I will think about the point of harm.

    I am sorry that the Minister has not been more receptive to this amendment. While he is correct to say that, in the normal course of appeal against a criminal sentence, the reasons why the judge has chosen one sentence rather than another are not necessarily given, the situation here is that, if the court does not make a banning order, it must state its reasons. Therefore, it seems appropriate that if it makes the order it should also give its reasons. I should be happy to accept the version proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, which would make it clear that the court must state its reasons either way.

    However, clearly, this is not a matter to take any further this morning. We shall consider whether to bring it back this afternoon. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 5, line 14, leave out ("absolutely or").

    The noble Lord said: Again, this is a short point. A banning order can be made only in addition to a sentence or in addition to an order of absolute or conditional discharge. An absolute discharge is given only in circumstances where the defendant is technically guilty of the offence but is wholly without blame and no kind of sentence whatever is justified in the circumstances.

    Therefore, it seems wholly inconsistent to impose a banning order, which is clearly a form of punishment, at the same time as giving an absolute discharge. I see no problem as regards a conditional discharge but an absolute discharge seems to me to be wholly inconsistent with the idea of making a banning order. The point needs no further exposition and, therefore, I beg to move.

    The Minister may be tempted to say that this wording and these arrangements are in existing legislation. The answer to that is that this is a good opportunity to rectify what is a form of nonsense. My noble friend Lord Goodhart expressed the matter very clearly.

    Amendment No. 21 would remove the power to impose a banning order following an absolute discharge. That is right. As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said, this provision is one of those re-enactments from earlier legislation. Indeed, it has been there since 1989 and was taken through by Simon Burns last year when the last piece of legislation was put on the statute book.

    However, it must be remembered that an absolute discharge is not an acquittal. It is a disposal following conviction. The reasons for imposing an absolute discharge may be many, but the fact remains that the person concerned will have been convicted of a football related offence. For that reason it is important that we retain the possibility that a banning order may apply.

    I do not believe that we can bend to this amendment and I do not believe that it is right to suggest, as the noble Lord appeared to, that an absolute discharge is close to being acquitted. That is not the case.

    1.45 a.m.

    Can the Minister explain to the Committee under what circumstances he believes that it would be appropriate to give an absolute discharge followed by a banning order? The Minister uses the excuse, "We have done it before". When dealing with badly drafted legislation, I accept that that is a reproach to noble Lords; it is no excuse as regards the Minister.

    I too want the Minister to consider in what circumstances that is appropriate, given the keenness to retain the word "must". To the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, I say that if he chooses to press this amendment to a Division, I am sure that I and a large number of my colleagues could be persuaded to abstain.

    When an absolute discharge is given a defendant receives no punishment. Under this Bill one would say, "We will give you an absolute discharge which means no punishment, but we have to give you one anyway". That is not right.

    I am sorry that the Minister has not given a positive response to this amendment. I would be tempted to take it further were it not for the fact that I cannot imagine that, in circumstances where the court thought fit to give an absolute discharge, it would also believe that there were reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence in connection with a regulated football match. So in practice, it seems to me inconceivable that anybody who has been given an absolute discharge would have a banning order imposed upon him. Certainly it seems to me to be quite absurd. In what circumstances could one impose a banning order when an absolute discharge has been granted? In those circumstances, it is inconceivable that that would lead to a banning order. Having made the point, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    If Amendment No. 22 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments Nos. 23 to 37.

    Page 5, leave out lines 27 to 44.

    The noble Earl said: This is an amendment of some substance. It proposes leaving out Section 14B, the anti-social behaviour section, and what my noble friend Lord Goodhart described as the "civil banning order".

    The anti-social behaviour order has never found particular favour on these Benches. I am not sure that it has found that much favour anywhere else. Before we leave this subject, I would be grateful if the Minister could tell me the number of so-called anti-social behaviour orders that have been given since the power was introduced.

    My noble friend suggests that 500 is the number. I thank him. It is not a substantial number. I believe doubts about it are shared.

    One of our misgivings about this is the mixing up of criminal and civil procedures. It involves the use of the civil procedure—according to the balance of probabilities—for something that carries penalties that may, more appropriately, be thought of as criminal. That reminds me that someone once said to an Elizabethan archbishop that he was a monster, neither ecclesiastical nor civil. It was a comment on the archbishop's manners as well as on his legality. As a comment on the anti-social behaviour order, it may perhaps be germane.

    I listened to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Donaldson of Lymington, say that a substantial body of evidence would be required. I take his point, but it would comfort me more if I heard to what that evidence would relate—that is not as well covered by the drafting of this clause as I would like—and what degree of certainty one could expect from that evidence.

    One of the things that strikes me more and more is that it is very hard to be certain exactly what happens in a crowd. The Minister relied heavily on the uncertainty of much that happened at Charleroi. That illustrates my point: how hard it is to be certain what happens in a crowd. So applying a civil standard of proof in a case like that, will make error easier in a place where it is already a great deal too easy.

    My noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury describes this as the lowest hurdle of proof anybody has been asked to cross. That applies to a lot of the drafting. But I am not clear what is meant by the phrase "contributed to disorder". I believe it was my noble friend Lord Phillips who introduced this point at Second Reading. What precisely is meant by "contributed to disorder"? Does it involve mews rea? Does it involve being present? Or does it involve giving aid and comfort to somebody who then created disorder, unbeknown perhaps to the person who comforted him?

    The point was raised in another place by Mr Gummer. Of all the things that Mr Gummer's worst enemies could say about him, that he is liable to create disorder would have been the last. But in col. 115 on 17th July Mr Gummer recalled an occasion in 1961 when he had been on an anti-ugly march, protesting at an appalling building in Cambridge. He said that there was some disorder at the edge of the march and that, as one of the march's leaders, he thought he might be accused of contributing to it. Were Mr Gummer's fears well founded? Since the Home Office has had several days to take that point on board, I hope it will provide us with an answer.

    Of course, that is not the only case. The Home Secretary himself, on 9th July, was in a car alleged to have been driven at 103 miles an hour. First, is that a disorder? I should like some precision as to the meaning of disorder. Secondly, if it is disorder, could the man in charge of the car be said to have contributed to it? If so, will the effect of this Bill be to ban the Home Secretary from attending football matches? If so, was that his intention? I can imagine circumstances where just possibly it may have been, but they seem just a little ironic.

    Then at the end we return to the word, "must". I have said my say about that and will not say it again tonight. But I am free to return to the point tomorrow as I hope the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, will as well. He has not divided the Committee on this one so we can certainly return to it. I beg to move.

    This provision is an appalling abuse of our liberties. Here we have a banning order on somebody going abroad to a football match because people think he might do something. They have no evidence; they just "think" he might. Surely that goes against every single grain of British legal history.

    Somebody may have a long record, but is there no room for repentance? If we are asking about a Minister's previous experience, I cannot resist asking the noble Lord whether his squatting experiences in Brighton make him liable to be stopped by PC Plod at the gates of Dover. I am sorry, but I find a certain amount of hilarity in that. The fact that there are certain ironies and amusing jokes to tell in connection with these matters is about the only saving grace of the Bill.

    The Minister's previous life is his own and is well past. As I said on Second Reading, he is now a pillar of the establishment; he is a Home Office Minister and as clean as the driven snow. He is an able member of this administration. So why should his previous experience of prancing around the Brighton courts of justice wearing an illuminated red nose stop him going to football matches? That is what the new section says. I concede that I find it hysterical, but it is not good law. If, suddenly, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, is on the ferry to Brighton, it is deeply unfair that "Plod" could come along and take him off. Indeed, it would be grossly unfair to the noble Lord. I still think that this is the most wretched section in a wretched Bill.

    My name is attached to this amendment. I do not wish to detain the Committee for very long, except to mention briefly some of the instances in which, as drafted, the new section could give rise to banning orders, or applications for them. That situation worries noble Lords on this side of the Committee and also, I suspect, those on the Minister's side. I have in mind student demonstrations in particular. For example, we had the recent demonstrations on student fees and the demonstrations that took place when the president of China visited this country. On the latter occasion, many students were shunted around various university towns with some vigour by the police. Indeed, some students reacted vigorously to the police attempts—and their success—in preventing them from exercising their normal civil rights of peaceful demonstration.

    As drafted, there is no doubt whatever that it would not take a high level of activism on the part of the students involved in those demonstrations for them to fall within the scope of this section and its definitions. I am afraid that it returns us once again to new Section 14B(2), where the conditions upon which to base an application for a banning order are so low, so undemanding, as to place it in a unique category of harshness and "illiberty". I just wanted to add those words to the eloquent way in which my noble friend introduced the amendment.

    This amendment would knock out the whole of new Section 14B. There is a following series of amendments that we shall discuss shortly that deals with the individual words and phrases involved, so I shall not go into that detail at present. However, the question remains as to whether or not banning orders should be made. After all, we are talking about the magistrates' court making such orders on an application made by the relevant chief officer of police.

    Although the hurdle in new Section 14B(2)—namely, whether the person concerned has,
    "caused or contributed to any violence or disorder"—
    as defined by new Section 14C, is extremely low, the hurdle that will really matter is that contained in new Section 14B(4)(b), which says that such an application can be made to a magistrates' court if,
    "the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe,
    that the person will contribute to such violence. That condition will be quite difficult to satisfy; indeed, the chief constable may have difficulty in explaining why he thinks that someone will be responsible for violence or will get involved in violence in some way in connection with a football match. That is much the higher hurdle, although it is not all that high.

    I believe that this particular banning order provision is less offensive than some of the provisions in the new Section 21A of a constable detaining a person. As regards new Section 21B, that allows a constable to prevent someone going to Scotland or further afield until magistrates have had the chance to consider it. If new Section 14B is left in, then something like new Section 21B must also remain in the Bill. It at least has the merit of the magistrates deciding the matter on the basis of admittedly not very high hurdles.

    2 a.m.

    May I take the opportunity given by this amendment to ask the Minister to deal with one or two matters of the process under the slow route. This amendment relates to the complaints system. Initially it concerns the slow route but later we come to the fast route. Can my noble friend explain a little of the process that he envisages operating under the slow route?

    If someone has been found guilty of violence or is likely to cause it, and that is connected with football, I can well understand that that person may be identified and a case brought against them in a magistrates' court. But a person may not have been convicted of violence in connection with football, as we heard during the Second Reading debate and today, and a very high percentage of the population fall into that category.

    I am still a little puzzled as to how people who are not connected with football violence are identified. In the arguments put forward for this legislation, it was observed that people involved in the European championship violence had not been suspected of violence in connection with football. In other words, the conundrum that the Government are seeking to grapple with in this legislation is dealing with the people who have no obvious and immediate link with football violence abroad. I am trying to understand in my own mind what advice the Minister is receiving from the police or other authorities about identifying people who, on face of it, have nothing to do with such violence. I would not know where to start.

    International football is rather different from club football. From my experience, as regards international football a large group of people follow England abroad. Everyone has voiced concern about the England supporters' club. Many others follow, but it is thought that often they do not follow club teams, but the national team. I can well imagine that they could be identified.

    As regards club football, very often it is not known until two or three weeks beforehand that a club is playing abroad. Bradford City has just won through the interminable Inter-Toto competition to qualify for the UEFA cup. That club won a game this week and I believe that it plays another next week. If it had lost, the question of further banning orders would not have arisen, but, if it goes through, presumably people will consider whether there might be others going to the games who should be considered for banning.

    As I explained some time ago, I understand the general thrust of, and need for, the legislation. However, I am genuinely concerned as to how the measure will apply. How is it envisaged that these people will be identified when many of them have not been convicted of football violence, and when, as regards club football, decisions have to be taken in a fairly short time frame and not at leisure over several months? How is a calm and measured inquiry to take place within that short time frame?

    I hope that the Committee will forgive my speaking again. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, spoke, it occurred to me that a Member of this House and a Minister in the other place would, in their time, have been caught slap bang by the legislation. I think of David Steel and Peter Hain, both of whom were engaged in anti-apartheid demonstrations, particularly in relation to rugby. Am I not right in thinking that both of them would have been caught slap bang by the provisions of new Section 14B and by the second test mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Cope; namely, that a court would indeed be satisfied that there were

    "reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent … disorder … in connection with any … football matches"?
    Is that not a worrying example of the way in which this legislation could—I suspect that, if the legislation had been in force at the time, it would have been used in this way—have been used to close down the civil demonstrations that I mentioned?

    This amendment would have a fairly devastating effect if passed. It would remove a significant chunk of the legislation. I accept entirely the sincerity with which the amendment has been moved. That sincerity overshadows the wider debate. I obviously cannot accept the amendment. The present law has clearly not proven adequate to deal with the problem. Sometimes when I hear noble Lords speak from the Opposition Benches, be they Conservative or Liberal Democrat, I almost think that they imagine that there is no problem to deal with. I am rather surprised at that. I believe that a noble Lord said that there was uncertainty about what happened at Charleroi. I do not think—

    I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I have already this evening, and at Second Reading, specifically disowned the interpretation that I do not think that there is a problem. My question is: does the Minister have a solution? That is a legitimate question.

    It is indeed a legitimate question. However, I do not think that there is any uncertainty about what happened at Charleroi. There is a problem which has been identified. We believe that this legislation, and other steps and measures that we might want to take in the future, will be part of that solution, just as each piece of anti-hooligan legislation that has been added to the statute book over the past 15 years is an attempt to find that solution. I do not pretend that that is easy and I do not pretend that there are easy answers to the questions that have been raised. New Section 14B is a carefully structured, measured and balanced attempt to prevent those who engage in hooliganism from continuing to do so.

    The noble Earl, Lord Russell, asked about the term "contributed to". In the context of this legislation, the term "contributed to" means, "took part in the disorder but did not necessarily initiate or lead it". So someone would be involved in the action, as it were, without necessarily being the leader of it or initiating it; nevertheless he would have made a contribution to it. I think of the scenes I witnessed in Charleroi, where people who were not necessarily inciting or leading acts of violence or public disorder were certainly involved and without doubt contributing to that disorder. So the term does play an important part in this legislation.

    The noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, referred to violence in other circumstances. Yes, of course, it is part of our argument that if someone has acted in a violent or disorderly way in other situations, that may well be a consideration that would lead to them being affected by a banning order made on complaint. That is indeed part of our argument—I do not deny that at all. If they have been involved in public disorder of a violent nature in other circumstances, and they have a violent nature and disposition, it is likely that they will repeat that kind of behaviour—perhaps fuelled by alcohol—in the circumstances surrounding a football match, particularly an international football match, which is where the major part of the problem now rests. That is another reason why this proposed new section is of importance.

    I shall not rise to the provocation that the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, is poking in my direction about being an ex-squatter. He clearly does not understand much about my past or about the political activity in which I have been involved for the past 20 or 30 years. It is one of those things; he does not know me terribly well.

    The noble Earl made a suggestion about this particular proposed new section: that allowing the police to take action to prevent the possibility of violence or disorder would be contrary to our constitutional traditions. That point was fully answered at Second Reading by my noble friend Lord Mackenzie, who pointed out that the police have had common law powers since time immemorial to prevent crime or breaches of the peace. As I have said, this power is entirely within the traditions of British policing. It is workable for that reason.

    I shall not make further jokes about squatting at this stage. I think that joke has nearly run its course. I may be tempted later, but on this occasion I shall not be tempted further.

    What the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate, said about the common law powers of arrest was comprehensively demolished by one of my noble and learned friends, who pointed out that that involved an arrest, followed by a charge, followed by conviction or acquittal. This is not the same. That is why the argument produced by the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie of Framwellgate, at Second Reading was faulty.

    The noble Earl is entitled to his opinion. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Mackenzie, made an important point.

    This proposed new section is important and valuable. I cannot support the notion that it is a low test. The noble Lord, Lord Cope, made quite a good case for this proposed new section; he seemed to think that the test in proposed new Section 14B(2) was a higher test. I agree with him; my reading of it is much the same as his.

    Noble Lords are quite entitled to push this point. However, I believe it would considerably undermine the effects of the legislation and that the noble Lords who have moved the amendment understand that. If they are serious about making a contribution to tackle the problem, they will reflect on this matter, withdraw the amendment and not pursue it any further.

    I thank the Minister for that reply. I thank him for trying to be as helpful as he could be about the phrase "contributed to". He has narrowed the area of my uncertainty; he has not removed it. Before replying to the amendment, I wonder whether I could ask him to narrow it a little more. I respect his desire not to make any reply about his own case. That is perfectly proper.

    Perhaps I could ask him to reply further on the case of Mr Gummer. Mr Gummer happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. When he talks about being involved, is he talking about criminal activity; is he talking about being an accessory before or after the fact to criminal activity; or can one be ruled to have contributed to disorder simply by being in the wrong place at the wrong time? That is a question of which the Minister must have had notice. Mr Gummer's speech was, after all, made about a week ago. It is material to what I do tomorrow to know what the answer to that question is. Therefore, if the Minister is able to enlighten me further I should be grateful.

    2.15 a.m.

    Famously, I am not a lawyer. I should think that the actions of someone involved in a demonstration would be extremely important; whether they were acting in a disorderly way; whether they were being provocative; whether they were inciting others; whether they were encouraging others to acts of violence; or whether they were intimidating in some way. Those circumstances could be described as contributing to violence or disorder. Mr Gummer was probably the right person in the right place at the right time if he was protesting in the way in which I suspect he was. No doubt he had a good cause as well. I am not entirely convinced with the example the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, raised about Peter Hain. I think that Peter Hain's leadership of the anti-apartheid movement was something of which he was probably rightly proud, and many others were too. It was certainly a noble cause and one which I am sure Members of the Committee will have supported. I do not think that one would necessarily transpose Mr Hain's activities into contributing or making it plain that he would have been a contributor to violence in and around surrounding football matches, certainly in the circumstances in which we envisage this law to operate.

    I was not seeking to disparage Mr Hain, rather the opposite. I was a strong supporter of his courage then and would be now. This is not unimportant because the Minister constantly refers to violence. This new section deals with disorder and violence. Disorder is defined, I repeat, in a most modest way, as,

    "using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or disorderly behaviour".
    Those demonstrations in the days when Peter Hain was on the barricades were certainly disorderly behaviour within that definition. There are no two ways about it. Therefore, it demonstrates the kind of conduct which is perfectly lawful and yet falls within the new section. That is why the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and myself are moving the amendment. As he has already said, we must withdraw it. But I did want to try and put that part of the debate on a proper level.

    The noble Lord quoted the Hain case. Even if that behaviour was thought to have a degree of disorder about it, that is not itself an action that would actually result in a banning order. It could only result in banning if,

    "the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that making a banning order would help to prevent violence and disorder at or in connection with any regulated football matches".
    Frankly, the case being made simply does not bear examination. There is no connection between the two. I honestly think that that is a red herring. I am more concerned with people who genuinely have some violence in their background. The authorities will have to be able to choose out of the tens of thousands of people who have a violent background but do not have convictions the few that they will ban. However, I believe that the Hain case is a red herring.

    New Section 14C(3) states:

    "In this Part, 'violence' and 'disorder' are not limited to violence or disorder in connection with football".

    I thank the Minister for doing the best he could about the words "contributed to". He has reduced my anxiety. If he were able to come here tomorrow with explicit legal advice on that point, I would find it even more helpful.

    I thank the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer of Leeds, for an extremely helpful and thoughtful contribution. If there is a solution to the points we are debating, it is along the lines that he is thinking that we would be most likely to find it. On the other hand, I am not so sure that the case of Mr Hain is a red herring, though it seems to me that in the event he will personally be protected by the Government's amendment, which I welcome in advance, to introduce the principle of spent convictions. But were someone to have done something like that rather less than 10 years ago, the same principle could still apply. Even granted that Mr Hain is now an extremely respectable citizen, I could imagine certain former Springbok forwards who might regard his presence as being of itself provocative. There is that aspect of the matter to be considered as well.

    The biggest problem is not just the question of the standard of proof but that we are being asked for proof of something for which proof cannot possibly be found. In subsection (1) we are asked for proof that something is likely to happen in the future. That is called "bookie's odds". What really worries me is that a court is being asked not to make a finding of fact but to make a bet. We all know that there are a good many rich bookies and there are very few rich punters. As everyone who has tried to make a living out of the study of the form book knows perfectly well, even the best evidence you can collect does not necessarily make a bet justifiable. When you are asking for evidence to prove the validity of a bet, you are asking for something that is by its very nature uncertain. That is at the heart of our misgivings about this provision and the Minister's remarks have not altogether removed them. We shall need to return to this matter tomorrow. But what happens when we do will depend a good deal further on what advice the Minister has received. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 5, leave out line 32.

    The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment I should like to speak also to Amendments Nos. 46 and 48. These amendments are brought forward in response to an amendment put down at Report stage in another place by the right honourable Sir Nicholas Lyell. Concerns were raised in another place about the prospect of the court taking account of spent convictions or of conduct which was many years in the past. Convictions which are spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 will not be admissible in proceedings by complaint because they are civil proceedings. That is the effect of Section 4(1) of the Act. The Government accept that it would not be right to take into account conduct which took place more than 10 years before the application unless that conduct led to a conviction which is not spent. That is the combined effect of the amendments. I commend them to the Committee. I say in passing that the two examples—perhaps even the three examples—that were given in the preceding interesting but long debate were quite irrelevant. I beg to move.

    I think of this grouping as the "Gummer protection amendments", although perhaps they could equally be described as the "Hain protection amendments". They should appeal to all parties. They certainly appeal to me.

    Had the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, proposed the amendments, I should not have risen to ask my question. That is because the noble Lord resembles at all times a gentle and bucolic farmer, full of reasonableness and sunny weather. On the other hand, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, resembles nothing so much as his noble friend's half-demented sheepdog, ever ready to go for one's ankles. I ask the noble Lord, therefore, whether he has anything to declare as regards these amendments. Will the amendments spare him from attention under this part of the Bill?

    I do not know where to begin. At this hour of the night I have no intention of biting the noble Lord's ankles—or those of anyone else, for that matter. I have nothing to declare here. What was it that Oscar Wilde said? "I have nothing to declare" at all.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Before I call Amendment No. 24, I should point out to the Committee that if this amendment is agreed to, I shall not be able to call Amendments Nos. 25 to 29 inclusive.

    Page 5, line 33, leave out ("caused or contributed to any violence or disorder") and insert ("been convicted of an offence involving violence or any other relevant offence").

    The noble Lord said: We have had a thorough debate on new Section 14B. This amendment makes clear its intention; that is, it seeks to replace in new Section 14B(2) the words,

    "caused or contributed to any violence or disorder",

    with the words,

    "been convicted of an offence involving violence or any other relevant offence".

    The reason was covered in our earlier debate. The term,

    "caused or contributed to any violence or disorder",

    begs the question: if an act warranted a prosecution, why did not that take place at the time? If the act did not warrant a prosecution, why should it be resurrected subsequently to justify a banning order?

    My colleagues in another place argued strongly that they would be much more satisfied if this provision was based on an offence. I must tell the Minister that we feel the same. I beg to move.

    Amendment No. 25, tabled in my name on the same subject, is not nearly so well drafted as Amendment No. 24. Perhaps I may say only that I entirely support what has been said by the noble Lord, Lord McNally. His amendment receives my backing.

    As regards my other amendments in the grouping, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, knows that I shall speak to them individually, although it may be that one or two have already been covered and so I shall not need to move them. They embrace too many different subjects for my brain to encompass at this time of night. I promise to be as quick as possible when we reach them.

    I rise briefly to speak to Amendment No. 47 which has been included in this grouping. It has been included purely for drafting purposes.

    On page 6 at line 23, the Bill states "or Section 15(2A) below". The problem is that there is no "Section 15(2A)below". Paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 states:
    "For section 14 … and sections 15 to 17 there is substituted".
    Then follows new Section 14, followed by new Section 14A and on up to new Section 14J, but there are no new Sections 15, 16 or 17 in the Football Spectators Act as amended. For that reason, there can be no "Section 15(2A) below".

    Except for the "super alert", it is difficult to get one's priorities right at this time of night—or rather, this time of morning. However, it seems to me that Amendment No. 24 and alternative Amendment No. 25 are exceptionally important. I hope that the movers of those two amendments will not be satisfied with being fobbed off tonight and will return to them and press them hard tomorrow.

    The noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway, has had to leave and he asked if I would speak to Amendments Nos. 30 and 31 on his behalf. I am happy to do so. The wording of the amendments is admirably clear. I do not propose to enlarge on either of the subsections that he suggests should be added to the Bill. The second of his amendments is largely technical.

    I have added my name to Amendment No. 37 standing in the name of my noble friend Lord McNally. The amendment is unhappily grouped with Amendment No. 24, which requires a conviction in order that a complaint can be laid under proposed new Section 14B as opposed to the present provision which we have debated ad nauseam.

    If Amendment No. 24 is accepted, it will remedy the principal and major defect of proposed new Section 14B. As that stands at the heart of the Bill, there is no more important amendment than Amendment No. 24. If, however, the Government are not minded to accepted Amendment No. 24, and if when it comes to the showdown tomorrow—or rather, today—the vote on Amendment No. 24 is lost, my amendment, which is of lesser consequence to proposed Section 14B, comes into relevance.

    I have drawn the points in Amendment No. 37 from the Public Order Act 1986, which gives the respondent who is in effect charged with disorderly or violent conduct in circumstances where there has been no conviction a defence or defences as set out on the grounds that: he had no reason to believe that there was anyone who was likely to be caused offence, alarm or hurt; that his conduct was reasonable; and similarly, that there was intent. As proposed new Section 14B stands, there is no requirement for intent any more than there is a requirement for proof of conduct beyond reasonable doubt. I am sorry to have to complicate my explanation of Amendment No. 34, but it is inevitable in the light of its being grouped with Amendment No. 24.

    Before my noble friend the Minister responds to Amendment No. 24, will he confirm that I am right in thinking that this would mean that some of the hooligans we saw heaving tables and chairs during the European championships in Brussels and Charleroi who would not suffer a conviction could not, therefore, have evidence brought to hear on whether they were regarded as able to have a complaint brought against them? That would seem to be a staggering consequence of that amendment. I cannot possibly believe that it would be the intention. That is probably the most blatant thing that the public would expect us to grapple with.

    If we are to go down the road proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, why have new Section 14B(4)(a) at all? Why do we require that such people should be in the 50 per cent or so of the population who have a conviction or have otherwise indulged in bad behaviour? Why not just say that so long as we have evidence that people should not be at a football match, they can be served with a banning order?

    Perhaps I may respond to the query raised by the noble Lord. New Section 14B(2) specifies a condition subject to which a complaint can be lodged. Under subsection (4)(b), once a complaint has been lodged, a judgment must be made by the court as to whether a banning order should be made. Those are two quite different matters. New Section 14B(2), which would be amended by Amendment No. 24, would be changed in such a way that if somebody was seen on television to be throwing tables, chairs and stones, a complaint could not be lodged so that at least a court could decide whether such a person would cause disorder. That seems to me to be an extraordinary result.

    I do not believe that the court would have all that much to consider in such a case. If there was clear evidence that an individual had been throwing chairs or stones, he would certainly fall within the first of the conditions, essentially new Section 14B(2). It would have to be proved that he was the person in question. Provided that the court was so satisfied, he would easily fall foul—I was going to say "clear the hurdle"—of subsection (2). The other condition in subsection (4)(b) would also have to be satisfied. That seems to me to be the more difficult condition in this Bill. This whole series of amendments seeks to tighten the wording in one or other of the provisions of new Section 14B, although one or two refer to subsequent matters. For the most part, these amendments tighten the wording of one or other test in new Section 14B.

    The Committee must decide whether it believes that the conditions are too weak. The first is extremely weak, and the second will be difficult to satisfy. That is the one to which we should give closest attention. Anyone who has been proved to be throwing chairs about should be considered in this respect, and to that extent I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer.

    Before the noble Lord, Lord Cope, sits down, does he agree that in some cases the video evidence of what happened at Charleroi may be wholly reliable so that identification is unambiguous but that in other cases it may not be? In the absence of any other confirming evidence, it may well be that two people of similar appearance are confused and, therefore, that the wrong person is banned.

    The noble Lord is quite right. It is for the court to decide whether it believes, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent was the individual in question. That is something which courts must decide all day and every day, as it were.

    So far in this debate the Committee has considered Amendments Nos. 24, 25, 30, 31, 34 and 37. I shall address those amendments and wait for the others to be moved or spoken to in due course. Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 limit the scope of new Section 14B to the imposition of a civil order on the basis of conviction. The hooligans who fought pitched battles in Copenhagen and acted so offensively in Belgium were not convicted of their deeds despite substantial evidence against them. As the law stands, however, the police and courts are powerless to act. I agree with the interpretation of my noble friend Lord Woolmer. If Amendment No. 24 were passed, that would continue to be the case. Therefore, Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 should be resisted.

    The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, kindly spoke to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. We take the view that those amendments are unnecessary. It is obviously necessary that the respondent shall have a clear idea of the matters to be alleged against him where an application for a football banning order is heard. We intend to prepare a standard form for the application and in due course to incorporate it into the magistrates' courts rules. That seems the most sensible way. However, I fear that we cannot promise that a copy of the application shall be served on the respondent at least 14 days before the hearing of the application, as would be required by Amendment No. 31. If a local police force became aware just a few days before a football tournament that a local troublemaker with no previous record of football disorder was proposing to attend, the powers in new Sections 21A and 21B could be relevant. In those circumstances, a 14-day rule would become impractical.

    When a standard form for the application is prepared, the question of time limits will need to be carefully explored. In the meantime, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw that amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway.

    Amendment No. 34 would create uncertainty where currently there is none. The courts are well used to applying the civil standard of proof. To invent a new test just for this purpose seems to be unnecessary. It will prevent the imposition of banning orders in at least some cases where the civil standard of proof would be satisfied. That is in our view entirely undesirable. Therefore, we cannot support that amendment. We do not think that it would be conducive to securing the objectives of the legislation.

    The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, spoke to Amendment No. 47. He raised what seemed a sensible point. However, there is an explanation and I shall endeavour to give it. The noble Lord asked why there was a reference to Section 15(2A) of the 1989 Act in new Section 14C(5). Subsection (5) is there apparently to ensure that where a court on conviction has had power to make a banning order but does not do so, a subsequent court on an application by complaint must take account of the grounds on which the earlier court made that decision. That would have been by virtue of Section 15(2A). This is a safeguard apparently for the individual. The section refers to a statement under new Section 14A(3) which will replace Section 15. But in order to cover convictions under the present law it also refers to the sections of the Football Spectators Act and the Public Order Act which apply at present. I think that that clears up the mystery. When I read the note after the noble Lord's explanation, and when we checked, I believed that it covered the point. It covers the time when that section was in existence.

    I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. I still think that there is a drafting problem. If one considers the legislation as it will be after the amendments have been incorporated, there will be no "Section 15(2A) below". The Bill needs to be redrafted to make some reference to Section 15(2A) in the Act as it existed before it was amended.

    I shall check that we have got it right and give an assurance later today.

    I make two brief points on Amendment No. 34. The noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, urged us earlier against putting too much emphasis on the numbers deported from Charleroi implying that a number were innocents caught up in a general hoovering up by the Belgian police. Yet he now seems to imply that at Charleroi there is evidence which could be used in the banning order. That dilemma concerns us, which is why we want provision made for a criminal conviction. The Bill is very subjective as it stands.

    It is increasingly clear that we would not have this legislation—certainly not in this helter-skelter, end-of-Session way—but for Charleroi, yet that was not the only game in Euro 2000 in which England was involved. One wonders whether poor policing and different access to alcohol were factors.

    We must not think of the Bill as elephant powder. Your Lordships may recall the story of the man found by his friend to be throwing powder over the ground. Asked why, the man replied, "It keeps the elephants away". His friend said, "There isn't an elephant within 500 miles". The man replied, "I know. Isn't it marvellous stuff?" There seems to be a feeling among Ministers that if they sprinkle the elephant powder that is the Bill, disorder will disappear.

    The Minister and I are in agreement that the Bill may work—but only as part of a package that covers better policing, access to alcohol and a range of related matters such as the media and the behaviour of the police and footballers. The noble Lord, Lord Monson, has urged us to return to the issue tomorrow. We certainly will. My noble friend Lord Phillips has passed me a message saying, "Extra-territoriality will deal with the Woolmer point". He will return to that tomorrow as well. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [Amendments Nos. 25 and 26 not moved.]

    2.45 a.m.

    Page 5, line 33, after first ("or-) insert ("significantly").

    The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 27 and 29 have the intention of raising the hurdle that has to be cleared under new Section 14B(2). Banning somebody who just contributes to violence or disorder is to set the hurdle very low. One can get caught up in a demonstration in which others are throwing stones and the police decide to react—as was shown by the poll tax or miners' strike demonstrations. One thinks also of the involvement of the noble Baroness, Lady Dean, in various activities against Murdoch at Wapping. Using "contributed" without a qualifying adverb puts the test far too low.

    To leave the words "any violence or disorder" unqualified invites a low test in regard to someone who may have done little. He or she might have made a rude or abusive comment to a policeman who was causing inconvenience in their drunken progress down a street—the person, not the policeman. One can be tripped up by a little thing. It seems to me that we are talking about people who have done something serious.

    I have no particular attachment to these words, nor do I have an attachment to a clause which gathers in such a wide variety of ordinary misdemeanours and discretions that should not qualify a person for attention under it. I beg to move.

    It is not a novel point, but we are faced with an extremely low hurdle. Under the definition of "disorder", the provision will affect not only the person who suggests that the referee needs a new pair of glasses but also somebody who laughs at that person. In laughing, that person will encourage the first person to make another similar remark. That is contributing to someone making an insulting remark. No series of actions is involved, making the hurdle extremely low.

    I support the noble Lords, Lord Cope and Lord Lucas. Often one hears of cases, perhaps second hand, of generally peaceful demonstrators who have never used violence but who on seeing a women pushed by a policeman instinctively rush to help her and push the policeman away. That is totally out of character with no violent intent; it is just gallant behaviour instinctively coming to the fore. They would he caught by the wording as it stands. I believe that the amendment is valuable.

    I, too, associate myself with the amendments. They appear modest but are important in the context of the definitions concerned.

    According to the Bill, such disorders can take place anywhere in the world. Page 6 states:

    "any decision or tribunal outside the United Kingdom … any decision of a public authority, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere … deportation or exclusion from a country outside the United Kingdom … removal or exclusion from premises used for playing football matches, whether in the United Kingdom or elsewhere … conduct recorded on video or by any other means".
    The hurdle is a nano-hurdle, no higher than that! I cannot see how any government with any sense of liberality cannot raise it to at least an inch.

    It occurs to me that Amendments Nos. 39 and 40 also cover the ground. If the noble Lord wants to cover them in his reply, that would be fine.

    At this early hour of the morning, I am grateful to the noble Lord for speeding things up a little. I am casting my mind back to when I worked in a law centre in the early 1980s. We occasionally provided legal aid, support and advice to people involved in demonstrations against the National Front. From time to time we had to help to perfect a defence and there were occasions on which I thought the police had been a fraction over zealous in affecting an arrest. I cannot remember our success rate, but it was not poor. In those days, the courts were probably more reluctant than they are now to come to the aid of a defendant.

    On reflection, I thought that in most circumstances the cases were resolved satisfactorily. We were able to put our arguments effectively and where there was a good case, we were able to secure an acquittal. I am struck by the fact that the court must now satisfy itself, as it had to then, that, on the evidence of an officer, the defendant played a leading role in provoking, inciting or encouraging violence of the kind that led the officer originally to make the arrest.

    Is it not true that in the cases to which the noble Lord refers it was the criminal test of which the police had to convince the magistrates?

    That is, of course, the point. However, I am trying to suggest that, by and large, courts take their responsibilities very seriously, and the question to be asked is whether a person played a clear part in encouraging, initiating, leading and inciting. I believe that the type of descriptions which noble Lords have used that might cover what they view as a low threshold are unrealistic and extremely unlikely. I do not believe that the power will be used in the way that noble Lords have suggested.

    As will have been obvious from my contribution to debates in various guises over the past few months, I have a great concern for people's civil liberties. Throughout my life I have played a part in protecting them. I am certainly not willing to be part of a government who undermine those civil liberties.

    However, we must consider the question of civil liberties in a broader context. While we protect the civil liberties of people whom we and noble Lords clearly consider to be worth protecting, we must consider that perhaps the way in which they have acted in the past has seriously infringed the civil liberties of people who have been confronted by some of that mindless racism, xenophobia and loutish behaviour. There is a balance to be struck and we believe that in this legislation we have that balance right.

    As I said, I can well understand the concerns that have been expressed, but I cannot accept the argument that has been put forward. I believe that the courts will continue to act quite properly to protect people, as they have done over many years, in cases where a reasonable defence has been offered. I do not believe that courts will be impressed by the low threshold argument. The way in which this measure is set out provides more than adequate protection. The words which the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, seeks to add by way of description will do very little to assist and are entirely unnecessary. That is our argument.

    I am grateful for that reply, although I do not agree with it. In his reply the noble Lord referred to "seriously disrupting the lives of others" or "playing a leading role in disorder". That is exactly the type of wording that I should like to see in the Bill; that is, some kind of quantification.

    There is no doubt that together my amendments represent overkill and to some extent they duplicate each other. However, I hope that, with my noble friends on the Front Bench and the noble Lords on the Benches next to me, on Report I shall be able to put forward a form of strengthening to this part of the Bill so that what appears on the face of the Bill to the ordinary Englishman will be what appears on the face of the Bill to the skilled lawyer, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, doubtless is or would be. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 5, line 33, after ("contributed") insert ("with intent").

    The noble Lord said: This amendment introduces the notion of intent, which I believe to be important in relation to this matter. If one contributes to violence or disorder, I believe that there should be mens rea, as the lawyers express it, or intent, which I believe is a reasonable English equivalent. We are considering actions whose consequences are very close to crime. Even if we are not considering a criminal level of proof, we ought to consider a criminal level of involvement in the activity. Intent is essential to crime and should be essential to the offence that we are considering. I beg to move.

    3 a.m.

    I am tempted by the amendment. It might go a little further than I would like, but I should like to reflect on it. There may be circumstances in which a contribution was made without intent and there may be others in which it was clearly intended. There may be a distinction between the two that is evident in the way in which the evidence is collected.

    I am not sure about the amendment. I want to think further about the issue. I say that without making a firm promise one way or the other. The noble Lord may well have a point.

    I am delighted to accept the Minister's words on that. I look forward to hearing what he has to say in 12 hours or so. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 29 to 31 not moved.]

    Page 5, line 39, after ("met,") insert—
    ("() the respondent cannot demonstrate that those of his actions that are at issue in respect of subsection (2) above were reasonable in all the circumstances,").

    The noble Lord said: I should like to hear the Minister's reaction to the suggestion that there should be a defence of reasonableness against the charges to be brought under new Section 14B(2). There are many occasions on which one might have acted rudely or abusively but with justification, particularly when the altercation was with someone who was behaving threateningly or being even more rude or abusive. That defence is commonly available in such cases and it should be available in the Bill.

    I spoke to Amendment No. 37 earlier, but the Minister did not cover it when he replied to that group. It contains a similar provision to those in Amendment No. 32, just as it mirrored the provisions on intent in Amendment No. 28. It might be convenient if the Minister replied to both amendments together.

    Amendment No. 32 would allow the respondent to avoid having a banning order made against him under Section 14B if he could demonstrate that those of his actions that were at issue in the case were reasonable in all the circumstances.

    I fully appreciate the concerns that lie behind the amendment. Evidence on video that one person had struck another with a stick and had therefore been involved in violence or disorder might well be tempered by the realisation that the act had been carried out in self-defence. However, I am sure that in those circumstances the person concerned would have the opportunity to ensure that the fact that he had acted reasonably was given its proper weight. The court must be satisfied that the imposition of a banning order would help prevent violence or disorder in connection with football matches. If the person has not previously been involved in violence or disorder, except to the extent that his behaviour could be regarded as reasonable, no court would ever make an order.

    The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, invites me to respond to Amendment No. 37. It would allow a respondent to avoid a banning order if they could show that they had no reason to believe that any person was likely to be hurt, offended, alarmed or distressed by the violence in which they had participated or that their conduct was reasonable. It further provides that an order shall be ma de against such a person only if they intended their behaviour to cause hurt, offence, alarm or distress or were aware that it could have that effect. Proof of the mental element which this amendment requires is likely to be difficult whether the burden of proof lies on the respondent or the applicant.

    The policy behind these measures is to focus on the behaviour itself and not on the reactions to it which other people may have had or, indeed, on the particular state of mind activating the person who is responsible. To accept the amendments would greatly impair the effectiveness of the powers under Section 14B. Therefore, I cannot invite the Committee to accept them.

    I appreciate what the noble Lord said and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendment No. 33 not moved.]

    Page 5, line 40, leave out ("there are reasonable grounds to believe") and insert ("it is substantially more likely than not").

    The noble Lord said: In moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 35. I shall return to Amendment No. 35 another day or, at least, at another hour.

    The Minister addressed Amendment No. 34, although I had not spoken to it. The noble Lord has been pushing the whole subject of new Section 14B down to 14B(4)(a) and my noble friend Lord Cope of Berkeley also focused on new Section 14B(4)(b), which is the crucial test which must be met if someone is to be faced with a banning order.

    In part, Amendment No. 34 addresses the old question of, "Let us have the Government say what the standard of proof is on the face of the Bill". Under these circumstances, someone has passed through the very light test, without any great weight to it, in Section 14B(2), and has arrived at this crucial point. He is someone with a small stain in his past and is faced with a two- to five-year banning order. That poses great inconvenience to him, given the number and duration of football matches and there is considerable social stigma. In those circumstances, there should be a rather higher standard of proof than the mere balance of probabilities.

    On Second Reading, the Minister said that that would tend towards something which he described as a higher level of civil proof, closer to "beyond reasonable doubt". This is merely an attempt to arrive at that sort of wording. What the Minister said on Second Reading should, in some way, find its way into the Bill. I beg to move.

    As the noble Lord has acknowledged, I have already spoken to Amendment No. 34.

    Amendment No. 35 would also seriously weaken the new powers by jettisoning the principle established in last year's legislation—which, I remind the Committee, this House supported—that, where a court believes that there are good reasons to impose a banning order, it must do so. It seems to the Government that, if we want these new powers to be effective, and I am sure we all do, it would be a mistake to countenance a situation in which the respondent's previous involvement in violence or disorder has been demonstrated and the court is satisfied that a banning order is likely to prevent violence and disorder and yet a banning order might not be imposed.

    Therefore, I invite the Committee to reject the amendments because they fundamentally undermine what we are trying to achieve in this part of the Bill.

    I think I am right in saying that the chap does not have to be proved to have been involved in violence, only suspected of that. I still find it quite impossible to understand how you can say with any fairness—and I think this is what the Bill says; I am sure the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—"We think that you are a hooligan who was involved in Utrecht. We cannot prove it but we have sufficiently strong grounds to think that you were and, therefore, we think that you will do that again in the future". I find that an incredibly low standard of proof. If the Bill says that, as I am certain that it does, I still have enormous difficulty. Anything that we can add to the Bill to raise that standard of proof, the better. It is impossible to prove what somebody will do. We must raise the hurdle over which they must go. I hope that my noble friend pursues this, if not now, certainly later.

    I believe that the Minister has drawn a false analogy with the existing law. The same provision was in Amendment No. 19, but that related to new Section 14A, which applies only where there has been a conviction for a relevant offence. Here we are dealing with a situation where there is no conviction and no relevant offence. Therefore, there is all the difference in the world between the old legislation—which not unreasonably says that where there has been a relevant offence and a conviction, one must apply a banning order other than in exceptional circumstances—and the situation here where we are dealing with what everyone is calling the lowest hurdle: no conviction and, in many cases, no illegality. In those circumstances, we on these Benches feel strongly that the court must have that discretion. I remind your Lordships that in the comparable provisions under the anti-social behaviour order legislation the court has that discretion.

    I need to ram home this point. For a banning order to be made, new Section 14B(4)(a) requires it to be proved that,

    "the condition in subsection (2) … is met".
    Although noble Lords do not accept that that is a particularly high burden of proof, that section states,
    "caused or contributed to any violence or disorder".
    There has to be proof that that is the case. That condition must be satisfied for subsection (4)(b) to work. Noble Lords should consider the two in relation to each other.

    The Minister is saying that the matter has to be proved. I thought that in English law one was innocent until proved guilty. Is the Minister shaking his head and saying that that is not the case? That was my impression. Surely, we are saying that if we suspect someone of having done something, but cannot prove it, we shall impose a punishment on him just in case he does something in the future. That encapsulates this section, and the noble Lord cannot understand those on this side of the Committee objecting to that. We should do anything that we can to make that suspicion-cum-extra-suspicion harder to achieve.

    If the noble Earl will forgive me, I shall offer a word of clarification. Hypothetically, it is possible that what is in new Section 14B(2) may be proved, subject to reservations about the words "contributed to" which I shall not explore again. It seems to me that new Section 14B(1) cannot possibly be proved because it is contrary to the nature of the case that any proof should exist relating to a person likely to contribute to disorder. That calls for a prophesy. A prophesy cannot be proved until after the event.

    I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation. I still have considerable reservations in relation to the standard of proof for new Section 14B(4)(b). I believe that the Minister has expressed himself in words that I would be happy to support were they in the Bill. I hope that we shall manage to find a formula to put them into the Bill. I hope that the Minister will consider a way of achieving that too because there is no certainty that the court will decide that that is the standard of proof that is required by the Bill. On this matter we are subject to such conflicting whims. It appears to be a civil offence, so there should be civil proof—the balance of probability and 50:50—and not the strong civil proof as the Minister says. At the other end, it is clear that under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is a criminal offence and, therefore, the criminal test should apply.

    It is very uncertain where an individual court will find itself between those two poles of ideas. It would be extremely helpful if the Bill contained some sort of waymark as to what the level of proof is supposed to be. New Section 14B(4)(b) is where that level should appear. I look forward to returning to this on Report. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 35 to 37 not moved.]

    3.15 a.m.

    Page 5, line 44, at end insert—

    ("Application To Chief Officer Of Police

    14BA.—(1) Any person may make an application to the chief officer of police for the area in which that person resides for a declaration that there are no grounds in his case for seeking a banning order.

    (2) On receipt of such an application a chief officer of police shall, within seven days, either—

  • (a) provide such a declaration in writing; or
  • (b) make an application under section 14B(1).").
  • The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 38 I shall speak also to Amendment No. 63.

    Again, I am not particularly attached to the wording of this amendment. It addresses the problem of how, if one is a person who may be liable to be picked up at the ports under Clause 21 of the new arrangement, one deals with that situation. Do we just buy our ticket at great expense, go along to the port and see whether or not we are nabbed? Or can we in some way obtain guidance as to whether or not we are likely to be stopped at the border?

    It seems to be proper and right that people should be able to obtain guidance from their local chief of police—after all, he is the person who will throw them into Section 14B—as to whether or not they are likely to be stopped under Section 21. If the chief of police says that they are likely to be held up, then they will not go to the expense of buying a ticket or, if they do, it is their lookout. If the chief of police says that they are in the clear, then they should have a pass to wave at anybody who tries to stop them at the port.

    Perhaps this is not exactly the right way to do things. But, one way or another, some procedure must exist so that those who find themselves on the margins know which way to jump. I beg to move.

    Like my noble friend I am not wedded to the specific wording of Amendment No. 38. But it carries an important point; that is, that one should be able to obtain clearance in advance, which could be of great practical value.

    I understand the motive and good intentions behind Amendment No. 38. It would entitle any individual to seek from the police advance warning of whether or not there are grounds for seeking a banning order.

    The intention behind the amendment is to prevent an individual's journey to an overseas match or tournament being disrupted or curtailed by a police decision to detain them en route to make inquiries. I am sure that, whatever the fate of this amendment, people will ask the police in advance for such reassurance. We will undoubtedly need to discuss with the police what the appropriate response should be.

    The noble Lord accepts that the amendment is not well phrased. We cannot possibly accept it because it would probably cripple the police resources and certainly add to the burden of bureaucracy. Also, it would not add much to the prevention of hooliganism if the police had to give such a formal response. However, I understand the motivation behind the amendment. We cannot help on the face of the Bill; but we shall clearly have to discuss guidance with the police because they will have to advise officers who receive requests from ordinary members of the public who feel that they may have been a citizen of suspicion.

    Therefore, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment. We cannot offer anything in the legislation. Clearly it is an issue we will need to discuss with the police and no doubt they will want guidance issued as to how they should respond to requests for information of the kind that the noble Lord is seeking to provide.

    Can the Minister say why it would be more bureaucratic to have this provision in the Bill than giving the police guidance regarding answering such questions? I should have thought that exactly the same number of people will ring up with this request, whether or not it is in the Bill. What is the extra bureaucratic aspect that would arise from putting this provision on the face of the legislation, as opposed to it just being there by way of guidance?

    The Minister said that this provision would not contribute to the prevention of hooliganism. But, with respect, that can never be the sole motive for legislation, although it is a good and necessary motive. The Minister may be forgiven for thinking that the Second Reading debate took place rather a long time ago. However, he may remember that I said that one of the things that seems to me to produce the very worst legislation is a Bill that has but one purpose. We must legislate for the prevention of hooliganism but also for the doing of justice. If we remember both those objectives, we might get it right. But if we do not, we certainly will not get it right.

    There is one interesting possibility here, although I can immediately see the dangers. Most of the large clubs have away-supporters' clubs. Of course, the England team has an English supporters' club. If it were possible for the police, so to speak, to give a clean bill of health to fans as a condition of being a member of such a club and qualifying for the purchase of tickets, that would certainly be a way in which legitimate fans could get that kind of clearance.

    However, there is a problem; namely, that people might reasonably say that, in order to become a member of a club, you could open yourself up to being investigated by the police. Nevertheless, it suggests a potential avenue by which people who are legitimate football supporters could seek to gain clearance by associating themselves with the mechanism that links in with the acquisition of tickets. Therefore, in a sense, you could at a stroke have a legitimate ticket holder and a member of a club with such clearance. It would be an incentive for such fans to join a club of that nature.

    Although I am inclined to agree with what the Minister said about the possible administrative problems that might be caused by these amendments, the arguments for something of this nature are powerful. They are not only powerful; they are also very strong arguments against having the summary procedure under new Section 21A.

    I find myself agreeing with what both previous speakers said. However, under the current timetable of the Bill, I understand that nothing can be done to put this provision on the face of the Bill. Indeed, it would take too much discussion. I shall be happy to rely upon what the Minister said. It is essential that the police should have some way to deal with such questions. That will play an important part in ensuring that the Bill does not upset relationships between the police and those whom they are policing.

    Before the Minister responds, perhaps I may ask him to think most carefully about the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer. This could perhaps be a possible subject for the attention of the study group that is working parallel to the Bill.

    The noble Lord has anticipated 50 per cent of what I intended to say. In response to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, I put forward the argument that this is something that could properly be dealt with by way of guidance. That applies similarly to the point made by my noble friend Lord Woolmer. We are discussing one of those issues upon which the working group could spend some time. We shall certainly have to address the issue of membership clubs and the qualifications that people may have to pass in order to become members of them. There is also the relationship between that situation and criminal records and information that the police may hold. As I am sure the Committee will recognise, one of our proposals in the legislation deals in part with that issue.

    In the context of the present position of this Bill, I am very content with the Minister's explanation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendment Nos. 39 and 40 not moved.]

    Page 6, line 6, at end insert—
    ("() In this Part "causing or significantly contributing with intent to any serious violence or disorder" includes conduct likely to encourage others to cause or significantly contribute with intent to any serious violence or disorder.").

    The noble Lord said: The best reply that I could possibly receive on this amendment is that it is not necessary. It is drawn with the single purpose of making sure that, if not Mr Murdoch, then at least the editor of the Sun is caught by this Bill. I beg to move.

    The noble Lord is right in saying that the amendment is unnecessary. I do not believe that it adds anything in particular to the legislation. We have had the arguments as regards Amendments Nos. 39 and 40. I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

    I look forward very much to the time when Mr Murdoch is served with a banning order and told that he cannot go to football matches in Europe because of what the Sun has been doing to our fans. It is not an insignificant contribution to the way in which people behave at football matches and the way in which they think of our opposing teams, particularly in Europe. I very much hope that the passing of this Bill will mark the passing of a particular type of headline and attitude in our tabloid newspapers. I suspect that I may be told to dream on. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 6, line 11, after ("tribunal") insert ("inside or").

    The noble Lord said: This amendment attempts to ensure that the magistrates' court, in deciding these matters, may take into account the decisions of courts in and outside the United Kingdom. I realise that magistrates' court,

    "may take into account the following matters (among others)".

    But if the legislation specifically states,

    "court or tribunal outside the United Kingdom",

    it might be held that a court inside the United Kingdom was deliberately not spelt out here and is not included when it should be. I make it clear that the decision which the magistrates' court might wish to consider would not only be a conviction. If that were the case, the application would be under the new Section 14A rather than under new Section 14B. It would also include someone who has not been convicted of a violent offence at some time in the past. That is also relevant within the magistrates' court. It can be a decision either way. Not only should foreign courts be taken into account, but also our own courts or our tribunals. I beg to move.

    One of the amendments in this group is our Amendment No. 44, which deals with new Section 14C(4) set out on page 6 of the Bill. That section contains a non-exhaustive list of matters which magistrates' courts may take into account as far as they consider it appropriate to do so. It is not at all clear what is the purpose of the list since it is clearly not exhaustive, but the implication must be that the courts must pay special attention to matters under headings (a) to (e).

    I would have no objection to the courts paying special attention to any decision of a court or tribunal inside or outside the United Kingdom. The Minister is moving an amendment to remove heading (b). We want to see the removal of headings (c) and (d) as well. We believe that deportation from a country outside the United Kingdom, or removal from premises there or elsewhere, may well be relevant factors. However, we see no reason why they should be given any special significance; they are simply ordinary facts which, along with other facts, need to be taken into account.

    In the case of deportation and exclusion, we know all too well that in many cases perfectly innocent people are deported because they have been swept up by a police street cleaning operation whereby they grab everyone they can lay hands on and chuck them out of the country. There have been stories of wholly innocent Americans, who have no interest in football whatever, being caught in an operation of that kind and suddenly finding themselves in London. Therefore it would be quite inappropriate for any special attention to be paid to paragraph (c). Broadly speaking, we believe that the same applies to paragraph (d).

    3.30 a.m.

    I shall deal with Amendments Nos. 42, 43, 44 and 45 in turn. The intention of Amendment No. 42 is clear enough, but I am advised that there is no question but that one court may have regard to the decision of another—this does not require to be stated explicitly. New Section 14C is simply a list of additional matters a court may—if it thinks it appropriate or relevant—take into account. I invite noble Lords to withdraw the amendment.

    Government Amendment No. 43 removes paragraph (b) from new Section 14C, and responds to earlier criticisms of the Bill. Amendment No. 44 would delete references to deportation and removal from football grounds from the factors a court could take into account. We do not believe that that is wise in the circumstances.

    Amendment No. 45 would have the effect (after the government amendment) that deportation on its own could not justify the making of a banning order. Of course, I accept that none of the factors in new Section 14C is sufficient on its own to justify the making of a banning order. Conduct recorded on video, for example, not mentioned in these amendments, might be entirely innocent holiday footage. But all the factors mentioned in new Section 14C may be relevant and may help to establish the necessary conditions in new Section 14B—that is, involvement in violence or disorder and grounds to believe that an order would help to prevent future violence and disorder at football matches. We should bear in mind not just one element here but the sum of several parts. I believe that we have helped by removing the power, as it was earlier described. Amendment No. 43 achieves that. I invite noble Lords to withdraw their amendments in this group.

    I understand what the noble Lord says. However, I still feel uncomfortable about the inclusion of deportation, particularly as it invites people to look at the people who are deported from Belgium as if they are prima facie guilty of something. Deportation without any court or tribunal decision behind it is an administrative exercise and has been used recently—as the noble Lord said—as a street cleaning exercise. It seems to me that it is undesirable that that should be taken into account. I rather go along with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, on that point.

    Perhaps the noble Lord can satisfy my curiosity on subsection (4)(e). Does that wording override the wording of what used to be Clauses 16 and 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill? I am sorry to return to such a recent, beloved memory. Does the term "by any other means" mean that we are looking at a situation where interception evidence could be brought into court, or does the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Bill take precedence?

    On the first point, I understand the nervousness that people feel about deportation, particularly in the light of events that occurred in Belgium. However, there have also been occasions—I think that the noble Lord would concede that point—where other jurisdictions have simply deported people because they consider it to be the quickest way of dealing with disorder, and with those who have been involved in disorder. In those circumstances, deportation has perhaps been seen by that jurisdiction as a punishment. It is something that would need to be considered by a court, but not considered on its own. I hope that I made that plain in my earlier comments. If not, that is exactly what I was trying to make clear.

    As to the noble Lord's second point about proposed new Section 14C(4)(e), it would be unwise to speculate about the application of the RIP Bill in this respect. The noble Lord was being a little mischievous in trying to put me up to it. The quality of the material gathered under the RIP Bill is not what we are seeking here; we are seeking to establish a reasonable means of securing evidence in the ordinary way. It is as simple as that.

    I am not quite sure whether "mischievous" counts as an insulting word for the purposes of the previous clause. I shall let that pass. In the light of the Minister's response, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 6, leave out lines 13 and 14.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    [ Amendments Nos. 44 and 45 not moved.]

    Page 6, line 21, leave out ("But") and insert—
    ("In determining whether to make such an order—
  • (a) the magistrates' court may not take into account anything done by the respondent before the beginning of the period of ten years ending with the application under section 14B(1) above, except circumstances ancillary to a conviction,
  • (b)")
  • On Question, amendment agreed to.

    [ Amendment No. 47 not moved.]

    Page 6, line 25, at end insert—
    ("and in this subsection "circumstances ancillary to a conviction" has the same meaning as it has for the purposes of section 4 of the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (effect of rehabilitation).
    (6) Subsection (5) does not prejudice anything in the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974.").

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Page 6, leave out lines 45 to 51.

    The noble Lord said: It is very unfortunate that at 3.35 a.m. we come to one of the most important groups of amendments. Amendments Nos. 49 and 53A seek to leave out of the Bill the requirement to surrender a passport. I am afraid that, in our hurry, we failed to propose leaving out paragraph (c) of Clause 1(1), which is a necessary paving amendment. Amendment No. 50 was left in by mistake; it formed part of an earlier draft but was cancelled before we tabled our amendments and should not have been left in.

    There are two problems with a requirement to surrender. First, it may have inappropriate consequences; it is a serious interference with freedom to travel. Assuming that it is legitimate—as I believe it is—to prevent hooligans travelling with intent to cause trouble at football matches, it still cannot be legitimate to prevent travel for unrelated purposes for people who live abroad; or who need to go abroad because of their jobs; or who need to go abroad for family reasons, such as a wedding, a funeral or a family illness; or even for people who have booked a holiday in Florida, far from the nearest regulated match. There would be entirely random bans on their travel. As soon as the control period begins they will have to hand their passports in, and they will not get them back until the control period ends.

    They can of course apply for an exemption under Section 20 of the 1989 Act, but, as it stands, it is much too broad. It is not enough to say that they can get an exemption; we need a much more targeted way of hitting the people whose only purpose in travelling abroad is to go to a regulated football match or to take part in potentially violent activities around it.

    There is a second problem with the requirement which is perhaps more fundamental—that is, why do passports need to be surrendered at all? After all, the primary power is to order the subject to report to a police station at specified times; those times, of course, are naturally the times of matches. If the subject of the order does not turn up at the police station, that is just as much an offence as not surrendering his passport. Subjects of banning orders are unlikely to go abroad if they know that they will go to gaol when they get back.

    We have now been told that the German rules do not require passport surrender except in the most serious crimes. They rely mainly, as I think that we should, on the reporting obligation. They rely also on a stamp in a passport; that is a passport stamp which restricts travel to countries where matches are about to be played. Plainly, that is less restrictive than a requirement to surrender a passport. But the Government have not considered the possibility of a stamp which would, of course, operate as an obvious warning to immigration authorities at the other end not to allow people with a stamped passport to enter.

    The requirement to surrender a passport is a serious restriction on freedom of movement which is protected under EU law. The passport surrender requirement goes far beyond legitimate control of potential football hooligans. It is disproportionate to the problem. A power to order attendance at match times is perfectly adequate. It would save a great deal of trouble if we were to rely on that alone. I beg to move.

    I have to inform the Committee that if Amendment No. 44 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 50.

    I should like to support at least the spirit in which these amendments have been moved. My concern is not so much that it might not be right under particular circumstances for a person's passport to be taken away, but that there must be an ability to make exceptions. These banning orders are long term. They are not just for the immediate future. Let us suppose that some six months after having imposed on him a five-year banning order someone obtains employment in Germany. Under new Section 14E(2) he will have to pop back to England every time there is a football match. There is no discretion on the court to do anything about that. Presumably he will also have to surrender his passport because that will be in the banning order imposed before he took up his employment in Germany. Therefore, he will have to surrender his passport, come back to England and sit around not earning any wages. He may lose his job if he has to go through these hoops.

    For someone who has taken employment elsewhere in the Community, there must be flexibility under the terms of the banning order. The court may say, "No, we do not believe that you have real employment out there. We shall not let you off the banning order". But the court must have discretion to let someone off the banning order if he is employed elsewhere in the EU. The Bill will run into considerable trouble under EU law if it does not.

    I have not spotted the word "must" in new Section 14E(2). That need is the irrevocable requirement which will cause considerable problems. An exception is probably needed in the same way as there is provision in new Section 14E(3) to give the court some flexibility to make an order which can deal with overseas employment. Indeed, there must be flexibility for someone subject to a banning order who has to be hauled back from the middle of a holiday in South America because of some unexpected football match.

    The matter must be able to be dealt with rationally by a court. I do not feel that this absolutism is the right way to go about the matter.

    I shall not press further at this moment our obligations under the Treaty of Rome. Before we come back to this tomorrow, can the Minister undertake to obtain legal advice on whether there is a need for exemptions to ensure our compliance with the Treaty of Rome?

    New Section 14E raises a general point on the period which banning orders last. My noble friend Lord Lucas said that these can last a considerable time. I do not see why they can be quite as long as he suggested, but he may be right. Therefore, I should be interested in the Government's response. Can a banning order last for five years? How long will it last? There is also the severe requirement in new Section 14E(2). It states:

    "A banning order must require the person … to report initially at a police station".

    I thank my noble friend for giving way. Under new Section 14E(3) the maximum is 10 years and the minimum is six years.

    I should like to hear from the Government how they think the provision will be used.

    New Section 14E(2) provides that someone must report initially. In new Section 14E(3), the word "must" is used again with regard to the passport. But some people have more than one passport. I have two British passports. In order to be correct, should not the provision state "passport or passports"; otherwise someone could hand over one and go off on the other? I do not suppose that one could do so, because one would be subject to both the provisions. However, the Government must clarify the position.

    Perhaps I may return to the general point of the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. If the banning orders are to be as long as has been suggested by both my noble friends, those who wish to go about their lawful business, which may mean going abroad on business or on holiday, will have to come back. That will be an imposition on them and, indeed, an imposition on the court. We are not trying to stop people travelling abroad. The purpose of the Bill is to stop prospective hooligans or people who are thought to be hooligans travelling abroad to go to football matches. That is the important point. Therefore, it is not a general power to prevent people travelling. The Government should look carefully at new Section 14E and come up with a justification for why these powers are needed.

    3.45 a.m.

    I thought that the Conservative Opposition supported us on the taking away of passports, but obviously I was wrong about that.

    I find it extraordinary that the noble Lord does not seem to listen to the arguments put forward from this side of the Committee. All we are asking the Government to do is to justify the powers sought in the Bill. We have said that we support the principles of the Bill. But we are now talking about the length of time of banning orders. The noble Lord really must listen with greater care and respond to the arguments being put forward. We want to know how these powers will work and why they are necessary. We do not necessarily support taking passports away from people for ever. We want the point to be made clear. We want the passports taken away if they relate to football matches.

    All I was asking is whether the noble Viscount and his party support the principle of taking away passports in order to stop people going to football matches. Perhaps he will come back at a later stage and answer that point.

    The noble Lord asked me a question. I shall answer it. The answer is "Yes". The noble Lord is behaving in a most extraordinary fashion.

    The answer is "Yes". They do support us. One could be forgiven for being wrong about that.

    I know that the noble Earl does not support us. We know where he stands on this issue.

    Amendment No. 49, on which Amendment No. 53A is consequential, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, would remove the passport surrender condition from all banning orders. That condition is a key element of such banning orders and is one that has been widely welcomed. New Section 14E(3) makes provision for the court to exempt an individual from this condition in exceptional circumstances, as the European Convention on Human Rights in our view requires. Moreover, a person can appeal against such a condition and the enforcing authority can waive compliance with the condition in certain circumstances.

    Section 19(2A) makes it clear that the enforcing authority under the Act, namely the football banning orders authority, can impose conditions only in relation to a particular person and a particular match if they are satisfied that it will reduce the likelihood of violence or disorder at that match.

    Section 20 of the Football Spectators Act, which is unamended by this Bill, already provides for the individual to apply for exemptions from any requirement and for a right of appeal to the magistrates' court against a refusal. We believe the condition to be proportionate and its impact limited to relevant control periods. Without such conditions it would be much easier for people with banning orders to evade the controls that we are establishing.

    The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, asked why it was necessary to seize a passport. One of the answers to that is that it will make it far more difficult for those who are minded to go abroad and cause trouble at football matches to do so. If their passport is taken from them, along with the other remedies such as the need to report, we believe that it will be less likely rather than more likely that such people will venture abroad.

    For that reason, we believe that Amendment No. 49 moves right to the heart of what we are trying to establish. We know that the Conservative Opposition support us as far as this is concerned. I had that confirmation from the noble Viscount opposite just now. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, will also find that he is able to support us on this.

    Before the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, replies, I should point out that the noble Lord opposite is always swift to put views into my mouth without listening carefully to the views that have been put forward in this debate. As a result, he has not answered those points. I wonder if the noble Lord is not trying to encourage these Benches to call a Division at this time of night. This kind of behaviour is extraordinary.

    I asked a simple question: what will happen if someone holds more than one passport? However, I also asked a more important question of principle. We believe that people's passports should be taken away from them in order to prevent them attending a football match. However, the question that the noble Lord has not yet answered is: if someone's passport is taken away for a long period of time, what are they to do if other, perfectly reasonable and law-abiding reasons related to work and so forth mean that they need to use their passports? How will that work? How will people retrieve their passports? The noble Lord has not answered any of those questions.

    They may either argue that they have an exceptional case or they may appeal against the decision. I thought that I had already made those points clear.

    Before we leave the matter, the Minister should bear in mind that almost all of us remaining in the Chamber feel a good deal less sympathetic to the Bill than we felt seven hours ago. After all, there is no point in holding a Committee stage if one does not probe the provisions of the Bill. Every now and then, one may change one's mind.

    Before the Minister accuses me, too, of inconsistency, he may recall that I said on Second Reading that I was, with some reluctance, prepared to accept the provision on passports. Since then I have had the privilege of listening to my noble friend Lord Goodhart, whose case I have found to be entirely and totally persuasive. The Government's refusal to engage with the argument for exceptions, which is, I think, unanswerable, has served only to make the arguments of my noble friend even more persuasive than they were before. I now recant what I said on Second Reading.

    I am grateful for the support that has been demonstrated for the amendment. I am afraid that I do not regard the response we have received from the Minister as being satisfactory.

    If we were satisfied that the rules to prevent problems arising from the surrender of passports were properly effective, then we might take a different view on the issue itself. However, in our view, those rules are plainly inadequate.

    Under proposed new Section 14E, the court may refrain from making an order for passport surrender as part of a banning order in "exceptional circumstances". The provision is inadequate for two reasons. First, it applies only to the circumstances as they are at the date when the order is made; secondly, it requires the circumstances to be exceptional. It must be said that, in the present day, the fact that someone is living and working abroad is by no means exceptional. Equally, an appeal can only be an appeal from the original order, and that again depends on the circumstances as at the date of the making of the order.

    The real problem arises if someone, for example, gets a job offer to work abroad. The banning order will have a serious effect. The person can apply for an exemption under Section 20 of the Act, which the Minister said was unamended—it is amended, although in drafting terms rather than in substantive terms. But as I understand it, an exemption under Section 20 is an exemption from a particular notice and does not amount to either a permanent or temporary discharge of the banning order, or at any rate the requirement in the banning order for the surrender of the passport which would plainly be necessary where the circumstances had changed to that extent.

    It seems to me that there is a problem that the Government have not dealt with. Before they could get our consent to surrender of the passport—which is not in any way a vital matter; it is almost entirely symbolic—the Government would have to put in position rights to apply for the discharge or modification of an order which had general application, and not merely something that was to be renewed whenever a notice was given.

    Although I shall ask the leave of the House to withdraw the amendment now, it is a matter to which we shall almost certainly want to return on Report later today. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendment No. 50 not moved.]

    Page 7, leave out lines 29 to 42.

    The noble Lord said: This is another important amendment. The same point is raised in parts of Amendment No. 53A, which covers a multitude of subjects and needs to be broken down into several amendments.

    The amendment arises out of proposed Section 14G, which allows a court making a banning order to impose "additional requirements". Similarly, there is to be a power under proposed new subsection (2B) to Section 19 for an enforcing authority in a notice to require the subject of the order,

    "to comply with any additional requirements of the order in the manner specified in the notice.

    The effect of these additional requirements is that if the subject of the order commits a breach he will be guilty of a criminal offence, but there is no indication whatever on the face of the Bill what those requirements may be. We believe that it is wholly inappropriate to give either the courts or the enforcing authority power to impose requirements which have such an effect. This matter should be subject to parliamentary control, preferably by being put on the face of the Bill. If not, at least it requires a statutory instrument that is subject to the affirmative procedure.

    It is right that the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee did not put any such recommendation in its report. While it is not appropriate to disclose what took place in that committee, I have less hesitation in disclosing what discussions did not take place. The Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee, like this Committee, had an extremely short time in which to consider the issues raised by the Bill. This matter simply did not come to its attention. I cannot say what decision that committee might have reached had it considered the point. Speaking for myself and not the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee, we should insist that these additional requirements are subject to parliamentary control. It is wholly wrong that they should be absolutely at large and in the discretion of the court, and perhaps even the discretion of the enforcing authority. I beg to move.

    4 a.m.

    I rise to speak to Amendment No. 52 and to address the other amendments in the group. I should like to return to a subject which we raised in the previous group to which we received no answer. How does somebody who finds himself, quite reasonably, subject to a banning order, which under new Section 14E(3) requires that his passport be surrendered every time one of the relevant matches takes place, deal with the situation where in the middle of the ban he must go abroad to work? At the moment there is no provision to rescind or vary an order under that section and the purpose of Amendment No. 52 is to give the court power to do so.

    Remember that this provision does not relate only to British nationals. A German national may be subject to a banning order. If after one year of a 10-year ban he returns to Germany and is still theoretically subject to the order, a criminal penalty can be imposed if he does not surrender his passport every time there is a match abroad involving England. There must be some mechanism whereby the person who is subject to the banning order can agree with the enforcing authority how the requirements are to be varied.

    Without at present knowing my way round the Bill, how does the enforcing authority know what is reasonable in relation to any particular individual who has taken employment abroad? How does a person who regularly needs to travel abroad negotiate with the enforcing authority to ensure that the requirements imposed on him are reasonable and fit in with his work or his decision to live abroad? There is no clear explanation on the face of the Bill. It would be extremely helpful if we were told that.

    My noble friend Lord Goodhart said that he could speak only to the fact that the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee overlooked this power. But it is on public record that at Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Alexander of Weedon, drew particular attention to this extraordinarily unconstrained ability on the part of a court to impose any additional requirement it thinks fit. The anti-social behaviour orders under the Crime and Disorder Act where magistrates' courts have a wide discretion about what to impose by way of such an order are not a good analogy. Those orders come within a much tighter framework: they are preceded by immediate past evidence of anti-social behaviour. The procedure is more rigorous and more down to earth. I share the considerable anxieties on this unconstrained power on the part of the magistrates' courts.

    We owe thanks to the Delegated Powers and Deregulation Committee that we have a report on the Bill. Like the pianist, it has done its best.

    While I listened to my noble friend I considered again the wording of new Section 14G(1). As drafted at present, the provision is impossibly open-ended. It is a generally well understood principle of English law that no one should be punished at will; they should be punished according to rules laid down in advance by Parliament. But here, so far as I can see, Parliament has not laid down any rule whatsoever. Any type of additional requirement could be put in place. A requirement to go for a 21-mile run every day could be put in place. From time to time requirements will be put in place with which people are physically incapable of complying. That leaves them in serious jeopardy. We cannot allow any measure like this to proceed out of a British Parliament. It is quite impossible.

    When I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, I was suddenly reminded of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, speaking on the Crime (Sentences) Bill in the last Parliament. He said that if you try to abolish discretion in one place the only result is that it breaks out in another. If these orders remain in place, the interesting question is this: where will the discretion break out? I suspect that it will be in the turning of a blind eye by the police. That may mean that the legislation may break down at yet another point.

    The more we consider the Bill, the worse it becomes. Even if it emerges from this House, I do not think that it can survive in the world outside.

    I plead guilty to not doing anything about this aspect. I had failed to realise that not only is there a maximum period—if one has to have punishments maximum periods are essential—there is also a minimum period. In other words, under new Section 14F the maximum period is three years and the minimum two years. It is another lack of discretion to add to that pointed out by the noble Earl, Lord Russell. One adds to that the provision that a banning order may,

    "if the court making the order thinks fit, impose additional requirements".
    These are horrible provisions. We have to continue saying that they are horrible. They will not work. They will break down. It will not be fun saying, "I told you so". But I promise the Committee that that is exactly what will happen in six months' time.

    The noble Earl, Lord Russell, said that an additional requirement might be going for a 21-mile run. I can think of much worse tasks. It might mean attending your Lordships' House for an all-night sitting—a severe punishment.

    New Section 14E(2) and (3) requires someone to report initially to a police station in England or Wales and to surrender their passport, then new Section 14(G) refers to "additional requirements". The only logical and sensible additional requirement is for the person to reattend at the police station. Presumably the Government cannot think of anything else. They want the banned person at a police station to prevent them attending a football match.

    If the Government require someone to attend again at a police station prior to or during a match, they should say so. They should use the words,
    "impose the additional requirement of reporting at a police station".
    That would be a safeguard for the Government and Parliament because magistrates would have a clear steer on what they were required to do.

    It is getting late and no doubt that is why we are getting confused and at times tetchy.

    The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, seeks in Amendment No. 51 to preclude a court from imposing additional conditions and adding to or waiving conditions already attached to a banning order. The existing measure provides the court with useful flexibility. It would enable the police, for example, to seek a specific condition in respect of a particular person's activities. It is aimed primarily at the domestic component of a banning order. It would permit the police to seek to exclude the subject from a town centre or the vicinity of a railway station where groups of fans might regularly meet to fight with visiting supporters. Believe me, that does happen. The annual bust-up between Cardiff and Millwall is an ample expression of such circumstances.

    A person currently subject to a domestic ban is prevented from entering a ground but not from travelling to away games or joining up with accomplices to indulge in hooligan behaviour. The police see the facility to add specific conditions as potentially useful in their battle to combat hooliganism. The provision to review the conditions provides a means for either party to seek changes. That additional flexibility is important. It helps both sides of the argument.

    It could be. Equally, it could be reduced.

    Amendment No. 53 would allow the courts to relax requirements. That is not necessary because the facility already exists for someone subject to an order to make an application to have it varied outside the additional requirements order.

    I can understand the case for the argument that has been made but we do not believe that it is necessary because the facility exists to make an application.

    As I explained earlier, Section 20 provides for exemptions. A person affected can apply to the football banning authority, NCIS, and at short notice he can apply to the police for exemption. If the exemption is refused, there is a right of appeal to the court. Therefore, that facility exists.

    I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. I, too, have searched through my mind and read various parts of the schedule. Perhaps it is not immediately plain to all concerned and the ability to apply for that variation is not as clearly spelt out as it could be. Therefore, before the Report stage tomorrow I undertake further to investigate the point so that I can make it plain to the noble Lord that the facility exists. On that basis, I invite the Committee to reject the amendment.

    Perhaps I may help the Minister. Is not the power to vary contained in new Section 14G(2)?

    I thought so on my reading of it, but that provision relates to the additional requirements of orders. The point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is more general; it is to seek to vary the order at large outside the additional requirements of orders. That is a point that I properly need to make clear to the Committee and I shall undertake to try to do so tomorrow.

    Before the Minister sits down and before my noble friend Lord Goodhart replies, perhaps I may ask the Minister a question. He makes the case, and with some persuasiveness, that there may be a need to impose additional requirements. However, would it not be minimally fair that before imposing additional requirements the magistrates gave the respondent the opportunity to make such observations on the proposals as he or she thought fit before they reached a conclusion? That would lend some protection against magistrates going outside the conventional brief and doing something which inadvertently was of significant disadvantage or unfair to the respondent.

    The noble Lord is suggesting that a facility be made available so that the respondent has the opportunity to make representations. I take that point and undertake to ensure that the opportunity will be made available. It is an important principle.

    I do not think the Minister helped himself with that reply. He invoked useful flexibility. Does he understand that that is precisely what worries us most about the proposal in the Bill? The point about having a fixed upper limit on punishment is that it is the citizen's only protection against punishment based on spite. When we become exhausted, and I am sure that the Minister sympathises, spite is something of which we are all regrettably capable. The need to place a maximum limit on punishment is the only thing that persuades us that we are punished according to fixed and known rules. I am surprised that the point has not been thought of. It is an example of the obsessive single purpose legislation. As I listen to the debate I conclude that this Bill makes the Child Support Act 1991 look well drafted.

    I am afraid that once again the Minister's reply is deeply unsatisfactory. We are not saying that there should never be any additional requirements. The Minister's example of banning someone who is the subject of an order from going to or near a railway station which is being used by fans of the visiting club is sensible.

    However, we say that the parameters of the additional requirement should be either on the face of the Bill or, at the very least, set out in a statutory instrument. Without that, there is a real possibility that requirements could be made which are not acceptable. Let us say, for example, that the court stated that the subject of the order was to be confined to his house for the whole of the day of the match except for going to and from the police station for the purpose of reporting. I do not believe that we would regard that as being an acceptable additional requirement. We consider that the possibility of making orders of that kind needs to be curbed by requiring some degree of parliamentary control over the additional requirements that can be imposed.

    Once again, I intend to ask the leave of the Committee to withdraw the amendment, but this, too, is a matter which we shall bring back on Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 52 to 53A not moved.]

    Page 8, line 50, leave out from ("section") to end of line 2 on page 9 and insert—

    ("(a) may not require the person subject to the order to report except in the control period in relation to a regulated football match outside England and Wales or an external tournament,
    (b) may not require him to surrender his passport except in the control period in relation to a regulated football match outside the United Kingdom or an external tournament which includes such matches.").

    The noble Lord said: In moving government Amendment No. 54, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 68 and 73. They are major drafting amendments. Their purpose is to make it clear that, while the requirement to report to a police station may be applied in relation to matches outside England and Wales, the requirement to surrender a passport can be imposed only in relation to matches outside the United Kingdom. There will be no need to surrender passports in relation to a match which takes place in Scotland or Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    [ Amendments Nos. 55 and 56 not moved.]

    Page 9, line 11, leave out ("for suspecting") and insert ("to believe").

    The noble Viscount said: In moving Amendment No. 57, I wish to speak also to Amendments Nos. 58 to 60. I do not want to go back over territory which the Committee has already debated. However, through an amendment moved earlier this evening the whole of new Section 21A would, in effect, have been removed. Therefore, these amendments look at the matter in another way and, I hope, improve or make clearer the grounds for the burden of proof.

    They are fairly simple amendments. Amendment No. 57 inserts "to believe" instead of "for suspecting". Amendment No. 58 requires that an officer of at least the rank of inspector should be involved. Amendment No. 59 adds a time constraint. They attempt to toughen up the measure.

    The noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, was unable to stay until such a late hour but he asked me to mention his amendment. I should be entirely happy if the Government were to go back over the Second Reading speech of the noble and learned Lord in which his thinking on the matter is set out. I could try to paraphrase the speech but I suspect that, if I did so, it would be even longer than the original. Therefore, I hope that the Minister can take as said the points made by the noble and learned Lord so that we do not have to repeat the process, because I am sure that he realises that the points will come up in this debate. If the Minister could reply to those points, it would help enormously with the next stage of the Bill, which I am sure he would like us to get through in the quickest and most orderly fashion possible. I beg to move.

    I suggest that Amendment No. 69, which is also in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, and is in the same terms as Amendment No. 60, should be considered with this grouping. I support the amendments.

    I have a couple of amendments in this group. Amendment No. 64 has been dealt with by the effect of the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Cope of Berkeley. Amendment No. 65 is on a different subject. It comes back to a point that I raised earlier about the effect of the two sections on the Scots. At the moment, any Brit can be hauled up and stuck in chokey for six hours under Section 21A, but Section 21B does not allow a Scotsman or someone from Northern Ireland to be further processed under that section. Section 21B(4) requires the complaint to be made as if it is by the appropriate chief officer of police to the court in question. For a Scotsman or someone in Northern Ireland, there is no such person.

    Section 14B is drafted entirely with the English and the Welsh in mind. It has no application in Scotland or Northern Ireland. The process of arraigning in front of a magistrates' court has no status for someone who lives outside England or Wales. Section 21A gives the right to detain the Scots and the Northern Irish to no purpose. Many of us might enjoy doing that on an off day to lighten the weary hours, but it should not be in the Bill.

    4.30 a.m.

    I shall try to respond to all the amendments. We are not convinced of their necessity. Amendment No. 57 would require a police officer to believe rather than to suspect that a person had been involved in violence or disorder before exercising the power to detain. I suspect that the practical difference is not great, but I submit that suspicion is probably the right test. The officer must have reasonable grounds for his suspicion. Government amendments in another place have ensured that, and it is not necessary or in the interests of the effectiveness of the Bill that the officer should have formed a firm belief on the matter before any inquiries are made.

    Amendment No. 58 is unrealistic. It would require an inspector to authorise every case of detention for further inquiries. The inspector will need to be engaged if an extension of detention from four hours to six seems justified, but a constable is capable of making and justifying the initial decision.

    Amendment No. 59 would limit the detention period to the time reasonably necessary to reach a decision. That would not make much difference in practice. The officer may detain until he has made a decision and in no case can that be for above six hours. How would it be established in practice that an officer had taken longer than was reasonably necessary to make a decision? On what basis could that conclusion be reached?

    I believe that the absolute limitation on detention time which we have now introduced will, in practice, be a much better safeguard. I am tempted to pray in aid of my argument the earlier words of the noble Earl, Lord Russell; but perhaps not.

    The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, has done us a service in speaking to Amendment No. 60. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, has tabled some interesting amendments. However, I fear that Amendment No. 60 would create real difficulties for the police in attempting to implement new Section 21A. The reality is that a person detained will be held for only a relatively short while and then will either be issued with a notice or released to continue his journey.

    Of course, the police will not indiscriminately pick out people to check on them. It is right that they should do so only when there are reasonable grounds, as the Bill currently provides.

    But the amendment goes beyond the kind of requirement which we see in analogous provisions of PACE and the requirements of the common law. "Full particulars" suggests to us a rather substantial document which may add to the bureaucracy with which the police must comply without being of much value to the person detained. By the same token, I recognise that, as we were warned at Second Reading, there may be a temptation to issue a notice to the individual explaining that the detention was in order to make further inquiries. I suggest that that matter can be best dealt with in guidance to the police. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will be interested in the explanation which I have given.

    In moving Amendment No. 65, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raised an interesting issue. We may wish to look again at that to see whether we can help in terms of covering the point which the amendment raises. I say that without commitment, but I am happy to go away and look again at that amendment.

    The noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, has also tabled Amendment No. 69. That makes the same point in relation to the issue of a notice as was made in relation to the power to detain under new Section 21A. The amendment is based on the premise, which we accept, that people issued with notices commencing a banning order by the complaint process need to know the case against them so that they can prepare for their hearing.

    In those circumstances, simply reciting the wording of the criteria in new Section 21A would not be appropriate. We are not clear that the full particulars formulation is the right one either. If the requirement is too onerous, that may lead to an extension of the detention period while a substantial notice is prepared, thus adding to the bureaucracy of it all.

    We should not want to forestall evidence which came to light subsequent to the issue of the notice from being presented in court. If the police are unable to make their case at the first hearing, the person concerned should be free to travel immediately. Where there are substantial issues of fact between the parties, we imagine that the court would adjourn the hearing to a later date. I assure the Committee that there is no intention that the police should regard it as sufficient merely to cite the criteria in new Section 21A and that guidance on that point will be provided by the police. We recognise and acknowledge that it is an issue, but we believe that it should not be on the face of the Bill and that it is best dealt with in guidance.

    I am rather depressed by the fact that the Minister cannot tell the difference between the meaning of the words "suspect" and "believe". The dictionary would make it quite clear. The following subsection refers to "reasonable grounds to believe". Why cannot we have those words here as opposed to "suspecting"? That would be a minor improvement on something which is pretty awful, but at least it would be a minor improvement.

    I believed that my noble friend Lord Lucas, who is not now behind me, was going to thank the Minister for his contribution to the amendment, so I shall do so on his behalf. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will study carefully what the Minister said on his Amendments Nos. 60 and 67.

    How will the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, be able to study what the Minister has said before Report stage?

    I do not know whether Hansard will have been produced, but I presume that there will be some record at Report stage. I understand that the Government Chief Whip cannot tell us. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, will not be able to read Hansard, no doubt my noble friend will tell him in the morning and take him carefully through the arguments on which he has been concentrating.

    We shall be able to provide the noble and learned Lord with a copy of the speaking note.

    The noble and learned Lord will have help from all sides of the Committee.

    In relation to Amendments No. 57, 58 and 59, I accept what the Minister has said. Our positions are not all that different. I am happy to beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    [ Amendments Nos. 58 to 60 not moved.]

    Page 9, line 26, at end insert—
    ("(4) A person who has been detained under subsection (2) above may only be further detained under that subsection in the same control period in reliance on information which was not available to the constable who previously detained him; and a person on whom a notice has been served under section 21B(2) below may not be detained under subsection (2) above in the same control period.").

    The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 61, I shall also speak to Amendment No. 62. The power in new Section 21A is designed to be a short-term power to hold someone while inquiries are made. We do not believe that it will be abused by police officers. Nevertheless, we are mindful of the suggestions that have been made here and in another place that it may theoretically be possible for the same person to be detained repeatedly under that power. Therefore, we have brought forward government Amendment No. 61 which makes it clear that a person who has been detained and released without issue of a notice under new Section 21B can be redetained under this power in the same control period only on new information, the key words being "on new information". Similarly, someone who has been issued with a notice and appeared in court cannot be redetained under new Section 21A in the same control period.

    I hope that this amendment will allay any anxieties on this score and I commend it to the Committee. The opposition Amendment No. 62, standing in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope of Berkeley, clearly has the same object in mind. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that it is preferable to tie in the prohibition on redetention to the whole of the control period rather than to a 24-hour period and, therefore, that he will, in due course, not move Amendment No. 62.

    The Lord in Waiting correctly says that my amendment is also aimed at what at one stage in history was called "cat and mouse" detention. His amendment achieves the effect in a more satisfactory way. I am happy to go along with it.

    It may interest noble Lords to know that while I was out of the Chamber my attention was drawn to the Evening Standard and particularly to the horoscope of the noble Lord, the Captain of the Gentlemen-at-Arms. It says:
    "A recent bout of over-tiredness is making you less perceptive than usual. It's not that you're unwilling to put in your share of the workload, but you are struggling to make your usual impact".
    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    [ Amendments Nos. 62 to 65 not moved.]

    Page 9, line 30, after ("may") insert ("if the conditions in section 21A(1)(a) and (b) are met").

    The noble Lord said: This is a version of Amendment No. 67, which we have already discussed.

    [ Amendment No. 66 not moved.]

    [ Amendment No. 67 not moved.]

    Page 9, line 38, after ("tournament") insert ("which includes such matches").

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    [ Amendments Nos. 69 and 70 not moved.]

    Page 10, line 3, at end insert—
    ("() The Lord Chancellor shall ensure that during any control period a magistrates' court is convened for the purpose of hearings under this section at such ports and airports as he considers appropriate.").

    The noble Lord said: Amendment No. 71 originally appeared in one of the earlier groups. It provides that magistrates should be convened at the ports and airports at appropriate times. The obvious purpose is to try to ensure that the court part of the procedure follows as quickly after the police part of the procedure as possible—if I can summarise it in that way now that we are all familiar with the Bill—by having stipendiary magistrates standing by at what are expected to be busy times. It could be helpful if the sort of scenario envisaged earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer, were to come about. I beg to move.

    We have agreed that magistrates' hearings will be convened, at weekends where necessary, to ensure that individuals issued with a notice preventing them leaving England and Wales will have the opportunity of a hearing as soon as possible, and certainly before the 24-hour limit expires.

    I appreciate the intention behind the amendment. In fact, the noble Lord discussed the effect of it briefly with me and I took that as a positive contribution. We do not believe that it will be necessary, though we accept that it is vital that the hearings are held a s close as possible to the port or airport concerned, if indeed the notice was issued at a port or airport; some may have been issued at the respondent's home before he set off. It will not usually be necessary to set up courts in the port buildings themselves. However, I am willing to look at the matter again when the measures are reviewed in 12 months' time. That timeframe will enable us to take a further rain-check on this.

    We have been in contact with the Lord Chancellor's Department on this matter. It shares our view that we can put in place adequate arrangements to cover the noble Lord's point. However, we will keep it under review and, when the first review period is complete, we shall need to comment to continue to satisfy Members of your Lordships' House and elsewhere that these measures are effective and that people have reasonable access to justice not far from the point of their original detention.

    I take it from the Minister's response that it is not necessary to have this provision in the Bill to achieve the effect required, should it be thought necessary. In the light of that, and in the light of the Minister's undertaking to keep the matter under review during the initial period, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 10, line 15, at end insert—
    ("() The court must offer bail to any person remanded by virtue of subsection (3).").

    The noble Lord said: I look forward to the Minister's reply on this amendment. I beg to move.

    The Government are not able to accept this amendment, which seeks to ensure that anyone remanded under new Section 21C(3) will be offered bail. We believe that the court must have the power to remand either in custody or on bail as it sees fit. So we should not act to fetter its discretion. To deprive it of the power to remand in custody even where there were strong reasons to believe that the respondent would, if released, leave the country and cause disorder at regulated football matches would be a significant weakening of the structure of controls in the Bill.

    I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, therefore, that, if he believes that this should be an effective measure—and I believe he does—he should withdraw this amendment.

    The Government are saying that someone charged merely with a civil offence can none the less be imprisoned for it until the police are ready with a case that the person is supposed to answer. That really is stretching the definition of "civil" case a long way.

    4.45 a.m.

    Yes, in some circumstances where we thought there was good cause to hold that belief, we believe that that would be right. Of course that would have to be based on good and sound evidence. No doubt the officers involved would be very careful in the exercise of that power. But, as I said, we believe that that would be right in some situations.

    I find the concept fairly extraordinary. As envisaged here, the court will not be in a position to issue a banning order. Therefore, the evidence will presumably not be in place to issue such an order but, none the less, the person concerned could be imprisoned. What level of evidence cannot justify a banning order but can justify keeping someone in prison? As I said, this is a hard concept to grasp. Bearing in mind the time necessary to accumulate evidence for a court case, such a person could be in prison for a month. He would not be charged with any offence; indeed, there would be no crime with which to charge him.

    The fact that the authorities are considering whether someone should be made the subject of a banning order is sufficient to ensure that he is kept in prison. The banning order largely consists of a promise not to leave the country and that could be extracted from him under the bail conditions in subsection (4). I do see how this power to keep someone in prison is gaining the country much. Moreover, it is damaging civil liberties to quite an extraordinary extent.

    I invite the noble Lord to consider the following proposition. If it is the case that someone is being held under these powers and it is plainly known to the police that he has a string of previous convictions, or has been involved in similar instances, and there is no guarantee that he will attend court, as provided for under the notice, it would be right in those circumstances. I am not saying that this will happen in each and every circumstance; indeed, that is far from the case. However, where there is more than adequate reason to believe that the person might not turn up in court in compliance with the notice, I do not believe that it is at all unreasonable for this facility to exist. There will be circumstances in which that will be the case.

    I find it absolutely ridiculous that, on the one hand, the Government continue to insist that this is a civil and not a criminal order and yet, on the other hand, are refusing to allow bail. It is simply unbelievable.

    I entirely share the noble Lord's views. However, I return to the Minister's proposition. The person concerned has been picked up by the police; he spends 36 hours "in jug" and is kept there until the magistrates' court can convene. The Minister is saying that, at that point, the police can produce evidence that the person has been sufficiently involved in football crime to justify keeping him in gaol but there is not sufficient evidence under the extraordinarily weak tests here to make him the subject of a football banning order. It is unbelievable. The way that the Bill is written at present means that there can be evidence that is sufficiently weak so that it cannot justify a football banning order, but yet is sufficiently strong to enable someone to be imprisoned who is not even charged with a criminal offence.

    This is a matter that the Government should re-consider. It seems to me to be a most extraordinary idea. Yes, if it is a criminal offence, you should keep someone in prison who might abscond before the matter comes to court. However, if the Government are saying that the court has to be so certain that the person is likely to commit an offence so that he should not be let out, then those concerned must be able to issue a football banning order. The requirements for it are only the civil level of proof. Surely there cannot be circumstances where that process cannot be completed at the end of the 24 hours of custody envisaged under new Section 21B. If the evidence is there at the end of that period, the banning order can be issued. But, if the evidence is not there, the person should be offered bail. I cannot see any middle way between the two, especially not if the Government insist on this being a civil procedure.

    Two points were raised towards the end of the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, said that we were refusing to allow bail. We are not. We are saying that the court should have the option of either granting bail or remanding in custody. We are not refusing bail. Perhaps because of the lateness or early nature of the hour, whichever way one wants to put it, I did not make that point plain.

    In response to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, it may well be the case that there is very strong evidence that the respondent may want time to prepare his defence, but that does not meet the point that there may be circumstances where it is right that the respondent needs to be held in custody while the court is convened. I believe that it would only be in extremis situations; we do not see it happening on each and every occasion. That is something which will have to be judged. There may be such circumstances.

    I find the Government's reply extremely unsatisfactory. It comes back to the matter being a criminal offence in everything except what the Government insist the name should be. In every other matter of stigma, treatment and consequences it is a criminal offence, but the Government insist that it should be a civil offence so they can get away with a civil level of proof. That will not wash under the Human Rights Act. This Bill will fall apart on that. The Government ought to take precautions if they wish this legislation to have a chance of success. They should take precautions that there is at least a chance of the Bill surviving examination under the Human Rights Act, which it will surely receive at a pretty early stage if the Government do such things as imprisoning people on the basis of being not yet ready to proceed with a new Section 14B arraignment in front of magistrates.

    It would not amuse the Government Chief Whip for me to call a Division at the moment. I am sure that his troops are not available. I am not sure what would be the consequences for this afternoon's business. We are so near the end that perhaps I should allow him to have his way. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 10, line 23, after ("tournament") insert ("which includes such matches").

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    Page 10, line 24, at end insert—

    ("Summary Measures: Compensation

    21D.—(1) Where a person to whom a notice has been given under section 21B above appears before a magistrates' court and the court refuses the application for a banning order in respect of him, it may order compensation to be paid to him out of central funds if it is satisfied—

  • (a) that the notice should not have been given,
  • (b) that he has suffered loss as a result of the giving of the notice, and
  • (c) that, having regard to all the circumstances, it is appropriate to order the payment of compensation in respect of that loss.
  • (2) An appeal lies to the Crown Court against any refusal by a magistrates' court to order the payment of compensation under subsection (1) above.

    (3) The compensation to be paid by order of the magistrates' court under subsection (1) above or by order of the Crown Court on an appeal under subsection (2) above shall not exceed £5,000 (but no appeal may be made under subsection (2) in respect of the amount of compensation awarded).

    (4) If it appears to the Secretary of State that there has been a change in the value of money since the coming into force of this section or, as the case may be, the last occasion when the power conferred by this subsection was exercised, he may by order substitute for the amount specified in subsection (3) above such other amount as appears to him to be justified by the change.

    (5) In this section, "central funds" has the same meaning as in enactments providing for the payment of costs.").

    The noble Lord said: We now come to compensation. I do not want to say much about it at this time of the morning. We believe that the compensation arrangements are an important part of the Bill and represent a safeguard for those detained. Members of the Committee opposite have had an opportunity to see our Amendment No. 74 on compensation. I shall be inviting them to withdraw their Amendment No. 75. I believe that our amendment is to be preferred because, first, it provides for an appeal against decisions on compensation; secondly, it provides that compensation shall be paid out of central funds and, thirdly, it provides an upper limit of £5,000 for compensation payments. I beg to move.

    As the Minister said, Amendment No. 75 in my name goes to the same point. It reproduces an amendment that was pressed in another place by my colleagues there. The Government amendment is quite satisfactory and probably better in its drafting except that I am not sure why there should be a limit of £5,000 for compensation. Generally speaking, that will cover all the likely expenses. I do not believe that many cases will go above it. I do not see why it should be limited in that way. It is for the court to decide. I am not going to press that particular point at this hour of the night or morning.

    I should be grateful for clarification from the Minister as to what happens when the police do not press charges. I was clear about that under Amendment No. 75, but I do not see where that is picked up in the wording of Amendment No. 74. I shall be very grateful to the noble Lord for pointing it out.

    It may be due to the lateness of the hour but I do not grasp the noble Lord's point. The amendment provides for compensation to be paid to those who have perhaps been wrongly detained. The noble Lord, Lord Cope, is happy with our amendment, which seems to us to cover the needs of this important part of the Bill.

    I do not think that I can have explained myself clearly enough. Amendment No. 75, in the name of my noble friend Lord Cope, states,

    "Where a person, having been detained … or having been issued with a notice".
    In other words, that is the point at which the entitlement to compensation starts. Amendment No. 74, in the name of the Minister, states,
    "Where a person … appears before a magistrates' court".
    What happens if the police have detained a person for six hours, held him for another 18 and then say, "We haven't been able to gather the evidence: off you go son"? Under my noble friend's amendment, that person would get compensation. However, it appears to me that, under the Government's amendment, he would not. It also appears to me that that kind of behaviour on the part of the police should be strongly discouraged. I hope that the noble Lord can point out where in his amendment someone who is subject to that kind of treatment is entitled to compensation.

    My noble friend appears to have discovered a flaw in both the amendments we are discussing. Both refer to an appearance before the magistrates' court. If that appearance does not take place, as a result of the scenario that my noble friend suggests, I do not think that compensation is payable under either amendment. However, I believe it should be. Indeed, in some respects, such cases may be the most deserving of compensation if the police cannot even raise a case to present to the magistrates and yet they have detained someone for a number of hours and caused that person to miss his flight and so on.

    I believe that there is a further advantage to my amendment; namely, that the appropriate sum of compensation was to come from the police budget concerned, not from central funds. It seems to me that such compensation would make the police more careful with regard to the use of this power in appropriate cases. I shall not press the point but I believe that my noble friend has pointed out an interesting flaw in both the amendments.

    I wonder whether I should ask the following question now or later. Earlier I was serious when I asked how the noble and learned Lord, Lord Ackner, would obtain the evidence of what had happened during the debate, as I believe that the cutoff point for Hansard is ten o'clock.

    I thought that I had stated plainly that I would make my speaking notes available to the noble and learned Lord.

    On Question, amendment agreed to.

    [ Amendment No. 75 not moved.]

    Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

    Schedule 2 [ Minor and consequential amendments]:

    Page 15, line 13, after ("means") insert (", subject to subsection (4) below,").

    The noble Lord said: I rise to speak to the amendment briefly as it is not an amendment of the greatest importance. If it is not acceptable to the Government, I shall not bring it back on Report.

    However, Wales plays as a separate national team, although a number of the leading Welsh clubs play in the nationwide league alongside English teams. I believe that particularly in the case of a Welsh national team which is playing in a competition abroad, the National Assembly for Wales should be consulted about whether or not the match should be regulated. The same should apply to a Welsh club team which is playing an overseas club team in a competition. Although I recognise that this is not a devolved matter, Wales has a special interest because it plays as a separate team.

    This is the last amendment I shall be moving at Committee stage and I should like to add this: I think that the way in which the Government are handling this Bill is intolerable. We have been here in Committee now for eight and a half hours; it is just now striking 5 a.m. The debates have not been unduly prolonged; there has been no time wasting. None of the amendments has been frivolous. A great many serious points have been raised. Were the Government to give themselves time to look at them in rather more detail, many of the amendments would be accepted by the Government and would lead to modifications which would make this a much better Bill than it is now. As matters stand, it is virtually impossible for that to happen.

    The debate has shown in greater detail than before the number of serious flaws and problems in the Bill. I beg the Government, even at this stage, to defer the Report stage until after the Recess so that the Bill can be given proper consideration before we get to Report stage. That would mean that Lords amendments would have to go back to the Commons when it returns from its Recess, but it would still be possible for the Bill to become law by the middle of October. That is a price well worth paying for getting a better Bill than this one is likely to be.

    Having said that, I beg to move Amendment No. 76.

    5 a.m.

    Amendment No. 82, which stands in my name, is also within this group of amendments. However, in view of the fact that some of the government amendments grouped with it take the point entirely, I shall not move the amendment.

    On the wider point made by the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart, on the treatment of the legislation, I join in the protest about the way in which we have been obliged to consider the Bill. The Committee stage has been extremely good tempered and very constructive throughout. A large number of points have emerged; it will be extremely difficult for the Government, let alone ourselves, to give them proper consideration between now and Report stage if the immediate timetable is followed. At the same time, I appreciate the Government's anxiety to get the legislation completed this week. I cannot speak for my noble friend the Opposition Chief Whip, but it seems to me that tomorrow—I speak of a Parliamentary tomorrow, which is later today—is very soon indeed in which to try to consider so many points on Report. I leave that for the consideration of the usual channels.

    I wish to return to the point about the record of today's proceedings. Of course the speaking notes of the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, will be of some help, but, unless he read them verbatim and unless he departed from them not by one iota, they are not a true record of what even he said. I know that what the noble Lord said is laden with interest and that it is very important to the Bill—even hints of what the noble Lord said are important—but I cannot remember what the noble Lord, Lord Woolmer of Leeds, said four hours ago—I wish I could, it was jolly well worth listening to; I cannot remember the more obscure of the observations of my noble friend Lord Russell—I use that term because we were both at Eton together 85 million years ago—about something that happened in the reign of Charles I, which was undoubtedly apposite. What are we going to do when we try to get our minds around the Report stage with everything that has been said at this Committee stage? It is totally unsatisfactory.

    Perhaps I may deal with the amendments before the Committee. Government Amendments Nos. 77, 78, 79 and 80 are designed to implement the third recommendation of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers. Amendment No. 81 is merely a drafting amendment. I am sure that noble Lords will recall that the committee recommended two ways of dealing with the point. The Government amendments take one route and the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cope, takes another route. The noble Lord, Lord Cope, has begged to defer to us. I am grateful to him for that.

    I do not consider affirmative resolution procedure necessary for an order of this type, but I recognise the Select Committee's point that the order-making power, as drafted, is wide. The amendments standing in my name therefore limit the maximum number of days before the beginning of a match or tournament which may be included in the control period to 10. The amendments also provide that the Secretary of State can exercise his power to extend the control period only if he considers it necessary or expedient for the effective enforcement of the Football Spectators Act.

    The purpose of that power is to ensure that, if necessary, the provisions of the Bill on submission of passports and the powers in new Sections 21A and 21B can be exercised more than five days ahead of a match or a tournament. That might arise, for example, in the case of a tournament being held a very long way away. It might be necessary to lengthen the period for a relatively short time before a match or tournament if intelligence indicates that that would be desirable. I hope that noble Lords will agree that affirmative resolution procedure is not necessary in this instance and might inhibit effective use of the power. As a consequence, I commend the amendments to the Committee.

    Amendment No. 83 seeks to ensure that the Welsh Assembly is consulted before games involving Welsh clubs are prescribed. Technically speaking, the amendment is not appropriate because it relates to a matter that has not been devolved. Indeed, the leading Welsh clubs of course, as noble Lords will recognise, play in the English leagues. It would seem somewhat incongruous to treat them differently for the purposes of the legislation when they play overseas. Nonetheless, I recognise that the Welsh Assembly may well have views on these matters. I undertake to noble Lords that any representations which are made to us by the Assembly will be listened to with great respect, as they are on all occasions. I trust that with that assurance the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.

    Comment has been made about the way the Government are passing the legislation through. I, too, am less than happy with the circumstances in which we have to deliberate on the legislation. I do not think that anybody can be happy. No one wants to be here at ten past five in the morning talking about complex matters like these. Noble Lords have worked very hard to table amendments which have been moved, by and large, in good spirits and with the best intentions. I hope that during the rest of today's deliberations, at Report and Third Reading, we can hold our good temper in considering the Bill. It is an important piece of legislation. If we were to fail to introduce the Bill before the next football season we should be letting down the British public, the English football clubs and the English team. It is important that the Bill is put in place. There has been support across the parties, more particularly from the Official Opposition, to bring the legislation forward. They, among others, were crying out for legislation just a few short weeks ago. While we must give it our very urgent and detailed consideration, nevertheless, I believe it is right that we should seek to enact the Bill.

    First, as far as concerns Amendments Nos. 76 and 83, I am happy to note the Minister's undertaking. I do not intend to be more Welsh than the Welsh. As no Welsh Member of the Committee has chosen to raise this particular point, I certainly do not intend to take it any further. The fact that there is now a maximum limit of 10 days on the control period before the match which the Secretary of State has power to order by regulation is a significant concession and in substance cannot be queried.

    I ask further whether it would not even now be possible to give some further time by splitting up the Report and Third Reading stages so that another day is available in which amendments can be considered rather than having to deal with them in a period which will start approximately 10 hours from now. However, having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

    Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

    Page 15, line 15, after ("may") insert ("if he considers it necessary or expedient to do so in order to secure the effective enforcement of this Part").
    Page 15, line 15, leave out from ("for") to ("above") in line 16 and insert ("section 14(5) and (6)").
    Page 15, line 16, after ("effect") insert ("in relation to any, or any description of, regulated football match or external tournament").
    Page 15, line 18, after ("days") insert ("(not exceeding ten)").
    Page 15, line 18, at end insert—
    ("() Any power of the Secretary of State to make an order under this Part is exercisable by statutory instrument.").

    On Question, amendments agreed to.

    [ Amendments Nos. 82 and 83 not moved.]

    Schedule 2, as amended, agreed to.

    Remaining schedule agreed to.

    House resumed: Bill reported with amendments.

    House adjourned at twelve minutes past five o'clock.