asked Her Majesty's Government:

What is the legal position regarding access for disabled people to buildings not constructed to modern standards.

My Lords, the Disability Discrimination Act—the DDA—requires employers and providers of services to the public to make reasonable adjustments to improve access for disabled people. The duties apply irrespective of the age of the buildings occupied.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that the brilliant performances by her and others in the recent Palace of Varieties Show in St John's Church, Smith Square, could not be seen by anyone in a wheelchair owing to lack of access? Further, does she agree that access is not the only issue in such buildings? The lack of availability of suitable lavatories presents a further difficulty. Are any funds available to overcome such problems in that type of building?

My Lords, I agree that not only disabled people but all people were severely deprived when they were not able to hear the smoke-soaked, gravelly voice of the noble Baroness at the performance. This is a serious issue, and I am grateful that the noble Baroness told me that she was concerned, in particular, about St John's, Smith Square. It is one of the most superb baroque buildings, dating back to 1728. As she rightly says, it is inaccessible from the outside stairs, although inside there is a fair degree of physical accessibility, but not yet to loos.

As I understand it, in 1997 St John's applied for money from the Heritage Lottery Fund in order to make the building physically accessible. The application was refused on the grounds of shortage of funds, although subsequently additional money was made available for repairs and maintenance. However, I am pleased to say that the noble Baroness's Question has generated a flurry of activity. English Heritage inspected the building this morning and is working with St John's in order, we hope, to put in a further bid, which I hope will be attractive. Not only is the audience affected; performers and musicians, too, are denied access to a very important venue. Therefore, I express my congratulations to the noble Baroness, and I hope that St John's will be successful in its bid.

My Lords, many of the difficulties referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Trumpington, could have been avoided had the Government not delayed the implementation of Section 3 of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. Instead of making heavy weather over the consultations, as the Government are doing—they could have been carried out in a couple of weeks; after all, landlords have known about the proposals for over six years, since 1995—why cannot the Government get on with implementing the Act in full?

My Lords, the DDA, as it applies to access to buildings for services, will come into force in 2004. Far be it from me to challenge my noble friend's information on this point because he knows more about the subject than perhaps most of the rest of us put together. But his statement certainly does not tie in with my understanding of the law, which is that all such adaptations for listed or non-listed buildings must be reasonable in terms of cost. Therefore, in relation to St John's it would not necessarily be reasonable in terms of cost to install an outside lift and it might not be appropriate in terms of listed planning consent to install other forms of adaptation. The DDA does not override existing requirements under the law, as I suspect my noble friend knows perfectly well.

My Lords, does the noble Baroness accept that access does not imply simply provision of a ramp? Some disabled people are not in wheelchairs and find ramps not only difficult but dangerous. What they need instead are shallow steps and sturdy handrails.

My Lords, it is perfectly true that when one thinks of a disabled person, one tends to think of the wheelchair and the white stick. The noble Lord is absolutely right: wheelchair users account for possibly fewer than 5 per cent of disabled people, and white stick users account for an even smaller percentage. Of course, what may be helpful to a wheelchair user—that is, a ramp, a smooth surface or a dropped kerb—may be counter-effective for someone who has a visual impairment and who needs to use a white stick. Therefore, problems do arise in relation to this matter.

I emphasise that at present the law states that buildings must be made fully accessible to employees who work in them, provided that it can be done at reasonable expense. In relation to services, it is the services which must be accessible rather than the building in which they occur. If the building can be altered, it should be; if a secondary access can be found, that should be made available; and if ramps are appropriate, they should be installed. But if none of those is appropriate, then providing the service—for example, by bringing goods to a disabled person or adjusting the height of a door bell—may be a more appropriate way in which to proceed.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that much resistance to making historical buildings accessible lies in the notion that the adaptations will be ugly? Will she join me in refuting that notion and in issuing a challenge to architects by arguing that it is perfectly possible to provide disability access with historically sensitive and graceful solutions? Will she say whether the Government intend to extend Part M of the building regulations to alterations to existing buildings?

My Lords, I certainly agree with my noble friend. The English Heritage guide to easy access to historic buildings gives the example of Liverpool Town Hall. In my own city, major adaptations have recently been carried out, courtesy of the Heritage Lottery Fund, to a 900 year-old building—the Castle Museum. Some 15 years ago I was involved in making adaptations to the finest Unitarian chapel in the country—the Octagon Chapel. In all cases, the adaptations not only enhance the building for disabled people; they do so for many other people, too, including women with children in prams and buggies, people carrying baggage and elderly people. The result is certainly an enhancement for us all. Part M of the building regulations has applied since 1999 to domestic and non-domestic buildings alike.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that one of the major problems has been that the run-in period has taken so long? Can she assure the House that in future we shall not speak of such matters in terms of half a dozen or so years but will have a realistic timescale which will concentrate the minds of those involved?

Yes, my Lords. However, some of the issues to which we refer, for example the possibility of increasing access to underground stations, are hugely expensive projects, which take time. In other cases, employers and service providers need time to make reasonable adjustments to their premises. I am sure that the House will accept that it is important to work with consent as far as possible. To do that, we need to ensure—this goes back to a point made by my noble friend—that both employers and service providers recognise that disabled people collectively have around £45 billion of expenditure at their disposal. If we can get employers and service providers to recognise that such measures are in their interests, I am sure that we shall reach solutions which are satisfactory to all concerned.

My Lords, would the noble Baroness care to accept an invitation to lunch with me at the Royal Air Force Club? There, she will find that the difficulty of access is not about available funds, nor the willingness of the club authorities to provide access; it is about the difficulty of persuading the authorities, such as English Heritage, to allow the facility to be erected at the front steps of 128 Piccadilly. Perhaps she could come along and tell them how they would be able to encompass that desirable objective.

My Lords, I do not know whether a ramp would be the right solution in that case. However, I am happy to do for the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, that which I have done for his noble friend Lady Trumpington: that is, to ask English Heritage to let me know what proposals, if any, are possible for that building.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Following the decision by the European Court of Justice that "open skies" agreements negotiated between individual member states and the United States are illegal, whether they will support moves for the European Commission to negotiate all such future agreements on a Europe-wide basis.

My Lords, a final ruling from the European Court of Justice is probably some months away. According to the opinion of the Advocate-General, which comprises his advice to the court, it remains open to member states to negotiate and conclude open skies agreements with the United States subject to meeting their obligations under Community law. We are currently reflecting on the options best to advance the interests of UK consumers, airlines and the wider economy.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for that reply. Does he agree that there is much more likelihood of the whole of Europe acting en bloc and being able to negotiate properly with the United States for a balanced open skies policy, which would include the fifth freedom opportunities within the United States, if Europe acted altogether rather than individually, with the United States playing off one member state against another?

My Lords, our purpose in the negotiations with the United States of America is best to advance the interests of UK consumers, airlines and the wider economy. We shall make judgments in relation to how best to negotiate with the United States of America with that as our touchstone.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the interests of consumers and airlines, whether best served by the present arrangements or open skies, need a functioning air traffic control system? Can he tell the House whether the Government have now finally agreed to make funds available to secure NATS' financial position; and if so, how much?

My Lords, that is fairly wide of the Question. However, I agree with the principle that obviously a properly functioning air traffic control system is vital; and that is what we have provided.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that it would be better to negotiate the open skies agreements, particularly with the United States, on a wider European basis rather than rely on individual airlines to make arrangements with American airlines, which could cut across all our ideas of what is right in terms of company structure, monopolies, and so forth?

My Lords, that is a similar question to the one asked by the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley. The answer I gave is that our touchstone in deciding how best to negotiate is what will he in the best interests of UK consumers, airlines and the wider economy. There is no single answer to that. We shall make our judgment in relation to that touchstone.

My Lords, I speak on behalf of the British Airline Pilots Association (BALPA), of which I am president. Does my noble and learned friend agree—I am sure that he does—that the attitude of the Government is right? It is no good anticipating the views of the court at this time. All that has happened is that the Advocate-General has given his opinion. That being the case, I do not believe that the Government should act on that.

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that the attitude of the Government is right. What we have at present is simply the opinion of the Advocate-General, which does not lay down the judgment of the court. The right thing for the Government to do is to ensure that they look all the time to see what is in the best interests of UK consumers, airlines and the wider economy.

My Lords, what is the outcome of the Government's negotiations in liberalising the UK and US aviation markets? I understand that the Minister's right honourable friend Mr Spellar flew in Concorde to Washington in November last year to commence those negotiations. What is the outcome of the negotiations, or have they failed?

My Lords, as the noble Lord must know, those negotiations have been going on for 10 years. They were started by the previous government and no conclusion has yet been reached in relation to them.

My Lords, further to the Minister's reply to his noble friend Lord Clinton-Davis, can he give many examples where the court has not agreed with the Advocate-General? Secondly, can the noble Lord give the House any reason for confidence that the European Union will be better at running these open skies agreements than it is at running anything else?

My Lords, yes, I can give examples of where the court has not followed the Advocate-General. But not now. So far as concerns the best way of conducting these negotiations, I return to the point that we must make judgments about how they are conducted, having regard to the interests of the aviation industry, the UK consumer and the wider economy.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

What is their view on the broadcasting on Channel 674 digital television of Al-Jazeera in the United Kingdom.

My Lords, we value the increasing choice available on digital satellite platforms. In particular, we value the contribution made by Al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite channels to the encouragement of debate about political and social issues affecting the Middle East. Ministers and officials have been able, through the Arab satellite media, to convey messages about British policy to a wide audience.

My Lords, my noble friend will be aware that Al-Jazeera is available throughout the United Kingdom on Channel 674 on Sky digital television. Would my noble friend be prepared to approach the authorities in Qatar who are responsible for transmitting this service and ask them whether they would be prepared to provide an English subtitled news broadcast or news bulletins so that people within the United Kingdom who are interested in these matters can follow Al-Jazeera, and, in particular, the Islamic interpretation of world events and affairs?

My Lords, I am aware that Al-Jazeera can be watched on Sky digital channels in the UK. Al-Jazeera is licensed to broadcast in Europe by the CSA in Paris. It is the equivalent of the ITC in the UK. A large proportion of its potential European audience are French rather than English speakers. It would be for the CSA as the licensing authority to address the issue of either non-Arabic bulletins or subtitling with the board of Al-Jazeera and not the UK Government or even the ITC.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether they consider themselves bound by the growth and stability pact.

My Lords, under Article 116(4) of the EU treaty, the UK shall,

"endeavour to avoid excessive [government] deficits".

We are not obliged to avoid "excessive deficits" unless we move to the third stage of EMU.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Is he saying that we need not take the growth and stability pact terribly seriously unless we are foolish enough to join the euro-zone? If that happens, is it right that we will be much more tightly bound by the growth and stability pact and by the fines to which we are not currently liable as we are not in the euro-zone? If we join the euro-zone and are bound by the rules of the growth and stability pact, will that not severely limit any ability of this or any future Chancellor of this country to use his spending plans as he sees fit in the best interests of this country?

My Lords, without being thought to accept the language used by the noble Lord, Lord Willoughby, in his question, let me make it clear, as the Chancellor did only last week, that we support the growth and stability pact subject to prudent reforms to ensure that it takes account of the economic cycle, of sustainability of debt and of public investment. We have been in conformity with the growth and stability pact since its inception in 1998.

My Lords, did the Minister's original Answer to the Question mean "yes" or "no"?

My Lords, as we are now in stage 2 of economic and monetary union we shall endeavour to avoid excessive government deficit. That is one part of the answer. If and when we move to the third stage of EMU we shall be bound by it. The answer to the Question was precise, accurate and much better than "yes" or "no".

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that all contemporary thinking on fiscal policy comes to the conclusion that it should be conducted according to a set of rules and should not be ad hoc or gratuitous, as it used to be? The growth and stability pact is a very good example of conducting fiscal policy according to a set of rules. The one thing that this country does not need is to abandon rules in which to engage in fiscal policy. Therefore, the question seems to me at least—and I hope that my noble friend will agree with me; he usually does—to be completely misplaced in its understanding of modern thinking.

My Lords, I thought that the question was a purely factual one; to which I gave a factual answer. I agree with the thinking behind my noble friend's question. Yes, of course it is important that fiscal policy is conducted in accordance with rules. Our fiscal policy is conducted in accordance with fiscal rules which are those most suited to our needs. The European fiscal policy is conducted in conformity with the growth and stability pact which is, we believe—subject to the reservations which the Chancellor has made clear—appropriate for its purposes.

My Lords, does the Minister accept that the need for the growth and stability pact for countries within the euro area encapsulates the fact that one cannot have a common currency without a common economic policy? The corollary from that is that one cannot have a common economic policy without a common political intent to set the rules. Therefore, the growth and stability pact is an illustration of the fact that membership of the euro is inevitably linked with political union.

My Lords, I do not think that I agree with any part of that complicated argument. We think that multilateral surveillance, which is what the growth and stability pact is, is a valuable discipline for all governments in considering their fiscal policy. It is valuable for the European economy that there should be agreed multilateral surveillance, whether it be the less formal version for those in stage 2 or the more formal version for those in stage 3.

My Lords, is it right that multilateral surveillance should mean interference in the affairs of this country and, for that matter, any other country of the European Union, since our taxation and public expenditure policy is a matter for the electorate of this country and not for any country or any group of foreign potentates? Is it not a fact that multilateral surveillance has encroached upon matters which are for the House of Commons and for the elected Government of this country and for no one else?

My Lords, I have made clear the extent to which we think that multilateral surveillance is valuable, both for us and for other members of the European Union. I do not believe that rules which, as my noble friend Lord Peston has made clear, are helpful in the conduct of fiscal policy, both here and in Europe, are an infringement of the rights of the House of Commons in any way. We think that a coherent economic and fiscal policy in Europe is to our advantage.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the growth and stability pact has already served an extremely useful purpose in encouraging a number of EU member states—Italy and Greece spring to mind—to adopt the kind of fiscal rules which I am sure that all members of this House would want them to have whatever our formal relationship with them? Can he further confirm that the Chancellor is currently excluded from discussions on the interpretation of the growth and stability pact by virtue of the fact that we are not members of the euro-zone?

My Lords, I certainly agree that multilateral surveillance of the kind set up in 1998 has been valuable. On occasion, countries have for their benefit and that of the European economy as a whole changed their policies as a result of that surveillance. We welcome that. As my right honourable friend the Chancellor has made clear, there is a need for a degree of flexibility, reinterpretation and reform. But to the extent that it has strengthened the European economy, which is so important to our economy, it is certainly valuable.

As to the role of the Chancellor in determining policy, of course the decisions about implementing the convergence programmes of those outside and inside the euro-zone are a matter for ECOFIN, of which this country is a member.

My Lords, if the situation in relation to the pact is as relaxed as the Minister suggests, why did the Commission's statement on 30th January say that the United Kingdom's budgetary projections,

"would not be in line with the requirements",

of the pact?

Why was it that, shortly afterwards, the Chancellor issued a scare story about the EU forcing a £10 billion cut in our hospital programme in order to comply with the pact? Why did the Chancellor, as did the Minister today, last week open his remarks on the EU White Paper with a list of excuses why Britain does not corn ply with the rules of the pact?

My Lords, first, I did not use the word "relaxed" and, secondly, the noble Lord protests too much. When we submitted our convergence programme last December, the projected government deficit was 1 per cent of gross domestic product at the end of the forecast period in 2006. That is very close to "at or near in balance or in surplus"— I cannot remember the exact wording. ECOFIN recognised that by in its comments only noting the UK's position. In the light of the fact that our gross debt at 60 per cent of GDP and our net government borrowing at 3 per cent of GDP are so far within the range of the growth and stability pact, a difference of 1 per cent in four years' time is relatively minimal.

My Lords, as the Question is about fiscal matters, does the Minister agree that time is money? Is he therefore able to say that when we reach stage 3 of European monetary union the Government will consider harmonising our timescale with that of Europe?

My Lords, I was going to answer the first part of the noble Lord's question by saying, "Which time is money?", but he answered that himself. I do not think that there is collective responsibility on this matter, so I can say personally that I strongly agree with what he says and has always said about European time.

My Lords, in his reply to my noble friend Lord Newby, the Minister stated firmly that the growth and stability pact was a matter for ECOFIN all together. Would he therefore confirm that the story in the Financial Times that discussion of the letter to the German Government about the growth and stability pact took place within a group that did not include the Chancellor of the Exchequer is inaccurate?

My Lords, I rather think that the content of a letter that might have gone to Germany but did not go in the terms originally intended was discussed in many contexts, including and excluding this country.

My Lords, I did not think that anyone thought that that was the question. Perhaps I may pursue the matter. The Minister is trying to take the growth and stability pact seriously, but that does not really chime with what a Treasury spokesman was quoted as saying on 30th January, which was:

"The UK has no intention of reducing public spending by £10 billion as the Commission seems to imply …As we are outside the single currency we are not subject to its sanctions".

Does the noble Lord agree with that? Is that the present position?

My Lords, I am sure that the noble Lord is actually quoting a Treasury spokesman. My point is that the Chancellor has for some time now been arguing for a sensible and prudent reform of the growth and stability pact. That is valuable whether or not we have joined European monetary union.

My Lords, if the Minister agrees with his noble friend Lord Peston that healthy fiscal policy requires adherence to a clear set of rules, can he explain to the House why the Government recently supported the Germans in driving a coach and horses through the pact in question?

My Lords, again, that is an interesting question but I do not accept the terms in which it is asked of driving a coach and horses. What in effect was the judgment of the European Union about the German economy was, I believe, quite right: the German deficit resulted from cyclical factors which, in our view, ought to be taken into account in making the judgments called for.

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now again resolve itself into Committee on this Bill.

Moved, That the House do now again resolve itself into Committee.—(Lord Rooker.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

House in Committee accordingly.

[The CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES in the Chair.]

Clause 5 [Directions to chief officers]:

moved Amendment No. 35:

Page 4, line 10, at beginning insert "Subject to section (Limitation of powers of Secretary of State) of the Police Reform Act 2002,"

The noble Lord said: At this stage of proceedings, I always feel rather like someone on the promenade of a rather overpopulated holiday resort, leaning on the rail and waiting to see what will be left on the beach when the tide has gone out. I hope that what we find will be adequate to our needs.

In moving Amendment No. 35, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 52 and 61. I give notice that I shall not speak to Amendment No. 65, which is superfluous. While we wait for the Chamber to clear, I remind the Committee and the Minister in particular that what renders some of us not just worried but seriously anxious about the Bill is not primarily how the present Government will use the powers that they seek under it—although of course we are concerned about that—but how those same powers might be used by a different and less politically responsible government formed by a party either far further to the Left or far further to the Right than at present. The possibility of such a government taking power is usually remote but always present. The less we recognise the danger, the more real it is.

We also need to guard against dangers that are more immediate and less dramatic in nature. The less that we provide against the abuse of legislation, the more likely it is to be abused. Such provision is the purpose behind this group of amendments. What one means by abuse of legislation of course depends on what one thinks the legislation is for. Fortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has been most helpful in defining the purposes for which the Government seek our approval of the Bill and in providing that definition early in the Committee stage.

Last Thursday, we were discussing the first group of amendments and the not unreasonable proposal that the Home Secretary should be required to consult various persons before drawing up his national policing plan rather than afterwards, as is currently proposed—a point on which I hope that we shall persuade either him or your Lordships collectively on Report. In that debate, the Minister acknowledged that a general concern had been expressed that the Home Secretary should not use the Bill as a means to intervene in the proper running of a police force and to substitute his own judgment for that of either the police authority or the chief constable. He made it clear that that was not the intention of Her Majesty's Government. Helpfully, he went further:

"I remind noble Lords that in the White Paper we made it absolutely clear that the purpose of the national policing plan, as set out in the new clause introduced by Clause I of the Bill, is to consider strategic policing priorities. That hits it on the head: this does not concern micro-managing the police force. That is not its function. If a matter moves away from the area of strategy, then it will be thrown out. We are not interested in it and it would not form part of the action".

Later in the same intervention, he returned to the point:

"Again, I should like to make this absolutely clear: this is not about micro-managing the police. It concerns only general strategic policing priorities for the police forces. It is crucial that Members of the Committee keep that in mind".—[Official Report. 28/2/02; col. 1552.]

I can assure him that I, for one, will do so.

According to that definition, any non-strategic use of the powers proposed in this clause—and, I presume, the clauses included in furtherance of it, including Clause 5—would be outwith the purposes and intention of the Government and would, therefore, by definition be an abuse of the proposed legislation. We must see that that does not happen.

Of course, what was said was said in the context of Clause 1, which relates to the national policing plan, and this group of amendments relates to Clause 5, which creates a power for the Home Secretary to give directions not to a police authority but directly to a chief constable, who is inescapably bound to obey them. If noble Lords have any doubt about that, they might turn to subsection (11) of the new Section 41 A, where they will find that doubt dispelled:

"A chief officer of police of any police force shall comply with any direction given to him under this section".

First, I take it that the powers of direction for the Secretary of State proposed in Clause 5 are to be given to him in furtherance of the purposes of Clause 1—a means of carrying out the national policing plan—in which case, they fall squarely within what the noble Lord said on Thursday. Even if that is not the case, we must know whether the words that I quoted apply to this clause and to the intended use of the proposed powers for the Home Secretary. I shall repeat what the Minister said:

"this is not about micro-managing the police. It concerns only general strategic policing priorities for the police forces. It is crucial that Members of the Committee keep that in mind".

The Minister had earlier said that anything else would be thrown out.

Before the Minister answers, I should make it clear that our anxieties about the uses to which such powers might be put are not limited to those that I mentioned to fill in time while the Chamber was emptying. There is another danger, much closer to home, that we must address. We will be asked to agree to the creation, elsewhere in the Bill, of a new sort of policeperson; not a fully trained police officer, not a fully empowered constable nor yet a straightforward civilian assistant. It will be something in between.

We shall discuss the presentational and operational pros and cons of that later, but two things are clear. First, they will cost a good deal less to pay and a great deal less to train than fully trained policemen. Secondly, because of their lesser training, they will be able to accomplish a great deal less than fully trained policemen. Whatever view the Home Office takes of their lesser effectiveness, the reduced cost will be evident and attractive to the Treasury and to all other departments competing for scarce resources. Even a reluctant Home Secretary may therefore find himself under extreme pressure to secure an increasing proportion of that sort of cheaper policeman in police forces. It is important that the Bill should not make it easy to yield to such pressure.

Members are aware of the constant public clamour for more policemen on the heat, a clamour that any government anxious to be rewarded for being tough on crime, as well as tough on the causes of crime, must want to satisfy. The problem is making more policemen visible to the electorate without having to pay for them with the money that the Treasury refuses to cough up. The answer is cheaper policemen. We also know that, outside the Met, there is no great enthusiasm for the new, cheaper quasi-policeman. There may even be resistance to the idea of employing him at all. How convenient for the Home Secretary to be able to give directions to a reluctant chief constable—directions with which, as subsection (11) says, he must comply—that a proportion of his force must be made up only of such assistant policemen.

The powers that could be used for that purpose are in subsection (2) —to direct a chief officer of police to prepare and submit to the Home Office an action plan—and in subsection (7)(a), which relates to the taking of specific steps and the meeting of specific performance targets. Amendments Nos. 35 and 52 would make both provisions subject to the prohibition in the modest new clause proposed in Amendment No. 61. A single application to the whole clause might be better. There should also be provision in Clause 1, but we can discuss the principle now and get the detail right on Report. The prohibition is on using those powers to impose on any chief officer of police a requirement to ensure that any particular proportion of his force should be made up of the new sort of assistant policeman, as defined elsewhere in the Bill.

I am confident that, if we have no such provision, some Home Secretary quite soon—possibly even the present Home Secretary—will use those powers for the purpose of securing those levels within police forces. If the Minister argues, as he may, that the proper place for the restriction is elsewhere or that the drafting is wrong, I shall be happy to accommodate him on Report. I see that he wishes to say something before I sit down.

I was not sure whether the noble Lord was coming to a conclusion. I was waiting for him to acknowledge the fact—it will be dealt with later—that we currently have record numbers of police officers. He has not deployed a shred of evidence—not a scintilla—that we intend to reduce those record numbers simply to add to their support. I could not see how that aspect of the facts of life fitted in with his speech.

I am obliged to the Minister for enabling me to amend my speech before I finish making it. I had thought that he would say that to demolish me at the end of the argument.

I do not, in any way, minimise the importance of the numbers of policemen now being fully trained. The numbers are not yet sufficient, but there has been an extremely welcome change of direction. However, the economic facts of running the country remain the same, and the difference between the economic costs of producing the two different sorts of personnel remains the same. There will be a temptation, when the tide of recruitment of fully trained officers turns, as, I regret to say, it certainly will. It will be too late to do anything about it then; we must do something about it now. I beg to move.

The Minister will remember that I had the opportunity of raising some of these matters when we were last in Committee. He will forgive me if, to some extent, I repeat myself. I shall state the argument swiftly.

As my noble friend Lord Elton said a moment ago, there is little enthusiasm, apart from in the Metropolitan Police, for the idea of community support officers. The Minister has been at pains to point out that chief constables in the provinces have nothing to worry about; they have no need to recruit community support officers, unless they really think that that is desirable for their force. I accept that from the Minister, but he will recognise that we are legislating not just for this Government and this Home Secretary but for anybody who may become Home Secretary in the future.

I am worried that it will be all too easy for the Chief Secretary to the Treasury to ask the Home Secretary of the day, "Why are you asking for more money for the police when there is a simple way of making better use of the resources that you already have? Why should you come to us for more money when there are available to you powers to recruit community support officers who will cost you very much less?". That is the simple argument.

We are not challenging the probity of the Minister or the Home Secretary. Not for one moment did I doubt the word of the Home Secretary when he said that it was not his intention that these powers should be used to make chief officers of police recruit community support officers. However, we must legislate to protect future Home Secretaries against pressure being put on them of the kind I have mentioned.

We must find a formula that will enable a future Home Secretary to say to the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, "I cannot do it. It's no use you telling me that money can be saved by recruiting community support officers. I cannot do it because of Section 61, or whatever it is, of the Act".

I am not saying that my noble friend's wording in the amendment is right, but before the Bill leaves this House there must be something in it which says that the Home Secretary cannot in any circumstances require a chief officer of police to recruit community support officers. That is the point and I humbly suggest that it is a good one.

The key amendment is Amendment No. 61. Part 4 of the Bill contains provisions which enable chief officers to decide whether to have designated community support officers or accredited persons operating in a force's area. The Government have made much of the fact that these are enabling and not mandatory provisions.

The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, seeks to ensure that the Government do not use their powers to give directions to chief officers under Clause 4 or use power to regulate for operational practices and procedures under Clause 7 as a backdoor way of forcing chief officers down that route. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord therefore receives our support. It is obviously right that one should support it.

The debate on Part 4 is still ahead of us, but we have been assured by the Government—I hope that the Minister will confirm it—that decisions about whether to have new-style police auxiliaries or to give police powers to the staff of private security firms will be entirely for the chief constable. None of that will be mandatory.

However, as the noble Lord, Lord Elton, has pointed out, what is there to stop the Home Secretary, whether now or in the future, using powers contained in Part 1 to force a chief officer down that route? I shall be interested to hear the Minister's answer. He may tell us that any direction or regulation under this part could not override the discretion given to chief officers in Part 4. That may be true in strict legal terms, but a great deal of informal pressure could be brought to bear on a chief officer to include such provision in the action plan he will have to produce under Clause 5. We hope to discuss that matter later.

Those who are even more cynical and suspicious might envisage the Home Secretary exerting pressure in a less overt but equally forceful way. Therefore, it is right that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, is supported.

Perhaps when the Minister responds to my noble friend he will be kind enough to say whether the Bill as presently drafted gives power to a Home Secretary, either directly or indirectly, to require a chief officer to behave in the way which my noble friend fears he might be asked to behave in relation to the recruitment of police and what are, in effect, auxiliaries.

The wording of new Section 41A, which is set out in Clause 5 of the Bill, is at best, on the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Elton, ambiguous—at best. I want to draw the Minister's attention to the general wording of new Section 41A.

First, the direction of the Secretary of State does not have to follow on an adverse report. Secondly, subsection (2) provides that the remedial measures which the Secretary of State may direct the chief officer of police to address can be in relation,

"to anything that the Secretary of State considers relevant to the matters".

That is very wide.

Secondly, subsection (7) provides that the direction by the Secretary of State may be,

"for the taking of such steps…as may be specified for the purposes of the plan by the Secretary of State".

Finally—the noble Lord, Lord Elton, made the point but it is worth emphasizing—unlike Clause 2where a code imposed by the Secretary of State is one to which the chief officer of police "shall have to have regard", in new Section 41A it is a question of complying—the word used is "comply"—with any such directions.

Unless there is a complete misreading of the breadth of the new section, we believe that the noble Lord's point must be accommodated—apart from the fact that we want Clause 5 taken out of the Bill altogether.

I support this group of amendments. I notice that the new Section 41A(1) provides that the Secretary of State must be satisfied,

"that the whole or any part of the [police] force is…not efficient or not effective".

Presumably, that indicates a very bad state of affairs indeed; one in which policing is not being carried out effectively. Can the Minister say what can be done to improve the situation before that point is reached? Does the Home Secretary have a right to draw attention to such a situation? If so, how?

When the noble Lord. Lord Phillips, rose, I was about to answer the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, because I can do so without advice. The answer to his specific question is no. I shall take advice on the matter but I covered it in part on Thursday. In fact, I have a minor adjustment to place on the record in relation to a comment I made on Thursday about this part of the Bill.

I want to make the matter clear so that there is no misunderstanding. The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, hit the nail on the head in that the issue is pre-judged because the police force in question is clearly in trouble. If not, there would be no such action. It is clear that there is a major problem which locally no one has been able to solve; not the police authority, the chief constable, the inspectorate or anyone else.

It is clear to me and my colleagues that a majority of Members of this House do not want Clause 5 as currently drafted in the Bill. However, the codes of practice which we discussed last week are intended to spread good practice throughout the police service. They are not binding on the chief constable. The directions for chief officers are for use where remedial action is required to address under-performance. Regulations on operational procedures are for use where it is in the national interest that all forces adopt the same procedure or practice; for instance, as regards equipment.

I hope that as a result of that brief summary Members of the Committee will see in a flash that the setting of quotas for particular types of officers in each force does not fall into any of those categories. Therefore the issue does not arise.

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister so early in his response and I am most grateful to him for giving way. I think that what he has said so far is not consistent with new Section 41(1)(b). I should remind the Committee that that provision allows the Secretary of State to impose a direction not where at this point in time there is any inefficiency or lack of effectiveness, but rather it looks towards the future; that is, where the Secretary of State considers that in the future a force may lack effectiveness or efficiency.

I put it to the Minister that, set against his protestations at the start of his remarks—that this could arise only where there was a serious lack of effectiveness and efficiency—this does not square with those comments. I believe that that is why a great deal of concern has been expressed.

While there might be concern about that, the concern does not spill over to the quotas for particular types of officers. I say to the Committee that that is because it is outwith whatever interpretation is put on the clause.

The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Elton—

Perhaps I may take the Minister up on that point. Surely a Home Secretary—not this particular Home Secretary—could come to the conclusion that more people were needed on the ground; that the money would not allow for the recruitment of 20 further fully trained police officers, but that it would cover 20 community support officers. He could conclude that a part of the force will cease to be able to carry out its duties correctly unless there is that increase in manpower. In those circumstances, surely he could say that the way in which the matter should be corrected is for the chief officer of police to recruit 20 community support officers to help in that part of the force. I cannot see how that would be outwith the wording of new Section 41(1)(a).

The Home Secretary can say what he likes, but the chief officer can say no. That is the fact of this Bill. There is no requirement—I respect the wish of noble Lords to intervene and I shall give way as often as any noble Lord wants, but so far I have not been able to speak for more than two sentences.

I have been advised to let this go, but the Minister said that the chief officer of police could say no and that would be the end of the story. But I remind the Minister of the wording of new Section 41A(11):

"A chief officer of police of any police force shall comply with any direction given to him under this section".

How does that provision square with what the Minister has just said?

Earlier on I said that the supply of quotas for different types of officers in the forces does not fall into the categories of codes of practice, directions or regulations. It is as simple as that. It remains for someone to show me that it does, at which point I shall go away and have the Bill redrafted. At the present time, the setting of quotas in relation to officers does not come under any of those headings.

Last week, the noble Lord, Lord Elton, remarked on this. Many Aunt Sallies and red herrings and so forth are being raised about this point to the effect that in the future we are going to have a nasty Home Secretary and a nasty government. If I were back in the another place, I would add other descriptions to that, but as I do not wish to wind up noble Lords and bring party politics to the Floor of this Chamber, I shall refrain from doing so.

I repeat, at the present time we have record numbers of police officers. We expect to reach a figure of 130,000 by spring 2003. When that point is reached, the Home Secretary will set new targets which will not be lower; they will be higher. I hope that that instils confidence that we are not seeking to reduce police numbers or "police" in the way that we all understand the term by the use of civilian support staff in any way, shape or form.

It is for those reasons that I have stated that, basically, the amendments are unnecessary. I appreciate that when later in the week we come to Part 4 of the Bill, we shall have more substantive debates on this matter, although I make no criticism of the fact that noble Lords are raising it today. The Home Secretary could not specify proportions of staff who would fall into particular categories even supposing that he wanted to do so. Under the terms of the Bill, and whatever reading is made of those terms, it is not possible for him to do that. The chief officer is the responsible person for the direction and control of his officers and support staff. It will be the chief officer who decides on the balance between regular forces, special constables and support staff and, indeed, on how they should be deployed.

It is true that we want to see as many support staff aiding police officers as are necessary to provide a good quality service. Over the years, under both governments there has been increasing "civilianisation" of the police force. That point was made clear during our discussions on the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Bill. For example, the use of new technology has radically changed the nature of civilian staff in the police through the use of experts to support officers in their duties.

As I have said, we are committed and on track, with present rates of recruitment and retirement, to have 130,000 officers in post by the spring of next year. That will be a record.

The provisions in Part 4 relating to community support officers and the wider police family will enable the best use to be made of those officers. When we achieve a force of 130,000, we then want to be able to allow chief officers to make better use of their skills. I shall certainly be happy to debate in full those issues when we come to them.

I would humbly submit that there is no case for the amendments. Indeed, I would challenge noble Lords on this because the issues relating to Clauses 4 and 5, as well as the issues relating to Clauses 2 and 3, but in particular to Clause 2 covering codes of practice for chief officers, are not suitable vehicles for the setting of quotas, even if the Home Secretary wanted to do that, which he does not.

I should now like to put on the record a small adjustment to a speech that I made last week relating to this very issue. Perhaps I was a little more positive than I should have been, but that does not undermine what I have just said; there is no plan and there are no powers for the Home Secretary. It would not work under the codes of practice, regulations or directions. However, when last week I referred to the scope of the Secretary of State to give directions to police authorities under the provisions of the Bill in response to a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, as regards whether this could require a certain number or proportion of community support officers, I said that it would not be used to specify what a force should have in terms of community support officers.

That is indeed the case. The words I used then were, I believe, officers by gender, ethnicity or whatever. It is correct to say that the power could not be used in that way, but I wish to make it clear, and to remind Members of the Committee, that in July 1999 the Home Secretary set for each force employment targets for the recruitment, retention and progression of people from the minority communities. That was done because there was a positive public policy argument which had transcended both governments to the effect that the police force should be made more representative. Indeed, I believe that special constables are more representative of the minorities than is the regular force. Police forces were required to adopt a 10-year target to reflect the size of the minority ethnic communities in their area with an objective of making each force more representative of its community.

That policy does not in any way undermine my remarks, but when last week I was responding to the noble Lord, I may have given a rather black and white impression by the use of words such as "gender", "ethnicity" and so forth. The point is that no order has been made; we want targets because we want to see proactive action taken by chief officers of police, although I do not think that many of them have had to be pushed. Achieving representative forces has been extremely difficult. I know for myself, having been an elected Member of Parliament, that trying to persuade people that the police force is a good and worthy cause working on behalf of fellow citizens is not easy. Sometimes those comments have been met with quite negative views. As I have said, it is not easy to make the case. Nevertheless, that case has to be made and some small progress is being achieved.

That does not alter the fact that the setting of quotas according to types of officers, whether it be special constables, community support officers or regular police officers, is not a function of the Home Secretary. For this Bill, the codes of practice, the directions and the regulations cannot be used for that function. For that reason, I hope that Members of the Committee will feel able to leave it at that. We shall be able to come back to the matter and deal with it in greater detail when we come to Part 4. At that point we can consider the examples that no doubt noble Lords will wish to cite.

I am grateful to the Minister for that very full reply and for the gloss on what he said in reply to my noble friend about when the Home Secretary set something very like a quota but using powers not in the Bill.

I have listened closely to everything the Minister said. He has repeatedly said, in one form or another, that none of the clauses we have covered so far is a suitable vehicle for the laying down of quotas, but I cannot see that anywhere in the Bill. It may be that he can be held to this under the case of Pepper v Hart. The Minister's statement may be a fragile defence against abuse by that means.

I shall have to look with my friends at this issue again before the next stage and to consider whether or not the proper way of doing this is to provide a general prohibition rather than linking it to two little parts of the Bill which, as the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, pointed out, will be brought in only in certain circumstances. With that said, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 41:

Page 4, line 19, leave out "chief officer of police of the"

The noble Lord said: The purpose of Amendment No. 41 is quite straightforward. The amendment seeks to restore traditional lines of communication. For the convenience of the Committee, I should say that I shall not be moving Amendments Nos. 48, 50 and 57, which are grouped with this amendment.

Amendment No. 41 is tabled for the simple reason that it would require the Home Secretary to issue his directions to prepare a plan to the police authority rather than to the chief constable direct. I know that there is a requirement later in the clause for the chief constable to inform the police authority and to consult it on anything that he does subsequently, but that is the wrong way round. The proper lines of communication should be from the Home Secretary to the police authority. The police authority would then, of course, immediately pass on the directions to the chief constable because he is the man who will have to take whatever action is required. It is a simple amendment which seeks to leave out a few words in order to restore the original situation.

I hope that the Minister will find it in his heart to be as amenable as he was so many times last week when we discussed the Bill. Perhaps he will accept the principle of the amendment even if he does not like the wording. I beg to move.

As to the noble Lord's last point, I should say at this early part of our considerations that the Committee has, as yet, no idea of how emollient and amenable we will be in today's proceedings. There will be occasions when my noble friend Lord Bassam will have good news for the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, but he will have to wait and be patient. That is not designed to suck up to him when I ask him to withdraw his amendment.

I accept that the noble Lord makes a seductive case, but his amendment would have no real effect. I shall briefly explain why. The purpose of Clause 5 is to establish why a force or a part of a force is underperforming and to draw up plans to address the issue. The production of an action plan must be an on-going process if it is to address the underlying causes of under-performance. It will not work if the Secretary of State is presented with a finished action plan to which no amendments can be made. Therefore, removing some of the Secretary of State's powers to influence resubmitted plans would seriously dilute the effectiveness of the provisions.

It is in no one's interest not to take the remedial action required. Obviously, if the action plan did not address the under-performance and correct the issues, there would be no point in having it. But, having reached that stage, there is no point in not taking the action required—least of all for the local community which, by definition, is not receiving the policing it is entitled to expect.

Amendment No. 41 seeks to remove the reference to the chief officer in proposed new Section 41A(4) so that the force would be required to amend and resubmit the action plan. However, the duty would still fall on the chief officer as he is responsible for the direction and control of the force. To that extent, the amendment would have no discernible effect. As I said, the amendment is seductive, but I hope that for those reasons the noble Lord will think again and not pursue his amendment.

I do not want to stray on to later amendments in the way that the Minister did, but there are reasons why the proprieties of the lines of communication should be maintained. Amendment No. 41 is directed towards restoring the more normal way of dealing with matters. I have never yet found it satisfactory to move away from the normal lines of communication towards a situation whereby senior officers—or, in this case, the Government—are able to give orders lo people down the line.

I accept that we are dealing with a situation where there is a lot of mutual feed-back of information. It is highly unlikely that a force would receive an adverse inspector's report just like that. Any force which received such a report would probably know about it before the Minister. That kind of situation makes some of this legislation incomprehensible to me. By the time the directions come down from the Secretary of State, someone will already be taking action to put things right. If not, then the police would not be acting in the way I would expect them to act. That is the way I would expect them to behave.

I heard what the Minister said and, at this stage, I shall withdraw the amendment, but I cannot say that I am satisfied with the answers I have received.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 51:

Page 4, leave out lines 34 to 38.

The noble Lord said: We now come to the Secretary of State's power to, quite literally, micro-manage the police. We are not talking only about action plans to rectify the consequences of an adverse report but, if I have read the Bill correctly, about the fact that those action plans can be bounced backwards and forwards between the Government and the police force until they are worded in precisely the way required by the Home Secretary. If he does not like what he sees, the Home Secretary can require that the plan be resubmitted and that the resubmission be resubmitted. We could go on and on with submission and resubmission for so long that, if we were not careful, the original fault would be lost sight of by the time the argument ended. This is micro-management run wild. We need to think very seriously about whether this is an appropriate way to go forward.

I accept that if an adverse report is received the Home Secretary has every right to call for a plan to rectify the situation. There is no difficulty with that. But I do not understand why the Home Secretary would have so little confidence in senior officers—with an immense amount of experience and local knowledge—doing the serious job that they had to do and submitting a report to put matters right. The idea in the Bill is that the Home Secretary, if he (lid not like particular parts of the report, or if it did not alter the emphasis in quite the way that he believed it should be altered, could say as a consequence that Answer A was not the answer and that the Home Office wanted something else.

It seems to me that this provision is in danger of being an immense vote of no confidence in the senior officers who are employed to do the work. I do not believe that it is wise to legislate for this kind of detailed interference—even if I thought that the interference could be explained on any rational basis.

It is extremely unfortunate that the Bill is drafted in this way. I should prefer to see the capacity to "micro-manage" removed from it. We may not have wholly succeeded in achieving that in our amendment and I should be the first to admit that. However, if the Minister is prepared to accept the principle that I have enunciated, he could help us to make sure that the Bill was consistently drafted. He has the experts, and we just do our little best. I beg to move.

I support the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith. I declare an interest as a member of the Thames Valley Police Authority.

I ask the Minister at the outset: has he any idea about the way in which police authorities are managed? First, they are inspected by inspectors of constabulary, who are employees of the Secretary of State and presumably do his bidding. They carry out their inspections at several levels. There are also the community partnerships. We have an audit and performance review committee and a strategy, finance and planning committee. I can assure the Minister that if any weakness is indicated, either in the best-value performance indicators or in the indicators of various crimes, that is the work of the committees and of the police authorities. In no way would an authority be found to be inefficient or ineffective without there having been very clear signals for some time in advance of that happening. Plenty of time exists for the Home Secretary to draw people's attention to that and to order a special inspection.

I know that the Minister is not listening to what I am saying, but he has not made a case for the powers set out in the Bill. There are all kinds of means by which authorities are managed—properly, thoroughly and in respect of legislation and audits which we have previously been given. It is incumbent on the Minister to indicate the degree of inefficiency which would require the powers that are now being sought. There is little evidence of that at present. We strongly support the amendment.

The noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, has emphasised that this clause—like the previous one, which deals with authorities as distinct from chief officers of police—provides powers for the Home Secretary based on findings of inefficiency or ineffectiveness in the whole or in a part of a police force, or at the very least findings that the force will be inefficient or ineffective unless remedial measures are taken.

I listened to the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, and I bear in mind his experience in these matters, but that strikes me as very much something to be done as a last resort. A most unfortunate and undesirable occasion will have arisen. But the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, did not mention—or certainly did not stress—the basic requirements set out in both clauses before the Home Secretary can act. He mentioned the fact that senior officers will have great experience. There will be officers of great experience, but, sadly, we are talking about a position where those officers, albeit of great experience, have failed—where they have been ineffective or inefficient in the running of their force—or about the fact that that will be the outcome unless remedial measures are taken in a last resort. Given those circumstances. I do not see the strength in the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, that the provisions to which the amendment refers are overblown or unnecessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, has provoked me into a short riposte. He lumps Clauses 4 and 5 together. There is a major difference between them. Under the terms of Clause 4, the Home Secretary can act only where there is an independent report of malfunctioning. Under the terms of Clause 5, his action need not follow any such report. We on these Benches are worried about an over-zealous, over-dogmatic or misguided Home Secretary—particularly having regard to future trends in policing—where there is no present inefficiency or ineffectiveness, having the strong and misplaced view in his or her head that to maintain future effectiveness the chief constable must do this, or must do that. That is our worry.

The noble Lord on the Front Bench is known for his lively imagination and his lack of inhibition. I nevertheless fear that his masters do not always have the same elasticity and flexibility of mind.

The noble Lord is absolutely right!

I am much obliged to the noble Lord.

The amendment raises the question: has the Home Secretary thought about the likely reaction of a force— often under-strength and facing complex and often dangerous tasks—to constant doses of advice and instruction? Most of the time, a force will he doing its best but simply does not have the men on the ground to do what is required.

This modest amendment deserves consideration. Were it to be accepted, it would go some of the way towards reassuring chief officers of police and members of the force generally that their worries were at least understood. As it is, I fear that they are not. This House would do well, either now or at some future stage, to send this kind of amendment back for consideration by another place, which has probably not even considered the matter. I very much hope that the noble Lord will take it seriously. I hope that he will at least put the point to his noble friends. I repeat my question: has he appreciated the likely reactions of a modern police force to constant doses of advice and instruction given in public?

I realise that the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, was addressing his comments about imagination and flexibility not to me, but to my noble friend Lord Rooker. I shall try to be as imaginative and flexible as my noble friend, who has such an enviable reputation in that regard.

We have listened carefully to the thoughts that have been expressed on the issue, as part of a subset of very similar issues. We are prepared to keep an open mind, but noble Lords need to focus on what we are trying to achieve. The noble Lord, Lord Borrie, got it pretty much spot on. We are talking about police forces in which there is a failure in whole or in part and looking at those forces' efficiency and effectiveness—words that are drawn from the historic Police Act 1964, which was all about the relationship between the police authority, the officers of the service and the public. That Act gave the police authorities specific responsibility for ensuring that we had efficient and effective police forces. Taking out the paragraphs specified in the amendment would deprive the Secretary of State of the important ability to address precisely that part of the police force in which there was an element of inadequacy.

One issue that has come up during the debate about which I feel most strongly is the assumption behind some of the arguments that have been brought forward by all noble Lords, but particularly those on the Benches opposite, that we are seeking to impose detailed action plans on all police forces at all times. That is not the case. They will apply only when there is demonstrable evidence of specific and particular elements of failure.

Noble Lords need to think carefully about the matter, because removing the ability to issue directions in the way that we suggest would undermine the effectiveness of the power, which is designed to address underperformance. All of your Lordships are very concerned about underperformance in the public services, particularly in the police service, because we know that we need to get good value for money. We have been impressed by the effects of best value reviews in the police service, which the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, mentioned. They have served us well over the past few years in bringing up performance. That is what we are seeking to do. If HMIC or the Police Standards Unit have identified an area of underperformance, it is right that they should be able to make recommendations and that those recommendations can be addressed in an action plan.

This is an iterative process. It will he ongoing. The noble Lord, Lord Peyton, referred to interference. The provisions are not about interference; they are about setting the parameters of the action that needs to be taken and having a process of dialogue with the officers to ensure that we—and more particularly they—get it right, so that underperformance and bad performance can be properly addressed.

We shall listen to the points that have been made and reflect on them, but that is why we argue that the Secretary of State must be able to require chief officers to pay detailed attention to those recommendations so that that iterative process continues and the action plan and targets can be perfected to ensure that they address specifically the issues concerned. That will enable the police authority, the Home Office, the Secretary of State and, more importantly, the local communities to which the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, referred—I presume that he was talking about the crime prevention partnerships that are in place—to be properly engaged in ensuring that those targets and performance measures are delivered. We are all committed to ensuring performance at the highest level and to getting booms for our bucks in public expenditure by raising standards in the police service. It is not about the overbearing centre always getting it right; it is about the centre helping the police service to ensure that it can deliver on the ground, where it really matters.

I hope that noble Lords feel that that explanation will enable them not to press their amendments and that we can all reflect on the central importance of raising standards and quality in the localities. The issue for us in government is finding ways in which the centre can seek to help in that process.

I am sure that the noble Lord is aware that one of the three biggest lies in the world is when a representative of government calls on somebody and says, "I am here to help you". The noble Lord has just talked about help coming from the centre. That is a very unusual situation. If one were to ask many of the policemen who receive that constant flow of advice and instruction, they might well say that it was not always helpful. Neither the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, nor the Minister has even referred to the problem of under-resourcing. There may be inefficiency—

My noble friend Lord Rooker made it plain in an earlier exchange that by March 2002 we shall have record numbers of serving police officers in the United Kingdom. The figures are clear and uncontested. There is an ongoing process that looks again at improving the level and standard of resourcing. That is the Government not just being helpful, but putting the resources where it matters—on the streets and in the communities, making sure that the police service is there on the ground to do the job that we all want it to do. Surely that is an incontestable fact.

The basic fact remains that in London, the capital city, and in many areas of the countryside, the police are hopelessly under-resourced. That is a major cause of inefficiency and failure. Ministers refuse to acknowledge the existence of such problems and merely say complacently that we shall soon have a record number of policemen. Later in the Bill we shall deal with one suggestion as to how the Government are going to increase numbers, which not all of us find acceptable. Ministers seem unimpressed by any evidence that the police are grossly under-resourced for dealing with modern crime and the behaviour of modern society.

Why are such draconian measures necessary? Clause 4 says:

"the Secretary of State may direct the police authority responsible for maintaining that force to take such measures as may be specified in the direction"

Why is it necessary for the Secretary of State to interfere directly with the chief constable when he can direct the police authority to take the necessary action?

I hope that the Minister will not think that I am perpetrating another well-known lie when I say that I have a certain sympathy for him. As he frequently reminds us, he is anxious to remedy proven failure. The problem addressed by the amendment is that the power that he is taking is not limited to cases of proven failure. As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has pointed out, subsection (1)(b) extends the power to a case in which the Secretary of State believes,

"that the whole or a part of the force will cease to be efficient or effective, whether generally or in particular respects, unless remedial measures are taken".

The Minister is well fair enough in mind to understand our anxiety that the Government may be paying lip service to the doctrine of operational independence by legislating to call for a plan, whereas in fact, in certain circumstances, they are taking power to themselves to require measures to be taken. That is where the resubmission comes in: "Resubmit and resubmit until you do exactly what L the Home Secretary, want". I know that the Minister is fair enough to realise that that is a genuine and a proper anxiety on our part. Perhaps he could give an indication that the Government will think again about it. We are anxious that this power may be applied to a future situation which has not yet arisen and in which there is not yet proven failure. It might be sensible, before Report, to think again about subsection (1)(b) and to remove the possibility of applying the power in such situations.

I had not intended to intervene, but the Minister has made a number of statements that—although he tried to pretend otherwise—are distinctly challengeable. It is absurd to say that the police service will be fully resourced if we reach the level of 130,000 policemen. When the Minister bandies about words such as "record", he should think about what has occurred. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, police service strength increased by about 15,000 net. In the rest of the 1990s, and the period in which this Government have been in office, police service numbers have decreased. It is perfectly true that police numbers will eventually be greater than ever before, but that simply begs the question. The fact is that increases should have been made year by year.

We are under-policed in this country. On Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Condon, made that point very well. London cannot compare with New York. New York is adequately policed, which is why it has been able to adopt such successful policies. That point goes to the heart of this debate. We are talking about trying to make the police as effective as we conceivably can, but one of the reasons why the police are not as effective as possible is that they are under-resourced, as they have been for the past few years.

Noble Lords should remember that, on recruitment, a police constable is effectively 0.3 of a man because he has to undergo a great deal of training. Some 57 per cent of policemen in the Slough division are constables on probation. Although we can fill the establishment, we cannot fill it with effective policemen. Furthermore, we are going to "civilianise" between 200 and 300 posts in Thames Valley. We have had to pay for that from reserves by increasing our precepts by almost 14 per cent because the money available from central Government is not sufficient to increase police numbers to the required level. Moreover, the recruitment and particularly the retention of policemen in London are extremely difficult. Those are all reasons why the raw figures do not always tell the full story.

I shall intervene only briefly. It seems to me, having listened to the debate so far, that the proposed power of direction is totally misconceived. In its proposed form, it pre-empts consultation; whereas, if it were reversed behind consultation, it could be a step towards retaining the reserved power. However, from the point of view of administration and good policing, the proposal seems provocative nonsense.

Those points were all helpful and underlined earlier points. I should like to return to the resource issue. I think that we could probably all agree, hand on heart, that there can never be sufficient resources for the police service. The question that I always ask is: what is the appropriate resource level? Perhaps when he was the shadow Home Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, had in mind an optimum number for the Metropolitan Police. I do not know whether he did, but I certainly do not remember him going on the record with such a figure. Perhaps he had an optimum number in his head.

Our Government, however, have been firm and resolute in their commitment to ensuring that the police service has well-funded budgets. We have also started in the past few years to see a turnaround in the whole issue of recruitment and retention. The figures bear that out. In March 1997, there were 127,158 police officers. We anticipate that, in March 2002, there will be 128,000. We also project that, in March 2003, there will be a total of 130,000. Obviously, when we reach those figures, we shall have to continue examining whether they are the right ones. It will be for those in position on the day, working with their colleagues in the police service, to make those assessments.

The case is there to be made. We accept and have never hidden from the fact that resource issues are very important and that we must address them. It is also true that, in the timeframe that I have been talking about—the four years from March 1997 to September 2001—3,000 extra support staff have been put in place to support the police in their important work. Moreover, according to my figures, budgets will grow from £7.7 billion in 2001 to £9.3 billion in 2003–04. That does not suggest a lack of commitment. It suggests to me that we should keep these issues continually under review to improve support and resource levels so that we can tackle the profound issues surrounding crime.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, was kind and helpful in his observations. We take the point that we shall have to reflect on how the power is exercised. However, we believe that it will be exercised where HMIC, the standards unit and perhaps the Audit Commission have found evidence of precise failure. As I said at the outset, we would expect to pursue the matter, in an iterative and helpful manner, in those circumstances.

Those comments have been repeated by Ministers so often now that the Government should perhaps table an amendment to this clause ensuring that, if the power survives at all, it can be exercised only in the circumstances he has just enunciated.

The noble Lord accepts my case—that this would be appropriate action where there has been an identifiable failure—and I am grateful for that acceptance.

The Minister knows—I nearly used a Saxon word—very well that I believe that the whole clause is misconceived; we shall soon be dealing with that point. However, if the power must survive, the legislation should include the limitation that the Home Secretary cannot go off on a frolic of his or her own, but act only on receipt of an adverse report from the inspectorate. That would allay some fears.

It should limit the Home Secretary to perceived failure and not expected failure. The Minister continues to say that the Secretary of State can act only when there is evident failure, but the Bill does not say that.

The Minister says that he is dealing with a case. In effect, however, without meaning to do so, he is moving away from the essence of the argument. He really has to go back and consider the essence of the issue, and whether, in the form in which the proposal is made, there is a pre-emption of essential consultation. That is the essence of this argument.

This whole debate is predicated—I thought that I had made this clear at the outset—on there being perceived failure, or the likelihood of failure which, if it existed, would fundamentally undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of a police force. I think we are all agreed that it is desirable to achieve effectiveness and efficiency. That has been a constant thread in legislation for much of the past 40 years. Obviously, we shall reflect on the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, made. We may well be able to improve the wording of the clause.

I am grateful that there appears to be acceptance, albeit not wholehearted, on the part of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, that if we can further perfect the meaning of the clause to make it useful in its exercise, we shall be happy to do so. However, the measure is in essence a matter of last resort where there is proven failure on the part of whole or part of a police force. It seeks to enable such a police force to be sustained in an efficient and effective way. We take on board the sensible comments about the need constantly to review the resource in supporting the force and ensuring that it is properly provided for.

This has been—

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Before the noble Lord responds, I emphasise the anxiety that other Members of the Committee have mentioned in connection with the clause. I hear what the Minister says but, as drafted, the powers are not linked to unsatisfactory performance. Subsection (1) of new Section 41A states:

"in consequence of a report under section 54 or otherwise".

The word "otherwise" can be linked to future anticipated behaviour as opposed to faults that occurred in the past. That is then linked to fairly unfettered powers to set performance targets and so on. It may be a theoretical argument, but an argument can be constructed to the effect that without any fault having occurred the Home Secretary of the day may seek to impose performance targets for nakedly political reasons, perhaps in the run-up to a general election, to demand that clear-up rates in relation to a particular crime improve dramatically in an unreasonable period of time.

I wish to ask the noble Lord a question to draw out the issue. Does he accept that the Secretary of State may in certain circumstances be right to act if there is anticipated failure that would have an adverse effect on the effectiveness and efficiency of a force? If the Secretary of State is obliged to wait until that failure has occurred, I suggest that he would be rightly criticised for failing to act earlier in anticipation of an evident failure in the efficiency and effectiveness of the force.

I agree absolutely with the noble Lord on that issue. Such action in those circumstances would clearly be in the public interest. I believe that all that Members of the Committee are arguing for is that those circumstances should be stated on the face of the Bill.

This has been a long and interesting debate. Perhaps I should begin with a few words of explanation to the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, as to why I do not go round the whole of the landscape before I get to the substance of my argument. Quite simply, as in this case, the reason is that we have often covered the ground earlier to some degree and also, if one were to do that, one would prolong the debate considerably with much repetition. I also like to think that Members of the Committee have experience and knowledge of the situation. I do not accept the noble Lord's criticism of my remarks. If the Bill dealt exclusively with those situations where a report indicated failure, his remarks would be entirely appropriate and I would agree with him. I cannot remember whether the noble Lord was present at the time, but we certainly tabled an amendment which we debated last Thursday as to whether we should take out of subsection (1) of new Section 41A the words "whether or otherwise". The noble Lord, Lord Condon, referred to those words, as did the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury. The other word that renders the whole provision rather abstruse is "will". The measure deals with a situation that might arise in the future. Those areas give cause for concern.

I deal with two other issues. I pick up the resource issue and then put it on one side, so to speak. Clearly, the resource issue is important but it has nothing to do with the particular issue that we are discussing. However, as it has been brought up, one has to say that the situation with regard to manpower in the police is now improving. That must be welcome to absolutely everyone and is certainly a reversal of the trend that existed only about two years ago. That is immensely welcome and it is good to see that that situation has changed.

I come back to the substance of how you deal with a force that has a problem. The real question which lies behind the amendments that we are discussing is whether it is a right and appropriate use of a Secretary of State's immense powers—after all, he has legislative authority—to deal with what might be a problem in a basic command unit, as the powers go down that far. Last week I said that in many cases a direction emanating from a Whitehall department is less effective than a telephone call to someone in authority who is directly in charge of the situation to ask what on earth is going on as a problem has developed. The person directly in charge will already know about it as he will have seen the report and will have been present when the inspectors carried out their inspection. The inspectors will have told him that the situation was not right and asked him what he intended to do to sort it out. I draw an analogy with the Ministry of Defence. Senior officers in the military would be astonished if the kind of procedure that is suggested in these proposals were to be applied to a military situation.

However, I accept that we are discussing an entirely different situation. The police constitute a civil force. I accept that the Home Secretary finds himself occasionally in the embarrassing situation of having to answer awkward questions in another place. However, that is appropriate; he is accountable. His solution to putting that right is to ask those who are immediately accountable to him for the situation what they are doing about it. However, the powers that we are discussing do not seem to me to constitute good management practice. We all share the same ambition; that is, to have a police force which works effectively and well on behalf of the whole community. There is no difference between us as regards that ambition. As I often used to find in discussions with my father, the difference is over method. I believe that the Government have picked the wrong method. However, I shall study what they have said. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 58:

Page 5, leave out lines 10 and 11.

The noble Lord said: I believe that we have slipped on this amendment. I do not intend to move it. But Amendments Nos. 59, 110 and 130 are grouped with it so that gives me the opportunity to speak to them. I do not believe that I can move Amendment No. 58, but I believe that it is all right if I do not withdraw it until after dealing with the group of amendments. We had better de-group these amendments because I do not intend to speak to Amendment No. 58, but to the following amendment.

moved Amendment No. 59:

Page 5, line 11, at end insert "and, subject to his obtaining the approval of the relevant police authority to such plan, shall take such steps as are necessary and practicable to implement any action plan resulting from such direction"

The noble Lord said: I apologise to the House: occasionally one gets into procedural difficulties. This amendment deals with what is to happen when the chief officer of police submits an action plan and has to deal with it. By implication, an action plan is going to be acted on, but there is nothing in the Bill which actually says that it must be. It is also essential that the police authority is fully involved in the situation. The amendment is designed to bring that about.

The amendment also calls on the chief constable to obtain the approval of the police authority and NCIS as regards Amendment No. 110 and the National Crime Squad in relation to Amendment No.130 and the approval of the directors of the action plan. It is important psychologically that everyone is thoroughly involved at all levels. This amendment seeks to make explicit on the face of the Bill something which I am quite sure the Minister will tell me is implicit. He may try to tell me that the amendment is unnecessary, but we thought that it was worth making sure that this situation will come about. I beg to move.

I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, did not move Amendment No. 58. If he had been serious about it, he would have removed from Clause 5 a provision which states that a police officer is required to comply with any direction issued under the clause. Effectively, the clause would have been entirely purposeless. I believe that the noble Lord realises that.

He continued by suggesting amendments which effectively render the clause irrelevant or superfluous. The other three amendments provide the requirement to comply with directions under the clause, but for that to he highly qualified. A chief officer, in circumstances which the noble Lord is attempting to establish, would he required to comply with a direction issued under the clause and would implement any action plan resulting from such a direction, subject to obtaining the approval of the police or service authority.

Therefore, regardless of what was agreed in consultation between the chief officer and the police authority and of what the Secretary of State agreed to in an action plan, the police authority would effectively be able to veto its implementation. That is the effect of the noble Lord's amendment. We argue that the phrase "necessary and practicable", which seem reasonable words in themselves, would also risk offering a get-out clause if the action plan was not to be fully implemented.

Perhaps that is what the noble Lord intends. If he does, it fundamentally undermines the purpose behind having a power of direction. The chief officer could then claim that the Secretary of State had imposed impractical conditions on the force and that under this provision he was unable to deliver the action plan.

I can understand circumstances in which that might arise, but I question its desirability. Frankly, there would be little purpose in the Secretary of State being able to issue directions to chief officers if the very means of implementing them could effectively be vetoed at the very last stage by the police authority. I am not sure that that is the right way for the police service to proceed. There has to be a question mark over that point.

Perhaps the argument being put forward by noble Lords opposite is that there should be a greater role for police authorities in preparing action plans. I shall be very interested to hear whether that is the case because welcome though such involvement would be—and they are to he involved in the process—we need to focus on the real reason and intention behind the power of direction.

We keep coming back to this point. The power of direction is to enable the service to drive up and improve standards and quality of performance. After all, that is what we are attempting to achieve. We have just had a long debate about how one achieves efficient and effective policing and its importance, particularly as regards issues where a long-term and precise failure has been identified and, in such a situation, the kinds of powers of direction that may be required.

I am grateful for Amendment No. 58 not being moved. I believe that the noble Lord will wish to reflect on the net effect of the other three amendments that he spoke to in this group. They would fundamentally undermine what we are seeking to achieve where there is a measure of agreement between us on the desirability of raising standards and ensuring that there is adequate support from the centre of the right kind and which has been negotiated and subjected to arbitration. We see that as being part of the process of getting the support in place and ensuring that the powers of direction are not undermined by an effective veto on action plans.

Perhaps I may intervene before the noble Lord speaks. This matter goes to the very heart of the issue of the tripartite nature of policing. In my view one cannot separate the chief officer from the police authority, which is what this clause seeks to do. Since Derbyshire was, I believe, the last police authority found to be inefficient or ineffective, police authorities have been thoroughly reformed. They include independent members and they have also gone through the process of best value. They have also gone through considerable processes of consultation. I honestly believe that if they are left out of the process one goes to the very heart of the way in which policing is conducted here.

The Minister has never made it clear why the Home Secretary wants these powers. He has all sorts of powers of direction, which are used informally such as when there is a petrol crisis and airliners fly into buildings in the United States. There are immediate directions from the Home Office which are issued by informal means. He does not secure legislation to do that. I am sure that he has enough powers now. The Minister has not made his case at all.

I support what has just been said. I believe that we are moving towards understanding the Government's need to enable direction to be given in cases of proven incompetence. We will not go over the last debate again. But would it not undoubtedly salve some of the soreness that the exclusion of the police authority would occasion if this amendment were accepted? I can see the Government's anxiety in that they may believe that the police force would not have got into this mess if the police authority had been doing its job. But things would have moved on if matters had got to the stage where the Secretary of State had to issue a direction.

I invite the Minister to think carefully about the need to preserve the tripartite structure, which has just been alluded to, and the importance of keeping the police authority on side, if I may put it like that. It is worth more than a thought and I hope that the Minister will give it more than that.

Since the issue of the tripartite arrangement has been raised, it is important to place on record our continued confidence and trust in that relationship. Perhaps without realising it, the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, made quite an astute observation. He makes lots of them! He made the point that changes have been made to the tripartite arrangement. Changes were made in the 1994 Police Act, which reconstituted police authorities and changed their composition. I have heard the other side of that argument—that those changes undermined the tripartite arrangements at the time. In practice, that has not been the case. The arrangement was changed. It is organic; it has changed over time. We see some of our proposals for this piece of legislation as again reordering that balance but, nevertheless, recognising the fundamental importance of the tripartite arrangement, which has in the past served us extremely well. Although at present there is no specific proposal that the police authority should give particular approval to the plan resulting from the direction, we anticipate that, through debate, it will be involved in the evolutionary process of seeking to remedy something that is clearly not working.

I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew, will accept the point that it may on occasions be absolutely right for the Secretary of State to issue a direction to the chief officer and to expect some immediate remedial action to be taken, especially when the problem causing the direction needs immediate resolution. It would fall specifically to a chief police officer to put right any precise failure that had led to a lack of confidence in the police locally and to ensure a restoration of public confidence in the local police service to deal with particular problems that are identified. Given the nature of the police service and the difficult job that it has to do, there may in the future be circumstances in which that precise power of direction will need to be exercised, without necessarily having to refer the matter back to the police authority itself. However, by and large, we anticipate that the police authority will be involved in the development of an action plan following a direction.

I do not wish to draft an amendment on my feet—it is not my business to do so—but will the Minister accept that the words "after consultation with the police authority" would chime exactly with what he has just said?

The noble and learned Lord, of course, has great experience of such matters. Without commitment, I shall be quite happy to reflect on the important point that he has made.

The noble Lord and learned Lord, Lord Mayhew of Twysden, has at least winkled something out of the Government. I accept the Minister's criticism that it could be argued that this amendment may give the relevant authority a power of veto. That, of course, is perhaps not the purpose of this debate. However, we face considerable difficulties in tabling amendments to this clause. My own inclination was simply to deal with the clause as a whole when we reach the Question whether it shall stand part of the Bill, rather than trying to dissect it.

We have had a worthwhile debate, if only to extract from the Government their absolute statement of confidence in support of the tripartite arrangements. That in itself has made the debate worthwhile. One might have suspected, if one simply read the Bill, that that confidence no longer existed. We have had a useful discussion. I do not intend to rehearse the issues any further at this stage. We shall consider what the Minister has said. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Whether Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill?

I listened with great care to what was said earlier today by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker. There is no doubt that his tone was very reasonable, as were his replies on the first day of Committee last week. One has the impression from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, that the Government are willing to amend this clause. The noble Lord certainly gave the impression that its purposes are limited merely to what would probably be acceptable to both sides of the House. However, it appears to me that the difficulty arises in that, whereas that may be the Minister's intention, the wording of the clause is extremely wide and gives unnecessary powers to the Home Secretary, such that it affects the tripartite arrangement for the management of the police force in this country. I shall endeavour to illustrate how wide it is.

The noble Lords, Lord Borrie and Lord Rooker, said that this clause could not come into being unless there was, to use the phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, already a finding that the police force, or part of it, was in serious disregard. With great respect, I do not believe that that is so. A "finding" implies an independent finding by an independent body. Here one requires no finding, but merely that the Home Secretary, in order to make directions about how a police force shall behave, should satisfy himself, without stating the basis of the evidence, that a part of that force will cease to be efficient in particular respects.

The clause goes on to state that the chief of police, having responded to the directions of the Home Secretary and having put in a plan of action to remedy what the Home Secretary foresees as a possible defect in a particular respect in a part of that force, has the power to direct him again to change that plan so as to fit in with his directions. Sub-section (4) states that, on considering an action plan submitted to him in accordance with a direction, the Secretary of State may direct the chief officer to revise that plan. It has been said that he may continue to require him to revise it until it eventually accords with his own wishes and that finally, having done so, the chief officer of police of any police force is required by sub-section (11) to

"comply with any direction given to him under this section"

It seems to me that those are much wider powers than those which the Government purport to say are the purpose behind this clause. It is very difficult to understand the difference between the powers granted to the Home Secretary under Clause 5 of this Bill and moving by stealth—I do not intend to be in any way derogatory to the Home Secretary—unnoticeably and slowly towards a national police force, without having open debate, if that is the way in which we wish to proceed. I therefore hope that the Government will consider carefully the terms of Clause 5 and the amendments that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, implied that he would consider.

I do not understand the answer that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, gave to my noble friend Lord Waddington. He said that the Bill's powers could not be used in the way in which my noble friends Lord Waddington and Lord Elton suggested or to regulate the number of different parts of a police force. I give what some will say is an extreme example, but it may not be. The Home Secretary might be satisfied that in a force that has a motorway and other roads running through it, the intended decision of the chief police officer to reduce the number of police cars on the motorway and to employ the police in other ways could make that force inefficient in a particular respect; namely, in relation to the control of traffic on the motorway. There is nothing in the clause that could not require the Home Secretary to make the chief constable provide a plan that would show how he was going to dispose of his officers for the purpose of remedying the possible problems that the Home Secretary had perceived.

We should also consider the fact that Clause 32 will allow the chief police officer to take on such community officers as he wishes. I do not see how that could overrule the requirement that he,

"shall comply with any direction given to him",

by the Home Secretary. It is arguable that the actions that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, suggested were never the intention of or purpose behind the Bill fall within the scope of the Bill. For those reasons, I hope that the Government will carefully consider the terms of the clause.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Carlisle for his comments. He suggested that the Government should amend the clause but I feel obliged to go further. The clause is unnecessary; it is a bad clause. If things were going wrong, Clause 4, which will give power to the Secretary of State to give directions to the police authority, is what is needed. As the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, pointed out, it is absurd to separate the responsibilities of the police authority from the chief police officer. Instead of maintaining order and preventing and fighting crime, chief officers would, under Clause 5, become involved in a mass of bureaucratic and detailed directions, which would come from Home Office officials and which would lead to arguments with them.

It is many years since I was responsible for police matters in the Home Office, where, for four and a half years, I was Under-Secretary and Minister of State. My noble friend Lord Carlisle and other noble friends have had those responsibilities in more recent years. In my time, we simply did not have the staff, expertise or experience to exercise such control over the police. I do not know—it is right that none of us knows—whether the Home Office now has officials with such responsibility and expertise. However, even if the situation has improved, such bureaucratic control over chief constables would not help them to do their work more effectively and put matters right. It would be time-consuming and tiresome for them and direct their attention from their true responsibility of keeping order. I hope that the Government agree to withdraw the clause altogether.

It is worth quickly reminding ourselves what the clause will do. First, a direction does not have to be laid before Parliament. Secondly, it can be issued by the Home Secretary on his or her initiative. Thirdly, it is not dependent on any third party or adverse finding. Fourthly, it is a direction with which the chief constable must comply. Fifthly, it completely bypasses the existing tripartite balance and leaves the police authority totally out of the calculation, except in so far as the Home Secretary has to tell the police authority that a direction has been issued when one is issued.

When examining these centralising powers, there is a danger that one does not see the overall context within which they will operate. We have surely seen enough centralising measures during the past few years. We have seen, for example, county probation committees converted into county probation boards, although closely comparable powers were put in the Home Secretary's hands. We also saw that with community health councils and in many other areas. We on these Benches object in principle to any further centralisation of powers at the expense of local power and local government that is not overwhelmingly and beyond peradventure justified by hard evidence. The one feature that has been signally lacking in our debate so far on this part of the Bill is any clear evidence from the Government that the present arrangements are failing.

I take considerable comfort from those Members of the Committee who have experience of police authorities. I refer in particular to the noble Lord, Lord Condon, who is to me a sort of Moses on the Mount in this debate. So long as he agrees with me, I shall continue to look on him as Moses on the Mount. It is notable that in one of his interventions in our debate last Thursday, he said—indeed, the Minister also said this—that the tripartite arrangements have stood the test of time. So what on earth are we doing driving a huge wedge into the existing balance between police authorities, the Home Secretary and the chief constable?

We are told that the powers will not be used except in the last resort. With respect to the Ministers, they are not entitled to say that. They can say, "I will use the power only in the last resort", but they can say no more than that. I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is following my argument—

I am always listening.

I am glad of that. We are dealing with the relations between the state, the police and local communities, and in relation to that matter we need to proceed on an extremely cautious basis—perhaps more so than in relation to almost any other area. We should proceed not on the basis of complete mistrust but on one of extreme scepticism when we hear statements from a Minister that seek to bind future Ministers. We have had experience of overzealous—and, some of us may believe, misguided—Home Secretaries. It would be profoundly mistaken to agree to the clause, which completely subverts—let us not dilly-dally—the existing tripartite arrangements. It would he folly to allow that unless we had overwhelming evidence of the failure of the present arrangements.

We are bound to return to the importance of local democracy and of consent in policing. The police force is under enough pressure. For example, there is enough evidence of people refusing to give evidence to make us feel strongly that nothing at all should be done to diminish local influence and control.

I shall read a letter that I received from Christine Laverock, who is the chair of the Suffolk police authority. She pithily summarises that authority's view of the clause and this part of the Bill. She said:

"In our view, these proposals ride roughshod over the voice of local communities, and make Police Authorities administrative agents of central government. The operational independence of Chief Constables and the role of target setting, monitoring and planning by members of Police Authorities is in danger of being seriously undermined".

We say "Amen" to every word in that letter.

I have one further point to make on the issue of management. At present, chief constables know roughly where they stand: they are primarily responsible to their employing police authorities. Therefore, to allow the Home Secretary to dive in without consulting the police authority, as Clause 5 would permit, and issue directions with which the chief constable must comply would be devastating in terms of that chief constable knowing where he, or she, stands. The Old Testament was right to say that a man cannot serve two masters. The effect of Clause 5 would mean that the chief constable would have to do just that.

With the leave of the Committee, perhaps I may read from a letter that I have received from Martin Wargent, who is the chief executive of the Central Probation Council. Some noble Lords present in the Chamber today will have taken part in the debate on the proposal to strip the probation committees of their powers in almost precisely the way that is now proposed under this Bill. He has visited 32 of the 42 boards, and summarises their view of what that stripping of powers has done to the management arrangements, as follows:

"Chief Officers are getting instructions from the Home Office that are not always made clear to the employing boards. Board members are increasingly concerned about the nature of their role. They were told it was of great importance and their skills and excellent background experience would make them central to good delivery of services, good staff care and good community liaison. They are discovering that they are bypassed by the National Probation Directorate [under the Home Secretary] which directs the Chief Officer … There is growing disaffection amongst probation Board members".

How do the Government expect the calibre of people serving on police authorities to remain as high as is currently the case if significant powers are taken away from them and given to the Home Secretary?

I sometimes think that this business of the Home Secretary having the power to intervene and to take decisions away and exercise them himself is a little like a father with a son who has come of age. He says to the son, "Well, good luck son; you are now in the world on your own. By the way, I shall have the right to ring your bank manager and tell him not to give you an overdraft, but I shall not exercise that other than in extreme circumstances". We all know that we need to consider the matter in the round and that the salami slicing of powers away from local authorities, local bodies, and, here, police authorities, can have a devastating effect over time on the calibre of people willing to serve on such boards, and, indeed, on the way that they perceive their authority and power. Noble Lords on this side of the Committee are adamant that this clause should not stand. It will be counter-productive. We believe that it should be removed from the Bill.

I believe that the Minister has argued his case both persuasively and genuinely. I admire his instinctive feel for where the balance should lie in the tripartite arrangements. He has argued convincingly as regards how the clause would be used; that is, if it were used in the way that he would like it to be used. However, the noble Lord has failed to persuade us that it could not be used in ways that do not match his aspirations. As drafted, the clause could be used in ways that were not in the public interest, which could damage the tripartite arrangements and, indeed, which would allow personality clashes to be played out through the Bill's provisions, whether such clashes arose because of an unreasonable Home Secretary, an unreasonable authority chairman, or an unreasonable commissioner or chief constable.

As presently worded, the clause provides worrying scope for unreasonable men and women to utilise the Bill. Therefore, in his defence of the clause, I encourage the Minister to give the Committee some reassurance that he would consider further drafting to close the credibility gap between what he says will happen and what might happen under the Bill, as currently drafted.

Before I sit down, perhaps I may thank the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, for his description of me a short while ago. I was called many things during my police career, but very few were as charitable or as kind as his comments.

I agree with every word that has so far been spoken in this clause stand part debate. I should just like to remind the noble Lord. Lord Rooker, of what he said the other day. I am sure that I am right in saying that it was him. I believe he said, "We are not looking for a national police force". In responding to the debate, it would be helpful if the Minister did not just repeat those words, because I am sure that he meant them. Perhaps he could go a little further and tell us that he will be satisfied after the next stage of the Bill that it would not be possible for someone with very different intentions from his own, and those of the present Government, to use the provision in the way that the Opposition now fear.

There are some 60 lines in Clause 5. However, there are but 11, or so, lines in the brief summary of the clause that appears in the Explanatory Notes to the Bill. I should like to draw the Minister's attention to that quite short paragraph, and to ask him whether he has any reservations as to what is said therein. It would be of some comfort to me if the noble Lord were to say that that is an accurate summary of the clause. The paragraph begins by saying that the clause,

"empowers the Secretary of State to require a chief officer to take remedial measures where he is satisfied that the whole or any part of the force either as a whole or in any aspect of its operations is not efficient or effective (or will become so unless such measures are taken)".

The main point to note is that it is entirely on the initiative of the Home Secretary: no one else is involved. There is no consultation, and no warning to a police authority of what is afoot. It is just a matter of the Home Secretary saying that there is something to worry about in a particular force that must be put right; and that he requires the chief officer to take the remedial measures. He is giving instructions. That certainly raises a big question mark over that declaration to which I referred earlier; namely, that the Government are not looking for a national police force.

The paragraph in the Explanatory Notes to which I referred continues to say:

"The intervention power takes the form of a requirement on the chief officer to prepare and submit an action plan to address those aspects of the force's performance that the Secretary of State considers inefficient or ineffective".

If that is not a step in the direction of a national police force, I really do not know what is. It is possible that the Government do not intend to land us with a national police force, but one cannot help fearing that they may one day wake up to the fact that they have actually taken a series of measures that have precisely that effect. I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has experience of opposition. He should not dismiss—I am sure that he will not—all the fears of opposition as being purely founded on partisan, party considerations. They are not; they are genuine anxieties. There is a long and deep-rooted tradition of not having a national police force that will now be eaten away, whether or not that is the Government's intention.

The last part that I want to quote from paragraph 30 of the Explanatory Notes is that under Section 41 A(9),

"the action plan must be prepared in consultation with the relevant police authority".

It is nice that the police authority has been let in at the last minute. But, unless the Government regard police authorities as being worthless organisations, it seems an extraordinary omission that the Home Secretary has not placed upon himself or his successors the duty to consult them.

I agree with everything that has been said about this clause. As it stands at present, I hope that, even if we do not divide against it today, we shall certainly reject it on Report.

I concur with everything that has been said about the clause. I have no doubt that in a few years' time the Home Office will ask some kind of management consultant to consider the arrangement that the Minister seeks to introduce. He will wonder how the hell we got into such a mess.

We argued that during debate on the probation legislation. My noble friend Lord Phillips rightly pointed out the Government's insatiable appetite for controlling everything centrally. We are opposed to any move which takes away the powers and functions of the independent police authority and gives those powers to the Home Secretary. Clause 5 effectively introduces new Section 41A to the Police Act 1996, giving the Home Secretary power to issue directions to chief constables to take remedial action, bypassing the police authority. We object to that. lit should be the police authority and not the Home Secretary which controls that type of function.

The Home Secretary's new Police Standards Unit already has sufficient teeth, and sharp ones at that. although we have already made known out concerns that this part gives the Home Secretary too much power and control at the expense of local policing. In effect, Clause 5 gives him the power to direct chief constables in all but specific operations or cases. That is a new departure and one which threatens the viability of local policing. I believe that the perception of the general public is that that is going down the road towards central control of police or a national police force.

The role of the police authority, and thus the local community, is all but ignored. The Home Secretary will simply notify the authority of any direction and the chief officer will then consult it on his action plan. Otherwise, it is a two-way dialogue between the chief officer and the Home Secretary.

Why does the Home Secretary need those powers when he already has extensive powers under Section 40? Our opposition in relation to clause stand part seeks to restore the balance in the process. It should be the job of the local police authority and not the Home Secretary to oversee the remedial action.

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Condon, for saying that I have been persuasive. I must report back to the boss at the end of the day that I have defended Clause 5. I believe that the clause is defensible. However. I, together with my noble friend, said on Thursday and again today that if Clause 5 is put to the Committee as it stands—that is, unamended—it will be rejected outright. We are not stupid—we understand that there is no question about that. We shall not wait until Report stage. The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, asked me last week whether we could discuss the matter beforehand so that it was not left until the last minute. As a result, discussions are taking place and suggestions are being put forward in the appropriate quarters.

Therefore, with the permission of the Committee, I do not propose to go back to first principles but I do want to place a few matters on the record. There is complete distrust of the Home Office which is probably sometimes born out of experience. I do not mean that in a pejorative sense; it is a healthy scepticism. But, two ex-Ministers of State and an ex-Commissioner have obviously, over the years, seen something in a way that I have not done.

However, I said last week that, even before it starts, the operation of the clause will be subject to an agreed protocol between the Home Secretary, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Police Authorities. I made that clear. No Member of the Committee today has even referred to that. With respect, most noble Lords have simply gone for the jugular. They have completely ignored the caveats that I have already inserted. But, in fact, the Home Secretary does not want to do many of the things that noble Lords are suggesting. Before he begins to exercise any powers under the Bill, he will obtain an agreed protocol—by definition, it must be agreed—with the relevant authorities; that is, the Association of Chief Police Officers and the Association of Police Authorities.

Although I suspect that the lawyers will have difficulty in finding the necessary form of words—however, that is their job; it is what they are paid for—the powers will be used only in the last resort. I know that that is not a very legalistic form of words, but that is the situation. In the letter that I sent to noble Lords in response to a submission that we received following Second Reading, I made it clear that, by their nature, the powers would be exercised only as a last resort. That applies to Clauses 4 and 5; it is not new. Some of the powers already exist in relation to police authorities, although it is true that they have been delineated separately for chief officers.

I shall obtain an answer to the example of the motorway given by the noble Lord, Lord Carlisle. It was a good example because it is one that people can readily understand. But, to my mind, it is inconceivable that the Home Secretary will operate on the powers without advice. I believe that, by way of example, both my noble friend Lord Bassam and I have mentioned Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary, the Police Standards Unit and the Audit Commission. There are other bodies. Such action will not be taken on a hunch. The Home Secretary will not operate in an unreasonable fashion. Ministers are not allowed to do that; we are subject to the legal process.

I accept that the Committee is unhappy. Examples have been given in relation to the national probation directorate. I stand to be corrected because I do not remember every Written Answer for which I am responsible. However, since I have been in this House—that is, since last June—I do not believe that the words "national probation directorate" have crossed anyone's lips at any Question Time. I hear from a sedentary position the words, "It's too early yet". But the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has already quoted a letter today stating that the national probation directorate is not working, and so on. I do not track all the Answers given in the other place; that is outside the remit of my day job, if I may express it in that way. But all the key issues are raised in this House. Therefore I am confident that issues relating to the national probation directorate have not been raised by your Lordships.

The Home Secretary will not, in the words of one noble Lord, "dive in". He will not, in the words of another noble Lord, send in "hit squads". Those allegations are without any foundation whatever.

The answer that I must give to the first question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, must be: yes; by the end of Report stage, after Easter, I do not want to be in a position—nor do I believe that anyone else would—of looking back in a few years' time and being told, "Well, you didn't ask enough questions as a Minister". That is what I have always done in all the roles that I have held. I am engaged in one such role at present which has nothing to do with this Bill. I am saying, "Hang on a minute. That may go wrong". I may be asked later, "Did you ask these questions or did you get a second or third opinion before you took this course of action?" Those are ordinary, reasonable things which a Minister should do. It is true that it sometimes slows down decision-making processes, but by the end of the next stage I believe that one should be comfortable in providing the answers. The fact is that, when the Bill leaves this House to go to the other place, it will do so only by consent. I understand that. The noble Lord, Lord Peyton, made what was probably a slip of the tongue and said that I had had no experience of opposition. All my life I have been in opposition, even when I have been on the side of the establishment.

The noble Lord should give me credit for remembering that!

I was a humble Back-Bencher between 1974 and 1979. I knew what it was like then to feel as if one was in opposition. As regards the Explanatory Notes, I plead guilty. It is outrageous that anyone who buys the Bill for £10 has to pay £8 for the Explanatory Notes, which clearly state on the front page:

"They are not, and are not meant to be, a comprehensive description of the Bill. So where a clause or part of a clause does not seem to require any explanation or comment, none is given".

They do not form part of the Bill. Parliament has not been asked to approve the Explanatory Notes.

Perhaps I may repeat my question to the noble Lord. Do I understand that he does not dissent from anything that is contained in that paragraph of the Explanatory Notes?

No, but it could have been bigger, better and more detailed. For example, it could have benefited from the inclusion of paragraph 13 of the letter I wrote to noble Lords on Clause 5, which is as long as that part of the Explanatory Notes. It uses the phrase "last resort"; it makes clear that there will be a protocol before anything is done and refers to what was in the White Paper which is not necessarily in the Bill. As I said, the Bill relates only to those parts of the White Paper, which require legislation.

I hope that I shall he permitted to take this away and speak to my elders and betters about the contributions made by noble Lords as regards Clause 5. That also applies in a global sense to Part 1. I understand the particular concerns about this clause. It probably requires more clarity and precision in the trigger mechanism which is used before such a clause would operate. That is going pretty far for me in Committee. I hope that I shall be able to come back on Report and please the Committee.

Before the Minister sits down, he commented on the experience of the Central Probation Council and said that he had not heard any Questions being asked in relation to that since he has been in the House. As my noble friend Lord Dholakia said, these are early days. I asked the Central Probation Council what, even in these early days, was the developing experience. That is the background to that matter.

My second point is that the Minister makes much of the protocol which the Home Secretary intends to introduce. However, that comes into the same category as notes on clauses. It is not part of the statute; it may not be right and the next Home Secretary may not want one.

Before the Minister replies, perhaps I may ask another question. I made the point that Clause 4, which gives directions to a police authority, makes Clause 5 unnecessary. It might help if the Minister were to comment on that.

Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Renton, that much of Clause 4 exists at present in respect of police authorities. Last Thursday, my noble friend Lord Harris, who is not in his place, tabled an ingenious amendment which moved a good part of Clause 5 into Clause 4, thereby getting rid of it. The mood of the Committee then was, as many noble Lords said, that that was a seductive way of solving what was clearly a problem. That is on the table for us to consider in the Home Office.

In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, I shall have nothing more to say about the national probation directorate until I start to receive questions on it.

The noble Lord, Lord Carlisle, took the wind out of my sails when the debate began. However, perhaps we might now draw it to a close. It has been a good debate. The essential issue that drove the tabling of the amendment that Clause 5 should not stand part of the Bill was that the clause is centralising and micromanaging to a degree which is inappropriate. We are all completely convinced of that. I am bound to say to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, that in the answer he has given he has not sufficiently allayed the fears expressed.

He began by saying that there would be discussions in all the appropriate places. Discussions are wonderful things, but we do not have discussions before us; still less do we have the content of such discussions. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, raised the question of a protocol. If the Government were serious about the content or the protocol, it might have been useful if we had been able to have sight of it. I know that that is often the case, and this is a circumstance which has been criticised on many occasions. In particular, I recall that there were protocols on how relations should develop between this Parliament in Westminster and the Scottish Parliament. A number of us had to fly through the Scottish Parliament legislation completely blind because protocols did not exist and there was no way of telling exactly what the relationship was going to be. That is a problem.

Although the Bill carefully, correctly and specifically limits the power of the Secretary of State so that he cannot take action that would affect any specific operation, the fact of the matter is that he could take a whole host of actions which could affect the capacity of the police to act effectively operationally if he were to get wrong the balance of his directions. That is not ruled out. I am not a betting man, but if I had to bet on whether experienced policemen on the ground were more likely to reach a solution to a problem with local management rather than a Secretary of State sitting in an ivory tower in Whitehall, I would bet on the people on the ground.

I accept the question that is raised in the event of a report indicating that there are problems. However, by the time that report crosses the desk of the Secretary of State, my strong view would be that remedial action would already have been taken. Such situations do not develop in isolation. By the time it was reported to the Secretary of State, the people on the ground would be aware of it. The whole technique of management today has changed. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, made the point that police authorities and, indeed, the police service generally, have evolved dramatically over the past few years. That is not just because of best value but simply because in this modern era we have much more management information which makes that possible. It is the access and provision of such information which could lead to this situation and which might drive a Secretary of State to take action. If he did not receive the information, he would not be able to issue directions.

We still have considerable doubts as to whether the clause is appropriate. For a host of reasons, most of which have been raised in this debate or in debates on the individual amendments to the clause, I do not believe that it is appropriate to have such a clause in this form on the face of the Bill. That said, the Minister indicated that he is prepared to consider the whole issue and the way it is presented. I take seriously the words of the noble Lord, and I am glad to be able to do that. With that, I do not oppose the Question that Clause 5 shall stand part of the Bill.

Clause 5 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 62:

Page 5, line 47, leave out "such persons as he thinks fit" and insert—

"(a) persons whom he considers to represent the interests of police authorities in England and Wales;

(b) persons whom he considers to represent the interests of chief officers of police of forces maintained by those authorities; and

(c) such other persons as he thinks fit"

The noble Lord said: Clause 6 deals with equipment. In moving Amendment No. 62, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 131 which relates to the corresponding provisions for the National Crime Squad. The clause on its own is not a particular cause for concern. However, it must be viewed in the wider context of Part 1. It is yet another centralising measure.

The clause gives the Home Secretary the power to make regulations which require all forces to use the same equipment. He can require forces to hold stocks of certain kinds of equipment, even if they will not use it locally. As the Minister probably knows, under the mutual aid provisions forces go to each other's assistance.

We all want our forces, if possible, to be equipped with the most modern equipment. But equipment, as the Minister knows, does not come free. I know from my experience with the fire service, which was a Home Office department until recently, that half the fire services in Oxfordshire were using second-hand uniforms and equipment simply because there was not the wherewithal to buy new equipment. So it is not simply a question of the Home Secretary saying, "You will have the latest equipment", and it suddenly arriving free of charge, because it will not.

Money spent on equipment is not available to spend on police officers. Therefore, any regulations which are made have significant financial implications for police authorities. I do not know whether the Minister has yet seen the precepts for police authorities around the country. We shall talk later about such matters as police pensions. But I can assure the noble Lord that they are well above the 2.3 per cent increase which we got to fund a 13 point something per cent increase in precept. It is really quite serious.

Of course we will not have as much scope to use money as we think fit; it will be as the Home Secretary thinks fit. The recent experience with the new radio system has taught us that it is critical that the three partners—the chief officers, the police authorities and the Home Secretary—work closely together to decide whatever new equipment is bought. These are multimillion pound projects; they are not small projects. Even a decision to use a different type of baton throughout the whole of the police service would be extremely expensive in terms of both the equipment and the training that would be required to enable the officers to use whatever type of equipment was specified.

Therefore, we are asking specifically for the Association of Police Authorities and ACPO to be consulted before regulations are made. At the moment, the Home Secretary is only required to consult "as he thinks fit". We would rather that there was an obligation to consult the appropriate authorities and that such an obligation could not be bypassed should the Home Secretary so wish.

No doubt, as in the past, the Minister will give us an assurance that the Government would not dream of making regulations without consulting ACPO and APA, but we should very much like to see that on the face of the Bill. That would give a measure of confidence, extending into the future, and beyond the period, which we hope will be very long, that the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, sits on the Front Bench in that or in another job.

The amendment would not restrict the Home Secretary's ability to consult more widely with other interests, but it would send a powerful signal to police authorities and the police forces that he will work in partnership with them. The Minister has indicated that he will look closely at the wording of previous clauses in the Bill. I hope that he will feel able to give a similar commitment to us today. I beg to move.

I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, particularly on the point about consultation. The powers to make regulations with regard to equipment do not seem to be wholly unreasonable. There have been incidences in the past with incompatible equipment between forces and so on. It is taking time to worry those difficulties out of the system. I recall several years ago one authority ordering state-of-the-art equipment; but that then put it virtually incommunicado with its neighbours. That of course cannot be satisfactory.

It is absolutely essential that if the Secretary of State is to regulate in this area of equipment he should have the fullest possible discussion, particularly with those who will use the equipment, in determining its specification. Getting things wrong in this area would be completely disastrous. I am sure that he would not wish that to happen, and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, will be most helpful on this point.

The noble Lord said that I was going to be the emollient one this afternoon. That does not mean that my noble friend Lord Rooker is not emollient at all appropriate times.

If the noble Lord agrees not to press his amendment this afternoon, I shall agree that we shall take the matter away and construct an amendment which gives effect to what he is after. We think that a reasonable point has been made. We agree in principle about the need to consult representatives of chief officers, police authorities and so on and their equivalents with NCS and NCIS. That would be our intention in any event. But the point has been well enough made.

The amendment is defective in the sense that it needs to be made more consistent with other legislation, and in particular with Section 37 of the Police Act 1996. So, if the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, is good on this one, we shall be helpful, take it away and bring something useful back on Report.

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 63:

Page 6. line 8, at end insert "; and

( ) communications equipment"

The noble Lord said: Amendments Nos. 63 and 64 are simple little amendments which add words to the Bill. It is really a moot point whether proposed new subsection (2C) (at the top of page 6) is appropriate in the Bill at all. It states:

"In this section 'equipment' includes—

(a) vehicles; and

(b) headgear and protective and other clothing".

There is a great deal more to equipping a police force than vehicles and headgear and protective and other clothing. The amendments would add the words "communications equipment" and,

"information technology (whether hardware or software)".

However, I think that in reality the word "equipment" is probably sufficient. Once one begins to create a list, it can go on ad nauseam.

This is just a probing amendment to discover whether there was a specific reason why the Government decided to mention vehicles, headgear and protective and other clothing.

On the subject of vehicles, I hope that the Government will be extremely careful what they do. My local police force in Essex has a large Ford establishment within its boundaries and has had a long, co-operative arrangement with Ford developing cars—not just for police use. That has been an extremely useful arrangement for both sides. If we are to "regulate" vehicles and vehicle types, I hope that the arrangements will be sufficiently flexible to permit such a mutually beneficial, symbiotic relationship to continue. I beg to move.

There was a time when there was a commonality of communications equipment and information technology, when we had whistles and notebooks. The amendment seems sensible, although I am a little cautious about adding needlessly to the list, which should be confined to essential matters where there is plainly advantage.

I have the feeling that when he was a lad in and around Sudbury, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, was probably caught out by whistles and notebooks. Perish the thought!

I return to the probing amendment. We intend communications and IT equipment to be categories of equipment that could be subject to the regulations. The items listed in the clause—cars, clothes, and so on—are specified as included only because they are not obviously equipment. Communications equipment is obviously equipment so there is no need to specify it in the Bill. The same applies to IT. We have taken the view that specifying obvious items in the Bill may cast doubt on other types of equipment that are not mentioned.

So that is the explanation for the wording of the clause. The noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, has been helpful in tabling his amendment because it has enabled us to clarify that point.

If the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, has achieved anything, he has made the point that the definition should stop at the word "equipment" and we should not list anything for the sake of clarity. If we were to ask a police officer in a traffic division whether his car was equipment, he would say that it was essential equipment because he could not do without it. This has been an interesting debate but perhaps we can make better sense of it later. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

The Minister has given us assurances that he will consider suggestions made by my noble friend Lord Bradshaw. In the light of that, I do not intend to press the matter further.

Clause 6 agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 66:

Page 6, line 28, at end insert—

"( ) On considering any advice received from the Central Police Training and Development Authority and before making any regulations under this section, the Secretary of State shall consult—

(a) persons whom he considers to represent the interests of police authorities in England and Wales; and

(b) persons whom he considers to represent the interests of chief officers of police forces maintained by those authorities."

The noble Lord said: In moving the amendment, I shall speak to Amendment No. 132. The two amendments are similar to Amendments Nos. 62 and 131 which we have just discussed in relation to clause 6. I hope that they will receive the same emollient response from the Ministers on the Government Front Bench. They are of greater concern because Clause '7 is even more worrying than Clause 6. That is because it represents a significant departure from the existing constitutional position. It gives the Home Secretary power to determine operational policing practices and specify them in regulations. We all want good policing practices to spread; we all want standards of performance across the country raised to the level of the best. There is no argument about that.

However, I question whether the Home Secretary is necessarily always the best person to determine what is good operational practice and especially whether something that works in one area will work in another. Our concern about the clause, as with so many others, is that it provides yet another piece of the jigsaw that, when assembled, will result in a very different picture of the tripartite relationship. We seek by the amendments to provide a small but important safeguard by recognising the roles of the other two partners—the Association of Police Authorities and the Association of Chief Police Officers—in determining the regulations.

Operational practices and procedures concern the style and nature of the local policing: issues in which local people have a keen interest and now rightly have a voice through their police authorities. No doubt the Minister will remind us—I am already aware of this—that both the APA and ACPO are represented on the Central Police Training and Development Authority, which will be responsible for drafting the regulations. So why have we tabled the amendments? Because the role of the CPTDA board is to provide strategic oversight of police training. The board cannot and should not spend its time trawling through draft codes and regulations. It will not be able to consider detailed comments from police authorities and forces. If it did, it would never have time to do its job properly.

As I said, the clause represents a radical change in the constitutional position. We must ensure that the views of police authorities and forces are heard clearly by the Home Secretary himself, not just the CPTDA, before decisions are reached on any regulations. We feel strongly that the voice of local people, reflected through their police authorities, must be heard in decisions about how they are policed.

We received an emollient response to the previous, similar amendments. I hope that the Minister will again feel able to give a commitment to re-examine the issue of consultation before Report, when I am sure that we shall return to the matter. I beg to move.

To cut a long story short, while we do not support the noble Lord's amendments, we are happy to reflect on whether there should be an express duty on the CPTDA to consult ACPO and the police authorities separately—bearing in mind that, as I said on Thursday, they will have representatives on the board anyway. It is the duty of the CPTDA to organise the codes of practice and it will clearly consult on that. We do not want to be unnecessarily bureaucratic by building in a second round of consultation. We will reflect on whether to place that duty to consult on the new authority.

I am grateful to the Minister for that undertaking. I hope that, on reflection, he will consider that there is a difference between having two representatives on the board and properly consulting the police authorities and ACPO. In the light of the Minister's comments, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 67:

Page 6, line 30, at end insert—

"( ) A statutory instrument containing the first regulations to be made under this section shall not be made unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House."

The noble Lord said: I can probably be pretty brief in moving this amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Rooker. Basically, it gives effect to one of the recommendations—

The one.

That is right, the one recommendation made in the report of the Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform. It recommended that in view of the potential width of the power delegated to the Secretary of State, on first application of the power the regulation should be subject to the affirmative procedure. We are more than happy to go along with that, which is why we have tabled the amendment. I know that the Chamber is keen on our compliance with the recommendations of that Select Committee and on this occasion we are more than happy to do so. Amendment No. 68 gives full effect to the committee's recommendation. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 68:

Page 6, line 31, after "any" insert "other"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

On Question, Whether Clause 7, as amended, shall stand part of the Bill?

Clause 7 deals with the regulation of operational procedures and practices. As with Clause 5, we think that it goes too far.

We accept that the Government wish to drive for greater efficiency and effectiveness in the police service. However, the clause goes too far because it may stultify and freeze off development. It says:

"The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision requiring all police forces in England and Wales—

(a) to adopt particular operational procedures or practices; or

(b) to adopt operational procedures or practices of a particular description".

Although it is a sine qua non of good policing that operational practices and procedures should be compatible between forces, the idea that there should be one centrally directed way of doing things does not appeal to me. It appeals even less when one considers that there might be a change of Secretary of State and we would have somebody who would like things done differently.

On this side of the House we are in danger of becoming boring on the subject, but the development of operational practice will happen out in the field. It will be evolved in the light of hard experience gained by policemen dealing with criminals and community problems. It is unbelievable that a Secretary of State could regulate that process. I have no difficulty with the idea that the inspectorate, the CPTDA, the Audit Commission and all the other bodies should work with the Government to see that details of best practice are distributed around those who are not doing so well and that people should be guided in the best way of doing things. Nobody has any problem with that, but we do not require a power of regulation for procedures and practices in order to achieve it.

For a long time this afternoon we have been debating a question of management style. The management style that is coming from the Government is that Whitehall knows best. In my experience, by the time that Whitehall has found out, the best has probably moved on; somewhere in the country, somebody will be doing something better that we have not yet heard about. That is why we are concerned about the clause.

The clause says that,

"The Secretary of State shall not make any regulations under subsection (1) unless he considers—

(a) that it is desirable in the national interest"—

well, as they say, he would say that, wouldn't he? —

"and that the making of regulations is necessary".

He is obliged to seek advice from the CPTDA and so on, but then we get into all the possibilities for consultation, as the CPTDA,

"shall consult such persons as it thinks fit".

It is a bit harsh to judge it like this, but the CPTDA is a new organisation. In fact, it is a creation of the Home Office. The CPTDA has yet to become a proven body.

We oppose the clause simply because we regard the centralising powers encapsulated in it, as in earlier clauses, as singularly inappropriate.

I know that the Minister is keen to make progress. He gave me a commitment that he would think about the amendment that I moved earlier and come back to it, so I will not now speak at the length that I was going to speak on the Motion.

I should make it clear that, even if the previous amendments that I moved—or at least the spirit of them—are accepted, those of us on these Benches would still find the clause unacceptable. It represents an unnecessary and unwarranted interference by the Home Office in local policing. Operational policing—policy and practice—is properly a matter for police authorities. The clause distorts the tripartite relationship and undermines our system of policing by consent, so we oppose it. I am sure that we will return to it on Report.

I support what my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith said. My concerns are his concerns.

We are talking about operational procedures and practices. One of the great advantages of our policing system, with the many different forces, is that one force might pioneer a new way of doing something. It is a real strength of a local police service that it can do that. I am concerned that, if the spirit of the clause were to be put into effect, we would be transferring such decisions to the Home Office and setting things down in a uniform way for the whole country. It is anything but clear that that would be to the advantage of the police or the public. The process would become centrally driven—Home Office-driven.

As my noble friend said, it is one thing to have the inspectorate checking whether particular systems are being used well and efficiently and effectively; it is quite another to have the kind of uniformity that lies behind the clause. Like both noble Lords who have spoken, I have the strongest reservations about the clause.

I also support my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith. I do so by analogy, and perhaps extravagant example.

When I lived in the United States in the 1950s, I had a friend who was a retired officer of the Indian Army. He showed me a manual that instructed officers of the Indian Army in getting camels across rivers. I acknowledge immediately that there are probably practical problems in getting camels across rivers; I acknowledge that there may be health and safety considerations and that there may be animal welfare issues. However, the clear objective is to get the camels across the river, and the camels would not be much use to the Indian Army if they did not survive the experience.

By analogy with the French Government, who always know exactly what any French child is being taught at any particular time of the day, it may have given satisfaction to the commander-in-chief or the viceroy—who may be the same—to know that all camels were being taken across rivers in the Indian subcontinent in the same manner at any hour of the day. However, it was quite clear to my retired friend from the Indian Army that the manual was unnecessarily constricting and that officers who could not get camels across rivers were unworthy of service in the Indian Army.

I shall not even try to follow that. The noble Lord has cited a good example; it give us a picture in our minds.

I thought that the earlier brief debates on this clause were quite positive but, to be frank, I do not accept the arguments put forward in seeking to remove the clause from the Bill; far from it. There seem to be some fundamental misunderstandings.

I have forgotten which noble Lord said it, but a point was made that the Home Office would be in charge of the Central Police Training and Development Authority. Let us look at what happens today, in March 2002. National police training is currently a part of the Home Office. From 1st April 2002 it will become the Central Police Training and Development Authority, a non-departmental public body established through the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. In some ways police training is now being put at arm's length from the Home Office, with an independent chair for the authority, along with six independent members from the private sector, whose names I did not mention last week and I do not intend to do so now. There will be two members of ACPO. one of whom is a chief constable and two members of the Association of Police Authorities. Do not tell me that the authority is to be run by the Home Office.

Through previous legislation, the Home Office is now setting up a separate, non-departmental body to carry out an important function that it is not necessary to carry out 100 per cent, as is the case now, by officials in Queen Anne's Gate. The notion, "Oh, this is the Home Office", when in April we shall set up a new organisation bringing in fresh thinking, outside interests and frontline police expertise is the exact opposite of what most noble Lords have just said. Although we may fundamentally disagree about the way we are going, we ought to look at the road signs. The road sign on this issue is not over-centralisation and it is certainly not micro-management.

The clause forms an important part of the machinery. Noble Lords were brief in their remarks, so I too shall be brief. The president of ACPO, Sir David Phillips, in giving evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in another place on 7th February, stated that:

"We have argued for a long time that we do not have a sufficient mechanism within ACPO not only to develop and propound good policy but to make sure, as far as we can, that it reaches all corners. The need for there to be a better mechanism to spread good practice I think is identifiable".

That is not someone saying that they do not want to see a mechanism used to spread good policy and that the mechanisms are already sufficient and in place. They are not.

It is no secret that in the White Paper we set out our approach for raising professional standards. I have said that the bottom tier will be purely advisory guidance to be issued on a non-statutory basis. We have already debated the middle tier covering codes of practice. This clause covers binding regulations. I know that it can be interesting to quote selectively, but not one Member of the Committee mentioned subsection (6) of this clause. Any regulation made under this provision will need to be approved by this House, but no one mentioned that point. I ask noble Lords to look at the legislation. This is not the Home Office seeking to drive through regulations at the whim of the Home Secretary. Parliament will approve regulations as set out on the face of the Bill, but no one mentioned it. If an outsider was listening to the speeches of noble Lords, frankly they would think that another Bill was being debated.

The Home Secretary will be extremely positive about the contributions made by noble Lords in relation to this Bill because I have said to him that that is a good idea, bearing in mind the situation that we face. But he will not be positive if I go back and say, "Well, David, they want to chuck this clause out. Too much Home Office interference". He will say, "Didn't you tell them that Parliament has got to approve the regulations?". "No, I forgot about that"—and heads off. I have to say to noble Lords that this is serious legislation. Parliament—this House—will have to approve the regulations.

I shall cite just one example of where they might be used so that Members of the Committee can see the scope of the ideas here. At the moment, all forces in England and Wales have different approaches to the gathering and handling of criminal intelligence. That comes as a surprise to me, but it is the reality of the matter. As a result, there is no mechanism for effectively sharing intelligence across force boundaries. The power in Clause 7 could be used to require all forces to adopt at least the minimum requirements of the National Criminal Intelligence Service's National Intelligence Model; in other words, there is a body that has already thought about this matter. The effectiveness of policing is clearly enhanced where one force can make efficient use of intelligence gathered in another force.

We do not want a national police force and we are not going to have a national police force, but criminals do not respect police force area boundaries. Thus there are some areas in which it is necessary for police forces to be able to work, co-operate and at least share information. We have also talked about equipment. I say simply that that is but one example.

It is clearly stated on the face of the Bill that, before making any regulations, the Home Secretary would consult the tripartite partners and others in the context of the national policing plan to see whether any particular areas of procedure need to be mandated in this way. After those discussions, if it is concluded that it would be in the national interest to regulate, then it will be for the Home Secretary to seek the advice of the Central Police Training and Development Authority and, in most cases, the National Centre for Policing Excellence, which will be a part of the Central Police Training and Development Authority—I wish there was a shorter way of saying all that, but there is not. The centre would be expected to handle the detailed work, which would be subject to oversight by the CPTDA board, on which I repeat both ACPO and the APA are represented.

In offering its advice, the new authority will draw on professional policing experience and inevitably there will be very close consultation with the relevant ACPO policy committee. It is axiomatic that that would follow. Furthermore, the authority will of course consult other bodies and persons before it concludes its deliberations.

By their nature, the regulations will be concerned with the generality of cases—for example, how to collect and record criminal intelligence or how to investigate homicides or other serious crimes. Regulations cannot relate to particular cases, so again—as elsewhere in the provisions—there is no threat to the operational independence of the chief officer.

I have said that we would be willing to look at all the points raised by noble Lords, but I hope that the main concerns have been covered by the clause as drafted in the Bill. We shall look at those that are not, along with the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Tope, and come back on Report.

The Minister has done his best to relieve our concerns with regard to this clause, but I am hound to say to him that in doing so, he has not convinced me of the need for the clause to be kept in the Bill. I do not think that we can call in aid the White Paper, which covers many matters that do not require legislation. It has been pointed out previously that the White Paper was published only five days before the Bill. Matters not requiring legislation set out in that paper no doubt are already being implemented. However, the relationship between the White Paper and this Bill has nothing to do with the argument.

I accept that the CPTDA may well become a very effective free-standing body and I think that that is what we all hope for it, but it is not yet in place in its final form. I still have a tremendous fear of the old cliché which states that the man who pays the piper, calls the tune. When I was in local government, I always found that if I controlled the finances, and possibly also the manpower, I had every department exactly where I wanted it. The same applies to government, so we should not wholly set aside our worries.

The Minister is right, Parliament must approve any regulations made in this way—but parliamentary supervision of regulations is less thorough than the supervision that we give to primary legislation. We have the opportunity to accept it or refuse it, and that is as far as it goes. If the mood that prevails in the Committee continues, I suspect that regulations brought forward under this clause will never pass, which comes back to the issue of whether there is a need for the clause in the first place.

The Minister referred to the national intelligence model as being appropriate for regulation. I do not believe that it is necessarily appropriate. While I agree that there is every need for the national intelligence model to be spread as rapidly as possible across all the police forces of the country, we come back to the business of the best way to do things and I doubt whether a regulation could be worded in sufficiently good form to bring that about. We are talking about the spread of best practice and, generally speaking, that is not a matter for regulation but for persuasion. I doubt whether people would need a great deal of persuading on that point.

Although the Minister has gone some way towards alleviating our concerns, he has not shown that the clause is necessary to the Bill, which is a different thing. We will consider what he has said.

Clause 7, as amended, agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 69:

After Clause 7, insert the following new clause—

"SPECIAL CONSTABLES

(1) The Police Act 1996 (c. 16) is amended as follows.

(2) In section 51 (2)(d) after "constables:" there shall be inserted—

"(dd) the payment to special constables of an annual bounty;"."

The noble Lord said: In moving Amendment No. 69, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 183. The amendments are, to some extent, related because they both refer to special constables. It is an old subject which has been debated previously in your Lordships' House on at least two occasions since I have been here.

The needs of the police service are very much for manpower on certain specific occasions—for example, on Friday and Saturday nights, at football matches, race meetings and so on. Such events require a lot of manpower—sometimes to direct traffic, sometimes to control crowds—and a mechanism whereby we could employ more people as special constables than we do now is highly desirable.

The county in which I live employs people as retained firemen. In fact, more than half the firemen in the county of Oxfordshire are retained. They are paid for two hours training on a Wednesday evening and when they turn out, as required, for a fire. In the Thames Valley, we employ about 400 special constables—we have weeded out of the force those people who do not attend very often or who may be too old or inactive—but they constitute a very small part of the force.

One of the reasons for that is that we do not pay them. There have been suggestions in your Lordships' House that special constables should be given a bounty akin to that enjoyed by Territorial Array soldiers, who are paid for a fortnight's camp and whenever they are required to turn out. Alternatively—the method we prefer because we are looking for younger people and we wish to make the service modern—people should be paid to attend for training and to turn out regularly as required. The Home Office has always said that this would be very difficult, but I know that most police officers support the idea of an enhanced special constabulary.

I am not proposing in Amendment No. 183 a specific method of remuneration because some people may prefer to pay a bounty, others some kind of lump-sum payment, and others may prefer for special constables to be paid by the hour when they attend for duty. However, bearing in mind that the fire service throughout much of the country relies on volunteers, as I call the retained men, to attend when required, it is time that we allowed police authorities the freedom to employ people to turn out.

If this were to happen, I am sure that instead of having about 400 special constables in Thames Valley we would have a lot more. In my home town there are 10 retained firemen but there are no retained constables. That situation prevails in much of the county. If special constables were to be paid it would make a big difference.

I shall be interested to hear what the Minister has to say about the proposal. It is not prescriptive but allows authorities a choice. I know that in London it may be more difficult to recruit special constables, as it is to recruit retained firemen, and it may not be possible there, but it could have application in much of the country. I beg to move.

I am grateful to the noble Lord for bringing forward the amendment. It gives an opportunity for us to hear what the Government have to say about building upon a body of long-established men and women who are now accepted by the regular police service. That was not always the case, but the misgivings and suspicions have now been overcome.

We should certainly carefully consider this issue before we get to the provisions in the Bill which provide for detention officers and community safety officers, who, in the latter case, will not have powers of arrest. They are neither fish nor fowl, nor even a good red herring. I am not saying a decision about them should be taken now, but we certainly should hear what is wrong with a proposal to build upon the special constables.

The noble Lord's analogy with the retained firemen was a very good one, as all of us who live in the countryside have reason to acknowledge.

I support what my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew and the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, have said. Surely what we all want to achieve is a situation where there are more policemen noticeably on the beat. Therefore, the area of special constables—who are recognised as such, who wear a recognisable uniform and have recognised powers—is where we should look first to get that increase in numbers so as to have more policemen visible on the streets of this country.

Just as the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, said that he believed that in Oxfordshire, in the area of the Thames Valley, a considerable increase could be achieved, I have no doubt that in other parts of the country more special constables could be recruited if the terms of employment were more attractive than they are at the moment. As my noble and learned friend Lord Mayhew said, I hope that the Home Office will tell us what is its attitude towards special constables and whether it agrees that this is an area in which it should give special encouragement.

I, too, want to encourage debate on the role of special constables. Without going into all the history, one has only to go back 20 or 30 years and in most police forces there were as many, if not more, special constables than there were regular constables. Some county forces had almost twice as many. They were an integral part of the policing of county forces.

Events have moved on, and it has been harder to recruit and retain special constables, particularly in the big city environment. That is not just because of pressures of work. It is partly a question of lifestyle. If a man or woman works in London and is thinking of becoming a special, his or her first thoughts are about having to travel home from work out of London; therefore, people think about becoming Specials in the area in which they live. A great many pressures prevent people from becoming Specials in big cities.

As to payment, when most existing Specials are asked whether they wish to be paid, they say categorically no. But that is based on the experience that they did not take up the position expecting to be paid. As a matter of personal pride, they see it as somehow demeaning if they argue for payment. However, I believe that a great many good and worthy people are deterred from joining the special constabulary in big city environments. They would be further encouraged if there was a payment.

As the Minister and others have said, the special constabulary in the big cities mirrors the ethnic diversity and richness of big cities much better than the regular force. Specials are an important means of encouraging diversity involvement in policing. There are worthy reasons why the situation regarding Specials should be reviewed and why they should be given important consideration—not as a total alternative to community safety officers or to other provisions in the Bill but because of their history and because of the valuable part that they can play in modern policing.

I am pleased to follow the noble Lord, Lord Condon. Perhaps I may speak briefly—and somewhat nervously in his presence—of my experience in the Metropolitan Police Service. The noble Lord is right to refer to the difficulties, which we can all understand, of the recruitment and retention of special constables in cities, and particularly in a large urban area such as London.

However, one feature in London is worthy of consideration. The proportion of special constables in the Met who are from visible ethnic minorities is significantly higher than it is in the mainstream force, the full-time force.

The noble Lord, Lord Condon, referred to many special constables saying no to the idea of payment. They are, of course, a pre-selected sample. They came in knowing that they were not going to be paid. I should have thought that in all police forces, and certainly in the Met, we should be doing all that we can to encourage growth in the number of special constables, particularly given the lead that has already been taken in terms of recruitment among visible ethnic minorities. Payment, in whatever form, must be an incentive in terms of encouraging such recruitment.

What we are seeing—and I hope that we shall see it happening more and more—is that a significant number of those who start out as special constables then wish to join the force as full police constables. That must be a good move. I therefore look forward with great interest to the Minister's response. Payment in some form to special constables can only encourage people further in that direction.

I rise to add general support to the amendments. I do not want to anticipate later stages of the Bill, but it is our belief that the special constabulary is perhaps the ideal vehicle for handling some of the issues that arise later in the Bill. Without wishing to take words from the Minister's mouth, we should perhaps appreciate the law with regard to special constables. I took the trouble a considerable time ago to look this up. It goes back to the 1996 Act, which is the simplest and most basic authority. Section 27 states:

"The chief officer of police of the police force maintained for a police area may, in accordance with regulations under Section 51, appoint special constables for that area".

Section 51 states:

"The Secretary of State may make regulations as to the government, administration and conditions of service of special constables … Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), regulations under this section may make provision with respect to … qualifications … retirement … suspension … [and] the allowances payable to special constables".

So we do not need further law in order to do this. What we need is willpower. I simply make that point, for what it is worth.

It should be a matter of concern to all of us that the number of Specials has diminished. We ought to try to reverse that. We have designs on later parts of the Bill which may or may not be wholly acceptable. If they were to become acceptable, they would provide the most original line of thinking that has taken place with regard to special constables for a considerable time. I support the amendment.

At Second Reading, 15 out of 21 speakers mentioned the Specials. As special constables are not referred to in the Bill, that was an indication that the issue needs to be addressed. Although I am not able to address it now, I have some hopeful words to offer.

The amendments are drafted in good spirit. However, the drafting implies a compulsion on chief constables to employ Specials. It so happens that no chief constable has refused to employ Specials, but having listened for several hours to Members of the Committee talking about not forcing rules on chief officers, that is ironic.

Having got that off my chest, I can say that this is a fair point. It is true that the number of Specials has dropped—from 20,000 four years ago to about 13,000 today in round figures. That is to be regretted. Specials play a magnificent role.

Of course, Specials are not civilians exercising police powers. They are not remotely comparable with the kind of people we are talking about in Part 4 of the Bill. Once attested, they are full police constables—and in that sense, as was always the case, they are never off duty. They are a volunteer police force. They are not civilians exercising a few police powers.

To address the amendments, work is going on in this area. The police authorities already have discretionary power to pay a bounty to Specials with the agreement of the Secretary of State under regulations made in 1992 (SI No. 1526 1992). The provision was introduced to facilitate an experimental bounty scheme in 1993 and has not been repealed.

The Government are considering—subject to the current spending review—the case for paying a fixed allowance to Specials in return for a minimum commitment in terms of hours. No firm decisions have been made, but this could be done by means of an amendment to the regulations. It would not require primary legislation. I want to satisfy the Committee that there is a mechanism already on the statute book which could be used, rather than this Bill. That is an important point. I do not want the Committee to think that, although we are considering the matter and might do something, it is a matter for primary legislation and that we shall have to wait for more parliamentary time. The regulations are already in place.

We share the aims behind Amendment No. 183, which are, in total, to improve the recruitment and retention of special constables. On the other hand, we do not believe that the proposed new clause would achieve that. There is an emphasis on each force having its own policy for Specials and this could give rise to the risk of fragmentation and lack of clarity about their conditions. Therefore, we must be careful.

For that reason, the Government are currently working with stakeholders on a range of measures to improve recruitment and retention of Specials, including the new national training package and the revised conditions of service and conduct regulations. Central to that process will be the Home Office-ACPO good practice guidance on the management and deployment of Specials.

The proposal in the new clause that each individual force should determine how its Specials will be paid might be a bit divisive. I understand that the poll was taken among people who knew that there was no pay to start with. We have to be careful, because people might try to judge how much individual forces valued their Specials. I am sure that every force values its Specials. The Government are considering the case for a payment of a fixed allowance for Specials.

I do not know when we shall come to Part 4, but I implore noble Lords not to see the Specials as a substitute for our proposals. We shall debate those proposals properly. By their nature, Specials are police constables; they are not civilians exercising limited police powers. They work outside the normal working hours of their day job, in contrast to community safety officers and accredited persons, which will be full-time jobs available at the beginning and end of each day. It is not a switch on and switch off process in the same way as Specials. I mention that only because it is the fact of the matter.

It was never expected, even on Second Reading, that I would be in a position to make any commitments in Committee, but there is a commitment and work is actively going on in the Government, in consultation with stakeholders, on what we can do to improve numbers of Specials. In due course it will be a matter for this House to approve changes in the regulations. That is important. We cannot put the issue to bed and I am sure that noble Lords will keep coming back on it. It will be at the forefront of my mind while the Bill is going through Parliament anyway and I have no doubt that it will also rightly be raised in the other place.

I thank the Minister for that reply. We have been told in the past that work is going on in the Home Office but, like the mills of God, it grinds exceeding slow. I ask the Minister to put a bit of his notorious energy behind the people who are dealing with the matter, because we are waiting patiently. I notice that there are powers. I presume that they extend from the bounties in the past, which I know were paid in Dorset. They were very small bounties of about £200 a year. We want a proper scheme of payments. I stand to be corrected on whether it should be different for different forces. Perhaps some forces want Specials and others do not. I have no wish to force things on people if they do not want them. In the meantime, I thank the Minister for his reply and I hope that we shall return to the subject very soon. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

On Question, Whether Clause 8 shall stand part of the Bill?

When we first tabled our intention to oppose the clause, we had no indication of what the Minister had in mind. He has already explained that Schedule 1 would apply to NCS and NCIS similar provisions to those applied to local police forces by Clauses 1 to 7. We have already rehearsed the issues at some length in debates on amendments to Clauses 1 to 7, so I do not intend to pursue the matter further.

Clause 8 agreed to.

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 75:

Page 74, line 22, leave out "the whole or any part of"

The noble Lord said: I do not intend to waste the time of the Committee on this group of amendments. They would apply to the schedules some of the proposals that we debated in Committee last week on the clauses. I do intend to move Amendment No. 75 or the other amendments in the group.

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 98:

Page 75, line 27, leave out from "measures" to end of line 17 on page 76 and insert "for the purpose of restoring the efficiency and effectiveness of NCIS"

The noble Lord said: The amendment represents the drafting that I would prefer, but we have been round and round the subject without securing agreement on our proposals and I do not intend to move the amendment now. We shall wait to see what comes back at the next stage of the Bill.

moved Amendment No. 135:

Page 7, line 9, leave out paragraph (b) and insert—

"(b) not less than five members appointed by the Magistrates Association; and

(c) not less than five members appointed by the Local Government Association."

The noble Viscount said: I shall speak also to Amendment No. 137. We have now moved on to Part 2. A police complaints commission appointed by the Government of the day hardly deserves the description "independent". To introduce a truly independent element, some of the appointments should be made by other bodies.

The Magistrates' Association represents those who have experience of the police and of people accused of crimes, who are likely to be a major source of complaints, as well as experience in sifting out the truth of conflicting claims. The Local Government Association represents the people elected by the public, who are served by the police. It also has the added advantage that it may sometimes be controlled by a different political party from that in government and can therefore provide an element of political balance to the appointment process.

Those bodies can be relied on to choose members who have relevant experience, while spreading the source of appointments and giving the commission a much better chance of developing the reputation for independence that it will need if it is to inspire confidence in its adjudications.

On Amendment No. 137, the Bill proposes giving some police powers to accredited persons—who will form such a feature of Part 4—but fails to bring them within the remit of the independent police complaints commission. That does not make much sense. The nature of the powers vested in the police makes an independent system necessary and desirable. All those who have such powers, including accredited persons, should be brought within the independent system. The argument against allowing the employer to deal with complaints is the same as that against allowing the police to police themselves. Once accredited persons are brought within the complaints system, they should also be kept away from membership so as to preserve the independence of the commission. I beg to move.

I shall briefly support my noble friend on his amendments. I have tabled Amendment No. 136. I am astonished by its modesty. I simply suggested that not fewer than three members of the commission should have police experience.

I do not think that I would have thought the amendment necessary were it not for the fact that the next subsection states:

"A person shall not be appointed as the chairman of the Commission, or as another member of the Commission, if—

(a) he holds or has held office as a constable in any part of the United Kingdom".

I accept that we want to have a completely independent chairman. However, I think that it is very important that a body of this importance should include people who possess some experience of police work and are able to ventilate the point of view of the police generally on these matters.

I hope very much that, in considering this matter, the Government will reflect on the degree of mistrust about their current proposals. Many policemen of all ranks believe that the Government are taking too much into their own hands, and that they do not pay sufficient regard to the need to have the confidence of the police. The Government will not enjoy the police's confidence unless the police are satisfied that the arrangements for handling complaints against them are fair and in no way biased against them. I hope that the Minister will give serious consideration to that view.

I rise to express some support for the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Peyton of Yeovil. It is very reasonable that, of the commission's 10 members, three should have had experience of police service. I am currently involved with two unrelated self-regulated industries: the accountancy profession and the world of advertising. Although they have ensured that a majority of those serving on the governing councils of their self-regulatory bodies are independent, they have also ensured that a specific number—a minority, admittedly—should have experience of the world of advertising or of the accountancy profession. I therefore have much sympathy for the views expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Peyton.

Conversely, I feel that no support whatever should be given to Amendment No. 135, proposed by the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman. He started his remarks by asking how the independent police complaints commission can be independent if it is appointed by the Government. Over the years, numerous bodies, including the current Police Complaints Authority, have been able to establish with the public—and, I should hope, with Members of this House—a reputation for independence despite the fact that they are appointed by the Government. In such cases, the Government seek to make a point of ensuring that the members are independent.

Moreover, to safeguard that independence, the Government seek to provide some security of tenure. The office concerned with public appointments is always concerned with ensuring, among other things, that appointments entail some years of security so that members appointed by the Government or a particular department shall indeed be independent and able to perform their tasks fully and adequately.

I oppose Amendment No. 135 for that particular reason. However, I also oppose the particular notion which it expresses that responsibility for appointing half the commission members should be handed over to one voluntary association—the eminent and reasonable people at the Magistrates' Association—and that responsibility for the other half should be handed over to another voluntary association, the Local Government Association. There has been great disagreement across the Floor of the Committee about the degree to which the Home Secretary should have responsibility in these matters, but surely we can agree that the Government should not abnegate and hand over to someone else responsibility for the appointment of the chairman and commissioners of the independent police complaints commission.

On Second Reading, I made what may have seemed the extravagant claim that getting the independent police complaints commission right was one of the Bill's most important objectives. I still believe passionately that we must get this provision absolutely right.

I find myself, paradoxically as a former police officer, almost arguing against the amendments. Many years ago, I was persuaded—as the Association of Chief Police Officers, the Police Superintendents' Association and the Police Federation have more recently been persuaded—that a proper complaints process is vital to public confidence in policing. A lack of confidence in that process would be the greatest mischief and must be avoided. I am not taking anything away from the good and worthy people who have spent many years in the current complaints arrangements and done their very best to make those arrangements work, but it is still a fact of life that very many people do not have confidence in the police complaints process. In particular, and more disturbingly, many people from ethnic minority communities do not have confidence in the police complaints procedures.

It is vital that we get it right. Anything that waters down the sense of newness and change and the greater emphasis on independence needs to be thought about very seriously. I would only rarely argue with the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, on these issues, because I respect his motivation in raising them. However, in respect of the other two amendments, we should be very careful not to water down the important and symbolic statement about the independence of the new provisions.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Condon, we stress the need to ensure independence for the complaints authority. Although it is superficially attractive, I am not sure that Amendment No. 135 provides the independence that we want. I can see what the amendment seeks to do, but I do not think that it does it.

We do, however, welcome the provision in Amendment No. 137. We think that it is a sensible amendment and we support it. As a member of a complaints authority, I know that there is not much confidence in the process. However, I can assure noble Lords that the investigations are most thorough. Furthermore, with the restorative interventions which are now not only allowed but encouraged, we are disposing of very many more complaints by bringing together the parties. They agree on some issues, even if it is only to differ, and they are at least on good terms with one another.

I therefore support Amendment No. 137. I am not sure that Amendments Nos. 135 and 136 add to the independence of the authority.

I should inform noble Lords that, if Amendment No. 135 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment No. 137.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, I have had relatively recent experience of serving on an ombudsman's scheme. That scheme related to financial services, but it has now been subsumed under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. It had a controlling body of eight, five of whom were independent, with three from the building societies industry. The chairman was of course an independent.

I assumed from the Bill's wording that the considerations which were raised by the noble Lord, Lord Condon, had powerfully influenced the Government on the need to establish independence in the minds of the public. I recognise that the scheme is not the same as an ombudsman scheme; there are critical and essential differences, not least in the range of issues which will be covered by the commission. I am conscious that although the ombudsman for the Northern Ireland police service did not serve in the RUC, she did serve on the police authority of the RUC, when it existed, prior to the present police board being set up.

I refer to the views of my noble friend Lord Peyton and to those of the noble Lord, Lord Condon. Does the Bill preclude appointments to the commission—I refer to the relevant amendment from the Opposition Front Bench—on the part of those who have experience of these matters, even if they have not served directly in a police force? That is the issue that the noble Lord, Lord Condon, raised. I understand the Government's view on the matter, but I shall be interested to hear their response. I wonder whether there is virtue in exploring compromise in order to satisfy the point made by my noble friend Lord Peyton; that is, that if the commission comprised entirely independent members it would not understand how policing works in general.

I accept that we are in totally different territory in this part of the Bill. I welcome the broad support for the changes that we are making. I shall not argue about the definition of titles. However, the independent police complaints commission will certainly be independent of government. It is funded centrally and therefore it is not totally outwith the system. Nevertheless, it will be set up as an independent body. Certainly, its decisions will be utterly and totally independent of both the police and the Government. The Home Secretary will have no involvement in those decisions.

I refer to some of the points that have been made. It is crucial that the Committee understands that the appointments will not be made on a whim. A code of practice will be drawn up by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. When Members of the Committee opposite were in government, there was no Commissioner for Public Appointments. That person was not appointed until about 1996. The present system is innovative, is much more codified, and has many rules and regulations to ensure transparency. We do not want to restrict appointments to people of particular backgrounds. We shall operate a totally open recruitment process as regards the appointments. The members will be representative of the community and will provide the new commission with a wide range of skills, experience and expertise.

I say at the outset in response to the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, that constables will be excluded from membership of the commission. I shall discuss the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, in a moment. I am fairly certain that any citizen who has served as a member of a police authority would not be excluded from membership of the complaints commission. We are not putting up a cordon except as regards serving or former police officers. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, expressed the matter much better than I when he said that public perception is crucial to the success of the organisation we are discussing.

Amendment No. 135 would limit the field of people with necessary competencies. We do not believe that there is any advantage to be gained by placing the responsibility for appointments in the hands of any other bodies. This is a new, non-departmental public body. It is common practice that appointments to the boards of public bodies are made by Ministers. The power to appoint and dismiss board members is an important safeguard of a Minister's ability to supervise a public body. The chairman of the new body will be appointed by Her Majesty rather than the Home Secretary. Anyone who looks at Schedule 2 and the rules with regard to the removal of the chairman of the commission will see clearly that the chairman will be an extremely powerful, independent figure who will not be beholden to any Minister whatever or any Member of either Chamber of Parliament. The commission will be set up in a similar way—

In describing the appointment of the chairman the Minister has provoked me to inquire: who in this instance is Her Majesty?

Subsection (2) of Clause 9 states:

"(a) a chairman appointed by Her Majesty; and

(b) not less than ten other members appointed by the Secretary of State".

Her Majesty will appoint on the recommendation of the Secretary of State. The chairman will be a person of substance. It will be almost impossible to remove the chairman unless the gravest circumstances which are set out in Schedule 2 should arise. As I say, the chairman will be extremely independent.

I accept that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, is seductive; nevertheless it runs directly counter to the principle that the public's perception of the commission should not be that of the police investigating the police. The expertise will come from the people employed by the commission. It will be free to employ whoever it chooses to carry out investigations. That includes former police officers, serving police officers, people from other police forces or from none, such as private investigators. The frontline experience will come from the people employed by the commission; it will not be found at the level of the commission where the final decisions will he taken.

We are confident that the commission will be able to recruit people with the abilities and expertise necessary to fulfil their role from a variety of walks of life. We do not believe that the competencies required are exclusive to the police service. As I say, if police expertise and experience is required—it clearly is in respect of investigations—it is more appropriate for it to be held within the investigative teams of the commission, rather than in its membership.

I can be a little more emollient as regards Amendment No. 137. There are some important points to consider as regards who is or is not a member of the police family. There is an attraction in Amendment No. 137 which stands in the name of the noble Lord. Lord Dixon-Smith. The amendment stipulates that those who have been involved in a community safety accreditation scheme should be barred from membership of the commission. Such persons will be members of the extended police family and, as such, will work closely with the police. Although they are not employed by a chief constable, they exercise very limited police powers. It would not make sense to have on the commission someone who is doing that job, or who has done that job.

Perhaps I may examine further Amendment No. 137. The employer of an accredited person is a private citizen. Accredited persons could be involved with shopping centre security or local authorities. It would be wrong to exclude from membership of the commission employers of accredited persons. An accredited person is accredited with very limited police powers. However, that does not apply to employers of accredited persons. We must consider those two different roles. As I say, it would be unfair to exclude from membership employers of accredited persons. However, as regards accredited persons themselves, so far as I am concerned, it is an open and shut case. They are part of the police family, exercise police powers, and should not be eligible for membership of the commission. I shall return in due course with a suitable amendment to that effect.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, for his support of my amendment. However, having heard my noble friend on the Front Bench and the noble Lord, Lord Condon, I would like to set an example and say that I recognise that my amendment was mistaken and I would not wish to press it further. I was quite convinced by their arguments.

As regards the opening remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, I agree that I was wide of the mark. However, I am very grateful to the Minister for the explanation of his ideas for the appointments to the commission. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

There is one question which I would like to ask the Minister under clause stand part. It relates to the scale of the budget for the commission. My particular reason for doing so is that in Northern Ireland, which I agree is not a directly analogous case, the budget for the ombudsman exceeds by more than a factor of two the budget of the Police Board. Consequently, there have been some observations in the community in Northern Ireland as to whether that is an appropriate comparison.

I remember looking at this matter during Second Reading. The budget and the resources for the independent police complaints commission will be approximately three times the size of the budget for the existing Police Complaints Authority. It is a substantial amount of extra resources going into this area.

Clause 9 agreed to.

Schedule 2 [The Independent Police Complaints Commission]:

moved Amendment No. 137A:

Page 81, line 37, leave out sub-paragraph (2).

The noble Viscount said: This is a probing amendment. The terms as to the remuneration of members should be determined at the time of their appointment. The Secretary of State should have no power to make extra payments on termination over and above the initially agreed entitlement. The arrangements between the Secretary of Stale and the commission should be seen as totally transparent. I beg to move.

My response is going to be very brief and I hope that it will reassure the noble Viscount. This is a standard provision in the setting up of a non-departmental public body. It is almost identical to those used in establishing the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) under the Police Act 1997 and also the Central Police Training and Development Agency under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001. We believe that it is appropriate for the Home Secretary to be able to direct the new IPCC to make payments to departing chairmen, deputy chairmen or members where appropriate. That has been a long-established principle. Provision has been made for it in the current legislation which governs the Police Complaints Authority. It is a continuation provision to reestablish something which already exists. There is nothing new, fancy or elaborate about it. There are no whistles or bells attached to it. It is a bog-standard job.

It may be that the Government have a number of special circumstances in mind which could vary considerably. It would be very helpful to know something of the special circumstances which might arise, even if only one example is given.

I confess that I do not have an example in my head at this moment. If the noble Lord would give us time I am sure that we shall be able to provide him with a special circumstance that might seem appropriate, to use the language of the briefing. It would perhaps be extenuating circumstances where a person has had to leave the commission rapidly for some reason. There is an element of flexibility. It is there and I suspect that the provision has been used quite sparingly.

I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, for his explanation of the procedure. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 138:

Page 82, line 3, leave out "Subject to sub-paragraphs (3) and (5),"

The noble Viscount said: This amendment is concerned again with the independence of the commission and freedom from political interference. In order to preserve its independence it is important that the commission should appoint its staff without interference from the Home Secretary. I did hear the Minister's reply to the intervention of my noble friend Lord Dixon-Smith. Nevertheless, the right to have a say in the commission's choice of chief executive ensures that the Home Secretary can mould the commission in his own image, which is an unacceptable infringement of the commission's independence.

I ask Members of the Committee to recall the theme running through the debate on Clause 5. This legislation must be successor-proof and in this case proof against a tendency towards political interference by a future Home Secretary. I beg to move.

I support this amendment. Although it is not directly relevant, perhaps I may declare an interest. At one time I worked as a member of the Police Complaints Authority. What I am not quite sure about is why the Home Secretary requires a power to approve the appointment of a chief executive? More importantly, why is it necessary for him to appoint the first chief executive of this independent police complaints authority? The word "independent" does not necessarily fit if the Home Secretary is going to interfere in the appointment. I do not know of a statutory commission where that has been possible. Can the Minister give some indication as to why the Home Secretary is so interested in this particular matter?

Under this Bill and various other statutes, the Home Secretary is given a very wide range of detailed powers. How he is expected to have the knowledge, and sometimes the expertise, necessary to exercise those powers is a bit of a puzzle to me. I do not see why the commission itself, which will have to operate with the co- operation of the chief executive, should not appoint the chief executive without the need to seek the approval of the Secretary of State.

I also support this amendment. I imagine that it is very probable that the commission would wish to have a chief executive, but if it is independent it should surely be its choice as to how it wishes to operate. I can understand, when the commission is yet to be established, that it may be for the Secretary of State to appoint the person to act as chief executive, but why should not that be someone appointed as an interim measure until the commission is established and able to determine, first, whether it wants a chief executive, which I hope it would, and, secondly, who that chief executive should be?

Finally, the Minister went to great lengths a moment ago to assure us, with total sincerity, about the absolute independence of the commission. How can we be reassured that a commission is really and truly independent if probably the most important appointment that it makes in its chief executive, the person for running the body, is subject to the approval of the Secretary of State? How can that possibly be consistent with being truly independent as the Minister assures us?

I am impressed that there is a determination in the Committee that we should have a truly independent police complaints commission. That is absolutely right and none of us here today want to see anything other than that. It is good that there is a political consensus for it. But we need to be realistic and reflect on how similar bodies are established.

The argument runs like this. As with Amendment No. 133, these provisions are pretty much standard for the setting up of non-departmental public bodies. I am sure that there are Members of the Committee who are very familiar with this and more so than I. with the establishing of the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO). Very similar provisions were set up under the Police Act 1997 and the Central Police Training and Development Agency, which was set up under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, and, my noble friend Lord Rooker advises me, very similar procedures were followed in the setting up of the Food Standards Agency; and I do not believe anyone would argue that that is not a genuinely independent body that feels free to criticise the Government whenever it is right and appropriate so to do. It is a genuinely independent body, established with very similar procedures, which has provided exactly the measure of credible independence that we expected it to deliver.

It will be essential for the Secretary of State to appoint the first chief executive of IPCC. That person will need to be in place well before the IPCC has been formally set up, to take forward its establishment and set in place all its operating procedures, which otherwise would have to be done by the Home Office. In the light of the argument about genuine independence, I shall leave the question of whether the Committee would regard that as desirable. We think that it would be a much less satisfactory way of proceeding.

We also believe that it would be appropriate for the Home Secretary, who has a role in overseeing the operation of the IPCC and the police complaints system as a whole, to have the power of approval—but it is only a power of approval—over subsequent and future chief executives and over the terms and conditions of their appointments. After all, the Home Secretary is ultimately accountable to Parliament. We believe that it would be an important safeguard of the Government's ability to supervise a public body most effectively, so that, importantly—criticism is often made that we seek to undermine the role, importance and significance of Parliament—Parliament itself can hold the Government properly to account for the performance of the IPCC, which surely can be done only through the Home Secretary. However, if the Secretary of State has the power of approval with regard to the chief executive, it would be appropriate for the appointment of IPCC staff to be delegated to the chief executive or his or her senior officials. The Secretary of State need only have the power of approval, therefore, over the terms and conditions of the appointment of those members of staff.

We are therefore 100 per cent in favour of the notion of full independence. We see this as a practical and reasonable measure to take in terms of setting up the IPCC. In relation to the subsequent appointment of chief executives, the Home Secretary retains only a right of approval. The Home Secretary represents the golden thread of accountability running through the whole system. I can understand some of the scepticism about the genuine independence of the IPCC raised by this issue. However, there are many examples, of which I have given three, of how the same standard approach to the creation of genuinely independent, non-departmental public bodies has worked perfectly adequately in the past.

In those circumstances, I hope that noble Lords are reasonably assured by my comments and will feel able to withdraw and reconsider the amendments, which, I willingly concede, are inspired by a genuine need to create an independent police complaints supervisory body.

I am even less reassured than I was before the Minister stood up. I am not sure that it is fair to compare PITO and the training authority with something called the independent police complaints commission. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, spoke very eloquently about the vital importance of the new independent police complaints commission being perceived to be independent. I therefore cannot see any justification for the Home Secretary retaining the right to approve—and therefore, by definition, to veto—the appointment of the chief executive. I do not understand why the Home Secretary cannot be prepared to leave that to the wisdom of the commission and its members.

I well understand the position concerning the first appointment. On the first day of Committee I declared my membership of both the new Greater London Authority and the new Metropolitan Police Authority, both of which bodies were established with interim chief executives—or, in the rather quaint world of police authorities, an interim clerk— appointed, of course, by the Government because no one else was in a position to do it. But both of those authorities, when established, were able and trusted by the Government to make their own appointments without the approval or disapproval of not only the Secretary of State but even of the Mayor. Why are the Government not willing to extend the same trust to the body that they, as fully as we, accept has to be seen to be independent?

Perhaps I may again refer to the example of the Food Standards Agency, the White Paper for which I was originally responsible. I suspect—I shall obtain further information for the next stage—that the first and most important person to be appointed will, by definition, he the chair of this authority. The noble Lord nods, but it would be common sense to make sure that the chair is first appointed. The nature of the advertising for the post of the chair will be different from that for the other members. It may be—I do not know—that the appointment of the first chief executive by the Home Secretary will be done in conjunction with the chair-designate. That may be a practical solution. It would be practical because it has worked elsewhere in government. It has been approved by this House and is thought to be a fully independent, bona fide way of making such public appointments in the first instance. We shall be happy to consider other ways of doing it that meet the demands of a new organisation, but we do not want the Home Office to do all the work. That, as my noble friend said, is the whole point of the exercise.

That is not in issue at all. None of us is arguing, alternatively, that the Home Office should do all the work. I accept what the Minister has said about how the first appointment may be made. What about the second, third and fourth appointments of successive chief executives? The Minister has still not addressed the question why an independent police commission must ask the Home Secretary to approve—and therefore, by definition, not approve—the appointment of the chief executive.

Although some may be critical of the powers granted to the Home Secretary in Clause 5, I still believe that the Minister is right in saying that we should not assume, for example, that merely because an appointment is subject to the approval of a Minister, it would in any way affect that individual's independence. That is commonly done in many tribunals. There is a line between accepting the right of a Minister to approve the appointment of a chief executive, or the membership of a committee, without in any way undermining the independence of that committee. It is different from the kind of powers that we were considering earlier.

I apologise for being unable to attend the earlier part of this debate. Having listened to the critical point about the independence of the police complaints body, I suggest that no one would ever argue that, in appointing the chairman of the governors of the BBC, the Secretary of State of the day tampers with the independence of that body.

The concern about the composition of the commission and the appointment of the chief executive has been widely aired during our debate on this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Tope, has drawn attention to the difference between the appointment of the initial chief executive and that of his successors. However, I note the Minister's comment that that is common practice. I hope that the Minister will reconsider the whole composition of the commission and the executive. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

had given notice of his intention to move Amendment No. 145A:

Page 8, line 7, after "confidence" insert "and that of the police".

The noble Lord said: I propose this amendment tentatively, in view of the Government's comments on my previous amendment. I am also very much influenced by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Condon. I appreciate that it is very important to safeguard the total independence of the authority. I am minded not to move the amendment unless the Minister wants to discuss it.

moved Amendment No. 146:

Page 8, line 16. leave out from beginning to first "to" in line 17.

The noble Viscount said: It should be a basic principle that all bodies that are given police powers should be brought within the remit of the independent police complaints commission and that any exception has to be justified. I suggest that there is no obvious reason why the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the National Crime Squad should not also be subject to the independent complaints system, which is applicable to mainstream police forces. I beg to move.

The National Criminal Intelligence Service, the National Crime Squad and those forces that are maintained otherwise than by police authorities, which we may call the Home Office police—I refer to the British Transport Police, the Royal Parks Police and the Ministry of Defence Police—are not automatically included in the system. They are included if the Secretary of State makes regulations that establish corresponding or similar procedures or if a particular force and the complaints commission, with the approval of the Secretary of State, enter into an agreement. I should explain the reason for that because we obviously want such forces to be included.

It is necessary to provide for the inclusion of those bodies via regulations or agreements because there will be differences in those bodies from regular forces that mean that it is not possible to fit them into the complaints system, which is primarily designed for what I referred to as the Home Office police. The regulations will be able to take account of any individual peculiarities. For example, the British Transport Police operates throughout Great Britain and not just in England and Wales. That could require minute drafting changes, which would be more easily done in regulations.

It is important that the IPCC's functions in relation to those forces takes account of the differences from the regular forces, which will be expressed through regulations. That is a good example involving Great Britain as opposed to England and Wales. Amendment No. 174 would compel forces to enter into an agreement with the IPCC.

The Home Secretary made a commitment to Parliament, which I repeated, during the passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill just before Christmas, to bring the Ministry of Defence police and the British Transport Police under the scope of the new police complaints system. However, it is appropriate for other forces that are maintained otherwise than by police authorities to be free to come to an agreement with the IPCC to set up such a system if and in such a way as it would be appropriate to do so. I refer to bodies such as the Ports Police, the atomic energy constabulary and the Royal Parks Police. Nevertheless, it is also appropriate for the Secretary of State, who has a role in overseeing the operation of the police complaints system as a whole, to have the power to approve such agreements when they are made. The amendment appears to accept that the Secretary of State should have the power of approval over the variation or termination of an agreement between the IPCC and a non-Home Office police force. We therefore fail to see why the power of approval should not also extend to an agreement as originally made.

We want the other police forces to be included, and we gave a commitment that some of them would be. However, that will be done by regulation because the nature of the set up is different from that of the Home Office police.

I am pleased that the Minister made that clear. We hope that the regulations will be made promptly. The relevant forces are none the less made up of constables, and they have police powers. We want the National Crime Squad, the National Criminal Intelligence Service and the other forces which are organised differently to be brought within the Bill's provisions as soon as possible.

I am grateful to the Minister for explaining why the NCS and the NCIS should be excluded and for confirming that the other police bodies to which he referred should be brought within the commission. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move that the House do now resume.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

House resumed.

rose to ask Her Majesty's Government how they intend to respond to the Gambling Review Report.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I start by thanking all noble Lords who have put their names forward to speak in this debate. I greatly look forward to hearing their contributions, although I fear that those contributions will mostly be rather short. I declare an interest in that I have been an adviser to Littlewoods Leisure and its predecessor company Littlewoods Pools since 1977. That was at the time of the Royal Commission on Gambling, which was chaired by Lord Rothschild. I am also an unpaid member of a number of committees, charities and boards, which receive or distribute funds that are derived from gambling.

I am grateful to the many organisations that have written to me in recent weeks about this debate on the Budd report. I agree with many of the points that they have made. If I do not mention all of those bodies this evening, I hope that they will forgive me. There was only one response with which I profoundly disagree; I shall come to that in a moment.

The terms of reference of the gambling review are set out on page 6 of the report. A combination of changing social attitudes and the arrival or e-commerce, the flight of United Kingdom bookmakers abroad and the threat of Internet gaming persuaded the Government to set up the review, and they were right to do so. The review also provided an opportunity to take stock of the gambling market as a whole, following the enormous impact made by the arrival of the National Lottery at the end of 1994. That changed for ever the traditional Home Office approach, which was enshrined in the Betting and Gaming Act 1960; that is, that the role of government was to discourage the stimulation of demand for gambling. Gambling is now seen as a mainstream leisure activity, and that is reflected in the fact that the Department for Culture, Media and Sport has taken over responsibility for it from the Home Office.

The opening paragraph of the Budd report would seem to provide as good a basis as any for a new public policy on gambling. That policy is,

"to ensure that…Permitted forms of gambling are crime-free, conducted in accordance with regulation, and honest".

It is also to ensure that:

"Players know what to expect, are confident they will get it, and are not exploited",

and that:

"There is protection for children and vulnerable persons".

In following that approach, it would seem to be a fundamental principle that there are no artificial boundaries or distinctions drawn between the different forms of gambling, other than to make it adult only and to maintain sensible retail structures.

It is therefore all the more extraordinary that by far the largest gambling operator in the country—the National Lottery—should have been outside Budd's terms of reference. That was rather like asking a student to write an essay on the rise of fascism in the 1930s but to exclude any reference to the German Nazi Party. I suspect that the National Lottery was omitted to maintain the fiction, first propounded when the National Lottery legislation was going through Parliament in 1993 and 1994, that the National Lottery somehow did not involve gambling. However, Budd reports in paragraph 14.7, that,

"80 per cent of people surveyed thought that doing the national lottery was gambling".

Of course it is; it is a public monopoly, licensed by Parliament and run by private sector companies for the benefit of their shareholders. There is nothing wrong with that. It has generated huge sums of money for good causes, and it pays lots of tax. So, in my view, it is a pity that the opportunity was missed to include the National Lottery in the review of gambling. In particular, I should have like to know what Professor Budd and his colleagues would have had to say about the role of the National Lottery Commission, and about regulation generally.

This is the only regulator of a monopoly about which I am aware that has within its terms of reference the conflicting aims of both stimulating demand through the phrase,

"maximising the return to good causes",

and protecting the public from the dangers of excessive play. The Government could have the opportunity to correct the situation when they legislate on Budd by placing the regulatory duties of the National Lottery Commission under the proposed gambling commission. I hope that they will give very careful consideration to that proposal.

Given the extraordinary favourable treatment that the lottery has been accorded by successive governments since it started, and its exclusion from the gambling review, we might have expected Camelot to respond to Budd in a measured and conciliatory way. But, sadly, not so. In every area where there is a possibility of some additional competition, such as the introduction of side betting and the deregulation of bingo, it preaches gloom and despair.

Let us consider, in particular, what Camelot says about society and charity lotteries, and Budd's very sensible recommendation that,

"the limits on expenses and prizes as a percentage of proceeds should be removed, subject to an overriding requirement that no less than 20 per cent of proceeds must go to a good cause".

In its response, Camelot claims that these relaxations would reduce its payments to good causes by £1.28 billion over the seven-year licence period,

"threatening the very basis of the national lottery".

For the year up to 31st March 2001, the Gaming Board reported that sales of chances in society lotteries amounted to just £107.1 million from the 5,049 lotteries registered. In the same period, Camelot sales were £4.983 billion—that is almost 50 times as much.

Camelot has over 95 per cent of the scratchcard market, with unlimited stakes and prizes, unfettered access to television, radio, and the printed media, as well as a vast advertising budget, 35,000 agents, the Post Office as a tame retailer, and a deal with the BBC that pays Camelot money for programmes that advertise its product. Are its management and marketing staff really so poor that they cannot cope with a little competition from society lotteries, which, although a minnow by comparison, do so much good for the causes that they support?

Camelot points out that under Section 5 of the 1976 Act a minimum of 20 per cent of sales proceeds from society lotteries must be given to good causes, yet it ignores the figures in Section 6 of the Gaming Board annual report for last year which show that 47.11 per cent of sales were retained by the good causes—that is substantially more than the 28 to 32 per cent provided by the National Lottery. That is despite a limit on society lottery prizes of either £25,000 or 10 per cent of the value of chances sold. As the maximum size of a society lottery is set at £1 million, the maximum allowable prize is just £100,000.

One great difference between the two is that people who buy society lottery tickets know precisely what good cause they are supporting, whereas they have no say in how the National Lottery good cause money is distributed. A typical charity that benefits from a society lottery is the Roy Castle Lung Cancer Foundation, based in Liverpool, of which I am proud to be a patron. It works in partnership with the University of Liverpool. It grants over I million each year to carry out research into the early detection of lung cancer, and supports lung cancer nurses at various cancer centres around the country. Its chairman of trustees, Sir Philip Carter, has written to me in the following terms:

"We applaud what the National Lottery has done for the country but we protest strongly at Camelot's intention to resist the Budd recommendations on relaxation of charity lottery regulations … We have never received one penny of government funding for our research programme nor have we received any funds from the National Lottery. That is why it is so important you do not deny us the opportunity of bringing in legitimate funding through a society lottery".

In his letter, Sir Philip also points out that the foundation is likely to receive over three-quarters of a million pounds in 2002 from a lottery run on its behalf by Littlewoods Leisure. He goes on to say:

"Any increased support for the national lottery at the expense of charity lotteries will jeopardise this and have a devastating effect on organisations like the Roy Castle Lung Cancer Foundation".

When my noble friend the Minister replies to the debate, I hope that she will be able to give us some indication of the Government's intended legislative time-scale. On the assumption that it may be a little while before we see a substantial Bill, will the Government at least act on the society lotteries front, and use existing regulatory powers to double lottery sizes and prize limits?

In conclusion, I hope that my noble friend will also be able to say that the Government accept the broad thrust of Professor Budd's recommendations, and that they agree that his team has produced an excellent report that will provide a way forward for gambling in this country through a fair and competitive framework for all participants.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, is much to be congratulated on introducing this debate. But it is quite ridiculous to expect such an important subject to be covered in one hour. Before I begin. I probably should declare an interest as my wife is a director of the British Horseracing Board (BHB).

I have chosen to concentrate on one aspect of gambling, a fairly new one; namely, person-to-person betting. That it is a live subject is demonstrated by the fact that half the front page, page 2 and all of page 9 of yesterday's Racing Post is devoted to the subject. In P2P betting, as it is described, punters bet with each other, usually by means of the Internet. These bets are brokered by firms who take a commission, approximately 5 per cent, for their services. As BHB charges for the services that it provides on the basis of turnover, this makes nonsense when the turnover is the broker's fee—that is to say, 5 per cent. More importantly from the Government's point of view, there is a clear and major loss to the Revenue.

P2P is now big business with a steep growth curve. From a few thousand two years ago, it is now standing at ¤15.68 million a week for one firm, Betfair, alone. This makes it a major threat to on-course bookmaking. Some bookmakers are claiming that it is illegal on the grounds that it allows individuals to act as bookmakers. The Jockey Club's director of security, General Phipps, is calling for government action to regulate this form of betting. Illegal or not, there are clear dangers to the integrity of betting when it is so easy to lay a horse, or whatever, to lose.

The Budd report recommends that betting brokers should be licensed and regulated in the same way as bookmakers. This must be right, as must some way of ensuring that brokers and punters make a fair payment to whatever sport gives them a field in which to lay their bets. It is to be hoped that this policy will he adopted when the DCMS view on the report is published next month. It has to be said that the operators are co-operating, particularly where there may be suspicious betting markets. They are showing a clear understanding of the data protection issues and seem to wish to work with racing and other statutory authorities.

In general, not all of the report is rational; for example, it takes up an illogical stance on betting in pubs compared with drinking in casinos. But, generally, it is to be welcomed. I hope that other noble Lords will find time to cover the salient points in their skeletal three minutes.

My Lords, like my noble friend Lord Faulkner, I am shocked that the Government excluded the National Lottery from Alan Budd's otherwise excellent report. However, I am not surprised. As a government, it is not very often that you find a tax that is not only popular but one that also enables you to extract money from poor people's pockets and spend a large amount of it on rich people's hobbies. But they did exclude it and I regret that. However, in relation to one issue it has crept under the bar; that is, in the recommendations of Budd that betting should be allowed by bookmakers on National Lottery numbers. Here I declare an interest as a member of the board of the Tote.

It seems strange that it should be banned in the first place. One can bet on whether it will be a white Christmas, on the Booker Prize, on the name of the next Archbishop of Canterbury and on whether Prince Charles will ever be king. However, one cannot bet on lottery numbers. I could understand that if the amount of money that such betting would cost the lottery were very great. The question is: is it?

With the aid of Europe Economics and MORI, the bookmakers produced a substantial study—I have read it; it is a convincing piece of work—which states that such betting would not have much effect on the National Lottery. Indeed, it might even increase sales because, in case they did not get all six numbers but got three or five, some people would place money on the results in order to hedge their bets. However, the National Lottery has said that over the lifetime of the licence period it would cost it sums of £400 million and more. If that were so, it would of course be an important argument.

But the National Lottery—a publicly set-up body—has decided to keep its report secret. It claims to have reports from the Henley Centre and PricewaterhouseCoopers which bear it out, but it will not publish its research. I believe that that is an affront to public policy-making. We need to hear both sides of the case in order to make a judgment. I am shocked that the National Lottery—a body which relies on the integrity of figures—should deprive the debate of figures in this way. It is cheating and it should not he permitted.

However, I do see a way forward. I believe that bookmakers should be allowed to bet on numbers but, just as bookmakers are about to have to pay a licence fee to the British Horseracing Board for the use of horse-racing data, it seems to me that it would be sensible for bookmakers to pay a fee to the National Lottery in order to accept bets on its numbers. Instead of there being a conflict situation in which the bookmakers say "yes" and the lottery says "no", that would produce something which, in my experience, is rather rare in gambling—a situation in which everyone wins.