asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, information published by the European Commission and European Court of Auditors shows all member states except Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Finland to have been net contributors to the EC budget in calendar year 2000, the last year for which information is available. It is too early to determine the net budgetary positions of the new member states on accession to the European Union. Negotiations on the financial aspects of enlargement are in progress.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer. Is he aware that it is the view of senior figures in the Polish Government that, as things stand, Poland is likely to be a net contributor to the European Union budget on accession? They feel that that would be an absurd outcome, given that Poland would be one of the poorest countries in the European Union. Such a situation might give rise to strong opposition in Poland in any referendum on accession and could result in a negative outcome.

My Lords, I understand the difficulties to which my noble friend Lord Dubs refers. The financial negotiations are, of course, incomplete. We do not yet have the budgetary chapter, nor do we have the amounts for the structural and cohesion funds. All those matters must be resolved at the summit in Copenhagen in December. Generous financial proposals are being made for accession candidates. No doubt Poland will benefit from those.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that, although the accession negotiations are close to a conclusion, the two vital dossiers—budget and agriculture, which are two sides of the same coin—are still open? It is perfectly feasible to avoid demanding an unjust budget contribution from the acceding states, by the use of transitional or other arrangements. Does the Minister agree that it would be helpful to express figures not only in money but as a percentage of gross national product? Incidentally, that would show that the United Kingdom was the fourth or fifth largest contributor.

My Lords, I agree with the last point made by the noble Lord. He is right to say that the negotiations are close to a conclusion on some issues. However, as I said, there are still major financial issues to be resolved.

We are happy with many of the details of what is being negotiated with regard to the common agricultural policy; we are not happy with the fact that no savings are proposed.

My Lords, while we are talking about budget contributions, perhaps I may ask the Minister whether he is aware that, according to the latest figures, this country has been saved £29 billion because of the abatement negotiated by my noble friend Lady Thatcher in 1984.

I turn to the issue of the contribution to be made by new members. Does not the attempt to achieve enlargement without fundamental reform of the common agricultural policy present Poland—Polish agriculture, in particular—with an enormous problem? It makes things difficult, if not impossible, and could undermine the entire accession process.

My Lords, I acknowledge the value of the abatement negotiated by the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher. It was, of course, renewed by this Government. There is no doubt that there are huge difficulties in the accession countries with the common agricultural policy. That is why it has been proposed that payments should be at the rate of 25 per cent from 2004, rising to 100 per cent only in 2013.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that the CAP is at the heart of the question? The best and fairest way forward available at the moment is the surprisingly radical reform of the CAP just proposed by the European Commission. Will the Minister give broad endorsement to that proposal?

My Lords, I said that we were disappointed at the fact that no savings were proposed. I could have said—and am happy to say now—that we are happy with the decoupling of payments from production and with the environmental, animal welfare and food safety provisions of the reforms.

My Lords, notwithstanding the important points made by my noble friend Lord Dubs and the noble Lord, Lord Williamson of Horton, about mitigating the most serious costs to the accession countries, does my noble friend agree that we make a fundamental mistake in talking only about the cost of the European Union, when, in fact, it is a cost-benefit equation? We ought to put at least as much emphasis on the benefits of membership for the accession countries as on the costs.

My Lords, that certainly applies to us. Three million jobs in this country are linked to exports to the European Union, and the best calculation is that the benefit to our gross domestic product is £1.75 billion. Such considerations apply equally to the accession countries, although the extent to which they apply is yet to be determined.

My Lords, I shall not deny the Government their credit for having renewed the British abatement. However, does the Minister agree that, as the rule for voting on the abatement requires unanimity, there is no way that the Community could have secured it without our approval?

My Lords, that was part of the negotiation completed successfully in 1984 by the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher. I have never denied that. I do not do so today and I have not done so when the issue has arisen on previous occasions.

My Lords, will my noble friend see to it that steps are taken to ensure that the Commission does not try to take over the role of governments in this matter and thus may present all governments with a. fait accompli?

My Lords, I am not sure what my noble friend means when he says, "in this matter". The European Commission is not going to take over the role of governments. Neither this country nor any other member state would agree to that. It is not even being proposed.

My Lords, while it is true that there was an upside to the question of abatement, is it not also true that there was a downside? During the negotiations with the European Union, we found repeatedly that we were compromised by the very existence of the abatement and thus we lost out.

My Lords, the point about our renewal of the abatement was that we succeeded in doing so while restoring ourselves to a position at the heart of the European Union. That was the significant achievement of this Government.

My Lords, the noble Lord referred to Poland as one of the applicant countries likely to make a net contribution. Are any other countries from the nine applicants also likely to make a net contribution? Furthermore, will the countries that are currently net recipients lose out, thus meaning that those which are net contributors will have to pay more?

My Lords, I did not say that Poland would be a net contributor. In response to my noble friend Lord Dubs I said we were still in financial negotiations and thus we do not yet know. We have made generous financial proposals to the candidate states, but we must acknowledge the difficulty that those countries will find that it takes time to put forward realistic proposals for the use of the funds which will become available to them, in particular the structural and cohesion funds. Those proposals may take time to develop. Thus there may be accession countries that are in deficit at the beginning, but which will recover their position as time goes on. That applies not only to Poland but to all the other accession countries.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, yes, we will consider a national policy as part of our longer-term strategy for improving the skills of prisoners. We want to see more prisoners involved in learning and benefiting from it. Our approach will be informed by existing good practice and by the outcomes of the current review of funding and procurement arrangements for prison education and training.

My Lords, I am grateful for that response. Does the Minister share my view that two weighty documents published this very month, the report on reoffending from the Social Exclusion Unit and the White Paper, Justice for All—in particular Chapter 6—should be required reading for everyone concerned with rehabilitation? Do not those documents provide compelling evidence that more offenders would take up education and training if they were not, in effect, lured into unskilled prison work by the better pay; that those on short sentences are often explicitly discouraged from training courses because it is said that it is not worth the bother; and that financial incentives should be provided after completion of sentence so that former offenders can continue with the courses they began while incarcerated?

My Lords, first, I agree with the proposition that the two reports should be required reading for anyone involved in the work of rehabilitation. Secondly, I agree with what was implied by the noble Lord in the second part of his question. We need to look again at how best to take steps with people in prison in order to reduce the risk of reoffending. Those steps should focus in particular on activities that will help them to secure gainful employment when they leave prison. Thirdly, I agree with the noble Lord in his point that simply leaving people without assistance after prison will often increase the chance of reoffending and reduce the chance of preventing it.

My Lords, I refer the Minister to the two reports cited by the noble Lord, Lord Quirk. Does he accept that employment can reduce the rate of reoffending by between one-third and one-half? At present, approximately three in five offenders are reconvicted within two years of leaving prison. The process of dealing with reoffending by former prisoners costs this country over £11 billion a year. Given that, does he consider that prison sentences are not succeeding in turning the majority of offenders away from crime? Would not community penalties backed by education and employment projects be a better alternative for such offenders?

My Lords, the best alternative would depend on the facts of a particular case. It is for sentencers to decide on the appropriate sentence in each individual case. However, I agree entirely with the estimated rate of reconviction referred to by the noble Lord. I agree that the cost to this country of reoffending is huge. Lastly, I agree with the proposition that we need to take a long, hard look at how we seek to reduce the rate of reoffending. That would not mean no custodial sentences, but we must look at how we help people not to reoffend after they have served their prison sentences. Instead, they should be encouraged into gainful employment.

My Lords, will the Minister consider using prisoners as peer group tutors for the teaching of reading, as recommended in the report of the Social Exclusion Unit? That has been tried in at least six prisons and appears to work well.

My Lords, the right reverend Prelate is right to refer to what has been said by the Social Exclusion Unit about that issue. We need to look at that proposal and a whole range of other proposals in regard to rehabilitating prisoners and making it less likely that they will reoffend.

My Lords, can the noble and learned Lord tell the House how many writers-in-residence are in prison?

My Lords, I have never had an answer to any question asked by the noble Baroness. I do not know how many writers-in-residence are in prison. Perhaps I may write from my residence to the noble Baroness to indicate how many there are.

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the target for education provision for children under school-leaving age who are in prison is 15 hours a week? Can he tell the House in how many cases that target is reached? What are the arrangements for young people who are held in police cells because of prison overcrowding to ensure that their education is continued?

My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that education is compulsory for offenders of compulsory school age. Fifteen hours is the target. I cannot help the noble Baroness in relation to the position of young people held in police cells. Perhaps I may write to her on that issue.

My Lords, does the Minister recognise that the most wonderful education provision in prisons is no good unless prisoners can get to it? Will he undertake that there will be a concentrated effort to ensure that prison officers are available to escort prisoners to education when they are, unfortunately, in prison rather than following the kind of course recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia?

My Lords, I fully accept that access is vital. As I indicated in answer to the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Quirk, the whole issue of education in prison, including funding, is being looked at. That will obviously cover physical access to educational facilities.

My Lords, in addition to incentives to attend and complete basic education and skills training courses—incentives which I hope will include the possibility of a reduction in the sentence served—does the Minister agree that where such courses genuinely cannot be provided within the prison itself, more use could be made of temporary release orders for suitably assessed prisoners to attend locally provided further education courses?

My Lords, I do not want to comment on that particular proposal but I have made it absolutely clear that we wish to improve the quality of education provided, access to education and the range of educational opportunities available. We also want to improve incentives for people in prison to take educational courses. The noble Baroness's specific proposal obviously will be considered in relation to all of those issues.

My Lords, a very high number of people within the prison population have special educational problems and other social communication problems, which is usually one of the reasons why they failed in education prior to finding themselves in prison. Do the Government undertake a comprehensive series of assessments of such people when they turn up? If the figures are right and one in two of the prison population in young offender units have these problems, then, no matter how much money is pumped in, it may well be wasted.

My Lords, I agree with what underlies the question: there is a very wide range of educational needs in prison, many of them at the most basic level. That is why we are widening the targets for basic skills qualifications. That will enable establishments to be much more responsive. As I understand it, the point being made is that the most basic skills are required. We need to provide education for those basic skills. We are looking at how to widen the system to achieve that.

My Lords, I declare an interest in that I spent six years on the Parole Board. I congratulate the Government and their predecessors on the educational programme they give to life prisoners. The educational programme for the remainder of prisoners is lamentable. Can the Minister assure the House that his department will consider giving the remainder of the prison service the kind of attention that life prisoners receive in their educational programme? For example, it is ridiculous that people follow school terms while they are in prison.

My Lords, I cannot give the assurance that the noble Lord seeks. All I can say is that we are looking at how we can improve educational provision for prisoners.

My Lords, will the Minister note that, unlike education, vocational training is not ring-fenced in prisons and that prison governors can, if they so choose, divert the money to other purposes? Will he further note that the provision for construction industry training has been reduced by 50 per cent over the past seven years, in spite of it leading to jobs and there being an acute shortage of skills? Will the Minister look into that?

My Lords, as I have indicated, the whole question of the funding of prison education will be looked at.

My Lords, does the noble and learned Lord agree that credit should be given where credit is due? There are some excellent training courses in some prisons. I have been corresponding for four years with a young man who was given a life sentence and is due to be released shortly. He is concerned about what will happen to him when he comes out of prison. He has benefited wonderfully from what he has been taught in prison, but he is worried about what will happen when he comes out.

My Lords, I agree with the noble Countess that there are a number of extremely good courses in prison. The problem is—it concerns the Government just as much as it concerns many Members of the House—that they are not sufficiently widespread. There is not enough choice and not enough opportunity for people to get to them.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

My Lords, since the imposition of the EU asset freeze on 18th February we have frozen personal assets to the value of £76,000. This is a small sum, but it is not surprising given the advance media publicity before sanctions were imposed. The key point is that Europe's financial markets are now off limits to those on the banned list.

My Lords, I am grateful for that reply. However, the Minister will be aware that additional names have today and over the past 24 hours been added to the original list by the EU. Do not these extra names and the extra measures announced reveal all too painfully that the earlier freezing of assets has entirely failed to deter Mr Mugabe and that much more pressure is now needed? Does the Minister agree that the earlier measures which have led to the freezing of £76,000—a tiny amount given the total assets involved—were clearly too little, too late? They were announced far too long in advance and assets were moved beyond reach by Zidco, ZANU-PF's trading company. Advice was received also from other advisers. As Mr Mugabe has not in the least been deterred, and as the situation in Zimbabwe continues to deteriorate, has not the moment clearly come for the international community to consider more direct action?

My Lords, I do not agree with the noble Lord. I should perhaps clarify that the General Affairs Council is meeting now and will make a decision this afternoon on whether or not to extend the travel ban list. That decision has not yet been taken.

I do not agree with the noble Lord. It is clear that sanctions have worked. There is a general isolation of the ZANU-PF regime and we have built an international consensus that includes the Commonwealth, the European Union, the United States and others. That will continue to be our strategy. We need to work very closely with our African colleagues on this matter. We shall continue to do so and to keep up the international pressure on the Mugabe regime. But, as I have said in the House a number of times, it is obvious that we are dealing with a regime that cares nothing for its own people given the humanitarian, political and economic crisis that we are seeing.

My Lords, will the Minister consider encouraging the Government and our partners in the EU and the Commonwealth to make greater use of independent investigators to investigate the funds which are held, often in nominee names, in banks and other financial institutions, not only in the developed world but in off-shore banking? This is not easy to do—it is not easy for governments to do—but the use of independent investigators has much helped Nigeria to trace illicitly-taken funds. I believe that this would benefit the ordinary people of Zimbabwe, who urgently need this help.

My Lords, I totally agree that the ordinary people of Zimbabwe need this help. They are facing a humanitarian crisis: up to half the population will require food aid by the end of the year. The situation means that farm workers will be thrown off farms, and will be out of a job. As regards independent investigators, I assure the noble Baroness that we are taking all the steps that we can.

My Lords, will the Minister confirm that the NePAD agreement contains provisions—as does the new treaty on African union—for human rights observation and good governance by the member countries. It also contains provision for peer pressure to be brought to bear by member countries on defaulters. Is not this the best potential source of pressure on Mr Mugabe? Are the African member countries of those two organisations exerting such pressure?

Yes, my Lords, the AU and the NePAD communiqués contain important elements relating to human rights, good governance and peer review. NePAD is an African-led initiative. It is an inclusive initiative, not an exclusive one. African leaders have made it clear that, through the peer review process, they want to encourage those countries that are poor performers to improve their governance considerably. Yes, it is up to African leaders to put pressure on other African leaders in relation to these elements.

My Lords, will the Minister confirm that, as she indicated in a letter to me, the Zimbabwe authorities were allowed to import armoured cars from Germany for the exclusive use of Mr Mugabe and leading members of his regime? How did it happen that the assets that were used to pay for those expensive cars—at a cost of 250,000 dollars—were not confiscated by the Germans?

My Lords, I have no idea where the assets came from to pay for the vehicles. I gave the noble Lord as open an answer as I could. I shall check again, but I do not think that I have any further information that can help him.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that we welcome the indications that the General Affairs Council will agree tougher sanctions this afternoon—although as she rightly says, it has not reached a decision yet? it is belated, but it is better than nothing. Will the sanctions now cover not merely the funds of individuals but also the funds of ZANU-PF and its various subsidiaries held in British and other banks? Has the Minister anything to tell the House about the reports that very substantial land allocations have now been made of seized land to the Libyan authorities and to Colonel Gaddafi?

My Lords, as I said, the General Affairs Council is meeting as we speak, so I am unable to give the noble Lord any further information with regard to any possible extension of the travel ban and the assets freeze. As to the question of land allocation to the Libyan authorities, I have no further information. If information becomes available, I shall happily write to the noble Lord.

My Lords, on more than one occasion, I have heard the noble Baroness explain that, in spite of the travel ban, President Mugabe and some of his henchmen have been able to travel in order to attend international meetings of certain kinds. Should not that right be withdrawn and extended only to alternates attending on their behalf so that the effect of the ban becomes more widely real?

My Lords, this is an international agreement. The EU common position on the travel ban states:

"Member states may grant exemptions from these measures where travel is justified on the grounds of attending meetings of international bodies".

This position is not new. It applies in other cases where, for example, heads of state face travel bans in respect of individual countries. It means that countries which host international organisations such as the UN are obliged to grant visas to enable individuals to attend such meetings. We do not like it, but that is the position.

My Lords, I should be grateful if the noble Baroness would answer my question about ZANU-PF funds.

My Lords, would the noble Lord like to repeat his question?

My Lords, I asked whether the controls on assets held by individuals in Zimbabwe apply also to the funds of ZANU-PF, which are held in British and other overseas banks.

My Lords, the current travel ban and assets freeze apply to the 19 named individuals. As I said, I cannot comment on a decision which is currently being taken by the General Affairs Council.

My Lords, will the Minister agree to return to this House at a later stage with more details about the activities of Zidco, the trading arm of ZANU-PF—currently registered, I believe, in Liberia—and with details of advice that has been given in the past to Zidco by companies which have been managed out of Guernsey?

My Lords, as the House knows, if I am asked a specific question, I am always prepared to answer it.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, immediately following this business statement, my noble friend Lord Bach will make a Statement on the Mull of Kintyre Chinook accident. Following that, my noble friend Lord Whitty will, again with the leave of the House, repeat a Statement that is being made in another place on the foot and mouth disease inquiries.

My Lords, with permission, I should like make a Statement on the crash of Chinook ZD576 on the Mull of Kintyre.

During a routine flight from Aldergrove to Inverness on 2nd June 1994, all on board—the 25 passengers and four crew—were killed.

What we must remember above all is that this was a tragedy. Twenty-nine families lost loved ones that day. The whole House will once again want to extend sympathy to them. This was also a blow felt throughout the Royal Air Force and in the many other areas of the Armed Forces and the public service from which the passengers on board were drawn.

This has been the most extensively examined air crash in the history of British military aviation—not only by aviation and engineering experts but also by at least 10 Ministers from across two governments: from the right honourable Sir Malcolm Rifkind to, most recently, my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence. Ten Ministers have considered the case. Each new Minister has had the advantage of coming to this with an open mind. Every new Minister who has examined the facts of the case has come to the same conclusion.

The senior reviewing officers of the original RAF board of inquiry found the pilots grossly negligent. They concluded that the pilots had flown the aircraft at a consistently high speed at low level, and into poor weather that they had been warned to expect. These facts led the board of inquiry to believe that the only possible conclusion was that this accident was a result of a controlled flight into terrain.

Many have challenged this conclusion. As a result, in April last year, your Lordships set up a Select Committee under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Jauncey, to consider the justification for the findings by the senior reviewing officers. The Select Committee concluded that the reviewing officers were not justified in their findings that negligence on the part of the pilots "caused the crash".

The Government have now considered the Select Committee's report very carefully indeed. We have thoroughly examined the alternative explanations for the crash that were considered by the committee. We have painstakingly reviewed the complex technical, legal and airmanship issues which the report raises. We have sought further clarification from Boeing on the points made about its original work conducted as part of the RAF board of inquiry in 1994.

In order to leave no question unanswered, we have also asked Boeing to undertake further work to review its original analysis, including a full FADEC simulation. Those familiar with this case will know that the FADEC system, by controlling the fuel supply, maintains approximately 100 per cent rotor speed in all conditions and matches engine torque between the two engines on the aircraft. It has been argued that the failure of this system was a cause of the accident.

Our deliberations are now complete, and I am arranging to place copies of our response, together with copies of the further work by Boeing, in the Library of this House as well as in the Library of the other place. A number of theories have been put forward to explain the cause of this accident. Each depends on a particular interpretation of the evidence. That is why at the outset I want to try to set out those facts as best I can that are not in dispute.

We know that, as before every routine flight, the pilots received meteorological information, in this case warning them of poor weather conditions in the vicinity of the Mull. They took this into account in planning their route, from Aldergrove to the Mull lighthouse, then on to Corran near Fort William, then up the Great Glen to Fort George, near Inverness.

We know that the first "way-point" entered on the aircraft's navigation computer was very close to the lighthouse on the western tip of the Mull. This way-point was the position where they needed to change or adjust their course to head towards Corran. Taking into account the weather conditions, they planned to fly their route at low-level under "visual flight rules", which means that they needed to maintain at least 1,000 metres of visibility. If during the flight they were unable to do so, then under the rules they would be required either to turn away from the poor conditions or to climb to a safe altitude of 1,000 feet above the height of any known obstacles. They would then have flown under "instrument flight rules"—which would require them to fly with sole reference to their cockpit instruments.

We know that the aircraft took off from RAF Aldergrove at 17.42 hours. We know—from an exchange between the crew and air traffic control—that, at just after 17.46 hours, the aircraft was seven nautical miles from the Aldergrove radio beacon. A number of witnesses reported the aircraft flying low as it headed for the coast. These sightings are consistent with a high-speed, low-level transit towards the Mull along the planned track.

We know—from the data in the SuperTANS navigation system on board every Chinook—that the aircraft was 0.81 nautical miles from the lighthouse when the pilots took the steps necessary to enter the second way—point89 miles away, at Corran—into the computer. Given their training and experience, the pilots would not have performed this task if they had been experiencing any significant difficulty in handling the aircraft. The Select Committee accepted that it was highly unlikely that the pilots would have entered the way-point change if they had thought they were not in control of their aircraft.

We know—from all the eye witnesses on the Mull—that the weather there was generally foggy and very bad. The lighthouse keeper estimated visibility to be 15 to 20 metres at most.

We know—from the power down recording in the Super TANS system—that the time of initial impact was 17.59 and 36 seconds; giving a total journey time of just under 18 minutes. From these facts we can calculate that the ground speed of the aircraft, from the air traffic control fix to impact, averaged 158 knots. This shows that the pilots had selected a high cruising speed for their crossing to the Mull.

We know that the ground speed at impact was at least 147 knots, from the evidence on the aircraft's instruments at the crash site, and corroborated by data extracted from the GPS system and the navigation computer.

We know that the aircraft hit the ground at a height of 810 feet above sea level. All the evidence clearly points to the aircraft having flared—or "pulled up" in layman's terms; with its nose upward at an angle of 30 degrees—in the final few seconds of flight. This is shown not only by the physical evidence at the crash site, in particular the alignment of the fuselage; it is also shown by the fact that the collective control, which controls power, was set at or near full travel at impact, with the cyclic control, which controls pitch and elevation, at 25 per cent aft and 23 per cent left of neutral, all indicating a demand for high power and nose-up attitude in a last desperate attempt to pull away. This evidence at the crash site also indicates that the aircraft was almost certainly responding properly to its controls, at least in the final seconds before impact.

These then are the facts which have not been seriously challenged by anyone. What remains at issue is what happened in the last 20 or so seconds of the flight from the point at which the pilots entered the way-point change into the navigation computer until moments before impact when they pulled hard up in a clear attempt to avoid hitting the ground. Various theories have been put forward and we have considered each in turn. They are examined in detail in our fuller response which has been placed in both Libraries.

One hypothesis suggests that, because of the low cloud, the pilots had slowed down for the way-point change, intending to turn left to hug the coast towards the way-point at Corran while remaining at low level. The Select Committee has accepted that the aircraft was performing satisfactorily up to and including the way-point change. The Committee suggests that, having performed the required deceleration successfully, some catastrophic failure occurred in the last 20 or more seconds of flight. This failure caused the aircraft to accelerate out of control so that it flew at high speed into the Mull, with the pilots unable to control the aircraft, at least until the final few seconds.

Was it the crew's intention to slow down significantly for the way-point change? Boeing's analysis shows that, given a normal rate of acceleration, it would not have been possible to achieve the speed conditions for the final flare if the ground speed was below 80 knots at the way-point change. If the aircraft had slowed to around 80 knots at that point, then an even higher average cruising ground speed from the air traffic control fix to the way-point change would have been necessary. And, crucially, the aircraft would have begun to decelerate about one mile prior to the way-point change, and in the process to reduce power considerably, adopting a nose-up attitude for a considerable period. Such a manoeuvre is not consistent with the evidence.

In addition, the further analysis from Boeing shows that, given a normal rate of acceleration, it would not have been possible to accelerate from below 80 knots and achieve the speed conditions necessary to be consistent with the final flare just before impact.

Even if the aircraft had performed the manoeuvres necessary to slow to 80 knots at the way-point change, what plausible explanations could account for the pilots not being able to execute the turn and cause the aircraft to accelerate to the known speed at impact? What sort of incident could have cleared in time to allow the pilots to perform the final flare in the seconds just before impact?

It has been suggested that a control jam of some sort could have occurred. For that to have happened, the aircraft would first have had to have been rotated nose down to an accelerating attitude, the power set to full, and the controls "frozen" to such an extent that neither a heading change, nor a climb, nor a speed change was possible. Moreover, this condition would have had to have remained fixed throughout the significant period required to achieve the acceleration. To achieve these conditions either simultaneous multiple failures would have had to have occurred to the pitch of the aircraft and have frozen the controls, or the pilots would have had voluntarily to conduct at least some of the extraordinary control combinations needed.

The Select Committee also explored the possibility that the "thrust balance spring attachment bracket" and other inserts detached before impact, as some of these flying control components were found to be detached at the crash site. But because the controls are hydraulically powered such a fault would result in a change to the "feel" of the controls and would have been detected by the pilots. Moreover, the aircraft would still be controllable. It is not credible that this could have caused the accident. In any event, the report from the Air Accidents Investigation Branch indicated that the brackets were likely to have become detached during the post-accident break up of the aircraft.

Despite suggestions from other commentators, the Select Committee accepted that the FADEC system and the trials of the Chinook Mark 2 that had been suspended at Boscombe Down had no bearing on this accident. In fact all the available evidence indicates that the engines were working normally up to the point of impact. The committee was also satisfied that the E5 software fault, which has also been the subject of much media speculation, had no relevance to this accident.

We have examined in detail all the alternative hypotheses put to the committee by witnesses. The question is, when taken in the context of the whole flight, are they—or any one of them—plausible against what was a strict standard of proof needed at that time before a finding of negligence could be made against deceased aircrew?

As the committee observes, the standard of proof of "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" involves an even higher standard of proof than that applicable in criminal cases. I am, of course, aware that four of the five members of the Select Committee are distinguished lawyers.

It follows from this strict standard of proof that if there is another plausible explanation for what took place other than the one accepted by the board of inquiry, its conclusion cannot be allowed to stand.

The reviewing officers in this case were required to be in no doubt whatsoever that the pilots' negligence was a cause (although not necessarily the sole cause) of the accident.

No investigation into a serious accident can ever hope to answer every question with absolute certainty. Negligence can itself be the cause of an accident or it can be one of a number of factors. The reviewing officers were charged with considering all of the evidence as a whole; they were entitled to call on their own knowledge and experience of military flying, and take proper recognition of the very high standard of airmanship that is required of RAF pilots.

It follows that if the senior reviewing officers were left with no "honest" doubt that the pilots were negligent, and that negligence was a causative factor in what happened, they would have failed in their duty if they had not found the pilots negligent. It would have been wrong of the reviewing officers to avoid such a finding on the basis of a hypothesis for which there was no plausible evidence.

The senior reviewing officers' finding of negligence was not dependent upon whether the pilots could see the Mull at the time of the way-point change. We can deduce that at some point the aircraft entered cloud—which the crew had been warned to expect—well below safety altitude. The issue is whether at the time they did so the aircraft was fully under the control of the pilots. There is no other plausible explanation for the accident. The only realistic explanation therefore is that found by the reviewing officers of the board of inquiry.

As they approached land, the pilots would have been aware that their visibility was about to reduce significantly. Had they been flying with the minimum visibility allowed for Visual Flight Rules, by the way-point change they would have seen the landmass of the Mull and should have recognised their perilous position. They should have taken prompt action by flying higher or turning away. The finding of negligence is therefore based on the fact that they failed to take such avoiding action.

This is a very sensitive and emotive case. I recognise that some people would like us to have reached a different conclusion from that of the reviewing officers. Some former Ministers have since changed their minds about their original interpretation of the facts.

However, we require senior military officers to make decisions on the facts at the time, applying their judgment as professional airmen against the high standard of airmanship to which the Royal Air Force adheres.

We have therefore reviewed the material put forward by the committee with the very greatest care. We have probed the alternative hypotheses rigorously to see if there is any other plausible explanation that fits with the facts. And we have agonised over whether there was some way that we could exonerate the pilots posthumously. But on the basis of all the evidence, I am unable to do so.

Apportioning blame for such a terrible accident to men who lost their lives in it was not an easy task for those responsible. Reviewing the circumstances of the case has been one of the hardest duties I have been asked to perform as a Minister.

None the less, where lives have been lost, we must be willing to examine the facts as carefully and dispassionately as possible, for the sake of all those involved. This we have done.

I know that this response to the Select Committee's report will be unwelcome to some. And, as I have consistently said before, should new evidence come to light the Secretary of State would be prepared to look at it again. Indeed, it was precisely the possibility of new evidence that led the Government to commission the further work from Boeing.

I hope that this Statement, and the supporting detailed analysis which is being published today, will assist the House in understanding the reasons why we have not been able to support the conclusions of the latest report into this tragic accident.

My Lords, we on these Benches are grateful to the Minister for repeating the long and detailed Statement on the tragic crash of the Chinook Helicopter ZD 576, but we very much regret and are disappointed that Her Majesty's Government are unable to provide time for a detailed debate by your Lordships before the Summer Recess. Once again, we on these Benches extend our deepest sympathy to all the families who suffered such tragic loss of life.

I have no intention of covering the facts and detail of the case in this debate. As your Lordships have heard, there are many technical facts in the Statement which need to be analysed carefully. I believe that the right and proper place to do so is when we eventually discuss Her Majesty's Government's response in full debate. However, it may be timely to remind your Lordships that the House of Lords Select Committee which was set up was tasked to consider the justification of those reviewing the conclusions. I repeat that it was tasked to consider the justification of those reviewing the conclusions of the Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry that both pilots of the Chinook helicopter were negligent. The Select Committee was satisfied that on the evidence brought before it and against the standard of "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" as required by the Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry rules, the air marshals were not justified in finding that negligence on the part of the pilots caused the crash.

How does the Ministry of Defence justify disagreeing with three other investigations into this matter? The Air Accidents Investigation Branch did not conclude that the pilots had been negligent. The fatal accident inquiry concluded that it had not been established to its satisfaction, and on the balance of probabilities, that the cause of the accident was the decision by the crew. The House of Commons Public Accounts Committee found that the verdict of the Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry was unsustainable and should be set aside.

I should like to ask the Minister a few questions. When will a full debate be held to discuss Her Majesty's Government's response to your Lordships' Select Committee report? Will the Minister confirm that the evidence relied upon by the committee in coming to its conclusion was not limited to the evidence that was freshly before it and was not available to the air marshals but that there was other evidence, which it identifies, which led it to the conclusion that it reached? Why does the Ministry of Defence now accept that "no honest doubt" is a sufficient reason to support a finding of gross negligence when the Royal Air Force Board of Inquiry rules require that there should be "no doubt whatsoever" to support a finding of gross negligence? I should be grateful if the Minister will answer those questions in his reply.

My Lords, from these Benches, we thank the Minister for making this Statement in this House in advance of his noble friend in another place. It was, of course, a response to a Select Committee of this House.

There will no doubt be considerable disappointment among those noble Lords who served on the Select Committee that the Government have been unable to accept the fully argued conclusions in their report earlier this year. We on these Benches wish to join the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, in expressing our considerable sympathy with all the families of those who lost their lives so tragically on this occasion. We can well understand the serious feelings which the fathers of the pilots still hold. That is why this matter is one of continuing concern on these Benches as elsewhere.

It is a detailed analysis and I understand that further material is to be made available to us in the Library. We are grateful to the Minister and the Secretary of State for having spent so much time and care in reviewing the material and attempting to provide the House with a detailed analysis of each of the alternative hypotheses. As the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, said, it is too early to analyse that response in detail today. In the Statement, the Minister drew attention to the committee's observation that the standard of proof was "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". A little later he says that no investigation into a serious accident can ever hope to answer every question with absolute certainty. That seems to suggest that the task facing such a board is almost impossible and that in the future the whole procedure will need to be re-examined.

We believe that noble Lords will wish to return to this subject after they have had a chance to study in detail the reply and remarks made today. I am pleased to see the Captain of the Gentlemen-at-Arms on the Bench opposite. I hope that he and the usual channels will be able to arrange a full debate in this House as soon as possible after we return in October. We can then express in detail the views of the House not only on the important report of your Lordships' Select Committee but also the reply today from the Minister.

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, and the noble Lord, Lord Roper, for their measured remarks today. I am grateful for what they said. Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, that we are not repeating a Statement made in another place. Another place will follow us on this occasion—the noble Lord, Lord Roper, mentioned the reason—because a Select Committee of this House has reported. It is only right that a reply is made in this House, whether before or contemporaneously with a Statement in another place.

I understand that the usual channels will decide the date of a debate. That there will be a debate in the autumn has already been stated in this House in clear terms, and I confirm that today from the Dispatch Box. Perhaps I may point out that it is fairly unusual for a Statement to be made at the same time as a response from the Government to a Select Committee's report. The reason that we chose to do so is that we consider it a matter rightly of great import to this House, and a matter with which the House has been engaged for some time. Whatever noble Lords feel about the merits or demerits of what I have said, I hope that the House will accept that we are attempting to show the House some respect in making the Statement. Likewise, the Secretary of State is doing the same today in another place.

The noble Lord, Lord Vivian, raised the point about "no honest doubt". We have taken advice from outside government, as one would expect a government department to do in these instances. I make this point also in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Roper. The phrase "no doubt whatsoever" was a very high standard of proof. But it is, or was meant to be, achievable. We are satisfied that this standard was reached in this case as, after detailed examination, every other hypothesis was implausible and the only conclusion that the reviewing officers could reach, therefore, was a controlled flight into terrain.

As regards the details of the response and the extra evidence being made available, I agree with both noble Lords—it is, of course, a matter for noble Lords—that it is best to leave that until our important debate which will take place on another occasion.

My Lords, I welcome the thrust of the Government's Statement in response to the Select Committee report. The Government have not been persuaded to do a U-turn on the consistent support which has been given for the board of inquiry findings by Ministers of both political parties in both Houses at the Dispatch Box.

Noble Lords may agree that there will be much important detail in the Government's response to the Select Committee and I believe that it will be inappropriate to make snap responses or judgments until the Government's views have been studied. I welcome the opportunity for a debate in October when there will have been time for such study and reflection.

The Minister mentioned the importance of the airmanship aspect of this tragedy. Can he say why he feels that this is such a critical factor in the professional judgment of the board of inquiry and its findings? Does he agree that the attacks in the media and elsewhere outside Parliament on the integrity and professional judgment of the two air marshals are now without foundation and should not be continued?

My Lords, I am grateful for the noble and gallant Lord's remarks. I agree with him that the details announced can best be discussed during the debate.

The necessary level of airmanship was important to the rules as they then were. I cite the guide to the consideration of human failings which was attached to the regulations. It states that the duty to take care varies according to the operation being performed and the duty to take a very high degree of care is rightly imposed upon a pilot flying an aircraft or responsible for its maintenance or control. In such circumstances what might be trivial in other fields may, when associated with aircraft operations, amount to negligence. That amounts to severe criticism, but it was the standard that was set.

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Vivian, said, it is a matter of great regret that this Statement has been made and the response received, leaving no time for a full debate in your Lordships' House. The Minister has promised a debate in the autumn when we shall go into further details of this whole affair.

The Statement is no surprise as it seems to underline the prevalent doctrine of infallibility in the Ministry of Defence. But the conclusion is astonishing. The ministry states that it has studied the report of the House of Lords Select Committee and cannot accept its opinion. That seems to indicate that the Secretary of State for Defence prefers the opinion of two air marshals which, despite what has been said, differed from the original board of inquiry. The Secretary of State prefers to accept their opinion on a verdict of manslaughter. I am not surprised that the noble Lord appears to wince at the word "manslaughter". If someone is found guilty of gross negligence, which leads to the death of 27 people, including himself, manslaughter is a fairly mild word to use. But that is what those young, dead pilots have been found guilty of.

It is odd that that opinion should be preferred over the judgment of a House of Lords Select Committee consisting mainly of legally qualified Peers, presided over by a distinguished former Lord of Appeal, which had all the evidence before it that the air marshals had. The Minister has said nothing new in his Statement today. All that evidence was before the House of Lords Select Committee too. The Ministry of Defence constantly asks for new evidence before it reconsiders its opinion. But, I repeat, the Ministry of Defence has said nothing new since the House of Lords Select Committee reached its conclusion.

This judgment flies in the face of the fatal accident inquiry, which was also held before a distinguished judge in Scotland, the conclusion of the Public Accounts Committee in the other place and the views of the flight operations group of the Royal Aeronautical Society. It also flies in the face of the facts of the matter. To a large extent, many of the statements made to the air marshals were found by the Select Committee to be assumptions, not facts.

What is behind this conclusion? Why is the Ministry of Defence not prepared to accept the view of legally and aeronautically qualified people outside the Ministry of Defence? It prefers instead to rely on the judgment of two senior air force officers who, in their review of the board of inquiry, ignored findings which showed no evidence of human failing on the part of anyone involved in the matter. We shall now have to wait until the autumn to ask and receive answers to many questions that will go much further than the cause of the accident. Many such questions need to be asked about why this conclusion has been reached.

I shall not pose any of those questions now, and I do not expect answers today. There is, however, one question that I should like to put to the Minister. I hope that the House can be given an answer today; it deserves one. Are the Secretary of State and the noble Lord the Minister satisfied beyond any possible doubt whatever that there was gross negligence in this case? I ask not for air staff briefings or official advice, but for the views of the Ministers concerned. Ministers are responsible to Parliament, although that sometimes seems to be forgotten. Are they clear in their minds that there is no possible doubt whatever about the gross negligence of those two young men? We await the debate in the autumn with interest.

If we cannot be assured that the Ministers concerned are themselves satisfied beyond all possible doubt about the finding of gross negligence, I shall be suggesting to your Lordships' House and a wider public that perhaps it would be correct to ignore the response of the Ministry of Defence and that the findings of the House of Lords Select Committee should be regarded as exoneration of the two pilots. In effect, that would be a refusal to accept the view of the Ministry of Defence and the verdict of the two air marshals.

My Lords, before my noble friend replies, perhaps I should remind your Lordships that we have only 20 minutes in total to discuss these matters.

My Lords, I shall come straight to the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. Of course we have received advice and are persuaded on these matters. Therefore, the answer to his question is yes. I mentioned specifically in my Statement that that applies to all Ministers who have come to the Ministry of Defence since those tragic events took place. I can give the answer readily today. It is yes.

The response took so long to be published because the Select Committee's report deserved careful study. It rightly took a number of months to be prepared. It was a very detailed report. We felt that the number of opinions that it expressed required further work, especially with regard to the original flight modelling conducted by Boeing, of which there was some criticism in the body of the report. Inevitably such work takes time, but it was important that the best possible advice was obtained to inform our response to the House. Of course it would have been preferable to publish it sooner and debate the issues before the Summer Recess, but we published it as soon as we could and are—unusually—making Statements about it in both Houses.

My Lords, I join the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, in welcoming the detailed Statement made by the Minister. It is an issue of enormous pain for the families of the pilots and all the families of the victims of the crash. I really do not know why the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, is making remarks from a sedentary position.

I remember the shock on hearing of the crash when I was abroad and not being able to find out from the initial media reports how many friends I might have had on board the Chinook. I have followed in great detail what has transpired since then in relation to the crash. For all of the bereaved, the wounds have been opened again and again.

I have a couple of questions for my noble friend—that is all that one can do when responding to a Statement. Does my noble friend agree that the absolutely indisputable facts are that the Chinook was in a wrong and dangerous position, which in the event resulted in the crash; that the MoD has looked at all possible explanations why the Chinook was in the position; and that, all other possibilities having been eliminated, responsibility has to lie with the pilots?

I understand very well the desire for a debate in this House; of course there will be one. I put it to noble Lords that perhaps the time is approaching when a line should be drawn and the wounds of bereavement allowed to start to heal.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her comments and I shall try to answer her questions. Yes, it is right that the finding of the air marshals is based on the fact that the Chinook, which was obviously still under pilot control, found itself in a highly dangerous position. In a nutshell, that is precisely the case.

My Lords—

My Lords—

My Lords, as a member of the Select Committee—

My Lords, we should hear first from the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, and then from the noble Lord, Lord Hooson.

My Lords, what was the hypothesis that persuaded the Minister that two highly experienced pilots, judged suitable to fly this most important group of people, should suddenly take leave of their senses and commit an error of airmanship so basic that if a student pilot were to attempt to do it, his instructor would stop him and probably fail him on the spot?

Secondly, did the Minister read the recent newspaper reports that the Ministry of Defence is inclined to argue that the failures of the SA-80 rifle are because the Marines who are trained to use it could not do so properly?

My Lords, I do not intend to attempt to answer the second question, which has absolutely nothing to do with today's very serious Statement. However, the noble Lord's first question is entirely proper. The answer is that even the most distinguished airmen—these were fine pilots—can make serious errors. They do not always, thank goodness, end up in the kind of tragedy that we are discussing today, eight years later.

I shall explain briefly how I came to the view that I expressed earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont. When the pilots were some 700 or 800 yards away from the way-point change, they were about one kilometre away from the coast. If they were below cloud, could see one kilometre ahead and were flying legally (they were under visual flight rules), it was negligent—here I rely to some extent on the script of the Select Committee's hearings, which I have read carefully, as I know the noble Lord will have done—that they did not start such a turn when they first made visual contact with the cliff. However, they flew on for another eight or nine seconds before the way-point change. That is the first alternative. The only other alternative is that at some point earlier than one kilometre away from the cliff, they went into cloud, either voluntarily or involuntarily. In those conditions, they should without doubt have taken immediate action to outclimb the Mull of Kintyre by carrying out an emergency low-level abort and, once established in that climb, turning away to the left. They did neither. I remind the noble Lord that it is clear that at the time of the way-point change, the aircraft was fully serviceable.

My Lords, as a member of the Select Committee, I have only one question for the Minister. As I understood him, he said that the Government have taken outside advice. Was the advice legal or technical? Before we have a debate in this House on the subject, will he identify from whom that advice came?

My Lords, I can tell the noble Lord that the advice was from outside government and that it was both technical—from Boeing—and legal. I shall have to consider carefully whether to tell the noble Lord at this stage who supplied that legal advice. He and the House can take it from me that it was from an extremely distinguished Queen's Counsel.

I take this opportunity—I have not done so previously—to thank the noble Lord and all the others who played their part in the committee for the incredibly long hours and the huge amount of work that they put in on this very vexed subject. Although the Select Committee will be unhappy—if not worse—at our conclusions, the Government are genuinely grateful for what they did.

My Lords, I find—

My Lords—

My Lords, very briefly, it is the turn of the Cross Benches.

My Lords, I forbear making any comment on the report. I confine myself to simple questions. First, the Minister accepts, I understand, that the air marshals had only very limited authority to find the airmen guilty. That was because the relevant words are "absolutely no doubt whatsoever". My central questions are these. Nowhere in their judgments did the air marshals recognise that vital limitation on the lawful exercise of that power. If the Minister does not agree, perhaps he will identify where it is so stated. Finally, nowhere in their judgment did the air marshals expressly or implicitly claim that they had "absolutely no doubt whatsoever" that the deceased airmen—or one of them—Were guilty of negligence. If the Minister does not agree, will he please identify what was the relevant statement in this regard?

My Lords, of course the standard was very high indeed, but it was, as I said earlier, achievable. Indeed, it had been achieved on previous occasions. I am afraid that I do not have immediately available before me the answers to the questions of the noble and learned Lord, and I shall not waste the House's time looking them up. I promise to write to him in very short order.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. I begin by pointing out that, in parts, the Statement differs from the text available in the Printed Paper Office, largely as regards quotations, although the substance remains. The Statement is as follows:

"Following last week's publication by the Royal Society of its independent examination, chaired by Sir Brian Follett, of how we might prevent and combat future animal disease epidemics in the UK, today we publish the independent report of Dr Iain Anderson, identifying the lessons he believes can be learnt from the most recent of these—last year's outbreak of foot and mouth disease. The Government are grateful to Dr Anderson for the huge amount of work and effort he has put in and to all the 800 to 900 individuals and organisations that gave him evidence.

"Foot and mouth disease is a devastating and highly infectious animal disease, feared and loathed across the world because of its impact and virulence. In Britain alone, the experiences of the 1967 outbreak are a remembered nightmare in many rural communities. But what hit us in February 2001 was, as Dr Anderson notes, due to a,

'rare set of circumstances [which] had already determined that this would be one of the worst epidemics of FMD the modern world has ever seen. Numbers alone cannot capture the sense of what unfolded. The great epidemic of 2001 left an indelible mark on communities, businesses and people from all walks of life'.

"The Government are determined to learn the lessons of what happened in 2001. That is why we so quickly set up an inquiry process with three strands, each of them independent. That decision means that within six months of the outbreak ending, we already have the scientific review, the Policy Commission report charting the way forward for the industry and, now, the report of lessons we need to learn.

"Dr Anderson's report, which concentrates primarily on the early part of the outbreak, is a sombre and thoughtful document, for the most part measured in its tone and content, although unquestionably grave in its import. What is crucial to future policy is that he makes a large number of strong recommendations, most, if not all, of which I believe we shall he able to accept. Indeed, many suggest actions that the Government, while trying not to prejudge his report, have begun to address.

"Separately, in his comment and observations he draws on the views and evidence put before him. Here, there is certainly scope for different interpretation—even for disagreement. However, he asks in his introduction whether, as a first step,

'DEFRA [can] simply…admit that government made mistakes during its handling of the crisis and that all involved are determined to learn from these mistakes'.

I can and I do. The House will know that I have always acknowledged that, in the desperate circumstances faced not only by the farming community but by my department and its officials, as by our departmental and ministerial predecessors, mistakes were bound to have been made.

"Dr Anderson shows complete understanding and sympathy for the terrible experience of those in the field. But he also shows recognition of the dilemma of the centre, especially where there were clear or substantial deficiencies in management information. He suggests that for the first few weeks government did not realise the seriousness of the measures which would be needed to control the outbreak. I accept, although it is with hindsight, that that is so. But he also shows how often the action taken was entirely consistent with the information and advice then available.

"But if we are to learn the lessons from those dreadful months, we need most to consider whether, while, as I say, there are bound to have been mistakes, there were structural defects.

"Dr Anderson identifies what he regards as mistakes of strategy. I think it is right to say that many, if not all of these, we as government already acknowledge. Where there may be room for disagreement is on the question of how much of that was evident only, or at least primarily, with hindsight. As Dr Anderson himself says in the report on the issue of an immediate national ban on animal movements:

'Even today the State Veterinary Service believes it would not have had the justification or the support immediately to introduce widespread restrictions'.

"Throughout the report, the reader returns again and again to what was known and to what was without precedent and consequently unanticipated. Dr Anderson says, for example:

'The disease could have been present at Burnside Farm for weeks, but it went unreported, despite the requirement of farmers to report suspected cases of notifiable diseases'.

We now know, in fact, that there was virus present on at least 57 farms in 16 counties on the day that the first case was confirmed—20th February.

"As to the unknown origin of the first case, both inquiries stress the importance of effective import controls in order to prevent exotic infectious diseases entering the country. We have set in hand a wide-ranging programme of action against the risks posed by what have, I believe, been illegal imports of meat and animal products. But as both reports acknowledge, it will never be possible to reduce that risk to zero, so the necessary measures must be in place to limit the risks that, if disease enters the country, it will reach livestock and then subsequently spread.

"Both reports also highlight the importance of contingency planning. Dr Anderson examines the pre-existing contingency plan, which was followed, but he demonstrates that, although meeting the international standards then expected—the European Commission judged the UK's readiness for disease outbreak as among the best in Europe—we can see with hindsight its deficiencies. But that is an admission that make with hindsight. The European Commission is on record as having said recently:

'It cannot be reasonably expected from any Member State to design a contingency plan for the event of an epidemic causing more outbreaks within months than the 10 years' estimate for the whole Community'.

"On all these issues the analysis in the report is detailed. It shows that, in Dr Anderson's own words—words echoed, among others, by Commissioner Byrne—the outbreak in Britain in 2001 was of a kind unanticipated in any country in the world.

"Dr Anderson makes some trenchant criticisms to which I shall return, but he also deals comprehensively with the myriad conspiracy theories in circulation then and since. He does not just dismiss them; he investigates and then dispels them. One in particular—the charge that the handling of the crisis was driven by concern over the general election—Iain Anderson explicitly rejects. He said,

'we found no evidence to support such a suggestion'.

Indeed, officials at all levels and in many locations are adamant that they were never exposed to any pressure other than the need to control a disease in the best possible way.

"While awaiting these reports, we have already published a draft interim contingency plan and have invited stakeholders and operational partners to comment. We shall now review it comprehensively in the light of the recommendations of the inquiries for regular updating, involvement of stakeholders and rehearsals, all of which the Government accept.

"Dr Anderson calls for a mechanism to assess potential domestic civil threats and steps to improve our capacity to handle an emergency of national proportions. We have set up the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, reporting to a Cabinet Committee chaired by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, which is intended to do just that through horizon scanning, an assessment of capability and through work with departments facing disruptive challenges on how to prevent or manage crises. He also identifies the need to establish 'trigger points', where issues move to a new phase of crisis handling. Again, we agree.

"Also, both reports make important recommendations about how the Government should improve their ability to respond effectively in the event of a disease outbreak. Again, I can say that we support the thrust of these recommendations, especially where they relate to the need for high-quality management information systems.

"The Army is praised, rightly, for the role it played in helping to deal with the enormous logistical challenge—one it has identified as of larger dimensions logistically than the Gulf War. It did, indeed, do a remarkable job. I believe that, had we had better information systems in place, it would have been called into action earlier. But, as Dr Anderson demonstrates, that is not so in the context, as is so often claimed, of the Northumberland report, but when disposal options were failing to keep pace with slaughter.

"In addition, knowing what we now know, we would, on any future occasion, work on the presumption that a national ban on livestock movements would apply when the first FMD case was confirmed. But, because of the early silent spread of the disease in this outbreak, it is important not to assume that it would ever have been easy to check. Dr Anderson himself said that,

'even a perfectly implemented cull of infected premises within 24 hours of discovery would not, on its own, have controlled that epidemic until the disease itself had reduced the density of susceptible farms to such an extent that the epidemic ended naturally'.

"We would not intend, in the future, to permit local authorities to impose a widespread ban on the closure of footpaths. That, too, is a judgment made with the benefit of hindsight, and the House will know that it is a contested judgment. Some local authorities clung to a blanket ban long after government had encouraged its lifting.

"Both inquiries have called for a strategic approach to animal health and disease control policies, and endorsed the call in the report of the Policy Commission on Food and Farming, chaired by Sir Don Curry, for a comprehensive animal health strategy. My department will be opening discussions with industry and other interests on the content and coverage of such a strategy in the near future. It would need to deal with the protection of public health, animal disease prevention control, surveillance, animal identification, animal welfare and emergency preparedness.

"One other key issue which draws much comment is the contentious issue of vaccination, on which both inquiries made recommendations. There are two specific recommendations which we can immediately accept: that, as in 2001, we should ensure that the option of emergency vaccination forms part of any future strategy for the control of foot and mouth disease; and that any emergency vaccination policy should in future not be 'vaccinate to kill' but 'vaccinate to live'. But that does not require action from government alone. It requires acceptance that meat and meat products from vaccinated animals enter the food chain normally.

"Quite rightly, the inquiry reports address most of their recommendations to government. But they both also recognise that the farming industry shares responsibility for minimising disease risks. Dr Anderson concludes that the Government can do only so much to prevent a recurrence of the disease. The farming industry has a crucial role to play, particularly with regard to biosecurity.

"This reminder is particularly pertinent after last month's foot and mouth disease scare in the Midlands. It is not enough for government to have the right approach or proper rules to mitigate disease risk. Everyone in the industry must follow those rules and they must be properly enforced. In that recent episode, existing pig identification rules were not followed. Had the tests confirmed the disease, the effort to track down the source of the infection would have been severely hampered. This episode strengthens our resolve to continue to work with the livestock industry to establish better livestock identification.

"But both this episode and the report lend weight to the call by Sir Don Curry's Policy Commission for farm assurance schemes, owned and operated by the industry itself, to reward good farm management practice in biosecurity and other areas. The Government endorse this principle.

"While the Government will give full consideration to all the lessons in the two reports, there are two areas in which we can and will move forward more quickly. The emphasis in the reports on the roles which might be played by emergency vaccination and pre-emptive culling underlines the importance of the passage of the Animal Health Bill, which my noble friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State will be taking to Committee stage next week. The Bill contains powers which could be vital to the timely interventions for which the inquiries call.

"Secondly, the Government need to take an early decision on the animal movement rules to apply from the late summer, and in particular on the 20-day standstill. We will consult quickly with industry stakeholders in the next week or two, in the light of what the two reports say, on interim rules to apply from late August.

"This is a serious report into an outbreak of foot and mouth disease which was devastating for many parts of our country. I want to make one more quote from Dr Anderson. He said:

'Even had everything been done perfectly by all those concerned to tackle the disease, the country would have had a major epidemic with massive consequences. Second, many farmers, local people and government officials made heroic efforts to fight the disease and limits its effects. Through their efforts it was finally overcome and eradicated after 221 days, one day less than the epidemic in 1967–68'.

This inquiry does make many important recommendations. It accepts that everyone involved was doing their level best to deal with the outbreak. It makes criticisms which are accepted. It makes recommendations on which we will act. Above all, it fulfils its remit and gives us the basis on which to learn lessons, and learn lessons we will".

My Lords, that concludes the Statement. I apologise for the fact that the quotations were not in the original version.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement that was made in another place earlier today and for the facility of being able to look at the report at MAFF this morning. These three wide-ranging reports confirm that the Government's handling of the foot and mouth disease crisis, particularly at its onset, was, at best, inept—so inept that the outbreak was much deeper and lasted much longer than it perhaps may have done. At this stage, I remind the House of my family's farming interests.

The Royal Society makes a number of recommendations relating to its concern about the lack of research. Will the Minister indicate whether new money will be available for funding research into, for example, alternative methods of disease control, alternative methods of cleansing, and particularly vaccination? Does the Minister envisage the thorough testing and approval of vaccines and the concept of "vaccinate to live"—the particularly welcome comment at the end of the report—for animals to live afterwards and then to cull? Will the Government make use of some of the overseas vaccines that are available?

The Anderson report is scathing about the lack of funding at Pirbright. Do the Government's future contingency plans include an intention to expand the important role of Pirbright in having acceptable vaccines and the testing facilities to which I referred earlier? The question of vaccination arose at all stages as various Statements were made to the House. Noble Lords will want further clarification of that matter in addition to what the Minister has said.

The Northumberland report on 1967–68 showed that there were 24 almost simultaneous outbreaks at the beginning of that outbreak. Will the Minister indicate why the UK contingency plan this time limited it to a scenario of only 10 farms? I do not understand why it should be lessened. Who made that decision, and why was it made?

On decisions, will the Minister explain it took 25 days before COBRA was called in; why it took nearly 31 days to call in the Army, when in fact the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who is in her place, and I raised the issue of the Army being called in on 8th March; and why the scientific group was not established until 35 days after the onset of the disease? Those are disturbing figures. Will the Minister explain why, according to Anderson, scientific decisions were taken outside of COBRA by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Agriculture in the middle of the outbreak?

The Anderson report is also outspoken on the failures of joined-up government—members of various departments did not talk to each other—and the failure of the IT system has also been highlighted. In the Statement that has just been repeated. Anderson said that substantial deficiencies in management systems added to the difficulties.

I turn to the question of meat imports, which I divide into two categories, as does Anderson. Anderson accepts that the disease was not caused by the legal importation of meat, but was much more likely to have been caused by the illegal importation of meat, in respect of which, as noble Lords will know, we have called many times for a tightening up of the rules. Will the Minister therefore say why it has taken almost a year for the Government to put into action some extra contingency plans to stop the import of illegal meat into our country?

Throughout the course of this disease, we have unfortunately experienced a breakdown of trust not only between the farming communities but also the rural communities and the general public. The devastation directly affected farmers. It also affected those farmers who could not move their animals but who were not directly affected themselves. It affected rural business, and particularly tourism. I should therefore like to ask the Minister what proposals the Government have to ensure that whatever plans they put forward appreciate the very close interlink between the health of our livestock and the health of the countryside and rural business and tourism.

I turn to the Animal Health Bill, which we shall debate later this week. I again quote from Anderson:

"The powers available in the Animal Health Act 1981 should be re-examined".

That is what we should be doing. Will the Minister assure us that the timetable for the current Animal Health Bill will allow such re-examination to be full and thorough? That is particularly important in the light of the research shortcomings, laid bare by the Follett report.

The Anderson report also shows that in the 1967 to 1968 FMD outbreak, 75 per cent of costs went in compensation to farmers. But in the 2001 outbreak that proportion was only 40 per cent. Can the Minister indicate how the Government will control that 60 per cent of costs in any future—heaven forbid—outbreak? Perhaps he may explain where the 60 per cent has gone.

I do not wish to shoot arrows. The report reflects that mistakes were made. I am grateful that the Statement and the Government accept that. However, we want to learn by those mistakes and to see where we can go.

All the reports reflect inadequate action at the start. Had there been more robust action the disease would not have spread as much. I call on the Minister and the Government to have a full debate when we return early in October. It is impossible in the short space of time left before the recess to do anything like justice to these three important reports. Indeed, it will not surprise the Minister when I say that however good these reports are, we should have had a full public inquiry.

The Government have expressed their regrets for some of the mistakes made and are determined to learn. Indeed, the industry should learn in order to find better ways forward. But I ask that we have regular updating; involvement of the stakeholders; and rehearsals of contingency plans. I understand that on a regular basis a review will be brought before Parliament.

It is impossible to pay tribute to all those who worked hard under difficult circumstances and to express sufficiently our sorrow and support for those who were devastated by the outbreak. The noble Lord, at the end of the Statement, referred to the 20-day standstill, which is still in being. As he knows, there is great concern in the industry about that being in effect long term. Can the noble Lord tell us more about the Government's position on the current 20-day standstill? I thank him for repeating the Statement. I look forward to his being able to assure the House that we shall have a full debate when we return in October.

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and for the courtesy of allowing me to see the report this morning. I associate these Benches with a great deal of what the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, said. I shall attempt not to repeat too much of it.

These three reports are an important stage in getting the farming industry and the countryside back to something like normal—or what normal will be in the future—after the devastation of the foot and mouth outbreak. They also will provide useful background for our discussions in the next few days and after the recess when the Animal Health Bill is in Committee.

The immediate issue raised in the Anderson report is the question of the 20-day standstill, to which the noble Baroness referred. There is a great feeling in the industry that not only would it be devastating to keep a 20-day standstill for a substantial period of time and through the autumn of this year, but that it is also almost unenforceable, placing farmers in a position where they would feel the need to break it on a large scale. It is important, therefore, that the Government find a compromise, which is accepted on all sides, which works, and which will do the job we want it to do. So we very much welcome the commitment in the Statement to a speedy review.

There are some interesting statistics in various parts of the report. On page 27, for example, it reveals that the State Veterinary Service has been run down. In 1979 to 1980 it employed 597 vets and in 1995 it employed 300. In that period it was believed—under the then Conservative government—that the state ought not to be doing things that other people could do them and that self-regulation was the way forward. It was also a time when efficiency savings were much in vogue. That is a good example of those two dogmas failing us badly. The reduced MAFF presence in the regions during that period and the cuts in research—not least at Pirbright—are other examples that should provide us with food for thought for policy in the future. I, too, ask the Government what they are doing to put more resources into those and similar areas.

The two sectors devastated more than any others by foot and mouth were farming and tourism. Tourism throughout the outbreak got a worse deal than farming. At least farmers whose animals were culled got compensation, although many others did not. On page 133 of the report, there are interesting statistics providing the sectoral economic effect of FMD 2001 to 2005. It suggests that for agricultural producers there will be a net loss of £710,000. For tourism, it is £5 billion. That indicates the huge impact on the whole of the varied tourist industry. It is absolutely vital that any future outbreak is not allowed to impact in that way on such an important industry, not just in terms of this country's economy but for the whole way in which the countryside now works.

The report's recommendations seem rather weak in the whole area of tourism and the rural economy in general. However, I very much welcome the statement from the Minister that in a future outbreak they would not be looking to impose any blanket ban on the closure of footpaths. There are all kinds of things which occurred during this outbreak which must never happen again. I cannot say that foot and mouth disease must never happen again. It is impossible to guarantee that. I mean the way that images of funeral pyres were beamed around the world; the way in which large areas of countryside were turned into war zones where it was living hell, not just for the affected farmers but for many other people; the human misery and tragedy, the suicides that took place—and the many other people who must have been on the brink of suicide—and the huge mistakes made right at the beginning in declaring that the countryside was closed.

I believe that vaccination and what the Follett report refers to as "preventive vaccination to live" is a fundamental key to the future. It is a fundamental key in getting the trust of farmers as well as the rest of society. The recommendations set out in the Royal Society report are vital. Again I very much welcome the statement by the Government that preventive vaccination to live would form a key part of future strategy. The Follett report points out that the whole area of vaccination needs a great deal more research before it becomes a practical strategy. It suggests a timescale of 18 months. I ask the Government whether this will be an absolute top priority.

The publication of these reports is a turning point. It is a chance to lance the wounds and to start a healing process in the countryside based on developing a consensus for the future. But I believe the Government must go further than merely admitting that mistakes were made. It would help enormously if they could apologise for those mistakes in a fulsome and genuine kind of way, saying that they are sorry for the farmers who suffered; that they are sorry for the tourist industry; sorry for everything else that happened in the countryside last year; and sorry for their contribution to what happened. Have the Government the guts and the sense to face the countryside and say, "Yes, we didn't just make mistakes in hindsight, but we are deeply sorry for them. We want to work with you to stop them happening again"?

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their comments. If I may, I shall grind quickly through the specific points made and then turn to the general points.

On research, we shall clearly have to take seriously the substantial recommendations of the Royal Society report. How we fund research is a matter for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the institutes and the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council. Of course, there is also the question of whether that should be performed on a European scale, because we face the same problems across Europe and must take a consistent approach.

The noble Baroness, Lady Byford, asked why the contingency plan was based on 10 farms or 10 outbreaks. The reason for that was that for some years the European Union requirements for the contingency plan were for the most likely scenario. In the light of evidence, that was judged the most likely scenario. That is what the plan was based on, and it was clearly inadequate to deal with the massive outbreak that actually occurred. The key finding is that, before we knew it was there, the disease had entered 57 farms.

The noble Baroness asked several questions about the machinery and why there were delays in involving the military, COBRA and so on. We shall clearly have to consider those areas carefully. Co-ordination of government is an important issue, which is one reason why we have now set up a Civil Contingencies Committee. When we face future crises, whether or not involving animal disease, we ought to be able to pull together the resources of government more rapidly. At the time, of course, it was not immediately evident that the disease was of such crisis proportions. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learnt.

On imports, the noble Baroness will have heard me say many times that there is more to be done. An action plan is in place and we are tightening up both on smuggling through passenger imports and on potential illegal imports through commercial channels. The reports, together with the risk assessment that we are completing, will give us more of a basis to act on that front.

The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, both referred to the involvement of the tourist industry and others, including the farming industry and government. It is important that future contingency plans not only take them into account but involve other elements of rural society and the rural economy in the rehearsals for and understanding of the plan.

The noble Baroness also asked about two immediate issues to which I referred at the end of the Statement: the Animal Health Bill and the 20-day standstill period. Clearly, the reports may have implications for the Animal Health Bill. That is one reason for the timetable on which we eventually reached consensus, which gives us the summer to think about the matter. There may also be other, wider implications for animal health legislation that may have to be dealt with more broadly. We shall need to consider that in the light of the findings and recommendations of the reports. I do not expect that that will seriously affect the timetable, but we will need to consider that after the summer. No doubt, noble Lords will also have amendments to propose and points to make about that.

The noble Baroness raised the question of the proportion of costs, which is an interesting point. One of the differences between the 1967 outbreak and the latest one was, first, that more animals were killed but, perhaps more importantly, that the costs of disposal and the need for disposal effectively to be undertaken by the Government made those non-compensation costs much higher. There is an issue about cost efficiency, about which both these reports and the National Audit Office report make points, and, frankly, about who will bear those risks in future, which the industry and the Government need to discuss. But that is the main change: the non-disposal costs—the cleansing and disinfection costs—which were borne by the Government separate from compensation, were substantially higher than in 1967.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, and the noble Baroness referred to the 20-day standstill period. Clearly, that is the issue that most concerns the industry and the department at present. As I have told the industry, our veterinary and scientific advice is that we should maintain the 20-day standstill, or something like it. Indeed, the Anderson report states clearly that it should remain until an effective and thorough risk assessment is adopted. As I said in the Statement, we will continue to discuss with the livestock industry during the next few days what, if any, changes can be made to that regime in the immediate future and to consider the long-term regime that may be appropriate following that thorough risk assessment.

The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, referred to the number of people employed by the State Veterinary Service. The figures are slightly misleading. Far be it from me to defend the previous Conservative government, but the numbers at the outset include all of the managerial, structural and research grades, some of which were removed from the State Veterinary Service when the regions were rationalised. So there has been a significant reduction in the management structure of the SVS; but the number of field veterinarians has not altered that much—certainly during the past 10 years—when they are counted on the same basis. Although there has been a reduction in the total size of the service over the long term, the reduction in the field service during the past 10 years has been much smaller. Of course, the field service is the key element in spotting and immediately dealing with the disease.

I echo the views of both the noble Lord and the noble Baroness on the need to establish trust and understanding. There has been a serious breakdown of trust and the Government recognise our responsibility in that respect. If we are to use a "vaccinate to live" rather than a "vaccinate to kill" policy, understanding must be established in the farming industry and elsewhere both domestically and internationally of how the vaccinated meat and meat products would move into the normal food chain. That was one difficulty during the epidemic.

Trust also needs to be established in a wider sense; as I said, the Government accept our responsibility in that regard. Mistakes were of many different sorts. In retrospect and with hindsight, some strategic mistakes were made, most of which we have acknowledged. In what was a massive logistical exercise, mistakes were made in implementing the policy. Those are identified in the reports.

How many strategic mistakes were made at the centre because of the information then available—given the constraints on that identified in the report—is a different matter. I do not accept the challenge of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, to make a general apology in that respect. Things occurred that we regret, but I do not believe that my predecessors, senior or local departmental officials are culpable in any individual or collective sense for what happened. We were all faced with an unprecedented situation—in effect, a wartime situation. Mistakes are made in war, however effective or otherwise the strategic direction. That is the case here. The main thing now is not to go blaming each other but to continue to build that basis of trust in the countryside that has been sadly missing in the wake of the disease.

My Lords, while thanking the noble Lord for repeating the Statement, I refer him back to his quotation at its end from the report, which states:

"Even had everything been done perfectly by all those concerned to tackle the disease, the country would have had a major epidemic with massive consequences".

Although no one would argue with that, Dr Anderson must have made a broad assessment of how many animals would have had to be slaughtered if everything had been done perfectly. Will the Minister tell us—in broad terms; clearly we cannot be precise—how many extra animals were slaughtered in that dreadful affair as a consequence of the unpreparedness, delay and incompetence to which he has admitted today?

My Lords, without accepting the terminology of the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, there are different forms of effect on the disease. There is no answer to his question. The lack of preparedness in certain respects relates to a wrong presumption of what was the most likely scenario. Clearly, had we made a different presumption, the level of preparedness and the speed with which we contained the disease would have been greater. However, the report states that, given where we were, it would have been more sensible to engage in a wider pre-emptive cull, in which case, per outbreak, more animals would have been slaughtered in order to contain the disease more rapidly. Similarly, given the fact that there were at least 57 seedings before we even knew of the existence of the disease, as well as others developing as we were trying to catch up with the spread, the balance between slaughtering more to contain the disease at the beginning and the total number involved will never be able to be calculated.

My Lords, I welcome the fact that the Minister recognises that mistakes were made, though I am not interested in whether they were blameworthy or whether one can say, with the benefit of hindsight, that any mistakes were made. I also welcome the fact that the noble Lord accepts most of the recommendations, and agrees that there are lessons to be learned. However, in the light of that, I find it totally incomprehensible that he is intending to press on with the relevant part of the Animal Health Bill on the very first day of our October sittings.

Is the noble Lord suggesting that there is nothing contained in these reports that would alter the contents of those parts of the Animal Health Bill? In view of these recommendations, does he intend to deluge the House with a whole raft of amendments to bring the legislation up to date? Alternatively, is he leaving it to the Opposition, or to Back-Benchers, to amend his Bill and thereby bring it into line with the recommendations?

Bearing in mind all that is to be learnt from these reports, how does the Minister consider that the Bill can possibly proceed until we have had a debate on these reports, and he has brought forward either a re-drafted Bill or amendments to it so as to bring it in line with the recommendations that the Government accept? If we do not follow that route, the entire postponement of the Bill's passage until such reports were made will have been a waste of time, and a farce.

My Lords, as I said earlier in response to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, we shall need to consider what is in these reports that may require amendment to the proposed Animal Health Bill. No doubt other noble Lords will be doing likewise during the Committee and subsequent stages of the legislation. There are two items that are already in the Animal Health Bill that meet some of the anxieties expressed by Dr Anderson. In particular, he is concerned that the contiguous cull was not carried out rapidly enough. Of course, there are additional powers in the Bill that are intended to speed up that process.

In addition to the provisions in the Animal Health Bill, there is a need to make provision for pre-emptive culls. That is also, in part, covered by firebreak cullings in similar provisions, as well as being covered by this legislation. Moreover, it would be even more important for those provisions to be there were we to adopt a substantial policy of vaccination. Powers to impose both a contiguous vaccination and firebreak vaccination would be a consequence of us adopting vaccination in the way that both reports suggest we should now consider. Therefore, the Animal Health Bill already contains some powers that are fairly controversial in this House, but which meet some of Dr Anderson's anxieties. However, there may be others.

My Lords, does my noble friend the Minister agree that hindsight is a weapon that everyone can take advantage of after the event has taken place, but that, nevertheless, lessons should be drawn from such experience, and consequently acted upon? One observation that must be made on all this is the number of cases that developed—I believe that my noble friend mentioned 57—before the disease was reported. Is there not something that the farming community can learn from that; namely, that surveillance is necessary and early reporting essential?

My Lords, I absolutely agree with both those observations. Clearly, hindsight must not be used to suggest that decisions taken at the time based on the information available were unreasonable or inequitable. However, it is not only important for government to learn such lessons; industry must do likewise. The bulk of industry is responsible for observing biosecurity and for reporting any sign of disease. Regrettably, the incident mentioned in the Statement reaffirmed that fact. The rules are sometimes not being observed, and the process of reporting is not being undertaken. As we now know, the almost certain origin of the disease—the farm where this occurred—noble Lords, and others, cannot fail but to be horrified at the conditions at that farm and the trading process that followed. There are lessons to be learnt by both government and industry.

My Lords, I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hoyle, which may come as both a deep and a bad shock to him. Hindsight is a bad instrument. However, is the Minister aware that the use of the word "hindsight" on this occasion is totally irrelevant. Some of us were advocating vaccination as early as April, and the Prime Minister accepted the need for vaccination when he met the Soil Association, the National Trust, and four other bodies; but he then said "I've got to ask the farmers". Can the noble Lord imagine my noble friend Lady Thatcher taking that view once she had made up her mind? The answer is, no.

Vaccination was tried in Uruguay at the same time, where 10 million animals were vaccinated. As a result, they had to slaughter only 10,000 and the disease was contained and eradicated. The disease in that country started after our outbreak, but it finished before our outbreak was brought to a halt. That is not hindsight. It is all very well for the Minister to say that there is nothing to apologise for; there jolly well is something to apologise for. After all, the Prime Minister apologised for the famine in Ireland for which he had absolutely no responsibility, but he cannot apologise—or get his act together—as regards the foot and mouth disease, which was prolonged, exacerbated and made worse by the fatuous incompetence of the Treasury Bench.

My Lords, I strongly resent the noble Earl's last few remarks. Indeed, his comments are not in the spirit within which the rest of this discussion has taken place. I believe that we all have lessons to learn; and we intend to do so. Many wrongdoings occurred during the course of that period, some on the part of government and others on the part of industry. We all need to recognise that fact.

As regards vaccination, I can confirm that we did consider vaccination at various points during the outbreak. However, it was vaccination for very specific purposes. The events to which the noble Earl referred related to cattle only and were in respect of Cumbria only. Once the disease had broken out, we would not have had the logistical resources or the availability of vaccine to enable us to carry out vaccination on a scale equivalent to the Uruguayan experience. It was not a feasible option as an alternative to the cull. The Netherlands was the only country to follow that route. It very efficiently used that process as a supportive mechanism, but did so on a "vaccinate to kill" rather than a "vaccinate to live" basis.

It is important that any future strategy not only has the involvement of the farmers and the rest of the community; it must also have the understanding of the farmers and the rest of the community. Therefore, although the methods of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, may be appealing to the noble Earl, I believe that both industry and government together need, at least broadly, to agree the future strategy, without conflict, if disease—God help us!—ever breaks out again.

My Lords, I refer to the Royal Society report, which I consider contains the most important analysis and recommendations for the future in the history of the control of foot and mouth disease. Obviously, the question now is how to prevent another disaster occurring. Does the Minister agree that it is significant that the report shows important recent advances in vaccines, and that it is now possible to distinguish vaccinated from non-vaccinated animals? Does he also agree that it is an error to suppose that a carrier animal is automatically infectious; on the contrary, the carrier animal is not likely to be a significant risk factor in spreading and maintaining foot and mouth disease? Does he further agree that the report positively recommends that emergency vaccination should be seen as a major tool of first resort? Does the noble Lord consider those three points significant? I do.

I hope that we shall not spend too much time on apportioning blame for the past—indeed, I shall not—but rather that we concentrate on planning for the future. It would be a serious blunder if the Follett report is not acted upon, and acted upon fast.

My Lords, I accept that advances have been made over the course of the past year in some of the technology and in the provision of vaccine, some of which still has to be validated internationally in order for it to be fully effective. It is certainly true to say that some advances have been made that were not available—or would not have been accepted—had we wished to deploy them during the course of this epidemic.

It is also important that, in preparation, we use vaccination—emergency vaccination and firebreak vaccination—as a tool. At this stage, it is not possible to say that vaccination entirely replaces the culling system; we will not be at that stage for many years. However, vaccination ought to be one of the immediately available tools. Vaccination and its consequences must be understood in advance by the farming community, the rest of the food chain and the international regulators. Without that, vaccination will not be viable, but I believe that we can overcome those difficulties.

My Lords, the outbreak of foot and mouth disease was such as no other country has experienced. I can assure the Minister that the three reports into the handling of the outbreak and the lessons to be learnt will be read by people in many countries who will admire how we handled the problem. However, mistakes were made, including the lack of attention to the need for sufficient manpower to survey the health status of flocks and herds in this country; the dwindling level of research into highly infectious diseases; and the lack of control on imports, about which some of us have spoken. All those matters are mentioned in the three reports, each of which contains an enormous amount of information that requires careful study, as we consider the way ahead.

We did not know what sort of outbreak we faced. If it had been the sort of outbreak we experienced 20 years or more ago—a single outbreak—it would have been acceptable and satisfactory to react as we did at that time. However, the outbreak got away from us, and it was several weeks before we knew precisely what we were dealing with. Therein lies the major problem, given the shortage of manpower and the absence of the tools we now have. We must face the fact: some of the technology that could be used now to differentiate between vaccinated animals and infected animals and the new vaccines have come on line only in past months. We did not have them a year ago when we could have used them to great advantage for pen-side diagnosis, as mentioned on the radio this morning. We did not have that sort of test, and we cannot criticise people for trying to diagnose foot and mouth disease using the old clinical methods.

The Government must convince the general public that there is nothing wrong with meat from vaccinated animals: we eat it every day. All our chickens, sheep, pigs and cattle are vaccinated one way or another. It is ludicrous that there should be any revulsion against eating meat from animals vaccinated against foot and mouth disease. We import meat from countries that use vaccines against foot and mouth disease. The Government must make a major effort to convince the general public that such meat is safe and edible.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Soulsby of Swaffham Prior, for his remarks about what must now be done and about the quality of the reports. The reports show that there has been a thorough examination, and the three areas that the noble Lord identified will be addressed.

The noble Lord's final point—about the public view of vaccinated meat—is also important. I came to the matter halfway through, and it always seemed illogical to me. One of the reasons we did not pursue a policy of vaccination was that there was a view among consumers, in the wholesale and retail trade and internationally, that there should be a difference. There is a difference internationally between FMD-free status and FMD-with-vaccination-free status. That issue must be addressed domestically and internationally.

My Lords, as several noble Lords have said, the three reports are extremely important. Can my noble friend deal, once and for all, with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Byford, about the absence of a public inquiry? Three reports, containing nearly 500 pages of closely argued scientific, logistical and policy argument, have been produced in six months. How long would a public inquiry have taken? What information would it have produced that is not already in those comprehensive reports?

The Royal Society report makes it clear that there was no alternative to the rapid culling of diseased animals and of those thought likely to have been infected. It supports the 24-hour and 48-hour policy, although it is hard to achieve in practice. To the noble Earl, Lord Onslow, I say that the Anderson report says that, on vaccination, the science is not yet clear enough. How long will it take to get agreed EU and international protocols in place for emergency vaccination? The National Audit Office report and the Anderson report refer to the widespread seeding of the virus before it was reported. Can my noble friend confirm that the failure to report the 57 outbreaks in 16 counties was the main factor in the speed and severity of the outbreak?

Can I also ask my noble friend to clarify, in the light of what we now know, what powers are required? It is an important point. It appears that the Government do not have sufficient powers to deal with another outbreak. What will happen if—please God it does not happen—there is another outbreak before the Animal Health Bill becomes law? I hope that we can get to the Committee stage when we return. The Anderson report was a little unclear about the issue; the Minister's Statement was clearer. Can the Minister confirm that the powers in the Bill and any other powers that the Government may wish to introduce will be sufficient to deal with another outbreak?

My Lords, to answer my noble friend's last point, I shall expand on what I said earlier. The powers in the Bill now address some of the problems identified by Anderson. We will need to take careful note of other comments about the powers and how they are exercised or inhibited before we can say whether they are adequate. As part of the overall animal health strategy recommended by both reports, there must be a wholesale consideration of animal health legislation in general. Subject to that consideration, the Animal Health Bill would go some way to meeting the requirements.

My noble friend referred to undetected spread. I was not suggesting that 57 people failed to report; I said that, by the time that the outbreak was reported, 57 cases were already seeded, not all of which would have been apparent at that stage. That meant that we were running behind the disease until, eventually, it reached its peak. That was the major strategic disadvantage that we faced. The outbreak was unlike most other epidemics, including the Dutch outbreak. There, they identified the fact that there was a problem immediately and dealt with it quickly and strategically, but not without culling large numbers of animals.

I have covered the points about vaccination. It is true that vaccination could not be carried out unless there were domestic and international agreement on the implications. In introducing its report, the Royal Society said that we ought to be able to reach some agreement at the level of the European Union and the Office International des Epizooties by the end of 2003. That seems optimistic and is the minimum time that we would need to get an international understanding that vaccinated animals could go into the national and international food chain.

Turning to the question of a public inquiry, I refrained from responding to the noble Baroness earlier lest I descended into party politics. However, whatever one may have thought of a public inquiry at the time, we now have three very authoritative reports on the table—or even four if we include the Curry/National Audit Office report. As the noble Lord, Lord Soulsby, remarked, those reports will be read throughout the world and will become the authoritative account of how the epidemic began, how overcoming it was conducted and how we should approach any future outbreak.

To be frank, I do not think that a public inquiry could have reached this stage in this length of time. The Phillips inquiry lasted for three years, and we know that other inquiries have lasted even longer. Moreover, I shall repeat a point that I have made before in this House. People were probably more frank in their discussions with Dr Anderson and the Royal Society than they would have been had they had to give evidence in the quasi-judicial procedure through which the public inquiry process would have put them. For that reason, I think that the good doctor and the Royal Society have reached conclusions on the basis of the experiences of many people who have aired their views and understanding of the situation. I am not sure that those views would have emerged in a public inquiry, even after three years. In that respect at least, the Government are vindicated in their decision on how to review the conduct of the disease.

Now we must move on and learn the lesson—in the Government, in industry and in society as a whole.

My Lords, I beg to move that the Commons amendments be now considered.