My Lords, I beg to move the first Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

Very briefly, these amendments fall into four categories. The first is consequential on Welsh devolution. The second is the consequence of references to definitions of local authorities and government departments. The third makes House of Lords practice consistent with that of the House of Commons. The fourth makes a number of minor amendments resulting from recent experience with the procedure.

My Lords, I should like very briefly to make a slight plea. When we are being asked to do this sort of thing in future, may it be made quite clear to us without our having to look at more than one document what it is we are seeking to amend? The Standing Orders relating to public business were themselves amended in July 2001, I believe, and we are now required to amend further that amended version. That seems to make for undue complexity. I hope that the noble Lord will make appropriate representations to Ministers, who wish to have their papers correctly addressed to them, kindly to make it more convenient for us to do their will.

Noble Lords will have noticed—I can hardly bear to miss this chance opportunity—that the substantial figure of the Deputy Prime Minister figures rather largely in these amendments. I am holding a book outlining the functions of government in which the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister takes up no fewer than 40 pages and 120 columns. It is a substantial entry. However, we can hardly call that joined-up government—it is overgrown government. It would be appropriate if we could persuade the Deputy Prime Minister to change the name of his office, as he calls it, to those of a number of departments. He has a huge empire, and simply to call it an office is stretching language too far.

I do not wish to take up more of your Lordships' time, but I would be very grateful to the noble Lord if he would convey that message to the appropriate quarters.

My Lords, I wonder if I may ask the Chairman of Committees to elucidate a little further the first section to which he referred, which relates to Wales. I should be very grateful if he would expand on what he said and tell us precisely what this "consequence of devolution" actually means.

My Lords, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, we do our best to keep up with the changes that occur. The most recent book was printed in May 2001. Sadly, by July that year, we had to make a number of changes to mark the demise of the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions when the environment bit was hived off to agriculture, leaving the Department for Transport, Local Government and the Regions. Now, one year later, we have to make amendments which recognise the split of the Department for Transport from that department and the creation of the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister. For the time being, I cannot agree with the noble Lord that we should press for another change because we have not yet had even these changes printed. Nevertheless, we do our best to keep up.

As for the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, under Standing Order 4A, the first one referred to, copies of Bills have been made available at an office in London, at an office in Edinburgh if the Bill affected Scotland, and at an office in Belfast if it affected Northern Ireland. The difference is that if the Bill affects Wales, it will be made available at an office in Cardiff as well. I hope that that clarifies the position.

My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion standing in my name on the Order Paper.

My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, as I am sure are all your Lordships, for setting out with her usual clarity the scene in relation to the UN resolution and the Iraqi crisis. December 8th, the date of the crucial test of whether Saddam Hussein does, indeed, understand that this is, in the noble Baroness's words, his "final opportunity", is very near.

We have no substantive Motion before us, as there was in the other place on Monday, but the noble Baroness has again raised a number of vitally important questions. I believe that some aspects remain to be clarified. Noble Lords, with an accumulated experience in many of the areas we are discussing, can bring that experience to bear and help to improve the public debate and the public analysis.

I believe that, by now, most people agree that Saddam Hussein is an unprecedented danger—a uniquely dangerous threat both to Europe and the United States. Indeed, he is a global threat. I read a comment this morning from what was called a "Whitehall source"—I fear that it may have been the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—that Iraq is not a global threat but simply a regional threat. I believe that to be entirely wrong. It betrays a state of mind and a perspective which could be very misleading.

The reality is that we are now facing a globalised phenomenon of which the horrors in Kenya this morning are one more example. It is bad enough that Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction, which we hope will be identified shortly. But the point not always grasped is that when hostile states which dabble in terror conspire with non-state agents—terrorist networks linked to no particular state—the threat is increased not only marginally but exponentially. We are indeed dealing with a global problem: I believe that that Whitehall source is wrong.

I have been surprised all along by the lack of linkage between weapons of mass destruction and the global terrorist threat. In the United States, the State Department has no doubts at all about that. It believes, and I understand has evidence, that Iraq shelters several terrorist groups, including the Mujaheddin e Khalq and several Palestine-sponsored groups. As we know, Saddam finances the families of suicide martyrs, and it is the suicide bombing which most damages the fine and upright Palestinian cause. There is also evidence of extensive terrorist training at the Salman Pak facility.

Therefore, from the US perspective, Iraq and terrorism are the same issue and the moral case is the same—that against unspeakable evil. It is desirable that we emphasise that because it is important. War is dreadful. It is important that, in sending our citizens to war, we hack them with a moral case or cause.

As we have previously said on this side of the House, Resolution 1441 is welcome. The work done by our team at the UN and, indeed, by our Ministers was excellent and achieved a remarkable result. But then we come to the question addressed by the Foreign Secretary on Monday and again by the noble Baroness today concerning what is a material breach and who decides whether a material breach has occurred. Someone suggested to me that it was a little like an elephant—it is very difficult to describe in the abstract but easy to recognise when one sees it. Perhaps that is so.

Paragraph 4 of the resolution sets out a list of items, including false statements, omissions and failure to comply. Then there are other items which have already been debated, such as firing missiles at allied aeroplanes in the no-fly zone. Does that take effect as from last week? Does such an act constitute an attack on signatories to the resolution? It does, but is it serious? The noble Baroness mentioned talk of hugging the inspectors so that, when they turn up at the gate of a plant or chemical works, it appears that everyone knows they are coming. Again, as the noble Baroness said. Saddam Hussein is already in breach of a whole string of earlier UN resolutions.

Therefore, considering that this is the point which could trigger warfare. deaths and danger on a massive scale, we are still left with the question of how material is material. On Monday, the Foreign Secretary said that,

"the actions as a whole add up to something deliberate and more significant: something that shows Iraq's intention not to comply".—[Offical Report, Commons, 25/11/02, col. 52.]

As the noble Baroness said, it is very hard to pin that down in advance. Yet, as parliamentarians and as those who will at least approve, if not authorise, a major policy decision, we must be as clear as we can be about that matter. I believe that even more clarity is needed. I know that some of your Lordships will bring great wisdom to hear on that precise issue. Perhaps we can do better than "something deliberate" and "significant".

I was very glad to hear—as I was hoping to hear, having not seen evidence of it previously—the Government's strong endorsement, in the words of the noble Baroness, of the inspectors and of Dr Blix. He and his record have been subjected to much criticism. But our hopes rest heavily on his abilities and energies and on those of his team. Therefore, I believe that the endorsement was needed and was perhaps overdue. It was right that it came this morning.

Next, we have the question of whether the second resolution is necessary or simply desirable. Our view is similar to that of the Government—that it is not necessary or stipulated but that it probably is desirable if such a thing can be secured. The difficulty is that China and Russia have made explicit their insistence on a second resolution. Perhaps, in that situation, we do not have much of a choice. I believe we must face the fact that there is a possible clash ahead between those who will insist on a second resolution if there is non-compliance and if force is to be used and those who simply want to get on with it and who argue that, under existing resolutions, they have international legal authority to do so.

Either way, I hope that Parliament will have another say—I was glad to hear that confirmed by the noble Baroness—although not, of course, to give prior authority or to tick the box and authorise a decision to launch ourselves into an expeditionary operation. I do not believe that any government could be bound in that way. It would be absurd to try to lay that down as a precise rule. But both Houses of Parliament certainly have an important role. I believe that the Prime Minister has been unfairly criticised for not paying much attention to Parliament these days. That cannot be right because I read somewhere that the Spectator made him "Parliamentarian of the Year". The Spectator cannot be wrong, can it? I shall leave those questions for your Lordships to tackle in due course, as I know the House will.

I want to talk about two aspects of the situation. The first, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, concerns our own preparedness as part of the vital credibility of the threat. Keeping credibility is the key to the whole matter. Secondly, I shall refer to the international response—that is, what NATO is doing and what help we are receiving from our European neighbours. If I have time, I also want to discuss how Turkey fits into the jigsaw. I consider that to be an immensely important part, if not the key.

The noble Baroness said that we must have—I use her words—"proper preparations". At the end of the debate my noble friend Lord Attlee will raise a number of points about equipment, readiness, preparation and the lessons which we did or did not learn from the big operation, Saif Sareea, in Oman. All those matters were raised in debate the other night. Certainly, answers will be needed, including the position as regards the Challenger 2 tanks and whether they are ready to go. There seems to be confusion as to whether the filter weaknesses discovered in Saif Sareea have been remedied, are about to be remedied or are in the process of being remedied.

Our troops are without equal. What they have accomplished even in the past stormy year is fantastic. We should not forget for a moment the role they have played and that of their families, the wives and children who support them. They have done marvellously. Can the Government reassure the House that they will release the funds necessary to see that our superb Armed Forces are properly equipped? Will they refute the worrying stories about the Treasury denying funds; about false economies; and about soldiers having their pay delayed, drawing income support and paying high-rate tax on their modest income? Those stories are not good and need to be put down if there is any untruth in them or examined if they contain truth.

Yesterday the Chancellor's Statement mentioned £1 billion to help international security, if needed. It will be needed. This is an expensive business, particularly maintaining the credibility of a threat. I should like to hear, as would my noble friend, exactly how that £1 billion tits into the pattern. I assume that it is not just to correct the £1 billion underspend of last year; I believe that that has been corrected. But more will be needed. When we consider the extra sums discussed in the Senate and Congress for just this operation, we realise how even £1 billion, which sounds colossal, is a tiny sum compared to what is contemplated the other side of the water.

I turn to the role of NATO. The Prague meeting, which was very successful, produced a little noticed but milestone declaration. It read as follows:

"The NATO allies stand united in their commitment to take effective action to assist and support the efforts of the UN to ensure full and immediate compliance by Iraq".

That is an important statement. We are entitled to ask how that will be delivered. It has profound implications. First, starting at the less profound end, it presumably means that our neighbour and friend, Germany, is again on board. Germany stated recently that it wanted nothing to do with the Iraq expedition. Is that right? Are the German Government again refusing to help in Kuwait? I believe they have opened their airspace to the Americans, but that is the least they can do. It is hard to see how that fits in with all the NATO allies performing this high-sounding role.

Secondly, if that is now the role of NATO, it is a large transformation. Someone referred to the meeting in Prague as the transformation meeting. That puts NATO on a completely new path and one which we should certainly debate and analyse. I strongly welcome that. Thirdly, the statement that NATO will throw its weight into the Iraq situation, as it has strongly into the Afghan situation, reminds us that NATO must prepare for this kind of role in a more effective way. That is why we should examine positively the NATO response force, which I understand is to be a smaller, more powerful and much more effective way of shouldering Europe's share of the defence burden than previous initiatives. If the Iraq crisis is in any way to be prolonged I would hope that the proposal, which is very strong, has a part to play and enables NATO to fulfil its commitment.

The proposal is for a fully integrated force totalling around 20,000 but with a core of 5,000 soldiers and 50 bombers, with infantry, air power and naval strength all fused together and backed by the highest and latest American technology with no argument about whether or not it is NATO property. It seems to me that that is far the best way to forge a modernised, military. transatlantic security link, which responds in an era of terrorism. I think it was General Ralston who said the other day that,

"the key metric of war is no longer space; it is time".

That could apply at any moment in the Iraq case. We need small forces moving with lightning speed. That is the new necessity. That is what the NATO response force provides. It is odd that somehow we have hardly debated that matter in this House. Here is the real way to see burden-sharing working and NATO contributing to the Iraq crisis in a manner that some of the statements of individual NATO allies have not indicated. It is a pity that that kind of thinking and this kind of scheme were not in place earlier and that so much time has been lost.

I planned to say a word on Turkey, but I must be brief with so many noble Lords wishing to speak. I welcome the new regime in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party. That provides a great opportunity for a country which neighbours Iraq, with a powerful army, to be embraced in every possible way and certainly not frozen out from the EU as sonic of its leaders have suggested.

People ask for a post-Saddam vision concerning what will happen, what is the exit strategy, and so forth. Here is one I offer: an enlightened Turkey, as we see under an Islamist but not Jihadist government; a pluralist Iraq, if we can get there, perhaps not fully democratic in the western sense, but pluralist and no longer tyrannised; and perhaps a reforming Syria, which voted the right way in the UN, but that may be wishful thinking. If those countries begin to turn, I can think of no better context in which to make progress with the Israeli-Palestine settlement—the sore at the heart of the matter—and finally give back the Palestinians their land. I can think of no better way to help the quartet process and turn the spotlight on compliance with UN resolutions by both Israel and Palestine which, as the noble Baroness and many others have said, is the next priority.

That is my answer to those who ask, understandably, "Why don't we put the Israeli-Palestine problem first?" Dealing with an ugly and destabilising Iraq could also mean dealing with a whole culture of terror, which has gripped the Arab world and poisoned the Israeli-Palestine progress. Saddam's state terror interweaves inextricably with non-state terrorism. In the words of the US Under-Secretary of State last weekend, they are two faces of the same evil. No one wants war. In the words of Erasmus:

"Sweet is war to those who do not know it".

That is why I hope that in the coming weeks Saddam's twisted dream of Middle East domination and anti-free world terrorism will be utterly dismantled and that we will be utterly resolute in going about that task.

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, perhaps I may take up one point he made. He referred to American evidence of links between Saddam Hussein and international terrorism. Certainly, I would not want to be thought to be defending the despicable behaviour of Saddam Hussein or his regime. However, I remember making a point in the debate which immediately followed the publication of the Government's dossier that there was no evidence in that dossier of Saddam Hussein's links with Al'Qaeda or any other form of international terrorism. Therefore, unless the noble Lord wants to take up the point, I hope that the Minister will tell the House what further evidence the Government have following the publication of their dossier.

My Lords, I am sure that the Minister will set out the view as understood by the Government. However, my understanding is that while the dossier said nothing about terrorism or 9/11, the State Department is firmly convinced that there is evidence of perhaps Al'Qaeda but certainly terrorist training and other groups which I mentioned on Iraqi soil. Those people are all in the terrorism business together.

My Lords, I very much welcome this debate. It is particularly gratifying that so many Cross-Benchers have put down their names to speak because that will bring to bear a great deal of expertise from which we benefit greatly in this House and from which I think the country as a whole benefits.

The Minister said some extremely interesting things in the course of her remarks. I am sure that she will bear with me when I try to explore some of them in somewhat greater detail. The inspectors' first reports—I think the noble Baroness will agree—have been encouraging. Up to now they have been greeted politely and we understand that they have been given unrestricted access to the things that they want to see.

Reference was made earlier to the inspectors being bugged. My own hearing of "Today" suggested not that, but rather that the accommodation they were using had not yet been swept for bugs. It may be that the Minister can enlighten us later on that obviously important issue.

These are very early days. Resolution 1441 has laid down extremely detailed conditions. The first part of what I want to say relates to the difficulty of meeting those conditions, even if we can assume on both sides an honest intention to try to make the resolution work.

I begin by expressing my concern that arose from a remark made yesterday in a long interview on the "Today" programme with Jacques Baute, who is the head of the Iraq Action Team of the IAEA. I had the interview played back to me several times in order to ensure that I got it absolutely right. He said this about the resolution:

"There are timeframes which are incomprehensible … If everything goes well, if Iraq co-operates … a year should be a good timeframe".

He went on to say of laboratory analysis of any materials that might be discovered and that might be suspect,

"you don't do it in an hour".

He indicated that laboratory analysis by itself could take up to a month or more. So the timetable in the resolution is extremely difficult. Can the Minister tell us how far that practical and logistical difficulty was taken into account in the setting of these extremely tight timetables.

It is right that Resolution 1441 should be couched as it is in precise and uncompromising terms. That must be correct in a situation where peace and war are at stake. In that context, I praise the Prime Minister, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and his United Nations team, the French negotiators and, not least, the American Secretary of State Colin Powell for the huge amount of work that was put in to getting that resolution through the Security Council with the unanimous support of its members. That was a remarkable achievement and praise should be given for it.

It is also important that the American President, who is so often the recipient of rather stupid abuse in this country and elsewhere, made it clear that he would listen to differing opinions—and there are plenty of those in his administration, to which I shall return—hut that the final decision was made by and rested with him. He gets great credit for framing a resolution and taking a channel, which was essentially that of the United Nations.

It is right and proper, too, to claim that this team of people—American, British, French and other, and including nations such as Syria which also contributed to the resolution and to its negotiation—have helped to recover the authority of the United Nations. That is a substantial achievement. But some parts of what I must say today relate to whether the United Nations can now hold on to the authority it has reacquired. That depends greatly on the inspectors being seen to undertake their work honestly and in a trustworthy way, and, frankly, without unacceptable interventions from any quarter with regard to that work.

It is not doubtful either that the threat of the use of force, sustained now over months, has been critical in getting Iraq to agree to the resolution. It is also absolutely right that Iraq must comply with its terms if it can. I believe that "if it can" is the absolutely crucial phrase.

The Minister encouraged noble Lords on these Benches by her remark that mild, minor or unintended omissions would not be regarded as a failure to comply. But I believe that it is very important to recognise what we are asking for. Resolution 1441 states that by 8th December, Iraq has to make,

"a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. ballistic missiles and other delivery systems".

Reports from Iraq suggest that Iraqi officials are stupefied by the list of sites expected to be put forward and publicised by them, which includes factories making mattresses, factories making slippers and many other such things. It is right and proper that Iraq should be asked to open these sites to inspection, but to do that by 8th December, which is almost upon us, raises large questions of how its response is to be interpreted.

One of the real concerns is to consider how the inspectors will report back on the failure or success of Iraq in that respect. A huge amount turns on those interpretations and indeed one could say that the fate of the region depends on the way in which that is dealt with.

There is a certain catch 22 implicit in this part of the resolution. If Iraq declares illegal sites, as all of us hope it will, that itself constitutes a new breach of Iraq's commitment to get rid of weapons of mass destruction. If, on the other hand, it does not declare them, then the assumption may well be that it has not declared them because it is trying to conceal them. It is very difficult to see how one can guarantee that nothing has been concealed if the inspectors themselves say that it will take up to a year to complete a full inspection of Iraq.

I must ask the Minister a further question. If the inspectors look at a sample of sites and are satisfied, will that constitute sufficient guarantee that Iraq is trying to comply with the terms of the resolution? The trustworthiness and honesty of the inspectors is absolutely vital in this context. I quote a remark made yesterday by the Syrian information Minister on behalf of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. He said:

"Syria hopes that the resolution will be observed honestly, and that … aggression be averted".

A country such as Syria will depend entirely on whether it believes that the interpretation of a resolution is honest and fair. That is as important as the attitude of the western countries to whether it is thorough and complete. Both criteria must be met. They are by no means easy to meet.

It would be less than honest if we did not indicate that one of the reasons for concern about the whole process of the resolution and the upholding of the resolution flows from what was raised in another place earlier this week—the real concatenation of voices out of Washington which do not say the same thing. One has to say that the existence of very different voices in Washington is one reason for the real apprehension about whether the resolution will be able to succeed. I shall quote one or two of those different voices. In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars last August the vice-president Dick Cheney said:

"A return of inspectors would provide no assurance whatsoever of his compliance with UN resolutions. On the contrary, there is a great danger that it would provide false comfort that Saddam was somehow 'back in his box'".

A further example comes from the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. In answer to a caller on a recent phone-in programme in the United States, who asked what would happen if no weapons of mass destruction were found by United Nations weapons inspectors inside Iraq, Mr Rumsfeld said:

"What it would prove would be that the inspection process had been successfully defeated by the Iraqis".

In other words, in the eyes of the Secretary of Defense, it is impossible to prove one's compliance.

I have said before that one great strength of the American position is that, at the end of the day, the President makes the decisions, and he has shown a refreshing willingness to listen to a whole range of opinion. But we cannot simply slide over the fact that many members of the United Nations Security Council, many of our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, many members of the Arab League and many countries in Europe have heard those discordant voices and are open to questioning the precise motivation of the United States.

Only yesterday, Richard Perle stated:

"I am very troubled at the idea that the United Nations is the sole legitimising institution when it comes to the use of force … Why is the United Nations a greater source of legitimacy than NATO?"

The answer is clear: NATO is an important alliance, but it does not represent the opinion of huge areas of the world. For all its weaknesses, the United Nations is the one and only body that has the right to speak for world as a whole.

It is important to say that those discordant voices have sown great concern and worry among many people in this House, in another place and much more widely among America's allies. We must recognise that there is a strong opinion that does not allow for the possibility of a peaceful outcome in Iraq.

What has happened so far has helped to restore the authority of the United Nations. It is crucial that the organisation and the Security Council are firm about Iraq—I entirely agree with the Minister on that—but they must also be seen to be absolutely fair and objective in how they define how far Resolution 1441 has been carried out by Iraq. That is crucial to maintain the support of moderate Arab nations, countries such as Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf states, for a moderate Arab attitude towards terrorism and what is happening in the world.

Finally, I turn to a question that profoundly troubles me: what is sometimes called the aftermath. Many of us passionately want the resolution to succeed because we recognise how high would be the cost of war. According to the International Institute of Strategic Affairs in an article published this month in its journal, Survival, the most moderate estimate of casualties is about 10,000 Iraqi military, 10,000 Iraqi civilians, with possible casualties far beyond that. Caritas, the international Christian aid organisation, puts the estimated figure much higher, pointing out that 14 million Iraqis are today dependent on food aid—two-thirds of the country's population—and that a major disruption of supplies, which will inevitably follow from a war sustained for more than a week or so, will put all those lives at risk.

The price is terribly high, but does not end there, because we all know that there may be repercussions on the whole of the Middle East and on the attitudes of moderate Arab nations and their populations. There is always the danger that, far from suppressing terrorism, we will encourage a new wave of terrorism, unless—I repeat—our actions are seen to be absolutely fair.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, referred to Turkey and its support for the coalition. I agree that Turkey's new Government are in many ways encouraging, but she has let it be known that if there is a war on Iraq, she would expect to move quickly into northern Iraq—the so-called no-fly zone—to ensure that there can be no question of Kurds from that area entering Turkey in an attempt to establish a separate Kurdish state. The break-up of Iraq is a real concern.

There is little evidence of co-operation between the United States and this country about what may happen to a future Iraqi government following a war. The United States has tended to keep everyone else at arms' length. I cannot easily accept assurances on that point because, like some of my colleagues, I have attended several recent seminars with senior American officials at which it was made plain that they have a policy for the new administration in Iraq that is not multilateral. Perhaps that does not matter, but if we consider the sad story of Afghanistan, which was to be the model for the creation of new democracies and orderly states, we can only conclude that there is a long way to go, because so far, it is a story of reversion to warlords, violence and disorder outside Kabul, with little sign that the international community is sufficiently concerned to provide the necessary money and forces to ensure order in that country.

I end with a reference to Israel. The Israeli-Palestinian position simply lumbers from one act of retaliation and revenge to the next. Both sides are deeply convinced of the morality of their position, but that does not help to bring about any kind of peace. There are many illusions that a war in Iraq will somehow suddenly solve the Middle Eastern problem. I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Howell. on that point. That is a dangerous illusion held in Washington for which there is little evidence, and to which I am glad to say that even the US Secretary of State and his department give no credence.

My Lords, I hope that you will forgive me if I croak a little at you this morning, because I am recovering from a heavy cold.

When I was Leader of the Opposition in your Lordships' House, I learnt early on that one should never rely on reports either of a resolution or a council meeting, one should read the documents. In this case it is particularly important, when we are considering the effect and implications of a Security Council resolution, that we read what it says.

I echo the tributes paid to the diplomatic effort that went into the framing of the resolution. I am deeply grateful that it was passed by unanimity in the Security Council. It is worth recording which countries voted for it. Apart from the Permanent Five, they included Syria, Mexico, Ireland, Bulgaria, Norway, Singapore, Colombia, Cameroon, Guinea and Mauritius. Whatever one thinks of the resolution, a fair spread of world opinion was mobilised behind it in the Security Council.

I shall not read the whole resolution because the document is available, but I shall draw the House's attention to certain parts of it. The preamble is as strong a preamble as I have ever seen in a United Nations resolution. Paragraph after paragraph is condemnatory of the behaviour of the Iraqi Government. The resolution firmly states that the UN is acting under chapter 7 of the charter, which means that it is one of the most important steps that the Security Council can take. The decisions that it makes are extremely important, and it is appropriate that we should be clear about what the Security Council decided.

First, the Security Council decided that,

"Iraq has been and remains, in material breach of its obligations under the relevant resolutions".

They are decisions, not requests. Secondly, the council decided:

"while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations."

It decided to set up,

"an enhanced inspection regime".

Then, there are details of the regime. The resolution says that the Security Council has decided that,

"false statements or omissions in the declarations … shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq's obligations and"—

your Lordships should note the following words—

"will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 or 12 below".

Paragraph 5 demands that UNMOVIC and the IAEA have,

"immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access".

The central part of the resolution is about what will happen, if there are material breaches. Paragraph 11 directs,

"the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities".

Paragraph 12 states that the Security Council has decided to convene immediately,

"upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security".

Finally, paragraph 13 recalls:

"in that context, that the Council has repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations".

That is the international framework, if I can call it that, within which all the events relating to Iraq must be judged and must take place. Now that we have the resolution, the argument is about what it means. It is important to consider what individual countries seemed to think that it meant. Mr John Negroponte, the United States' ambassador to the United Nations said that the resolution contained no "hidden triggers" and no "automaticity" with the use of force. He said that the procedure to be followed was laid out in the resolution and that, one way or another, Iraq would be disarmed, if the Security Council failed to act decisively in the event of further Iraqi violation.

He also said that the resolution did not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself—I note the word "itself'—against the threat posed by that country. I totally accept that; it is within the terms of the charter. However, he went on to say that the resolution did not constrain any member state from acting to enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security. Is it seriously being suggested that a country can do that when the rest of the Security Council does not want it? In other words, is it seriously being suggested that one country, however large or powerful—indeed, perhaps, however well intentioned—can take upon itself the obligation to enforce Security Council resolutions for the enforcement of which the rest of the Security Council does not, at that stage, see any necessity?

I am happy to say that Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the UK ambassador, avoided that morass and said that there was no automaticity in the resolution. He said that, if there were a further Iraqi breach of its disarmament obligations, the matter would return to the council for discussion. He expected the council then to meet its responsibilities.

The French ambassador said that if the inspection authorities reported to the council that Iraq had not complied with its obligations, the council would meet immediately and decide on a course of action. France welcomed the lack of automaticity in the final resolution. The same thing was said by other countries. The Mexican ambassador said that those who advocated the automatic recourse to the use of force had agreed to offer Iraq a final chance and that Iraq was now obliged to fully comply with its international obligations. He said that the resolution had eliminated automaticity in the use of force as a result of a material breach, and he welcomed the acceptance of the two-stage approach. The Irish ambassador said that the resolution provided for a clear, sequential process for Iraq's compliance. The Russian ambassador emphasised that the resolution did not contain any provision for the automatic use of force The Bulgarian ambassador said much the same.

The most extraordinary vote on the council, in some ways, was that cast by Syria. I did not think that the Syrian Government would be prepared to support the resolution, and it is important that we look to see why they did. The Syrian ambassador said that Syria had voted for the resolution in order to achieve unanimity in the council and because of its commitment to the UN charter and international law, be it in the case of Iraq or of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian cause. His country voted in favour after having received from the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as France and the Russian Federation, reassurances that the resolution would not he used as a pretext to strike Iraq and did not constitute a basis for automaticity. I do not need to refer to the views of the rest of the Security Council; they expressed themselves in like terms.

The difficulty is that we must now construe the resolution in circumstances that are, as yet, unknown and, perhaps, unknowable. The resolution and the terms of its acceptance would make it difficult to argue that there was no need for a second resolution. The tenor of the resolution and the debate on it pointed in the direction of having a second decision by the Security Council before force was used. The firm way in which automaticity was excluded means that we go back to the provisions of the charter. We must examine the charter and decide whether, in the circumstances, chapter 7 of the charter should be used. I can think of no case in which there was unilateral action by a country to enforce a chapter 7 determination without, at least, the acquiescence of the Security Council.

I understand that governments like to preserve their freedom of action, but it would be difficult to justify unilateral action with regard to law or political reality. Will the United States really go it alone, not just without Security Council approval but, possibly, in the face of Security Council opposition? Once it has met to consider a report from the inspectors of what is alleged to be a material breach, the council is bound to express an opinion. I have no doubt that that opinion will, at some stage, emerge in the form of a proposed resolution. I suppose that, in those circumstances, the United States would be prepared to use the veto. If the United States does so, must we follow it? We would be in an almost impossible situation, caught between a rock and a hard place. We could have to veto a resolution. More importantly, we would be supporting .action that, prima facie, at any rate, was legally doubtful.

If there is urgency such that it is essential that military intervention take place, where is the evidence? I have not seen it. I understand the restraints imposed by the delicacy of the process of gathering intelligence, but we cannot go to war on the basis of a nod and a wink. The United States and the United Kingdom were two of the nations that were most active in promoting the United Nations after the Second World War. To put it mildly, it would be sad, if we were to be party to undermining the United Nations to the point that its continued effectiveness was put in doubt.

I am an unashamed multilateralist, as I have been all my life. Even allowing for all the problems, it is messier, it is more difficult to control, there are more countries to take on board and so on. But the outcome, if successful, will be infinitely greater than a unilateral approach. If nations act in concert rather than individually, the chances of resolving those problems will be increased, not diminished. It is that doctrine that I am afraid will perhaps be put in doubt if a certain interpretation of this resolution is adopted.

My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Richard, in a bipartisan policy on croaking. I apologise to your Lordships if I am not entirely audible.

The noble Lord referred to the United Nations Resolution 1441 and, with his considerable experience of the United Nations, said that it was as condemnatory as any resolution that he could recall. As we all know, the explanation for that lies in the first paragraph of the resolution, which sets out all the United Nations previous resolutions that have been studiously ignored over all these years. I was somewhat involved in the very first, 687, which set out the absolute conditions of the ceasefire when the real threat of military force and the continuance of military force threatened Saddam Hussein, which he then accepted and, of course, has failed to comply with, and the succession of resolutions listed thereafter.

I therefore recognise and welcome the achievement of the Government; and I refer to the Government in totality because it is an example of British diplomatic capability, led by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary playing a very significant role in the achievement of this remarkable outcome, with, to the surprise of many, as the noble Lord, Lord Richard, said, the inclusion of Syria and all the other countries of the United Nations representing their various areas of the world. It was also good to see the subsequent support of the Arab League for the need for action by Iraq.

I do not believe that anyone would suggest that the situation has now become any easier or that the world has become a safer place since the failure to achieve those earlier resolutions. We awoke this morning to the announcement of further terrorist outrages in Kenya—I apologise for the old-fashioned pronunciation—where I once served. With the terrorist attack in Bali, the fragility of the situation in Afghanistan, the obvious determination of Al'Qaeda to pursue its activities wherever it may, the recent warnings of threats to our own country and the possible arrest of those alleged to be involved in serious terrorist attacks in this country, we know that we face a serious terrorist threat.

I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Wright that, whether or not there is the closest evidence of total identification, we should not leave one country, as unattractive in its approach to other countries and other peoples as Iraq, in some sense impregnable, which could then subsequently become a base. The world is a more dangerous place. I have had some involvement myself in trying to combat terrorism in its various forms, but I have never had to combat the kind of terrorism that involves suicide bombers or organisations that care not how many people they kill and whose objective is that the greater the outrage, the more effective and successful they will regard their activity.

It is a new threat. My noble friend Lord Howell made that point very clearly. The allying of that threat and the completely different mind set that now exists in the world of terrorism, with the capability to ally it to weapons of mass destruction that are not necessarily secure, with no obvious linkage to the source from which they came but for which they may be made available, poses a challenge to the civilised world on a scale that we have not so far had to face and which, I accept, underpins much of the resolution of the United States and of Her Majesty's Government at present to try to make people realise that we face a quite different scale of threat.

So we face this resolution, and I have no hesitation in picking up the words that have been quoted: "This is the final opportunity". Those are the words of the resolution. There must be an absolute insistence on total compliance. There must be absolute certainty that Saddam Hussein is under no illusion whatever that a failure to observe that total compliance will lead to military action. Anyone who says, "We shall have to think about it" or "I am not quite sure" or "We shall have to deliberate on it later" will encourage Saddam Hussein to believe that he may be able to get off the hook. It will be a very serious decision. It has not yet been taken. I accept the Government's position on that, and we shall need to think about it, but to suggest at this stage that we are not sure what to do would be the biggest failure at the present time.

We are debating a resolution that is already in operation. Noble Lords will have read the reports of the first day of the inspectors' work. Anyone who has had a chance to speak to the inspectors, as I have previously in Kuwait at one of their bases in the early days, will know the difficulties that they face. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, suggested, I think with tongue in cheek, that someone may be bugging the inspectors. To anyone who would care to have a bet with me on that, I would say that it is the easiest money you could possibly make. The Iraqis bug everyone. I was in Baghdad on an innocent trade mission. It is in the nature of the Iraqi government and the secret police to operate in that way. The difficulty for the inspectors is that one of the requirements contained in Mr Blix's letter is that the Iraqis are responsible for the security of the inspectors as they travel around. It therefore comes as no surprise that six United Nations cars were followed by 15 Iraqi police cars and other government officials roaring around the streets of Baghdad, all part of the same convoy. The difficulties of their role cannot be underestimated.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, discussed all the problems and asked, "How can we be sure?" The reality is that we cannot be sure about this inspection. Whether it takes a month, six months or a year, the best that we can hope for is that they find no evidence. They cannot possibly say more. The Iraqis are masters of deception and concealment. All that they can possibly return with is a statement that they have found no evidence.

The first crunch will come much sooner than a year from now. The first crunch will come on 8th December, the date by which Iraq has to make a full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes of weapons of mass destruction. I do not know what the Iraqis will say. Will they say, "We have none"? Of course, everyone knows that that is completely untrue. They certainly had them, as evidenced by the 20,000 dead bodies that lay in the Fao Peninsula. The use of chemical weapons was a crucial element in the defence strategy of Saddam Hussein in relation to Halabja. When the offensive was launched on the Fao Peninsula, the Iraqis resisted the numerical superiority of the Iranians by the use of nerve agents and mustard gas, and 20,000 Iranians paid the price of that.

The Iraqis said that it was not an accident but a vital element in the protection of Iraq and its survival in the Iran-Iraq war. I do not intend to develop this point, but I have seen it reported and widely quoted by Iraqis that they positively believe that the reason why in the Gulf War we did not continue from the liberation of Kuwait to advance on Baghdad was that we knew that they would then use the chemical weapons that they had and they believed that their possession of chemical weapons saved them on that occasion. This is not some imaginary existence or a fantasy of some maverick intelligence organisation. The existence was real.

On 8th December, therefore, in accordance with the resolution, they will have to say what the programme was, whether it has stopped and what has happened to all the materials. We did not find them all in the previous inspections. We found some, but we certainly did not discover them all.

The current position is that out of that is highly likely to come a material breach. What happens then? There is to be a United Nations Security Council discussion. I do not believe that anyone will carry much credence if more sanctions are suggested. The no-fly zone, which I helped to institute in 1991, has reached the end of its life. It certainly provided protection to the Kurds and to an extent the Marsh Arabs, but it has provided no greater sanction than that. It is clear that there must be resolute action.

My position is that it would be better if that were done with the full support of the United Nations. However, if the United Nations continues to be paralysed, as it has been for the past 11 years, if it fails to implement the resolutions it has imposed, and facing the scale of threat that the world and particularly this country now faces, it may be necessary to act outside the agreement of the United Nations but with the maximum support we can obtain.

In that context, the United States has enormous power, but it would be disastrous if the Americans were to act on their own. While I worry considerably about our current capability and the quality of some of our equipment—I shall not raise that at this moment—we none the less have a real contribution to make with our background and experience particularly in that part of the world in which the UK has been involved for so many decades. I therefore hope that we will be prepared to play our part and I support the Government's approach to the parliamentary process.

Finally, in the case of the Gulf War a succession of Motions supported the deployment of our forces and the giving of the sternest possible warning to Saddam Hussein to evacuate Kuwait and to cease his aggression, warning him of the consequences. When subsequently it was necessary to take action, we came to the House of Commons and to this House as soon as possible in order to obtain a substantive Motion. I believe that that is the right action to take.

My Lords, a hundred years ago in Chicago, Theodore Roosevelt repeated the, even then, old adage, "Speak softly and carry a big stick". Today's President of the United States is well equipped to follow that advice.

Sound advice it is, too, if one is seeking to influence the thoughts and reactions of a potential opponent. Surely he will measure the strength of your resolve by the size of your stick rather than the volume of your rhetoric. Words will not faze him; actions will.

The spoken volumes of threats, often at high decibel levels, have nevertheless been the more dominant features of recent weeks, even months, as the Iraqi crisis has unfolded. They started with assertions of the need for regime change, of the determination to ensure disarmament and the removal of all weapons of mass destruction. I doubt that much of all this verbiage has had Saddam quaking in his shoes.

What will have influenced him—at least, assuming that he thinks rationally and I think that we must—is the scale and achievement of those western forces that he has seen in operation elsewhere in the world. After a hesitant start, the efforts in the Balkans proved a success. Those in Afghanistan demonstrated the global reach that can now be achieved by air and naval forces in relatively short time frames.

He will be aware of the importance of mounting bases for offensive action, and knows that there are a number of neighbours and near-neighbours to Iraq who are prepared to co-operate, or positively consider co-operation, with his enemy. He will recall the overwhelming military nature of Desert Storm, though he may console himself that it took several months of logistic and other efforts to bring ground forces to bear.

But that was a decade ago. What we hear little about, but he will be very familiar with it, is the constant patrolling of the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq. The efforts of the RAF and other air forces involved in this so-called humanitarian task have varied over the years since they started soon after the end of the Gulf conflict. A few general figures will nevertheless give a measure of this protracted commitment for the RAF. Its extent may come as a surprise.

Flying from bases in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in the south and from Turkey in the north, over 24,000 RAF missions have been mounted since these operations started a decade ago. The RAF's weapons and defensive aids have greatly improved since Desert Storm. ASRAAMS on the Tornado F3s are now the best air-to-air missile in the world. Air-to-ground weapons, like the enhanced Paveway, have reliability and accuracy of a far greater degree than ever before.

The aircrew who fly these missions are not out on some training exercise. Often Iraqi air defences will catch them with their radar and try to shoot them down. Coalition aircraft were fired on 120 times recently in one month alone. In my maiden speech in your Lordships' House in 1991, following the end of the Gulf conflict, I drew attention to the courage and determination that aircrews showed then when they flew into danger. I also referred to the bravery of our special forces and those in minesweepers. I said then that I counted it a privilege,

"to have been associated with the activity of such brave people who display that very special kind of individual courage: to outface danger and conquer fear on their own".—[Official Report, 4/11/91: col. 36.]

It requires a special form of bravery and grit to fly today's missions not once or twice but many, many times. More than 30 RAF crews patrolling Iraqi no-fly zones have done it over 100 times; the highest scorer's next mission will be his 160th.

Not all of those now involved are seasoned campaigners with years of squadron experience under their belt and many hours in their logbooks. First tourists are fully committed too. Any one of them may have to fire their weapons in self-defence against the Iraqis. We can all be thankful that, thus far, no fatality or shooting down of one of our aircraft has occurred. But each day that goes by shortens the odds.

I have no doubt that these young men, and now women, deserve to be rewarded for their bravery and determination in the face of imminent danger. There seems to be some reluctance to recognise, with anything more than the General Service Medal, these young people who risk their lives to uphold the policies of Her Majesty's Government and the good name of the Royal Air Force. I hope that we shall hear that many of them are to be honoured. It would do much for morale, even perhaps as good a retention measure as a bounty cheque in the bank. Such bravery and determination deserve recognition.

If the present rules for awards do not cover such courage and commitment, then the rules are wrong. They need to be changed to reflect that these flights are missions into real danger. I recall from my discussions with Sir Arthur Harris his disgust and dismay that there was no special campaign medal for those who flew bombing missions in World War II.

I hope that we do not repeat this short-sighted and niggardly approach. We should not have to wait for one of our aircraft to be shot down to recognise that there is real danger in every mission. I hope that the Minister, whom I have alerted to my concerns, will be able to say that many such honours will be forthcoming. They are certainly well deserved.

Meanwhile, Saddam, in spite of Resolution 1441, has not stopped attempts to shoot down those who patrol these no-fly zones. But I take some comfort from the fact that Saddam must realise that his military potential to deal with even greater air operations in his airspace will not be good. In 10 years he has not had one success. All credit to our crews for that Iraqi duck. But he cannot expect that his forces will greatly interfere with air attacks on key targets in Iraq, let alone stop them being damaged and destroyed.

He is in a good position to appreciate that, for all the western rhetoric—which he might he tempted to ignore or dismiss—the big stick is for real. He will not want to give the West the excuse, that some in Washington would like, to wage air war upon his country. So I hope that we shall continue to demonstrate that there is the real potential to destroy him and that it is not left only to the megaphone pronouncements of governments, repeated by the world's media, to tell him so. The rest of the world will be listening too and can be scared by what it hears. More so than Saddam, who will only be likely to co-operate if the will to use the stick is quietly made known to him by both word and deed.

The crews who fly over Iraq deserve our fullest support and admiration. It is they as much as anyone who are helping to get the right messages to Baghdad. If this is achieved, a successful outcome, without major conflict, could still be within our grasp and that of the United Nations and Resolution 1441.

We must be prepared not only for conflict but be clear about the post-hostilities situation. I hope that the Minister can give assurance that this aspect of planning is not being neglected.

My Lords, it is good that your Lordships' House has the opportunity of debating the situation in Iraq at this significant stage in developments.

The General Synod of the Church of England was meeting at much the same time as the Security Council of the United Nations was formulating Resolution 1441. There was general recognition during the Synod's debate that the Government were to be congratulated on playing such a significant part in ensuring that the United Nations was the body driving the negotiations seeking to disarm Iraq of any weapons of mass destruction. In particular, it was recognised that the Prime Minister had been very instrumental in persuading the United States, at least at this stage, to work with and through the UN rather than taking unilateral action.

The Synod endorsed the House of Bishops' submission that the crucial first step in disarming Iraq was to obtain the unfettered and unhindered access of UN weapons inspectors to facilitate the identification and destruction of any of these terror weapons. Yesterday in Iraq the weapon inspectors began their work.

The equivalent debate in the other place took place on Monday, before it was known what reception the inspectors would receive. Speakers there reflected upon what would happen if the Iraqi Government did not co-operate in the process of inspection; who would report this back to the Security Council and how it would be done; and what steps the Security Council might then take to ensure compliance with Resolution 1441.

Yesterday, both teams of inspectors reported every co-operation from the Iraqis as they began their work. My concern today is not the unco-operation of the Iraqi regime with the UN inspectors but its super cooperation and what may lie behind it.

It could be that the Iraqi Government have nothing to hide; that the dossier of information which Her Majesty's Government placed before your Lordships' House during an earlier debate was misplaced or mistaken; that there are no weapons of mass destruction hidden in Iraq. That would be a marvellous outcome to the inspection process for the world would then be a much safer place.

But a second reason for yesterday's super cooperation of the Iraqi regime could be that the weapons of mass destruction are so carefully squirreled away that the Iraqis are confident that they will remain hidden from the prying eyes of the UN inspectors, particularly if those eyes can be directed in a different direction.

When the noble Lord, Lord Steel, and I paid a humanitarian fact-finding visit to Baghdad following the Gulf War, we were met with just such super cooperation. Every day and every evening our minder took us wherever we wanted to go. Our visits were always well expected and well prepared for. It was all very frustrating. It was only when we noted that our minder assumed that we and he would take a rest every afternoon that we began to make any progress, by slipping out of our hotel rooms during our minder's siesta and visiting independent agencies and contacts, where we saw a very different picture and heard very different voices describing life in that unhappy country. Somehow the UN inspectors must develop similar plans, away from prying eyes and ears and super co-operative minders.

But there could be a third reason for the super cooperation with the inspectors. We might find a clue to this in the Bible in St Paul's letter to the Romans, chapter 12, which states:

"If our enemy hungers, feed them. If they are thirsty, give them something to drink. For by so doing you will heap burning coals upon their heads".

Or, in this case, if the UN inspectors want to go somewhere, take them everywhere they want to go and more. Exhaust them and their limited resources with super co-operation. Take them to every corner of the country until they are overwhelmed with activity.

This Pauline doctrine of super co-operation might then be taken a stage further. Resolution 1441, as we have heard, places upon the Iraqi Government the necessity of making a full and complete declaration of their entire weapons of mass destruction programme within 30 days-8th December. Questions were asked of the Government in the other place on Monday as to what would happen if the Iraqi regime failed to do this or simply replied that it had no such weapons. Would this be regarded as non-compliance with Resolution 1441? If so, what then? The noble Lord, Lord King, addressed this question earlier.

I should like to ask the Minister a rather different question. What will the UN do if there is super compliance and the Iraqis make a super declaration on day 30, saying something like this: "We do not have any weapons of mass destruction or ways of producing them. But we want to be co-operative and so we have listed every biological, chemical and mechanical facility we have, every research, development and production unit. The list for these is very long for there are thousands of such items, but we want to be cooperative"?

Of course, hidden away in such a list may well be items of real concern which might indeed be weapons of mass destruction, in embryo at least, but it could be extremely difficult to find them among the rest; it would be like looking for 10 needles in 1,000 haystacks. Can the Minister indicate whether that kind of super co-operation would be regarded as noncompliance with Resolution 1441 and, if so, how the members of the Security Council who are less suspicious of the Iraqi regime than Her Majesty's Government might be persuaded of this?

I freely admit that this Pauline doctrine of super cooperation is pure speculation, but we are dealing with an intelligent, powerful and cunning regime which has survived and prospered thus far by being able to turn even adverse situations to its own advantage. If the UN inspectors can be encouraged to engage in a frantic round of activity until the summer months, when military operations in the desert become more difficult, then the threat of military sanctions becomes less formidable. The frustrations and divisions of the UN Security Council could become immense, with the consequent danger of the United States, and possibly Britain, taking unilateral action, with very serious consequences for us internationally and possibly within Britain.

In Dukas's Sorcerer's Apprentice, a magician's young apprentice tries to lighten his workload by experimenting with magic spells that he has seen his master use. When the boy is alone, lie commands a broom to go to the well to fetch water for the house. The broom obliges all too well, and the apprentice finds that he does not know how to command the broom to stop when the basin begins to overflow, soon filling the room with water, and before long the boy is near to drowning.

Resolution 1441 requires the UN inspectors to update the Security Council within 60 days of resuming inspections and, thereafter, every 60 days. In my scenario of super co-operation, where the inspectors risk drowning in activity and information. I should like to ask the Minister whether there is an end point to the flood; or do successive 60 days stretch out long into the future?

I have concentrated very much on the short-term here and now situation, but I should also like to place on record that in the General Synod's debate we were also very conscious of the difficult issues underlying the present tensions in Iraq and elsewhere, particularly the Israeli/Palestinian convulsions. This is even more relevant following this morning's disturbing news from Kenya of the attempted missile attack on an airliner carrying Israeli passengers. The Synod resolution supported and encouraged the Prime Minister in his efforts to press for a new international conference to revitalise the Middle East peace process based on the twin principles of a secure Israel and a viable Palestinian state. This might not be in the forefront of our minds today as the UN inspectors go about their work in Iraq, but there will be no abiding peace until that issue too has been tackled and solved.

My Lords, I join with other noble Lords in saying that the fact that UN Security Council Resolution 1441 was carried unanimously is an amazing achievement for the British and American diplomats and politicians involved, who certainly deserve our congratulations.

It is an excellent resolution which confronts and deals with two problems. First, how to pin down the Saddam regime to co-operate with the UN inspectors in such a detailed way as would prevent the squirming manoeuvres which this regime had used to evade detection by previous UN inspection teams. Some have queried the specifics into which paragraph 5 goes, but the detailed points in paragraph 5 are all necessary. As one reads it, one recognises again and again precise incidents and tactics which occurred in the past and which are being specifically blocked in the wording of this resolution.

In particular, some have questioned the provision that,

"Unmovic and IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside of Iraq, may facilitate the travel of those interviewed and family members outside of Iraq, and at the sole discretion of Unmovic and IAEA such interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government".

It is difficult to over-estimate the chilling efficiency and scope of the terror machine which keeps the Saddam regime in power. It is well documented that whole families are wiped out if a member is suspected of disaffection for the regime. Some of your Lordships will have seen the powerful "Dispatches" programme on Channel 4 on 17th November which investigated reports of public beheadings of women by men with faces and bodies swathed in black known as Uday's Fedayeen (controlled by Saddam's son, Uday). Officially any such executions are denied, but ordinary people, unaware of the official denial, confirmed the executions on camera, explaining rather disingenuously that these women were executed only because they were prostitutes and it was part of a campaign supposed to reinforce the principles of Islam.

In fact, there is evidence that among the women executed were a doctor, a teacher and an ordinary mother, who had all fallen foul of the regime for real or imagined dissidence. No one who saw this programme will easily forget the eyewitness descriptions of some of the ghastly details of these executions—all carried out at carefully chosen times and places for maximum public effect. As the courageous investigative reporter said about one such event, it was the equivalent of choosing a busy time in Oxford Street. Carefully planned actions like that ensure maximum terror effect and surely justify the provisions in paragraph 5.

The second problem for the UN resolution was how to make the language so clear and unequivocal that even Saddam would recognise that this time the penalty for not co-operating with the UN inspectors will have serious consequences up to and including military action against him, and that he could not just play for time as he had done so often before. That is why it is right that a strict timetable is laid out in this resolution.

The 8th December is now a crucial date—as my noble friend Lady Symons made clear in her opening statement—by which, as laid down in paragraph 3, Iraq has to make a,

"currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles".

And paragraph 3 adds,

"as well as all other chemical, biological and nuclear programmes including any which it claims are for purposes not related to weapons production or material".

Paragraph 4 states—as my noble friend Lord Richard quoted—that false statements or omissions in the declarations shall constitute a material breach of Iraq's obligation and will be reported to the Council.

It has been claimed that this is a resolution for war but, as I have said before, it is only that if Saddam makes it so. Saddam has agreed to go along with Resolution 1441 so there should be no way out of full compliance.

I should like to be optimistic about Iraq complying, but to be honest, that would be a triumph of hope over experience. The former UN inspector, Richard Butler, said a fortnight ago:

"I will predict Iraq will not simply comply, they will give a version of compliance".

I fear that he may well he correct. And he went on to say what I hope will not prove true, that when there is obfuscation or deviation from the requirements of the resolution, there would be disagreement in the Security Council on whether or not Iraq was in material breach.

I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord King, said about this. It is essential that Saddam is not allowed even to start to play that game, let alone win it. It is vital that this time the will of the UN to disarm this dreadful regime of its weapons of mass destruction prevails, and Resolution 1441 provides the necessary tool to achieve this.

My Lords, as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 the sand in the hourglass of Saddam Hussein's defiance has almost trickled out. As we have heard, he has been presented with a stark choice: to give up his weapons of mass destruction voluntarily, for which he has made the Iraqi people pay so dearly in sanctions since 1991, or face the near certainty of military force and his political, if not physical demise. This is Iraq's final opportunity—and "final" must mean final. It is a case of disarm or face the consequences.

There is widespread consensus today that the subtler points of diplomatic nuances are wasted on Saddam Hussein. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, said in this House two weeks ago: namely, that there was no point in trying to be "diplomatically subtle" with the Iraqi regime. As Kofi Annan has said,

"We have learned that sensitive diplomacy must be backed by the threat of military force if it is to succeed".

A strategy of diplomacy must be backed by the credible threat of the use of force. Without that credible threat, I doubt that we would have seen UN inspectors back in Iraq today.

We all want to avoid war. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, emphasised, if the UN weapons inspectors are given time to do their jobs, we may yet succeed in doing so. But in the brief time available, I intend to focus on what has been called the aftermath.

We know that Saddam Hussein did not use his chemical and biological weapons during the Gulf War because he was striving to ensure the survival of his regime. In the event that war is waged to terminate Saddam Hussein's regime, if his removal is our ultimate war aim, there is less to stop him from pressing the WM D button. He will have little to lose, and the assumption must be that he may be prepared to use his weapons of mass destruction, and, it' he can, to light the touch paper for a full Middle Eastern conflagration. This is only one of the reasons why war against Iraq must be the very last resort, when all else—diplomatic and political initiatives—has failed.

However, if the threat of the use of force that underlies Resolution 1441 is to be credible—and as my noble friend Lord King said, it must be credible—it is right to consider the possibility, and the aims and goals, of military action. The UN resolution may not contain any hidden triggers, but, in its threat of serious consequences in the event of a material breach, it does contain a casus belli. Any war against Iraq must be a means to an end. It cannot be an end in itself. If Saddam Hussein is toppled, that is not an end in itself. If military action results in regime change, we cannot then pat ourselves on the back and say, "job done, pack up and go home". It is only the beginning.

On Monday, I asked the Minister whether she agreed that we must have full contingency plans, in the event that the use of force becomes necessary, and plans for the outcome and aftermath of any military action. I asked her whether she agreed that any decision to use force against Iraq must include a strategy for the long-term, post-war stability of Iraq and the region as a whole. I asked for assurances that Britain would not enter a conflict against Iraq without a clear, effective and pre-planned exit strategy.

I am troubled by the uncharacteristic lack of clarity in the Minister's answer. I wonder whether we have learned the lesson that we cannot have a strategy to enter a war—which may happen very soon—unless we have a strategy to exit one. The lack of an effective, pre-planned exit strategy risks a long military campaign followed by continued political and military entanglement. If this should prove to be the case, the eddying politics of the Middle East may make a military campaign only the start of our problems. Saddam Hussein cannot be toppled without a replacement in view; otherwise there will be a dangerous power vacuum. But a government in Iraq that is perceived as the West's puppet, any kind of client regime or an American protectorate will do nothing to bring stability to an already politically highly volatile region. To quote the noble Baroness:

"These will not be actions seen to be absolutely fair".

It would be highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as would we, because it would risk presenting terrorist organisations with a gift—the proof of their claim that the US is illegitimately controlling their part of the world. It is just that propaganda that a terrorist organisation such as ATQaeda requires.

How do we address this? It is not just a question of the United Kingdom standing shoulder to shoulder with America. The involvement of Arab countries is essential as it was in the Gulf War coalition. If we take military action, it must be with the backing of the people who live in the region and whose governments support our aims and objectives. So I ask the Minister what implications he believes military action against Iraq would have for the stability of the Middle Eastern region as a whole, in the event that the use of force is triggered as a result of non-compliance by Iraq with Resolution 1441.

There is no doubt that many Arab countries see the problem of Israel and Palestine as inextricably linked to that of Saddam Hussein. There must he progress on one if there is to be progress on the other.

I hope that the Minister will give an assurance that in the event of military action the Government will set out their plans for a post-Saddam Iraq. Our goal should be a unified, single country at peace with itself and with its neighbours. As your Lordships are all too well aware, the internal opposition to Saddam Hussein is weak, ineffective and hopelessly divided. If Saddam Hussein lost power, it is possible that Iraq would fragment into entities controlled by the Kurds in the north, the Shia Muslims in the south and the Sunni Muslims in the centre. To many, the creation of a southern Iraqi state run by Iraq's majority Shia community would represent a victory for the influence of radical Iran. Turkey, Syria and Iran would also fear the rise of Kurdish nationalist and separatist movements. There are other reasons why Iraq as a country should not be allowed to fragment.

The American press has reported that the US Administration are considering a plan to occupy Iraq and install a US-led military government as a way of avoiding the country's chaotic disintegration. Yet there is little indication of the existence of a sensible, workable, long-term strategy for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq

The international community has a responsibility to assist the people of Iraq with economic aid and humanitarian assistance. This is vital if the Iraqi people are to rebuild successfully the internal infrastructure and the economy of their country. We will need to help to rebuild Iraq's economy and infrastructure after the ravages of more than a decade of sanctions and the "wasting of the treasures of Iraq in the hands of its leaders". This is a responsibility for the whole international community.

We have developed the dangerous habit of partitioning our roles, sometimes in the name of burden-sharing, sometimes in the name of expediency. There has been a tendency to say that the US has all the military might so it should shoulder the burden of the military campaign while Britain, the European Union and whoever else is prepared to do so are better suited to sweeping up the broken glass afterwards and handling the post-war reconstruction. This will not work in the case of Iraq. In this situation, we must work together at every step, be it during a military campaign or in a post-war humanitarian and reconstruction scenario.

I have said before in this House that winning the peace is as important as winning the war. This applies equally to Afghanistan, and, if circumstances were to lead there, it also applies to Iraq. Yet, time and again, we fail to devote the same resources to resolution of the underlying causes of conflict as we do to diplomatic and military requirements. Beyond the CNN headline-making effect of waging and winning wars, the making and keeping of a permanent peace through the long, slow process of restoration of a country or a region, of the reconstruction of its towns, villages, businesses and communities, and of the revival of its spirit and its people is too often neglected.

As we tour the world and focus on Iraq, it is still a lesson I am not convinced we have learned, even in the wake of September 11th.

My Lords, I begin by apologising to your Lordships, as I already have to the Minister, that, because of a long-standing engagement overseas late tonight, I shall probably not be present for the closing speeches.

Like others speaking in this debate, I welcome Security Council Resolution 1441. It helpfully tightens the screw on Saddam Hussein to compel him to disarm. Like other noble Lords, I also hope that Saddam will give a full accounting of his weapons of mass destruction, as well as the materials and facilities for manufacturing them, so the inspectors can find and destroy them and we will not have to go to war on Iraq.

But, my Lords, I am not holding my breath. Experience suggests that such hopes are likely to be vain. Saddam Hussein will hang on to his weapons of mass destruction so long as he believes he can deceive us and so long as he thinks he can rely on some UN members continuing, to want to stave off military action at all costs. It also seems all to likely, I fear, that he will be able to outsmart the inspectors on the ground.

The lessons about this that I draw from my personal experience of the Gulf War are that with hindsight we made a mistake by not insisting on Saddam's personal surrender and subsequent removal in 1991; that Iraq will never renounce weapons of mass destruction permanently, so long as Saddam and his associates remain in power—to believe otherwise is wishful thinking—and that half measures will never solve the problem; at best they will only defer it.

So I have very little doubt that force will have to be used, and probably sooner rather than later. That is the prospect to which I shall address my remarks. I shall make four points.

First, we should not be floppy about identifying what constitutes a material breach of the UN resolution. An untrue declaration by Saddam would be a material breach, to add to many earlier ones. It may be that we shall want to wait for an even more concrete breach before initiating military action, but let us call a spade a spade from the beginning.

Secondly, once a clear material breach is detected and exposed, there will be a great outcry demanding another Security Council resolution before force is used. Indeed, we have heard it already. However, as others have said, there is no legal requirement for that and there is no commitment to it in the earlier resolution; only to further discussion. President Bush has said clearly that such discussion cannot and must not jeopardise America's freedom of action. I hope Britain will stand with him on this rather than make a misguided attempt to appease opinion by actively canvassing and expressing a preference for a second resolution. That will only encourage Saddam to believe that he still has a chance of escaping the serious consequences that the Security Council resolution threatened. You cannot make and then remake decisions without losing credibility.

Of course, in an ideal world it would be desirable to have every member of the Security Council signed up to military action, but in the real world the chances are very slim. It is easy enough to predict here and now the course that a further Security Council discussion will take. After all, plainly several UN Security Council members voted for Resolution 1441 precisely because it did not threaten the use of force. Those countries that for years have been trying to help Saddam Hussein get off the hook of sanctions will temporise and argue for more time, for more evidence, for one more chance. To quote a renowned speech in another place, "No, no, no"—no more time; no more breaches; no more chances; and no vetoes.

Thirdly, what about the reaction of Muslim countries and their governments to the use of force to disarm Saddam Hussein? There is a certain amount of hyperventilation on the subject, including in this House. The fact is that Saddam Hussein represents even more of a threat to his neighbours than to us. He invaded Kuwait. There was little doubt then that his ambition extended beyond that to the Saudi oil fields and even to those of the lower Gulf. The Saudi Government certainly thought so at the time. Saddam also holds the unchallenged world record for slaughtering his fellow Muslims—over 1 million in the Iran-Iraq war. Whatever Arab governments feel it necessary to say publicly now, I cannot believe that most of them will not be mightily relieved to see him go, provided military action is swift and successful and does not involve Israel. That will do far more for their own security than appeasing the anger of the so-called Arab street—a threat that is often wheeled out, but which has constantly proved exaggerated.

The attitude of the Muslim world would certainly be improved if the United States would galvanise itself to rekindle negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. All that needs to be said was said in President Bush's excellent speech last June, spelling out the elements of a settlement. Of course a full-blown solution cannot be delivered just like that, but a start needs to be made and made now. It is worth recalling that in the previous Gulf War, President Bush 41 promised a peace conference as soon as the task of ejecting Iraq from Kuwait was completed.

Lastly, as we reflect on the further steps at the United Nations, let us remember that disarming Iraq will not be the end of the story. Beyond that there is the emerging risk of a nuclear-capable and terrorist-supporting Iran and there is North Korea's cynical admission after years of blatant lies that it is developing nuclear weapons—and, indeed, probably has them. There is no single strategy that can disarm North Korea and deter other rogue states that may be trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. In the case of North Korea, there will need to be intense and co-ordinated pressure on the regime, not just from the United States, but from China, Japan, Russia and South Korea.

One thing is surely indisputable: swift, resolute and successful action to disarm Saddam Hussein will send an unmistakable signal to others with similar ambitions that their game is up.

My Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Powell. Slightly to my surprise, I agreed with almost everything he said.

There are two issues. The first, which the noble Lord dealt with, is whether a war can or should be avoided. The second, not yet mentioned, is the overflow from the Iraq situation, actual and potential, into community relations in this country.

On the potential war, I echo the views of the noble Lord, Lord Howell, that Saddam Hussein presents a uniquely dangerous threat and that there is a clear link between Iraq and terrorism, shown not least by his financing of the suicide bombers. The noble Lord did not mention that Saddam has also been reported many times as giving 25,000 dollars to the family of each suicide bomber. In other words, he encourages families to send their children not only to their own deaths, but to murder others. As a parent I find that difficult to understand—and even more so as a grandparent. The idea of somebody paying families to do that is revolting.

This man is a danger to us all. Clearly, none of us who has seen war or its aftermath wants it to be inflicted or imposed on anyone else. The question is what alternative there can be in this case. The alternative is for him to give up his weapons and to treat the inspectors with openness and respect. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said, they must be treated honestly, in a trustworthy way and without interference. I have no belief that he will do that. Some noble Lords may have heard the broadcast yesterday morning by the former head of the CIA who said that he has no doubt that Saddam Hussein will not behave in that way.

Iraq is a country the size of France. There will be 80 inspectors on the ground with their staff. We can imagine how little would he found in this country by 80 inspectors. They will certainly not find much in Iraq, where it is reported—again without contradiction—that Saddam Hussein has had a staff of literally thousands engaged for months in hiding away his weapons of destruction. He will have had no difficulty doing that: he is the dictator of a country of mountains, deserts and caves that are ideal for hiding any of these potential weapons. They are not weapons that those of us involved in wars in the past would have known. These are new biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Thinking about this debate, I remembered with happiness a 90th birthday party for a very distinguished relative of mine. He is a doctor and businessman and is physically and mentally fit. After the celebration I asked him, "How do you do it? What is your secret? I would like to be like you at 90", "Oh, it's simple," he said. "Get it before it gets you". He has health checks. He was talking about his health and about dealing with personal problems before they kill you, which all of us can understand. But I am afraid that that is my view on Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. If we do not get him, he will get us; indeed, not only us, but our way of life, our world, and those about whom we care. As the noble Lord, Lord Powell, so eloquently pointed out, he will outsmart the inspectors.

We do not want war, but we do know what will happen. I notice that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Croy, is sitting on the opposite side of the Chamber. He led British troops into Belsen after the war. I followed him a little while later while the war was still going on—

Yes, my Lords, it was three weeks before the end.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord. The noble Lord knows the effect of appeasement on Europe in the past. We should all remember the dangers of allowing a vicious dictator not merely to be in power but to be in a position to impose his will, his dangers—and, indeed, death—upon others. As the noble Lord, Lord King, said, there is a new scale and a new nature to the threat. Saddam Hussein must have an absolute certainty that failure to come clean will lead to swift, effective military action.

The other side of the problem is the overflow into other worlds, not least our own. I have in mind the suicide bomber about whom we heard this morning—the man who drove his car into an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya and blew himself up killing 10 other people in the process. There was also the threat today to an Israel aircraft in Kenya at about the same time; happily, the two missiles did not connect.

After 9/11 I remember talking to a senior security person who said that he would be very surprised if we did not have such an event in this country. Among the perfectly obvious targets is the one in which we work— the Palace of Westminster. There is an overflow and a danger to us all that we should never underestimate. However, there is also an overflow into relations between communities that live in this country.

I am a member of the Jewish community, which, I know, is very happy to work with people in the Muslim community in this country—now numbering about 2 million. It is very important that we should not allow the overflow of problems in the Middle East, from whatever part, to enter the relations between our own communities, no matter what our differences may be. Those of us who remember the successful efforts of the Nazis in Britain before the war will have felt a deep sense of shock that they would win even one council seat last week.

As a Member of Parliament for part of Leicester, where we had, and have, many mixed communities, I remember that the National Front came within 56 votes of winning two seats in a council election in my patch in the early 1980s—an area of the city that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will remember well because he was with me at that time. We issued a pamphlet, which said:

"The National Front is a Nazi Front".

However underprivileged they may have been, it sunk into people's minds that they would not find any relief by supporting the National Front, or any other Nazi party. One of the fascists sued for libel, but subsequently dropped the suit. The message had sunk in: the National Front and the British National Party have never made any inroads in Leicester. The fascists are feeding off communal ill will. They are attacking the Muslim communities. They are very happy when the Muslim community attacks the Jewish community. There have been Muslim marches with those taking part carrying banners saying, "Death to Jews". I believe that any Jewish person who carries a banner displaying the words, "Death to M uslims"—I know of none—should be prosecuted, locked up, and kept away from society for as long as possible.

The Jewish community understands that if the far Right waxes fat on its attacks on the Muslim community, other minority communities will follow. The Muslim community must understand that if they pick successfully on the Jewish community, they will be next. We are very fortunate to live in this great, decent, and happy land, all of us together, with our agreements and disagreements. We must keep it that way; we must not allow foreign wars to turn into wars in the United Kingdom. That is as vital a message for us in the Iraqi situation today as it is in any other.

My Lords, as the noble Lord referred to a certain time in the past and mentioned my name, I should like to seize this opportunity to clarify the events in question.

The noble Lord is absolutely right. I was commanding a unit in the division that discovered the concentration camp at Belsen. It was three weeks before the end of the war, and I was wounded two weeks later. After that, I spent over a year in hospital recovering from my injuries and left in a wheelchair. That is the course of events that the noble Lord described. Those of us who found Belsen and realised what had been going on there were absolutely horrified and will always remember it.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his intervention. It is an honour for me to work with him in this House in an effort to prevent such events ever occurring again, whatever minority may be under attack.

My Lords, I believe that the debate is highlighting the difficulties of reconciling the requirements of internationalism with the existence in the world of one overwhelmingly powerful country, not only militarily but also, in the case of the United States, economically and in terms of its popular cultural influence.

We should bear in mind the fact that the American public and the American Government believe that they have sustained an act of war, and that they are at war. The President of the United States received from both Houses of the Congress far heavier majorities authorising the use of force against Iraq than his father received for authorising the Gulf War.

On 11th September of last year the President of the United States said that the US was at war and that it would consider its enemies to be all terrorists; that it would hunt down terrorists wherever they were: that it would make no distinction between terrorists and countries that supported terrorists; and that it would judge by their actions whether any country, and all countries, were friends or foes of America. I believe that all of America's allies essentially heard and agreed with that position when the President enunciated it. He has been quite faithful to that. In the subsequent weeks, I believe that some of the President's advisers made it clear that, in practice, where there is a legitimate territorial issue—such as in Israel and in Palestine—that policy can be varied somewhat, but in general the United States has continued to adhere to it.

What the Congress has voted and what has been ratified by the most successful mid-term election in 68 years was tantamount to a declaration of war; to call it otherwise is a distinction without a difference. That is the condition that the United States is in. Given the severity of the provocation, given the overwhelming evidence that Iraq is a terrorist state, given the egregious acts of terrorism with which Saddam Hussein has been complicit, the United States has in fact behaved with considerable constraint, particularly as it has more military power than all other countries in the world put together. It has a casus belli and it has a righteous cause under international law.

When the President of the United States spoke at the United Nations in September of this year, he made it clear that his objective was in fact the reinforcement of international law, to give effect to the 11 to 16 resolutions which the government of Iraq had contemptuously evaded prohibiting the development of designated weapons of mass destruction. The President said that it was his administration's goal that the United Nations should not become derisory and impotent as the League of Nations had when faced with the aggression of Germany, Italy and Japan in the 1930s. I am sure that those are objectives with which all noble Lords are in complete agreement. However, we should be under no illusion whatever that the Government of Iraq would pay any more attention to this resolution than they paid to previous ones were it not for the purposeful position adopted by the United States since September 11th 2001.

That is entirely continuous to longstanding American national security policy enunciated by President Roosevelt in 1941, when he said that America,

"must always be wary of those who with sounding brass and tinkling cymbal would preach the Ism of appeasement'".

Later in 1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbour, he said that America would,

"make very certain that this form of treachery never again endangers us".

The United States has not been an appeasement power, and, since 1941, no one has dared attack it directly and identify itself with that attack.

I think that it is also to be borne in mind that, while he is a secular leader, Saddam Hussein has set himself at the head of the radical Islamists—of that school of thinking which holds that any form of violence is justified in pursuit of their objectives; that all of the West, not just the United States, is cowardly and decadent; and that the West reposes on no principles whatever except an over-commercialised self-indulgence.

There is no doubt that the Government of Iraq is in defiance of a great sequence of United Nations resolutions and of the terms ending the Gulf War. I must dissent somewhat from the distinction which some draw between the express desire for regime change and the desire to disarm the Government of Iraq. The fact is that we cannot have disarmament of Iraq without a Government of Iraq who wish to disarm. It is illusory to think otherwise. Many preceding speakers have put that point very well and I shall not elaborate on it. However, we should always he mindful of that fact.

The United States possesses a casus belli now. It is behaving in perfect conformity with international law now. The frequently expressed allegations against its unilateralism are in my opinion doubly false: first, it has not acted unilaterally; secondly, it has a perfect right and military capability to do so if it wishes. As has been said, the resolution which we are considering calls upon a process of discussion at the Security Council in the event of considered non-compliance and the advocacy by any of the members for recourse to force. I think that in practice, as my noble friend Lord Powell of Bayswater said—in this as in everything that he said I emphatically agree with him—it is very likely that, unfortunately, that is exactly what is going to happen barring a grace of conversion for which I think there is no precedent.

When we get to that point, what will happen is that the United States ambassador will informally discuss with the permanent Security Council members whether they are prepared to approve a further resolution. If they are not, or at least if they are not all prepared to abstain from vetoing it, I think that we will go to the use of force quite quickly. Like all noble Lords, I would regret that in the abstract. In those circumstances, however, we will have no moral or practical political choice.

I very respectfully caution anyone in need of it against conveying to the Americans the impression that they are regarded as equivalent to a great St Bernard dog which will take the risks and do the work while its ostensible allies including Europeans hold the leash and give the orders. It is not by succumbing to such a system that the United States has risen in a relatively short time to exercise greater influence in the world than any other country in the history of the world. It is obviously not a formula that is acceptable to that country. I think that we would do ourselves no favours in trying to advocate such an approach.

In the summer, a very senior member of the Government told me that if the potential action against Iraq were led by China or Russia there would be no great opposition to it in the parliamentary ranks of the governing party or elsewhere in this country or in Europe, but that people were worried by the force of the United States. I am worried by the force of envy. I think that we have nothing to fear, and nothing to do other than rejoice in the fact that the power of the United States resides with a country that broadly shares our values and generally behaves with restraint and a respect for justice in the abstract, and which is all the same not, as I said, an appeasement power. I think that that is a source of great relief to all of us. There are in your Lordships' House those who vividly remember from their own observations the consequences of the leading powers of the West not behaving in the 1930s as the United States is behaving now.

My Lords, I beg to move that the debate on UN Security Council Resolution 1441 on Iraq be now adjourned.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, at a convenient moment after 3.30 p.m, my noble friend Lord McIntosh will repeat a Statement on British Energy.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether they will introduce legislation to require all coaches to be fitted with seat belts for both drivers and passengers and all drivers and passengers to be required to wear these seat belts.

My Lords, all new coaches are now required to have seat belts fitted in all forward and rear facing seats. Drivers and front seat passengers in all vehicles must use seat belts where provided. An EU directive under discussion will require passengers aged three and over in the rear of coaches to use the seat belts provided.

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for that Answer but can he please tell us how many lives he estimates have been lost, and how many injuries suffered, through people in such coaches not being safely belted in? If, as he says, there is a law that certain passengers on coaches where seat belts are provided must be belted in, what steps are the Government taking to enforce that law? How many people have been prosecuted and with what result? In order to prevent deaths and injuries, some of which have occurred in recent disasters, will my noble friend issue an instruction that drivers must not depart without ensuring that they and all passengers aboard are safely belted into place?

My Lords, in each of the past five years there have been between 11 and 18 deaths in coaches. We cannot tell how many of those deaths resulted from the provision or non-provision of seat belts as some of them occurred as people were getting off and on coaches. Clearly, every single death is a death too many, but that does not mean that this is an enormous problem. All coaches first registered after 1st October last year must have seat belts fitted. Since 1997 all coaches that carry children—that includes nearly all coaches as they cannot make a living unless they carry children as well as adults—must have seat belts fitted. The difficulty, which is recognised in the Question, is that of enforcement and getting drivers and those in charge to ensure that seat belts are used.

My Lords, will the Minister explain why, as I understand it, not only coach passengers but also coach drivers will in future have to wear seat belts and why lorry drivers will not be required to wear seat belts? What is the difference between coach drivers and lorry drivers? Would it not be better for lorry drivers also to wear seat belts? As I understand the position, older coaches will not be required to have seat belts fitted as sometimes their floors are not strong enough to enable them to be fitted safely. But is there any reason why, on those older coaches, the driver should not be required to wear a seat belt?

My Lords, the argument used at the time—I do not express any judgment on its correctness—both as regards drivers of lorries and drivers of taxis was that their safety would be compromised if they could not get out of their vehicles quickly. The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, is right to say that satisfactory moorings for seat belts do not exist in very old coaches. That is a serious disadvantage as it means that they cannot carry children. They will be phased out in a short period of time. As regards the requirement for drivers to wear seat belts not being enforced, that is a perfectly fair point that deserves to be followed up.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that the coach crash on the M25 on 16th November, which I believe prompted my noble friend's sensible Question and supplementary question, tragically killed six people travelling back from the Continent but attracted less media attention than the derailment last Sunday of a First Great Western train at Ealing? That incident attracted tabloid headlines such as "train terror" even though not a single passenger was killed or injured. Should we not stress over and over again how much safer train travel is than travel by road? The latest statistics show that travel can be up to 20 times safer by train than by road.

My Lords, it is true that train travel is very safe but it is also true that coach travel is very safe. I refer to the figures that I gave and to a figure for all road user casualties of over 300,000. When we compare that with a figure of well under 1,000 casualties from coach travel, it can be seen that we should not extend the dangers of road travel to coaches.

My Lords, will my noble friend be good enough to answer my question about whether there have been any and, if so, how many, prosecutions for failing to wear seat belts and, if so, with what result?

My Lords, I try to answer two questions from each speaker as that is what I understand to be the convention of the House. I shall write to my noble friend on that point.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

What measures they intend to introduce to encourage the growth of the private sector in healthcare.

My Lords, the Government's first priority is to implement the NHS Plan and deliver a high quality service to the public. It is not our policy to promote private healthcare as an alternative to the NHS. However, it is our policy to use the private sector when it can support the public sector to improve public services, for example, by increasing NHS capacity and patient choice.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply and I welcome the Government's radical use of the private sector to free up supply to the National Health Service. But is it not time, and is it not logical, to go a step further because is it not increasingly open to argument that however much money is put into a monopolistic state system it will not deliver commensurate improvements? Given that half the hospitals in Germany are in the nonpublic sector and that in France, Switzerland and Germany there are competing independent insurance systems, why do the Government, who have called a debate on the health service, refuse even to consider measures to encourage similar developments in this country?

My Lords, the noble Lord will know that the Wanless report examined those matters to some considerable degree. In terms of funding of the NHS it concluded that there is not an alternative funding method to that currently in place in the UK that would deliver a given level and quality of healthcare either at lower cost to the economy or in a more equitable way. The Wanless review was thorough. We see the need for greater diversity and provision of services. That is why we are quite prepared to use the private sector in the way that has been developed in the past few years. Each country has developed its own culture and system in health. It seems surely better to take what we have, improve it, use the private sector where effective but concentrate our focus on building on the excellence of the National Health Service.

My Lords, we on these Benches certainly support the view stated by the Minister and not the belief of many on the Conservative Benches that the salvation of the NHS seems to lie in the private sector. One of the points made by the Health Select Committee earlier this year was that the NHS simply lacks the procurement and commissioning skills necessary to secure value for money when procuring from the private sector. What steps are being taken to ensure that the NHS will have that expertise and experience?

My Lords, we have given clear advice to the NHS that there is potential for obtaining keener prices in the contracts that it negotiates with the private sector. We are putting in place a new financial planning framework for NHS services which will give much greater guidance and encouragement to the NHS to ensure that it has the proper contracting skills and to ensure value for money. As relationships develop between the NHS and the private sector the NHS will become much more skilled at obtaining a good deal.

My Lords, a Labour government introduced the National Health Service, which became the pride of the world in terms of healthcare. Does my noble friend agree that, following 18 years of neglect of the National Health Service by the previous Administration, at this stage it would be a retrograde step to return to a system where the Government encouraged private medicine? Would that not again introduce a price tag on health benefits, whereby those with the ability to pay would receive the best treatment?

My Lords, my noble friend is absolutely right. The NHS was a great service and a wonderful vision for which many people in this country are extremely grateful. It has a great ethos and receives tremendous support from its staff and .from the public. But, as the Kennedy report into the Bristol Royal Infirmary showed, it was starved of resources and capacity over many years. We are putting that situation right. The NHS Plan is the way forward, and I am confident that the NHS, in partnership with the voluntary, and indeed the private, sectors, will produce the high-quality services that we all want to see.

My Lords, how does the noble Lord justify the term "starved of resources" when the National Health Service has received an increase of 43 per cent in real terms over the past 10 years—half under one government and half under another?

My Lords, so far as concerns the amount of resources going into the National Health Service, perhaps I may set out what is intended for the next five years. By 2008, NHS resources and healthcare spending in general will be brought to a level of 9.4 per cent of GDP. That is how we shall deliver the targets and priorities in the NHS Plan.

So far as concerns the previous government's record on expenditure, the fact is that they did starve the NHS of resources. When they increased the amount of resources—I refer, in particular, to the early 1990s—that went not on patient care but on the incredibly wasteful bureaucratic system of the internal market.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that not only would it be illogical to try to improve the health service by transferring funds from the health service to the private sector; it would also be highly undesirable? The stand outlined by my noble friend will receive warm support throughout the country, especially from the many millions of people who depend on the health service.

My Lords, my noble friend is right that we must focus on improving and developing the National Health Service. But the issue that we face at present is a lack of capacity. That is why we are embarking on a major hospital building programme. It is also why we are increasing the number of training places and recruiting staff at home and abroad. However, with current capacity being very tight, it surely also makes sense to use the private sector, which at present has considerable spare capacity.

My Lords, the delivery target for digital hearing aids appears to have fallen behind substantially. Does the Minister agree that it would be useful to go into partnership in respect of digital hearing aids, not least in the fitting of the aids, in which the private sector has considerable expertise?

My Lords, I certainly agree that the National Health Service should look for partnerships with the private sector where that sector can provide expertise that is not available within the NHS, whether in relation to services for deaf people or other services. That is the intention of the Government. I believe that over the past few years many schemes have shown the benefit of using private sector expertise.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that, given that the private healthcare sector has three distinct components—the profit-making one, the mutual one and the charitable one—the most natural partner for the NHS would be, first, the charitable sector, secondly, the mutual sector and, only thirdly, the profit-making sector?

My Lords, I certainly welcome the long tradition of the NHS working with both the charitable sector and what the noble Lord describes as the "mutual" sector. I should have thought that the hospice movement is an example of that. But, ultimately, what counts is whether we can increase capacity in the NHS. Even with profitable private hospital care providers, if they have spare capacity which the NHS could use, we should use it.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether the health needs of asylum seekers who have entered the United Kingdom are being met.

My Lords, people who seek asylum in the United Kingdom are fully entitled to NHS treatment without charge. In England, initiatives such as local development schemes, personal medical pilots and pilot health assessments for newly arrived asylum seekers are geared to meeting their health needs.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. What action are the Government taking to combat the worrying increase in TB among asylum seekers entering this country? In the borough of Newham, 200 out of every 100,000 people now have TB—a higher incidence than in India.

My Lords, the noble Lord is right to draw attention to the problem of TB. The majority of asylum seekers entering the UK via east Kent ports are screened for, and, if appropriate, vaccinated against, TB as part of a Home Office-funded pilot. We shall review the results of that pilot in the new year and, in the light of that, make decisions about the future of screening newly arrived asylum seekers not only in Kent but throughout the United Kingdom.

My Lords, asylum seekers access the free health service via form HC2, which they use to apply for help with health costs. Such help, along with their housing and subsistence money, comes via NASS, the National Asylum Support Service. Will the Minister consider the case of those who reach the end of the process in terms of their applications and appeals and who are unsuccessful but who cannot be, and are not, removed from this country because they come from places such as Iraq to which it is currently impossible to send people? Such people lose not only their housing and subsistence payments but also their HC2 help with health costs. How are they supposed to access health services when they need prescriptions, dental treatment, sight tests, or whatever?

My Lords, my understanding is that when applications are refused by the Home Office, asylum seekers often appeal against the decision. While appeals are outstanding, free NHS treatment continues. That is also the case in relation to those whose applications fail but who are given indefinite leave to remain in the UK. As the noble Lord suggested, that is appropriate where it is currently not safe for an asylum seeker to return to his country of origin. Those who do not appeal and who are not given leave to remain may be removed from the UK. While they are waiting for that to happen, they will not he refused any treatment they require before removal.

My Lords, did I hear the Minister aright? Did he say that when asylum seekers arrive in this country and are found to have tuberculosis, they are given a jab and then sent on their way? Is that sensible? Does it not encourage spread of the disease?

My Lords, clearly we need to ensure that health-screening measures are appropriate. I referred to a pilot scheme being undertaken in east Kent. We shall consider the evaluation of that pilot to see how well it works. We are concerned about TB and its potential spread. We are keeping the matter under tight review.

My Lords, does the Minister agree that proper records should be maintained of asylum seekers who are pregnant or who have suffered recent miscarriages? In which places of detention does he consider that adequate healthcare facilities are available to such persons?

My Lords, there is a problem with health records, particularly as asylum seekers move around the country. There is no doubt that hand-held patient records are the most appropriate method for dealing with the problem referred to by the noble Lord and for recording health information. The asylum seeker would keep the handheld record and take it to health appointments wherever that may be. Many areas have developed their own hand-held records for issue to asylum seekers. My department is working with front -line staff on the development of a national model.

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House how the additional costs to the health service of asylum seekers are met? He will be aware that there are signs of stress in the NHS.

My Lords, such costs fall within the NHS budget. We are dealing with that in a number of ways. We are looking to make the funding formula sensitive enough to ensure that primary care trusts receive an appropriate allocation. We have also pursued a number of local initiatives, such as local development schemes, where additional money is allocated by the department to help primary care trusts and GPs in specific areas. The flexibility of the personal medical service pilots in relation to the remuneration of GPs may also be of assistance. I acknowledge that particular areas of the health service are under financial pressure as a result of this situation.

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the full range of health services will be available to asylum seekers in the new accommodation centres and that there will be no discrimination, as there is in education?

My Lords, the intention is that appropriate health services of NHS standard are available.

My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the remuneration of GPs includes a considerable capitation element for regular performance of routine tasks such as vaccinations? Can he confirm that in the case of the homeless, that has been a deterrent to GPs registering transients? Can he tell the House whether the dispersal policy has made that operate even more in the case of asylum seekers?

My Lords, there have been cases in which GPs were reluctant to accept asylum seekers. There have been one or two cases—we are currently investigating the facts—where a GP had a deliberate policy of not accepting asylum seekers. I cannot support that in any way. The scale of fees and allowances is based on both a basic practice allowance and a capitation allowance, which should ensure that additional patients mean additional financial rewards for a general practitioner. However, I accept that that may not be sensitive enough in the circumstances raised by the noble Earl. We are in discussions with GPs about their national contracts. We also believe that the PMS pilots give greater flexibility to the NHS at local level, which may enable them to deal with the issues raised by the noble Earl.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Why passenger lifts at surface railway stations have been closed to passengers during the strike by fire-fighters.

My Lords, before the beginning of the Fire Brigade industrial dispute, station operating companies carried out detailed health and safety risk assessments at the behest of the Health and Safety Executive. The HSE has not specifically recommended the closure of lifts at surface railway stations. A small number of station operating companies have judged it appropriate to close passenger lifts during the strike.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that Answer. A number of station lifts are still closed, including the one at Oxford. Do the Government believe that an open lift made of steel and glass in an open-air station is at greater risk of catching fire than a lift in an office building? Surely, if a lift breaks down the answer is to call a lift engineer rather than the fire brigade. Can he issue an instruction to the train operators to open the lifts and to give to the staff on duty the name of a suitable lift engineer to call to get people out if the lift breaks down?

No, my Lords. The Government do not involve themselves in matters of that kind. Such assessments of safety risks are for the Health and Safety Executive and for the train operating companies. This is not a "nanny state". There are things which can be done, and which have been recommended by the Health and Safety Executive. It is desirable for emergency procedures to be put in place for the manual winding of lifts, and for staff to accompany passengers in lifts. Companies could consider restricting lift use and directing passengers over ramps and footbridges. However, those are matters for the operating companies and the Health and Safety Executive.

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House whether the closure of various parts of London Underground was decided by the unions or by London Underground?

My Lords, it was decided by London Underground on the advice of the Health and Safety Executive.

My Lords, if we are not a "nanny state", are we not in danger of becoming a very hysterical state, where at the first excuse people quote health and safety as the reason why lifts are closed; why the roadway at Potters Bar has not been repaired; and why coach seat belts should be worn? It is well known that travel by coach is the safest means of road travel. Can he assure the House that Ministers, officials and anyone else over whom he has influence will try to avoid that type of hysteria, and play down the general reaction of the media?

My Lords, I have said within the past half hour that coach travel is one of the safest forms of road travel. I am rather opposed to exhortation as a means of government. The good sense of the British people will resist the kind of hysteria to which the noble Lord, Lord Bradshaw, refers.

My Lords, the Minister referred to a few stations. Perhaps he has not heard, as I did today on the underground, that 22 stations are closed. If the Government have delegated to the Health and Safety Executive responsibility for advice on this matter, is he sure that it is giving correct advice by failing to have lifts closed in hotels, offices, stores and in other buildings to which the public have access, including, at certain times of day, the Palace of Westminster?

My Lords, the Question on the Order Paper refers to surface railway stations, not deep stations in the London Underground. My comment of "very few" referred to surface railway stations. The 22 stations of the London Underground to which the noble Lord referred are closed because they are deep stations with access only by lift or very long flights of stairs.

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall now repeat a Statement made in another place by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry about British Energy:

"British Energy operates eight nuclear power stations in the UK, supplies over one-fifth of our electricity and employs 5,200 workers in Britain.

"In May this year the company in its preliminary results announced a pre-tax, pre-exceptionals, profit of £42 million in its UK and North American operations but an overall loss to its UK operations of £41 million. None the less, the company chose to maintain its dividend, paying out £48 million to shareholders.

"During the summer, British Energy decided to attempt a bond issue in the United States. It was unsuccessful. On 13th August, one of the reactors at the company's Torness station was taken out of service due to unforeseen problems—reducing the company's income by £56 million.

"The next day company executives told investors that there were no immediate cash flow problems.

"Throughout the summer, British Energy engaged in discussions with BNFL to renegotiate the terms of its contracts. These were entirely commercial discussions between the two companies.

"At the beginning of September, British Energy realised that its financial problems were far greater than it had thought and that any conceivable deal with BNFL would not be enough to meet its requirements.

"On 4th September the company wrote to inform me of a significant worsening of the company's financial position and liquidity problems. It said the board would have to decide, on legal advice, whether it could continue to meet its liabilities and therefore trade legally. And it asked for government help.

"The next day I announced that the Government were entering into discussions with the company. On 9th September I announced a loan facility of £410 million to support its trading operations both in the UK and in North America.

"On 26th September, after a further request from the company, the Government decided to extend the loan facility until 29th November and increase it to £650 million. This was to give the company sufficient time to clarify its financial position and to come to a clear view on its future options.

"Both the initial loan and its extension were notified to the European Commission under state aid rules, and I can tell the House that the Commission announced yesterday that it has approved the loan. I offered that loan because it was the best way of securing the safety of the nuclear power stations and the security of electricity supply to the grid and consumers. These remain my overriding objectives.

"British Energy has submitted a plan to the Government for the solvent restructuring of the company. We, and our financial advisers, have assessed its implications and I can announce to the House that the Government have agreed to play their part in allowing the company to attempt solvent restructuring.

"Both the company and my department have made statements to the Stock Exchange today; I have placed copies of both in the Libraries of the House and in the Vote Office.

"The company has announced that it will continue to make payments to a fund which is used to pay for costs of decommissioning its power stations; give the fund £275 million of bonds in the company; and surrender to the fund 65 per cent of its available cash each year.

"The Government will underwrite these arrangements to ensure safety and environmental protection. In addition, we have recognised that if this restructuring is to work, the Government themselves must contribute significantly to the company's £2.1 billion of historic nuclear fuel liabilities managed by BNFL which extend to 2086. The cost to the Government will average £150 million to £200 million per annum for the next 10 years and fall thereafter.

"If the company does very well, surpluses from BE's contribution to the decommissioning funds will help meet these costs. But I also intend to look at how these contracts are managed as part of the creation of the Liabilities Management Authority.

"In addition, BNFL is today announcing that it will agree new contracts with British Energy for fuel supply and for spent fuel services in respect of future nuclear electricity generation.

"If the company's proposed restructuring is to succeed, the existing creditors will have to accept a temporary freeze on payments and subsequently a significant writedown in the value of what they are owed. Secondly, the company will have to complete the sale of all its North American operations. And, thirdly, the company will have to implement the new trading strategy it has announced today.

"Agreement to this must be achieved by the middle of February.

"The Government are prepared to continue to fund BE's operations while the restructuring plan is agreed and implemented. The existing credit facility will be extended to 9th March with the size of the facility remaining unchanged at £650 million.

"Of the existing facility of £650 million, £382 million had been drawn down by yesterday. Under the proposal, the money will be progressively repaid as the financial situation improves. And in the event of administration we have taken security to protect the interests of the taxpayer and rank above other creditors.

"I also intend to bring forward legislation shortly to enable me to carry forward the Government's part of the proposed restructuring or, if it fails, to acquire the companies or their assets.

"This proposal for solvent restructuring will of course need state aid approval by the European Commission. Once the company has reached agreement with its financial creditors we will notify the plan to the Commission.

"I said in September that, if possible, we would look to a solvent restructuring. However, we did not rule out that the company might decide to go into administration.

"We have therefore prepared detailed contingency plans for administration in discussion with all the key responsible regulatory bodies to ensure that whatever happened nuclear safety and security of supply would be maintained.

"Let me stress that if British Energy were to go into administration all its nuclear liabilities would fall to government. We cannot just walk away from them; no responsible government would. This is the reason why the situation with British Energy is different from any other generator.

"I would like to take this opportunity to thank the staff at British Energy. Their skill and dedication is essential to ensuring nuclear safety. This has been an unsettling time for them but whatever happens nuclear power stations will continue to generate electricity and will continue to employ staff. Pension entitlements will be met. Trade suppliers will be paid. And customers' lights will stay on.

"I understand that today's news will give little comfort to British Energy's financial stakeholders. But they too must take their share of the pain if the company is to survive. The stakeholders now need to decide whether they are willing to support solvent restructuring. If they are not, the Government are fully prepared if British Energy decides that administration is the only option.

"Today the company has announced that Robin Jeffrey is stepping down and that Adrian Montague will succeed him as chairman. Mr Montague is an experienced executive who brings key business experience, from both the public and private sectors. It is clear there have been management failings and I think it is right for the company to be seeking to strengthen the management learn at this critical time.

"I have set out today the limits of what the Government are willing to do to support solvent restructuring. It is now up to the company, its new management and its financial stakeholders to determine the future of British Energy".

My Lords, that concludes the Statement.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made in the other place by his right honourable friend. the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. It has at least given Parliament the chance to question Her Majesty's Government over a decision taken almost three months ago which committed £650 million of taxpayers' money to bailing out British Energy, although, as we see it, occurring at the last possible parliamentary moment before a decision by the Government had to be made.

In a fairly detailed Statement, I find it somewhat strange that no mention is made of the climate change levy. Does the Minister riot consider it absurd that Her Majesty's Government claim that imposing the climate change levy is part of their strategy to meet our climate change commitments? Since nuclear power is the principal energy source that does not generate CO₂ emissions, this is really an absurd contradiction. The fact is that British Energy will always struggle until the climate change levy is removed.

Does the Minister agree that the right answer would be to abolish the climate change levy, an arbitrary tax that unfortunately does not play a part in addressing the climate change problem? Does he further agree that it could be replaced with a single economic instrument which could be an emissions trading system or a carbon tax? Is the Minister aware that this is not just a view that I mention as a member of my party but that of the Royal Society which only two weeks or so ago issued its policy document on this very important matter? Can the Minister tell the House why Her Majesty's Government do not accept these arguments by the Royal Society, which were strongly and with authority put in the paper that it issued? Does the Minister agree that the approach I have just indicated would improve the position of both nuclear and renewables compared with fossil fuels? Or is the problem that the Treasury perhaps would not like it?

The Statement indicates that BNFL is announcing today that it will agree new contracts with British Energy for fuel supply and for spent fuel services in respect of future electricity generation. But is it not a fact that, some time ago, British Energy reached agreement with BNFL on terms that the department agreed, only to have the agreement blocked by the Treasury?

Does the Minister realise that part of the problem is the Government's muddled approach to the whole of the nuclear industry, with Ministers not singing from the same hymn sheet? Does he recall a statement on British Energy made by the Minister of State as recently as 17th November to the Sunday Times? He said:

"We need that supply, so come what may, nuclear generation will continue".

Only eight days later, we read in the Western Mail that the Secretary of State for Wales, the former energy Minister, wants to shut nuclear power stations. Perhaps the Minister can tell us what is the true position.

In the Statement, the Minister told the House that British Energy has submitted a plan to the Government regarding the solvent restructuring of the company. The Secretary of State said that she and her financial advisers have examined and accepted it. Of course, we hope that it is successful, but as we know that the security of supply is of the most overriding importance, is it consistent with the new electricity trading arrangements, NETA? The Minister who made the Statement is not the Minister who answered a Question on Monday on electricity supply, when that very matter arose. The noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury, said that he was totally satisfied that there would be no problem with supply. Can the Minister tell us whether that is still the position?

Perhaps some consideration should now be given to the remit of the regulator. Much as we like electricity costs to be as low as possible for consumers, we also want an electricity supply and an electricity generating industry. Are the new financial commitments mentioned in the Statement included in the new, huge borrowing requirements announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday in the other place? Now that the Secretary of State has made it clear that she will not let British Energy go into administration, what is the assessment of the cost to the taxpayer?

The problems of British Energy are undoubtedly due to the fall in prices paid to the generator, which have not been helped by NETA.

I am terribly sorry, but I must tell the Minister that if he was confused by anything that I said, so was I. because I read page seven of my brief before page six, which is absolutely appalling. He must have thought it rather strange that all of a sudden I mentioned N ETA out of all context. Did noble Lords notice?

Yes.

Well, my Lords, it is really bad news if, at the end of the day, I make a mistake like that. Perhaps I should not have brought it to the Minister's attention. I shall not read that page again, unless the Minister would like me to, but I think I ended up by saying what I meant to end up by saying, which is that perhaps the remit of the regulator should now be considered. Much as we want electricity costs to be as low as possible, we definitely want continuity of electricity in the generating industry. I apologise again to the Minister for my eagerness to finish my response to the Statement.

My Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating this important and in many ways disturbing Statement. I accept that in view of the importance and size of British Energy, which supplies more than 20 per cent of the electricity needs of the country, in these difficult circumstances there either had to be a restructuring or the Government had to take over responsibility for running the assets and continuing to supply electricity from them. Those were the two options described in the Statement.

However, I should like to ask the Minister a number of questions. First, it was implied in the first part of the Statement that British Energy should have taken action earlier and that, had it done so, the solution could have been less costly. Is that the Government's view, as is implied in the Statement? Apart from that, the major external factor—to which the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, referred—has undoubtedly been the massive fall in wholesale electricity prices, which has affected not only British Energy but other major generating companies. Incidentally, that big reduction in wholesale electricity prices has only in part been passed on to the retail sector.

The reason for the fall in those prices has undoubtedly been the operation of the new electricity trading arrangements, NETA. Does the Minister agree that, as the noble Baroness pointed out, it is time to review the operation of NETA, which seems to have introduced a degree of instability in the marketplace? The question of security of supply is obviously closely tied to that question. Earlier this week, I asked the Question to which the noble Baroness referred and received a reassurance from the noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury, that electricity reserves were adequate. I beg to differ; they are probably inadequate to meet exceptional circumstances. But whatever may be the case, should we not review the regulatory arrangements to ensure that a reserve capacity is maintained?

Under the previous, much criticised Pool arrangements, there was such a provision. There is no longer. The Government have said that they will keep the electricity supply situation under review, but what will they do if the review shows that a shortage is likely to develop? From where will they get the reserve capacity, if it has not been previously built up and maintained?

Apart from the question of reserve capacity, to which nuclear and other generators must contribute, there is the big issue of the future of the nuclear industry itself. We hope that that will be clarified in the forthcoming energy review. Does the Minister agree t hat it is vital that a decision should then be reached on the future of the nuclear industry? Either we continue with a nuclear industry of the size that we have now—in which case all the problems of the cost of construction, decommissioning and dealing with waste and security issues must be identified and resolved—or, if that is not to be done, we must be clear what other forms of energy are to be developed that will have a similar impact on the environment.

So the issue does not simply affect a single electricity generating company. It raises wide questions of energy policy, security of supply and, above all, the future of the nuclear industry itself.

My Lords, am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, and the noble Lord, Lord Ezra, for their reception of the Statement. I say straightaway to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller. that I was not at all worried by the reversal of the order. I listened to Mr Tim Yeo's intervention in the Commons. I took careful notes. I noted the seven points that he made. The fact that the noble Baroness took one of them out of order does not worry me in the least. At least they were the same points. which is helpful. A co-ordinated Opposition! I am glad to hear it. Unfortunately, it does not sound as though the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, paid attention to the very effective answers which the Secretary of State gave to Mr Tim Yeo. The arguments that were used do not carry much weight.

The noble Baroness asked about the climate change levy. She said in effect that we should be moving over to a carbon tax or to trading permits. The climate change levy and the alternatives of carbon tax and energy trading permits will, of course, be considered in the White Paper that will be published in the new year. However, the Secretary of State made it clear that this is not a carbon tax. It is intended as an energy efficiency incentive for the whole energy industry and all its customers. The noble Baroness and Mr Yeo can hardly expect us to make a change for just one company.

The noble Baroness repeated the allegation that there had been a deal between British Energy and BNFL that had been blocked by the Treasury. That is not the case. It is a commercial deal between the two companies in which the Government were not involved. She repeated the question about the role of the obligations in yesterday's announcement of the Pre-Budget Report and the borrowing requirement despite the fact that the Secretary of State answered clearly that those obligations could be and would be maintained within the departmental expenditure limit of the Department of Trade and Industry and would, therefore, have no effect on the figures in the Pre-Budget Report.

Security of supply is a legitimate concern. The noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, and the noble Lord, Lord Ezra, asked me about it. I shall give the facts of the matter. The capacity of the generating industry is 65 gigawatts. The peak demand in the winter of 2000–01 was 55 gigawatts, which leaves a margin of 17.5 per cent. That is just about the same margin as there has been for many years. It has been lower in one or two years and more like 20 per cent for most years. Now, as opposed to the position in the past, there are seven gigawatts of capacity in power stations that are mothballed and could be brought back into operation. We are always concerned about security of supply, and we never relax that concern. However, the arrangements and the capacity that we have and can bring into use are adequate for the purpose.

The noble Baroness repeated the allegation that the climate change levy was generated by the Treasury's need for revenue. The climate change levy is revenue neutral. She asked for an assurance that we would not let British Energy go into administration. That is a matter for the company, it has an obligation to reform its managerial activities and persuade its bondholders, stakeholders and shareholders that it is in their interest not to go into administration. If it fails to do that, there is a threat of administration, and the Statement made that clear.

I was surprised by some of the comments about the new electricity trading arrangement. I had thought that it was a success for the Government and a success for the Utilities Bill that I was proud to take through the House a couple of years ago with the help of the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, and the noble Lord, Lord Ezra. It was a success that retail prices were brought down by the new electricity trading arrangement. That was what we tried to do. The old pool arrangements were absurd. They were contradictory and led to excessive profits for some of the energy companies. That is not to say that we do not keep NETA under review. We support changes that will reduce barriers to consolidation and the balancing mechanism. Again, such matters can be considered when we produce our White Paper in the new year.

The noble Lord, Lord Ezra, raised a particular point about whether British Energy should have taken action earlier. He heard the criticism in the Statement of some of the actions of British Energy earlier this year. They are matters for the management of the company, not the Government, but the Secretary of State made the Government's views sufficiently clear. I have answered the noble Lord's questions about the fall in prices due to NETA and about the review of NETA. His broader question about the future of nuclear energy is, of course, a matter for the White Paper to be published in the new year.

My Lords, I heard the Statement with great interest. As my noble friend knows, I have been an advocate of nuclear energy for a long time—since my early life as a civil engineer, when I used to design nuclear power stations.

I shall pick up a point raised by my noble neighbour—although she sits on the other side of the House—Lady Miller of Hendon relating to the climate change levy. No doubt, the climate levy had positive features, but my noble friend must know that the form of energy that has least impact on the climate is nuclear energy. The imposition of the climate levy on nuclear energy is, therefore, not only mistaken but daft. I have been in this House for 25 years or so and in another place for longer, and I am used to seeing governments do things that are unnecessary and daft. It is the way of things. However, to impose the levy, which deals with climate change, on an industry that does not change the climate is dafter than daft.

I do not blame my noble friend. He is one of my oldest friends in politics. However, he should suggest to those who are in authority that they should pull themselves together and have a good look at the matter. If they will not listen to what I have said on the matter, they should, at least, listen to what the noble Baroness, Lady Miller of Hendon, has said.

My Lords, I have already made it clear that the imposition of the climate change levy on British Energy is not being done because we think that British Energy produces byproducts that damage the climate. That is not the purpose of the climate change levy. The levy is an energy efficiency incentive for the whole energy industry and for all its customers. It is one of a range of possibilities that can be considered in helping the Government and the country to achieve our objectives under the Kyoto arrangements.

We have not ruled out the alternatives such as the carbon tax or energy trading permits. We will consider those matters in full in the White Paper that will be produced early next year.

My Lords, the gravity of the Statement is underlined by the fact that, as I understand it, the Government have just taken on a further commitment of £2 billion over the next 10 years. The costs in other areas may be substantially greater.

Has any agreement been reached to change in any way the previous programme for the closure of ageing or obsolete nuclear power stations, including, in particular, advanced gas-cooled reactors? Are there any proposals on that, or is the policy of maintaining nuclear power in this country on the programme of British Energy to be sustained?

My Lords, existing programmes for closure of nuclear installations are not affected by the proposals in the Statement.

My Lords, I listened carefully, but I am not sure that I heard the Minister explain how the Government would underwrite the arrangements for the proposed solvent restructuring. What is the limit of the underwriting commitment, expressed in an amount and in time?

My Lords, the figures are contained in a statement made by the company and the Government to the Stock Exchange, which is available in the Library of the House. I think it better that I should rely on that rather than seek to find the figure and run the risk of making a mistake.

My Lords, I rise to support the Security Council Resolution 1441. That a unanimous resolution of this character was passed on 8th November is a tribute to the efforts of the Prime Minister, for which he deserves great credit, which has been freely given from all sides of politics.

Furthermore, our position in international law is much more secure than it was in the case of Kosovo. As Saddam Hussein ignored a succession of Chapter VII resolutions before the Gulf War, calling on him to eliminate his weapons of mass destruction, he is in "material breach" of the obligation imposed on him after his ejection from Kuwait, which, as the noble Lord, Lord King, pointed out, was the condition of his political survival. He is being given a "final opportunity to comply". All that is straightforward.

I want to ask a slightly different question, which is in the nature of a thought experiment. Why is it so necessary and urgent to disarm Saddam Hussein now? It is in my approach to this question that I fear I shall diverge from most views hitherto expressed in this debate. It is important to give a convincing answer to that question, because on that answer hinges the question: how big a failure of Saddam Hussein to comply fully with Resolution 1441 would justify resort to a war to remove him?

So far, the debate has proceeded on the assumption that anything less than total compliance would justify the most extreme measures. The Shadow Foreign Secretary said in another place that to leave Saddam Hussein in possession of the arsenal he is believed to have would be inconceivable. Why? Not only is it conceivable, but it has been the actual situation for the past 10 years. It seems to me inconceivable that Saddam Hussein will launch another foreign adventure of the kind that he launched in 1991. Not only are his conventional capabilities much reduced, but he can be in no doubt about the response of the international community were he to try. As matters stand at the moment, he is thoroughly trussed up. Had Hitler been certain that the whole world would unite against him, I doubt whether even he would have risked war in 1939.

The badness of Saddam Hussein is not in issue: he is a bad man. But evil is a quality of human character. Evil acts depend on opportunity. We have already cut away his opportunities. The argument must then go one step further. It must be that Saddam Hussein sees nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as the means of his liberation from the pen in which the international community has placed him. He could either allow non-state terrorists access to these weapons or spread death and destruction by using them himself. I suggest that there must be considerable scepticism on both counts. In particular, some of the alarmist scenarios conjured up by germ warfare verge on science fiction.

What are the facts? To take nuclear weapons, unlike Israel, Saddam Hussein has no nuclear capacity and is probably some years away from developing it: that will depend on his getting access to enriched uranium and other substances. But let us take the worst case. Suppose he does develop nuclear weapons. Why does the theory of deterrence, on which we were all brought up, not apply to him? The argument must be that he is mad, but no one has suggested that.

Chemical agents, such as nerve gas, can inflict great localised damage to health and life, but they are useless over large areas and cannot be delivered in hulk to distant places. I am told that it takes one tonne of nerve gas to affect one square kilometre. In addition, there has been no successful instance of biological warfare. The scientists to whom I have talked are extremely sceptical about whether effective means of delivering biological agents exist or can be developed or how destructive their effects would be. The anthrax scare in the United States following 11th September resulted in one death. Except for nuclear weapons, therefore, the phrase "weapons of mass destruction" seems to be a misnomer.

We must always remember that 9/11, horrendous though it was, involved no use of the weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein is required to eliminate. Therefore, the logical link between terrorism and those weapons, either in the particular case of Saddam Hussein or in general, is actually quite weak.

In short, I suggest that by accepting without question the assumption that life with Saddam Hussein possessed of his "weapons" would be inconceivable, we would be guilty of worst-case thinking, based on faulty science. I had hoped that the eminent scientists we have in your Lordships' House would have chosen to take part in this debate, either to contradict or reinforce what I am saying.

I conclude by repeating my welcome for the resolution. I sincerely hope that M r Blix and his team will be able to report success. Both Iraq and the rest of the world would be better off without this man, without this regime and without these weapons in his possession.

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for giving way. He said that he wishes Mr Blix success. Will he define "success"?

My Lords. I am about to do so. I was about to say that I am not persuaded that the world would he a significantly safer place if Mr Blix and his team achieved complete success. The conclusion that the world would not be a significantly safer place has to be balanced against the risks and destructiveness of war.

That leads me to my final thought. If, as I expect, the inspection regime is able to report only partial success in the form of the elimination of some weapons but not others, should this automatically be the occasion for war? I say that it should not. In those circumstances, we should be prepared to explore intermediate forms of coercion short of full-scale war. I do not believe that partial success would constitute failure. It would constitute failure in terms of Resolution 1441 and would be a possible trigger for war, but I suggest that it would not necessarily constitute failure. We could live with partial success. If we felt that we could not live with partial success, we should he prepared to pursue intermediate means of coercion short of full-scale war.

It would be immoral to make war on a foreign state unless it presented a clear and present danger to other states. Unless it did so, it would not be a just war. That is why the determination of peace, and war in this case, should be left to the Security Council and why we should continue to oppose any unilateral action by the United States.

My Lords, I speak as n historian, of whom there are too few in this House, although I have the honour of following a most distinguished one. I am not an historian of the Middle East, although I once wrote of Suez, a book published by my dear noble friend Lord Weidenfeld who will speak later in the debate.

As an historian, I cannot forget the role of Britain in helping to break up the old Turkish Empire, a lamentable error, as it would now seem, as often used to be argued by the late Eli Kedourie, an historian whose family originated in Baghdad. We ought now also to remember our role in creating the new state of Iraq after 1918 and our part in establishing there our Hashemite friends as kings. Furthermore, we ought not to forget that the tragic Suez expedition of 1956 helped to create the conditions for the overthrow and murder of King Feisal and of Britain's best friend in the Middle East, Nuri-el-Said.

Going further back, it is not quite irrelevant to recall that at the 1920 Cairo conference on the Middle East, the then Colonial Secretary suggested the creation of an autonomous Kurdish state as a buffer between Iraq and Turkey. The idea was mentioned, not favourably, in our debate today by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby. However, I am sure that a Kurdish state will come about in the long run.

In 1920, the Colonial Secretary was, as we all can guess, opposed successfully by Sir Percy Cox and Dr Gertrude Bell. Those two civil servants had what used to be called "Alpha minds" and were well informed. But the Colonial Secretary, who had a premonition of the long-term future, was, if not an Alpha mind, a genius. His name was Winston Churchill.

I do not believe that in this House today we should entirely forget the work carried out by a great British scholar and archaeologist, Sir Leonard Woolley, in what is now Iraq but which was once Babylon, Nineveh and Ur. In any war in what used to be called Mesopotamia—Mespot to the British soldier in 1915—we should do whatever we can to avoid further ruin of the little which remains of those ancient civilisations.

To speak of the campaign of 1915 is not quite irrelevant since, if the regime of Saddam Hussein is overthrown, I hope that the Commonwealth War Graves Commission will give every help to restore the cemetery of Basra where so many of General Townshend's unfortunate expedition of 1915 lie in graves which, according to The Times recently, have been desecrated.

One final point about the past. I am against appeasement in general, but I do not believe that invoking the examples of the 1930s is always helpful in the 21st century. Sometimes, I remind noble Lords, appeasement has worked. We appeased the Soviet Union, for example, for 40 years between 1945 and 1990 and in the end we won the Cold War.

Coming to the present, I, like perhaps most noble Lords, find it most satisfactory that any attack on Iraq (if there is to be one) will now take the form of something emanating from the United Nations. The fact that the Security Council voted for the severe United States draft resolution represents a victory, it would seem to me, for the US Secretary of State, for our ally France, for the British Prime Minister and the British delegation to the United Nations headed by the admirable Sir Jeremy Greenstock.

Victory over what? It must be said to be a victory over those who believed in the desirability of a direct attack—a pre-emptive attack—on Iraq without previously obtaining the support of the United Nations. The idea of a pre-emptive attack had an attractive simplicity. Perhaps to some it still has. For no one can put forward coherently any defence of the regime in Iraq and few of us have any doubts about Iraq's willingness to use the chemical and biological weapons which it has—its regime has used them previously—even if there must be some doubt about its possible use of nuclear weapons.

But such a pre-emptive attack, mounted by the United States and perhaps supported by ourselves, surely would have been at variance with the policies and practices of this country since 1945. The only possible justification for such a direct attack would have been—might have been—if there were a proven connection between Iraq and Al'Qaeda. But no such proof has been forthcoming. I know that one should not endanger the forces of intelligence, but, as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord King, would agree, intelligence must always be made to serve politics and not politics to serve intelligence.

I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Janner, will not take it amiss if I say that the support known to be given by Iraq to suicide bombers in Israel is not quite the same as approved support for Al'Qaeda, whose ambitions are global, as we saw only again this morning. As the noble Lord, Lord Richard, said, if there is such a connection between Iraq and Al'Qaeda, it must be explained before any combat is embarked on which assumes the connection. I do not believe that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, could be right in saying that one can take the connection for granted or on trust, as he implied.

Even if such evidence were forthcoming, it would be reasonable to demand that it be presented to the United Nations, as President Kennedy, for example, presented the information about the establishment of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962.

The United Nations, as all noble Lords, know, is a far from ideal body, but it does have many uses. Action under its auspices offers still a precious framework of law between states which, feeble though that law may sometime seem, is what our country, our European friends and the United States have been patiently trying to build up since 1945.

In 1945—I know I do not have to remind noble Lords—the UN was the achievement of the wartime coalition led by the very president whose condemnation of appeasement the noble Lord, Lord Black, so eloquently invoked earlier, and it was also the product of much hard work by the British wartime coalition led by the Colonial Secretary of 1920, Winston Churchill.

Surely, so far as the UN is concerned in the present crisis, the critical pass was crossed this month. The states members of the Security Council, named by the noble Lord, Lord Richard, will surely, if necessary, vote again in favour of a strong resolution. Of course it is possible that UN approval may again be difficult to achieve and may be necessary to seek patiently, meticulously, as regards words, and carefully, as was done in respect of the resolution which we are discussing today. But that patience, that meticulousness with regard to words and that care is something which our Government, the United States Government—in general anyway—and our allies have shown we possess, making November 2002 a month in which the United Nations, often reviled, has been revived in an unexpected and positive way.

The noble Lord, Lord King—I hope that I do not misrepresent him; I am sure that he will tell me if I do—implied, also eloquently, from the heights of his long experience in defence matters, that in our modern dangerous circumstances the spokesmen of western civilisation—the United States, Britain and our allies, or any allies that can be found—should be willing to act without UN approval if necessary. That could have been the attitude of the noble Lord, Lord Powell of Bayswater, and probably was of the noble Lord, Lord Black. I believe that those noble Lords are being too pessimistic, too negative. Surely if a report of the inspectors finds Saddam Hussein in breach of obligations which he assumed in 1991 and a case is presented for military action, it will be supported by the Security Council.

Action against Iraq's nuclear weapons programme is essentially a continuation of the uncompleted business of 1991. Iraq agreed to abandon that programme after its defeat in Kuwait. To possess, or to seek to possess, such weapons is not in itself—yet—an international crime. The Iraqi case is, in this respect, a matter apart.

So, in the long run, we should surely consider our long-term attitude to all these weapons. Until the end of the Cold War in 1989, we were, after all, committed to securing nuclear disarmament, even if we were not optimistic about the possibilities of achieving it. Thus, as I suggested in the Spectator last week, when this crisis is over, we, the United States and all our allies should give priority again to consideration of what we want in future in relation to all nuclear weapons, not only those of Iraq.

The United States is now able to assert itself as the most powerful state the world has ever seen. Richard Haas, who is now in the Bush Administration, wrote in the 1990s of the United States as a "reluctant" world sheriff. Perhaps, as I heard the former mayor of New York say only this week, the adjective "reluctant" is now, after September 11th last year, not quite so relevant.

But his country, the United States—our great ally—could j ustify what sometimes seems almost imperial—

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but other noble Lords have been asked to keep to a target time and I should be grateful if he could wind up his speech.

My Lords, may I finish my sentence?

Yes.

My Lords, I hope it does not seem too long a sentence.

The United States could justify what sometimes seems its almost imperial—certainly imperious—assertions about its current destiny if it, if we, were to pursue a resolution of the global threat of nuclear weapons, which will continue whatever happens to the regime of Saddam Hussein.

My Lords, it is clear that the Government, ably supported by Sir Jeremy Greenstock and his team in New York and, as my noble friend said, by many diplomats across the world, have played a pivotal role in reasserting multilateralism and the role of the UN and the Security Council. That is exactly how it should be and they are to be congratulated.

During a recent visit to Washington, I was struck by how much more pluralism was still alive, even within the US Administration itself, than is sometimes assumed on this side of the Atlantic. It is important never to undermine those within the US who share our multilateral commitment by simplistically lumping all Americans together and suggesting they are all in the camp of the unquestionably powerful but blinkered fundamentalist right. The challenge is always to work with those who share our sense of global reality and to strengthen their position.

In our dangerous and unpredictable world, stability and security cannot be imposed by the US alone, however powerful. The US is as vulnerable as any other nation. The extremist bubble in the lino syndrome becomes obvious—suppress it in one place and too easily it pops up in another—except that, because of alienation and resentment, there is a growing likelihood that in suppressing it in one place it will pop up in many others.

No, there are no short cuts. Peace and stability have to be painstakingly built. Hearts and minds have to be won. And widespread stakeholding in the stable world we want to see has to become a priority. Redistribution of wealth, greater social justice, sound environmental policies, fairer trade—all these have their key part to play. But these, without redistribution of power, will play into the hands of the alienated extremists and, yes, of the sinister psychopathic manipulators who are waiting for their opportunity to exploit a growing sense of frustration and exclusion.

In all this, the UN has become more relevant, not less. We must all seek to strengthen it. The UN is there, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, said, to represent the authority of the glolbal community as a whole, not the authority of a minority of the global community over the rest.

But those of us who argue for multilateralism cannot just protest if unilateralism is contemplated when in the past multilateralism has too often proved weak or ineffective. We have to ensure that in future collective action is effective. In particular, we have to ensure that it is effective in time, wherever possible, making the ultimate use of force—war, in other words—unnecessary.

That is why I am convinced that a strong resolution, in which a firm willingness to use force if need be is spelt out, was so important at the Security Council. Multilateralism cannot be left to vacuous resolutionary politics. It has to be muscular and any necessary resolutions have to be convincing, establishing not only a determination to achieve the stated objective but also a determination to do whatever is required to achieve it. Anything less ill serves the cause of multilateralism.

While I fully appreciate what my noble friend said about the need not to speculate on all the possibilities, there are nevertheless some important questions which I, like other noble Lords, hope my noble friend Lord Bach will answer. How secure is the work by the UN inspectors? Is the operation adequately resourced and funded? If not, why not? The cost of a well resourced inspection is minimal against the cost of war.

When the 8th December return by the Government of Iraq is made on their weapons of mass destruction, will it be the task of the UN inspectors to establish its accuracy? Or do the United States and the UK governments reserve the right to reject it as inaccurate there and then on the grounds of their interpretation of the intelligence independently available to them?

If the return is rejected by the US and UK, will their interpretation of their own intelligence be shared with the Security Council as a whole? The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, referred to this issue. Would they then make the case for immediate military action? If they did, what would be the implications for the inspectors? Is it or is it not the task of the inspectors, in effect, to check the accuracy of the US and UK interpretation of their own intelligence as well as to investigate the accuracy of the return submitted by the Government of Iraq?

All this surely underlines the significance of whether or not further specific Security Council authorisation for military action is required. I hope that when my noble friend replies he will once more return to this issue and leave the House in absolutely no doubt of the Government's position. My noble friend Lady Ramsay of Cartvale and the noble Lord, Lord Black of Crossharbour, spoke powerfully in this context.

As I understand it, the Government's position is that they would favour a further resolution if military action was to be taken. Am I right? But, as I understand it, the Government are also signalling that they reserve the right to review the situation and to act independently, with the US and others, if they are convinced that such military action has become necessary but the Security Council is not prepared to go along that road. Is that right as well?

I should like to put one more question to my noble friend. If there were to be UN military action, would it not be the task of the Secretary-General to call up the necessary military forces on behalf of the Security Council? I was a little perplexed when it seemed that last week the United States might still see it as its responsibility to do this.

If military action is contemplated, the political analysis and strategy—the context—become all the more relevant. The noble Baroness. Lady Williams of Crosby, referred to this point, as did other speakers. Just what are the global and regional implications? What are the political consequences? What will follow? What resources will be needed for reconstruction, and are they being guaranteed? How will human rights and the innocent he protected?

As we all know, perceptions become political facts. How, therefore, will counter-productivity be avoided'? How, for example, will any perception of confrontation with Islam per se be avoided? How will it be demonstrated beyond doubt that any military action is not really about access to oil resources?

Above all, within the political strategy, what precisely will be the war aims? We are told that they would be to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and not directly to change the regime. But in Iraq, as has been repeatedly stressed, we are dealing with a ruthless, cruel, dangerous, sinister and calculating regime. There is no doubt about that. How, therefore, do we avoid playing into its hands by winning a vital tactical objective of disarmament, but at the price of alienating and driving into the arms of power hungry extremists still more millions across the world'? How do we avoid fanning the flames of Islamic militancy?

Consistency is imperative. We would be profoundly misguided if we failed to see the connection between our policy on Iraq and that on the Middle East as a whole. No one can condone terrorism by Palestinian extremists. But why are the extremists able to set the agenda? There is no doubt that this is to no small extent because the outside world has failed to deal effectively with the injustices perpetrated by Israel. What we do in Iraq will be seen by millions against what we have not done elsewhere in the Middle East. It will also be seen against our opportunist arms and economic dealings with corrupt regimes whose days are numbered. Indeed, we cannot escape the United Kingdom's own deep and devious involvement in building up the military strength of Iraq in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq conflict, even after the regime had used chemical weapons to kill 5,000 of its own citizens in 1988. No, consistency is at a premium in global politics. Its absence in the past means that the chickens are now coming home to roost.

We have to take seriously the research of organisations such as Saferworld—of which I am privileged to be a trustee—and ISIS. We need to be strengthening, not eroding, our control of arms exports and arms brokering. We need to ask ourselves whether or not we are convincingly working towards a world free of weapons of mass destruction, or whether we seem to be settling for a world in which some states are allowed to retain such weapons but others are not. Why is Israel OK when Iran is not—especially when Israel has refused to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty?

Surely, it starts with us. How can the existing principal nuclear powers persuade the world that they are serious about ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction when they give too many indications of a determination to hang on to their own nuclear weapons and when, for example, the United States has insisted upon its right to be able to veto challenge inspections of US chemical facilities?

Multilateralism—to which the Government have commendably committed themselves—is not about the powerful using international institutions and arrangements to dominate the world. It is about building global commitment to the effective policies which humanity must pursue if it is to survive. That means demonstrating our own commitment to what is necessary, not just demanding that commitment of others.

My Lords, my noble friends Lord Howell and Lord King mentioned the quality of our military equipment that might be committed to a full-scale war in Iraq—and I take the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, that there is no inevitability as regards military action.

Equipment is a vital issue to young servicemen and servicewomen, particularly in the light of the Prime Minister's comment that he would be willing to pay a -blood price" to resolve the situation in Iraq. I look forward to assurances from the Minister that they will not be sent away—possibly to their deaths—with second-rate equipment and clothing. I know that he, personally, takes this matter very seriously and will answer in the best way he can, mindful that surprise is the key advantage.

While making preparations for a possible war against Saddam Hussein, we must also be planning how to deliver humanitarian aid to the people of Iraq. I hope that the Government are conducting a very serious assessment of the humanitarian impact of any future conflict. NGOs are reviewing contingency planning and their role. Understandably, plans are not being made public for fear of de-stabilising the current situation.

The end-game, rightly, is the eradication of weapons of mass destruction. But we must be prepared to mitigate any humanitarian fall-out in the event of conflict. We must also ensure a principled and effective response to any humanitarian crisis after the conflict is over. Our permanent membership of the Security Council, and of the European Union, and proximity to the US Administration, make us uniquely positioned to help. In addition, we are the second largest bilateral humanitarian donor in real terms.

The humanitarian situation in Iraq is dire. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, pointed out that 14 million Iraqis are dependent on food aid.

The regime of Saddam Hussein is culpable for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of women and children, through systematically denying them food and medicine, and subjecting them to the most gruesome chemical and biological attacks.

If there is a war, Iraq's infrastructure is expected to be targeted, including power stations. A lack of power is likely to cause a serious epidemic, as there would be no way of treating water. The international community must then work together to avoid the rapid spread of infectious diseases, such as cholera and typhoid. In addition, vaccines and blood banks could become ineffective as both products need to be stored in a cool environment.

United Nations overseas staff will be evacuated, and the humanitarian agencies will be winding down just at the time when they are most needed. It is vital. therefore, that the military and NGOs work closely together as early as possible.

Post-war reconstruction is vital, as my noble friend Lord Moynihan pointed out. A great deal of work in repairing bridges and roads will need to be done before NGOs can start to work, which will severely hamper the humanitarian effort.

I hope that consideration is being given, in the event of a conflict, to informing the Iraqi people of the ongoing humanitarian issues using the BBC's Arabic Service. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan said, winning the peace is as important as winning the war. The noble Lord, Lord Judd, rightly said that hearts and minds have to be won.

The probability that Saddam Hussein will use chemical and/or biological weapons, possibly on his own people, possibly to try to save himself, is a major concern to servicemen and servicewomen and to their families. I assume that there will be sufficient vaccine to immunise against the effects of NBC all service personnel and reservists who may be deployed to Iraq. However, troops will need assurances that lessons have been learnt from problems over Gulf War syndrome, and that any side-effects of interaction between the various vaccines are properly understood.

I accept that, for security reasons, the Minister will be careful in any response that he may give.

My Lords, in this, the first week of the countdown on Iraq, I was forcefully struck by two different messages. In an Al'Qaeda videotape, a voice, credibly that of bin Laden, threatened us with terrible vengeance if we used force against Saddam's Iraq. In a letter to the editor of The Times, an ordinary Iraqi living in London quoted President Bush's vow—echoed by the Prime Minister—that liberty for the Iraqi people is not only a great moral cause but also a great strategic goal. He adds:

"I was very hopeful that the day my country was freed from oppression was getting closer but the language seems to be changing".

He concludes:

"America should not abandon the moral cause it believed in only two months ago".

We all hope that the inspectors will flex their muscles. Dr Blix lauded the atmosphere of collegiality so far discernible in Baghdad. Somebody suggested that the idea of flying scientists out of Iraq for interviews with their families might prove impracticable and be regarded by the Iraqis as constructive desertion. Are those signs of softening attitudes to the inspectors' mandate?

I wish to confirm something that the noble Lord, Lord Janner, said. Four years of interruption have given the Iraqis a tremendous lead time for concealment. There are reliably more than 6,000 full-time Iraqi personnel charged with hiding and securing sensitive assets and sites. They face 80 to 100 inspectors who will only be fully operational by Christmas. There is an aura of ambiguity about what will constitute noncompliance. Over all this uncertainty hovers the delicate phrase "regime change".

In the heated debate about a possible military intervention, most European governments make clear that they would prefer a process of ongoing altercation and reasoning with the regime in Baghdad to any show of force. In the case of compliance, Saddam would not be dislodged, and, as to his future, speculations diverge. Some think that, once de-fanged, his humiliation would lead to his downfall and he would be overthrown internally. Others hope that, even earlier, he might he persuaded to emigrate like Idi Amin, Baby Doc Duvalier or, more respectably, King Faruk and the Shah of Iran.

History negates the proposition that a defeated dictator in the Arab world is necessarily discredited. Gamal Nasser was grimly beaten in the Six-Day War. his airforce destroyed in hours and his army crippled in three days; yet he lived on, not only staying in power, but becoming a romantic legend in the Arab world. I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, and find myself in a rare show of disagreement with my dear noble friend Lord Thomas.

Saddam Hussein as a survivor, remaining in his seat of power, will be a mighty magnet for terrorists of every hue, hailed as the man who won the 30 years' war against the Goliath of the West. The war on terror would be intensified rather than diminished, and relations between the USA and Europe would worsen. A stampede of fawning entrepreneurs bidding for his favours would make him a triumphant hero.

In one way, time is on Saddam Hussein's side. Economic downturn in the Western world, a state of suspense and nervous unease all detract from the zeal to punish a culprit and effect seismic changes in the neighbourhood. European attitudes to the Iraqi opposition tend to be coloured by this ambivalence so, consciously or subconsciously. the significance and effectiveness of this opposition is constantly played down. I quote a great expert on the Middle East, Professor Bernard Lewis, who takes the view that the opposition is potentially much more effective than we believe it to be. Are those opposing forces to be let down again?

The obverse side of the great blessings of democratic transparency is that hand-wringing and agonising in public are eagerly noted by Saddam and the whole international camaraderie of terror and appeasement. They all have fine-tuned ears. Browsing through the abundant literature of protest against President Bush, it is a strange feeling for some of us who have lived through the age of dictators and the Munich crisis that there is so much thunder on the Left and passion in the liberal centre for policies that would preserve the most heinous illiberal regimes, and that it takes a Right-wing Republican American President to stand up for the unseating of criminal despots.

I say this in the full knowledge of the welter of conflicting strategic, commercial and self-seeking national interests that lie at the root of the complex issues relating to the Iraqi problem. But it is broadly true that a regime change in Iraq, with all the perils it might entail, is preferable to the present impasse that harbours future catastrophes to humanity. Should the inspection lead to peaceful change through compliance, the world will sigh with relief. But should Saddam Hussein defend his nefarious assets, hidden or revealed, for the sake of which he sacrificed reliably more than 150 billion dollars and pauperised his people, we must not stand in the path of those who argue for punitive action, preferably, but not necessarily, with the consent of the United Nations.

In all diffidence, and with full respect, this great institution has in its 50-odd years performed many outstanding feats in the service of mankind. But, alas, mankind, according to a great philosopher, is made of crooked timber. So, too, is the United Nations. It is an institution that, with all its great achievements, suffers from serious shortcomings. By dint of geographic rotation, Colonel Gaddafi of Libya may become head of a commission on human rights. Syria, with a regime that lags behind that of Iraq in material wealth but not in moral turpitude, may preside over the Security Council. States practising vivisection or genocide may sit in judgment over which governments practise racism or lack a civil society.

If the United States feels that the security of her people and the civilised world to whose open society she has contributed so richly is to be seriously endangered, she will act. I hope that the British Government and other governments would not stand in the way, and that they would participate in the pursuit of what the Iraqi correspondent to The Times described as a "moral cause".

My Lords, we have had a very good debate. I wish to respond to some comments, notably those of the noble Lords, Lord Skidelsky and Lord Thomas, and my noble friend Lord Judd. The noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, invited us to indulge in a flawed experiment. The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, gave us a historical account and asked some pertinent questions, as did my noble friend Lord Judd.

I welcome Resolution 1441. Having carried out expert consultation with my neighbours, it seems that this is only the third time in the history of the United Nations that there has been a Chapter VII resolution. I will be happy to be corrected if I am wrong, but, as far as I know, the Korean War and the Gulf War are the only two previous instances of a Chapter VII resolution. Resolution 1441 is very special; it is unlike any other resolution. The fact that, after much negotiation, Resolution 1441 was arrived at unanimously implies that it is not just the US or the UK, but many countries, who regard the threat of Saddam Hussein seriously.

People ask: why is Saddam being singled out? Why now? What harm would it do if we did not pursue him? I do not know the answers to all those questions. But if a Chapter VII resolution has been arrived at, which does not happen often—this is not a UN Chapter VI resolution, which can be, and is frequently, ignored—the situation is serious. Why is this so? Why are the Americans so sensitive about compliance with this resolution? I tried to address this question in my speech in the debate on the Address. I will briefly repeat my point. America is the only superpower because of both its economic and defence strength. But, at the moment, America is feeling very fragile as a result of 11th September.

I do not know whether your Lordships remember seeing the film "King Kong". King Kong was a nice gentle giant, but if aroused he became rather disturbed and went slashing all around. America is in a similarly delicate position. It is hard to believe that it is simultaneously both a very powerful nation and a very fragile one. It regards the particular event of 9/11 as unique and prioritises its own self-defence above everything else, including all the other programmes that my noble friend Lord Judd mentioned for creating a peaceful world, eliminating poverty, improving the environment and so on. There are many reasons for that, some of which are sound.

The world must be able to come to the help of this fearful giant and tell it that we shall not ignore its need for reassurance in its fragility. This may sound strange, but. I have been reading literature and talking to people from the United States and that is the vision that emerges. That is why it is important that 1441 was passed, keeping America within the multilateral family. I add my tributes to the many others that have been paid to the Prime Minister on that.

At the same time, it is important not to forget the seriousness of 1441. My noble friend Lord Judd talked about muscular mull ilateralism—more in hope than in experience, I think, considering the record of the United Nations. During the Cold War it did very little, being stymied by the counter vetoes of the two great powers. Since 1991, we have had one successful multilateral intervention in the Gulf War, but we failed to gel a United Nations resolution on Kosovo. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, disagrees, but I still believe that it was right that we intervened in Kosovo and stopped the genocide that was going on. Let us clearly face the fact that had we waited for a United Nations Chapter VII resolution, like we have got on Iraq, by now many more people would have died and perhaps Milosevic would still be in power and people would still he reasoning with him to change his ways.

There is a distinct possibility that a material breach will occur. If it does, we, together with other non-US members of the Security Council, will have to take that seriously on board and not make new excuses and alternatives just to postpone the evil day. If that happens, the United States will definitely lose its fragile faith in the UN. We could not blame a country for losing that faith if it genuinely felt its self-defence was at stake.

When a material breach occurs, our main task will be to try to follow up with a second resolution based on fairly muscular multilateralism that will deliver on the threat it has made. If a UN resolution is not obeyed, the United Nations should act on that and not pass another resolution that says, "Well, we know you did not obey that one, but you almost obeyed it, so we shall give you another chance not to obey us again, and perhaps we will really, really mean it this time".

What my noble friend Lady Ramsay said is very important. I am not saying this just to make an excuse. The most important aspect of the Saddam regime to me is not even its weapons of mass destruction, but its record of torture and violation of human rights. I read that when the current Prime Minister took office in 1997, doing something about Iraq was on his list of priorities, both because of its continued flouting of previous UN resolutions and because of its record on torture and human rights.

Even if 9/11 had not happened—and whatever the connections between 9/11 and Saddam Hussein may be—the world community would have had to come to thinking seriously about regimes that violate human rights to such an intolerable extent. The United Nations failed miserably in Rwanda. In a sense it also failed in Kosovo, but, thank God, other people acted. There are some vile regimes in the world, but when it comes to violation of human rights Saddam Hussein is special. If those violations continue, the world will have to devise for its muscular multilateralism some code of intervention for countries that, although they may be sovereign, should not be allowed to violate human rights in that way.

Finally, we ought to guard against the speculation by Richard Perle and others in America that after this war America will redraw the map of the Middle East. There are big utopian ideas that the Hashemites will go hack to Iraq and all the Palestinians will be thrown out of Palestine and put into Jordan. In the Gulf War in 1992, only the UN resolutions' objectives were achieved and no further activity was carried out in Iraq, such as going into Baghdad. We must strongly urge the United States that we ought to stick to the UN resolution again this time. If it is achievable without a war, fine, but if not, we should attempt only to achieve that and nothing else.

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister, who has demonstrated that often the fairer sex have perhaps a better understanding of these events. She has spoken on everything to do with Iraq with directness, frankness and openness, on a nonpolitical basis. I congratulate her more than I would her right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary, who sometimes shows the soles of his feet in the Arab world, which is not really acceptable, or even the Prime Minister. Today I am trying to focus my mind on what we are here for. I assume it is to try to find the formula whereby we can achieve the disarmament of Iraq and its reintroduction into the international community, setting all things aside. Here there are certain unanswered questions and areas of confusion.

I have declared my involvement before. We were the principal bankers to the Government of Iraq. For many years I went backwards and forwards. Probably even today I am one of the few who has been there frequently. I like the Iraqi people. I understand something of their history. I enjoyed the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. I have a brief quote for him from the letters of Gertrude Bell:

"We treat Mesop—

not Mespot—

"as if it were an isolated political unit, instead of which it is part of Arabia, its politics indissolubly connected with the great and far reaching Arab question".

Let us put the great and far-reaching Arab question aside and return to where we are now. What are the motives and objectives of those involved? The noble Lord, Lord Black, has just left the Chamber, probably because I was to remind him that we have never thought of the United States as a great St Bernard dog. Has he ever had the difficulty of holding a great St Bernard dog on a lead when it smells a bitch on heat? He is in danger of suggesting that the United States is now a free-ranging rottweiler. That is his view. He spoke in the same way last time he contributed. As your Lordships may know, I have many family in the United States and was partly brought up over there.

My first question relates to the Gulf War and what ultimately happened. We are dealing with a strong man and a strong regime—two qualities the Arab world likes because it has often known nothing else. The problems arise when there is a weak regime. Why did we stop after we managed to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait? There are many views on the subject. The first is that the mandate from the UN only allowed us to take him out of Kuwait, and that was it. Secondly, there is the belief that we did not want to be seen on television screens to be killing lots of innocent Iraqi citizens. Thirdly, there is the view that the Americans did not want to have any body bags; and, fourthly, the fear that, if they got nearer to Baghdad, the chemical warfare might open up. I am not sure that the Minister will be able to deal with that question today, but I should rather like to know the answer sometime. Indeed, the Iraqis themselves are slightly confused, because they saw a weak chink in the armour.

Now we find ourselves in a very difficult position. We need to know why Saddam Hussein has weapons of mass destruction. The noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, could refer, as I do, to Section 5, or whatever, of the anti-terrorism Bill, which lists all the pathogens. If you analyse them all, as I asked people to do, it appears that none of them alone can create mass destruction. To some extent they are terrifying, but only in the quantities that exist in that country. As noble Lords, will remember, when the allies, if I may call them that, began to bomb Baghdad from England, the Americans would not come to London because they thought that they could be bombed from Baghdad. There are many prejudices and doubts involved.

I want to know why Saddam Hussein and his regime are keeping up this game. Perhaps it is because, as we know, the Iraqis play poker from the age of about four or five. There is a poker game going on during which masses of chips are being added to each person's bank, with no day of reckoning. There must be a day of reckoning, and that day is now. It is not just a UN resolution; it is something deeper. Unless we can return Iraq to an acceptable status that will enable it to join the international community, many opportunities will be lost. I still cannot understand what is going on.

When I used to visit Iraq, I found that the regime was getting stronger and stronger over a period of about 30 years, and that, logically, all opposition had been eliminated. Sometimes I would adopt something of a socialist attitude, and say "Where is Mr So and So?" "He is no longer with us", was often the response. I did not realise at first that the words "no longer with us" meant not just that he was no longer in the ministry but that he was in another place—a superior place! Over time I have noticed the disappearance of many people who I may or may not have known either directly or indirectly: they have been eliminated. So in Iraq at present there is no opposition.

Let us just imagine the scenario that a good poker player would put forward; namely, that there were no weapons of mass destruction and that there would be a call in Baghdad for free and open elections. The Council of Europe would then send a delegation to the country and everyone would inspect everything and, suddenly, we would find that Saddam Hussein was elected with a full majority because there was no opposition. That sort of thing is possible, though it is not the same as the situation in Zimbabwe. We know that strong leaders do use the death threat. Iraq over time—that is, over centuries—has suffered from that strong leadership and persecution. It goes way back into the mists of time. Let us not forget that it was meant to be the original headquarters of the Tower of Babel, which I am told never in fact existed.

My worry is that if we do not move now, we shall be seen as being weak. I do not believe in any more resolutions that go running around through the United Nations, nor do I believe in allowing the United States to put itself into the position of being the world's enemy for the rest of this century by taking unilateral action. The resources are difficult. The bald eagle may believe that it can achieve success just by bombing from the skies, and that is possible. We may go for a full war at the end of the day where we say that we are not planning to remove a regime, which is what has been said, and that we are not on an anti-terrorist war. But I have never understood it when people talk about the war of terrorism; it is sometimes like the "War on Want" or the "War on Pollution". It is not a real war: it is a battle.

So what will happen next, and what is the end game? The Iraqis must be left in absolutely no doubt of the seriousness of this resolution and of those who support it. They must see no weakness, no chink in the armour. No one must introduce factors such as a link to world terrorism. It is straightforward "go for the throat". They must give up what they have. But what will they receive in return? If I were young enough. I would be out in Baghdad again looking at the fantastic potential of the country both industrially and agriculturally; and, indeed, as regards oil.

Iraq could very quickly produce 8 million barrels of oil a day. It has always worried the Saudis that it holds the whole reserves that could be put on stream in a world conflict, and they do not like that because it makes them feel insecure. With my permission to speak, I have had the doubtful privilege of meeting many people to discuss economic matters and how they could pay for the war bearing in mind all the obligations that they have from the Gulf War. One suggestion I made was that they should just hand it hack to the British. I said, "Give us the oil fields. We will discuss it with the Bank England and pay off your debts. We'll sort it out and finance your industrial redevelopment. But, for goodness sake, give up this charade that you want to have weapons to attack someone. Who do you want to attack?"

Then you get the classic answer. The right hand goes across the left breast and the official says, "Excellency, I am not authorised to discuss this at my level". I respond by asking, "Were you trained with the Midland Bank like me?", because that is the sort of thing you expect. Then the next official responds in the same way. Finally, you meet a minister, or member of the revolutionary command council, and the same response is made. After the minister's initial "Hello", which is delivered with no smile at all, the rhetoric begins. It comes in the whining voice of the interpreter. "His Excellency says that your Excellency is a lackey of capitalist imperialistic pro-Zionist policies that have destroyed the stability of the world and caused the death of many innocent women and children". That discourse goes on for another 20 minutes after which you have your turn. I have learnt to give a rhetoric that makes me cringe even to think about it. I have used words that I would never dare use in your Lordships' House. After my response, we smile and are friends.

It is possible that the friendship with Iraq could return if the Iraqis could be persuaded to realise that they have a chance, economically, of being a greater nation than they ever can be militarily.

My Lords, I am glad that we have been given another opportunity to debate Iraq, and the prospect of a possible war. I participated in the special debate held on 24th September. I then commenced my contribution by saying that I was opposed to war with Iraq. I continue to hold that view, although I am just a little more optimistic about the possibility of avoiding war than I was at that time. There is at least the UN resolution that we are discussing this afternoon, and inspectors are back in Iraq. So far, they have been able to say that there is full co-operation with the Iraqi authorities. But concerns remain.

The resolution is a tough one. It is clear that some United States' politicians want to be able to claim "material breaches" so that they can go to war. Some examples of the rhetoric involved were quoted this afternoon by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams. There is talk of the possibility of Saddam Hussein "playing games". In the mean time, the United States and ourselves are continuing to bomb Iraq. There is apparently no UN mandate for these raids. Indeed, Kofi Annan's spokesman made it clear in a recent television interview that other members of the Security Council had never supported the so-called "no fly zones". It was, therefore, not possible to agree with the claims made by some US spokesmen that firing by the Iraqis at the planes was a breach of UN resolutions. If that is so, it seems to me that the Iraqis are within their rights in firing on the planes, as the UN charter permits countries to act in self-defence. A violation of what the Iraqis see as their air space. plus the bombing, must surely count as aggressive actions against which they are entitled to defend themselves.

But we live in a world where nations as powerful as the United States may do as they please with little hindrance. Other countries do not want to offend the United States. Of course, if America wants to go to war with Iraq, everyone knows that it will eventually do so. It does not really need the support of others, alt hough plainly President Bush would prefer to have that support, if only to silence his domestic critics. And those critics do exist. A1'Gore has been extremely critical and has apparently refused to be silenced even by elements in the hierarchy of his own party, the Democrats. There are also other well-known critics.

I remain against a war. I am horrified at the casual way in which the possibility of war is often discussed. We are told that if Saddam Hussein does not cooperate he must be disarmed by force. I sometimes think that our present ruling elites—and not just political elites but the elites who run our media—do not entirely understand what war entails. Mostly they are too young to remember the last war, and that is why they sometimes make the ludicrous comparison of Saddam with Hitler. Those who are against the war are accused of appeasement. That kind of talk really does annoy me: it undervalues the courage of the generation who fought that war against Hitler. Hitler's Panzer divisions threatened the whole of Europe. We knew, when Hitler was finally challenged, what had to be faced. In schools, gas masks were handed out; we hung them round our necks in boxes. Air raid shelters were built in suburban gardens. We expected and we got prolonged aerial bombardment.

Iraq is a battered country. After two major wars, punitive sanctions for a decade and constant bombing, the idea that it is capable of threatening ourselves or the United States is absurd. Nor is there any evidence of a link with A1'Qaeda. No one expects to see Iraqi bombing planes over London, and the few Scud missiles Iraq possesses are no threat to us. Many people in this country understand that. They are unwilling to be dragged into a war at the behest of the United States. This feeling is widespread across Europe. The French and German Governments take the line they have because of public opinion in their countries. Yet, we are being manoeuvred in this country into an acceptance of the view that war is almost bound to happen.

There is constant emphasis on the unpleasant character of Saddam Hussein. Many of his past sins took place when he was an ally of the United States and receiving financial support plus weaponry from America. He is not the first tyrant to be supported when it suited and then demonised when it did not. Moreover, by concentrating on Saddam Hussein and his atrocities—and there are other atrocious regimes in the world—attention is diverted from the undoubted fact that war will be fought against the Iraqi people. They will be the sufferers, as if they had not suffered enough already.

We are told that there is no quarrel with the Iraqi people, but we know from past experience that the war will start with a massive air attack. Remember how shocked—indeed devastated—we were when the Bali terrorist bomb killed 180 mostly young people? That was high explosive in a car. Is it really imagined that high explosive dropped from a fleet of planes flying at 15,000 or 20,000 feet is somehow less destructive of human beings? No, if there is a war with Iraq, the Bali bomb casualties will be replicated over and over and over again. We shall be told about targeting: that it is possible with "smart" bombs to target accurately so that civilian casualties are minimised. Well, that did not happen in Kosovo, where schools and hospitals were hit as well as the Chinese embassy, and cluster bombs were used on the civilian population of towns such as Nis. Nor did it happen in the last Gulf War, when 400 mainly mothers and children sheltering in a large bunker in Baghdad died as the result of a direct hit.

It is not only those immediately killed or injured; the civilian infrastructure is usually destroyed as well, leaving the unfortunate inhabitants without clean water and lacking in power supplies. Food supplies are also affected, as we saw in Afghanistan. People who often have not much anyway lose whatever they have as their dwellings are destroyed. They become homeless refugees in their own country. Yes, for a civilian population, modern war is a truly terrifying prospect. With Iraq, there is also the possible destabilising effect on surrounding countries.

Only in the most extreme circumstances should war be even contemplated. In my view, those circumstances do not exist in relation to Iraq. I have no doubt that the United States, with its vast technological superiority, can win a war and occupy Iraq. But what then? And what about existing commitments in Afghanistan and in the Balkans? What about the cost of such a war? The world economy is already in recession. Those who were persuaded to invest in the stock market in the 1990s have seen the value of their investments go into sharp decline. War is unlikely to aid recovery. War has to be paid for. But most important of all, there is the cost in lives.

For those reasons, I am glad that a few points have been made quite strongly in this debate—that the statement contained in Resolution 1441 does not automatically lead to war; that there will be a necessity to go back to the United Nations Security Council to discuss what should happen even if there is an allegation of a material breach; and that that does not automatically lead to a military intervention. I believe that there are other means of dealing with this situation which have been dealt with very eloquently by other speakers. I hope that we take every possible step to ensure that the situation is resolved without military conflict.

My Lords, the nearer we get to the brink of war with Iraq, the louder are the humanitarian voices being raised outside Parliament, especially among the non-governmental organisations and the Churches. Some have warned against war itself, and we have just heard a very sincere example of that, but the most recent warnings have come from those who anticipate the consequences of war both for the Iraqi people and for the Middle East as a whole.

While I strongly support United Nations Resolution 1441 as a means of cajoling the Iraqi leadership into co-operation. I am well aware of the real differences which remain among the UN members over the necessity of a second resolution. Having heard Richard Perle in the Committee Room upstairs last week describe the work of weapons inspectors as a more or less pointless exercise, I can foresee another inevitable split in the next round of the Security Council in which France and Russia once again try to pull us out of our happy honeymoon with the United States. I cannot follow the noble Lord, Lord Desai, in his description of the United States as a kind of warm, cuddly teddy bear; that is just not the image that I have. Given that the United States will be prepared to go it alone and ignore any further resolutions, I fully expect Britain to join the campaign. However, I personally cannot recommend it unless there is a further meaningful resolution.

My noble friend Lord Thomas questioned the assumption made by the noble Lord, Lord Howell, about a connection with A1'Qaeda. I think that we all look forward to hearing the Government's view on that. I certainly do not believe that the case for such a connection is convincing.

I spoke in the Queen's Speech debate about our neglect of our wider obligations to the coalition against terrorism and to our friends in the Middle East. I am against any kind of appeasement. However, I recognise the differences between this war and the air strikes against the Taliban a year ago. I look forward to hearing the comments of my noble and gallant friend Lord Bramall on that subject. It is not possible to win an Iraq war without a ground war, and the number of civilian casualties is bound to be much greater than that in Afghanistan.

The noble Lord, Lord Astor, has already outlined a part of the grim humanitarian scene in the event of war. I should like to quote from a Christian Aid statement of 22nd November, and I declare an interest as a trustee. Christian Aid states:

"If there is war, Iraq's poorest communities, already suffering as a result of government policies"—

which makes it clear that the suffering is caused by government policies—

"weakened by years of conflict and undermined by economic sanctions, will be among the first to suffer. There are currently 700,000 Iraqi people who have been made homeless in their own country. Military action, as well as potentially resulting in a loss of civilian life, could force more people to leave their homes and become cut off from their food supplies.

The international community has an obligation to plan for and implement an effective humanitarian response, which guarantees resources and access to independent assistance for all those in need".

I therefore hope that the Minister does have an answer for the noble Lord, Lord Astor.

I could repeat several similar statements from CARE International, Save the Children, the Middle East Council of Churches and many other organisations that are now working in Iraq, both in the Kurdish area and in Baghdad. The Caritas figures have already been quoted. Those organisations say that leaving aside the thousands of casualties from military action, the consequences of war for children under 14, who now constitute almost half the population, are almost unimaginable. Children who are already chronically malnourished—an estimated one n five—would face death from hunger or ill-health. Children in some urban areas would be instantly deprived of water and other services, let alone health and education. Food distribution by the World Food Programme and the NGOs under the nationwide Oil For Food programme would simply come to a halt.

It is easy to forget that Iraq is not a developing country like Afghanistan, although Saddam Hussein has done his best to make it so. It has a highly sophisticated infrastructure and technical capacity, as weapons inspectors know all too well. That also means that the scale of any destruction will be proportionately greater and will have a more devastating effect in Iraq. The civil service, although seriously underpaid, includes many with high standards of training in education and professional skills. Those people cannot run the country without an adequate infrastructure and properly functioning services. Essential spare parts, even now, for hospitals, schools, pumping stations and water supplies are lacking to the point at which a nursing sister cannot even find a spare light bulb. That is where sanctions have already failed: they failed to hurt the rulers of Iraq and, worst of all, they have succeeded in hurting the people who are already suffering enough.

It is true that the Oil For Food programme has been improved, as have the smart sanctions under Security Council Resolution 1409, which was passed in May last year. Despite the efforts of the various UN panels, those changes have not solved the fundamental challenge of keeping people alive and children healthy.

I accept that Resolution 1441 has been a great landmark for the United Nations. As the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said, it has enhanced the authority of the United Nations, which we should all welcome. Here I pay tribute to the UN Secretary-Gene ral, Kofi Annan. While much has been said about our Prime Minister's role in restraining the US President and reminding him of his international obligations—in case he had forgotten them—few recognise how much success is due to the personality and perseverance of the Secretary-General and his staff over many years. He achieved the latest resolution, I suggest, much against his own inclination.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Judd, as always, made the important connection between Iraq and the Middle East; some of us did so during our debate on the Queen's Speech. I was encouraged that the Foreign Secretary gave more space to the Middle East peace process in his opening remarks on Monday. Some of that was echoed by the noble Baroness the Minister this morning. That is a welcome trend in government statements. There are signs that the Americans recognise that the Middle East may be part of the price for our support. There is an important difference between our position and that of the United States. I hope that that is the case. However, there is not much movement in the peace process. We have many words about progress from the Foreign Secretary and the noble Baroness the Minister but we do not see any movement. We should not expect very much to happen before the elections but at the same time those elections in the Middle East are no excuse for inaction. Finally, a Government who have just doubled their arms exports to Israel are hardly in a position to convince the British public, let alone the Palestinians, that they are making progress towards a lasting peace settlement.

My Lords, I am among the many in your Lordships' House and throughout the country who have no love for Saddam Hussein but who do not see the pressing need for a war on Iraq at present. There are better and less destructive ways of persuading a country to disarm than threatening to pulverise it with vastly superior airpower and then to invade it, however distasteful its regime. In that regard, I seem to differ from my noble friend Lord Desai.

As my noble friend Lady Symons said, Security Council Resolution 1441 gives us and Saddam Hussein a window of opportunity to achieve peaceful disarmament despite, perhaps, its rather draconian wording. I agree with the Liberal Democrat amendment, which received 85 votes in another place on Monday: when UNMOVIC reports early next year, the situation should be reassessed by the Security Council and a further resolution passed before any military action is launched. That was the Russian and French position initially, and also that of the Syrians, which they changed only after intensive discussions with US representatives. Many believe that both carrot and stick methods of persuasion were used. Even now those governments believe that the Security Council should carefully consider the situation again before a US-led attack is endorsed.

I am glad that my noble friend was able to confirm the statement that the Foreign Secretary made in the debate in the Commons on Monday; that is, that the UK also takes that position. He even went so far as to say that a second resolution would be desirable if' it were possible. Despite strongly supporting the American position publicly—perhaps too strongly for many people—the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and our ambassador, Sir Jeremy Greenstock and his team at the UN, have been quietly successful in moderating the US position. They did so by persuading them first to work through the United Nations route, leading to SCR 1441, but also to agree that there should be further Security Council deliberation before any military action is taken.

However, the hawks in the clearly divided US Administration, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and my noble friend Lord Judd referred, are still powerful. I am afraid that the American public and the American Congress have been groomed to support a war. I was one of a number of noble Lords and Members of Parliament—several other noble Lords have mentioned this—who heard Richard Perle, the chairman of the US defence policy board, speak in Committee Room 9 last week. Like many others present, I was somewhat alarmed by his position. He said that even if Hans Blix and UNMOVIC do not detect any weapons of mass destruction or destroy all those that they do detect, he would not be satisfied that Iraq was not hiding further stocks somewhere. Dick Cheney has said much the same thing. He implied that an attack was inevitable although of course he stopped short—only just short—of saying that explicitly. He also said, partly in jest, that only if Saddam were to adopt the US constitution would there be enough of a regime change for the United States to allow him to remain in power and avert a military confrontation. He also played down the effect that a military strike would have on the people of Iraq because of the greatly increased accuracy of American weapons and smart bombs, which he said would he used only on military targets and communications systems. He was confident that Iraqi troops would quickly lay down their arms when confronted by overwhelming US air power. He seemed to think an urban battle for Baghdad unlikely. But even if a war were to end quickly, the damage to the country's infrastructure and the impact on its people would be profound. My noble friend Lady Turner and the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, amplified that.

In 1991, immediately after the Gulf War but before sanctions had begun to bite, a United Nations report was produced by Martti Ahtisaari, who was then a UN under-secretary-general. He said:

"The conflict wrought 'near-apocalyptic' results on the economic infrastructure of what had been a fairly highly urbanised and mechanised society. Now, most means of modern life support have been destroyed or rendered tenuous. Iraq has, for some time to come, been relegated to a pre-industrial age, but with all the disabilities of post-industrial dependence on an intensive use of energy and technology".

Desert Storm stopped short of invading Iraq and yet caused the damage that I and other noble Lords have described. Surely a war aimed at overthrowing the regime will be at least as destructive and probably a great deal more so.

I am aware that Mr Perle is not a member of President Bush's administration but he certainly has great influence and several members of that administration hold very similar views. So convinced are they that a war is the only solution to the problem that they are likely to try to use even a minor infringement of UNMOVIC's protocol as a casus belli.

As my noble friend Lady Turner pointed out, already there has been a US complaint about Iraq's defence of its airspace against one of the now more frequent attacks on ground installations by allied aircraft in the no-fly zones. I need not repeat her argument that those no-fly zones are not authorised by the United Nations. But I note that the United Kingdom did not recognise this as an interference with the United Nations resolution. That is another example of the United Kingdom acting as a restraining influence on the more impatient elements behind US policy formation.

But we could do much more to avert this impending war which, if it occurred, would be likely to have disastrous repercussions, as other noble Lords have said, throughout the Muslim world and increase rather than decrease the likelihood of A1'Qaeda inspired terrorist attacks. This is exactly the converse of the avowed purpose of the confrontation. Perhaps today's bad news from Kenya is a precursor of more bad news to come if this conflict takes place.

There are stronger ways in which we could persuade the United States to draw back, the most obvious being to withhold our military support. We did that in Vietnam without the "special relationship" being unduly disturbed. In the case of Iraq it is less likely that the Americans will "go it alone"; we therefore hold a critical position. I hope very much that Her Majesty's Government will not be afraid to use this trump card skilfully so that the doves rather than the hawks prevail in Washington and a potentially disastrous and unnecessary war is averted.

Before concluding. I ask my noble friend—and follow on from the noble Lord. Lord Astor—about the humanitarian situation which is likely to arise in Iraq should we not be successful in preventing conflict. The Iraqi people have had a disastrous decade due to the twin effects of the war on the infrastructure of the country and continued sanctions which have destroyed the economy and delayed its recovery. Although there are now signs of improvement, the standard of living of Iraqi citizens has dropped to that of the third world from one approaching first world levels before the Gulf War. I am aware that Saddam himself, by not disarming to UNSCOM's satisfaction, is perhaps largely responsible, although the full story of the sanctions is far more complex.

Discussing the effect of the sanctions may seem a diversion from today's topic but it is relevant when considering the effect of a future war on the population. There is still widespread poverty and undernutrition in Iraq. Tun Myat, the UN humanitarian co-ordinator in Iraq, said six months ago that even though the Oil for Food programme is now preventing overt malnutrition, many poorer people have to sell part of their barely adequate ration to pay for rent and clothing. Interruption of the Oil for Food programme, which would be inevitable in case of hostilities, would find many Iraqis in a very vulnerable condition and might have a disastrous effect. Can my noble friend say what advance planning is going on—here again I very much echo the words of the noble Lord. Lord Astor—to ensure that in the event of hostilities adequate food and medical supplies will rapidly be made available to the population?

The Iraqi health services, already running well below capacity, will not be able to cope with the immediate needs of the physically and mentally traumatised population which will probably include many thousands of internally displaced persons, let alone offer them any longer term rehabilitation. Perhaps learning a lesson from Afghanistan, are we prepared to put in the necessary resources after a conflict to restore a doubly damaged economy, which even now is only beginning to recover from the effects of the Gulf War? I hope that my noble friend will spare some time to address these important economic and social concerns which need to be taken into account before any military intervention is contemplated.

My Lords, I must first ask the indulgence of your Lordships' House as I was unavoidably detained and unable to attend the opening of this important debate. Nevertheless, I feel it my duty to try to make some modest and short contribution despite my waywardness in respect of the rules of your Lordships' House. I hope that noble Lords will accept my apology.

The unanimous resolution of the United Nations Security Council to get observers back into Iraq while threatening Saddam Hussein with serious consequences if he obstructed them was a diplomatic triumph, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton, said in his powerful speech. All concerned, not least our Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, deserve heartfelt congratulations and thanks. It must be recognised, however, that this could not have come about, let alone been accepted by Iraq, without a credible and continuing threat of force by the Americans.

But surely we now need to build on that consensus, which must be the only right way of handling international relations in the modern world, and not deviate from the Security Council unless it becomes literally the only way to achieve the indisputable aim of destroying or disarming Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as required and demanded by the Security Council itself. That objective must somehow be brought about.

However, the date of 8th December, by which time Saddam Hussein is required under the resolution to disclose and list any such weapons in his possession, may, if he prevaricates, provide a flashpoint for military action. That causes me some concern. It must be better for the observers, armed with all the intelligence at their disposal from the United States and others, which must be considerable and detailed, to find whatever weapons exist and destroy them rather than that we should use a quibble over paperwork as an excuse for going to war prematurely and without further UN sanction.

There are, after all, to coin a phrase, more ways of killing a cat. However much the British Government may want, quite understandably, to be seen to be supporting the United States, I hope that the Prime Minister will not forget that wise observation of the renowned Chinese general of 500BC, General Sun Tsu, who said that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy—notice the phrase "subdue the enemy"—without fighting. Incidentally, that is a philosophy which seemed to suit the Americans at Yorktown.

Finally, I hope that war will not become inevitable. Whatever success there may be early on, any—even temporary—occupation of Iraq will, I believe, create more problems than it solves. But, if it does become inevitable, can the Government assure us flat the British forces that they send to participate in any American action—if, indeed, that is the intention—will, in every sense, be properly prepared for whatever lies ahead of them?

Will they, for example, be properly equipped? That has been mentioned previously. There have been some ominous rumours about equipment. Much work needs to be done in that area. Will they be properly supported, particularly in the medical field, given that the medical services are struggling to keep their head above water? In view of the pressures on them and the over-stretch highlighted by the Chief of the Defence Staff, will they be properly trained? Can we be assured that the views of the Chiefs of Staff will he listened to and respected and that, as a result, our forces will have clear-cut, attainable objectives, both in the short and longer terms? Judging by Afghanistan, they could be there for quite a while.

In short, can we be assured that our forces are not being asked to take unnecessary risks? All armed forces take risks and they do it willingly and consciously. But we want to be assured that they are not taking unnecessary risks. It is absolutely lueicrous to think that war can somehow be cash limited. Either something is worth fighting and making sacrifices for or it is not.

I hope that the Minister will try to give assurances on the points I have raised. At least my contribution, which comes so close to his winding-up speech, should be comparatively fresh in his memory. After all, we would be asking men and women to risk their lives for reasons which, to say the least, are more obscure and contentious than those which prevailed in World War II, Korea, the Falklands or the Gulf. So the Government had better get it right.

My Lords, I can hardly resist adding to the reference to Yorktown made by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. I had pleasure in reading that Yorktown was not, as I had originally understood, a British/American conflict but fiat the German regiments in the British Army surrendered to the Irish regiments in the French Army as the siege came to a conclusion. We often forget how confused and multi-national our past conflicts were.

This has been a very thoughtful and intelligent debate. It began with a thoughtful, helpful and constructive speech from the Minister. We all welcome Resolution 1441. It was carefully drafted, tight and tough. It was well worth the weeks of multilateral negotiation which led to its unanimous agreement. I repeat what I said in the Queen's Speech debate: we on these Benches congratulate the Government on the very useful contribution that they made to that outcome. However, we all recognise that the Government are maintaining a delicate balance of critical support for the United States, holding together the multilateral coalition with a great deal more of the tightrope still to cross before safety and a safe conclusion are reached.

The Minister's speech underlined the significant differences of understanding between London and Washington. In London there is a much greater emphasis on disarmament than on regime change. We welcomed the explicit comment that there is a settled preference within the British Government for a second resolution. We also welcome the Minister's clear statement that our definition of material breach is as a deliberate and significant breach and not, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, remarked, a mistake on the paperwork.

We also note and welcome the Minister's acceptance that there is an unavoidable link with the Israel-Palestine conflict and that the international community needs to press forward on that, not simply to make occasional speeches reminding the world that we have accepted in principle a two-state solution even as action on the ground in the West Bank and the Gaza makes a two-state solution more and more difficult week by week.

One hesitation I had with the introductory speech of the noble Baroness was her reference to Iraq as a bad regime. I worry about those in the United States who divide the world into good guys and bad guys; a very simple Manichaean view of the world, which is one of the worries many of us have about the current debate within Washington. The world is full of greys rather than blacks and whites. Most regimes with which we have to deal around the world are on the murky side of grey. Sadly, international diplomacy is not a matter of knowing who is with us and who is against us but a matter of how we have to deal with unsatisfactory governments elsewhere around the world.

We welcome the Government giving strong but critical and qualified support for the United States. As many noble Lords have said, we all have concerns about the current debate within Washington. The noise of the neo-Conservative right in the Op-Ed pages, the think tanks, and so forth, is extremely worrying. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, referred to Theodore Roosevelt's comment that one should speak softly and carry a big stick. A Conservative right in Washington, as Richard Perle made clear to us, believes that one should speak loudly and thrash around with a big stick. That is not necessarily the same desirable approach.

The justification for the war on Iraq as a response to September 11th is one which we have to resist. Yes, the American people felt wounded by that massive terrorist attack, but there is no evidence of any direct link between Iraq and A1'Qaeda in that attack on New York. The fact that the American people feel that they are at war, as the noble Lord, Lord Black of Crossharbour, said, does not suggest that political leadership should simply follow them.

There have been occasions in the past year when I have thought both of Britain and the United States in 1898 and 1899 when a press war swept the United States into war with Spain, and when a similar jingoistic crowd swept Britain into war with those silly little Boer Republics in South Africa and thought that the transfer of a few regiments from India, where they had been fairly successful putting down the Afghan tribes would sort things out in six months. On both occasions the states were carried away by jingoism and stopped thinking about the rational and long-term implications of their actions.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Desai. We are dealing with a fearful giant in the United States and we need to ensure that we make it less fearful and that we do not feed its fears. I am not sure that I would go quite as far as the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, in saying that the United States is not a St Bernard but a Rottweiler. That seems to me to be rather over the top. There are distortions and taboos in the American domestic debate of which we all have to be carefully aware.

The noble Lord, Lord Black of Crossharbour, gave us a flavour of that right-wing debate. He talked of the United States having a righteous cause. I have heard people in Washington talk about the United States as a righteous nation and on that basis justify stating that the United States does not need to obey international law in the same way as we do because we are much less righteous. With respect, that is a fundamentalist approach, which we all have to resist. We must resist Christian fundamentalism in the United States as much as we resist Muslim fundamentalism in the Middle East. The United States does not have a casus belli against Iraq now. September 11th did not provide the United States with that cause. Throwing around phrases such as "appeasement" and "treachery" simply does not help.

The United Kingdom and other European allies therefore need to be more vocal in their participation in the debate within Washington and across the United States in persuading the United States that war against terrorism is not the answer, but that an engagement with other countries from which terrorists draw support is what we all have to do.

The question of links between the war on terrorism, the war on Iraq and Israel/Palestine is therefore a key element of this debate and of a number of future debates. The noble Lords, Lord Howell and Lord King, in effect accepted that these two are the same; that the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq are part of the same conflict.

There are links, but they are not direct. A1'Qaeda feeds on anti-Americanism, but at its core is based on fundamentalist Islam, is anti-modernisation, is anti the current Saudi regime and is also anti a number of regimes in the Middle East. Saddam is not—as I think I heard the noble Lord, Lord Black of Crossharbour, suggest, a radical Islamist; he is a cynical secularist who actually is trying to modernise Iraq and stands against many of the things promoted by the A1'Qaeda network.

Iraq gives support to specific terrorist groups which are anti-Israel, as indeed do some within Iran. But that has a limited geographical spread. It is equally to be condemned, but clearly to be understood as not part of the same problem. Israel is a symbol and an excuse for radical Islamic terrorists, but we need to be careful what it is that we are fighting.

A number of noble Lords—most impressively I thought the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan—have spoken about the implications of a war on Iraq for the wider war on terrorism and for the Middle East as a whole. I was at an extremely interesting conference in Washington in September about the threat that anti-Americanism would grow in the event of a war with Iraq. I was very happy to know that a number of people within the Washington policy community are actively concerned about that. Thus, the West has to take great care that in approaching any necessary and unavoidable conflict with Iraq—if we reach that stage—we do not emerge with an American protectorate which looks as though the West is attempting to occupy part of the heart of the Arab world.

The containment of terrorism, as the British have learned painfully over the past 30 years, requires a long-term commitment with great determination and great patience, and a recognition that there can never be a complete victory over terrorism. There are still unreconciled terrorists in Ireland. There are still too many unreconciled terrorists in the Basque country. The red brigades in Italy have not entirely disappeared. But, by drying up the pool of support from which these gained their activists, we have managed in all those cases to reduce the threat. That is the way we have to deal with A1'Qaeda. That is why the reconstruction of Iraq, if there is to be a war, has to be very carefully managed on a multilateral basis. That is also why the reconstruction of Afghanistan, in which currently the West is close to failing, is an important indication of how our approach to that entire region should go forward. And we have to resist at all costs those noisy voices on the Washington right that suggest that after a victory in Iraq the United States and its allies should roll forward from there across Iran and the rest of the Middle East.

One or two noble Lords—in particular the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall—have talked about the question of military preparedness. That is an important issue about which I hope that the Minister will say something in his speech. It seems to me that that is not the major thrust of today's debate but it is something to which we shall need to return.

The question of containment versus invasion, however, is one about which a number of noble Lords have spoken—again most impressively and at an early stage, the noble Lord, Lord Richard, who carefully went through the exact resolution. Containment has not failed. Inspections are not a charade. We all have to remember that between 1992 and 1993 UN inspectors with much less good equipment than the team now has managed to destroy a substantial amount of the ABC weapons which Iraq had. To suggest that inspections have no chance of succeeding again seems to be a gospel of despair which all the evidence we so far have does not support. I note the concern of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark and the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, that we are likely to be subject to all sorts of tricks and diversions from the Iraqi regime, but that, too, was so before. Containment must therefore be tried.

We must also have progress on the Israel-Palestine dispute. The most dangerous phrase that one hears in Washington and reads in the American press is that the road to Jerusalem lies through Baghdad, as if an invasion of Iraq will somehow resolve the Israel-Palestine dispute by removing what is seen as the source of support for Palestinian terrorism. The noble Lord, Lord Black, said that we must understand what this looks like to the Americans. We in the West must also think what this looks like to Muslims in the Muslim world. Heavy American support for Israel, vast financial support for Israel and repeated retreats from bringing pressure to bear on Israel look like an appalling imbalance.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Powell, for reminding us that President Bush 41, as he called him, promised firm American leadership and a Middle East conference to push for a settlement once the United States and its allies had liberated Kuwait from Iraq, but that that was forgotten once the Gulf war had successfully ended.

We may hope for changes in domestic policy in Israel and Palestine; we must hope that they move away from confrontation towards peace. We certainly need more impetus from the quartet, which the Minister mentioned—a quartet now, sadly, operating at relatively middle-ranking official level, rather than at the political level at which it began. We certainly need pressure on both sides in the dispute and an early peace conference but, above all, we need pressure now on Israel to step back from its attempted destruction of the economy and society of the West Bank, which looks to Palestinians and other Muslims like a preliminary to the expulsion of the population—what is called a Jordanian solution.

So we support the government position as set out by the Minister in her careful speech: a step-by-step approach, delicately balanced, with critical support for the United States, recognising all of America's strengths and weaknesses. We want closer and more explicit co-operation with other European Governments—we may not have obtained the resolution without both the British and French Governments' efforts. We want that to be developed a good deal further. But in all that, we want the Government to push forward with the intention of strengthening international institutions and law, to demonstrate that even in the case of states such as Iraq, multilateral diplomacy, enforced by effective inspection, can provide an effective answer to global problems.

My Lords, I welcome the Motion so ably moved by the noble Baroness. It is particularly gratifying that throughout the debate we have been attended by both Ministers.

The House knows that we on these Benches fully support the Government's strategy. However, first, I must declare an interest as a serving Territorial Army officer with a Group A commission—that is a very direct interest.

Many noble Lords have commented on the desirability of UNSCR 1441, which is vital to demonstrate the resolve of the international community that Saddam must give up his weapons of mass destruction. We must at all costs avoid any risk of a perception by Saddam or his generals of a lack of resolve on our part. I regret that his perception of our firemen's strike will be just that.

The strike also divides the attention of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and the service chiefs. The Fire Brigades Union and its members are compromising the security of the United Kingdom. The services' view of the firefighters is practically unprintable. However, I do not believe that the strike reduces our ability to deploy a substantial force. That is because of the way that units have been allocated by the staff. On the other hand, as we know, it means that some units have had to endure painful cancellations of post-operational tour leave.

Parliament's anxiety stems from two concerns: first, the need for further resolutions before the start of any conflict and, secondly, the need for UK parliamentary authority. Obviously, that authority will come primarily from the other place rather than your Lordships' House, but we will, of course, give our counsel.

We may be missing one point. It may be necessary to deploy a coercive force; certainly, it will be necessary to prepare to do so. I am not convinced that we are properly prepared. I will say more about that later.

I am confident that the Government will not give us any nasty surprises in Parliament. All UK governments have a good record of making appropriate announcements to Parliament. However, it would be nice if Parliament heard before the media.

The military difficulty is this: we cannot sustain even a brigade for the type of operations being planned. It is not a simplistic issue about tank engine air filters. In Germany during the Cold War we planned for a war of two weeks' duration, with short and reducing lines of communication. Now, we face an operation with long lines of communication in extremely hostile terrain. In addition, large numbers of armoured vehicles will cover long distances using manoeuvre warfare tactics. That will result in a high logistic load. I am not giving anything away; any military analyst can confirm those facts. Noble Lords will also be aware of other problems such as those relating to the Defence Medical Services and the impact that they will inevitably have on operations and services in the NHS.

Several years ago, at this Dispatch Box, I admitted that DCS 15 was not a perfectly developed policy. However, this is the sixth year of this Government: what have they achieved since then? It will be no use hanging on to the United States' coat-tails so far as concerns logistics. Surprisingly, they have their own logistical challenges. It would be suicide to deploy ill prepared. Doing so would demonstrate a lack of genuine resolve and could lead to operational failure.

With two caveats, we on these Benches supported the Strategic Defence Review. Indeed, we were pleasantly surprised by it. However, there were two exceptions. First, there was the destruction of the TA infantry. How would we keep the rear areas secure? There was also the 3 per cent year-on-year efficiency saving, which has caused so much difficulty at the Ministry of Defence. SDR rightly recognised that, in future, we will be engaged in expeditionary warfare, which is just what we are talking about. Four years after the SDR, the Government have failed to implement the plan completely.

I fully accept that there have been significant and welcome shop-front improvements, but the chickens are coming home to roost. For instance, there is no effective fleet of off-road fuel-carrying vehicles. Under the Smart procurement initiative, the Government toyed around with a PFI solution for a few years and then realised that there would be no third party revenue for an off-road fuel tanker. Apparently, the Government are now going for outright purchase, but no orders have been placed for that vital capability. We still use the low-mobility tankers that I was trained to drive 25 years ago. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, is just about to nod his head.

Another concern is the general level of stocks of matèriel—spare parts and so on. It would not be helpful to go into greater detail on the shortfalls. Whether or not the Government judge it necessary to deploy, will the Minister assure the House that he will fully implement the SDR plan so that in future we do not have sustainability gaps?

Much comment has been made about exercise Saif Sareea. I was on it. It was an extremely good and valuable exercise. Of course, there were difficulties and disappointments. Incidentally, my biggest problem was accidentally separating the Secretary of State from his tactical communications operator and then almost killing the unacclimatised operator by making him trot, not run, for 150 metres, which gives some indication of the difficulties of operating in that part of the world during the summer. It is very important to understand that only France and the United States, and possibly Russia, could deploy a brigade for combat operations at a strategic distance from the home base.

Many noble Lords spoke about chemical and biological weapons. The noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, and others made some interesting observations about the difficulty of delivering chemical and biological attacks. In terms of attacks on our own troops, it is important to understand that chemicals are only another weapon. They can inflict casualties and horrible injuries, but they are not comparable to a nuclear attack. The real military problem is the need to wear chemical protection suits and associated clothing requirements in very high ambient temperatures, which significantly degrades operational capability. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, possibly underestimated the difficulty of removing a persistent nerve agent should our equipment become contaminated.

Many noble Lords spoke about Iraq after all threats have been eliminated, perhaps post-conflict, perhaps not. I have been involved with post-conflict reconstruction in Bosnia and Rwanda. The process of observing improvements on a week by week basis can be rewarding. The concern must be about the number of states that have to be rebuilt and the challenge of identifying funds to do so.

We do not hear much in the media about our efforts in Kosovo. That is perhaps not surprising because the process, especially with elections, has been going rather well. Of course, there are challenges; organised crime; drugs; and trafficking in human beings.

The real question that arises is: can we deploy a credible, sustainable force in order to help convince Saddam and his generals that UNSCR 1441 must be complied with? I am certain that we can, and, as many noble Lords have noted, we need to be able to do so in order to exert a suitable strong influence on the US Government.

The Minister no doubt has a rather large shopping list for any possible deployment. The Minister has said that no decisions have been made. What worries me is that I believe him. The Government's plan must contain timescales. It would not be wise to suggest the when, what, how or why of those timescales. But it essential that, when required, Ministers make decision without hesitation. Some of the decisions will be extremely expensive, as suggested in today's Daily Telegraph. Interestingly, mobilising the TA would not be one of the first overt actions.

However, it is not possible to deploy at brigade strength, or greater, without extensive use of reservists, by which I especially mean volunteer reserves, such as the T.A. The Secretary of State in another place indicated that reservists would informally be sounded out to ascertain their availability for operations. Twenty-five years of experience in the TA informs me that the vast majority do not want to volunteer to be called up. They want to be compulsorily called up, so that they can tell their families and their employers that they are legally and morally bound to go. But being compulsorily called up will be a momentous event in their lives. It is important that they are mobilised by their parent unit and with officers and men whom they trust. There will be some who cannot go due to family reasons or because they are essential to their employers. RFA 96 provides a means of appeal, and commanding officers are best placed to determine these matters.

Finally, on these occasions we invariably lavish fulsome and well deserved praise on our Armed Forces, and I do so again today. However, we must not forget the position of the inspection teams in Iraq. They are doing an extremely difficult and dangerous job and I believe that they are displaying the highest levels of physical and moral courage.

My Lords, today's debate has illustrated yet again the great wealth of experience on all sides of this House. We are lucky indeed. I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in today's excellent debate. We have heard about Saddam the dictator and oppressor of his own people; we have heard about his misdeeds against his neighbours and against Iran and Kuwait in particular; but we have also heard about the risks of military action and the need for the Government to consider carefully what the consequences might be.

It is a statement of the obvious that for any responsible government, military action is always a grave step and a last resort. No member of this Government, or of any other government, wishes to risk British lives unnecessarily. But let there be no doubt that our goal, the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, is a peaceful one and the UNSCR 1441 offers Iraq a process towards peace and disarmament.

The issue of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction is the focus of our efforts because that is the major threat which Saddam poses to the international community. That includes the danger that Iraqi WM') will proliferate to terrorist organisations. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, asked about direct links between Saddam and terrorist organisations. Other noble Lords also referred to that topic. There is a long history of that, including Iraqi support to Palestinian terror groups such as Abu Nidhal and the MEK in Iran. Although we keep an open mind on links to A1'Qaeda, nothing we have seen so far suggests that Iraq was behind 11th September attacks. We do not have evidence of a direct link. I am not prepared—no Minister would be—to say more about matters so closely based on intelligence, partly with new information that is coming forward each day.

UNSCR 1441 has been the result of much concerted effort both at the United Nations in New York and bilaterally, too, between nations. The Government have been credited with playing a key role in this process and I am grateful for the compliments that have been paid. Other countries, too, must take credit, including the United States. It has led to the achievement of a considerable international consensus. Noble Lords have raised many questions about Resolution 1441. I will address as many of them as I can.

I begin with material breach. The noble Lords, Lord Howell and Lord Powell of Bayswater, and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, and others asked about that issue. They asked what would constitute a material breach and how it might lead to military action. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary set that out in some detail on Monday in another place and I am sure that noble Lords have read what he had to say in Hansard. My noble friend Lady Symons today dealt with that point fully. It is important.

In the course of his comments, my right honourable friend explained that Resolution 1441 offered Iraq a final opportunity to comply with the wishes of the international community. Paragraph 4, about which we have heard a great deal, states that a further material breach would arise where there are,

"false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with and co-operate fully in the implementation of this resolution".

The Government's interpretation of the clause was given by the Foreign Secretary, who said:

"As with any definition of that type, it is never possible to give an exhaustive list of all conceivable behaviours that it covers. That judgment has to be made against the real circumstances that arise, but … material breach means something significant: some behaviour or pattern of behaviour that is serious. Among such breaches could be action by the Government of Iraq seriously to obstruct or to impede the inspectors, to intimidate witnesses, or a pattern of behaviour where any single action appears relatively minor but the actions as a whole add up to something deliberate and more significant: something that shows Iraq's intention not to comply".—[Official Report, Commons, 25/11/02; cols. 51–52.]

However, as has been said both in this debate by my noble friend and the Foreign Secretary on Monday, no one wants military action to be taken against Iraq, or any other country, in some gratuitous manner. Resolution 1441 is a peaceful process, properly authorised under international law. It is now up to Saddam Hussein alone to comply with the wishes of the international community and to rid his country of weapons of mass destruction.

Some have linked the issue of material breach to the position of coalition patrols of the Iraqi no-fly zones. This issue has not featured much in the debate but it has been said outside the Chamber. In order to understand it, we need to consider the context in which these patrols operate. Coalition aircraft patrol the no-fly zones in support of UNSCR 688, which states that Saddam must end the brutal repression of his people, both in the north and in the south. The House will know that these patrols were set up in response to an overwhelming humanitarian necessity. That is the justification for our patrolling of those zones under international law.

In carrying out this task, coalition aircrew face attacks daily from Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles. Any response they make is entirely in self-defence, a right enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter.

We should be proud of our servicemen and servicewomen who contribute to the maintenance of the no-fly zones. A few months ago, I was fortunate and privileged enough to visit Ali Al Salem in Kuwait to see some of those who act with such courage on our behalf and on behalf of the persecuted minorities in Iraq.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, paid an extremely well merited tribute to those servicemen and servicewomen. He asked about medals—he was good enough to give me warning that he would do so—and I have an answer here for him. I hope that he will forgive me if I do not read it out in full. I shall write to him with that answer because I have much to say about this issue, but I have reason to believe that he will not find the answer unpleasant reading.

The focus of Resolution 1441 is on the disarmament of weapons of mass destruction and UNMOVIC provides the mechanism for taking this forward through its inspection regime.

As to the inspection process itself, there have been many justified questions and queries about it—some of which I may be able to answer and others I will not—but under Resolution 1441 Iraq must complete a final declaration of its WMD and other prohibited holdings by 8th December this year. It will then be for UNMOVIC to verify the accuracy and the completeness of that declaration through the inspection process.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark asked about the 60 days. The first progress report from UNMOVIC, from Dr Blix, is due by 26th January 2003. Obviously no one can speculate about it, but the resolution provides for further reports until the Security Council considers the work of UNMOVIC and its sister organisation to be complete.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, asked about time-frames. The time-frames agreed and explicitly set out in the resolution were debated thoroughly. It is important to note that Dr Blix and Dr El Baradei's teams were consulted on the drawing up of the time-frames.

So far as concerns funding, the inspectors are paid for by the oil for food programme, which runs a healthy surplus. There is no shortage of money for this mission. As regards the number of inspectors, Dr Blix has said that he is content that he has enough inspectors: some 300 on UNMOVIC's books to carry out the task set. On the timetable for inspections, the calendar set out in the resolution was discussed in detail with the leaders of the two teams.

My noble friend Lord Judd asked how capable UNMOVIC would be in carrying out what is certainly a challenging task. I make just two points. Dr Blix has, of course, the full backing of the United Nations, and member nations are more determined than ever to see a successful inspection regime. We are, for example, in direct discussion with the UN on how best we can assist UNMOVIC if it requires further help. Secondly, it must be remembered that Dr Blix and his team are hacked by a much tougher Security Council resolution than were their predecessors. There are, for example, no off-limits sites, as were the so-called presidential or sensitive sites.

Let me make it clear that the Government's goal is to seek Iraqi compliance with the inspection process set up by the resolution and with its disarmament obligations under earlier UN resolutions. We look to UNMOVIC to carry out thorough inspections and to report any non-compliance, whether it is Iraq's failure to co-operate or the discovery of illegal WMD, direct to the Security Council. On receipt of such a report, the first step will be for the Security Council to meet and consider what further action needs to be taken. The resolution makes clear that any failure of compliance by Iraq will have serious consequences.

We have debated widely the use of military force and the sequence of events that might lead to military action. Resolution 1441 is neither a pretext for military action, nor does it stipulate that a second Security Council resolution would be needed to authorise military action. We have made it clear, and I do so again. that our preference is for a second UNSCR in the event of a material breach of Resolution 1441 and that it should authorise the use of military force. In doing so, the Security Council will continue to face up to its responsibilities, as it has done so far.

But my right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary was right the other day—my noble friend Lord Desai mentioned it today—to reserve the Government's position on the necessity of a second resolution. As the Foreign Secretary said, had we not similarly reserved our position in 1999, no military action against Milosevic would have been possible in respect of Kosovo.

I can assure the House that the Government will only consider the case for military action in full compliance with international law. This can be considered only against the background of the circumstances that we find at the time. I shall not attempt to second-guess those circumstances. Of course the House wants certainty and clarity now, but those who seek certainty must bear in mind that it would be helpful not only to the House; it could be helpful to Saddam himself.

The question was raised whether there should be a vote on military action. My noble friend Lady Symons made clear the Government's position on the matter in her opening speech. I shall not go into it again. Let me emphasise, however, that no decision on military action has been taken, and there is no reason why such a decision must follow.

Saddam has it in his power to comply with the will of the international community. But, frankly, experience shows that he has only ever complied when diplomacy has been backed by credible force. Does anyone seriously consider that we would be where we are today, with inspectors in Iraq and at least the promise of co-operation from Saddam Hussein, if there had not been that threat of force? Obversely, does anyone consider that, if that threat was dissipated in any way, Iraq would simply revert to former attitudes? We do not need a crystal ball; just read the history books.

It is on that basis that, with the greatest respect, I cannot accept the analysis brilliantly made by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky. He asked what made Saddam so different, and why he should want to start a new war against the united position of the United Nations. Perhaps for the same reasons as he began two wars in his region some years ago, one of which resulted in more than a million people dead; for the same reason as he has killed his own people in tens of thousands; and for the same reason as he has defied (that is an understatement)—laughed at—the clear position of the United Nations for 10 long years. If he thinks he can act with impunity as he has done until now, he will carry on doing so. That is why it is time for the United Nations not just to pass resolutions, hut, if necessary, to act upon them. Even if the noble Lord is right that Saddam has changed and no longer sees any advantage to be gained, rationally or irrationally, by acting as before, no responsible government could take a risk on that.

I shall now discuss military preparations. Our goal is to achieve the aims of Resolution 1441. But it would he unrealistic not to plan for the contingency that those aims cannot be achieved by peaceful means alone. Not only would it leave our Armed Forces ill-prepared; it would send exactly the wrong message to Saddam Hussein. My right honourable friend the Defence Secretary set out in the other place some of the preparatory steps that we arc taking, in particular with respect to reservist members of the .Armecl Forces and military equipment, which I shall summarise.

Before that, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, whose words are ringing in my ear because they were spoken so recently, needs to be reassured. I hope that I can do so. He would not expect me to say anything else. Required preparations will be made so that, if it proves necessary to send British Armed Forces into war, they are not unprepared.

The House should be clear that we have not called out any reservists for possible military action against Iraq; nor do we have immediate plans to do so. But any substantial military operation will require a contribution from the reserves. We are therefore clarifying the requirement of such a contribution in support of any military action against Iraq, a process that in due course may involve sending out members of reservist-formed units, individual reservists or their employers. The House should note that only planning activity is authorised at this stage. I assure the House that, should it be judged that we need to call out reservists for potential military action, there will be a formal call-out under the Reserve Forces Act 1996. Most importantly, that will be reported to Parliament.

As regards military equipment, in response to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, it is nonsense to suggest that the Strategic Defence Review is riot being implemented. The concept of high-readiness flexible forces able to respond rapidly to events was a core tenet of that review. We introduced the joint rapid reaction force to deliver this and equipment such as the introduction of the C-17s and HMS "Ocean" to deliver our forces in theatre and to sustain them. There are real-life examples of our ability to deploy and sustain our forces, whether one looks to Afghanistan, Sierra Leone or East Timor.

As part of this planning and preparation we have also been considering potential additional capability requirements. We are of course committed to equipping the Armed Forces for a range of contingencies, but specific operational environments and scenarios require special priority to be given to particular capabilities. That is why we have been taking action to meet certain capability requirements as quickly as possible. We have a comprehensive and diverse programme under way, ranging from the provision of increased numbers of boots and desert clothing through temporary deployable accommodation to the modification and enhancement of our Challenger 2 and AS-90 armoured vehicles.

Importantly, we also have measures in hand to improve the provision of medical care to our Armed Forces both at the sharp end, where we are upgrading our battlefield ambulance to facilitate treatment during transit, and through the modernisation of our field hospital infrastructure to provide a much improved level of secondary care. We take very seriously the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Astor of Hever, about equipment and clothing in particular.

The noble Lord, Lord Howell, and others have mentioned costs, asking about the announcement made by my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer yesterday in another place that a £1 billion special reserve had been allocated to cover the costs of military and overseas operations this year. I assure the noble Lord that the figure represents a prudent allocation at this time but makes no assumption about the nature of any UK contribution to international efforts in Iraq or elsewhere. Any media reports that we are somehow holding back on military preparations because of Treasury reticence are simply wrong.

Many noble Lords, too numerous to mention by name, have talked about post-conflict and humanitarian thinking. Those are important points. However, as I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said—unless I misunderstood him—this is not the main point of the debate today. Maybe I am misquoting him. I apologise. My comments on the subject are important but strictly limited. I stress straightaway that the Government are working to avoid the conflict and, while we are taking military contingency planning forward, it would be wrong to do so in isolation, ignoring the humanitarian and post-conflict considerations. Of course, any coalition forces on the ground will clearly bear responsibility for the immediate future and security of the country in the aftermath of any operation. It is therefore incumbent on military planners to take those factors into account now. I assure the House that to the extent that military planning can be taken forward now, it is happening. We agree with the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, that the whole international community should be involved in the humanitarian and civil effort that would be needed after a conflict. The Government take seriously their potential responsibilities towards the Iraqi people. In the aftermath of any potential conflict, we, Britain, will of course remain at the forefront of efforts to help the Iraqi people. I do not intend to say any more about that today, but I am sure that the subject will come up again and again.

Before concluding, I shall say a word about the Middle East peace process, which many noble Lords have rightly mentioned, as happened in the last debate on the subject. The Government believe that the Middle East peace process and Iraq are separate issues. Sadly, the difficulties in the Middle East predate Saddam Hussein. However, the Government recognise that to many, particularly in the Arab world, the two are inextricably linked. That is one reason why the Prime Minister has been so clear that it is vital to use every endeavour to move the Middle East peace process on and to resolve it and why my noble friend made a point of addressing the issue when she opened the debate this morning.

We believe that we are taking the right steps to prepare for what may come. We are drawing on the lessons of recent conflicts. I hope that we have reassured the House that the Ministry of Defence is doing everything it can to ensure that our servicemen and women are properly equipped if it becomes necessary to call them into action. As my noble friend made clear, the responsibility rests solely with the Iraqi regime to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction.

We believe that our position is a reasonable one. We have no quarrel with the Iraqi people; indeed, it is in everyone's interest, including theirs, that Iraq should comply with the resolution placed upon it. As my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Defence said in another place on Monday, history should have taught us the dangers of not dealing effectively with ruthless dictators. Therefore, we can be grateful that the international community is definitely resolved to deal with Saddam Hussein through the process set out in UNSCR 1441.

My Lords, on behalf of my noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor, I beg to introduce a Bill to make provision about the courts and their procedure and practice, about judges and magistrates, about fines and the enforcement processes of the courts, and about periodical payments of damages; and for connected purposes. I beg to move that the Bill he now read a first time.