asked Her Majesty's Government:

What discussions they are having with other European Union member states and with the European Commission on the future of imports of wild birds.

My Lords, there have been no specific discussions with EU member states or the Commission on the question of imports of wild birds, although we meet on a regular basis to discuss the implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species—or CITES—which protects about 1,700 species of bird.

My Lords, I am disappointed in the Minister's reply. I should have thought that this unnecessary and destructive trade was something that the EU would want to bring to an end. Does the Minister think that the current position amounts to a kind of bird racism? The EU has a strong policy in its birds and habitats directive, while this country has strict regulations on the licensing and capture of wild birds—and, indeed, the killing of them, as was shown by the incident of the three robins last month. However, a trade is allowed to continue that is literally raping the rain forest of its species.

My Lords, as regards the endangered species, there are of course very strict rules under CITES on the importation, transportation and the capture of and dealing in birds in the native country. There is no such provision in relation to non-CITES species; they are of course legally capturable in those countries and trade in them is legal. Subject to general animal welfare regulations, there is no reason why the trade should be stopped.

My Lords, does the Minister accept that the trade that is dealt with under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species is crucial? Of the 99 seizures of animals and birds that took place in 2003, how many were birds? Does the Minister accept, too, that of the 411 seizures last year, with not one prosecution taking place, this Government are dragging their heels? That is an absolute disgrace.

No, my Lords, I do not accept that. The figures for seizures are not kept separately for animals and birds, so I cannot give the figures to which the noble Baroness refers. However, I would be reasonably confident that birds would be in a minority in those figures.

Clearly, Customs enforces a large number of seizures—2,000 animals and birds were seized last year. There is a very strong enforcement at the point of entry. The prosecution that has been successful in recent years has also ended with an exemplary sentence, with one person being sentenced to five and a half years' imprisonment. So it is not fair to say that the enforcement authorities are not doing their job.

My Lords, how do the two things fit together—the question of endangered species, such as the tortoise, and the right of people to bring in a pet, if they have lived abroad somewhere? It is possible that someone might even have had a wild bird in the country of origin for years and might want to come to this country and bring it. Are permits available, or is there an absolute ban in all such cases, even if they would comply with the Passports for Pets scheme?

My Lords, within Europe there would of course be free movement, subject to the border regulations on pets and the pets passport system. Beyond Europe, there is no entitlement to bring a bird into this country unless it is allowable in terms of trade and, if it is an endangered species, one is observing the regulations under CITES. There is no absolute ban, but pets do not qualify any differently from any other point of trade, in that respect.

My Lords, in relation to the number of seizures referred to by the Minister, could he hazard a guess as to what percentage of the total illegal trade that may represent? Is there any evidence that that is just the tip of the iceberg?

My Lords, by the nature of things, I cannot give figures on undetected illegal trade. The indications are that there is some illegal trade going on, but through the airports it is unlikely to be very substantial as there are tight Customs controls and birds and animals are reasonably detectable. I cannot really give any indication of total size, but there is some illegal trade, and Customs and other authorities are doing their best to stamp it out.

My Lords, might I press the Minister further? There have been 411 cases and only one prosecution. My question did not suggest that the enforcement agencies were not doing their job; my question was about why the Government were not having more prosecutions.

My Lords, as the noble Baroness knows, the question of prosecution for all smuggling offences is a matter in the first instance for Customs and Excise in most cases. Customs and Excise judges that its best efforts are focused on detection, seizure and, if necessary, destruction. Only in the most blatant and provable cases does it engage in prosecution. When it has done so, in this area—unlike in other areas in which I might have more sympathy with the noble Baroness—the sentence was exemplary.

My Lords, will the Minister acknowledge that the introduction of the Wild Bird Conservation Act in the United States has converted the USA from a major importer of wild birds to a non-importer? There are no more wild birds being imported into the USA. Would the Minister consider introducing legislation in the United Kingdom to that effect? Clearly, present legislation is inadequate.

My Lords, as the noble Lord knows, any move on importation would have to be an EU decision, not a UK decision. Indeed, half of the non-poultry birds imported into the UK come directly from European sources rather than from elsewhere. The single market would continue even if we were to ban non-EU trade. The situation is therefore not the same as that in the United States.

My Lords, given that reply, will the Minister initiate discussions with the EU since the European Union and Japan are now the two major markets for wild birds captured from the rain forests?

My Lords, one must make a judgment on priorities and the judgment we have made is to stop the destruction of endangered species. The prime concern is focusing on those listed under CITES— both birds and other species—to try to tighten and enforce all trade and welfare controls relating to CITES birds. We may come to the wider issue, but the endangered species must surely be the priority.

My Lords, will the Minister accept that when these birds are seized by our Customs the damage has already been done and that it is far too late? What are the Government doing to talk to the countries from whose rain forests the birds are coming?

My Lords, to a large extent I agree with that but it does not destroy the need for effective action at the point of entry. So far as CITES species are concerned, there are obligations on the country of origin and on those who are trading in such species as well as on Europe or any receiving countries. The same is not true of non-CITES animals and birds.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Why the cost of external consultants to the Northern Ireland Office has risen from £10 million to £18.6 million between 1998–99 and 2002–03; and whether this represents value for money.

My Lords, the figures quoted in the Question were presented in a recent Northern Ireland Audit Office report. That report acknowledged that consultants bring short-term expertise when it would be poor value for money to recruit and retain staff for discrete pieces of work. The increases referred to occurred as a result of devolution and the associated increase in work requirements, together with the introduction of new initiatives, such as resource accounting.

My Lords, I thank the Lord President for her reply, as far as it goes. This rise is of at least 80 per cent in a five-year period. I say "at least" because the report notes that there has been severe underreporting in certain areas, so it is not a comprehensive report. Does the noble Baroness agree with me that it is a damning report, in so far as the NIAO offers strong criticism of poor procurement, sloppy procedures, failure to follow DFP guidelines and little evaluation of results? As a benchmark, what was the corresponding figure for the use of consultants by government in England and Wales over the same five-year period, 1998–99 to 2002–03?

My Lords, the report identifies areas that need improvement and action has now been taken to address those areas. With respect to a comparison with England and Wales, there are no official data to hand but survey evidence suggests that expenditure on consultancy by the public sector in England has risen significantly. A survey done in April 2004 by the Management Consultancies Association highlighted how expenditure by public sector bodies had almost doubled in the year to 2003 to a figure of £1.3 billion.

My Lords, I have with me a collection of documents that I picked up off my desk just now. They all arrived in the past month or so. They are all consultations of one sort or another. Is this a satisfactory and efficient way of carrying on the democratic process? What are the print runs of such documents and what percentage of them are read or, in particular, responded to by anyone?

My Lords, there have been many discussions in this House about the importance of consulting on policy questions and I think we all agree about that. I shall have to write to the noble Lord on the specific question of print runs.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that at least part of the reason for the increase in consultants' fees in the period was the restructuring of Northern Ireland government departments from six to 10 because of devolution? It was essentially a one-off expenditure so that one would expect consultants not to have to be used further for those purposes.

My Lords, my noble friend is quite right. Some of the increase is related to restructuring. It is also related to the move to resource accounting and to devolution. It is important that we recognise that it would be poor value for money for departments to recruit and retain highly specialised staff whose contribution is not necessarily needed on a permanent or on-going basis. I cannot say that it is one-off expenditure but we need to make sure that we are giving value for money.

My Lords, does the Minister agree with me that this is a very incomplete report on the use of consultants? If one tries to piece together some of the evidence one cannot actually get to the actual expenditure on consultants. In 2001–02, it was certainly in excess of £34 million, which is more than £20 per man, woman and child in Northern Ireland, but the worst element of all in this is that in 88 out of 100 cases studied in this report there has been no proper evaluation about whether there was any benefit in these consultants being hired.

My Lords, as I said in relation to an earlier question, the report identifies deficiencies, and those have now been addressed.

My Lords, does the figure include the cost of image consultants? If so, what was the conclusion on those image consultants employed through the activities of the North/South Ministerial Council's recent discussions with loyalist and republican paramilitary groups? How do we assess value for money for image consultants for paramilitary groups?

My Lords, I have no idea whether the report includes the cost of image consultants, but I will find out and write to the noble Lord.

My Lords, what were the deficiencies that the Minister says have been remedied?

My Lords, there were concerns about inconsistencies in the definition of "consultant" and about some of the monitoring mechanisms put in place. Guidance has been tightened and sent to departments.

My Lords, are the Northern Ireland consultants engaged by competitive tender? That is a very good way to make sure that one gets value for money.

My Lords, depending on their size, contracts are put out to competitive tender. If I can give the noble Baroness any further information on that, I shall write to her.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Whether there are any legal or technical reasons why direct flights are currently not permitted between Ercan airport in Northern Cyprus and United Kingdom airports.

My Lords, the British Government fully support the agreed EU policy of ending the isolation of Turkish Cypriots. Direct flights to Northern Cyprus could play a useful role in bringing that about. We are currently examining the feasibility of such flights.

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. The very encouraging statement from the European Commission—it came out only last night—mentions, among other things, opening Turkish-Cypriot ports. Does that mean that the airport in Northern Cyprus can be used by those who seek to sell their produce abroad or visit the country? If so, can she give the House any idea when the ports, including the airports, might be opened?

My Lords, as the noble Baroness said, the proposals came out last night. The Commission made it clear that the proposals have been concerned with establishing a regime to permit trade between Northern Cyprus and the EU, and did not go into the issue that was really the subject of the Question—that is, the direct air links. They did not go into the direct maritime links either. We are examining what the Commission said. As the noble Baroness knows, my right honourable friends the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have said that they want to do what is possible to enable trade, and to end the isolation in a broader sense and a transport sense as well. The proposals certainly look encouraging.

My Lords, the Minister agrees that the objective of bringing the north of Cyprus closer to the European Union is a worthy one; she has already said that. Does she agree that the Greek Cypriots ought to realise, if they took a calm look at the matter, that is in their interests too that the prosperity gap between them and the Turkish Cypriots should be narrowed? They are likely to benefit economically from an increase in economic activity in the north.

My Lords, there is a great deal of common sense in what the noble Lord says. We welcome the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus have stated their commitment to work to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots. I very much hope that they will continue to demonstrate their support for that goal, not merely by their general statements but by their willingness to engage in real facilitation on those points.

My Lords, is my noble friend aware that those of us who attended the meetings earlier this week with the new Prime Minister of Northern Cyprus were very impressed by his statesmanlike approach? He pointed out that it may be more difficult for airports, which are under the International Civil Aviation Organisation's jurisdiction, than seaports to do something as quickly as the European Commission has suggested. As the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said, it will be very important to encourage the Government of Cyprus to realise that the moral high ground is increasingly occupied by Northern Cyprus, and that the threat of the Republic of Cyprus to use its veto in the European Union is not the way to go.

My Lords, as I said, I hope that what the Government of the Republic of Cyprus in Nicosia have said--that they want to end the isolation of the Northern Cypriots—can be taken at face value. They must now look at practical ways whereby that might be possible. The noble Baroness's Question about direct flights is very important, and I feel that we have somewhat moved away from it in supplementary questions. We must also recognise that the issue is highly contentious, as I am sure that she does, but enormously critical. By examining those issues, as we are doing at the moment, and recognising all the problems around legalities and air traffic control, we are trying, as the Prime Minister has said, to look at ways in which the flights can begin as soon as possible. The Prime Minister has said that.

My Lords, I am sure that all the issues will be examined and reviewed ad nauseam, but the policy of the European Union seems to be to have direct flights to Ercan. It is also the policy of the Government, who say that flights should happen as soon as possible, and of the noble Baroness herself. Ercan airport has been transformed and upgraded, travellers want to travel and tourists want to tour, and the airlines want to run the flights, so why do we not simply get on and allow them?

My Lords, we cannot do that because it is an enormously complicated and difficult question, as I have explained. The noble Lord may not like it, but we have to get things right legally. The open-skies policy of the European Union does not extend to the air links between sovereign states within the EU, so direct air links are a matter for bilateral agreements. Such agreements have to be properly licensed. That is what is being looked at. I could not be more positive than I have been to the noble Baroness, short of saying that we will begin flights tomorrow. I indicated that my right honourable friends want them to happen, that the Government would like to find a way through the problems, and that officials and lawyers are looking at the issue very actively. I hope that that will satisfy the noble Baroness.

My Lords, that response from my noble friend was very helpful. She said that the flights would have to be licensed bilaterally. Who has to license them? Who is stopping them?

My Lords, I did not say that. The flights do not get licensed bilaterally, but are agreed by bilateral agreements. Those agreements have to be licensed internationally by the Chicago Convention. I am jolly glad that I asked about that before I came into the Chamber.

asked Her Majesty's Government:

Why the police do not investigate attempted fraud over the Internet.

My Lords, the decision on whether to investigate an attempted fraud rests solely with the police, who will take into account available resources, national and local policing priorities, the likely eventual outcome, and the competing priorities of fraud and other criminal cases already under investigation. The Home Office works with the police and industry to tackle fraud and other online crime through a number of other initiatives.

My Lords, I hope that I am not alone in finding that an extremely woolly and unsatisfactory Answer. Is the noble Lord aware of what it feels like to be told that, effectively, part of the place where one works and lives is off limits to the police—that one can see a crime being committed but the police do not express the slightest interest in investigating it, locally, nationally or through the department? What does he think that that does for one's impression of the Internet as a place to do business, and of the police as people who should keep law and order in this country? Such simple things could be done by the police to make matters better, if only they would get off their bottoms and do them.

My Lords, I am quite clear that the police will devote resources to the investigation of fraud perpetrated over the Internet where a case is considered sufficiently serious. Where there is clear evidence of serious and computer-enabled criminality, nationally and internationally, the National High Tech Unit within the National Crime Squad is more than prepared to deal with such cases. This Government have put large resources into ensuring effective and successful policing of the Internet. I understand that the noble Lord has had an unfortunate experience and I greatly sympathise with that. No one likes being the victim of an attempted crime.

My Lords, is the Minister aware that only 100 detectives in the United Kingdom are qualified to investigate computer crimes, most of whom are focusing on the Botnet armies as well as on paedophile cases. Considering the recent statistics that 50 per cent of home computers are subject to fishing attacks, and that 70 per cent of e-mail is spam, most of which is sent through hacked computers, do the Government plan to allocate greater resources to tackle this ever-growing problem?

My Lords, I am aware of the statistics that the noble Lord has drawn to the attention of the House. We work closely with the industry to ensure that the problems to which he referred are tackled. The Government take these issues most seriously and for that reason we have begun to put in extra resources. Indeed, in the next year, we are providing extra funding for the City force so that it can expand its capability. It is estimated that some 600 officers are dedicated to tackling fraud and a large part of that work will involve them in dealing with crimes which operate through the Internet.

My Lords, as the use of the Internet is due to increase greatly in the years ahead, it is most important that trust be maintained. In the United States, the FBI sponsors the Internet Fraud Complaint Center. Will not users need to have that kind of confidence in the Internet if usage and interest are to be maintained?

My Lords, obviously, it is up to each jurisdiction to decide how best to organise its resources to counter Internet crimes. The noble Lord is right that we must have trust in the Internet. For that reason, we have invested more money in tackling Internet crimes and fraud, and the Government are committed to ensuring that we do so effectively. As I explained, we have the National High Tech Crime Unit, which concentrates a great deal of its resource and time in that area of tackling criminal activity.

My Lords, it just so happens that at 10.36 this morning I received an e-mail from a gentleman in Nigeria who wants my help in disbursing some 8 million dollars. Unfortunately, the money is located in China, the United Arab Emirates and in other parts of Europe and he needs my assistance with air flights. This is of course of interest because my noble friend Lord Rennard and the Liberal Democrat by-election fund could well use that kind of money. There is a certain caveat emptor in dealings on the Internet—the citizen has a certain responsibility to himself or herself when getting involved. I am certainly taking advice on this offer. On the wider point, is the Minister convinced that the police are not over-restricted by RIPA and the Data Protection Act and are not over-interpreting them, thereby stopping themselves taking action under that legislation?

My Lords, I am fascinated by the kind of e-mails that the noble Lord receives. I have not had an e-mail of that kind, but perhaps I should check more closely. Perhaps the Liberal Democrat funds could benefit from such an injection, but they might find that that kind of scam relieves them of money rather than advances them some.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord McNally, that individuals have a responsibility in this respect, but I cannot see how the RIPA provisions and those in the Data Protection Act can be a bar to the police acting effectively in this area. It is a complex one for police investigating and no one should underestimate that. There are simple measures and good advice that members of the public can make and receive, which will enable them to deal with the problem.

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that, if policing is about anything, it is about balancing resources? Perhaps one of the reasons for the criticisms of the shortage of police officers on the beat during the past few years has been the increase in the number of specialist departments, so ultimately there must be a balance.

Does my noble friend also agree that a great deal of fraud is not reported, particularly by the financial institutions because they seem to believe that it brings disrespect to the organisations? Is he aware of the case I dealt with fairly recently where I discovered a man who failed to report the theft of his wife's credit card once he discovered that the thief was spending less then she did?

My Lords, I do not want to get into that territory—but it is a good one. My noble friend made some sensible points. The best advice I can give is that where someone receives one of these spams, spoofs or invitations to play a money game, he ought to forward the e-mail to his Internet service provider. That prevents such fraudulent activity and we must all be ever-vigilant in this Internet age.

My Lords, I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified her Royal Assent to the following Acts:

Appropriation Act,

Age-Related Payments Act,

Gangmasters (Licensing) Act,

University of Manchester Act.

My Lords, I beg to introduce a Bill to make provision for a referendum on the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe; and for connected purposes. I beg to move that this Bill be now read a first time.

Moved, That the Bill be now read a first time.— (Lord Blackwell.)

On Question, Bill read a first time. and ordered to be printed.

My Lords, on behalf of my noble friend the Leader of the House, I beg to move the first Motion standing in her name on the Order Paper.

Moved, That the draft order be referred to the Northern Ireland Orders Grand Committee.—(Lord Grocott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

My Lords, I beg to move the second Motion on the Order Paper tabled in the name of my noble friend.

Moved, That the draft order be referred to the Northern Ireland Orders Grand Committee.—(Lord Grocott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

My Lords, I beg to move the third Motion standing in my noble friend's name.

Moved, that the draft order be referred to the Northern Ireland Orders Grand Committee.—(Lord Grocott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

My Lords, I beg to move this Motion on behalf of my noble friend.

Moved, That the draft order be referred to the Northern Ireland Orders Grand Committee.—(Lord Grocott.)

On Question, Motion agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 3, leave out line 1 and insert—

"(5) For the purposes of this paragraph, the workplace at which a worker works is—"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 2 to 4 and 30 to 36. This first group of amendments contains various minor and consequential changes to the Bill's provisions concerning the statutory recognition and derecognition procedure. However, I should like to mention Amendments Nos. 31 and 33. They deal with the consequences for a union where the Central Arbitration Committee declares that it is not entitled to recognition because of unfair practices that it has committed. In those circumstances, the union is not entitled to reapply under the statutory procedure for recognition in the same or similar bargaining unit for three years. The amendments change the starting point for that three-year period.

Noble Lords will remember that the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, tabled an amendment to Clause 9 about the three-year moratorium in Grand Committee. I think that she was then mainly concerned whether there was a moratorium of any sort in such circumstances. In response, my noble friend Lord Treisman reassured the noble Baroness that the union was debarred from reapplying for the same or similar bargaining unit for three years. He stated that the starting point for that three years was the date on which the union's unsuccessful application was declared admissible by the CAC.

However, following remarks of the noble Baroness in Grand Committee, the Government have reconsidered the issue. Those deliberations revealed an inconsistency that Amendments Nos. 31 and 33 are now intended to rectify. The Government consider that the moratorium that results where an application fails because of unfair practices should be consistent with that which applies where the union loses the ballot. Otherwise, a union would have to wait slightly longer before it could apply again for recognition if it lost the ballot fair and square than if it had been guilty of repeated or serious unfair practices. Amendments Nos. 31 and 33 therefore amend the statutory procedure to bring the relevant dates into line.

Amendment No. 31 provides that the three-year moratorium on further Part 1 applications in respect of the same, or substantially the same, bargaining unit contained in the admissibility provisions of Paragraph 40, where the original application failed because of unfair practices, should start on the day after the CAC's declaration of non-entitlement to recognition. Amendment No. 33 makes the same change to the validity provisions contained in Paragraph 48. I am most grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, for her diligent scrutiny that directed attention to that point.

The other amendments—Amendments Nos. 1 to 4, 30, 32 and 34 to 36—either amend cross-references to paragraph numbers that will change as a result of the Bill or make small refinements to the drafting of particular phrases. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning Amendments Nos. 31 and 33 and his kind remark that he was pleased that I had brought the matter to the Government's attention. I agree that most of the amendments concern minor drafting matters. I find it difficult to understand why some of the words sound better than others, but I accept that that is in order. I especially welcome Amendments Nos. 3 and 4, because the Government have conceded the use of the word "coercion" in Clause 9 instead of the words "undue influence". I welcome those amendments and we accept the others.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 9 [Unfair practices in relation to recognition ballots]:

moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 13, line 44, leave out "paragraph 24(5)" and insert "each of sub-paragraphs (5)(a) and (6)(a) of paragraph 24"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 12 [Unfair practices in relation to derecognition ballots]:

moved Amendments Nos. 3 and 4:

Page 17, line 35, at end insert— "( ) If a declaration is issued under sub-paragraph (4) the bargaining arrangements shall cease to have effect accordingly." Page 19, line 14, at end insert— "( ) If a declaration is issued under sub-paragraph (5) the bargaining arrangements shall cease to have effect accordingly."

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 19 ["Pay" and other matters subject to collective bargaining]:

moved Amendment No. 5:

Page 24, line 4, leave out "does not" and insert "shall"

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, the Bill sets out the core issues on which negotiation may take place once recognition of the trade union has been agreed. Those include wages, hours of work, and so on, but not pensions. In Committee, my noble friends and I sought to include pensions among those core items. We were not especially keen on our wording, but were anxious to get the matter debated and to learn the Government's attitude. We drew attention to the fact that the Government did not seem very sure that it was right to exclude pensions, as, later in the Bill, arrangements are included whereby the Secretary of State can by order arrange for pensions to be included as an item for collective bargaining.

In Committee, the Government did not accept our amendment or the principle involved. At col. GC65 of Hansard, we were told that there was a question whether pensions had achieved the same status as bargaining items as pay, hours and holidays. We were informed that research was being undertaken into actual bargaining procedures. Apparently, where pensions are regularly a bargaining issue, the Government will consider activating the power in the clause enabling the Secretary of State to make an order. We were informed that the Government were sympathetic to the argument behind our amendment and the Minister said that he looked forward to the time when pensions were indeed a core item in collective bargaining, but that the time was not yet.

We were not happy about that response, and I said so. Indeed, I said that we would return to the issue on Report, although we might choose a different form of wording. That is what we have indeed done, although we accept that this wording may not be as complete as it might be. Our amendment simply reverses the clause that removes pensions from the collective bargaining agenda under the Bill.

Recent developments indicate just how important pensions have become for employees. At one time, pension provision was felt to be an item of concern solely to white-collar employees. The large unions organising manual workers were thought to be concerned only with the workaday rate for the job. That was never entirely true and is certainly not now. Recently, one of our most powerful unions achieved a noted success when the employer was forced to abandon its plan to close its final salary scheme to new entrants and gradually phase it out. The final salary scheme was saved when the closure of the whole railway network was narrowly avoided in a dispute not about wages, hours or holidays, but simply to save the final salary scheme. That lesson will not be overlooked by others. Pensions are a core item for employees. I hope that the Government will now agree that they should be included as a core item for collective bargaining.

I emphasise again that unions now take pensions very seriously. They employ people who develop specialist skills and buy in expertise as and when they need it. As I have said on many occasions, my union includes pension training in its schools and specifically runs training courses for members who are nominated to act as pension fund trustees. We need the Government to change their approach on the issue. I beg to move.

My Lords, we have had difficulty in finding a form of words acceptable in principle and practice and have tried a different one this time. The amendment would change "does not" to "shall", so that there is a general right for pensions to be included if a union wins a recognition claim. However, it would leave in place the rest of the clause, which enables the Secretary of State to modify, circumscribe or specify what that right would be in practice. That would seem to be in line with what the Government wanted in Committee, if we understood it correctly.

The Government have not come out and said, as they did in 1999, that pensions are insignificant and that workers do not want to negotiate about pensions. No, they admit it. They admit that pensions have become one of the most important items on any negotiation or consultation agenda. There are very good reasons for that. In the absence of any influence over employers on pensions during the past 10 years or so, there have been significant pensions scandals. Companies have gone broke and have had no money to pay contractual pensions. Companies have for years milked their pension funds by reducing their value and giving themselves a pensions holiday. The workers did not know about that.

As my noble friend said when moving the amendment, the Government accept that. They want to do something about it in the Pensions Bill by introducing consultation. But that is not enough. It is not enough for workers to be consulted because all that happens is that when the organisation decides to have a pension scheme, it consults. It has already decided what the pension scheme will be, how much it will pay or whether it will reduce the provisions of an existing scheme, and then it consults. If there is a mechanism for consultation in the firm—there may not be—all that the workers can say, if they have a proper representative system, is that they like the scheme, they do not like it or they wish it were changed.

If there was collective bargaining and if, where the union was recognised for bargaining purposes, that could be done by the Secretary of State, that could be limited so that it was allowed only where there was recognition for collective bargaining. If there was recognition for collective bargaining, then the recognised union would be able to put up its own scheme. From the beginning, it would be involved in the formulation of the scheme.

A pension is regarded by many workers as, in effect, deferred pay—that is what it is. In the present society, it may be even more important than pay, because if you do not like your pay, you can go somewhere else. However, if you retire and find that your pension is not worth anything, there is nothing you can do. Pensions are at least as important as pay. If the Government accept, as they have, that they should assist workers to get trade union recognition for core matters, those core matters should involve pensions. I support the amendment.

My Lords, the importance of pensions could hardly be more powerfully stated. I thank all noble Lords for their contributions in Grand Committee and today. The Government understand the strength of feeling that exists on the issue of pensions among trade unions and their members. I am sure that all workers hope that they can look forward to a comfortable and secure retirement without financial hardship. It is right and proper that trade unions should vigorously defend their members' pension rights.

The Government are taking positive steps to address this very serious issue in the Pensions Bill, which includes assistance to those who have lost their pensions and a right for employees and their representatives to be consulted on significant changes to their schemes. There is no question that the importance of the issue to workers and their unions is understood, and we acknowledge the positive effect that employee involvement on pensions can have.

The question is whether it is appropriate at this time to make pensions a subject for statutory collective bargaining. In looking at this, we need to bear in mind the aims of the statutory procedure and the factors which have made it a success to date. Key to this is the principle that the statutory procedure is a fallback. It is designed to encourage the voluntary resolution of recognition claims. It is intended as a last resort, where attempts by the parties to resolve a claim among themselves have ended in failure. That is why the Government do not believe that it would be appropriate at this time to add pensions to the core topics for collective bargaining. The evidence suggests that pensions are not commonly bargained about in voluntary recognition deals. So if we were to add them to the statutory bargaining topics, this would, in effect, make the statutory procedure broader in scope than most voluntary agreements.

That would risk making it far more attractive to unions to go to the CAC than to try to reach a voluntary agreement through dialogue with an employer. For this reason, the Government are making it clear that pensions should not be regarded as part of pay for the purposes of statutory collective bargaining.

I do not accept the contention that the Government are uncertain about this. We are trying to gauge what should be done, and the time at which it should be done, against the realities of experience and the results of research in this area. Recognition of the importance of pensions, and the fact that they appear to be moving up the bargaining agenda, means that we are taking a power so that we can add pensions to the list of core topics at such a time as evidence emerges that their inclusion as a topic for bargaining in voluntary agreements has become typical.

As I indicated in Grand Committee, the Government are undertaking research to get a clearer picture of the coverage and content of agreements signed since 1998. This will act as a benchmark against which to compare the results of further periodic surveys on this subject.

From my own experience, unions often prefer to deal with pensions in ways other than collective bargaining, especially where schemes relate to a specific professional or occupational group, or to a particular tier in a workforce. Unions often elect—sometimes appoint, but generally speaking these days they elect—trustees to pension schemes. This concentrates expertise in a way which is not always apparent in the generality of collective bargaining. From the point of view of the trustees of the scheme—not just the employer trustees, but the union or the workforce trustees—they discuss issues which are for the trustees to decide, not those involved in the practice of voluntary agreements. That is the nature of trusteeship in most cases. It sometimes means that where a union shares collective bargaining responsibilities with other unions, but the pension scheme relates to a particular group or tier of workers for which one union happens to be responsible—rather than all the unions that are involved in that collective bargaining process—then that union can deal with those issues specifically, using its specific expertise. For purposes of illustration, that is the common practice across education at all levels in the arrangements for pensions. A general right would not be helpful or appropriate.

The Government have tried to strike a balance between the desire to encourage dialogue between employers, unions and workers on pensions, and the need to protect the smooth running of the statutory procedure. I hope noble Lords will feel that we have struck the right balance and expressed it. In the light of my explanation, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment, conscious of the fact that I doubt whether there is any lack of understanding on any side of the House of the importance of pension arrangements to workers.

My Lords, before my noble friend sits down, he mentioned that evidence is being taken at the present time. Can he give the House any indication of the timescale in relation to the results of this evidence?

My Lords, the evidence is being assembled through the research of Dr Sian Moore of the Working Lives Research Institute of the London Metropolitan University. The first phase of research has already taken place and some detailed data have been collected. The second phase is under way, which will look at how recognition has occurred in practice, and whether its scope and depth have developed over time, including in respect of pensions. We hope to publish the results of the second phase later this year.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, he says he is certain and that he does not like general rights, but what would he say "typical" means? If there were 50 per cent recognition of pensions in the recognition sector, would that shift get us a selective or general right? Would it need to be 45 per cent? What is "typical"?

My Lords, that question was asked in Grand Committee. I shall not answer it at the same length because I am very happy to refer back to what was said then. The Government do not believe that it would be appropriate to set a simple, quantifiable threshold, as that would not take account of the complexities of the issue. Collective bargaining on pensions may take many forms, as my noble friend Lord McCarthy will know. Employers and unions might bargain about the establishment of pension schemes, the eligibility of workers to be members of such schemes, the level of contributions and so on. Likewise, there may be a difference between what a recognition agreement says on paper and what the parties actually bargain about in practice. I know from experience that they are not always one and the same. We want to be able to look at the whole situation and reach a balanced judgment. That is why a simple numerical threshold could not reflect the entire picture. We believe that the research will show whether there is a general mood in the direction that is advocated by my noble friends. I make the point to them again—and I apologise if I repeat it, but it is very important—that many of the schemes in which unions have invested huge amounts of time and trouble, as have employers, are now dealt with by trustees. That is where the work is done, rather than through collective bargaining.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response; it is similar to that given in Grand Committee, about which we were not entirely happy. We were told that, although our proposal was regarded sympathetically, it was not felt to be a matter for statutory requirement in the same way as the core items listed in the Bill. We disagree with that concept. We believe that it is very high up the agenda of bargaining nowadays. As I am sure my noble friend is aware, the TUC is running a campaign about pension rights at the moment. It has had meetings and issued a great deal of material about the need for trade union action in the pensions field.

My noble friend referred to trustees. As I indicated, our union and others run training schemes for member-nominated trustees. We are well aware that, when introducing a pension scheme, there is a difference between being a trustee and being a negotiator. In such schemes I have often negotiated with employers, but we have had entirely different members act as trustees, with a different remit—we know that a trustee is responsible in a different way to the whole membership of the scheme, and that the situation as regards negotiation is different.

I regret very much that the Government have not found it possible to move in our direction. I understand that research continues and I am interested and pleased to learn that the time limit is not very long, and that the Government expect to have at least the first tranche of results by the end of the year. We shall watch that with great interest. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 21 [Information about employees to be balloted on industrial action]:

moved Amendment No. 6:

Page 26, line 27, leave out "of the employees concerned" and insert "at which the employees concerned work"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 7 to 15. The aim of this group of amendments is to improve the wording used in Clauses 21 and 24 where they refer to workplaces. The current wording in these clauses could give rise to confusion because the language used is not consistent. At some point the clauses refer to,

"workplaces of the employees affected"

and at others they refer to,

"workplaces at which the employees affected work".

All the amendments seek to ensure that the latter construction is used consistently throughout the clauses. I should point out that we have already considered a similar amendment to Clause 3. Clearly, these are technical amendments and I urge noble Lords to accept them. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 7 and 8:

Page 26, line 40, leave out from "workplaces" to "who" in line 41 and insert "at which the employees concerned work and the number of them" Page 27, leave out line 22 and insert— "(21) For the purposes of this section, the workplace at which an employee works is—"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 24 [Information about employees to be contained in notice of industrial action]:

moved Amendments Nos. 9 to 15:

Page 28, line 22, leave out "of the affected employees" and insert "at which the affected employees work" Page 28, line 35, leave out from "workplaces" to "who" in line 36 and insert "at which the affected employees work and the number of them" Page 29, line 4, leave out "his workplace" and insert "the workplace at which he works" Page 29, line 19, leave out "of some or all of the affected employees" and insert "at which some or all of the affected employees work" Page 29, leave out line 25 and insert— "(5D) For the purposes of this section, the workplace at which an employee works is—" Page 29, line 26, leave out "affected" Page 29, line 28, leave out "affected"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 28 [Inducements relating to union membership or activities]:

moved Amendment No. 16:

Page 31, line 40, leave out "sole or main"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 18, 22, 23, 24 and 25, which relate to Clause 28. A related issue, although not quite the same one, arises in Amendments Nos. 28 and 29, which refer to Schedule 1.

The amendments are part of our attempt to get the Government fully to implement the decision in the Wilson and Palmer case. That judgment is supposed to be coercive on this Government, their having passed the Human Rights Act 1998, which was to enforce the European Convention on Human Rights. We argue that our law is in breach of Article 11, and that the court was trying to say that in the case of Wilson and Palmer. Therefore, it is the Government's responsibility to put the law in the right position. Although the Government have gone some way, there are two ways in which they have not gone far enough; therefore if they do not accept our amendment, sooner or later they will be back before the court. I wish to say three things. First, this is a very long story. For a long time, employers have attempted to discourage trade union membership and activism by various inducements: bribes, favours, promotions and so forth. Nothing could be done about that and nobody attempted to do anything about it until Section 53 of the Employment Protection Act 1975. That worked a little, but we never got rid of the problem entirely until the Ullswater amendment in 1993.

We argue that it was discovered in the Wilson and Palmer judgment that the state of English law was almost the same as it had been before any legislation had been enacted. Unless the Government are prepared to accept our amendments—the first set deals with the problem of "sole or main"—we will not comply with the judgment.

Several things are wrong with the way in which the Government have attempted to modify their approach in respect of the employer's purpose. The judgment said that if the purpose involved an attempt to induce workers to leave the union, and if that purpose was detected by a tribunal, it would mean that the worker was not fully protected and therefore was entitled to compensation. But the Government have changed that. They say that that applies only if the court decides that it is "the sole or main purpose". That takes us right back to the Ullswater amendment, and it is not enforceable.

Any employer could say at any time that an element of what he did was not related to putting pressure on the union. For example, he could argue that, although he may have put pressure on the union or the consequence of what he did may have put pressure on the worker to give up the union, he had other considerations also. That is exactly what the Ullswater amendment says. So long as the employer can find that he had a mixed motive or set of motives, it would be easy to argue that there was no sole or main motive and that if there was one, it was not to discriminate against the union.

We have had most of these arguments; I do not want to repeat myself. However, I wish to respond to several things that the Government said in Grand Committee. We were told that if our amendment were agreed it would be disastrous for employers and that it would be impossible for them to manage the plant efficiently. That is complete nonsense. In most of what we seek, it would be the easiest thing in the world, if the Bill read as we want it to, for the employer to show that no part of his purpose involved discriminating against the union. For example, he would have to show that if he promoted someone or gave them a bonus he was not doing it exclusively for non-union members. As in other forms of discrimination, the employer would have to show that he was applying the benefit across the board and that the promotions or benefits were awarded for reasons other than to put pressure on the union.

The only situation in which it might be difficult for an employer to defend himself, if the Bill were amended as we wish, is if he wanted to do precisely what was done in the Ullswater case—to move a considerable group of workers out of an area of collective bargaining into an area of non-bargaining and therefore in some way to discriminate against the union as much as against them. What would the consequences of that be? The worker could retain a very large part of the benefits that he enjoyed as a result of union membership—for example, the right to raise grievances and to bring in his trade union official. If the employer was transferring that group of workers into a non-union area to pay them more money, it would be extremely difficult for either the union or the member to show that there had been any disbenefit.

It is almost certain that in most cases it would be easy for the employer to defend himself against a charge of discrimination unless discrimination was his central purpose. So we do not take the view that disastrous things would happen if our amendment were agreed. We commend it to the House. I beg to move.

My Lords, I agree that this section of the Bill was very thoroughly discussed in Grand Committee. It was considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights on two occasions and there was an exchange of correspondence with the DTI, which we have seen. According to that correspondence, the DTI accepts that this is a very difficult issue. It says that it is important to ensure that a remedy is available for all cases that fall within the scope of the well known Wilson and Palmer judgment. That is why we have again proposed that "sole and main" be left out, because the purpose of the clause is so important.

It is surely clear that even the purpose of rewarding valuable staff might well be accompanied by another purpose—perhaps even the main purpose—of weaning staff away from union representation. Indeed, plenty of employers would perhaps regard it as rather valuable to have staff who were willing to move to individualised contracts and to give up trade union representation. As we understand it, one of the purposes of the Bill is to protect such people from being intimidated in any way into giving up union representation. As my noble friend Lord McCarthy has explained, we have put the amendment before the Government on a number of occasions. The wording as it now stands contains a loophole which employers can utilise in order to claim that they are not attempting to wean people away from trade union rights and representation and that that is really in the interests of business or the individuals. I ask the Government to think again about the matter.

My Lords, this is an extensive group of amendments. They would all delete words from the Bill and they are clearly designed to make an absolute prohibition against offers being made to employees outside collective bargaining which do not interfere at all with union membership. However, the Government have clearly stated both in the White Paper and in our debate in Committee that such offers are not to be prohibited or objectionable.

Amendments Nos. 16 and 18 would preclude an employer from making an offer if there were an element in that offer which might, however fancifully, be construed as one of the matters which the clause, as drafted, already prohibits. In other words, the amendments are too restrictive. Furthermore, the use of the phrase "sole or main" throughout Clause 28 certainly induced me to withdraw the revised version of the "Miller amendment"; that is, Amendment No. 63 in Grand Committee. I hope that the Government will reject the amendments.

As regards Amendments Nos. 22 and 23, the Bill already imposes an onus on the employer to justify his purpose in making such an offer. That should be more than enough protection for the interests of the worker from inappropriate offers. Therefore, the amendments are unnecessary.

The two subsections to which Amendments Nos. 24 and 25 relate are similarly stringent in requiring justification, supported by evidence, for the making of an offer by the employer. Again, that extra obligation should provide more than adequate protection from inappropriate offers being made, thereby dealing with the problems that the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, think are likely to arise.

Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 would alter the Government's amendments to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. That Act refers simply to "the purpose". The Government propose to amend that to "sole or main purpose". Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 would restore the original wording. I do not understand why the Government want to do that. If carried, the amendment would completely negative the Government's amendment, which could of course be the proposer's intention, but I do not suppose that that is the wish of the Government.

My Lords, Clause 28 contains the core of our proposals to ensure that UK trade union law complies with the European Convention on Human Rights in the wake of the judgment in the Wilson and Palmer case. This large group of amendments deals with an issue which was examined by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in assessing whether Clause 28 complies with the convention. We discussed the same or very similar amendments in Grand Committee.

I shall discuss the six amendments which would remove the various references in Clause 28 to the "sole or main" purpose of the employer in making offers. The words "sole or main" are an essential component of the regime that we are seeking to construct. They are necessary to ensure that employers have some flexibility in setting their reward systems. We do not consider that employers should be prevented from making offers for justifiable business purposes just because a by-product or incidental consequence of making such offers would be to deter a person's involvement with a trade union.

My noble friends Lord McCarthy and Lady Turner of Camden consider that this will allow ill intentioned employers easily to evade the law. We do not share that view. Tribunals are expert at making the kind of judgments required, and can distinguish between true and fabricated accounts by employers of their underlying purposes. That is what they do every day in unfair dismissal cases. To assist the tribunals, we have placed the burden on the employer to demonstrate what was the sole or main purpose of his action.

Our proposal is fully compatible with the Wilson and Palmer judgment. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has considered the matter in some detail and it now accepts that there is a case for retaining the "sole or main" purpose test. The Minister for Employment Relations, Gerry Sutcliffe, has also written to the Joint Committee confirming that the Government will monitor the operation of these provisions when they come into force.

Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 relate to our proposals to introduce an explicit "sole or main purpose" test into Sections 146 and 148 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992. Both sections currently refer to the "purpose" of the employer's act or failure to act. As my noble friends would agree, these sections contain important protections against detrimental treatment by the employer on grounds of trade union membership and activities.

As we explained in Grand Committee, our proposals are designed to create a consistent set of provisions across related trade union rights. As we have introduced a "sole or main purpose" test in Clause 28, there are advantages in using the same wording in Sections 146 and 148 of the 1992 Act.

As well as achieving consistency across these closely related provisions, our insertion of the "sole or main" test will clarify the law. The tribunals have to deal with situations where two or more purposes might have driven the employer's conduct. Where that occurs, Sections 146 and 148 of the 1992 Act are unclear about the consequences because they use the term "purpose"; that is, the singular form of the noun.

It is highly likely that, in such cases, the tribunals would interpret the current wording as implying a "sole or main" purpose, but the original wording leaves the position open to at least some doubt. That is a potentially confusing situation which does not help parties to enforce and respect trade union rights.

In Grand Committee, my noble friends Lord McCarthy and Lady Turner of Camden asked my noble friend Lord Triesman to cite an actual case where that situation had arisen. We have checked back through some cases. In fact, we did not need to look very far to find one. I refer here to the Employment Appeal Tribunal's judgment of 24 February 2004 by his Honour Judge Richardson in Smyth-Britt v Chubb Security Personnel. In that case, counsel for Mr Smyth-Britt argued that the employer had been motivated by dual purposes in taking detrimental action against him. Although the case did not turn on the point, the Employment Appeal Tribunal gave a clear view on the meaning of Section 146. It said:

"In our judgment, the statute invites consideration of the main or principal purpose of the employer".

My noble friends are concerned that the introduction of an explicit sole or main test will diminish the existing protections that they provide. But, as I have argued, the extent of the existing protections is not as wide as they might think, because the sole or main test would probably be applied anyway when complicated cases arise. In fact, our proposals, taken in the round, significantly enhance the protections for trade unionists under Sections 146 and 148.

We are confident that our proposals are fair and workable. In our view, they comply with the European Convention. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, two points have been made to which I must reply. First, there is the analogy that is constantly drawn with the situation in other forms of discrimination, where the onus of proof is precisely the same as that proposed in the Bill and where it is said that tribunals know how to separate the issues. However, they often have great difficulty in doing that. Those involved in the process often consider that there was discrimination but that it was not possible to prove it. So it is not generally accepted by the parties involved that using this kind of formula has been a total success—not at all.

In any case, there is a substantial difference between the situations. I tried to make this point in Grand Committee, but I probably did not make it well enough. In other types of discrimination case, if the employee wins it is usually because the employer is manifestly a liar. It can be seen that he or she is a liar. When asked, "Why did you fail to promote?", "Why was this excellent person on your shortlist, yet never got the job?", or "Why was there no black face or woman involved at any stage?", they lie because they do not have an answer. They say, "Oh well, this person was a bad performer". When they are asked to provide evidence of that, there is none. When such employers say, "Her attendance record was bad and she kept going off to have a baby", and they are asked for evidence, the employers' answers are manufactured, for the most part. Therefore, when those answers can be shown to be manufactured, the case goes in favour of the employee because the employer has not proved the case.

It is quite different in this case. The employer will not have to manufacture. He or she will not suddenly decide to do something about trade unions, sack the branch secretary and say that is the end of that and all that he says is bogus. It is not bogus. The man is probably a good worker who is entitled to be promoted, moved, made a supervisor or whatever. At least the Government threw out the Ullswater amendment, which was not the same. It specified that even if there was evidence that the employer was discriminating, if he could show that he had some general restructuring reason, he could not be penalised.

The amendment provides for exceptional cases. It will not do all the terrible things that the Government believe. If they do not take the initiative now and fully comply with the decision of the court, they will find themselves back there again. It will be expensive, unjust and the Government would do much better if they took action now. Since no one will take the slightest notice of my argument, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 17:

Page 32, line 28, leave out "which is recognised by his employer"

The noble Baroness said: My Lords, in moving this amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 19, 20 and 21 in this group.

Essentially, we are talking about trade union rights. Clause 28 sets out a whole package of new rights which have been drafted as a response to the Wilson and Palmer judgments. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made a series of recommendations which we discussed in Grand Committee. However, the new clause limits the protection and rights accorded to members of recognised trade unions only. In Grand Committee we sought to amend that to include members of unrecognised unions. In doing so, we were able to point to the recommendations of the Joint Committee, which also agreed that the clause should cover members of unrecognised unions.

The Government did not accept our view and we have returned to the issue, first, because it is important and secondly, because the Minister at the time gave the impression that the Government were willing to look at the recommendations in the Joint Committee's 13th report, although they made no firm promise that they were likely to alter their view. However, the Bill is about trade union recognition. Its objective, as we understand it, is to make recognition more easily achievable through a set of fairly simple procedures.

All unions are unrecognised before they are recognised. The unrecognised union obviously campaigns to achieve recognition so that it may represent the interests of its members adequately. It will already have members in the employ of the company concerned. Such members are entitled, as individuals, to the protection which Clause 28 offers to members of recognised unions. As we said in Grand Committee, it is a matter of individual human rights. I do not understand the Government's opposition, particularly in the light of the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. For that reason we have returned to this issue on Report.

The other amendments in the group, in particular Amendment No. 21, again deal with union rights. The Joint Committee on Human Rights made it clear that in its view an important part of the ECHR judgment had not been adequately dealt with in this clause. The judgment clearly indicated that by using financial incentives and detriment in order to induce workers to give up their rights to have unions represent them, the rights of both individual workers and the union were infringed.

However, the Bill deals with the rights of individual members only. It has nothing to say about union rights. As it stands the Bill would not enable a trade union to bring proceedings to obtain a remedy for an action taken by an employer to offer inducements for employees not to join a trade union or take part in its activities. The Joint Committee stated categorically that this was wrong. It said that failing to provide unions with an avenue for redressing a violation of their rights under Article 11 could result in a violation of that article.

In Grand Committee we drew the Minister's attention to the findings of the Joint Committee. However, at that stage the Government were unwilling to accept our amendment and said that they did not agree with the Joint Committee. However, the Minister did say that the Government would consider seriously what the Joint Committee had to say before deciding their final position. Therefore we have tabled a slightly reworded amendment in the hope that perhaps the Minister will be able to say that the Government have reconsidered their view on the basis of the Joint Committee's recommendations. Naturally, I hope that their view has changed to accept our arguments. I beg to move.

My Lords, this group of amendments deals with the other thing that is wrong with the Government's reaction to the Wilson and Palmer judgment. It will not take long, but I should read a short section of what the court said in the Wilson and Palmer case. Listening to this, how can the Government say that the limitations that they have placed on the rights of non-recognised unions and the rights of unions to defend their members—whether recognised or not—are in conformity with this judgment?

12.30 p.m.

Section 46 says,

"It is of the essence of the right to join a trade union for the protection of their interests that employees should be free to instruct or permit the union to make representation to their employer or to take action in support of their interests on their behalf".

Notice that no one is talking about recognised or non-recognised unions.

"If workers are prevented from so doing, their freedom to belong to a trade union, for the protection of their interests, becomes illusory".

Now, we turn to what the present situation is.

"However, as the House of Lords judgment made clear, domestic law did not prohibit the employer from offering an inducement to employees who relinquished the right to union representation"—

nothing about representation in a recognised situation—

"even if the aim and outcome of the exercise was to bring an end to collective bargaining and thus substantially to reduce the authority of the union".

Notice that we are talking about the authority of the union, not just the worker. This is supposed to affect the influence, power and position of the union. That is what the judgment says,

"as long as the employer did not act with the purpose of preventing or deterring the individual employee simply from being a member of the trade union".

I am almost finished.

"Under United Kingdom law at the relevant time it was, therefore, possible for an employer effectively to undermine or frustrate a trade union's ability to strive for the protection of its members' interests".

Not just to recognise them. Perhaps a recognised union does not have to struggle in the same way. Perhaps an unrecognised union needs more assistance rather than less; that is what the judgment seems to say.

The Court … considers that by permitting employers to use financial incentives to induce employees to surrender important union rights, the respondent State failed in its positive obligation to secure the enjoyment of the rights under Article 11 of the Convention. This failure amounted to a violation of Article 11".

Article 11 has two parts. The first part establishes all those rights, and then it lists five specific ways in which you do not have to guarantee those rights. I challenge the Government to tell me any one of those five ways that apply in this case. They apply to the armed services, for example. They have nothing to do with this case. Therefore, I suggest that the judgment affects trade unions as well as workers. It affects trade unionists whether they are recognised or not; it applies across the board, and there are no defences in terms of Article 11 to what the Government are trying to do. I support the amendment.

My Lords, I will make a few comments on Amendment No. 21. There is a slight difference between the amendment as originally put down by the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, and the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and the current version.

In the first version, it was proposed that an independent trade union with a member or members whose rights have been contravened may present a complaint to an employment tribunal. The latest version apparently seeks to make the point clearer by saying:

"Where the rights of a worker who is a member of an independent trade union have been contravened … the union may complain".

In both cases, the amendment asks that the union be given a separate right to complain on its own volition. The effect of the amendment would be that it would enable a union to intervene, even one that is not recognised by the employer, and even if the employees themselves did not object to the offer, or may even have welcomed it. In other words, this amendment seeks to impose a union's will on workers irrespective of their wishes and democratic rights. It negates the Government's stated policy of allowing workers to make agreements outside of a collective bargain when it is appropriate for the workers to do so, and in no way do they interfere with the worker being a member of the union.

My Lords, Amendments Nos. 17 and 19 deal with another issue discussed in Grand Committee, namely whether new Section 145B should apply in some way to the members of unions which are not recognised by the employer. The Joint Committee on Human Rights is also interested in the position of such workers because they are not currently covered by the rights under new Section 145 B. The Joint Committee's main concern centres on the position of members of non-recognised unions who receive offers to persuade them not to seek recognition for their own union. I note that Amendments Nos. 17 and 19 do not actually deal with that kind of offer. Instead, they focus on offers made to the members of a non-recognised union to opt out of a collective agreement negotiated by another union. We are therefore unsure whether these amendments meet that need, though I thank my noble friends for their suggestions. As I stated in Grand Committee, we are considering the issue again in the light of the Joint Committee's latest report. We have since opened discussions with key stakeholders on the matter, and that consultative process will be completed in time for us to determine our final view for Third Reading.

Amendments Nos. 20 and 21 deal with the question of the union having a right to seek a remedy in its own name. As my noble friends have pointed out, it is the opinion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that such a remedy should be created. This is in fact a far-reaching idea, which runs counter to the way all other individual employment rights are currently enforced, so it requires very close consideration indeed. We are therefore seeking the views of key stakeholders, both employer bodies and unions, before finalising our position. For example, just yesterday my colleague Gerry Sutcliffe met a delegation from the NUJ that included Mr Dave Wilson of Wilson and Palmer. These consultations will be completed by Third Reading. In the light of the ongoing consultations on both issues, I ask my noble friends to withdraw their amendments.

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, will he agree that if he does propose a way forward in time for Third Reading he will let us see his proposals in time for us to decide whether to accept, reject or amend them?

My Lords, I see no problem in keeping noble Lords informed of our decisions.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. Of course. I am happy to withdraw the amendment, and I will not move the other amendments, on the basis of what he has said. I look forward to seeing the results of the consultations that are now proceeding. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendments Nos. 18 to 25 not moved.]

Clause 32 [Exclusion or expulsion from trade union attributable to conduct]:

moved Amendment No. 26:

Page 37, line 41, leave out "contrary to the rules" and insert "inconsistent with stated rules and objectives"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is my last attempt to bother noble Lords this afternoon. Once again this is something on which the Government have moved. At Third Reading in the other place, the Government accepted an amendment to deal with this problem. The problem is that the TUC, which should know, thinks that the amendment does not deal with the problem. I understand that discussions are going on through the usual channels to see whether we can find a form of words. Our form of words was the form of words that the TUC was seeking to press on the Government in Committee. That was not acceptable, and certain things were said by the Ministers, so we tried to combine the reference to what they said in our amendment today.

It is about the circumstances in which unions are now to be allowed to expel or refuse to accept members. The Government accept that infiltrating forces of racist, fascist and extremist groups of various kinds are now making a set at British trade unions. Whereas the union might have been able to have dealt with that before the beneficent effect of a shoal of Government Bills in the days of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, it is now difficult for unions to expel anyone. Of course, there is the case of a union confined to Scotland, which can keep out people who do not live in Scotland; or if you fail to provide subscriptions or run out of dues. After that, it gets extremely difficult. The Government propose that that will be all right if it is in the rules. As I understand it, if it is in the rules, one does not have to admit. But if one does admit, one can expel fascist, racist and other extremist groups, and that is all right.

However, the TUC does not think that is all right. On looking at union rule books—we discussed this in Committee—blanket rules would have to be relied on. As the Minister said in Committee, many such rules are still in place. But the unions do not believe that they can be used because some of them have used them and were caught in the courts. Nevertheless, on looking at those blanket rules and the way in which the courts have always interpreted them—which is nothing to do with recent legislation—it is doubtful whether using the current rules or even changing them would deal with the problem.

I looked at a few rule books in order to see how far that is the case. Really, rule books with blanket rules do two things. They contain a number of extremely wide purposes, some of which are rather frightening. One such purpose refers to "furtherance of political objectives of any kind". One wonders what that would cover: the founding fathers of the union just shoved in the first thing that they could think of in order to cover everything.

Another purpose is to "advance the interests of labour". In what way? How? Why did they put that in? The rules of one very important union refer to "any objectives specified by the executive". One could be frightened by that.

We now have a residue of extremely general rules, which were mostly written by the founding fathers and hardly ever used. But there they are.

There are also the ways in which the unions have interpreted those rules and have sought to expel, exclude or in other ways discriminate against workers who could not be caught by a precise rule. Therefore a blanket rule was used.

Quite rightly, the courts have interpreted those rules very narrowly. They do not think very much of rules such as the "furtherance of political objectives of any kind" or "any objective specified". The courts tended to say that, if a general rule of that sort was being used, there ought to be a lot of precise grounds against the individual. Ultimately, the rule book is supposed to be a contract between the members of the union. That type of thing cannot be called a breach of contract.

The TUC says that there must be something else. It suggests that the unions could be allowed to specify in policy statements—perhaps of some length with some contemporary relevance—who and what it is they want to guard against. Those principles, not necessarily set out in rule books, could be interpreted by the courts.

As I say, the Government have shown sympathy for this, but they will not accept the introduction of principles. The Government have said that these objectives and principles could simply be made by the general secretary at an annual conference. He could say, "We are against the BNP". But that is not good enough. We accept that and we are trying to bring it on board.

I have slightly rewritten our original suggestion. Amendment No. 26 states:

"leave out 'contrary to the rules' and insert 'inconsistent with stated rules and objectives'".

That would include the rule book, which it must because it tells people what to do and how to do it. But then the objectives have to be stated, published or prescribed. If the Government want to go away and add to that, good luck to them. We are doing our best to try to find a way to do what the trade union movement thinks it needs and the Government say they want to do. I beg to move.

My Lords, I support the amendment, which is similar to that which I moved in Grand Committee. I made the point then, which is very relevant, that the trade union movement in this country has very good and progressive policies in relation to the recruitment of people from ethnic minorities. The unions are put in a difficult position if they are not able to deal with awkward people who infiltrate unions in order to carry out anti-ethnic and discriminatory practices from inside the union. We need to have policies and legislation in being that will enable the unions to deal with such people and to enable them to deal with discriminatory practices and attempts at discrimination against their own members from within the union, which does happen.

In Grand Committee, the Minister said that the Government were sympathetic to the aims of the amendment and that they would have discussions with the interested parties with a view to putting forward a form of wording. I hope that the consultations have proceeded and that we will hear from the Minister today that he has something to offer on those lines.

My Lords, obviously, I have no idea whether the Minister will offer something to the liking of the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, and the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy. I can simply state my position. The amendment is extremely similar to Amendment No. 67 in Grand Committee. I use the words "extremely similar" because I cannot use the word "identical". That is because of the words "stated rules".

In Grand Committee, my argument against the amendment was that the words "contrary to the rules", which are in the clause, are absolutely clear and unequivocal. I also said that,

"inconsistent with the rules and objectives",

is a vague and woolly concept. In my view, Amendment No. 26 is not very different.

I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, that it is dreadful that there are people in the unions who ought not to be. I would not want to make it difficult for a union to expel someone when it ought to be able to expel them. On the other hand, it is not right that a person should be deprived of his or her union membership except in the clearest possible terms. If the Government can introduce clearer terms than before, I would not object to that.

I remember that the noble Lord, Lord Sainsbury, said:

"We wanted to ensure that the statute is clear and places reasonable obligations on individual members to act in accordance with widely available and accessible information on the union's policies and positions. That is why we refer to the union's rules".—[Official Report, 15/6/04; col. GC 157.]

I would never pretend to the noble Lord, Lord McCarthy, who would never allow me to do such a thing, that I am as knowledgeable as him about union rules. He made a few remarks about some unions having rules that are simply unacceptable, which may be so.

Perhaps the Minister will suggest that he has better wording. But, in the event that he does not, I object to the amendment as it stands.

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I particularly like the words, "and objectives" of the unions, for the reasons that my noble friends have given. On occasion, union rule books can be strange. They have evolved over the years. As my noble friend Lord McCarthy said, it is important that we include the union's objectives. That would strengthen the union's position in relation, for example, to racists.

My Lords, among other things, Clause 32 changes the arrangements whereby employment tribunals award remedies to individuals who have been unlawfully excluded or expelled on grounds of their political party mmbership.

A minimum award, currently set at £5,900, applies where the union has not admitted or re-admitted the individual to the union at the time the application for compensation is made. We think that the tribunal should be given greater discretion to decide the amount of the award in cases when the exclusion was unlawful because it was mainly attributable to membership of a political party, but where there were other reasons for the union's decision concerning conduct that were contrary to the union's rules. In choosing the wording we wanted to ensure that the statute is clear and that it places reasonable obligations on individual members to act in accordance with widely available and accessible information on the union's policies and positions—an aim that is shared on both sides of the House. That is why we refer to the union's rules within the subsection. The amendment returns to the topic that we discussed in Grand Committee, as my noble friends have rightly said. It would broaden the test which disapplies the minimum award so that it includes subsidiary behaviour that is inconsistent with the stated rules and objectives of the union.

The Government consider it extremely important to ensure that the test to disapply the minimum award works in pratice. Union rule books vary, although I should say that the survey carried out on behalf of the TUC in 2003 showed that of the 34 unions considered in the sample, 22 had explicit national rules on equality issues. Therefore, on the basis of the sample, that is a reasonable proportion thus far. Some explicitly refer to the union's opposition to racist attitudes or conduct. Others do not specify many proscribed behaviours, but leave it to other union documents to set out the union's position on such matters. We recognise that the current wording may not be broad enough to meet union concerns, and we have therefore been working closely with the TUC to devise alternative wording.

In assessing the alternatives, we must be sure of the openness and clarity of what I have described. That point was made in Grand Committee, and the inclusion of the word "stated" in the amendment is in response to that. I am not sure, however, that my noble friends' latest approach would fully meet the need. Just because something is stated does not mean that it is sufficiently accessible to the relevant individuals, and therefore capable of influencing their conduct. The amendment uses the word "inconsistent". As was mentioned in Committee, that word is also open to a wide variety of interpretations, and we are not keen to see unnecessary legal debate at tribunals about the meaning of the word.

I also note that my noble friends' amendment refers to conduct that is inconsistent with the stated "rules and objectives" of the union. I am not sure whether that was intentional or whether, on reflection, they would prefer the word "or" rather than "and". The proposed wording has the effect that subsidiary conduct would need to be inconsistent with both the rules and the objectives of the union for the minimum award to be disapplied. I fear that the amendment would narrow the scope for disapplication in a way that I am sure was not intended.

We are in urgent discussions with the TUC, which are progressing well and should conclude in time for Third Reading. I am grateful to Mr Brendan Barber, the General Secretary of the TUC who has provided me with the TUC's recent documents. I believe that we shall be able to draw on a wealth of sensible thinking, and am confident that that will proceed well in time for Third Reading. In that light, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

My Lords, I want to make two things clear. First, it is not and never was, our intention to do something that was inconsistent with the rules. If the wording gives that impression, it must be changed. The rules do a whole series of things, and do not deal only with exclusions and expulsions. They set out the power structure of the union. We do not want another generation of practices that are unlawful or enable the union to exclude or expel, and which are not connected to the rules.

Secondly, it may be that my form of words —

inconsistent with stated rules and objectives—

confuses that point. Perhaps it would be better to say, "inconsistent with either rules or objectives". I do not mind. We do not want to set up those two things in opposition to one another, and we do not want to make them additional qualifications. We have to show both. It is complicated, but we look forward to seeing what the Government will do, and hope that they find the magic words. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 54 [Provision of money for trade union modernisation]:

moved Amendment No. 27: Page 59, line 34, at end insert—

"(4) If money is provided to a trade union under this section, the terms on which it is so provided shall be deemed to include a prohibition ("a political fund prohibition") on any of it being added to the political fund of the union. (5) If a political fund prohibition is contravened, the Secretary of State— (a) is entitled to recover from the trade union as a debt due to him an amount equal to the amount of money added to the union's political fund in contravention of the prohibition (whether or not that money continues to form part of the political fund); and (b) must take such steps as are reasonably practicable to recover that amount. (6) An amount recoverable under subsection (5) is a liability of the trade union's political fund. (7) Subsection (5) does not prevent money provided to a trade union under this section from being provided on terms containing further sanctions for a contravention of the political fund prohibition."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, the amendment makes it clear that unions may not use the money received from our proposed union modernisation fund on their political objects. That was always our intention, but the amendment puts a clear and effective legal prohibition in place. There was consensus in Committee on the need for the amendment, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, who cannot be here today, for pressing the case to have the greatest possible clarity.

Clause 54 inserts a new Section 116A into the 1992 Act. The amendment adds four new subsections to that new section. New subsection (4) establishes a prohibition on the payment into a union's political fund of money provided by the Secretary of State under the new section. Under the 1992 Act, all union expenditure on political objects must be made from a separate political fund. The Act also prevents a union transferring money from its general fund into its political fund. The prohibition will ensure that money cannot be paid directly or indirectly into a political fund.

New subsection (5) ensures that the Secretary of State must take such steps as are "reasonably practicable" to recover money which has been added to political funds in contravention of the prohibition. Those steps include the taking of legal action against the union.

New subsection (6) ensures that the repayment of money wrongly added to a political fund must come from that political fund, and not from the union's general fund. If that provision were not there, the union could potentially manipulate the arrangement and, in effect, switch money from its general fund into its political fund.

Finally, new subsection (7) makes it clear that when providing money from the union modernisation fund the Secretary of Sate may include terms providing for other additional sanctions against the union if it breaches the prohibition. Such sanctions will be set out in the contractual terms under which money from the fund is given. For example, the Secretary of State could stipulate that the money must be repaid in full with interest.

The amendment fulfils the commitment we made in Committee. It removes any possibility of a misunderstanding about the use of the fund, and addresses the issues that were put to the Government fully and comprehensively. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for accepting the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Razzall, in Committee, and which was one part of a larger amendment that I had tabled. There is still a possibility for a union to circumvent it one way or another—I say that because the plain words which I used are not there. Having said that, I look to the Government to prevent abuses of taxpayers' money, which I am sure they will do both with regard to regulations that they may need to make and by the procedures adopted, including the close scrutiny of applications and supervision of the funds. The Minister said in Committee that that would happen. I am grateful that we have clarified the bit that gave us most problems.

My Lords, speaking as a rather inadequate stand-in for my noble friend Lord Razzall, I can say that he feels that the government amendment achieves, in a slightly better way, what he originally intended with his amendment. He thanks the Government for bringing their amendment forward and hopes that it will deal with this area of possible abuse.

My Lords, I join other noble Lords in welcoming this clarification, which has shot Mr Michael Howard's latest fox. If we were to shoot any more such foxes, we would solve the problem of hunting with dogs.

My Lords, I know not what fox the noble Lord refers to, but I am quite certain that if the amendment was bad for our party I would not have accepted it.

My Lords, perhaps it was not a fox; it may have been a red herring.

My Lords, before we go further into the animal realm, I commend the amendment to the House.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Schedule 1 [Minor and consequential amendments]:

[Amendments Nos. 28 and 29 not moved.]

moved Amendments Nos. 30 to 36:

Page 63, line 39, leave out "27D(2) or (3)" and insert "27D(31, 27D(4)" Page 63, line 40, at end insert— "( ) In paragraph 40 (bar on further application after declaration by the CAC of non-entitlement to recognition), in subparagraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "27D(4) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged". ( ) In paragraph 41 (bar on further application after declaration by the CAC of end of bargaining arrangements), in subparagraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "119D(4), 119H(5) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged"." Page 63, line 43, leave out "27D(2) or (3)" and insert "27D(3), 27D(4)" Page 63, 1ine 43, at end insert— "( ) In paragraph 48 (invalidity of application after declaration by the CAC of non-entitlement to recognition), in sub-paragraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "27D(4) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged". ( ) In paragraph 49 (invalidity of application after declaration by the CAC of end of bargaining arrangements), in subparagraph (1)— (a) after "under paragraph" insert "119D(4), 119H(5) or"; and (b) for "held" substitute "arranged"." Page 64, line 12, at end insert— "( ) In paragraph 89(8) (effect of declaration of entitlement to recognition), after "27(2)" insert "or 27D(3)". ( ) In paragraph 89, after sub-paragraph (8) add— "(9) Paragraphs (a) and (b) of sub-paragraph (7) also apply if the CAC issues a declaration under paragraph 27D(4)."" Page 64, line 23, leave out "27D(2)" and insert "27D(3)" Page 64, line 25, leave out "27D(2)" and insert "27D(3)"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 1:

Page 8, line 30, at end insert— "( ) The guidance shall cover, among other matters, the respective responsibility of a local traffic authority, the police and fire service to attend to spillages of diesel fuel and render the road safe again for the passage of motorcycles and other vehicles."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I have decided to return once again to the issue of diesel spills. With the patience of noble Lords who have heard it before, I shall briefly outline for those who may have missed it on the previous occasion what the amendment does.

The amendment aims to ensure that diesel spills are cleared up by the local authorities which manage the roads in question in order that such spills do not pose a threat to road users. My particular concern in this case is with the relatively small spills that affect motorcyclists and bicyclists.

I have taken on board what the Minister said on Report—that guidance is available on diesel spills in general—but, on looking at the section to which he referred me in the code of practice for maintenance management, there is no direct reference to diesel spills but only to flooding, high winds, temperature and so on.

While I acknowledge that the Minister outlined the possibility of this issue being discussed in public consultation on the draft network management duty guidance, the department does not have a duty to take on board all aspects of the consultation; the Bill as it stands allows only that guidance "may" be published, rather than a commitment that it "shall" be published.

I welcome the fact that local authorities are given advice on the management of incidents, which covers diesel spills, and I support the idea of the emergency services and local authorities working together. But the Minister did not say whether local authorities have to adhere to such advice, nor whether it is ever checked that they are adhering to the advice by the emergency services. Can the Minister clarify this issue?

It would appear that there is a system in place at the moment for dealing with diesel spills, but in practice it does not always work. The British Motorcyclists' Federation's journal, the Motorcycle News, on 3 March 2004, revealed that there are now less than 3,000 dedicated UK traffic police, down from 9,000 in 1992. The other 6,000 are now used to tackle a variety of crimes. However, the forces claim that they still have time for traffic duties to ensure that our roads are safe.

The British Motorcyclists' Federation tested this claim. In five police force areas where, I understand, those 6,000 police officers have multiple roles, it found five dangerous diesel spills, each of which could have caused a crash. It concluded that four out of five of those diesel spills were not made safe, and the fifth one was made safe only because a road gritting lorry went past. The Association of Chief Police Officers has stated that if a diesel spill is likely to cause an accident it is deemed an emergency and you can call 999 to report it. If it is not, you should call the local police force or the council. That does not seem to have any effect on cleaning up a diesel spill. It may get a policeman out, but it does not make it safe.

To highlight this concern, a traffic officer from Norfolk said that a diesel spill should be dealt with as a "grade two emergency", which means that the police can put on their flashing blue lights and get there. At the officers' discretion it can be changed to a grade one, which means that they can exceed the speed limit and go through red lights. The officer said:

"If it's rush hour and only a grade two, you'll get there late to find that some motorcyclist has crashed".

I look to the Government to give an assurance that this issue in particular will be subject to discussions between the department, the emergency services and local authorities, as well as any other stakeholder they deem fit, be it as part of the consultation on another issue or as an issue in itself. This may be a small issue but I believe that it will make a huge difference to road users and the prevention of accidents, which cause congestion.

I make the point, once again, that motorcyclists represent 22 per cent of those killed on British roads each year, even though they represent only 4 per cent of the traffic. I beg to move.

My Lords, I am sorry that I was unable to reassure the noble Lord at the previous stage of the Bill that we are tackling the issue of diesel spillage. I recognise that it is a serious issue, particularly in respect of the safety of motorcyclists and others.

As I mentioned at previous stages of the Bill, there are already regulations aimed at preventing diesel escaping in the first place. It is an offence to spill any oily substance on a carriageway if it is likely to cause danger. The Department for Transport has been tasked with considering the possibility of raising both the profile of the existing regulations and their enforcement.

Turning to the issue of who is responsible for the removal of spills, this clearly falls to the local traffic authority. Guidance on dealing with diesel spillages and similar accidents is already covered in the code of practice for maintenance management, and the network management duty guidance reinforces this in its advice to local traffic authorities on the management of incidents.

In addition—I hope this is a direct response to one of the noble Lord's stronger points—the department is involved in drawing up engineering guidelines for powered two-wheelers, which will include the concerns of motorcyclists, when advising on the planning, designing, implementing and maintenance of the road network. So the action we are taking is not inconsiderable. As I sought to assure the House on the previous occasion, we recognise the issue raised by the noble Lord as a matter of considerable importance. I hope that the noble Lord recognises the seriousness with which the Government view the safety of motorcyclists. He will be delighted to know that we will soon be launching a motorcycling strategy with a view to improving conditions for all motorcyclists. With that in mind, the department convened an advisory group on motorcycling that included representatives of the Motorcycling Action Group and the British Motorcyclists Federation. They have been working on a report that will contain recommendations to Government on the issues of most concern. We are expecting it to be published next month. Ministers will give it careful consideration when developing the strategy.

I respect the points the noble Lord made about the accident rate for motorcyclists. Only a short while ago in response to a Question in the House I indicated how concerned we were about the rise in deaths and serious injuries among motorcyclists. That is why we are concerned to take the measures I have outlined. But there is a salient point in relation to the amendment. The noble Lord said that motorcyclists represented 22 per cent of those killed when they comprised only 4 per cent of the traffic. Those are chilling statistics that we take extremely seriously, as we do the upturn in motorcycle casualties, which is a worry to us all.

However, diesel and oil spillages were present in less than 1 per cent of all injury accidents involving two-wheeled vehicles last year. Although I hope I have convinced the noble Lord, I am sure that he is aware that my colleagues and I have the issues of motorcycle safety very much in mind. We need to pursue the matters with vigour. The amendment relating to spillages is not justified by the figures, but we are taking on board the representations that the noble Lord has made so forcefully again today. We will keep the issue under review. I want to reassure him that motorcycle safety is an important feature of the Government's perspective on road safety.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his kind assurances and for the information he gave us about the report due for publication next month. Perhaps my reading skills are not up to it, but I have a copy of the code of practice for maintenance management and we could not find any reference to diesel spills.

Furthermore, both the times I have come off my motorcycle on diesel spills, neither of those occasions were included in the accident statistics. It would be misleading to think that the accidents caused to motorcyclists due to diesel spills are just 1 per cent; perhaps the figure is much larger because they are not recorded. Notwithstanding that, I am grateful to the Minister for his assurances and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 20 [Interpretation of Part 2]:

moved Amendment No. 2:

Page 9, leave out lines 8 and 9.

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, we move from the dangerous position of two wheels to the safety of four wheels. My amendment is purely for tidying up because your Lordships deleted Clauses 20 to 30 on Report. We needed to table the amendment because it removes the definitions of "intervention notice" and "intervention order" from the current Clause 20 as they are no longer needed in the Bill. I hope that the amendment is helpful to the Government. I beg to move.

My Lords, this is an obvious amendment in view of what happened. It was a most unfortunate decision by the House and I hope that it will not prevail indefinitely.

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend. Like me he is careful of the Danaans when bearing gifts. Of course the noble Viscount has an unexceptionable and unarguable case that once Clauses 20 to 30 were excised from the Bill—temporarily I trust, like my noble friend—the amendment should be carried. As he will recognise, although we do not accept the reason why it has become unarguable, we accept the amendment.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 33 [Directions as to placing of apparatus]:

moved Amendment No. 3:

Page 17, line 2, after "to" insert "the persons who may determine appeals and"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, Clause 33 inserts a new Section 56A into the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991. That will provide a new power for street authorities to direct undertakers that in certain circumstances they cannot place new apparatus in a particular street. Subsection (5) already allows the Secretary of State to make provision in regulations for a system of appeals against such directions and the procedure for appeals. Upon reflection, we believe that it would be sensible to make it clear that the regulations can also make provision as to the persons who may determine such appeals, which is what Amendment No. 3 does. I beg to move.

My Lords, the amendment clarifies that regulations made by the Secretary of State to allow appeals against directions preventing the placement of new apparatus by undertakers—in particular, for roads as set out in Clause 33—may also make provision as to the persons who may determine such appeals. We welcome the amendment and thank the Government for tabling it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 44 [Power of street authority to require undertaker to re-surface street]:

moved Amendment No. 4:

Page 24, line 22, leave out "serve" and insert "give"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving the amendment I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 5, 6, 7, 24 and 28, which replace references to the "serving" of notices with the "giving" of notices. Elsewhere the Bill refers to the giving of notices and for consistency we consider it best to refer to one term. Amendments Nos. 23 and 27 are also grouped with Amendment No. 4. They correct references in two of the schedules for fixed penalty offences. Both Schedules 3 and 6 incorrectly refer to "section". The amendments correct the errors so that they refer to "paragraph", which is the appropriate terminology when referring to schedules. I beg to move.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 5:

Page 25, line 5, leave out "served with" and insert "given"

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 45 [Re-surfacing: regulations and guidance]:

moved Amendments Nos. 6 and 7:

Page 25, line 28, leave out "served on" and insert "given to" Page 25, line 30, leave out "be served with the notice" and insert "whom the notice is to be given"

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 46 [Contributions to costs of re-surfacing by undertaker]:

moved Amendment No. 8:

Page 27, line 32, leave out "(corresponding to subsections (1) to (5))"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving the amendment I shall speak also to Amendment No. 9. Clause 46 inserts a new Section 78A into the New Roads and Street Works Act 1991 providing for undertakers to make a contribution to the costs of resurfacing roads in certain circumstances. The amendments provide that regulations under subsection (7) are able to make substantive provision for payments and so on and are not simply intended to give powers to the Secretary of State to require payments. The drafting amendments are to make clear the scope of provisions. I beg to move.

My Lords, will regulations provide undertakers with a choice, or will they prescribe the circumstances in which an undertaker is entitled to pay a sum with regard to resurfacing? It would help if the Minister could give me some understanding of how they consider the regulations will be framed. In principle, we support the amendment.

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for asking that question. The regulations will indeed prescribe. I believe that clears up the uncertainty that he expressed.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 9:

0Page 27, line 39, at end insert— "( ) The power in subsection (7) includes power to make provision corresponding to provision that may be made under subsections (1) to (5)."

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 10: Page 27, line 46, at end insert—

"( ) No contribution may be requested under this section in respect of works carried out before regulations under this section have first been made."

The noble Lord said: My Lords, I thought that we knew where we were on this new section, and that through the process of Committee and Report we had gained an understanding that no retrospection was involved. But then it appears from comments made very recently by Ministers that there is to be retrospection, and that the way in which this section of the Bill will work is that it will be brought into effect next year some time, but the regulations will not be promulgated for the first time until some years afterwards. When the regulations are promulgated, the whole period between the Bill coming into effect and the regulations being agreed to will then be covered by the section, and there will be an immediate back-charging of the utilities which have done works in that period.

My objection is not that utilities should be charged for such things; we are all agreed on that point. I object, however, to the idea that an unspecified and unquantified charge will suddenly materialise in five years' time. Utilities are presumably meant to reserve for that eventuality—but how can they reserve for something when they do not know the scale and extent of the charges? The Minister has said that these cases will be rare and occasional, but there is nothing in the Bill to say that; it all depends on the nature of the regulations.

The Minister must be straight and keep to what he has said before—that there will not be retrospection. Until it is possible for the utilities to know when the charges will arise and how large they are likely to be, they should not be asked to pay them. That seems to me the very basis of fairness and reasonableness, on which we thought we had agreed.

My decision on the amendment depends very much on how the Minister replies. Given that we are at this stage, I shall not know until he has whether this is a matter that I want to take seriously. I would hope that if my noble friend Lord Astor and the Liberal Democrats have some reason for me not to divide the House on this matter, if the Government are going retrospective, they will let me know—because I certainly shall divide the House if they are. I beg to move.

My Lords, I do not find myself very often in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, so it is a pleasure to agree with him today. It seems quite unreasonable that utilities should engage in work tomorrow, next week or the month after on the basis of the present law, then find that because regulations are made retrospective some time in the future their liabilities are much greater than they thought. I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and myself, that that is not intended. Otherwise, I believe that the noble Lord has an important point.

My Lords, I understand the point that my noble friend Lord Lucas is making, and I entirely agree with him. I had thought, although I may have got it wrong, that the Minister had given assurances about this matter before. I may not be right, and it would be very helpful if the Minister could clarify the situation.

My Lords, I shall address myself to the issues, although I regret that I shall have at one stage to indicate in a rather technical way that the amendment would not quite achieve what the noble Lord seeks. However, it would do the noble Lord a disfavour if I merely addressed the technicality and not the real issues that he has raised.

As the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, said, we have had considerable debate on these issues in Grand Committee and at Report. The concerns of utilities about the resurfacing powers have been raised previously, and it is right that they should be today. There is not a great deal to add to what I said before; I had sought to meet these points in the assurances given about the use of the powers. The assurances have been given, not only during the proceedings of the Bill in this House and in another place but outside the House by my colleagues in the department.

I emphasise the point that the provision is not a way for authorities to get their roads resurfaced on the cheap. The Government envisage that the powers would be used only where problems were most serious, and where a succession of works had left roads in a particularly bad condition. Regulations will place the appropriate limitations on the circumstances in which these powers could be used. We gave the assurance on Report that the first of the regulations will be subject to affirmative resolution, so both Houses of Parliament will have the opportunity to consider them.

We envisage that the authority itself would still be expected to make the largest contribution to resurfacing costs even when the new powers were triggered. The basis on which costs are to be shared between undertakers and the authority would of course be part of the regulations, so there will be an opportunity for this House to scrutinise the powers before they come into effect. As and when the regulations are brought forward, they will be developed with the help of undertakers and authorities, and will be subject to full public consultation.

The amendments that the Government tabled at Report already limit the liability of undertakers to exclude any works before commencement of these clauses. Amendment No. 10 seeks to stretch that exclusion to the time when regulations are made. I understand the concerns about how contingencies for resurfacing costs can be dealt with by utility companies. But we need to balance that against the principle that where utilities' street works have made a significant contribution towards damaging a road, the utilities in question should contribute towards the necessary resurfacing. As I said at Report, the Government have increased substantially the funding of maintenance on our roads, and we do not want to see that investment prejudiced. We do not of course want to make it difficult for utility companies to operate. I can assure your Lordships that all these matters will be the subject of proper discussion and consideration when developing the regulations so that we can come to a reasonable conclusion, which will take on board the point that the noble Lord has made.

The amendment itself in fact only partially addresses the concerns that the noble Lord articulated so clearly. This is where I shall lapse into the slightly more technical argument. While the amendment would add a subsection making liability start only after the regulations have been made, it leaves intact subsection (2)(a), which was amended at Report to make it clear that the starting point is that, subject to the eventual provisions made in regulations, liability may start at commencement of the clause, irrespective of whether regulations have been made. So the amendment would inadvertently cast doubt on the intended effect of the provisions in new Section 78A, if it were made. That would be deleterious to how we envisage these issues developing and to how the noble Lord addressed them.

Returning to the point of principle, I want to give the assurance that I have given in the past about these powers. The regulations will be developed in conjunction with the undertakers and authorities. They will take into account all the points that have been raised during the passage of the Bill. They will be subject to the fullest public consultation and of course they will be subject in the first instance to parliamentary scrutiny under the affirmative procedure for regulations. On that basis I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

My Lords, not really—not at this stage. If my noble friend Lord Astor chooses to indicate that he would rather I did not divide—by a thumbs down or similar motion—I will of course follow his advice. However, I thought that we had established the principle in Committee and on Report that there would be no retrospection, and now we find that there is this long period between commencement and the issuing of regulations when retrospection will apply. Furthermore, there will be no indication of the extent of the coverage or of the costs when they are incurred.

I thought that we had all agreed that there should be no retrospection, or at least not for more than six months or a year, which is survivable in the context of company accounts. The prospect of five years of retrospection is just not on and what the Minister said did not satisfy my concerns. I appreciate that the amendment is defective, but I hope that it is irritating enough to get the Government to correct it and put something in place that will work in principle. We all agree that utilities should pay their share of the costs. I hope that the amendment will make the Government hurry on the regulations so that they can. 1.32 p.m.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 10) shall be agreed to?

Their Lordships divided: Contents, 81; Not-Contents, 126.

moved Amendment No. 11:

Leave out Clause 48.

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a probing amendment about the inspectors' role in looking at road works. I am seeking a few words of comfort from my noble friend that those who do the roadworks well will get some reward for good behaviour because the inspections cost money. There has been a lot of correspondence between my noble friend and the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, on this subject. I shall not go over it now.

The Government have commented that they see the role of using a stick to punish those companies that do not improve their service. However, they have said little about a corresponding carrot for those who do improve; that is, a reduction in the number or proportion of inspections, and therefore a reduction in cost, if a company's work is shown to be good. It would good to hear from my noble friend whether the percentage of inspections carried out will vary according to the previous performance of the utility, or maybe even the local authority. It would be good to see whether the Government will accept the principle that the better company should, after a bit, have the proportion of its works inspected reduced, even down to something like 10 per cent. Of course, if the inspections found that its work was getting worse, it would be perfectly reasonable to put the percentage up higher. It would be very nice to hear a few words from my noble friend about the carrot as well the stick. I beg to move.

My Lords, I appreciate the spirit in which my noble friend proposes to delete an important clause of the Bill. But, despite bringing a nuclear weapon to his aid, I understand that he is seeking to air a concept and a principle that I find attractive.

As the noble Lord will know, it is certainly the case that in other areas where we have regulation it becomes lighter-touch when the performance record of the body to be inspected merits confidence. I think that that is the burden of my noble friend's remarks. I think it is an attractive concept and one that is not unknown to government in a number of areas. I will bear in mind the principle that he is identifying. We have quite a way to go before we reach conclusions on these issues so it is a helpful contribution.

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend for that response. It is exactly what I hoped he would say. I had no intention of throwing any nuclear weapons in his direction. I was trying to convert my thoughts into an amendment that fitted into the Bill in order to get some very helpful words of comfort. I am sure he will understand why I chose the simpler option. I am very grateful to him. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 68 [Immobilisation of vehicle where penalty charge payable]:

moved Amendment No. 12:

Page 45, line 6. leave out sub-paragraphs (ii) and (iii)

The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 12 I shall speak also to Amendments Nos. 13, 14 and 15. On Report, we debated an amendment moved by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, that sought to prevent the immobilisation of a vehicle for a period of 15 minutes after a penalty charge notice had been issued for a parking contravention. On that occasion, I explained that we could not accept that amendment because it would apply not just to overstaying in a paying parking bay but also to other circumstances. It would have also prevented immobilisation for 15 minutes following the issue of a charge notice for other parking contraventions, such as parking on yellow lines. That is why we could not accept it as drafted. People who knowingly park unlawfully in the first place should not be given a period of grace against having their vehicles immobilised.

However, I indicated that we were prepared to amend what is now Clause 68 so that a vehicle cannot be immobilised for contravening the conditions of use of a paid-for parking bay until a period of 15 minutes has elapsed from the time that a penalty charge notice for the contravention was issued. That is the purpose of our amendments to Clause 68 and I think they meet the argument that the noble Viscount advanced in Committee and on Report.

Amendment No. 12 removes the existing prohibition on immobilisation for overstaying until a period of 15 minutes has elapsed from the end of the period of parking paid for. Amendment No. 13 replaces it with a prohibition on immobilising a vehicle in a parking place for a period of 15 minutes after a penalty charge notice has been issued for failing to pay a parking charge, failing to display properly a parking ticket showing that parking has been paid for or failing to remove a vehicle from a parking space at the end of the time paid for.

The prohibition on immobilisation for failure to pay a parking charge or to display a ticket would cover, for example, the eventuality of someone who went to a nearby shop to obtain change for the ticket machine and who, as matters stand at present, could potentially receive a penalty charge and have his vehicle clamped while carrying out that activity. The noble Viscount made a persuasive case that people may not immediately be able to meet the requirements of the parking charge, and that an element of grace would be appropriate.

The proposed new paragraph in Amendment No. 9 replaces the provision on overstaying removed by Amendment No. 8. It means that there would be a period of grace of at least 15 minutes before a vehicle could be immobilised for overstaying. In practice, that period could be longer, depending on when the contravention of overstaying was detected and when the penalty charge notice issued.

Amendments Nos. 14 and 15 are consequential. They address the anomaly that the Government seek to correct. Rather than a no-score draw, which is how the noble Viscount characterised our position last time we discussed the issue, I hope that we have the most unusual phenomenon of a win-win situation. I hope that he will accept the government amendments in those terms. I beg to move.

My Lords, I thank the Minister for addressing the concerns that we raised in Committee and on Report, and for bringing forward his own amendment, which deals with the problem. As I said previously, I have no problem with the issue of a ticket, but my concern has always been for someone who is trying to find a machine that works having to pay a charge. They might get a ticket and can then write to say that the machine was not working or whatever, but there are too many instances in London where the clamping car follows the traffic warden issuing the ticket. Suddenly the innocent comes back and has been made guilty, inconvenienced, and has to pay and then appeal.

The amendment will not lead to people parking in places where they should not park, and one advantage of it is that it will reduce the number of appeals in which the payment of clamping has to be refunded, because of the 15 minutes. It will be beneficial to the system, and I support it.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendments Nos. 13 to 15:

Page 45, line 22, at end insert— "( ) The regulations shall also provide that an immobilisation device must not be fixed to a vehicle in a parking place in respect of a contravention consisting of, or arising out of, a failure—

(a) to pay a parking charge with respect to the vehicle,

(b) properly to display a ticket or parking device, or

(c) to remove the vehicle from the parking space by the end of a period for which the appropriate charge was paid,

until 15 minutes have elapsed since the giving of a notification of a penalty charge in respect of the contravention." Page 45, line 23, leave out "subsection (5)" and insert "this section" Page 45, leave out line 26 and insert— ""parking device" means a parking device within the meaning of section 35(3B) or 51(4) of that Act; "parking place" means—

(a) a parking place designated by an order under section 45 of that Act, or

(b) an off-street parking place provided under section 32(1)(a) or 57(1)(b), or under a letting or arrangement made under section 33(4), of that Act."

On Question, amendments agreed to.

Clause 69 [Representations and appeals]:

moved Amendment No. 16:

Page 46, line 2, at end insert— "( ) enabling an adjudicator to refer an appeal made under subsection (1) back to the enforcement authority if he sees fit."

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, I see that a similar government amendment is grouped with my Amendment No. 16. However, it may be for the benefit of the House if I briefly explain the purpose of mine. The Government have again been very helpful and addressed my concern, and I will leave the Minister to put the case for his own amendment.

Amendment No. 16 is about adjudication, fairness and mitigating circumstances. It gives parking adjudicators the statutory power to refer an appeal case back to the enforcement authority if they feel that the authority should reconsider the case in the light of mitigating circumstances. Amendment No. 17 is the wording suggested by the London chief adjudicator, Martin Wood, who argued that the adjudicators need more teeth so that, in particular cases, they should have the power to alter penalty charges. The example raised was if someone has been on holiday and his permit falls off his windscreen, so he returns to find £1,000-worth of tickets that he then has to try to contest.

The amendment is also supported by the National Parking Adjudication Service and its chief adjudicator, Caroline Shepherd. She and Martin Wood have been enormously helpful to me in addressing the issue, for which I am grateful.

National and London parking adjudicators have expressed concern, in various annual reports over the years, that some councils have not been using their power to take into account mitigating circumstances when reconsidering fixed penalty notices in the correct manner, and that there should be more scrutiny and transparency. Recent Department for Transport figures published in the Evening Standard, no less, on Tuesday 6 July showed that drivers across England spent £1 billion on parking charges and fines last year, which is 50 per cent up since the Government came to power in 1997. I am not sure what the Minister feels about that, or what it says about motorists' behaviour during the period of his Government, but I leave him to consider that.

It is important to point out that adjudicators already refer cases back to local authorities, but the adjudicators are concerned that those referrals are not considered properly. Not all local authorities are bad, but not all are good. I can give some examples of good local authorities—Winchester, Oxford and Harrogate—but in Birmingham and Liverpool it can take up to seven months to get a reply to a letter.

The amendment ensures that the ability to take account of mitigating circumstances remains with local authorities, but the power of the National Parking Adjudication Service to refer cases back to them will encourage them to be more responsible and accountable in the use of that discretionary power. Importantly, it avoids making the power subject to judicial review, which was a concern of the Minister. Therefore, it will be of no additional cost to the taxpayer. It has received support from the National Parking Adjudication Service as well as the RAC Foundation. It would give tribunals a firmer overseeing principle.

The National Parking Adjudication Service has highlighted that it is vital, in conjunction with the amendment, to have strong guidance to ensure that when a case is referred back to the local authority it will be undertaken or overseen by the chief executive of the complaints department within that council, so that it is not reconsidered only by the same individual who looked at the case to start with. The NPAS has also called for better standards for dealing with parking penalties, and is calling for secondary legislation to allow the Audit Commission to outline standards that should be met, rather than the arbitrary system of enforcement that exists today. It would be interesting to hear what the Minister says on that.

The NPAS has also suggested—again, we look to the Minister to give us some understanding of the Government's thinking—that local authorities should not be allowed to spend the additional money raised from parking fines on other things until certain standards have been attained.

The Government have moved a long way on the issue, and their amendment is rather similar to mine. However, there are still some questions which I hope the Minister will answer when he comes to explain his amendment. I beg to move.

My Lords, I thank the noble Viscount for his persistence on the matter. Were my noble friend Lord Bradshaw here, he would add to my thanks, because he has also expressed some concerns about it. In supporting the amendment, I plead guilty to a certain amount of inconsistency. My feeling is usually that most things are best left to local authorities and local discretion. Nevertheless, it has become evident that, at the worse end of the scale, some of the activities of local councils in not taking mitigating circumstances into account are virtually a miscarriage of justice, and cause immense anger and frustration among the public.

Under those circumstances and given the very strong will of the adjudication service that such a provision be in the Bill, I am glad in principle to support any such amendment on offer today. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say.

My Lords, I had it in mind to congratulate the noble Viscount, both on his assiduity in pursuing the issues over a long period and on the considerable success of the drafting of the amendments. We will not move our amendment to score a point over him at all; we merely seek to make eminently workable the case that he has established. I was in my most benign mood, but it never lasts long. It certainly does not last very long if I get an onslaught on the issue of the present parking policy of local authorities and what the Government are meant to do about it. First, we would be here all day on this issue of where the motorist stands in his right to park in certain areas. Secondly, I do not think that this is the time to pick up the cudgels in that respect. There is probably a good deal more agreement between all three Front Benches on these issues than might be thought when tendentious matters arise in particular cases in the press.

I bear in mind the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Scott, mentioned a moment ago. We have become concerned at the increasing number of cases—and the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, established this case at earlier stages of the Bill—in which there could be a real miscarriage of justice because of the rather rigid way in which the procedures operate. So we are entirely sympathetic to the case that the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, has made so ably and well.

The noble Viscount's amendment highlights the important issue of the need for proper consideration of cases where penalty charges are incurred, but compelling mitigating circumstances suggest that they should not be enforced. He gave us a number of examples on previous occasions including one in which a vehicle was abandoned in a snow storm the previous night and the owner was penalised the next day before he could even get to his car. That, to put it mildly, is not the basis on which parking penalties should normally be enforced.

When we discussed this issue on Report, we said that we intended to take into account how to tackle mitigating circumstances. However, that rests first and foremost with the local authorities undertaking the civil enforcement of traffic contraventions. It is their decisions that are important. The real need is to get enforcing authorities properly to consider mitigating circumstances.

One element will certainly be our determination to issue statutory guidance to authorities under Clause 76 on dealing with such cases. By virtue of subsection (2) of that clause, authorities will be under a duty to have regard to such guidance. However, giving adjudicators the ability to refer cases back to the enforcing authorities if they think that they have not properly exercised their discretion would be an additional useful string to add to the bow. The noble Viscount has made his case and we agree with him.

We have subjected the noble Viscount's amendment, as we are bound to do, to the scrutiny of parliamentary draftsmen. Government Amendment No. 18 would enable regulations to be made providing that mitigating circumstances are a ground for appeal and that the potential outcome of such an appeal is that the adjudicator could decide to refer the matter back to the enforcement authority for reconsideration. That would effectively be giving the adjudicators a supervisory role over how enforcing authorities exercise their discretion in cases where there are mitigating circumstances. If the case is cut and dried and there are no issues to be discussed, the regulations would go through in the normal way. However, we are talking about cases where there might be mitigating circumstances.

We believe that, with our amendment, Clause 69 will provide sufficiently wide powers to enable regulations to be made to deal with representations and appeals, including giving adjudicators a lever to address the issue of mitigating circumstances. That is the burden of the noble Viscount's argument and all the discussions on this issue. As I think will be recognised, the detail of those regulations is for another day. However, I assure the House that their preparation will be subject to wide-ranging consultation. We will certainly be discussing their scope with the chief adjudicators. I would also remind the House that the regulations will be subject to parliamentary approval under the affirmative procedure.

So there will be another opportunity to look in detail at how these regulations will actually work. I therefore commend Amendment No. 18 and ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment. He has made his case, but I think our amendment hits the nail slightly more accurately.

My Lords, before the Minister sits down, perhaps I can ask one question. When it comes to the guidance, will the Government undertake to address the point raised by both adjudicators—that it is important that, when cases are sent back to local authorities, they are not overseen by the same individuals who looked at the case initially, but go to the chief executive's complaint department within that council? It would be very helpful if the noble Lord could answer that point.

My Lords, I am again happy to reassure the noble Viscount. I accept the point. It would not be appropriate to return the matter to those who may not have been as judicious in their assessment as the adjudicator would have liked. If an adjudicator asks quite specifically for mitigating circumstances to be taken into account, the local authority should recognise that as a quite serious point. I can therefore give the noble Viscount that assurance.

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his contribution and indeed for his amendment. I accept that his ability to draft amendments is sometimes better than mine-not surprisingly; he has rather a larger team behind him. This is important for one reason which perhaps has not been addressed today. The Bill is going to extend the powers of civil enforcement officers to move vehicles; therefore, there will be much more opportunity for difficulties and problems to arise. When that happens, it is important that we have a strong and robust appeals service that works. As I said, I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply. I will of course beg leave to withdraw my amendment in favour of his.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

[Amendment No. 17 not moved.]

moved Amendment No. 18:

Page 46, line 2, at end insert— "( ) The regulations may provide that, as respects a ground on which representations may be made, the adjudicator's function on an appeal is to decide whether to direct the enforcement authority to consider or re-consider (as the case may be) any representations relating to that ground."

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Clause 70 [Adjudicators]:

moved Amendment No. 19:

Page 47, line 7, leave out "Lord Chancellor" and insert "appropriate national authority"

The noble Lord said: My Lords, this is a minor operational amendment. It provides for enforcing authorities to report to the appropriate national authority rather than to the Lord Chancellor on the discharge by adjudicators of their functions. The appropriate national authority is the Secretary of State or the National Assembly for Wales.

The change brings the provision in Clause 70 about annual adjudicator reports into line with the current arrangement under Section 73(18) of the Road Traffic Act 1991. This requires that the local authority joint committees responsible for the appointment of adjudicators make an annual report on the discharge of their functions to the Secretary of State. The change reflects the fact that, on balance, we feel that the reports issued by adjudicators will be more likely to contain substantive comments about enforcement mechanisms as a whole, rather than about the role of parking adjudicators. I beg to move.

My Lords, I have only one question for the Minister. He said that the Secretary of State will be the appropriate national authority. Am I not right that the Lord Chancellor is the person who makes regulations with regard to the adjudicators? Is it therefore not sensible that he should receive the report on how they discharge their functions, as he has set them up to do? Will that still happen? As far as I can see, the Minister's amendment changes that. The report would go to the Secretary of State, who is not responsible for making the regulations for adjudicators. Will there be a split? It seems a slightly strange process. I may not have phrased the question correctly; I accept that I may not have. However, I should be grateful for clarification from the Minister.

My Lords, it would be totally illogical if the amendment were agreed to, because the Bill states that the Lord Chancellor appoints the adjudicators and makes the regulations. Therefore, as my noble friend said, why should the report go to another authority? That seems totally illogical.

My Lords, the issue concerns the functional operation of the adjudicators and the effectiveness of their actions. The report goes to the Secretary of State because they are working within his purview. The reason the Lord Chancellor establishes them is that they have a quasi-legal position. But the reports go to the appropriate Secretary of State or, in the case of Wales, the National Assembly.

It is not quite as the noble Lord suggested—perhaps I did not make the matter entirely clear. The Lord Chancellor approves the appointments—they are made with his consent—but the adjudicators are appointed by the enforcing authorities, which are within the purview of the Secretary of State. I should have thought that it was obvious why those appointments are made with the consent of the Lord Chancellor: because of the quasi-judicial dimension. But they are bodies established by the enforcing authorities and answerable to the Secretary of State or, in Wales, to the National Assembly.

My Lords, before the noble Lord sits down, if the report states that the regulations need to be changed, which could well happen, surely that should go to the Lord Chancellor, not the Secretary of State. It is obvious that the report could cause a change in the regulations.

My Lords, before the noble Lord replies to that question, perhaps he could answer a brief question of mine. As the Minister is only too well aware, we are on Third Reading but this issue has not come up before. Indeed, the Government drafted the Bill naming the Lord Chancellor as the appropriate person. The Minister has not explained why the Government have changed their mind since the original drafting of the Bill and have now proposed this change. As my noble friend said, if the Lord Chancellor makes regulations about the adjudicators, he is responsible for their successful function. I entirely accept that the Secretary of State, in his role at the Department for Transport, is responsible for the traffic rules and regulations of local authorities and nationally, but the adjudicators are clearly set up by regulations from the Lord Chancellor. The report concerns not what they are adjudicating on, but how well they are doing their job. That is the cause of the confusion.

Well, my Lords, the reports are about the operational matters with which the adjudicators have been concerned. Those reports are therefore matters appropriate to be dealt with by the Secretary of State. The consent of the Lord Chancellor and the reason why he features does not relate to a line-management function. His consent is required because there is a quasi-judicial aspect to the adjudicators' work. But their work concerns operational matters and their reports are judgments on enforcing authorities. That is why it is appropriate that they should go to the Secretary of State who, after all, is responsible for that whole area of policy.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

moved Amendment No. 20:

Before Clause 83, insert the following new clause—

My Lords, the amendment moved by the noble Lord is identical to one that he moved in Grand Committee on 4 May. He may recall that he and I exchanged some words then and he challenged me to produce figures for the increase in accidents on motorways and on smaller roads that has taken place elsewhere when speed limits have been raised. I then undertook, as president of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents—an interest that I declare in this debate—to ensure that a brief was prepared for the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, and sent to him. That was done three days later and copies were sent to the noble Viscounts, Lord Goschen and Lord Astor.

I am a little surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, is moving the amendment again given the information contained in that briefing. For example, it stated:

"A study of the effects of raising the speed limit on Washington State's rural freeways from 55 mph to 65 mph in 1987, found that the incidence of fatal crashes more than doubled afterwards compared with what would have been expected if the limit had not been raised.

"A 1999 study compared the number of motor vehicle occupants killed in 24 States that raised their speed limits in 1995–96 with the period before the speed limits were increased, and with 7 States that did not increase the speed limit. The study concluded that where the limits were increased deaths on interstates and freeways rose by 15%, but did not increase in those states where the speed limit was left at 65 mph".

There is a great deal more, but I do not intend to read out the whole letter. I will just make the point that it is a three-page briefing which counters, point by point, the arguments used by the noble Lord in Grand Committee. As I said, it is a pity that he is not using that in this debate.

I shall give one more example. The briefing states:

"In states that increased speed limits to 70 mph, deaths were 35% higher than expected based on deaths in states that did not increase their speed limit, resulting in 1,100 extra deaths".

It would be the height of irresponsibility for us to contemplate an increase in the speed limit, largely—if I recall the noble Lord's argument in Grand Committee—on the grounds that, as most people do not observe it, the obvious thing is to raise the limit. The truth is that if the limit were raised, the acceptability of a new breaking of the law would be raised by 10 or 15 miles an hour. Instead of breaking the law at 80 miles an hour, people would be breaking it at 90 miles an hour.

My Lords, on the point about American freeways, as a past vice-president of RoSPA for many years, I point out to the noble Lord that the way in which freeways operate in the United States is not remotely comparable with motorways in this country. There are many more lanes and there is no outside lane as such—you can pass on either side. Under those circumstances, there may be a case for reducing speed. Those circumstances do not exist on our motorways.

My Lords, unfortunately that is not at all what the Transport Select Committee in another place said when it looked at this issue. It said that if speed limits were raised to 80 miles per hour, casualties on motorways would rise by between five and 10 per cent. Based on 2002 casualty figures, that would suggest an extra 75 to 150 would be killed or seriously injured.

I quote the final sentence in the letter that went to the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick:

"But ultimately, the public as a whole needs to be persuaded that driving at inappropriate speeds is not a minor, technical offence that everyone commits, but a serious, dangerous and antisocial activity in which the speeding driver places his or her own convenience above the safety and well-being of other people".

I hope he does not press this amendment.

My Lords, on these Benches we have consistently opposed the notion that the speed limit on our motorways should increase. It seems extraordinary, given that our motorways are currently the safest roads we enjoy, that we should jeopardise that position by tacking such a complicated subject on to a Bill such as this, and taking such a drastic step with so little debate and evidence. I hope the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, does not push this amendment, because we will certainly not be supporting it from these Benches.

I have a fragment of sympathy with the noble Lord and his sense of frustration about general speed limit policy. It has become clear that we need a proper debate—what I think people call a "mature debate", whatever that means—on the whole question of speed limits: how they are set, and whether they are enforced. In that context, I would be quite happy, and would support the Government looking at motorway speed limits again, but not in isolation from all other types of roads, and certainly not in the context of this Bill.

My Lords, it would be extremely irresponsible if the amendment were pressed to a Division. The rules of your Lordships' House precluded me from speaking at an earlier stage in the debate and, despite being very new to this place, I am surprised that something so fundamentally important should be tagged on the back end of a debate in the way this amendment has been.

Like every other motorist, I have broken speed limits on a regular basis. I probably tempt providence when I tell your Lordships that the last time I was fined for doing so was in the mid-1970s. I feel—having done 30,000 miles per year until comparatively recently, much of it on motorways—that an extension of the speed limits in the way outlined in this amendment would be grossly irresponsible.

We are all familiar with the dangers of driving on our roads. My own motorway experiences tell me that the problem is not so much speed but, quite often, driver reflexes. Even smallish modern motor cars are capable of speeds undreamed of 30 or 40 years ago, when I first got a driving licence. There are far too many vehicles being driven at 80 miles per hour by people with their brains firmly stuck at 30 miles per hour. Anyone who has seen the carnage on our motorways caused by excessive speed would feel that to pass such an amendment after so little debate would be grossly irresponsible. I notice from reading the national newspapers that there is an organisation called the Association of British Drivers, which seems to be one of the few bodies in favour of this measure. I do not know who it speaks for. It certainly does not speak for me, having held a driving licence for more than 40 years. It is supported by the Daily Mail. I have a simple rule of thumb: if the Daily Mail is in favour of it, I am, by and large, against it. The Association of British Drivers does not speak for the majority of drivers, I am sure. We all think that we are better drivers than we are, I suspect. It is a bit of a male characteristic, as one sees on the motorways. I know that if I catch up with a Jaguar—I used to drive one myself, so I am not picking on Jaguar drivers—with a personalised number-plate, it will rarely move out of the outside lane. All too often, the driver appears to feel that he—and it is invariably a "he"—is somehow diminishing his masculinity by doing so.

If this amendment were accepted and that driver could drive legally at 80 miles per hour—which, as we all know, would mean 90 miles per hour—it would mean he was driving in exactly the same way, except that he would do so just that bit faster. We need not higher speed limits but better driver education. I know it is not, strictly speaking, a matter for this amendment. Despite the attacks on the proliferation of cameras, I am inclined to drive more carefully since their proliferation, for the reason—like everyone else—that I do not wish to risk my own driving licence.

Will the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, consult other Members of his own party before pushing this amendment to a vote? It strikes me as one of the populist and irresponsible measures that oppositions all too often introduce in the run-up to a general election. I rate it no higher than that. It is perhaps a measure best left to the counterparts of the noble Lord down the Corridor.

My Lords, we have heard it suggested that introducing this amendment is an irresponsible act. Nothing could be further from the truth.

My noble friend Lord Rotherwick is quite right to draw attention to the fact that, at the moment, we have a totally unacceptable situation with a de facto speed limit on motorways of around 85 miles per hour, below which the police will not stop drivers in good weather. Anyone who drives regularly on motorways will see people driving quite happily at 85 miles per hour and not being stopped by the police. My noble friend is quite right to draw attention to the fact that this uncertainty about speed limits—having a law that the Government know perfectly well is not designed to be enforced at the level set down in statute—is quite wrong. For the benefit of the noble Lord, Lord Snape, my noble friend has already admitted that the Secretary of State has the powers to vary the speed limit without resorting to primary legislation. The purpose of this debate, I would suggest, is more to draw attention to the fact that the Government cannot just brush this under the carpet and pretend it is all too difficult to deal with. There does need to be a proper debate about speed limits. To the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, I would suggest that the answer is to determine the appropriate speed limit, and for it to be agreed by Parliament and then properly enforced. At the moment it is not properly enforced, as the Government admit. That is an unsatisfactory situation.

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, said that increasing the speed limit would get you there quicker. I would draw his attention to the report of the Transport Committee of the House Commons on the road traffic speed. It found that:

"Higher speeds would do little to reduce journey time; on the congested motorways of England an 80 mph limit might well increase them because it would create an uneven flow".

So you are not going to get there quicker. Yes, we need some enforcement, and if the Government are going to have a review of speed limits, I hope that they will consider reducing them as well as increasing them, along with enforcement.

Given the facts that my noble friend Lord Faulkner has given to the House, both in his letter and today, and many other facts that we have seen, I just cannot understand how the Conservative Party can be promoting a policy that will increase by many hundreds a year the number of people killed or seriously injured on the roads. I cannot understand it. I strongly oppose this amendment.

My Lords, we had the benefit of this debate on Report and in Committee, although, as I recall, there were slightly fewer participants than today. My noble friend Lord Snape has got the perfect alibi for that: as he was not eligible to speak earlier in the Bill, he has taken his opportunity now. But I agree with him. His main point is that this is not the occasion upon which this debate ought to take place, because the amendment is misplaced in relation to this Bill. That is certainly the Government view on the broad issues, and I am going to speak very negatively on the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, and supported by the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen.

The concept I find most difficult to accept is that if we legitimise those who are breaking the law by travelling at over 80 miles per hour now, we will consolidate it nicely around 80 by moving the speed limit up to that position. The obvious question is: why would not those who currently break the law by 10 to 15 mph and appear to get away with it increase their speed with considerable abandon by another 10 or 15 mph when we have the higher speed limit? It seems obvious—

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for giving way. I have no desire to prolong the debate. There is an obvious answer to the noble Lord's argument: enforcement. Technology now allows us to enforce speed limits perfectly well. If the speed limit that is eventually decided were properly enforced, motorists could not travel at 10 to 15 mph faster without being apprehended regularly. Proper enforcement must be the answer.

My Lords, but the enforcing authorities have due regard to what is reasonable in their policing of the motorways and the rules of enforcement. It is not because they think that the speed limit ought to be 10 mph higher, but they recognise that a considerable number of motorists have difficulty in regulating their cars precisely to the speed limit—as evidenced every time one travels on the motorway. That will occur no matter what speed limit is enforced on motorways.

The noble Baroness, Lady Oppenheim-Barnes, challenged my noble friend Lord Faulkner on his American illustration on the grounds that American roads are not exactly the same as ours. Of course they are not; each country has a road system to reflect its geography, the weight of traffic and to some extent the nature of its drivers. In Europe, where speed limits are much higher than 70 mph—indeed, much higher than noble Lords opposite dream of—we see carnage. The figures for road deaths in France and Italy are horrendous.

Noble Lords may argue that French roads differ from British roads. That is certainly so, but Britain has tremendous problems with pedestrian deaths on urban roads, which is why children suffer so on our roads. France has much freer motorways and lighter traffic than is customary on all our main motorways. I hate to say it, but whereas there have been 6.1 deaths per 100,000 in the United Kingdom, there have been 11.1 in Italy and 13.8 in France.

When we debated the issue on Report, the noble Lord, Lord Rotherwick, asked me whether I recognised that the autoroutes in France were much safer. He asked me when I had been worried about speed in France. I have been worried pretty much every time I have been in France. Whenever the motorways have become crowded, I have been anxious. I doubt that many noble Lords who have driven on French autoroutes are unaware, first, that the speed limit is 10 mph higher than ours, and, secondly, that there is a built-in tolerance level that means that a fair percentage of drivers expect to travel a good deal faster. Therefore when one travels at around the legal limit of 80 mph, in an outside lane, in reasonable queues of traffic—that is to say, those regulated in distance—regularly you have drivers coming at you at over 100 mph. We all know that phenomenon. Not a motoring correspondent in the country does not attest to that from time to time and even indicate that it sharpens one's reflexes. I am afraid that it also produces drastic accident statistics.

I accept one aspect of the noble Lord's argument. He asked whether it was not time that we had a review of speed limits. Yes, it is. Such a review is under way. We expect it to conclude before the end of the year. It will give us further evidence on how we should tackle the issues.

When the reputable organisation on whose behalf my noble friend Lord Faulkner spoke, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents, produced statistics indicating that speed kills, they were sufficiently strong for the Government to feel the need to convey that message to the whole country. Extending the motorway speed limit would give an indication in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, our minds are not closed on these issues. If our review indicates that we can safely increase the speed limit without deleterious effects, we will return to the issues after the end of the year.

My Lords, that was an exciting debate. I am not sure whether the rest of the Traffic Management Bill will be so lively; perhaps it will be, now that lunch has finished.

The emotion expressed is perhaps derived from the fact that people envisage drivers travelling faster on the motorways. Our angle is to try to legalise motorists who already travel at 80 mph and not to criminalise them as they are at the moment. We have already heard from one noble Lord opposite that, if he travelled at 70 mph, everybody overtook him. I do not agree with many of the arguments that increasing speed means that accidents will occur. There was a period in the 1980s when speeds went up and the number of incidents went down, so that cannot be a logical argument.

Cars in the USA are built to travel at only 50 to 60 mph; they do not perform technically in the same way as European cars. The argument about Europe is more difficult, but I still believe that in some respects the difference is like chalk and cheese.

I am confused by the views expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, because her party's Front-Bench spokesman in another place says the exact opposite of what she said. As the Front-Bench spokesman, presumably he has some view. He says:

"I have said that I see nothing wrong in the principle with the possibility of raising the speed limit to 80 mph".

He goes on to say:

"I remember that when I worked in a business in the south of England, I had a conversation with the then chief constable for the area, who said that he, too, was quite happy with the concept of increasing speed limits on motorways".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee A, 10/2/04; col. 354.]

He continues very much in the same mode.

It was very nice to hear from the noble Lord, Lord Snape, although I am sad that we could not have heard from him earlier. I am very grateful to the Minister for what he said. I do not wish to waste any more of the House's time or to leave noble Lords on the edge of their seats. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

moved Amendment No. 21:

After Clause 84, insert the following new clause—

"PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON THE LONDON CONGESTION CHARGE

(1) Section 295 of the Greater London Authority Act 1999 (c. 29) (road user charging) is amended as follows.

(2) After subsection (1) there is inserted—

"(1A) After the coming into force of section (Public consultation on the London Congestion Charge) of the Traffic Management Act 2004, the Mayor of London and Transport for London may not establish, extend or operate a scheme under subsection (1) above unless the scheme has been approved by a majority of the residents of any London borough proposed to be included, wholly or in part, in the charging area.

(1B) The approval of a scheme mentioned in subsection (1A) shall be determined by—

(a) a local referendum conducted by the borough concerned under section 116 of the Local Government Act 2003 (c. 26) (local polls); and

(b) where at least 50 per cent of the residents of the borough concerned have voted in that referendum.

(1C) Subsection (1A) shall not apply in the case of a scheme already in operation, but Transport for London shall take into account the result of any referendum that may be conducted by a borough in which such a scheme is in operation in determining—

(a) whether it is reasonable to continue to operate an existing scheme concerned; or

(b) whether the existing scheme shall be modified."

(3) After paragraph 3 of Schedule 23 (road user charging) there is inserted—

"3A. A charging scheme may only be made by the Mayor if it is also approved by the council of the borough or boroughs, included wholly or partly within the boundaries of the scheme, following a referendum conducted by the borough or boroughs concerned under section 116 of the Local Government Act 2003."

The noble Viscount said: My Lords, this is a simple but important amendment. I see no reason that the Government should not accept it. After all, they believe in local people being consulted on local issues. The amendment requires that the congestion charge should be extended in London only if it is clearly supported by local people and local councils, who know best about the local economy and the effects that the introduction of a charge might have on the local way of life. It does not empower any council to enforce the lifting of an existing charge zone, although it rightly says that the Mayor and Transport for London should take note of local opinion on the impact of the charge.

The Minister said in a rather brief debate on Report that he accepted that there should be consultation on such a controversial policy—and so there should be. But the trouble with the congestion charge is that its impact on business and local life is very local while the Mayor's consultation, such as it is—apparently, 3 million letters were sent out to which there was a 3 per cent response; not a very high hit rate—covers the whole of London, including areas far distant and totally unrelated to those areas where the charge is threatened to be introduced. Even the Mayor admits that, according to his private surveys, over 60 per cent of local people are against extending the charge.

I take no particular view on the charge. I believe, as set out in the amendment, that it is a matter for local people. Surely they must be allowed to decide. The Government legislated for local referendums only last year, so what possible reason can the Minister think of to say that they should not be used as is proposed in this amendment?

My amendment states that local people should have the right to have their say and that the Mayor should be required to listen to them. In this, as in other areas, we believe in extending the right to choose. I would be surprised if the Government were, by contrast, to defend the Labour Party's newest member's right to dictate.

Local determination featured heavily in the mayoral election and was supported by the Liberal Democrats, particularly by their candidate, Simon Hughes. I am sure that the Lib Dems will show their normal consistency in these matters. Perhaps I may remind your Lordships' of what Simon Hughes said in the campaign:

"Liberal Democrats support the principle of Congestion Charging in central London and are committed to making it work better for all Londoners. We will:… Only consider expansion of the zone in boroughs already partly covered by the zone. Decision would ultimately be decided by a vote in a local ballot of registered electors in the possible extension areas".

That is exactly what my amendment provides. I hope that the Government will support local democracy instead of just paying lip service to it. I beg to move.

My Lords, this is a mischievous and misguided proposal. It is mischievous because, among other things, it proposes a hurdle of 50 per cent of the voters having to take part before a referendum would have any validity, knowing that that is a very high hurdle. It is also mischievous because not only today but also on a previous occasion when the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, raised this matter he referred to his amendment as a "simple little amendment". It is no such thing. It is an amendment that seeks to do battle not just against the existing congestion charge system in London but against any extension of it in London and against the possibility of it being introduced in many other cities and towns, which are naturally thinking about it now because of what we all know to be the great success of the congestion charge system so far in London.

The other reason why I think that the amendment is misguided, misconceived and mischievous is because it provides that a very narrow electorate should determine for everybody whether the congestion charge system should be extended or initiated in another city. It is concerned to have a vote among,

"the residents of any London borough proposed to be included … in the charging area".

Whether there is a congestion charge in any London borough is of vital interest, not only to the residents or the businesses of that area but also to vast numbers of other people who drive into or through it. I refer not only to visitors but also to people who commute regularly. They have at least as much interest in the matter as anyone else.

If we are to have voting or consultation, surely it must be done on a wide scale. I need hardly remind the noble Viscount—who knows very well but deliberately did not mention in his speech—that the Greater London Authority Act 1999 requires the Mayor to consult before any congestion charge system is introduced or extended. Consultation has been carried out already and will be done again. That is a much more sensible way of dealing with the matter than having a narrow voting system as proposed by the noble Viscount.

My Lords, I hesitate to cross swords with the noble Lord, Lord Borrie, who knows that my respect for him is second to none, so I do so with due humility.

One important aspect of the amendment is the issue of local accountability. One of the most unacceptable features of the current congestion charge is that there is no accountability for anybody outside the GLA. Have we ever been told exactly how much the scheme has cost, how much it has raised and how much of that has been put into improving public transport other than empty red bus after empty red bus, one behind another? There is no accountability for the ordinary people who use London's streets. I would hazard a guess that, given the operating costs, the system is not only not making money but also losing a substantial amount.

The system is also totally unacceptable for people who live very close to the edge of the zone. The amendment refers to boroughs that are partly but not wholly within the scheme. That is another consideration to which your Lordships should give some thought before deciding whether to reject the amendment.

My Lords, I warmly support the amendment. It is extraordinary that a measure that would cause so much hardship for tens of thousands of people for extremely dubious net benefits could be pushed through against the wishes of the majority by somebody elected by a minority of the electorate—who, moreover, was elected not with vast enthusiasm this time round, but simply as the least unattractive to the electorate of the major candidates.

I declare an interest as a long-time Kensington resident. However, that is a peripheral interest, because, with the big proviso that the weekly charge for residents is the same as that paid by central London residents—most of whom are business people, not residents—it will not be seriously disadvantageous for me or my wife. However, younger members of my family definitely will suffer.

Let us suppose, for example, that my son and daughter-in-law drive in from Hammersmith to have Sunday lunch with us, when no congestion charge is payable, but one of my granddaughters accidentally leaves behind her favourite toy or colouring book. At present, my daughter-in-law could arrange to pop in on Monday for no charge, leaving the engine running as she collects the item from my wife at the front door. However, if the measure goes through she will have to pay £5 for the privilege. It would be much cheaper to go out and buy a new toy or colouring book. Others will be far worse affected, such as all those whose school runs necessarily take them through Kensington, to say nothing of those who live in the part of Kensington on the other side of Earl's Court Road, who will not be included and will have to pay to come east of Earl's Court Road.

I hope that your Lordships enthusiastically support the amendment.

My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, made a rather unworthy point about our mayoral candidate and the Liberal Democrat position on the issue. The debate so far has given the game away, because, although the amendment purports to be about consultation on the congestion charge, the debate has been about the charge itself. In that sense, he is driving a Trojan bus through your Lordships' House. Sorry, that was a bit feeble. From the point of view of these Benches, it is a matter for London people and the London Mayor. My friend in another place who was our mayoral candidate was quite right if he wanted to offer, as part of his package for Mayor, a local referendum on this subject. It is not for your Lordships' House to impose that condition on the Mayor, who has after all only just been elected on a perfectly open platform.

I am a little surprised to hear the noble Lord, Lord Monson, refer to the Mayor's mandate perhaps being wafer-thin because so few people voted. The entire British constitution is based on that. It is often the case that the government do not enjoy a majority. We are skating on rather thin ice if we pretend that immediately after an election the views and the platform on which the winner stood can be overturned by Members of your Lordships' House. From the point of view of these Benches, we take this amendment at face value. It is about whether some sort of local referendum should be a statutory obligation. We do not think that it should, and in that sense there is no inconsistency between that and the voluntary offering of such a ballot or referendum by my friend in the other place.

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Borrie referred to this amendment as misguided and mischievous, and the look on the face of the noble Viscount as he moved the amendment suggested that there was a significant element of mischief in it. This is also a highly misconceived amendment. The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, said when he introduced it that there was no intention to undermine the position of the existing congestion charge. However, the proposal is that they,

"may not establish, extend or operate a scheme".

I am not a lawyer, so I have probably got it wrong, but I read that as meaning that unless there was instantly a referendum on the existing scheme, it would have to be dropped. That may not be the intention of the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, and I can see that he is looking at it again, which probably means that I got the legal phraseology wrong. I suspect that this is a misconceived part of the amendment. I take issue with the proposals about a referendum. There are existing, clear obligations on the Mayor of London who was, incidentally, elected by more than a simple plurality of votes. The supplementary vote system required that second choices were counted in the election. There is already a strong obligation on the Mayor of London to consult. Indeed, the consultation that seems to have excited some noble Lords is not about a specific proposal to extend the area of the congestion charge in London. It is about a proposal to amend the transport strategy of the Mayor of London. If having considered the outcome of that consultation, the Mayor of London believes that he should amend the transport strategy, there would then be a further detailed consultation on specific proposals in respect of the extension of the congestion charge zone. There are already substantial requirements on the Mayor to consult in the Greater London Authority Act 1999.

In his amendment, the noble Viscount is attempting to impose belt, braces, string and sealing wax in a series of tests that must be passed by the Mayor of London before any congestion charge change can take place. Not only would there presumably still be those requirements for two stages of consultation; there would then be the requirement of a referendum and a further requirement for the approval of the individual local authorities concerned. The fundamental fallacy of all of this is that it is restricted to those residents of particular boroughs who are affected by the change.

I recently fought an election for the London Assembly. The proposed extension of the congestion charge zone did not apply anywhere within the borders of the constituency that I fought in the London Assembly elections. It was, however, an extremely topical issue as far as people in the southern part of my constituency were concerned, because they might have been affected. We have heard the touching tale of the putative issues affecting the family of the noble Lord, Lord Monson, and events of cuddly toys being left behind. However, there were residents in the area that I previously represented for the London Assembly who were concerned that they would have to pay a congestion charge any time they went to the supermarket or to visit the graves of relatives in nearby cemeteries.

The problem with this amendment is that they would still have no more say in the proposals concerned than exists at present in terms of the consultation. They would not be enfranchised in any way, and they would not be given any more right to intervene. That is a fundamental fallacy in the amendment. I was unconvinced by the logic of the proposed extension to the congestion charge. What we were being asked to do as Londoners was agree to the subsidy of the residents of Kensington and Chelsea, many of whom are extremely well-off already, so that they could get discounts on the congestion charge, whether they were visiting family members or driving at random across central London, because they would be enabled to have the residents discount. Why give a referendum to the people who would benefit from the change—the people who would receive the subsidy—through a reduced payment of the charge? They will get the residents discount. That is the illogicality of this amendment. Not only it is misguided and mischievous, it is also misconceived.

My Lords, I draw the attention of the noble Lord, Lord Harris, to subsection (1C) of the amendment. It says,

"Subsection (1A) shall not apply in the case of a scheme already in operation".

That addresses the point.